THE UNIVERSITY OF HULL

THE INVOLVEMENT OF THE ITALIAN STATE INSTITUTIONS IN THE RISE TO POWER OF FASCISM: THE POLICE FORCES IN THE PROVINCE OF BOLOGNA, 1897-1925

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by

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Corrections to the text will be found in the appended leaves at the back of the thesis and are indicated in the body of the text by an asterisk in the RH margin.
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ABBREVIATIONS

ASB. Archivio di Stato di Bologna. Gabinetto di Prefettura


INTRODUCTION

This thesis aims to demonstrate and account for the role played by the Italian state institutions in the rise of Fascism. It is based on a case-study of Bologna's police forces. While most historical accounts of Italian Fascism mention the collusion of the police and judiciary with the Fascist movement during the period 1920-22, my thesis attempts to provide a clearer definition of the part played by the prefect, Questore, Regie Guardie and Carabinieri during the years of serious and prolonged civil disturbance and to provide convincing motives for such conduct. I hope to demonstrate that there are many hypothetical explanations for the connivance of Bologna's police forces with local squadristi. These range from anti-Socialism and opportunism to numerical weakness, the physical, psychological and moral pressure of Fascism and the ambiguous attitude of the central government towards Mussolini's movement. I aim, above all, to show that the relationship of Bologna's police forces with the provincial Fascist movement may be linked back to several traditional internal and external factors inherent in Italian policing, the most crucial of which was Italy's weak and out-moded police system itself, and that from an institutional point of view Fascism may be considered a 'revelation' of Italy's past in spite of the 'revolutionary' desires of many of its exponents for an end to Liberal politics and a break with the past.
The first of two introductory chapters considers the origins and development of the Italian police system, the roots of which are to be found in the Napoleonic occupation of the peninsula at the beginning of the nineteenth century and the pre-unification monarchic dynasty of Piedmont. Using mostly secondary sources, it refers particularly to the two main police corps, the Carabinieri and the Guardie di PS., the Napoleonic figure of the chief representative of the state in the provinces, the prefect, nineteenth-century preventive police legislation and traditional internal weaknesses inherent in the Italian police system. This chapter is fundamental in explaining the role of the police in the rise of Fascism.

The second chapter traces social, political and economic developments in the province of Bologna between 1890 and 1926. Based again on secondary sources, many of which are the works of local historians, it aims to point out those aspects of Bolognese history directly involving the provincial police authorities, such as development of the peasant Socialist movement, the agrarian strikes which dominated the period researched, the growth of agrarian employers' defensive associations, the effects of the First World War, the founding of the Fascist movement and the struggles between provincial and state Fascism during the years immediately following the March on Rome.

Chapter III is a case-study, using primary sources, of policing in Bologna between 1897 and 1918. It is roughly
divided into three periods. The first (1897-1900) examines traditional nineteenth-century policing methods and the effects of prevention laws as epitomized in the repression of Molinella's *braccianti* strikes in 1898. The second period (1901-1914) questions the success of Giovanni Giolitti in promoting social and political peace and changing the role played by the police in syndical disputes. It particularly aims to demonstrate that the failure of the prime minister to give the police less of a repressive and more of a mediatorial outlook may be directly linked to his failure to update and enlarge an archaic police system. The third and final part of the chapter considers the Interventionist crisis of 1915 and the role of the police forces in this as well as the restrictions which the First World War placed on local Socialist political and syndical power. This chapter generally questions the relationship of the provincial police authorities with the Socialist movement, its attitude towards strikes, the development of trade unions, revolutionary Socialism and Anarchy. In doing this it seriously calls into question whether police collaboration with the Fascist movement during the post-war period may have stemmed from an anti-Marxist tradition which was so much in evidence between 1897 and 1918. It also examines the weak and inefficient nature of the police forces and the negative repercussions which this had on policing.

The fourth chapter firstly questions the social and political effects of the First World War in Bologna in 1919 and 1920.
It examines the manner in which the provincial police authorities dealt with both the threat of Socialist revolution, as epitomized in braccianti land occupations and the metalworkers' occupation of the factories in September 1920, and the founding and development of the Bolognese 'Fascio di Combattimento'. The second half aims to show, as accurately as possible, how many members of Bologna's police forces collaborated with the Fascist movement and how the state did or did not attempt to overcome both Fascist violence and police connivance in this. Particular attention is paid here to the role of the prefect of Bologna, Cesare Mori, probably one of the last state representatives to oppose Fascism. The final part of the chapter outlines possible motives for police connivance with the Fascist movement. Special emphasis is placed here on the importance of Fascism as a physical, psychological and moral influence on police conduct and the ambiguous nature of government directives concerning the Fascist movement so that the phenomenon of connivance cannot alone be attributed to anti-Socialism.

Chapter V starts by examining the effects of Mussolini's rise to power on the police system. Considerable attention is given to the founding of the Milizia Volontaria per la Sicurezza Nazionale in 1923 and its relationship to the traditional police system. It then questions whether connivance between provincial Fascism and the police authorities altered after the March on Rome and particularly whether such collaboration was political or opportunist, that
is, whether the police organs became Fascist or simply 'Fascistized'. Much consideration is given to the attitude of the police towards the conflict during the period 1923-6 between state and provincial Fascism, particularly during the Matteotti crisis, as well as the role of the police in ousting opposition to the Fascist government, particularly following Mussolini's speech of 3 January 1925 which put Italy on the road to dictatorship. By examining the role of Bologna's police forces this chapter tries to demonstrate that from an institutional point of view Fascism was a continuation or indeed development of Italy's 'Liberal' regimes of the past.

My main sources for Chapters III, IV and V were the Interior Ministry police documents from the Archivio di Stato di Bologna and the Archivio Centrale dello Stato in Rome. These were supported where possible by local and national newspapers dating back to the period researched. The use of this primary material posed several difficulties. Firstly, the documentation was of such a vast quantity that it was physically impossible to consult all of it in the time available to me. This meant that I tended to examine those files which, by the nature of their title, seemed relevant to my research, unless my attention had been drawn to them specifically by some other source. Experience gained from these documents showed me, however, that often the most relevant documents were found by chance in the 'wrong' files. Hence a letter concerning events in 1921 might be found in a 1925 file. Similarly, for example, a document concerning
the Fascist movement might be found in a file entitled 'Personale di Pubblica Sicurezza'. This in itself suggests that I may have overlooked certain documents of great significance to my research.

Having stated that the vast quantity of documents posed difficulties for me on occasions, it must be additionally pointed out that in places documentation was scanty, particularly from the 1925 files onwards. Some of the documents sought after were, as outlined above, located in the 'wrong' files. Others may have been misplaced, lost or even damaged and destroyed over many years. The bombing of the Archivio di Stato di Bologna during the Second World War may be a significant factor here. It is also equally possible that certain documents may never have been released by the police authorities for confidential or political motives. This may well have been the case with regard to incidents which risked putting the police in a bad light. The Bolognese journalist and historian, Nazario Sauro Onofri, claims, for example, that the police file concerning the Palazzo d'Accursio massacre on 21 November 1920 (described in Chapter IV) is not available at the Archivio di Stato but is sure of its existence, at least at one time, because copies of some of the documents from it have been found in other files.¹

I should also emphasise that I did on occasions encounter interpretation problems because of the very nature of the documents themselves. Many were undated, illegible or damaged. It was sometimes impossible to identify the writers
or the persons to whom the documents were addressed. Often they were incomplete so that it was almost impossible to follow the progression of events accurately. Obviously, I could not always count on the objectivity of their authors. A police report, for example, to the prefect, Cesare Mori, on Fascist violence in the Bolognese countryside almost certainly understated the extent of such violence. This was because policemen feared reprimand for their failure to prevent the violence and possibly punishment for their support of Fascist illegalities. In places the documentation may have been supported with newspaper articles, but once again these may hardly be considered politically impartial. Left-wing newspapers almost certainly exaggerated the extent of police connivance with the Fascist movement, for example, and their accounts, no matter how enlightening had to be taken with a degree of caution.

The solution to this problem lay, above all, in familiarizing myself with the social and political context to which the documents belonged. In many instances it was necessary, therefore, to attempt to 'read the mind' of the person who wrote a particular document, by taking into consideration such side-factors as the political climate of the time and the political attitudes of the writer and the person to whom the document was addressed. By increasing my familiarity with the personality behind the pen I was able, at least in part, to better understand the true message between the lines of official police rhetoric.
NOTES

CHAPTER ONE: POLICE, PREFECTURE AND PREVENTION;

A HISTORY OF THE ITALIAN POLICE SYSTEM, 1800-1926

The first of two introductory chapters to the thesis aims to trace the development of the Italian police system from its origins in the first half of the nineteenth century to the year 1926, marked by Mussolini's police laws, popularly known as 'Leggi Fascistissime' and defining the authoritarian character of the Fascist regime. This should ideally facilitate comprehension of those factors inherent in the role of the police forces, if not the Italian state institutions as a whole, during the Fascist ascendancy between 1920 and 1926.

Three particular aspects of Italian police history are taken into consideration. Firstly the development of the two main Italian police corps, the Guardie di PS and the Carabinieri Reali, and the traditional phenomenon of dualism caused by the co-existence of two or more police forces with conflicting civilian and military hierarchies is examined. Other problems in the internal organization of the police system recurring throughout the years under investigation are taken into account. Secondly consideration is given to the prefect who combined the roles of provincial police chief, government electoral agent and periphery state administrative
representative during the period concerned. This indeed reflects controversial state restrictions on the growth of local political and administrative power as very much evident in the documentation consulted for the case-study of Bologna. In close relation to the above the third aspect of police history studied here concerns the predominance of preventive policing in Italy from its unification onwards, as reflected in its penal codes and public security legislation. This illustrates the traditional tendency of the Piedmontese and later Italian ruling houses to safeguard state political power in the face of democratic advancement. This should provide better perception of the nature of the police system to which the execution of such legislation was entrusted.

Examination of legislation governing the evolution of the Italian police system during the nineteenth century reveals a whole series of complex hierarchical dependencies and the co-existence of several rival police forces. This indeed is a reflection of power struggles, dominating the first decades of Italian unification but still unsolved throughout the period the case-study of Bologna covers, between military - representing the traditional aristocratic forces - and civilian - representing the emerging bourgeoisie - ministries. The origins of the Italian police forces may be traced back to the Piedmontese dynasty, several decades before the unification of Italy, when a royal decree (Regie
Patenti of 13 July 1814) founded the corps of the Carabinieri Reali, the first capillary police network in the monarchy, consisting of 776 men (1,200 by 1816, 3,100 by 1823 and 9,000 by 1848) and territorially divided into legions (Legioni), divisions (Divisioni), companies (Compagnie) and lieutenancies (Tenenze). Modelled on the French Gendarmerie, it formed an integral part of the army though distinguished from other military corps by the denomination 'Reali' and the prestige of 'primo corpo dell'esercito'. As Renato explains, the corps formed part of the 'Buon Governo' or Ministry of Police - founded by the same legislation - which 'concentrò sul piano unitario e generale, sia attribuzione di polizia, sia poteri amministrativi e anche giudiziari'. Police executive powers were initially placed in the hands of military governors (Governatori). Indeed the first Carabinieri commander was in fact the governor of the city, citadel and province of Turin and 'Presidente capo' of the 'Buon Governo' (as stipulated by the legislation of 13 July 1814).¹

Though the first Italian police corps was military, article 114 of the Regie Patenti of 16 October 1822 stated that the Carabinieri were hierarchically dependent on the war ministry in terms of recruitment, discipline, arming, administration and training and on the interior ministry for police duties. This clause in fact came to represent the basis of ministerial conflict over control of the corps dominating Italian police history.² Police administration
itself moved several times between ministries during the first half of the nineteenth century, illustrating such conflict. Placed under the shortlived 'Ministry of Police' on 5 October 1816, police powers were devolved to the interior ministry in 1821. In 1841, as stipulated by the Regie Patenti of 5 August that year they passed to the war ministry under the command of a Carabinieri officer (Fried, p. 32). Finally, in October 1847, with the founding of a constitutional monarchy in Piedmont, control of policing was placed under the 'Direzione Polizia' of the interior ministry reflecting in Renato's words the realization of the problems caused by 'L'abnorme sottoposizione dei servizi di polizia, che costituiscono essenzialmente una funzione civile nell'ambito di un Dicastero Militare'. At the periphery level police powers were placed in the hands of intendants (Intendenti) and intendants general (Intendenti Generali) in the geographical divisions (Divisioni) of Genoa and Turin, thereby unifying the two previous roles of intendant (entrusted with state administrative tasks) whose role in the pre-unification states is described below, and military governor (Renato, pp. 336-7). The former military police commanders had in fact, through their violent and often arbitrary use of police powers, their general ignorance of laws and civil rights, become unpopular and the role of military governor was abolished, therefore (Fried, p. 39).

The following year the founding of the interior ministry
police administration (Law 798 of 30 September 1848) marked, according to Renato:

Le basi fondamentali della struttura unitaria che l'Amministrazione, di massima, salvo modifiche e sviluppi futuri, ha in generale sino ad oggi conservato e che corrisponde a quel concetto unitario e nazionale dell'esercizio della funzione di polizia in Italia.

The 'Direzione Polizia' of the interior ministry took on the denomination 'Amministrazione di Pubblica Sicurezza' in order to dissociate itself from the less noble activities of the 'Polizia'. Its tasks were to 'Vegliare e provvedere preventivamente all'ordine e alla osservanza delle leggi nell'interesse pubblico e privato', whilst its personnel was exclusively civilian. In confirmation of Law 612 of 8 October 1847, police executives were - according to administrative territorial demarcations - the intendant general in the division, the intendant in the province (Provincia), the police delegate (Delegato) in the district (Mandamento) and the mayor (Sindaco) in the municipality (Comune) The intendants general of Turin and Genoa were each assisted by a Questore who became police chief within the jurisdiction of the provinces of Turin and Genoa. Delegati could be appointed police chiefs of towns in the division or province, with the exception of provincial or divisional capitals, and in municipalities, with the exception of
district capitals. These police funzionari (officials) were required to possess a law degree. According to Renato Questori were chosen from judicial circles and delegates needed to have worked in state administration for at least two years. Public Security orders were executed by the Carabinieri. Carabinieri Veterani, police funzionari and, if necessary, the national guard (Guardia Nazionale) - founded in 1848 as a bourgeois counterpoise to the royalist/aristocratic regular army and Carabinieri - had similar functions in division capitals and highly populated towns (Renato, pp. 336-8).

Law 1404 of 11 July 1852 increased bourgeois/civilian executive powers with the relegation of the Carabinieri to the countryside and the abolition of the Carabinieri Veterani and their replacement in urban areas by public security guards. (Guardie di Pubblica Sicurezza). Territorially divided into companies (Compagnie), brigades (Brigate) and sub-brigades (Sottobrigate), this military style corps was distinguished from the Carabinieri in that it came exclusively under the jurisdiction of the interior ministry (Fried, p. 41, Renato, p. 338). The founding of the public security guards, if a step forwards for bourgeois/civilian forces, marked also the beginning of conflict and rivalry between Italy's two main police corps. The relative autonomy which the Carabinieri maintained from the interior ministry indeed reflected the desire of military hierarchies to protect the corps from civilian dominance and control. The
Public Security decree of 21 June 1865 (2336) only formally guaranteed the cooperation of the corps with the intendants. Carabinieri could be requested 'in writing' for police duties. In reality, as the case-study of Bologna reveals, the corps was able to maintain a certain amount of autonomy which allowed it where necessary to avoid the fulfilment of its duties. Similarly - revealing the presence of a third and a fourth shortlived and relatively insignificant hierarchy in police operations - article 18 of the decree allowed the police authorities to ask, 'in writing' once again, the military authorities for the use of troops for police duties and the mayor to resort to the use of the Guardia Nazionale.

The Public Security Laws (Leggi di Pubblica Sicurezza) of 1859 and 1865 confirmed the dependence of police administration on the interior ministry. The 1859 law founded Questure (police headquarters) in provincial capitals with over sixty thousand inhabitants. The Questore was police chief within the provincial capital district (Circondario). He was assisted by inspectors (Ispettori) and delegates. The intendant general, later prefect (Prefetto), had the assistance of delegates. The sub-prefects - replacing the intendant - were directly dependant on the prefect, had both administrative and policing responsibilities, were assisted by delegates and placed in charge of districts (with the exception of those run by Questori).
The 1865 police laws were better explained by the Istruzioni pei funzionari di pubblica sicurezza issued by the Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri (prime-minister) Ricasoli in April 1867 with the aim of clarifying to the advantage of police funzionari, their tasks, competences and hierarchical dependencies. According to article 6, the prefect was 'primo rappresentante del potere esecutivo nella provincia' and:

il solo che per l'autorità conferitagli della legge regola e dirige l'azione governativa e la politica, e prende o provoca tutti i provvedimenti, che sono richiesti non solo dai bisogni e dalle esigenze dell'ordine e della tranquillità pubblica ma ancora dai voti della pubblica opinione.

Ultimately, therefore, public security and Carabinieri officers were responsible to him. Within the jurisdiction of the district they were responsible to the sub-prefect, or Questore who were responsible to the prefect. Article 10 stated that each authority was to report to that authority immediately above it on the public security conditions in its area of jurisdiction. In this manner a rural Carabinieri commander could pass news of events in an isolated area of the province to the prefect via the nearest delegate or mayor, and in turn the sub-prefect or Questore. Both the prefect and the Carabinieri legion commander were expected to report to the interior minister on the state of public
security in the province every month. Article 19 reiterated that:

Continue e reciproche debbono essere le relazioni tra i funzionari di pubblica sicurezza ed i reali carabinieri, al quale uopo il comandante della stazione dovrà recarsi quotidianamente presso il delegato di sicurezza pubblica o il sindaco nel rispettivo ufficio, il comandante la luogotenenza o compagnia presso il sottoprefetto o questore, ed il comandante la divisione presso il prefetto per comunicarsi reciprocamente le opportune notizie, prendere i debiti concerti, e procedere con quell'unità d'indirizzo e di azione, che sola può assicurare il buon andamento del servizio al quale debbono essere rivolte le cure di tutti gli ufficiali di pubblica sicurezza di ogni categoria.6

The Istruzioni revealed another important characteristic again reflecting the conflicting hierarchies to which the police organs belonged. It stipulated that police officers and agenti had double qualities; that of preventive policing, better known as polizia ordinaria or amministrativa and that of officials of the judicial police polizia giudiziaria, for the collection of evidence for the sentencing of crimes in the courts, under the dependence of the Procuratore (public prosecutor). In particular article 22 stated that the prefect and sub-prefect would designate a delegate or
inspector from their offices for daily conference with the public prosecutor:

Per riceverne le istruzioni ed informarlo di ciò che si riferisce all'accertamento dei reati nonché allo scopimento, alle ricerche ed all'arresto degli autori.

Article 23 stipulated:

Nella trattazione degli affari relativi alla polizia giudiziaria, i questori, ispettori o delegati di prima classe che reggono gli uffizi provinciali o circondariali di pubblica sicurezza corrisponderanno direttamente col Pubblico Ministero (office of public prosecutor) (Correa, p. 505, Renato, p. 344).

The significance of this double role lies in the controversial dependence of police personnel on the Pubblico Ministero as officials of the polizia giudiziaria and on the Questore as normal policemen, especially from 1907 with the removal from the Questore of the qualification of 'ufficiale di polizia giudiziaria' (through Testo Unico 690 of 31 August 1907) which allowed him to act over and above the orders of the judicial authorities. What is more the lack of distinction between the roles of judicial police officials and examining magistrates up to 1906 (the latter dependent on the Pubblico Ministero as officials of the judicial police
until that year) meant that the police had an excessive role in the preliminary phases of trials and that the judiciary was, therefore, not totally independent from state executive power in the execution of justice.7

Playing a key role in the police system was the periphery state executive, the prefect. The controversy surrounding this omnipotent figure lies in the powers he had as provincial police chief to limit local government autonomy and the development of political 'subversion', particularly during the period researched. The origins of his office date back to the Napoleonic invasion of the Italian peninsula in 1800 and the combination imposed in the majority of the occupied states by the First Consul of two previously separate offices. In Piedmont, for example, the former military governor (periphery police chief) and intendant (government administrative representative) were united in the office of the 'Préfet' who represented government authority within the 'Département'.8

The Law on the Organization of Administrative Authorities promulgated in the neighbouring Republic of Italy (a union of the Duchy of Milan and Republic of Venice under Napoleon) defined the role of the prefect as follows:

(Art. 7) The Prefect is the immediate organ of the Government in the Departement. He dispatches the laws and regulations to all the communes, publishes them and has them executed.
(Art 8). The administration of all those assets and liabilities of the nation in the Departement is exclusively entrusted to him.

(Art 9). He superintends the police and supervises the preservation of public tranquillity.

(Art 10). The prefect prepares each year the budget of national expenditures in his Departement for the coming year and transmits it to the respective ministers with the deadline fixed by the government.⁹

The defeat of Napoleon in 1814 and the restoration of the former ruling houses saw the separation of the roles of intendant and governor until 1848 when with the founding of a constitutional monarchy they were re-united in the intendant general - governor (Governatore) in 1859 and prefect (Prefetto) in 1861 - hierarchically dependent on the interior minister.¹⁰ Though continuing to perform important administrative tasks for all ministries as his Napoleonic predecessor¹¹ the start of democratic advancement in Italy placed notable restrictions on the governor's control of local government. The Provincial and Communal Law (Legge Provinciale e Comunale) of 1848 rendered provincial, divisional and municipal councils elective, whilst the similar law of 1859 abrogated his former position of 'Capo dell'amministrazione e della divisione e delle provincie che lo compongono' (as previously stipulated by article 196 of the 1848 law) to that of president of the Deputazione Provinciale.
which had discretionary powers over municipal councils but over which the prefect only had 'controllo di legittimità'.

New emphasis was placed on the political role of a state executive figure with the aim of controlling local government from the outside, reflecting the desire of the ruling classes to safeguard their political power whilst formally permitting democratic advancement. Of importance was his task of 'informatore', to the central government on the state of politics and public opinion in the province (Fried, p. 42), but even more significantly he became a political electoral agent with the job of winning over political consensus for the government at the local level in order to maintain its majority in the Chamber of Deputies and keep local councils in the hands of government supporters or 'ministeriali' as they were called. He was able to use both formal powers and informal political influence to this end (Fried, p. 134).

Francesco Crispi, prime minister for several long periods during the 1880s and 1890s, decentralized state political power in 1888, by amplifying the representative basis of local government. The electorate was increased to 11% of the population and mayors became elective for the first time. He counteracted this democratic move, however, by increasing the prefect's powers of control by removing him from the presidency of the Deputazione Provinciale and making him president of the Giunta Provinciale Amministrativa, (GPA), a council of state field agent, with control over the financial decisions of municipal and charitable institutions. If again
formally the prefect's position was merely that of 'controllo di legittimità' - the GPA committee was elected by the Deputazione Provinciale - the obligatory presence of two 'consiglieri di prefettura' on the committee, according to Ragionieri, in reality allowed the prefect discretionary powers over local governments. According to Ernesto Ragionieri:

Da un corpo totalmente elettivo - poteva rilevare a ragione il radicale Salaris - di cui faceva parte un solo ufficiale del governo che era il prefetto, che ne era il presidente, e che qualche volta piegava all'opposizione, siamo passati ad un corpo di cui fanno parte tre membri governativi. Ora chi è che non veda che quando ci sono tre membri di questa giunta, che saranno quelli che prepareranno i lavori, gli altri quattro membri eletttivi non faranno che mettere la sabbia su ciò che hanno fatto questi tre? Chi è che non veda che questi tre assorbiranno gli altri quattro?13

The prefect could always use legal powers to dissolve municipal councils which opposed the government line as provincial police executive. Article 3 of the Provincial and Communal Act of 1859 (renewed in 1888) allowed the dissolution of municipal councils, as indeed political associations, if they were a threat to public order. Indeed, such a pretext was not hard to come by, especially during the latter two decades of the nineteenth century when new
legislation aimed to limit the activities of the so-called 'subversive' organizations, as described below. The PSI, which very much relied on the success of local-level politics for its advancement, saw the prefect as a serious threat in this sense.\textsuperscript{14} Indeed Massimo Giannini states that:

\begin{quote}
Era sufficiente che una pratica comunale acquistasse un colore politico, perché il prefetto perdesse la sua qualità di consigliere tecnico per divenire istanza decisionale tendente a sovrapporsi al comune. È dipeso e dipende da circostanze varie, di giochi di forze politiche, di compattezza della forza politica rappresentata dal comune, il risultato, ossia l'effettivo sovrapporsi e sostituirsì della istanza decisionale prefettizia all'istanza decisionale comunale.\textsuperscript{15}
\end{quote}

According to Fried (p. 134), it was normal practice for the prefect to dissolve municipal councils, temporarily replacing them with \textit{Commissari Prefettizi} (prefectoral commissioners) until new elections arranged a more favourable outcome, as this case-study reveals (p. 134). Vivarelli states that once local government had been firmly placed in the hands of government sympathisers, the prefect usually connived with the 'administrators' to the detriment of the 'administered'.\textsuperscript{16}

It was in election periods, however, that the prefect principally demonstrated the extent to which state corruption
was capable of reaching. According to Fried, he received special funding from the government to enable him to intimidate opposition candidates, suspend opposition mayors, dissolve opposition municipalities and intimidate or bribe opposition supporters to the advantage of the 'ministeriali'. In the south of Italy bribery, intimidation and even murder were resorted to, while in central and northern regions greater discretion was required (pp. 122-4). The archival documentation revealed in this study indeed demonstrates the importance of the role of the prefect in the manufacture of central and local government majorities, with the aid of his police powers.

The government's desire for exclusive control of the nomination of prefects was from the very first years of unification evident in legislative moves. Article 24 of the Regio Decreto of 24 October 1866 stipulated that the cabinet nominated administrative top officials on the proposal of those ministers concerned while article 1 of Regio Decreto 3629 of 27 March 1867 'dichiarò competente il Consiglio dei Ministri per le deliberazioni concernenti Prefetti, Sottoprefetti, Segretari Generali dei Ministri (...) 'etc. Finally article 5 of Regio Decreto 3925 of 25 June 1877 stated that rank superiority in ministerial administration was not a necessary qualification for nomination to the post of prefect (Casula, p.94).

Another question emerging from the last decades of the nineteenth century and the initial years of the twentieth
century was the type of prefect, whether political non-bureaucratic figures (parliamentary deputies, for example) or career prefect (usually qualified members of the interior ministry administration). Though Law 105 of 7 March 1897 stipulated that 'le promozioni al grado di prefetto dovessero essere fatte, fra gli iscritti in uno speciale ruolo di merito, compilato da apposita commissione e comprendente funzionari giudicati ottimi del grado immediatamente inferiore a quello del prefetto', indicating according to Casula, the attempt of the bureaucratic class to limit the possibilities for the promotion of political figures to the post (p. 101), article 37 of Regio Decreto 26 of 2 February 1902:

eccettuò le promozioni ai posti di prefetto da ogni intervento della commissione il cui parere era obbligatorio per le altre promozioni. L'art. 25 stabilì che il Ministro non era tenuto a rispettare la trafila dei gradi per le nomine a prefetto e a direttore generale.

while article 7 'riaffermava che a tali posti potevano essere nominati estranei all'amministrazione', confirming the return of the decisional power of the Consiglio dei Ministri (cabinet) (Casula, p. 104).

In reality, however, if the possibility of the use of political prefects was not excluded, the legislative evidence suggests that governments aimed to rely principally on career
prefects who were put in such tight career positions that their collaboration with the political will of the government was guaranteed. As early as 1887 Crispi introduced 'collocamento a riposo per motivi di servizio' (retirement made necessary by professional responsibilities), over and above normal regulations on pensions, maximum age, etc., through Law 4711 (mentioned above) (Casula, p. 108). In 1901 with Regio Decreto 466 of 14 November Giolitti legalized 'collocamento a disposizione' (temporary discharge), a mechanism allowing the government to hold a temporarily removed prefect for years, under various terms to a maximum of 6 months 'disposizione', 1 year 'aspettativa' and 2 years 'disponibilità' (Casula p.112). The law fixed the maximum number of prefects 'a disposizione' or 'in aspettativa' at ten (Casula, p. 145). According to the historian:

la possibilità di una sanzione così drastica ed inappellabile opera come tacito mezzo di persuasione, assicurando positivamente la corrispondenza dell'operato dei prefetti alle esigenze del governo (p. 166).

This may be appreciated if one is to consider that it took at least 20 years for a functionary to reach the office of prefect. He would be too old, therefore, to find other professional employment should he lose this position (Casula, pp. 167-8).

If, therefore, after the unification of Italy the
majority of prefects were not initially from the career class, the reinforcement of administration gradually overturned the balance so that by the end of the nineteenth century three-fifths of the posts were reserved to career prefects (Casula, pp. 175-6). Casula adds that the 'scarce garanzie giuridiche ed economiche, commesse tradizionalmente alla carica prefettizia, non potevano certamente facilitare candidature da parte di personalità di rilievo estranee all'Amministrazione' (p. 177). Yet at the same time the conservative sociological composition of the administrative class was ideal for the use of career prefects. Though the political prefect was useful during certain moments of political orientation, in theory career prefects responded to the intentions of any political government since they were 'più politicizzabili' (p. 182). The author states, however, that purges of the prefectoral class usually followed the change in political regime, though this was less a reflection of prefectoral dissent towards the new political class and more the result of 'la compromissione e l'allineamento che avevano caratterizzato i rapporti della classe prefettizia col precedente regime' (p. 167).

The controversial political role of the prefect - career or political - is indeed the object of debate among many historians. If Ragionieri sees the role of the provincial executive representative as mere suffocation of local government (pp. 156-7), Aquarone maintains, in his study of the first years of unification, that 'troppo di frequente si
sia stati e si continui ad essere eccessivamente inclini a sopravvalutare l'onnipotenza, o quasi, del prefetto'. If it was true that the first prefects were often top political figures and close friends of the prime minister/interior minister, very much conscious of their task to defend the new bourgeois ruling class from 'clerico-reazionari', their positions could be limited by the public prosecutor and neutralized by the local council, aristocracy, senators, parliamentary deputies, etc.\textsuperscript{17} True cases of excess and corruption in elections were rare and due less to government directives and more to overzealousness on the part of individual prefects. If on occasions the prefect over-interfered in local government this was often necessary because of acts of corruption and abuse of power by municipal administrators, particularly in southern Italy. According to Aquarone what should be deplored were not so much their 'inframmentenze' but more their failure to intervene sufficiently on occasions. This indeed suggests possible local level political connivance on the part of the prefect against the central government.\textsuperscript{18}

It was with the constitution of a parliamentary system on the basis of true political parties - coinciding more or less with the succession of the Liberal 'left' over the 'right' in 1876 - that the role of the prefect inevitably became more controversial. This is because the interference powers (whether formal or informal) which he maintained represented less the defence of the state (and of its citizens) against
the corruption of local administrators and more the suffocation, often under the same pretexts, however, of the development of mass political power. As demonstrated in the case-study of Bologna references in prefectoral reports to Socialist bullying during elections, for example, or the excessive or illegal spending of their municipal councils, etc., simply concealed the reality of a transformist system whereby the government continued to buy votes from its deputies in exchange for administrative favours over and above the dictates of local political administration. According to Gaetano Salvemini, for example, under Giolitti particularly local government lost all power under the prefect while deputies faithful to the government were able to receive such services from him as the dissolution of anti-government municipalities and the provision of electoral funds to the detriment of local opposition parties.19

For a firm understanding, however, of the motives behind the political role of the Italian police system it is necessary to turn back once again to the initial unification years and follow the development of police activities and the legislation governing them. The reluctance of the emerging bourgeois ruling classes to better share their power is well perceivable when examining the 1859 Piedmontese penal code (written in preparation for the unification process) and in the 1859 and 1865 Public Security laws, which according to Berselli were to a great extent rooted in the absolutist
dynasties of Piedmont, Lombardy, etc. According to the historian the impression gained from reading Ricasoli's Istruzioni is that of a dominating theme:

"l'ordine, l'ordine pubblico con tutti i suoi sinonimi: "tranquillità pubblica", "sicurezza dello stato", "sicurezza interna", "sicurezza generale", "il buon ordine pubblico", "il bene pubblico", "la pace sociale", "l'armonia delle classi", "l'inviolabilità del diritto di proprietà", "l'integrità della famiglia", e così via. L'ordine costituisce il limite al diritto di libertà nelle sue estrinsecazioni e quindi anche al diritto di riunirsi pacificamente e senz'armi riconosciuto dall' 32 dello statuto (1859 penal code).\(^2^0\)

The significance of these laws lies in those articles prohibiting acts threatening the security and integrity of the state and granting exceptional powers to the police. Article 26 of the 1865 PS legislation, for example, allowed the dissolution of public meetings if they were hostile in character towards the law and the authority of the state and thereby compromising to public order (Correa, pp. 520-22). Ricasoli's Istruzioni stated that police officials on duty during public meetings were to check that no speeches inciting hatred or contempt towards the government or compromising the government's diplomatic relations or slandering public officials or causing 'disordini' because of
their generally seditious character were made (Correa, p. 523). If repeated warnings on the part of officials to the speakers failed the hall or square where the meeting took place was to be emptied. Article 35 of the Regolamento per l'Esecuzione della Legge di Pubblica Sicurezza (Regio Decreto 2336 of 18 May 1865 stated that no theatrical production could take place without the permission of the police and that it could be banned if inopportune or liable to cause disorder. Articles 36 and 38 allowed the police to be present during performances which could 'in caso di gravi disordini' be suspended. Giovanni Bolis, Questore of Rome during the 1870s, referring to the above legislation stated that a meeting could be banned even if it aimed to discuss possible new forms of government, deliberations in themselves constituting 'attentato contro la sicurezza interna/esterna dello stato o contro la pubblica tranquillità'. Similarly the discussion of laws, or criticism of the government or incitement to strike (ironically permitted by article 386 of the penal code unless "senza ragionevole causa") were considered such that 'cessa la pacifica riunione acconsentita dallo Statuto e diventando faziosa ed illegale, devesi vietare ed impedire preventivamente' (Berselli, p. 188).

This legislation naturally controlled the political activities of associations which under articles 78 - 81 of the 1859 PS law could be dissolved 'per motivi di pubblica sicurezza' under article 3 of the 1859 Provincial and Communal Law. The prime minister Peruzzi, in justifying for
example, the dissolution of the Società di Solidarietà Democratica in June 1863 stated, 'Chiunque voglia mutare il patto scritto (....) è un ribelle, e come tale lo tratterò' (Berselli, p. 194). During moments of extreme disorder such as the development of associations of brigands and 'mafiosi' in Sicily in 1874, 'provvedimenti straordinari' were resorted to. These allowed preventive arrests on suspicion only of participation in criminal acts, unlimited house perquisitions and ultimately up to five years domicilio forzato (internal exile) for members of criminal associations.21

Both the 1859 and 1865 PS laws gave the police authorities firm control of the press which again in the opinion of Bolis, 'Eccitando l'odio fra i cittadini, getta la diffidenza e il disordine nel paese' (Berselli, p. 189). Article 52 of the 1859 law necessitated the possession of a licence (granted by the police authorities) for journalism, while article 84 of the 1865 law prohibited the printing of false information.

Another aspect of the 1859 and 1865 PS laws fundamental to Italian police history was the use of ammonizione (warning) to control persons suspected of or prone to committing crimes. The legislation particularly applied to oziosi (persons living by criminal means) and vagabonds, but, as pointed out by Barile, the category was extended to thieves, forgers, 'mafiosi' etc.22 Indeed article 50 of the 1859 penal code allowed their arrest and trial on the basis of suspicion of having taken part in a crime, while article 76
of the 1965 PS law allowed internal exile for recidivi (habitual criminals) (Correa, pp. 525-26). Following release from prison or exile these subjects remained under the strict surveillance of the police authorities. They could not change their place of residence without special permission (articles 73-74 of the 1865 PS law) and their residence itself was confined to specific areas (article 76).

The above legislation has particularly important implications if one is to consider that with the growth of the Socialist/Anarchist movement from the 1870s the designation of these political groups under articles 426 and 427 of the 1859 penal code as 'associazioni di malfattori' allowed their ammonizione under article 5 of the 1865 PS law so rendering them liable to the same punishments (internal exile, etc) as criminal suspects. This is important because it demonstrates the criminalization of political opposition to the ruling classes, and the refusal to recognise socialists, anarchists, etc. as political.

Following the attempt on king Umberto I's life by Internationalists in December 1878 and the succession of the left Liberal regime over the right, it was generally felt that legislation was insufficient in dealing with this new threat to state integrity, especially since judges often found themselves having to treat perfectly upright, honest citizens as criminals because of their political identification (Canosa/Santosuosso p. 31). The 1889 new
penal code and PS legislation perfected, therefore, the instruments founded with unification. Indeed, in the words of Canosa/Santosuosso (p.9), the penal code:

"mantenne tuttavia in vita e perfezionò tutta una serie di strumenti idonei a rendere assai 'difficile' non solo le azioni che fossero dirette sul piano concreto contro il sistema ma anche le manifestazioni di pensiero aventi lo stesso obiettivo. Non solo: il codice fu 'opportunamente' accompagnato da una legge di PS emanata nello stesso giorno la quale ancorché migliore 'et par cause' di quella precedentemente in vigore, conservava alcune istituzioni di prevenzione assai dure, come il domicilio coatto (replacing domicilio forzato), e poneva una grave limitazione alla libertà di riunione (stabiliva l'obbligo di preavviso di almeno 24 ore alle autorità le quali avevano la facoltà di divieto e di scioglimento).

Articles 2 - 6 of the PS law in fact allowed the dissolution of public meetings for 'manifestazione o grida sediziosa' and the imprisonment of those responsible for up to three months unless they could be better incriminated under the following articles of the penal code. Article 247 punished with up to a year's prison sentence those responsible for 'incitamento all'odio tra le classi sociali in modo pericoloso per la pubblica tranquillità' 'apologia del reato' and 'incitamento alla disobbedienza'. Article 251 more specifically punished
with a prison sentence of between six and eighteen months.

'Chiunque prende parte ad un'associazione diretta a commettere i delitti preveduti nell'articolo 247'. Article 252 punished those responsible for inciting civil war with between three and fifteen years imprisonment and between ten and eighteen years if they were successful in their intentions. Article 246 carried a prison sentence of up to five years for those encouraging crimes. Article 248 punished with up to five years imprisonment those accused of 'associazione a delinquere when five or more persons formed an association with the aim of committing crimes against public morality, the family, property, the state, etc. Those responsible had increased sentences if they detained arms and if they were the main promoters or leaders of the association. Article 96 of the 1889 PS law in fact placed those designated as habitually responsible for associazione a delinquere, arson, theft, etc., in the category of ammoniti.

The clearer definition of political criminals and their placing in the same category as normal criminals may be considered, therefore, a perfection of the 1859 and 1865 PS laws in terms of political persecution. Article 123 allowed the punishment of internal exile (now known as domicilio coatto) for 'ammoniti' and 'condannati alla vigilanza speciale', for violating the special regulations under which they lived and for crimes against property and persons, etc., if committed on more than one occasion. According to article 124 of the PS law of 1889, internal
exile lasted between 1 and 5 years and would take place in a colony or designated location on the peninsula, while article 125 stated that a special provincial commission - consisting of the prefect (who presided over it), president of the law courts, public prosecutor, Questore or delegate and local Carabinieri commander - emanated such sentences which would then be communicated to the interior minister.

Crispi's Leggi Eccezionali of 19 July 1894 were particularly aimed at repressing the Anarchist movement. Law 314 entitled 'Repressione contro le mene anarchiche' illegalized the possession or use of explosives. Law 315 'Sulla istigazione a delinquere e sulla apologia del reato - a mezzo della stampa' increased by a half prison sentences for violation of articles 246 and 247 of the penal code and article 6 of Law 314 when committed through the press. Encouragement of contempt towards the army, or mutiny, through the press was punished with between three and thirty months imprisonment. Law 316 'Provvedimenti Eccezionali di PS' sentenced those condemned for crimes or even the intention of committing crimes against public order, the state, public safety, etc. to internal exile. Article 5 of the law sentenced to up to six months internal exile those simply belonging to subversive associations. According to Amato, Crispi justified this law, which punished on the mere suspicion of subversion, on the grounds that it guaranteed the punishment of those criminals who otherwise would have been acquitted in the courts for lack of evidence (p. 83).
The true legitimate applicability of the above legislation with regard to the Anarchists and even Socialists was at times questioned in the courts and criticised by intellectuals in the judicial field. To what extent could articles 247, 248 and 251, for example, be applied to the anarchist programme? Indeed the 'Classical School' of jurists, worried about the fate of public freedom, was contrary to the manner in which article 248, which categorized anarchists as delinquents, was applied. They argued that:

le associazioni di malfattori prevedute nell'art 248 non vogliono soppressa la proprietà, la vogliono anzi mantenute saldamente, ma vogliono spogliare il proprietario tizio per arrichire dell'altrui roba: non uccidono mai ai fini di abbattere chi rappresenti il sistema della proprietà, ma uccidono tizio, caio, sempre, vuoi per derubarlo, vuoi per vendicare un rifiuto a un tentato ricatto o una denuncia all'autorità (...) concetti e scopi assolutamente estranei al programma anarchico' (Canosa/Santosuosso, p. 36).

Opposed to this line of thought and in agreement with Crispi's opinion, the 'Positivist School', strongly influenced by Lombroso's theory of the 'born delinquent', claimed that in reality an anarchist was simply a common delinquent who aimed to profit materially from the movement's political programme. It was on these grounds, naturally, that
the state persecuted anarchists and socialists. This, however, was done less on the basis of true acts of delinquency and more on the implications of their political programmes. On these grounds all 'subversive' associations were abolished in October 1894. According to the Milanese prefect, responsible for this measure, the PSI programme aimed to demolish every 'organismo giuridico-sociale stabilito e garantito dalla attuale legislazione' (Canosa, p. 53). As a result of this a situation was created in which the simplest phrase could be condemned as 'eccitamento all'odio fra le classi' or 'istigazione a delinquere' or 'apologia del reato', even if expressed in an empty room. According to Canosa and Santosuosso (p. 107), referring in particular to article 247:

Si tratta di un complesso di norme che, anche se compreso nel titolo dei delitti contro l'ordine pubblico e non in quello contro i poteri dello stato, aveva una chiara impostazione politica. Erano, cioè sostanzialmente costruite in modo da consentire di colpire gli oppositori, sia partiti che singoli militanti e cittadini, sia nelle manifestazioni politiche più minute: finanché l'affermazione fatta in una osteria ormai deserta.

As an example of this, the director of the democratic newspaper, Il Lamone, was imprisoned for five months and seven days for publishing an article in July 1894 criticising the
new measures of internal exile on the grounds that the article was considered not only offensive towards the law but also a form of incitement to law-breaking (Canosa/Santosuosso pp. 116-118). Similarly the Circolo Socialista of Legnano in the Venetian region was accused of 'eccitamento all'odio fra le classi' simply because it had taken part in the 1893 PSI congress in Reggio Emilia in which delegates from other regions of the country had expressed solidarity towards the mass rebellion in Sicily that year. The Socialist 'Inno dei Lavoratori' was also an easy victim of the legislation (Canosa/Santosuosso, pp. 128-135).

Indeed, the authors point out that it was very easy to confuse 'eccitamento all'odio di classe' with 'eccitamento alla guerra civile' which carried a higher prison sentence, just as it was possible to interpret social criticism as 'eccitamento all'odio' etc., so that:

C'era un evidente utilizzo dell'elasticità ed indeterminatezza delle formule legislative per colpire chi in qualche modo era già deciso che dovesse essere colpito (pp. 120-121).

On occasions, however, the provincial courts clearly moved against the desires of the executive. In this sense the appeal court of Lucca declared on 7 February 1895 that:
la sola adesione di una associazione al congresso socialista di Reggio Emilia non era sufficiente per ritenere che essa fosse costituita per eccitare alla disobbedienza delle leggi, ed all'odio tra le classi sociali e che, per l'inapplicabilità dell'art. 5 della legge 316, 1894, era necessario la prova concreta che l'associazione avesse lo scopo di sovvertire con vie di fatto gli ordinamenti sociali (Canosa/Santosuosso, p. 61).

Such liberal orientation was usually corrected, however, by the Cassation Court which, closely tied to the minister of justice, tended to confirm sentences and revise acquittals (Canosa/Santosuosso, p. 136).

Berselli notes a certain continuity between the pre and post-unification regimes in terms not only of police legislation but also police personnel so that with the coming of legislation the first to enrol in the Italian police forces were policemen from ex-dynasties. In the Papal states, for example:

sono le vecchie guardie pontefice a chiedere di essere assunte e talvolta accompagnano la domanda con una raccomandazione del parooco che attesta la moralità e soprattutto la necessità di ordine materiale (Berselli, pp. 178-9).
This is significant if one is to consider the barbarous nature of pre-unification police systems inherited by the new kingdom of Italy. Canosa notes the brutality of both Carabinieri and Guardie di PS of Piedmont which, of course, was the forerunner in the process of unification, so that:

gli interrogatori dell'uno come degli altri si equivalevano per brutalità, scarsa umanità, tentativi di aggravare la posizione degli arrestati, spingendoli a difendersi per poter imputarlo il reato di resistenza, violenza, false promesse, minacce, ecc. (…) I rapporti tra polizia e magistratura erano totalmente sbilanciati a favore della prima la quale era solita trattenere in carcere gli imputati assolti dai giudici' (Canosa, La polizia, cit., p. 13).

Tarantini similarly describes the network of spies set up in the Papal states to control the movements of the so-called 'classe dei pensatori'. Viola mentions that police massacres were the most popularly used repressive methods in Europe especially in the Papal states and the Two Sicilies. The pope's soldiers employed such methods in Forli (Romagna) on 21 January 1832 in order to intimidate would-be rebels.27

It is clear, therefore, that with unification the public continued to consider police 'thugs', especially since the new regime in no way altered the generally impoverished and illiterate state of the forces, so Berselli claims (p. 179). Canosa also states that:
la sostituzione del nuovo ordine all'antico era avvenuto in modo da turbare il meno possibile gli antichi assetti del potere (il dislocamento di posizioni tra nobiltà e borghesia sarebbe venuto in modo assai più indolore) anche se le burocrazie della nuova Italia erano destinate a distinguersi assai poco da quella della vecchia (Canosa, *La polizia*, cit., pp. 14-15).

The preventive police system characterising unified Italy was in reality a better defined and coordinated version of the pre-unification instrument of the absolutist regimes, somewhat intent on the restriction of liberal advancement and with little desire for humanitarian progression.

In this light the use of Carabinieri alongside the regular army for the repression of such democratic movements as southern Italian 'Brigandage' whose exponents were portrayed as 'cutthroats' against whom the Carabiniere 'figlio del popolo, protettore dei deboli, difensore della società' risked his life, concealed the reality of cruel suffocation of mass political advancement. Indeed according to Canosa:

La repressione del brigantaggio (l'assetto politico e giuridico nel cui quadro i governi della destra moderata, incapaci di uscire altrimenti della posizione minoritaria in cui si trovarono nel sud, fecero ricorso alla dittatura militare per battere il movimento democratico) concorse validamente ad imprimere fin dall'inizio all'apparato dello
stato unitario un'impronta burocratico-poliziesca in funzione anti-contadina e antipopolare.28

Similarly the police system was particularly brutal and corrupt in the repression of Anarchy. If the legislation of 1889 perfected the instruments necessary for suffocating the movement Questori were well capable of fabricating or provoking anarchist terrorist attacks, using false witnesses and 'agenti provocatori' (usually criminals who received a suspended prison sentence in return for favours to the Questura) to that end.29 D'Orsi claims, for example, that it was the Questore of Florence, Serafini, who organized the assassination attempt on Umberto I in 1878. The Florentine Internationalist Cesare Batacchi, imprisoned for life for the crime, was acquitted in 1901 following declarations from most witnesses that they had been forced to provide false testimonies. An equally tragic case was that of the republican Frezzi, arrested following another attack on the sovereign in 1897, simply because he appeared alongside the anarchist and suspected author of the plot, Acciarito. Alleged to have committed suicide in his cell, contradictory declarations by the Questura in Rome made it clear that he had been murdered. The impunity of the police forces in such affairs (in the Frezzi case all police officers and officials were acquitted, whilst the prime minister Rudini even attempted to exempt the Questore of Rome from giving evidence at the trial) demonstrates the connivance of the judiciary in
the persecution of anarchists.  

Explanations of excesses on the part of the police towards the Anarchist movement lie in both the desire to justify stronger forms of government with the use of 'leggi eccezionali' and the obvious prestige successful operations bestowed upon them. According to D'Orsi, the bomb attack on Umberto I of 1878, for example, aimed to put an end to plans of the Cairoli government to reverse policing policies (p. 15) and Coletti indeed hints at the success of the plot which forced the government to resign (p. 27). The Questure, aware of their weaknesses and deficiencies, obviously desired to put their hands on any element capable of conviction (with the use of false witnesses, etc.) in order to win over recognition from public opinion for either punishing terrorists or preventing attacks at the last moment (Coletti, pp. 16-7). This explanation reflects a far more deeply rooted phenomenon, particularly evident in the Italian police system from the end of the nineteenth century: an archaic, badly organized and undermanned force, as considered below.

The late 1890s, from where the case study of policing in the province of Bologna takes its course, are demonstrative of the heritage of prevention legislation and a politically conscious police system in Italy. Though the effects of the anti-Socialist/Anarchist legislative instrument have been examined, attention should now be drawn towards those mass protests - in the form of strikes and demonstrations - dominating the period researched on and the relationship of
the police and judiciary towards such democratic expressions. If, according to Neppi Modona, prior to the 1889 penal code the 'ragionevole causa' of article 386 of the 1859 penal code generally allowed the punishment of the strike weapon on every occasion, the acrobatics often required to ensure this, together with increasingly liberal expectations of public opinion, saw the need for legislative alterations. The author points out, however, that articles 165 and 166 of the 1889 code, which judged the legality of the strike weapon in terms of possible acts of violence and intimidation accompanying it, represented, rather than progress in the liberal sense 'un perfezionamento delle finalità repressive che si erano venute sviluppando attraverso l'interpretazione giurisprudenziale dell'art 386 del codice sardo'.

Leonida Bissolati, a prominent Socialist figure at the end of the nineteenth century indeed warned in Critica Sociale of 15 January 1891 that the effects of the legislation were such that:

Se fra gli scioperanti sorga alcuno a parlare additando nella costituzione sociale le cause della miseria dei lavoratori e inculcando le necessità che questi abbiano a riunirsi in lotta contro lo sfruttamento capitalistico, tutti i buoni procuratori regi e tutti i buoni giudici troveranno che si incita all'odio fra le classi sociali in modo pericoloso per la pubblica tranquillità e interverranno con la forza.
Here he was, of course, referring to the possible use of article 247 of the 1889 code in the repression of strikes.

The 1890s, therefore, saw little change in the severity with which the courts dealt with the strike. This was also due to increasing doubts on the part of the judiciary as to the possibility of peaceful Socialist development. The period was dominated by the dissolution of worker organizations (too often associated with Anarchist aspirations), the repression of strikes and demonstrations through police intimidation, indiscriminate mass arrests and the substitution of strikers with soldiers - as revealed in Chapter III - illustrating the continued failure of the ruling classes to distinguish between the PSI and the Anarchists, political and economic demonstrations as well as the continued alignment of the judiciary to the will of the executive. This culminated in the brutal military repression of bread riots in Milan in May 1898 causing the deaths of 80, and injury of 450 demonstrators. The prime minister Rudini was forced to declare a state of martial law, with the use of military tribunals, as most of the nation rioted in response to the massacre. His immediate successor General Pelloux decreed the dissolution of all subversive associations on 22 June (D'Orsi, p. 20, Modona, p. 88).

According to Canosa/Santosuosso, such manifestations had mostly been spontaneous and dictated by hunger rather than true desire for insurrection (p. 89). Many eminent politicians and jurists recognised the brutal reaction of
government forces towards the demonstrations which, even if in some way influenced by the subversive parties, were in reality caused - in the words of *Rivista Penale* - by:

il malcontento, il disgusto delle popolazioni per il modo con cui sono governate, per l'eccesso e la sperequazione dei balzelli, per il trionfo della immoralità e della corruzione, per la mala amministrazione della giustizia (...).

The periodical ridiculed the role of military tribunals in condemning 'una continua sfilata di femminucce e di adolescenti imputati di aver fatto e promosso la guerra civile' (Canosa/Santosuosso, pp. 89-90).

The repression of 1898 convinced many members of the ruling classes, urged on by public opinion in general, that the advancement of the masses could not be halted. The policies of Giovanni Giolitti (interior minister from February 1901 to November 1903 and then prime minister almost uninterruptedly until April 1914) were certainly based on the need for a new policing strategy, alongside economic and administrative reforms, though there are varying opinions as to his true intentions and success in this. In his parliamentary speech of 4 February 1901, ten days before becoming interior minister in the Zanardelli government, he recognised the advancement of the masses and their necessary integration into the 'alvea istituzionale'. In this light,
at least initially, faithful to the new alignment between Turati's Reformist Socialism and his government, he urged distinction between Socialism and Anarchy, between political and economic strikes, the latter of which could be considered legal as long as they were not accompanied by acts of violence (Neppi Modona, p. 90), relaxing excessive interpretation of already existing legislation, rather than changing the penal code, and implementing social legislation to the benefit of the masses.\textsuperscript{33}

According to D'Orsi, Giolitti did not intend to renounce using the police organs for the defence of the ruling classes but accentuated 'gli aspetti e i metodi meno appariscenti, più approssimativamente legalitari'. He gave preference to the police over the army, the PS over the Carabinieri, prefects over army generals, etc. (D'Orsi, p. 22). This would indeed account for legislative moves during the Giolittian decade to increase the force and prestige of both police corps, particularly the Guardie di PS, though, as described in Chapter III, such moves were apparent rather than real, reflecting the reluctance of the prime minister to oppose military hierarchies by totally excluding them from police services. They also denoted the limits of his pacifist/mediatory policies towards the Socialist movement, especially following his break with Turati in March 1903 and the PSI's dominance by revolutionary factions, from 1904 onwards. The politically motivated general strike, which came to dominate the decade was usually declared by the PSI
in protest at continued police massacres. According to D'Orsi (p. 22), there were 50 deaths and 500 injuries, mostly at the hands of the Carabinieri, on official records between 1901 and 1904 alone.

Similarly, the role of 'mediator' instilled in the Giolittian prefect, who, according to Fried, was no longer to side automatically with the employers during disputes and was to study wage rather than troop figures, had severe limitations. Many were reluctant to break their personal solidarity with the ruling classes or found having to mediate among 'subversives' or workers degrading. Others were unconvinced that giving the socialists greater political freedom would put an end to the threat of revolution (pp. 147-8). D'Orsi claims that the traditional repressive and policeman-like mentality of the prefect posed automatic resistance to Giolitti's efforts (p. 21). Fried again points out the ambiguities of Giolittian 'trasformismo'. The prefect retained his traditional role of electoral agent, especially in the south where, according to the author, election rigging reached unprecedented heights of brutality.34

If initially Giolitti and the judiciary did not agree over the application of more liberal policies in the courts, the changed political climate from 1903 saw a return to collaboration between the two over the repression of the most revolutionary of PSI activities (Neppi Modona, p. 97). Indeed the use of article 154 of the penal code (violenza
privata), carrying between three and five years' imprisonment, for the punishment of violence committed during general strikes and the most radical forms of boycotting—mentioned in Chapter III—instead of articles 165 and 166, which carried lighter prison sentences, signified, in Neppi Modona's opinion, their political alignment with the government. Similarly Giolitti had the support of the judiciary in his militarization of railway workers in 1902 and their categorization as 'pubblici ufficiali' in 1905 (article 18 of Regio Decreto 137 of 22 April 1905) so that an organized strike could be penalized under article 181 of the penal code (delitto di rifiuto d'atti d'ufficio) - also extended to state employees by law 693 of 22 November 1908. This is demonstrated by their prosecution of most railway strikers under that article even if the necessary condition of 'previo concerto' (ie on the orders of the union) was mostly overlooked.

An important factor in Giolitti's failed police strategy was his incapacity, like his predecessors, to alter sufficiently a police system which by the end of the nineteenth century was out of date and no longer adapted to the social and political realities of the nation. During the 1890s and the first decade of the twentieth century new legislation aimed, though with little effect, to improve the quality and organization of police administration and the two police corps. Legislation concerning the Guardie di PS is particularly significant because it suggests efforts on the
part of the state to increase the prestige and military nature of the corps, almost certainly reflecting the desire to remove its sense of inferiority towards the Carabinieri. Law 7321 of 21 December 1890 increased the corps, under the new name of Guardie di Città, to a total of five thousand. Law 173 of 31 March 1892 allowed the transfer of army officers to the corps on the condition that they passed an examination 'al fine di mostrare che erano in possesso delle cognizioni indispensabili per l'esercizio delle nuove funzioni'. The law confirmed the incorporation of Guardie into 'compagnie di disciplina' as well as the application of sanctions prescribed by the military penal code for desertion or insubordination (Arista, pp. 23-24). The decree law of 27 June 1897 was also fundamental because whereas previously PS officials led Guardie police operations, this task was now assigned to Guardie officers (Arista, p. 28). Under Giolitti, Law 269 of 30 June 1901 brought the corps to a total of 7,555 men, who were recruited, in order of preference, from the Carabinieri and the army. Similarly Law 318 of 8 July 1906 increased its numerical strength to 10,855. Both the 1901 and 1906 legislation aimed, along with several ministerial circulars to encourage greater recruitment with salary increase, better promotion possibilities and pension scales. Again of notable importance was the 'equiparazione' of the Guardie di Città to the Carabinieri and army in 1903 in terms of ranks and military salutes which in the words of Giolitti 'dimostra in
quale conto e tenuto dal Governo il corpo delle Guardie di Città' in his 'Circolare' of 14 August 1903.38

Legislative moves also aimed to improve the Carabinieri. On 17 May 1884 a "Scuola per aspiranti a grado di sottotenente" was founded alongside the Legione Allievi with the intention of:

allargare le cognizioni letterarie e scientifiche degli aspiranti ufficiali e dar loro mezzo di perfezionare l'istruzione militare e di impratichirsi nell'equitazione.

This was the basis of the future Scuola ufficiali Carabinieri. On 21 April 1887 the corps increased in number to a total of 622 officers and 24,004 troops.39 Under Giolitti, Law 647 of 30 December 1906 'concernante provvedimenti per L'Arma dei Reali Carabinieri' clearly aimed to increase the attraction of the corps for recruitment purposes, with pay rises, an increased number of officers, a training school for promotion possibilities and financial bonuses for those renewing their contracts. The above legislative moves reflect Giolitti's desire for the use of both Carabinieri and Guardie di Città as an alternative to the army for policing duties, the former particularly for the more repressive aspects of crowd control (usually undertaken by the army). This was almost certainly a consequence of growing fear of the unreliability of the army during demonstrations whether in terms of its possible
fraternization with the demonstrators or in terms of the fatal consequences of their employment as illustrated by the events of 1898.

Within the Amministrazione di Pubblica Sicurezza legislative moves from the end of the nineteenth century clearly aimed to improve the position of its dependants. With Regio Decreto 226 of 12 May 1881 its ranks were aligned with those in other administrative bodies. Promotion on merit prevailed over 'anzianità' (number of years' service) for officials. On 4 February 1883 a special 'corso di perfezionamento' was founded for 'aspiranti alla carriera di funzionari di PS' and promotions within the ranks of police funzionari (Renato, pp. 346-7). Again under Giolitti Regio Decreto 512 of 12 December 1901 improved the career prospects for officials, quickening promotion possibilities. The decree law of 25 October 1903 made a forensic police course obligatory for a PS career, whilst Law 3187 of 8 July 1906 founded a new rank of Vice-Questore with the task of assisting the Questore (Renato, pp. 347-8).

The frequency of intellectual criticism of the police forces at the end of the nineteenth century well illustrates the inadequacy of the new legislation, however. In 1890 an ex-interior minister stated that the multiplicity and the variability of ministerial instructions, often counteracted by secret circulars, placed the police official in a position where he no longer felt that his action would be supported by his superiors, so that 'é appunto questa certezza che gli
manca sovente e tale mancanza lo rende fiasco, esitante, e gli vieta di prendere iniziative che possono in qualsivoglia guisa compromettterlo'. Alongi in his 1895 article in *Nuova Antologia* lamented about the incompetence of interior ministry officials in the Direzione Generale di Pubblica Sicurezza because of their passing so easily from one ministry to another. At the provincial level prefects and sub-prefects had no police-training unless they had been promoted from the rank of Questore. Continuous transfers and role changes in the personnel were the natural cause of deficiencies so that:

Il funzionario rivelatosi abile a Roma nel servizio investigativo tramutato a Napoli, si trova condannato a far permessi d'arma e fogli di via. Le guardie prestano oggi servizio in divisa, domani in borghese, i carabinieri sono addetti indistintamente al servizio preventivo, senza distinzione di territorio, di centri abitati, e, starci per dire, di latitudine.

The situation was worsened by the failure of the police organization to divide and distinguish between various administrative mandates and active police services, so that young, active funzionari often found themselves doing desk-work when they could have been a greater asset on the streets. To this he added the persistence of inadequate promotion opportunities and salary increase schemes so that
too many years' service were required to achieve promotion. Bureaucratic pettiness only obstructed police officers in the course of their duty. It took 24 hours for an official to obtain permission to leave his place of residence on mission, giving, for example, a criminal he was searching for a 24 hour head start. Such physical deficiencies as lack of telephones and telegraphic facilities only heightened these difficulties.41

Alongi also saw police deficiencies in terms of an underdeveloped forensic police system. Better training facilities were essential. He criticised the lack of academic qualifications possessed by police officials and the habit on compromising on these when admitting candidates to the career of police funzionario. He added that following admission at least a years' training should take place (p. 256). Lack of literature and library facilities for the study of policing techniques was the fault of the interior ministry which had neve considered nominating a technical commission to the above ends. Officials only had reference to Ricasoli's Istruzioni of 1867, by now well out of date, so that 'è lasciata all'iniziativa personale, donde l'empirismo dominante gli errori e gli insuccessi ovunque deplorati ed addossati al personale' (pp. 130-37). Fiorentino justly points out that the usually double role of prime minister and interior minister under one and the same person naturally restricted the time and energy available to him for the above considerations.42
These deficiencies naturally placed the police in an inferior position towards the army and the judiciary which had all the necessary facilities and scientifically and technically advanced methodologies (p. 250).

Both Codronchi (1895) and Alongi (1897) consider low police numbers and a low ministerial budget key factors in the police crisis. Codronchi compared a total of 600 Guardie di Città allocated to the city of Naples to over fifteen thousand policemen in London. Similarly if the last national PS budget totalled nearly 14 million lire, the 1894 Paris city budget alone totalled almost twice as much. Indeed, according to Alongi, with little more than one policeman to a thousand citizens and an annual average of 607,000 crimes, the punishment of 45% of crimes could be considered praiseworthy (p. 142).

Finally the phenomenon of dualism between two or more police forces was in no way saved from criticism. In urban areas the presence of Guardie di Città and Guardie Municipali (municipal police) had the effect of failing to repress or prevent crime since neither of the two corps claimed that any particular task lay under their legal competences (Ex-Ministro dell'Interno, p. 736). Codronchi saw the attempted militarization of the Guardie di Città, characterized by their accommodation in barracks and the impossibility of marrying (later abrogated, however), as counterproductive to the requirements of a police force since it rendered the guards passive soldiers only capable of obeying orders, when
in reality spontaneity and initiative were required of him. He suggested the unification of the Guardie di Città and the municipal police (p. 219). Sciacca in his 1905 essay opposed moves to demilitarize the police on the grounds that, unlike other European nations where civilian police forces functioned successfully the indisciplined nature of the Italian character, especially within the social classes from which policemen were recruited, militarisation was necessary in order to maintain a disciplined police force.44

Alongi again criticised the disunity of the police system and the illusions created by Article 1 of the 'Legge sul servizio e attribuzioni degli ufficiali ed agenti di PS' of 21 December 1890 which reiterated 1865 norms on the immediate subordination of all policemen to the prefect, stating that in reality:

l'azione del centro è sentito più o meno intensamente dalle sole prefetture, perché le unità inferiori sfuggono agli impulsi direttivi. I carabinieri obbediscono ad un loro ordinamento autonomo ed inflessibile e le polizie municipali.....a nessuno (p. 252).

That Giolitti's new legislation was recognised by Sciacca as something of an asset to the desired improvement of the police system in Italy is expressed in his 1905 essay, though he still stressed that there was plenty of room for further change. He acknowledged that the 1901 legislation improved
the careers of PS officials, giving them faster promotion prospects, for example, as well as the increase in Guardie and Carabinieri, but added that the few financial resources available for policing were being wasted on too many corps and that the officials needed to be better organized in terms of rank and areas of responsibility. There were not enough Questori to assist prefects - Law 409 of 21 August 1901 designated them to cities with a population of over a hundred thousand - whilst the third class of commissars needed to be abolished since it proved itself to be less capable than the rank of delegates immediately below it in the hierarchy. There were still too many transfers whilst bonuses and rewards were granted more as a stimulus than for outstanding qualities. Unjust punishments often disorientated funzionari, destroying any faith they had in their superiors (pp. 320-24). The founding of agenti ausiliari (Law 269 of 30 June 1901) for office work left much to be desired. While it was true that officials were relieved of bureaucratic tasks, Sciacca suggested that it would be more efficient if 'ausiliari' were used for active police investigative work alongside normal officials and retiring to office work when they reached the age at which they were no longer fit for active service (p. 325). Indeed with the coming of Law 618 of 30 December 1906 the agenti ausiliari were abolished (Arista, p. 26).

