THE UNIVERSITY OF HULL

THE WARHORSE AND MILITARY SERVICE
UNDER EDWARD III

being a Thesis submitted for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

in the University of Hull

by

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September 1990
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INTRODUCTION

There are few aspects of medieval English history as important, yet as neglected, as military service. This is not to suggest that the study of war has been eschewed by scholars of the Middle Ages, for this is very far from being the case. A great deal of attention has been devoted to the vexed questions of military obligation and the mentalité of the chivalric class; to the size, structure and financing of armies and the mechanisms of their recruitment; and to the martial aspects of knightly culture, such as the tournament and crusading. On a more general level, there has been much discussion of the impact of war on society and the economy, and on the influence of wartime conditions on the development of parliament. It is not so much war that has been neglected, as the 'military community': the many thousands of men who served in English royal armies and garrisons during the Middle Ages. These men - their careers in arms, their backgrounds, their peacetime lives - remain, if not wholly in shadow, then very much in the penumbra of history. So far, indeed, are we from a comprehensive study of those who engaged in military activity in later medieval England that we lack a full prosopographical study for even a single major royal army.¹ The contrast with, for example, the history of parliamentary representation is indeed striking, yet we surely need to understand the social composition of the king's armies quite as much as the origins and affiliations of the membership of the king's parliaments. At the moment a good deal is known about the men who 'were prepared to be at the pains of repeatedly riding across

England to serve as representatives in parliament\(^2\) and comparatively little about those who took up arms to ride across France and Scotland. The neglect of the men who engaged in military service, and in particular the ordinary men-at-arms and archers who formed the backbone of Edwardian armies, has significantly impaired our understanding of the workings of the English war machine; but the implications of this neglect extend far beyond the province of military history, into the study of many aspects of late medieval English society. How, for example, are we to assess the likely extent and distribution of campaigning profits (and, indeed, costs) in society - or the impact of military service on the workings of shire administration, or the influence of war on the retaining practices of the nobility and gentry - without first establishing the identities of those who served in the king's armies during this period? There can be few major research undertakings in the field of late medieval English history that would offer such wide-ranging benefits as a full-scale reconstruction of the military community.

The main impediment to systematic study of the military community is the immensity of the research task. Reconstructing the careers of those who are known to have served in the king's armies in the later Middle Ages represents a most daunting undertaking, for the numbers of individuals involved are very great and the source materials are voluminous and, in the main, not available in printed form. A major assault on the records has yet to be made,\(^3\) but there have been a number of small-scale attacks, with varying degrees of success. These have, in the main, been undertaken as part of broader based studies,


\(^3\) Dr. Anne Curry is, however, currently engaged in a major prosopographical study of field army and garrison personnel in Lancastrian Normandy, this building on her *Military organisation in Lancastrian Normandy, 1422-50* (Council for National Academic Awards, Ph.D thesis, 1985).
The majority of which are concerned with either an individual magnate and his retinue, or with county or regional communities. The most valuable published work to date focussing on the problem of military service has been Philip Morgan's recent study of the military community of fourteenth-century Cheshire. Although Cheshire's military traditions and patterns of lordship make it something of a special case, the themes explored in Morgan's pioneering book are of great relevance to the wider community of militarily active Englishmen. This monograph, however, stands very much on its own. The military community of late medieval England has yet to receive treatment comparable with Philippe Contamine's magisterial study of *guerre, état et société* in later medieval France.

The foundation for a systematic study of the military community must be a proper appreciation of the possibilities and limitations of the source materials. Though self-evident, this must be firmly stated since such appreciation has not always been displayed in the past. Too often the nominal sources for the personnel of royal armies have been used without sufficient consideration for their shortcomings, with the result that impressive-looking castles have been built upon very insecure foundations. One of the underlying aims of the present study, therefore, is to explore the strengths and weaknesses of the


military records for the fourteenth-century. It is particularly important to ascertain what proportion of those engaged in military activity can actually be known by name, as well as the nature of the distortions which are introduced by incomplete evidence. This study focuses primarily on one very distinctive collection of records, the horse inventories, but it seeks to place them within a broader-based analysis which embraces the full range of relevant records, with a view to determining their relative importance in contributing to the nominal roll of fourteenth-century military personnel.

Of the various categories of source material available to the historian of military service, the horse inventories (together with a miscellany of associated records) stand out as being of particular importance for the light which they can cast upon the military community of Edwardian England. On one level, they are invaluable as a source for the performance of military service. Few records provide evidence which is as reliable or as complete as that which is to be assembled from the horse inventories. Most types of record, whether of a conventional kind, like enrolled lists of letters of protection, or rather more unusual, like rolls of arms, tend to reveal only the more prominent members of the military community - the milites strenui. A collection of muster rolls would certainly redress the balance, but comparatively few appear to have survived from the earlier fourteenth-century. So, for consistent evidence of the 'ordinary' men-at-arms in Edwardian armies, it is necessary to rely

7. This theme is fully developed in Chapter V. The vagaries of documentary survival, combined with the fact that horse appraisal operated for only a proportion of expeditions, means that the inventories are offering no more than a sample; but it is a sample which, as we shall see, is usually composed of either a random selection of personnel or a slice through the military community with representatives from each of its layers.

8. For example, the four rolls of arms, dating from the mid 1330s, which N. Denholm-Young considers provide a 'Peerage, Baronage, and Knightage of England on the eve of the Hundred Years War': The country gentry in the fourteenth-century (Oxford, 1969), p. 96.
upon the horse inventories, where the modestly-priced mounts of these men are listed alongside the destriers and coursers of their more affluent or celebrated comrades-in-arms.

It is, indeed, in the association of warhorse and man-at-arms that the unique value of these records lies. The inventories are an extraordinarily abundant and varied source for the study of the late medieval English warhorse, but the present study is concerned not so much with the horses themselves as with what their descriptions and valuations can tell us about their chivalric owners. They can be made to reveal a good deal about social and military status and about attitudes to campaigning. Viewing the information in bulk allows patterns to emerge for the chivalric class as a whole - or rather for those sections of it which are embraced by the surviving rolls; and because the inventories are available for the greater part of the Edwardian period, it is possible to trace changes in the patterns over a respectable length of time. Against the background of this broad canvas it is possible to perceive conformity or divergence in the behaviour of individuals or groups within the military community.

The primary aim of the present study, therefore, is to determine how much can be learned about the military community through an analysis of the horse inventories. The ground requires careful preparation. First, it is necessary to place the inventories within a broader context. There are several important questions to be considered. What was the nature of the relationship between the warhorse and the traditional 'military class' in the fourteenth-century, and how far

9. Thus, this study is complementary to R.H.C. Davis' work on the medieval warhorse (which does not make direct use of the inventory evidence); and, also, perhaps to J. Langdon's splendid book, *Horses, oxen and technological innovation* (Cambridge, 1986).

10. This is explored fully in Chapter VI
was it altered in practice, and in people's perceptions, by the 'military revolution' of the Edwardian period? To what extent can the evidence of the inventories be supported and amplified by sources of other kinds?\textsuperscript{11} The second essential task of preparation involves a close examination of the inventories themselves and the administrative mechanisms and other circumstances involved in their generation.\textsuperscript{12} This is central to a proper assessment of the reliability, comprehensiveness and consistency of the information which these records supply.

The inventories are a written record of the process of horse appraisal, the valuation of his warhorse being only one element (in fact, a kind of insurance policy) in a package of payments and benefits - the terms of service - offered to a man-at-arms serving for the king's pay.\textsuperscript{13} The elements in the package were by no means constant, however, and horse appraisal was offered by the Crown for only some forms of military service and for only a proportion of major expeditions. An examination of the shifting balance of elements in the terms of service forms an important aspect of an exploration of the context of the horse inventories,\textsuperscript{14} for it will reveal whether the extent of documentary survival is broadly in line with the pattern of actual compilation and how far the warhorse records have been the victim of the indiscriminate ravages of time. Whilst contributing to one of the broader aims of this study - to determine the practical limits of knowledge about military service - the analysis of the

\textsuperscript{11} These questions are considered below, pp. 15-22 and in Chapter II.

\textsuperscript{12} For this, see Chapter III.

\textsuperscript{13} These terms were in fact offered to the captain of the retinue in which the man-at-arms served. It is often far from clear whether the terms under which ordinary men-at-arms served differed from those which the Crown made available to captains. Studies of the handful of surviving sub-contracts from this period tend to suggest that captains were often able to recruit men of respectable quality and preserve a margin of profit (see below, p. 167 n. 57).

\textsuperscript{14} For this, see Chapter IV.
package of terms of service as it evolved during the period is also intended as a commentary on the predicament of the man-at-arms in the Edwardian military system. This predicament is still far too little understood, for a really convincing portrayal of the benefits and costs of war as they affected the typical man-at-arms has yet to be written. As a modest contribution to this intriguing - and often debated - subject, this study is concerned not with the glamour of ransoms, the chance windfalls of war, but with the more mundane matters of day to day costs and remuneration.

The horse inventories which are to be examined have survived in considerable numbers from the reign of Edward I and the early years of that of his son, but after the 1320s they become far less common and the last examples to have come down to us date from the mid-1360s. Why, then, choose to focus attention on Edward III's reign, the period in which these most illuminating of military records are rapidly petering out? It is not simply a matter of manageability, for a more abundant supply of inventories for the mid fourteenth-century would be greatly welcomed. The period has been chosen, not so much for practical reasons, but because of the significant changes in the organisation of the English fighting machine which it witnessed: changes in army structure and patterns of recruitment, in types of troops raised and in the social background of personnel; changes in military obligation and the terms of service, and in related administrative mechanisms; and changes in the practice of war, in campaigning methods and battlefield tactics. As documents produced during this period of change, and in some ways at the very heart of

15. For a fuller discussion of the pattern of documentary availability, see below pp.54-55;256-73.
16. The main emphasis of the present study is on the materials of Edward III's reign, but the methods of investigation could be applied with profit to the records generated during the reigns of the first two Edwards.
it, the horse inventories of the 1320s to '60s cast valuable illumination on the character and attitudes of the military community at a time when their traditional role and *raison d'être* were in the course of re-evaluation.
Chapter I
THE MILITARY REVOLUTION IN EDWARDIAN ENGLAND

To speak of a 'military revolution' in England during the second and third quarters of the fourteenth-century may give rise to some surprise,¹ but the extent to which the English fighting machine was transformed during this period cannot seriously be doubted. The years separating the débâcle of Bannockburn from Edward III's expedition to France in 1359-60 witnessed very significant changes in the character and structure of English royal armies.² The great army which Edward II led to the relief of Stirling castle in 1314, and which was heavily defeated by the Scots at Bannockburn, probably consisted of about 2,500 men-at-arms serving in companies of various sizes, and 15,000 foot soldiers raised in the shires (of which a proportion would have been archers).³ The two elements of the army were numerically unbalanced, they were recruited separately, and they fought separately. The contrast with the English army serving in France in 1359 is striking indeed. This consisted of nearly 12,000 men, of which the most important elements were about 4,750 men-at-arms and 5,500 mounted archers;⁴ it was, thus, formidable both in its sheer size and in the balance between men-at-arms and mounted archers, a


². This chapter focuses on changes in the structure and composition of Edwardian armies, together with accompanying developments in fighting methods; the terms of service are discussed in Chapter IV. The institutional dimensions of the late medieval 'military revolution' (for example, the evolution of parliamentary institutions and the establishment of regular taxation) fall outside the scope of the present study, as do those technical developments (e.g. gunpowder) which had only a minimal effect on the functioning of the English war machine prior to the end of the Edwardian period.

³. These are informed estimates, in the absence of any surviving pay-rolls or horse inventories: see J.E. Morris, Bannockburn (Cambridge, 1914), p. 41.

balance which was, moreover, reflected in the composition of the individual retinues making up the bulk of the army's strength. The earl of Northampton, for example, served with a retinue composed of 160 men-at-arms and 200 mounted archers; the earl of Warwick, with 120 men-at-arms and an equal number of horse archers.\(^5\) Thus, at the heart of the transformation of the English fighting machine can be identified two crucial developments: the emergence, on the one hand, of the mounted archer\(^6\) and, on the other, of the retinue of mixed composition, recruited by a re-invigorated class of noble and gentry captains, and 'capable of assuming a variety of military roles'.\(^7\)

If by the time of Brétigny, the English had become \textit{[les] plus nobles et les plus frisques combastans qu'on sache},\(^8\) the dramatic transformation of the military machine since Bannockburn had only been gradually achieved. Boroughbridge has been seen as a significant landmark in the development in English battlefield tactics,\(^9\) but only after Halidon Hill is it possible to detect really significant developments in the character and organisation of English royal armies.\(^10\) The great army with which Edward III campaigned in Scotland during the summer of 1335 consisted of about 13,000-13,500 men, of which in 'region of 3,350 were mounted archers. This is certainly an impressive number, bearing in mind that the horse archer's first significant appearance in surviving records occurs in the previous year; but of these 3,350, only 1,095 were serving with men-at-arms in

\(^5\) E101/393/11 fo. 79v.

\(^6\) Emphatically described by J.E. Morris as 'the finest fighting man of the Middle Ages': 'Mounted infantry in medieval warfare', \textit{T.R.H.S.}, 3rd. ser., viii (1914), p. 78.

\(^7\) Morgan, \textit{War and society in medieval Cheshire}, p. 41; Morgan provides an excellent summary of these developments (pp. 37-49).

\(^8\) Jean le Bel, i, p. 156.


\(^10\) For the unsuccessful experiments under Edward II, see Powicke, \textit{Military obligation in medieval England}, Chapter VIII.
mixed retinues and the greater part of the king's army in the summer of 1335 was still being raised in the shires by commissions of array.\textsuperscript{11}

The onset of the war with France gave added impetus to the processes of change in English military organisation, to the rise of the 'mixed retinue'\textsuperscript{12} and the declining contribution of shire levies. The changes did not occur over-night: as Michael Powicke has pointed out, the county and urban levies continued to figure very prominently in the pay rolls of English armies until at least the Rheims campaign.\textsuperscript{13}

Yet we should not confuse numbers with military significance; and there are clear signs that 'the wind was blowing in a new direction'


\textsuperscript{12}An interesting side-light on the evolution of the 'mixed' retinue is offered by a planning document dating from 1341 (C47/2/33), for which, see M. Frestwich, 'English armies in the early stages of the Hundred Years War: a scheme in 1341', \textit{B.I.H.R.}, liv (1983), pp. 102-13. It envisages an army composed (with the exception of a Welsh contingent) entirely of magnate retinues - these consisting of varying proportions of men-at-arms, armed men and archers. By contrast, a document drawn up four years earlier lists the retinues of a projected army, but specifies numbers of men-at-arms without any mention of archers (E101115/17, for which, see N.B. Lewis, 'The recruitment and organisation of a contract army, May to November 1337', \textit{B.I.H.R.}, xxxvii (1964), pp. 1-19). The omission may not be significant, however: royal officials remained much given to equating magnate retinues with numbers of men-at-arms. See C81/1750 m. 106, for example, which is a list of 25 captains (beginning with the earl of Northampton), each of whom are assigned a number of \textit{hommes d'armes}. It dates from c. 1341-42, but its purpose is unclear.

\textsuperscript{13}Powicke, \textit{Military obligation in medieval England}, p. 185.
long before 1359. Take, for example, the English expeditionary forces which campaigned in Brittany in 1342-43. These, though not large, were composed of well balanced elements: if the personnel of the three expeditions are combined we find that just over 1,900 men-at-arms served for pay, as against 1,950 mounted archers and a little over 1,700 foot soldiers. In fact, the army which actually operated in Brittany may well have been rather more compact than these figures suggest. The main set of vadia guerre accounts for this campaign seem to indicate that of those archers who were not included in mixed retinues, the great majority either served for very short periods in the autumn, or did not leave England at all. If we focus on those combatants still in service on Christmas Day 1342, Edward III’s army begins to appear like a smaller version of the great army of 1359: 1,650 men-at-arms and 1,650 horse archers. The great majority of mounted archers - 93% - served in mixed retinues with men-at-arms. There were only two significant exceptions: a company of eighty horse

14. English expeditionary forces raised during the period 1369-80 were dominated by ‘mixed’ retinues, consisting usually of equal numbers of men-at-arms and archers, though occasionally having a preponderance of archers: see J. Sherborne, ‘Indentured retinues and English expeditions to France, 1369-1380’, E.H.R., lxxix (1964), especially Tables A-D. A document headed Fur le viage de Portugal, showing the contingents expected to comprise Edmund of Cambridge’s expeditionary force in 1381, lists ten retinues (ranging in size from 1,000 men to 40), each with exact parity of homes darnes and archers (C47/2/49 m. 2). The ideal of roughly equal numbers of men-at-arms and archers was not to last, however. Archers outnumber men-at-arms (by 1.5 / 3 to 1) in many of the retinues listed in the ‘Order of Battle’ for Richard II’s Scottish campaign in 1385. S. Armitage-Smith, John of Gaunt (London, 1904), Appendix II, pp. 437-39 prints what appears to be a most authoritative text of this document; cf. N.B. Lewis, ‘The last medieval summons of the English feudal levy, 13 June 1385’, E.H.R., lxxiii (1958), pp. 3ff on the ‘Order of Battle’ and Appendix II (pp. 17-21) for details of the paid contingents in Richard II’s army. In the expeditionary force taken to Scotland in 1400 by Henry IV (numbering in all over 13,000 men), archers outnumbered men-at-arms by more than 6 to 1, though at the retinue-level the ratio was often more in the region of 4 or 5 to 1: A.L. Brown, ‘The English campaign in Scotland, 1400’, British government and administration. Studies presented to S.B. Chirmes, ed. H. Hearder and H.R. Loyn (Cardiff, 1974), pp. 40-54. The optimum archer to man-at-arms ratio was deemed to be 3 : 1 during the earlier stages of the Lancastrian occupation of northern France. In practice, during the later stages of the war, the ratio was sometimes nearer to 10 : 1.

15. For a fuller discussion of the English expeditionary forces in Brittany in 1342-43, see Appendix 2.

16. If the retinues of Robert de Artois and William de Kildesby are added (they are not included in the vadia guerre accounts; see Appendix 2), the totals of men-at-arms and archers each increase by about 150-250 men.
The emergence of the mounted archer as associate of the man-at-arms in mixed retines brought about a significant shift in the social composition of the military community. Changes in military organisation were, thus, paralleled by changes in the patterns of recruitment. Compared with the ill-equipped and undisciplined infantry of Edward I's day, the mounted archers of the mid fourteenth-century were more expensively equipped and thus drawn from a wealthier social group; they were 'men of some standing in local society'. Military service was now undertaken by a more restricted section of the population; and, moreover, the gap between chivalrous and non-chivalrous elements of the military community had narrowed.

Just as, during the fourteenth-century, the heraldic separation of

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17. E36/204 fo. 109v; on John Ward, see Morgan, War and society in medieval Cheshire, pp. 43-49.
19. Consisting of 68 men-at-arms; his son's retinue was composed of only three men-at-arms: E36/204 fos. 106v, 107. R. Nicholson, in noting the existence of similarly unbalanced retinues in the army for the Roxburgh campaign, is sceptical about the completeness of the pay accounts: Edward III and the Scots, p. 177. The same may well be true in the case of the pay rolls for the Breton campaign.
21. Morgan, War and society in medieval Cheshire, p. 41. According to a definition of the various levels of the military community, established by the Crown as part of an attempted military levy in 1344-45 (C.P.R., 1343-45, p. 495) a man with £5 a year in land should be equipped as a mounted archer, whilst £10 required him to be a hobelar (partially armoured horseman) and £25, a man-at-arms. In practice, hobelars were employed increasingly infrequently under Edward III, and so a typical royal army would probably include many archers and men-at-arms of roughly similar status. On the 1344 experiment in military assessment, see G.L. Harriss, King, parliament and public finance in medieval England to 1369 (Oxford, 1975), pp. 392-95; Saul, Knights and esquires, pp. 33-34.
knights and esquires became blurred, so the social and economic distinctions between archer and man-at-arms were also becoming less pronounced. This process may have been more marked in some parts of England than others. Philip Morgan has noted, for example, that there were many Cheshire archers 'whose standing, within the context of county society, was analogous to that of men-at-arms raised elsewhere in England'. A single family might contribute both men-at-arms and archers to a royal army. A man might serve in both capacities during the course of his career, perhaps as a consequence of temporary, or more permanent, changes in fortune.

The emphasis on mounted troops, and recruitment on the basis of individual retinues consisting of roughly equal numbers of men-at-arms and archers, greatly enhanced the effectiveness of the English fighting machine under Edward III. Expeditionary forces could operate with speed and flexibility, and if brought to battle could offer a most effective form of defence against numerically superior opponents. The classic chevauchée method had been tried-out before the onset of the French war: Edward III's raid into the Scottish highlands in 1336 demonstrated the effectiveness of a small mounted force of men-at-arms

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22. For a recent discussion of this process, see Saul, op. cit., pp. 20-25.
24. For example, amongst the citizens of Norwich in the mid fourteenth-century (W. Hudson, 'Norwich militia in the fourteenth-century', Norfolk Archaeology, xiv (1901), p. 290.
25. Sir Thomas Gray offers pertinent observations on the swarms of young men from all over England who descended upon France in the 1350s: 'young fellows, who hitherto had been of but small account, who became exceedingly rich and skilfull in this [kind of] war ... many of them beginning as archers and then becoming some knights, some captains' (Scalacronica, pp. 131, 134). For specific examples of men who began their careers as archers, but rose into the chivalric class, see Bennett, Community, class and careerism, pp. 182-83. For comparative examples from Normandy in the 1440s, see A.J. Pollard, John Talbot and the war in France, 1427-1453 (London, 1983), p. 90; but Pollard observes that 'only a handful of the archers were ever promoted'.
26. In some cases, even as early as the 1340s, a numerical superiority of horse archers was preferred. For example, Sir Thomas Dagworth's retinue for service in Brittany in 1346 consisted of 80 men-at-arms and 120 horse archers (as well as 40 bidouers): E101/68/3 m. 62 (indenture), E101/25/17 (pay account). For the period after 1360, see n. 44 above.
and archers. The Breton campaign of 1342-43 revealed the system operating on a more expansive scale. After landing at Brest, Edward III's army swept through Brittany to lay siege to Vannes. Several detachments of the army were sent on separate raids to secure other important towns in the duchy. They managed to avoid serious confrontations, but earlier in the year, the earl of Northampton's small army had been attacked whilst attempting to besiege the town of Morlaix. In the resulting clash, the English dismounted men-at-arms and archers combined to devastating effect, as they had done previously at Dupplin Moor and Halidon Hill, and as they were to do on many future occasions on continental battlefields.

The tactical developments which bore such abundant fruit during the Hundred Years War may not represent the most significant dimension of the Edwardian 'military revolution', but for the English chivalric class they heralded a most dramatic change to established fighting methods and, one must suppose, a not inconsiderable shock to their social identity. In commenting on how the English at Halidon Hill

27. The importance of this 'brief ride through the highlands' is stressed by Morgan, War and society in medieval Cheshire, pp. 41-42.


29. For an ingenious reconstruction of this important battle, see A.H. Burne, The Crecy war (London, 1955), pp. 71-78; as always, some may not find Colonel Burne's interpretation of the chronicle evidence (bolstered as it is by I.M.P!) entirely convincing. For an earlier, important, discussion of Morlaix, see T.F. Tout, 'The tactics of the battles of Boroughbridge and Morlaix', E.H.R., xix (1904), pp. 711-15.


31. At a time when members of the chivalric class may have perceived threats to their social identity from other quarters. There was, on the one hand, competition from the newly emerging, socially ambitious groups in the military community - horse archers and men-at-arms of obscure origins - whilst, on the other, a growing proportion of the gentry abandoned serious performance of their traditional military role. On the 'demilitarisation' of (or, at least, diversification of interest amongst) the landholding class, see: C. Given-Wilson, 'The king and the gentry in fourteenth-century England', T.R.H.S., 5th. ser., xxxvii (1987), p. 99; Saul, Knights and esquires, pp. 52-53.
contra antiquatum morem suorum patrum, pedes pugnare, Geoffrey le Baker \textsuperscript{32} would have been expressing the thoughts of many of the combatants. Yet a clear distinction was emerging in English military circles between deeds of chivalry, which were most appropriately performed on horseback, and the practical business of battlefield fighting which was most effectively done on foot in disciplined tactical formations. \textsuperscript{33} The sons of men who had fought astride great warhorses at Falkirk and Bannockburn, would rarely find themselves riding into battle during the reign of Edward III. \textsuperscript{34} Circumstances demanding a mounted charge, as occurred for example at the battle of Auberoche in 1345, \textsuperscript{35} were occasionally encountered, but the great majority of engagements, whether fought offensively (as at Roche Derrien) or defensively (as at Mauron), saw the English men-at-arms operating on foot, supported by dismounted archers. In France, numerical inferiority usually obliged the English to adopt a defensive posture; but their tactical methods were broadly similar whatever the scale of the engagement, \textsuperscript{36} and wherever they happened to be fighting.

\textsuperscript{32} Le Baker, p. 51. Sir Thomas Gray writes of the English at Bannockburn that 'they were not accustomed to dismount to fight on foot; whereas the Scots had taken a lesson from the Flemings, who before that had at Courtrai defeated on foot the power of France': Scalacronica, p. 55.

\textsuperscript{33} Gray illustrates this point well in the contrast which he draws between the impetuous behaviour of Sir Thomas Marmion (concerned to make his crested helmet famous in the most dangerous place in Britain) and that of his rescuers, the Norham garrison, advancing steadily on foot with levelled lances (Scalacronica, p. 62). Gray attributes the English defeat at Presfen in the late 1330s to a breakdown of the usual disciplined approach to fighting (ibid. p. 105).

\textsuperscript{34} A few men straddle the tactical divide: Sir John de Hardreshull, for example, appears to have been at both Bannockburn and Morlaix: C71/6 m. 3 (1314: in John de Hastings' retinue), C76/17 m. 37 (1342: in Robert d'Artois' retinue). On Hardreshull, see M. Jones, 'Edward III's captains in Brittany', England in the fourteenth-century, ed. W.M. Ormrod (Woodbridge, 1986), pp. 99-118 and idem., 'Sir John de Hardreshull, king's lieutenant in Brittany, 1343-5', Nottingham Medieval Studies, xxxi (1987), pp. 76-97.

\textsuperscript{35} Froissart, ed. Johnes, i, p. 134. The English men-at-arms attacked on horseback to make the most of the element of surprise. The assault (as earlier at Bergerac; ibid., p. 128) was well supported by archery.

\textsuperscript{36} To appreciate the extent to which the English had abandoned fighting on horseback, we should focus attention not so much on the few great battles of the period, like Crécy and Poitiers, but rather on the numerous medium- and small-scale encounters in which the English showed great consistency in their tactical method. See, for example, Scalacronica, pp. 136, 140, 143, 152-53, 156, 158; T.F. Tout, 'Some neglected fights between Crécy and Poitiers', E.H.R., xx (1905), pp. 726-30.
In the Scottish border country in the years after Bannockburn, the English dismounted to fight as a matter of course, whilst by the early 1360s, Englishmen serving in the White Company had introduced their distinctive tactical methods into Italian warfare.

Thus, very much at the heart of the new tactical system employed by the English from the early 1330s was a changed, or rather, much diminished role for the warhorse. Its function on the battlefield was usually confined to the closing stages of an engagement. A successful action fought on foot might very profitably be followed-up by a pursuit on horse-back, as was the case, for example, after Dupplin Moor and Halidon Hill; conversely, of course, it might be necessary to flee the field in some haste. In either case, grooms, who had been holding the horses in readiness behind the battle-line, would bring them forward for their masters to mount. Away from the battlefield, good horses were essential to the successful prosecution of a chevauchée; yet we must doubt whether the destrier - the true 'great horse', highly bred for battle - would be suitable for hard-riding over rough country. An Edwardian campaign was as likely to be static as mobile: it would often peter out in a protracted siege and in the

37. See, for example, an anonymous newletter of c. 1340 which describes how the Roxburgh garrison encountered a Scots raiding party and dismounted to fight with them: SC 1/54 m. 30, calendared in Bain, v, no. 809.

38. For the English in Italy, see M. Mallett, Mercenaries and their masters. Warfare in Renaissance Italy (London, 1974), pp. 36-38.

39. Nicholson, Edward III and the Scots, pp. 89, 136. This did not always happen: exhaustion or prudence (as after Crécy) frequently dictated that the English stood their ground or withdrew quietly from the field. At Lunalonge in 1349, the French carried off the English horses during the course of the battle and although the latter had successfully defended themselves, they were obliged to make for the safety of an English-held fortress on foot (Scalacronica, pp. 136-37). Sir Thomas Gray's account of the battle supplements that provided by the writer of the Chronique Normande, which was used by T.F. Tout, 'Some neglected fights between Crécy and Poitiers', pp. 228-29.

40. For a variant on this, see Scalacronica, p. 62, where Sir Thomas Gray tells how, after a sortie on foot by the garrison of Norham castle had put the Scots to flight, the ladies of the castle brought out their men-folk's horses for the pursuit. In the event of defeat, the grooms could not always be trusted: after a skirmish at Pont-Vallain in 1370, they took flight on the horses in their care, leaving the men-at-arms to be taken prisoner by the French (Proissart, ed. Lettenhove, viii, p. 53).
encampment surrounding an invested fortress expensive warhorses were very much a liability, regularly falling victim to disease. When in May 1347 Edward III requested that several magnates should hasten to join his army outside Calais with as many men as they could muster, he urged that they should not wait for shipping for their horses, in part no doubt to ensure speedy arrival, but equally because warhorses would not be needed during the siege, nor in all probability in any engagement with Philip de Valois' forces. 41

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So, by the middle of the fourteenth-century, the warhorse no longer occupied a place of primary importance in the military practice of the English. 42 The impact of this change on the collective psyche of the chivalric class and also, indeed, on the military establishment should not be underestimated. On one level it was simply that the warhorse had been the sine qua non of chivalrous combat; that, as Noel Denholm Young has put it, it was 'impossible to be chivalrous without a horse'. 43 This was not merely the stuff of romance, for it involved questions of military identity and, indeed, social identity. Military service for the knightly class, whether in fulfilment of feudal obligations or for the king's pay, had become unthinkable without a barded warhorse. The armoured horse was a prerequisite of service; it was, as much as anything, what defined a man-at-arms as far as muster

41. Crecy and Calais, pp. 121-22. During the siege, men-at-arms were given permission to send their valuable granntz chivalx back to England (C81/1710 m. 47, see below, p. 47).

42. The increased resort to naval expeditions by the English high command during the later fourteenth-century (J. W. Sherborne, 'The English navy: shipping and manpower, 1369-1389', Past and Present, xxxvii (1967), pp. 163-75) can only have contributed further to the decline of the English warhorse.

officials were concerned, and it was what set him apart as a member of the military class.

As a symbol of that martial caste, the warhorse had never been more potent than during the early decades of the fourteenth-century, for it was these years which saw the emergence of the true magnus equus. Under pressure of a growing burden of armour and equipment for man and horse, 'the size of the best warhorses [had increased] almost beyond recognition between the eleventh and the fourteenth centuries'. The most expensive horses were, indeed, of formidable stature, perhaps seventeen or eighteen hands in height and very powerfully built. Yet such destriers were the preserve of the upper echelons of the chivalric class and we must imagine the warhorses of the majority of Edwardian men-at-arms to have been of rather less imposing stature; perhaps they should best be visualised as heavy hunters. They needed to be strong certainly, for the weight of a man-at-arms' armour and equipment reached a peak during the fourteenth-century; but strength, needed to be combined with mobility. Such are the powerful, yet agile, horses which are depicted in the literature of the fourteenth-century; the horses on which King Arthur's knights achieve their sanguinary triumphs, a horse such as Gryngolet, Sir Gawain's

44. See below, pp. 109 ff.
46. See, for example, the 'great horse' depicted in Uccello's fresco of Sir John Hawkwood in Florence Cathedral: Davis, The medieval warhorse, plate 40.
47. There is a danger of assuming that all late medieval warhorses were destriers (e.g. J.M. Brereton, The horse in war (Newton Abbot & London, 1976), pp. 24-25; P. Edwards, The horse trade of Tudor and Stuart England (Cambridge, 1988), pp. 12-13), which is rather like assuming every saloon car to be a Rolls Royce.
inseparable companion. By the middle decades of the century, the best of them were described as *coursers* in the military records, a term which underlines their strength, speed and stamina, all virtues required of a good hunter.

The 'great horse' became the pride of the English chivalric class during the late thirteenth- and early fourteenth centuries. R.H.C. Davis has shown that a shortage of suitable horses at a time of growing military commitments in Wales prompted Edward I to embark upon a serious warhorse breeding programme in the royal studs. Although, for reasons of economy, this activity slackened towards the end of Edward I's reign, his son, who had a keen interest in horsebreeding, 'revived the [royal] studs with the utmost vigour'. It is likely that the Crown's example was followed to varying degrees on the estates of the nobility and gentry. They provided the chivalric manpower for the king's armies and most would, no doubt, wish to avoid

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49. Gryngolet is *gret ... and huge* (line 2047), yet is no ponderous destrier (e.g. lines 2160-63): *Sir Gawain and the Green Knight*, ed. J.R.R. Tolkien and E.V. Gordon (2nd. edition, Oxford, 1967). The martial skills of an Arthurian knight very much depended upon his *jambe stede* - his swift-footed warhorse: see *The alliterative Morte Arthure*, ed. V. Krishna (New York, 1976) - the expression is used in line 2894.


52. 'So far as warhorses were concerned, it would have been the king who set the example ... It was inevitable that he would be the leader in almost every new development, and that the nobles would follow his lead' (Davis, *The medieval warhorse*, p. 70). This can be seen as early as 1277, when following the king's acquisition of over 150 horses from continent sources, similar imports were made on behalf of the earl of Lincoln (30 horses), Roger de Mortimer (12), Otes de Grandison (2), William de Beauchamp and others (12) and William de Valence (25): *C.P.R.*, 1272-81, pp. 171, 184, 194.
appearing at muster with inferior horseflesh. Edward I, indeed, applied appropriate pressure at a very early stage. In May 1282, with a second campaign in Wales just beginning, writs were issued which ordered those holding land worth £30 or more to 'meet the scarcity of the great horses suitable for war, by procuring such a horse with appropriate horse-armour' and to keep it in readiness for active service. The extent to which the breeding of 'great horses' was actively pursued on the estates of the English nobility and gentry during the late thirteenth- and early fourteenth-centuries has yet to be determined but, as we shall see, the evidence of the horse inventories suggests a significant improvement in quality during the reigns of the first two Edwards, reaching a peak at the start of the Hundred Years War. Thus it was that the warhorse in England reached its apogee at the very time that it was being abandoned as a practical tool of warfare. The warhorses which were left in the baggage camp at Buironfosse may have comprised the most impressive collection of horseflesh ever taken on campaign by the English.

Yet the military revolution was soon to have a significant effect on the warhorse in England. By the time of the Rheims campaign in 1359-60, the quality of warhorses employed by the English chivalric class had quite perceptively declined. It seems that men saw less need for expensive warhorses if they were not to be put to vigorous use on the field of battle. The diminished status of the warhorse in the


54. For an analysis of the horse valuations provided by the inventories, see Chapter VI; on the horse terminology used, see Chapter III, pp. 72-81.

55. On the quality of the warhorses for the Low Countries expedition of 1338-39, see below pp. 251-55; 281-83.
Edwardian fighting machine also had an unsettling effect on the balance of obligations and benefits which formed the relationship between the king and the men-at-arms who served in his armies. The eventual result, the abandonment of the system of horse valuation and *restauro equorum*, provides an intriguing indication of the Crown's response to the changed status of the English warhorse; but this is to anticipate.
Chapter II
THE WARHORSE AND CHIVALROUS SOCIETY

i) The image of the chivalric warrior in fourteenth-century England

The mounted, armoured knight is one of the most potent symbols of medieval civilisation, a persistent, ubiquitous image which springs from the folios of illuminated manuscripts and the texts of the chroniclers of chivalry. Man and warhorse formed a unified fighting unit: the horse was far more than simply a means of conveyance. 'There are horses', observed Diaz de Gamez, 'who are so strong, fiery, swift and faithful, that a brave man, mounted on a good horse, may do more in an hour of fighting than ten or mayhap a hundred could have done afoot'.

By the late thirteenth-century, following the development of armour and equipment for both horse and man, 'a fully equipped knight was like a moving castle', the equivalent of the tank in modern warfare: able in the right circumstances to perform a decisive role, but by no means invincible on the field of battle.

Indeed, the chinks in the mounted warrior's armour were exposed on a number of occasions in various parts of early fourteenth-century Europe, but only in the case of the English chivalric class did a major battlefield catastrophe herald a complete re-appraisal of tactical methods. The explanation for this is no doubt to be found in the particular circumstances of campaigning in Scotland and France, combined with the emergence of the mounted archer. Yet it is indeed an arresting fact that after Bannockburn, for the remainder of the

3. J.F. Verbruggen, The art of warfare in western Europe during the Middle Ages (Amsterdam, 1977), Chapter 3 'The foot soldiers'. For a lesser known example, see C.C. Giurescu, 'Les armées Roumaines dans la lutte pour la défense et l'indépendance du pays, du xivème au xve siècle', Revue Internationale d'Histoire Militaire, no. xxxiv (1975), pp. 6-7, for the defeat of king Charles Robert's Magyar army in a defile at Posada (9-11 November 1330), which the author compares with the battle of Mortgarten.
Middle Ages, there was scarcely a significant battle in which the English chivalric class fought on horseback. The English man-at-arms became renowned throughout Europe for his skill in dismounted combat, but whilst his opponents were occasionally moved to experiment with similar tactics, for continental Europe the mounted man-at-arms retained a place in the fore-front of military affairs until the sixteenth-century.

Despite the practical requirements of the battlefield, the association of knight and warhorse was an enduring one in the minds of Englishmen - both the chivalric class itself and society at large - and it is an association which continually re-asserts itself in the visual and literary arts of the period. Perhaps the most striking representation of an equestrian warrior in a manuscript of late medieval English provenance is that of Sir Geoffrey Luttrell in the psalter which he himself commissioned at the end of the 1330s. Although Sir Geoffrey appears to have been no longer militarily active at this time, a scene such as that depicted, with a mounted knight about to leave for war, could easily have been played out with his son, Andrew, in the

4. The English even adapted the cavalry lance, the chivalric weapon par excellence, for use in dismounted combat: Scalacronica, pp. 136-37; Mallett, Mercenaries and their masters, p. 37.

5. In 1486 a company of English troops fighting in Grenada were observed to be fighting on foot a uso de sua tierra. Three years earlier, Dominic Mancini commented that the English used horses simply 'to carry them to the scene of the engagement ... therefore they will ride any sort of horse, even pack horses' (A. Goodman, The Wars of the Roses. Military activity and English society, 1452-97 (London, 1981), pp. 175, 195). But Goodman considers that 'the Wars of the Roses probably produced a revival of English cavalry fighting': ibid., p. 179.


8. Sir Geoffrey (d. 1345) would have been in his early sixties in the later 1330s. His military career, which began in the late 1290s, appears to have ended in the 1320s: see The Luttrell Psalter, pp. 3-4. He is, however, included on the Ashmolean roll of arms, dating in all probability from the mid-winter of 1334-5 (Oxford, Bodleian Library Ms. Ashmole 15A), and on Cotgrave's Ordinary, c. 1340 (Rolls of arms of the reigns of Henry III and Edward III, ed. N.H. Nicolas (London, 1829), p. 31).
saddle. Yet, in fact, the scene is purely symbolic. It is a celebration of knightly status, an expression, by a member of the chivalric class, of his position in society. As such, it is only to be expected that Sir Geoffrey would wish to be presented as a mounted warrior on a brightly caparisoned warhorse; indeed, it is just such an image which his peers, and society at large, would expect to see. It is, moreover, the traditional image of the chivalric class which is offered when the subject of illustration is not a posed portrait, but an apparently realistic representation of military events, either contemporary or from some time in the past. The combat scenes included in countless illuminated manuscripts almost invariably present the chivalric warrior fighting in time-honoured fashion.

There are, for example, many such tableaux in the Romance of Alexander, a beautiful manuscript dating from the early years of the French war - and, thus, an appropriate counterpart to the portrait of Sir Geoffrey Luttrell. The Romance, it may quite reasonably be felt, is a little too early to be influenced by the tactical revolution of the mid-fourteenth century; and, of course, it is not attempting to depict contemporary events. Yet the tendency of illuminators to show the chivalric class fighting on horseback, rather than on foot, is an enduring one. As Anthony Goodman has noted, in relation to contemporary illustrations of Wars of the Roses battles,

9. Andrew Luttrell served in Scotland in 1337 (with warhorses valued at 12 marks and 20 marks: E101/20/17 m. 10d; E101/388/5 m. 19) and then in the opening campaign in the French war (Treaty Rolls, 1337-39, no. 371). He is still to be seen in the king's service in 1359: E101/393/11 fos. 71, 83v. In his testimony before the Court of Chivalry in 1385 he claimed in addition to have taken part in the siege of Tournai and the duke of Lancaster's campaign in Caux: Scrope-Grosvenor, i, p. 243.

10. Cf. seals depicting martial equestrian figures from the mid fourteenth-century: e.g. Fowler, The king's lieutenant, plate 4 (duke of Lancaster; DL 27/324).

11. The romance of Alexander. A collotype facsimile of ms. Bodley 264, ed. M.R. James (Oxford, 1933). As with other collections of military scenes, the Romance's many illustrations of mounted mêlées are as reminiscent of the tourney-field as of the traditional chivalric modes of fighting on the battlefield - a point to which we shall return.

12. Some aspects of the Romance's military tableaux are, however, quite up-to-date: for example, the armour. See B. Thorndeman, Armour from the battle of Visby, 1361 (2 vols., Stockholm, 1939), i, Chapters V - VIII.
'the artist has taken considerable licence with his text ... suggesting that the battles were primarily cavalry engagements'.

This distortion may be in evidence in even the most valuable visual representations of battle. The selection of vivid, well-observed scenes from the military events of the early decades of the fifteenth-century, offered by the (late fifteenth-century) 'pictorial life' of Richard Beauchamp, earl of Warwick, also offers a view of the English man-at-arms as an essentially mounted warrior. The illustrator seems aware that if he is to present the earl and his followers in the best chivalric light, he must depict the closing stages of battle, at which point the English did, on some occasions, take to their horses.

Turning from the visual arts to literature, we find the same persistent emphasis on mounted combat. The alliterative Morte Arthure, for example, contains an enormous amount of battle detail; it is, indeed, an almost unremitting orgy of violence. Yet it is striking that, although apparently written in the second half of the fourteenth-century, the fighting depicted is entirely in the traditional chivalric mode: men are described wielding lance and sword from the saddle. There is no sign of the tactical methods which the English chivalric class were employing in their military adventures all over Europe at this time. King Arthur's men, like their real

14. Pageant of the birth, life and death of Richard Beauchamp, earl of Warwick, K.G., 1389-1439, ed. Viscount Dillon and W.H. St. John Hope (London, 1914), Plates VI, VII, XL and XLVIII. The artist appears to be well-informed about military affairs (e.g. armour, the role of archers).
15. There are many further incidental fragments of evidence which could be offered: e.g., the 'Falling Knight', the famous late fourteenth-century miserichord on the sub-dean's choir stall in Lincoln cathedral, which depicts a man-at-arms, wounded in the back by an arrow and falling from his horse (M.D. Anderson, The choir stalls of Lincoln Minster (Lincoln, 1967), fig. 10 and pp. 33, 36-7).
17. Archers are mentioned occasionally (e.g., The alliterative Morte Arthure, ed. V. Krishna (New York, 1976), lines 2095-105), but their role is not associated with that of the knightly class and the latter are never shown to be fighting on foot.
counterparts, often find themselves facing long odds, but unlike the English in France, their immediate response is to spur their warhorses forward in a headlong charge; they *come flyeande before one ferawnte stedes* (line 2451). In fact the writer is presenting not an accurate portrayal of the conditions of war, but a projection of the methods of the tournament (i.e., the tourney, in which the traditional forms of mounted combat were still employed) onto a broader canvas. This is mortal combat certainly, yet, as the writer observes on one occasion, *was never siche a justyng at journe in erthe* (line 2875), and when he comments on the 'unfayre' strike which causes Sir Kayous to be mortally wounded (line 2171), he is surely revealing that his portrayal of warfare is based upon the *mores* of the tournament field, rather than the reality of the battlefield.

It could, of course, be objected that the author of the alliterative *Morte Arthure* was writing romance not contemporary history and should not, therefore, be expected to reflect the most up-to-date modes of fighting. But the *historical* writing of this period frequently exhibits a similar high regard for the exploits of the mounted warrior. Thus, for example, Froissart and Chandos Herald, whilst aware of prevailing tactical developments, delight in drawing attention to feats of arms of a traditional kind. Their description of Sir William Felton's exploits during a skirmish before the battle of Nájera provides a good example. A small Anglo-Gascon force, confronted by a much larger body of Castilians, takes up a defensive position on a *petit montaigne*. But Felton, in true Arthurian fashion,

18. As in the final battle against Mordred, in which Arthur's knights (*Bot awghtene hundrethe of all, entrede in rolles*) faced an army of 60,000 foreign mercenaries.

19. It is, however, very reminiscent of Chaucer's vivid description of a tournament in the 'Knight's Tale': *Canterbury Tales*, The Knight's Tale, lines 2605-19.

charges come home sanz sens & sanz avis, a chivall la lance baissie. In terms very reminiscent of the tone of the alliterative Morte Arthur, he engages the enemy with great gusto; but son chival ont desoubz li mort and he is finally killed. It is a contrast, indeed, to turn to the family memoirs of a veteran soldier of the northern border country. Sir Thomas Gray's imagery may be less colourful than the chroniclers of chivalry, yet in his writing we see a more realistic portrayal of the relationship between a man-at-arms and his warhorse, with the latter being employed as a practical tool of warfare. On one occasion, Gray's father, finding himself stranded in the town of Cupar some distance from the safety of the castle, managed to force his way through a crowd who were barring his way by using his spurred horse as a battering ram. Here, indeed, is Sir Maurice Powicke's 'moving castle' in action! If for Sir William Felton his warhorse was a means to chivalric glory, for Sir Thomas Gray it was a means of escaping from a tight corner.

'Artistic and literary evidence', Anthony Goodman has observed, 'provide uncertain guides to the realities of the contemporary battlefield'. What they do offer, however, are insights into the complex of assumptions and attitudes which occupied the minds of artists, patrons and the wider receiving public. Thus, as we have seen, for the Englishman of the mid to late fourteenth-century, the association of knight and warhorse was as strong as it had ever been. The dramatic changes in methods of combat, changes which brought unparalleled success and prestige to English arms on the continent, do

22. Scalacronica, pp. 49-50. Sir Thomas Gray seniour's career, as related by his son, was punctuated by a series of hair-raising escapades: for example, ibid., pp. 18, 24-6.
not appear to have shaken this association. We began with a portrayal of a mounted knight, the specifications for which we may assume were determined by subject of the portrait. We will end this brief discussion with an illustration, dating from over a half century later, which re-affirms the message of the picture of Sir Geoffrey Luttrell, though in rather more subtle terms. Geoffrey Chaucer, in his description of the Knight's appearance in the 'General Prologue' of the *Canterbury Tales*, tells us nothing of his horses, except that they were *goode.* But the early fifteenth-century illustrator of the Ellesmere manuscript of the *Tales* knew exactly what kind of horse would be appropriate for the Knight, and indeed for his son, the Squire. The horses portrayed are not those which would actually be used for travelling - these would be palfreys - but they are the types of horse which society would immediately associate with members of the chivalric class. The Ellesmere artist has therefore provided a most telling visual dimension to Chaucer's literary tapestry of late fourteenth-century English society. Both the Knight and the Squire are shown astride large and powerful horses. The Knight's is particularly heavily built and is presumably intended to be a destrier. The artist has added a neat touch: a brand mark (a letter 'M') in the horse's flank underlines the military association and may perhaps reflect the Knight's service with the Teutonic knights. If his father is shown on a rather old-fashioned horse, as would be appropriate for a veteran who began his career in arms in the first half of the century, the Squire's horse is of lighter build and is


26. Dent, op. cit., p. 9; cf. T. Jones, *Chaucer's knight* (London, 1982), pp. 29-30. Jones' suggestion that the brand might be intended to suggest service in a mercenary company in Italy has little to commend it: one of the greatest weaknesses in Jones' controversial thesis concerning the Knight is the fact that the latter is not said to have served in Italy. On the branding of warhorses at the start of a period of paid service, see below, pp. 62-63.
depicted 'executing the high-school air known as curvet or courbette'. This may well be intended to reflect Chaucer's words about the Squire's equestrian skill (wel koude he sitte on hors and faire ryde); but equally, the artist may have intended to depict a courser, a lighter, more agile form of warhorse, which had become popular with the well-to-do members of the chivalric class.

* * * * *

For the Ellesmere artist, then, a large and expensive warhorse was still very much the mark of a member of the knightly class. This is hardly surprising, for he would have been surrounded by powerful imagery which could only serve to reinforce the established view of the warrior class as a mounted élite. Despite the developments in military practice which, as we shall see, appear to have had a depressive effect on the calibre of warhorses employed on campaign, high-quality horses continued to occupy a very prominent place in the lives of the nobility and gentry.

Horsemanship was an essential accomplishment of an active member of the knightly class for the simple reason that a great deal of his life was spent in the saddle. Some men began their military careers at an early age, yet for most, an association with horses which they had forged as boys would find many outlets before they were called upon to join a chevauchée; and for many, horsemanship remained a predominantly peacetime activity throughout their lives. A member of the chivalric


28. Canterbury Tales, General Prologue, line 94. In his tale, the Squire shows himself to be well versed in equestrian matters.

29. N. Orme, From childhood to chivalry. The education of the English kings and aristocracy, 1066-1530 (London, 1984), pp. 190-91, citing evidence from the records of the armorial disputes in the Court of Chivalry in the 1380s. Many of the deponents revealed that they first bore arms in their mid-teens.
class was distinguished not simply by the possession of good horses, but also by the way that he handled them. He should combine a courtly demeanour with practical proficiency; and he should take an active interest in the welfare and management of his horses. In these respects, the Gawain poet offers his hero's relationship with his faithful companion, Gryngolet, as a model of true knightly behaviour. Similarly, the eulogy of Don Pero Niño stresses that 'he knew all about horses; he sought for them, tended them and made much of them'. It is certain that many of his English counterparts behaved similarly, for there is evidence enough to demonstrate the activities of a community of equestrian connoisseurs amongst the nobility and gentry. In 1332-33, for example, Sir Ralph de Neville made gifts of three and four year old horses from his studs at Raby, Middleham and Ulgham to members of the lay and ecclesiastical aristocracies. Horse traffic of this kind, whether involving gifts, loans, exchanges or purchases, was one of the major pre-occupations of the landholding class. Some of the horses would be destined for use on campaign, but we must also recognise the demands of the more mundane, and the purely recreational, aspects of aristocratic life.

The peripatetic life-style of the medieval landed classes ensured that

30. This was, of course, a society very much concerned with the welfare of horses: see, for example, E. Power, Medieval people (repr., Harmondsworth, 1951), p. 101.
31. Sir Gawain and the Green Knight, ed. J.R.R. Tolkien and E.V. Gordon (2nd. edition, Oxford, 1967), e.g. lines 670-73, 2047-53, 2062-63. By contrast, the parvenu mercenary Crokart, of whom Froissart heartily disapproves, is killed in a riding accident as a consequence of failing to detect that his horse had been badly shod: Society at war, ed. C.T. Allmand (Edinburgh, 1973), p. 89.
32. The unconquered knight, p. 41.
33. E101/507/14. Recipients included Sir Ranulph Fitzralph, Sir Alexander de Neville and Sir John le Sturmy and the Priory of Warter. Five mares were given to the bishop of Winchester and three to Sir William de Montagu. In July 1335 the king gave Montagu a warhorse caparisoned with his arms (Knighton, i, p. 472). For gifts of horses of all kinds by the Prince of Wales in the 1350s, see B.P. Reg iv, pp. 67-73.
they would spend a significant proportion of their time on horseback and their principal outdoor recreation, their passion for hunting, contributed to the same end. The chase was certainly a most appropriate pastime for the military class when not engaged in war. An exhilarating, aggressive pursuit and not without risk (especially when hunting boar), it tested endurance, horsemanship and one's eye for the lie of the land. It might also serve to forge bonds of comradeship which could be carried over into the testing arenas of war and politics. But if hunting possessed undoubted military overtones, it was on the tournament field that the chivalric class could most effectively express its traditional martial role, short of actually going on campaign.

For many young men during the fourteenth-century, the rigours of the tournament provided the first test of their martial prowess. For older hands, experienced in war, it offered opportunities for the display of traditional mounted combat skills which from the mid fourteenth-century were only infrequently employed on campaign. During the reign of Edward III, such opportunities were very plentiful. Although detailed lists of participants, such as the second Dunstable Roll of Arms, are rare, it is clear that

34. For the travels of some members of the east Sussex gentry, see N. Saul, *Scenes from provincial life* (Oxford, 1986), pp. 174-76.
36. Some of the deponents before the Court of Chivalry in the 1380s speak of the tournaments of their youth: e.g. John Garlek esq. who mentions an event at Thetford sixty years earlier (C47/6/1 no. 19).
37. For a 'Provisional list of the tournaments of Edward III, 1327-55', see J. Vale, *Edward III and chivalry* (Woodbridge, 1982), Appendix 12: fifty-five are listed.
tournaments were popular and well attended. 39 'Tourneying society' was, however, a closed community; full participation was allowed only to the chivalric classes and although this included large numbers of esquires, 40 it did not by any means embrace the whole of the active military community of Edwardian England. The tournament remained the violent and prestigious pastime of the traditional military class, and whether involving an old-fashioned mêlée-style combat between teams, or as, was increasingly popular, jousting competitions between individuals wielding lances, the display offered could only serve to re-affirm society's vision of the knight as an élite mounted warrior.

As a contest between mounted men-at-arms, the tournament in its various forms bore little resemblance to the 'English' method of fighting which, from the mid fourteenth-century, was employed in countless battles and skirmishes throughout Europe. This is not to deny the undoubted links between warfare and tourneying for the English. In the first place, the men who served in the king's armies were also the men who attended tournaments in England: 'military preoccupations and hastiluding went hand in hand'. 41 Some of them would be bound to engage in both activities by the terms of indentures of retinue, 42 but it is clear that most, in any case, regarded warfare and tourneying as complementary aspects of a career in arms. Many of the deponents before the Court of Chivalry offered testimony which

39. There were about 250 knights at the Dunstable tournament of 1342 (Murimuth, pp. 123-24; Le Baker, p. 75). Indirect evidence for the identities of active tourneyers is to be found in inventories of goods and chatts. For example, an inventory of John, lord Fitzwalter's goods, compiled in 1351, contains armour and saddles for tournaments and jousting, whilst that listing Sir Robert Marny's possessions includes receptacles plein de diverses choses pur justes: E199/10/16 m. 9; E199/10/18 mm. 1, 3.

40. Barker, op. cit., pp. 116-17. Many of the Court of Chivalry deponents who mentioned attendance at tournaments remained esquires throughout their lives: e.g. C47/6/1 nos. 7, 14, 19, 92. For Thomas Bezoun's attendance of a tournament in 1328, see G.H. Fowler, 'A household expense roll, 1328', E.H.R., lv (1940), pp. 630-34.


consisted of a mixture of tournament and campaign memories, and keen tourneyers found plenty of opportunities for combats à outrance during the course, or at the end, of expeditions in Scotland and France. Such contests, whether arising from careful planning or chance encounters, were usually fought in traditional fashion, on horseback with lance; and fuelled by the bitterness of 'national' conflicts, they frequently resulted in fatalities.

For the English, it was the tournament which was largely instrumental in keeping alive the traditional methods of chivalric combat. On campaign, a bout of tourneying offered opportunities for the demonstration of individual prowess at a time when battle tactics required disciplined formation fighting on foot, with the warhorse being used only for transport or the pursuit of a beaten enemy. Back in England, tourneying served to reinforce the established image of a mounted warrior aristocracy. Hastiludes - and particularly the urban events - were well-attended spectator sports. The most lavish of them were great theatrical spectacles, involving processions of masked riders through streets packed with onlookers. The clamour of the crowds can be well imagined from Chaucer's vivid picture of a tournament in the Knight's Tale and the crowds will have included all sections of society. Such colourful events can only have had a most potent effect on the popular imagination. For artists - illuminators

43. For example, William de Penbrigg esq., who attended the tourneamentz de Dunstable and certeins Joustes de Lonndres, also served at Sluys, the siege of Calais and during the Rheims campaign: C47/6/1 no. 7. Cf. the similarly mixed career of Sir Ralph de Ferrers, speaking on behalf of the Scropes: Scrope-Grosvenor, i, pp. 155-56.
44. Barker, op. cit., Chapter 2.
45. The contest during which Sir Thomas Colville killed a French knight who had insulted Edward III is good example (Barker, op. cit., pp. 30-31; cf. Anonimalle, p. 22).
46. There is a discernible 'gradual relocation of the sport' to towns: Barker, op. cit., p. 99.
47. In 1385, John Durant, parson of Thelveton, remembered how he had attended jousts at Bungey and Bury St. Edmunds back in the 1340s: C47/6/1 no. 15.
and writers - it offered the most readily available experience of 
warlike activity\textsuperscript{48} and we should not be surprised to detect, as we 
have earlier, a marked similarity between warfare as depicted in 
illuminated manuscripts and by romance writers, and the combat 
conditions and codes of conduct of the tournament field.

For the many participants who knew both the tourney field and the 
battlefield, the reality of the contrast between war and hastiludes 
was clear enough. If in the past there had been a close relationship 
between the mêlée-tournament and the conditions of cavalry warfare,\textsuperscript{49} 
by the mid fourteenth-century such an association was far less 
relevant to military needs.\textsuperscript{50} The disappearance of the mêlée-style 
tournament in the 1340s - during, it should be noted, a most active 
period of tourneying in England - has been explained in terms of the 
ingcreasing popularity of the 'smaller types of hastilude', which 
favoured the display of individual prowess.\textsuperscript{51} But it must also, in 
part, have been prompted by the transformation in English tactical 
thinking which had occurred during the preceding years. Increasingly, 
in war and tourneying, we see two separate, but complementary, aspects 
of the military aristocracy's life. It is true that the later 
fourteenth-century saw the emergence of the 'feat of arms', which 
usually included a significant element of dismounted combat,\textsuperscript{52} was

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{48} Even though domestic tourneying tended to be à plaisance, it was nevertheless a violent sport and 
  casualties were commonplace: e.g. the hastiludes at Northampton in 1342, where \textit{multi nobiles 
  fuerunt graviter laesi et aliqui mutilati, et perditi multi equi, et dominus J. de Bello monte occisis} 
  (Murimuth, p. 124).
\item \textsuperscript{49} Barker, op. cit., pp. 19-22; 139-45; Verbruggen, \textit{The art of warfare in western Europe during the 
  Middle Ages}, pp. 32-39. Mounted knights fought in closely formed tactical units (conrois) on both 
  the tourney field and the battlefield.
\item \textsuperscript{50} Cf. J. Vale, who considers that 'the tournoi still provided essential training and experience of 
  fighting': \textit{Edward III and chivalry}, p. 59.
\item \textsuperscript{51} Barker, op. cit., p. 140. The Dunstable tournament of 1342, a large scale mêlée-style event, is 'the 
  last recorded occasion of its kind in England'. On the survival of the tournoi throughout the Middle 
  Ages in continental Europe, see Vale, \textit{War and chivalry}, pp. 63-87.
\item \textsuperscript{52} Barker, op. cit., pp. 14-15, 23, 40, 156-58.
\end{itemize}
normally fought à outrance and which, therefore, 'reflected the changing expectations of the knight's role in warfare'. Yet it is equally clear that during the second half of the century, jousting became the most popular form of tourneying, particularly in a peacetime context; and that jousting and war had become very different forms of activity. On one level it was a question of different equipment. A greater weight of armour was used for the joust and this, combined with the specialised training demanded by the sport, prompted men to keep separate horses for jousting and for war. But on a more profound level, these two activities involved different conditions of combat and codes of conduct, and altogether different attitudes of mind. The joust was a carefully regulated test of individual prowess and, with the exception of contests à outrance, killing was not the aim of the exercise. War was wholly unpredictable. A man's prowess could be neutralised by unfavourable terrain, the work of projectile weapons or the crush of a mêlée; and to survive he must be prepared to kill, though he would always be on the look out for rich pickings. 'The sport was quite distinct from real warfare'; this had always been the case, but in the English context, from the mid fourteenth-century, the distance between jousting, even à outrance, and the customary English tactics of the battlefield meant that a contrast in methods underlined the contrast in mentality.

54. Barker, op. cit., Chapter 8 (on tournament armour); pp. 173-74 (on jousting horses).
55. This included the capture of warhorses as well as men. At the fight before the castle of Albome in August 1374, la somme des bones chivals nomes Ionets Desaigne et autres chivals conqys amountent a cccviii (Anonnement, pp. 76-77). The winning of warhorses was one of the primary aims of the old-style mêlée tournaments (Muirimuth [p. 124] says of the Dunstable tournament of 1342 that x equi fuerunt perditii vel lucratii; cf. Vale, War and chivalry, p. 70), but this was not the case with jousting.
57. Cf. Vale, War and chivalry, pp. 70ff, which argues for the continuing relevance of the tournament to continental warfare in the fifteenth-century.
Despite its distance from the reality of war, jousting acquired a popularity with both participants and spectators which ensured that the traditional form of mounted combat with lance maintained a prominent place in the training of the military class and an enduring hold on the imagination of society at large. In considering how the tournament helped to re-affirm the long-established association between the knightly class and the warhorse, we should not underestimate the ceremonial aspects of these colourful events. Tournament processions were an impressive and not infrequent sight in the main tourneying centres. Thus, for example, the route from the Tower to the tournament site at Smithfield, was used so regularly that it became known as Knightriders Street.\textsuperscript{58} Ceremonial of this kind was an entertainment, but also a forceful demonstration of the reality of the social order. The 'great horse' which had originally been bred for the battlefield and which reached its peak of development in the mid fourteenth-century could play a most effective role in such events. The warhorse, whose direct military function had significantly diminished, continued nevertheless to stand as a potent symbol of the power and wealth of the military aristocracy. Thus, in the stables of all wealthy members of the chivalric class would be found not only horses for war, for hunting and for travelling, but also larger, heavier steeds needed for jousting and ceremonial activity.\textsuperscript{59} It is no surprise to find that the greatest ceremonial warhorses graced the stables of the king: the great steed ridden by Richard II at his coronation cost £200.\textsuperscript{60}

\textsuperscript{58} Barker, op. cit., p. 99.
\textsuperscript{59} Cf. Don Pero Niño, who trained his horses, 'some for war, some for parade and others for jousting' (\textit{The unconquered knight}, p. 41).
\textsuperscript{60} M. McKisack, \textit{The fourteenth-century, 1307-1399} (Oxford, 1959), p. 239 n. 3.
Great ceremonial processions associated with coronations, military triumphs and urban tournaments were events which many in England would never witness; yet most of the population would occasionally be exposed to displays with a similar message though staged on a smaller scale. The mobilisation of a magnate's retinue for military or political purposes might, for example, involve the assembly of an impressive array of equestrian warriors. But perhaps the most arresting ceremonial occasion in which the warhorse could play a central part in the re-affirmation of the knight's place in the social order was the funeral ceremony. This was far simpler than a tournament procession, yet the local context and the solemnity of the occasion would add greatly to the effectiveness of the symbolism. In one very striking way the warrior class in England failed to exploit the symbolic power of the warhorse at the point of their departure from this world. By contrast with, for example, Italy - which is noted for its equestrian statues and bas reliefs - the warhorse rarely figures in the sepulchral monuments of the chivalric class in medieval England. The inclusion of a horse's head on the semi-effigial slab of a man-at-arms at Gilling-in-Ryedale (Yorkshire) is highly unusual. If not incorporated in their monuments, warhorses were frequently bequeathed, together with military equipment and heraldic achievements, as mortuary gifts: a symbolic gesture from which the Church benefitted financially, but which also marked its recognition of the continuing martial function of the aristocracy.

61. A splendid fourteenth-century example is the funeral monument of Cangrande I della Scala, lord of Verona; see E. Arslan, 'La statua equestre di Cangrande', Studie in onore di F.M. Mistrorigo, ed. A. Dani (Vicenza, 1958).

62. For example, the tombstone of the Beccadelli (1341) at Imola, of which there is an illustration in J. Larner, The lords of Romagna (London, 1965), frontispiece.

63. The slab is illustrated in H. Lawrence, Heraldry from military monuments before 1350 in England and Wales, Harleian Society, xcvi, 1946, plate opposite p. 3.

64. 'La monture était probablement revendue au profit du bénéficiaire mais l'équipement restait exposé dans l'église, près du mausolée du défunt': C. Gaier, L'industrie et le commerce des armes dans les anciennes principautés belges du xiiié siècle à la fin du xvié siècle (Paris, 1973), p. 73. Cf. Vale,
made shortly before his death in 1345, Sir Geoffrey de Luttrell directed that 'for a mortuary I leave my best horse with the trappings of war as befits'.65 We might reasonably imagine a caparisoned great warhorse very like that depicted in the Luttrell psalter. The horse intended as a mortuary gift would play a prominent part in the funeral ceremony. In 1308 Henry, lord Grey asked that the graunt piolé destrer, which he was giving to the burial church at Aylesford, Kent, should precede his body in the procession.66 In 1347, the earl of Surrey had more ambitious plans, for his corpse was to be preceded by four grauntz chivaux, caparisoned in his arms. Two of them, barded for war, were to be mortuary gifts for the church of his burial, St. Pancras, Lewes.67 If anything it is possible to perceive an increase in the warhorse's ceremonial role at the very time that its military role was diminishing: as Malcolm Vale has observed, 'the procession of chargers ridden by men dressed in the arms of the dead man became a striking part of the funeral ceremony in the second half of the fourteenth-century'.68 Few, perhaps, would match the grandeur of Arcite's funeral procession as depicted by Chaucer in the 'Knight's Tale'.69 But with an occasion such as Sir Brian Stapleton's funeral in the 1390s, which was to include a man de bone entaile wearing the

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War and chivalry, p. 88.