According to Sciacca the number of Carabinieri though increased was still inadequate. If another three thousand
were voted by the Chamber of Deputies in 1904 (taking the total to well over 28,000) in reality at least 30,000 were needed. The author also maintained that if the number of service renewals had increased from 2,500 to 3,500 per year, in reality 5,000 per year were necessary. He added that the manner in which renewals were obtained was counterproductive in that pension prospects for Carabinieri refusing renewal were so depressing that they could be considered almost punitive in character, and this, according to the author, accounted for the failure to obtain sufficient enrolments. Again the author stressed that Carabinieri should be placed into auxiliary services once they were no longer fit for active work, permitting them an extra 15 years service and an improved pension. He also criticised the lack of sufficient transport means for the corps and the need to directly connect rural Carabinieri headquarters directly with local telegraphic stations (pp. 326 - 8).

Finally, as a solution to the dualism still inherent in the police system, Sciacca suggested that urban policing should be left to only one corps, the Guardie di Città, which should take on an increased military character, whilst the municipal police should be abolished. In turn a special squad of agenti ausiliari 'in borghese' should be chosen from the Guardie and Carabinieri for delicate investigative operations (pp. 320-26).

The seriousness of an inefficient incoherent and undermanned police system in Italy throughout the period
researched and in the face of an every-growing Socialist revolutionary movement indeed forms a considerable part of this thesis. Archival investigation illustrates in fact that the situation described by Sciacca in 1905 in no way improved substantially and that, as indeed Fiorentino points out in her study of policing under Giolitti, lack of numbers had the double effect of placing the emphasis of police work on political affairs to the detriment of the repression of common crime and increasing conflict between the civilian (PS/Guardie) and military (army/Carabinieri) authorities, given extensive and often excessive requests by prefects for military force for the control of mass revolutionary development, a phenomenon lasting throughout the years under examination (p. 67, p. 101, pp. 114-20). As demonstrated in Chapter III, the failure to update the Italian police system and improve the living and working conditions of its dependents also meant failure to change its nineteenth century outlook and almost encouraged neglect of duties and indiscipline.

The disastrous state in which the police forces emerged from the First World War necessitated radical updating. Funzionari, Guardie di PS and Carabinieri were numerically insufficient and badly paid and generally suffered miserable living conditions. As a result of this preventive police services were almost non-existent. Ministerial funds were lacking and neither of the corps could fill up the
numerous vacant positions. If during the war years many saw enrolment in the Guardie di Città as a comfortable alternative to the trenches, so that disciplinary regulations, long and tiring shifts and low pay seemed insignificant, the coming of peace totally changed such an outlook. Realizing their low wage levels (despite the increase stipulated by Law 1732 of 14 October 1917) the majority refused to renew their contracts which expired six months after the coming of peace and remained inside their offices, rather than fighting crime in the streets. Similarly, many Carabinieri, discredited during the war for their role as military police which involved the rounding up of deserters, preferred not to renew their contracts.

Post-war governments were unsure as to the manner in which the police system should be reinvigorated. They had no doubts as to the dangers of employing troops, because of their proletarian composition and the risk, therefore, that they might side with the masses in the case of insurrection. Francesco Nitti, who became prime minister in June 1919, was, on the other hand sceptical of the idea of giving the Carabinieri a policing monopoly which would probably mean placing police power in the hands of military hierarchies (if not the crown itself). The special commission set up by the Orlando government in March 1919, led by Camillo Corradini, concluded that police power should be liberated from the control of the army and that the interior ministry police system should obtain 'la massima autonomia e tecnicità
(. . .) al di fuori di ogni corpo e comando militare'
in the founding of a 'corpo speciale di indole professionale,
reclutato ai fini della polizia' (as he told Il Giornale
d' Italia on 21 March 1919.) (Donati, p. 449).

On the basis of this, Law 1790 of 2 October 1919
undoubtedly strengthened the appeal and morale of the Guardie
di Città (and of course that of the interior ministry) by
turning the corps into an enlarged armed force of 25,000
agenti - of which 500 cavalry - and 337 officers under the
new name of Regie Guardie (D'Orsi, p. 25). Its increased
military character was demonstrated by its division into
seven legions (in turn divided into divisions, companies,
lieutenancies and local headquarters or Stazioni) - similar
to the Carabinieri - with a general command consisting of two
lieutenant generals and two major generals. Training schools
for cadets and officers were also founded. Article 1 of the
'disegno di legge per la costituzione di un corpo di Regie
Guardie' of 6 September 1919 stated that legislation
regarding Carabinieri officers - their participation in armed
conflict, for example - now equally applied to Regie Guardie
officers. Its aspired equality if not superiority as a police
force over the Carabinieri is illustrated by the
reconfirmation of the latter's role as principally a rural
force and the equality of their salary scales.

The position of the interior ministry was equally boosted
by the founding of agenti investigativi by Decreto Legge
1442, a corps of eight thousand ex-Guardie di Città'in
for criminal investigation work (leaving administrative and judicial tasks to the Regie Guardie) (Flores, pp. 178-9, Donati, pp. 447-8). According to Flores, the decree also improved the working conditions of police funzionari. Questori were placed in all provincial capitals. Officers were given easier promotion possibilities and each grade increased in number, while salaries increased so that they were much higher than those received by other state funzionari. 'Anzianità' was also a factor governing salary levels. Given the creation of agenti investigativi tasks were better divided among Pubblica Sicurezza personnel. Bureaucratic tasks were no longer the responsibility of funzionari but of the police administrative secretaries (Flores, pp. 178-9).

The Carabinieri Reali, however, also underwent improvements to counter the state in which they emerged from the war. The decree of 2 October 1919 brought the total number of Carabinieri to 60,000 (75,000 in 1922), dividing the corps into nineteen territorial legions with seven group commands, a cadets' legion, a training school for officers and a training school for non-commissioned officers (Sottufficiali). The following decree law of 20 November 1919 stipulated that two thirds of new officers were to be recruited from the army (the remaining third from the corps itself). In May 1920 eighteen autonomous mobile battalions of Carabinieri were founded with the aim of combatting the threat of revolution, demonstrating that the corps was in no
way seriously relegated to a second-rate position. Again two thirds of their members were directly recruited from the army (*Enciclopedia del diritto*, Vol. VI, p. 269). According to Flores (p, 182), both officers and agenti received salary increases.

Donati reveals, however, several key errors in interior ministry moves to ensure that the Regie Guardie adapted to new policing requirements. Firstly, he criticised efforts to excessively militarise the corps. This was demonstrated by article 14 of the founder law which allowed the passage of army officers into the corps and article 10 which similarly allowed the recruitment of non-commissioned Carabinieri officers. To this may be added its equipping with military type vehicles and machine gunners. This naturally enhanced the ill-feeling of the armed forces towards the corps, but more importantly, according to Donati, 'prese il sopravento, a discapito dell'autorità civile della PS' so that:

Gli ufficiali non appena trasferitisi nel nuovo organismo, cercarono di recreare condizioni e modi di vita nell'esercito, favoriti delle particolori protezioni politiche di cui si sentirono, volerò creare una visione quasi mistica della Regia Guardia quale continuatrice, in tempo di pace, dei gloriosi episodi dell'esercito vittorioso (Donati, p. 451).
If, according to the author, there were no limits to spending so that by 1922 the corps had increased to a total of forty thousand men and there were three times as many officers as there had been in the Guardie di Città in reality the corps did not develop the role to which the interior ministry aspired. Indeed L'Illustrazione Italiana of 17 September 1922 stated that though there were now eight thousand Regie Guardie in Rome (as opposed to nine hundred Guardie di Città, previously) crimes were on the increase. The corps erroneously considered itself a military organization and not a professional police force. It needed, after three years' existence, to better identify itself with its intended civilian attributes. Nitti had given the Guardie uniforms but not 'spirito di corpo'.

The police legislation of 1919, if undoubtedly improving and enlarging the forces, was still relatively inefficient in dealing with the needs of the post-war years. The failure of Socialist revolution was a reflection not so much of the repressive capacity of Italy's government forces but more of the unwillingness of party leaders to put their revolutionary theories into practice. Indeed the continued weak state of the police forces was such that in September 1920 Giolitti preferred not to put them to the test in the face of factory occupations which the metalworkers carried out. D'Orsi states that on other occasions, however:
l'eccidio proletario ritornò all'ordine del giorno. Nel numero del 1 maggio 1920 Avanti! pubblicò l'elenco dei morti proletari per mano poliziesca nei dodici mesi che vanno dall'aprile 1919 all'aprile 1920: 145 morti e 44 feriti gravi: nello stesso giorno a Torino venivano uccisi 4 operai, mentre numerosi altri erano feriti dalla forza pubblica e altre uccisioni si verificarono in Istria e Calabria. 50

Research on the province of Bologna during the period concerned suggests, however, that on many occasions police violence may have been the result of a sense of defencelessness and the incompetence of their superiors - as demonstrated by frequent transfers - rather than a reflection of their anti-revolutionary spirit. The case-study shows that in no way did the Regie Guardie come to dominate policing, as had originally been intended, as is proven by the frequent use of the army, despite the risks of fraternization this entailed, and of the Carabinieri, which continued urban services alongside their rival corps, despite reiterations to the contrary in the 1919 legislation. The thesis also demonstrates that the increased military character of the Regie Guardie only heightened their autonomy from the prefectoral authorities so that police officials often experienced lack of cooperation from their commanders over the use of Guardie for police operations.

The rise to power of Benito Mussolini at the end of October 1922 saw radical changes in the organization of the Italian
police system, though again the extent to which these cured its long-term deficiencies is uncertain. Firstly, Law 1680 of 31 December 1922 abolished both the Regie Guardie and Agenti Investigativi which were absorbed into the Carabinieri Reali, an obvious blow to the interior ministry. The abolition of these corps may be attributed to the general unpopularity they had created, especially within military circles. Mussolini in fact entrusted General Giardino of the army high command with the task of compiling a report on the functioning of the Regie Guardie in November 1922, the results of which revealed excessive ministerial spending and general corruption. Of particular significance, its general command was strongly involved in:

episodi di favoritismi e di lotte intestine che originavano e si alimentavano nella corruzione propria di quel mondo politico che della regie guardia aveva fatto riserva di caccia personale, vantandone la sottomissione diretta al potere 'politico' del ministero dell'interno e della Presidenza del Consiglio.51

The report concluded that:

Il servizio di sicurezza e d'ordine pubblico deve essere affidato ad un corpo organizzato a tipo militare, retto unicamente da disciplina militare, con le garanzie di giustizia in uso nell'esercito. Meglio, deve far parte
Mussolini indeed had three motives for not maintaining the existence of the Regie Guardie. Firstly, doing so would have meant laborious and time-consuming purges by removing those officers particularly tied to the politics of the pre-March on Rome governments. Secondly, the dissolution of the corps, principally condemned for its Nittian associations, would be looked upon favourably by military leaders, the monarchy and the most conservative of public opinion. Thirdly, given the founding of the new Fascist police corps, the Milizia Volontaria per la Sicurezza Nazionale (MVSN), its maintenance may have been seen as excessive power concentration by the new prime minister (Donati, p. 485). According to the new legislation, both the Regie Guardie and Agenti Investigativi would, by the end of March 1923, be absorbed into the Carabinieri, the numerical force of which increased from 65 to 75 thousand - of which 12 thousand were to form a special division, known as Ruolo Specializzato, and under the jurisdiction of the interior ministry from May 1924. Donati in his essay states, however, that:
I provvedimenti presi da Mussolini significavano sostanzialmente il congedo-licenziamento di un ingentissimo numero di guardie che non avrebbero trovato posto nei ruoli, di poco aumentati, dell'Arma dei Carabinieri. Se si considerano un poco più attentamente le norme sullo scioglimento della r.guardia, si rileva che esse furono dettate da uno spirito punitivo nei confronti degli appartenenti al corpo e, per la loro rapidità di esecuzione crearono inconvenienti abbastanza gravi nell'organizzazione dei servizi di polizia nei mesi immediatamente successivi alla loro applicazione.

The author continues that:

Durissimo fu il trattamento riservato agli ufficiali della r. guardia che potevano si rientrare nelle categorie di provenienza senza che però fosse riconosciuto (...) "neanche un giorno di servizio prestato nella r. guardia". Non meno severe le disposizioni adottate per i sottufficiali e militari di truppa che sarebbero stati licenziati e collocati a riposo d'autorità qualora non avessero trovato posto nell'istituento ruolo specializzato dei carabinieri in borghese (pp. 480-1).

In April 1925, however, the Guardie di PS came back into existence so that the definition of the Carabinieri as
'l'unica forza armata in servizio permanente di pubblica sicurezza' by article 1 of Law 1680 was shortlived. This signalled, according to Collin, Mussolini's realisation that the Carabinieri remained ultimately loyal to the king, and in Donati's opinion (p. 487), the unreliability of the MVSN (described below), rendering necessary the use of a new 'polizia politica'. Article 19 of Regio Decreto 383 of 2 April 1925 stated that Carabinieri belonging to the Ruolo Specializzato of the corps had the right to enter the newly constituted Corpo degli Agenti di PS, which was dependent on the interior ministry whilst the Carabinieri were newly relegated to the countryside with only a token presence in the cities.

With Mussolini's rise to power the traditional police system came to find itself merely a component of multiple and conflicting police hierarchies which, according to D'Orsi, the new leader set up in order to:

da una parte garantirsi le spalle contro eventuali contraccolpi militari, poliziesche o amministrativi che potevano tentare di rovesciare il piedistallo su cui egli si era appena asceso, dall'altro togliere di mano ai 'ras' i capetti dello squadrismo locale e specialmente agrario'.

Parallel to the Carabinieri, a new Fascist party corps, the MVSN, was founded by Regio Decreto 31 of 14 January 1923. This was a means of regimenting, and so legalizing and
disciplining the Camicie Nere of the Milizia Fascista which had, in unofficial form mobilized for the March on Rome in October 1922. Article 3 of the law in fact stipulated that voluntary recruitment could be carried out among 'appartenenti alla milizia fascista' between the ages of seventeen and fifty. The corps had the task of preparing and maintaining the regimentation of the Italian people for the defence of the nation's world interests and and was to work parallel to the army and the traditional Italian police organs (article 2). All militi had to swear an oath of allegiance to the nation (article 3 of Regio Decreto 831 of 8 March 1923). They were subject to strict military discipline and military jurisdiction, therefore, for certain crimes, and divided into military ranks and zones, legions, etc. Article 7 of the founding decree stipulated that in case of war the MVSN automatically became a component of the army.

The rather ambiguous hierarchical dependencies of the corps were outlined in Law 832 of 8 March 1923. Article 2 in fact stated:

Egli è agli ordini del Capo del Governo, a cui è direttamente subordinato il Comando Generale e dipende in conseguenza dalle proprie autorità gerarchiche, che agiscono in accordo col Ministero dell'Interno, e quindi con le autorità da questo dipendente. Eventualmente in quelle località ove non esiste nessuna di dette autorità, può venir richiesta della sua opera anche dai sindaci.
Article 38 of the law stated that the MVSN could be required for police duties by the interior minister, the Comando Generale, prefects and sub-prefects (following the norms in use for requesting troops) and in exceptional circumstances the mayors. The Comandante Generale (directly subordinated to 'Il Duce') who was also Direttore Generale di Pubblica Sicurezza (later renamed Capo della Polizia with a higher rank than director generals in other ministries) linked, therefore, within the interior ministry two police hierarchies, that of prefect and the traditional forces and that of the MVSN, signalling, according to Fucci, a divergence between 'autorità legale' and 'autorità rivoluzionaria'.

The violent and undisciplined nature of the MVSN, whose members tended to remain loyal towards their past squad leaders rather than towards the hierarchy of the corps was looked upon suspiciously by the traditional police forces and even more so the army. The latter, though glad of the creation of a new force relieving it of its past laborious function of emergency police force was not altogether happy about the constitution of a military style corps over which it had little control, according to Lyttelton, and was embittered at the unjustly high ranks and salaries enjoyed by officers (ex-army officers and NCOs). Lyttelton states:

Agli occhi dell'esercito la concessione di questi gradi a * uomini che in guerra non erano stati che ufficiali subalterni
The question of possible increased control by the army of the MVSN was brought to a head by the crisis created by the murder of the Socialist deputy Giacomo Matteotti, in June 1924, during which Mussolini actually ordered its mobilization, so demonstrating his desire to keep a political corps based on the Fascist movement which he could resort to in the event of an attempted government overthrow by the traditional police and armed forces (Lyttelton, pp. 398-401). Decree 1292 of 4 August 1924 modified, in the words of Verné, 'criteri liberissimi di reclutamento del personale ufficiali delle precedenti disposizioni legislative'. Besides the obligatory oath of allegiance to the king (article 1), article 6 stated:

Gli ufficiali della MVSN sono tratti dagli ufficiali delle categorie in congedo del Regio Esercito, della Regia Marina e della Regia Aeronautica, in seguito a loro domanda; i Capi Manipolo potranno essere reclutati anche dai cittadini e dai capi-squadra della Milizia, previo accertamento della loro idoneità al grado.

and most importantly, article 8:

1
Gli ufficiali della MVSN all'atto della loro incorporazione conserveranno il grado e l'anzianità assoluta loro attribuita nelle categorie in congedo del Regio Esercito, Regio Marina e Regio Aeronautica dalle quali provengono. Il successivo avanzamento degli ufficiali della MVSN sarà regolato con apposite norme legislative, analoghe a quelle stabilite per la altre forze armate dello Stato. L'ufficiale della MVSN potrà essere incaricato delle funzioni di comando superiori a quelle inerenti al grado rivestito.

This naturally forced officers who had enjoyed elevated positions in the corps to step down to the equivalent of their original army rank. Article 18 in fact stated that only in exceptional circumstances could officers keep their present ranks. Finally, article 11 placed the corps under the war ministry for obligatory pre-military training. Lyttelton states, however, that in reality the changes brought about by the new legislation were minimal. With regard to the question of ranks, for example, militi were able to continue to have functions in no way reflecting the inferiority of their nominal ranks. The case-study of Bologna again demonstrates that such modifications in no way helped lower the levels of indiscipline and violence characterising the corps.

In policing terms the corps presented the traditional problems of dualism similar to those encountered between the Guardie di PS and the Carabinieri, etc., and the prefectures
increasingly avoided resorting to a force which proved itself inefficient from a technical point of view. The MVSN remained in existence purely to guarantee Mussolini an extra margin of personal power. D'Orsi correctly points out that:

La milizia fascista, lungi dall'essere come recitava l'art. 2 del decreto istitutivo 'al servizio di Dio, della Patria Italiana', si inseriva nel sistema di organizzazioni repressive in potenziale contrasto fra loro, a cui Mussolini diede vita e ristrutturò a proprio uso e consumo al fine di ottenere un più ampio margine di sicurezza personale attraverso il reciproco spiarsi dei diversi organismi (pp. 32-3).

These words indeed illustrate the essence of Mussolinian policing: the co-existence of conflicting police hierarchies and their traditional dualism were exploited in order to maintain the fascist leader's personal power. This would account for Law 672 of 18 March 1923 which allowed the interior minister police chief (Direttore Generale di Pubblica Sicurezza) to 'conferire temporaneamente per straordinari esigenze di servizio le funzioni di questore a persone estranee all'amministrazione' and the co-existence by 1927 of several secret political police organizations known as 'uffici politici di investigazione' with powers at the provincial level but not necessarily under the control of the prefect.
Under the direct orders of the Capo della Polizia, and acting over and above prefects and Questori came the OVRA - the exact meaning of the title is unknown - famous for its anti-Communist activities and divided into territorial zones. The prefects had similar provincial organizations under the title of Servizio di Investigazione Politica, as well as the MVSN (Ufficio Politico di Investigazione). Though OVRA was probably founded by the Capo della Polizia in 1927, Franco Fucci traces its origins back to the founding of an Ufficio Politico within the Direzione Generale di Pubblica Sicurezza in 1880. Decreto Luogotenenziale 1732 of 14 October 1917 set up a similar special investigation office under the direction of a Questore or Ispettore di PS. In 1920 an Ufficio Informazioni was founded. Led by a PS official, its purpose was the collection of 'notizie inerenti all'ordine pubblico'. Employing mostly secret informers, Fucci saw this as:

un metodo di lavoro che dunque non è stato inventato dal fascismo, ma pre-esisteva e di cui era sempre stato fatto largo uso; addirittura se ne trova traccia nella documentazione del ministero dell'interno relativo agli ultimi anni dell'ottocento, dalla quale risulta non solo l'esistenza degli informatori (o confidenti che dir si voglia) ma che comprende addirittura le ricevute delle somme a loro pagate (pp. 49-50).
This indeed illustrates the relevance of the study of pre-fascist police development to the Mussolinian era.

The co-existence of several police organs with conflicting hierarchies was of course in open contradiction to legislative norms of 1926 and 1927 re-defining the role of the prefect and generally increasing the prestige of his office. Law 660 of 3 April 1926 gave prefects extended powers as ministerial administrative field agents. Article 1 endowed them with the responsibility for the unity of political orientation of the activities of local authorities and different ministerial services. This more or less coincided with the abolition of municipal elections that year so providing for the appointment, on the recommendations of the prefect, of the Podestà who assumed the former powers and functions of the mayors, municipal and provincial councils.\textsuperscript{60} The prime minister's circular of 5 January 1927 declared the prefect the highest state authority in the province and direct representative of central executive power, towards whom fascist party-militants in particular had to show respect and obedience - defender of the regime against the enemies of Fascism and coordinator of the political and administrative life of the province.\textsuperscript{61} The use of political (ie Fascist) prefects from 1923 onwards, solved a contradictory situation in which Mussolini wanted to rely on the traditional police forces as the main defender of
his position. As Fried states (pp. 183-4), only political prefects could check party encroachments without accusations of anti-Fascism. Prefects were also obliged to become party members. Casula states, however that the trend of favouring non-bureaucratic personnel during the first years of the Fascist regime

Nevertheless, according to Fried, the power of the prefect - though officially elevated and accompanied by such prestige-boosting feats as the building of new prefectures and the new importance of his bishop-like tours of the province - could be ultimately checked by the MVSN, the federal party secretary, the police chief's private inspectors, OVRA, the Questore, hierarchically dependent on the police chief) and the provincial Carabinieri commander (ultimately responsible to 'Il Duce') (pp. 192-3).

The increased power of the traditional police apparatus under Fascism is reflected, however, in Regio Decreto 1848 of 6 November 1926, notably referred to as 'Leggi Fascistissime'. It may be considered the basis of the Fascist authoritarian regime. Significantly, however, many of its articles are clearly modifications of already existing
legislation dating back to the nineteenth century, defining therefore, the extreme importance of unification police norms of which Fascism may only be considered a perfecting agent. Of innovative interest was article 2 which endowed the prefect with extraordinary powers in an emergency situation:

Il Prefetto, in caso di urgenza o per grave necessità pubblica, ha facoltà di adottare i provvedimenti indispensabili per la tutela dell'ordine e della sicurezza pubblica. Contro i provvedimenti del Prefetto gli interessati possono ricorrere al Ministro per l'Interno.

Notably, article 17, 'delle riunioni pubbliche e degli assembramenti in luoghi pubblici' was a literal duplicate of article 1 of the 1889 PS law. Articles 166, 167 and 168 of the legislation took decisions on ammonizione out of the control of the courts and placed them in the hands of a commission consisting of prefect, public prosecutor, Questore, Carabinieri commander and a superior officer of the MVSN. Articles 166 and 167 rendered not only habitual criminals, vagabonds, etc., but also 'persone designate dalla pubblica voce come pericolose all'ordine nazionale dello stato' subject to ammonizione, which may be considered a perfection of the 1889 and 1894 legislation in terms of the incrimination of political enemies of the state. Article 184 prescribed confino (internal exile) - substituting the denomination domicilio coatto - for 'ammoniti' and:
coloro che abbiano commesso o manifestato il deliberato proposito di commettere atti diretti a sovvertire violentemente gli ordinamenti nazionali, sociali o economici costituiti dello stato, a menomenare la sicurezza ovvero a contrastare od ostacolare l'azione dei poteri dello stato, per modo da recare comunque nocumo agli interessi nazionali, in relazione alla situazione, interna od internazionale, dello stato qualora siano pericolosi alla sicurezza pubblica'

Article 168 again specified that: 'L'assegnazione al confino di polizia e la durata di questo sono pronunciate dalla Commissione provinciale di cui all'art. 168', which was a confirmation, therefore, of article 125 of the 1889 law, on internal exile. The articles concerning confino carried the same weight as the 1894 Leggi Eccezionali, which had been dropped from the beginning of the twentieth century, in that the mere intention of committing crimes against the state was sufficient for sentencing. Article 215 of the law asserted the prefectoral power of decree to dissolve associations 'of an anti-national character' and notably concluded that: 'Contro i provvedimenti del Ministero non è ammesso ricorso nemmeno per motivi di legittimità'.

The Fascist totalitarian police system undoubtedly had its roots in post-unification Liberal Italy. However, if according to D'Orsi (p. 27) 'l'uso di classe della polizia non muta nel passaggio dall'Italia liberale all'Italia
fascista', the author adds that what did change with the coming of the Fascist regime and the accelerated industrialisation of the 1920s and 1930s was the 'politica dell'ordine pubblico'. Under Fascism the police organs penetrated society very much more deeply, so that:

Proprio in funzione del controllo oppressivo e dell'irregimentazione corporativistica delle masse del nuovo proletariato urbano si articola la politica fascista dell'ordine pubblico. Non si tratta più di fare sparare sui contadini, dai quali del resto Mussolini riceve, soprattutto inizialmente, fiducia e benevolenza, bensì di tenere a bada gli operai, non limitandosi semplicemente a frenarne le 'intemperanze', ma consegnando l'intera organizzazione dello stato totalitario in modo da impedire la stessa possibilità di muoversi, esprimersi, ed organizzarsi, alle masse proletarie, così da ridurre ad un fatto marginale la pura 'repressione' (p. 27).

Carucci similarly points out that whereas in the Liberal system the state was able to make life difficult for the political opposition with the use of 'provvedimenti eccezionali estranei al sistema ordinario' whilst contemporarily promoting electoral democracy, the Fascist police system was founded on the total elimination, from 1926, of political opposition to the regime. The achievement of new internal orderliness necessitated:
il controllo preventivo e segreto sull'attività pubblica e privato delle persone, l'uso sistematico delle misure preventive di polizia (confine, ammonizione, diffide), la concessione di poteri amplissimi ai prefetti e al ministro dell'interno, che vengono ad essere svincolati per motivi di 'necessità e di urgenza' anche della forma del decreto legge (p. 72).

Carucci maintains that the 1926 PS law was founded upon the 1889 legislation but adds that it enormously amplified police powers 'allargando i margini della discrezionalità fino a negare ogni certezza al diritto ed ad annullare ogni rispetto della "persona umana"' (p. 72).

If the above indeed illustrates the adaptation of the traditional police organs to the requirements of the Fascist regime, one is naturally led to question the extent to which such organs became Fascist, given also, for example the increasing use of Fascist prefects during the 1920s and their obligatory party membership. According to D'Orsi, Mussolini himself was reluctant to 'fascistize' the traditional police organs because in this way they could be used, if necessary, to counter the power of the MVSN, denoting once again his exploitation of conflicting police hierarchies in order to maintain his personal power. Similarly Bocchini, Capo della Polizia until 1940, a traditional career class prefect, was able to control the police system 'sottraendola in tal modo in buona parte ad un inevitabile processo di
fascistizzazione' (p. 38). Collin adds that Bocchini, though personally corrupt and never more than opportunistically loyal to the regime, 'provided Mussolini with a valuable counterweight to the PNF, successfully resisting party efforts to dominate the field of law enforcement' (pp. 430–31). The Fascist nature of the traditional police system never went beyond its loyalty towards the figure of Mussolini, as demonstrated by Bocchini's particular concern to protect him from assassination attempts from 1925 onwards. Indeed the author suggests that the more or less unaltered state in which the police organization emerged from the Second World War and lived through the immediate postwar period is demonstrative of the relative autonomy it maintained throughout the Fascist period.63

In summarizing briefly the history of the Italian police system from its Piedmontese origins to the late 1920s, a number of significant factors emerge: firstly, the phenomenon of the co-existence of more than one police corps which may in turn be linked to historical conflict between military and civilian, royalist and bourgeois ruling forces in Italy; secondly, emphasis placed on preventive rather than repressive policing, a reflection of late and restricted development of mass politics and democracy in Italy and the reluctance of whichever ruling class (be it aristocratic or bourgeois, Liberal 'left' or Liberal 'right') to share political power, epitomized also in the figure of the
provincial prefect; thirdly, the close link between the traditional, liberal (post-unification) police system and that of the fascist authoritarian regime, as illustrated by the limited institutional changes Fascism brought to the traditional police organs, as well as the basis of nineteenth century preventive legislation of the Leggi Fascistissime of 1926 which in many respects may be considered a development and perfection of the former; finally, an undermanned and badly organized police system, a factor almost certainly playing an important role in the moulding of often unofficial twentieth-century prevention tactics and in the ascendancy of provincial Fascism.
NOTES


2. According to Volume VI of Enciclopedia del diritto, (p. 273): 'I carabinieri fin dalla loro istituzione hanno avuto una doppia dipendenza; dal competente ministero militare (difesa, esercito) per tutto ciò che riguarda il reclutamento, l'ordinamento, la disciplina, l'armamento, l'equipaggiamento, l'addestramento, nonché il servizio di polizia militare considerato nel senso più lato; dal Ministero dell'Interno per quanto si riferisce al servizio d'istituto, d'ordine e di sicurezza pubblica, nonché all'accasermamento ed al casermaggio'. According to Il Digesto Italiano: Enciclopedia di legislazione, dottrina e giurisprudenza, Vol. VI (Turin, 1906-12), p. 584, this naturally rendered the Carabinieri subject to the jurisdiction of both the military penal code and the civilian penal code 'per i reati commessi nell'esercizio delle loro funzioni, come ufficiali della polizia giudiziaria, ed agenti della pubblica sicurezza'.

3. Article 8 of the 'Regolamento per l'esecuzione della legge di Pubblica Sicurezza' of 21 June 1865, stated: L'azione delle Autorità e degli Ufficiali di Pubblica Sicurezza verso l'Arma dei Carabinieri si esercita per iscritto ed in forma di richiesta nel modo seguente: 1. La qualità dell'Autorità o dell'Ufficiale richiedente. 2. La richiesta. 3. Il comandante a cui è diretta la richiesta. 4. L'oggetto della richiesta. 5. La data e la firma. Qualora per l'urgenza non fosse possibile l'immediato estensione della richiesta in iscritto, può la medesima anche essere verbale, coll'obbligo a chi la fa di ridurla in iscritto al più presto possibile. Queste richieste sono indirizzate al Comandante dei Carabinieri Reali del luogo in cui occorra siano eseguite'. Article 9 stated: 'Qualunque difetto di forma nella richiesta, di cui all'articolo precedente, non dà la facoltà ai Carabinieri di rifiutarvi: essi hanno però il diritto di reclamare in seguito e di chiedere la riforma della richiesta'. Article 10 stated: 'Se il Comandante L'Arma dei Carabinieri Reali, per ragione di altri urgenti servizi, si trovi nell'impossibilità di
aderire in tempo debito, in tutto od in parte, alla richiesta, deve prontamente riferirne all'Autorità od all'Ufficiale da cui la richiesta è partita'. Article 11 stated: '(...') I Reali Carabinieri debbono rimesitere una relazione giornaliera ai Prefetti e Sottoprefetti. I Reali Carabinieri inoltre debbono riferire agli Ufficiali di Pubblica Sicurezza il risultato delle richieste da essi ricevute'.

4. According to article 18 of the Regolamento... etc., of 21 June 1865: 'Gli Ufficiali di Pubblica Sicurezza debbono indirizzare al Sindaco in iscritto le richieste pel concorso della Guardia Nazionale e devono indirizzare all'Autorità superiore militare del luogo quelle per l'intervento della Truppa. Queste richieste debbono indicare il numero approssimativo d'uomini necessario, il luogo e l'ora in cui la forza abbia ad intervenire'. According to D'Orsi, the Guardia Nazionale was abolished in 1870 (p. 13).

5. Renato (pp. 339-41) states that the 1865 law confirmed once again the dependence of the Amministrazione di Pubblica Sicurezza on the interior ministry through the prefect and sub-prefect at the provincial level. PS personnel was divided into funzionari (police officials), and agenti - the officials Questori, inspectors, vice-inspectors and delegates, and the agenti Carabinieri and Guardie di PS. Officials were further categorized into First Category (superior) of Questori, inspectors and vice-inspectors, for which a law degree was required, and Second Category (inferior) for delegates, for which a grammar school qualification was required by the Regio Decreto of 25 March 1880 under the Depretis government (Renato, p. 345). The delegate was in charge of policing in each sub-district (mandamento). In communes (comuni) without the office of delegate the mayor was as a police official responsible to the prefect or sub-prefect for policing. The 1865 law also gave the prefects the power to send delegates to localities in the province 'ove fosse stato necessario per la tutela dell'ordine pubblico e della sicurezza pubblica'. Fried notes (p. 65) that the Provincial and Communal Act of 23 October 1859 provided for the territorial subdivision of Italy into provinces (previously divisions), districts (Circondari) (previously provinces), sub-districts (Mandamenti) and communes (Comuni).


8. Fried, p. 19. The historian points out that the prefectural system was imposed in all regions of Italy, except the islands of Sicily and Sardinia (p. 57). Piedmont, a forerunner in administrative development was divided into military 'départements', which in turn were subdivided into 'arrondissements' (the equivalent of the former provinces in Piedmont) and communes (p. 15). The government executives in the 'arrondissements' and the commune were the Subprefect and the Mayor, respectively (p. 16). This denotes the affinities between the Napoleonic and later Piedmontese (Italian unification) prefectural systems.

9. According to Fried (pp. 15-17), the prefect, as administrative executive, appointed municipal councillors and mayors and his approval was required for all municipal council decisions. The First Consul appointed members of the councils of 'départements' and 'arrondissements'. France introduced a more centralized administrative system in Italy in that it subjected all communities to the same penetrating controls and regulations but the provision for a measure of local interest representation above the municipal level - which had not existed in Piedmont since the sixteenth century, for example- meant that in some respects the system was decentralized (p. 20). Prefects were active in promoting social and economic welfare among the populations entrusted to their care, introduced modern agricultural methods, reformed and encouraged welfare and education institutions and undertook broad programmes of public works (p. 21).

10. Through Law 3720 of 13 November 1859 the intendant general was replaced by the Governatore who in turn was
replaced, through the decree law of 9 October 1861, by the prefect.

11. According to Fried (p. 49) the prefect was expected to perform such administrative tasks as the maintenance of high educational standards for the ministry of education, taxation for the finance ministry, policing, elections and the maintenance of high sanitary standards for the interior ministry, conscription for the ministry of war, the provision of public works for the ministry of public works, etc.


15. Massimo Giannini, 'Autonomie comunali e controlli statali' in Zanni Rosiello (ed.), cit., pp. 103-22 (p. 120).


18. Aquarone, pp. 366-9. The author also mentions the example of the prefect of Pisa who was removed in January 1873 for having over-defended the anti-government forces there, as proof of the mistake of assuming that the prefectoral figure was automatically and exclusively an instrument of the will of the central government (pp. 361-3).


21. According to Berselli (p. 203), article 2 of the 'Provvedimenti Eccezionali' of 1874 stipulated: 'l'arresto preventivo, per ordine del prefetto o sottoprefetto, in attesa che fossero raccolti gli atti informativi per la denuncia nel più breve termine all'autorità giudiziaria di tutte le persone "sospette di far parte" delle associazioni(...)'. Article 3 allowed house-searches 'in qualunque tempo e dovunque avessero motivi di ritenere che si trovassero persone, armi od oggetti attinenti alle associazioni o reati indicati'. Most significantly, article 12 allowed between one and five years internal exile for members of the associations 'sulla proposta del prefetto', illustrating, therefore, the judicial role instilled in the prefect on such occasions.

22. In the words of Paolo Barile, 'Relazione generale' in Paolo Barile (ed.), La Pubblica Sicurezza, cit., pp. 11-49 (p. 13): 'nasce così lo speciale procedimento che permette di giungere a tale misura, mediante la denunzia al pretore e l'ingiunzione al prevenuto di darsi stabile lavoro e di non allontanarsi dal luogo del domicilio (se ozioso o vagabondo), oppure di "meglio comportarsi" o di ridurre il bestiame, qualora "notoriamente" ne abbia più di quanto ne possa mantenere, oppure di "non dare motivo ad ulteriori sospetti", nascono, infine, nel caso di contravvenzione all'ammonizione, l'arresto, il processo penale e la condanna per sospetto di furto'.

23. Giovanni Bolis, La polizia e le classi pericolose per la società (Bologna, 1871), pp. 490-92.


25. Law 314 of 19 July 1894 punished with between 3 and 6 years imprisonment whoever made, stored or transported bombs with the aim of committing crimes against persons and property or disturbing the peace (article 1). The sentence was increased to 4 to 10 years if the bomb was actually exploded and to 8 to 12 years if this occurred at times of public disorder (article 2). Articles 3 and 4 prescribed sentences of between 8 and 24 years should the consequences of the explosion be particularly grave (causing death, injury, etc.). According to article 5 the sentence was increased by between and third and a half if the crime was committed by three or more persons.
Article 6 sentenced those encouraging the use of explosives to between 3 and 5 years. Finally article 7 prescribed the punishment of domicilio coatto to 'ammoniti' and 'vigilati speciali', condemned on only one occasion for one of the above crimes.


28. Canosa (La polizia, cit., p. 30). D'Orsi (pp. 12-3) mentions the use of Carabinieri alongside the regular army to put down the following revolts: refusal of military service in Sicily (1861-2), the Palermo revolt (1865-6), demonstrations against taxation on flour in northern Italy (1869-70) which resulted in 250 deaths. He adds that usually the civilian police forces (Guardie di PS, Guardia Nazionale) moved in to carry out arrests and execute ring leaders, after the rebellions had been repressed by the army/Carabinieri. He also mentions (p. 19) the death of 92 citizens at the hands of the police and army when Crispi ordered the repression of the Sicilian proletarian movement ('Fasci Siciliani') in 1893.

29. For detailed accounts of the role of the police in the repression of the anarchist movement at the end of the nineteenth century see Alessandro Coletti, Anarchici e questori (Padua, 1971).

30. For the Battacchi case see Coletti, pp. 27-49. The author states that even members of the public totally above suspicion of subversion stepped forward in support of Batacchi's release. Notably Conte Arrivabene claimed that he himself had been fooled by the Questore into giving incorrect evidence during the trial. For the Freszi affair see pages 62-74.

31. See Neppi Modona Sciopero, potere politico e magistratura (Bari, 1969), pp. 24-5, 37-8, for details about the manner in which strikes were dealt with in the courts before 1889. The use of the 'ragionevole causa' as denominator judging the legitimacy of strikes and the success of this in generally suffocating strike action is demonstrated by the declaration of the illegality of the 1885 agrarian work stoppages of Mantova on the grounds that 'subversives' in demanding higher wage levels had
exploited peasant ignorance. The parliamentary scandal caused, however, by the arrest of 140 peasant strikers "in bianco" and their eventual acquittal is demonstrative of the growing pressure of public opinion for a more liberal revision of strike legislation. The author states (p. 26): "È evidente la tendenza a qualificare, con notevole superficialità ed approssimazione, tutti i gruppi di estrazione operaia o contadina che presentano un minimo di struttura organizzativa dapprima come affiliati all'Internazionale o comunque di provenienza anarchica, si da potere sostenere che la loro stessa esistenza costituisce un pericolo per le istituzioni dello stato, anche quando si è costretti a riconoscere il fondamento economico delle rivendicazioni che spingono il proletariato allo sciopero". Also worth noting are articles 165 and 166 of the 1889 penal code. Article 165 stated: 'Chiunque con violenza o minaccia, restringe o impedisce in qualsiasi modo la libertà dell'industria o del commercio è punito con la detenzione sino a venti mesi e con la multa da lire cento a tre mila'. Article 166 stated: 'Chiunque, con violenza o minaccia, cagiona o fa perdurare una cessazione o sospensione di lavoro, per imporre, sia ad operai, sia ai padroni o imprenditori, una diminuzione od un aumento dei salari, ovvero patti diversi da quelli precedentemente consentiti, è punito con la detenzione sino a venti mesi'.


33. There were few changes to the 1889 penal code during the Giolittian era. According to Canosa (La polizia, cit., p. 57), Law 278 of 28 June 1906, however, relaxed previous press censorship legislation by abolishing preventive newspaper confiscations without prior court orders. The 1912 penal code: 'prevedeva limiti massimi per la carcerazione preventiva - quali che fossero l'imputazione e lo stato dell'istruttoria nel momento in cui i termini venivano a scadere - anche se questi limiti non erano molto ristretti, regolava il mandato di cattura nel senso di ridurre ad una esigua minoranza i casi in cui esso era obbligatorio e di diminuire notevolmente anche i casi nel quali ne era prevista l'emissione facoltativa'. According to the author, social legislation concerning child and female labour, for example, was passed between 1900 and 1904.

34. Fried, pp. 149-51. According to the author, the prefect enrolled local criminals to intimidate, beat or even murder the opposition candidate who received no protection from local police forces and was often imprisoned until after polling day. Voters suspected of upholding the opposition were refused voting cards while
government supporters were given as many as twenty, often belonging to deceased voters. In the central and northern regions where local government and the political opposition were better protected by public opinion the prefect was instructed to show more tolerance especially towards local Socialist or Catholic party deputies on whose support Giolitti depended. For a closer picture of elections in the south under Giolitti and the role played by the police forces see Gaetano Salvemini's description of the 1904 election campaign in Gioia del Colle (Apuglia) in Il Ministro della mala vita e altri scritti sull'Italia giolittiana (Milan, 1966), pp. 73-107, and Amedeo Nasalli Rocca, Memorie di un prefetto (Rome, 1946), pp. 46-50, for an account of electoral operations in Cuneo (Piedmont).

35. According to Neppi Modona, p. 163: 'le numerose sentenze del supremo collegio, che a partire dal 1905, escludono l'operosità dell'art. 165 cod. pen. in occasione del cosidetti scioperi politici, a vantaggio del delitto di violenza privata, acquistano un inequivoco significato di appoggio alla volontà politica del governo.'

36. Article 181 of the 1889 penal code - which inflicted a fine of between 500 and 5,000 Lire and temporary suspension of work on three or more public officials who went on strike - stated that 'previo concerto' in the form of a union deliberation was necessary before a work stoppage could be penalized. According to Neppi Modona, however, there were only two cases (Parma and Siena) where the courts ruled that it need to be proven that workers acted on the orders of their union. The Cassation Court in fact ruled that: 'Non è necessario che il pubblico ufficiale abbia partecipato alla deliberazione presa dai collegi di abbandonare l'ufficio, poiché il concerto può anche essere costituito da un accordo di volontà tacito ed esplicarsi con l'abbandono simultaneo del lavoro da parte degli scioperanti. (...) È sufficiente che il pubblico ufficiale abbandonato il lavoro per aderire alla deliberazione degli organi sindacali, affissa per le vie e pubblicata nei giornali locali' (p.143, p.150).

37. Giovan Battista Arista, 'Il Corpo delle Guardie di Città e le vicende della politica interna italiana dall dicembre 1890 all'ottobre 1919' in Rivista di Polizia, January 1961, pp. 22-45 (pp. 23-4). With Law 7321 the Guardie di Città consisted of 25 officers, 600 non-commissioned officers - marescialli, brigadieri and guardie scelti - 4225 guardie and 150 cadets. Maintaining the attributions of the past the corps was divided into Compagnie, Brigade and Sottobrigate. The Compagnie were placed in towns with a Questura, the Brigade and Sottobrigate in other localities, 'quando gravi motivi di
servizio lo richiedevano'. The law stipulated that cadets had to attend a special training course in Rome.

38. Article 2 of Law 648 of 30 December 1906 offered, for example, salary increases to graduati or guardie who continued service after 5 years. This increased again, if they were to stay on after 10 years service. Guardie who were married or widowed with children received monthly bonuses. Article 3 clearly aimed to encourage lengthened service since, for example, after 15 years service pensions were worth only a quarter of a salary, whereas this increased to four fifths should they have completed 25 years of service or reached the age of fifty. As the interior minister himself pointed out to prefects in a circular of 1907 (9601 of 9 July 1907) Testo Unico 367 of 27 June 1907 brought economic improvements for Guardie di Città and enabled quick promotion possibilities from agente to non-commissioned officer (sottufficiale), as well as a full pension after 25 years' service.


40. Un Ex-Ministro dell'Interno, 'La polizia e la sua unificazione' in Nuova Antologia, 104, 1890, pp. 733-44 (p. 734).


44. Gaetano Sciacca, 'Organì e servizi di polizia', in Nuova Antologia, 199, 1905, pp. 319-31 (pp. 325-6).


46. Flores, p. 176. According to Flores: 'La crisi che colpiva l'arma dei Carabinieri era grave perché riuscivano deserti i nuovi arruolamenti, né i ministri del Tesoro, che si erano succeduti nel ministero Orlando, avevano trovato modo di fare i fondi per migliorare le condizioni. Durante la guerra l'opera dei carabinieri alla fronte, lodovissima nell'interesse generale, in quanto procedeva al rastrellamento dei paviidi che tentavano disertare, aveva logorato l'arma anche di
fronte alle masse, che non comprendevano i miserabili sacrifici compiuti dai carabinieri, non si vedeva benevolmente l'arma e mentre i nuovi arruolamenti non avevano alcun risultato, anche coloro che compivano la ferma nell'arma, preferivano andar via rifiutando ogni proposta di rimozione di ferma'. See also Lorenzo Donati, 'La Guardia Regia' in Storia Contemporanea, 8, 1977, pp. 441-487 (p. 444).

47. According to Donati, p. 447: 'Nel dopoguerra il timore dell'uso della truppa come polizia si accentuò al tal punto che si riconobbe apertamente che "non potrebbe la truppa essere impegnata largamente in servizio di ordine pubblico". I soldati erano in fatti sospettati di una possibile fraternizzazione con le masse che invece avrebbero dovuto contenere e reprimere.'

48. Donati (p. 448) again states that: 'L'assegnare all'Arma il monopolio delle forze dell'ordine italiano avrebbe significato probabilmente, per il Governo, rimanere in balia delle gerarchie militari dell'esercito (e forse della Corona stessa) in un settore d'intervento estremamente delicato e proprio in cui circolavano voci e propositi di cambiamenti istituzionali'.

49. Donati, pp. 451-3. The author adds that by the end of 1920 there was an officer to every 44 Guardie - compared with one officer to every 55 Carabinieri in 1921. By September 1921 the Regie Guardie also possessed 8 cavalry squadrons.

50. D'Orsi, p. 25. The reaction of the left to the strengthening of Italy's police organization with the founding of the Regie Guardie and Agenti Investigativi was sceptical. According to Donati, pp. 463-7, it represented in Gramsci's opinion, a "cura ricostituente di guardia regia, di poliziotti, di carabinieri scelti e simili" that avrebbero ammazzato "ogni tanto, per le vie del paese, alla spicciolata, qualche cittadino, per tenersi in esercizio pel giorno della rivoluzione", and the Regie Guardie themselves a "corpo armato mercenario creato dallo stato borghese". The new corps, perhaps because of its important policing role 'a scapito anche dei carabinieri e dell'esercito' and its proletarian origins which were seen as a form of class betrayal, was a particular subject of debate in the communist daily Ordine Nuovo which aimed to convince Guardie of their exploitation by the regime.

51. General Giardino claimed that the extent of rivalry among Regie Guardie reached a state where: 'Anche le punizioni e i trasferimenti chiesti o inflitti dai comandanti gerarchi responsabili risentivano di questa clima di rivalità tra ufficiali, per cui poteva accadere che dopo
breve tempo questi provvedimenti fossero attenuati o revocati da altri superiori con grave pregiudizio (…) della disciplina e del prestigio di tutto il corpo' (Donati, pp. 472-8).


53. Article 2 of the legislation specified that the corps of the Agenti di PS consisted of 144 officers and 12,000 non-commissioned officers and agenti. Articles 7 and 8 allowed the recruitment of agenti among Carabinieri and discharged Carabinieri and soldiers. Article 19 specified that commanders belonging to the Ruolo Specializzato would take the rank which they possessed at the moment of the abolition of the Regie Guardie and that non-commissioned officers and agenti would retain the rank they possessed in the Ruolo Specializzato.

54. See the following legislation governing the constitution and working of the MVSN: Regi Decreti 31 (14 January 1923), 831 (8 March 1923), 832 (8 March 1923), 967 (15 March 1923), 1597 (8 July 1923), 2316 (10 October 1923), 2903 (30 December 1923) and 1292 (4 August 1924).


58. According to Lyttelton, p. 401: 'La Milizia rimaneva agli * ordini diretti di Mussolini, eccetto che nell'esercizio delle funzioni di addestramento premilitare. Uniformi, simboli e nomenclatura fascisti non venivano toccati. Il reclutamento, per quanto nominalmente aperto ai non-fascisti, rimaneva sotto il controllo dei consoli. Una modesta concessione era fatta all'esercito con la norma in virtù della quale fuori servizio agli ufficiali della MVSN sarebbe stato riconosciuto il grado che avevano avuto da militari (ma all'interno della Milizia potevano continuare ad esercitare funzioni più elevate del loro grado nominale)'.


60. According to Fried (p. 187), article 1 of the law stated: 'Prefects shall act to ensure unity of political orientation in the activities of different state services
and of the local authorities, within the territory of
their respective provinces, coordinating the activity of
all public offices and supervising their services except
for the administration of Justice, War, Navy, Air,
Railroads and the Southern Public Works', an improvement
therefore on his previously postion. In the liberal
state, Fried maintains (p. 146), the prefect could not
very easily keep track of what the various services were
doing, since their directors tended to act on their own,
often failing to inform him of decisions affecting
provincial interests. Each ministry tended to distribute
its patronage through its own field offices. The prefect
could only counter-act this through the various
hierarchical channels.

61. Mussolini's circular defined the prefect as 'il
rappresentante diretto del potere centrale' and warned
that: 'l'autorità non può essere condotta a "mezzadria",
né sono tollerabili slittamenti di autorità o di
responsabilità. L'autorità è una ed autoritaria. Se ciò
non sia si ricade in piena disorganizzazione e
disintegrazione dello stato: si distrugge cioè, uno dei
maggiori motivi di trionfo dell'azione fascista, che
lottò (...) per dare consistenza, autorità, prestigio,
forza allo stato, per fare lo stato uno e intangibile,
come è e deve essere lo stato fascista'. Regarding the
repression of state enemies the circular continued: 'Il
prefetto deve porre la massima diligenza nella difesa del
regime contro tutti coloro che tendono ad insidiarlo o ad
indebolirlo (...)' and with regard to moral discipline:
'Il prefetto fascista si occupa della tutela dell'ordine
morale (...) l'ordine morale fra i cittadini diventa il
presupposto e la migliore garanzia dell'ordine pubblico',
and finally, with regard to his new powers over the
political and administrative life of the province: 'Il
prefetto fascista non è il prefetto dei tempi
demoliberali. Allora il prefetto era soprattutto un
agente elettorale. Ora che di elezioni non si parla più,
il prefetto cambia figura e stile: il prefetto deve
prendere tutte le iniziative che formino il decoro del
regime (...) e al prefetto che deve fare capo tutta la
vita della provincia, ed e dal prefetto che la vita della
provincia deve ricevere impulso, coordinazione, direttive
(...)'. (D'Orsi, pp. 29-30).

62. According to Casula, p. 145, the move towards
' politicization' of the prefect was facilitated by Regio
Decreto 2395 of 11 November 1923 which eliminated the
state of 'aspettativa' and 'disponibilità' founded in
1901, so that once the maximum period of 'disposizione'
(three years) had expired prefects were automatically
retired from service. Casula sees this as 'innovazioni
(...) che rientrano puntualmente nella linea di favore
economico collegato al meccanismo punitivo della
rimozione temporanea. The law increased the maximum number of Prefects 'a disposizione' to 15 and eliminated the maximum period of 'disposizione' 'quando al prefetto in tale stato fossero affidati speciali incarichi del ministro', denoting the use of prefects for special non-provincial missions. In the words of the author (p. 145), 'Il prefetto con il carico diverso dalla prefettura diventa così un ipotesi ordinaria e stabile e vice versa, fra i compiti connessi alla qualifica di prefetto, vengono ad essere ricompresi anche gli speciali incarichi affidati dal Ministro'.

63. Richard Collin (pp. 431-2) states: 'Just as Public Security guards and Carabinieri had maintained a substantial degree of independence under Fascism, albeit while enforcing Fascist laws, neither force changed enormously in the immediate postwar period, although the greater discipline and organizational unity of the Carabinieri, plus their contributions to the Resistance, helped them to emerge from the war with somewhat greater prestige. Those senior officials in both organizations who had been too closely identified with Fascism were quietly retired, but at the working level, policemen who had been anti-Marxists under Giolitti and Mussolini survived to be anti-Marxists under Alcide De Gaspari'. 
CHAPTER TWO: SOCIAL, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS IN THE PROVINCE OF BOLOGNA, 1897-1925

This second introductory chapter follows social, political and economic developments in Bologna from the last decades of the nineteenth century until the establishment of a Fascist dictatorship in Italy in 1925, with the intention of providing the reader with a background to the case-study. It aims, wherever possible, to indicate those aspects of the history and development of the province in which the police authorities played a significant role, as a prelude to the following analytical chapters.

It should be emphasised that until Italy's entry into the First World War in 1915 the Bolognese province owed its economic livelihood to agriculture (rice, wheat and hemp particularly), as is reflected in the many agricultural conflicts spanning the years 1890 to 1914.¹ Before the European conflict Bolognese urban industry consisted mostly of small-scale, artisan-structured machine, food, steel and chemical manufacturers of limited importance.² The only existing larger-scale industries were directly linked to agriculture, stimulated by projects of agricultural modernization and mechanization and land reclamation undertaken at the end of the nineteenth century. They produced farm machinery/vehicles and steam-powered pumps for land reclamation (Dalla Casa, pp. 180-1).

From an agricultural viewpoint Antony Cardoza divides the
province of Bologna into three areas, each with varying forms of cultivation and social structure: the plains, foothills and mountains. The first, forming part of the Po Valley which stretches across the northern half of the province was characterized by large farming estates of at least fifty hectares each for the cultivation of wheat, sugar, trefoil, hemp, rice and other crops. They were usually owned by large landowners (grandi proprietari) but were often rented out to large leaseholders (grandi affittuari) (Cardoza, p. 12). The foothills lying directly south of the city of Bologna tended to be farmed by sharecroppers (mezzadri) (wheat, corn, grapes, fruit, livestock rearing), though only between 60% and 90% of the land was exploited (Cardoza, p. 18). The mountainous area to the very south of the province was predominently farmed by small peasant proprietors (piccoli proprietari lavoratori) (corn, potatoes, chickpeas and beans for direct consumption). It was only 40% arable, however, and was geographically and culturally isolated from the social, political and economic life of the province (Cardoza, pp. 16-17).  

The majority of large landowners were members of the local aristocracy. According to D'Attorre, they were usually involved in Italian political and economic life at the local, provincial and national level. The Marquis Tanari, for example, besides owning farmland, held the office of mayor of Bologna, was a parliamentary deputy and undertook
many new agricultural projects. Several of them held the office of village mayor. Scaglierini, in her account of the commune of San Giovanni in Persiceto, states that many absentee landowners left the responsibility of running their farms to fattori (managers). She also mentions, alongside the aristocratic landowners, urban middle-class proprietors from either the city of Bologna or San Giovanni itself (usually successful merchants, contractors or members of the professional classes) who, unlike the absentee nobility, exercised greater control over the running of their farms. The small/medium proprietors (piccoli/medi proprietari) were divided into two categories: peasant farmers who worked their land (proprietari lavoratori) and those usually belonging to the urban lower middle-classes who had become wealthy as a result of their activities and who employed peasant workers (proprietari non-lavoratori).

Alongside the landowners were the leaseholders. By the end of the twentieth century many of the biggest farms on the plains catered not only for the harvesting but also for the cleaning, refining, storage and selection of crops. Management of these farms was increasingly taken over from their proprietors by large leaseholders (grandi affittuari) whose full time staff included technical experts, skilled peasant workers and engineers. The leaseholder class was chiefly responsible for the above-mentioned undertakings of land reclamation and agricultural modernization (Cardoza, pp. 23-4). The landowners often rented out small sections
of their property to small/medium leaseholders (affittuari piccoli/medi, lavoratori or non-lavoratori) who paid rent by ceding 18% of their produce to them (Scaglierini, p. 140).

To the peasant classes may be added sharecroppers (mezzadri), permanently employed labourers (salarlati fissi), and seasonal workers (braccianti). The sharecroppers were employed by landowners or leaseholders to work small plots of their land by annual contract. At the turn of the century such contracts stipulated that the sharecropper had to cede 50% of his produce or livestock to his employer. He was also responsible for the costs of hiring peasant workers and feeding harvesting vehicle drivers and for the provision of tools. His employer provided him with housing and paid 50% of the costs of seeds and farm machinery hire (Scaglierini, p. 142).

The permanently employed labourers chiefly worked on the large farms on the plain and were paid monthly in cash and natural products. Scaglierini states that:

nonostante gli stipendi fossero bassi, venivano considerati come una categoria privilegiata rispetto ai braccianti (salarlati avventizi), poiché avevano un guadagno garantito e sicuro. I salarlati avventizi, o braccianti, costituivano la classe più povera dei lavoratori agricoli, quella più soggetta alla disoccupazione; essi venivano pagati giornalmente a cottimo, ma durante un anno lavoravano in media 50 e 60 giornate (...) 15 lire per giornata (p. 143).
Cardoza states that, 'ordinarily labourers and braccianti resided in make-shift "agro-towns" along the roadways of the plains', by way of illustrating their deplorable living conditions (p. 25).

It was indeed braccianti unrest, attributed by Cardoza to the nationwide if not continental economic crisis in agriculture during the 1880s, which saw the beginnings of a rural Socialist movement in Bologna as elsewhere, especially in the Po valley. Competition from North America, Argentina and Russia forced landowners to withdraw land from cultivation or shift to less extensive crops, cutting labour costs down to a minimum by transforming many sharecroppers into braccianti. The state responded by promoting land reclamation projects (p. 45). Cardoza adds, however, that the leaseholders involved in this:

shared few of the gentlemanly pretensions and paternal sentiments of the agrarian old guard; they were essentially "agricultural industrialists" in the business of maximizing profits by increasing production, lowering costs, and selling their crops in the most lucrative markets. Running business enterprises rather than peasant households, they began to apply systematic economic calculation to farming and to introduce new crop rotations, machines and chemical fertilizers on an unprecedented scale (p. 49).
Bolognese **braccianti** Socialism was strongly influenced by the anarchist tendencies - dating back to the 1870s - of Bakhunin and the regional socialist leader Andrea Costa. If during the 1880s spontaneous Anarchy was dominated by 'legal' Socialism, the radical nature of social tensions in the province allowed the movement - now called the Partito Socialista Rivoluzionario Romagnolo, founded in 1881 - to retain a firm revolutionary character alongside its legalitarianism.⁶

The first **braccianti** syndical organizations opposed to the power of the agricultural employers appeared around 1884. They aimed, as the Associazione Operai Braccianti del Mandamento di Budrio, to increase salaries, improve peasant working conditions and reduce local unemployment. From 1885 similar organizations for permanently employed labourers began to exist.⁷ In 1892 the founding of the Camera del Lavoro in Bologna coincided with that of the Partito dei Lavoratori Italiani (the future Partito Socialista Italiano) by Costa in Genoa. With a heterogeneous composition of Democrats, Radicals and Socialists, it united both urban and rural syndicates which were divided, according to trade, into leagues,⁸ though according to Arbizzani (La Federazione, cit., pp.114-5):

**gli interventi della Camera del Lavoro di Bologna verso le campagne e i contadini erano stati molto limitati (...).**

Nonostante la riaffermazione dell'impegno di profondire una
"cura continua" verso i lavoratori delle campagne, l'opera dell'organismo cittadino restò sempre saltuaria ed "estranea" alle reali esigenze organizzative e sindacali dei lavoratori della terra.

In 1901 the Federazione Nazionale dei Lavoratori della Terra (Federterra) was founded. Divided into provincial affiliates and closely linked to the Camera del Lavoro, at its first congress, held in Bologna in November that year, it voted in favour of a policy of socialization of the land and of production and exchange, to the disgust of many sharecroppers and small/medium leaseholders who splintered off from the organization. Indeed, according to Arbizzani, (La Federazione, cit., p. 119):

L'identificazione di programmi e obbiettivi fra l'organizzazione sindacale e il Partito Socialista, pose un limite fortissimo alla penetrazione e all'influenza del sindacato fra le categorie contadine e in special modo fra i mezzadri, i fittavoli e i piccoli proprietari coltivatori diretti.

Its founding of workers' cooperatives, apart from protecting wage levels, enabled experimentation in both land socialization and production control. Cooperatives were able to buy or rent land on which their members worked, paying them a fixed salary. Later-founded farm machinery
cooperatives which rented out harvesting vehicles to sharecroppers at cheap cost also played a significant part in the agrarian conflicts.9

Such achievements were the result, however, of years of laborious and often violent struggles. The peasant strike weapon itself carried serious risks because in order to become effective it needed to be put into action during the harvest months so threatening both the employers with the loss of a whole year's produce and the braccianti with the loss of the major part of their annual wages. (Cardoza, pp. 58-9). League victories during strikes were imperative, therefore, so that their action was directed not only against the employers but also against non-league workers, known as 'krumiri', often with violent results. According to Preti:

Si comincia con l'opera di convinzione: e se questa non ha esito, si passa alla minaccia. Dalla minaccia si scende molto sovente, quando gli animi sono riscaldati e il posto in gioco è grande, anche alla violenza.10

Indeed, various forms of anti-'krumiri' boycotting were adopted by the socialist syndical organizations during the period under examination, as is demonstrated in the following chapters.

The reaction of Bologna's property-owning classes to the development of Socialism in the province was naturally total
condemnation. Both the landowner and leaseholder classes declared the *braccianti* strikes of 1897 'acts of economic repression and violence, violating the fundamental norms of reason, custom and law' (Cardoza, p. 58). The author continues that even the traditional, aristocratic class of landowners, though partly blaming the strikes on the profit-making policies of the leaseholders, were relatively unsympathetic. Indeed many, realizing that they could benefit from higher rents, if not also threatened from the competition of industrial agriculture, moved over to the leaseholder class (p. 52). Government repression was advocated as a means of 'bringing the workers back to their senses' and the agrarian local press organ *La Gazzetta Emilia* of 9 July 1897 accused syndicalist profiteers of spending their time in coffee houses 'mentre i poveri disgraziati, che ricevono la loro parola d'ordine, durano fatica a trovare in qualche fosso dell'acqua putrida'. According to Onofri the frequent use of the army to suffocate strike initiatives was the motive for which *braccianti* work-stoppages were usually fruitless. Indeed, according to Tarozzi the 1890s were hard years for the Camera del Lavoro organizations, hit by Crispi's 'Leggi Eccezionali' in 1894 and the declaration of martial law in 1898 which saw the disbandment of many syndicates and cooperatives (as outlined in Chapter III). Likewise its funding from the city council was frequently abolished, as during the period spanning December 1896 and April 1898
The reaction of these classes to Socialist electoral gains was equally hostile. When in the administrative elections of 1889 the Democratic League (Socialists, Radicals and Republicans) won control of the council of Imola, the new administrators were referred to as 'straccioni, mascalzoni, affamati' (Onofri, '1913-22 cit., p. 64-5). Imola's council, distinguished for its initiatives in the public sector, including the founding of orphanages and mental hospitals, increased welfare policies and the making of school education more effectively compulsory, was abolished in May 1893 on government orders (Arbizzani, Su compagni, cit., p. 127). In 1895 and 1898 the Socialist party was forced to go into hiding to avoid government persecution (Arbizzani, Su compagni, cit., p. 157).