65. For the will, see The Luttrell Psalter, Appendix I, pp. 52-56. For similar mortuary gifts, see J.T. Rosenthal, The purchase of paradise (London, 1972), pp. 86, 91, 92, 94.


67. Vale, War and chivalry, p. 89. Eight horses ridden by armoured men were involved in Sir Ralph Neville's funeral in Durham cathedral in 1355 (Barker, The tournament in England, p. 174). This kind of display was not to everyone's taste. Henry of Grosmont, for example, wanted 'nothing vain nor extravagant, such as armed men, covered horses, nor other vain things' at his funeral (ibid., p. 88). Cf. M. Vale, Piety, charity and literacy among the Yorkshire gentry, 1370-1480. Borthwick Papers, No. 50 (University of York, 1976), pp. 12-14.

68. Vale, War and chivalry, pp. 89-90.

69. Canterbury Tales, Knight's Tale, lines 2871-904.
deceased Garter knight’s arms and helm, and riding a good horse,\textsuperscript{70} we see a decidedly theatrical event, redolent of the traditional symbolism of a warrior aristocracy.

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\textsuperscript{70} The other participants in the event included a 'gathering of Stapleton's tenants and servants, dressed in gowns of blue cloth': Vale, \textit{Piety, charity and literacy}, p. 12.
ii) The English warhorse in the fourteenth-century: the sources

To confine oneself to the records generated by the owners of warhorses in late medieval England necessitates acceptance of documentary coverage which is both patchy and unsystematic. No more than glimpses can be had for most horse-breeders and owners. The one great exception to this picture of archival paucity concerns the king's studs and great horses, which are greatly illuminated by a series of detailed accounts.¹ For the English nobility and gentry, evidence is far more fragmentary: occasional stud and equestrian expenses accounts,² and a miscellany of other references, to be found, for instance, in the Registers of Edward, Prince of Wales and John, duke of Lancaster, in household and estate accounts,³ and in a scatter of wills.⁴ Information of this kind can be supplemented by recourse to royal administrative records, in which, for instance, can be found relevant records of gifts,⁵ thefts,⁶ and forfeitures.⁷

¹ The equitium regis accounts form a section of Exchequer Accounts, Various (E101). They have been examined most recently by R.H.C. Davis in The medieval warhorse pp. 86-97. For a discussion of the king's horses during the first decade of Edward III's reign, see N. Neilson, 'The king's hunting and his great horses', The English government at work, 1327-1336, ed. J.F. Willard and W.E. Morris (3 vols., Cambridge, Mass., 1940-50), i, pp. 435-44. For the officials in charge of the king's horses, see M.M. Reese, The royal office of Master of the Horse (London, 1976), Chapters 4 and 5.

² For a stud account, see E101/507/14; for an expenses account of the earl of Hereford's horses, July 1304, see E101/12/23.

³ For the marshalsea costs of the earl of Cornwall's destriers in 1297, see Ministers' accounts of the earldom of Cornwall, 1296-1297, ed. L.M. Midgley, 2 vols., Camden Soc., 3rd ser., lvi & lviii (1942, 1945), i, pp. 63-64. For the costs of keeping horses in aristocratic households, which amounted to about 10% of annual expenditure, see C. Dyer, Standards of living in the later Middle Ages (Cambridge, 1989), pp. 70-72.

⁴ The evidence is usually imprecise: for example, in 1379, Sir Roger de Beauchamp bequethed to his grandson and heir, deux de mes meillourz Chyvaux except mon principall Chivall which was left to his wife ('The Bedfordshire wills and administrations proved at Lambeth Palace and in the Archdeaconry of Huntingdon', ed. F. A. Page-Turner. Bedfordshire Historical Record Society, ii (1914), p. 8). Considerably more illuminating is Henry, Lord Grey's will of 1308 (Report of MSS of Lord Middleton of Wollaston Hall, Nottinghamshire. Historical Manuscripts Commission, Report No. 69 (London, 1911), pp. 84-86), in which, apart from his mortuary gift, the testator bequethed mon neir destrer, un bon rouncyn de vint mars ou de dis livres, le sor rouncyn de Estaumford, le ferraunt rouncyn ky est apele 'Dycoun' and le bay rouncyn de Estaumford. But even a detailed will, such as Grey's, is offering only selective glimpses of a nobleman's stables; and the majority of the horses itemised are not valued.

⁵ For presentations of horses to the Crown, see the Dona section of royal household accounts (which record small royal gifts to servants bringing the horses to the king). The donors were quite often foreigners: for example in 1359, John de Gistell, scutifer of Sir Wulfard de Gistell, presented a courser to Edward III (E101/393/11 fo. 71; cf. gifts by Germans in the mid 1330s: B.L., Add. Ms. 46350 fos. 6, 7). French and German knights made similar gifts to Henry of Bolingbroke whilst he
Material of such varied provenance cannot provide reliable evidence for a systematic study of the late medieval English warhorse. Although the total haul is seems substantial, the information is insufficiently consistent to allow a clear impression of developments over time. Much of the evidence is not about warhorses at all, but concerns horses needed for activities far removed from the noise of battle: palfreys for riding and cart-horses for haulage, for example. Frequently, indeed, the records fail to distinguish warhorses from those kept for non-military work. The inventory of Sir Edmund Appleby’s property, drawn-up in 1374, includes his own grey horse, worth 100s. (together with a number of others of lesser value), which could well have been a fairly cheap warhorse, but was more probably a palfrey. Household accounts are usually quite as unspecific in their references to ‘the lord’s horses’. The greatest barrier to analysis, however, is not the ambiguity of terminology employed, but the lack of a consistent measure of horse quality. Warhorses are often referred to, and even described, but they are far less frequently valued. Many of the estimates of horse value which we do


6. For example, the theft of forty horses from the Yorkshire estates of John de Mowbray in 1342: C.P.R., 1340-43, p. 590.

7. Thirty-four destriers, coursers and other horses, which had belonged to Sir Andrew de Harcla prior to his fall, were in the custody of Sir Anthony de Lucy from the end of February to early July 1323 (B.L., Stowe Ms. 553 fo. 32v; cf. E101/16/9). The livestock forfeited by some who had been on the losing side at the battle of Shrewsbury is discussed in Morgan, War and society in medieval Cheshire, pp. 82-83; Sir Hugh Browe, for example, forfeited 39 horses.

8. Three horses worth, in all, £5 and five cart-horses with a combined value of 10 marks. The inventory is printed, with a translation, in G.G. Astill, ‘An early inventory of a Leicestershire knight’, Midland History, ii (1973-4), pp. 274-83. There are few such inventories for the fourteenth-century and they do not always include details about horses.

9. Appleby had a long military career (for which, see below, pp. 48-49), but he was a very old man by 1374.

10. For example, see G.H. Holley, ‘The earliest roll of household accounts in the muniment room at Hunstanton for the 2nd. year of Edward III [1328]’, Norfolk Archaeology, xxi (1923), pp. 77-96, which refers simply to the ‘horses’ of the lord and his visitors. It does, however, distinguish stotts.
have come not from objective assessors, but from the horse-owners themselves in circumstances in which they might be expected to furnish inflated valuations. In 1331, for example, John de Aspale was allowed 100 marks, which he claimed represented the value of two horses confiscated as a result of his connection with Edmund, earl of Kent.¹¹

A few years earlier Isabel de Vernoun sought recovery of, amongst other things, a £20 courser, a 12 mark rouncy and a 4 mark sumpter, which had been taken into the king's hands at Carlisle castle at the time of Sir Andrew de Harcla's fall.¹² Prices data of such unreliable origin is obviously unsatisfactory; the problem with more 'conventional' prices data - the records of actual sales of warhorses - is that there is not enough of it for worthwhile analysis.¹³

Information concerning the king's purchases and sales is relatively plentiful,¹⁴ but there is comparatively little relating to the buying and selling of warhorses by the chivalric class of late medieval England.¹⁵ The best that can be mustered is a miscellany of isolated references. The busy trading at fourteenth-century horse fairs has left only scattered traces of hard evidence in the records.¹⁶ Indeed,

¹¹. C.C.R., 1330-33, p. 105. Twenty years later John de la Rokele claimed that a horse worth £10 had been killed during an assault on his person: C.P.R., 1350-54, p. 277.


¹⁴. See, for example, Davis, The medieval warhorse, pp. 87-91. For horses bought from Spanish and Italian merchants during the mid 1330s, see B.L., Cotton Ms., Nero C. VIII fos. 62-62v. In 1342, six destriers and six coursers, with a combined value of £230, were shipped to England from Spain for the king's use (E403/326 mm. 14, 15). The king spent a great deal on continental horses, but for purchases in England, see below, p. 274 n. 2.


¹⁶. In 1381, two coursers grey pomelez, costing £29. 13s. 4d, were bought at Pontefract for John of Gaunt: J.G. Reg., 1379-83, ii, no. 744. In 1364, the Prince of Wales' servant, John Pryme, was sent to purchase horses at Stamford fair in preparation for his master's departure for Aquitaine: B.P. Reg., iv, p. 488. For a detailed account of nine horses bought for Edward, Prince of Wales, at Ripon fair in 1307, see C47/3/52 m. 13; these are, however, palfreys, not warhorses.
by no means all of the evidence is provided by financial accounts. Thus, for example the Lord Grey of Ruthyn stated before the Court of Chivalry in 1385 that his only personal contact with the Grosvenors had been through the purchase of a black horse from an Emma Grosvenor, costing £22 and more.17 In 1319, Hugh de Neville's servants spent £20 on five horses for use by their master on campaign in Scotland, only to have them stolen by miscreants.18

Occasionally the sale of substantial numbers of warhorses has left a mark in records associated with military administration; but, in most cases, we must doubt the value of the evidence supplied. Thus, for example, at the end of the short and dispiriting Weardale campaign in 1327, John of Hainault's substantial contingent of continental men-at-arms sold most of their horses to the English Crown.19 Little is known about this sale, but the re-sale of some of these horses to Englishmen is recorded in detail.20 The prices secured by royal officials appear very modest: in all, they raised only £920 2s. 8d. from the sale of 407 beasts,21 whilst the Hainaulters claimed no less than £21,482 5s. 6d. for their lost and sold horses.22 The discrepancy is not difficult to explain. John of Hainault had no doubt secured the values recorded on the official horse inventories drawn up at the time of muster,23 whilst the English Crown had to accept whatever they could get for horses which were probably in poor

18. C.P.R., 1317-21, pp. 474-75.
19. Some 672 of these animals were kept at York, in the castle and the Archbishop's palace, during the second half of August: E101/18/5.
20. The sale of 98 of these horses (to 65 named persons) is itemised in Brunham's account book: E101/383/8 mm. 8-8v.
23. For the process of horse valuation, see below pp. A John of Hainault's company may have been the only section of the English army in 1327 to have had their horses appraised.
condition after a demanding campaign.

Clearly the prices obtained for the Hainaulter horses in 1327 did not reflect their true value. A similar case, this time involving Englishmen's horses, can be seen about twenty-five years later. Towards the end of 1352 some of the men-at-arms serving with the earl of Stafford delivered-up their warhorses to the constable of Bordeaux before leaving Gascony. But, as in 1327, rather than knowing the sums which the authorities paid for the horses, what we have is a record of prices secured when the horses were re-sold\(^\text{24}\) - and, once again, the prices are very low. This is certainly not a reflection of the status of the men-at-arms to whom they had belonged: at least nine of these were knights, some with long and distinguished military careers. One of their number, Sir Richard de Merton, had been campaigning regularly for at least twenty years and we might, therefore, reasonably expect his warhorse to have been worth rather more than the £6 for which it was sold by the constable of Bordeaux.\(^\text{25}\)

It is, then, fortunate that we need not rely upon prices data of conventional kinds for a systematic survey of the fourteenth-century English warhorse; that the horse inventories compiled at the commencement of periods of paid military service can offer an excellent alternative source of warhorse prices. The inventories are in fact a guide to rather more than simply the horses themselves.

They provide an insight into the status and attitudes of the group of

\(^{24}\) E101/170/20 fos. 19-21v; for a discussion of these materials, see below p. 271. In 1350, 27 members of the earl of Lancaster's retinue sold their horses to the constable of Bordeaux before leaving the duchy and on this occasion the values are known: E403/355 m. 19. See below, pp. 270-71 for a discussion of this transaction.

\(^{25}\) This was, nevertheless, one of the most expensive horses to be sold. Merton had served at Halidon Hill (C71/13 m. 31), in Scotland in the later 1330s (C71/16 m. 32; C71/17 m. 20; E101/35/3 m. 1), at Buironfosse in 1339 (Treaty Rolls, 1337-39, p. 392), at Sluys in 1340 (C76/15 m. 24), in Brittany in 1342-43 (C76/17 m. 32) and at Crécy and the siege of Calais (Crécy and Calais, pp. 125, 145). He was still prepared to go on active service in 1359 (C76/38 m. 10).
men who owned and served with these horses: the English chivalric class under the three Edwardian kings. It is perhaps only to be expected that a man-at-arms' horse would tend to reflect his standing in society and in the military hierarchy. This can be seen clearly enough when the man is well known, his career well documented. But many, indeed most, of the members of the military community figure only fleetingly in the most readily accessible records. The quality and type of warhorse listed in the inventories is thus a simple, but invaluable, measure of social and military status for the many hundreds of faceless men serving in Edwardian armies. Often a particular individual will appear only once in the inventories, a single 'snap-shot' of man and warhorse, and it may be uncertain whether an accurate reflection of his military status is being offered. A series of records about an individual is obviously more revealing and more valuable, for it will allow us to chart the course of a man's career, perhaps his rise and fall, as reflected in the quality of the horseflesh which he employed on campaign.

Some members of the military community are well known to history. Earlier, a fleeting glimpse was offered of Sir Andrew de Harcla's stock of horses at the time of his dramatic fall from power. 26 A series of horse inventories for the years 1313 and 1314 reveal a little a more of this ambitious border fighter. Harcla, as leader of a retinue, is listed with warhorses ranging in value from 20 marks to 40 marks; 27 horses which were of significantly higher quality than those possessed by the men in his retinues and which demonstrate well


27. E101/14/15 m. 2 (destrier valued at 20 marks on an inventory dated 7 November 1314); m. 4 (horse: 40 marks; 16 January 1313); m. 5 (destrier: £20; 8 July 1314).
his military standing in the western marches. Retinue captains, it must be admitted, form a small élite in the military community. Most names listed in horse inventories are far less familiar and many are very shadowy figures. Yet, their association with a particular type and quality of horse gives them a measure of identity, which it may be possible to amplify through further research. Take, for example, Laurence de Streatley, who can be seen serving in Ireland in the mid 1340s in the retinue of Sir Ralph de Ufford. That he was a man-at-arms of very modest status is suggested by the fact that the horse which he lost during this expedition was valued at a mere 5 marks.28 Although Streatley never really rose out of obscurity, his military status appears to have increased to some extent by the mid 1350s, for in December 1354 he can be seen claiming and receiving compensation for a horse worth £10.29 For others, service with Ufford in Ireland in the mid 1340s represented a slightly more advanced stage in their careers. Sir Thomas Daniel claimed £13 for the loss of two horses; 30 this represents a modest improvement in warhorse quality - as an esquire, he had served regularly in Scotland in the later 1330s31 - but he had further to go up the military ladder. 32 Sir Reginald Fitz Herbert seems to have reached the top rather quicker. Like Daniel, as

28. The low fee which he received for two years' service - 10 marks - tends to confirm this suggestion: C260/57 m. 28.

29. E101/172/4 m. 9, 10. His presence in Gascony was probably connected with that of Master John de Streatley, who had been appointed to his second term as constable of Bordeaux earlier in the year. In May 1348, Laurence had secured a letter of protection for service in Gascony with Master John at the start of the latter's first spell as constable: C61/60 m. 27. For John de Streatley, see Tout, Chapters, v, pp. 376 n. 5; 377 n. 1; vi, pp. 69-70.

30. One was probably a cheap 'second string' horse. Daniel's fee for nine months service was 20 marks: C260/57 m. 28.

31. 1336: 10 marks (E101/19/36); 1337: £8 (E101/20/17); 1337-8: £5 (E101/35/3) - on each occasion serving in Sir Henry Percy's retinue. Still an esquire, he was a member of the Edinburgh Castle garrison in 1340-1: E101/23/1 m. 4.

32. He was serving in Gascony with Ralph, Lord Stafford in 1345 (C61/57 m. 5). This, perhaps significantly, appears to be first the occasion on which he can be seen to have received a letter of protection. He served in the Prince of Wales' retinue during the Crécy-Calais campaign and captured the count of Tancarville at Caen: The life and campaigns of the Black Prince, ed. R. Barber (Woodbridge, 1986), p. 33.
an esquire, Fitz Herbert served in Scotland in the mid 1330s with modestly priced horseflesh;\(^{33}\) but he (unlike Daniel) became actively involved in the French war from the outset, and by the time he joined Ufford's retinue in 1344, during a lull in continental campaigning, Fitz Herbert appears to have acquired a decidedly more elevated military status.\(^{34}\) Thus, the horse which he lost in Ireland was worth £20, and he was in receipt of a very substantial fee for this term of duty.\(^{35}\) The upward course of many other careers can be charted in the inventories.\(^{36}\) In some cases, however, a distinguished career in arms and consequent high esteem in the military community failed to confer permanent benefits. It will be recalled that, according to the inventory of his property, Sir Edmund de Appleby's most valuable horse in 1374 was worth a mere £5. But this aged and apparently impoverished country gentleman had a long and varied military past which had seen him in the company of the greatest military figures in the kingdom.\(^{37}\) In the year after Bannockburn, he had served in Scotland with a horse valued at 10 marks.\(^{38}\) In 1337-8, he was once more in the north, but now with a 20 mark warhorse. He was by this time a distinguished knight,\(^{39}\) and a prominent member of the earl of

\(^{33}\) In 1336, he served with a 10 mark warhorse in the retinue of the earl of Cornwall (E101/19/36). He had also been in Cornwall's retinue for the summer campaign of the previous year (C71/15 m. 32).

\(^{34}\) Cambrésis-Thiérache campaign: Treaty Rolls, 1337-39, nos. 181, 365, 385. Sluys: C76/15 m. 22. Brittany 1342-43: C76/17 m. 26. After a year in Ireland, he joined the earl of Pembroke's retinue for service in Gascony: C76/21 m. 5, 6.

\(^{35}\) The fee was 40 marks for one year's service: C260/57 m. 28.

\(^{36}\) Many similar case studies are outlined in brief during the course of Chapter VI.

\(^{37}\) For his financial difficulties, see Astill, op. cit., p. 277. For a man with similar problems, see N. Saul, 'A "rising" lord and a "declining" esquire: Sir Thomas de Berkeley III and Geoffrey Gascelyn of Sheldon', Historical Research, lx (1988), pp. 345-56.

\(^{38}\) E101/15/6 m. 2; serving in the retinue of Sir Richard de Grey, as he was also to do in the War of St. Sardos (Astill, op. cit. p. 275).

\(^{39}\) He is included on the Ashmolean roll of arms (Oxford, Bodleian Library, Ashmole Ms. 15A) and Cotgrave's Ordinary, of c. 1340 (Rolls of Arms of the Reigns of Henry III and Edward III, ed. N. H. Nicolas (London, 1829), p. 47.
Gloucester's military retinue.\textsuperscript{40} This was by no means the climax of his career, for he was to serve in the early campaigns of the French war and, later, at Poitiers.\textsuperscript{41} By the 1370s, however, Sir Edmund de Appleby had little to show for a long career in arms: a striking reminder that regular service in apparently profitable theatres of war did not guarantee the accumulation of profits which could be converted into lasting wealth.

Using the evidence of the inventories as a barometer of the fortunes of an individual man-at-arms is most effectively done when the circumstances of the individual can be checked against the collective experience of the whole military community. Thus, for example, if Sir Andrew de Harcla's warhorses in 1313-14 are viewed in the context of the wider chivalric community at the time of Bannockburn, he begins to seem a captain of no more than moderate standing. He is an important, 'rising' figure in the western Marches, but retinue captains with greater political weight and from the more affluent corners of England (and less attuned to the practical realities of border warfare) will often be listed with horseflesh of considerably higher value.\textsuperscript{42} A man's fortunes may rise or fall, but this will need to be set against a background in which the collective experience of the military community, as reflected in the general level of warhorse values, is also fluctuating. Here we must recognise, on the one hand, trends of

\textsuperscript{40}E101/35/3 m. 1. He had served in Scotland in Audley's retinue in, 1327, 1335 and 1336 (E101/383/8 m. 10; C71/15 m. 32; C71/16 m. 19).

\textsuperscript{41}1340: C76/15 m. 6. 1341: C76/16 m. 26. 1342: C76/17 m. 25. On each occasion he served in the retinue of the earl of Gloucester, with whom he probably had a close retaining tie. For his involvement at Poitiers, see Hewitt, \textit{Black Prince's expedition}, p. 196. He appears to have been in Gascony several years earlier, in the earl of Stafford's retinue: an 'Edmund de Appleby' was amongst the men who sold their horses before leaving the duchy. In his case the horse was re-sold for £3 (E101/170/20 fo. 20v.).

\textsuperscript{42}For example, the retinue commanders' warhorses in the earl of Pembroke's small army, campaigning in the Scots borders during the summer of 1315: the earl himself (£100); Sir Richard de Grey (100 marks); Sir Robert de Mohaut (£80); Sir Bartholomew de Badlesmere (100 marks). E101/15/6.
a long term nature (associated with the rise of the 'great horse' and the eclipse of the warhorse in English military practice) and, on the other, short term fluctuations associated with the circumstances of particular campaigns (for example, the nature of the theatre of war, the identity of the captain). Gathering the data and compiling the statistics so that these patterns may be perceived is a laborious task, but the end-product amply repays the labour expended. The result represents something approaching a 'prices series' for warhorses; but more important, it offers a reflection of the attitudes of the English chivalric class as whole: how they responded as a group to the changing circumstances of campaigning in the fourteenth-century, as reflected in the quality of the horseflesh which they selected for active service. Thus, a man-at-arms' warhorse, if viewed in the context of the body of data for the whole military community, can be seen as a reflection not simply of the man's military status, but also of his response to the conditions of a particular campaign. His response may be broadly in line with that of others, or spurred by the circumstances of his own career, it may be wholly divergent. Either way, the evidence of the horse inventories offers a means of gaining access, however fleetingly and imperfectly, to the thought processes of hundreds of faceless men.

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The Edwardian horse inventories, though undoubtedly an excellent source, have yet to be subjected to systematic analysis - a neglect which probably arises from the fact that the great bulk of them

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43. See Chapter VI, Tables 6.1 and 6.2.
are available only in manuscript form. There appears to have been only one attempt at summary analysis of these records: by the father of Edwardian military studies, J. E. Morris. He indicated the range of values which are to be found in the inventories and showed, in general terms, how the quality of horseflesh was related to a man's status, from 'barons and [the] richest bannerets' (80 - 120 marks), through knights (£15 - £30) to 'ordinary troopers' (£5 - £8). Morris's figures seem to have formed the basis for much, if not most, subsequent comment on the quality of the English warhorse. His scale of values was used, for example, by N.B. Lewis to reconstruct the rank structure of a small company which was to serve in Wales in the later 1280s. In most cases, Morris's figures are simply re-stated; but the manner of re-statement is often misleading, for there is a tendency to dwell upon horses of the highest quality, without giving a clear impression of what an ordinary man-at-arms would need to pay for a typical warhorse. It may well be true that 'a good Edwardian dextrarius alone would fetch from £20 to £100', but about 90% of the horses listed in the inventories for the Falkirk campaign were valued


47. For example: a knight's great warhorse was 'worth anything from £40 to £80' (Powicke, The thirteenth century, p. 549; for similar wording, see S. Harvey, 'The knight and the knight's fee in England', Past and Present, no. xlix (1970), p. 40); 'the price of destriers is known to have risen as high as £80 in the thirteenth-century' (Dyer, Standards of living in the later Middle Ages, pp. 71-72); 'a good war horse could cost up to £80' (A.L. Brown, The governance of late medieval England, 1272-1461 (London, 1989), p. 86). R.H.C. Davis shows us both ends of the spectrum: 'the best military horse ... the warhorse or destrier [cost] £50-100 or even more', whilst 'the horse ridden by the non-knightly man-at-arms was a rouncy costing £5-10 or slightly more': The medieval warhorse, p. 67.

at less than £20. In order to emphasise the scale of a man’s investment in his warhorses, it is unnecessary to dwell on the prices of the greatest destriers (which were, in any case, the preserve of commensurately wealthy men), for to a member of the lesser gentry, a £10 horse represented a massive outlay. This was, after all, a horse of real quality, worth at least ten-times as much as an average cart-horse and twenty times as much as a plough horse. It represented over six months pay for a man-at-arms serving in the king’s army, or, looked at another way, 25% of an annual income which in this period would usually be regarded as adequate for the support of knighthood, and 40% of the income which in 1344-5 qualified a man to be equipped as a man-at-arms.

Such men as these, the owners of warhorses worth £10, 10 marks or even as little as 100s, will often be taking centre stage in this study. Their role in the functioning of the Edwardian military machine was crucial and it is one of the great strengths of the horse inventories that they reveal the part played by the ordinary man-at-arms rather more clearly than most military records. They and their warhorses will be considered in due course; but first we must take a careful look at the horse inventories and the administrative processes involved in their production.

49. See Table 6.2. It is unfortunate that the other main source of evidence for Edwardian warhorse prices, the records of royal purchases, tends further to reinforce this impression of highly-priced horseflesh (e.g., M. McKisack, The fourteenth-century (Oxford, 1959), p. 239 n. 3); an impression to which many of the fragments of evidence from earlier periods, often concerned with the possessions of great men, lend further weight (e.g., R.A. Brown, 'The status of the Norman knight', War and government in the Middle Ages, ed. J. Gillingham and J.C. Holt, p. 28; P. Contamine, War in the Middle Ages (London, 1984), p. 96).

50. The agrarian history of England and Wales, ii, 1042-1350, pp. 749-50 and Table 7.4: ‘Livestock prices by decades, 1160-1356’.


52. Saul, Knights and esquires, pp. 37-47; C.P.R., 1343-45, p. 495.
Chapter III
THE HORSE INVENTORIES: DOCUMENTS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESSES

i) Inventories and *restauro equorum* accounts

At the core of this study are two distinct, though closely related, types of document: horse inventories and *restauro equorum* accounts. The former were working records, drawn up as an army's warhorses were appraised at the start of a period of paid military service and designed to be consulted and annotated during and after the campaign. The latter, consisting of lists of horses lost on active service, were based upon information contained in the full horse inventories, but were usually compiled long after the dust of the campaign had settled, as part of a formal set of accounts.\(^1\) Although the product of very different administrative exercises - and despite consequent differences in appearance and layout - horse inventories and *restauro equorum* accounts are similar in their essential content. They both consist of lists of men-at-arms grouped into retinues, with each man having a horse, described and valued, against his name. Although horse inventories and *restauro equorum* accounts provide the most substantial body of information on the Edwardian warhorse, a range of other materials also contribute usefully to our knowledge of these animals, their owners and their place in the organisation and conduct of war. Thus, for instance, documents subsidiary to *restauro equorum* accounts - such as claims and warrants for compensation payments - together with many scattered entries on the Issue rolls and Chancery

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1. The great majority of Edwardian horse inventories, together with a miscellany of related materials, are to be found amongst Exchequer, Accounts Various (E101) and Chancery, Miscellanea (C47, bundle 2) at the Public Record Office. The most important *restauro equorum* accounts for the reigns of Edward II and III are included in the Wardrobe books of the royal household, held at the P.R.O. (E36 and E101) and the British Library (e.g. Cotton Ms., Nero C VIII; Stowe Ms. 553). A few of these documents are available in printed editions. For the horse inventories compiled at the start of the Falkirk campaign of 1298, see Gough, pp. 160-237; for *restauro equorum* accounts for the period 1299-1300, see Topham, pp. 155-87, and for those arising from the Low Countries campaign of 1338-39, see Norwell, pp. 309-25.
rolls, both supplement the evidence of the horse lists and broaden our understanding of the administrative processes at work.

Horse inventories and *restauro equorum* lists are highly distinctive sources, but as far as English medieval history is concerned, they are unique to the period of the three Edwardian kings: there is nothing remotely similar for either the period prior to the later thirteenth-century, or for that which followed the passing of Edward of Woodstock. The earliest surviving inventories date from the second Welsh war of Edward I and the latest from the duke of Clarence's expedition to Ireland in 1361-64. They are available in substantial quantities for the regular Scottish expeditions of the English kings from the 1290s until the late 1330s. For their overseas enterprises, including those in Ireland, there are good materials rather more intermittently from the later 1290s until the 1360s. Within this time span of rather less than a hundred years, their coverage is far from consistent. They are available for only a proportion of Edwardian campaigns, either because of changes in the terms of military service, or as a consequence of the vagaries of documentary survival. The continuous modification of the terms of military service, and their complete overhaul towards end of Edward III's reign, will be discussed in detail in the next chapter. Suffice to say here that there were many military operations, during the period c.1280-c.1370, for which no horse inventories were compiled. Only a modest proportion of the inventories which were drawn up have survived the rigours of the intervening centuries. Rarely do we find the kind of embarrassment of documentary riches which have made the English expeditions to Gascony

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in 1324-25 amongst the best documented of the fourteenth-century. Often, the full inventories have entirely disappeared, and it is necessary to rely upon *restauro equorum* accounts (as, for instance, for the campaigns of 1322, 1338-39 and 1342-43), files of compensation warrants (as for troops in Gascony in the mid 1350s) or less revealing materials, such as the aggregated figures for horse losses embedded in the *vadia guerre* accounts for the Rheims campaign of 1359-60. Even when full horse inventories are available for a particular army, they rarely provide anything like a complete tally of warhorses, usually covering only a selection of retinues. A *restauro equorum* account, on the other hand, will include only those horses which have been lost on campaign and it can offer, therefore, only a sample from the full inventory, though an invaluable one if the original lists have not survived.

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ii) The appraisal of warhorses

How did these documents come into being? The compilation of horse inventories usually formed part of the mustering process at the start of a period of military service.\(^1\) The assembly of the feudal host traditionally involved an inspection of the contingents offered by tenants-in-chief, to ensure that the required numbers of men-at-arms were present and that their horses and equipment were of suitable quality.\(^2\) Proffer rolls, compiled at feudal musters by the Constable and Marshal or their deputies, have survived for several early fourteenth-century armies.\(^3\) They list, for each tenant-in-chief, the names of the men-at-arms who were to serve in the host, together with the total number of 'covered' horses (or in certain circumstances equi discooperti) brought by each feudal contingent. The advent of paid service - and with it restauro equorum - complicated the mustering procedure to a certain degree in that it was now necessary not simply to inspect warhorses, but to compile a written record of their descriptions and values. Like the proffer rolls, the horse inventories were often compiled over a period of weeks rather than on a single day, new contingents being added as they arrived and were taken into the king's pay. Thus, for example, in 1322 the vadia guerre accounts show that horse valuation occurred on ten different days between 4 and 16 August.\(^4\) In the case of this army, it is likely

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4. B.L., Stowe Ms. 553 fos. 56v-63. The gradual build-up of Aymer de Valence's small army during the summer and autumn of 1315 is clearly shown by annotations on the surviving inventory (E101/15/6).
that the Constable and Marshal, or their lieutenants, supervised horse valuation as well as the receipt of proffers.\textsuperscript{5} Frequently, the task was performed by officers of the royal household, thus reflecting the origins of \textit{restauro equorum} in royal household practice and the continuing involvement of the Wardrobe in the financing of campaigns.\textsuperscript{6} With smaller expeditionary forces, horse appraisal was usually the responsibility of 'a king's clerk trained to the work and a capable knight',\textsuperscript{7} the later probably the marshal of the army. For Henry of Lancaster's army serving in Scotland in the spring and early summer of 1336, the task was undertaken by Sir Ralph de Neville of Raby, the leader of a substantial retinue in the army, and John de Houton, clerk.\textsuperscript{8} More often, perhaps, a larger team of appraisers was employed, sometimes working in more than one location.\textsuperscript{9}

As horse appraisal formed an integral part of the muster process, we usually find, in the case of overseas expeditions, that it took place at the port of embarkation. When contingents were to sail from a number of ports, a team of horse appraisers would be needed. The records rarely offer more than glimpses of this sub-division of responsibility, but for the Breton expeditions of 1342-43 it is possible to see a number of different men being sent to Plymouth, Portsmouth, Southampton and Winchelsea to appraise the horses of

\textsuperscript{5} Henry de Beaumont was Constable and Thomas de Brotherton was Marshal of England (C47/5/10). Proffers were received on five of the ten days (and in the same locations) on which horse appraisal occurred.

\textsuperscript{6} In 1338, the appraisers for the continental campaign were Sir John Darcy, Seneschal of the Household and Richard de Nateby, Controller of the Wardrobe (Norwell, p. 309).

\textsuperscript{7} Prince, 'The indenture system under Edward III', p. 294.

\textsuperscript{8} B.L., Cotton Ms., Nero C. VIII fos. 280v-82. John de Houton's rolls for this army are largely intact: E101/19/36.