The 1897 braccianti strike in Molinella in the north-east corner of the province of Bologna was one of the few successful union initiatives. The agreement reached between the leagues and the employers' association stipulated the reduction of daily working hours from twelve to seven and wage increases from 1.50 to 3.00 lira per day for male and from 1.20 to 1.75 lira for female labourers. Employers were also forced to accept foremen ('caporali') to keep watch over their actions and decisions, a first step, therefore, towards worker control, which employers were hardly prepared to tolerate for long (Onofri, '1913-22 cit., p. 64). Indeed, if the 1897 strike may have taken the agrarians by
surprise, they fought back ruthlessly the following year with the aid of the prefect who reduced rice-workers' wages on his own authority, using troops and policemen to arrest and imprison league leaders and close Molinella's consumer cooperative, braccianti leagues and the local Camera del Lavoro (Onofri, p. 62). This more or less coincided with government repression of acts of solidarity on the part of the local 'subversive' parties in the aftermath of the violent suffocation of the Milan bread riots (see Chapter I, pp. 38-9) so that a number of local newspapers (the Socialist L'Amico del Povero, the Republican La Minoranza and the Anarchist La Libertà), many affiliates of the Camera del Lavoro and the Circolo Educativo Socialista were forcibly closed (Tarozzi, p. 32). In 1900, with the threat of renewed strike action, the prefect supplied the farmers with 600 military farmworkers (Cavazza, p. 74). The agrarians justified this on the grounds that:

Noi (...) rappresentiamo una parte non piccola dello stato e dal momento che i soldati sono al suo servizio di difenderlo dai nemici esterni, perché noi non dovremmo servirci di loro per combattere il nemico che lo aggredisce dall'interno? (Onofri 1953-22, cit., p. 62).

The appointment of Giovanni Giolitti to the post of interior minister in February 1901 partly affected the outlook of the prefectoral authorities. This reflected the
statesman's theory that social, economic and political concessions would reduce discontent among the masses, isolate PSI extremists and, in Cardoza's words, 'strengthen the position of reformist elements within the PSI who could then be induced to participate in an enlarged governing coalition under his leadership' (p. 70). It was certainly true that in Bologna itself strikes and electoral advancement had since 1898 continued, despite repressive measures. Indeed, the PSI had won three out of eight constituencies at the 1900 general election (Onofri, 1982, cit., p. 72). Giolitti ordered the prefect to demand greater fairness from agricultural employers. In 1901 police and military action was in fact minimal compared to previous years, league offices and Socialist-controlled councils remaining open (Cardoza, p. 72). This policy naturally weakened the agrarian class which was divided over the question of how to deal with league power. The leaseholder class, particularly concerned at the fact that their rent contracts stipulated payment irregardless of financial loss through strikes, generally refused cooperation with union leaders or government mediation through the prefect and looked towards the formation of 'associazioni di resistenza'. The old guard landowner class advocated compromise in the hope that this would neutralize the appeal of the leagues (Cardoza, pp. 78-85). According to D'Attorre, several of them felt that the solution to the challenge of braccianti leagues lay in the expansion of
sharecropping, others in Catholic-organized 'cooperativismo confessionale dei lavoratori, alternativo all'organizzazione di resistenza, di cui siano economicamente partecipi gli stessi proprietari' (D'Attorre, p. 119).

The return of tension in the Bolognese countryside from 1902 onwards was a reflection of Giolitti's national-level strategy, as demonstrated by the break between the PSI and the government in March 1903 over the issue of continued 'eccidi proletari' in urban centres and the now prime minister's inclusion of right-wing elements in his government in November. A number of his policies aimed at minimizing the dependence of rural employers on braccianti. These included the use of contracts binding braccianti to work even during strikes and the increased employment of sharecroppers (Cardoza, p. 88). A partial return to strike repression is demonstrated, according to Arbizzani ('La Federazione', pp. 122-3), by the outcome of the Molinellese strikes of the summer of 1903 which after 72 days concluded with the arrest of 39 strikers and the imprisonment of 12.

If again at the national level the change in PSI strategy manifested itself in the increasing influence of Revolutionary Syndicalist factions and the first general strike in 1904, the involvement of the sharecroppers in rural conflicts in Bologna from that year onwards was, according to Cardoza, crucial, because the threat of a united Socialist peasant front forced the agrarians to put aside their differences in order to form a stronger opposing
force (Cardoza, p. 100). D'Attorre states that many aristocratic landowners defected to the leaseholder-capitalist front, as in other Emilian provinces, in the defence of the general interests of agriculture, with the aim of favouring the development of contract labourers (as opposed to braccianti) and turning the sharecroppers against the braccianti by organizing and developing their class in order to 'esasperare la disgregazione del proletariato rurale attraverso una gestione discriminatoria del collocamento, riaffermando così il pieno controllo del mercato del lavoro' (D'Attorre, p. 120). Sturani, the front leader of such developments, which became known as 'compartecipazione', advocated not only opposition to league power in defence of property and liberty but also the support and protection of other agricultural classes and non-league braccianti within a united farming hierarchy (Cardoza, pp. 102-4). In this sense the agrarian class was partly supportive of Catholic syndicalism which promoted the formation of separate sharecropper leagues. Indeed the commercial farmers of Molinella had a monopoly over the local Catholic organizations by 1904 (Cardoza, p. 93).

There is indeed no doubt as to the ambiguous social position of the sharecropper class. Though not always in agreement with his employer the sharecropper was traditionally dependent on the success of harvests for a living and opposed, therefore, to strike action (Cardoza, p. 21). Paul Corner in his account of the neighbouring
province of Ferrara states that this peasant class had a tendency to oscillate between the landowners and leagues. They supported the syndical organizations when this proved to be advantageous but they were also prepared to abandon them as soon as the agrarian employers responded positively to their demands. The historian adds, however, that they were not prepared to accept becoming members of a rural proletariat which to them signified unemployment and general hardship. According to Preti, many sharecroppers sided with the leagues for economic reward in the hope that the so-often-preached abolition of private property would not turn into a reality, since their ultimate desire was to be able to afford to buy their own plot of land (Preti, pp. 250-51).

The attitude of the Socialist unions to this class was no less ambiguous, however. Franco Cavazza states that economic gains - Federterra initially aimed to achieve the division of farming expenses and products between the sharecropper and employer by exactly 50% - were offered in the sly hope that sharecroppers could eventually be converted to the Socialist visions of land socialization (Cavazza, p. 76). At the same time, however, boycotting was extended to the class as a means of coercing them into joining the leagues (Cardoza, p. 95, Preti, p. 301). This is significant if one is to consider that the sharecroppers were among the first rural classes to defect to the Fascist syndicates from 1921 onwards.
Though the policies of 'compartecipazione' were initially effective by 1907 it was clear that the agrarians had failed to win over the sharecroppers in significant numbers, given the strength of both the Socialist and Catholic syndicates (D'Attorre, p. 120). The period 1907 to 1911 was generally marked by peaceful relations in Bologna as many employers negotiated with Federterra. This more or less coincided with a general return to Reformist Socialist dominance both in Bologna and nationally, and less willingness on the part of the government to support the employers outright, as demonstrated by the new prefect Dallari's refusal to grant police/army support over the importation of non-league workers during strikes (Fiorentino, p. 19). The most intransigent of the agrarians joined forces against the unions by forming, for the first time, provincial, regional and even national-level organizations. The founding of the 'Interprovinciale' - a regional farmers' association - in 1907 and the Confederazione Nazionale degli Agricoltori (CNA) in 1910 marked the growing need for class solidarity in the face of the hegemony of industry and the threat of Socialism. The intransigent line, representing the leaseholder class of farmers, called for legal restrictions on the leagues, strike-insurance funds and the formation of an interprovincial corps of armed volunteers to protect non-league workers from league violence, as used by the agrarian leader of Parma, Carrara, during the agricultural strikes of 1908 (D'Attorre, p. 123).
The modernization of farming, as illustrated by the use of new machinery and planting techniques, electrification and the development of sugar refineries, textile manufacturers and food processors indicates the growing relationship between agriculture and industry from 1908. The intransigents, led by Carrara, urged the founding of new forms of political representation, however, to protect agriculture from the power of industry, as experienced by the tensions which this new rapport had created over price-stability, over-production and financial speculation. The agrarian parliamentary pressure groups he proposed would also serve to oppose Giolittian policies of mediation and compromise with Socialism. The more moderate line led by Count Filippo Cavazza, who continued to advocate government mediation in strikes and the use of the traditional liberal party system for lobbying for the needs of agriculture, had been isolated from the forefront of 'Interprovinciale' by 1911 (Cardoza, pp. 138-46, D'Attorre, pp. 121-25). The Associazione Agraria Bolognese (AAB), founded that year, was modelled on Carrara's organization in Parma (Cardoza, p. 165). One of its main exponents, Alfredo Benni, had indeed led the Bolognese intransigents in previous years and like Carrara used squads of strikebreakers to protect his workers, as is demonstrated in the following chapter. As shown in this study (see pp. 178-79), the hard line of the AAB radicalized social, political and economic tensions in the province to the extent that the organization broke off
relations with the prefect in 1912.\textsuperscript{16}

The increase in agrarian militancy in Bologna during the years leading up to the First World War coincided with a general loss of faith in the capabilities of the liberal parliamentary system. The extension of the franchise, enlarging the electorate from three and a half to over eight and a half million, enabled a PSI victory in Bologna in both the general election of 1913 and the administrative election of 1914 - Bologna's city council gained a Socialist majority for the first time (Onofri\textsuperscript{12} p. 67). According to Cardoza (p. 207) the failure of the liberal parties was partly caused by the hard line of the AAB which isolated many farmers, fragmenting agrarian electoral forces, therefore. The government's failure to intervene in the class war pushed the agrarian organizations, together with the industrialists, towards the anti-parliamentary politics of Nationalism. Attracted by its cries for an anti-democratic, authoritarian form of government and the expansion of markets abroad, the CNA, according to Cardoza, supported the 1912 invasion of Libya, lobbying for government spending on an Italian empire, rather than on the masses. Socialism, which obstructed the progress of production, became strongly identified as the enemy of patriotism (Cardoza, p. 187, pp. 190-2, D'Attorre, p. 127).

The combined industrialist-agrarian front, bolstered by the economic recession in 1913, in turn pushed the PSI into the arms of the Revolutionaries who won a
majority at the 1912 PSI congress at Reggio Emilia. Though in Bologna itself the majority of peasant workers remained Reformist (as was demonstrated by Federterra's joining the Camera Confederale del Lavoro which split off in 1912 from the Syndicalist Camera del Lavoro with mostly urban membership) (Arbizzani, 'La Federazione', cit., p. 140), the agricultural syndicates showed firm determination against agrarian intransigence as was illustrated by Federterra's new sharecroppers' programme of 1913. This aimed to increase to over 50% the expenses sustained by the employer and the products retained by the sharecropper. It also intended to remove where possible tension between sharecroppers and braccianti (Arbizzani, 'Lotta mezzadrile', cit., pp. 169-70). This eventually led to the particularly violent combined braccianti-sharecroppers' strike in Molinella in the summer of 1914 - provoked by the handing out of eviction notices to sharecroppers who, with the support of Federterra, had demanded a fairer deal from their employers. (Arbizzani, 'La Federazione', cit., pp. 151-3).

Under the new government of Salandra who succeeded Giolitti in April 1914 and the new prefect Vincenzo Quaranta, appointed in August, the Molinellese farmers obtained police support over the importation of 'krumiri' from the province of Padova to replace the strikers. On 5 October Socialist league workers attacked the convoy of non-league workers in an effort to prevent its arrival in
Molinella, killing four peasants and injuring many others. In the wave of police repression following the incident league power was eliminated as local syndical leaders were either arrested or, as in the case of the local PSI leader Massarenti, fled to exile, and farmers threatened with eviction those sharecroppers who did not sign contracts on their terms. As is indeed revealed in the following chapter, the Guarda massacre became, in the eyes of the public (which only a few months previously had experienced the truly revolutionary implications of 'Red Week') a symbol of what they considered to be Socialist tyranny in the province of Bologna. Documentation reveals, however, that Molinella's movement was prosecuted less on factual evidence and more on the immoral implications of Socialism as a whole.

Though the entry of Italy into the European conflict in 1915 and the necessities of war naturally placed restrictions on syndical power, the decrease, at least officially, in labour disputes during the war years cannot be attributed to state repression - as evident in the strict disciplinary procedures governing the running of many militarized war production plants during the conflict alone. If Cavazza asserts (p. 116) that the PSI 'aveva trasferito il suo campo di manovra in un altro terreno: quello della battaglie contro l'interventismo per la neutralità ad ogni costo.', so weakening syndical defence systems, Cardoza argues that Federterra rather than
supporting the party line responded positively to the government's call for increased and more efficient production since it saw this as a means of legitimizing its policies. Bologna's Socialist municipalities, unions and cooperatives were in fact so efficiently organized that they were considered indispensable to the war effort. Federterra itself came to an agreement with the AAB, through the mediation of the prefect, that the latter would only hire socialist workers if it promised not to strike (Cardoza, pp. 221-2). Archival documentation again reveals, however, that though there were no serious disputes during the war, Federterra particularly felt that the AAB violated its side of the agreement and that the prefectoral authorities tolerated this for the most part.

The war additionally brought vital changes to the industrial sector of the province. The necessity of increased production expanded the chemical, machine, wood, textile and state industries. Those factories most needed for the war effort - many were converted into gun-cartridge factories - underwent radical structural changes with the introduction of machinery allowing for mass production and the employment of unskilled workers (Dalla Casa, pp. 181-2). They employed between twenty and twenty five thousand workers, many of whom came from the countryside, attracted by the prospect of a safe wage. De Benedictis states that the war brought full employment to the province and that 'per far fronte alla continua
necessità di mano d'opera vennero impiegate anche le donne (circa 6,000 lavoravano negli stabilimenti di stato e ausiliari) e i minorenni (da 1,148 minorenni impiegati negli stabilimenti e opifici di Bologna nel 1914, si era passati a 1,803 nel 1915' (pp. 71-2).

As in the rest of the nation Bologna suffered the serious economic consequences of demobilization. According to Dalla Casa, though the smaller, unmodernized industries were able to adapt back to a pre-war economy, those directly linked to war production left thousands unemployed. By November 1918 post-war redundancies amounted to between twenty five and thirty thousand. The province was particularly affected because during the war it had suffered a population increase, caused by immigration from the Veneto, which had been a war zone (Dalla Casa, pp. 182-3). De Benedictis adds that those of rural origins who had worked in industry during the war and were now redundant were unable to return to the countryside because an agrarian crisis had reduced the demand for labour (De Benedictis, p. 72). In rural areas of the province the leaseholders had benefited during the war from both the increase in output demand and war-time rent freezes (to the detriment of the landowners) and many of them had been able to buy property. Additionally, some sharecroppers had made enough money to buy their own plots of land, pointing, according to D'Attorre, to the post-war emergence of a new class of small peasant proprietors. This was strongly contrasted with the poverty of the majority of
sharecroppers and the **braccianti** who had most suffered the effects of inflation, military conscription and the violation of agrarian pacts (Cardoza, p. 230, D'Attorre, p. 129).

The intensification of PSI militancy and the particularly tense political atmosphere in post-war Bologna are highly comprehensible in the light of the economic crisis and the sheer size of the workers' movement which, now with a significantly large urban proletariat, had doubled in size. The Camera Confederale del Lavoro alone increased its membership from 41,583 in 1914 to approximately 86,000 in 1919, of which 16,000 came from the urban sector (De Benedictis, p. 80). The deaths of six workers in a clash with police in Imola in July 1919 (see Chapter IV, p. 248) epitomized the tense situation of the nation as a whole. According to De Benedictis, all worker categories went on strike during the first months of 1919 for wage increases and an eight-hour working day, which they obtained without difficulty. In April 1919 an agreement between the Camera Confederale del Lavoro and the employers recognized the eight-hour day (p. 107). If the general weakness of the industrialists may partly have been the motive for the ease with which they complied with the unions' demands, Dalla Casa notes that the government had strongly encouraged the employers to start post-war production 'in una clima di collaborazione fra le parti' so stimulating the above
agreements (p. 191).

De Benedictis continues, however, that:

motivi sociali e politici si intrecciavano però già a quelli economici. Si richiedeva il riconoscimento delle organizzazioni operaie e degli uffici di collocamento presso le Camere del lavoro, si voleva l'istituzione di commissioni interne nella fabbrica, i lavoratori addetti ai servizi pubblici chiedevano l'abrogazione dell'art. 56 del codice penale, fortemente limitativo del diritto di sciopero, e il riconoscimento del carattere industriale delle aziende in cui prestavano servizio (p. 79).

Such demands were obviously spurred on by Syndicalist/Maximalist elements which, by the summer of 1919, dominated the PSI and Camera Confederale del Lavoro. Believing that the bourgeoisie was on the point of disintegration and almost certainly encouraged by the capture by the PSI of seven out of eight constituencies in the November 1919 general election, they aimed to prepare the proletariat for revolution. As is demonstrated in Chapter IV, though their rhetoric may have been alarming to the public, the frequent general and public employees strikes of 1919 and 1920 were of no particular consequence, despite their presumed revolutionary implications. This reflected the failure of party and union members to put into practice their theories of revolution and general
disagreement between and within the Camera Confederale del Lavoro and the Revolutionary Vecchia Camera del Lavoro. According to De Benedictis (pp. 85-6), the reformists, 'incapaci di rinunciare ad una visione settaria della lotta politica del proletariato', were principally responsible for the failed formation of an effective Reformist-Syndicalist-Anarchist front. She equally blames the Maximalist leadership of both the PSI and Camera Confederale del Lavoro, incapable of turning their revolutionary rhetoric into reality, for their failure to give sufficient lead to the metalworkers' factory occupations in September 1920, which lost, therefore, their revolutionary character (p. 106). According to Dalla Casa, this is demonstrated by the fact that in only one of the fifty-six factories where 'Consigli di Fabbrica' had been elected did production actually take place during the occupations (p. 193).

The state of the Bolognese countryside in the initial post-war years, was marked by a weakened, more moderate and collaborationist AAB, under the leadership of the aristocratic landowner Filippo Cavazza, and a re-vitalized and extremely militant Federterra. The new agricultural programme of the AAB stressed the collaboration and moral uplifting of the peasant classes by transforming braccianti into sharecroppers, sharecroppers into small landowners, etc. It also advocated the legalization of the leagues as a means of modifying Socialist political goals (D'Attorre, p. 128, Cardoza, pp. 252-5). Federterra, though remaining
without Maximalist leadership, was largely influenced by the revolutionary post-war atmosphere. As a result of this it committed, in Preti's opinion, the serious error of adhering to the principle that 'i lavoratori hanno il diritto di imporre ai proprietari le condizioni del loro lavoro' when it came to union demands (Preti, pp. 428-9). There was consequently an increase in the use of fines and boycotting by the leagues against uncooperative employers, sharecroppers and small leaseholders and landowners, often resulting in such intimidatory acts as the burning of crops, killing of livestock and physical assault (Corner, p. 108).

The extent to which such violence and intimidation took place is open to varying opinions. Corner differentiates such acts as the imposition of fines and boycotts - often stipulated in league statutes and pacts - which he considers non-violent though obviously intimidatory and which were often sufficient for achieving the desired ends, and acts of violence accompanying this on occasions. He explains - and this is most significant - that:

i resoconti della violenza socialista vanno trattati con una certa cautela. Il desiderio dei fascisti di amplificare le dimensioni della "tirannia" di cui pretendevano di aver salvato l'Italia produsse una buona dose di esagerazione e di distorsione degli eventi dell'immediato dopoguerra (p. 108).
Preti on the other hand states that in 1920 such acts of violence were frequent, adding that a lack of police presence combined with braccianti anger over past maltreatment and illusions about revolution had 'gone to the heads' of several league leaders (Preti, p. 422). According to Corner, many of them tried to dictate the everyday life of their fellow villagers on such issues as church-going and the political colour of the newspapers they read (Corner, p. 111). Preti again states that many agrarian employers found themselves paying fines of up to ten thousand lire, impositions which they found it hard to oppose, given the lack of effective police presence (Preti, p. 424).

Lack of rural police presence, which will be demonstrated in Chapter IV, may have forced the agrarians to accept Federterra's demands for an eight-hour working day and wage increases of between 18 and 20% in 1919 (Scaglierini, p. 147). In January 1920 the increase in the cost of hiring braccianti, which the sharecroppers could no longer afford, given their failure to force the employers to contribute towards this, motivated, once again, the formation of a braccianti-sharecroppers' front. Federterra proposed the division of the sharecroppers' produce so that they would be entitled to fifty, sixty or even seventy percent of it, depending on the number of braccianti they needed to hire (Scaglierini, p. 148, Preti, pp. 430-1). From February 1920 the leagues went on strike for the
recognition of Socialist labour exchanges and guarantees of a fixed number of workers per hectare (Preti, pp. 140-41). This was accompanied by the invasion and working of uncultivated farmland. According to Cavazza, the leagues unjustly took advantage of the September 1919 government decree which legalized the occupation of abandoned land.

Such legislation, he claims, aimed to solve the agrarian crisis in southern Italian regions where, unlike Lombardy and Emilia, uncultivated or badly cultivated land was a serious issue. He also claims that Federterra ordered braccianti to leave plots of land unattended, giving them a pretext for occupying them. Similarly, the nine thousand sharecroppers facing eviction for having taken part in the strikes were ordered to leave the employers' share of the crops unattended in readiness for occupation (Cavazza, pp. 165-6, Cardoza, p. 282).

Cavazza further complained of the weakness of post-war governments in the above disputes. Nitti had informed a provincial farmers' commission that there was nothing he could do to prevent the lawlessness in Bologna. The indignation of the agrarians was further roused when Giolitti ordered state crop requisitions at reduced rates, given the sharp fall in production which the strikes had caused (p. 166, pp. 169-70). The strikes ended on 25 October 1920 when the Provincial Association of Agriculturalists (APA), which had replaced the AAB in December 1919, was forced to negotiate with Federterra. The
ensuing agreement - the Paglia-Calda Pact, named after the leaders of the APA and Federterra, respectively - gave Federterra full control over labour recruitment, the guaranteed employment of braccianti in land reclamation projects and an increase in the share sharecroppers were allowed to retain of their produce (60% of cereals, 65% of sugar and hemp), as well as a higher standard of accommodation and income guarantees in the event of bad harvests (Cardoza, pp. 286-7).

Working-class gains in both the industrial and agricultural sectors of the provincial economy were to be short-lived, however. The sense of insult felt by farmers and industrialists at the government's lack of support in the disputes and its apparent indifference turned them not only to intransigence but also to extra-legal methods of dealing with Socialist power, of which they had some past experience (see Chapter III). The Socialists for their part would live to regret their failure both to unite the rural and urban movements and to take advantage of the political climate in which revolution might well have succeeded if sufficiently organized and coordinated.

It would be erroneous to consider that Bolognese Fascism rose from the ruins of the First World War, however. Its origins may be traced back to 1914, the year in which the Socialist victory in the administrative elections coincided with 'Red Week' and an outburst of interventionist feelings as the European conflict began. According to Onofri, the
first 'Fascist' movement was formed by a group of left-wing interventionists (Radicals, Republicans, Anarcho-Syndicalists and Socialists) in 1914 under the name of Fascio di Azione Rivoluzionaria (later Fascio Democratico di Resistenza). The 'Fascists' directed their patriotic violence against the city's Socialist administration during the days of 'Radiant May'. The upper and middle classes, insulted by the mayor, Francesco Zanardi's policies of rent controls and the compulsory modernization of rented property, looked on without too much displeasure and became increasingly influenced by their anti-liberal/parliamentarian rhetoric (Onofri, '1913-22', cit., pp. 68-70). The military defeat of Caporetto in 1917 was the cause of several defections from the Socialist (Neutralist) to the Interventionist camp, strengthening the resolve of the latter that the PSI could be defeated.20 Though there were attempts at posing legal opposition to the PSI violence remained the favourite interventionist weapon. At the end of the war the 'Fascists' had the support of demobilized soldiers and military forces occupying the city and who, in June 1918, had tried to prevent the PSI from holding a demonstration commemorating fallen workers. The following November interventionists and ex-soldiers physically attacked Zanardi (Onofri, '1913-22', cit., pp. 70-71).

The first Bolognese Fascio di Combattimento was founded on 9 April 1919, less than a month after Mussolini had launched
his political movement in Milan. It was mostly represented by ex-soldiers and officers of various political backgrounds, predominantly Republican but also Nationalist, Monarchist, Catholic, Radical and Syndicalist. Though strongly anti-Bolshevik they were not insensitive to the needs of the working classes. They advocated strong forms of government capable of finding solutions to the internal and international crises.\textsuperscript{21} The Fascio broke up almost as soon as it had been founded because of conflicting political origins. The main issue concerned anti-Bolshevik policies. While the Nationalists demanded total authoritarian opposition to revolutionary movements, the Republicans argued that the working classes could only be tamed through democratic, Socialist policies. The Nationalists split off in order to form the Lega Anti-Bolscevica, under the leadership of the ex-serviceman Dino Zanetti. Among its members were Senator Tanari and Giorgio Ghigi, both prominent agrarian figures. During the same period the \textit{Arditi} (assault soldiers) formed their own association (Tarozzi, 'Dal primo al secondo fascio', cit., pp. 95-6).

The rebirth of a right-wing Fascist movement in Bologna in September 1920 was totally dependent on the initiatives of the urban and later rural upper and middle classes. During the course of 1920 those afflicted by Socialist unrest and angry at government passivity joined forces. Many agrarians and industrialists, despite their traditionally belonging to two opposed groups which had tended to force their economic
problems upon the other with protectionist policies, etc., realised, in the face of land and factory occupations and incessant strikes, that they should fight the common enemy united (Onofri, '1913-22', cit., pp. 73-4). Many Nationalist farmers, under the leadership of Ghigi, left the APA, challenging Paglia's line of collaboration and compromise and identifying their interests with those of industrial groups in the city, as was demonstrated by the formation of a Fascist-agrarian-industrialist front during the October 1920 administrative elections (Cardoza, p. 301).

Tarozzi, however, places great emphasis on the importance of the urban middle classes — particularly the economic forces of shopkeepers, artisans, small-scale industrialists and employers — in the launching of the Bolognese Fascist movement. This, she claims, is evident in their formation of several economic associations which included the L'Unione Esercenti and the Lega Industriali, Commercianti ed Esercenti, both aiming to represent the needs of the middle and lower-middle classes, which were worse hit than the large-scale industrial and agricultural employers in the economic crisis of the post-war years. The government, they claimed, tended to favour the big capitalists and the working classes while they themselves were hit by price-reductions imposed by the Socialist council with the assent of the prefect. They felt the need for political representation so as to allow the recovery of a free-market economy which until then had continually faced obstacles
from the government (Tarozzi, 'Dal primo al secondo fascio', cit., pp. 96-99).

The Associazione Bolognese di Difesa Sociale (ABDS), founded in April 1920, united the anti-Socialist forces of politicians, agrarians, industrialists and the commercial classes. It claimed the right to oppose strike action, maintain public services and use its own volunteers to enforce law and order if the prefectoral authorities failed (Tarozzi, 'Dal primo al secondo fascio', cit., pp. 103-4). According to Onofri, when in September 1920 the ABDS turned to Leandro Arpinati's re-organized Fascio di Combattimento in order to recruit three hundred armed men for the administrative election campaign, the Questore found this 'del tutto normale' (Onofri, '1913-22', cit., p. 74). The second Fascio was very much more right-wing and para-military than the first. Republicans and Syndicalists had been replaced by Nationalist and Liberal students, anti-Socialist ex-soldiers and members of past Interventionist para-military groups, the Arditi and D'Annunzio's 'Legionari fiumani'. Its political programme stressed anti-Socialism and anti-Bolshevism and the use, if provoked by its enemies, of violence. It joined the agrarian, industrialist and commercial classes in a united anti-Socialist electoral campaign under the name of 'Pace, Libertà e Lavoro' (Tarozzi, 'Dal primo al secondo fascio', cit., p. 105).

The Socialist majority of 58.2% at the October administrative elections, however, coupled with several
very effective Fascist assaults on the PSI the following November demonstrated that violence was an effective means of ridding the province of its Socialist hegemony. Indeed, the provocation by fascists of an armed conflict in Bologna's main square during the inauguration of the Socialist city council on 21 November 1920, resulting in the death of nine workers and the conservative councillor Giordani, marked the debut of Fascist anti-Socialist violence dominating the province until well into 1926. What became known as the 'Battle of Palazzo d'Accursio' (the city council headquarters) was almost certainly responsible for the development of Fascism in many urban areas of Italy and rural areas of Emilia and Romagna, as seems proven by the launching of a movement in the neighbouring province of Ferrara the following month. The Fascist movement was well supported and justified by the upper and middle classes (many of whom helped to finance it) and many members of the police and judiciary - as is well documented in later chapters - as a moral force capable of ridding the province of the Socialists, who were unjustly accused of planning the tragedy of 21 November, particularly the murder of Giordani, who became a patriotic martyr. Indeed, according to Tasca:

Il cadavere dell'ex-combattente è sfruttato fino al delirio; si dimenticano la provocazione fascista, l'illegalità armata contro un amministrazione regolarmente eletta, i nove morti socialisti. Non si vede più che l'ex-combattente,
condottosi eroicamente in guerra, ucciso "in un agguato" dagli anti-nazionali.\textsuperscript{25}

The attack, which had almost certainly been organized and coordinated by the city \textit{fascio} with the collaboration of the \textit{Questore} had its desired effect. The new Socialist council was dissolved and replaced by a government commission. Many party and trade union leaders were arrested in connection with the tragedy and further credence was given to the theory of a Socialist attack when a number of Reformist socialists resigned from the council in order to dissociate themselves from Giordani's murder (Onofri, '1913-22', cit., pp. 78-80, Cardoza, p. 312, Arbizzani 'L'Avvento' cit., pp. 98-100).

The Bolognese Fascist movement had its origins in the city. Following the Battle of Palazzo D'Accursio its attacks on distinguished Socialist figures, including Zanardi and Ercole Bucco, secretary of the Camera Confederale del Lavoro, increased. Workers were frequently assaulted and union headquarters were ransacked.\textsuperscript{26} In the city it owed its increasing support not only to the industrialists but also to the middle classes, especially public employees who moved over from the Camera Confederale del Lavoro to the support of the Fascists in order to dissociate themselves from the revolutionary implications of 21 November.\textsuperscript{27}

The force of Fascist counter-revolution was demonstrated
by the movement's penetration into the countryside from December 1920 onwards with the strategic objective of crushing socialist resistance and preventing the maintenance of a braccianti and sharecroppers' front, through the forced disbandment of their unions (Arbizzani, 'Lotta mezzadrile', cit., p. 175). According to Cardoza, fasci began to appear in the communes from the spring of 1921. A rural fascio was usually founded after local anti-Socialist avengers called on the town fascio, eight thousand strong by June 1921, for help. It was divided into two sections: the young squadristi formed the action group or squads which carried out violent punitive expeditions while the older members were responsible for such administrative jobs as the organization of transport and information. The author also suggests that rural fascio membership was in no way homogeneous. That of San Giorgio di Piano consisted of ten agrarians, four merchants and manufacturers, seven white-collar workers, five public-service employees, fifteen factory workers, eighty-two braccianti and sharecroppers and eighteen from the professional classes. He adds that most rural support came from the sharecroppers and small-scale landowners who sought protection from the socialist leagues (Cardoza, pp. 316-21).

Many historians and local accounts have testified to the extremely high level of violence characterizing punitive expeditions. Tasca, for example, describes lorry loads of armed fascists assaulting those suspected of being Socialist, the ransacking of cooperatives and union headquarters, the torture
and even murder of league leaders (Tasca, pp. 165-6). An Avanti! report on Fascist crimes in Bologna between November 1920 and May 1921 bears witness to the general indifference if not complicity of the local police forces which usually failed to intervene to prevent violence, blocked off access to communes under attack to conceal Fascist activities and even arrested the victims of punitive expeditions.\(^{28}\) According to Dalla Casa, the local judiciary also became particularly intransigent towards socialists and anarchists after the Battle of Palazzo D'Accursio, collaborating with the prefectoral authorities over Socialist arrests and in the confiscation of documents used by the reactionaries to condemn the Socialist city council for a Maximalist revolutionary attack (Dalla Casa, 'Il movimento operaio', cit., p. 19, p. 27).

According to D'Attorre (p. 141), Bolognese Fascism owed its success in rural areas to the support received from an increasing number of agrarian employers, especially the leaseholder class. In the spring of 1921 many of them fixed contracts with the Fascists over financing and some - such as Regazzi and Pedrelli, two young Molinellese leaseholders - actually became fascio leaders (Cardoza, pp. 323-4). Exploiting the peasants' fear of Fascist violence the agrarians violated the terms of the Paglia-Calda pact, punishing league leaders for past acts of violence and intimidation, as well as the imposition of fines on agrarians and the middle class peasantry (sharecroppers, small leaseholders and landowners, etc.). The squads had, in Arbizzani's words, the support of
'vari gruppi di contadini medi, di appartenenti ai ceti commerciali e impiegatizi, colpiti nel corso delle lotte dei braccianti e degli operai a causa di impostazioni settarie e "violente" (Arbizzani, 'L'Avvento', cit., p. 258). These words reveal the significance of the ambiguous relationship between the sharecropper class and the socialist unions and the repercussions of Federterra's intimidatory and coercive attitude towards the peasant middle classes. Dalla Casa correctly points out, however, that 'Il risarcimento dei danni conseguenti alla violazione degli obblighi contrattuali era avvenuta alla luce del sole e con la mediazione delle massime autorità pubbliche'. In this sense the imposition of fines by the leagues had been perfectly legal (Dalla Casa, 'Tra fascismo e reazione', cit., p. 212).

The APA became increasingly isolated as the majority of agricultural employers were attracted by Agrarian Fascist slogans of 'La terra a chi la lavora e a chi la fa produrre' and the emergence of Grandi and Baroncini - both in favour of closer ties between agriculture and Fascism - as provincial fascist leaders (D'Attorre, pp. 146-7). Their programme, a 'virtual carbon copy of the proposals advocated by Count Filippo Cavazza and the AAB in 1919', according to Cardoza, advocated the 'industrialisation of agriculture (...) in the general interest of the nation' and 'profit-sharing contracts that transformed the rural labourers into partners and associates of the growers in the processes of farm production'. This would allow for the growth of a class of 'stable and
socially conservative peasant proprietors' and the elimination of the class of braccianti and Federterra with it (Cardoza, p. 335). Cardoza adds, however, that many urban fascists resented the development of what they considered 'profit-making' Agrarian Fascism which, though paying lip-service to the above slogans, in real terms amounted to no more than an alliance between the employers and Fascists to the detriment of the poor. Indeed, as early as January 1921 Arpinati urged that the movement break off from the conservative, bourgeois factions, remaining an independent force, representing the 'interests of all the people' (Cardoza, pp. 326-9).

If Agrarian Fascism aimed to take the rural proletariat out of the control of the Socialists, the void left behind by coercive methods had in some manner to be filled up. Fascist syndicalist experiments seriously accentuated, however, the dangers inherent in the founding of a 'peoples' movement on the support of the property-owning classes. Though the first Fascist syndical organization in Bologna, the Camera Sindacale del Lavoro, founded at the end of 1920, had the representation of not only Fascists, but also Liberals, Democrats and Syndicalists, who claimed class collaboration, it became increasingly obvious that in reality Fascist Syndicalism did not seriously defend the rights of workers (Dalla Casa, 'Tra fascismo', cit., pp. 208-10). Indeed, according to Arbizzani, the only means of guaranteeing the success of the syndicates was continued coercion so that the peasantry could be forced
into the hands of the new Fascist leagues, thereby allowing the agrarians, who no longer depended on Socialist labour exchanges, to break contracts with the leagues. Those sharecroppers refusing to desert Federterra, for example, received eviction notices and little sympathy from local magistrates (Arbizzani, 'L'Avvento', Cit., p. 270). Fascist violence also prevented them from using low-cost cooperative farm machinery (Cardoza, pp. 360-2). Raffa, however, does attribute the success of the Fascists in organizing the sharecroppers to the appeal of their slogans promising land and protection from league persecution.\textsuperscript{29} \textit{Braccianti} desertions on the other hand were increased through relentless violence and fear of unemployment, especially during the harvest period when the agrarians tried to rely totally on fascist workers (Cardoza, p. 269).

The heaviest violence was concentrated in the commune of Molinella. It involved the Bonifica Renana land reclamation works, the territory of which comprised parts of the provinces of Bologna, Ferrara and Ravenna. Through an agreement of 1919 labour recruitment was controlled by an interprovincial branch of Federterra. In June 1921 the directors, strongly influenced by Ferrarese fascists, sacked 62 Molinellese Socialist workers who had refused to give up their league membership, on the grounds that they had not turned up for work. Fascists had in fact used force in order to prevent them from doing so. They were replaced with Ferrarese Fascist workers (Dalla Casa, 'Tra fascismo', cit., pp. 218-9). The
incident was also complicated by the fact that the particular place of work concerned was just inside the province of Ferrara, and out of the jurisdiction, therefore, of the Bolognese prefect, Cesare Mori, who had limited cooperation from his Ferrarese colleague - who was obviously sympathetic towards the Fascist cause (see Chapter IV, pp. 278, 288) over the repression of these acts of intimidation.

The promotion of a Pact of Pacification by Bonomi, who replaced Giolitti in July 1921, in the summer of 1921 was an obvious threat to the Fascist syndicalists and came to represent the first open conflict between Mussolini's parliamentary line - following the election of 35 Fascist deputies in May - and provincial squadrismo. Advocated by the former as a means of enhancing Fascist parliamentary manoeuvring powers and unifying the political force of Fascism, Grandi, Arpinati and Baroncini vehemently opposed it (Cardoza, p. 331). As Raffa states:

i fascisti bolognesi - e non solo - dovettero avere ben chiaro il rischio che correvaro a mantenere nella forma precedente le relazioni con i nuovi organismi sindacali. Un iniziativa come quello del patto poteva svuotare i risultati ottenuti (Raffa, p. 45).

Fearing an exodus of workers back to the Socialist unions, demonstrating once again the coercive basis of Fascist syndical recruitment, provincial Fascism, as a token of its dissent and
as a show of strength, organized a March on Ravenna in September 1921, forcing the national leadership to 'tacitly disavow' the treaty (Cardoza, p. 332).

Mori's unsuccessful attempts at conciliation in the Bonifica Renana dispute formed part of such pacification initiatives. After failing to persuade the Fascists to accept politically mixed labour exchanges he placed an apolitical government commission in charge of labour allocations, which however, the Fascists ignored from December 1921 (Dalla Casa, 'Tra fascismo', cit., p. 220). The dismissal of Racheli and Baroncini from the Camera Sindacale del Lavoro, which accused them of turning the syndicates into an employers' organization, and the founding of the Federazione Provinciale dei Sindacati Nazionali in January 1922 marked increasing alignment between the fascists and the employers (Dalla Casa, 'Tra fascismo', cit., p. 223, Raffa, p. 95). The following May the Bonifica Renana management and the Fascist syndicates signed an agreement whereby the former would hire its workers exclusively from the latter in return for salary reductions (Arbizzani, 'L'Avvento', cit., p. 272).

Given both the violence and the extremely high level of unemployment in Molinella, as Socialist workers were forcibly replaced by Ferrarese Fascist workers Mori imposed an emergency decree on 27 May 1922 suspending the importation of labourers until all local workers had found employment (Arbizzani, 'L'Avvento', cit., p. 272). In reaction to this Bologna was occupied for several days by fascists from throughout Emilia
who, with the support of the provincial property-owning classes, demanded the removal of the prefect, accused of siding with the Socialists in the conflict (Dalla Casa, 'Tra fascismo', cit., p. 230-1). His departure in August 1922 indeed marked the failure of the state to repress a movement, the subversive implications of which were by now all too clear, as is in fact demonstrated in Chapter IV.

In the urban sector the Fascists obtained exclusive recognition of their unions from the industrialists in return for wage reductions of up to 45% and increased working hours. During the 'sciopero legalitario' of August 1922, which the left-wing syndicates had declared in protest at the government's failure to prevent the ferocious Fascist invasion of Ravenna and other Adriatic towns at the end of July, the Fascists formed anti-strike squads and ordered the industrialists to supply the fasci with the names and addresses of the strikers, with the obvious tragic results. Following termination of the strike the Bolognese industrialists automatically sacked those who had abstained from work, replacing them with fascist workers. (Dalla Casa, 'Tra fascismo', cit., pp. 199-202, pp. 235-43).

Though the connivance of the state institutions (police, army, judiciary), if not the government itself, was partly responsible for the success of the Fascist onslaught, Arbizzani also blames the defencelessness of the working classes on the incapacity of Socialist leaders to understand the true implications of Fascism and their hesitation in organizing a
resistance strategy. Although the Italian Communist Party (PCI) which split off from the PSI in January 1921 declared war on the Fascists, it was weakened by its refusal to ally with other left-wing parties. Both the PCI and PSI refused to support the 'Arditi del Popolo', a Socialist paramilitary organization created to counter Fascist violence and disbanded by the government in the latter half of 1921 (Arbizzani, 'L'Avvento', cit., p. 261, p. 265). In May 1921 the Socialists went to the general election erroneously believing that they could suffocate Fascist violence through the ballot box.\textsuperscript{30} Similarly they committed themselves to the Pact of Pacification without realizing that (in the words of Pietro Nenni):

Trattare la pace coi fascisti, voleva dire non rendersi conto della natura del fascismo e specialmente di quello rurale, che era il più terribile. Voleva dire soprattutto, smarrire dietro una chimera la coscienza dell'antitesi assoluta fra socialismo e fascismo. Ora questo finiva per essere grottesco se si pensa che il Partito nello stesso momento, rifiutava qualsiasi intesa con i gruppi antifascisti.

As on 6 August 1921 the Socialist daily \textit{La Squilla} ordered its forces to adhere strictly to the pact, putting down their defensive weapons, the Fascists accelerated their offensives, so that in reality the agreement amounted to no more than the legalization of Fascist violence and the condemnation of any worker resistance to this (Dalla Casa, 'Tra fascismo', cit., p.
The period spanning the March on Rome in October 1922 and the establishment of full Fascist dictatorship in Italy from the end of 1925 was marked by a general state of crisis in provincial Fascism. The process of normalization and legalization which the fascist ascendancy to power required—as was indeed epitomized by the attempted containment of squadristi within the MVSN—fragmented provincial Fascist movements, previously unified by the common desire to eliminate the force of Socialism, so that the various factions forming the movement, aware of their conflicting political aspirations, often became totally opposed to each other. In the province of Bologna the most apparent conflict within the Fascist movement was between Syndicalist elements and the property-owning classes who had supported the Fascist revolution. In rural areas particularly, antagonisms had developed from the end of 1921 onwards. Many of the former faction, under the leadership of Baroncini, realized that Fascist Syndicalism as it stood amounted to no more than the destruction of Socialist unions to the benefit of the agrarians.

D'Attorre points out that 'La ricerca di una "legittimazione" di massa più duratura di quella offerta dalla violenza terroristica, portava Baroncini e i suoi uomini ad avallere financo rivendicazioni eversive rispetto ai successi conseguiti dagli agricoltori nel 1921' (D'Attorre, p. 150). Both the agrarians and the Fascists saw in the founding of the
Provincial Federation of Farmers' Syndicates (FPSA), an arm of the Federazione Provinciale dei Sindacati Nazionali, the strengthening of their aims. Led and run by Cacciari and Fornaciari, who represented the commercial leaseholder class, but subject to the control of Fascist syndicates, its programme favoured the rise of the small proprietors and sharecroppers but also the dominance of commercial farmers with closer ties to banks and marketing consortia. Yet, the FPSA only formally guaranteed the application of labour agreements, sharecropping contracts and wage rises (Cardoza, pp. 395-7, D'Attorre, p. 150). Baroncini, who had the support of the prefect Aphel, wanted to use the FPSA to assert his power over the agrarians and often turned his squads on farmers refusing to join the organization. This was matched, however, by similar anti-Syndicalist action, so that, according to Cardoza, a Fascist class war almost developed. In 1923, for example, Regazzi's agrarian squads physically assaulted the syndical secretary of Mezzolara (D'Attorre, p. 150, Cardoza, pp. 422-3, Raffa, p. 219).

Baroncini came to realise that the paradox of agrarian Fascism lay in its being built upon the destruction of workers' rights and that for FPSA members the interests of production inevitably meant the sacrificing of workers' needs, as was demonstrated by their imposition of salary cuts well beyond the 10% stipulated in the pacts. The Fascist government which was dependent, especially financially, on the support of the property-owning classes, was at best lukewarm in its support of
the Syndicalists (Cardoza, pp. 410 and 413). The removal of Baroncini and the re-emergence of Arpinati as provincial Fascist leader signalled the start of the isolation of the Fascist Syndicalists. Revolutionary, anti-conservative intransigence was strongly opposed by Arpinati who, with the support of the new prefect and the commercial farmers, began to purge dissidence from the movement (Raffa, p. 330). Criticising Baroncini's movement as a 'closed party of thugs', Arpinati stated that squad action should be limited to keeping down the development of Socialist leagues and not the coercion of non-Fascists into joining the syndicates. He stressed that union members should be truly convinced by the ideals of Fascist Syndicalism, which advocated welfare only through production (Raffa, pp. 325 and 433).

The political crisis following the Matteotti murder temporarily restored power to the Syndicalists, though this was in reality a means of preventing a resurgence of the local PSI and Camera Confederale del Lavoro whilst legislative instruments that in future would put an end to any such possibility were being prepared in Rome (Raffa, p. 383). This enabled the Bolognese syndicates to dissociate themselves from the PNF in December 1924, claiming that it had failed to defend the workers against the landowners and industrialists (Raffa, p. 380). Conflict between the urban Fascist unions and employers was particularly evident in this period, as was demonstrated by a series of cost-of-living strikes by many worker categories in the autumn of 1924 and February and March
the following year. The quick signing of agreements between the employers and syndicates signalled less the achievement of real benefits for the workers and more the necessity of preventing the socialist organizations from exploiting such crises, however. In August 1925 all militant union leaders were dismissed and replaced by party hacks as all local level syndicates became centralized as part of the National Corporations. Similarly, Arpinati was instructed by Mussolini to restore discipline to the party in the autumn of 1925, placing dissidents in politically harmless positions. Notably, Baroncini became executive of the agrarians' insurance company, whilst Cuccoli, former syndical leader ousted by Arpinati in August 1925, became podestà of Castelfranco Emilia. (Cardoza, pp. 419 and 431).

If Fascist Syndicalism no longer posed a threat to the employers it would be incorrect to assume that in Bologna power was restored to them on traditional terms. Many did take back positions of leadership in local and provincial administrations, podestà, for example, which had been lost to the Socialists. However, in agriculture, for example, positions of leadership were awarded to the leaseholder class rather than to the old-guard landowners. Agrarian individualism was not restored in that decisions concerning agriculture were taken in Rome and the ritual of contracts with workers' syndicates had to be gone through, even if it was only a formality (Cardoza, p. 433). According to D'Attorre, through
the transfer of many Bolognese agrarians to leading positions in Rome:

I contenuti programmatici dell'agrarismo emiliano - dal produttivismo tecnico, all'antindustrialismo, dalla valorizzazione della compartecipazione all'accentuazione delle istanze consortili e corporative - avrebbero permeato la presenza degli agrari nel dibattito politico e sindacale del regime (D'Attorre, p. 153).

Cardoza concludes that the theory that Bologna's farmers were simply Fascist flankers is destroyed if one is to consider that the commercial leaseholders, despite their aversion towards true Syndicalist worker power, were actively involved in the Fascist institutional framework at all levels, their policies bringing agriculture and industry closer together (Cardoza, pp. 450-1).

The March on Rome heightened already existing divisions within the left in Italy. A few weeks before the Fascist conquest of power the PSI had expelled its Reformists and the Confederazione Generale del Lavoro had declared its independence from the party with the aim of uniting all workers in an apolitical organization in collaboration with the fascists. This had been shortlived for the Communists, Maximalists and Revolutionary Socialists had formed their own syndical committee (Dalla Casa, 'Tra fascismo', cit., pp. 243-4). From 1923 union power was further weakened by several
central government decrees. These included law 692 of 15 January 1923 which officially abolished the eight-hour working day, law 143 of 28 January which allowed the dismissal of workers accused of 'subversion'. Indeed in Bologna many civil servants were sacked for 'plotting against the state'. The Camera Confederale del Lavoro was increasingly excluded from labour agreements and on several occasions was attacked and devastated by Fascist squads (Dalla Casa, 'Tra fascismo', cit., pp. 252-4).

The only serious initial resistance to the Fascist onslaught was centred in Molinella where, despite excessive violence, even murder, and the boycotting of socialists by the Fascists and employers, workers remained loyal towards the Socialist organizations, even at the cost of starvation. On 3 March 1923 local Fascism faced severe embarrassment when Mussolini was presented with a petition signed by 3,624 Molinellese workers asking for the re-opening of cooperatives and the right of free organization. In July that year it was necessary to abolish by prefectoral decree the Paglia-Calda pact which in other areas the agrarians had been able to violate without difficulty. Similarly in the summer of 1923 the Bonifica Renana works had to be temporarily closed, so causing the redundancy of 750 socialists, in the hope that this would encourage them to join the Fascist organizations.31

Peasant workers elsewhere showed less resistance than their Molinellese companions, however. What is more, Raffa states
that even if Fascism in reality meant lower wages and longer working hours:

sembra assai probabile che la vera arma psicologica del fascismo sia stato l'annuncio della sua politica agraria che prevedeva la sistemazione sulla terrazza dei lavoratori agricoli. (...) in effetti 7.000 famiglie coloniche e 30.000 braccianti ci indicano a ritenere cospicua la penetrazione di quella propaganda (Raffa, p. 260).

Raffa's point well suggests that one of the fundamental failings of the Socialist policies of land socialization was that it may have undervalued the ultimate desire of many braccianti to be able to rent or own land. Indeed the 'Patto di Compartecipazione' of 1923 placed many of them on small plots of land under more or less the same conditions as sharecroppers, though their employers gained between 60 and 65% of their products, according to Scagiliarini (pp. 170-1). According to Raffa, however, from 1924 onwards 'compartecipazione' was abandoned, due to the financial burden it imposed on the braccianti and Fascism turned to the idea of transforming them into small peasant proprietors (Raffa, pp. 278-9). Onofri, points out, however, that in the long run fascist anti-braccianti policies produced more braccianti than existed in 1920, since the high costs incurred by sharecroppers and small-scale landowners forced them into poverty (Onofri, '1913-22', cit., pp. 83-4).
The Matteotti crisis of the summer of 1924 perhaps revealed that despite the crushing of Socialist syndical power many workers remained loyal to their previous unions. On 27 June a ten-minute silence was successfully carried out by the Camera Confederale del Lavoro in memory of the Socialist deputy Giacomo Matteotti who was kidnapped and presumed murdered by the Fascist government. Dalla Casa notes that this was the first general strike after the March on Rome. It encouraged workers to take advantage of the crisis by infiltrating the ranks of the Fascist unions in the hope of winning over support (Dalla Casa, 'Tra fascismo', cit., p. 255). Similarly, special police powers allowing the closure of subversive associations and persecution of anti-nationals, with which prefects were endowed following Mussolini's infamous 3 January 1925 speech, failed to eliminate all resistance immediately. As is demonstrated in Chapter V, the more or less outlawed Camera Confederale del Lavoro exploited the crisis in Fascist Syndicalism. Dalla Casa states that well into 1925 Fascist penetration into the Bolognese working classes remained incomplete as a number of socialist-organized strikes caught the Sindacati Nazionali off their guard (Dalla Casa, 'Tra fascismo', cit., pp. 254-60).

The aim of this second introductory chapter is to familiarize the reader with the historical context in which the study of policing in the province of Bologna takes place. In tracing social, political and economic developments from the end of the
nineteenth century to Mussolini's establishment of a dictatorship from 1925 emphasis has been placed on those events most significantly involving the provincial police authorities. These are: the growth of Socialist-led peasant syndical power and the ensuing conflicts with local agrarian elites before and during the First World War; industrial development in Bologna during the First World War and the urban proletariat which emerged at the end of the conflict; the post-war social, political and economic crises, epitomized in Socialist land and factory occupations and the growth of Fascism; post-March on Rome struggles between provincial and state Fascism and finally, the destruction of Socialist syndical achievements after Mussolini's rise to power.
NOTES


3. See Appendix 1 for maps of the province of Bologna and of its agricultural subdivisions.


16. The eviction of the Molinellese sharecropper Pondrelli by his landowner Zerbini in 1911, for having demanded an improved contract, and the ensuing battle is an example of the extremes to which the agrarian conflicts had risen by that year. Though the refusal of other sharecroppers to apply for lease of Pondrelli's farm together with the solidarity of local braccianti who refused to harvest the employer's half of the crops forced Zerbini to renew Pondrelli's contract, the AAB opposed this. When Pondrelli was finally evicted on 11 November 1911 Zerbini's remaining sharecroppers struck. If at first they received eviction notices the leagues managed to force Zerbini, in June 1912, to renew Pondrelli and the other sharecroppers' contracts and grant them the improvements originally demanded. Nazario Sauro Onofri, La Strage cit., pp. 142-4, 147-8.

17. For a detailed account of the Guarda Massacre see Onofri, La Strage, cit., pp. 110-118. See also Cavazza, pp. 114-6, and Arbizzani 'La Federazione', cit., pp. 151-4.

18. Angela De Benedictis 'Note su classe operaio e socialismo a Bologna nel primo dopoguerra' in Movimento Operaio e fascismo, cit., pp. 69-134 (p. 71).

19. According to Onofri, ('1913-22', cit., pp. 91-2, note 56): 'Le elezioni politiche del 1919, che si svolsero con il sistema proporzionale, diedero questo risultato: PSI 81.592 voti (68,6 per cento); partito popolare 21.115 (18 per cento); Fascio liberale (una lista di destra) 9.145 (7,8 per cento); Combattenti (una lista comprendente anche Pri e radicali) 5.556 (5,6 per cento). Furono eletti sette deputati del PSI: Nicola Bombacci, Genuzio Bentini, Anselmo Marabini, Antonio Graziaidei, Francesco Zanardi, Leonello Grossi e Vincenzo Vacirca; e uno del partito popolare: Fulvio Milani'.


22. According to Onofri ('1913-22', cit., p. 92, note 58): 'Le elezioni amministrative del 1920 (...) diedero questo risultato a Bologna: PSI 20,195 voti (58,2 per cento); lista Pace liberta lavoro (che comprendeva tutti i partiti di destra e di centro compresi i fascisti, ma non i cattolici) 8,706 (26,5 per cento); partito popolare 5,093 (15 per cento). Al PSI andarono 48 consiglieri, 12 a Pace liberta lavoro e nessuno al partito popolare. Rispetto alle politiche del 1919 in città il PSI era sceso dal 62,9 per cento dei voti al 58,2. Al consiglio provinciale il PSI conquistò 47 consiglieri lasciandone 3 a Pace liberta lavoro e nessuno al partito popolare. Inoltre il PSI conquistò 54 comuni su 61. Il partito popolare ne ebbe 7 e nessuno Pace liberta lavoro'.

23. For a detailed account of the Battle of Palazzo d'Accursio see Onofri, La Strage, cit., Chapter 9. See also Arbizzani, 'L'Avvento del fascismo nel bolognese' in Movimento operaio e socialista, 10, 1964, Part I, pp. 83-102, (pp. 98-102), Part II, pp. 250-75, (pp. 253-5).

24. In the parliamentary report on the Battle of Palazzo d'Accursio the president of the Camera del Commercio declared that 'io e gli altri amici concorriamo magari con qualche offerta a favore dei fasci di combattimento'. (Camera del Deputati. Documenti. XXI. Commissione parlamentare per l'accertamento dei fatti avvenuti in Bologna. 31 January 1921, p. 24). This was confirmed by the Questore Luigi Poli who according to Tarozzi ('Dal primo al secondo fascio', cit., p. 105) stated that the ABDS 'diede al fascio la solidità finanziaria attraverso contributi versati (...) da molti cittadini benestanti della città, ispirati da sentimenti di simpatia verso i componenti del fascio e verso l'azione dei medesimi spiegata'.


30. Brunella Dalla Casa, 'Ira fascismo', cit., pp. 213-4. According to Arbizzani, ('L'Avvento', cit., Part II, p. 264) though the PSI vote in Bologna decreased from 68.6% in November 1919 to 47.2% in May 1921, given that the PCI obtained 10.5%, the effective loss was only 10.9%. The government Blocco Nazionale of agrarians, industrialists, the commercial classes and fascists obtained 27.1% of the vote.

31. Brunella Dalla Casa, 'Tra fascismo', cit., pp. 245-52. In 1926, following the publication of the Fascist Syndical Law Molinellese workers, taking advantage of one of its articles - created to satisfy the requirements of the International Labour Organization for propaganda purposes - formed an ad hoc league, as permitted by the article. At this point the government forcibly removed over three hundred families from the commune and settled elsewhere.
CHAPTER THREE: A CASE-STUDY OF BOLOGNA'S POLICE FORCES, 1897-1918

While the first chapter deals with a general history of the Italian police system and the second examines social, political and economic developments in the province of Bologna, this chapter considers the role of the police forces in Bologna. Though mainly concerned with Giolittian police strategies and policing in the province during the First World War, the principal starting point for the chapter is the year 1898 - dominated by violent strikes throughout the peninsula - and this provides sufficient insight into late nineteenth-century policing and the application of the 'Zanardelli' 1889 penal code and Crispi's 'Leggi Eccezionali' in controlling the Socialist political and syndical movement.

The case-study begins in the commune of Molinella - the heart of the provincial peasant syndical movement - and is therefore initially focused on the braccianti strikes of 1898, though other aspects, including the prefect's role as electoral agent and his control of Socialist syndical and municipal development, are considered. The chapter then questions the success of Giovanni Giolitti (appointed interior minister in the Zanardelli government on 15 February 1901 and prime minister on 3 November 1903) in moving away from the traditionally military-based police methods of the 1890s. Though again principally focused on agrarian battles,
reference is also made to the use of general strikes in urban areas, as well as more general questions of the control of Socialist associations and electoral strategies. As evident in the first chapter, the question of Giolittian policing is strongly linked to the extent to which the statesman managed to solve such internal policing factors as numerical weakness, complex hierarchical structures, etc., and this is questioned with direct reference to the Bolognese situation. The final part of the chapter considers the role of the police in the interventionist crisis leading to Italy's entry into the First World War and the effects of war-time emergency legislation on the province.

(i) Nineteenth century trends in police repression and Giolittian innovations.

The failed Molinellese braccianti strikes of 1898, 1899 and 1900 were almost certainly a consequence of the success of the 1897 strike and the determination, therefore, of both the agrarians and the prefect not to be caught off guard as before (See Chapter II, pp. 99-100). Strikes broke out in 1898 when the employers violated the wage agreement, which had been signed under the auspices of the prefect Giovanni Giura the previous year. According to the Democratic daily newspaper Il Resto del Carlino the agrarian employers had refused to recognize the validity of that agreement and had fixed lower
wage rates without consulting the **braccianti** organizations first (31 March 1898). The agrarians retorted through their press organ *La Gazzetta dell'Emilia* that the leagues had little understanding of the true needs of the **braccianti** and only blocked negotiations (3 April 1898).

According to Onofri the prefect of Bologna, Serrao - who was evidently seen as a stronger prefect than Giura who was promptly transferred after the 1897 strike - authorized pact violations because otherwise the employers had threatened not to plant rice that year (in order to avoid having to meet the demands of the leagues) ('1913-22', cit., p. 61). This is in fact verified by a telegram Serrao sent to the interior minister in which he considered the 1897 pact invalid because it had been forced upon the landowners by the Socialists. He added that:

> Quest'anno si è impegnata sulla stessa questione ma con diverso risultato, poiché l'azione energica dell'autorità poliziesca incoraggiò i proprietari a non subire le pretese dei socialisti e quindi a non trattare con intermediari noti per la loro mala fede.

This document, besides revealing the prefect's refusal to recognize the validity of the pact, demonstrates that the prefect shared the opinion with the agrarians that a minority of troublemakers had coerced the majority of **braccianti** into
striking. They exploited the peasants by charging a daily commission of five lire for their services. Similarly, he showed little concern for the serious economic plight of the braccianti workers. Though expressing concern about this to a police inspector in Molinella, he added that previous strikes, limiting the amount of grain harvested, had been the cause of the failure of wages to rise proportionately with the cost of bread. Molinella's delegate complained that many of the unemployed were not seriously in need of charity and that 50% of those on the poor list spent their relief money in the osterie. On many occasions police concern for peasant poverty was more associated with the consequences of this in terms of public order and the development of revolutionary movements. Indeed the interior minister even suggested to Serrao that only encouraging emigration of what he considered 'quella classe la quale offre i maggiori pericoli per l'ordine pubblico, perché più accessibile alle lusinghe della propaganda socialista' (the braccianti) would solve the problem.

During the strike Carabinieri and regular troops had the task of preventing acts of violence and intimidation (as stipulated by articles 165 and 166 of the 1889 penal code) which strikers may have resorted to in an effort to force non-league workers or those simply ignoring the strike call to stop work in support of their cause. There are no doubts as to the large numbers of arrests carried out for such crimes,
as testified by both archival police documents and press reports.

What is questionable, however, is the extent to which such police action was legitimately executed. If La Gazzetta dell'Emilia insisted that large crowds of strikers intimidated free workers (31 March 1898), the police documents rarely cite specific cases of violence. This suggests that articles 165 and 166 left ample space for interpretation. What does transpire through them is the use of cavalry charges and/or mass arrests of large groups of strikers for merely assembling and demonstrating, despite the fact that this was perfectly legal, if not accompanied by violence, as Avanti! claimed (31 March 1898). On 28 March, for example, the prefect informed the interior minister that a crowd of ninety striking rice planters had been arrested for refusing to disband. Even there is no evidence in the document to suggest that their assembling was, in itself, illegal. They were freed after the local police inspector had warned them not to carry out further demonstrations. An explanation to this is gained from studying Serrao's telegram to the Molinellese delegate, dated 3 August 1898, in which he ordered the banning of 'passeggiate collettive di donne o braccianti in cerca di lavoro' on the grounds that 'Un tale fatto costituisi di per se stesso una violenza e potrebbe essere il sintomo di una ripresa d'attentati alla libertà di lavoro'. The banning of assemblies was considered a form of prevention of 'attentato
alla libertà del lavoro', therefore. Only under martial law (between 15 May and 7 July) were assemblies of any kind officially abolished, however.  

With regard to arrests for violation of articles 165 and 166, Il Resto del Carlino of 31 March 1898 accused police witnesses of fabricating episodes of violence and intimidation. Referring to eight women alleged to have been victims of the leagues, it stated that 'neppure una appare come testimone al dibattimento. Esse parlano per bocca del delegato o dei carabinieri'. The fact that on several occasions the prefect ordered his forces not to carry out arrests without sufficient evidence, as demonstrated by his telegram to the delegate in Molinella of 10 August 1898 - given that court acquittals were counterproductive in both political and policing terms - suggests that the police was indeed overzealous in the manner in which it handled strikes.

The repression of Socialist institutions accompanying the strikes is an example of the way in which 1889 and 1894 legislation was put into use in order to suffocate labour disputes. If Avanti!'s article of 31 March 1898 openly supported the Molinellese rice planters' strike and criticised the repressive attitude of the police and army, the prefect saw the article concerned as punishable under article 247 of the penal code ('apologia del reato, incitamento all'odio fra le classi sociali', etc.) and article 246 ('istigazione a commettere reati'), given also that the newspaper had promoted
public subscriptions in support of the strikers. Similarly, Massarenti and his colleagues were arrested or sought after by the police for their role in encouraging strikes and charged under articles 247 and 248 ('associazione a delinquere'), hence the dissolution of both the Lega di resistenza fra gli operai and the local Camera del Lavoro.10

The Societa cooperativa fra i braccianti di Budrio which had supported the Molinellese strikes was dissolved under article 3 of the Provincial and Communal Act, since it had become 'un centro di propaganda socialista pericolosa per l'ordine pubblico'.11

Propaganda criticising state institutions was sufficient to justify the closure of political associations. On 1 May 1898 the Federazione Socialista Anarchica Romagnolo of Imola was dissolved by the prefect under article 251 of the penal code ('associazione diretta a commettere i delitti preveduti nell'articolo 247') and article 3 of the Provincial and Communal Act because of its publication of 'propaganda', criticizing among other things internal exile legislation and article 248.12

During the particularly conflictual period of May 1898 the government was concerned not to allow the transmission and publication of information which might be politically damaging. On 9 May 1898, the prime minister Di Rudini - almost certainly as a result of the bloodshed of the previous day during bread riots in Milan - ordered prefects not to
allow the transmission of private telegrams if they contained reports on the conflicts which, in his opinion, would be ' alarming to the public'. This naturally had its repercussions on the Molinellese strikes. On 29 June the prefect informed the military authorities (who with the declaration of martial law had become the highest police authority in the province) that he had intercepted and banned the transmission of a telegram from Molinella addressed to the Socialist newspaper *Il Messaggero* containing information which, as he saw it, was 'in parte incomplete, in parte informate'.

A number of acquittals for lack of evidence by local tribunals suggest, however, that the police authorities were over-repressive. In June 1898, for example, Socialist leaders in Baricella were acquitted by Bologna's Tribunale Penale from the charge of having organized public demonstrations against the cost of bread and flour in May (as part of the nationwide demonstrations) and of having formed an association with the aim of provoking a rebellion. Similarly, three workers arrested for having sung the 'Inno dei Lavoratori' were acquitted by the court in Imola since 'risulta provato avessero accennato una sola strofa che Pretore non ha ritenuto indizio sufficiente eccitamento odio'.

While 1889 and 1894 legislation was used to contain, if not suffocate, Socialist strike and syndical activities, the traditional prefectoral role of electoral agent was used to
limit the success of Socialist local government initiatives and prevent the election of Socialist parliamentary deputies. At the 1897 general election, for example, the prefect Giura received messages from all over the peninsula asking permission for non-residents in Bologna to be able to return home to vote for the constitutional parties, especially in those constituencies where the PSI had a chance of winning a majority. He also received a telegram from the prefect of Ferrara, dated 19 March 1897, stating:

Nell'interesse candidato costituzionale contro al socialista sarebbe desiderabile che a Fantoni Giovanni impiegato ferroviario rete adriatica non fosse accordata licenza recarsi a Cento domenica.

In the light of such documentation, the prefect's request on 18 March 1897 for military support against imminent Socialist electoral violence may well have concealed his desire to use reinforcements to the advantage of the constitutional candidates. Out of election periods, however, the prefect turned to official legislation in order to control the activities of Socialist local administration. In this manner the town council of Medicina was dissolved in the autumn of 1898 for over-spending and 'manifestazioni di partito contrarie alle istituzioni'.

The archival documentation suggests that from the summer of
1900 change, if only minimal, was on its way, a consequence of altered public opinion on the manner in which the political expression of the masses should be treated (see Chapter I, p. 39). Though, as in 1898, troops continued to over-protect free workers from braccianti strikers with mass arrests, etc., and even carried out harvest work for the employers, there is scarce information suggesting that the Socialist organizations were persecuted on the scale of 1898 repression. Demonstrations and meetings of a political nature were usually permitted and were only interrupted if they openly and directly criticised the government. In October that year, for example, a police inspector on duty at a PSI meeting in Molinella ordered the speaker to moderate his language after he criticised the government for sending for troops to stop recent strikes. The sub-prefect of Imola indeed praised this behaviour as tactful, since it had enabled the respect of the law without the need to resort to repressive measures.20

Again, if Il Resto del Carlino accused the police and agrarians of having tried to repress strike action which in the opinion of the journalist had not involved illegal acts (21/22 August 1900), the new prefect Evandro Caravaggio showed particular concern for the plight of many workers who were refused employment in the autumn of 1900 for having taken part in the summer strikes. He reminded the employers that strikes were the cause of a minority and that the workers and their families caught up in agrarian revenge were not responsible
for their actions. On another occasion he saw the employers as incorrect in refusing to negotiate with the leagues 'perché non solo non è vietato a una classe commettere la propria causa a delegati o rappresentanti, ma anche è utile e necessario non potendosi conferire direttamente con migliaia di persone'.

Evidence of change is also provided by an article in La Gazzetta dell'Emilia of 23 August which stated:

Quando la polizia, i carabinieri, i funzionari, i magistrati credono che il governo intervenga a favore degli scioperanti, cominciano a temere di essere sacrificati se fanno atti di energia, e non è certamente con tali disposizioni d'animo che i rappresentanti della legge possano avere l'autorità necessaria per agire.

Though the agrarian press almost certainly exaggerated here, the sense of caution and tact adopted by the police forces in certain situations is also evident in other areas of policing activities. Documentation implies that in the electoral field police officials were becoming aware of the force of public opinion. This is expressed by the sub-prefect of Imola who in the aftermath of the 1900 general election stated:

Io ho la coscienza di aver fatto tutto quello che un Funzionario del Governo può fare in una città di Romagna e
specialmente in Imola, sotto un controllo costante del numeroso partito socialista. Ho visto ripetute volte i Sindaci e molti elettori veramente influenti, e mi sono astenuto dal compiere qualsiasi atto che giustificando, anche soltanto nell'apparenza, l'accusa di violenza avesse potuto far giuoco agli avversari.23

In this sense policing in 1900 may in many ways be considered an anticipation of Giolitti's police strategy the following year.

One of the main problems in approaching the Giolittian policing question lies in the lack of institutional norms governing his policies, as described in Chapter 1 (p. 40). According to Fiorentino, the explanation for this is to be found in the wide socio-political differences between the Italian regions and even the individual provinces, rendering a single police strategy impossible. Giolitti had to approach the 69 Prefetture on an individual basis (p. 5). A close study of the manner in which he initially dealt with the braccianti strikes in Bologna suggests that without altering legislative norms on strikes and political associations he based his strategy on more relaxed interpretation of legislation previously used to suffocate syndical activities. Even where he dealt with advanced forms of the PSI strategy (boycotting, general strikes, etc.) in later years by
altering such norms, the documentation suggests that slow legislative developments forced prefects and police commissars to use their powers of discretion more than normally.

Examination of the archival documentation reveals Giolitti tried to alter the manner in which the police authorities confronted the Socialist strike weapon. Indeed, he encouraged prefects to distinguish between economically- and politically-based strikes and to show more tolerance towards the former if they were not accompanied by acts of violence - a more accurate interpretation of articles 165 and 166, therefore. He often in fact asked the prefect for details of wage figures and working hours forming the basis of the protests. Where he considered grievances genuine, as in Molinella in May 1901, he ordered the prefect to encourage greater fairness from employers, refusing to support them with troops, as in the past. On 20 May that year he ordered Caravaggio to warn Molinellese agrarians that they could not count on government support during the present braccianti strike because their wages were the lowest in the province and to encourage them to negotiate with their workers to avoid losing a whole year's produce.24 He ordered prudence on the part of the prefect to ensure that agreements were achieved, thereby keeping spirits calm, reflecting his desire to solve disputes before they reached violent proportions and indicating the new role of the prefect as mediator in labour disputes. He was to use acts of persuasion to prevent league demands from becoming excessive,
especially if failed negotiations were likely to cause unemployment the following winter. Giolitti clearly saw the local Socialist deputy Bissolati as having a strong influence on the masses, since on several occasions he ordered Caravaggio to persuade him to keep the strikers calm, avoiding embarrassment for the government which could only tolerate non-violent economic strikes.\(^\text{25}\)

The new role of the prefect is evident when considering his toleration of frequent peaceful demonstrations by the unemployed (usually in front of the local PS or council headquarters) who demanded work and relief money and his frequent requests to the government for the development of public works schemes (and in particular the execution of long-awaited land reclamation projects). According to Avanti! of 1 February 1902, for example, hundreds of workers demonstrated in the village squares of Minerbio, Baricella, Budrio and Ca' de Fabbri for a more prompt start to land reclamation works, and concluded 'Il prefetto fa sperare subito provvedimenti'. Caravaggio pointed out to Giolitti in September 1901, however, unemployment relief also served to lessen the risks of demonstrations becoming violent. This suggests that new conciliatory measures may often have been less aimed at solving long-existing social problems and more concerned with public security.\(^\text{26}\)

Alongside peaceful economic strikes and demonstrations the initial Giolittian years reveal tolerance towards political
demonstrations and conferences, though again the prefect was given scope in deciding whether or not such acts constituted a public security risk. The documentation suggests that though the police officials kept the prefect informed about the contents of Socialist speeches, only direct or violent criticism of the government was considered illegal. In April 1902, for example, Caravaggio informed Giolitti that he had no intention of prohibiting an anarchist conference on the internal exile legislation since 'Il comizio medesimo possa ritenersi non un atto di vilipendio ad una legge dello stato, ma solo un esame obbiettivo e sereno di disposizioni legislative da correggere'. As with strikes it seems that under Giolitti already existing legislation was more accurately interpreted, therefore.

Where strikes became violent, political or spread throughout the province Giolitti showed no reservations, however, in calling for military repression to protect non-union workers from league intimidation and arresting ring-leaders, if necessary, demonstrating therefore the limits of his new policies. The prefect was authorized to resort of article 3 of the Provincial and Communal Law which allowed the banning of public assembling in emergency situations. On 23 April 1901 he wrote to Giolitti justifying his decree which put into practice such legal provision on the grounds that strikers armed with farming tools were roaming around the countryside in a threatening manner. He emphasized,
though, that troops were to act as a deterrent only and were not to over-protect the employers. Indeed Caravaggio had to remind the Molinellese delegate, who obviously interpreted the use of military reinforcements as a return to nineteenth-century forms of repression, that 'Non si devono soffocare scioperi ma semplicemente impedire che degenerino in atti delittuosi'. The funzionario concerned had in fact, in accordance with the military authorities, encouraged employers to provoke the strikers into acts of violence so justifying their repression.²⁹

Socialist press articles and several letters of complaint to Giolitti from Bissolati suggest that the interior minister's new strategy was unsuccessful in altering the attitude of the policeman towards working-class manifestations. As Bissolati pointed out, strikers continued to be arrested for peacefully inciting non-union braccianti to stop work. He added that 'L'eccitamento pacifico allo sciopero non è reato', but that 'così non intendono né prefetto, né delegati, né carabinieri, i quali si sono evidentemente assunti il compito di fare l'interesse dei padroni'. Massarenti accused the police in telegrams addressed to Avanti of having injured strikers. This was confirmed by Bissolati who stated that policemen, having been reminded that they were no longer allowed to carry out mass arrests, had resorted to the use of fire-arms, killing a worker during demonstrations in Molinella.³⁰

There are several possible motives for the above-mentioned
police conduct. Firstly, one should consider the sense of disorientation these new and sometimes ambiguous policies caused especially among the lower ranks of the police forces. Indeed, as in the last example, the use of bullets almost certainly reflected the policeman's sense of insecurity at not being able to carry out mass arrests, as in the past, despite orders to prevent Socialist violence. They may have panicked in the face of violent or apparently threatening behaviour on the part of strikers. Fiorentino states in fact that episodes of small groups of Carabinieri or Guardie di Città firing on demonstrators whilst awaiting the arrival of reinforcements were a common phenomenon during the Giolittian period (p. 26). This may have been the cause here, given that the interior minister had advised the use of troops in the area only a day previously to Bissolati's letter. If the prefect had considered the use of military reinforcements unnecessary, judging perhaps that in that particular situation mediation was more likely to calm the strikers, it does not follow that local forces were able to cope with large crowds of people, previously considered internal enemies of the state, without resorting to the repressive methods of the past. Indeed, in the commune of Budrio the local police delegate demonstrated much frustration at not receiving extra forces despite his frequent requests for help, adding that five Carabinieri were incapable of controlling the Socialist movement there.31
Obviously, where policemen had little experience in dealing with the strikers and demonstrators on conciliatory terms the possibilities of casualties were high, especially when considering that the prefect in no way tolerated weakness and inefficiency from his subordinates. One should also bear in mind the constant reality during those years of numerical weaknesses - dealt with later on in the chapter - even in terms of military reinforcements so that those areas presenting a less conflictual situation usually remained unprotected and exposed, in Budrio for example, while forces were concentrated in zones of heavy conflict, as for example Molinella.

Another significant factor lies in the dangers implicit in the discretionary powers bestowed upon the prefect by Giolitti who advised mediation though offering, if necessary, sufficient repressive means, as demonstrated by the interior minister's note to Caravaggio on 24 April 1901. Prefects obviously had to judge accurately how to deal with varying situations. This could hardly be guaranteed and indeed the autonomy left to them may have allowed abusive conduct. A survey of Giolitti's communications with other prefectures indeed suggests that the severity he showed to those prefects failing to put down violence during strikes and demonstrations may well have helped to maintain a pre-Giolittian level of abuse and repression. As the prefect of Foggia was warned in June 1902, a more liberal government did not mean a weaken
government. Indeed Giolitti held prefects personally responsible for episodes of uncontrolled violence.33

The interior minister's new policies were further limited by the relative autonomy the Carabinieri maintained from the prefecture. The hierarchical ambiguities governing the use of this military corps for police duties have been outlined in Chapter I. If one is then to consider that it constituted the only effective rural police force, divided into small nuclei stationed in most of the towns and villages in the province and dependent for police operations on a small number of PS police delegations,34 the limited control of the prefect over Carabinieri operations is easily imaginable. As the Questore warned the prefect Dallari in 1908, he had to ask mayors to inform him of all significant events in their villages 'non essendo l'Arma dei RRCC tenuta, per proprio regolamento, a riferire su tutti indistintamente gli avvenimenti che si svolgono nel territorio delle stazioni sparse nel Circondario'.35 One may conclude from this that Giolitti was limited, therefore, in the influence he had over Carabinieri conduct. Though he saw the increased use of the corps as an alternative to the army (see Chapter I, p. 44), its fundamentally military character almost certainly reduced the possibilities of change.

Though the interior minister officially showed concern about allegations of arbitrary arrests and police brutality during strikes in Bologna, there is little evidence of serious
measures preventing or punishing such conduct. Besides, the prefect tended to assure Giolitti that he had ordered moderation on the part of his subordinates, advising arrests only where articles 165 and 166 were violated. On May 20 1901, for example, Giolitti asked Caravaggio to investigate allegations of brutality on the part of a Carabinieri brigadier towards women strikers. Caravaggio replied that such allegations were exaggerations on the part of Massarenti. He defended his forces on the grounds that the strikers had violated the law. As Fiorentino states, Giolitti tended to support publicly policemen accused of abuse of power or even brutality, as he in fact defended Caravaggio in parliament against accusations by Socialist deputies that the prefect continued to side with the agrarians during strikes (p. 11). The acquittal of the army commander, who ordered his forces to fire on demonstrators in the neighbouring province of Ferrara in June 1901 killing two workers, on the grounds of 'legittima difesa', may be considered concrete proof of Giolitti's failure to resist 'l'urto combinato delle forze reazionarie politiche e degli interessi della casta militare', according to the moderate PSI leader Filippo Turati.

Reaction on the part of the agrarians suggests, however, that despite certain serious limitations in Giolitti's policies, change had indeed come to the province of Bologna. According to La Gazzetta dell'Emilia of 13 May 1901, the new government policies forced Caravaggio to 'assistere
impassibile allo svolgersi dello sciopero di Molinella, deve, anzi chiamare a sé i proprietari per invitarli a trovare una via di accomodamento, mentre un anno fa mandava i soldati a sostituire gli scioperanti'. As described below, however, agrarian reports tended to contort the reality of the situation and this was often aimed at coercing police leaders into demanding greater intransigence from their subordinates towards the working class movement, allowing if possible a return to pre-Giolittian policing methodology.

In later years Giolitti's policies were inevitably influenced and altered by such external factors as the increase in revolutionary elements within the PSI, its break from the government in 1903 and the development of more radical strike forms, as described in Chapter II (p. 102). This is very evident in the province of Bologna where from 1904, so documentation suggests, the prefectural authorities returned to pre-Giolittian forms of repression. La Squilla in reports on 13 and 20 August 1904, for example, blamed this on the arrival of a new prefect, Antonio Dall'Oglio. Policemen in Medicina were accused of preventing free workers from joining strikes and encouraging them to commit acts of violence against the leagues. The police in general were criticised for over-exaggerating about the level of Socialist violence to justify the use of military repression. At least initially Dall'Oglio certainly disagreed with Giolitti over how to deal with agrarian strikes. Giolitti saw the employers as the
cause of disputes in August 1904 because of their refusal to recognize the leagues as workers' representatives. The prefect argued, however, that the agrarians could not recognize them because in doing so they would be admitting their obligation to employ league workers only, which they considered an infringement on the rights of property.\textsuperscript{38}

The prefect's abandonment of the 'Giolittian' role of mediator may well reflect his uncertainty about how to handle new PSI syndical strategies. In rural areas, so he reported to Giolitti in September 1904, legislation was insufficient in dealing with frequent boycotting which in his opinion had violent implications, violating the rights of property. He added that non-league peasants 'vivono quindi una vita continuamente agitata nella tema di dover subire presto o tardi qualche vendetta'. His apprehension may well have been influenced by the lack of legislation to deal specifically with this new strike form, as demonstrated by the acquittal in Budrio of six braccianti accused of threatening to boycott those peasants refusing to join the local league in May 1904. His attitude was almost certainly influenced by the agrarian press. \textit{Il Giornale di Bologna} (temporarily replacing \textit{La Gazzetta dell'Emilia} in 1904 and 1905) reported on 28 August 1904 that police delegates sent to rural areas of the province became so influenced by the leagues that they were powerless against everyday Socialist violence and intimidation.

In urban areas the revolutionary implications of the latest
PSI strategy, the general strike, were obviously alarming to Dall'Oglio. His apprehension may again have been heightened by the initial caution of the prime minister who during the first general strike, which followed the victory of the Revolutionary Syndicalists over the Reformists at the PSI national congress in September 1904, ordered his forces to avoid contact with demonstrators on the grounds that 'trattandosi di movimento che non avendo ragione di essere non può durare'. The prefect in fact failed to follow these directives and Avanti! (21 September 1904) reported conflict as police officials, 'sorpresa dalla imponenza della manifestazione' tried to disband demonstrators and the army carried out cavalry charges, arresting forty workers.

From the end of 1904 however, Dall'Oglio had greater support from Giolitti - and his shortlived successors Fortis and Sonnino - who temporarily abandoned his policies of mediation. This change in the prime minister's strategy was clearly caused by the failure of the 1904 general strike, which demonstrated that repression could be used without the risk of provoking revolution. More or less coincided with his more determined support of agrarian policies of 'compartecipazione' and a constitutional electoral revival in Bologna. Indeed Giolitti called a general election in November, exploiting public anti-Socialist feelings generated by the general strike in September. In Bologna the prefectoral and military authorities acted to assure a constitutional majority. A
telegram from Dall'Oglio to his rural delegates ordered 'in nome ministero' the formation of monarchist 'defence groups' in front of polling stations, allegedly to protect voters from socialist intimidation. La Squilla, however, reported the use of cavalry to put down public protests at acts of clerical and moderate party intimidation inside polling stations during the Budrio constituency re-election in January 1905.\(^{40}\) Cardoza states that the local administrative elections of the summer of 1905 which saw the recapture of 11 out of 15 municipalities by the constitutional parties coincided with the collapse of the leagues and temporary success in agrarian 'compartecipazione' policies (p. 108).

1905 documentation clearly reveals an over-protective attitude on the part of the prefect, who now had better support from the government, towards the agrarians, with little concern for the disastrous effects 'compartecipazione' may have had on the economic plight of the local peasantry. This was particularly evident in his support of the agrarian anti-braccianti policies epitomized in the development of agrarian associations, employment offices and sharecropping-type pacts which prohibited strikes. Indeed he recommended the main promotor of such policies, Sturani, in a letter to the agricultural minister in May 1905.\(^{41}\) While Socialist politicians and union leaders complained that the local proletariat starved because of inadequate public works schemes and the refusal of employers to harvest land if this would
enable them to avoid having to negotiate with the leagues, Dall'Oglio replied that:

questo stato di cose non è che effetto di quella lotta di classe che va sempre più accentuandosi in codesta zona e per la quale all'organizzazione del proletariato viene opposto quella dei proprietari di fondi. (...) se nessuno loro (Socialist leaders) contende il diritto di organizzare in leghe gli operai essi non possono negare ai proprietari il diritto di consociarsi fra loro.42

Similarly, he justified the eviction of sharecroppers in Crespellano in October 1905 on the grounds that Socialist leaders had encouraged them to rebel against their employers.43

Dall'Oglio was also concerned about the activities of the Revolutionary Syndicalist and leader of the Camera del Lavoro, Lenzini, in 1905 and 1906. He was considered responsible for violent demonstrations during general strikes and for the promotion of Anarchist anti-militarist campaigns. Indeed the prefect informed the interior minister of an Anarchist-Syndicalist resurgence in the province in October 1905. Both Lenzini and the provincial Anarchist leader Armando Borghi had promoted public meetings with the aim of discussing the possible use of propaganda to damage the integrity of the army. Orders were consequently received from Rome to ban such
meetings, which could henceforth only take place in private form and with a limited number of participants. Three thousand copies of a manifesto entitled 'Ai Richiamati' were confiscated from the homes of Borghi and other Anarchist leaders who were prosecuted under article 2 of Law 315 of July 1894.44

Lenzini was also accused of leading the Camera del Lavoro in a boycotting campaign against the city council in 1906, in the hope that this would persuade the mayor Tanari to entrust municipal public works exclusively to Socialist labour exchanges. Both the Camera del Lavoro and the Lega dei Muratori (bricklayers' syndicate) were considered the main promoters of a violent demonstration in February 1906 in which a few thousand workers were encouraged to invade the city council headquarters, Palazzo d'Accursio. Stones were thrown at groups of soldiers, Carabinieri and Guardie di Città.45

Again, during May Day celebrations that year demonstrators attacked tram-drivers and shopkeepers who continued working. Several carriages were vandalised and shop windows smashed and a tram-conductor and barber injured. The prefect held the Anarchists principally responsible for this.46

The documentation also illustrates growing government intransigence towards railway workers' strikes. During the April 1905 general strike the prefect took firm measures to guarantee as far as possible the normal functioning of the rail network. Army reinforcements were used to guard railway
stations and lines from possible sabotage attempts and to protect trains, which were driven by 'krumiri' workers. Signalmen who went on strike without being substituted were preventively arrested. The government ordered Dall'Oglio to abstain from negotiations. This tough line may be considered an anticipation of legislation, passed after the strike, which declared railway men public officials (see Chapter I, p. 42) and on these grounds, as declared in a circular from the interior minister to all prefects, a railway strike was henceforth to be considered an open act of rebellion.

The general strike of May 1906, in reaction to the killing of workers by the police during a demonstration in Turin, is of particular significance to this study. On this occasion the citizens of Bologna took the law into their own hands to repress the action of what Dall'Oglio described as 'scioperanti teppistici', carrying out numerous arrests 'all'approvazione della forza pubblica'. That the prefect approved of such action is demonstrated by a report to the interior minister of 10 May in which he stated that the vandals had no longer dared attempt further acts of violence following a citizens' counter-demonstration. If the prefectoral authorities interpreted such action in defensive terms, Avanti! of 12 May 1906 accused young Monarchists, 'democristiani' and merchants of provoking the demonstrators with the protection of the police.
The participation of Bologna's bourgeois forces in the repression of the general strike was almost certainly a consequence of the weakness of the police forces or alarm on the part of the prefect himself. Though there are no doubts as to the resistance put up by large forces of Carabinieri and soldiers, as well as numerous arrests of demonstrators attempting to force public employees to stop work, it is possible that police forces were exasperated by the insistence of the strikers who reacted to the repression by throwing stones, causing several casualties among the police ranks - as testified by both Avanti! and the prefect. Though the use of arms may have been a solution it is possible that the authorities feared the consequences of this, given that the strike itself had been caused by police killings in Turin.

It is feasible therefore, that the reaction of the civilian forces may have posed a safer alternative to harsher forms of repression. Whatever the explanation to this - archival documentation is not clear - the real significance of this episode lies in the use of civilians for policing activities. Though the extent to which this was spontaneous or organized by the Questura is unclear, the incident almost certainly had some influence in the formation by the Questura from 1909 onwards of 'Pattuglie Cittadini', making up for police numerical weaknesses, to fight crime, as mentioned below. The importance of this is also appreciable if one is to consider the basis of the post-First World War Fascist movement in
Bologna: the repression of violence by civilian forces where the police authorities were or seemed powerless.

It would be erroneous to consider that during the above period government policies, as reflected in the attitude of the prefect, aimed to crush the working-class movement. They intended, if anything to counterbalance growing radicalism within the PSI in an attempt to maintain a political equilibrium. This is evident if one is to consider the changes the new prefect Ernesto Dallari (appointed in October 1906) brought to policing, especially in rural areas, suggesting more or less a return to original Giolittian policies. Indeed he criticised many employers for their exaggerated use of non-union workers and for relying too heavily on the support of the authorities in this. The delegate in Molinella, who supported him over this, admitted that claims by employers that the leagues invaded their land were simply part of their tradition of 'allarmare con invenzione per ottenere antica protezione'. He criticised the local agrarian association for failing to maintain its promise to reduce daily working hours and suggested that the prefect advise them not to provoke violence because of their obstinate attitudes. He also took legal action against one particular employer, Brunelli, for encouraging his non-union workers to insult and assault league members.51

According to Cardoza, the explanation to this clear change in policy lies in Giolitti's realization that in the long run
'compartecipazione' had only increased conflict, since the associations which it promoted were run by the strongest and most intransigent employers who pulled smaller farmers into battles which they could not afford to lose. As a result of this many moderate and traditional employers began to negotiate with the leagues once again (pp. 112-5). Another explanation lies in the return to Reformist dominance of the PSI both nationally and in Bologna. Dallari reported the strengthening of Reformist ranks in Bologna in April 1907 with the unification of the majority of municipal sections of the PSI under the Federazione Provinciale Socialista. Similarly the Questore noted a crisis in the Revolutionary dominated Camera del Lavoro culminating in the removal of its leader Lenzini.52

With regard to certain PSI strategies the government remained intransigent as in the past, hence the sending of troops to Baricella in July 1907 to cope with peasant land invasions aimed at preventing 'krumiri' from harvesting.53 Similarly, troops and police reinforcements were mobilized during general and railway workers' strikes. During the October 1907 railway strike Giolitti banned the transmission of telegrams encouraging work stoppages and ordered prefects to arrest those committing acts of sabotage and railway personnel abandoning convoys, reflecting increased zealousness on the part of the government, in accordance with 1905 legislation.54 The arrest of most of Crespellano's league
leaders in November 1907 and their prosecution under article 154 of the penal code ('violenza privata') for intimidating their own members into the observation of boycotts illustrates moves by the judiciary to more severely repress certain forms of league activities, as outlined in Chapter I (pp. 41-42).^55

On the other hand the repression of the most radical forms of Socialism was contrasted by new social legislation passed during the period 1907 - 14 regarding such issues as accident insurance and pension schemes. New health legislation placed responsibilities on state periphery organs, including the prefect, for such initiatives as the setting up of 'farmacie comunali' (municipal chemists selling medicines at reduced prices) from 1913, and the free administration of medicines to the poor (Aquarone, Tre capitoli, cit., pp. 14-17, 177-85). This was matched by more serious initiatives on the part of the prefect to solve unemployment problems in the province. In November 1912 Dallari criticised public works schemes because they only had immediate relief effects and were really no more than a 'semplice mezzo di polizia', ie they were aimed more at keeping the masses at bay and less at solving long-term economic problems. The solution he advocated was the reclamation of 90,000 hectares of land which though reducing the number of braccianti required would allow greater sharecropping settlements.^56

The prefect's concern to prevent extremism on both sides is well illustrated from 1911 when in Bologna the intransigent
AAB began to evict sharecroppers and violate pacts and the Camera del Lavoro became strongly influenced by Anarchist and Revolutionary elements once again - paralleled on national terms by the Libyan invasion and a return to Revolutionary dominance in the PSI. Though the Questore was fearful of the consequences of a revolutionary dominated Camera del Lavoro and a Federterra which though still reformist was not immune from infiltrations from the extreme left, he claimed that the reformists could win back 'se la maggioranza degli operai saprà affermarsi e reagire contro la sopraffazione e le violenze', illustrating his faith in the generally pacifist nature of the majority of the workers. Such predictions were in fact confirmed at the end of 1912 with the formation of the reformist Camera Confederale del Lavoro (see Chapter II, p. 108). In the same report he criticised the attitude of the employers which was:

tutt'ora circoscritta nel criterio classico del diritto di proprietà e della sua prevalenza su quello del lavoro. Il jus utendi et abutenti vige senza la minima evoluzione, assoluto ed intangibile, nella concezione padronale ed ogni pretesa o deroga ad esso appare una violazione ed un principio rivoluzionario.

He expressed annoyance at their constant demands for police protection in return for their full tax contributions. The
uneasy relationship between the prefectoral authorities and the agrarians was confirmed the following year when the latter abandoned negotiations with the leagues in protest at what they considered Dallari's support of braccianti claims. The prefect had in fact justified their protests at constant pact violations by Medicina farmers.58

If the above documentation shows that Giolitti's policing strategy was to a great extent dependant on the relationship between the government and the PSI, the impact that this had on provincial policing, especially at the local level was limited, however. Indeed, though initially Dallari was praised for opposing the unfairness of the agricultural employers - as demonstrated by a telegram he received from Massarenti in June 190759 - allegations of police partisanship with the agrarians turned out to be as frequent as they had been under his predecessor Dall'Oglio, so union leaders complained. In 1911, for example, Federterra sent Giolitti an extensive report accusing Dallari of indifference towards agrarian pact violations and police brutality. A Carabinieri sergeant major (Brigadiere) was alleged to have condoned the murder of a bracciatante by his employer in Sala Bolognese while in San Pietro in Casale another sergeant major shot and killed a striker, injuring another. Local magistrates were accused of delaying court action against him.60

Similarly, general strikes were no less violent affairs under Dallari. Though, according to Avanti! of 14 October
1907, the new prefect avoided using conspicuously large forces in the October 1907 general strike, 'cossiché la manifestazione proletaria si svolse calma e tranquilla e la città aveva solo l'aspetto di un giorno festivo', the extent to which his forces always managed to follow his directives is dubious. During the April 1911 general strike Il Giornale del Mattino, a local Democratic newspaper, reported Carabinieri and Guardie di Città blocking a procession and brutally attacking its front-liners (18 April 1911). The Questore for his part claimed that he had stopped the procession because it was intent on throwing stones against Palazzo d'Accursio and had acted repressively because anarchists and 'pregiudicati' had reacted violently to this.61 This therefore suggests continued failure among many policemen to adapt to Giolittian tactics of mediation.

Dallari's reaction to allegations of police brutality was total support of the forces involved, despite his opposition to agrarian intransigence. When, for example, in June 1911 the mayor of Sala Bolognese complained of police maltreatment of peasant demonstrators, he replied that such repression had been necessitated by the criminal behaviour or the leagues.62 Even if Dallari was conscious of police over-protection of the agrarians he may well have followed the prime minister's tradition of publicly playing down allegations of this sort and defending his forces. This may account for his measures to restrict the circulation of Massarenti's telegrams...
reporting police abuse. As the Questore pointed out, however, the police found themselves in a situation where the agrarians considered their action late and insufficient and the leagues accused them of arbitrary and partisan behaviour. Indeed, that both sides were probably not totally objective in their interpretation of police policies in the province should be borne in mind when considering their reports on police behaviour.

Independently of their attitude towards labour disputes, both Dall'Oglio and Dallari maintained their roles as government electoral agents, and this naturally conflicted with policies of strike mediation. Hence, like Dall'Oglio in 1904, Dallari was instructed by Giolitti to ensure a constitutional victory in the 1913 general election. Similarly, he limited public spending by Molinella's Socialist municipal council and kept Budrio's council under the control of a 'commissario prefettizio' in 1907 and 1908 until he was sure of a constitutional electoral win. The ambiguous role of the Giolittian prefect is in fact only conceivable if placed within a general governing context in which minimum economic and political concessions were granted to the working classes in the hope of keeping the ruling classes in power. Hence the reality of continued electoral corruption, despite the widening of the franchise in 1912.

The 'Giolittian' prefect epitomized the government's desire for career personnel with professional administrative
training and experience who could be 'politicized' to fit the needs of an ever-changing social and political climate. This would account for Dallari's rather conflicting role which reflected less his own political feelings and more the ambiguous dictates of the government which he was serving. Dall'Oglio's replacement in October 1906 - for over-supporting the agrarian cause, so Cardoza claims (pp. 113-4) - may well be an example of the failure of the prefect to run the province less on his own political dictates and more according to the varying political needs of Rome. Documentation in Rome suggests, however, that all prefects appointed in Bologna under Giolitti (Dall'Oglio included) were from the career class and there is no doubt as to their excellent professional records. According to Aquarone, under Giolitti a successful prefectoral career opened the way to such elevated political positions as ambassador and senator, rather than vice-versa (pp. 60-1). Caravaggio in fact became a senator on retiring in November 1901, after a number of years in office in Bologna. The question of the Giolittian prefect deserves far wider investigation, however.

If near-nineteenth century forms of police repression continued to be used in certain situations - as was also demonstrated by continued 'eccidi proletari' at the national level - episodes of individual, unofficial and usually locally-based police partisanship with the agrarians demonstrate that Giolitti's policies did have some impact, if
only negative, on police conduct. In 1908, for example, the delegate of Budrio informed Dallari that his predecessor had become so friendly with local employer Benni (mentioned in Chapter II, p. 106), that when league land invasions were imminent he sent the Carabinieri away from the scene of conflict in order to justify the leaseholder's use of firearms in self-defence and legitimize the use of army reinforcements. There are several possible explanations to this. Individual policemen may have moved over to partisan support of the employers because they genuinely felt disorientated by new policies which limited their previous repressive powers. They may have been influenced by the force of public opinion which frequently attacked the police forces, as was illustrated in the agrarian press. Indeed personal attacks such as the one received by Molinella's delegate in July 1907 obviously were effective in enforcing police connivance with the agrarians. As in the case of the delegate of Budrio, however, the provocation of conflict in order to justify the use of troops may almost have been a means of self-defence on the part of unprotected policemen, reflecting a relatively weak police structure.

This analysis of policing under Giovanni Giolitti would not be complete, however, without considering serious internal problems in the administration and organization of Bologna's police forces, since they almost certainly accounted to a fair extent for police behavioural trends during the period. Of
greatest significance here is the question of numerical weakness which has on several occasions emerged in this study. Documentation indeed reveals that nearly always police numbers were well below the limits set by law and that even considerable increases in numerical strength were usually ineffective. In January 1910, for example, the Questore informed Dallari that out of 32 police officials posted within his territorial jurisdiction, 14 had permanent office positions, leaving 18 for active service. Of these 4 were too old for street duties and 6 were on missions outside the province. This left 8. Similarly, he complained that though the numerical force of the Guardie di Città had been increased from 214 to 310, this had been reduced to 272 because the city council was unable to pay for extra board and accommodation. In 1911 he stated that missions often pushed the numerical strength of the Guardie to below half. Again in 1909 he claimed that 'il personale dei Carabinieri è assolutamente impari alle ordinarie e normali esigenze del servizio, tanto in città che nel circondario'.

Lack of sufficient forces during this period is evident if one is to consider the large number of requests made for the establishment of new police delegations and Carabinieri stations. Indeed the absence of police presence in certain rural areas often necessitated the setting up of temporary police units, using forces from other areas of the province. The inefficiency of these measures is obvious, however, since
the transfer of a police delegate, for example, to another zone exposed his own delegation to the threat of the Socialist leagues, etc.73

Documentation suggests, however, that the interior minister did not usually respond positively to the prefect's requests for extra forces or new headquarters, despite official encouragement through financial compensation of increased Carabinieri and Guardie di Città enrolment, as shown in Chapter I (pp. 43-4). When in May 1906 Dall'Oglio asked for a new police delegation in Malalbergo, he received the reply that there was not enough funding for such a venture. Again, in reply to Dallari's requests for more Guardie in 1909, the police chief stated that this was impossible given that over a thousand were lacking nationally.74 The seriousness of numerical weakness in Bologna is evident if one is to consider that during the general election of May 1909 reinforcements of Guardie di Finanza (financial police) were employed. The following November the Questura had to resort to the use of 555 members of the public to form 'Pattuglie Cittadine' - under the authorization of an interior ministry decree of 1863 which granted arms permits to citizens for this purpose - which under the guidance of police officers guarded the city against crime. By February 1910 the numbers had diminished to 118 and, as the Questore himself admitted, these patrols were of no real effect in crime prevention.75

If there were few casualties in Bologna itself, in Italy as
a whole the inadequacy of police forces placed the onus on the use of reinforcements or the army. According to Fiorentino, Giolitti was forced to admit in parliament in March 1908 in the face of continued 'eccidi proletari' that the use of the army was the main cause of bloodshed and added that he hoped that an increased number of Carabinieri as an alternative to troops would limit this, though continuing to emphasize the importance of the army in policing (p. 40). One may conclude, however, that if no real changes took place - Giolitti's idea of using Carabinieri battalions as an alternative to the army was never pushed through (Fiorentino, p. 72) - this was because, besides the financial difficulties this may have involved, the prime minister was afraid to oppose military leaders by altering traditional and military forms of repression too much.

That the over use of reinforcements generated tensions between the prefectoral and military authorities is evident in Bologna. In September 1908 the police chief Leonardi criticized Dallari for over-concentrating Carabinieri reinforcements in certain areas of the province without forewarning their commanders.76 There was also obvious rivalry between the Carabinieri and the civilian police authorities. When in December 1914, for example, the mayor of Castiglione dei Pepoli asked the prefect for a permanent police delegation in the town, given the success of the presence of a temporary delegation in controlling strike
initiatives there the previous summer, the Carabinieri division commander angrily claimed that his forces were adequate! Such animosity may well have been generated during the Giolittian period by the prime minister's obvious desire to increase the prestige of the Guardie di città, as described in Chapter I (pp. 43-4).

Reports show that in Bologna the quality of policemen was in no way improved under Giolitti. This was almost certainly due to the failure of the government to improve their working conditions. The Questore was as critical of the bad quality of his forces as he was of their numerical weakness. He mentioned apathy, frequent absence from work and general indiscipline in reports of January and August 1910. An attempt to place Guardie di Città in special divisions to cope with increased crime that year had proved fruitless. Of the forty percent of Guardie who stayed in the force after two years service, at least a third were badly disciplined, taking advantage of their plain clothes status for these special duties to slope off work. Similarly, he complained that their superiors in the force set them a bad example with their 'alcoholic' or 'psychologically affected' state.

Motives for the state of decay into which the Questura had fallen are numerous. The Questore's January report suggested, for example, that the limited number of active officials were especially envious towards their younger colleagues who usually avoided night duties and other exhausting work because
they were sent on missions out of the province. Criticism from the public about the high levels of unsolved crime had also thrown personnel into a state of apathy. On a national scale newspapers such as state officials La Tutela Pubblica expressed the bitter feelings of many policemen about unfair pension and promotion schemes and humiliating salary levels and what many considered lack of sympathy from the government over this. Fiorentino indeed mentions a Carabinieri national strike in 1910 and a high level of discontent among funzionari that year, since financial bonuses granted in August 1907 had still not been paid (p. 67). This last point reveals the reality of slow bureaucratic procedures rendering any legislative moves aimed at improving the policeman's working conditions insignificant.

Giolitti was generally unsuccessful in altering the state of policing in Italy and changing the traditionally repressive mentality of the policeman because he did not create the conditions necessary for this. If anything his policies simply disorientated police leaders, often with dramatic consequences. After thirteen years of Giolittian rule the police system remained in as much decay as it had been in 1901, presenting more or less identical problems of numerical weakness, dualism and rivalry between corps, indiscipline, etc. Giolitti's strategies were automatically limited because his own support for the working-class grievances were only half-hearted and often totally incompatible with his
electoral requirements. He aimed to keep the Socialist movement under firm control, his social policies a means of limiting the attraction of Revolutionary Socialism, but when the going became too rough a return to near traditional methods of repression was inevitable.

Giolitti's replacement by Salandra in April 1914 left Dallari a further four months in office in Bologna. The following June a conflict between republicans and Carabinieri in Ancona, resulting in the deaths of three demonstrators, provoked serious revolutionary disturbances in many parts of the peninsula as Benito Mussolini, the Revolutionary Syndicalist PSI leader proclaimed, in the words of Luigi Albertini, 'Caccia agli agenti, carabinieri, soldati'. What became known as 'Red Week' had its effects to a minor but significant extent on the Bolognese province. On 10 June Dallari received reports of the felling of telegraph poles and the cutting of telephone wires in rural areas, and during the following days he informed the interior minister of acts of arson and sabotage. 'Teppisti' attempted to steal weapons from a train, which they managed to stop and railway lines were blocked. Several churches and public buildings were set on fire. Of greater importance to this study, however, as during the general strike of May 1906, once again civilians were involved in anti-revolutionary counter-demonstrations. Though the archival evidence is thin here, Onofri states that demonstrations proclaimed by Federterra and the Camera
Confederale del Lavoro on 9 and 11 June were attacked by armed members of the Nationalist Party with the protection of the police. Dallari, in answering to allegations by the socialist deputy Calda that the police had tolerated Nationalist violence, claimed that in reality a group of citizens, mostly merchants embittered by the effects that the demonstrations were having on their trade, had exchanged punches with workers on 11 June and that the police had intervened to stop the conflict, arresting those resisting their orders or inciting revolution. That he may have been aware of the intentions of the Nationalists, however, is demonstrated by the fact that he had warned the Socialists not to pass in procession through the particular location where the conflict later took place. Indeed, if one is to consider that on 11 June the prefect had reported that he did not have sufficient Carabinieri and army reinforcements, it is quite understandable that the police forces may have benefited from the help of the bourgeois forces of the city. Following the incident Salandra did in fact order the prefect to avoid conflicts, especially those 'derivanti spontanea collaborazione cittadini', suggesting that the original circular issued in which the government expressed its confidence that it would have the cooperation of its subjects in the restoration of peace may have been overinterpreted by both the police and the citizens.

Dallari himself claimed in a letter to the interior minister
on 12 June that, unlike his predecessor, he had never permitted the formation of 'pattuglioni tutela ordine pubblico' for the repression of revolutionary demonstrations, since he considered this a reflection of the numerical weakness of the police as well as giving such conflict almost civil-war dimensions. He added that he intended to ban arms permits to prevent this. Indeed, he received a letter of protest from the president of a shooting range in Castelfranco Emilia that Carabinieri had removed the breach blocks from rifles stored there, the following day.\textsuperscript{84} The events of June 1914 provide once again evidence of the importance during the first years of the twentieth century of the adoption by bourgeois society of anti-Socialist self-defence tactics to counter a police system which, under Giolitti, had adopted mediatory measures in handling the aspirations of the masses, independently of how successful these measures actually were. The unofficial connivance of individual policemen in this and the often official organization of 'Pattuglie Cittadine' by the Questura itself (as in 1909) only further legitimized what may be considered a dress rehearsal for the post-First World War years when Fascism provided the solution to newly gained Socialist powers.
(ii) The Guarda massacre and the effects of the First World War on policing in Bologna.

The replacement of Dallari by Vincenzo Quaranta in August 1914 was almost certainly a reflection less of the manner in which the former handled 'Red Week' - there is no evidence of this - but more of his association with the Giolittian era. According to Brunello Vigezzi, Dallari was 'un tipico prefetto giolittiano, accusato di tolleranza verso i socialisti e i loro episodi di barbarie'.

The disbanding of Molinella's syndical organizations and the dissolution of the Socialist administration on the orders of the prefect following the tragic massacre at Guarda on 5 October 1914 during the braccianti-sharecroppers' strike (see Chapter II, pp. 108-9) indeed illustrate the advantage gained by the agrarians from Quaranta's appointment. Onofri, in his detailed study of the event, goes as far as to suggest that the massacre had been provoked by the new prefect, who needed a sufficient pretext for repressing the leagues. This author argues that Quaranta, well aware that the peasants were prone to outbursts of violence, deliberately delayed the arrival in Molinella of a crucial telegram which would almost certainly have calmed the mood of the leagues. The telegram in fact informed Massarenti that the presence of 'krumiri' - the fundamental cause of the tragedy - in Molinella was merely a precaution. They would be sent home immediately, should an agreement be reached between
the leagues and the employers. (La Strage, cit., pp. 110-8).

What indeed does emerge through study of the documentation is the prefect's desire to incriminate the Molinellese leagues, not so much in terms of legal evidence proving that they had planned the incident in advance, as was made out, - evidence of this kind was in fact hard to come by! - but more on the immoral implications of years of 'red slavery' in Bologna. The local PSI deputies Bentini and Modigliani, who rallied to the support of the leagues after 5 October informed Salandra that both the prefect and the agrarians had, before the incident, demonstrated their unwillingness for a peaceful solution to the strike. Though the Molinellese peasant association declared its willingness to end the strike within the deadline set by the agrarians for this, non-union workers had still been sent for. Following immediate repressive moves in the aftermath of the tragedy, Quaranta, rather than promoting real moves towards pacification, supported the employers over their refusal to negotiate with what remained of the leagues on the grounds that they should in no way feel obliged to have dealings with worker representatives accused of murder. Similarly, the Vice-Questore was unwilling to help those sharecroppers who, because of their refusal to accept new pacts on the terms of the agrarians, were evicted since 'concessione ricovero escomiati parte Autorità municipale o per ordine governo porterebbe vittoria sovversivi e perpetuerrebbe agitazione escomiati'. Quaranta added that the
ease with which the majority of sharecroppers had managed to come to agreements with their employers without the mediation of the leagues was proof of the 'artificiosità di tutte le impostazioni'. In response to accusations that the authorities had forcibly prevented the leagues from taking part in these so-called 'negotiations' he retorted that:

con una sorveglianza attiva si cercò di impedire che i leghisti potessero coartare la volontà di proprietari, coloni o braccianti, costringendoli a seguire direttive non suggerite dalla persuasione, ma imposte con le minaccie e le violenze.

The documents cited demonstrate how Quaranta exploited the violent implications of local syndicalism emerging from the massacre to suffocate any league initiatives.

Proof of the farcical nature of the incrimination of Molinella's Socialist organizations for the murder of the 'krumiri' emerges once again in the police files of 1916 at the time of the first trial when the prefect, despite the original arrest of 62 league members, informed Salandra that:

Il Massarenti è infatti l'unica figura degna di rilievo. Tutti gli altri imputati sono personaggi secondari che dileguano nelle incertezze morali di un delitto compiuto da una folla. Il Massarenti è l'esponente di tutto un sistema e il perno di tutta una propaganda di odio e di lotta (...).
The trial, postponed until 1919, terminated that year with an amnesty for the 62 arrested and revocation of arrest warrants for Massarenti and two other colleagues. Quaranta had notably advised the prime minister not to proceed with the trial since, in his opinion, an acquittal would appear a moral triumph for Massarenti whilst if condemned they would become political martyrs. Massarenti was also acquitted of the charge of embezzlement of public funding as mayor of Molinella. Indeed, the 'commissario prefettizio' Cacciari who had immediately replaced him in 1914 had been forced to withdraw the charges for lack of evidence.91

If Giolittian police tactics certainly had their limitations the events of Guarda are suggestive of total abandonment of policies of mediation and a return to nineteenth century forms of repression. If Dallari in the face of what he considered violence and intimidation by revolutionary elements within the PSI organizations had tended to place his trust in the pacifist/Reformist Socialist majority of the province's working classes and the success of dialogue rather than repression, Quaranta, a normal career prefect but in Cardoza's opinion an instrument of Salandra (p. 192), saw repression as the surest means of putting an end to Socialist bullying. Indeed he complained in a report to the interior minister in November 1914 that in the past the police and judiciary had been too weak.92 Vigezzi, commenting on the repression in Molinella, claims that he ignored possible differences between
revolutionaries or reformists, desiring only to liberate the proletariat from any form of 'red' enslavement' (pp. 954-9).

The above point needs to be taken into consideration when examining policing in Bologna during the war years. This final section is significant for this study for the following reasons. Firstly, it questions the position of the prefect and his forces with regard to 'interventionist' development in Bologna and aims to parallel this with the post-war period in the next chapter. Secondly, it considers the effects of mobilization and emergency legislation on the life of the province with particular reference to the restrictions this placed on Socialist party and syndical power. It examines the role of the prefect and the provincial military authorities in encouraging, if not enforcing, social, economic and political harmony and maintaining, where possible, a high level of patriotic morale.

Though Italy did not join the First World War until May 1915 the period of its neutrality, declared in August 1914, is essential since it is characterized by lively, if not violent, internal political conflict centred around the question of Italy's possible intervention. Though there is little evidence to suggest that demonstrations for or against intervention were officially banned by the government, Salandra did initially enforce Italy's neutralist position by ordering his prefects to prohibit 'qualsiasi manifestazione delle rappresentanze locali a favore di uno o dell'altro degli
stati belligeranti intesa ad influire sulla azione politica del Governo' on 7 August 1914. Indeed, less than a week after this, the interior minister ordered Quaranta to invalidate a declaration by Molinella's Socialist council in favour of neutrality and threatening to mobilize against 'tentativi di quanti volessero trascinare Nazione nell'immane conflitto'.

This was matched by general concern on the part of the prefectoral authorities about the position of the political parties with regard to the war. On 21 April 1915 the Questore informed Quaranta that not only the Socialists but also the Catholics and bourgeoisie were opposed to it. Police forces appeared particularly concerned about initiatives against the war in the Anarchist camp. On 11 April the Questore claimed that Borghi, Emilia's Anarchist leader, was organizing a general strike in the hope of setting off revolution and that 'per raggiungere l'effetto voluto sarebbero commessi attentati alle opere d'arte ferroviarie a mezzo di esplosivi allo scopo di rendere difficili i movimenti di truppa ed obbligare i ferrovieri di essere con loro solidali.' On 21 April the prefect asked the interior minister for 'forze sufficienti a sopprimere il minimo atto di ribellione, istituendo anche, se del caso, un regime eccezionale che, di per sé, sarebbe il migliore ammonimento'. Less than a week later he received orders from the ministry to compile a list of dangerous elements to be arrested in the event of 'disordini'.

A certain amount of apprehension was expressed by the
prefectoral authorities about the formation of revolutionary Interventionist groups. According to a report by the Carabinieri authorities in January 1915, the Reformist Socialists, now under the denomination Partito Ufficiale Socialista and the largest Socialist organization in the province, and the Revolutionary Syndicalists - both opposed to the war - had suffered defections to the 'Fasci di Azione Rivoluzionaria' which (dominated by republicans and dangerous ex-revolutionaries and anarchists) aimed to act illegally and violently in the hope of setting off the war in order to 'sovvertire le attuali istituzioni'. 96

The period of neutrality was characterized by a series of violent clashes between the Neutralists and Interventionists. Officially the prefectoral authorities showed firmness towards both camps in repressing violence. Where, for example, Interventionists attempted to storm Palazzo d'Accursio in protests at the Socialist city council's neglecting to fly the national flag on the king's birthday (11 November 1914) repression was naturally swift, and a patriotic demonstration in front of the Austrian consulate in December 1914 was put down with similar brutality, so the Nationalist Dino Zanetti claimed in his memoirs. 97 Quite apart from the author's tendency to exaggerate, the action of the prefecture was almost certainly motivated by Italy's neutral state in the European conflict in the latter case and the general necessity for the maintenance of public order in the former. Especially
among the lower ranks of the police forces, however, there were obvious cases of connivance with the Interventionists which the prefectoral authorities seemed to tolerate. If police spokesmen claimed that the police remained impartial during clashes and simply aimed to keep confrontation at a minimum, the Socialist press painted rather a different picture. On 11 April 1915, for example, a police report stated that following a private Interventionist conference the authorities separated and disbanded opposing groups in Piazza Vittorio Emanuele, Bologna's main square, and arrested several interventionists for provocative behaviour. La Squilla of 17 April 1915 claimed, however, that the police 'in dolce connubio coi rivoluzionari "fascisti" ' prevented neutralists - including those who had tickets - from attending the conference. At its termination fifty Nationalist students headed in the direction of the Ponzio bar - a Socialist meeting place - provocatively singing patriotic songs with no reaction from the police. Only when the Socialists retorted with "La Bandiera Rossa" did the police intervene to arrest several socialists. Avanti! claimed that both the police and the Interventionists had invaded the bar which they vandalised (12 April 1915) La Squilla similarly reported the police attacking a group of neutralists to the delight of Interventionist onlookers in May 1915, by which time manifestations of violence had become an everyday affair in the city (22 May 1915). The censored spaces of an Avanti!
article of 16 May on a Neutralist demonstration imply that the authorities may well have desired to conceal the conduct of both the Interventionists and their own forces. 99

Only on 18 May 1915, with the realistic possibility of intervention, did Salandra send telegrams to the prefects of Bologna, Parma, Reggio Emilia and Modena ordering the prohibition of meetings and demonstrations threatening public order in the light of the international situation which necessitated the maintenance of internal peace. The circular stated that

Chi istiga disordini o vi partecipa si rende reo di tradimento verso la patria. Ogni opinione potendo liberamente e legittimamente manifestarsi in parlamento, non è ammisibile che assembramenti tumultuosi tentino infrangere indirizzo della politica del paese.

Quaranta himself issued an appeal to the citizens of Bologna on 15 May urging them not to be divided at such a critical moment for the nation. 100 Italy's declaration of war on 20 May 1915, however, saw another particularly violent Interventionist demonstration on the evening of 23 of that month. This time the interventionists had no difficulty in breaking through police cordons to invade Palazzo d'Accursio, breaking several windows ('involuntarily' so the prefect claimed). They also invaded Palazzo Re Enzo to ring the
bells. Similar attempts in two churches were halted by the 'amorevoli esortazioni' of police officials. Evident here is Quaranta's desire to play down the episode.¹⁰¹

In analysing the behaviour of the Bolognese police forces during the period of neutrality it is important to distinguish where possible between acts of true political discrimination and repression dictated by the necessities of public order. Police numerical weaknesses may have been a serious motive for the latter. In April 1915, for example, the prefect warned the interior minister that his forces were insufficient and that the few available Guardie di Città and Carabinieri:

stanchi di turni lunghissimi (....) non hanno modo di resistere coi mezzi ordinari e non si vuol o lasciare che la teppa domini per le vie o che i consolati vengono offesi e che le repressioni seguano con metodi violenti ai quali poca forza è sufficiente (...).¹⁰²

This may indeed account for the manner in which the above-mentioned Interventionist anti-Austrian demonstrations were repressed, especially since in this case policemen guarding consulates had particularly important responsibilities. Serious incidents could have had international repercussions. On other occasions, however, the natural aversion of many policemen towards the anti-patriotic rhetoric of the Socialists coupled with psychological pressure from the
Interventionist camp was probably the cause of obvious political persecution. Zanetti clearly mentioned the euphoria in which the forces of law and order may have been caught up. He implied that during a demonstration in Piazza Vittorio Emanuele on 21 February 1915 soldiers let interventionists through cordons since 'ormai anche i soldati sapevano che la dichiarazione di guerra era imminente'. A soldier knocked down in the ensuing rampage was carried in triumph by the crowds because 'Era un soldato d'Italia' (pp. 115-6). The significance of this lies once again in the obvious collaboration of civilian and police forces against Socialism and the parallels that may be made with the post-war years in the suggestion that such behavioural trends had a long-standing tradition in the province of Bologna.

With the declaration of war, social, political and economic life in Bologna was transformed. Starting on 22 May 1915, many emergency legislative measures were immediately put into force. Law 671, 'Conferimento al governo del re dei poteri straordinari in caso di guerra' of 22 May allowed the government to pass any laws concerning defence and public order and to finance military affairs outside the limits of previous legislation. Regio Decreto 674 of 23 May 'Provvedimenti Straordinari in materia di pubblica sicurezza' allowed policing to be placed in the hands of military commanders or civil commissioners, prohibited public meetings,
civil and religious processions, military style marches (with or without arms), public assemblies and private meetings if public in form. The law also allowed the dissolution of associations responsible for disturbing the peace. In consequence of this law Quaranta ordered his forces to keep an eye on both Neutralist and Interventionist activities.\(^{103}\) As forewarned by the decree, police responsibility for the province passed to the armed forces in September 1915. The provinces of Bologna, Ferrara, Ravenna and Forli were divided into military zones, each led by a Comandante di Zona (zone commander) who directed policing activities. Though the police forces maintained their regular competences, the prefects had to 'tenere al corrente i Comandanti di Zona circa lo spirito delle popolazioni, l'atteggiamento dei partiti, specialmente sovversivi, nonché su tutto ciò che possa interessare un vigile di servizio di P.S.'.\(^{104}\)

Regio Decreto 675 of 23 May 1915 prohibited references in the press to the number of dead, injured or imprisoned in the war, changes in military leadership and military operations. Newspaper editions could be confiscated by the prefect, sub-prefect, 'o chi ne fa le veci' if in their opinion publication would lower public morale and faith in the government authorities, encourage conflict between political parties or jeopardize national interests in any way. Most importantly, article 3 of the law stipulated that all newspaper editions should be presented to the prefect, sub-
prefect or their representatives at least an hour before publication for possible censorship. The effects of this were keenly felt in Bologna, particularly by the left-wing parties. On 12 July 1915, for example, Quaranta ordered the confiscation of the thirty-fifth edition of La Squilla 'dato l'atteggiamento subdole del foglio che, con frasi e articoli non apertamente contrari alla guerra tende ad attrizzare lo scontento e l'odio fra le classi sociali', as he explained to the interior minister. On 22 October, however, he complained that measures to control anti-war propaganda were insufficient, suggesting that the matter should be placed in the hands of military tribunals.

Law 885 of 20 June 1915 punished the passing of information different from that issued by the government. If such a crime were committed with deliberate intent to disturb public order or damage public interests the punishments were severer. In view of this law in September 1915 the Questore reported the arrest of an anarchist for talking against the war to injured soldiers at the Rizzoli hospital. Quaranta was also apprehensive about charity missions on the part of the city mayor Zanardi and the local Socialist deputy Bentini at the war front. As he warned the prefect of Udine on 19 June 1915 'Trattasi di due socialisti ufficiali noti per gli atteggiamenti anti-militaristi prima della guerra e pel contegno subdolo (...) essi sotto l'apparenza di una iniziativa lodevole cercherebbero portare costà
Several significant police measures in Bologna emerge from the documentation. At the end of May 1915 an organization of 'Pattuglie Cittadini' was set up, as in 1909, to make up for a lack of policemen in the city, given the war situation. Four squads consisting of between fifteen and twenty-five civilians and each led by one or two Guardie di Città guarded the four city districts from crime late in the evening. A fifth group would carry out afternoon duties alongside the 'Squadra Mobile' (flying squad). They had to pay particular attention to foreigners and suspects living near to the military arsenal. If an initial report concluded that 'I singoli Pattuglianti sono animati da buone disposizioni di animo e volenterosamente si sobbarcano al disagio di una notte insana e ciò pur di potere contribuire anche in minima parte all'opera concorde di tutti gli italiani', archival evidence suggests that they did not seriously solve the problems of police numerical weaknesses. Indeed the following month the Questore advised the prefect to ask the military authorities for permission to arrest all 'pregiudicati' since 'la pubblica forza impegnata tutta in servizi straordinari non può efficacemente esercitare sui medesimi la sorveglianza normale di tempo di pace'. In August 1915 Quaranta complained of the mal-functioning of the 'Pattuglie'. Their members were indisciplined and their excitability 'li rende pericolosi ogni qualvolta vengono a
contatto con i cittadini'. The policemen leading the squads either had no authority over the civilians or behaved as unprofessionally as the 'pattuglianti'. Though no reference is made here to the anti-Socialist activities of the Interventionists, this is yet another example of the importance of the civilian policing tradition in Bologna.

If on the one hand the war placed further restrictions on political activities on the other it regulated industrial relations in order to ensure maximum productive output. In agriculture, for example, law 791 of June 1915, 'Provvedimenti straordinari per il raccolto dei cereali nell'anno in corso' allowed the prefect to order landowners, leaseholders, sharecroppers and peasants to lend out their quadrupedi and harvesting vehicles, along with their personnel, to other farmers in their commune before and after their own harvests. It also established the setting up of commissions presided over by a legal expert (giudice consigliatore) and two agricultural experts (one representing the employers, the other the workers) in order to solve disputes.

In the province of Bologna the agrarian conflicts officially ended on 9 June 1915 with the signing of an agreement between Federterra and the AAB. It stipulated a wage increase of 15%. In turn the Socialist syndicates renounced boycott action on condition that the employers gave preference to local Socialist workers. Law 203 of 8 August 1915 postponed the expiration of agrarian contracts for one year. It also
allowed the employers to call workers to assist sharecroppers unable to cultivate their land sufficiently as a result of military call-ups. The sharecropper was required to pay 50% of the costs. On 5 March 1916 an agreement in the province of Bologna increased wages by a further 25% and agrarian contracts were extended once again with the Decreto Luogoteneziale of 24 February 1916. Finally the 'Provvedimenti straordinari' of 30 May 1916 (645) authorized the formation of a provincial commission, led by the prefect, with the task of considering work forces available in relation to local labour requirements, organizing the movement of labour, revealing the availability of farm vehicles, encouraging female labour and solving labour disputes. 'Commissioni arbitrali mandamentali' (sub-district arbitration commissions) led by local magistrates were formed with the task of judging claims on either side of contractual violations.111

The above war legislation and the ensuing pacts are vitally significant to the history of the Bolognese agrarian struggles because they represent the first examples of legally binding agreements. The prefect as president of the provincial arbitrary commission was particularly confident that he had achieved social peace in rural areas. In the aftermath of the March 1916 agreement he claimed, perhaps over-optimistically that:
Si è stabilito che ogni divergenza venga dissoluta ad un arbitro con che si è tolta la possibilità di sorpruse e l'essere l'unico arbitro scelto nella mia persona è naturale atto di omaggio all'autorità specialmente per parte dei lavoratori tutti iscritti alle leghe socialiste, mentre documenta il riconoscimento del Governo nelle questioni socialmente importantissime.\textsuperscript{112}

In reality, however, the documentation suggests that social and economic peace was only superficially maintained, as is evident in the large number of protests from both sides at pact violations. Federterra claimed that the employers refused to increase wages as stipulated in the agreements and that they used non-league or Catholic workers – and prisoners of war and soldiers towards the end of the war – to avoid having to employ Socialist workers. On 28 September 1915, for example, Federterra informed the prefect that Benni of Molinella refused to grant the 15% wage increase to his workers as stipulated by the pact of the previous June. This caused a strike which served as a pretext for him to employ non-league workers with the aim of damaging the interests of the Socialist unions. Federterra's letter concluded that, 'Per ottenere tale cosa, egli ricorre al solito sistema dell'Agraria di rimangiarsi i contratti per poi gridare all'infrazione dei medesimi da parte dei nostri leghisti'.\textsuperscript{113}

In November 1916 Federterra claimed that Benni and other
local employers employed Ferrarese workers despite the presence of unemployed workers in Molinella, so violating article 3 of the March 1916 agreement which banned the importation of workers unless there was no local unemployment. Ironically, however, the prefect went down on the side of the employers who appealed to the arbitrary commission against league work stoppages in protest at the above. He judged that Federterra's attitude was contrary to the March agreement and to the spirit of the commission, since violations of agrarian pacts did not justify strikes and only the commission itself had the competence to judge whether or not violations had been committed. He also issued a 'Lodo Arbitrale' which confirmed that Benni had violated the pact but reiterated that this did not justify similar violations by Federterra.

The appeal of Francesco Manzoli, leader of the Lega Braccianti di Bologna, against the Società Orticoltori on 27 July 1916 had a more straightforward outcome. In April 1916 a pact had been signed whereby the society would only employ workers from Manzoli's organization. When the employers violated this by employing workers from other communes at cheaper rates, the prefect as president of the arbitrary commission ordered the violators to respect the pact. Quaranta also ordered the sub-prefect of Imola to warn a certain Diotaloni in August 1917 who abandoned his crops to avoid having to pay workers at higher rates that 'un siffatto contegno anti-patriottico non sortirebbe alcun effetto, perché
The huge number of pact violations during the war years suggests that the arbitration commissions were of no real effect, however. There is little evidence of legal action being taken against violators, implying that the so-called 'Lodi Arbitrali' as issued against Benni (see above) were no more than a declaration by the higher authorities and did not carry legal sanctions. Notably Federterra's work-stoppages were usually in protest at pact violations by the employers, suggesting that the Socialists felt the need to act outside the commissions which were obviously of limited effect.

On many occasions Quaranta demonstrated that he did not take Federterra's complaints seriously and that he saw the leagues as the chief pact violators. This was particularly evident towards the end of the war when Federterra frequently complained that the agrarians used military workers to avoid having to employ league members. According to a report Quaranta received from Federterra in October 1918 Federico del Rio of Medicina had provoked strikes by deliberately giving his workers a poor quality wine ration. This gave him a pretext for resorting to military workers. Other employers tended to allow Socialist labourers to do low paid work while better paid jobs were given to the army at a cheaper rate. Though the employers claimed that there was no available labour Federterra retorted that farmers often ignored offers...

a parte ogni eventuale responsabilità in cui incomba si provvederebbe alla lavorazione coercitiva dei prodotti'.117
of workers from the Socialist labour exchanges, as happened in Minerbio in March 1918, or did not even ask for workers, as was reported in Medicina.\textsuperscript{118} If restrictions on the employment of soldiers by the agrarians were imposed by the military authorities themselves in March 1918, suggesting that on occasions Federterra was taken seriously, the prefect demonstrated his support for the agrarian cause and his contempt for the principles of the arbitration commission of which he was president by advising a certain 'Marchese' in May 1918 that in case of syndical pact violations he could always resort to the use of soldiers or prisoners of war.\textsuperscript{119}

Quaranta's image is further distorted when considering his appeal to the interior ministry for secret funds to finance the Catholic unions. In January 1915 he urged upon the minister that the Fratellanze Coloniche were:

associazioni di contadini costituzionali che meritano ogni benevolenza non solo per aver saputo resistere alla marea socialista ma perché ciò fecero unicamente con gli scarsissimi mezzi propri senza aiuto né economico né di altro genere.