\textsuperscript{9} As in 1305-6, when the 'main unit', operating from Carlisle, consisted of two knights (Sir Thomas Paynell and Sir Robert de Felton) and a clerk (James de Dalilegh). Some horses were valued at Berwick by John de Sandale, clerk, and the records sent to Dalilegh at Carlisle (E101/612/15).
several magnate captains. They are all clerks, so we must assume that they collaborated with military men, or local officials, on the spot. On occasions, it was necessary, or desirable, to delay the process of horse appraisal until reaching France. In 1345, for example, the earl of Derby's retinue was paid from their day of arrival at Southampton, but their horses were only appraised after they had reached Bordeaux. It is quite likely that many of them were bought in the Duchy, thus avoiding the potential hazards of a long voyage from England, as well as making it easier to assemble an adequate transport fleet.

As regards the actual procedure of horse appraisal, we are almost wholly reliant upon the evidence of the inventories themselves. Other record sources cast very little light on this subject and, as Hewitt observed, contemporary illuminators were not usually attracted by such

10. William de Dalton, clerk, was sent to Portsmouth and Southampton to appraise the horses of the earl of Northampton's company, whilst William de Cusance and Thomas de Baddeby, clerks, were despatched to deal with the earl of Salisbury's (and other magnates') horses at Winchelsea (E36/204 fo. 79). Also sent to value the horses of earl of Northampton's troops were William de Stury and William de Huggate, clerk (C76/17 m. 31). On 20 October 1342, John de Pitte and John de Baddeby, clerks, were appointed to appraise the horses of the earl of Gloucester's retinue at Plymouth (C76/17 m. 17), but a few days later William de Northwell and John de Kermond, clerks, were assigned to the same task (C76/17 m. 18); and it is clear that the latter pair actually went to Plymouth, for an account exists outlining the expenses incurred by their journey (E101/23/36 - the account is incorrectly dated, cf. E403/327 m. 6). Master Richard le Ferrou accompanied them, together with three esquires, seven grooms and nine horses. Kermond was also responsible for paying the wages of some of the troops and seamen assembled at Plymouth (C76/17 m. 18; E101/23/22). It is worth noting that Gloucester's retinue is not included in the restauro equorum accounts for this campaign.

11. In 1337, Roger Turtle, mayor of Bristol, was one of two men appointed to supervise the appraisal of the horses of John de Norwich's retinue, assembling in his town for the voyage to Gascony (C61/49 m. 17). The horses of Aymer de Valence's company, mustered at York in July 1315, were valued by three men, including the mayor of the city (E101/15/6).

12. Cf. the earl of Stafford's indenture of 1361 which allowed for the appraisal of his horses in either England or upon arrival in Ireland, in case les chivalx que serront achatez pferjdeila (E101/28/27 m. 4; C.C.R., 1360-64, p. 198).

13. E101/25/9. The terms of Derby's indenture allowed him a choice: his men could either have their horses valued devant lour eskippeson en manere acustunree, or they could acquire them in Gascony where they would be appraised by the constable of Bordeaux (Fowler, The king's lieutenant, pp. 230-31). They were, in fact, appraised by three men: Sir Thomas Cok, marshal of Lancaster's army (though only a knight), John de Wawayn, constable of Bordeaux and Bernard Brocas, controller of Bordeaux (E101/25/9). The Prince of Wales was given similar terms in 1355: Hewitt, The Black Prince's expedition, p. 33.
routine aspects of military organisation as the appraisal of horses.\textsuperscript{14} One or two observations can be made, however. In the first place, the order in which the horses were inspected seems to be preserved in the order of the entries in the surviving inventories. Most of the documents which have come down to us appear to be the original working records, drawn-up at a time and place often noted at the head of the document and subsequently amended 'in the field'. Duplicates or copies rearranging the order of the originals may well have been regularly made, but few have survived the passage of the centuries.\textsuperscript{15} The retinues were dealt with one by one; sometimes they are each given a separate membrane, sometimes they appear in sequence on a single roll. In most cases, the order of appraisal within a retinue appears to have followed the dictates of military precedence. The captain is followed by his knights, and then his esquires, in two separate blocks. Although knights banneret are not always distinguished from knights bachelor, there will usually be no danger of confusing bachelors with ordinary men-at-arms - as there often is with other military records.\textsuperscript{16}

On occasions, however, the order of appraisal within a retinue was a little different: the horse of each knight is followed by those of his

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{14} Hewitt, \textit{The organisation of war under Edward III}, pp. 154-55. Some useful comparative evidence is, however, forthcoming from continental Europe.
\item \textsuperscript{15} It seems to have been usual to make several copies of the original inventory (copies of the whole inventory for administrative use, and also sections of it for the retention of individual captains) and it is, therefore, probable that more than one clerk was at work during the horse appraisal process. Bearing in mind that two men were likely to record slightly different versions of an essentially verbal proceedings, this might also explain some of the apparent discrepancies between single surviving inventories and \textit{restauro equorum} accounts (on which, see below pp.\textsuperscript{97}). The four versions of the horse inventory for the first (western) fleet which sailed for Gascony in 1324 differ from one another in a number of respects: two copies are identical except for the fact that one is latin and the other French (E101/17/2); the third is basically the same, but with some changes to the order of the material (E101/16/38); the fourth has similar minor disparities, but is also clearly the latest version as it incorporates a number of late corrections (E101/13/35). These documents also exhibit differences in spelling, which appear to be the consequence of the the dictation process.
\item \textsuperscript{16} In particular, enrolled lists of letters of protection, but also \textit{restauro equorum} accounts: see below, pp. \textit{200, 246 n.2}.  
\end{itemize}
esquires, with the result that the inventory provides a clear
impression of the internal company structure of the retinue. Several
of the retinues included in the bundle of inventories compiled during
the winter of 1337-38 offer good examples of this approach. Not
only do inventories of this kind provide insights into military
structures which are otherwise all too rarely perceived in the
records; they also offer glimpses of associations between
individuals which may indicate the existence of retaining or tenurial
ties, or at least links of a less formal kind. The inventory of earl
of Salisbury's retinue in 1338, for instance, includes companies led
by members of the Berkeley and Ufford families, together with those of
a number of other knights with whom they were closely associated. At times, a connection of a particularly interesting kind is
suggested. Sir Thomas West contributed a not inconsiderable company
of six vallets to the earl of Salisbury's retinue in 1338, but the man
immediately following West's name in the inventory, Sir Richard Penlee
is described as son compaignon - a term of association which suggests

17. E101/35/3: in particular, the retinues of the earls of Gloucester, Arundel and Salisbury, and Sir
Giles de Badlesmere. The terms esquier and vallet are used interchangeably on this roll: see Saul,
Knights and esquires, pp. 11-20. The contrast between the quality of a knight's horse and those of his
esquires is brought out very strikingly when the inventory is arranged in this fashion. Some
inventories appear to have a random order of names (e.g. the earl of Warwick's retinue in 1337:
E101/20/17 m. 7), simply because the personal ties between knights and esquires are not explicitly
supplied.

18. The company structure of a retinue is sometimes revealed by collections of subcontracts (e.g. A.
but such documents are not available in any numbers. Some muster rolls arrange their contents so
as to reveal the existence of component companies (e.g. for Henry, Lord Percy's retinue in 1337:
E101/20/17 m. 5) but most are simply grouped according to rank and their survival is very patchy for
the earlier fourteenth-century.

19. E101/35/3 m. 2d. The historian is obliged to rely upon such 'indirect' sources as this for the
Berkeley retinue (see Saul, Knights and esquires, pp. 69-73). A rising star of this phase of Edward
III's reign, Sir Ralph de Ufford, has a small company in Salisbury's retinue. One of his vallets,
Robert Tane, and one of those in the company of the Sire de Ufford, Thomas de Hertford, also
served with him in Ireland during the mid 1340s (C.P.R., 1343-45, p. 244, C260/57 m. 28).
friendship, and perhaps brotherhood in arms. Although there is no evidence that West and Penlee served together before this time, they were both members of the earl of Pembroke's retinue in Brittany in 1342-43, shortly before West's death.

Each man-at-arms would come forward, declare his identity and present his horse for inspection. The appraisers were required to determine the type of the horse, its colour - together with any distinctive markings - and its value; all was written down on the inventory next to the name of the owner. They rarely included any additional information about either horse or man-at-arms; never, for instance, the height or age of the horse. Sometimes the valuation

20. E101/35/3 m. 1d. It may, however, be more a reflection of clerical etiquette: a term reserved for a man who is serving in the company of another man of equal rank (the equivalent phase in Latin inventories, e.g. the Falkirk rolls, is socius eiusdem). An unusually complete set of enrolled letters of protection, dated about a month after the inventory, suggest that Penlee and the six vallets (and one further man) are all serving with (i.e. under) Sir Thomas West, but Chancery roll terminology cannot be said to unambiguous (C71/18 m. 23). On brothers in arms, see K.B. McFarlane, 'An indenture of agreement between two English knights for mutual aid and counsel in peace and war, 5 December 1298', B.I.H.R., xxxviii (1965), pp. 200-8; idem, 'A business-partnership in war and administration, 1421-1445', E.H.R., lxviii (1963), pp. 290-308; M. Keen, 'Brotherhood in arms', History, xlvii (1962), pp. 1-17.

21. C76/17 m. 27. Sir Thomas West was a very experienced soldier, having served in Scotland in 1322, 1327, 1333, 1335 and 1338 (C.P.R., 1321-24, p. 186; E101/383/8, fo. 12; C71/13 m. 28; C71/15 m. 30) and the Low Countries in 1338-39 (Treaty Rolls, 1337-39, nos. 401, 404, 714; C76/14 m. 3) before going to Brittany in 1342. He died overseas in November 1343 (G.E.C., xii, part 2, pp. 517-18) but Sir Richard Penlee was to play an active role in the Crécy-Calais campaign (Crécy and Calais, pp. 85, 91, 137).

22. The names were almost certainly transmitted verbally, rather than in writing. This is suggested by the extremely variable spelling of surnames in the inventories (far more so, for example, than in letters of protection, which are based upon written warrants) and the occasional inclusion of unusual name forms: e.g. Sir d'Ufford, Mons. de Asllarton (E101/35/3 m. 1d, 2),

23. There is a uniformity in the basic layout of these documents, irrespective of whether they are written in Latin or French. All are lists with a single line of information for each man-at-arms and his horse: Symond de Lulleford - un chival ferant pomele - 10m. In some parts of the earlier inventories the order of the information is reversed: un chival ferant pomele pour Symond de Lulleford - 10m. (e.g. C47/2/6 & 7).

24. Cf. fourteenth-century France: 'le pelage est parfois decrit, sans allusion malheureusement à l'âge ou à la race' (Chomel, 'Chevaux de bataille et roncins en Dauphiné au xivème siècle', p. 12). In Italy, more detail might be recorded about the owner: his father's name and his place of birth (Contamine, War in the Middle Ages, p. 131). Sometimes the man-at-arms' county of origin is supplied in English inventories (e.g. some entries in the Falkirk rolls). The omission of height and age from the horse descriptions is perhaps surprising; cf. sixteenth-century practice in England: C.G. Cruickshank, Elizabeth's Army (2nd. edition, Oxford, 1966), p. 34 n. 1
is omitted, usually because the horse was a gift from the king and would not qualify for compensation if lost. As we have seen, it is likely that several versions of the inventory would be compiled at the time of appraisal. It is unusual for bundles of duplicate inventories (such as those for the War of Saint-Sardos) to have survived, but we know that on some occasions at least indented copies were made for the retention of retinue commanders and something along these lines may well have been normal procedure.

In addition to making a written record of their inspection, the appraisers would ensure that each horse was branded. Next to nothing is known about this aspect of the appraisal process: the records are more than usually uninformative, but English practice was probably similar to that of continental states. John II's ordinance of 1351 outlines what may have been a standard branding procedure: all warhorses were branded on the thigh, a separate brand-mark - decided upon by the muster official - being used for each company. In Italy, warhorses were branded with the condottiere's emblem; as in

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25. For example, Sir Pain Tibetot's destrier ferrand: E101/14/15 m. 9; cf. a number of examples in E101/15/6. It is not clear why the values have been wholly omitted from the inventory of the earl of Warenne's inventory, dating from 1325 (E101/17/31), but it may simply represent incomplete work. The last section of the household inventory for the Falkirk campaign, dated 21 July, also lacks values, apparently because the task of appraisal had not been completed before the battle on the 22nd (Gough, pp. 204-5).

26. For example, in 1364, for William de Windsor's expedition to Ireland (C.C.R., 1360-64, pp. 507-8; but only one inventory has survived: E101/29/5). The inventory for the winter campaign of 1337-38 is indented down its left side, suggesting that two identical copies were made in the manner of an indenture for service (E101/35/3).

27. Hewitt's reference to the 'usual' branding instructions is a little misleading (Organisation of war under Edward III, p. 87 n. 3), for they are often omitted from the orders appointing horse appraisers during the early years of the Hundred Years War. For an example, dating from July 1342 and referring to troops in Gascony, which does include these instructions, see C61/54 m. 2; cf. for the Black Prince's expedition, 1355, Rymer, III, i, p. 310.

28. '[Le chival sera] marque en la cuisse d'un fer chaut, a tel saing comme il plaira a ceulx qui en auront afaire, & seront touz les chevauls d'icelle Route marquiez d'un mesme fer & saing ...': Ordonnances des roys de France de la troisième race, ed. D.F. Secousse (Paris, 1734; reprinted, 1967), iv, p. 68. The branded part of the horse's hide was usually required as proof of loss (Contamine, Guerre, état et société, p. 104).
France, this helped prevent 'improper substitution' at musters.\(^{29}\)

Although probably designed to emphasise the continental origin of the horse depicted, the brand-mark shown on the flank of the Knight's mount in the Ellesmere manuscript of the Canterbury Tales - apparently in the form of a capital 'M' - may well resemble the kind of marking employed at musters of English royal armies earlier in the century.\(^{30}\)

The valuation of horseflesh was perhaps the largest and most time-consuming task facing royal and military officials as an army gathered at a muster point or a port of embarkation:\(^{31}\) the assembly of a large army might involve the examination of thousands of horses. It should be remembered, however, that only a proportion of an army's horses would be submitted for appraisal. As a general rule, it was only the warhorses of men-at-arms which were eligible for valuation. As with all rules, very occasional exceptions can be seen. The inventory of the earl of Salisbury's retinue, drawn up early in 1338, includes a 100s. horse for an unnamed archer.\(^{32}\) Rather more common are appraised horses for non-combatants. Included in Salisbury's *restauro equorum* account for the Low Countries campaign of 1338-39, for example, are horses for several clerks.\(^{33}\) But the vast majority of horses listed in the inventories and compensation accounts were horses


\(^{30}\) The brand-mark may have been intended to suggest a German origin for the Knight's horse (A.A. Dent, 'Chaucer and the horse', *Proceedings of the Leeds Philosophical and Literary Society*, ix (1959-62), p. 9), or, perhaps, service with mercenary companies in Italy (Jones, *Chaucer's knight*, pp. 29-30).

\(^{31}\) The appraisal task at any one port is likely to have lasted several days. The team who were sent to Plymouth in 1342 to value the horses of the earl of Gloucester's men stayed for eight days from 5 to 12 November (E101/23/36).

\(^{32}\) E101/35/3 m. 1d; instead of a name, are the words 'pur Archour'. Similarly in France it is exceptional to find archers receiving *restor* payments (Contamine, *Guerre, état et société*, p. 104).

\(^{33}\) Norwell, p. 312.
destined for a military role and belonging to men-at-arms. As a consequence of this, very little is known about the animals brought by the non-chivalric elements of an Edwardian army - in particular, those of the horse archers. It is not easy to determine how their mounts compared with those of the men-at-arms, though the fact that the former were primarily a means of transport, whilst the latter had to possess the sterling qualities required for mounted combat, would suggest that the man-at-arms' warhorse was a beast of a very different order. Such documentary evidence as there is tends to confirm this. In 1346, Sir Thomas de Dagworth claimed 20s. in compensation for each of the 120 hackneys lost by his mounted archers during a year's service in Brittany, whilst the corresponding figure for horses lost by men-at-arms was £10.\textsuperscript{34} In 1335, John de Bikenor, king's archer, received a gift of 20s. from the king in compensation for a horse lost in Scotland.\textsuperscript{35} It is probably reasonable to conclude from this kind of albeit fragmentary evidence, that the least valuable horses used by men-at-arms, valued at 100s.,\textsuperscript{36} were about five times as expensive as the normal mount of a horse archer.

A more fundamental deficiency of the horse inventories lies in the fact that, in the great majority of cases, only one horse is listed for each serving man-at-arms.\textsuperscript{37} As an indenture of war between Edward III and three foreign knights in May 1346 put it, it was \textit{la custume Dengleterre} for each man-at-arms to have \textit{un chival prise}.\textsuperscript{38} But, once again, there are exceptions. Captains of retinues quite often had

\textsuperscript{34} E101/25/17.
\textsuperscript{35} B.L., Cotton Ms., Nero C. VIII fo. 273v.
\textsuperscript{36} For a discussion of minimum values of warhorses, see below, pp. \textit{82-83; 127-29}.
\textsuperscript{37} On one occasion at the end of Edward I's reign, Sir Robert de Clifford is specifically disallowed from having a second appraised horse: E101/612/15 mm. 1, 2.
\textsuperscript{38} E101/68/3 m. 64.
more than one horse appraised for their own use; this privilege was, on occasion, written into indentures. The inventories drawn up during the winter of 1337-38 allow two destriers for the earl of Gloucester, three horses each for the earls of Arundel and Salisbury, two for Sir Hugh le Despenser and several chivals for Sir Richard Talbot. A captain might also have a horse valued for son baner. Whilst the great majority of men who appear in inventories are allowed only one horse, we can be sure that they had more than one mount with them. As the theoretical 'unit of the feudal host', a knight traditionally served with two 'covered' horses. In addition to these warhorses, he would probably have had a palfrey for himself, a rounce for his servant and a sumpter for his baggage. Records for Edward II's Scots campaigns duly show knights to be serving with two or more 'covered' horses, even though complementary horse inventories would record only one for most men. Despite the emphasis on dismounted combat, there is no apparent decline in the number of warhorses employed by English armies under Edward III or his

39. As, for example, in 1361: Ralph, earl of Stafford was to have deux chivalx pris pur son corps (E101/28/27 m. 4). Thus, on his retinue's horse inventory, drawn-up at Bristol on 18 August 1361, the earl appears with a destrier and a trotter, worth 80m. and £20 respectively (E101/28/11 m. 3).

40. E101/35/3. By contrast, the inventories for the Scottish campaigns of 1336-37 list only one horse for the captains of retinues (E101/19/36, E101/20/17).

41. Including most of the above-mentioned captains in 1337-38. Of these, only the earl of Salisbury's banner-bearer is named. In 1361, the earl of Stafford's banner was borne by une Lyard de Burbache, valued at 20 marks.


45. The proffer roll for the 1322 campaign assumes two 'covered' horses for each knight: C47/5/10. A roll of Sir John de St. John's retinue shows most of the knights to have two chivaux covertz, with some having three and one with as many as five: E101/17/32 (temp. Edward II).
successors. An English man-at-arms in the mid-fourteenth century would still need several good horses for both his peacetime pleasures and the more serious business of war. Some indication of the numbers of horses taken on campaign can be gained from the allowances which were paid to captains for the transport of their retinues to or from the continent. In 1340, for instance, the Crown was willing to pay the cost of the passage of 4,614 horses from Sluys to England: five horses were allowed for bannerets, four for knights and three for esquires. The same scale of allowances was employed for Sir James Audley’s retinue on its outward voyage to Gascony in 1345, with the addition that provision was made for the passage of one horse for each mounted archer. Evidence of a similar kind is provided by the terms of an indenture drawn-up in May 1347 between the Prince of Wales and Sir Thomas Fournival, which included the provision that in wartime the Prince would supply hay and oats for four horses in the case of Sir Thomas and a knightly companion, and three for each of two esquires. Making every allowance for the inclusion of ‘non-

46. If anything, we can detect signs of increasing numbers: a trend which is certainly perceptible in other parts of Europe. An increase in the size of the lance, or basic fighting unit, can be seen in several European states during the late fourteenth and fifteenth-centuries. The growing weight of armour for man and horse necessitated a larger number of re-mounts for combat and, consequently more ‘support personnel’ for the man-at-arms. See Contamine, War in the Middle Ages, pp. 126-28, cf. 67-68, 91; Vale, War and chivalry, pp. 121-25; Mallett, Mercenaries and their masters, pp. 149-50; Mallett and Hale, Military organisation of a Renaissance State, p. 70.

47. On the need for a series of re-mounts on the tournament field, see R. Harvey, Moriz von Craun and the chivalric world (Oxford, 1961), pp. 222, 226, 235, 237, 254. A man may well use different horses for war and for tournaments. Jousting, in particular, required a specially trained mount: see above, p. 36.


49. E101/24/20. The same scale operated for transporting horses to Ireland in the 1360s (E101/28/21 fo. 13v). In 1347, ships were ordered for the passage of thirty men-at-arms and thirty archers, together with 120 horses - figures which imply the the operation of the standard horse passage allowances (C76/24 m. 10). Roger Mautravers’ indenture of war with the earl of Salisbury (1372) stipulated that he was to be provided with eskipeson resonable for four chivaux (for himself) and two hakkneys for his two vadlet archers: E101/68/5 m. 107.

50. B.P. Reg., i. p. 128. An indenture between Sir John de Wylughby le fitz and the Prince, drawn-up apparently at the same time, provided for similar horse stabling arrangements; ibid., p. 129. The
combatant' horses in these figures, they seem to suggest that knights
certainly, and esquires very probably, took more than one real
warhorse on active service. Some vadia guerre accounts from the mid
fourteenth-century record pay cuts for men-at-arms who served with
insufficient warhorses, and a few fragments of vivid evidence tend
to point in a similar direction. In October 1346, for example, during
the siege of Calais, the king gave permission for Sir Roger de Huse
denvoyer en Engleterre trois garsonns ove trois granntz chivalx,
presumably to escape the unhealthy conditions of the siege camp; the
same order also allowed Robert Alwyne to send three horses home. It
is clear from the horses sold by members of the earl of Lancaster's
retinue shortly before leaving Gascony in 1350, that some at least of
the earl's men served with several expensive horses. Sir Stephen de
Cusington, for example, sold one destrier for 100 marks and three
other horses with a combined value of £43. 6s. 8d.

At any one time, only one of Cusington's horses would have been
appraised, and thus eligible for compensation. Yet it was possible
for a man-at-arms to receive compensation for the loss of more than
one horse. Having lost an appraised horse, a replacement would be
valued and, in theory, this sequence of loss and re-valuation could

stabling allowances outlined in Sir John de Sully's indenture of March 1353 are rather more
generous. In wartime he and his esquire were to have livery for nine horses between them (B.P.
Reg., ii, pp. 45-46).

51. It should be remembered that these allowances for sea transport or stabling represent only
minimum figures: i.e. the number which the Crown or the Prince was willing to pay for, which may
not be the same as the number actually transported or stalled.

52. See below, pp. 126-27.

53. C81/1710 m. 47. Sir Roger Huse was an experienced campaigner, having served in Scotland in
1333, 1335 and early 1338 - on the last occasion, with a £10 horse (C71/13 m. 24; C71/15 m. 32;
E101/35/3).

54. E403/355 m. 19.

55. For example, the indenture of war between Edward III and the Black Prince drawn up on 10 July
1355 stipulates that the constable of Bordeaux would 'value any horses purchased from time to time
by men-at-arms to make good the loss of horses previously valued' (B.P. Reg., iv, pp. 143-45). The
process is sometimes explicitly mentioned by vadia guerre accounts when wage payment is dependent
occur several times during the course of a campaign. The results will be seen if a *restauro equorum* account has survived. During the Low Countries campaign of 1338-39, for example, four of the members of the earl of Northampton's retinue each lost two warhorses.\(^{56}\) In each case the replacements were of good quality; but they could well have been bought locally and so should not be seen as wholly reliable evidence for the quality of English men-at-arms' second-string warhorses. The fact is that the re-mounts remain resolutely in shadow; we know they were there, but we have little hard evidence of their quality. Assuming at least one re-mount per man-at-arms, it is clear that no more than a half - and probably nearer a third - of the warhorses taken on campaign would be appraised, and thus potentially available for our scrutiny.\(^{57}\) If we further assume that a man would present his best horse for valuation, then it follows that this minority of appraised horses may constitute a misleading sample - a sample which significantly over-represents the quality of warhorses as a whole. This is a possibility which should be borne in mind when compiling statistics from the horse inventories.

If it is necessary to be content with seeing only a sample of the warhorses employed by even the most completely documented fourteenth-century army, how certain is it that this sample consists of a reliable body of evidence? How valid would be conclusions which were based upon comparative analysis of a series of such collections of evidence? All depends, clearly, on how the horse appraisers carried out their duties. Whilst accepting that horse appraisal could not

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57. Prominent captains were, on occasion, allowed more than one valued horse, but they would bring significantly larger number of re-mounts.
have been an exact science, it was, nevertheless, a job demanding considerable knowledge and experience. It is impossible now to determine how skilled, or fastidious, particular appraisers were at their task. We might reasonably expect that the appraisers who were members of the chivalric class would have considerable relevant experience to draw upon; they will have spent much time assessing the merits of particular horses for their own use. Some men, like Sir Thomas Cok, were called upon to supervise appraisal on a number of occasions. If the clerks involved had far less specialist equestrian knowledge to bring to bear, then their primary functions would be administrative: ensuring that the regulations surrounding appraisal were fully adhered to and that the inventories were correctly drawn-up. They might also be responsible, simultaneously, for overseeing the muster of men-at-arms and archers. It is uncertain how far the appointed appraisers went about their task independently, or whether the owners of the horses under inspection were called upon to offer information. The greater captains may have been keen to place their own records at the disposal of the appraisers. There may well have been a conflict of interests which would make for a rather tense atmosphere. The owners, after all, would be concerned to secure the highest possible valuation, whilst the royal clerks may have felt duty bound (or, indeed, may have been briefed) to keep the valuations as low as possible. The pressures might be particularly great if heavy pre-campaign demand had induced a

58. Sir Thomas Cok was one of the appraisers of Henry of Lancaster's horses on at least two occasions: in 1345 and 1350 (E101/25/9, E404/508 mm. 51-79).

59. Letters of appointment often combined horse appraisal and manpower mustering duties: see, for example, C76/16 m. 6, C76/17 mm. 18, 31.

60. Some magnates will have compiled their own inventories for their retainers' horses before reaching the muster centre. Thus, for example, Sir William Latimer's indenture with the earl of Lancaster (May, 1319) stipulated that his warhorses would be appraised at the commencement of hostilities par les gente le dit Counte (G. A. Holmes, The estates of the higher nobility in fourteenth-century England (Cambridge, 1957), p. 123). Cf. B.P. Reg., i, pp. 69-70, for the valuation of the horses of the Prince of Wales' bachelors.
The knightly appraiser was often not without a personal interest in the proceedings. He would usually be not only marshal of the contingent being inspected, but also a serving soldier in his own right: a man with horseflesh of his own, perhaps a retinue, certainly friends and rivals - all of which could influence his decisions. However impartial he might strive to be, we must suspect that the opinions of the mightier captains concerning the quality of their men's horses could not always be entirely excluded.

If this kind of interference could have served, on occasions, to disrupt the consistency of horse appraisal, then we must in any case suspect that real consistency was impossible to achieve, because valuation was often conducted in more than one place, by a number of different appraisers. It has been noted already how a team of clerks were despatched to the ports of embarkation during the summer and autumn of 1342. However seamless the *restauro equorum* account for the Breton expeditions might appear, therefore, it is clear that it was based upon a substantial and disparate collection of inventories; records drawn-up by a number of different men over a period of several months. By contrast, the horse inventories for a Scottish campaign might be confined to a single roll; but they will often have been compiled over a period of weeks, or even months. The inventory of the four retinues comprising Aymer de Valence's army serving in Scotland during the summer of 1315 shows that valuations were made on 20 separate days from July to October. What is more, the 'knightly' appraiser changed during the course of the campaign. If a degree of

61. See below, pp. 292-93.
62. For a discussion of a specific example, involving Sir John de Molyns, see below pp. 312-15.
63. E101/15/6. Sir John de Pabenham, the mayor of York and John de Percy, clerk made the initial valuations, whilst those conducted in *Marchia versus Scotiam* were undertaken by Sir William de Felton and John de Percy. Pabenham was a member of Valence's retinue, whilst Felton appears to have commanded a small independent company.
inconsistency in the valuation process is to be suspected for a single campaign, then how much more likely is it that the appraisers for one army would bring to the task of describing, classifying and valuing the horses which came before them, criteria which differed to some extent at least from those applied to the next? How far are the apparent contrasts - in the types of warhorses employed and their quality - which arise from an analysis of a series of inventories representative of real changes and how far do they arise simply from shifting terminology and differences in standards of judgement? It is indeed a salutary thought that the modern historian is able to know far more about the appearance of the warhorses of the Edwardian chivalric class than about the men who rode them. On the one hand, there are certainly no muster rolls for English armies to match that which has survived for a Provençal army of 1374, which includes descriptions of the principal physical features of individual soldiers. On the other, although the English horse inventories do not include the height of the animals appraised, they do provide descriptions of the colour and distinctive features of the horses - descriptions which are vivid in their use of myriad colour combinations and which often reveal a nice attention to pertinent detail. This testifies to some extent to the diligence and expertise of the inspectors, but we are primarily concerned with their judgements about of the quality of the horses coming before them.


66. After the horse's basic colouring, the clerk might add, for example, cum stella in fronte et iii pedibus albis. A one-eyed (monoculus) horse, like Peter de Nutle's £10 rouncy in 1282, is unlikely to have gone unnoticed (C47/2/7 m.3; cf. Gough, p. 227).
However experienced the horse evaluators were, assessment of quality would to some extent always be a subjective exercise. In the first place, they had to decide on the type of horse coming before them. The surviving inventories for Edward III's reign indicate that, during this period, the great majority of warhorses were classified simply as equi or chivals. Of the 1,250 horses listed in the inventories and restauro equorum accounts for the later 1330s, over 90% were described in this fashion, in either the Latin or French forms. The restauro equorum accounts for the early campaigns of the French war offer a figure of very similar magnitude.\(^67\) Despite very significant variations in quality (as expressed in the valuations), it is clear that the majority of men-at-arms in Edward III's reign served with warhorses which the horse appraisers were content to see classified as a single type. There were some warhorses, however, which could not be embraced by the umbrella term 'equus'. Some, like destriers and coursers, were regarded by the appraisers as significantly superior in quality, whilst others, also apparently distinguishable from equi, were apparently regarded as somewhat inferior.

The word 'destrier' (or dextrarius) is commonly regarded as synonymous with 'warhorse': according to popular imagination, destriers were 'the chargers who carried the mounted knights to war'.\(^68\) Yet, as far as the men whose job it was to classify and appraise horses at the start of a campaign were concerned, only a small minority of warhorses were true destriers.\(^69\) Less than 52% of the warhorses listed in the

\(^67\) For the sources lying behind these figures, see Table 6.1.

\(^69\) The term was used more loosely in other records and had a long history (see Davis, The medieval warhorse, Chapter 4). Some medieval writers used it as a generic term for warhorse: for example, Le Baker, p. 52.
restauro equorum accounts for the campaigns of 1338-39 and 1342-43 are described as destriers, whilst the proportion for the immediately preceding Scots campaigns of the later 1330s is even smaller: thirteen out of a total of 1,250 warhorses. In fact destriers had never been numerous; they had always been the preserve of a small élite amongst the chivalric class. The other category of warhorse to be found regularly in the inventories of Edward III's reign is the 'courser' (or cursarius). This is often characterised as a horse for the chase or the tournament field, but the inventories show that it was also regarded as a high quality warhorse, clearly a cut above the ordinary equus and second only to the destrier in value.

The chival, the destrier and the courser were the three main categories of warhorse employed by the horse appraisers of the 1330s and '40s. Occasionally, however, they felt the need to use a different term. In the case of the trotter, listed as the earl of Stafford's second appraised horse in 1361, it was probably not a warhorse; but most of the less usual terms which are to be found in the inventories do concern horses with a military function. On eleven

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70. Numbers were to remain at this low level. Only one of the horses sold by Henry of Lancaster's men in March 1350 was a destrier (Sir Stephen de Cusington's horse, valued at 100 marks): E403/355 m. 19. Similarly, only one of the horses listed in the surviving inventories for service in Ireland in the 1360s is a destrier (the earl of Stafford's mount, valued at 80 marks): E101/28/11 m. 3.

71. In the late 1290s, fewer than 5% of the horses listed in the inventories for the Falkirk campaign are destriers. Similarly small numbers are to be found on rolls for the Flemish expedition of the previous year: only ten destriers are listed on one roll (E101/6/37) and six on another (E101/6/28).

72. They appear regularly, but not in great numbers, in the inventories. There are fifty-three (about 5% of all warhorses) on the Scots horse rolls for the later 1330s (generally in the possession of retinue commanders and wealthy knights), but rather fewer (twenty-six in all) listed in the restauro equorum accounts of the early French campaigns.