Having obtained 3,000 lira for this from secret police funding he once again asked for help in August 1917 since the Fratellanze, he claimed, were the only non-Socialist workers' organizations and could produce promising political results in the province.\textsuperscript{120} Further evidence suggests partisan behaviour
among several other police officials and magistrates. Federterra informed the prefect on 17 July 1915 that Cacciari, Molinella's 'commissario prefettizio', had advised local agrarians not to respect pacts since they could always count on the army for any necessary work.\footnote{121} On 21 April 1917 the provincial public prosecutor informed Quaranta that the justice minister was concerned about the manner in which the arbitration commission of Budrio functioned. The local judge 'lascierebbe troppa libera mano al Commissario Baroni e talvolta favorirebbe illegittime pressioni di costui sui contadini, per costringerli ad accontentarsi di rimborsi minori di quelli che sarebbero dovuti'.\footnote{122}

The above suggests that traditional episodes of connivance between policemen and the agrarians remained in force during the war years. Again, pressure from the agrarian camp may have been responsible for this. An anonymous note to the prefect found in the 1917 police files stated, for example:

È vivamente commentata la proposta di aumento del 30% sulla tariffa ai Lavoratori Agricoli. È un aumento esoso e grave perché unito al 20% forma il 50% mercede ossia aumento approvato in nessuna parte d'Italia. (...). Cosa dice la popolazione lo vedrete sui giornali. Intanto rimediate se non volete una crisi dolorosa. Intanto il presidente dell'Agraria si è dimesso.\footnote{123}
Quaranta for his part maintained an ambiguous role throughout the war period. If officially he dedicated himself to the tasks the war required of him, promoting social peace and harmony, behind this lurked the inevitable desire to curb the power of Socialism which in many respects, as in the rural areas of the province, benefited from war-time legislation. If he seriously aimed to protect the masses from the lure of Socialism he did not realise, however, that on many occasions his support of the employers was economically detrimental towards those he desired to protect.

In the industrial sector emergency legislation placed restrictions on the freedom of employees of firms involved in important military production. Decreto Luogotenenziale 1455 of 29 September 1915 militarized all workers in the 'Stabilimenti Militari', (auxiliary factories). According to the Ministry of War circular of 4 October 1915 militarized workers became subject to the jurisdiction of the military penal code. Those who abandoned their posts were declared desertors. In Bologna the designation of many industries as 'auxiliary' pulled in between twenty and twenty-five thousand workers from the countryside to work in war production, (see Chapter II, pp. 110-11). Evidence suggests, however, that factory directors on occasions preferred to grant concessions rather than impose the harsh sanctions dictated by the war-time legislation. Indeed, according to a report from Quaranta to the interior minister in February 1917
the directors of three military plants were relatively lenient towards striking women workers demonstrating for higher wages, which were granted. The prefect warned the military authorities, however, that 'una arrendevolezza eccessiva' could increase the likelihood of strikes.125

According to both the prefect and the local military commander, the real threat to the smooth running of production in both the urban and rural areas lay in the activities promoted by the PSI and the Camera Confederale del Lavoro. In December 1916 Quaranta warned that demonstrations by women — free of the iron discipline to which their male counterparts were subjected in the factories — for wage increases were the effect of subversive propaganda which aimed to stimulate general discontent among the masses and lower public morale. The police authorities also claimed that Socialist mayors were responsible for demonstrations. A report by a police commissar to the Questore in 1917 stated that the mayor of Granarolo, for example, had encouraged a demonstration by women. The absence of employment in the commune rendered this manifestation solely political. While the demonstrators were prosecuted under article 3 of the Provincial and Communal Act and article 3 of the Decree 674 of 23 May 1915 the commissar suggested that the mayor could easily be intimidated into restraining his conduct.126

Quaranta himself complained that the civil courts were too lenient towards 'subversives'. Acquittals or light sentences
were almost an encouragement of propaganda and demonstrations. Quaranta suggested to Salandra that all public order crimes should be referred to military tribunals since 'qualora gli elementi sovversivi sapessero che giudici della loro delittuosa impresa sarebbero non i giudici (....) ma i tribunali di guerra, ben diverso dивerebbe il loro contegno'. He also complained of the lack of Carabinieri, given their involvement in military operations, rendering police activities difficult. Similarly a police commissar advised the Questore in May 1917 to transfer troops to those areas where socialist propaganda was particularly successful and strengthen Carabinieri village nuclei there.

Again, however, Quaranta clearly advocated, alongside this repression, concessions to those hardest hit by the war. As he told the sub-prefect of Imola in December 1916:

Ricordi che le autorità devono oggi più che mai dimostrare concretamente tutto il loro interessamento per le classi più colpite dalla guerra, ma debbono evitare di cedere a intimidazioni violente che costituirebbe esempio pericoloso.

On these grounds probably he criticised the 'uomini d'ordine' not only for their incapacity to match Socialist propaganda, choosing 'la politica del silenzio' instead of patriotic manifestations but also for their economic selfishness.
Agricultural employers abandoned the cultivation of non-profit-rendering crops and shopkeepers profited from the war with up to 100% price increases. He warned that economic hardship for the masses would keep the subversive parties in business.\textsuperscript{130}

This was almost certainly the motive behind his support of Zanardi and the city council over the maintenance of an 'Ente Autonomo di Consumo' (Consumer Co-operative) set up in August 1914 to sell food products at cheap prices and control local inflation. The prefect demonstrated this support in a letter to the interior minister, dated 21 September 1916, in which he stated that the action of the mayor should be encouraged given the absurd manner in which shopkeepers had pushed up prices to the highest levels in the nation. Indeed he ordered Zanardi to intensify checks not only on price levels in local shops but also to see whether certain food stuffs had been dosed with foreign substances.\textsuperscript{131}

This may be contrasted, however, by his defence of the ruling classes against the PSI over other issues. This was particularly evident with public spending by Socialist councils. Communal and provincial budgets with special regard for employment and hospital schemes were usually cancelled by the prefect who appealed to the Consiglio di Stato as president of the Giunta Provinciale Amministrativa. Indeed Zanardi complained at a city council meeting in February 1916 that every time the Socialist majority proposed some kind of
reform which did not appeal to the Conservative majority the prefect intervened, a procedure which rediculed the so-called autonomy of local government.\textsuperscript{132}

If Socialist municipal council spending was curbed during the war, those ex-Socialist communes controlled by 'commissari prefettizi' suffered drastic reductions in public spending on health, employment and charity as part of Quaranta's overall desire to curb what he considered abusive spending by past socialist local governments, so making up for the enormous deficits which this had caused. This was particularly evident in Molinella and was almost certainly part and parcel of the purges originating back to the Guarda massacre. As early as November 1914 the prefect had written the following words to the interior minister:

Giova ricordare come molte delle amministrazioni della provincia siano nelle mani di socialisti ciò che rende più facile il pericolo (....) di attività che anima le amministrazioni popolari poco preoccupate dei mezzi con cui far fronte alle spese, mezzi che ricadendo in gran parte, mediante la sovrimposta, sulle classi abbienti, sono invece assai calcolati da questi quando trovansi al potere. Di più i socialisti mal si adattano spontaneamente alle barriere della legge a cui tendono a sfuggire solo che rallenti la vigilanza continua delle autorità.
Referring to Molinella the report continued that council funds had been placed in a cooperative run by Socialist councillors so that it was more difficult for the authorities to control their spending. Over-spending on health assistance and the registration of too many names on the poor list had caused a deficit which the council had overcome by going further into debt.133

These measures reflected once again Quaranta's desire to remove Socialist hegemony from the province and his failure to realise the economic effects this would have on the provincial population. Several articles in Avanti! and La Squilla in 1916 claimed that the 'commissario prefettizio' of Molinella, Cacciari, removed many from the poor list, causing starvation and disease (see Avanti!, 9 March 1916, La Squilla, 18 and 25 March 1916). The enquiry ordered by the local Carabinieri into these allegations concluded that these new measures certainly offended those who were used to 'spadroneggiare in detto comune' but that the discontent was not the result of starvation but the cause of the propaganda.134 Quaranta for his part praised Cacciari's success in removing corruption from the commune and:

procurando principalmente elevare materialmente e moralmente condizioni quei lavoratori, togliendo sistemi degradante elemosina e fornendo invece abbondante proficuo lavoro di cui tutti sono grati.135
La Squilla, however, in an article dated 25 March 1916 challenged the authenticity of data on the economic state of families in Molinella. If, as the authorities claimed, many families had benefited from the previous harvest which gave them 24 quintals of grain each, given the large composition of families and the seasonal nature of braccianti work this would be nearly sufficient to last them until the next harvest, but was hardly an indication of wealth.

Relevant here is evidence of the interference of the military authorities who, according to Quaranta in a report to the interior minister in October 1916, had ordered the cancellation of government payments to families in Molinella with males at the war front, 'essendo risultato che esse invece godono di un reddito più che sufficiente ai propri bisogni'. Similarly the mayor of Loiano complained in August 1916 that his position on a special commission to decide on charity concessions was superfluous because of the condescending attitude of the military authorities and Carabinieri who also had representatives on the commission, who refused to take the opinions of local members into consideration and were unaware of the reality of poverty in his commune.

Archival evidence suggests that Quaranta's strategy towards the provincial PSI changed towards the end of the First World War. This may well reflect a softened opinion about the true will or capability of the PSI leadership to carry through a
revolution, gained from his experience of a general strike in April 1917 which, he claimed, had revolutionary implications. He stated that his warning to Zanardi and local Socialist deputies Bentini and Brunelli 'circa i provvedimenti che l'autorità avrebbe potuto adottare nei riguardi degli operai militari maschi, anche se non scioperanti' induced them to stop the strike from going ahead though the last-minute call-off had not been effective. Though expressing genuine fear of revolution which was almost certainly encouraged by events in Russia and other belligerent nations and the over-concentration of troops with local origins in Bologna which increased the risks of army fraternization in the case of insurrection\textsuperscript{138} he admitted the following July that the local PSI was unlikely to become involved in revolutionary activity. Only the youngest elements were involved in preparing the masses for possible revolution.\textsuperscript{139}

In the aftermath of the military defeat at Caporetto in October 1917 Quaranta continued to warn that though Socialist leaders made positive official statements about the tragedy in order to create the impression that the PSI believed in national solidarity they would certainly not have the courage to force a healthy attitude upon the masses, whose support they did not want to risk losing. On these grounds he suggested that as much tact as possible be used to obtain support from the masses. In particular PSI leaders were not to be constrained to 'silenzio ufficiale' since this would
only increase anti-national propaganda.  

Such policies of tact rather than repression became increasingly apparent towards the end of the war and indeed brought him into conflict with the military authorities who advocated a hard line. An example of this concerned censorship, which from Caporetto until the end of the war was particularly harsh. News concerning anti-war demonstrations, accidents in the military factories, army suicides, the punishment of deserters and references to the Bolshevik revolution were strictly prohibited in the press, as is evidenced by numerous government circulars on the subject. In November 1917 the prefects of Bologna, Ferrara, Forlì, Ravenna and Rovigo received orders from the area military commander that private postal correspondence in the war zone was to be opened 'per seguire le attività delle organizzazioni sovversive e delle persone sospette di attività antinazionale'. When on 4 June 1918 the army supreme command ordered the banning of an Avanti! edition in Emilia and Veneto Quaranta wrote to the interior minister, protesting that the measure was 'inutile e antipatico', adding that the censor's office in Bologna had correctly vetted the paper and other papers with the same contents had been published. As will be demonstrated in the following chapter, conflict between the prefect and the military authorities heightened in the immediate post-war period over the involvement of the army in the newly found 'Fascio di Combattimento'.


The dilemmas and ambiguities in the prefect's attitude towards the left during the war period stem from the unique manner in which the European conflict regulated social, political and economic relations in the province. These were dictated by the overriding necessity of guaranteeing the highest possible war effort in terms of both patriotic and moral support and industrial and agricultural output. This of course rendered a truce between conflicting political and economic forces inevitable. Behind the facade of internal peace lay the reality of continued conflict, however. This was almost certainly dictated to a large extent by Quaranta's failure on many occasions to free himself from past allegiances with the employers and from his natural distrust of 'Red' power. Indeed from a political point of view he was strongly suspicious of the revolutionary potential of the PSI, especially in war time. His capacity for tact rather than repression matured, however, during the latter war years so that by the end of the conflict he saw dialogue and the increased economic welfare of the masses as the surest means of curtailing the advance of revolution, as we shall see in the following chapter.
NOTES

1. ACS: PS., B. 24, 1905. The interior ministry police chief (Direttore Generale di Pubblica Sicurezza) informed the prime minister Di Rudini on 9 July 1897 that the prefect of Bologna, Giura, like his Ferrarese colleague had given in too easily to the leagues during agrarian strikes and that more intransigent prefects were required for the two provinces.

2. ASB., 1898, Cat. 6, Operai disoccupati, scioperi e dimostrazioni a Molinella (henceforth 1898 Operai disoccupati), prefect to interior minister, 17 May 1898.

3. Ibid., prefect to Molinella's police inspector (Ispettore di PS), 28 March 1898.

4. Ibid., interior minister to prefect, 1 March 1898, Molinella's delegate (Delegato di PS) to prefect, 9 March 1898.

5. Ibid., prefect to interior minister, 28 March 1898 (see Appendix 2, Document 1).

6. Ibid., prefect to Molinella's delegate, 3 August 1898.

7. ASB., 1898, Cat. 6, Agitazioni tumultuose nel Regno, Agitazioni per il rincaro del pane (henceforth 1898 Agitazioni tumultuose), prefectoral decree, 15 May 1898 (see Appendix 2, Document 2).

8. ASB., 1898, Operai disoccupati, cit., prefect to Molinella's delegate, 10 August 1898.

9. Ibid., prefect to prime minister, 31 March 1898.

10. Ibid., Carabinieri of Molinella to prefect, 18 May 1898. See also Onofri, '1913-22', cit., p. 89.

11. ASB., 1898 Agitazioni tumultuose, cit., prefect to minister of agriculture, industry and commerce, 13 June 1898.

12. Ibid., ASB., 1898, Cat. 7, Partito socialista, persone affiliate (henceforth 1898 Partito Socialista), prefectoral decree 1 May 1898 (see Appendix 2, Document 3).

13. ASB., 1898 Agitazioni tumultuose, cit., prime minister to prefects, 9 May 1898, prefect of Bologna to regional military commander (Comandante VI Corpo d'Armata), 29 June 1898.
14. Archivio Centrale Dello Stato, Ministero della Grazia e Giustizia, 1898, B. 103, f 35, Tumulti popolari (Bologna), Bologna's public prosecutor (Procuratore Generale Corte d'Appello Bologna) to justice minister, 7 June 1898.

15. ASB., 1898 Partito socialista, cit., sub-prefect of Imola to prefect, 4 May 1898.

16. See, for example, ASB., 1897, Cat. 5, Elezioni politiche ed amministrative, prefect of Ravenna to prefect of Bologna, 24 March 1897.

17. Ibid., prefect of Ferrara to prefect of Bologna, 19 March 1897.

18. Ibid., prefect of Bologna to interior minister, 18 March 1897.

19. ASB., 1898, Cat. 4 and 5, Amministrazioni comunali, sindaci, etc., sub-prefect of Imola to prefect, 6 November 1898.

20. ASB., 1900, Cat. 7-8-9, Partiti politici, associazioni varie, sub-prefect of Imola to prefect, 23 October 1900, Carabinieri legion commander (Comando Legione Territoriale Carabinieri Reali) to prefect, 24 October 1900.

21. ASB., 1900, Cat. 6, Agitazioni operaie, scioperi, congressi, etc. (henceforth 1900 Agitazioni operaie), Molinella's delegate to prefect, 18 August 1900.

22. Ibid., prefect to interior minister, 21 November 1900.

23. ASB., 1900, Cat. 5, Liste ed elezioni politiche ed amministrative, sub-prefect of Imola to prefect of Bologna, 27 May 1900. Andrea Costa won control of the Imolese constituency. See Onofri, '1913-22', cit., p. 90, note 35 for the results of the 1900 general election.

24. ASB., 1901, Cat. 6, Agitazioni operaie, dimostrazioni, congressi...Molinella e altri comuni (henceforth Agitazioni Molinella), interior minister to prefect 20 May 1901 (see Appendix 2, Document 4).

25. Ibid., interior minister to prefect, 24 April 1901, 5, 22 and 26 May 1901.

26. ASB., 1901, Cat. 6, Avvenimenti straordinari, inaugurazioni, etc., prefect to interior minister, 4 September 1901; ASB., 1902, Cat. 6, Agitazioni operaie, dimostrazioni, scioperi, congressi, prefect to interior minister, 16 February 1902.
27. Ibid., prefect to interior minister, 14 April 1902.

28. ASB., 1901 Agitazioni Molinella, cit., prefect to interior minister, 23 April 1901;

29. ASB., 1901 Agitazioni operaie, dimostrazioni, scioperi, senatori e deputati (henceforth 1901 Agitazioni operaie), prefect to Molinella's delegate, 5 May 1901, 10 June 1901, Molinella's delegate to prefect, 30 April 1901.

30. ACS: PS., 1901, B. 2, Bissolati to interior minister, 18 and 25 May 1901 (see Appendix 2, Document 5). For Massarenti's telegrams informing Avanti! of police repression during strikes see ASB., 1901, Agitazioni Molinella, cit.

31. Ibid., Budrio's delegate to prefect, 23 May 1901; ACS: PS., 1901, B. 4, interior minister to prefect, 24 May 1901 (see Appendix 2, Document 6).

32. ASB., 1901, Agitazioni Molinella, interior minister to prefect, 24 April 1901 (see Appendix 2, Document 7).

33. See Giovanni Giolitti, Quarant'anni di politica italiana, (Dalle Carte di Giovanni Giolitti). Documenti Inediti, Volume 2, Dieci anni al potere, 1901-9, edited by Giampiero Carocci (Milan, 1962), for Giolitti's general policing strategy in Italy. In February 1902, for example, the interior minister ordered the arrest of all railway strikers threatening to hold the prefect responsible should the strike continue (p. 175). See p. 239 for Giolitti's telegram to the prefect of Foggia, dated 2 June 1902.

34. The Carabinieri nuclei in the villages and towns of San Giovanni in Persiceto, Sala Bolognese, Sant'Agata Bolognese and Anzola Emilia were responsible to the PS delegation in San Giovanni in Persiceto. The provincial PS delegations were responsible to the Questore if they were situated in the Bologna district (Circondario) and the sub-prefects of Vergato and Imola if situated in the corresponding districts of Vergato and Imola.

35. ASB., 1908, Cat. 2, Pratica generale dell'Amministrazione di PS, (henceforth 1908 Pratica Generale), Questore to prefect, 17 November 1908.

36. ASB., 1901, Agitazioni Molinella, cit., interior minister to prefect, 20 May 1901, prefect to interior minister, 21 May 1901. On 18 May 1901 Caravaggio informed Giolitti - in anticipation of complaints from Bissolati - that arrests carried out by Carabinieri in Alberino (Molinella) were
justified because of the offensive behaviour of the strikers (see Appendix 2, Document 8).

37. For Turati's comments on the Berra incident (Ferrara) see Girolamo Sotgiu, L'Italia di Giolitti (Cagliari, 1972), p. 58.

38. ASB., 1904, Cat. 6, Agitazioni operaie, disoccupazione, scioperi, etc. (henceforth 1904 Agitazioni), prime minister to prefect, 30 August 1904, prefect's reply, 31 August 1904.

39. Ibid., prime minister to prefect, 17 September 1904.

40. ASB., 1904, Cat. 5, Elezioni generali e politiche, prefect to rural police delegates, 5 November 1904. According to Onofri, '1913-22', cit., p. 90, note 36, at the 1904 general election the PSI won 15,424 votes, the moderates (with the support of the clericals) 13,907, the radicals 1,086. The PSI won five constituencies. However they lost their absolute majority when during the re-election of the Budrio constituency in January 1905 Andrea Costa was beaten by the moderates.

41. ASB., 1905, Cat. 7, Partiti politici, etc., prefect to minister of agriculture, commerce and industry, 9 May 1905.

42. ASB., 1905, Cat. 6, Agitazioni operaie, comizi, scioperi, etc., mayor of Baricella to prefect, 11 April 1905, prefect's reply, 12 April 1905.

43. Ibid., Questore to prefect, 26 October 1905, prefect to interior minister, 27 October 1905, mayor of Crespellano to prefect, 31 October 1905.

44. ACS: PS., B.25, 1905, prefect to interior minister, 9 October 1905, ASB, 1905, Cat. 6, Agitazioni politiche, operaie, comizi, congressi (henceforth 1905 Agitazioni politiche), Questore to prefect, 12 October 1905, 13 October 1905.

45. ASB., 1906, Cat. 6, Agitazioni operaie, politiche, comizi, congressi, scioperi, Questore to prefect, 5 January 1906, prefect to minister of public works, 5 January 1906, prefect to interior minister, 5 February 1906, Questore to prefect, 6 February 1906.

46. Ibid., prefect to interior minister, 1 May 1906.

47. ASB., 1905, Agitazioni politiche, cit., prefect to interior ministry police chief, 16 April 1905, interior ministry police chief to prefect, 19 April 1905, prefect to sub-
prefect of Imola, 18 April 1905, prime minister to prefect, 22 April 1905, sub-prefect of Imola to prefect, 21 April 1905.

48. Ibid., interior minister to prefects, 13 October 1905.

49. ASB., 1906, Cat. 6, Avvenimenti straordinari, inaugurazioni, informazioni, commemorazioni, pellegrinaggi, etc., prefect to interior minister, 10 May 1906.

50. Ibid., prefect to Di Stefani government press agency, 9 May 1906.

51. ASB., 1907, Cat. 6, Agitazioni operaie, politiche, dimostrazioni, scioperi, comizi, disoccupazione, etc., Molinella's police delegate to prefect, 23 April 1907, 9 and 25 June 1907.

52. ASB., 1907, Cat. 7, Partiti politici, associazioni, etc., prefect to interior minister, 7 May 1907, Questore to prefect, 7 March 1907.

53. ASB., 1907, Cat. 6, cit., prefect to local military division commander (Comando Divisione Militare), 1 July 1907.

54. During the railway strike of October 1907, Giolitti banned the transmission of telegrams encouraging work stoppages and ordered prefects to arrest those committing acts of sabotage under articles 312 and 317 of the penal code and railway personnel abandoning convoys under article 312 of the Legge sulle Opere Pubbliche of 20 March 1865 suggesting an intensified repression strategy. Ibid., prime minister to prefect, 17 October 1907, prime minister to prefects, 17 October 1907. Article 312 of the 1889 penal code punished with a prison sentence of between 1 and 5 years whoever placed obstructive objects or opened or closed points on railway lines. Article 317 reiterated this with regard to similar acts committed on roads or waterways. In every case the sentence was increased if the crime caused a disaster. Article 312 of the 1865 legislation carried a ten year prison sentence.

55. For details about the Crespellano leagues and their trial see La Squilla, 23 November 1907 and 8 February 1908. See also ASB., 1908, Cat. 6, Agitazioni politiche, comizi, etc., Carabinieri of Crespellano to prefect, 18 November 1907. According to Neppi Modona (pp. 151-9), with Giolitti's return to power in May 1906 there was considerable debate as to the legality of: 'il boicottaggio (...) all'interno delle organizzazioni operaie, nel confronti del compagno dissenziente, al fine di mantenere e
rafforzare la solidarietà di classe, esercitato attraverso l'intervento di tutti coloro (industriali, commercianti, artigiani, ecc.) che non rifiutano di impiegare il lavoratore boicottato o di fornirgli merci o servizi'. The author states that in the case of Crespellano its members were sentenced under article 154 of the penal code ('violenza privata') because they had threateningly forced shopkeepers: 'ad astenersi dal vendere generi del proprio negozio o a chiuderlo senz'altro, ovvero a non servirsi dell'opera di certi braccianti o a licenziarli, o a non permettere, essendo della famiglia, che si recassero al lavoro'.

56. ASB., 1914, Cat. 6, Agitazioni operaie a Molinella e Ancona (henceforth 1914 Agitazioni Molinella), prefect to interior minister, 7 November 1912.

57. ACS: PS., B. 23, 1911, Questore to prefect, 22 September 1911.

58. ASB., 1912, Cat. 6, Agitazioni operaie, scioperi, manifestazioni, etc., prefect to interior minister, 21 June 1912.

59. On 20 June 1907, Massarenti wrote to Dallari congratulating him for having removed the Carabinieri commander of Marmotta (Molinella) for his bias towards the agrarians in labour disputes. ASB., Cat. 6, 1907, cit., Massarenti to prefect, 20 June 1907.

60. ASB., Cat 6, 1911, Agitazioni operaie, politiche ed economiche, etc. (henceforth 1911, Agitazioni operaie), Federterra: Memoriale a Giovanni Giolitti, 14 September 1911.

61. Ibid., Questore to prefect, 15 April 1911.

62. Ibid., prefect to mayor of Sala Bolognese 22 June 1911.

63. ASB., 1911, Cat. 4 and 5, Amministrazioni comunali, etc., prefect to post/telegraph office director (Direttore Ufficio Poste Telegrafi), 17 August 1911.

64. ACS: PS., B. 23, 1911, cit., Questore to prefect, 22 September 1911.

65. ASB., 1913, Cat. 5, Elezioni politiche, The documentation reveals that Giolitti wrote to the prefect on several occasions instructing him which candidates to support. Of particular interest is a telegram Dallari received from the prefect of Ferrara advising: 'l'allontanamento (...) sacerdote Tomaso Gualandi da Reno Centese essendo egli
apertamente sostenitore Bussi (socialist candidate), 23 October 1913; ASB., Cat. 4 and 5, 1911, cit., Massarenti to prime minister, 12 December 1910. ASB., 1908, Cat. 4, Amministrazioni comunali, etc., prefect to interior minister, 18 December 1907.

66. ACS: Personale, B. 241, f.4791, Caravaggio; B. 471, f.11153, Ferrari; B. 531, f. 14270, Dall'Oglio; B. 775, f. 11750, Dallari. See also Mario Missori, Governi alte cariche dello stato e prefetti del Regno d'Italia, (Rome, 1973). Evandro Caravaggio (prefect of Bologna from September 1898 to March 1902) graduated from Questore to prefectural advisor (Consigliere di Prefettura) in 1866. He became a third class prefect in 1879, first class in 1893. He was appointed senator in November 1901 and the following February he retired on his own request 'per avanzata età e anzianità di servizio'. On his retirement he was knighted 'Cavaliere di Gran Croce dell'Ordine della Corona d'Italia'. Antonio Dall'Oglio (prefect in Bologna between July 1904 and October 1906) was sub-prefect, then Questore, then prefectural advisor (Consigliere Delegato di Prefettura) before being nominated a third class prefect in 1890. Knighted 'Grand Ufficiale dell'Ordine della Corona d'Italia' in 1897, he became a first class prefect in 1900. Again he retired on his own request, though the documentation suggests that this may have been prompted by his planned substitution in Bologna from August that year. Dallari (prefect of Bologna from October 1906 until August 1914) graduated from prefectural advisor to sub-prefect in 1891 and third class prefect in 1901. Nominated 'Grand Ufficiale dell'Ordine della Corona' in February 1906, he became first class prefect in January 1910 during his office in Bologna. Nominated 'Grand Ufficiale nell'ordine dei Santissimi Maurizio e Lazzaro' in June 1913, he was temporarily removed from service ('collocato a disposizione') in August 1914, leaving his post in Bologna, under the Salandra government, suggesting that he was associated too much with the previous government. He was, however, knighted 'Gran Cordone' on retirement.

67. Luigi Albertini Vent'anni di vita politica, (2 parts): Part I: L'esperienza democratica italiana dal 1898 a 1914, Vol. I: 1898-1908 (Bologna, 1950). Among the worker demonstrations ending in bloodshed cited by the author were: the Turin general strike and the Cagliari cost-of-living riot, May 1906, the Milan general strike, October 1907 (pp. 218-21), and the Rome general strike, April 1898, (pp. 302-3). According to Albertini (p. 219), the use of general strikes to protest at police killings constituted a vicious circle since: 'la pretesa che essi non usassero le armi rendeva le folle più minacciose, fino a che giungeva il momento in cui il ricorso alle armi era ineluttabile'.
68. ASB., 1908, Cat. 6-10, Sovrani, ministri, partiti politici, etc., Budrio's delegate to prefect, 29 August 1908.

69. ASB., 1907, Cat. 6, cit., prefect to Molinella's delegate, 19 July 1907. The prefect encouraged the delegate not to take notice of fierce criticism in the agrarian press against him for allegedly supporting the cause of the leagues.

70. ASB., Cat. 2, 1910, Pratica Generale dell'Amministrazione di PS (henceforth 1910 Pratica Generale), Questore to prefect, 10 January 1910. It is significant to note here that Law 269 of 30 June 1901 actually diminished the number of police funzionari in Italy by 250. This was explained to prefects by a government circular of February 1902 in which Giolitti urged upon prefects to make more efficient use of existing personnel and proposed the closure of rural delegates of little importance, (see Bollettino del Ministero dell'Interno of 1902).

71. ASB., 1909, Cat. 2, Pratica Generale dell'Amministrazione di PS (henceforth 1909 Pratica Generale), Questore to prefect, 9 November 1909 (see Appendix 2, Document 9); ASB, 1911, Cat. 2, Pratica Generale dell'Amministrazione di PS (henceforth 1911 Pratica Generale), Questore to prefect, 31 January 1911.

72. ASB., 1909 Pratica Generale, cit., Questore to prefect, 17 April 1909. No statistics on Carabinieri numbers were found. However a report from the prefect to the interior minister in September 1914 revealed that the large rural or suburban nuclei numbered between 5 (as in Corticella) and 13 (as in Imola) men. ASB., 1914, Cat. 2, Pratica Generale dell'Amministrazione di PS (henceforth 1914 Pratica Generale), prefect to interior minister, 8 September 1914.

73. In April 1906, for example, the Questore informed the prefect of the necessity of a permanent police delegation in Malalbergo to cope with agrarian strikes. He stated that the impermanent use of Baricella's police delegate in the village was no real solution especially since his temporary absence from Baricella encouraged greater determination on the part of Socialist organizations there. ASB., 1906, Cat. 2, Pratica Generale dell'Amministrazione di PS (henceforth 1906 Pratica Generale), 29 April 1906. Similarly the temporary establishment of a Carabinieri headquarters in Mezzolara in 1903, using men from other nuclei is another example of an inadequate solution to the problem of numerical weakness. ASB., 1904, Cat. 2, Pratica Generale dell'Amministrazione di PS (henceforth 1904 Pratica Generale), Carabinieri division commander (Comando Divisione Carabinieri) to prefect, 4 May 1903.
74. ASB., 1906 Pratica Generale, cit., police chief to prefect, 4 May 1906; ASB., 1909 Pratica Generale, cit., police chief to prefect, 15 November 1909.

75. Ibid. On 17 May 1909 the prefect informed the interior minister that during the election campaign 24 Guardie di Finanza (20 in Bologna and 4 in Imola) were used to guard polling stations, given the lack of resident Guardie and Carabinieri. See ASB., 1910 Pratica Generale cit., Questore to prefect, 8 March 1910 viz the use of Pattuglie Cittadini.

76. ASB., 1908, Cat. 2, Pratica Generale dell'Amministrazione di PS (henceforth 1908 Pratica Generale), police chief to prefect, 13 September 1908; for accounts of conflict between civilian and military authorities in Italy as a whole see Fiorentino, pp. 67-72.

77. ASB., 1914 Pratica Generale, cit., Carabinieri division commander to prefect, 3 December 1914.

78. ASB., 1910 Pratica Generale, cit., Questore to prefect, 1 August 1910, 12 January 1910.

79. La Tutela Pubblica (founded in 1909) of 12 May 1912, for example contained an article by an ex-Questore criticizing the appauling career conditions for police functionaries and blaming Giolitti for his unsympathetic attitude towards the grievances of what he considered 'la parte non buona e che non merita di più' of policemen. There were also several personal testimonies by Carabinieri expressing their bitterness at unjust pension and promotion schemes. These included the fact that while an officer could retire after 20 years service, a normal Carabiniere had to complete 48 years.

80. See Albertini, cit., Vol. 2, 1909-14, pp. 291-6, for a detailed account of the Ancona Incident sparking off 'Red Week'.

81. ASB., 1914, Agitazioni Molinella, cit., director of telegraph office to prefect, 10 June 1914, prefect to interior minister, 11 June 1914, sub-prefect of Imola to prefect, 12 June 1914, prefect to police chief, 13 June 1914.

82. Onofri, La Grande Guerra, etc., cit., pp. 53-4. Quoting the catholic L'Avvenire d'Italia of 10 June 1914, the author adds that on 9 June demonstrators were arrested by the public and handed over to the police.
83. ASB., 1914, Agitazioni Molinella, cit., prime minister to prefects, 10 June 1914, prefect to interior minister, 11 June 1914, prime minister to prefect, 12 June 1914, prefect to interior minister, 12 June 1914.

84. Ibid., prefect to interior minister, 12 June 1914, president of Castelfranco's shooting club (Presidente Tiro a Segno Nazionale) to prefect, 13 June 1914.


87. Ibid., prefect to interior minister, 16 October 1914.

88. Ibid., Vice-Questore to prefect, 24 November 1914.

89. Ibid., prefect to interior minister, 18 October 1914.

90. ASB., 1916, Cat 6, Parte II, Contratti agrari, Agitazioni a Molinella (henceforth 1916 Contratti Molinella) prefect to prime minister, 19 May 1916.

91. ASB., 1919, Cat. 6, Scioperi, agitazioni agrarie e altre (henceforth 1919 Scioperi) prefect to prime minister, 9 January 1919. For acquittal of Massarenti see ASB., 1919, Cat. 7, Spirito Pubblico, partiti, disposizioni ordine pubblico (henceforth 1919 Spirito Pubblico), Questore to prefect, 10 June 1919. See also Onofri, La Strage, cit., pp. 118-22.

92. ASB., 1914, Agitazioni Molinella, cit., prefect to interior minister, 15 November 1914. For details of Quaranta's career see ACS: Personale (1930), VI serie, B. 12, f. 2330.

93. ASB., 1914, Cat. 6, Avvenimenti europei, prime minister to prefects, 7 August 1914, interior minister to prefect, 12 August 1914.

94. ASB., 1915, Cat. 6, Guerra, spionaggio, Questore to prefect, 19 April 1915. The words of the Questore are more or less confirmed by Onofri who states that while the Radicals, Republicans and Nationalists were clearly in favour of war against Austria the Socialists, Clericals and Conservatives remained Neutralist. The Conservatives were split between pro-Neutralists and the 'progressisti' of the Unione Liberale who awaited the moment when neutrality was no longer sufficient to guarantee Italy 'il compimento dei suoi destini nazionali'. The author also notes that the Emilian agrarians were contrary to a war though this was

95. ASB., 1915, Cat. 7-8-9-10, Partiti politici, associazioni, spese di PS, stampa giornalisti, domande di impiego (henceforth 1915 Partiti), Questore to prefect, 11 April 1915; interior minister to prefect, 27 April 1915; ASB., 1915, Guerra, spionaggio, prefect to interior minister, 21 April 1915.

96. ASB., 1915, Partiti, Carabinieri legion commander to prefect, 22 January 1915. According to Onofri, however, defections from the Anarchist to the Interventionist camp were minimal. Only three prominent figures did so: Arpinati, Rocca and Maria Rygier. He adds that if anything the war brought the Socialists and Anarchists closer together despite ideological and political differences. *La Grande Guerra*, cit., p. 128-9.


98. ASB., 1915, Cat. 6, Guerra europea e italiana (henceforth 1915 Guerra), Questore to prefect, 11 April 1915 (see Appendix 2, Document 10).

99. According to Onofri, the Avanti! telephones were blocked by censorship as early as March 1915 and the paper was unable to publish accounts of national level Socialist anti-war demonstrations held on 19 May 1915. *La Grande Guerra*, etc., cit, p. 147.

100. ASB., 1915, Guerra, cit., prime minister to prefects of Bologna, Parma, Reggio Emilia and Modena, 18 May 1915, prefect's appeal to citizens of Bologna, 15 May 1915.

101. Ibid., prefect to prime minister, 24 May 1915 (see Appendix 2, Document 11).

102. Ibid., prefect to interior minister, 23 April 1915.

103. Ibid., prefect to Questore, 17 May 1915. The prefect suggested 'una pressione della P.S.' to encourage the Interventionists to use legal methods only in fighting those trying to depress national morale.

104. Ibid., regional military commander (Tenente Generale Comandante il Corpo d'Armata di Bologna) decree, 16 September 1915.

105. Ibid., prefect to interior minister, 12 July 1915. Of notable interest the prefect received orders from the
government censor office ('Censura Centrale') on 26 October to censor lists in the subversive press of 'fautori di guerra' who, despite their rhetoric had not enrolled in the armed forces.

106. Ibid., prefect to interior minister, 22 October 1915.

107. Ibid., Questore to prefect, 28 September 1915, prefect to prefect of Udine, 19 June 1915.

108. Ibid., Pattuglie Cittadine committee to prefect, 29 May 1915.

109. Ibid., Questore to prefect, 8 June 1915.

110. Ibid., prefect to Questore, 9 August 1915.

111. See ASB., 1915, Cat. 6, Agitazioni operaie a Molinella e in altri comuni (henceforth 1915 Agitazioni operaie) and ASB., 1916 Contratti Molinella, cit., for details of wartime pacts between the AAB and Federterra.

112. ASB., 1916 Contratti Molinella, cit., prefect to interior minister 6 March 1916.

113. Ibid., Federterra to prefect, 28 September 1915.

114. ASB., 1917, Cat. 6, Agitazioni, agrari, prefect's report, 12 November 1916.

115. Ibid., The prefect's declaration (Lodo Arbitrale) of 15 November 1916 stated: '(...) 1. Costituisce la assunzione di operai ferraresi praticata dal signor Benni fatto inammissibile per concordato 5 marzo 1916. 2. Non poter però tal fatto giustificare le ritorsioni effettuate da parte della Federazione Provinciale Lavoratori della Terra in quanto le violazioni del concordato da chiunque compiute debbono essere deferite all'arbitrato le cui decisioni sosstanno possono far stare fra le parti ogni convinzione delle quali, per quanto fondata su apparente fondatezza non giustifica la astensione nelle applicazioni di qualsiasi parte del concordato, astensione che si rischierrebbe in nuove, illegittime violazioni.'

116. ASB., 1916 Contratti Molinella, cit., declaration by arbitrary commission, 26 August.

117. ASB., 1917, Agitazioni, agrari, cit., prefect to sub-prefect of Imola, 8 August 1917 (see Appendix 2, Document 12).

118. ASB., 1919, Cat. 6, Agitazioni agrarie, operai, Federterra to prefect, 12 October 1918. ASB., 1918, Cat. 6,
Agitazioni agrarie e disoccupazione, sovrani, principi (henceforth 1918 Agitazioni), Carabinieri external division commander (Comando Divisione Esterna) to prefect, 30 March 1918.

119. ASB., 1918 Agitazioni, cit., letter from prefect to 'Onorevole Marchese', 10 May 1918.

120. ASB., 1915 Partiti, cit., prefect to interior minister, 12 January 1915; ASB., 1917, Cat. 7, Partiti politici, affiliati, associazioni, etc. (henceforth 1917 Partiti), prefect to interior minister, 10 August 1917.

121. ASB., 1915 Agitazioni operaie, cit., Federterra to prefect, 17 July 1915.

122. ASB., 1918 Agitazioni, cit., Bologna's public prosecutor to prefect, 21 April 1917.

123. ASB., 1917, Agitazioni, agrari, cit., anonymous letter to prefect, 20 May 1917.

124. ASB., 1916, Contratti Molinella, cit., minister of war to military factory directors, 4 October 1915 (see Appendix 2, Document 13).

125. ASB., 1917, Agitazioni agrari, cit., prefect to interior minister, 5 February 1917.

126. ASB., 1917, Partiti, cit., undated report from police commissar (Commissario di PS) to prefect.

127. ASB., 1916, Cat. 7, Partiti politici, affiliati, associazioni, etc. (henceforth 1916 Partiti), prefect to prime minister, 8 April 1916.

128. Ibid., prefect to interior minister, 7 December 1916 (see Appendix 2, Document 14); ASB., 1917 Partiti, cit., police commissar to prefect, 7 May 1917.

129. ASB., 1916 Contratti Molinella, cit., prefect to sub-prefect of Imola, 7 December 1916.

130. ASB., 1917, Partiti, cit., prefect to interior minister, 9 July 1917.

131. ASB., 1916, Cat. 12, Beneficenza, grano, granoturco, farine, etc., prefect to mayor of Bologna, 9 and 14 July 1916; ASB., 1916, Cat. 4, Amministrazioni comunali, congregazioni di carità, etc., prefect to interior minister, 21 September 1916 (see Appendix 2, Document 15). The prefect offered the same support over the question of
house-tenants. In May 1918 he not only ordered the postponement of evictions but also requested permission from the justice minister to requisition empty property to house those expecting eviction, though this was refused. See ASB., 1917, Agitazioni, agrari, cit., prefect to mayor of Bologna, 6 July 1918, public prosecutor of Bologna to prefect, 16 July 1918, justice minister to prefect, 21 July 1918.


133. ASB., 1915, Cat. 11 and 12, Onorificenze, beneficenza, prefect to interior minister, prefect to interior minister, 8 November 1914.

134. ASB., 1916, Contratti Molinella. cit., Carabinieri of Molinella to prefect, 15 March 1916.

135. Ibid., prefect to interior minister, 20 March 1916.

136. Ibid., prefect to interior minister, 26 October 1916.

137. ASB., 1916, Cat. 6, Guerra, cose varie, mayor of Loiano to military division commander, 11 August 1916.

138. ASB., 1917 Partiti, cit., prefect to interior minister, 14 April 1917.

139. Ibid., prefect to interior minister, 9 July 1917.

140. Ibid., prefect to regional military commander, 5 November 1917.

141. ASB., 1917, Cat. 6, Guerra (Censura), regional military commander to prefects of Bologna, Ferrara, Forli, Rovigo and Ravenna, 15 November 1917.

142. ASB., 1918, Cat. 6, Guerra (Censura), prefect to interior minister, 6 June 1918.
(i) The threat of Bolshevism and the roots of Bolognese Fascism.

Examination of the period spanning the end of the First World War and the Fascist counter-revolutionary debut in the autumn of 1920 in Bologna is essential to the study of the main period of Fascist ascendancy in the province. Comprehension of the motives behind the outbreak of systematic counter-revolution (epitomized by the Palazzo d'Accursio massacre of November 1920) and prevailing attitudes within the ranks of the police forces is only possible if events in the preceding period are considered. The two main aspects to be taken into account are the weakened and demoralized state in which Italy's police and armed forces emerged from the European conflict (which even Nitti's legislation was unable to retrieve) and the threat of revolution from the left. State hesitancy in dealing with subversion - given the weaknesses inherent in its police apparatus - was almost certainly a contributory factor in the radicalization of postwar anti-Socialist and anti-democratic forces and the development of connivance with those forces within state institutions.

The reduced state of Italy's police forces immediately after the First World War and in the following two years is very evident in Bologna. Archival documents show, for example, that
following the Armistice in November 1918 the Guardie di Città were numerically insufficient, undisciplined and so underpaid that their ministerial rent allowances were unable to keep up with the intense rate of postwar inflation. Many of them were so eager to leave the corps that they were prepared to commit acts of indiscipline (ranging from desertion to feigning illness) in the hope of being discharged. In February 1919 Guardie di Città tried to organize a national strike - as is evident in a pamphlet confiscated by the Questore of Bologna - in protest at what they considered a derisory level of pay. There is also evidence of a national Carabinieri strike during the same period. It was centred in Rome, Milan, Ancona and Turin and was motivated by low wages and - as in the case of the Guardie - the obligation to continue services until six months after the war for those who enrolled during the conflict. Though there is no concrete evidence of work-stoppages in Bologna the Questore reported general low morale and bitterness. In March 1919 the prime minister, Orlando, ordered prefects not to allow strikes or the formation of police unions or associations.¹

In Bologna the shortage of Guardie was accentuated by the fact that many Carabinieri were still employed by the ministry of war to guard munitions depots and factories and as late as April 1919 the prefect, Quaranta, urged the interior minister to persuade the war ministry to release Carabinieri from military duties since 57 of the 310 Guardie di Città
allocated to the province had never been provided. Of the remaining 253, 109 were unfit for service, sick or on duty outside Bologna. 15 were allocated to Imola and 83 were employed in special squads or for office duties. This left a total of 36 Guardie for policing in the streets, public buildings, etc. Quaranta also reported 6 Carabinieri guarding the powder-magazine and another 36 on duty at the ordnance factories, leaving a total of 80 for normal policing. The minister, though replying that he had asked the war minister to provide extra Carabinieri warned that no more Guardie could be sent because nationally the corps lacked three thousand men and because Bologna was numerically better off than other provinces. 2

Another problem facing Bologna's prefects during this period was the limited availability of soldiers for police duties. There are two possible reasons for this: Firstly, numbers in the army were obviously reduced as part of general postwar demobilization. In April 1919, for example, the local military commander complained to the war minister that he was unable to keep up with the prefect's requests for troops because of the discharge of up to a thousand soldiers at a time. 3

Secondly, the overwhelmingly proletarian composition of the lower ranks of the army acquired through war mobilization left their commanders in great fear of acts of subversion, easily encouraged by Anarchist and Revolutionary Socialist anti-militarist propaganda. Indeed, in October 1919 the prime
minister, Nitti, ordered prefects to censor frequent articles in the Socialist press on soldiers' living and working conditions, cases of indiscipline and mutiny, which were considered to be nothing less than incitement to subversion. In Bologna there were several cases of suspected involvement of soldiers in subversive activities, though for the most part these suspicions were not confirmed. In June 1919 the Carabinieri external division commander warned the prefect of rumours that subversive ex-soldiers or soldiers on leave entered barracks in uniform in order to fraternize with soldiers, encouraging them to aid them in the formation of battalions of Arditi Rossi. In May 1919 Quaranta warned the local military commander about the participation of soldiers at Camera del Lavoro meetings, though he was unable to tell whether they had been discharged or were still on active service. The authorities' fears may have been justified if one considers that in July 1920 the prefect, Pericoli, asked Nitti to transfer the 24th infantry division away from Bologna following a mutiny which the military authorities had quelled with the arrest of 17 soldiers.

The unwillingness of the military authorities to provide prefects with excessive numbers of troops was supported by both the Nittian and Giolittian postwar governments as illustrated by their circulars restricting their use to emergencies. Indeed, in April 1920 a decree limited army police duties to the guarding of buildings. Only in exceptional cases of disorder were they to be used for
controlling crowds. In June 1920 the war minister complained to Bologna's military commander that too many troops were being employed for preventive policing, a task which should have been limited to Carabinieri and Guardie Regie.6

In Bologna prefects were for the most part forced to rely on insufficient reinforcements of soldiers, Guardie and Carabinieri which in itself was problematic, given the impossibility of permanently maintaining forces in the various locations requiring them. In some cases reinforcements were simply drawn from permanent police nuclei elsewhere. In July 1919, for example, the sub-prefect of Vergato asked Quaranta for the return of 69 Carabinieri sent to another part of the province as reinforcements since the remaining 26 were incapable of handling anti-inflation demonstrations on their own. By October 1920 the Questore had warned the prefect, Visconti, that in some areas of the province forces were literally non-existent. In Praduro and Sasso (now Sasso Marconi), for example, the Carabinieri commander who was on leave had not been replaced, as a result of which:

Pertanto l'arma non solo non è in grado di intervenire, dove sarebbe necessario, per impedire violenze in atto, ma spesso non può neanche, per mancanza di mezzi, procedere poi agli atti di polizia giudiziaria occorrenti per la denunzia alla magistratura ed i riferimenti a questo ufficio, il quale perciò, quasi generalmente, apprende reati, talvolta di
notevole gravità, per caso dalla stampa cittadina o da voci vaghe, con inevitabili inesattezze e lacune.⁷

Such words are demonstrative of the seriousness of police absenteeism in many areas of the province in the postwar years. They also outline the general ineffectiveness of Nittian police legislation at the end of 1919. The significance of this lies in the use of another 'police force' from 1921, namely Fascism, in place of state forces, as illustrated below. This thesis indeed places considerable emphasis on the many inadequacies inherent in the Italian police system as a key factor in not only the rise of Bolognese Fascism but also the connivance of many members of the police forces with the movement.

Even if on occasions army and police reinforcements were available to police commanders, bureaucratic hitches often impeded their brisk arrival. In June 1920, for example, the prefect asked for better cooperation from the Carabinieri third division commander in the provision of men. This was because the military commander had recently obstructed his request for troops in an emergency on the grounds that he had applied to the wrong command. Similarly the prefect complained of lack of cooperation from the Carabinieri legion commander over his desire to reorganize Bologna's Carabinieri more efficiently.⁸ These incidents clearly indicate the autonomy which the Carabinieri continued to maintain from the prefectural authorities and the obvious negative effects this
had on policing.

In dealing with the threat of revolution Bologna's prefects apparently aimed first and foremost to reduce if not remove its potential causes. This was evident in the maintenance of cordial relations between the prefecture and the PSI city administration and economic concessions, wherever possible, to the working classes. This was obviously encouraged by the experience of the war years in which working class demands were at least formally fulfilled if this would guarantee social, economic and political peace in the province. Quaranta and his successors - all career prefects, as outlined in Missori's book - clearly lobbied for solutions to economic disputes. They were particularly concerned about the disastrous effects of industrial demobilization on the provincial working class population. As early as December 1918 Quaranta warned the government that public works and redundancy money provided only temporary relief. He suggested that in their place wartime military industries be transformed into peacetime industries. He also asked for the quickening of bureaucratic formalities necessary for setting up public works in the province, in the fear that otherwise 'extremist' Socialists would benefit from the economic crisis. Similarly he supported city council initiatives at artificial price-lowering. Prefects were also prepared to oppose the employers in labour disputes if they were clearly in the wrong. In March 1920 D'Adamo had no hesitation in telling the constructions director of the Italian State Railways that
workers building the new Florence-Bologna railway were justified in striking since their wages were lower than those quoted on the official local labour market.\footnote{11}

Peaceful relations were maintained with Zanardi in the hope of persuading moderate Socialists to oppose Revolutionary elements within the PSI. In December 1918 Quaranta even suggested that a confidant of the Questura infiltrate Socialist circles in order to 'acquistare l'animo di alcuno dei dirigenti, che pur non essendo fra i massimalisti godono influenza decisiva, almeno locale'.\footnote{12} Indeed, in the face of a "Pro-Russia" general strike in July 1919, the prefect Bladier - who had recently replaced Quaranta who had been promoted to interior ministry police chief - informed the interior minister that a disagreement between the Anarchists/Vecchia Camera del Lavoro and Zanardi/Camera Confederale del Lavoro was likely to prevent demonstrations from becoming violent. The majority of workers had voted to take part in the strike but rejected its revolutionary ends which were advocated by the Anarchist leader Borghi.\footnote{13} Similarly Quaranta, though initially fearful of the ability of the Moderates to successfully oppose extremist elements, authorized a PSI May Day procession on the grounds that in the past the Socialist city council had kept its promise of order and discipline.\footnote{14}

Government instructions on how to deal with strikes and demonstrations tended to be unclear and ambiguous, so enhancing the dangers of conflict, especially under Nitti. As
the prime minister told prefects in preparation for the general strike of March 1920: 'Intervento autorità dovrà essere pronto ed energico per impedire che possa crearsi stato di fatto che reclami repressione e susciti conflitti'. In other words the mere presence of the police forces was considered sufficient to intimidate would-be trouble-makers. In the face of a similar strike in December 1919 Nitti ordered the prefect of Bologna to maintain constant contact with the PSI in order to avoid 'sorprese'. Processions were only to be authorized if PSI leaders took responsibility for their conduct.¹⁵ Such measures may certainly have been attributed to the reality of inadequate police and armed forces. Notably the regional military commander told the sub-prefect of Imola on the occasion of the July 1919 general strike that he was unable to provide him with the two battalions requested for but that if the correct precautions were taken 'nulla avverrà di pericoloso'.¹⁶ Naturally precautions included the preventive arrests of potential revolutionary ring-leaders, as for example Borghi for his violent propaganda in July 1919 (Il Resto del Carlino, 20 July 1919).

If, however, the above precautions were unsuccessful and violence did occur Nitti, in total contrast to his tactful, non-provocative prevention policies, not only ordered swift repression but also counted on the cooperation of the public in this. During the May 1920 railway strike, for example, he ordered the formation of citizens committees to replace strikers.¹⁷ La Squilla of 24 and 31 January 1920 also
reported the substitution of railway, post-office and telegraphic employees by student volunteers during the general strike of January 1920.

Nitti's use of the public went far beyond the substitution of strikers, however. During the July 1919 general strike he ordered citizens organizations - including ex-combattents' associations and the various political 'fasci' to cooperate with the police authorities in the repression of violence and maintenance of public order, stressing however that these groups were to act under the guidance of police officers and never autonomously. Inevitably this was almost an incitement to conflict since it placed power in the hands of elements unable to draw the line between toleration and repression with any degree of accuracy, too easily carried away by patriotic or anti-Socialist euphoria. The prime minister in fact complained to prefects that these civilian groups disobeyed the orders of police officers, resorting to autonomous and overzealous, if not illegal activities.\(^{18}\) Avanti! of 24 July 1919 claimed that in Bologna Arditi (assault troops) had attacked a peaceful PSI demonstration. The article concluded that this had either been encouraged by the prefect under the orders of Nitti or organized by the military authorities, very much involved in anti-Socialist political initiatives, as will be discussed below.

In April 1920 the local socialist deputy Grossi questioned the interior minister about this issue in parliament, suggesting that he had authorized civilian volunteers to form
organizations with police functions. Though the interior minister denied this he added that he could not oppose the activities of these associations as long as they remained within the limits of the law (Il Resto del Carlino, 18 April 1920 and 20 May 1920). Archival documentation does not unfortunately provide sufficient insight into the true intentions of Nitti and his prefects here, though in the case of Bologna supplementary evidence suggests that the prefect Bladier would not have tolerated violence on the part of counter-revolutionary forces as demonstrated by his general opposition to disorderliness on both sides. There is the possibility that prefects either misinterpreted or even took advantage of ambiguous instructions, especially since police inadequacies were a reality. De Felice mentions, for example, that on the occasion of the general strike of July 1919 the prefect of Milan came to an agreement with the local 'Fascio di Combattimento' whereby he could rely on its help in the event of serious disorder.19

Whatever the case the use of civilians for police duties was proven yet again to be counter-productive, encouraging rather than avoiding conflict. It certainly dispelled any impression of tolerance or firmness which the government desired to give. Nitti himself was accused of legitimizing 'follie omicidiarie, abusi, violenze' as expressed in La Squilla's article of 19 July 1919 entitled 'Il Carabinierissimo'. It enabled the organizations involved to take advantage of their new powers to combat political
opponents in the streets. This risked conditioning individual policemen who may have interpreted such uncontrolled action as being on the orders of the government even if this was not actually the case.

If the evidence suggests that general strikes were not usually violent affairs in Bologna, those few cases of conflict involving the police were almost certainly a consequence of ambiguous ministerial policing norms. Analysis of two incidents shows that Nittian policies of firmness and tact in the face of demonstrators could not always be reconciled with the reality of insufficient numbers of policemen. In the case of the Anarchist demonstration of 3 July 1919 in Imola which ended in looting and ransacking the prefect criticised the police officials who instead of remaining firm in the face of danger abandoned the scene to fetch reinforcements. Their absence only increased the looting so that when the Carabinieri reinforcements arrived they had to use their fire-arms killing six people, an act which the prefect described as 'fatalmente legittimo', however. He also saw their state of physical exhaustion and unpopularity in Imola as contributory factors in the tragic outcome of the conflict.20

The killing of eight braccianti, again by Carabinieri during a Socialist conference in Decima (San Giovanni in Persiceto) on 5 April 1920 may again be attributed to a general sense of defencelessness on the part of the policemen involved. The incident was provoked when a police official tried to prevent
a speaker from criticising the government (and in particular the police system). This only rendered the crowd hostile. The Carabinieri brigadier ordered his forces to fire in the air when the official was hit by an object thrown from the crowd which he mistook for gun-fire, so he claimed. Since this had no effect he fired shots into the crowd, his subordinates following suit. A police inspector's report criticised the official for his intolerant attitude despite the limited number of Carabinieri at his disposal. He was blamed for trying to control a crowd with only thirteen men who were so badly positioned as to be defenceless without resorting to their arms. Nitti himself ordered the transfer of the official and also criticised his superior for the limited precautions taken.21

If the archival documentation suggests that the incidents were caused by inadequate police numbers, the Socialist press claimed that they were pre-meditated. According to Avanti of 4 July 1919, the illegitimacy of the action of the Carabinieri in Imola was proven by the fact that the victims were innocent citizens murdered in different locations of the town. La Squilla of 10 April 1920 accused the Carabinieri brigadier in Decima of venting his anger on the crowd, murdering the speaker Campagnoli at point-blank range with a bayonet and ordering his men not to fire randomly into the crowd but to single out their targets.22 Indeed the police inspector's report dispelled claims by Carabinieri that their action was motivated by their hearing shots fired from the crowd.23 What
is significant here is that on occasions such as these the
distinction between pre-meditated and defensive action on the
part of possibly exhausted policemen may have been only
slight, suggesting a correlation between the inadequacy of the
police system and cases of brutality. Such reactions may
indeed have been caused by both political aversion and the
threat of a menacing crowd.

Giolittian strike tactics certainly lessened the risk of
conflict, as illustrated by his handling of the September 1920
factory occupations. Contact with would-be revolutionaries
was to be avoided at all costs 'per non dare pretesti', as he
ordered the Bolognese prefect, Visconti, on 31 August. Though
originally troops, Carabinieri and Regie Guardie guarded
Bologna's metal factories (internally and externally) against
possible occupations, police officials allowed workers to take
over the factories when it became obvious that otherwise
conflict was inevitable. Troops left the interiors of the
buildings which they continued to guard from the outside.
Only following the end of the occupations did the police move
into the factories to check whether arms of explosives had
been manufactured during the occupation.24

There was nevertheless certain confusion as to the exact
orders given and the consequences of this could have been
tragic. The military authorities complained to Visconti that
police officials ordered troops not to fire on workers as they
commenced the occupations, claiming that this was contrary to
previous orders and would have a negative influence on the
morale and discipline of his soldiers. The prefect replied that no orders to prevent occupations at all costs had been issued. Further evidence of lack of clarity over the strategy to be adopted emerged in Zola Predosa where a Carabinieri marshall fired shots in the air in the hope of dissuading the occupiers. Indeed the impression gained is that both the Carabinieri and the army were in no agreement with the prefectural authorities as to the exact moves to be taken, so that police officials' orders not to fire came as a last minute surprise.\textsuperscript{25} Giolitti's strategy, no matter how unclear it may have been, was based, however, on the full awareness that he could not count on government forces in the face of revolution and in this sense was successful.

Examination of agrarian conflict in Bologna, characterized by braccianti land invasions from the beginning of 1920, reveals a particularly hesitant attitude on the part of Nitti. Initial orders received by the prefect to allow the peaceful occupation of uncultivated land in the province suggest that the government looked upon the plight of the rural proletariat with concern. Troops and Carabinieri were given instructions to check that intimidation and violence was not used to occupy uncultivated plots of land and that no products were stolen or alterations made to the land itself. Despite the protests of employers the prefect himself admitted that occupations had nearly all been carried out peacefully and that on a few occasions employers had even invited them to take over and cultivate their land. The agriculture minister Falcioni
ordered the prefect to encourage the agrarians to be less obstinate over the issue so avoiding conflict.  

Falcioni's decree of May 1920 which, in complete contrast to the above, illegalized invasions is almost certainly a demonstration of the fear the agricultural class, which according to Onofri had threatened a rebellion, was capable of instilling in the Nittian government. When Giolitti came to power in June 1920 the situation was reversed once again. The new government ordered prefects to reconsider the possibility of allowing the cultivation by braccianti of land voluntarily abandoned by the proprietors. The Bolognese prefect in fact wrote to the director of Federterra requesting a list of properties to which this could be applied. Similarly Giolitti's decree of 27 July 1920 which ordered the requisition of all crops in the face of persistent braccianti strikes may, in Onofri's opinion, be considered a victory for Federterra since it mobilized forces of braccianti and sharecroppers—paid at higher than normal rates—for this purpose.

Government hesitation if not acquiescence in the face of land invasions may only have encouraged greater reserve on the part of the prefectoral authorities. What is more, the prefects' appeasement of the working classes through economic support may have misguided party and union leaders into believing that the government was wholeheartedly on their side so increasing their determination to win their battles. Quaranta's efforts at keeping down the prices of essential foodstuffs may, for
example, have encouraged Bazzano's leagues to ignore official ceiling prices which they further reduced on the authority of the socialist council and forced landowners to accept.\textsuperscript{30}

If one is also to consider the reality of police absenteeism in several parts of the province, the unprecedented heights of violence which the rural leagues allegedly reached is not beyond comprehension. Indeed the prefect, Pericoli, warned the agriculture minister in May 1920 that he did not have enough forces to enforce the decree banning land occupations. Only weeks after its issue the APA complained of the government's failure to apply it.\textsuperscript{31} On occasions rural police nuclei were even reported to have been physically overpowered by the leagues. In June 1920 in San Giovanni in Persiceto, for example, \textit{Carabinieri} were forced to free the arrested league leader because of violent protests by 1200 workers.\textsuperscript{32} By the summer of 1920 Bologna's agrarian forces had lost all faith in the ability of the government to curb league activities. In September the 'commissario prefettizio' warned the prefect that the agrarians considered the law:

\begin{quote}
\textit{soltanto scritta e non osservata e fatta osservare e non si confidano più; le Autorità ritengono una forma rappresentativa di forza senza forza, l'Arma dei Carabinieri addirittura impotente a proteggere la libertà ed il diritto dei cittadini come a reprimere i soprusi e le giornaliere intimidazioni.}\textsuperscript{33}
\end{quote}
Similarly the Imolese agrarian paper Il Diario accused the prefect, Visconti, of using 'decreti e supplementi di decretini' which, however, the police forces were unable to apply (22 August 1920).

Indeed from the end of the First World War the conservative and Interventionist forces blamed the prefectoral authorities for their general failure to repress subversion. Prefects for their part were particularly critical of the literal desire of these elements for conflict with the local PSI. When in February 1919 the prime minister, Orlando, informed Quaranta that the local Moderate deputy and agrarian, Tanari, had urged that the prefectoral authorities call together the constitutional forces and break off relations with Zanardi, the prefect retorted that:

La sua sensibilità patriottica cui non risponde la massa del partito costituzionale del tutto inerte lo spinge talvolta ad una specie di esasperazione che nuoce alla esatta percezione di delicati posizioni politiche.34

Similarly the Questore criticised the anti-Socialist activities of the Fascio Democratico per la Resistenza Nazionale, founded in June 1918 since the PSI 'pur non aderendo alla guerra ha fatto e fa opera costante di assistenza civile'.35 The influence of these 'constitutional' forces is demonstrated by their successful lobbying for the removal of the Questore, Gaudino, in December
1919. According to L'Avvenire d'Italia of 10 October 1919 he had ordered his forces not to intervene during a Socialist procession.

The ill-feeling of such forces towards the prefecture was obviously a result of their failure to understand the motives underlying government strategies of tact and reserve in the face of strikes and demonstrations. Hence the ABDS condemned the prefect Pericoli's refusal to allow the publication of a manifesto inciting the citizens to repress a PSI festival. Indeed, during the January 1921 parliamentary enquiry into the Palazzo d'Accursio massacre the organization claimed that prefects had shown little favour towards it, reserving its preferences for the Socialists. Such feeling was only part of the nationwide resentment towards postwar governments over their failure to crush Socialism and fulfill the territorial aspirations for which the nation had joined the First World War in 1915. The banning of demonstrations in protest at the Treaty of Versailles in August 1919 by Nitti and the prohibition of demonstrations or the recruitment of volunteers for the liberation of Fiume and Dalmatia by Orlando, Nitti and Giolitti throughout the postwar years almost certainly outraged patriotic Italians, especially since few measures seemed to be taken against revolutionary forces.

One of the main problems facing prefects in postwar Bologna was the open participation of members of the army in street conflicts between Socialist and Interventionist forces.
dominating the period and the general opposition of army leaders themselves to any attempts on the part of the prefectoral authorities to remain neutral in these conflicts. As early as May 1918 Quaranta informed the interior minister that disabled soldiers ('mutilati') and non-injured uniformed soldiers and officers had scuffled with the police when a meeting of the Associazione Bolognese dei Mutilati e Invalidi di Guerra (disabled soldiers' association) turned into an attempt to storm Palazzo d'Accursio - the seat of the Socialist city council. Two lieutenants led an attack on a police commissar whom they insulted with the words 'austriaco, vigliacco, difensore dei ladri' and a Guardia di Città was injured trying to rescue him. The prefect claimed that the army officers had obstructed policemen in their duties.  

This issue brought Quaranta into direct conflict with the regional military command which was less kindly disposed towards the PSI. When the prefect informed the interior minister in April 1919 that mostly uniformed soldiers (some of whom were still active in the army) had been present at the constitution of the 'Fascio di Combattimento' the local military authorities defended their men on the grounds that such organizations were not, as Quaranta had claimed, of an anti-constitutional, republican nature but were simply opposed to anti-national parties and particularly the revolutionary programme of the PSI. Though they had prohibited soldiers in active service or uniform from taking part in political demonstrations and had arrested one of the
founder members of the 'Fascio', Captain Bergamo, they warned that they were limited in the extent to which they could control or prevent the activities of their men, especially since: 'moltissimi sono costretti ad uscire anche per ragioni di servizio e non sarebbe possibile impedire che essi passeggino e si soffermino in certi punti della città'. In view of Quaranta's persistence over the matter the regional commander very subtly informed him that though grateful for the information he provided:

Le intenzioni degli ufficiali possono più attendibilmente apprendersi dai superiori che ne vigilano costantemente l'azione, che non dai giornali che possono essere mossi da fini particolari.  

Evidence suggests, however, that in reality military leaders exercised little control over the activities of their subordinates and hardly took seriously the implications of their behaviour. On 15 June 1919 off-duty officers attacked a Federterra demonstration and in the ensuing conflict killed a bracciatore. If the Questore claimed that anarchists had provoked the incident and that the officers had used their fire arms in self-defence Avanti of 2 July 1919 accused the military authorities of plotting to incriminate the socialist, Giuseppe Tamborelli, for the incident. Indeed following protests from Bentini he was acquitted.  

On the same day however, officers and 'mutilati' led an
attack on the Camera Confederale del Lavoro. Army officers entrusted to guard the building from such attacks sided with the assailants and violently obstructed the efforts of Carabinieri to prevent conflict and protect workers from being assaulted. The prefect Bladier complained that though the military division commander had initially punished the officers responsible, the regional commander had reduced this to a 'ticking off' without even registering the incident. What is worse, he continued:

Tale soluzione è tanto più grave in quanto sembra che il Comando del Corpo d'Armata le abbia accompagnate con frasi che suonano approvazione all'operato del colonello il cui contegno è giustificato pienamente e solo ritenuto un poco eccessivo nella forma. Si rileva come il contegno dei Carabinieri non abbia distinti i sovversivi dai patriottici dimostranti rilevandosi in tutta l'intonazione il preconcetto da cui parte che le repressioni possono e devono essere violente quando si tratta di così detti sovversivi ma assai blande e tolerantì quando si tratta dei così detti patriotti cui evidentemente si vorrebbe fosse lasciato mano libera.42

That the military and prefectoral authorities disagreed over how to handle political conflict in the province was clear well before the First World War had ended. The regional military commander who during the war period was the highest police authority tended to ban all PSI demonstrations to the
objection of the prefect who felt that overzealous measures were politically counterproductive. When during the peace celebrations of 5 November 1918 an improvised Neutralist demonstration had to be quelled the military commander announced a ban on further non-patriotic demonstrations and ordered Quaranta to find evidence of provocative behaviour on the part of Zanardi and arrest those who had organized the demonstration. Quaranta warned, however, that since there was no proof that the demonstration concerned had been an attempt at revolution arrests could not be carried out without provoking a reaction from the left. With regard to Zanardi the prefect stated that though the mayor could indeed be accused of 'omissioni certamente gravi e patriotticamente deplorevoli' this was a moral and not a legal question. 43

Quaranta was quick to note the involvement of high-ranking army officials in postwar Interventionist groups and the obvious dangers this posed, given that under continued wartime regulations the army exerted authority over the political life of the province. In November 1918 he warned Orlando that the 'mutilati':

hanno, purtroppo, continuì contatti con le Autorità Militari a mezzo dell'Ufficio Stampa e Propaganda che prende iniziative di indole politica e a capo del quale vi è un Colonello già commerciante e bolognese che ha rapporti coi gruppi radicali facenti capo al Giornale del Mattino.
The military authorities had, he claimed, fallen under the influence of groups and individuals who under the guise of 'national interests' exploited the army for their political ends. He concluded that the army high command should be relieved as quickly as possible of its war-time role of highest political authority in the province.44

The participation of soldiers and army officers in violent political street conflicts obviously had a negative impact on policemen whose duty it was to repress disorderliness. They almost certainly felt embarrassed at having to repress fellow representatives of the state many of whom were dressed in uniform and some of whom may have even been on police duties at that moment. The 'patriotic' activities of these elements may have psychologically or even physically coerced them into showing greater tolerance towards the Interventionist forces in general. If, for example, during the above-mentioned demonstration of May 1918 policemen were assaulted and humiliated when they tried to prevent the storming of Palazzo d'Accursio, Zanetti claims (p. 329) that on the following occasion - a war victims commemoration organized by Zanardi in June 1918 - they remained indifferent when Interventionists forcefully took over the rally. This may also account for the freedom with which Arditi were alleged by Avanti! to have attacked demonstrations during the general strike of July 1919, as mentioned below. Relatively weak and unprotected groups of policemen may on occasions have preferred to remain aloof to avoid injury. Others may indeed
have been taken in by the moral force of these patriotic occasions, their indifference becoming a form of connivance.

From the autumn of 1920 there were signs of systematic police collaboration with the agricultural employers in the face of near lawlessness in rural areas of the province. In October the secretary of the Camera Confederale del Lavoro informed the prefect, Visconti, that police officials, Carabinieri and Regie Guardie were beginning to offer the landowners criminal means of defence against the Socialist syndicates. In Granarolo, Carabinieri were reported to have fired at pacifist demonstrators, in support of their employer during strikes. A police official also complained that his forces allowed the use of 'krumiri' during the strike, in defiance of the prefect's orders to the contrary.45 Individual cases of police connivance with the agrarian forces had by now become a tradition in the province, as was revealed in the previous chapter. That such action may have been dictated by not only political sympathies but also the relative physical weakness of rural forces during this period is demonstrated by a meeting that very month of 150 agrarian employers who claimed their readiness to arm themselves and place themselves at the disposal of the police in order to restore law and order.46

The escalation of the Fascist movement in the city of Bologna in the autumn of 1920 as the ABDS turned to Arpinati's second Fascio di Combattimento in preparation for the administrative elections in October was matched by increased
indiscipline and partisanship among the ranks of the police forces. According to the Questore, Poli, the Regie Guardie were so badly led by their officers that during a Nationalist demonstration they disobeyed the police officials and abandoned their posts in order to participate. Poli's report concluded that the absence of two superior officers left the responsibility of the division in the hands of lower ranking officers from outside Bologna who had limited knowledge or experience of the provincial political situation and little influence on their subordinates. Those responsible for acts of indiscipline were reprimanded while their officers were punished.47

On another occasion Carabinieri and Guardie were reported to have applauded a group of particularly violent Milanese Arditi. Poli warned Visconti that many policemen, their officers and even some officials did not conceal their sense of outrage at having to repress political groups dedicated to the destruction of Bolshevism. Many police officers and officials were in fact ex-Arditi. The Questore warned that he could no longer guarantee police protection of Socialist party and union headquarters against attacks from nationalists or fascists and feared that disciplinary action would dramatically alter the situation.48

A series of events in the autumn of 1920 led up to the explosion of large-scale Fascist violence in the province. On 14 October a conflict between a group of Anarchist demonstrators and Regie Guardie in front of San Giovanni in
Monte prison ended in the death of three demonstrators and two policemen. Following the funeral of Salvatore Colamasi (Regia Guardia) and Giuseppe La Volpe (vice-commissar) fascists tried to invade the Camera Confederale del Lavoro. La Squilla of 17 October 1920 claimed that though policemen prevented this they looked on with relative indifference as the fascists set fire to a Socialist newspaper stand and fired in the direction of the Borsa restaurant - a Socialist meeting place - killing a passer-by and injuring another three. They then entered the restaurant with the fascists to carry out arrests, assaulting those whom they arrested.49

On 4 November 1920 on the occasion of the second anniversary of the allied victory Poli allowed a procession of nationalists, fascists and uniformed army officers, despite a prefectoral ban on demonstrations, because otherwise he feared a violent reaction on the part of the local population and, so he claimed, because of the orderliness of the group. At its termination fascists managed to enter the tower of Palazzo Re Enzo to ring the bells. The Questore defended the failure of his men to repress this action on the grounds that the incident had taken them by surprise. The fascists, on descending from the tower, managed to mix with the crowds so swiftly that they could not be identified. On the same occasion fascists were able to invade Palazzo d'Accursio to fly the national flag and they also attempted to take possession of trams in the main square, though this was prevented by the police.50
On the night of 4 and 5 November 1920 a shooting incident outside the Camera Confederale del Lavoro provoked a police raid on the union headquarters, resulting in the arrest of 96 Guardie Rosse, who had formed to protect the PSI from Fascist attacks, along with the union secretary Ercole Bucco and the Socialist deputy, Quarantini. Though Poli accused the Guardie Rosse of provoking the incident when they fired shots from inside the building at an army officer, the Avanti! report of 1922 painted rather a different picture. It claimed that fascists had shot first and that Regie Guardie guarding the entrance to the building had actually abandoned their positions to facilitate this. The involvement of the fascists in the incident is also proven by the ransacking which followed the police raid. The Vice-Questore limited himself, however, to declaring that the fascists might have been able to break into the building.51

The Palazzo d'Accursio massacre of 21 November 1920 is by far the most important event demonstrating police connivance with the Fascist movement prior to its definitive launching in Bologna. During the ceremony inaugurating the newly elected socialist city council an armed conflict between fascists and socialists broke out in the square in front of Palazzo d'Accursio. The terrified crowd of mostly workers that had gathered for the ceremony took refuge in the courtyard of the council building. Guardie Rosse stationed there fatally mistook their own side for fascists and reacted by throwing grenades at them. A total of nine were killed either by
bombs or bullets. In the ceremony room inside Palazzo d'Accursio someone who was never identified, shot and killed the liberal councillor, Giulio Giordani.52

If literature published in the years immediately following the tragedy supported the hypothesis of a Socialist attack, recent publications claim that the incident had been masterminded by the local fascio with the collaboration of the Questore, Poli. Most significantly, the Fascists had put up posters threatening to put an end to the Socialist forces on the day of the inauguration of the council, advising women and children to stay at home and the men to prepare themselves for the decisive battle.53 This threat was taken seriously by the Socialists - who used Guardie Rosse, Vigili Urbani (municipal police) and Vigili del Fuoco (firemen) for defence purposes - and by the prefect, Visconti, and Poli. Visconti claimed in a report to the interior minister on 21 November that he had ordered Poli to mediate between the Fascists and Socialists in order to come to some agreement so as to prevent conflict of any kind. Onofri claims, however, that the Questore either took advantage of this to conspire directly with the Fascists or indirectly caused the conflict by misleading the Socialists about the conditions by which the Fascists agreed not to attack. After the incident, so local * PSI leaders claimed, Poli was quite careful to direct investigations so that neither the injured victims, nor the Carabinieri and soldiers on duty in the square, nor those living in the vicinity of Palazzo d'Accursio were
questioned.\textsuperscript{54}

\textit{Avanti!} articles of 26, 27 and 28 January 1922 even suggested that Poli had planted a secret collaborator in Palazzo d'Accursio with instructions to kill Giordani. The individual concerned, a certain Angelo Galli, was noted inside the ceremony room by witnesses. \textit{La Squilla} of 11 February 1922 confirmed a few weeks later that the Camera Confederale del Lavoro had suspected Galli of being a confident of the Questura, 'sospetti confermati in più di una occasione essendosi potuto constatare che delle operazioni di cui il Galli veniva a conoscenza era informata molto bene anche l'autorità'. At the trial of the Socialist council, held in Milan in February 1923, two \textit{agenti investigativi} stated that Galli was a confident of the Questura though unknown personally to Poli (\textit{Avanti!}, 11 February 1923). Poli himself denied the allegations in an interview with \textit{Il Resto del Carlino} on 31 January 1922.\textsuperscript{55}

Both the Questore and his forces contradicted themselves on several occasions during the trial, however, in an effort to prove that the conflict had been provoked by the Socialists and that the Fascists and police forces had at most acted in defence. Hence a \textit{Carabiniere} witness claimed that he had seen someone throwing a hand-grenade from the balcony of Palazzo d'Accursio, though it was later proven that he would not have been able to see this from the place in which he claimed he had been. What is more it was revealed that immediately after the incident he had identified this individual as Zanardi,
though at the trial he promptly corrected this assertion (Avanti!, Il Resto del Carlino, 8 February 1923).

Though Poli claimed that the Socialists had provoked the conflict by firing, he was unable to state against whom they had fired, given that he had previously claimed that police cordons had prevented fascists from getting into the square (Avanti!, 22 February 1923). Other police witnesses admitted, however, that shots were 'returned' from the windows of Palazzo d'Accursio, suggesting, therefore that fascists managed to force their way through the police cordons and fired at the moment when the newly elected mayor came out on to the balcony to greet the crowds, as in fact several press articles of the time reported (Avanti!, 8 February 1923). Though there is little evidence of a full-scale, premeditated Fascist-police operation Carabinieri witnesses admitted that they had no hesitation in firing at the windows of Palazzo d'Accursio when the conflict broke out. Regie Guardie in the courtyard of the building fired at the Guardie Rosse above them and people, who entered from the square with 'aggressive intentions'. There is no evidence to suggest that the fascists were in any way repressed. One cannot, on the other hand, deny the possibility of a confused reaction on the part of police forces, as in the case of the Guardie Rosse.

The Questore was held responsible for other cases of Fascist violence during this period, however. The PSI attributed the Fascist attack on the Camera Confederale del Lavoro on 24 January 1921, for example, to his reducing the number of
policemen guarding the building on the previous day. This is in fact confirmed by a message Poli sent to the prefect informing him that he had reduced the number of Carabinieri with this task from 25 to 8 in order to better protect the railway union headquarters. Other evidence shows that Poli was dedicated to the anti-Socialist cause and admired by many sections of society for this. Indeed Valente praised him as one of the few people in Bologna still determined not to give in to the threats and demands of the city council, as compared to the prefect, Visconti, who was criticized for compromising with Zanardi (p. 175). Poli himself complained during the trial that Visconti had practically been at the disposal of both Zanardi and Bucco. He claimed during an interview with Il Resto del Carlino of 31 January 1922 that:

Un bel giorno, ad esempio, dei sovversivi bruciarono un tricolore davanti alla questura, li feci arrestare, ma per l'intervento dell'On. Zanardi che minacciava una mezza rivoluzione dovetti rilasciarli. Da quel momento decisi di fare da me, perché non mi sentivo di continuare in simili condizioni.

That the government took allegations of Poli's connivance seriously is demonstrated by a telegram Visconti received from Giolitti at the end of January 1921 ordering him to warn the Questore that if he did not act correctly he would be dismissed. Indeed only days later he was removed from Bologna.
and transferred to Porto Maurizio (now Imperia), Liguria. The following March the Vice-Questore, very much present during the Fascist attacks of October and November, also left Bologna on suspicion of having passed information to the Fascio.58

In analysing the events characterizing October and November 1920 one may conclude that the Bolognese Fascist movement was more or less able to carry out its violent attacks undisturbed, if not with the cooperation of the police forces. There are several possible reasons for this. Police personnel may on occasions have preferred to turn a blind eye to Fascist activities to avoid conflict. The moral force behind the movement, as with any anti-Socialist movement, may easily have intimidated policemen into remaining inactive in the face of violence which, if committed by socialists, they would have had no hesitation in repressing. Physical weakness was obviously a serious phenomenon during the period concerned, as we have established, though as was demonstrated throughout the years of Fascist ascendancy, this often provided a perfect alibi for connivance. If Poli, referring to the incident in which fascists broke into Palazzo Re Enzo tower on 4 November, claimed that his forces had been ill-prepared, archival evidence shows that in reality the Questore had warned police officers of the possibility of hostile demonstrations on the previous day and had sent for reinforcements.59

By far the most serious factor during this period, political
aversion towards the PSI was by no means uncommon among policemen, as demonstrated by the attitude of Poli, himself. By no coincidence policemen remained indifferent to a Fascist attack on La Borsa restaurant and even carried out random arrests on its Socialist 'clientele' following the funeral of two of their colleagues, killed by Anarchist demonstrators on 14 October. Allegations in La Squilla of 17 October 1920 that Regie Guardie had caused the conflict of 14 October were in the Questore's opinion typical of many mindless insinuations fabricated by the PSI which only further embittered the police forces. The feeling, as experienced by Poli, that the authorities were literally expected to tolerate the insults of the Socialists, exasperated many policemen, who felt weak and exposed. Both De Felice and Fabbri indicate initial police collaboration with the Fascist movement in terms of the hard experiences extensive strikes and land occupations had bestowed upon them during the "Biennio Rosso", forcing them into overtime. De Felice mentions the frequent attacks policemen received in the Socialist press. He cites two articles in Avanti! one insulting policemen's wives, daughters and lovers and the other urging shopkeepers to boycott policemen. Fabbri indeed saw these excesses as one of the fundamental errors in the Socialist strategy since the main victims of these systematic insults were lower rank policemen who were too ignorant to realise that they were instruments of repression of the bourgeois regime.
(ii) Cesare Mori and the Fascist conquest of the province of Bologna, 1921-22.

The events of the autumn of 1920 marked the beginning only of the Bolognese Fascist revolution. The appointment of the career prefect, Cesare Mori, in Bologna in February 1921 reflected the desire of the Giolittian government to place a strong-minded police official, entirely capable of enforcing law and order and keeping Fascism within legal confines, in the province. The spring of 1921 saw, besides the new prefect's insistence on greater efficiency from his provincial forces in curbing political violence and constant demands to the government for increased numerical strength and better officials, the implementation of special government or prefectoral decrees to render prevention measures all the more efficient.

Giolitti's ban on arms permits in January 1921 is an example of this. The government in fact demanded weekly statistics on the number and type of arms handed in or confiscated by the police authorities in order to check that the decree was properly applied. The following March Mori ordered greater efficiency from his forces in controlling the movement of arms through the searching of property belonging to political associations and travel luggage. The ban was also extended to cudgels (usually used by fascists for beatings and workers for more defensive purposes) in October 1921 by a prefectoral decree which refused release on bail of those arrested for the
illegal possession of arms, as Mori had previously urged upon the interior minister as the only guarantee that the arms ban would be taken seriously. 62

In March 1921 a similar decree banned the circulation of private vehicles without the necessary permits, in order to limit the possibilities the Fascists had of rapidly moving through the province or indeed into surrounding provinces on their punitive expeditions. To complement this roadblocks manned by Carabinieri were set up at various points in the province, particularly in the northern confines, from June 1921 to the prevent Bolognese fascists from leaving the province and fascists from elsewhere entering. 63

The new prefect also controlled the movement of Fascist squads by censoring telegrams between fasci asking for reinforcements, etc. Telegraph stations were ordered to wait for a 'nulla osta' from the prefecture or nearest PS authorities before sending messages of this kind. 64 Notably the above ordinances were accompanied by strict orders from the government that the prefect warn his subordinates that they would be held personally responsible and punished for their failure to observe instructions correctly. 65

Another fundamental aspect of controlling political violence during this period lay in sufficient cooperation between prefectures over the repression of Fascist squads, given their tendency to move from province to province on punitive expeditions. This became particularly important from the summer of 1921 onwards when Modenese and Ferrarese fascists
aided their Bolognese companions in imposing new agricultural syndicates on the peasantry. Between November 1921 and February 1922 Mori was endowed with extraordinary powers over the political and military authorities of the Po Valley provinces in an effort to reduce all levels of political violence throughout the region. Prefects were obliged to ask his authorization for the use of reinforcements and inform him of all matters concerning public order in their provinces.66

In reality, however, such measures were of limited effect in controlling the Fascist movement in Bologna. To a certain extent this may be attributed to the tradition of numerical weakness and technical and bureaucratic inefficiency inherent in the Italian police system, as revealed throughout this study so far. If anything numerical deficiencies were accentuated during this period. If from the autumn of 1920 there was a significant increase in reinforcements of both Carabinieri and Regie Guardie allocated to the province, the intensified scale of violence meant that they were still insufficient.67 The army in fact found itself having to reduce drastically the number of available reinforcements for police duties at the end of 1921 when a whole levée was discharged.68

The negative effects of numerical weakness on the repression of political violence are all too obvious. In May 1921, for example, the prefect of Ferrara informed Mori that he did not have enough forces to prevent fascists from invading the Bolognese province. Low numerical strength may have accounted
for cases of policemen being literally overpowered by the squads, especially during periods of major Fascist mobilization. During the invasion of Bologna of May 1922 (see Chapter II, pp. 131-2) small police nuclei were unable to prevent the burning and ransacking of Socialist cooperatives and societies by groups of between 50 and 1,500 Fascists - so police reports claim - given the concentration of all reinforcements in the city of Bologna. The inefficiency of roadblocks may also be attributed to numerical weakness, as during the invasion when a small Carabinieri nucleus at the Ferrarese border was unable to prevent the entrance of three thousand fascists. 69

On occasions lack of cooperation and bureaucratic pettiness on the part of other police authorities (army, Carabinieri, Regie Guardie) as so often in the past hindered Mori's efforts to curb the high level of violence in the province. In June 1921, for example, the military division commander objected to his use of soldiers to guard the Camera Confederale del Lavoro and man roadblocks on the grounds that this violated circular 3630 of 14 April 1920 which limited the use of troops for policing purposes, demonstrating obvious indifference about the emergency situation in the province, which, according to Mori, justified these measures. 70

The stress which intensified political violence placed on a traditionally weak police organization was obviously quite considerable. Indeed, following the elections of May 1921 in which Fascist crimes reached unprecedented levels police
forces were reported to be in a state of physical exhaustion and therefore unfit for duties. Their morale was further weakened by the announcement that shortly three army regiments would be leaving the province without substitution. The constant use of reinforcements meant that decent living accommodation was scarce. In January 1922 Mori warned the prefect of Ferrara, for example, that bad living conditions risked causing indiscipline among Regie Guardie.71

Renzo De Felice points out that one of the problems which Fascism posed to the police forces was its use of large bands of armed men who had their own means of transport for moving swiftly about the countryside. As the historian states:

L'organizzazione e il modus agenti delle forze di polizia nell'21 erano quelli tradizionalmente usati nei decenni precedenti, quando sul piano politico e dell'ordine pubblico in genere, si trattava di fronteggiare scioperi, agitazioni, manifestazioni anche'essi di tipo tradizionale, dei quali cioè la polizia era informata, dai suoi agenti e confidenti e spesso della stessa stampa 'sovversiva' con giorni di anticipo (...) bastavano pochi colpi d'arma da fuoco per sbandare masse anche numerose di dimostranti (Mussolini il fascista, Vol. 1, cit., pp. 33-4).

Mori indeed attributed lack of experience to the failings of his forces and officials. In June 1921, for example, he
forces were reported to be in a state of physical exhaustion and therefore unfit for duties. Their morale was further weakened by the announcement that shortly three army regiments would be leaving the province without substitution. The constant use of reinforcements meant that decent living accommodation was scarce. In January 1922 Mori warned the prefect of Ferrara, for example, that bad living conditions risked causing indiscipline among Regie Guardie.71

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Mori indeed attributed lack of experience to the failings of his forces and officials. In June 1921, for example, he
admitted that one of the problems inherent in policing in rural areas was the control of territorial zones by inexperienced *Carabinieri*. Given the constant arrival and departure of reinforcements, often from other regions of the country, policemen were never given time to familiarize themselves with the political situation in a particular location. An insufficient communication system may have accounted for the late signalling of departures of Fascist squads on punitive expeditions, so that forces in the location to which they were destined were unable to take the necessary measures in time. On occasions fascists actually cut telegraph wires, as during the invasion of Bologna in May 1922. Finally, a problem associated with the identification of Fascist offenders was that they were usually from other areas of the province, if not other provinces, so that local policemen were unable to recognise them. It was often impossible to tell the locations from where expeditions had set off.

The arms and vehicles ban issued by Giolitti in the first months of 1921 proved to be inefficient. One of the principal reasons behind the failure of the arms ban was the fact that it was not extended to all categories of persons previously in possession of arms. Many avoided the ban because they owned arms for hunting purposes. Families of soldiers killed during the recent war were allowed to keep one gun as a memento. Persons whose moral conduct was guaranteed were also exempted from the ban. Mori himself asked the
undersecretary of state for the interior, Corradini, in March 1921 for a revision of arms permits for people living in isolated areas and the following month even proposed the return of arms to the majority of those previously holding a licence. Vigliani, the police chief granted this request, though advising prudence. By the summer of that year Mori was complaining that police officials and officers were too liberal in the issuing of permits. Similarly a possible setback in the decree of March 1921 banning the circulation of vehicles may have been the exemption of those vehicles used for commercial purposes. Given the support if not employment that the property-owning classes gave to Fascism it is very likely that such vehicles transported fascists under the guise of business trips. Roadblocks also proved to be very ineffective. The main fault here seemed to be the failure to put them up at all border points. As the prefect of Modena informed Mori in August 1921 fascists had no difficulty in getting past them since they could use roads without blocks. Otherwise fascists would get out of their transportation van and walk round the roadblock through the fields continuing their journey in the van on the other side.

If there are no doubts, therefore, as to the serious technical and bureaucratic difficulties encountered by Bologna's police forces in repressing Fascist violence - as indeed experienced in the face of socialist league intimidation in 1920 - the archival documents suggest, however, that on occasions these weaknesses may have provided
a perfect alibi for police indifference if not acquiescence towards the Fascist movement. This would explain, for example, excessive lack of cooperation in the summer of 1921 from the Ferrara's prefect, Pugliese, towards Mori over the invasion of Molinella by Ferrarese fascists. On several occasions he refused to take responsibility for failing to prevent this and even denied that the squads were from his province.\textsuperscript{76} Indeed weaknesses inherent in the Italian police forces cannot alone account for the near total failure of Bologna's police forces to repress political violence. Not only did Mori complain of the freedom with which Fascist squads carried out their illegal activities but also he deplored the absence of his forces from scenes of conflict, their lateness if not failure in reporting incidents and the poor results of his prevention policies.

The overall impression gained through examination of the vast quantity of documentation is that unlike the previous period of league violence, policemen usually put up no physical resistance to fascist criminal activities. To quote one of countless examples, a \textit{Carabinieri} officer preferred to walk away when in October 1921 a member of the Socialist council of Ozzano Emilia was assaulted by fascists.\textsuperscript{77} On occasions policemen directly disobeyed orders by failing to repress Fascist illegalities. As the \textit{Questore} informed Mori in April 1921, his officials:
mi hanno concordemente fatto rilevare che allorché debbono essi esplicare azione energica o repressiva verso gruppi di dimostranti fascisti o simpatizzanti con questi, trovansi isolati perché le forze di polizia non rispondono esattamente ai loro inviti.78

Statistics on the arrests of fascists, the confiscation of their arms and searching of their property, indeed strongly suggest that many policemen were well disposed towards the movement. This is particularly evident when comparing these with similar figures on socialists.

Those produced by De Felice (Mussolini il fascista, Vol. 1, cit., pp. 36-9) demonstrate that at least initially Mori was particularly successful in repressing violence in comparison to other provinces. For a total of 73 cases of conflict between socialists and fascists up to 8 May 1921, 124 fascists were prosecuted, of whom 84 were arrested, whilst 76 socialists were prosecuted and 52 of these arrested. In the other provinces the number of fascists prosecuted or arrested was significantly lower than similar figures for socialists. Further figures found in the prefect's files show that in Bologna itself, however, socialists involved in political conflict faced harsher treatment from the police authorities than their fascist counterparts. Between 8 and 31 May 1921, for example, only 9 out of 49 socialists were released on bail in comparison with 37 out of 61 fascists. Figures compiled
from monthly reports which the prefecture sent to the interior minister between March and September 1922, again showed that 311 out of 427 fascists were released on bail in comparison with only 73 out of 155 socialists.79

The conclusion drawn from these figures is confirmed by Mori's instructions to his forces. He noted, for example, that following a conflict between communists and fascists ten of the former and only one of the latter were arrested by Carabinieri though the majority of those injured were communists.80 He also became suspicious of the number of Fascist offenders reported 'in hiding'. In November 1921 he complained to his subordinates that:

Ricorre con troppa frequenza nelle relazioni delle SS.LL. per fatti di violenza provocati da fascisti la motivazione di non essersi potuto procedere all'arresto dei responsabili perché 'datasi alla latitanza' ciò che invece non avviene con la stessa frequenza per violenze quando i responsabili ne sono persone appartenenti ad altri partiti.

In January 1922 he indeed informed the Questore that three individuals sought after by the police and allegedly 'in hiding' were living free in their own homes.81 Further information shows that many fascists released on bail were accused of such crimes as murder and assault. Many names appear more than once on the lists. According to a report of August 1922 on crimes committed, 9 fascists accused of murder
or attempted murder were on bail. Another two accused of murder were 'in hiding'.

Similarly, figures on the number and type of arms confiscated as part of the government ban suggest that the police forces were lenient towards the Fascist movement and that this increased as time went on. Indeed, if between 27 December 1921 and 8 January 1922 a total of 242 licences were banned, 153 applications rejected, 82 weapons confiscated and 26 people prosecuted, by March 1922 figures were disastrously lower with only 12 banned licences, 8 rejected licence applications, 3 confiscated weapons and 3 arrests in one week. Significantly from May 1922 (the period of intensified fascist violence) the figures illustrated that police measures in enforcing the arms ban were almost non-existent, though again this may reflect to a certain extent the weakness of the forces in the face of large scale Fascist operations.

The evidence also implies that even if fascists were brought to trial they were not necessarily condemned for their crimes. The police forces almost certainly played a significant role here. Given that the majority of acquittals were for lack of evidence one may assume that Fascist violence and intimidation prevented witnesses from coming forward. Indeed in January 1922 Mori deplored the failure of Carabinieri present during the trials of fascists to protect key witnesses from fascists either inside or outside the courtroom. He also complained that his forces failed to carry out the necessary enquiries on fascists awaiting trial, claiming that such negligence
deliberately aimed at preventing their incrimination. As a result of this, for example, 32 fascists accused of attempting to ransack a Socialist club in San Donato in March 1921 were acquitted.85

Perhaps the most revealing case of this kind was that of Emilio Marchesini, Fascist 'ras' of Budrio, prosecuted for a total of 6 crimes varying from assault to resisting arrest between August 1921 and February 1922, but always acquitted, despite the fact that the Questura considered him a dedicated criminal! Indeed, during one of his many hearings he was reported to have beaten a prosecution witness. The impression gained from rather vague and inadequate documentation on Marchesini is that though continually sought after by the police and conveniently reported 'in hiding', he led a normal public life in Budrio. Indeed in April 1921 the Questore informed Mori that a Regie Guardie officer had seen and recognized Marchesini, but 'non sapendo che egli fosse ricercato non lo aveva tratto in arresto'. In the case of Budrio, the facility with which Marchesini was acquitted may have been a result of Fascist influence within the local judiciary itself. Indeed in January 1922 the Questore advised the removal of a court official from the town - as in fact happened - for his passionate Fascist sympathies and use of false witnesses during trials.86

The documentation quoted above implies that members of the police and judiciary protected Fascist offenders without making it too obvious, however, that the law was not being
upheld. This is indeed epitomized in the case of a Carabiniere who in October 1921 arrested a fascist in Borgo Panigale. A witness came forward to claim that he had seen the fascist secretly hand over his revolver to the policeman so that on arriving in the local Carabinieri headquarters he was promptly released, not having been found in illegal possession of a weapon. There is also strong evidence to suggest that elements within the Questura or prefecture warned the fascio of imminent arms searches. An anonymous letter to the prefect accusing the Vice-Questore of such activities was almost certainly the cause of the removal of the official concerned, as was mentioned above.87

Discrepancies in existing legislation almost certainly protected Fascist offenders from serious punishment as well. Notably article 372 of the penal code stated that should deliberate bodily injuries be curable within ten days, judicial action could only be taken if desired by the victim and the prison sentence did not exceed three months - this latter point meaning that offenders were automatically released on bail. If, therefore, it could be proven that injuries inflicted by the Fascists were light - and given the intimidatory nature of Fascism this would not have been difficult - even if the aggressors were reported by their victims - again very unlikely - they escaped imprisonment while awaiting trial. Indeed, La Squilla reported on 10 September 1921 that despite Mori's orders for the arrest of fascists in Budrio the local Carabinieri chief replied that
'Noi non possiamo farlo perché la legge permette che si bastoni purché non vengono prodotte delle lesioni guaribili oltre il decimo giorno'.

On many occasions policemen obviously protected fascists, and indeed themselves from accusations of incompetence, by playing down the seriousness of incidents. An enquiry into political violence in Molinella, for example, concluded that the workers were over-anxious about the possibility of encountering Fascist punitive expeditions and were prone to exaggeration, therefore. In reply to allegations of connivance on the part of the police the report stated that policemen 'gave the impression' of being partial towards the Fascists, though in reality there was nothing to criticise in their conduct.88 There are also documented incidents of policemen coercing the victims of assaults into denying that they had been injured by fascists. The Imolese Camera del Lavoro informed the sub-prefect in December 1921, for example, that following a beating by fascists a worker had been ordered by the local Carabinieri commander to declare either that he had fallen off his bicycle or that he had been attacked in a different location - so relieving the commander of any responsibility for the attack. When Mori made enquiries the policeman naturally denied the whole incident, accused the Camera del Lavoro of slander and even produced a declaration by the victim stating that the whole incident was based on a 'misunderstanding'.89

There were naturally cases of police collaboration far
surpassing the mere protection of fascists. In April 1922 Mori complained to the Carabinieri legion commander that Carabinieri had accompanied fascists on punitive expeditions, for example. Reports of open 'cameraderie' between fascists and policemen were not uncommon either. Mori particularly deplored the friendship between an extremely violent fascist, Cavedoni, of Bertalia and the local Carabinieri commander, for example, just as he deplored Carabinieri of Bazzano spending their evenings in the 'osterie' in the company of fascists with whom they sang anti-socialist songs. In December 1921 the Imolese Camera del Lavoro claimed that fascists and Carabinieri searched property and carried out arrests together. Mori on several occasions had to warn his funzionari not to carry out investigations with the assistance of fascists for the obvious reason that this would give the public the impression that the authorities protected one political faction to the detriment of the other. The latter examples illustrate the policeman-like semi-legal nature of the Fascist movement in the aftermath of what many had considered 'red tyranny' in Bologna. The impression gained is that on occasions the assistance of fascists in police operations may have been beneficial to the local police forces, rendering collaboration reciprocal, therefore. This is even more evident in the post-March on Rome years when Fascist squads aided the prefectoral authorities in persecuting socialists and communists who had become official enemies of the Mussolinian regime.
Serious efforts were made by Mori to remove those members of his forces suspected of connivance. Bertalia's Carabinieri commander left Bologna in view of his continued friendship with Cavedoni, for example. The prefect made little distinction, however, between cases of open collaboration and general negligence on the part of police officers who might have been simply too incompetent or weak to cope with the Fascist onslaught or at the most intimidated into showing greater tolerance towards Fascist violence. On applying to the prime minister, Bonomi, for the transfer of Imola's sub-prefect in September 1921 he noted that:

Non è legato agli agrari ma può averne dato localmente la sensazione in quanto una certa timidezza (...) lo portano anziché a reagire ad accostarsi di preferenza a chi più grida e minaccia e cioè in questo momento al fascismo agrario.92

The task of removing or punishing those suspected of connivance - whether active or passive - proved to be difficult on many occasions, however. Those under accusation were often able to defend themselves for technical failings or bureaucratic complexities. Policemen were often supported by their superiors against the will of the prefect. In April 1922, for example, Mori complained to the Carabinieri legion commander that despite proven acts of connivance on the part of Carabinieri in Castel San Pietro and Sesto Imolese the local division commander claimed that their action had been
'meritevole'. The legion commander in turn defended the division commander on the grounds that his subordinates had obviously 'not given him all the details of their activities'. The prefect had limited power over the removal or punishment of Carabinieri or Regie Guardie because of the limited dependence of the two corps on the prefectoral authorities, especially in disciplinary terms. On many occasions Carabinieri or Regie Guardie commanders were able to decide on their own authority, over and above Mori's, that it was not convenient to remove or transfer their men, as in fact happened in the above incidents.93

It has already been established in the first half of this chapter that at least initially police connivance with Fascism may have been strongly based on anti-socialist feeling deriving from the period of conflict of 1920. The deaths of six workers, mostly at the hands of the Carabinieri, at the end of 1920 and during the following year support this hypothesis. Medardo Vannini was killed at point-blank range by Carabinieri during a quarrel on 14 November 1920. Luigi Longhi mysteriously died in prison in December 1920 after being arrested for political reasons. Of the other four cases, Aldo Vecchi was shot at point-blank range in the stomach by a Carabiniere for no apparently justifiable reason in Budrio in September 1921. Primo Sibani was mortally injured by Carabinieri in an attempt to arrest him in Grizzana in November 1921. The most serious cases were joint Fascist-Carabinieri attacks. Enrico Bonoli was beaten to death by
fascists and Carabinieri in Castel Guelfo in May 1921 and Emilio Zardi suffered the same fate in Fontanelice in December that year (Arbizzani, Lavoratori ed antifascisti, cit., pp. 12-14).

It would be an error, however, to conclude from the above that connivance was in all cases motivated by political identification with the movement. The Questore, Luigi Poli, mentioned in the first half of the chapter, is again a clear example of political connivance within the higher ranks of the police organization. Yet, few other funzionari in Bologna shared his enthusiasm for the Fascist movement. Indeed, further archival evidence shows that police connivance with Fascism, though a widespread phenomenon, was not necessarily motivated by political feeling. Among top rank policemen especially connivance may have been motivated by personal opportunism. This may have been the case with the prefects in the neighbouring province of Ferrara, Pugliese and Bladier, both suspected of collaborating with the fascists and temporarily relieved of their duties (collocati a disposizione) but then reinstated following the March on Rome. Adrian Lyttelton indeed gives the example in his work on the rise to power of Fascism of the Questore of Cremona who, in anticipation of a future Fascist government, compromised his office, becoming a client of the ras Farinacci, in the hope that this would improve his career. He was in fact nominated prefect under Mussolini ('Cause e caratteristiche', cit., p. 45).

The documentation also suggests that passive collaboration
may often be attributed more to pressure and coercion - both physical and psychological - from the Fascist movement and less to political identification, especially among police officials. It also shows that the relationship between the police and the movement was often all but cordial. The documentation consulted shows that on many occasions the Bolognese fascist movement used methods of coercion in an effort to keep the prefectural authorities and provincial police forces under its influence. An example of this is the reaction of Bologna's Fascists - and much of the conservative population - to the arrest of their leader Arpinati, accused of attempted murder, in March 1921. Violent anti-government demonstrations and the closing of the city's shops aimed at securing Arpinati's release. This was supported by a violent press campaign by the Fascist local daily L'Assalto which, in an article dated 19 March 1921, accused the prefectural authorities of Bolshevism and ridiculed Mori. It concluded:

I prefetti di Giolitti credono sul serio che l'impero della legge altro non sia che ordine pubblico? Ma si sbagliano grosso. Per noi l'impero della legge significa la moralità nei rapporti e nei costumi politici, moralità che tutti gli organi dello stato, senza distinzione alcuna, hanno prostituito vendendo lo stato e la cosa pubblica a tutti i venduti allo straniero. No. Non c'è nessun regio o prefettizio decreto, nessun aumento di forza politica, nessun
provvedimento poliziesco che possa ormai far riacquistare alle nostre popolazioni la perduta fiducia negli organi di stato. Le nostre popolazioni, sane e laboriose, sanno benissimo che i soli, che al di sopra di tutte le apparenti procedure poliziesche abbiano ristabilito la legge sono stati i fascisti.

These words clearly illustrate the moral force with which the Fascist movement justified its criminal acts and the obvious pressure this placed on policemen who risked accusations of anti-patriotism for trying to uphold the law. This would almost certainly account for the quick release on bail of Arpinati by the Ferrarese judicial authorities. Mori deplored this move as illegal and motivated by 'pressioni piazza'. He added that such action did nothing to enhance the prestige of the judiciary. The socialists arrested for the Palazzo d'Accursio massacre in November 1920 and not released on bail for the same charges obviously accused them of partiality.95

Accusations of maltreatment of fascists during police interrogations, which Mori denied, may have formed part of general manoeuvres to discredit and thereby pressurize the prefectural authorities. A petition demanding that the police forces prove themselves 'di non essere solo severa esecutrice della legge, ma rispettosa della volontà popolare che continuamente viene invisa nei suoi sentimenti di Italianità' signed by the fasci, merchants', employers' and citizens' associations of Budrio and Mezzolora, demonstrates the support.
of conservative classes in this.\textsuperscript{96}

If such pressure - epitomized in the Fascist invasion of Bologna and ostracism of Mori in May 1922 - did not affect the prefect himself, who remained remarkably steadfast in the face of Fascist protest, other policemen may have been influenced by it. The manner in which police commanders gave in to the arrogant authoritarian attitude of Fascist elements is much in evidence on several occasions. In December 1921, for example, Mori complained to the \textit{Carabinieri} division commander that his men had released a fascist immediately after his arrest in Bologna after a crowd of fascists protested. \textit{Avanti!} of 23 April 1922 claimed that in Molinella those police officials who refused to collaborate with local fascists were treated with such hostility that they were forced to ask for transfer to another area. Police \textit{funzionari} did not always have the support of the \textit{Carabinieri} or \textit{Regie Guardie}. When, for example, in August 1921 fascists accused Molinella's vice-commissar of partiality towards the Socialists, after threatening to take legal action against their assailants, the local military commander intervened in support of the Fascists, stating that the functionary was in fact a 'subversive sympathiser'.\textsuperscript{97}

Policemen were on occasions victims of violent personal attacks in the Fascist press. Molinella's vice-commissar, Bovolo, was accused in \textit{L'Assalto} (1 July 1922) of being over-friendly towards the local Socialist leader Massarenti, to quote just one example of this (see Appendix 2, Document 33
for a similar example of this). On rarer occasions the Fascists even resorted to physical attacks on policemen who refused to cooperate with them. Indeed in May 1922 the Questore had to order the protection of a vice-commissar following threats. His colleagues did in fact have to defend him against a Fascist assault in the Modernissimo cafe in Bologna on 29 May 1922.98 Again, as during the immediate post-war period, the attitude of army officers on police duties counter-acted efforts on the part of the police officials to maintain law and order and was almost certainly a contributory factor to police connivance - active or passive - with the Fascist movement. In June 1921, for example, an army captain tried to prevent a commissar repressing a Fascist invasion of the Imolese town council headquarters.99

The case of the vice-commissar of Porretta, Mazzoni, illustrates the obvious physical and psychological effects of the pressure of the local Fascist movement. In April 1922 the official requested transfer for family reasons. The sub-prefect of Vergato informed Mori, however, that in reality Mazzoni desired to leave Porretta because of the hostility he faced from the local population, particularly the Fascists. The following month Mori informed the interior ministry police chief that:

Il Sig. Mazzoni ha reso utili e lodevoli servizi in questa provincia, nell'attuale sua residenza, ma da qualche tempo eccessivamente impressionato dagli attacchi mossigli sulla
stampa dai fascisti, e dalla loro ostilità per l'opera di repressione alla quale il Mazzoni ha dovuto provvedere in varie occasioni di violenze fasciste nel territorio del Circondario di Vergato, si va mostrando alquanto indeciso e perplesso.

Mazzoni himself declared that the local Carabinieri had sided with the Fascists, isolating him completely and undermining his authority. He alleged that their commander disobeyed his orders to protect a socialist from Fascist assaults. The Carabinieri division commander defended his forces on the grounds that Mazzoni connived with the Socialists. The sub-prefect of Vergato later admitted, however, that the Carabinieri commander of Porretta was a close friend of two local fascists and recommended his transfer. In the case of vice-commissar Bovolo, accused of having fallen under the influence of Massarenti, a slight nervous breakdown was diagnosed.100

If policemen were not necessarily coerced into actively supporting the Fascist movement they may have preferred not to put up resistance to the violence, where possible. The Questore De Silva, though initially praised by Mori for his efforts to repress political violence in the province, had by the summer of 1922 become the object of severe criticism by the prefect for his incompetence. In August he was accused of having failed to prevent fascists from requisitioning a train which they drove to Ancona, despite his having been warned of
this in advance. Similarly it took him three quarters of an hour to send forces to defend the Camera Confederale del Lavoro in Bologna from yet another Fascist attack, despite the closeness of the building to the Questura.\textsuperscript{101} Policemen may have feared punishment under a future Fascist government for repressing the movement in the past. Where a policeman's superior sympathised with the Fascists he was almost certainly reluctant to repress Fascist illegalities. Where the police forces were genuinely weak in the face of the Fascist onslaught they may have passively accepted violation of the law in order to save their skins.

Further light is thrown on the above issue by considering the reaction of police forces to the Fascist invasion of Bologna at the end of May 1922. The documentation suggests that the Regie Guardie and police officials responded particularly positively to Mori's general mobilization of police and military forces for defence of the city. Indeed the Questore reported scuffles between funzionari and fascists refusing to disband. Cases of hostility between fascists and Regie Guardie were so frequent that the Questore seriously considered the idea of employing Carabinieri only since, he claimed, they might be more able to uphold the law without the need for conflict.\textsuperscript{102}

Several significant points emerge from the above. Firstly, the rather unsteady relationship between the Regie Guardie and the Fascist movement, as evident in this instance, was not uncommon in other areas of the peninsula. In September 1921
Regie Guardie in the neighbouring province of Modena killed seven fascists after opening fire on an apparently pacifist-demonstration against police measures after fascists assaulted two police officials. The Communist daily L'Ordine Nuovo attributed this to the physical exhaustion of the corps in the face of daily episodes of Fascist violence as had been the case with the socialists in 1920. The anti-police demonstration and assault of two policemen may have been the last straw.103

Secondly, the use of Carabinieri as a 'soothing agent' was again not uncommon. Indeed Giuseppe Beato in his essay of 1938 on the contribution of the Carabinieri Reali to the Fascist cause in Tuscany states that though the corps and Fascist movement collaborated in repressing 'subversion':

tuttavia la prima, per il suo stesso istituto, dovette essere la moderatrice degli impulsi generosi del secondo e riuscì con delicato tatto, e qualche volta con pronta energia, ad impedire od a limitare le conseguenze di spiegabili reazioni, colla serenità ed il prestigio della propria inalterabile disciplina.104

This implies, therefore, that emphasis was placed not so much on repressing the Fascist movement but more on keeping it under control. In this sense the Carabinieri were considered useful on the basis of their cordial relationship with the movement. Such policies only risked increasing the extent of
police connivance and further undermining state authority, however. They also illustrate the extent to which the prefectoral authorities were fearful of provoking rather than preventing conflict through repressive measures.

The above points indeed suggest that certain distinctions may be made between the various police authorities over the question of their support of Fascism. It becomes clear, as generally emerges from this study, that police connivance with the movement was particularly strong among the Carabinieri and less so among police funzionari and the Regie Guardie. The documentation suggests that the Carabinieri for their sympathetic view of the Fascist movement were easily encouraged into collaborating with it, ignoring directives from the Questura and prefecture. Only on rare occasions did the Fascists resort to serious psychological or physical pressure on Carabinieri. The support individual Carabinieri received from their superiors when Mori tried to have them transferred for their alleged connivance with the Fascist movement is further proof of the extent to which the corps sympathized with Fascism. As will be revealed below, however, the Carabinieri as other police authorities would have maintained their loyalty to the state, despite feeling sympathy towards the Fascist movement, had the state itself shown more decisiveness in curbing the political violence dominating the period.

In view of this last point, the attitude of Bologna's police forces towards the Fascist movement may also be attributed to
the generally ambiguous moves taken by the pre-Fascist governments of Giolitti, Bonomi and Facta which obviously continued down the ranks of the police authorities. Giovanni Giolitti, though issuing decrees with the aim of restoring law and order, was concerned more at taming the movement, which he failed to see as subversive, through the repression of individual cases of violence, and less at outlawing a serious threat to state integrity. According to De Felice, he may even have quietly approved of anti-Socialist counter-revolution if this would help maintain the political status quo. The historian states that, in the prime minister's opinion:

L'importante era che il fascismo potesse essere mantenuto sotto controllo e incanalato nell'alveo delle forze medie: la routine politico-parlamentare avrebbe fatto il resto, gli avrebbe dato sfogo legale e lo avrebbe integrato nello stato liberale. Intanto bastava che l'apparato amministrativo fosse in grado di far rispettare l'autorità dello stato, assicurando la punizione dei reati specifici da qualsiasi parte politica. (Mussolini il fascista, Vol. 1, cit., pp. 35-9).

On the above grounds Giolitti included fascists on the government list at the May 1921 general election. Though the prime minister deplored the high level of Fascist violence characterizing the election campaign and the general failure of the police to prevent this (see Appendix 2, Document 27 for
an example of this), examination of the archival documentation suggests that government directives may have indirectly encouraged the police forces to tolerate Fascist excesses. Evidence shows that the election was carried in traditional 'Giolittian' style with the usual government interference in favour of its own forces. Thus, for example, the sub-prefect of Vergato asked for the removal of the electoral president of Grizzana because of his Socialist ties and for the substitution of the president of Marzabotto who was considered more beneficial to the government by fighting the electoral campaign in the Communist-dominated town. One should seriously consider the possibility that in the light of the 'Giolittian' electoral tradition in which the prefectoral authorities were usually expected to fight the opposition and support the 'constitutional' parties the inclusion of Fascist candidates on the government list was almost an indirect invitation to police connivance.

Under Bonomi, who succeeded Giolitti in July 1921, the Socialist movement came under attack not only from the Fascists but also from the provincial police forces following the prime minister's outlawing of the Communists and the Arditi del Popolo, a left-wing paramilitary organization founded in defence against Fascist violence, on the grounds that they provoked the Fascists. Though ordering the repression of Fascist violence alongside this, Bonomi gave his forces the impression that the government continued to see the left as the main threat and almost justified the Fascist
counter-reaction as a form of self-defence. Indeed, according to Neppi Modona (pp. 249-61), ministerial directives ordered the repression of the *Arditi del Popolo* under specific articles of the penal code - including article 253 on the formation of armed associations and article 248, 'associazione a delinquere' - articles which had never been applied against the Fascist movement.\(^{106}\)

These policies had the effect of placing undue emphasis on the repression of the left so that while *Arditi del Popolo* were arrested in organized police operations and their headquarters closed the *fasci* remained open and the majority of Fascist offenders went unpunished. Mori himself, who cannot in any way be suspected of favouritism towards the Fascist movement, initially failed to see the dangers inherent in Bonomi's policies. He defended his forces from accusations that they limited the repression of political violence to the *Arditi del Popolo* which, he claimed, was more than a defensive organization, citing an attack on the *fascio* of Mezzolara. In August 1921 he reported hearing from Fascist sources about the secret recruitment of *Arditi* among Bologna's bricklayers and tram-drivers and took repressive measures on the basis of this information, suggesting that the police and Fascists collaborated in repressing this paramilitary organization. A month later, however, he had to warn his forces that their action had degenerated into unjustified persecution of the left while the Fascist movement thrived.\(^{107}\)

De Felice (*Mussolini il fascista*, Vol. I, cit., p. 211)
indeed states that the Arditi del Popolo served as an excellent alibi for Fascist violence, appeasing public anxieties about the high level this had reached. He continues, however, that with this a new form of connivance was created:

quella dell'accordo con i fascisti per cercare di tenerli calmi, di contenerne la violenza e, in qualche caso, laddove i comunisti, gli arditi del popolo erano più attivi, per servirsene contro di essi

De Felice concludes that this type of connivance:

minava più al fondo quel che rimaneva dell'autorità e del prestigio dello stato, rendeva i fascisti sempre più sicuri di sé e tracotanti, influenzava col suo esempio pernicioso uno dopo l'altro gran parte degli organi periferici, scoraggiava coloro che avrebbero voluto applicare mezzi più idonei alla bisogna e opporsi ai fascisti in nome della legge e delle istruzioni impartite dal governo. (pp. 204-5).

The repression of the Arditi del Popolo is a perfect example of how ambiguous state directives continued down the ranks of the police forces and gradually subverted the state institutions from within.

The Facta government represented the pre-Fascist state at its weakest. This is indeed illustrated by the prime
minister's insufficient defence of Cesare Mori when the province of Bologna was occupied by fascists from the Bolognese and surrounding provinces in protest against his handling of the political violence. Facta clearly compromised Mori's position by promising Mussolini's forces that an inquiry into the prefect's conduct would be carried out. This allowed him to avoid ending the occupation with emergency measures. The July 1922 interior ministry report on policing in Bologna clearly aimed to discredit Mori, who was portrayed as having behaved excessively in the face of Fascist violence, so justifying his removal from Bologna the following August. Much space was used to argue that the prefect had isolated himself from Bolognese high society because of his undiplomatic attitude. Much of the report was centred on the corruption of the Vice-Questore and Mori's alleged failure to punish him. Alongside this testimonies by local prominent fascists accused the prefect of overzealousness. The parliamentary deputy, Oviglio, for example, claimed that he had arrested too many fascists, meddled in their trials and even tolerated beatings inflicted upon them by the Vice-Questore.

Contributions to the report by various police authorities were equally critical of Mori. The local Carabinieri claimed that they had lost their prestige after he had ordered them to fire at Fascist demonstrators. The prefectural authorities had over-interfered in their operations. The corps was also bitter that he had ordered agenti investigativi to carry out
enquiries into allegations that they had maltreated socialists. Many police *funzionari* claimed that Mori was so fanatically opposed to the Fascists that he tended to order their arrest even if they had a firm alibi, which was naturally of embarrassment to local magistrates. Police commanders even resorted to the arrest of fascists and their prompt freeing for lack of evidence in the hope of satisfying the prefect that his forces were sufficiently repressing political violence. Policemen were transferred on the slightest suspicion of connivance with the Fascist movement.¹⁰⁹ Though it is difficult to tell whether the police testimonies used in the report represented the feelings of the majority of policemen, the impression gained is that for some Mori posed a serious threat since he did not give them any leeway to cover up for connivance which in many cases may have been forced upon them by the moral pressure from Fascism.

This attitude was of obvious embarrassment to the Facta government which, according to Veneruso, limited its policies to declarations of firm stands which were never actually taken in the face of Fascist occupations of several towns during the summer of 1922. This was because the prime minister, like his predecessors, was conditioned by the pro-Fascist feelings of what remained of the traditional liberal ruling classes. Unlike Mori, the majority of police officials - and here the historian quotes a ministerial police report on the province of Cremona - were, by the summer of 1922, hesitant about how
to deal with Fascist violence which they now fully realised was a serious subversive threat. It was the attitude of the government which, instead of taking decisive action, granted political favours to Farinacci's movement which forced them to adopt a 'teoria del non intervento'. In this sense Mori's measures were not consistent with the general trend of the government.

Lyttelton indeed notes that the freedom of Fascist action was facilitated by the weaknesses and ambiguities within the Italian state structure. Prefects and police funzionari 'dovettero agire secondo la discrezione politica più che in base a precedenti amministrativi'. He adds that from unification onwards the Italian state authorities:

avevano adottato sia forme di connivenza con la criminalità sia forme arbitrarie di intervento repressivo. E ancor peggio, entrambi queste reazioni di disordine furono deliberatamente sfruttate contro gli oppositori politiche. La violenza politica fu in qualche misura accettata dalla opinione pubblica, nonché in molti casi dai custodi della legge e dell'ordine ('Cause e caratteristiche', cit., pp. 37-8).

If Lyttelton correctly points out the traditional discrepancies in the Italian state authorities as a serious factor upon which police connivance with Fascism depended, Veneruso just as accurately notes that 'i funzionari mai avrebbero osato disattendere alle istruzioni governative se
queste fossero state chiare e precise'. (pp. 321-2).

The manner in which the Bolognese prefectural authorities and police forces reacted to the mobilization of Fascist forces for the March on Rome during the last days of October 1922, long after the departure of Mori, in fact demonstrates that even if the province had formally ceded its powers to Fascism over the summer months the loyalty of the police forces to the state could generally be relied upon if decisive, unambiguous government orders were given. Before Facta formally ceded his powers to Mussolini, Bologna's police forces followed the prime minister's orders to maintain public order and the security of persons and property at all costs with considerable assiduity. The prefectural and military authorities collaborated, occupying the prefecture, telephone exchange, post and telegraphic offices and state bank on 27 October. The local Regie Guardie commander reported that his forces defended the telephone exchange from a Fascist attack on 30 October. On the previous day military forces injured two fascists while fighting off an attempt to occupy the city aerodrome and Carabinieri were involved in an armed conflict, defending their San Ruffillo headquarters. A fascist was killed before the Carabinieri were forced to abandon the building. In another conflict in the centre of Bologna a Regia Guardia was killed. If the sub-prefect of Imola allowed fascists to occupy the municipal and PS headquarters, the occupation was formal only. A few fascists were given permission to stand at the entrance of the
building. The main offices continued to function without interference.

In rural areas of the province police nuclei tended to give in more easily to Fascist forces. It seems, however, that in the majority of cases they were disarmed by large numbers of armed men. In San Giorgio di Piano, for example, 1500 fascists occupied the Carabinieri headquarters after a short exchange of fire. On the road between Molinella and Bologna fascists took possession of two Regie Guardie transportation vans and the arms it carried, without resistance. In such cases it remains to be seen to what extent the police forces were seriously overpowered by the fascists. They may have preferred to save their skins by surrendering without putting up a fight. The overall impression created, however, is that the government was successful in generally mobilizing its forces and defending the province from a true Fascist takeover. This suggests that police connivance with Fascism on previous occasions was to a great extent dependent on the failure of the pre-Fascist governments to show sufficient determination in repressing the illegal activities of the movement.

The above documentation demonstrates that the complicity of the police with Fascism cannot be entirely attributed to its identification with the anti-Socialist feelings of the movement. The rise of Fascism indeed took place in the two year period following the occupation of the factories in which
the threat of revolution proved itself to be limited. In Bologna itself Zanardi's socialist city council was ousted in November 1920, before the provincial movement had reached its heyday. From this one may conclude that individual policemen's anti-Socialist feelings may have been played upon by Fascism. Indeed the force of the movement lay in its capacity to exploit a threat which in reality no longer existed. To conclude, however, that the whole police structure accepted Fascism as a genuine solution to the threat of revolution would on the other hand be far-fetched.

Nevertheless, one should not underestimate the moral force of the movement which almost certainly encouraged many policemen to turn a blind-eye to their illegal activities. This is appreciable if one is to consider that pre-Fascist governments themselves did not move whole-heartedly against Fascism. Policemen were obviously fearful of not receiving support from their superiors over their curbing of political violence. They were certainly conditioned by a past in which it was usual for the state to resort to arbitrary methods in defending itself against political enemies, particularly Marxism. Nitti's employment of civilian squads to oppose revolution during the "Biennio Rosso" is a clear example of this. Indeed, it is during the post-March on Rome years (1923-5) that the cooperation of the MVSN and the traditional police forces may be considered a culmination of such forms of semi-legal civilian policing, as discussed in the final chapter.
Finally, the traditional deficiencies of the Italian police forces are a factor of some significance here. Initially collaboration with the Fascists may have been attributable to a sense of weakness in the face of revolution and a genuine solution to police absenteeism in the countryside. When it came to repressing the Fascist movement, however, many may have preferred not to provoke a patriotic force which was almost certainly superior in strength to police nuclei in local situations. Indeed, on several occasions weakness may have served as an ideal alibi for failure to prevent Fascist violence.
NOTES

1. For Guardie di Città crisis see ASB., 1919, Cat. 2, Personale dell'amministrazione di PS, Questore to prefect, 3 December 1918, 27 February 1919, manifesto entitled 'a tutti i colleghi di PS e Carcerari del Regno' dated February 1919 (see Appendix 2, Document 17), prime minister to prefects, 8 March 1919. For Carabinieri strike see ACS: PS., 1919, B. 90, prefect of Ancona to police chief, 15 February 1919, letter of protest of Carabinieri of Ancona to interior minister, 29 January 1919, prefect to police chief, 14 March 1919.

2. ASB., 1919, Cat. 6-7, Spirito pubblico, partiti, disposizioni ordine pubblico, (henceforth 1919 Cat 6-7), prefect to interior minister, 11 April 1919, interior minister to prefect, 16 April 1919 (see Appendix 2, Document 16). The discharge in May 1919 of those who joined the police during the war further reduced the strength of both police forces, as revealed in ASB., 1919, Cat. 2, cit., Questore to prefect, 19 May 1919, and ASB., 1920, Cat. 7, Ordine pubblico (henceforth 1920 Ordine pubblico), Carabinieri third division commander to prefect, 7 June 1920.

3. Ibid., regional military commander to prefect, 30 April 1920.

4. ASB., 1920, Cat. 6, Agitazioni operaie, scioperi, dimostrazioni di varie categorie (henceforth 1920 Agitazioni operaie), prime minister to prefects, 3 October 1919.

5. ASB., 1919 Cat. 6-7, cit., Carabinieri external division commander to prefect, 22 June 1919, prefect to military division commander, 9 May 1919; ASB., 1920, Cat. 7, Conflitti, scioperi, partiti politici (henceforth 1920 Conflitti), prefect to prime minister, 3 July 1920 (see Appendix 2, Document 18).


7. ASB., 1919 Cat. 6-7, cit., sub-prefect of Vergato to prefect, 7 July 1919. For situation in Praduro and Sasso see ASB., 1920, Cat. 16, Agitazioni agrarie, Questore to prefect, 7 October 1920.

8. ASB., 1920 Ordine pubblico, cit., Carabinieri third division commander to prefect, 5 June 1920, prefect's reply, 7 June 1920, prefect to interior minister, 3 July 1920.
9. ASB., 1919, Cat. 6, Scioperi, agitazioni agrarie e altre (hence 1919 Scioperi), prefect to finance minister, 18 December 1918. For the careers of Bologna's prefects see also ACS: Personale, (1930), B. 7, f. 1913, Bladier; (1930), B. 12, f. 2330, Quaranta; (1935), B. 2, Pericoli; (1939), B. 11, D'Adamo; (1939), B. 34, f. 4873, Visconti.
10. Ibid., prefect to interior minister, 28 December 1918. See prefect's decree of 7 July 1919 and decree law 1146 of 13 July 1919 for initiatives to keep down the cost of essential food products.
11. ASB., 1920 Agitazioni operaie, cit., prefect to Direttore Generale Costruzioni Ferrovie dello Stato, 2 March 1920.
12. ASB., 1919, Cat. 6-7, prefect to interior minister, 25 December 1918.
13. Ibid., prefect to interior minister, 18 July 1919, Questore to prefect, 19 July 1919.
14. Ibid., prefect to prime minister, 6 April 1919, prefect to interior minister, 1 May 1919.
15. ASB., 1920 Ordine pubblico, cit., prime minister to prefect, 9 March 1920, 2 December 1919.
16. ASB., 1919 Scioperi, cit., regional military commander to prefect, 6 July 1919.
17. ASB., 1920 Agitazioni operaie, cit., prime minister to prefects, 24 May 1920.
18. ASB., 1919 Scioperi, cit., prime minister to prefects, 14 and 19 July 1919.
20. ASB., 1919 Scioperi, cit., prefect to interior minister, undated document.
21. For the massacre of Decima di Persiceto see ASB., 1920 Conflitti, cit., police inspector general (Ispettore Generale di PS) to prefect, 6 April 1920, prime minister to prefect, 7 April 1920.
22. Arbizzani in 'Lavoratori ed antifascisti vittime della reazione padronale, poliziesca e fascista fra il 1919 e il 1926' in eQuaderno della Lotta (Bologna, 1969), pp. 5-20, confirms that the action of the police may have been irrational if not pre-meditated in both incidents. With regard to the deaths in Imola he states that two of the victims had no part in the riot. Aldo Ferruccio
Ungarelli, a travelling salesman, was hit by bullets as he left his hotel and Carolina Landi, a 51 year old widow, suffered the same fate as she fetched water from a fountain. (pp. 8-9). With regard to the Decima massacre he states that the speaker Campagnoli was shot in the chest and bayoneted in the throat. Many of the injured and dead were shot in the back suggesting that they were fired at as they tried to escape.

23. ASB., 1920 Conflitti, cit., Carabinieri internal division commander to prefect, 9 April 1920, police inspector general to prefect, 6 April 1920.

24. ASB., 1920 Agitazioni operaie, cit., prime minister to prefects, 31 August 1920, Questore to prefect, 2 and 28 September 1920, 5 and 25 October 1920, police chief to prefect, 17 October 1920.

25. ASB., 1920 Ordine pubblico, cit., regional military commander to prefect, 17 September 1920.

26. ASB., 1920, Cat. 16, Approvvigionamenti, raccolti, agitazioni agrarie nella provincia di Bologna, (henceforth 1920 Approvvigionamenti) prefect to prefect of Piacenza, 17 April 1920, Questore to prefect, 27 April 1920; ASB, 1920, Cat. 16, Questioni agrarie, trattative, rapporti, ecc, (henceforth 1920 Questioni) agriculture minister to prefect, 29 April 1920.

27. ASB., 1920 Approvvigionamenti, cit., see Regio Decreto 515 of 22 April 1920 entitled 'Provvedimenti per l'occupazione e coltivazione dei terreni'. According to Onofri, La Strage, cit., pp. 170-1, Nitti abandoned the execution of a decree legalizing the renting of uncultivated land to fifty peasant cooperatives in the Bolognese province after the agrarians threatened to incite a rebellion throughout Emilia. Following the Falcioni decree, troops and Carabinieri arrested occupiers, 150 of which were sentenced in the courts.

28. ASB., 1920 Questioni, cit., prefect to president of Federerterra, 10 July 1920.

29. Ibid., Decreto Commissario Generale per gli Approvvigionamenti e i Consumi, 27 July 1920. See Onofri, La Strage, cit... pp. 172-3.