73. The courser: 'the best horse for hunting ... [it was] large as well as swift but for some reason does not seem to have been used for fighting' (Davis, The medieval warhorse, p. 67); 'employed as a hunter and as a racehorse but never for military purposes' (A.A. Dent, 'Chaucer and the Horse', p. 5); 'not a racehorse but one that ran a course at jousts' (H.J. Hewitt, The horse in medieval England (London, 1983), p. 2).

74. E101/28/11 m. 3; cf. E101/29/33, for documents concerning the passage of chivals, coursers, trotters and hakeneys to Ireland in the 1360s.
occasions whilst drawing up horse inventories during the early summer of 1336, Sir Ralph de Neville and John de Houton, clerk, felt that the horse before them was really a 'hobby', rather than a conventional chival. These are usually viewed as the horses of the 'light cavalry', the hobelars - and yet here we see them being used by men-at-arms, and in most cases their valuation suggests that they were regarded as perfectly adequate for the job. Two of the hobbys, indeed, were valued at £10, which was rather higher than the mean value for equi in this army. The one frison to be found in the inventories of 1336 (and, indeed, the whole period) was valued at only 100s., but, though of moderate quality, it is not clear what distinguished it from the ordinary chival - or, indeed, the hobby - except its place of origin. Quite as enigmatic is the hengst. Neville and Houton also included one of these in their inventories in 1336: a spotted bay valued at £8 for Robert Fermer. Once again it is not certain what distinguished this kind of horse from the fourteen equi in the earl of Oxford's retinue. There are only two other hengsts mentioned in inventories of English retinues during this period and both are rather more valuable animals; Sir Giles de Badlesmere's was appraised at £24 during the winter of 1337-38 and Philip de Despenser lost an impressive 40 mark hengst during the

76. Owned by Alan de Clavering and William de Nafferton, both - perhaps significantly - members of Sir Ralph de Neville's retinue (E101/19/36 m. 3d). Three of the eleven hobbys were valued at less than £5, however; and the mean value (£5.4) was rather less than that for equi (£8). The most valuable hobby in the inventories for this period is a 20 marks horse lost by Thomas Gisors during the 1338-39 Low Countries campaign (Norwell, p. 311).
77. It was probably imported from Friesland (cf. the freson mentioned in the alliterative Morte Arthure, line 1365). It was owned by Thomas de Rodhom and it may be significant that two other members of the Rodhom family, both called John, were also serving with unconventional horses - hobbys. E101/19/36 mm. 3, 5.
78. Davis, op. cit., p. 136; it may be a warhorse of German origin.
79. E101/19/36 m. 6.
Breton campaign of 1342-43.  

That specialist types or breeds of horse were occasionally noted in the inventories may lend a little weight to the suggestion that the appraisers were knowledgeable and discriminating men whose work can be relied upon. But there will always remain the suspicion that the horse classifications and descriptions are not always wholly reliable; and, in particular, that some amongst the multitude of equi and chivalis in the inventories should actually have been classified as coursers or destriers. Bearing in mind the conflicting influences at work at the time of appraisal (not to mention the ever-present possibility of clerical error), it is not difficult to see how errors could occur. That they did occur is clear enough. The surviving roll of retinue inventories for the Scots campaign of 1337-38 consists of a list of over 350 chivalis, punctuated by only three destriers. The absence of coursers from this roll stands in stark contrast with the evidence offered by the inventories for 1336 and 1337, which list coursers for many bannerets and some of the more prominent knights. But even more telling is the appearance of eleven coursers amongst the

80. E101/35/3 m. 1; E36/204 fo. 87. There is a further hengst (valued at 10 marks) recorded as having been lost by one of Henry of Flanders' men-at-arms in 1339 (Norwell, p. 316).

81. It was obviously in the interests of warhorse owners that their mounts should be accurately (indeed flatteringly) classified and described. On one level, it was a matter of personal prestige: the captain of a retinue would not wish to be seen serving with anything less than a courser. But the classification of the horse might also affect its valuation, for a destrier or courser was likely to secure a higher value than an equus. Men-at-arms would no doubt offer suggestions to the appraisers and it may be that amendments to horse classifications, which can be seen in some inventories (e.g. E101/14/15 m. 9), arose from such prompting, combined perhaps with subsequent reflection and reconsideration by officials. Owners may also have been responsible for the occasional appearance in the inventories of unusual types of horse. Sir Giles de Badlesmere's hengst (in the winter 1337-8 inventory) is described in such terms (un chival appele hensk) as to suggest that the appraisers were not familiar with this particular type of warhorse (E101/35/3 m. 1).

82. Two for the earl of Gloucester and one for the earl of Arundel: E101/35/3 mm. 1, 2d.

83. There are, nevertheless, individual retinue inventories from the bundles for 1336 and 1337, which also present a suspiciously uniform list of equi. The earl of Cornwall's roll of 8 September 1336 is a good example of this: E101/19/36 m. 1.
restauro equorum accounts for the winter 1337-38 campaign. Most of them must have been drawn from inventories which consisted of a more balanced range of horse types, but which have long since disappeared; but in several cases there is at least a suspicion that the lost coursers correspond with horses included in the surviving inventory, but where they are listed as chivals. With the records for the winter of 1337-38 the evidence for a change in terminolgy between inventory and restauro equorum account is not conclusive, but if we turn to the materials for the summer 1336 campaign, a number of clear-cut examples can be seen. Sir Henry de Beaumont heads his retinue's inventory with a courser valued at £40, but in the restauro equorum account, this horse is described as a destrier. Similarly, two of Beaumont's knights have equi in the inventory, which become coursers in the compensation account; and there are further examples in other retinue inventories. How have these changes occurred? They may, of course, be simply the result of scribal carelessness. Comparison of the records shows that the clerks drawing-up compensation accounts abbreviated the often very detailed horse descriptions as a matter of course. Alternatively the 'changes' may derive from a third document which no longer exists: perhaps a slightly different version of the inventory, compiled at the time of horse appraisal, or an intermediate document listing only those horses which have been lost. The latter might well take the form of a bundle of warrants authorising compensation payment or a single summary roll of losses. Such a roll has survived for Henry of Lancaster's retinue from the Scots campaign.

84. E101/388/5 mm. 19-20.
85. In three cases, the descriptions and values do not match exactly.
86. Sir Robert de Saltmarsh and Sir Edmund Barde (E101/19/36 m. 2; B.L., Cotton Ms., Nero C. VIII fo. 281).
87. For example, Sir John de Tibetot's equus which was lost during a passage of the Forth, becomes a courser in the restauro equorum account (E101/19/36 m. 5d; B.L., Cotton Ms., Nero C. VIII fo. 281v). See also n. 101 below for the interchangeability of the terms rouncy and equus.
of 1336, and it is indeed striking that the sequence of information and degree of abbreviation exhibited by this roll is reproduced exactly by the corresponding section *restauro equorum* account for this expedition.  

Whilst drawing attention to transcription errors and the consequences of clerical abbreviation, an exploration of inconsistencies in horse classification should also take account of the fact that equestrian terminology, as used in the inventories, was in a state of flux in the first half of the fourteenth-century. That the term *courser*, for example, was not consistently used in the horse inventories of the 1330s is probably due in part to the fact that it had only recently been admitted to the practical vocabulary of the horse appraiser. It does not appear at all in the inventories of the first two Edwards. As late as the mid 1320s, there is not a glimpse of it in the substantial collection of horse rolls arising from the War of Saint-Sardos. Then, coursers appear quite suddenly in the inventories drawn-up during the late spring of 1336. They immediately become established as a favoured type of warhorse amongst the upper echelons of the chivalric class and, indeed, remain so until the early 1360s, when the inventory evidence dries up.

The question which must be asked, of course, is whether the appearance of the courser in the military records marks the emergence of a new

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88. E101/15/12; for a fuller discussion of this document, see below pp. 94-95.
89. The surviving inventories list nearly 700 different horses, of which all are described as *equi*, with the exception of fifteen destriers. For sources, see Table 6.1. This is not to say, of course, that the term *courser* was not in general use, but that it was not used in specialist military records. For coursers in the *Equitia* accounts of the English crown prior to 1336, see Davis, *The medieval warhorse*, pp. 88-89.
90. Of the forty-four horses listed on the most readily legible retinue inventories from the Irish expedition of 1361-64, thirteen are classified as coursers. This includes Sir Thomas de Hoggeshawe’s small company in which all five men served with coursers. E101/28/11 mm. 1-2.
type of warhorse (or at least the first use of a existing type of horse in the military sphere), or simply a new term - an attempt to differentiate a type which had long existed or which was only gradually emerging, but which previously had been described simply as equus. In considering this question it is necessary to look beyond the immediate circumstances of the courser, to take account of broader trends during the period of the three Edwardian kings. It was during this period, as we have seen, that the warhorse reached the peak of its development in England.91 We would expect this to be mirrored in the horse inventories, and indeed it is: not only in the emergence of the 'great horse', the true destrier (and, perhaps, the evolution of a swift, but heavy, hunter - the courser - that we see in the inventories from the 1330s), but also in a general improvement in the quality of horses used by all men-at-arms. The earliest inventories, surviving from the Welsh war of 1282, show the numerically dominant horse to be the rouncy (or runcinus).92 About three quarters of the horses listed are rouncys, whilst the remaining, rather higher grade, warhorses are described simply as equi. The roll includes not a single destrier.93 Edward I's efforts, from the early 1280s, to encourage the breeding of 'great horses' in England have been noted already94 and the results of this policy were beginning to be seen in the inventories by the time of the Scottish campaigns of the later 1290s. The horse rolls for the Falkirk campaign still show rouncys and equi in a roughly 3:1 balance, but destriers now have a small

91. See above, pp. 20-21.

92. A by no means insubstantial horse, as it had to be capable of carrying an armoured man and barding. It would surely, therefore, be inappropriate to compare this modest grade of warhorse with the 'rouncys familiar to us from Chaucer' (as does Morris, The Welsh Wars of Edward I, p. 53), or indeed those listed in Little and Exon. Domesday. Cf. J. Langdon, Horses, oxen and technological innovation (Cambridge, 1986), p. 296.

93. C47/2/7. The absence of destriers does not mean that there were no expensive warhorses at this time: forty-six of those listed in this inventory were valued at £20 or more.

94. See above, pp. 21; cf. Davis, The medieval warhorse, pp. 87-88.
(less than 5%), but noticeable, presence. As we have seen, although precise numbers fluctuated, destriers were never to represent more than a small proportion of English warhorses; but by the early years of Edward II's reign the terminology of the inventories had, nevertheless, undergone a dramatic transformation. The rouncy has disappeared and the great majority of horses which were not classified as destriers are described simply as equi.

Just as with the appearance of the courser in the 1330s, so with the virtual disappearance of the rouncy in the first decade of the century, it must be asked whether a real change in the horseflesh employed by men-at-arms has occurred, or whether we are merely witnessing a shift in terminology, in response, perhaps, to the vagaries of fashion or the strictures of official directives. It is, of course, inherently likely that the concerted programme by the Crown and the chivalric class to breed high-quality destriers, would also serve to raise the standard of warhorses in general. A statistical analysis of the thousands of horse valuations offered by the inventories of this period does, indeed, suggest that this is so. Yet are we to believe that a type of horse which served the bulk of men-at-arms under Edward I had been abandoned so completely and so abruptly? Were all the equi of the 1310s, 1320s and 1330s, which comprised 90% of all warhorses, really of a quality comparable with the equi of the 1280s and 1290s, which amounted to only 25% of appraised horses. It seems unlikely; more probable is that equestrian

96. Individual retinues sometimes had a significantly above-average proportion of destriers. In 1305-6, for example, of the eighteen horses appraised for Sir Henry de Percy's retinue, four were destriers; of Sir Robert de Clifford's nineteen horses, six were destriers. E101/612115 m. 1.
97. As early as 1301, the rouncy has all but disappeared from a horse roll of the Prince of Wales' comitiva: all the warhorses listed are equi, except for a sprinkling of highly priced destriers. E101/9/23.
98. See Chapter VI.
terminology was undergoing something of a change. The word *equus* (or *chival*), as used in military records, has broadened in meaning to become the standard term for a man-at-arms' warhorse. *Magnus equus* is reserved for higher quality animals, perhaps the equivalent of *equus* in the inventories of Edward I. At the same time, the word *rouncy* has also shifted in meaning. From being the standard term for the 'fighting' horse of the ordinary man-at-arms, it has become, by the early years of the fourteenth-century, the description of a horse used primarily for transport; a little closer, therefore, to the Chaucer's usage in the *Canterbury Tales*. A royal proclamation issued prior to the Weardale campaign in 1327 asks that all who intend to serve against the Scots should bring 'swift, strong and hardy rouncys to ride and pursue' the enemy. The rouncy is now presented as the optimum horse, not for the battlefield, but for the march - for rapid movement over rough terrain. As such, rouncys would not be presented for appraisal at the start of a campaign, and it is the *equus* - the man-at-arms' warhorse - which appears in great numbers in the inventories of the 1310s, '20s and '30s. It must be doubted, however, whether the more moderately valued *chivals* and *equi* of this later period differed very significantly as horses from the more highly priced *runcini* of the 1290s.

In interpreting the evidence compiled by the horse appraisers, it is necessary, therefore, to take account of developments in horse-breeding and changes in terminology. If the former 'was a very slow

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99. For example, the horse lost by Sir Richard de Grey at Bannockburn (E404/482 file 31 no. 9).
101. There is an unexpectedly late appearance of the rouncy in the *restauro equorum* accounts for the War of Saint-Sardos. This includes eight *runcini* ranging in value from 100s. to 20 marks: B.L., Add. Ms. 7967 fos. 104, 105, 105v, 106. The use of the term by the clerk responsible for these accounts is particularly interesting because six of the eight can be traced in surviving inventories, and in each case they are recorded as *equus* or *chival*. 
business, extending over scores of years\textsuperscript{102} or longer, the latter could occur quite suddenly, with established terms changing their meaning or being used for the first time in a specialist military context. In addition, the personal factor should be not be overlooked. The horse appraisers came from different social, occupational and geographical backgrounds and would bring very varying degrees of knowledge and experience to their task. This element of subjectivity would have given rise to a degree of inconsistency in horse classification, but, more significantly perhaps, it would also have influenced valuation.

According to an indenture of the mid 1340s, the warhorses of the contracting captain's retinue were to be \textit{prisez a covenable pris.}\textsuperscript{103} The 'appropriate' valuation for a particular warhorse would be strongly influenced by a complex combination of forces, including prevailing economic conditions and the balance of supply and demand.\textsuperscript{104} But the value which was written onto the horse inventory was the decision of the appraisers and, thus, was determined by their standards of judgement, as well, perhaps, as the influence of the owner of the appraised horse. The 'personal' mark of the appraisers, or the influence of others, can be detected in the warhorse valuations in a number of ways. Sometimes a value has been crossed out and a higher or lower figure substituted. In the inventory for the Scottish campaign of 1336, Sir Henry de Beaumont's courser was given a value of £20 at first, but this was subsequently altered to £40.\textsuperscript{105}

\textsuperscript{102} Davis, \textit{The medieval warhorse}, p. 8.

\textsuperscript{103} The earl of Derby's indenture with Edward III, 15 March 1345, printed in Fowler, \textit{The king's lieutenant}, p. 230.

\textsuperscript{104} For a full discussion of the 'impersonal' factors affecting the level of horse valuations during this period, see Chapter VI.

\textsuperscript{105} E101/19/36 m. 2.
If, however, the values are examined in bulk, some intriguing insights into 'valuing policy' can be gained. For some campaigns a clear-cut minimum valuation can be detected: £5. On at least one occasion - for the Breton campaign of 1342-43 - some of the clerks appointed to the task of horse appraisal were ordered to restrict their attentions to horses worth 100s. or more.106 It is not clear how often this ruling was applied, but the weight of evidence seems to suggest that it was a customary regulation for fourteenth-century continental campaigns.107 It is equally uncertain how the minimum value rule was applied in practice. Were horses which were considered to be worth less than 100s. simply passed-over by the appraisers, or were they all given the minimum valuation and included in the inventory? The latter is a real possibility, as there are always quite substantial numbers of £5 horses in the inventories.108 Some expeditionary forces during this period were quite clearly not subject to this particular horse valuation restriction. The inventories arising from the Scottish campaigns of 1336-37 include considerable numbers of horses with very low valuations, the lowest being Walter de Thomaston's equus, valued at a mere 30s. on 14 May 1336.109 The inventories for the winter 1337-38 campaign, by contrast, list very few low-value warhorses and whilst this might in part result from differences in the personnel

106. C76/17 mm. 17, 18.
107. See below, pp. 127-29.
108. The restauro equorum accounts for the Breton campaign of 1342-43, lists thirty-five £5 horses (15%); those for the Cambrésis-Thiérrache campaign of 1339, forty-two (11%). The inventories for the War of Saint-Sardos include seventy-three (11%).
109. E101/19/36 m. 5. He was one of fifteen men (out of thirty) in the earl of Angus' retinue with horses worth less than £5. Most of the inventories for the Scottish campaigns of Edward I and Edward II contain numerous nuncini and equi valued at under £5, but the absolute minimum appears to be £2. The inventory for Aymer de Valence's troops in Scotland in 1315 (E101/15/6) is notable for having a very high level of valuations, with none under £5; but it stands out very starkly from the other inventories of this period and may, therefore, represent an unusually 'favourable' set of valuations.
110. There are only eight horses valued at less than £5 in 1337-38, as compared with sixty-seven in 1336 and fifty-five in 1337.
included in these rolls, it probably also reflects differences of approach to valuation by several teams of appraisers.

A global view of the values in the inventories reveals further differences of approach. As a general rule the horse appraisers were not concerned with minute gradations of valuation: the great majority of warhorses were given one of a comparatively narrow selection of values. During the 1320s-40s they would usually choose from the following: £5, 8 marks, £6, 10 marks, £10, £12, 20 marks, £20, 40 marks, £30, 50 marks, £40, £50, 100 marks and £100. They were not, therefore, attempting to provide a precise valuation for each horse - a valuation which offered a true reflection of its strengths and weaknesses - so much as seeking to allocate it to one of modest selection of numerical pigeon holes. As a result, some horses would be under-valued and others over-priced; the more valuable the horse, the less precise the valuation category. Whilst this rough and ready approach is the norm for most inventories, in some cases there are clear signs of a more subtle and flexible attitude to valuation. Two examples will serve to demonstrate the point very clearly.

The *restauro equorum* accounts for the Breton campaign of 1342-43 allow for twenty-two different valuations; it adds only six categories to the normal selection and these additional values account for only eleven of the 228 horses on the roll. By contrast, the corresponding accounts for the Cambrésis-Thiérache campaign of 1338-39 make use of a total of fifty-one different values - with thirty-six categories beyond the normal selection and sixty-three of the total of 376 horses falling into these additional categories. The accounts for 1338-39

111. Of the lower values, 8 marks and £6 are prominent in some inventories, but not others; £5 and 10 marks are consistently the most frequently occurring low values. The same limited selection of values can also be seen to have dominated the inventories under the first two Edwards.
list a larger number of horses than those for 1342 and this certainly serves to heighten the contrast, but the fact remains that the appraisers responsible for the original inventories in the summer and autumn of 1342 were far less flexible in their approach to valuation than their counterparts had been in 1338-39.

Turning to the three collections of full inventories from the period 1336-38, a similar significant contrast in valuing policy can be seen. The rolls for 1336 and the summer of 1337 have a restricted selection of values. In 1336, well over five hundred horses are lumped into only eighteen value categories, with those worth £5 or more (the great majority) allocated to no more than twelve. The treatment of the 341 horses in the 1337 inventories is broadly similar, but with the winter 1337-38 inventories (and associated restauro equorum accounts) we see a marked contrast. The latter, as we have seen, contain very few low-value warhorses; they also exhibit a very interesting spread of higher values. About two-thirds of the 367 horses on the roll have, it is true, been slotted into eight standard value pigeon holes,112 but thirty-two other values are also used to provide more subtle indications of the quality of some the horses. The 1337-38 materials are particularly distinctive in that they favour several values which are seen far less often in the other inventories of this period. Thirty-two horses are valued at eight marks, whereas only four and seven are assigned this figure in 1336 and 1337 respectively.113 Two other values, 16 marks and 24 marks, are also employed with greater than usual frequency in the 1337-38 materials.

Why the appraisers responsible for the winter 1337-38 inventories

112. £5, 10 marks, £8, £10, 20 marks, £20, 40 marks and £40.

113. '8 marks' appears regularly in the inventories for the War of Saint-Sardos, but far less often in the restauro equorum accounts for the early campaigns of the French war.
should show an unusual preference for valuations of 8 marks - and, indeed, multiples of eight - is not clear; it is always far easier to draw attention to such phenomena than to explain them. This is, however, a neat illustration of the subjectivity of the appraisal process. Two appraisers, with equal experience of equestrian affairs, may well propose different values for a particular horse. This would, perhaps, be most likely to happen if one of them was more inclined to favour subtle gradations of value. It is probable, for example, that the great majority of the horses valued at 8 marks (£5. 6s. 8d.) in the 1337-38 inventory would have been assigned a £5 or a 10 marks valuation by a different, more conventional team of appraisers. But the effects of subjectivity - and, indeed, the tendency to force horses into a modest range of value categories - on the quality of the evidence should be placed in proper perspective. It should perhaps be borne in mind when examining individual horses (particularly high calibre animals where the scope for wayward valuations must have been greatest), but becomes a far less important consideration in global-level analysis of horse values, when individual valuations are absorbed in broad summary statistics. As we shall see in the last chapter of this study, if some inventories are tinged with the character of their compilers, they seem to be far more profoundly coloured by economic conditions and prevailing military attitudes.

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iii) Compensation for losses

Horse inventories were working records. Some, it is true, show no sign of use: it may be that they were 'clean' copies, preserved for reference only, or it may be that their active life had been very short.\(^1\) Most, however, were consulted by army marshals and annotated by clerks throughout the course of a campaign. The marginal notes and textual amendments, made during the weeks following muster, represent one aspect of the inventories' historical worth. Deletions of names, substitutions and late arrivals provide an indication of changes in army size and structure,\(^2\) whilst the dates and places mentioned in these clerical notes can allow an historian to build up a detailed impression of an army's movements.\(^3\) The majority of the annotations are concerned with horse losses. In many cases the word 'mortuus', 'perditus' or 'interfectus' is followed by the date and place of loss, and sometimes the precise circumstances, and thereby provides a useful insight into the course of the campaign, the intensity of the fighting and also, perhaps, an indication of the rate of decline in an army's military effectiveness. A great battle could leave an indelible mark on the inventories, as the two major horse appraisal rolls for the Falkirk campaign so eloquently demonstrate. Rather more than a hundred of the 1,350 or so horses listed are noted as having been lost in the battle on the 22 July 1298. This does not take account of losses by the unpaid sections of the army - nor, indeed, of fatalities amongst the second string mounts of those who were paid - so the total number of English warhorses which perished on that day must, indeed,

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1. For example, the inventory for the earl of Cornwall's retinue in 1336, drawn-up only a few days before the earl's death (E101/19/36 m. 1); see below, pp. 213-14.
2. See Chapter V, pp. 214-16.
3. See, for example, J.R.S. Phillips, *Aymer de Valence, earl of Pembroke 1307-1324* (Oxford, 1972), pp. 89-90, for a reconstruction of Pembroke's operations in the Scots Marches during the summer and autumn of 1315, based upon the dated notes provided on the army's horse inventory (E101/15/6).
have been very considerable. Such great battles were not common in medieval warfare and for few do we have a really detailed idea of horse casualties. The shift in English tactics after Bannockburn ensured that such engagements as there were would involve comparatively few warhorse losses. Even before the English abandoned the regular tactical use of heavy cavalry, many of the horse fatalities from combat arose from small skirmishes rather than real battles.

For most campaigns a very significant proportion, if not the majority, of warhorse losses arose from the rigours of the march: from accidents, exhaustion, disease or malnourishment. The inventories for the Scottish campaign of 1336 provide good examples of this. Several horses are said to have been killed in montibus during Edward III's raid into the Highlands in July, whilst two horses in Henry, Lord Percy's retinue died of murrain at Elgin on the 19th of the same month and Sir John de Tibetot's £20 horse was submersus during a passage of the Forth on 7 September. Had a more plentiful supply of original inventories survived for Edward III's continental campaigns, we would surely find a similar story of sickness and misadventure.

The narrative sources frequently dwell upon the heavy equestrian

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5. There is only fragmentary evidence for English warhorse losses at Bannockburn in 1314: Wardrobe debentures: E404/482 files 31, 32. Cf. the evidence for the heavy loss of warhorses at the battle of Montecatini in 1315 (L. Green, Castruccio Castracani (Oxford, 1986) pp. 68-69) and for glimpses of the horse losses at Cassel, Crécy and Poitiers, see Contamine, Guerre, état et société, p. 105.

6. The high equestrian casualties resulting from the ambush of Sir Ralph de Ufford's column in the Moiry Pass (Ireland) in 1345 are unusual (C260/57 m. 28).

7. For example, in the 1310s, fights at Faringley, le Redecros and Penresax: J.E. Morris, 'Cumberland and Westmorland military levies in the time of Edward I and Edward II', Transactions of the Cumberland and Westmorland Antiquarian and Archaeological Society, iii (1903), pp. 314, 317.


9. E101/19/36 mm. 3, 3d, 5d, 7d.
losses which the English suffered during their *chevauchées*. The Black Prince's raid of 1355, for example, cost the English many horses, due to the difficulty of the terrain and inadequate supplies of water.\textsuperscript{10} Even if the French chronicle estimates for English horse casualties during John of Gaunt's 'Great Chevauchée' are exaggerated (80\% of over 30,000 horses),\textsuperscript{11} there is unimpeachable record evidence for the loss of well over a thousand *appraised* warhorses during the Rheims campaign of 1359-60.\textsuperscript{12} In addition to the hazards of the march, the dangers *arising* from protracted occupation of unhealthy siege-camps should also be recognised. It is little wonder, for example, that men were keen to send their expensive horseflesh back to England during the siege of Calais.\textsuperscript{13}

The other major cause of equestrian losses (at least where continental campaigns are concerned) arose from the necessity of transporting large numbers of warhorses by sea. Once again, however, in the absence of annotated inventories, it is necessary to rely in the main upon the evidence of narrative sources for indications of maritime disasters. Thus, for example, the *restauro equorum* accounts for the Breton campaign in 1342-43 are wholly reticent about the circumstances behind the loss of well over two hundred appraised warhorses. But whilst it would be safe to assume that the siege camp at Vannes would have taken its toll, several chronicles also draw attention specifically to losses incurred during the turbulent passage back to

\textsuperscript{10} The *life and campaigns of the Black Prince*, ed. and trans. R. Barber (Woodbridge, 1986), pp. 61, 66, 68, using the chronicle of Geoffrey le Baker. The horses were given wine to drink, with disastrous results.


\textsuperscript{12} E101/393/11 fos. 79-116v. Cf. the French royal army in 1340, which lost over 3,000 warhorses (Contamine, *Guerre, état et société*, p. 106).

\textsuperscript{13} See above, pp. 67.
England. Quite apart from the loss of ships in stormy weather, we must also take account of the harm done to horses by long, debilitating voyages during which they would get no exercise, as well (in all probability) as being subjected to an inadequate or inappropriate diet. There would be casualties even during tranquil voyages and after a long journey, many horses would be unfit for immediate service. A mix of such considerations seem, indeed, to have encouraged many men serving in Gascony to purchase their horses upon arrival in the duchy, rather than risk bringing them from England.

A horse need not actually be killed in order for its owner to qualify for a compensation payment. A man-at-arms was occasionally the victim of sharp practice by the enemy. On 23 June 1337, Sir Henry Fitz Henry's courser, valued at 20 marks, was stolen in the night by the Scots. But more frequently, we find that a man is compensated when his appraised warhorse, through injury, lameness, exhaustion or disease, becomes unfit for service. In these circumstances, the clerk responsible for keeping the inventories up-to-date will usually note that the horse has been delivered to the army 'caravan' (redditur ad karvannum) or baggage train. Some horses were evidently well cared


15. For the effect of the elements on Thomas, duke of Gloucester's voyage to Prussia in 1391 (his losses included equos optimos), see Westminster, pp. 482-85. In December 1379, a fleet bound for Brittany was devastated by storms and nineteen horse transport vessels were wrecked on the Cornish coast (J. Sherborne, 'Indentured Retinues and English Expeditions to France, 1369-1380', E.H.R., lxix (1964), p. 731).

16. For a most illuminating discussion of the problems of transporting horses by sea, as relevant to the Middle Ages as for the period in which it was written, see M.H. Hayes, Horses on board ship. A guide to their management (London, 1902). Also useful are: B.S. Bachrach, 'On the origins of William the Conqueror's horse transports', Technology and Culture, xxvi (1985), pp. 505-31; and J.H. Prior, 'Transportation of horses by sea during the era of the crusades: eighth century to 1285 A.D.', The Mariner's Mirror, lxviii (1982), pp. 9-30; 103-25.

17. For example, the Black Prince's voyage to Gascony in September 1355: Morgan, War and society in medieval Cheshire, p. 110, drawing on the evidence of John Henxteworth's Journal.

18. E101/20/17 m. 7d.
for in the caravan, for we occasionally see horses being discharged with their health fully restored. But in these circumstances no compensation payment was due - and the same applied if the injury which had caused the horse's incapacity had been noticed at the time of appraisal.

There are several further forms of marginal annotation which appear to indicate that a horse has been withdrawn from service. The most common is 'redditur ad Elemosinam', but we also occasionally find 'redditur ad Garderoba'; in both cases a location (e.g. Newcastle) is often specified. It must be admitted that the meaning of these phrases is not entirely clear. The experience of other European states may tempt us to look for unexpected and very precise explanations, but the weight of evidence suggests that, far from representing wholly distinct and separate concepts, they are in fact interchangeable with one another and, indeed, with the phrase 'redditur ad karvannum'. Thus, for example, the restauro equorum account for the Scots campaign of 1322 states that two of the horses attached to Sir Thomas de Ughtred's retinue have been rendered ad

19. On medieval veterinary science (in the development of which England appears to have played very little part), see Davis, The medieval warhorse, pp. 100-7.

20. For example, the case of two knights whose horses joined the caravan on the day after the battle of Falkirk. For each the clerk added in the margin: Non habebit restaurum quia equus restituitur sanus apud [Durham/Newcastle]. Gough, p. 196.

21. For example, the appraisers in 1282 noticed that Sir Hugh de Doddinscles' 12 mark horse had various injuries and recorded that no compensation should be paid if these defects proved to be the cause of death (C47/2/7 m. 2).

22. They imply that the horse has been transferred (perhaps sold) into royal custody. The phrase Redditur ad Elemosinam is particularly problematic: it might indicate that the horse is being treated as a deodand (the cause of a person's death which has been 'handed-over to the king and devoted by his almoner to pious uses': Sir F. Pollock and F.W. Maitland, The history of English law before the time of Edward I (2 vols., reprinted, Cambridge, 1968), ii, p. 473). Alternatively, it might suggest that compensation was being offered as 'as alms, not as a matter of obligation' (Topham, p. 364).

23. In Spain, for example, a knight who neglected his military duties suffered the humiliation of having his horse's tail cut off. As a consequence, a man automatically received restauro equorum if his horse accidentally lost its tail in battle, thus enabling him to avoid embarrassment amongst his peers. J.F. Powers, A society organised for war (London, 1988), pp. 199-200.
Elemosinam at Newcastle on 12 September, whilst the corresponding vadis guerre account records that these two horses have in fact been delivered to the 'caravan' at Newcastle. In 1327, after the Weardale campaign, the warhorses of John of Hainault's contingent of men-at-arms were delivered ad karvannum, but here we are seeing horses which were being sold to royal officials. In the inventories for the Scottish campaign of 1336 there are five horses marked ad Elemosinam and three ad Garderoba; yet there are seven other horses which are simply assigned to a location (for example redditus apud Perth, 3 September) and there are no annotations ad karvannum in any of the inventories for this expedition - which also include no fewer than ninety (out of 542) horses marked mortuus, with varying amounts of additional information. A very contrasting, and indeed perplexing, situation is to be found in a set of inventories for a small army serving in Scotland in 1315, for here, there are no mortuus annotations at all, but over two dozen horses (all of the 'losses'on the roll) marked redditur ad Elemosinam. Did this army not suffer a single equestrian fatality, or has the clerk responsible for the inventory simply used a single form of annotation for all circumstances of horse loss?