30. ASB., 1919 Scioperi, prefect to mayors of Bolognese province, 24 July 1919.

31. ASB., 1920 Questioni, cit., prefect to agriculture minister, 8 May 1920, APA report to prefect, 29 May 1920.
32. ASB., 1920, Cat. 16, Agitazioni agrarie (henceforth 1920 Agitazioni agrarie), Questore to prefect, 26 June 1920.

33. ASB., 1920 Approvvigionamenti, cit., Commissario Prefettizio of Castenaso to prefect, 24 September 1920.

34. ASB., 1919 Cat. 6-7, cit., prefect to prime minister, 1 February 1919.

35. ASB., 1918 Partiti politici, cit., Questore to prefect, 6 June 1918.

36. ASB., 1920, Cat. 2, Personale di PS. See file on Gaudino.


38. For documentation concerning irridentist demonstrations, invasion of Fiume, etc., see ASB., 1919, Cat. 6, Guerra, cose varie, prime minister to prefects, 17 June 1919, 22 and 27 August 1919, police chief to prefects, 13 September 1919. ASB., 1920 Agitazioni operaie, cit., prime minister to prefects, 3 October 1919, Questore to prefect, 26 October 1920, 19 November 1920 and 1 December 1920.

39. ASB., 1918 Partiti politici, cit., prefect to interior minister, 20 May 1918, police delegate to prefect, 19 May 1918, prefect to interior minister, 21 May 1918.

40. ASB., 1919 Cat. 6-7, cit., prefect to interior minister, 11 April 1919, interior minister to prefect, 20 April 1919, prefect to regional military commander, 17 April 1919, regional military commander to prefect, 18 and 26 April 1919.

41. Ibid., Questore to prefect, 16 June 1919.

42. Ibid., prefect to interior minister, 5 July 1919.

43. ASB., 1918, Cat. 6, Dimostrazioni a favore della pace, regional military commander to prefect, 5 November 1918, prefect's reply, 5 November 1918.

44. Ibid., prefect to interior minister, 13 November 1918.

45. ASB., 1920 Approvvigionamenti, cit., secretary of the Camera Confederale del Lavoro to prefect, 6 October 1920; ASB., 1920 Agitazioni agrarie, cit., police commissar of Granarolo to Questore, 6 October 1920. The funzionarioreported that though the prefect had banned the use of krumiri for harvesting until the dispute in question had been solved, troops, Carabinieri and Regie
Guardie refused to cooperate with him when he ordered them to prevent harvesting from going ahead.

46. ASB., 1920 Approvvigionamenti, cit., Questore to prefect, 17 September 1920.

47. ASB., 1920, Cat. 2, Pratica generale di PS (henceforth 1920 Pratica Generale di PS) 21 September 1920 (see Appendix 2, Document 20).

48. Ibid., Questore to prefect, 1 November 1920.

49. For the incident of 14 October 1920, see ASB., 1920 Conflitti, cit., Questore to prefect, 20 October 1920, prefect to interior minister, 14 October 1920, prefect to undersecretary of the interior, 10 November 1920. (See also Onofri's account in La Strage, cit., pp. 230-35.)

50. Ibid., prefect to interior minister, 4 November 1920, Questore to prefect, 7 November 1920.


53. According to Onofri in La Strage, cit., p. 260, a copy of the poster displaying the Fascist declaration is to be found in ASB., 1920, Cat. 6, Manifestazioni e comizi pro-Piume e Dalmazia.

54. ACS:UC., prefect to interior minister, 21 November 1921. Ufficio Cifra documents are categorized as arrivi (documents sent to the ministry from the prefects) or partenze (documents sent to the prefects from the ministry). According to Onofri, La Strage, cit., pp. 264-7, Poli and Visconti probably banned the poster in order to conceal the intentions of the Fascists from the public, suggesting, therefore, that they quietly approved of the planned attack. He also notes that the Questore did not
warn the Socialists that the Fascists would attack during the ceremony if the bells of Palazzo del Podestà were rung. This implies that he left out this essential detail in his negotiations with the Socialists in the hope of provoking an incident. The author also questions why Poli managed to prevent the arrival of fascists from Modena, Milan and Turin for the ceremony but did nothing to stop the arrival of Ferrarese fascists which he should have anticipated, given the extremely close ties between the Ferrarese and Bolognese Fascists. Finally, if the prefect in his report to the interior minister of 21 November claimed that Poli visited the fascio on the evening of 20 November in order to persuade the Fascists not to cause trouble, Onofri suggests that the Questore visited the Fascists in order to make last minute arrangements with them for the attack. He notably did not mention this visit in his report to the local magistrate. For letters of protest from Bombacci, Marabini and Graziadei to Giolitti (27 November 1920) and from Bombacci to the undersecretary of the interior (7 December 1920) see ASB., 1921, Cat. 7, Fatti del 21 novembre 1920 (henceforth 1921 Fatti).

55. According to Battistelli, cit., Poli literally formed the first Bolognese Fascist squads and planned the massacre after failing to prevent the Socialists from winning the elections (p. 35). The death of Giordani was necessary if the Socialist council was to be dissolved, since the killing of workers in the crowd could hardly be attributed to a Socialist conspiracy! Giordani was a good patriot and would have made a perfect martyr, yet his death would not have weakened the ranks of the reactionaries. The author concluded, therefore, that either a fascist or a 'confident' of the Questura assassinated Giordani. (pp. 40-41). With regard to the trial only one member of the Socialist administration, Venturi, was actually convicted of murder. Battistelli claimed that Venturi was a necessary victim of the Fascists since someone had to be convicted. He added that the greatest proof of the innocence of the Socialists lay in the total lack of logic behind such a crime. Killing Giordani, who, what is more, was generally respected by the Socialists, would have only meant the end of the Socialist administration (pp. 39-40). According to Onofri, La Strage, cit., p. 288 (Note 100) Galli's life is surrounded with mystery. Acquitted at the 1923 trial, he was sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder of his fiancée, Maria Buriani, in 1924. Released in 1966, he made an official statement in 1971 that both he and Buriani had been eye-witnesses of the murder of Giordani and that because of this they had both been victims of the Questura. In the later 1970s he was arrested for a minor theft which he claimed to have committed in order to attract public attention towards his case. He was immediately released and no charges were
made. Il Resto del Carlino of 25 January 1922 notes that Galli, though arrested along with members of the Socialist council following the battle of Palazzo d'Accursio, was separated from the other detainees and almost immediately released.

56. ACS:UC., prefect to interior minister, 22 November 1920. According to Bassi, pp. 14-16, the first edition of Il Resto del Carlino of 22 November 1920 clearly indicated that the first to fire were the Fascists, since the shots came from the vicinity of the "Grande Italia" café where the Fascists were positioned. The author continues that the Fascists promptly forced the paper to correct this statement in a second edition which alleged that the first shots came from a window of Palazzo d'Accursio. With regard to the reaction of the police to the shooting, Battistelli, cit., claimed that Regie Guardie on the second floor of Palazzo d'Accursio had been ordered to 'prendere d'infilata, forse dall'alto con loro fuoco di fucileria, le aule e gli scaloni del comune, qualora fosse attuata la difesa predisposta dai socialisti' (p. 36). He also stated that 'Le bande fasciste dovevano operare nella piazza, provocando la reazione della folla e l'intervento contro la folla stessa e contro i suoi eletti socialisti, della forza pubblica. Si contava che fosse sufficiente a scatenare il conflitto'. Indeed the police remained indifferent towards the presence of armed fascists in the square and Regie Guardie fired at members of the crowd who ran into the courtyard of Palazzo d'Accursio (pp. 36-7).

57. ASB., 1921, Cat. 7, Fascisti (henceforth 1921 Fascisti), Questore to prefect, 23 January 1921. ACS:UC., secretary of Camera Confederale del Lavoro to interior minister, 25 January 1921 (see Appendix 2, document 22).

58. For transfer of the Questore Poli see ACS:UC., prime minister to prefect, 29 January 1921 (see Appendix 2, Document 19), interior minister to prefect, 6 February 1921. For transfer of Vice-Questore Lapolla see ASB., 1921, Cat. 7, Dati della forza e ordine pubblico (henceforth 1921 Dati) Questore to prefect, 4 March 1921, prefect to police chief, 10 March 1921.

59. ASB., 1920 Conflitti, cit., Questore to Carabinieri and Regie Guardie commanders, 3 November 1920.

60. ASB., 1920 Pratica Generale di PS, Questore to prefect, 20 October 1920.

gli operai assaliti, presi a bastonate o a revolverate dalla forza pubblica cercino di difendersi questo si capisce (…) Ma che si dovesse, fuori di questi casi eccezionali, sistematicamente quanto inutilmente, con parole, scritti o gesti di oltraggio o disprezzo, irritare la base forza pubblica, che se non altro ha la scusante di non sapere ciò che fa e d'essere comandata, mentre si va a parlare con educazione ed anche con eccesso di complimenti e cortesie con i commissari, con i questori, col prefetti e coli ministri, che sono ben altrimenti e più terribilmente responsabili dei fasti e nefasti della forza pubblica, ciò dal punto di vista rivoluzionario, era pazzamente irragionevole.'

62. ASB., 1921, Cat. 7, Associazioni e partiti politici (henceforth 1921 Associazioni), police chief to prefect, 3 February 1921; ASB., 1921 Dati, cit., prefect to sub-prefects, Questore, Carabinieri and Regie Guardie commanders, 3 March 1921; ASB., 1921 Fascisti, cit., prefect to interior minister, 11 August 1921; ASB., 1922, Cat. 7, Scioperi, agitazioni, partiti, armi, comizi, associazioni (henceforth 1922 Scioperi), decree law 1320 of 2 October 1921. For Mori's career see ACS: Personale (1947), Serie III, B. 36a, f. 634.

63. ASB., 1921 Dati, cit. For vehicles ban see prefectural decree 1831 of 9 March 1921; for roadblocks see prefect to commissari prefettizi of Galliera, Malalbergo, San Pietro in Casale and Crevalcore, 14 June 1921.

64. ASB., 1921 Dati, cit., prefect to sub-prefects, Carabinieri and Regie Guardie commanders, 16 June 1921.

65. ASB., 1921 Fascisti, cit. Bonomi warned the prefect on 17 December 1927, for example, that: 'La S.V. deve esercitare sotto la sua responsabilità personale rigorosa e energica vigilanza allo scopo prevenire et impedire ad ogni costo turbamento ordine pubblico. Voglia impartire opportune severe disposizioni autorità dipendenti avvertendole che esse saranno chiamate rispondere personalmente eventuali deficienze od omissioni le quali saranno punite con esemplare severità'. See also Appendix 2, Document 21.

66. ASB., 1921, Cat. -, Ufficio Zona: Decreto ministeriale che istituisce le zone, truppe e agenti investigativi a disposizione degli Uffici di Zona, etc. (henceforth 1921 Ufficio Zona: Decreto ministeriale), see decree founding zones, 20 November 1921, police chief to prefect, 10 January 1922.

67. For numerical deficiencies in the police forces encountered by Mori see ASB., 1921, Cat. -, Ufficio Zona: Avvenimenti diversi, agitazioni, etc. (henceforth 1921 Ufficio Zona: Avvenimenti), Questore to prefect, 2 January 1922, for example. The official complained that police
reinforcements sent to the province from the city left him with 180 Regie Guardie (60 per shift), an even lower number of Carabinieri and only 100 soldiers. He required an extra 150 Guardie, 150 Carabinieri and 200 soldiers (of which 100 cavalry). For the shortage of police officials see ASB., 1922, Cat. 2, Personale dell'amministrazione di PS (henceforth 1922, Personale), Questore to prefect, 22 February 1922. In November 1919 Regie Guardie and Agenti Investigativi in Bologna totalled 155, Carabinieri 860. These figures increased to 689 Regie Guardie and 1,414 Carabinieri in August 1920 and 1,364 Regie Guardie and 1,949 Carabinieri in December 1921 - in ACS: PS., B. 68, 1920, Regie Guardie: Situazione della forza effettiva; ACS: PS., B. 69, 1920, Comando Ufficio Ordinamento Carabinieri Reali; ASB., 1921 Ufficio Zona: Decreto Ministeriale, cit., Carabinieri mobile battalion commander (Comando Battaglione Mobile Carabinieri) to prefect, 13 December 1921.

68. ASB., 1921 Ufficio Zona: Decreto Ministeriale, cit., military division commander to prefect, 23 December 1921. Another problem facing the military and prefectoral authorities was the general lack of sufficient transport for police and army reinforcements. The local military commanders were particularly worried about the pressure prefects placed on them for the use of the vehicles, made worse by a low ministerial budget. There is also evidence of disagreement between the civil and military authorities over payments. This in turn slowed the necessary repairs owing to lack of funding for buying spare parts, etc. See ASB., 1922 Personale, cit., prefect to undersecretary of the interior, 18 February 1921, prefect to police chief, 6 October 1921.

69. ASB., 1921 Dati, cit., prefect of Ferrara to prefect, 27 May 1921; See ASB., 1922 Scioperi, cit., for list of property destroyed and numbers of fascists involved during Fascist invasion of Bologna (26 May - 3 June 1922). See also Ibid., Questore to prefect, 2 June 1922 for failure of police to prevent Ferrarese fascists invading the province.

70. ASB., 1921 Dati, cit., military division commander to prefect, 8 June 1921. On occasions cases of true conflict between the various police hierarchies arose. In June 1922 Regie Guardie officers tried to prevent police officials from counting a platoon on duty in Bologna's main square when suspecting that not all men were present. They claimed that this was not the responsibility of the police officials who should have taken their word that all were present. In April 1921 a Carabinieri captain was transferred for publically tearing up two notes he received from the sub-prefect of Imola asking for reinforcements. See ASB., 1922 Personale, cit., Questore
to prefect, 21 June 1921, Regie Guardie legion commander to prefect, 27 June 1921; ASB., 1921, Cat. 7, Comuni: Ordine pubblico (D-L) (henceforth 1921 Comuni: D-L), prefect to Carabinieri legion commander, 6 April 1921, reply, 23 April 1921.

71. ASB., 1921 Dati, cit., Questore to prefect, 18 May 1921, prefect to police chief, 19 May 1921; ASB., 1921 Ufficio Zona Avvenimenti, cit., prefect to prefect of Ferrara, 14 January 1922.

72. ASB., 1921 Dati, cit., prefect to interior minister, 12 June 1921.

73. ASB., 1922 Scioperi, cit., prefect to Questore, subprefects, Carabinieri division commanders, 30 May 1922. In June 1921 a police commissar claimed that investigations aimed at identifying and arresting a fascist aggressor in Molinella had been fruitless 'non potendo stabilire da quale paese provincia Ferrara gruppo fascisti sia partiti.', in ASB., 1921, Comuni: Ordine pubblico (M) (henceforth 1921 Comuni: M), Questore to prefect, 14 June 1921.

74. For documentation concerning arms bans and their inadequacy see ASB., 1921 Associazioni, cit., undersecretary of the interior to prefect, 23 February 1921, police chief to prefect, 11 February 1921, prefect to police chief, 10 April 1921, reply to prefect, 17 April 1921, prefect to undersecretary of the interior, 29 March 1921, prefect to Questore, sub-prefects, Carabinieri and Regie Guardie commanders, 31 August 1921; ASB., 1922 Scioperi, cit., interior minister to prefects, 21 December 1921.

75. Ibid., prefect of Modena to prefect, 3 August 1921.

76. For relationship between Mori and the prefect of Ferrara, Pugliese, see ASB., 1922, Cat. 6, Bonifica Renana (henceforth 1922 Bonifica), prefect to prefect of Ferrara, 27 June 1921, 8 July 1921, prefect of Ferrara to prefect, 27 June 1921, 5 July 1921, prefect of Ferrara to interior minister, 10 July 1921. During the same period the mayor of Galliera informed Mori that Carabinieri refused to adapt rigorous controls on vehicles passing the roadblock at the nearby border with Ferrara on the grounds that it was physically impossible. See ASB., 1921 Dati, cit., mayor of Galliera to prefect, 20 June 1921.

77. ASB., 1921 Fascisti, cit., prefect to police chief, 21 March 1921. ASB., 1921, Cat. 7, Comuni: Ordine pubblico (A-B) (henceforth 1921 Comuni: A-B) Questore to prefect, 8 October 1921. See also Appendix 2, Document 23.
78. ASB., 1921 Dati, cit., Questore to prefect, 20 April 1921 (see Appendix 2, Document 26).

79. Data on the arrest/release on bail of fascists/socialists is to be found in ASB., 1921, Cat. 7, Cose varie, Contrasti fra fascisti e socialisti dall'8 al 31 maggio us. (1921); ASB., Cat. 7, 1923, Partiti politici, associazioni, porto d'armi (henceforth 1923 Partiti politici) monthly figures sent from the prefect to the Interior minister between March and September 1922.

80. ASB., 1921 Dati, cit., prefect to Carabinieri external division commander, 24 April 1921.

81. Ibid., prefect to Questore, sub-prefects, Carabinieri and Regie Guardie commanders, 4 November 1921 (see Appendix 2, Document 30); ASB., 1922, Cat. 7, Dati della forza e ordine pubblico (henceforth 1922 Dati), prefect to Questore, 8 January 1922.

82. See Ibid. for list of fascists involved in political violence and awaiting trial, dated 9 August 1922.

83. ASB., 1922 Scioperi, cit., prefect to Questore, sub-prefects, Carabinieri division commanders, 14 March 1922, prefect to police chief, 9 January 1922. Evidence also suggests that the police authorities may have taken advantage of the arms ban to completely reduce the defensive possibilities of the Socialists. In March 1921, for example, the workers of Molinella complained bitterly that the police prevented them from carrying tools around with them to defend themselves from the Fascists, against whom the police made no effort to confiscate arms. Similarly the imprisonment of the mayor of Ozzano Emilia for illegal possession of a fire arm during a period in which he and his colleagues faced daily intimidation from the Fascists who wanted the Socialist village council to resign, may be considered a form of connivance. See ASB., 1921, Cat. 7, Comuni: Ordine pubblico (Mol - Mor) (henceforth 1921 Comuni: Mol - Mor), Vice-Questore to prefect, 2 March 1921; ASB., 1922, Cat. 4-5, Amministrazioni comunali, elezioni politiche (henceforth 1922 Amministrazioni), see file on Ozzano Emilia. See also files on Praduro, Pian del Voglio, S. Agata, San Giovanni in Persiceto, San Giorgio di Piano and Vergato for documentation concerning the forced resignation of Socialist councils.

84. ASB., 1922 Personale, cit., prefect to Questore, 10 January 1922. See also ASB., 1922 Dati, cit., prefect to Carabinieri legion commander, 13 March 1922.

85. ASB., 1921 Fascisti, prefect to Questore, 5 July 1921.
86. ASB., 1921 Comuni: A-B, cit., Questore to prefect, 11 October 1921; ASB., 1922, Cat. 7, Comuni: Ordine pubblico (A-B) (henceforth 1922 Comuni: A-B), see Budrio file for Marchesini's illegal activities. The attitude of the judiciary towards the Fascist movement deserves brief attention here. According to Neppi Modona, the judiciary tended, at least initially, to support Fascism as a means of countering revolutionary violence which the postwar liberal governments were incapable of controlling. This more or less coincided with orders by the justice ministry for greater severity towards strike activities from 1920 in a general effort to restore state authority. A situation was created in which at the local level the judiciary adopted a 'duplice atteggiamento (...) riguardo ai crimini commessi da fascisti e socialisti: rigore, severità e ferrea applicazione della legge nei confronti dei secondi, tollerante benevolenza a favore dei primi.' Hence 'attentato alla libertà del lavoro' was punished under article 154 ('violenza privata') of the penal code instead of articles 165 and 166 (pp. 225-35). As demonstrated in Ettore Vulterini's article in Rivista Penale of 1922 (Vol. 95, 1922, pp. 380-91) there was a general desire among magistrates to clamp down on boycotts and the use of fines by rural leagues. Indeed, so the article claimed, the mere participation of a peasant at a meeting during which the application of fines was deliberated was to be considered enough to incriminate him for extortion under article 409 of the penal code. If the paying of fines by league members was, some argued, stipulated in league statutes and therefore legal, Vulterini retorted that the statutes were 'contrari al buon costume' and therefore illegal. As demonstrated in the concluding part of this chapter, the failure of the justice minister to use the word 'Fascist' in his general appeals to the judiciary to put an end to political violence and restore law and order in 1921 may, in Neppi Modona's opinion, have been interpreted as an indirect invitation to the judiciary to ignore Fascist violence (p. 255). See Appendix 2, Document 29 for an example of leniency on the part of the judiciary towards Fascist offenders.

87. ASB., 1921 Comuni: A-B, cit., Carabinieri internal division commander to prefect, 15 October 1921 (see Appendix 2, Document 24). ASB., 1921 Fatti, cit., anonymous note to prefect, 4 March 1921.

88. ASB., 1921 Comuni: M, cit., Vice-Questore to prefect, 2 March 1921.

89. ASB., 1921 Comuni: D-L, cit., Secretary of Camera Confederale del Lavoro of Imola to sub-prefect of Imola, 17 December 1921, Carabinieri Imolese company commander to subprefect of Imola, 22 December 1921. See also Appendix
2, Document 25 for another case of accusations against Carabinieri.

90. ASB., 1922 Dati, cit., prefect to Questore, sub-prefects, Carabinieri division commanders, 29 July 1921; ASB., 1921 Comuni: A-B, cit., prefect to interior minister, 3 October 1921, prefect to Carabinieri internal division commander, 7 December 1921. On 7 April 1922 Mori complained to the Carabinieri legion commander that four Carabinieri of which two were officers had accompanied fascists on a punitive expedition from Massa Lombarda in the neighbouring province of Ravenna to the Bolognese province. See ASB., 1922 Personale, cit. According to Fabbri, cit., p. 31, it was normal to see fascists and policemen walking arm in arm. Fascists used the Questura as if it was one of their headquarters.

91. ASB., 1921 Comuni: D-L, cit., secretary of Camera Confederale del Lavoro of Imola to prefect, 20 December 1921.

92. ASB., 1921 Comuni: A-B, cit., Carabinieri internal division commander to prefect, 10 December 1921; ASB., 1921 Dati, cit., prefect to prime minister, 20 September 1921.

93. ASB., 1922 Personale, cit., prefect to Carabinieri legion commander, 7 April 1922, reply, 7 April 1922.

94. See Mario Missori, cit., for details of careers of Bladier and Pugliese. See also ACS: Personale (1930) B. 7, f. 1913 Bladier.

95. ASB., 1921 Fascisti, cit., Questore to prefect, 10 March 1921; ASB., 1921 Dati, cit., prefect to undersecretary of the interior, 20 March 1921 (see Appendix 2, Document 28).

96. ASB., 1921 Fascisti, cit., Questore to prefect, 23 June 1921; ASB., 1921 Comuni: A-B, cit., petition of organizations of Budrio and Mezzolara to prefect, 23 October 1921.

97. Ibid., prefect to Carabinieri internal division commander, 3 December 1921; ASB., 1921 Comuni: Mol- Mor, cit., Questore to prefect, 12 August 1921, army major of 35 infantry regiment to prefect, 14 August 1921.

98. ASB., 1922 Personale, cit., Questore to prefect, 29 May 1922 and 5 June 1922.

99. ASB., 1921 Comuni: D-L, cit., prefect to police chief, 18 June 1921, regional military commander to prefect, 22 July 1921, prefect's reply, 23 July 1921. The prefect also suspected that soldiers supplied the Fascists with arms. Following the theft of bombs from the San Nicolò magazine,
the Questore confirmed Mori's suspicion that the bombs had been handed over to Cavedoni, a particularly violent fascist, by an army officer alleged to have spent his free time in the company of fascists and now under arrest by his superiors. See ASB., 1922, Cat. 12-16, Inchieste, Incendi, requisizioni locali, etc. (henceforth 1922 Inchieste), Questore to prefect, 13 June 1922.

100. For case of Mazzoni see ASB., 1922 Personale, cit., sub-prefect of Vergato to prefect, 6 April 1922; prefect to police chief, 14 April 1922 (see Appendix 2, Document 32), vice-commissar of Porretta to Questore, 16 March 1922; ASB., 1922 Comuni: A-B, cit., vice-commissar of Porretta to sub-prefect of Vergato, 9 April 1922, 10 June 1922, Carabinieri internal division commander to prefect, 22 May 1922, sub-prefect of Vergato to prefect, 21 April 1922, 14 June 1922. For case of Bovolo see ASB., 1922 Personale, cit., prefect to Questore, 5 August 1922, Questore to prefect, 7 and 31 July 1922, 5 August 1922.

101. For the case of De Silva see ASB., 1922 Comuni: Bologna, cit., prefect to interior minister, 14 August 1922.

102. ASB., 1922 Scioperi, cit., Questore to prefect, 27 and 28 May 1922.

103. For an account of the Modena incident see Donati, pp. 468-72.

104. Giuseppe Beato Contributo dell'Arma alla causa del fascismo toscano 1919-22 (Rome, 1938), p. 2. There is only one serious case of Fascist casualties at the hands of the Carabinieri. This occurred in July 1921 when Carabinieri and troops defended the town of Sarzana in Liguria from a Fascist punitive expedition on the orders of Bonomi. Four fascists were killed. Unlike the incident in Modena, specific instructions had been given by the prefect of Genoa and even Mussolini recognised in Il Popolo d'Italia of 28 September 1921 that 'la forza pubblica si era trovata di fronte ad una spedizione fascista', see Donati, cit., p. 469. Claudio Costantini in 'I fatti di Sarzana nelle relazioni della polizia' in Movimento Operaio e Socialista, 8, 1962, pp. 61-100, suggests, however, that the decisive action of the Ligurian police authorities against the Fascists formed part of their general policy of keeping Fascism under control, not for political motives, but simply because they did not want their authority to be undermined. They tended to use Fascism in suffocating local Communism but in no way intended to let the tables be turned. The repression at Sarzana was, therefore, a means of regaining control of Fascism which had recently started to get out of hand.
105. ASB., 1921, Cat. 5, Elezioni politiche, sub-prefect of Vergato to prefect, 25 April 1921 and 9 May 1921.

106. According to Neppi Modona, p. 261, government directives ordering the repression of the Arditi del Popolo only further accentuated the government's lack of decisiveness with regard to the fascists. He states: 'Le circolari che affrontano il tema dell'ordine pubblico alla fine del 1920 e nel corso del 1921 senza fare espresso richiamo a queste forme di insubordinazione (Fascist violence) acquistano quindi un chiaro significato omissivo, quasi un invito a chiedere gli occhi di fronte a tale forma di illegalità'. He continues, pp. 269-72, that only in August 1922 did the justice minister Alessio send directives to magistrates ordering the repression of Fascist violence under articles 188 ('impedimento/turbamento delle adunanze o dell'esercizio delle funzioni dei corpi giudiziari, politici o amministrativi') which aimed to prevent Fascist intimidating of state officials, Socialist municipal councillors, etc., and 189 ('partecipazione ad una radunata di 10 o più persone').

107. ASB., 1921 Associazioni, cit., prefect to police chief, 20 October 1921, prefect to Questore, Regie Guardie and Carabinieri commanders, 25 August 1921 (see Appendix 2, Document 31), prefect to sub-prefects, Questore, Carabinieri division commanders, 30 September 1921.

108. If, according to Il Resto del Carlino of 3 June 1922, Facta declared that his government would not tolerate the lawlessness with which the Fascists occupied Bologna he added, however, that he would consider the possibility of removing Mori (as demanded by the Fascists) if the occupation finished. La Squilla of 3 June 1922 claimed, however, that though the police chief, Vigliani, came to Bologna in order to carry out enquiries in reality the government had long before given in to the Fascists. Arrigo Petacco (Il prefetto di ferro, Verona, 1975, pp. 28-9) states that Mori was invited to choose another post by the interior minister at the end of June 1922. On 26 August he left Bologna to take up the office of prefect in Bari until November when the new Fascist government temporarily retired him from service.


For documentation concerning the March on Rome in Bologna see, ASB., 1922, Cat. 7, Congressi, violenze, partiti politici, giornali, prefect to police chief, 27 and October 1922, interior minister to prefects, 26 October 1922, prime minister to prefects, 28 October 1922 (telegrams 23859, 24321 and 32533), Questore to regional military commander, 28 October 1922, sub-prefect of Imola to prefect, 28 October 1922, regional military commander to interior/war ministers, 29 October 1922, Regie Guardie commander to prefect, 30 October 1922.
CHAPTER FIVE: THE POLICE FORCES IN THE
PROVINCE OF BOLOGNA, 1923-25

The final chapter examines policing in Bologna during the immediate post-March on Rome years. It considers the relationship between the Bolognese police forces and Fascist movement during what was indeed a very difficult period of conflict for provincial Fascism as a whole. The period spanning Mussolini's rise to power and his establishment of a dictatorship may in many ways be considered continuous from the preceding period of Fascist ascendancy, as the documentation reveals. The necessary conditions for police connivance with the fascist movement were as present as they had been prior to the March on Rome. Squadrismo flourished if not intensified, yet the prefectoral authorities were still officially expected to repress this - as part of Mussolini's overall attempt at placing provincial Fascism under better control - as in the past. Again, however, directives ordering the suffocation of political opposition to the Fascist government together with the government's general hesitancy over how far it could attempt to oppose provincial Fascist leaders made this virtually impossible in the provincial context, as is illustrated below. On many occasions the provincial police forces were caught up in the struggle between state and provincial Fascism dominating the period. In this sense the March on Rome in no way rescued them from the dilemmas and ambiguities of preceding years.
Before examining the role of the police forces, however, analysis of the effects of structural changes the Italian police system underwent with Mussolini's rise to power, as described in Chapter I, is essential to this study. What is again significant here is that what may in many ways be considered dramatic modifications nevertheless failed to solve the traditional problems of physical weakness and dualism inherent in the liberal police institutions which the Fascist movement itself had on so many occasions scorned and exploited during the years prior to the March on Rome.

The abolition of the Regie Guardie at the end of 1922, for example, had serious repercussions at the provincial level. Lorenzo Donati (pp. 481-4) notes that the apprehension and sense of panic of the Guardie is evident in their attempts at mutiny, the most serious of which happened in Turin and Naples. In the Piedmontese capital a fierce battle between the Regie Guardie and Carabinieri, the army and Fascist squads on the night of 30 December 1922 caused the deaths of four Guardie and a fascist before the revolt was finally put down. In Naples, Guardie set fire to the Fascist trade-union headquarters. In some urban centres Mussolini ordered the constitution of Fascist squads alongside the traditional police forces. In Milan, for example, a 'Corpo Fascisti' of 500 men was formed while in Rome 25 'Pattuglioni speciali' each consisting of 2 Carabinieri and 8 fascists were employed for the maintenance of public order. In Bologna itself the Questore informed the prefect, Aphel, that on 31 December
approximately thirty armed Regie Guardie had unsuccessfully tried to organize a revolt. He also reported rumours that Regie Guardie intended to attack the local fascio and powder magazines. He added, however, that he was relying on 'Ufficiali superiori della RRGG di provata fede' to repress further protests.¹

The effects of the abolition of the Regie Guardie and the Agenti Investigativi on the numerical strength of the Italian police is evident if one considers that in 1921 the former numbered over 40,000 (the legions of Bologna and Florence totalled 5,604) and the latter 8,000. 10,000 new Carabinieri in no way made up for these losses, therefore.² In Bologna there were 1,470 Carabinieri and 1,097 Guardie (reinforcements included in both cases) in March 1922. In January 1923 there were 1,316 Carabinieri only. This total had further decreased to 910 by January 1924.³ Though the police chief, De Bono, admitted to prefects in April 1923 that police numbers had decreased by 40,000, he stated that they would have to make do with this, adding that under Nitti prefects had had too many policemen at their disposal and that previous to the First World War 25,000 Carabinieri and 15,000 Guardie di Città had been perfectly sufficient for policing. This was obviously an unrealistic solution given the significant population increase, especially in urban areas, during the intervening period, as well as the tremendous increase in violence in the post-war years.⁴

The Fascist government tried to account for the lack of
forces by claiming that emphasis should be placed on a small number of good quality policemen. As De Bono assured prefects in his circular of April 1923, the solution lay in the capacity of each policeman to 'imporsi e farsi obbedire dalla folla'. He also promised them that the government would support policemen forced to adopt violent measures. Directives released immediately following the March on Rome besides abolishing what were considered futile police services - the guarding of buildings, for example - encouraged a general increase in the prestige of the police. Policemen had to be honest and upright model citizens. Police stations were to be upgraded, though ironically the police chief admitted that there was no funding for this! Reductions in police numbers were justified on the grounds that 'Il pubblico che ha sempre fra i piedi gli agenti se ne fa l'abitudine e soprattutto non impara a rispettarli'. Heavy police presence meant extra work for policemen. Bored and tired-looking policemen were hardly an asset to the prestige of the force. De Bono's circular of 21 November 1922 concluded, for example, that 'Non farsi vedere, s'intende, non deve significare non guardar e non vedere: tutt'altro'.

Despite the optimism of the Fascist government the documentation confirms that under Mussolini prefects faced the same policing difficulties as they had done throughout the period studied. Police funzionari and Carabinieri were constantly reported as being numerically inadequate for dealing with political conflict in the province. The
government was generally unsympathetic, however. The employment of the newly-founded MVSN alongside the traditional police forces, which should have accounted for numerical losses, was no serious solution given the generally undisciplined and unreliable nature of the corps. Besides, as illustrated below, the government discouraged this on financial grounds. The failure of the government to take prefects' complaints seriously may well have encouraged continued police connivance, however.

The founding of a Fascist police force, the MVSN, marked, among other things, Mussolini's desire to control and discipline **squadrismo**, as was mentioned in the first chapter. In January 1923 De Bono informed prefects that the **Camicie Nere** - temporarily used for policing alongside the traditional police forces in November and December 1922 - were in the process of being absorbed into the **Milizia**. He clearly voiced his intention to curb Fascist violence through this, warning prefects that:

> Coloro che oggi commettono violenze in nome fascismo non sono da considerarsi fascisti ed è ora di addivenire disarmo di tutti coloro che detengono ed usano illegalmente armi.

In view of this De Bono asked for the return of arms which the Fascists had used for the October 1922 revolution and in another circular to prefects he stated that in order to join the MVSN fascists needed a 'certificato penale' or 'attestato
buona condotta' which had to be signed by the local Carabinieri authorities.\textsuperscript{7}

The archival documentation demonstrates, however, that the founding of the corps was of little success in taming or controlling squadristo. This is evident in the interior minister's constant reminders to prefects about the importance of ending Fascist violence. Indeed in March 1923 De Bono complained to the prefect of Bologna that the Carabinieri high command had still not received back arms which the Fascists had borrowed for the March on Rome.\textsuperscript{8} Fascist membership in the MVSN was almost certainly a sure means of justifying or covering up continued violence. Distinction should be made, however, between legal MVSN police operations and off duty illegal activities. There is certainly evidence of legal collaboration between Bologna's Questura and the local MVSN in the prevention of Socialist/Communist activities on occasions - as indeed was stipulated by decree law 832 of 8 March 1923 - from the spring of 1923 onwards. The Questore in fact informed his forces that:

All'uopo gli ufficiali e i sottufficiali dell'Arma potranno valersi anche di militi nazionali, prendendo accordi coi comandanti delle rispettive zone, ai quali perverranno subito istruzioni in proposito dal Comando del Gruppo Legione di Bologna (...).
He emphasized, however, that such operations should always be directed by 'un funzionario di PS o di un ufficiale o sottufficiale dei RRCC', demonstrating the subordinate position of the Milizia to the traditional police forces.9

In reality, however, the MVSN tended mostly to act independently of the traditional police authorities and illegally therefore. For one thing, as army leaders informed the prefect in July 1924, lack of funding prevented everyday use of the corps for normal policing. It was also the desire of Mussolini, as is evident in De Bono's circulars, that the MVSN remain solely a political force. What is more, constant use of the MVSN alongside the traditional police might create the impression that the abolition of the Regie Guardie had weakened the police authorities.10 The autonomy of the corps was an obvious incentive to indiscipline and often brought it into direct conflict with the traditional police forces, creating yet another form of dualism and rivalry in the Italian police system. This is particularly evident if one considers that on occasions the Questura found itself having to repress offenders belonging to the MVSN. In October 1923, for example, two Carabinieri tried to break up a brawl between fascists. One of the main offenders turned out to be a senior MVSN officer who reported the Carabinieri to the Questura for abuse of power. That a police funzionario initially punished the Carabinieri concerned suggests that policemen could easily be intimidated by members of the Fascist police corps.11
The above-mentioned incident is a clear example of how the MVSN allowed the Fascists to continue their illegal activities. The fascist involved used his membership of the MVSN in order to maintain his immunity from the law. Salvemini indeed states that the MVSN allowed for a combination of both legal and extra-legal methods in the repression of political opposition. Militi carried out house-searches and arrests while fascists administered beatings. If those assaulted managed to defend themselves the Fascists, as members of the MVSN, could always arrest them. Fascists as uniformed militi carried out legal duties, yet off duty and out of their uniform they turned to violent activities. Similarly the MVSN allowed the squads to use violence against the Communists during the general election campaign of 1924. The Communist daily L'Unità of 26 March 1924 claimed that though officially employed to ensure that the election proceeded in a legal fashion the corps resorted to violence to ensure a Fascist victory without the risk of punishment.12

Near lack of distinction between MVSN and squad activities obviously limited the capabilities of the traditional police forces to curb squad violence. De Bono indeed complained to prefects in May 1924 about their failure to distinguish between fascists and militi when reporting incidents.13 The police chief's orders that militi should never be permitted to wear uniform when off duty may well reflect his full realization of the true implications of MVSN activities and his opinion that if such illegal activities could not be
controlled they should at least not be identified with the MVSN. MVSN offenders usually managed to avoid serious punishment, even if caught red-handed. De Bono clearly ordered disciplinary action and there is indeed evidence of Bologna's prefect suggesting the expulsion of uncontrollable militi from their corps. This in fact happened to Alberto Marchetti of Vado who had on two occasions been reported to the local judicial authorities for acts of intimidation using fire-arms.

Action taken against the MVSN Consul, Marchesini, who organized a squad to rescue Fascist prisoners being escorted between jails, demonstrates, however, that senior officers mostly went unpunished. Both the MVSN and prefect reported their failure to track him down after De Bono ordered his arrest. The prefect in particular expressed his fear of violent repercussions should he be arrested, given his popularity in the province. This suggests that the provincial state representative was not totally impartial in his handling of the situation. He was eventually placed under arrest by his superiors. This was reduced to house-arrest for reasons of family and health and because an MVSN enquiry had 'escluso ogni sua responsabilità di carattere giudiziario'.

Though the ambiguous nature of the MVSN allowed squadrismo to flourish, as during the pre-March on Rome years police support of Fascist illegal activities continued, if not intensified, especially where it directly involved persecution of state enemies (communists, etc.). Indeed De Bono had to
remind prefects in December 1923 that 'l'avere la tessera fascista non deve ritenersi come un mezzo di impunità'. He warned them that this would bring Fascism and eventually the government into disrepute. In Bologna local police forces clearly remained indifferent to beatings received by 'subversives' or workers. They answered for their failure to arrest violent fascists on the grounds that the victims had only been lightly injured or did not wish to take action against their assailants. If potential victims attempted to defend themselves they risked incrimination. This happened to a communist who tried unsuccessfully to pull a gun on his attackers who subsequently dragged him to the nearest Carabinieri station where he was prosecuted for illegal possession of a fire-arm. His claims of self-defence were not taken seriously because he was 'subversive' and therefore 'non degno di fede'.

The prefectoral authorities clearly did their best to conceal the sad reality of continued Fascist violence from the government. The prefect tended to wave aside reports of violence received by the interior ministry as 'subversive fabrications'. This was probably due less to political fanaticism and more to the rather delicate position in which he stood. On the one hand he may have feared punishment (transfer/retirement) for his failure to curb violence. On the other the pressure of provincial Fascism probably did not allow him to repress the violence wholeheartedly. After all he could not afford to be identified as an anti-Fascist under
a Fascist government. His attitude was more likely to have been, at the most, opportunistic, therefore. On occasions, well aware that Fascist violence was embarrassing for the government, he may have preferred to use legal powers in an arbitrary fashion to the advantage of the Fascists in the hope that this would reduce the amount of violence. This was particularly evident in the prefect Aphel's support of the Fascist syndicates in the summer of 1923 when he abolished the Paglia-Calda pact by decree on the basis of article 3 of the Provincial and Communal Act. This aimed to appease those sharecroppers who had joined the Fascist syndicates and were bitter at the fact that despite their patriotic discipline they received a worse economic deal than Socialist workers. Indeed, following abolition of the pact he ordered Molinella's commissar to end the violence. He also supported the sacking in May 1924 of Bonifica Renana socialist workers in the hope that their forced unemployment would coerce them into joining the Fascist syndicates.19

If generally indifferent towards Fascist violence where enemies of the state were concerned, where political factions officially respected by the government were assaulted the prefect tended to urge Fascist leaders to control the violence. In August 1923, for example, Aphel informed the provincial party secretary that attacks on the Gioventù Cattolica Italiana were to stop since the organization was not political. He tactfully informed local Catholic leaders, however, that the attacks had obviously been a mistake
'conoscendo i sentimenti di rispetto per la religione ai quali si ispirano i principali dirigenti del grande partito fascista'. On other occasions he even offered such political groups protection from Fascist violence. Following an article criticising the provincial ras, Baroncini, in *Il Corriere della Sera* in September 1923, for example, the *Questore* ordered the police to guard the newspaper headquarters from a possible Fascist attack.

The ambiguities inherent in government directives are understandable if one considers that the Mussolinian government demanded total repression of opposition political and syndical activities. This almost certainly accounted in part for continued police tolerance of *squadrismo*. Legislation in 1923 abolished Socialist May Day celebrations and allowed the sacking of politically dangerous workers, as mentioned in Chapter II. Socialist and Communist institutions, though not officially outlawed, took on an illegal character as they faced frequent police raids, especially following the Matteotti crisis when the opposition clearly attempted to regain ground. The prefectoral authorities were particularly concerned to prevent the *Camera Confederale del Lavoro* from persuading those who had defected to the Fascist syndicates to return to the socialist trade union.

Though De Bono argued that Fascist violence would cease if the police forces demonstrated themselves to be capable of repressing subversion it seems that, in reality, the police...
forces, possibly aware of their weaknesses, may have benefited from the anti-Communist/Socialist activities of squadrismo which, as a result of this, flourished despite the police chief's orders to the contrary. On occasions, specific ministerial orders contradicted De Bono's circulars. Indeed in December 1923, following the publication in the Communist newspaper, La Giustizia (4 December 1923), of several thousand signatures of Molinellese workers in protest at continued Fascist violence, Mussolini ordered the prefect to confer with Emilian Fascist leaders over possible repressive measures to counter an anti-Fascist resurgence.24 The Questore permitted Fascist reprisals against communist leaders responsible for organizing the petition, which had been an embarrassment for both the government and the local ras Baroncini.25

Perhaps the most clamorous incident demonstrating the support which the squads received from the prefectoral authorities during this period involved two British journalists, Aubrey and Lina Waterfield of the 'Manchester Guardian' and 'Observer' who, in March 1923, paid a visit to Molinella to investigate allegations of coercive methods employed by the Fascist syndicates. Lina Waterfield informed the Bolognese prefect, Aphel, on 24 March that during their visit they were arrested by armed fascists - in her report to the 'Observer' of 18 March she mentioned Carabinieri alongside them - for interviewing a group of labourers. She complained that the town police official detained them for hours without
explanation, ignoring their protests. In concluding she asked the prefect whether steps had been taken against the fascists and whether her safety as a journalist was guaranteed. Aphel asked the prefect of Florence to inform the Waterfields:

The following month the prefect, on hearing that the Waterfields had published an article on the state of violence in Molinella in the 'Manchester Guardian' (5 April 1923), confided to a friend that 'Conosco già la vicenda dei corrispondenti del Manchester Guardian. Ed ho proposto che siano espulsi dall'Italia. Sono indegni dell'ospitalità del nostro paese'. This incident is obvious proof of the desire of the prefectoral authorities to conceal Fascist activities
from the public eye and thereby protect the movement. The attitude of the prefect may well also be attributed to his fear of possible reprimand from Rome for his failure to enforce government directives ordering the repression of squadristo.

Even in cases of murder the police authorities were prepared to protect fascists. This is obvious in the case of Augusto Regazzi, ras of Molinella, accused of murdering the Socialist sharecropper Pietro Marani in August 1923. Even the government intervened in his case demonstrating that it was prepared to protect him if this would prevent violent repercussions in Molinella. In September 1923 the undersecretary of the interior, Finzi, ordered Aphel to make sure that Regazzi was not excessively punished for the crime in order to maintain political calm in the town. The prefect assured him that:

Mi sto interessando e continuerò interessarmi vivamente affinché siano evitate eccessive sanzioni rigore nei confronti fascista Regazzi Augusto et altri suoi compagni indiziati responsabilità fatti Molinella.

The following November Aphel wrote to the justice minister advising against the arrest of Regazzi given the violent reaction this might cause. In July 1924 Aphel's successor, Bocchini, warned the interior minister that on occasions Regazzi had caused embarrassment by appearing in public while officially 'latitante'. Once he even took part in a
provincial council meeting at which the justice minister, Oviglio, was present. He suggested that he maintain a lower profile. 28

Regazzi's trial in March 1925 was farcical. The prefect, Bocchini, almost certainly tried to influence the proceedings by refusing to grant the prosecution counsel's request that it be held outside Molinella. He brushed aside the police chief's fears that the verdict would be influenced by the violence of Regazzi's local supporters. He later was in fact forced to deny allegations in La Giustizia, Il Mondo and L'Unità that during the trial fascists had assaulted the prosecution witnesses. 29 Regazzi was inevitably acquitted though his guilt was well proven. Indeed the public prosecutor urged the jury to condemn him for murder and denounced Molinella's police commissar for false evidence. 30

The Regazzi affair clearly illustrates the strength of provincial Fascism which even the government was unwilling to oppose on occasions. Mussolini's use of amnesties for Fascist offenders, in the hope of appeasing provincial forces, almost certainly had the opposite effect of encouraging the continuation of violence and was obviously counterproductive to any attempts at bringing these forces under control. (See Note 30). The government's failure to repress squadrismo whole-heartedly, despite official directives to that end, was almost certainly yet another factor in the general failure of the provincial police authorities to put an end to Fascist violence. Further investigation indeed reveals that the
government aimed less at repressing violence but more at controlling and coordinating it. On occasions it clearly used violence for its own political ends.

This is evident during the general election of 1924. Indeed Bocchini suggested to Mussolini in January 1924 that Fascists should be allowed to control voters' choices inside polling stations. The following March he expressed his intention that the Fascist Party play a serious part in instructing the masses how to vote. As he informed Mussolini's undersecretary 'Si è ritenuto (..) utile larga distribuzione schede propaganda ed insegnamenti ed ammaestramenti fatti personalmente'. The Communist press confirmed the dangerous implications of such measures. L'Unità reported violence inside polling stations in front of Carabinieri, soldiers and electoral officials who remained indifferent. Opposition voters were beaten up, their voting cards destroyed. Many were even imprisoned during the voting period. The Questura was even accused of referring the names of those who had placed their signatures on the opposition candidates' lists to the fascio. The Fascist syndicates ordered their members to vote for government candidates (21, 26 and 27 March, 6, 9 and 10 April, 1924). Mussolini limited his orders to prefects to the avoidance of unneccessary violence. However, reiterations alongside this of the importance of a government victory were sufficient to create the impression that political violence would be tolerated.

The government was particularly anxious, on the other hand,
to limit Fascist violence at times when international conferences were taking place for fear that foreign visitors might read about it in the papers, as during the Emigration conference held in Rome in May 1924.\textsuperscript{33} On another occasion the interior minister, Federzoni, warned prefects that the publication in the press of the names of government opponents due for beatings would cause serious political repercussions.\textsuperscript{34} The above again suggests that the government was more concerned to control and conceal violence than repress it totally. In certain situations it could be beneficial to the government. In others it was to be carefully avoided.

In Bologna, conflict between state and provincial Fascism was particularly dominated by the struggle for supremacy between Fascist Syndicalism and employer-dominated Fascism, as was outlined in Chapter II. Examination of the role of the police authorities in this provides further evidence of the difficulties faced by the prefect during this period. Apfel's support of the Syndicalists is particularly evident during the clash in March 1923 between the employers and syndicates over the constitution of a farm machinery cooperative to which the employers objected. The dispute was violent as both sides resorted to squad warfare. The prefect supported the Fascist ras, Baroncini, by closing the Mezzolara fascio for having attacked the local syndical leader.\textsuperscript{35} Apfel clearly favoured the Syndicalists who at that particular moment dominated provincial Fascism. That the government
considered the Syndicalists dissidents, however, is demonstrated by the removal of Baroncini at the end of 1923. The abrupt retirement, during the same period, of the prefect was almost certainly because of his identification with such dissidence. He had continued to support Baroncini even after the Bolognese ras had fallen foul of the government. This is demonstrated by several telegrams he wrote to Mussolini advising him that Baroncini's continued office in Bologna would be of benefit to the provincial Fascist Party.\textsuperscript{36}

Baroncini's successor, Arpinati, clearly aimed to bring Bolognese Fascism into line with the PNF and this is illustrated by his moves to eliminate Baroncini's Syndicalist dissidence. Again, there is clear evidence here of collaboration between the new leader and Aphel's successor, Bocchini, though again this was almost certainly for opportunistic motives. Indeed the prefect recommended the new Fascist leader as the right man for the task of cleaning up provincial Fascism. In February 1924 Bocchini supported Arpinati's use of violence to break up a meeting of dissident Syndicalists. This is a possible example of the government's justification of squads if used as a means of controlling the provincial movement, though it seems that Bocchini did his best to minimize allegations of violence on the part of Arpinati.\textsuperscript{37}

Naturally, however, the use of squad violence to crush dissidence was no solution to the desired end to \textit{squadrismo} as a whole. Indeed, particularly following the Matteotti crisis,
the prefect resorted to other remedies to keep the Syndicalists under control. He obviously realised that unreasonable behaviour on the part of the employers allowed the persistence of disputes, to the advantage of the Syndicalists, and risked causing an exodus back to the Socialist unions. In August 1924 he warned the undersecretary of the interior, for example, that attempts by the brick industry management to disrupt negotiations with the Fascist syndicates 'produce viva agitazione specie in questo momento in cui muratori cercherebbero tendere nuovamente verso Confederazione Generale Lavoro'. Though stressing the need for as much moderation as possible on the part of the syndicalists, this line was supported by the government until the summer of 1925 when syndical power was removed from the control of the provincial Fascists and centralized under the Palazzo Vidoni pact of the following October.38

The success of Bocchini's career - he became police chief in September 1926 - almost certainly lies in the generally positive relationship between Arpinati's provincial Fascism and the central government. This enabled him, for the most part, to support the government without risking conflict with local Fascism and vice-versa. The government itself may well have been prepared to turn a blind eye towards Arpinati's squad activities if they were in line with government Fascism. Aphel's position was more unfortunate in that during his office in Bologna the province was dominated by dissident Fascism. There are several possible motives behind his
support of Baroncini, which obviously put him in conflict with the government and affected his career. He may simply have felt extreme pressure from provincial Fascism and opportunistically have become a client of the ras. This is probable in view of the fact that he was a normal career prefect. He may have supported Baroncini for political motives. His reinstatement by the Fascist government after retirement in 1919 suggests that he may have been invited back to work for his Fascist sympathies. It is unlikely, however, that he was chosen for fanatical support of provincial Fascism at a time when Mussolini was concerned to gain better control over squadrismo.39

The disappearance of the Socialist parliamentary deputy, Matteotti, and his presumed murder on the orders of the Fascist regime in June 1924 clearly affected the attitude of the government towards both political opposition and provincial Fascism. The Mussolinian regime, which seriously risked downfall, found itself in the dual position of having to create the impression that the opposition parties were respected, yet preventing them from politically defeating Fascism. It was obviously hesitant as well about the extent to which it could safely crush squadrismo, though such a measure would almost certainly save the Fascist regime. What is more, Mussolini's initial mobilization of the MVSN in complete contrast to interior ministry directives - as noted in Chapter I, p. 65 - is a clear reflection of the divisions within the
regime itself. Hence conflicting government directives to prefects ordered discipline on the part of the provincial fascists and yet counted on them to prevent an opposition resurgence. Though the interior minister, Federzoni, banned provocative demonstrations in support of Mussolini and ordered the provincial Fascist unions to take part in a 10 minute work stoppage organized by the Camera Confederale del Lavoro on 27 June, the police chief, Moncada, had previously ordered the syndicates to use their influence to prevent the strike from being prolonged to one hour.40

The Bolognese prefect, Bocchini, was solely concerned with suffocating the political opposition, however. Indeed, in a report to the interior minister he claimed that both the police and fasci reacted harshly to political anti-government demonstrations, suggesting that squad violence, which he made little effort to curb, was useful to him.41 He may well have interpreted ambiguous government directives as general acquiescence of squad activities if directed against an opposition resurgence. He may equally have feared conflict with the provincial Fascist forces. Further documentation shows that he did his best to play down episodes of Fascist violence, featured in the left-wing press, to the government, suggesting that he was aware of the government's intentions of clamping down on squad activities and yet was reluctant to take firm steps in that direction. His denial of allegations in Avanti!, L'Unità and La Giustizia of 20 August 1924 that fascists stamped on flowers, sent to Bologna railway station...
to be placed on Matteotti's coffin as it passed through the city, was almost certainly motivated by the fact that he had previously assured Federzoni that police forces on duty at the railway station had prevented incidents.\textsuperscript{42} He claimed that allegations of this type were merely a form of 'speculazione politica' which risked causing a violent reaction among the Fascists and MVSN. In June 1924 he even prosecuted two socialists, one of whom was a journalist for \textit{Avanti!}, who claimed to be victims of Fascist assaults, for 'simulazione reato'.\textsuperscript{43}

One cannot totally rule out the possibility here that Bocchini was forced to rely on the squads to counter the numerical weakness of the police. Indeed he complained to the police chief in June 1924 that he did not have sufficient \textit{Carabinieri} to cope with a renewed onslaught by the subversives following the disappearance of Matteotti. His continued use of the MVSN alongside the traditional police forces, despite orders from the government in July 1924 to restrict this, was an obvious encouragement of squad activities, given the near lack of distinction between them.\textsuperscript{44}

The crisis of the summer of 1924 had serious repercussions on the role of the MVSN since the corps was only too evidently associated with the violence culminating in the murder of Matteotti. The circular which Bologna's MVSN zone commander sent to local leaders on 2 July 1924 demonstrates the government's awareness of the need to place this political police force under greater control. \textit{Militi} were ordered to
adopt a low profile, so avoiding further embarrassment for the government. They were to employ legal policing methods (arrests, etc.) instead of violence and provocation and show greater respect towards the army and prefectoral authorities. Commanders had to be clearer in their instructions to subordinates so as to avoid misunderstandings and the most violent elements in the corps were to be controlled with greater efficiency, even if this necessitated their arrest.45

Though the institutional alterations to the MVSN brought about by new legislation in August 1924 were minimal - as was outlined in Chapter I, p. 66 - archival documentation shows that members of the corps felt seriously threatened by possible changes. The effects of the legislation are evident in instructions sent by the zone commander to local prefects requiring information on the social and moral qualities of officers, which a special commission would take into consideration when deciding whether or not they could remain in the MVSN and retain their present rank.46 The archival documentation, though rather limited here, suggests that towards the end of 1924 the corps was on the point of revolt, signalling its desired independence from the authority of the state, its opposition to the threat of Fascist normalization and its total degeneration into original forms of squad violence. Indeed Avanti! (3 October 1924) reported militi stealing arms - which were usually deposited in Carabinieri barracks - though this was denied by Bocchini.47 The Emilian MVSN consuls claimed that they had no control over their
subordinates who remained loyal to their old squad leaders. Officers and militi were generally depressed at the future ahead of them and demanded specific guarantees concerning the August legislation which obliged them to take up their former usually much lower army rank. Their morale was further reduced when the MVSN chief, Italo Balbo (ras of Ferrara), was forced to resign following the revelation in *La Giustizia* (27 November 1924) that the judicial authorities were at his disposal. Subsequent documentation shows, however, that the institutional changes brought to the MVSN were of little serious effect on the discipline or controllability of the corps.

It was indeed MVSN and squad pressure at the end of 1924 which prompted Mussolini to outlaw political opposition to the government and endow the police with super powers for its repression on and after 3 January 1925. Federzoni's circular to prefects on that day ordered the dissolution of clubs and associations posing a threat to state security, the arrest of subversives suspected of criminal activities, the confiscation of illegally possessed arms and the frequent searching of property. The following day he stated that:

È particolarmente necessario che siano impedite e represse energicamente manifestazioni sediziose in luoghi sedicenti private e riunioni individui notoriamente sospetti come eccitatori tali manifestazioni. Procedono fermo responsabili per accertamenti eventuali responsabilità penali. Avverto che
saranno tenute responsabili di ogni negligenza od esitazione. 49

In Bologna the Camera Confederale del Lavoro was immediately closed. This was followed by the dissolution of the Federazione Italiana Operai Edili (brickworkers' union) in March and the Federazione Ferrovieri Italiani (railway workers' union) in April. The prefect also abolished internal commissions - founded in November 1924 by Socialist municipal gas workers on the basis of valid legislation - on the grounds that they had been undemocratically founded and that their presence angered the Fascist syndicates and was a public security risk. 50 In April 1925 Bocchini claimed that he had increased vigilance against 'Maximalist' propaganda and petitions. On the occasion of 1 May huge police provisions aimed at preventing a provincial work stoppage. Federzoni ordered the confiscation of newspapers or pamphlets encouraging the proletariat not to turn up for work on that day. Public meetings or rallies were to be suffocated immediately. Forty individuals were arrested on the eve of May Day as a security measure. 51

The MVSN also proved itself to be useful to the prefect on occasions in the repression of subversion during 1925. In October, for example, its zone commander reported a Communist revival after an MVSN informer actually infiltrated a secret meeting. In Imola, the 68th legion commander claimed that as a result of combined police and MVSN efforts subversive
activities had subsided. Left-wing deputies and papers alleged, however, that police activities were exaggerated. Federzoni was accused of allowing the persecution of individuals guilty only of being workers. L'Unità frequently reported the maltreatment of workers by the police who worked in league with Fascist squads. They arrested workers following beatings by fascists. One particular article of July 1925 claimed that a Communist brickworker, Reggiani, was systematically arrested every ten or fifteen days, thrown into prison and beaten.

Ironically, the outlawing of political and syndical organizations opposed to the government and the increase in police powers on 3 January 1925 specifically aimed, yet again, to bring squadristo under better control. Police operations were to substitute illegal squad activities. Indeed on 4 January 1925 while Federzoni authorized prefects to act beyond the limits of their legal powers when repressing enemies of the state, the PNF secretary ordered the Fascists to end their violence and return to work. Those refusing to obey were to be severely punished. When Bocchini reported that on the night of 3 January 1925 fascists carried out acts of devastation which his limited forces - he had only 100 Carabinieri at his disposal - were unable to prevent, the interior minister demanded his assurance that the vandals had been punished. The prefect replied that those responsible for eighteen cases of vandalism had been notified to the public prosecutor and that eighteen Carabinieri had received
punishments for making insufficient efforts at controlling the violence.\textsuperscript{55}

It becomes very apparent, however, that during the course of 1925 \textit{squadrismo} thrived, despite these measures. Indeed in April the interior minister had to order prefects to remind Fascist leaders once again that the repression of subversives was to be left to the police.\textsuperscript{56} What is more, MVSN activities remained scarcely distinguishable from those of the squads. In September 1925, for example, a \textit{milite} was reported to the judicial authorities for having injured a communist during a quarrel. On several occasions the corps proved itself to be counterproductive, rather than an asset, to policing. Such a situation arose in June when the \textit{Questore} reported that during a coordinated police operation \textit{militi} unnecessarily assaulted subversives under surveillance.\textsuperscript{57} On 25 June Federzoni warned prefects that in certain areas squad warfare between fascists and the MVSN took place. Indeed, the following month, the MVSN section in Marzabotto was dissolved because of its direct opposition to the local \textit{fascio}.\textsuperscript{58}

Once again, however, the government's attitude towards \textit{squadrismo} was ambiguous and this almost certainly accounted for its continuation. Though Fascist violence was ordered to end, the interior minister for obvious propaganda purposes desired not to publicize continued cases of political crimes in the press. Indeed he criticised the prefect of Bologna in July 1925 for failing to confiscate newspapers containing 'descrizioni particolareggiate raccapriccianti delitti sangue
Prefects were expected to issue their own versions of events. During the days of particularly violent squad activities in Florence in July 1925 Bocchini received information from the Florentine prefect about the version of events he had given to the press. He was advised to give the same version to the Bolognese press, which clearly minimized the seriousness of the events concerned and never used the word 'fascists'.

Federzoni's censoring of news of squad violence as well as his public condemnation of accusations from the left as 'speculazione politica' may have been interpreted by provincial Fascist leaders, as well as prefects, as government approval of such activities. The co-existence of the PNF alongside the government only enhanced the contradictory nature of the Fascist regime. If Federzoni desired, at least formally, to repress squad violence and use the police in its place, this contrasted starkly with the PNF leader Farinacci's invocation of persecution of the 'carnifici del fascismo' over and above usual PS procedures together with tolerance of Fascist violence, as reported in _L'Unità_ on 11 April 1925. This may obviously have been confusing to prefects. On several occasions Farinacci came into direct conflict with Federzoni over the question of the maintenance of the squads. According to Lyttelton his position was relatively weakened by Mussolini in October 1925 after he ordered Turin's squads to remain intact, despite the interior minister's orders to the contrary (_La conquista_, cit., pp. 458-9).
The prefectoral authorities clearly continued to tolerate the activities of the squads on many occasions. Indeed, L'Unità's above-mentioned reports of systematic police-Fascist operations against workers, which seem very characteristic of punitive expeditions, suggest that the new police powers from 3 January 1925 may have increased connivance. Higher up the ranks toleration of *squadrismo* was almost certainly partly a reflection of the ambiguous attitude of the government. Indeed, when the police did put up resistance to an attempt by fascists, led by Arpinati, to raid the headquarters of *Il Resto del Carlino* and 11 fascists were injured in the ensuing conflict, Bocchini obviously felt that he owed the interior minister an explanation. He claimed that counter-orders not to repress the action of the Fascists had not arrived in time. 61 This illustrates that the prefect was unsure as to how exactly the government expected him to handle the situation. He may well have feared not receiving the necessary support from the government in the event of a showdown with the provincial Fascists.

Events in August 1925 indeed show that his fears were justified. The Bolognese ras came into conflict with Dino Grandi's forces which were more closely allied to the central government. Bocchini obviously felt it imperative to limit the action of the Arpinatians for their direct opposition to state Fascism, so demonstrating that his primary commitment was to the government. He in fact banned the publication in the press of a manifesto protesting at the failure of the PNF
to respond to the needs of Bolognese Fascism. The hostility of Arpinati towards the prefect during this period is illustrated by his public condemnation of the latter for his 'male arti (...) disgregazione fascisti' and the attempted invasion of the prefecture which he organized on 24 August. If Bocchini remained firm in the face of the violence until the conflict was solved by the intervention of Farinacci, the sub-prefect of Vergato may have been more easily intimidated. Grandi's supporters in Porretta accused the official of permitting a punitive expedition against them by Arpinatians, though both he and the prefect denied such allegations. The declaration by the national party leader, Farinacci, of Arpinati's supremacy in the province of Bologna may, however, be considered a victory for provincial Fascism. Indeed, according to L'Unità:

il potere assoluto delle alte gerarchie è un poderoso bluff che può essere infranto in qualunque momento da qualsiasi moto squadrista della provincia. In sostanza la soluzione della crisi bolognese dimostra che i ras valgono ancora molto di fronte al Governo e ai vari Farinacci che si illudevano di tenere il Partito stretto in un pugno di ferro. (4 September 1925)

Though Bocchini seemed to come out of the conflict unscathed the affair may have been a warning to him about the ease with which the state was prepared to give in to the bossiness of
This case-study of the province of Bologna illustrates that during the period 1923-5 the phenomenon of police connivance with provincial squadrismo continued or indeed, increased, presenting the prefectoral authorities with the same dilemmas they had faced in the pre-March on Rome years. Such dilemmas may above all be attributed to the position of the Mussolinian government with regard to provincial Fascism which it wanted to bring under control. The contradictions in government policies are excellently defined by Renzo De Felice. The historian claims that the government aimed to repress 'l'illegalismo fascista' without eliminating its principal causes. Provincial Fascism was forced to resort to violence in order to counter both opportunists within the PNF, which for the first time opened its ranks to the masses, and political opposition to the Fascist regime. It was almost certainly encouraged by often illegal measures by the government to rid local administrations of non-Fascists. The government could hardly expect the police authorities to whole-heartedly repress provincial Fascism if both Mussolini and the PNF preferred policies of compromise and divide and rule, to repression. Indeed police officials were aware that Mussolini and his colleagues:

Come uomini di governo erano per l'ordine pubblico a tutti i costi; come fascisti non potevano non capire le motivazioni psicologiche della loro base; come fascisti al governo
dovevano imbrigliare il dissidentismo e por fine all'illegalismo, ma non potevano mettersi contro il proprio partito.

In this sense the Fascist government was forced only formally to order respect for law and order. This would obviously account for possible government tolerance of Arpinati's squad activities in the Bolognese province, for example. His opposition to dissidence and subversion was clearly of benefit to state Fascism and on these grounds the government may have been prepared to turn a blind eye towards 'illegalismi'. Indeed, according to Cardoza (p. 431), Mussolini ordered Arpinati to restore party discipline to the province in the autumn of 1925.

The prefect himself obviously tolerated, indeed benefited from, provincial squadismo, given also Mussolini's failure to solve the traditional phenomenon of a weak police system. If he clearly tried to play down Arpinati's use of violence this was almost certainly on account of official directives ordering an end to squad activities. On very few occasions did the government actually openly advocate the use of squads. It was usually up to the prefect to interpret how far the government was prepared to tolerate the activities of the provincial Fascists. The ambiguous nature of government policies naturally left him with a margin of freedom which he could serve his own ends.

Only with the replacement of elective municipal councils by
the single authority of podestà in 1926, the reaffirmation of the supremacy of the prefect over party federali in January 1927, the increased power of the Fascist Grand Councils over Fascist provincial organizations and, most importantly, the abolition of elections inside the party structure, was the power of provincial Fascism curbed, and the party federali reduced, in the words of Farinacci himself, to 'un prefetto del partito', a mere bureaucrat dependent on his superiors (Lyttelton, _La conquista_, cit., p. 475). Even though the majority of squads were dissolved after October 1925, many remained informally intact in so far as loyalties towards former Fascist leaders continued to exist, allowing their easy re-mobilization, however (Lyttelton, _La conquista_, cit., pp. 462-4).

One may conclude from the above that to a great extent the Mussolinian regime, in its first years, continued the use of political discretion over and above the impartial enforcement of law and order. This was of course very evident in the manner in which the provincial authorities fought the April 1924 general election. This characteristic, which was normally associated with pre-Fascist Italian politics, became much more noticeable in the post-March on Rome years as the Fascist government declared left-wing parties enemies of the state long before firm moves were made towards putting Italy on the road to dictatorship.

Similarly, the traditional identification, between the police forces and local or provincial ruling social elites,
of a common political enemy was obviously epitomized in the rapidly developing, yet still unofficial one-party state, during the period 1923-5. If, during the pre-Fascist period, Liberal governments officially ordered impartiality on the part of the police authorities towards all political factions as long as they remained within the limits of the law and unofficially intervened in an arbitrary manner in political disputes, the Fascist government's declaration of state enemies simply on the basis of their political colour placed communists, socialists, etc., at the total mercy of local Fascist supremacy in the eyes of the police forces. This increased the tendencies of police partisanship, particularly at the local level. One may indeed accurately conclude that squad violence was institutionalized by the formation of a political police force, the MVSN, which, as has been demonstrated above, acted as a facade for Fascist illegalities. The milizia may also be seen as the logical * concomitant of another phenomenon so common during the pre-Fascist period, namely the use of civilians for police activities.
NOTES

1. ASB., 1923, Cat. 2, Personale dell'amministrazione di pubblica sicurezza (henceforth 1923 Personale), Questore to prefect, 1 January 1923.


3. ASB., 1922 Dati, cit., police chief to prefect, 29 March 1922; ACS: PS., 1924, B. 46, see pamphlets entitled 'Comando Generale Reali Carabinieri. Ufficio Ordinamento. Situazione dell'Arma dei Carabinieri Reali divisa per provincie alla data del...', etc.

4. ASB., 1923 Partiti politici, cit., police chief to prefects, minister of war, Carabinieri general commander, 13 April 1923.

5. ASB., 1923 Personale, police chief to prefects and Questori, 17, 21 and 23 November 1922.

6. For police deficiencies see ASB., 1923 Personale, cit., Questore to prefect, 24 February and 8 March 1923, prefect to interior minister, 26 February 1923; ASB., 1924, Cat. 2, Personale dell'amministrazione di pubblica sicurezza (henceforth 1924 Personale), interior minister to prefect, 6 February 1924, prefect to police chief, 24 March 1924, Stato della Forza Presente alla Compagnia (Carabinieri of Imola) al Mattino del 13.6.24, Questore to prefect, 28 June 1924, sub-prefect of Imola to prefect, 9 July 1924.

7. ASB., 1923 Partiti politici, cit., police chief to prefects, undated (February 1923) (see Appendix 2, Document 34), 9 February 1923, 4 March 1923.

8. Ibid., police chief to prefect, 9 March 1923.

9. Ibid., Questore to MVSN legion commander, sub-prefects and prefect, 11 May 1923.

10. ASB., 1924, Cat. 7, Relazioni giornaliere della Questura, etc. (henceforth 1924 Relazioni), police chief to prefects, 2 and 19 July 1923.

11. ASB., 1923, Cat. 7, Comuni: ordine pubblico (A-Z) (henceforth 1923 Comuni) Carabinieri internal division commander to prefect, 11 October 1923. According to the report, the MVSN officer, Bonaccorsi, threatened the two Carabinieri with the words 'Abbiamo liquidate la Guardia Regia, vi liquideremo presto anche voi' before reporting them to the Questura. The report continued that Bonaccorsi was well known for his violent character ('non all'altezza del grado che riveste') and severely
criticised vice-commissar Garro for his disciplinary action against the two Carabinieri.


13. ASB., 1924 Relazioni, cit., interior minister to prefects, 29 May 1924 (see Appendix 2, Document 38).

14. ASB., 1923 Comuni, cit., Questore to prefect, 5 September 1923.

15. ASB., 1923 Partiti politici, cit., police chief to prefects and MVSN zone commanders, undated, Carabinieri of Vado to prefect, 15 October 1923.

16. For the case of Marchesini see ASB., 1923 Comuni, cit., police chief to prefect, 10 July 1923, prefect to Interior minister, 11 and 14 July 1923, MVSN consul general to prefect, 12 and 19 July 1923 (see Appendix 2, Document 36). See also Salvemini (Scritti, etc., cit.) p. 161 for the punishments inflicted upon MVSN offenders by their superiors.

17. ASB., 1923 Partiti politici, cit., police chief to prefects, 27 December 1923. See also Appendix 2, Document 35.

18. ASB., 1923 Comuni, cit., Questore to prefect, 28 June and 8 July 1923.

19. Ibid., Questore to prefect, 17 June 1923, prefect to Molinella's police commissar, 5 August 1923, prefect to Interior minister, 6 August 1923. For prefectoral decree annulling Socialist-agrarian pacts of 28 July 1923 see ASB., 1924, Cat. 16, Agitazioni agrarie, agricoltura.

20. ASB., 1923 Comuni, cit., prefect to secretary of Federazione Provinciale dei Fasci, 25 August 1923.

21. Ibid., Questore to Carabinieri division commanders, 23 September 1923.

22. In August 1924 Federzoni ordered increased vigilance against subversive activities. In October 1924 Bocchini assured the police chief that he was carrying out frequent house-searches, arrests, etc. In November the police raided the Camera Confederale di Lavoro during a Communist meeting. Ten communists were arrested and several documents - including a list of those registered with the Molinellense PCI - were confiscated. During the same month the interior minister ordered the prefect not to allow the a Socialist brickworkers' congress. Two communists were arrested for attempting to persuade
members of the Fascist syndicates to return to the Camera Confederale del Lavoro. See ACS: PS., 1924, B. 58, interior minister to prefects, 19 August 1924; ACS: PS., 1924, B. 90, prefect to police chief, 30 October 1924, 2 and 8 November 1924; ACS: PS., 1925, B. 114, interior minister to prefect, 11 November 1924; ACS: PS., 1924, B. 59, prefect to police chief, 18 November 1924.

23. ASB., 1923 Partiti politici, cit., police chief to prefects, 19 December 1922. Referring to the Fascist repression of a Communist attack in Turin in December 1922, the police chief told prefects that: 'La reazione fascista è comprensibile, ma deve essere prevenuta dalla misure energiche delle Autorità di PS. e politiche. Per esempio: Se non appena successo il doloroso fatto di Torino la Questura del luogo si fosse essa stessa lanciata all'offensiva contro i comunisti i fascist non avrebbero loro sentito il bisogno di farla.'

24. ASB., 1923 Comuni, cit., prime minister to prefect of Bologna, 5 December 1923 (see Appendix 2, Document 37).

25. Ibid., prefect of Bologna to prime minister, 4 December 1923, Questore to prefect, 7 December 1923.

26. Ibid., letter from Lina Waterfield to prefect, 24 March 1923, prefect to prefect of Florence, 28 March 1923, prefect to unknown, 18 April 1923.

27. ASB., 1926, Cat. 7, Comuni: ordine pubblico (L-Z) (henceforth 1926 Comuni: L-Z), undersecretary of the interior to prefect, 21 September 1923, prefect's reply, 23 September 1923, prefect to justice minister, 29 November 1923.

28. Ibid., prefect to interior minister, 17 July 1924.

29. ACS: PS., 1925, B. 118, prefect to police chief, 26 January 1925, 4 March 1925.

30. For accounts of Regazzi's trial see L'Unità, 27 and 28 February 1925, 3, 4, 6 and 7 March 1925. Other trials of fascists are worth noting. The jury acquitted the murderer of a sharecropper Gaiani - for his refusal to vote for the PNF at the April 1924 general election - despite the public attorney's insistence that he was guilty. (L'Unità, 28 and 29 April 1925) On another occasion, when the jury found a fascist guilty of the murder of a communist, the defendant was exempted from his prison sentence of five years and three months because of a government amnesty of Fascist offenders (L'Unità, 13 May 1925). According to Salvemini (Scritti, Cit.), pp. 155-65, after the March on Rome non-Fascists were removed from jury lists in many provinces and the 'Consiglio Superiore'
a body elected by magistrates to exercise control over them was abolished, leaving courts at the mercy of the justice minister. Provincial judges were limited in their action because of the Fascist sympathies of many of their superiors.

31. ASB., 1924 Relazioni, cit., prefect to prime minister, 28 January 1924. Bocchini told Mussolini that: 'perché si possa ottenere la piena sicurezza che la lista nazionale sarà votata da tutti gli iscritti ai Sindacati occorre però che almeno nei comuni ove più fondato si abbia il dubbio sulla possibilità di defezioni, le norme relative alla votazione, siano nella pratica esecuzione lievemente corrette e cioè: nella disposizione della porta della cabina (dato che l'elettore vi debba necessariamente entrare) che dovrebbe essere collocata in modo che tenuta un poco aperta possa consentire agli incaricati del partito messi in un qualche angolo dello spazio riservato agli elettori di controllare l'elettore che fosse in cabina e di vedere la scheda che da questi venisse loro mostrata. La legge nel suo complesso sarebbe rispettata. Per ciò occorrerebbe che fosse destinato a presiedere il seggio elettorale una persona di fiducia del partito, disposto ad una benevola tolleranza, che, del resto come si è detto superiormente, non ha nulla di grave'; ASB., 1924, Cat. 4-5, Elezioni politiche (henceforth 1924 Elezioni) prefect to prime minister's undersecretary, 25 March 1924. See also Appendix 2, Document 39.

32. Ibid., prime minister to prefects, 25 March 1924. Salvemini (Scritti, cit., p. 153) distinguishes between violence on the orders of the government/Fascist party towards which the provincial police and judicial authorities were to remain indifferent and unauthorized violence which they were to punish.

33. ASB., 1924 Relazioni, cit., prime minister to prefects, 25 May 1924.

34. Ibid., interior minister to prefects, 18 September 1924.

35. ASB., 1923 Partiti politici, cit., undersecretary of labour and social security to prefect, 24 February 1923, prefect to undersecretary of labour and social security, 28 February and 8 March 1923, Questore to prefect, 11, 18, 19 and 20 March 1923, prefect to Interior minister, 20 and 26 March 1923.

36. Ibid., prefect to prime minister, 3, 5 and 19 November 1923, 7 December 1923.

37. ASB., 1924 Relazioni, cit. The Questore informed Bocchini on 13 February 1924 that Arpinati used his squads and Carabinieri to prevent the dissident syndical leader,
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34. Ibid., interior minister to prefects, 18 September 1924.

35. ASB., 1923 Partiti politici, cit., undersecretary of labour and social security to prefect, 24 February 1923, prefect to undersecretary of labour and social security, 28 February and 8 March 1923, Questore to prefect, 11, 18, 19 and 20 March 1923, prefect to Interior minister, 20 and 26 March 1923.

36. Ibid., prefect to prime minister, 3, 5 and 19 November 1923, 7 December 1923.

37. ASB., 1924 Relazioni, cit. The Questore informed Bocchini on 13 February 1924 that Arpinati used his squads and Carabinieri to prevent the dissident syndical leader,
50. See ACS: PS., 1925, B. 77, prefect to police chief, 5 February 1925, for the dissolution of the gasworkers' internal commissions. See ASB., 1926 Partiti, cit., prefectoral decree of 9 April 1925, for dissolution of railway workers' syndicate. See L'Unità (17 March 1925) for dissolution of brickworkers' union. For general effects of Mussolini's 3 January speech see L'Unità, 9 January 1925, Il Resto del Carlino, 4, 9, 10 and 11 January 1925.

51. ACS: PS., 1925, B. 141, prefect to police chief, 27 April 1925; for May 1 provisions see ACS: PS., 1925, B. 143, interior minister to prefects, 23, 24, 25 and 29 April 1925, prefect to police chief, 1 May 1925.

52. ACS: PS., 1925, B. 114, cit., Comando Generale MVSN: Relazione sulla politica nella VII Zona, 14 October 1925.


54. ASB., 1925 Partiti, cit., interior minister to prefects 3 and 4 January 1925 (see Appendix 2, Document 41).

55. For acts of devastation in Bologna on evening of 3 January 1925 see ACS: PS., 1925, B. 118, prefect to police chief, 4 and 6 January 1925, interior minister to prefect, 13 January 1925, prefect to interior minister, 18 January 1925.

56. ACS: PS., 1925, B. 143, cit., interior minister to prefects, 25 April 1925.

57. ASB., 1925 Partiti, cit., Questore to prefect, 21 June 1925; ACS: PS., 1925, B. 93, prefect to police chief, 7 and 8 September 1925.


59. ASB., 1925, Cat. 7, Stampe e Giornali (henceforth 1925 Stampe), interior minister to prefect, 22 July 1925.

60. Ibid., prefect of Florence to prefect, 16 July 1925 (see Appendix 2, Document 42).

61. Ibid., undated and presumably prefect to interior minister.

62. ACS: PS., 1925, B. 118, cit., prefect (on behalf of) to interior minister, 26 and 27 August 1925.
63. ASB., 1925, Cat. 7, Comuni: ordine pubblico A-I, prefect to police chief, 24 August 1925.

64. According to Renzo De Felice (Mussolini il fascista, Vol. I, cit.), pp. 444-5: 'Una cosa era pretendere il mantenimento e il rispetto formale dell'ordine pubblico, un'altra cosa era pretendervi senza eliminare alla radice - e, anzi, moltiplicandole - le concause della situazione generale nella quale trovava alimento l'illegalismo fascista. Come si poteva pretendere che i vecchi squadristi potessero stare quieti quando per rafforzare il fascismo e svuotare gli altri partiti, in primo luogo quelli "alleati", si accoglievano nel partito centinaia di migliaia di individui che sino al giorno prima nulla avevano avuto a che fare con il fascismo, spesso lo avevano avversato, e ora compivano (specie nell'Italia meridionale) il passo di diventare fascisti solo per mantenere o addirittura accrescere le loro posizioni di potere? Come si poteva pretendere che i fascisti, vecchi e nuovi, non ricorressero a qualsiasi mezzo per soppiantare avversari e "alleati" quando era il governo che per primo ricorreva a tutta una serie di pressioni e di expedienti spesso illegali per estromettere dagli enti locali le amministrazioni non fasciste? E soprattutto, come si poteva pretendere che le autorità periferiche agissero con vera energia contro i gregari fascisti, quando il PNF e lo stesso Mussolini non agivano con energia verso i capi fascisti, dietro le spalle dei quali si annidava la dissidenza e quindi l'illegalismo, e preferivano invece ricorrere al metodo del compromesso e del divide et impera? In questa situazione è ovvio che le autorità locali non andassero a fondo nella repressione degli illegalismi e si limitassero più a cercare di impedirli che a punirli. Tanto più che, in ultima analisi, esse comprendevano che anche a questo proposito l'atteggiamento di Mussolini e dei suoi collaboratori era viziato all'origine da tutta una serie di contraddizioni. Come uomini di governo erano per l'ordine pubblico a tutti i costi; come fascisti non potevano non capire le motivazioni psicologiche della loro base; come fascisti al governo non dovevano imbrigliare il dissidentismo e por fine all'illegalismo, ma non potevano mettersi contro il proprio partito. Sicché la conclusione politica non poteva essere che una, quella del compromesso. Gli sfoghi, le minacce di Mussolini erano sinceri ma urtavano contro una realtà che era ancora più forte di lui.'
CONCLUSION

As has been demonstrated in the preceding chapters, foregone conclusions on the relationship between Bologna's police forces and the Fascist movement during the period 1920-26 are to be avoided. My study of the involvement of the Italian state institutions in the rise of Fascism reveals that police collusion with the Fascist movement manifested itself in numerous ways and may be attributed to a whole complex series of factors. The nature of the primary sources used for the thesis is such, however, that usually one can at most speculate on the possible motives for individual cases of police behaviour.

What do emerge significantly from the archival research are the fundamental links between the period of Fascist ascendancy and the preceding two decades. Indeed, examination of the pre-Fascist and post-March on Rome years is incomplete without prior study of not only policing in the province of Bologna during the period spanning the end of the nineteenth century and the end of the First World War but also general Italian police history from its origins. Such study demonstrates that from an institutional point of view factors governing the rise of Mussolini's movement were certainly deeply rooted in the past and that in this sense Fascism may be considered 'revelation' as opposed to 'revolution'. This is demonstrated by several closely-related characteristics of Italian policing, and of state administration as a whole (which are
common to both the 1920-25 period and the Liberal era), playing a key role in the rise of Fascism.

The Italian police forces were from their very founding the instrument of an absolutist regime which, though nominally liberalized during the nineteenth century, continued to safeguard its power from the development of mass politics. On such grounds it advocated the prevention rather than repression of any form of democratic initiative, particularly Marxism, under the guise of the maintenance of public order. Indeed, the authoritarian nature of the Italian Liberal state and its police forces is demonstrated by the fact that the post-1925 Fascist regime used pre-existing institutions and legislation, which were only partly modified, as its basis for a dictatorship. Yet the vulnerability of the Liberal state is also demonstrated by an undermanned and badly organized police system which was hardly confident of its ability to fend off the threat of mass movements, especially those which were inspired by Marxism. Such weaknesses would account for a number of rather unorthodox practices adopted in self-defence by the Italian institutions and of prime importance to this debate on the role of the state in the rise of Fascism.

Firstly, as pointed out by Lyttelton ('Cause e caratteristiche', cit., pp. 37-38) and demonstrated in this thesis the Italian state traditionally used arbitrary forms of repression and connived with criminal elements in order to stifle its political opponents. Political violence was widely accepted by public opinion and many guardians of law
and order. This is evident, for example, in the employment by the police of common criminals as \textit{informatori}. Police acceptance of political violence and criminal activities, if used against political enemies of the state, was epitomized, of course, in \textit{squadrismo} though here the state under-estimated the subversive potential of the Fascist movement.

In view of such forms of connivance and arbitrariness the state, rather than issuing general directives concerning the impartial enforcement of law and order to prefects expected provincial authorities to act according to the political discretion vested in them and the particular circumstances pertaining to any given locality. This would account for the manner in which Giolitti's policies towards syndical development in Bologna, as well as the attitude of the police authorities, varied according to the ever-changing political climate. Similarly, the role of the prefectoral forces in election campaigns was dictated by this. As again pointed out by Lyttelton, this was obviously dangerous since it gave policemen a certain amount of leeway for abuse of power and risked subverting the state institutions from within, as indeed occurred during the period of Fascist ascendancy ('\textit{Cause e caratteristiche}', cit., pp. 37-38). On the other hand, loyal policemen may clearly have been disoriented by such practices. On occasions, even if they desired to uphold the law they may have acted differently for fear that the government or their superiors would not support them. This is
obviously the case with the onslaught of the Fascist movement in the summer of 1922.

Another phenomenon common to the period 1897-1925 was the collaboration, at the local or provincial level, of the police and judiciary with the ruling social elite whether for political or opportunistic motives. Here the psychological, moral and even physical pressure which such elites exerted on the peripheral state authorities should not be underestimated. In this particular case-study this phenomenon is demonstrated by the relationship between the agrarian employers and policemen in a local context throughout the period examined and, of course, by the partisan attitude of the authorities towards the Fascist squads (which had the support of traditional social elites) and their leaders. If this partiality may have on occasions been desired by the regime as part of its policy of favouring political discretion over and above the law, on others it clearly ran counter to government policies.

The employment of civilians for policing purposes was an obvious consequence of the weaknesses inherent in the police forces. This was often legal, as in the case of the 'Pattuglie Cittadine' employed in 1909 and 1910 and during the First World War or unofficial and illegal as in the case of strike-breakers used by the agrarians during the Giolittian period and on occasions employed during general strikes both before and after the First World War. Such illegal forms of civilian policing are, of course, closely linked to the
above-mentioned phenomenon of the use by the state of criminal elements. Both forms of civilian policing tended to have moral, patriotic and anti-Socialist implications and were even more prevalent in the Fascist period, the former with the founding of the MVSN and the latter with *squadrismo*.

The motives for the connivance of periphery state institutions with the Fascist movement lie in the past, therefore. Bologna's police forces easily accepted, whether actively or passively, Arpinati's squads just as they had accepted similarly organized violence over the previous decades. They had so often witnessed the citizens taking the law into their own hands well before the emergence of the Fascist movement. In the eyes of many policemen, Fascism was quite simply yet another civilian moral and patriotic force to be used by the state as a counter-weight against the immoral and unpatriotic aims of Socialism. Its illegal and violent implications were acceptable on such grounds. Official government directives ordered the repression of the movement only in terms of individual crimes committed and thus political discretion often took precedence over this.

The Liberal pre-Fascist governments, however, underestimated the subversive potential of Fascism. Unlike similar movements in the past, which were very small in scale and easily controlled (Interventionism, for example), the Fascist movement used violence in order not only to destroy its political enemies but also to overthrow the state. By the time the reality of Fascism had become apparent state
institutions had been subverted to the extent that they no longer had the courage or will to prevent the Fascist onslaught, as is demonstrated by the ease with which many northern Italian cities fell to fascist occupations in the summer of 1922. In numerical terms, however, the police and armed forces, had they been mobilized, would have had the physical capacity to prevent this. Indeed, the invasion of Bologna in May 1922 and the events of October 1922 demonstrate that, to a certain extent, loyalties within the police forces towards the state remained intact and they could be counted on if clear instructions were given them. One may conclude from this that the connivance of state institutions with the Fascist movement, though undoubtedly motivated in many cases by political sympathy, internal organization, opportunism and the pressure of local elites, was also to a very great extent a result of the sense of insecurity created by the ambiguities inherent in the government's traditional means of maintaining the political status quo. In a situation where policemen did not feel the pressure of clear government directives but rather were expected to rely on their own initiatives connivance with local ruling elites was inevitable.
1. The province of Bologna and its communes.
2. Topographical divisions of the province of Bologna.

3. Agricultural zones of the province of Bologna.

5. Acreage distribution for main crops on Bolognese plains.

### KEY

--under 20%
- between 20% and 30%
- between 30% and 45%
- over 45%

- Rice (9%)
- Hemp (22%)
- Wheat (22%)

- Sugar Beets (56%)
- Hemp (39%)
- Rice (41%)
- Wheat (32%)

- Hemp (26%)
- Sugar Beets (2%)
- Wheat (18%)

- Wheat (28%)
- Sugar Beets (42%)
- Hemp (13%)
- Rice (50%)
6. Distribution of braccianti in the province of Bologna.

8. The spread of Bologna's Fasci.

(a) December 1920

(b) January to February 1921.
Maps are taken from Antony Cardoza, cit., pp. 12, 17, 18, 20, 22, 25, 318, 319, 322.
APPENDIX 2

1. Prefect to interior minister, 28.03.1898.
Stamane una pattuglia Carabinieri e soldati incontrando in contrada Guarda, presso Molinella, agglomeramento circa 90 donne cercò persuaderle a sciogliersi ma, non essendovi riuscita, le accompagnava quell'Ispettore di P.S. Ispettore colà in missione credette bene rimetterle in libertà dopo aver fatto loro comprendere opportunità desistere qualsiasi manifestazione per non intralciare azione Autorità nel evitare (di) comporre dissidi tra possidenti e lavoratori. Pare che parole funzionario abbiano ottenuto, almeno per oggi, desiderato effetto.
(ASB., 1898 Operai disoccupati, cit.)

2. Prefectoral Decree, 15.05.98.
Per ciò RENDE NOTA
1. Che il prelodato signor Comandante vieta in modo assoluto tutte le riunioni e gli assembramenti per qualsiasi scopo;
2. Che è fermamente deciso a ristabilire ad ogni costo l'impero della legge e che ha disposto perché sia energicamente repressione qualunque trasgressione alla medesima. Annunciando quanto sopra alla patriotica popolazione di questa nobile Provincia, confido che essa continui a serbarsi tranquilla e fidente nell'opera del Governo che pone ogni cura nell'alleviare il disagio dei bisognosi nel momento attuale.
(ASB., 1898 Agitazioni tumultuose, cit.)

3. Prefectoral Decree, 01.05.98.
Ritenuto che ad Imola fa corpo un'Aassociazione intitolata "Federazione Socialista Anarchica Romagnola" in cui sono affiliati tutti i gruppi Socialisti-Anarchici della regione;
Ritenuto che detto Sodalizio ha affermato la sua esistenza con i seguenti atti: 1° col manifesto pubblicato nel novembre 1896 - ed incriminato dall'Autorità Giudiziaria - contro il progetto di legge sul domicilio coatto, 2° con la circolare diramata ai partiti affine il 7 febbraio ultimo - per promuovere proteste contro l'applicazione dell'art. 248 del Codice Penale agli Anarchici, 3° col manifesto, in data 12 marzo p.p. indirizzata "Al Popolo Italiano" distribuito ai diversi gruppi Socialisti-Anarchici: nel quale manifesto, pubblicato come la circolare anzidetta, sul giornale Anarchico "L'Agitazione" si fa propaganda di
teorie sovversive, e incitano gli affiliati al partito di costituirsi in vere e proprie associazioni;
Ritenuto che della Federazione in parola fanno parte individui noti per i loro principi anarchici, ed alla cui istigazione si attribuiscono le manifestazioni tumultuose avvenute negli ultimi giorni in diversi comuni del Circondario di Imola onde parecchi di costoro vennero arrestati e deferiti all'Autorità Giudiziaria;
Ritenuto che detto Sodalizio non ha altro scopo che di sovvertire gli attuali ordini sociali e di manomettere la proprietà dei cittadini, per cui costituisce un permanente pericolo contro la tranquillità pubblica;
Visto il rapporto del Sottoprefetto di Imola;
Visti gli art. 3 della Legge Comunale e Provinciale e 281 del Codice Penale;
RENDA:
La Federazione Socialista Anarchica Romagnola che ha sede in Imola è sciolta per misure di ordine e di Sicurezza Pubblica.
I contravventori a tali disposizioni saranno puniti a norma di legge.
Il Sottoprefetto di Imola è incaricato di fare eseguire il presente Decreto.
(ASB., 1898 Partito Socialista, cit.)

4. Prime minister to prefect, 09.05.01.
Confidando fieramente opera sua la prego agire sopra proprietari Molinella che rifiutano accordi dimostrando loro quanto grave responsabilità si assumano. Raccomandi a tutti massima prudenza se si riesce ora a conciliare anche i patti per la mietitura se si saranno evitati gravi pericoli e si sarà compiuto un gran passo nella via della pacificazione degli animi. La prego tenermi giornalmente informato stato delle cose specialmente a Molinella.
(ASB., 1901 Agitazioni Molinella, cit.)

5. Leonida Bissolati to prime minister, 18.05.01.
Onorevoli Giolitti
Oggi a Molinella hanno arrestato ancora due operai, fra cui uno della Commissione operaia. Questi, come gli altri arresti, si fanno dalle Autorità di Pubblica Sicurezza appena un operaio e un'operaia si accostano a qualche compagno per persuaderlo alla solidarietà nello sciopero.
Le autorità educate, in quel luogo, alla scuola dell'arbitrio dal 97 a oggi, credono di compiere il loro dovere impedendo la propaganda dello sciopero anche se fatta senza violenza e senza minaccia.
In una frazione di Molinella (Alberino) furono arrestate, giorni sono, per offesa alla libertà del lavoro nove donne che dalla strada pubblica invitavano 18 tra uomini e donne di smettere il lavoro. Come si poteva parlare di violenza o di minaccia in questo caso? E noti, Onorevole Giolitti, che io andai sul luogo, e dalla bocca degli stessi uomini raccolsi le testimonianze che nessuna minaccia era stata
fatta.
Domani probabilmente l'Onorevole Talamo le parlerà su questo argomento. La neutralità del Governo dovrebbe consistere nell'esercitare il suo potere difensionale dell'ordine soltanto quando si commette qualcosa contro la legge. L'ecitamento pacifico allo sciopero non è reato; ma così non la intendono né Prefetto, né delegati, né carabinieri, i quali si sono evidentemente assunti il compito di fare l'interesse dei padroni - come fecero sempre.
Io non vorrei presentare interrogazioni né interpellanze in proposito né fare attacchi sul bilancio interno - perché comprendo che Ella non è responsabile di queste infrazioni della legge commesse dagli agenti.
Ma io la prego di voler far sentire a Bologna che Ella intende la neutralità in senso preciso e leale.
Se Ella volesse parlarmi sono a Sua disposizione domani (domenica): la sera partirei di nuovo per Molinella.
Con rispettosi saluti
(ACS:PS., 1901, B. 2, cit.)

6. Police delegate (Budrio) to prefect, 23.05.01.
In questi momenti che avevo bisogno di tener alto il morale è venuto telegramma odierno di V.S. per gettare massimo sconforto perché traspire che io non godo più fiducia di Lei che tanto mi onorava e reggeva. Sommamente mi permetto far notare che non credo esser venuto meno al mio dovere né di essere stato imprevidente e debole; ciò che si verifica oggi lo avevo preveduto con rapporto del gennaio scorso e da quel giorno non feci altro che telegrafare sempre che avevo bisogno di rinforzi perché con cinque Carabinieri non si poteva ottenere dietro ad un movimento in questo comune esteso per altre cinquanta chilometri. Convinto come lo sono che a Budrio a differenza di Molinella e Medicina basta la sola presenza della forza per tenere a freno dal Sindaco all'ultimo del Comune - Rinforzi mi furono mandati a fatti compiuti quando ve ne era sempre bisogno reclamati da me. Non mi sono lasciato sorprendere dallo sciopero che fu precipitato dagli eventi già segnalati con telegramma diretto a V.S. del 14 corrente col quale previdi sciopero generale - Anche ieri chiesi un funzionario per coadiuvarmi ed anche la ripregò di volerlo mandare possibile questo sera con agenti di P.S.
Sono tre giorni che io non prendo riposo - venendo funzionario pregola accordarmi udienza personale ore pomeridiane domani.
(ASB., 1901 Agitazioni Molinella, cit.)

7. Prime minister to prefect, 24.04.01.
Ricevuto suo telegramma ho piena fiducia nella opera sua. Assembraimenti e passeggiate possono sempre vietarsi. Quanto alle riunioni lascio al suo illuminato giudizio di decidere quando possono lasciarsi tenere, quando per impellenti necessità ordine pubblico sia indispensabile di
impedire. Procuri di persuadere i capi delle leghe e uomini politici che possono avere influenze sulle medesime della necessità di non creare imbarazzi per il governo mentre questa si propone di rispettare le pubbliche libertà e di restare nei limiti della legalità più perfetta (ASB., 1901 Agitazioni Molinella, cit.)

8. Prime minister to prefect, 20.05.01
Vedo passare telegrammi da Molinella che accusano brigadiere dei Carabinieri di arresto di donne le quali non facevano né violenze né minacce. La prego di mandare sul posto a verificare come vanno le cose perché non vorrei che eccesso qualche agente provocasse disordini finora evitati. (ASB., 1901 Agitazioni Molinella, cit.)

9. Questore to prefect, 09.11.09
Organico questa Compagnia Guardie Città, che nel 1906 fu fissato a 310, venne, per desiderio locale Sindaco, ridotto a 272 fino a quando cessasse obbligo comune contribuire paghe, caserme e casermaggio.

Prego pertanto V.S. Ill.ma invocare dal Ministero completamento organico per arrivare, almeno in parte, alla continua insufficienza degli agenti pei servizi ordinari, data specialmente continuità ed opportunità con cui Ministero dispone rinforzi da questo ad altri luoghi e pei quali, da oltre un mese, qui non si hanno che 100 agenti, compresi i planzioni, gli infermi e quelli in attesa di collocamento a riposo, così che, anche a fare un massimo sforzo, non si può disporre che di sessanta agenti. (ASB., 1909 Pratica Generale, cit.)

10. Questore to prefect, 11.04.15
Alle ore 15 ha avuto principio il comizio provato del Fascio Interventista - sono intervenuti circa 500 persone tra repubblicani, anarchici, interventisti e radicali. Ha parlato l'Avvocato Perona Luigi di Milano di parte radicale. La riunione è terminata alle ore 16 circa.

Gli intervenuti uscendo hanno intonato la nota canzone di Oberdan e altri Inni patriottici mentre un gruppo di neutralisti di circa 400 persone cantava l'Inno dei lavoratori. Ne sono sorti dei pugilati nei quali è prontamente intervenuta la pubblica forza. In tale occasione furono eseguiti parecchi arresti per disobbedienza all'ordine di scioglimento già intimato nel modo di legge.

In altri punti della piazza Vittorio Emanuele si procedette allo scioglimento di numerosi gruppi che manifestavano tuttora per ciascun parte in contesa. Alle ore 17 incirca parte della folla stazionava sulla Piazza Vittorio Emanuele. Da qualche gruppo specialmente di interventisti partiva ancora qualche grido e si è perciò dovuto procedere a qualche altro arresto. (ASB., 1915 Guerra, cit.)
11. Prefect to prime minister, 24.05.15.
La notizia della dichiarazione di guerra consegnata dal governo d'Italia al Rappresentante dell'Impero Austro-Ungarico a Roma produsse in città grande entusiasmo.
Alle ore 22 circa, oltre tremila persone, tra le quali molti autorevoli cittadini, colle bandiere di Trento, del Belgio e tricolori improvvisarono un corteo che percorse Via Indipendenza al canto di inni patriottici.
Verso le ore 11 circa innanzi al Palazzo d'Accursio richiesta la esposizione della bandiera nazionale a questa Prefettura, subito accordata fra grandi applausi, e quella del Comune. Non essendo la bandiera del Comune, in cui a quell'ora non trovavasi né il Sindaco, né alcuno della Giunta, stata esposta, un fortissimo gruppo di dimostranti, rompendo il portone del Palazzo, irruppe nel cortile e salito nel salone d’Ercole espose ad una delle finestre una bandiera tricolore tra gli applausi deliranti della folla. Nel trambusto furono involontariamente rotti alcuni vetri della sala del Bramante.
Dopo di ciò i dimostranti si recarono al Palazzo di Re Enzo per far suonare il campanone del Podestà, e poscia alle chiese di S. Pietro e di S. Bartolomeo, per far suonare le campane delle chiese stesse, ma avendo trovato tali località difese da Carabinieri e Guardie anche per amarevoli esortazioni di Funzionari di servizi abbandonarono tale pensiero.
(ASB., 1915 Guerra, cit.)

12. Prefect to sub-prefect of Imola, 08.08.17.
Trasmetto l'unito esposto V.S. Chiamare il Diottalloni, eccitando le ragioni della divergenza e facendogli comprendere l'opportunità di un contegno conciliante che risponda alla( quiesità) del momento in cui tutti debbono sentire il dovere di non insapire piccole questioni che non fanno che disperdere energie e danneggiare i supremi interessi della economia nazionale,
Qualora egli, come però, credesse di impressionare minacciando l'abbandono delle coltivazioni, Ella vorrà avvertirlo che un siffatto contegno anti-patriottico non sortirebbe alcun effetto, perché a parte ogni eventuale responsabilità in cui incomba si provvederebbe alla lavorazione coercitiva dei prodotti!
(ASB., 1917 Agitazioni agrari, cit.)

13. Minister of war to military factory directors, 04.10.15.
Con Decreto Luogotenenziale in data 26 corrente è stata ordinata la militarizzazione di tutto il personale operaia degli Stabilimenti Militari.
Per effetti del detto decreto, gli operai effettivi e straordinari delle Direzioni degli Stabilimenti Militari saranno assoggettati alla giurisdizione militare, e quindi, mentre continueranno ad essere sottoposti altresì alle sanzioni del codice penale militare, nel caso che le loro mancanze assumessero figura di reato a termine del
codice stesso.
Specialmente è da tener presente che, per effetto della militarizzazione, gli operai che abbandonassero il proprio servizio saranno dichiarati disertori.
(ASB., 1916 Contratti Molinella, cit.)

14. Prefect to interior minister, 07.12.16
Ritengo opportuno, in relazione alla precedente corrispondenza di rilevare la crescente attività dei partiti sovversivi i quali con ogni mezzo cercano di sobillare la popolazione per diffondere e accentuare il malcontento e trarne profitto ai loro fini.
Mezzo esterno più sono le manifestazioni di donne per chiedere sussidi ai municipi o ai Comitati di azione civile, manifestazioni che raccolgono talvolta, come ad Imola, centinaia di persone e possono improvvisamente degenerare in dimostrazioni più gravi che turbano lo spirito pubblico.
Seguo con ogni attenzione tale movimento e ho dato disposizioni perché le autorità prevenzano col loro sincero interessamento i giusti desideri delle classi colpite dalla guerra, ma siano severe nell'impedire atti di intimidazione o violenza che costituissero pernicioso esempio.
Debbo fare presente come nel momento attuale inconvenienti non lievi siano le scarse forze delle stazioni dei RR.CC. continuamente assottigliate e gravate per servizi militari e che per ciò assai poco attività possono dare ai servizi di polizia che pure hanno oggi più che mai importanza essenziale.
(ASB., 1916 Partiti, cit.)

15. Prefect to interior minister, 21.09.16.
La ostilità degli esercenti contro l'ente autonomo dei consumi è spiegabile con la efficacia di calmiere indiretto che gli spacci comunali esercitano.
Tale opera deve essere incoraggiata data la pretesa assurda dei negozianti che hanno spinto il rincaro in questa città a cifre più alte che in ogni altro luogo mentre del resto la costituzione degli enti autonomi è consigliato dallo stesso Ministero di Agricoltura che si occupa del loro funzionamento.
(ASB., 1916, Cat 4-5, Amministrazioni comunali, congregazioni di carità, etc., cit.)

Si è preso atto di quanto V.S. ha riferito con la controindicata nota e col successivo telegramma espresso il corrente avvertendo che si è subito interessato nuovamente il Ministero della Guerra perché provveda possibilmente a liberare i CC.RR dai servizi di indole militare attualmente loro affidate in modo che essi possano tornare a quelli di istituto.
Quanto al completamento dell'organico di codesta
Divisione delle Guardie di Città il Ministero è spiacente di non potervi, per ora, provvedere, perché mancano al corpo attualmente 3000 agenti, si che per poter rimediare a tale deficienza si è dovuto ricorrere alla misura di ridurre congruamente e temporaneamente l'organico di ciascuna divisione. E codesta di Bologna è una delle meno ridotte.

Con i nuovi arruolamenti si ha speranza, però, di potere presto riportare gli organici in piena efficienza di forza.

(ASB., 1919, Cat.6-7, cit.)


EGREGI COLLEGHI

Gli Agenti di PS e di Custodia delle Capitali, uniti ed affratellati da unicità di diritti e da comunanza di scopi, hanno eletta una Commissione mista per una grande agitazione, unica, concorde e risoluta che dovrà essere spiegata in tutta Italia.

Detta Commissione, mentre traccia le linee generali dell'agitazione e si riserva di comunicare con una prossima circolare il programma d'attuare, sente il dovere di fare appello ai colleghi di ambedue i corpi, perché tutti diano la loro adesione e collaborazione pronta, assoluta, incondizionata.

Colleghi! non c'illudiamo troppo su propositi di chi ci governa! Se non propugneremo i nostri diritti, come fanno le nostre classi, saremo sempre dei dimenticati. Quali miglioramenti, infatti, abbiamo noi avuto colla nostra remissività durante lo spaventoso cataclisma che si sta attraversando? Nessuno nè economico nè morale! Noi abbiamo sofferto e soffriamo la fame perché con L.3.80 al giorno non si può assolutamente più vivere, perché con L.17.85 cent. al mese (L17.85!) non è più possibile trovare un alloggio, neanche nelle soffitte e nei sottoscala! Noi dobbiamo attendere una promozione non meno di un decennio!

L'unico atto di giustizia che ci è stato resto, ponendo fine all'abuso sfacciato che si commetteva a nostro danno col tenerci obbligati al pagamento della R.M. si vuole gabellare per miglioramento economico, e come tale si dà a intendere al pubblico, che ignora le nostre reali condizioni! Ma noi proveremo, e con ogni mezzo, che questa è una volgare menzogna!!!

Noi siamo una potenza ma lo abbiamo ignorato. Ora è tempo di destarci: la forza è nelle nostre mani! Sappiamo adoperare adesso che se ne offre il destro. Facciamo nostro il detto: uno per tutti: per un coraggio!!

Avanti!!!!

LA COMMISSIONE

(ASB., 1919 Personale, cit.)
18. Prime minister to prefect, 24.05.20.
1° Dove fatti simili si verificano e vengono a sua conoscenza li denunci subito all'autorità giudiziaria e cerchi che si proceda per direttissima. Le prove devono essere raccolte con cura in modo che non si facciano processi a caso.
2° Cerchi per mezzo della stampa fare che pubblico reagisca a questi abusi e si formi la coscienza del grave pericolo.
3° In previsione di scioperi prossimi prepari tutte misure occorrenti per resistenza e fra cittadini volonterosi si stabiliscano comitati non dei soliti chiacchieroni ma gente abile, operosa, coraggiosa che sappia imporre interesse nazionale e minoranza faziosa. Mi telegrafi se ha misure da suggerire o provvedimenti da chiedere.
(ASB., 1920 Agitazioni operaie, cit.)

19. Prime minister to prefect, 29.01.21.
Mi informi se Autorità Giudiziaria ha preso provvedimenti contro giornale "L'Assalto" (che aveva minacciato invasione Prefettura) e contro autori eccitamento alla guerra civile. Diffidi Questore che se non agisce con la massima energia contro autori e provocatori violenze fasciste sarà immediatamente destituito.
Giolitti
(ACS:UC.)

20. Questore to prefect, 21.09.20.
In relazione a precedente corrispondenza partecipo a V.S. Ill.ma che, giusta quanto viene riferito, con apposito rapporto, dal Vice-Questore ed hanno constatato i funzionari tutti di servizio, Militari della Regia Guardia, ieri, troppo abbandonati a sé stessi malamente inquadrati e diretti dagli Ufficiali, contrariamente a quanto è prescritto e come avevo pure richiesto colla mia ordinanza di servizio, richiamando precise, tassative disposizioni, offrirono spettacolo poco edificante di indisciplina e di disorganizzazione, e si dovette all'iniziativa ed allo zelo dei funzionari di PS, se non si verificano, in seguito a ciò, dolorosi eventi.
Essi militari, infatti, malgrado anche le singole disposizioni e richieste dei funzionari, preposti alla tutela dell'ordine, si sparpagliano in gruppi, abbandonandosi, durante il passaggio del corteo, a manifestazioni, che, se pure ammirevoli, perché provocate da sentimenti di attaccamento alle Istituzioni, erano in
perfetta antitesi coi doveri dell'ordine e della disciplina, tanto necessari nei difficili e delicatissimi compiti del servizio di ordine pubblico, specie in questi giorni, ed in questo ambiente. Fra l'altro, muniti di banderuole, essi si spinsero sulla pubblica via, abbandonando i loro posti di inquadramento, colla manifesta intenzione di unirsi e seguire il corteo. Si dovetto lottare non poco (coi) funzionari, per ottenere che non si allontanassero dalla Questura; e quando, cominciati gli incidenti presso i locali della Borsa e nell'interno del cortile della Questura stessa, si richiesero d'urgenza per fronteggiarli, appositi nuclei, questi non si trovarono pronti e la forza ritardò al quanto ad intervenire. Fu merito dei funzionari e degli agenti investigativi, se si potè subito porre un argine all'azione delle parti avversarie in lotta, e scongiurare fatti molto più gravi per l'avvenire, con pericoli gravissimi per l'ordine pubblico; eppero prego V.S. Ill.ma compiacersi, ove lo creda, provocare gli opportuni provvedimenti, in considerazione delle gravissime responsabilità, che dal fatto derivano. Nella circostanza, faccio anche presente a V.S. Ill.ma che degli ufficiali subalterni del Corpo, i due capitani, che figurano nell'organico della locale Divisione, sono da più di un mese in congedo per motivi di salute; dei pochi ufficiali subalterni, assegnati alla Divisione stessa, un tenente è in congedo da qualche giorno, in altro è in missione da parecchi mesi a S.Rossore, e perciò non prestano servizio che due tenenti qui in missione, ed un sottotenente i quali, non pratici dell'ambiente, non conoscono a fondo i militari dipendenti, sui quali perciò non hanno, né allo stato delle cose, potrebbero avere alcun ascendente.  

(ASB., 1920 *Pratica Generale di PS*, cit.)

21. Prime minister to prefect, 27.01.21.  
Revoca permessi porto armi e fatto secondo legge di PS e deve eseguirsi a qualunque costo.  
Avverta tutti i funzionari della PS e Comandi dei Carabinieri e della Regia Guardia che governo sarà inesorabile contro chiunque trascuri esecuzione ordini ricevuti.  

(ACS: UC.)

22. Confederazione Generale Lavoro (Bologna) to interior minister, 25.01.21.  
Distruzione Camera Lavoro Bologna avvenuta ieri sera dimostra al di fuori qualsiasi inchiesta, che organizzazione fascista trova conniventi Autorità locali per sue imprese. Truppe e guardie, sufficientissime per impedire assalto ed incendio, assistettero impassibili per circa due ore, pur sapendo che le poche persone rimaste assediate
rischiavano di essere uccise in caso di assoluta mancanza di altre vie di uscita. Non già protesta contro chi tenta riportarci alla faziosità delle lotte medioevali ma questa nostra vuole essere denuncia contro chi incita alla guerra civile, approfittando della sua qualità di rappresentante del potere civile.

(ACS: UC.)

23. Prefect to Questore, no date (24.04.21. approx.).
Sembrami che azione svolta dai funzionari e carabinieri ad Argelato sia deficiente specialmente nei riguardi dei fascisti che presero parte alla nota rissa di quale soltanto uno è stato arrestato mentre feriti sono quasi tutti da parte dei comunisti.

(ASB., 1921 Comuni: A-B, cit.)

24. Declaration by vice-commissar (Baricella) to prefect, 15.10.21.
Reggiani Luigi di Antonio il quale domandato risponde: "Domenica verso le ore 9 trovandomi nel cortile della Cooperativa vidi che due carabinieri traevano in arresto il fascista Busi. Segul i carabinieri ed il Busi lungo la traduzione alla caserma ed a trenta metri distante della cooperativa notai che il fascista consegnava ad un carabiniere un oggetto che aveva la forma di una rivoltella. Ritornai alla cooperativa per prendere la bicicletta e mi portai alla Caserma dei RR.CC. per raccontare quanto avevo visto al Brigadiere che per tutta risposta dopo una mezz'ora d'interrogatorio fui messo in libertà. Null'altro sono in grado di aggiungere".

(ASB., 1921 Comuni: A-B, cit.)

25. Carabinieri Reali (Budrio) to prefect, 12.09.21.
Con la circostanza si sommette che lo scrivente sarebbe grato qualora la R. Prefettura volesse compiacersi far promuovere pratiche perché al lanciatore di dette venisse rinfacciato il risultato delle verifiche per sua norma avvenire, non potendosi ammettere nè permettere che impunemente si possono e con tanta frequenza inprospettare circostanze e fatti destituiti di ogni fondamento.

(ASB., 1921 Comuni: A-B, cit.)

Tutti i Funzionari di P.S. che sono stati destinati a servizi di ordine pubblico in questa città, mi hanno concordemente fatto rilevare che allorché debbono essi
esplicare azione energica e repressiva verso gruppi di dimostranti fascisti o simpatizzanti con questi, trovansi isolati perché le forze di polizia, non rispondono esattamente ai loro inviti.
Quanto sopra determina situazione difficile e pericolosa.
(ASB., 1921 Dati, cit.)

27. Prime minister to prefect, 20.04.21.
Violenza fascista in tempo di lotta elettorale costituisce reato e disonorano il Paese.
Camera eletta con violenza mancherà di autorità morale.
Purtroppo forza pubblica in codesta provincia manca al suo dovere non reprimendo così gravi reati. Occorre quindi cambiare quei capi della forza pubblica che per debolezza o connivenza non fanno il loro dovere. (Voglia quindi) lei indicarmi entro domani, con telegramma diretto a me personalmente, il nome degli ufficiali, carabinieri, guardie regie che sia conveniente traslocare.
L'avverto che la terrei personalmente responsabile dell'opera dei comandanti della forza.
(ASB., 1921 Dati, cit.)

28. Prefect to undersecretary of the interior, 20.03.21.
Locale procuratore generale del Re mi avverte avere inviato Ministero Giustizia rapporto rilevando che a suo avviso rilascio noto Arpinati avvenuto contro norme procedurali e con preavviso a giornali i quali ne pubblicarono anticipatamente notizia dà motivo ritenere che Autorità giudiziaria Ferrara abbia ceduto pressioni piazza. Da parte mia osservo che a mandato cattura opportunamente spiccato sarebbe stato bene avesse seguito normale regolare istruttoria salvo se del caso rilascio a suo tempo su ordine organo competente. Qui ad ogni modo malgrado rilascio che non giova prestigio Autorità giudiziaria arresto Arpinati fu per fascisti buon correttivo. Socialisti però lamentano disparità trattamento per negata libertà provvisoria a taluno imputati fatti 21 novembre scorso ed a qualche arrestato per taglie.
(ASB., 1921 Dati, cit.)

29. Questore to prefect, 28.12.21.
Partecipo a V.S. Ill.ma per conoscenza che il 22 corr. alla Pretura Urbana venne discussa la causa contro i fascisti Cavedoni Celestino, Bonfiglioli Luigi e Bartoli Marco, imputati di danneggiamenti alla sede della Lega Braccianti di Bertalia, commesso il 14.11.us.
I primi due vennero assolti per insufficienza di prove, il Bartoli fu condannato a giorni 20 di reclusione e L.100 di multa.
Con sentenza dello stesso giorno Biagi Arres, Ceroni Giuseppe e Borsari Luigi imputati di spari di fucili contro fascisti nell'episodio di Casa Zamboni avvenuto il 3 luglio us. furono condannati a: L.100 ciascuno di multa
ed alla confisca dell'arma per la mancata denunzia dell'arma stessa.
(ASB., 1921 Comuni: A-B, cit.)

30. Prefect to Questore, sub-prefects, Carabinieri and Guardie Regie commanders, 4.11.21.
Ricorre con troppa frequenza nella relazioni delle SS.LL. per fatti di violenza provocati da fascisti la motivazione di non essersi potuto procedere all'arresto dei responsabili perché "datasi alla latitanza" ciò che invece non avviene con la stessa frequenza per violenze quando i responsabili ne sono persone appartenenti ad altri partiti.
Sarei lieto se la stessa più lodevole attità sia dimostrata in confronto dei responsabili di tutte le violenze a qualunque partito essi appartengano.
(ASB., 1921 Dati, cit.)

31. Prefect to Questore, Carabinieri and Regie Guardie commanders, 25.08.21.
Da fonte fascista mi viene riferito che le locali due camere del lavoro stanno arruolando arditi del popolo che trovano di preferenza tra i muratori ed i tramvieri. Mi è stato inoltre assicurato che tale arruolamento si occupano attivamente il Gamalero segretario della Camera del Lavoro ed i noti Ramboni e Boni della lega tramvieri i quali in proposito avrebbero tenuto una importante adunanza la sera del 6 corr. in Via Rivareno 77-72. Mi è stato infine assicurato, sempre dalla medesima fonte fascista, che sarebbero stati già costituiti 7 rioni ciascuna come sede propria, che gli arruolati raggiungerebbero sino ad ora il numero di 2300 e che altro arruolamento stanno facendosi ad Altedo e Reale. Prego le SS.LL. di riferirmi le più ample informazioni in proposito e con la massima possibile sollecitudine e di procedere con ogni energia a norma delle istruzioni date con espresso riservatissimo in data 23 corr. N4645.
(ASB., 1921 Associazioni, cit.)

32. Prefect to police chief, 14.04.22.
Trasmetto a codesto On. Ministero per debito d'ufficio l'unita domanda con la quale il V. Commissario di P.S. Sig. Mazzoni Raffaele chiede di essere trasferito in altra residenza dell'Italia Meridionale e, possibilmente del Molise.
Il Sig. Mazzoni ha reso utili e lodevoli servizi in questa provincia, nell'attuale sua residenza, ma da qualche tempo eccessivamente impressionato dagli attacchi mossigli sulla stampa dai fascisti, e dalla loro ostilità per l'opera di repressione alla quale il Mazzoni ha dovuto provvedere in varie occasioni di violenze fasciste nel territorio del Circondario di Vergato, si va mostrando alquanto indeciso e perplesso.
Per quanto Egli, a causa della preoccupazione dalla
33. From L'Assalto, 3.05.21.
Tempo fa avemmo occasione di occuparci del Delegato di Molinella e riferimmo qualche episodio a prova della sua incapacità a coprire il delicato ufficio che gli è affidato.
Sembra però che l'Autorità non abbia tenuto in alcun conto il nostro articolo ed anziché fare un'inchiesta sull'opera di questo funzionario, agli ordini di Massarenti, abbia provveduto all'allontanamento del maresciallo contro cui era stato avanzato un rapporto di questo bel tipo di Delegato.
Di questo Delegato che si fa vedere ubriaco per le vie del paese, che minaccia colla rivoltella i pacifici cittadini, che partecipa alle baldorie socialiste ed odia a morte i fascisti e tutti coloro che non esaltano l'opera del Dio Massarenti.
Noi invitiamo ancora l'Autorità a prendere in esame la posizione di questo ridicolo funzionario trascurando fatto che egli è il beniamino ed il protettore di Giuseppe Massarenti.
Che se poi l'Autorità continuerà a proteggere questo Delegato ed a punire coloro che hanno sentimenti patriottici, allora cercheremo noi la via per liberare Molinella da questo funzionario poco serio e meno italiano.

34. Police chief to prefect, February 1923.
Col 31 Gennaio p.p., come è noto, tutte le organizzazioni inquadrate militarmente, a qualunque tendenza politica appartenessero, sono state sciolte in forza di apposito provvedimento di legge.
E poi necessario che tornino allo Stato le armi lunghe che molte camicie nere, venutene in possesso durante i moti di ottobre, conservano tuttora presso di loro.
Ritengo tuttavia che i fini di cui sopra si potranno più facilmente raggiungere anzitutto coll'opera di persuasione e col prestigio dei dirigenti Fasci e dei Comandi della Milizia Volontaria, e che, comunque, l'azione dell'Autorità di P.S. e delle forze di polizia, se necessaria, dovrà rivolgersi in pieno accordo con
l'Autorità della Milizia Nazionale e coll'Autorità Politica del Partito Nazionale Fascista.

Pregherei pertanto vivamente le SS.LL. di volersi complacere, ove lo credano, dare disposizioni ai segretari dei Fasci della Provincia ai Comandi locali della M.V.S.N. di agire nel senso suesposto, e di farmi conoscere il loro pensiero in merito.
(ASB., 1923 Partiti politici, cit.)

35. Circular 13652, 13.06.23.
Mussolini
(ASB., 1923 Partiti politici, cit.)

36. Console Generale MVSV (Baccolini) to ?, 19.07.23.
Riferimento telegramma codesto Comando N.16237, 11 corrente, comunicasi che Seniore Marchesini Emiliano si est costituito arresti rigore et per disposizione Divisione Militare trovasi caserma Cavavalleggeri Saluzzo. Da indagini praticate sua responsabilità appare molto attenuato et pare debba escludersi sua attiva partecipazione fatto.
(ASB., 1923 Comuni, cit.)

37. Prime minister to prefect, 5.12.23.
Le segnalo = ma Ella avrà già rilevato il risveglio antifascista che avviene in quel di Molinella. Occorre provvedere ed intervenire senza indugio: Ella ne parli anche coi dirigenti del fascismo emiliano.
Mi dia relazione della vera situazione.
(ABS., 1923 Comuni, cit.)
38. Interior minister to prefects, 29.05.24.

E stato rilevato che nel riferire circa fatti ed incidenti nei quali siano implicati fascisti e militi volontari non sempre i Sgg. Prefetti fanno esatta distinzione fra la qualità di fascisti e quella di militi nazionali, provocando così fra i vari organi competenti necessarie rettifiche ed inutile carteggio per assodare le rispettive responsabilità.

Ad eliminare il ripetersi di siffatti inconvenienti, prego le SS.LL. nel riferire sugli incidenti che si verifichino nel territorio della relativa giurisdizione, e sulla identificazione delle persone implicatevi, di volere accuratamente accertarne e quindi indicarne, anche, la precisa qualità, specificando, cioè, se trattasi di semplici fascisti o di militi volontari, e suddistinguendo, in quest'ultimo caso, se siano in divisa ed in servizio oppure no.

(ABS., 1924 Relazioni, cit.)


Con riferimento ad istruzioni precedentemente date circa gli sforzi da fare per ottenere una forte votazione faccio presente a V.S. che dalle risposte date dai Prefetti alle domande fatte sulle presumibili risultanze della votazione risultano che la percentuale dei votanti sarà probabilmente minore di quella del 1921. Ciò non deve accadere e perciò prego di prendere accordi con codesto Federazione Fascista per intensificare gli sforzi perché la percentuale dei votanti sia in ogni caso maggiore di quella del 1921. Nell'occasione torno a raccomandare di fare in modo che la lista del Fascio abbia una votazione plebiscitaria così che possa riportare la grandissima prevalenza su tutte le altre liste.

(ABS., 1924 Relazioni, cit.)

40. Interior minister to prefects, 3.01.25.

Rivolgo particolare invito ai Sigg. Prefetti di portare ogni cura nell'adozione delle misure atte a garantire il mantenimento ordine pubblico in qualunque circostanza. Dispongono intanto: 1° la chiusura di tutti i circoli et ritrovi sospetti dal punto di vista politico; 2° lo scioglimento di tutte le organizzazioni che sotto qualsiasi pretesto possano raccogliere elementi turbolenti aut che comunque tendano a sovvertire i poteri dello Stato. 3° particolarmente lo scioglimento di tutti i gruppi dell'Italia Libera vietandone sino da qualsiasi attività; 4° vigilanza dei commissari et sovversivi che diano prova o sospetto di attività criminosa procedendo a retate degli elementi pericolosi e avvertendo che ogni tentativo di resistenza deve essere severamente represso con ogni mezzo. 5° rastrellamento armi illegalmente detenute operando oculate frequenti perquisizioni; 6° vigilanza vigorosissima sugli esercizi pubblici. Per raggiungimento scopo chiedono alla abnegazione dei
funzionari ufficiali e militari militi il maggiore rendimento dell'opera loro e diano ordine perché tutte le forze di polizia siano mobilitate dal mezzogiorno di sabato alla mezzanotte del lunedì e cioè sino a nuova disposizione e si valgano se necessario ed opportuno della facoltà di mobilitare la milizia volontaria che deve naturalmente agire esclusivamente alle dipendenze delle SS.LL. Assicuri adempimento.

(ASB., 1925 Partiti, cit.)

41. Interior minister to prefect, 4.01.25.

(ASB., 1925 Partiti, cit.)

42. Prefect of Florence to prefect of Bologna, 16.07.25.
Circa incidenti verificatisi qui ieri sera e stanotte ho consentito tre giornali pubblicassero soltanto seguente comunicato e prego vossignoria provvedere in conformità per stampa locale: "Ieri verso ore diciotto alcuni individui attesero all'uscita dalla corte di assise avvocato Targetti con propositi violenza. Questore avvertito invid prontamente funzionari ed agenti i quali circondato Targetti lo fecero ricoverare in questura. Detto avvocato poté più tardi rientrare sua abitazione senza ulteriore molestie. Intanto alcuni sconosciuti fecero improvvisamente irruzione nello studio del Targetti danneggiandolo e dandosi subito alla fuga. Nella serata un gruppo giovani si recò abitazione ingegner Carlo Rosselli in via Giusti n.18 e successivamente nello studio due corrispondenti dell'Avanti in via Porta Rossa n.6 danneggiando mobili. Nessuna violenza fu fatta alle
persone famigliari che si trovavano nell'abitazione del Rosselli. Più tardi lo stesso gruppo si recò pensione Gozzoli e richiese al proprietario notizie di certo prof. Zanotti. All'asserzione del Gozzoli di non conoscere Zanotti ed al rifiuto consegna registro pensionati giovani stessi lo colpirono con qualche schiaffo allontanandosi dopo di aver danneggiato l'apparecchio telefonico. Sono stati eseguiti alcuni fermi ed arresti e sono in corso ulteriori indagini“.

(ASB., 1925 Stampe, cit.)
APPENDIX 3

Appointments to the Office of Prefect in Bologna, 1894-1925

Giovanni Giura 16.09.94.
Francesco De Seta 01.09.97.
Francesco Serrao 05.11.97.
Evandro Caravaggio 01.09.98.
Bernardo Ferrari 16.03.02.
Antonio Dall'Oglio 01.07.04.
Ernesto Dallari 01.10.06.
Vincenzo Quaranta 16.08.14.
Gennaro Bladier 01.07.19.
Agostino D'Adamo 15.12.19.
Vincenzo Pericoli 20.04.20.
Giuseppe Visconti 01.08.20.
Cesare Mori 08.02.21.
Enrico Palmieri 26.08.22.
Faustino Aphel 01.01.23.
Arturo Bocchini 16.12.23.
Raffaele De Vita 24.10.25.

From Mario Missori, cit.
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1900
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       Cat. 6, Agitazioni operaie, scioperi, dimostrazioni di varie categorie di lavoratori  
       Cat. 7, Conflitti, scioperi, partiti politici  
       Cat. 16, Agitazioni agrarie  
       Cat. 16, Approvvigionamenti, raccolti, agitazioni agrarie nella provincia di Bologna |
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       Cat. 4-5, Amministrazioni comunali, elezioni politiche  
       Cat. 6, Agitazioni impiegate dello stato e di enti locali  
       Cat. 6, Agitazione anti-fiscale, trebbiatura, importazione mano d'opera  
       Cat. 7, Dati della Forza e ordine pubblico  
       Cat. 7, Scioperi, agitazioni, partiti politici |
Cat. 7, Congressi, violenze, partiti politici, giornali
Cat. 7, Comuni: Ordine pubblico
Cat. 12-16, Inchieste, incendi, requisizioni locali, etc.

1923
Cat. 2, Personale dell'Amministrazione di PS
Cat. 6, Agitazioni operai, dimostrazioni, scioperi
Cat. 7, Partiti politici, associazioni, porto d'armi
Cat. 7, Comuni: Ordine pubblico

1924
Cat. 2, Personale dell'Amministrazione di PS
Cat. 5, Elezioni politiche, etc.
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1925
Cat. 2, Pratica Generale, Circolari, ecc.
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CORRECTIONS TO TEXT

p. 35  "This point is ill-documented, however, and therefore highly implausible." (to be inserted following sentence ending "1878.")

pp. 64-65 In the original English text (see Bibliography) this quotation reads: "It was a scandal, in army eyes, that such dignity should be granted to wartime subalterns, or even to retired regulars who now obtained ranks in the Militia higher than those of their contemporaries who had stayed in active service." (p. 246)

p. 87 In the original English text (see Bibliography) this quotation reads: "The Militia remained at the direct orders of Mussolini except while it performed functions of pre-military training. Its Fascist uniforms, symbols and culture were untouched. Recruitment, although it was nominally opened to non-Fascists, remained under the control of the consuls. Finally, a small concession was made to the Army by ruling that outside the service the MVSN would enjoy the same rank as they had had in the Army."
However, within the Militia they could continue to exercise functions of command superior to their nominal rank." (p. 249-50)

p. 193 "However, the author does not support such claims with well documented evidence (La Strage, cit., pp. 110-18)." (replacing "(La Strage, cit., pp. 110-08).")

p. 265 "Again, however, the author does not support his claims with well documented evidence." (to insert after sentence ending "attack.")

p. 358 ", despite being officially designed to curb such illegalities." (to be added on to sentence ending "illegalities.")