It is clear from this selection of examples that a clerk might use one of several different short-hand phrases to identify a horse which had been delivered into the king's custody; and, moreover, that a horse which had been killed may not always be distinguished from one which

24. B.L., Stowe Ms. 553 fos. 60v, 70.
26. See above, p. 44: The very low re-sale prices of these horses may suggest that they were in poor shape after an arduous campaign.
27. E101/19/36. The three ad Garderoba cases are all to be found in Sir Ralph de Neville's retinue and all are dated 'Berwick, 14 December'.
had simply been withdrawn from service. The important point, however, is that all of these clerical usages - the enigmatic ones as well as the unambiguous cases of 'mortuus' - indicated that the horse had been 'lost' and that its owner was eligible for compensation. This is most clearly shown when a restauro equorum account offers full details of the circumstances of loss. Thus, for example, the horse compensation list associated with the Scots campaign of 1322 and its immediate aftermath includes eleven fatalities from the battle of Byland, but also fifteen which had been rendered ad Elemosinam in various places.29 The restauro equorum accounts for the continental campaigns of 1338-39 and 1342-43 - and, indeed, the even more summarised information for the Rhiems campaign - do not provide this kind of detail, but bearing in mind the inconsistency and ambiguity of clerical usages, we should not, perhaps, be unduly concerned about the detail which has been obscured.30 A restauro equorum account, it must be remembered, will only include losses amongst appraised horses. It would probably be necessary to multiply the number it provides by two or three to get a true impression of total warhorse casualties. But such accounts are, nevertheless, likely to give a more comprehensive view of losses than the original inventories, which usually offer only partial coverage and which may not be completely up-to-date. Thus, for example, the inventories for the 1336 Scottish campaign, though an unusually full set, do not provide quite as complete a picture as the corresponding restauro equorum accounts.31

29. B.L., Stowe Ms. 553 fos. 70, 71.

30. Cf. another set of very detailed restauro equorum accounts, those for the War of Saint-Sardos, in which the time and place of most of the horse losses are specified, but which is content to regard all of the horses as simply mortuus: B.L., Add. Ms. 7967 fos. 104-106v.

31. E101/19/36; B.L., Cotton Ms. Nero C. VIII fos. 280v-282. Although all of the horses included in the restauro equorum account are to be found in the surviving inventories, four of them are not marked as casualties in the original lists. Conversely, Robert de Longvill's 10 mark hobby, mortuus at Perth on 6 September (m. 2d), has not been included in the compensation account. These restauro equorum accounts are more detailed than those for subsequent French campaigns: they record all the horses as simply mortuus (in fact the fate of only sixteen horses in the inventories are described in any other terms), but they do attempt to summarise information about the time and
The relationship between the information supplied by horse inventories and that contained in *restauro equorum* accounts is best explored by reference to the administrative processes set in motion when a captain claimed compensation for the losses sustained by men in his retinue. The loss of horses during a campaign was authorised by the marshal of the army and/or the clerk who had been associated with the marshal in the appraisal process. They would require proof of loss. In normal circumstances this would probably involve the presentation of the branded portion of the dead horse's hide. Sometimes this would not be possible - a horse's carcass would not always be recoverable - and in these cases it is likely that *une simple déclaration de perte affirmée sous serment* would suffice. The captains' coordinating role in such *restor* claims ensured that the less clear-cut cases at least received the backing of a retinue commander. Injured animals would no doubt present the greatest problem to the army marshal. He would need to determine whether they were unfit for further service and thus qualified their owner for compensation, and this would inevitably involve difficult decisions, for we may be sure that the more expensive an animal, the more likely that the slightest injury would be seen by its owner as justification for a compensation claim.

Each *restor* claim would be verified against the description provided by the horse inventory. This record was also the absolute authority for the sum which was due in compensation. The records offer an

place of death.

32. See, for example, *Bain*, v, p. 213 (1306-7); B.L., Cotton Ms., Nero C. VIII fo. 280v (1336).

33. This was the usual practice of several continental states: Contamine, *Guerre, état et société*, p. 104-5; Mallett and Hale, *The military organisation of a Renaissance state*, p. 139. It is sometimes suggested that the ears and tail of the dead animal were presented as evidence of its death (List of documents relating to the Household and Wardrobe, John-Edward I (London: H.M.S.O., 1964), p. 59); but this would provide far less certain proof than the brand-mark.

34. As in France, Contamine, op. cit., p. 104.
occasional glimpse of this consultative process in action. In the early 1360s, for example, Sir Thomas Dale wrote to Walter Dalby asking him to *enserchier les prises* of two horses from Sir Eustace d'Auberchicourt's retinue which *sont tuez sur les guerres* in Ireland, so that their owners *purrontestreduemontrestorezdelaprise des chivalx.* Once the check had been made, the details of the loss would be noted on the inventory in one of the ways which we have considered and a warrant issued which authorised payment. Retinue captains would present these *restauroequorum* warrants when they accounted for their men's wages. The authorisation process has sometimes left a trace in the surviving documentation. Thus, for example, the horses listed in the *restauroequorum* account for the Scots campaign of 1336 have qualified for compensation 'by witness' of Sir Ralph de Neville, marshal of the army and John de Houton, clerk. In the case of Henry of Lancaster's retinue in 1336, the documents involved in the process of making account have also survived: a roll which includes a muster list for Lancaster's men-at-arms, but also a list of the warhorses lost by Lancaster's retinue during the campaign. The latter is a most interesting document. The entries

35. E101/28/27 m. 10. These were the only horse losses sustained by d'Auberchicourt's retinue: E101/28/21 fo. 14v. Both Dale and Dalby had been appraisers of d'Auberchicourt's horses early in 1363: E101/28/11 m. 1.

36. Separate lists might be made of horses delivered to the army 'caravan': see, for example, E101/7/21 (1298-99: *ad karvannum* and *ad Elemosinam*); E101/612/12 m. 7 (1304-5: 'Rotulus de karvannum').

37. For a similar warrant issued to Millet le Buef, esquire, for a horse killed during the battle of Crécy, scc Contamine, *Guerre, état et société*, p. 105 n. 101.

38. See, for example, the detailed records for the Scots campaign of 1322, which frequently provide the date and place of account for both *vadia guerre* and *restauroequorum*: B.L., Stowe Ms. 553, fo. 56; cf. fo. 70. An individual presenting his own compensation warrant would, no doubt, be at an advantage if supported by the authority of a prominent captain: e.g. Aymer de Valence's letter supporting Hugh de Qwappelade's bid to recover the cost of his *rounscinnarmes*, thereby confirming the letter of authorisation by the appraiser, Sir James de Dalyleye (SC1/48 m. 114).


40. E101/15/12. There are, in fact, two muster rolls (though the second is truncated) - one for each of the two accounting periods specified in the *vadia guerre* accounts (1 May-7 September; 8 September-16 November: B.L., Cotton Ms., Nero C. VIII fo. 240).
in the list are in the standard horse inventory form, but unlike the original inventory they are arranged chronologically according to the date of loss (from the first on 27 May to the last on 4 November) and they also appear in a more abbreviated form. The horse descriptions are shorter and whilst the date and place of loss are noted, there is no attempt to reproduce the distinction between 'mortuus' and 'ad Elemosina' which we find in the original inventory. If Lancaster received individual warrants for each of the twenty-one horses which were lost by members of his retinue, then they appear to have been enrolled into a single list. It is this list, moreover, which formed the basis of Lancaster's entry in the restauro equorum account for this campaign. The order is the same (i.e. very different from that of the inventory) and the content is identical, with the exception of a few further abbreviations of the horse descriptions and slight variations in the spelling of the names of individuals.

It seems likely, then, that it is an 'intermediate' stage of documentation which holds the key to the differences between inventories and restauro equorum accounts. But such documents, compiled in the field and presented at the time of making account, must have taken a variety of forms. A comparison of the annotated inventories and the restor accounts for the 1336 campaign suggests that the chronological ordering of the information displayed by Lancaster's roll was not the norm. The majority of retinue-sections in the restauro equorum account reproduce the order of the original inventory, but whether this arose from rolls like Lancaster's (but differently ordered), or from the sorting of bundles of restor

41. E101/19/36 m. 7.
42. B.L., Cotton Ms., Nero C. VIII fo. 280v.
warrants into the order of the inventories, is unclear. Although Lancaster's roll may not in some respects have been a typical document, the evidence which it offers for the process whereby the information of the inventories was abbreviated and simplified is nevertheless very valuable. The 'intermediate' document retains the date and place of horse losses, but is unspecific about the precise cause of loss, with the result that the eventual restauro equorum account, though summarising the information about time and place (and adopting the abbreviated horse descriptions of the intermediate record), simply regards all the horses listed as 'dead'. The other occasional differences between inventories and compensation accounts which were noted earlier (for example, an equus which becomes a courser) are perhaps also most likely to be the result of changes, conscious or unconscious, made at the point of drawing up the warrants to authorise restauro equorum payments.

A discussion of the influence of authorising warrants on the form and content of the restauro equorum accounts will necessarily be tentative, for supportive evidence is sparse. It is not clear, for example, how far the reticence of the restauro equorum accounts from the early campaigns of the French war is the consequence of heavily abbreviated 'intermediate' records or clerical conciseness at a later

43. The only exception is the section concerned with the earl of Warwick's losses (ibid., fo. 281). In this case, the order is by rank, but the information within each rank-grouping does follow the order of the inventory. This unusual, though entirely logical, arrangement was in all likelihood based upon a horse roll similar to Lancaster's. An examination of the materials for other campaigns shows that the order of the inventories was frequently preserved in the corresponding restauro equorum account: for example, the earl of Gloucester's retinue in 1337-38 (E101/35/3 m. 1, E101/20/25 m. 3). In the case of the restauro equorum account for the Breton campaign of 1342-43, the horses within most of the retinue sections are listed strictly in the order of their value: E36/204 fos. 86v-88.

44. Thus, for example, John de Wetwang's £6 horse which was stolen by the enemy at Stirling (E101/19/36 m. 5d) is presented as a fatality in the restauro equorum account (B.L., Cotton Ms., Nero C. VIII fo. 281v).

45. For example, Sir John de Tybetoft's equus, drowned in the Forth between Cambuskenneth and Stirling on 7 September 1336 (E101/19/36 m. 5d), becomes Sir John Tibetot's courser which died at Stirling on 7 September (B.L., Cotton Ms., Nero C. VIII fo. 281v).
stage. Nor is it clear whether the clerks responsible for the
*restauro equorum* accounts made use of the original inventories. It
would certainly be unwise to assume consistency of clerical method,
just as it would be prudent to expect a sprinkling of clerical errors.
A glance at two versions of part of the *restauro equorum* accounts for
the winter 1337-38 campaign in Scotland will show how two attempts at
the same clerical exercise - but not necessarily drawing on the same
materials - could produce slightly varying results.\textsuperscript{46} Comparison of
the two accounts with the original inventory reveals a certain amount
of abbreviation in the horse descriptions; but, in the case of two of
the horses in the earl of Salisbury's retinue, Weston's roll offers
colourings which are quite different from those given in the
inventory.\textsuperscript{47} With the earl of Gloucester's retinue, on the other
hand, we find that it is Kellesey's roll which differs from the
inventory, this time with respect to the horse valuations. The most
interesting discrepancy concerns Sir Adam de Everingham's horse, which
Kellesey's roll records with a value of 28 marks, as compared with 25
marks in the inventory. Weston's roll has the latter figure, but '28
marks' can clearly be seen to have been erased.\textsuperscript{48} Whatever the
explanation of this particular case,\textsuperscript{49} its implications are clear
enough, for it provides a neat, concrete example of how the process of
drawing-up a set of *restauro equorum* accounts could give rise not
merely to loss of detail, through abbreviation and the frequent need
to translate from French into Latin,\textsuperscript{50} but also to the recording of

\textsuperscript{46} Some of the *restauro equorum* materials for the 1337-38 campaign appear in both Walter de
Weston's roll (E101/20/25), and the 'duplicate' roll of his controller, William de Kellesey
(E101/20/26).

\textsuperscript{47} E101/20/25 m. 3; cf. E101/35/3 mm. 2d-1d and E101/20/26 m. 2. Kellesey's roll, but not Weston's,
notes that Nicholas Webbele, who lost a 10 mark horse, was the 'vallet of Sir Roger Huse' - a usage
which seems closely related to the appraiser's roll.

\textsuperscript{48} E101/20/26 m. 2; cf. E101/35/3 m. 1 and E101/20/25 m. 3.

\textsuperscript{49} Can we see here the influence of an 'intermediate' record or a different version of the inventory
(the only surviving one is wholly unannotated), or is it a matter of clerical error?

\textsuperscript{50} The process of translation also has a significant effect upon name forms and this is reinforced by
horse valuations different from those in the inventories. It is necessary to be aware of this potential flaw in the *restauro equorum* data, but we should not be unduly dismayed by it. In the first place, such errors are unlikely to be numerous, and though disruptive on the level of the individual, they would have no more than a minimal effect upon a statistical analysis of horse values (such as that attempted in Chapter VI). Secondly, the inventories should not be assumed to be infallible. Disparity between inventory and *restauro equorum* account may arise from the earlier document being incompletely annotated.

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In general, the Crown's liability for compensation was based squarely upon the information contained in the horse inventories. This meant, on the one hand, that only those warhorses which had been appraised were eligible for compensation in the event of loss: in most cases, only one horse per man-at-arms at any one time. A man would indeed be unfortunate if the horses he lost were those which had not been valued, but this must have been a very common occurrence. On the other hand, the Crown would accept liability for the full value of the appraised horses which were lost. Only in very exceptional circumstances was a system of flat-rate payments adopted for warhorses, though such a system appears to have been the norm in some continental states.\(^{51}\) In asserting that it was only appraised horses which were eligible for compensation, we must recognise that there

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51. Sir Thomas Dagworth's *restauro equorum* claim following a year's service in Brittany in 1346 was based upon a flat-rate of £10 per warhorse lost: E101/25/17. By contrast, in fourteenth-century France, it was usual to pay a fixed rate of 25 livres tournois for each lost horse (Contamine, *Guerre, état et société*, p. 105); cf. a contract between Louis de Nevers and a household knight from 1338 (*Vale, War and chivalry*, p. 67).
were exceptions to the rule. The group most likely to secure special
treatment from the king were his own household servants. Under Edward
III, gifts to cover the cost of unappraised horses, lost during a
campaign or whilst pursuing the king’s business in England, are a
commonplace of the records; but these, assuredly, are not warhorses
and the gifts are made at the very modest standard rate of 40s. per
horse.52 Evidence of similar gifts for the compensation of
unappraised warhorses is far less frequently encountered. Clearly the
king’s closest confidants were in the best position to secure special
favours of this kind - as William de Montagu appears to have done in
133653 - but deserving cases also stood a fair chance of receiving
fair treatment.54 We should not imagine, however, that the Crown
agreed to all such compensation requests; there was a limit to the
king’s generosity. Thierry, lord of Fauquemont’s retinue lost thirty-
four horses during the Low Countries campaign of 1338-39, and this
combined with diversis equis perditis in via versus domum una nocte
que non potuerat habere hospicium nec pabulum, amounted to a total of
£600. But Fauquemont’s claim was disallowed 'by oral order of the
king at Brussells' because the horses concerned could not be found
amongst the lists of those appraised for the campaign.55

52. In November 1343, William de Bolton, clerk, received 40s. pro restauro unius somerii sui ... apud
Vanes perditi (E403/331 m. 11). For a substantial number of such 40s. payments, see Norwell, pp.
53. Montagu received £100 in compensation for unappraised horses which had been lost on
campaign: B.L., Cotton Ms., Nero C. VIII fo. 282. In June 1353, the king authorised the payment of
£500 to the earl of Stafford to cover the cost of horses lost by his men in Gascony during the
previous year: E101/26/25.
54. For example, in December 1369 the king and council agreed to a gift of 200 marks for a group of
nine Scots esquires who had incurred losses during a period of service in France: Issue Roll of
55. Norwell, p. 324. For the fief-rente which he received from Edward III, see Treaty Rolls, 1337-39,
o. 39; see also, H.S. Lucas, The Low Countries and the Hundred Years War, 1326-1347 (Ann Arbor,
1929), p. 218. Others among the foreign lords in Edward III’s army successfully secured
compensation for losses: e.g. Henry de Flanders (Norwell, p. 316), who had been promised in his
indenture that warhorse losses would be paid solonc ceo qils serront loialment & en bone foi prisez:
E101/68/3 m. 43.
It was one thing for a captain's compensation claim to be accepted by the Crown; but actually securing payment was quite another matter. As so often with royal disbursements for military service, *restauro equorum* payments were rarely made promptly.\(^{56}\) A captain might wait months, and not infrequently years, for full payment of the cost of his retinue's lost horses. Thus, for example, Sir John Darcy *junior* received a payment of £16 in July 1344 for a horse which had been lost by a member of his retinue, John de Sautre, during the Breton campaign of 1342-43;\(^{57}\) but Sir Reginald de Cobham was still receiving installments to cover losses from the same campaign throughout the following year.\(^{58}\) The sums involved could be quite substantial,\(^{59}\) and even the smaller debts might not be satisfied within a few years, though the fact that it took twenty years to meet the cost of a horse lost at Bannockburn seems extraordinary.\(^{60}\) Many of the men seeking *restauro equorum* payments from the Crown were captains whose claims were mainly made up of warhorses lost by men in their retinues. Thus, for example, although Sir Reginald de Cobham had lost his own horse, valued at 100 marks, during the Breton expedition in 1342-43, this amounted to less than a third of his total compensation claim for the

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\(^{56}\) The receipt of a compensation payment could involve several administrative steps. Captains accounting for their losses at the Wardrobe would be issued with a debenture for presentation at the Exchequer of Receipt (see, for example, the debentures arising from horse losses at Bannockburn: E404/482 files 31, 32). The eventual payment would be recorded in the Issue rolls. In some circumstances, however, it is clear that *restauro equorum* payments were made very rapidly. In Gascony during the 1350s it was not uncommon for only a day or two to elapse between the issue of a warrant for *restauro equorum* by the Seneschal and the receipt of payment from the constable of Bordeaux (for a file of warrants and receipts, see E101/172/4). Of the seventeen cases in which we have both warrant and receipt, all except two involve an intervening period of less than a week and for two men the whole process was completed in a single day. It should perhaps be added that all these cases concerned individuals and that the sums involved were not large.

\(^{57}\) E403/332 m. 16; cf. E36/204 fo. 88.

\(^{58}\) E403/335 mm. 21, 27; E403/336 m. 6.

\(^{59}\) For example, Hugh Audley *senior*, who in 1327 was owed £410 6s. 8d. for horses lost some years earlier in the Scottish war: *Calendar of Memoranda Rolls, 1326-27* (London: H.M.S.O., 1968), p. 304.

\(^{60}\) Geoffrey de Mildenhale, who lost a horse valued at £20. 13s. 4d.: E404/482 file 31, no. 18 (Wardrobe debenture, dated 25 September 1314); E403/270 m. 20 (Exchequer issue in 1334). Cf. Sir John de Bures, whose company lost horses with a total value of £106. 13s. 4d., but who had still not been paid the great bulk of this in November 1331: E404/482 file 31, no. 4; *C.P.R., 1330-34*, p. 221.
campaign. How promptly did captains compensate their men for their losses? Occasionally indentures of retinue include an undertaking by the captain to pay compensation in full within a fixed period from the time of loss - perhaps forty days. But, indentures, whether of a long- or short-term nature, are rarely as specific as this, and we are left wondering whether captains were inclined to pay their men and wait for eventual recompense from the Crown, or whether they kept their military retainers waiting until they received payment themselves. The terms of some military sub-contracts of the later fourteenth-century tend to suggest that the latter is most likely. One might imagine that men who were more permanently attached to a captain would receive prompt compensation, but even the retainers of great magnates can be seen to be waiting a year or two for *restauro equorum* payments, and sometimes much longer. In 1358, William Trussell, who describes himself, with some justification, as the Prince of Wales' *povre bachelor*, was seeking compensation for no fewer than six horses which he had lost whilst serving in the prince's war.

61. £213. 6s. 8d. (E36/204 fo. 87).
62. This is the period stipulated in the indenture between Aymer de Valence and Sir Thomas Berkeley in 1297: printed in facsimile in B. Lyon, 'The feudal antecedent of the indenture system', *Speculum*, xxix (1954), pp. 503-11. It is interesting to note that the earl of Pembroke secured similar terms from the Crown in an indenture of war drawn up twenty years later: E101/68/2 m. 42D.
64. See, for example, S. Walker, 'Profit and loss in the Hundred Years War: the subcontracts of Sir John Strother, 1374', *B.I.H.R.*, lviii (1985), p. 102.
65. For example, in February 1372, Sir John Cresy received 25 marks for a horse lost during the campaign in Normandy and Picardy in 1369: *J.G. Reg.*, 1371-5, ii, no. 908. But Sir Maurice de Berkeley, who was owed £80 for horses lost in Gascony in 1355, was still awaiting full payment from the Prince of Wales in the mid 1360s: *B.P. Reg.*, iv, p. 516.
66. B.L., Cotton Ms., Caligula D. III no. 30.
Chapter IV
RESTAURU EQUORUM, VADIA GUERRE AND THE PROFITS OF WAR

The horse inventories generated by the administrative machinery of the English Crown are available for a period of rather less than a hundred years, from 1282 to the mid 1360s. Within this period, the coverage is uneven, with a notable thinning of the evidence during Edward III's reign. Contemplation of this spread of documentation gives rise to a number of questions. How far do the surviving records offer an accurate impression of the chronology of horse compensation? What were its origins? Was it a regular, or merely an occasional, element in the terms of service offered to men-at-arms during this period? Why did it cease to operate?

i) Pay and the appraisal of warhorses: the reigns of Edward I and Edward II

The essential criterion for inclusion in horse inventories drawn up by the agents of the English Crown was established long ago by J.E. Morris, the pioneer of Edwardian army studies: 'inventories, it is clear, were only taken of the horses of stipendiary troops ....; this was not done in the case of the feudal quotas which served as a duty'.¹ Men performing military service in royal armies as a consequence of their feudal obligations supplied their own arms and horses, and made good any losses themselves, as part of those obligations.² Men serving for pay also supplied their own equipment

2. Some of the military costs of the feudal aristocracy would eventually be met by the collection of scutage from tenants, but initially the cost of service was borne by the military tenants' own resources. During John's reign a means of 'subsidising' feudal service was devised. The Crown would issue 'an advance to a feudal tenant [to help him meet the cost of equipping for war] which was ultimately repayable in cash, if not previously pardoned'. Such prests, therefore, enabled military tenants 'to anticipate their scutage' (Praestita Roll, 14-18 John, ed. J.C. Holt, Pipe Roll Soc., new ser., xxxvii (1964), pp. 79-80). Warhorses and military equipment were, moreover, exempt from taxation: see S.K. Mitchell, Taxation in medieval England (New Haven, 1951), pp. 139, 146, 148; J.F. Willard, Parliamentary taxes on personal property, 1290 to 1334 (Cambridge, Mass., 1934), pp. 77, 79.
and horses, but their relationship with the Crown was rather different. Their service was not obligatory, their resources were only temporarily at the disposal of the royal paymaster and it was only reasonable and prudent for the Crown to ensure that the heaviest costs, and particularly the replacement cost of lost warhorses, were met. If pay was rather more like a return on an investment than wages in the modern sense, that investment needed to be insured against loss.

When discussing the inventories for the second Welsh war of 1282, Michael Prestwich observed that it was 'customary' for the Crown to offer *restauro equorum* to those in royal pay. But it is far from clear when the association between paid military service and horse appraisal actually began. The English Crown had certainly been employing paid troops for several centuries prior to the Edwardian period, and we know that compensation for warhorse losses had frequently been extended, along with wages, to men who had been recruited by means of *fiefs-rentes*. But whether *restauro equorum* was normally made available to all paid men-at-arms is far less certain. Stephen Brown has drawn attention to the rarity of compensation payments for mercenaries in twelfth-century accounts. As late as

3. The contrast between, on the one hand, obligatory unpaid feudal service and, on the other, voluntary paid service is a simplification. Men obliged to perform military service as a consequence of money fiefs (*fiefs-rentes*) received daily wages and their costs, including lost warhorses, were met (see n. 7 below).


Henry III's reign there is no firm evidence for the operation of a formal system of warhorse appraisal embracing all men-at-arms entering the king's pay. The Crown might contribute to the cost of a man's equipment at the outset of a campaign 9 and at a later stage would make gifts to individuals to help with the replacement of lost warhorses. 10 But the evidence does not necessarily suggest the operation of a carefully regulated mechanism of warhorse appraisal of a kind similar to that which was to become a familiar feature of Edwardian expeditions. In the middle decades of the thirteenth-century it seems more a matter of royal favour 11 - and, moreover, (although this is by no means decisive) no horse inventories are available for the period prior to the Edwardian wars. 12 Indeed, the first inventories to have survived were compiled during the second Welsh war of 1282, 13 and bearing in mind that this campaign is notable for Edward I's attempt to raise a 'wholly paid army', it is tempting to see this as the first occasion in which pay and a formal system of restauro equorum had been


10. See, for example, C.L.R., 1240-45, pp. 269, 305, 325; C.L.R., 1245-51, p. 26. These are payments to individuals, not to captains for the warhorses lost by their men (as we find so often under the Edwardian kings).

11. Gifts were made for the replacement of all kinds of horses (sometimes several lost by a single man), for all types of personnel (e.g., Baudechun the crossbowman, in 1243: C.L.R., 1240-45, p. 197). Such gifts continued to be made during the Edwardian period, but were quite separate from the restor of appraised warhorses lost by men-at-arms.


13. C47/2/5, 6 and 7, assigned to the second Welsh war by Prestwich, War, politics and finance, pp. 50-51. A further fragment (C47/2/21 m. 29) may also derive from this campaign.
combined on a large scale.\textsuperscript{14}

All this is not to argue that men-at-arms would be unable secure compensation for lost horses unless they served in an army - or at least a contingent - which was receiving the king's pay. The Crown might not offer \textit{restauro equorum} to the feudal host or, indeed, to those offering voluntary unpaid service;\textsuperscript{15} but many men serving in feudal or unpaid contingents would, no doubt, have received \textit{restaur} payments, or equivalent benefits, from their immediate lord\textsuperscript{16} - perhaps as a consequence of membership of magnate households or in fulfilment of the terms of military subcontracts. The evidence is admittedly patchy and much of it is of late provenance. The military contractors employed by tenants-in-chief to perform their feudal service\textsuperscript{17} would not necessarily have \textit{restauro equorum} written into their terms of service, but the lump sum payments which they received would probably have included some allowance for possible horse losses.

In 1327 Sir Robert Constable of Flamborough was engaged by the

\textsuperscript{14}Although inventories may well have been compiled for the first Welsh war of 1277 and, indeed, for Henry III's Welsh campaigns, the form and content of the horse rolls drawn-up for the campaign of 1282 suggest a military institution in the process of development. They lack the consistent layout which we find in later inventories. In some sections, for example, the individual entries take the form: 'Un cheval ... pour...', 'Un cheval ... pris de...', rather than in the standard 'name - description - value' form which was to become the established norm with records of this kind by the later 1290s. A similar impression is provided by the few other fragmentary horse inventories to have survived from the 1280s and early 1290s (e.g. C47/2/2 m. 19 [12-13 Edw. I] and C47/3/48 mm. 16, 17 [13-17; 20-22 Edw. I]) and by a subcontract for service in Wales in 1287, a very early survival which gives 'minute attention ... to the question of compensation for horses lost on service'(N.B. Lewis, 'An early indenture of military service, 27 July 1287', \textit{B.I.H.R.}, xiii (1935), pp. 85-89).

\textsuperscript{15}For example, the Falkirk campaign, when more than half of the armoured cavalry were not paid and therefore excluded from the inventories: Prestwich, op. cit., pp. 68-69. Cf. the employment of \textit{restor} in France during the thirteenth and fourteenth-centuries: \textit{on le trouve servant de complément au service à gages, mais ailleurs il était employé pour alléger le service gratuit, et on ne saurait douter que ce fût bien son usage primitif} (P. Guilihermoz, \textit{Essay sur l'origine de la noblesse en France au Moyen Age} (Paris, 1902), pp. 284-85).


archbishop of York to provide *dis hommes darmes as chevaux coverts* (i.e. the service of five knights). For twenty days service with this company, Constable was to receive £100, which seems a very generous rate of payment, but which included £20 *pur son travaille, et pur son apparaîl*.18 A similar allowance was probably included in the £100 agreed between the bishop of Salisbury and Sir Robert de Sapy for the latter's provision of five knights for the king's army in 1322.19

Although documentary evidence is slight for the period prior to the fourteenth-century, we may be sure that members of magnate households would have their major military costs, including lost warhorses, met by their lord.20 There are indications that the Lord Edward compensated members of his household for horses lost during the crusade of 1270-72.21 At the very end of the century a small group of indentures of retinue show similar privileges being extended to the retainers of several non-royal magnates.22 Evidence from the later 1290s may not, of course, be a reliable guide to normal practice earlier in the century. By the time of Edward I's Scottish campaigns,

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18. N.B. Lewis, 'The summons of the English feudal levy, 5 April 1327', in *Essays in medieval history presented to Bertie Wilkinson*, ed. T.A. Sandquist and M. Powicke (Toronto, 1969), pp. 242-49. Lewis notes that Constable's 'fee of £20 for raising and equipping the troop would have been at about the normal rate of regard paid in Edward's reign': ibid., p. 246 n. 40.

19. The £100 was to be paid in two installments. If the campaign was cancelled after the payment of the first £50, Sapy would return two-thirds of this sum, keeping £13. 6s. 8d. *pur les custages qil avera mys*: The registers of Roger Martival, Bishop of Salisbury, 1315-30, eds. K. Edwards, C.R. Elrington, S. Reynolds, D.M. Owen. Canterbury and York Soc., 1959-65, iii, pp. 97-98.

20. For a discussion of the origins and shadowy early history of indentures of retinue, see Bean, *From lord to patron*, Chapter IV; see ibid., pp. 41-56 for an analysis of surviving indentures of retinue from the late thirteenth and early fourteenth-centuries. S. Waugh's careful study of the mainly indirect thirteenth-century evidence ('Tenure to contract: lordship and clientage in thirteenth-century England', *E.H.R.*, ci (1986), pp. 811-39), led him to conclude that, in Henry III's reign, the majority of contracts were prompted by administrative and legal, rather than purely military needs. Facing 'new military demands' in Edward I's reign, lords 'simply adjusted the system of contractual retaining which they had developed for administrative service to military needs'.


most magnates were, after all, receiving royal pay for some at least of the men which they brought on campaign and so the *restauro equorum* payments which they made to their retainers would, to some degree, be re-couped from the Crown. In this respect, therefore, the evidence offered by a small group of indentures drawn-up during the 1310s is particularly useful, for the superior contracting party is Thomas, earl of Lancaster, a magnate who may never have accepted pay for the troops which he contributed to royal armies, and certainly never during the period in which these contracts operated. Thus, for example, the indenture between Lancaster and Sir William Latimer offered the latter *monture por son corps du dit Counte come affiert por un Baneret*; in addition, *ses chevaux darmes [serront] prises al entre des dites guerres par les gentz le dit Counte, et aversa restor de ses chevaux darmes perduz en les dites guerres en le service le dit Counte selonc le dit pris.*

Great magnates like Lancaster were obviously well placed to offer generous benefits to their retainers and yet the practice of their households would doubtless have been copied by many smaller establishments. In this respect the greatest examplar was the Crown. Although the earliest detailed records of horse valuation and compensation date from the late thirteenth-century, it had become customary for members of the military household of English kings to be compensated for their losses as early as the reign of Henry I. It was the long-established methods of the royal household which provided the solid bedrock of administrative experience needed when horse appraisal and compensation were extended

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to all in the paid service of king.\textsuperscript{26}

During the early decades of the fourteenth-century an increasing proportion of troops serving in the king's armies were drawn within the embrace of royal pay. Unpaid contingents, whether based on feudal or voluntary service, made only a modest contribution to Edward III's armies.\textsuperscript{27} For the English military machine, this was a most significant development; and yet its effects may have been but little felt by the ordinary man-at-arms. If he lost a warhorse whilst on active service the man-at-arms would receive compensation from the captain of his retinue irrespective of whether that retinue was providing paid, voluntary unpaid or feudal service. Thus, although the growing universality of paid military service served very rapidly to institutionalise \textit{restauro equorum}, drawing it completely within the orbit of royal administration, the main impact of this change would have been felt, not so much by the ordinary man-at-arms as by those who were in direct contact with the royal paymaster: the magnates and lesser retinue captains. Some magnates had been vigorously opposed to the idea of receiving royal pay, refusing 'to descend to the level of stipendiaries'; 'but this was only a temporary stand ... in little more than a generation they all had succumbed'.\textsuperscript{28} The financial advantages - wages for all combatant retinue members and compensation payments for lost warhorses - were too great to be eschewed for very long. As far as the Crown was concerned, it was money well spent,\textsuperscript{29}

\textsuperscript{26} On the growth of \textit{restor des chevaux} from household practice, see Contamine, \textit{Guerre, état et société}, pp. 103-4.

\textsuperscript{27} These developments are unravelled with great clarity in Prestwich, \textit{War, politics and finance under Edward I}, Chapter III; idem, 'Cavalry service in early fourteenth-century England', pp. 147-58.


\textsuperscript{29} Part of the expenditure would be re-couped because a paid army was obliged to surrender to the Crown a proportion of its profits of war. Such considerations may have influenced Edward I's attempt to raise a wholly paid army in 1282 (Prestwich, \textit{War, politics and finance}, pp. 71-72). On the division of the spoils of war, see below pp. 160-75.
for a wholly paid army was, in a number of respects, far preferable to
one consisting of a shifting balance of paid, feudal and voluntary
unpaid elements. Paid armies, whose size, structure and length of
service could be predicted and regulated, offered new military
possibilities: the means for staging complex military operations of a
kind employed by the English high command during the the first phase
of the Hundred Years War.

If the Crown gained in terms of military flexibility and reliability,
it also wished to preserve, indeed enhance, the quality of the armies
mustered. Pay would be supplied only for those men-at-arms who
arrived at muster *covenablement mountez & apparaillez*;30 that is, the
man must have the necessary armour and equipment and his warhorse must
be of suitable quality, and 'covered' or barded.31 These requirements
had, of course, applied at musters of the feudal host;32 but as
Michael Prestwich has shown, a very substantial proportion of the
combatants in late thirteenth and early fourteenth-century armies were
providing voluntary, unpaid service and it is not clear how well they

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30. A stock phrase with many variants. This particular version appears in an indenture for the
garrison of Mitford castle, Northumberland, in 1316 (E101/68/2 m. 36). Sometimes, the tone is a
little more forceful; for example (as in an indenture of 1321): *bien & suffisaument mountez &
apparaillez* (E101/68/3 m. 47).

31. The dependence of the man-at-arms' full daily rate of pay (12d.) on possession of a barded horse
is evident before Edward I's reign (e.g. from 1269, *C.L.R.*, 1267-72, no. 738). The horse armour of
Edward I's reign was of mail or boiled leather resting on padding: Morris, *The Welsh Wars of
Plate armour for horses (chanfron, peytral, flanchards, crupper) appears in the fourteenth-century:
C. Blair, *European armour* (London, 1958), pp. 184-87. As far as the English armies of the mid to
late fourteenth-century are concerned, it is far from clear whether horse armour was still deemed
essential to a man-at-arms' pay; there appears to be at least as much concern with the number and
quality of horses taken (see below, pp. 326-29).

32. Helena Chew (op. cit., pp. 87-88) shows that the feudal *ostensio equorum et armorum* was a
serious business: 'the constable and marshal were empowered to reject the services of all
inadequately equipped knights or sergeants and to compel the lords to substitute others *lege militari
pp. 40-41, who also draws on Matthew Paris' description of a mid thirteenth-century muster in
*Chronica majora*.
were equipped.\textsuperscript{33} The provision of pay for most or all men-at-arms enabled the Crown to demand a uniform standard of equipment for both man and warhorse. Seen in this light, horse appraisal represents not simply a privilege for men-at-arms taking the king's pay, but in fact a prerequisite of receiving pay. The receipt of pay was actually dependent upon prior horse appraisal: this is made plain in records of various kinds, including military contracts and letters appointing appraisal officials. In 1318, for example, the indenture of retinue between Edward II and Sir John de St. John established that in wartime, St. John's chevaux seront prisez le premier jour de sa venue & adonques maintenant prendra gages pour lui & pour ses gentz tantz come il amenera.\textsuperscript{34} In April 1325, William de Oterhampton was ordered to pay vadia consueta to men-at-arms a tempore quo equos suos per [Sir Richard Damory] apprecciari.\textsuperscript{35} Thus, at the start of a campaign warhorses were inspected and valued to ensure that the correct level of compensation could be paid in the event of loss, but this inspection also formed an essential part of the muster process and a formal record was made of those men-at-arms whose equipment and warhorses were of a sufficient standard to entitle them receive the normal rate of pay. The detailed descriptions in the inventories and the branding of the horses themselves would make it easy, at subsequent musters, to check for improper substitution.\textsuperscript{36}

The connection between the valuation of warhorses and the receipt of


\textsuperscript{34} E101/68/2 m. 42C. Cf. an indenture drawn up during the previous year between Edward II and Aymer de Valence: tous ses chevaux darmes [seront] prisez le primer jour qil sera venu ... : E101/68/2 m. 42D.

\textsuperscript{35} C61/36 m. 6.

\textsuperscript{36} A Pisan military code of 1327-31 laid down penalties for all involved in the selling or bartering of horses which had previously been registered for pay (quoted in Jones, \textit{Chaucer's knight}, pp. 25-56).
pay is made explicitly in many pay rolls from the reigns of Edward I and Edward II. A good example is the *vadia guerre* account for the English army serving in Scotland during the summer of 1322.\(^{37}\) For the men-at-arms in this army, pay commenced on the day that their horses were appraised: entry after entry makes this clear. Thus, for example, the ninety-five *homini ad arma* in the earl of Pembroke’s retinue were paid from the 5 August, *quo die equi sui appreciabantur in guerra Scoicie*.\(^{38}\) What this particular *vadia guerre* account does not reveal is whether any men-at-arms were not taken into the king’s pay at the standard rate, because their horses and equipment failed to pass muster - either because inadequate, or because they did not appear at the appointed time.\(^{39}\) That this was a common enough occurrence is made clear by many other pay rolls. The *vadia guerre* account for the Flanders campaign of 1297 includes men who are paid 8d. per day rather than 12d., *quia sine equo appreciato*.\(^{40}\) In July 1311, whilst John de Enefeld received wages at 12d. per day *quia cum equo appreciato*, his fellow sergeant-at-arms, William Ferraunt, was paid only 8d. *quia sine equo appreciato*.\(^{41}\) For the English forces serving in Gascony in 1324-25, the penalty for serving without an appraised horse was rather more severe: many company commanders were paid only 6d. per day for men in this predicament.\(^{42}\) Whilst it is

37. B.L., Stowe Ms. 553 fos. 55v-63.

38. The first retinue listed on the pay roll. There are a number of variant formulae: e.g. [date] *quo die equi sui appreciati fuerunt*. Less explicitly, men are serving *cum equis appreciatis* or *cum equis ad arma*, the latter serving to emphasise that the horses were barded.

39. It is unlikely that significant numbers of men went unpaid for any length of time as a result of missing official musters, for the *vadia guerre* account suggests that the horse appraisers were regularly at work from 4 to 16 August. Changes in the size and structure of retinues are, therefore, probably to be explained in terms of actual movements of men, rather than changes in accounting totals. Thus, for example, the fifty-one men-at-arms who, on 15 August, were added to the existing numbers of Sir Hugh le Despenser’s retinue were probably new arrivals, rather than the victims of missed musters or stringent horse evaluation at an earlier date (B.L., Stowe Ms. 553 fo. 61).

40. B.L., Add. Ms. 7965 fo. 72.

41. B.L., Cotton Ms., Nero C. VIII fo. 97.

42. For example, Sir John de Felton who, as marshal of the army, was one of the three men responsible for horse appraisal at Plympton: B.L., Add. Ms. 7967 fo. 31v. It is not always clear
possible that men were on occasions obliged to serve without an appraised horse - that is, in the eyes of the Crown, not as a man-at-arms at all - because they had missed an official muster, it is more likely that in most cases they appeared at muster but were excluded from the horse inventory, because their horses and/or equipment were not of the required standard for the receipt of the man-at-arms rate of pay. The fault might lie with the horse itself, or it might not be properly 'armoured'. Alternatively the man's personal equipment might be considered to be that of a hobelar rather than a man-at-arms. There were bound to be disputes about what exactly constituted a man-at-arms equipment. In 1317, the keeper and chamberlain of Berwick were faced by a dilemma when, having been ordered to pay the wages of a company of fifty hobelars, twenty-eight arrived at muster covenablement mountez et armes Daketoun Hauberioun et bacinetz. They were better equipped than some of the men-at-arms in the garrison, and their captain, John le Hireis, felt aggrieved that they were not paid 12d. per day.

Those who aspired to be men-at-arms but who lacked an appraised horse would usually be paid at a reduced rate; at times, however, they

whether a man's horse has yet to be appraised, or whether he has no horse at all.

43. See, for example, James de Dalilegh's instructions, when sent to appraise the horses of the garrison at Lochmaban castle in 1302: Bain, v, no. 299.

44. English appraisers would surely be guided by principles similar to those stipulated by the Pisan military code for the employment of mercenaries (1327-31), which required officials to reject horses which were 'broken-winded, obstinate, affected by rheum or otherwise sick' (quoted in Jones, Chaucer's knight, p. 122). This code also laid down a minimum acceptable value; for a discussion of this in the English context, see below pp. 127-29. Some men would no doubt arrive at muster with either no warhorse at all, or at least an inferior beast, but with every intention of acquiring one. They would be paid a reduced rate until they did.


appear to be receiving no pay at all. In 1322, according to the *vadia guerre* accounts, the earl of Louth served with the king's army in Scotland from mid August until the beginning of November with a force of seventy-four men-at-arms (including himself, four bannerets and six knights), 189 hobelars and ninety-three foot soldiers.\(^{47}\) A separate retinue roll provides the names and ranks of the earl's men-at-arms, and reveals the retinue's internal company structure.\(^{48}\) The most interesting feature of this roll is that there are two lists of names for each of the six companies: one listing men with valued horses, the other those with unvalued horses.

Table 4.1: Retinue of Sir John de Bermingham, earl of Louth: Scottish campaign 1322.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Company commander</th>
<th>Valued horses</th>
<th>Unvalued horses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Earl of Louth</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sir Nicholas de Verdon</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sir John de Cusak</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sir Herbert de Marshal</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walter de Burgh</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. de Bermingham</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>75</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There is a close correspondence between the number of men-at-arms with valued horses and the number for whom the earl of Louth was allowed pay in the *vadia guerre* account; that is only to be expected. What is striking, however, is that so many men - about half of the earl's men-at-arms - were not allowed pay, apparently because their horses were unvalued. We must assume that their wages came out of the earl's own pocket.\(^{49}\)

\(^{47}\) B.L., Stowe Ms. 553 fo. 56.

\(^{48}\) E101/13/35 m. 8. The roll, headed *Hibn*, is one of a bundle of miscellaneous military materials dated temp. Edward I by the P.R.O., but the identification offered here is very firmly based upon internal evidence.

\(^{49}\) It is possible that the seventy-four men-at-arms without valued horses were regarded as hobelars for the purposes of pay, and are therefore included in the 189 hobelars recorded by the *vadia guerre* accounts. Although this is quite plausible (and consistent with pay policy at other times) it is difficult to produce a total of 189 from these seventy-four men and the numbers of hobelars allocated to each company by the retinue roll.
Does a chance documentary survival provide a glimpse of a phenomenon which, by the very nature of the pay records, would usually go unnoticed? Were significant numbers of men-at-arms regularly excluded from pay because, for whatever reason, their horses were not appraised? Not necessarily, for the circumstances of the earl of Louth's retinue were unusual. Not leaving Ireland until 18 August, the earl's men cannot have joined Edward II's army until long after the horses of the other retinues had been appraised and it is possible that Louth's men were treated rather differently from the rest of the army. There is no explicit reference to the valuation of their horses in the *vadia guerre* account, but this is not surprising because their period of paid service began when they set sail from Ireland and not upon completion of a muster in Northumberland. Their horses may have been valued at the time of embarkation or after their arrival in England. Either way, the evidence for these horses provided by the *restauro equorum* account for the campaign, suggests a simpler method of evaluation than that employed for the rest of the army.\(^{50}\) Four horses were lost, but rather than being separately costed, a suspiciously neat combined total is supplied: £20. It seems as if they have been valued at 100s each - a value which seems, at a slightly later date, to have become the minimum acceptable for a man-at-arms' horse.

How far the treatment of Louth's retinue followed, or differed from, normal practice is not clear. The scheme of compensation payments for his retinue certainly seems suspiciously neat and out of line with standard procedure at this time. But the apparent total dependence of

\(^{50}\) B.L., Stowe Ms. 553 fo 70. It may be significant that the *restauro equorum* entry dealing with the horses lost by Louth's retinue does not employ the formula normal for horses valued at the start of the campaign.
his men's wages on prior horse evaluation does give pause for thought. Louth's retinue roll appears to be a unique document of its kind, but this may be a misleading impression; and there are fragments of evidence from other quarters which also show that, on occasions, a man-at-arms might receive no pay at all until his horse has been valued. It was for this reason, for example, that Sir William de Fissheburn received nothing for one of his scutiferi for the first five days of August 1324, whilst Sir Nicholas de Stradeset lost over a month's pay for failing to secure an appraised horse for one of his men. But few pay rolls reveal details of this kind. For most armies we can but speculate how many retinues were partly paid for by their captains because of difficulties arising from horse valuation - and by how much a calculation of army size based upon the evidence of the vadis guerre accounts will under-estimate the numbers of men-at-arms actually serving.

There is another way of interpreting the evidence of the earl of Louth's retinue in 1322. It may be that the earl had contracted to supply a paid contingent of a fixed size, or a mixed force of paid and unpaid troops. Interpreted thus, the seventy-four men-at-arms listed in the earl's retinue roll who do not have appraised horses would be those who were not going to be paid for by the Crown: the earl would know all along that he would be paying their wages himself. Contracts from this period do occasionally make provision for paid and unpaid

51. B.L. Add. Ms. 7967 fos. 34v, 35.
52. In addition, a substantial number of foot soldiers in the 1322 army were serving at the expense of their home communities rather than the crown: see J.E. Morris, 'Mounted infantry in medieval England', T.R.H.S., 3rd. series, vii (1914), pp. 87-91; M.R. Powicke, 'The English commons in Scotland in 1322 and the deposition of Edward II', Speculum, xxxv (1960), pp. 559-61, and Military obligation in medieval England (Oxford, 1962), pp. 151-53. For a fuller discussion of the interpretive problems presented by the pay rolls, see below, pp. 177-94.
men-at-arms. In November 1316, for example, Sir Robert de Welle agreed to garrison Brough castle with fifteen men-at-arms and twenty hobelars, of whom five men-at-arms and ten hobelars were to be a ses custages, the rest being paid for by the Crown. Only the ten men-at-arms in the king's pay were to have their chevaux... prisez par les ministres notre seigneur le Roy & averont restor de ceux que se perdront en le service le Roy.

A man-at-arms received the standard rate of pay from the day that his warhorse was appraised and recorded on an inventory. But what happened if this appraised horse was killed or became unfit for service? We might reasonably expect the man's pay to be reduced until he acquired a replacement or had one of his other warhorses valued; yet the records provide evidence which is ambiguous and inconsistent. Take, for example, the pay rolls for the Scottish campaign of 1322. On the one hand there is the case of the earl of Louth's retinue. According to the restauro equorum account, the earl's retinue lost four horses at the battle of Byland on 14 October 1322. Appropriately enough, on the earl's retinue roll, the four men-at-arms concerned are to be found amongst those having valued horses and receiving pay, but the vadia guerre account shows no changes in the numbers of the earl's retinue receiving pay at the time of Byland - or indeed, at any other time. Further comparison of the pay roll and the horse compensation account indicates that this case is far from exceptional. There are, it is true, a few instances where an entry in the restauro equorum list is mirrored by an explicit statement in the

55. B.L., Stowe Ms. 553 fo. 70. In all seven valued, and four unvalued, horses were lost at Byland.
vadia guerre accounts. Thus, Sir John de Norwich's scutifer, William de Banham lost his horse at Norham on 1 September and his pay stopped immediately. Similarly, when Sir Robert de Swayneborne lost his horse on 19 August his retinue captain, the earl of Arundel, henceforward received pay for one knight less. But Arundel's company lost one further horse and no allowance is made for this in the pay accounts - and the same applies to losses by other retinues, both large and small. The pay rolls for the army in Gascony in 1324-25 offer equally inconsistent evidence. Often it is quite clear that pay has not been adjusted following the loss of warhorses. Sir Roger de Hegham, for instance, lost his £20 horse in March 1325, yet according to the vadia guerre account he received pay uninterruptedly for himself and two scutiferi for 499 days from August 1324. On the other hand, it is possible that Sir Fulk Fitz Warin's loss of pay for his son (eight days) and Sir William de Wauncy (three days) was directly connected with the death of their warhorses. In some sets of pay records, horse losses interfere quite regularly with the receipt of pay; but the penalties might not be uniform. Pay was stopped completely for two of Sir John de Crumwell's scutiferi who lost horses in Scotland in November 1310, whilst for others, serving about the same time, the loss of a horse resulted in a drop of pay to 8d per day.

56. Ibid. fos. 60v, 70.
57. Ibid. fos. 56, 70. Sir Richard Dammory's retinue lost three horses but no account of this is taken in the pay roll: ibid. fos. 56, 70.
58. B.L., Add. Ms. 7967 fos. 34-34v, 106.
59. Valued at £20 and 40 marks respectively: ibid. fos. 30, 105.
60. B.L., Cotton Ms., Nero C. VIII fos. 3v, 97-97v. In this particular case, those who received only 8d. per day quia sine equo appreciato, were king's sergeants-at-arms. Such a reduction is specified in the 'Household Ordinances of York', 6 December 1318. A king's sergeant-at-arms would receive 12d. per day if serving with un chivall darmez ... Et si cel chiaul soit revenuz en garder[obe], ou moerge en le servise le roy, li seront alloez en ... le roule [de marechal] viii d. le jour pour gagez, tanque il eit autre chivall darmez. T.F. Tout, The place of the reign of Edward II in English history (Manchester, 1936). p. 253.
If taken at face value the evidence suggests a lack of consistent practice from one campaign to the next and, indeed, in the treatment of personnel within a single army. It is possible to offer a number of explanations. Some of the inconsistency may be more apparent than real. It is quite possible that in cases of unaffected wage payment, the loss of an appraised horse was followed immediately by the valuation of a new one. Many men-at-arms, and certainly those of knightly rank, would have served with at least one additional warhorse, so the only practical obstruction to immediate re-appraisal would have been the availability of the necessary officials. Occasionally the pay accounts record when re-valuation has occurred - but days, or even weeks, will have elapsed. Thus, for example, on 12 September 1322, the horses of two of Sir Thomas de Ughtred's three scutiferi were delivered ad carvannum at Newcastle; but the whole company was back in service by early October cum equis de novo appreciatis. It may be that, for some expeditions or, indeed, for some privileged sections of the military community, a certain amount of flexibility was allowed: a man-at-arms who had suffered a loss might be allowed a period of grace before his pay was affected, in order to allow a replacement to be presented for appraisal. This would explain why so many horse losses appear to have no impact on the vadia guerre accounts. On the other hand it is probable that some at least of the cases where pay stops completely following an equestrian fatality arise not so much from the horse's death, but from that of the man-at-arms himself. So much about Edwardian pay rolls remains uncertain. Whilst a certain amount of experimentation with the terms of service is only to be expected, it is clear that much of the apparent inconsistency of practice arises from a complex of

61. B.L., Stowe Ms. 553 fos. 60v, 70.
circumstances which it is difficult now to disentangle.

* * * * *
ii) A period of experiment: the reign of Edward III

By the end of Edward II's reign it had become the norm for the non-feudal contingents of men-at-arms serving in royal armies to be in receipt of the king's pay. Voluntary, unpaid service, so important for some of Edward I's Scottish expeditions, had largely disappeared. At the same time as providing pay, the Crown had shouldered responsibility for horse compensation, but from the point of view of the man-at-arms, or perhaps more accurately the retinue captain, horse appraisal was at once a privilege and a prerequisite of military service. To what extent did the close relationship between horse appraisal and the receipt of wages continue into the reign of Edward III?

An examination of mid fourteenth-century military records suggests a loosening of the link between pay and the valuation of warhorses. It is true that some military contracts from early in Edward III's reign continue to associate the commencement of paid service with the appraisal of warhorses. A group of indentures for service in the Scots March in 1342 provide a good example of this. In each case, it is established that the contractor will muster at Newcastle (or Carlisle) on 15 July, on which day il entrera au gages et avera ses chivaux darmes prisez. Entering the king's paid service and horse appraisal are deemed to be simultaneous events, but one is not necessarily dependent upon the other. In practice, moreover, by the early 1340s they would probably no longer be simultaneous events. To see this it is necessary to turn to records of a different kind.

Rarely in the vadia guerre accounts of Edward III's reign do we find

2. E101/68/3 mm. 49-58. Cf. indentures for the custody of Berwick in 1340-41, which stipulate that horses will be valued a la venue of the contractor: E101/68/3 mm. 45, 48.
an explicit association between horse appraisal and the commencement of paid service.\(^3\) The pay rolls for Henry of Lancaster's army serving in Scotland during the early summer of 1336 provide, it seems, the last significant example. The earl's retinue of one hundred men-at-arms drew royal pay from 1 May, on which day their horses were appraised; the same explicit link is made with seven other captains serving under Lancaster's overall command.\(^4\) In the majority of cases these were not empty words: the survival of the original dated inventories for most of the retinues in Lancaster's army demonstrates this clearly.\(^5\) Although the pay accounts for most retinues serving in Scotland in 1336 make no reference to horse valuation, this may well be because valuation did not actually take place; the surviving inventories relate almost entirely to Lancaster's independent command.

With regard to the military operations which took place during the early summer of 1337, we find a rather different situation. The \textit{vadia guerre} accounts explicitly mention horse appraisal in only one (the

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\(^3\) By the end of the 1330s, explicit references to horse appraisal are no longer made in the pay rolls. This reticence may, in part, be a product of the more abbreviated style adopted by the later accounts. In the 1320s, for instance, the \textit{vadia guerre} accounts for the War of Saint-Sardos and, indeed, the Scottish campaign of two years earlier are models of their kind (B.L., Add. Ms. 7967 fos. 30-93v; Stowe Ms. 553 fos. 56-63), detailing every change in the composition of often very small retinues and making many incidental remarks about the terms of service of individuals. The pay rolls for the Scottish campaigns of 1336-37 preserve some elements of this comprehensive approach. They often, for instance, tell us who presented a particular captain's account: Sir John de Segrave's was presented by his clerk, John de Overton (B.L., Cotton Ms., Nero C. VIII fo. 240v). By comparison, subsequent pay accounts - for example those for the Low Countries expedition of 1338-39 (Norwell, pp. 325-56) - are altogether more terse. They appear meticulous enough in their detailing of retinue size changes but they supply little additional detail about the comings and goings of individuals and say nothing about horse valuation. A greater economy of words is a feature not only of the pay accounts, but also of the complementary \textit{restauro equorum} accounts. Details supplied by the account for horses lost in 1322, such as the precise circumstances of each horse's demise and the date and place of account, are not to be found in that listing equestrian losses in Brittany in 1342-43 (B.L., Stowe Ms. 553 fos. 70-71; E36/204 fos. 86v-88v).

\(^4\) B.L., Cotton Ms., Nero C. VIII fos. 240-41. The usual formula is: \textit{[commencing date] quo die equi sui fuerunt appreciati.}

\(^5\) The relevant information is tabulated in Appendix 1. What is more, in the case of Lancaster's own retinue, an original muster roll seems further to underline the dependence of pay upon horse appraisal. The roll was originally dated 23 April, but this has been crossed out and '1 May', the date of the inventory, written-in instead: E101/15/12.
first) of the retinue entries - that of the earl of Warwick - yet we know, from the survival of a bundle of original inventories, that the warhorses of at least six other retinues were valued. The loosening of the link between horse valuation and the commencement of pay is not just semantic: the dates given on the seven inventories do not match those at which pay is said to have begun. In nearly all cases horse appraisal took place after the start of paid service; for one retinue a month separates the two dates. The most striking case concerns the earl of Warwick's retinue. Although the vadia guerre account suggests that sixty-three men-at-arms presented their horses for valuation on 7 May, the surviving inventory shows that only twenty-two men actually had their horses appraised on that particular day, with a further thirteen, including the earl himself, being 'processed' the following day and the remaining thirty-three appearing before the appraisers on the 20th. of the same month. Either the vadia guerre accounts are offering a wholly inaccurate impression of the size and duration of service of the personal retinue of the capitaneo & duci of the king's army in Scotland, or the dependence of pay upon horse appraisal no longer has the force in the later 1330s that it had in the 1310s and '20s. A comparison of the surviving inventories and pay rolls for the winter 1337-38 campaign provides further evidence of a similar kind. The earl of Gloucester's retinue, consisting in all of ninety-two men-at-arms, took the king's pay from 1 December, whilst the inventory for his company, listing only fifty-four names, was drawn-up only several

6. B.L., Cotton Ms., Nero C. VIII fos. 245-47; E101/20/17 mm. 7-10d.
7. Sir Thomas de Wake's retinue: pay began on 7 May, but the inventory was compiled on 6 June. It names only twenty-five of the forty men who were supposed to be receiving pay, so it is possible that an earlier partial inventory has been lost.
8. B.L., Cotton Ms., Nero C. VIII fo. 245; E101/20/17 m. 7. The survival of muster rolls reveals that although the horses of Sir Ralph de Neville's retinue were only appraised on the 2 June, part of the company did muster on 7 May, the day on which pay began; the rest of the retinue mustered on 17 May and 1 June (E101/20/17 m. 6). By contrast, Sir Henry de Percy also drew pay for forty men-at-arms from 7 May, but his muster roll shows that he did indeed appear at Newcastle with his complete retinue on that day: E101/20/17 m. 5.
weeks after this date.⁹ There are few opportunities to make this kind of documentary correlation for later armies. The materials illuminating the duke of Clarence's expedition to Ireland in the early 1360s are, therefore, very valuable - and they tend to reinforce the tenor of the earlier evidence. Thus, for example, according to the pay roll, the earl of Stafford drew the king's shilling for his retinue from 4 August 1361 - the day of their arrival at Bristol;¹⁰ but the date on Stafford's horse inventory shows that appraisal did not take place until 18 August.¹¹

If this evidence does indeed indicate a more relaxed attitude towards the timing of horse appraisal, how is this to be explained? In part it must have been a response to military and administrative pressures. On the northern borders we see the horses of garrison troops being valued not from the first day of paid service, but immediately prior to embarking upon a foray,¹² thus no doubt enabling both man-at-arms and royal administration to make economies. But it was the start of a major continental war that actually necessitated a more flexible view of horse appraisal. With the establishment of paid service as the norm and with a war strategy demanding large-scale overseas expeditions, a re-evaluation of the function of horse valuation in the muster process was a practical necessity. It became customary practice for captains to receive the king's pay from the day of their arrival at the port of embarkation or the muster headquarters.¹³

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⁹. E101/388/5 m. 13 (specifying 2 bannerets, 17 knights and 72 homini ad arma): cf. E101/20/25 m. 3 (2 bannerets, 19 knights and 70 scutiferi). Gloucester's horses were prisez at Newcastle on 21 or 30 December: E101/35/3 m. 1.

¹⁰. E101/28/21 fo. 5.

¹¹. E101/28/11 m. 3.

¹². Sir Thomas de Musgrave, who secured custody of Berwick early in 1347, was to have his mens' horses prisez quant ii chivachera de guerre: E101/68/3 m. 66.

¹³. Indentures of war frequently state this explicitly; for examples, see Prince, 'The indenture system under Edward III', p. 292.
could not be withheld if the appraisal officials were not ready and waiting; and such were the administrative and logistical problems presented by expeditionary forces gathering at several different locations that we can be sure that mustering for pay purposes and horse appraisal were rarely simultaneous events. In 1342, for example, the earl of Gloucester's retinue had been in paid service for six weeks before horse appraisal officials were even appointed. They actually arrived in Plymouth over eight weeks later than Gloucester and his men. On some occasions, as we have seen, horse appraisal was delayed until arrival in France - and here the contrast between the conditions of service of the 1320s and those of the 1340s can be seen most strikingly. In 1324-25, a man-at-arms who left England without an appraised warhorse was paid only 6d. per day until the deficiency was rectified. By the mid 1340s the Crown was only too happy for men to acquire warhorses at their destination and there was no question of paying a reduced rate of pay as a result. This change of view was certainly influenced by practical considerations. Purchase and valuation in, for example, Bordeaux would reduce the administrative burden in England, ease pressure on a perennially inadequate supply of shipping and save the Crown the cost of horses lost during the long, debilitating voyage to Gascony. But it may also be illustrative of a shift in attitude towards horse valuation itself. Rarely do we now find any direct association between horse appraisal and the receipt of pay in vadia guerre accounts or indentures of war; the two have become separate aspects of military service. The Crown

14. E36/204 fo. 106; C76/17 m. 18; E101/23/36.
15. Or Ireland: Sir William de Wyndesore's indenture in 1362 allowed for his men-at-arms' horses to be prisez a leur arrivaille au Irlande: E101/68/4 m. 82. Thus, some of his retinue's horses were valued in Dublin on 7 November 1362, though pay for his retinue had started in England on 24 June (E101/28/11 m. 2; E101/28/21 fo. 7v).
16. For example, five of Sir John de Felton's scutiferi were on half pay for a period of seventy days prior to 15 October 1324, when they all presented warhorses for appraisal in Bordeaux: B.L., Add. Ms. 7967 fo. 31v.
seems now to be viewing appraisal rather less as a requirement of paid military service - a prerequisite of receiving the standard rate of pay - and rather more as a customary privilege for those in the king's pay, as a means of insuring against one of the greatest hazards of campaigning.

This shift in the Crown's view of the function of horse appraisal can be seen as but one aspect of a wider change in outlook during the 1330s and 1340s: the beginnings of a complete overhaul of the man-at-arms' conditions of service, prompted at least in part by the changing role of the warhorse in the functioning of the English military machine. Some of the evidence is admittedly fragmentary and by no means conclusive and there are signs that the traditional requirements persisted during the Scottish campaigns of the later 1330s. During the autumn of 1336, Sir John de Ufford, newly appointed as admiral of the northern fleet and presumably serving at sea, received (along with a scutifer) pay at two-thirds the normal rate quia sine equis ad arms. Further entries in the same set of accounts also stress the dependence of the standard man-at-arms' pay upon the possession of an 'armoured' horse. Such an association had been central to the concept of the man-at-arms in the earlier fourteenth-century, but it is found comparatively infrequently after the start of the French war.

17. B.L., Cotton Ms., Nero C. VIII fo. 243v; Ufford received 1s. 4d. per day and his esquire 8d.
18. The strength of a contingent of men-at-arms was frequently expressed as a number of 'covered horses'. See, for example, B.L., Cotton Ms., Vespasian F. VII, no. 1 (correct date: 29 Edward I); Bain, v, no. 480 (1307).
19. Records relating to horse appraisal (indentures and appointment of officials) do occasionally make reference to 'armoured horses', but it is not clear whether horse armour was still a prerequisite of appraisal. It seems more likely that the term chivaux darmes had become a synonym for 'warhorse' (the term chivaux de guerre is occasionally employed): the horses of the gentz darmes. For examples of such usage, see Dagworth's indenture with Edward III, 1346 (Prince, 'The strength of English armies', p. 371), Sir John de la Hyde's with the Black Prince, 1347 (B.P. Reg., i, p. 127), and the duke of Lancaster's with the king, 1369 (E101/68/4 m. 87). If by the 1340s, the receipt of a man-at-arms' rate of pay no longer depended upon the possession of horse armour, it was still necessary for the man-at-arms himself to possess a minimum standard of equipment. Roger Trumwyn, entrusted with the raising of troops in North Wales in 1345, reported to the Prince of Wales that whilst some men claim to be men-at-arms, it was likely that the Prince 'will not find them of such...
If the records for the early campaigns of the continental war are far less explicit about the importance of horse armour, they do however show that the number and quality of horses employed by a man-at-arms could still affect his pay. The *vadia guerre* accounts for the Low Countries expedition of 1338-39 suggest that each man-at-arms was expected to be accompanied on campaign by at least three horses. Thus, several groups of men-at-arms are recorded as serving at half the normal rate of pay *quia minus sufficientibus ad equos*, or more explicitly, *quia quilibet non habuit nisi duos equos*. Presumably only one of these two horses was a warhorse, whereas the Crown expected all men-at-arms to have at least one serviceable re-mount at their disposal. Linking pay rates to particular numbers of horses was clearly very sound policy - and a logical continuance of longstanding practice - and in doing this the English Crown was very much in line with continental practice. In fact, the *vadia guerre* accounts (if they can be taken at face value) suggest that it was rarely necessary condition as they make themselves out to be' and their pay will need to be adjusted accordingly (J.G. Edwards, *Calendar of Ancient Correspondence concerning Wales* (Cardiff, 1935), pp. 246-47).

20. It is not at all clear how usual it was for horse armour to be employed by the English man-at-arms in the mid to late fourteenth-century. Where contemporary illustrations show horse armour being worn - and this is by no means the norm - it is usually confined to head, neck and chest defences (*chanfron, crinet* and *peytral*): see the *The romance of Alexander*, ed. M.R. James (Oxford, 1933), for example fos. 66, 74, 78. Pieces of horse armour are occasionally mentioned in inventories of property (see, for example, L.F. Salzman, 'The property of the earl of Arundel, 1397, *Sussex Archaeological Collections*, xci (1953), p. 47) and wills, but the bulk of it was probably for use on the tournament field or ceremonial purposes (Barker, *The tournament in England, 1100-1400*, pp. 175-76; S.J. Herben, 'Arms and armour in Chaucer', *Speculum*, xii (1937), pp. 484-85). For the use of barded horses in a mid fourteenth-century funeral in England, see Vale, *War and chivalry*, p. 89. Little original horse armour has survived from the fourteenth-century (*Age of chivalry*, ed. J. Alexander and P. Binski (London, 1987), pp. 264-65) and this, combined with the relative scarcity of helpful pictorial evidence, means that 'our knowledge of the subject is somewhat patchy'; but see C. Blair, *European armour* (3rd. impression, London, 1979), pp. 184-87.

21. Norwell, pp. 351, 353. The allowances for the passage of part of this expeditionary force from Sluys to England assume that each man-at-arms was returning with three horses, each knight with four and each banneret with five. Thirty-eight men with only two horses each stand out starkly at the end. Ibid., pp. 386-92.

22. See above, pp. 65.

23. For fifteenth-century examples, see M. Vale, *War and chivalry*, p. 121-22.
to reduce pay rates for this particular reason,\textsuperscript{24} and it is likely that most knights and esquires in English armies brought more horses than strictly necessary.\textsuperscript{25} If few could claim, like Buonaccorso Pitti, that they 'had gone [on campaign] with fourteen horses, but received pay for four',\textsuperscript{26} then it was probably because such extravagance for continental expeditions would have made intolerable demands on English shipping.

The quality of the horses brought on campaign had always been important and the records of the mid to late fourteenth-century continue to emphasise that men-at-arms should be *assez suffisaument montez et apparailllez*,\textsuperscript{27} but they are rarely specific about the quality required. In Gascony during the late 1330s, men-at-arms were paid at the standard rate if they were serving with a warhorse (*equus*), but received only half pay if they had a palfrey (*cum palaffredis*).\textsuperscript{28} No direct evidence of this kind is provided by either the *vadia guerre* or the *restauro equorum* accounts for the Breton campaign of 1342-43,\textsuperscript{29} but a useful clue to warhorse quality is offered by the letters of appointment of several of the clerks charged with horse appraisal for this expedition. They were required to restrict their attention to horses worth 100s. or more.\textsuperscript{30} This seems


\textsuperscript{25} In 1417, 119 men in the earl of Suffolk's retinue had a total of 624 horses: twenty-four horses for each of five knights, six horses for each of twenty-four esquires and four horses for each archer (Newhall, op. cit., p. 32 n. 65).


\textsuperscript{27} A statement concerning the garrison of Cockermouth castle in 1337: E101/20/41 m. 5.

\textsuperscript{28} E101/166/11 m. 15; E101/167/3 m. 12. The difference was between 6s. and 3s. *bordelais* per day. Although the distinction here appears to be between two types of horse, it is possible that the term *equus* is being used to denote an 'armoured' horse.

\textsuperscript{29} Some of the letters appointing horse appraisers in 1342 do, however, make reference to the recording of horse numbers as well as values: e.g. C76/17 m. 31.

\textsuperscript{30} C76/17 mm. 17, 18.
to be a statement not of the minimum standard of warhorse required for
receipt of a man-at-arms pay, but rather of the minimum value which
the Crown was willing to recognise for purposes of compensation.31
 Appropriately enough the restauro equorum accounts for this expedition
include thirty-five horses valued at 100s., but none worth less than
this. What cannot be determined is the number of warhorses which were
adjudged to be worth less than 100s. and therefore excluded from the
original inventories. Nor is it clear whether this 'minimum value'
regulation was unique to the arrangements for the Breton expeditions
in 1342; but, on balance, the evidence suggests that this is unlikely.
Looking forward from 1342 to the rather patchy inventory evidence of
subsequent decades we find that 100s. is the lowest valuation used by
horse appraisers right up to the 1360s.32 Looking back, on the other
hand, we find that only one horse valued at less than £5 appears in
the restauro equorum accounts for the Cambrésis-Thiérache-campaign of
1338-39, and similarly only one in the inventories for the War of St.
Sardos.33 In between, however, the inventories arising from the Scots
campaigns of 1336-38 contain 130 horses valued at less than 100s.; and
similarly large numbers are to be found in most Scottish campaign
inventories from the reigns of Edward I and II. It may well be that
an experiment tried out during the mid 1320s for the war in Gascony
was re-adopted at the start of the French war in the late 1330s,
perhaps to encourage the employment of warhorses of rather higher

France's ordinance of 1351 laid down a minimum standard of horse acceptable for appraisal: for a
man-at-arms, it was thirty pounds tournois, for varlets, twenty pounds tournois (Ordonnances des roys
military code of 1327 employed a similar scale of minimum acceptable values for paid troops:
Contamine, War in the Middle Ages, p. 128.

32. See, for example, materials for Gascony in the 1350s (E101/172/4) and Ireland in the 1360s
(E101/28/11; E101/29/5). The list of horses lost during Sir Ralph de Ufford's term as Justiciar of
Ireland (1344-46) contains many valued at less than 100s., but this document (C260/57 m. 28) is
unusual in a number of respects and many of the horses listed were not warhorses.

33. On the inventories and restauro equorum accounts from the 1320s, '30s and '40s, see below pp. 229-30,
232 n. 63.
quality than those which had been used in the recent Scottish expeditions.

The changes in the institution of *restauro equorum* which have been considered here, and in particular the loosening of the traditional ties between pay and horse appraisal, occurred during a period strongly characterised by administrative and institutional experimentation in a number of aspects of military organisation.34

Where the experimentation concerned the terms of service offered to military personnel, it usually had some bearing directly or indirectly upon the operation of *restauro equorum*. There has been a tendency to describe the system of horse appraisal and compensation as though it operated uninterruptedly and uniformly throughout the early decades of Edward III's reign,35 but this was not the case. The only campaigns prior to the outbreak of the French war for which significant horse inventories have survived are the comparatively small-scale operations in Scotland during the years 1336-38. In this particular case documentary survival appears broadly to reflect documentary production. The English armies which conducted the Weardale campaign and fought the battle of Halidon Hill are very imperfectly illuminated by the records.36 We have only a rough idea of their size and structure, and the terms of service offered to retinue commanders are also by no means clear. There is sufficient evidence to be sure that, with the exception of feudal contingents in 1327, both armies served for royal pay, but rather less certain is the form which the pay


35. For example, Prince, 'The army and the navy', pp. 337-38.

36. For the available records, see Chapter V, p.17n. 6.
took\textsuperscript{37} and whether the receipt of wages was accompanied by horse appraisal.\textsuperscript{38} In the absence of solid evidence for these two campaigns, it might appear only reasonable to assume that the standard rates of pay and the usual right to \textit{restauro equorum}, which had been on offer for earlier expeditions - those of 1322 and 1324-25 for example - were also likely to be had in 1327 and 1333. But we should be wary of making such an assumption, for the two major royal expeditions following Halidon Hill, which are thankfully very well documented, exhibit terms of service of a decidedly unconventional nature.

Magnate captains serving in the Roxburgh campaign during the winter of 1334-35 with retinues of men-at-arms received from the Crown, not the normal daily rates of pay graduated according to rank, but a payment based upon a simple formula: £100 for twenty men-at-arms for a quarter of a year.\textsuperscript{39} This was not a favourable rate of pay,\textsuperscript{40} and there

\textsuperscript{37}The most detailed of a very thin array of records merely assign lump sums to individuals; they very rarely mention numbers of combatants, rates of pay or precise periods of service. See, for example, for 1327, E101/383/8; for 1333, B.L., Add. Ms. 35,181. \textit{Vadia consueta} had been promised before the campaign in 1333: \textit{Rot. Scot.}, i, p. 225.

\textsuperscript{38}The administrative records make no reference to horse appraisal for either campaign, whilst the mentions of horse losses should be treated with caution. Horse losses during the Weardale campaign appear to have cost an extraordinary £28,076 (A.E. Prince, 'The payment of army wages in Edward III's reign', \textit{Speculum}, xix (1944), p. 138), or in other words about two and a half times the cost of \textit{restauro equorum} for the Rheims campaign - during which well over a thousand appraised horses perished. Such an exorbitant figure might well have caused the Crown to re-consider its position concerning horse appraisal if all the losses had been sustained by the retinues of English magnates. In fact the bulk, if not all, of this sum was owed to John of Hainault's company (see E101/18/4): the cost of Hainault's horses lost during the campaign, or sold to the royal household afterwards, amounted to £21,482 5s. 6d. and if to this is added his men's losses in 1326 (£7,380 2s. 3d.) we have a figure very similar to that mentioned in Robert Wodehouse's Wardrobe account. No such interpretive difficulties exist for the campaign in 1333: the only losses which can be observed in the records were sustained by members of the royal household (see B.L., Add. Ms. 35181).

\textsuperscript{39}B.L., Cotton Ms., Nero C. VIII fos. 233-35v. The period of service ran from mid November to mid February (the precise dates varied a little). See R. Nicholson, \textit{Edward III and the Scots} (Oxford, 1965), Chapter XII, for an analysis of these pay rolls.

\textsuperscript{40}Captains were receiving a little more than 1s. per day for each men-at-arms, but they would presumably pay their knights at the standard rate of 2s. per day. The earls of Angus and Surrey received a reduced rate of pay (100 marks for twenty men-at-arms for a quarter of a year) because they had property in Scotland, but the king's household knights were given normal rates of pay for their companies.
appears, moreover, to have been no provision for the valuation of
warhorses. The same system of remuneration was in operation for the
great Scottish expedition during the following summer, and once
again there is no evidence that horses were valued or *restauro equorum*
paid. We considered earlier how the first two decades of Edward III's
reign witnessed a loosening of the ties between horse appraisal and
the receipt of pay. That process was no doubt hastened by a period of
experiment in the mid 1330s, a period during which these ties appear,
for a time, to have been wholly severed. *Restauro equorum* was not
only dropped from the terms of service for field armies in 1334 and
1335, it was, for a rather longer period, only sporadically offered

41. Not even for the periods of service preceding and following the Roxburgh campaign for which
captains were paid the standard wage rates. A horse inventory fragment does survive from the
period of this campaign, listing thirteen horses valued at Newcastle or Roxburgh, but the personnel
concerned appear to be members of the king's household: E101/101/14 m. 2. The two legible names
on the list, Gailard de Savynak and Richard de Grimesby were king's sergeants at arms: B.L., Cotton
Ms., Nero C. VIII fo. 225v.

42. Ibid. fos. 236-39; for the exceptions to these terms, see Nicholson, op. cit., pp. 199, 220.

43. The *vadia guerre* accounts sometimes make reference to the muster process at the start of a
period of service, but never mention horse appraisal. Thus, for the summer campaign in 1335, the
earl of Cornwall drew pay from 23 June *quo die primo visi fuerunt* [at Newcastle] *per ministros Regis:*
B.L., Cotton Ms., Nero C. VIII fo. 236. William de Montagu joined Edward III's army on 11 June
*quo die p(er)att (prearma?) fuerunt* ... (ibid. fo. 237v).
for garrison service. The motives lying behind this experimentation with the terms of service are not entirely clear. It is possible that the Crown was simply attempting to wage war more economically, in terms not only of expenditure, but also of administrative effort.

The concession, announced before the Roxburgh campaign, that those serving in Scotland would be allowed to keep the booty which they acquired may have been intended as a partial substitute for horse appraisal; the opportunity of gain to set against the possibility of loss. The Crown may well have been attempting to formulate a better package of terms of service - a package more favourable to both the

44. There are only fleeting glimpses of the operation of *restauro equorum* in castle and town garrisons in the 1330s. This might not appear surprising in the case of garrisons in England: in 1339, for example, there is no evidence of horse compensation at Dover (E101/22/15; accounts), Southampton (Southampton Record Office, S.C. 13/3/2; keeper's indenture) or Windsor (E101/21/22; accounts). But patrolling and raiding were important aspects of garrison service in Scotland and the border country, and so horse losses were a continual possibility (and, indeed, a regular occurrence, at least in Edward II's reign when documentation is relatively plentiful). Yet the accounts for these garrisons in the 1330s are silent about horse appraisal and losses (see, for example, for 1334-37, B.L., Cotton Ms., Nero C. VIII fos. 248-51; or the more leisurely 'particulars' for Roxburgh [E101/19/27] and Stirling [E101/19/40] from these years). The silence might, at times, be concealing something: Sir Richard Talbot's indenture for custody of Berwick in 1340 makes provision for horse appraisal, yet his accounts include no hint of either valuation or losses (E101/22/21 mm. 1-2) and the same applies with respect to Robert de Leyburn's indenture and accounts as captain of Cockermouth Castle in 1336-8: E101/20/41. There are, however, enough cases during this period where indenture and accounts can be compared, but where neither refer to *restauro equorum* (e.g., Edinburgh and Stirling castles, 1335-40: E101/19/21, E101/19/24, E101/23/1) to suggest that the broader corpus of garrison accounts are not providing a misleading impression. This stands in stark contrast with the two preceding reigns which offer plenty of examples of garrison troops benefitting from horse appraisal: see, for example, the surviving inventories for 1311-12 (printed in Bain, iii, pp. 413-32) and the *restauro equorum* section of the Carlisle garrison accounts for July-November 1314 (ibid., no. 403). But equally, garrison service on the Scots borders had been subject to experimental terms in the past. In November 1310, Sir Roger de Mowbray contracted to provide twenty men-at-arms for the Perth garrison in return for an all inclusive fee of 300 marks (ibid., no. 173). In this and a number of other cases, the fee is said to include pay, *restauro equorum* and other costs. In some instances in the 1330s, the garrison captain's wages were supplemented by a fee, which may have been intended to cover such costs as horse losses. It should said, however, that very few of Sir John de Strivelyn's sixty men-at-arms at Edinburgh castle in 1335-36 would need to lose their horses for his annual fee of £20 to be exhausted: E101/19/24 m. 5 (indenture, which envisages forty men-at-arms), m. 27 (account, which shows that there were sixty). At a slightly later date, the fee is quite explicitly described as a personal bonus for the captain, the *regard de son corps* (e.g., indenture for the custody of Pembroke castle, 1377: E101/34/29; cf. E. Perroy, 'L'administration de Calais, 1371-1372', *Revue du Nord*, no. 132 (1951), p. 220).

45. Cf. Henry IV's Scottish expedition of 1400, where a single lump sum of 20s. was paid for each man-at-arms (and 10s. for each archer). The king was 'desperately short of money' at this time and these unfavourable terms were part of 'attempt to mount an honourable expedition economically'. A.L. Brown, *The English campaign in Scotland, 1400*, *British government and administration: studies presented to S.B. Chrimes*, ed. H. Hearder and H.R. Loin (Cardiff, 1974), pp. 48-49.

46. Nicholson, op. cit., p. 174. A similar proclamation was made in 1327: ibid., p. 17.
royal administration and the ordinary man-at-arms. Reforming motives of this kind certainly seem to have been behind the changes made to the terms of service for continental expeditions in the 1340s, and again in the 1370s.\(^{47}\) Where the experiments of the 1330s are concerned, however, a further interpretation is possible. In this case it seems that the Crown was endeavouring to establish a new principle involving a modification to the terms of service for a certain kind of expedition. It was not that the right to horse compensation was being withdrawn from those receiving royal pay; this, as we shall see, was to continue for several more decades for at least some forms of military service. It was rather that *restauro equorum* was no longer to be offered for service in armies led by the king himself within the shores of Britain. The Crown no doubt wished to encourage the use of lighter and cheaper horses, more suited to the campaigning conditions in the north. At the same time, the prospect of royal leadership would guarantee a level of support from the military community which would not be seriously dented by a less than usually lucrative array of service benefits. But the 'pay without appraisal' principle for royal-led expeditions in Scotland rested essentially on considerations of military obligation. It was established by the three expeditions of 1333-35, for which captains were summoned individually on their allegiance to serve with contingents of mounted troops. The nature of the summonses, 'mandatory though non-feudal',\(^{48}\) enabled the Crown quite reasonably to withhold *restauro equorum* whilst offering pay. Similar terms operated for Edward III's later expeditions in Scotland: this is made manifest by a solid corpus of supportive evidence, beginning with the materials

\(^{47}\) See below, pp. 152-55.

\(^{48}\) N.B. Lewis, 'The feudal summons of 1385', *E.H.R.*, c (1985), p. 739. In 1335, for example, 136 magnates were summoned on their 'fealty, allegiance and affection' to serve 'with horses and arms as adequately as possible': Prince, *The army and navy*, p. 351.
for the campaigns of 1336-38.

The importance of the English expeditions to Scotland in the later 1330s as preparation for the demands of the war in France has not gone unnoticed by historians.\(^49\) In the context of the present discussion, these very well documented military operations, illuminated as they are by a substantial collection of original inventories, pay rolls and \textit{restauro equorum} accounts,\(^50\) demonstrate with utmost clarity the resumption, after a period of experiment, of a system of service resting upon standard rates of pay and horse compensation. Yet to suggest that the terms of service in Scotland provided a model for those which were subsequently employed in France would be misleading, for the operation of \textit{restauro equorum} in these two campaigning zones was founded upon different criteria. The reappearance of horse appraisal in the Scottish theatre of war seems to have arisen from the king's personal withdrawal from the struggle. He appointed lieutenants to conduct the military operations and although in 1336 this was a temporary expedient until he arrived in person,\(^51\) in 1337-38 his only appearance in the north was fleeting and unplanned.\(^52\) The retinues which can be seen to have served for pay \textit{and with appraised horses} were those in the commands of the king's lieutenants: Henry of Lancaster in 1336, the earl of Warwick during the summer of 1337 and the earls of Salisbury and Arundel during the winter of 1337-38. Horse inventories have not survived for all of the companies in the armies under the command of these men; but more significant is the lack of evidence of horse appraisal for the contingents which came


\(^{50}\) For the sources, see below pp. \textit{178 n.3} \textit{218 n.17}.

\(^{51}\) Fowler, \textit{The king's lieutenant}, pp. 32-33; Lewis, op. cit., p. 3 n. 5.

\(^{52}\) For details of the king's movements, see Lewis, op. cit., p. 1 n. 4.
north with the king during his lengthy stay in Scotland in 1336 and
his 'flying visit' in June 1337. When Edward III once more assumed
direct command of an expedition to Scotland, horse appraisal and
restauro equorum disappeared from the records. Thus, for the
expedition during the winter of 1341-42, there is a full set of vadia
guerre accounts (which now show pay to be based upon the standard
daily rates) but no accompanying inventories or restauro equorum
materials. By contrast, the captains who had custody of the Scots
March during the following summer contracted to serve for pay which
was accompanied by horse appraisal.

There is no trace of the
to Inventories which would have been drawn up, but sadly this is the case
with many such periods of contract service.

With the exception of occasional experimental schemes - which
envisioned the employment of all-embracing lump sum payments to meet

53. Of the troops which accompanied the king to Scotland on these two occasions, there is evidence
of horse appraisal for only one small company in 1336: see below pp. 220-221 n. 29.

54. For the Crown's instructions that vadia consueta should be paid, but no mention of horse
appraisal, see Rot. Scot., i, 611-12.

55. Gifts were made to cover the losses of selected individuals (e.g., C.P.R., 1340-43, pp. 383, 384).
The payroll for this very brief Scottish campaign is E36/204 fos. 102-4. The roll for the Breton
campaign of 1342-43, included in the same Wardrobe book, does have an accompanying set of
restauro equorum accounts. The terms of service for Edward III's Scottish expedition during the
winter of 1355-56 were probably similar to those of 1341-42, but unfortunately the records offer only
glimpses: see, for example, E101/26/33 and Fowler, op. cit., p. 148 n. 16. By the time of Scottish
expedition of 1385, restauro equorum had been abandoned for all forms of military service. Yet the
essence of the 'pay without appraisal' principle was maintained in that regard - which was closely
associated with warhorse costs and which, by the 1380s, operated at double the customary rate for
continental campaigns - was not offered for service in Richard II's army in Scotland (see below, p. 157
n. 23).

56. E101/68/3 mm. 49-58; the calendared versions of some of these indentures (Bain, iii, pp. 253-54)
omit the horse appraisal and compensation clause. The actual service of some of the contractors is
attested by a Wardrobe pay roll of retinues engaged in the defence of the Scots March during the
summer and autumn of 1342: E36/204 fos. 104v-105. Some captains accounted separately: Sir
Thomas Wake of Lyde's pay account for this period makes reference to an indenture with
Edward III, but this has not survived (E101/23/25).

57. As, for example, with the forty-seven days service on the Scots March by Sir John de Segrave's
retinue during the summer of 1340. The captian's account for this term of duty (E101/612/2)
includes no evidence that horse appraisal took place, but his indenture with the king (which is
referred to by the account) stipulates that the horses of his forty men-at-arms serront prisez al entre
de la terre ou devant & [ii] avera restor de ses chivaux ensi prises & perduz ... : E101/68/3 m. 46.
wage bills and other costs — there is no evidence that the Crown seriously considered withdrawing *restauro equorum* from the terms of service for overseas expeditions prior to the treaty of Brétigny.

From the late 1330s to the late 1350s, Edward III led a series of campaigns to the continent and the operation of horse appraisal and compensation can clearly be seen where sufficient evidence has survived. It is not difficult to see why. Service on the continent, particularly if involving a feudal levy, had been the cause of much friction between king and magnates in the past. If, by the late 1330s, Edward had already succeeded in establishing a very healthy relationship with the lay aristocracy — a relationship based upon comradeship in arms and reinforced by shrewd additions to the titled nobility — it must have been with a certain amount of trepidation that he embarked upon a continental war, particularly as his strategy of German alliances did not enjoy the universal support of his closest advisers. Enthusiastic participation by the corps of aristocratic captains and the military community as a whole would, in due course, be ensured by success in the field. But initially, Edward and his advisers seem to have felt that advantageous terms of service were necessary to ensure a respectable level of support. Thus, for the expedition which left the shores of England in July 1338, men-at-arms served, with appraised warhorses, at *double* the customary rates of pay; an ordinary esquire received 2s. a day, a knight 4s and a banneret 8s. Such extravagance was not to be repeated, however:

58. For example, according to a plan dating from the summer of 1341, captains would receive assignments of wool in *lieu* of wages (and presumably horse losses incurred) for the first forty days of the campaign: Prestwich, 'English armies in the early stages of the Hundred Years War: a scheme in 1341', pp. 102-13.


60. Scalacronica, p. 104.

although detailed records are lacking for the expedition of 1340, we do know that expenditure on wages was only about a quarter of what it had been for the preceding campaign.\textsuperscript{62} The cost of \textit{restauro equorum} for the Tournai campaign was broadly similar to that sustained in Brittany in 1342-43, but for the latter campaign we return to conditions of comparative documentary affluence. Captains received the customary rates of pay for their men and compensation for losses of appraised horses;\textsuperscript{63} and they were also provided with transport to and from Brittany. \textit{Eskippeson}, shipment of both men and horses at royal expense, was a necessary addition to a captain's terms of service for overseas campaigns. No doubt a captain would prefer to find ships ready and waiting for him at the port of embarkation; ships which would have been impressed by the king's agents, fitted out as 'fighting platforms' or horse transports and which would be paid for directly by the Crown.\textsuperscript{64} In the summer of 1338, nearly 350 ships were hired by the Crown to transport the English army to Antwerp.\textsuperscript{65} If the royal authorities were unable to assemble a transport fleet, retinue commanders would be obliged to make their own arrangements, but for this they would be paid a fixed sum for each horse in their retinues, with the number of horses allowed to each man being determined by his rank.\textsuperscript{66} The return to England in January and February 1340 of a large proportion of Edward III's army was financed in this fashion.\textsuperscript{67}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{62} £23,368 0s. 10d. as compared with £93,916 17s. 4d; compensation for lost warhorses in 1340 was no more than half what it had been in 1338-39. Prince, 'The payment of army wages in Edward III's reign', p. 150.
\item \textsuperscript{63} E36/204 fos. 105v-110v (\textit{vadia guerre}); 86v-88v (\textit{restauro equorum}). There were important exceptions to this scheme of remuneration: see Appendix 2.
\item \textsuperscript{64} Hewitt, \textit{The organisation of war under Edward III}, Chapter IV.
\item \textsuperscript{65} Norwell, pp. 363-86; these \textit{vadia nautanum} accounts include fourteen royal vessels.
\item \textsuperscript{66} For the treatment of this in indentures of war, see Prince, 'The indenture system under Edward III', pp. 294-95.
\item \textsuperscript{67} Norwell, pp. 386-92.
\end{itemize}
A great many horse inventories and *restauro equorum* lists were compiled between the truce of Malestroît in 1343 and the treaty of Brétigny in 1360, for horse appraisal was the invariable accompaniment of paid service on major overseas expeditions during this period. Yet, to our great loss, comparatively few have survived the intervening centuries. What the records do show, however, is that this period also witnessed a broadening of the terms of service normally offered to captains leading retinues of men-at-arms in overseas ventures. It is to this development that we must now turn.

* * * * *

One element in the man-at-arms' terms of service which is usually included in discussions of military organisation in Edward III's reign has not yet been mentioned: *regard* (or *reward*) - a payment intended as a contribution towards the expenses of preparing for war. The standard quarterly rate was 100 marks for the service of thirty men-at-arms, but there was always a certain amount of flexibility in the rates offered to captains. The term *regard* appears for the first time in the mid 1340s, but it was the term rather than the form of payment which was new. Although it has a passing resemblance to the 'lump-sum' payments employed, for instance, by the English Crown for the Scottish campaigns in 1334-35 and for many periods of garrison service, *regard* was in fact a different type of payment. It was not a

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68. Prince, 'The indenture system under Edward III', pp. 293-94; Sherborne, 'Indentured retinues and English expeditions to France, 1369-1380', p. 743 n. 6. Prince implies that the *regard* payment was a bonus for the captain, but Sherborne is quite insistent that it was 'divided among all the men-at-arms in a retinue'. It may be unsafe to generalise on this point: recent discussions of military subcontracts have shown that subcontractors would not necessarily receive the customary rates of remuneration (Sherborne, op. cit., pp. 743-44; Goodman, 'The military subcontracts of Sir Hugh Hastings', pp. 118-20). The *regard* which Sir John Strother received from the earl of March in 1374 represented a payment of about £9 for each of the subcontractor's thirty men-at-arms, but included a 'personal' *regard* of £60 for Strother himself (Walker, 'Profit and loss in the Hundred Years War', 103-4).
substitute for pay and *restauro equorum*, but a supplement to them. In the sense of forming one element in a package of actual and potential payments, *regard* is rather more closely associated with the annual fees stipulated by indentures of retinue\textsuperscript{69} and *fiefs-rentes*\textsuperscript{70} and is directly descended from the terms of some early-fourteenth century military contracts. In 1316-17, for example, Sir William la Zouche contracted to provide the Crown with the services of thirty men-at-arms for one year. Zouche would receive *gages acustomez* and *restor de chevaux* and 200 marks *por fee e por toute manere dautres choses*.\textsuperscript{71}

The latter looks very like the *regard* payment of the later fourteenth-century, though it represents only half the standard *regard* rate.

Rather more generous was the *feodum* paid to the earl of Salisbury for a half year's service in Scotland from December 1337 to June 1338: 1,400 marks for 140 men-at-arms,\textsuperscript{72} and he also received wages for his men and was allowed £155 in compensation for eight lost horses. Here, then, is a balanced scheme of remuneration - pay, *regard* and *restauro equorum*. It was not, however, the norm.

Salisbury appears to have been the only English captain during Edward III's Scots wars to have received such an advantageous package of payments. Nor does *regard* figure in the accounts for the earliest

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\textsuperscript{69} For example, the indenture of retinue between Aymer de Valence and Thomas, lord Berkeley (1297) stipulates that the latter, for serving with his company overseas, should receive an annual fee of 100 marks, plus standard wages and *restauro equorum*: B. Lyon, 'The feudal antecedent of the indenture system', *Speculum*, xxix (1954), pp. 504-5. According to his indenture with John of Gaunt, Sir John de Neville was to receive, in addition to customary wages and *restauro equorum*, a wartime fee of 500 marks per year for the service of twenty men-at-arms and twenty mounted archers. Neville was, therefore, receiving a fee which was rather higher than the standard rate of *regard*: I.G. Ind. of retinue, p. 89.

\textsuperscript{70} See Lyon, *From fief to indenture* (Harvard, 1957). This is not, of course, to suggest that the purpose of the retaining fee or money fief was to supplement *vadia guerre*. 'It established the claim to military service, though it did not constitute the payment for such service. Payment was made separately in the form of subsidies, wages and maintenance.' (J.O. Prestwich's review of Lyon's book cited above, in *History*, xlv (1959), p. 48).


\textsuperscript{72} E101/20/25 m. 3. This is equivalent to a quarterly rate of 150 marks for thirty men-at-arms - 50% higher than the standard rate of *regard*. Salisbury's wage account shows that he did not actually maintain 140 men-at-arms throughout this six month period.
campaigns of the French war, but it does appear, now actually called regard, in the indentures drawn-up during the spring of 1345 between the king and the captains who were to mount an ambitious multi-front offensive on France that coming summer. For his 250 men-at-arms, Henry of Lancaster secured a regard at three times the rate which was later to become the standard; and this formed part of a balanced, and very favourable, package of payments and benefits. The terms of the earl of Northampton's indenture for service in Brittany are less detailed than Lancaster's, but he too can be seen to have served in return for a combination of wages, regard and restauro equorum.

The captains serving under the Edward III's two principal lieutenants in 1345 secured the same balanced scheme of benefits as their superiors, and perhaps as a consequence of such widespread usage, this combination became established as the norm for field campaigns. Despite the patchiness of the surviving records, it is possible

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73. Although, as we have seen, for the Cambrésis-Thiérache campaign of 1338-39, pay was doubled, perhaps as a means of covering increased costs.


75. Lancaster's indenture, dated 13 March 1345, is printed in Fowler, op. cit., pp. 230-32 (the half-yearly rate of regard was 5000 marks for 250 men-at-arms, and not 500 marks as printed there). Lancaster's account shows that his wage bill amounted to over £14,500, whilst he was also to receive £10,000 for regard and £1,384 13s. 4d. for the loss of forty-three warhorses (E101/259).

76. E101/68/4 m. 72, (dated 27 April 1345), printed in *Rymer*, III, i, p. 37.

77. For the earl of Pembroke's indenture, for service with Lancaster in Gascony, see E101/68/3 m. 60. On 9 December, John Charnels was ordered to pay regard for the 'second quarter' to Northampton and his captains in Brittany: 3,400 florins to Northampton, 1,333 to the earl of Oxford, 166 to Sir Michael Poyning, 166 to Sir Edward Montagu and 133 to the earl of Devon's men. C76/21/ m. 3; E101/167/5.

78. The pay rolls for the Crécy-Calais expedition have been lost, but extracts from, and summaries of, Walter de Wetewang's original pay accounts by a number of early modern antiquaries and historians allow an impression of the basic proportions of Edward III's army to be formed. These transcripts are in a very abbreviated form, providing no more than the names of captains and the numbers of combatants of various kinds serving under them; they do, however, offer more 'structural' detail than any other surviving original records (e.g. summary accounts of wage payments and debts, partially printed in *Crecy and Calais*, pp. 205-19). Some of the extracts from Wetewang's lost accounts have been printed (e.g. Robert Brady, *A complete history of England* (London, 1700), ii, pp. 86-88; own extracts from the original accounts). The most detailed printed edition is *Crecy and Calais*, pp. 193-204 (from College of Arms Ms. 2, M. 16), but comparison with the other transcripts from Wetewang's original (e.g. B.L., Harleian Ms. 3968) reveals many omissions and disparities.
through entries on the Issue rolls and the provisions of military contracts to see the operation of both *regard* and *restauro equorum* during the Crécy-Calais campaign.\(^{79}\) This most momentous expedition was, therefore, the first under direct royal leadership in which conventional pay, *regard* and compensation for lost horses were offered simultaneously. It was a balance of benefits which was to be employed repeatedly in the coming years. Thus, for example, the indenture drawn-up between the king and the Prince of Wales prior to the latter's departure for Gascony in 1355 allows, in addition to the customary provision of shipping, for standard wages and *regard*, and the valuation of warhorses either at the port of embarkation or on arrival in Bordeaux.\(^{80}\) Lesser captains taking part in this expedition obtained similar terms,\(^{81}\) and advances of wages and *regard* were made to a number of captains for other expeditions in 1355.\(^{82}\)

If, by the mid 1350s, a degree of stability had been established in the terms of service offered by the Crown to captains serving in continental field campaigns, in detail the provisions secured by individual commanders were subject to a certain amount of variation. There was, moreover, some experimentation before the system became firmly established, as Sir Thomas de Dagworth's term of service in Brittany in 1346 neatly illustrates. His indenture, dated 28 January

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79. E403/339; E403/340; E403/341. On 1 April 1347, *devant Caleys*, Sir Thomas Ughtred contracted with the king to provide twenty men-at-arms and twenty archers for a year in return for wages, compensation for lost horses and a fee of £200 (E101/25/33 m. 3, printed in N.B. Lewis, 'An early fourteenth-century contract for military service', *B.I.H.R.*, xx (1944), p. 118). At subcontract level, similar terms were offered to Sir Hugh Fitz Simond, when on 16 March 1347 he contracted to serve for a year in Ralph, Lord Stafford's retinue with twelve men-at-arms - but his fee for the year was 100 marks: *Crecy and Calais*, p. 192.


81. A separate account has survived for Sir Thomas de Hoggeshawe's retinue, stipulating standard rates of pay and *regard* (E101/26/34).

1346, allows for gages usueles, regard and the valuation of his warhorses.  

These are quite conventional terms, but his account for just under a year's service from the date of the contract contains some far from conventional features. The wages section is unexceptional, but that concerned with reward shows Dagworth claiming 100 marks for himself, 20 marks for each of his fourteen knights and £10 for each of his sixty-five armigeri. Here regard is being graduated in the same way as pay. Whilst a captain might well employ differentials of this kind when dividing his retinue's regard among his men-at-arms, the payment he received from the Crown would not itself be affected by the rank structure of his retinue. The regard section is not the only unusual aspect of Dagworth's account. Compensation for the loss of sixty-six warhorses is claimed at a fixed rate of £10 per horse. This strongly suggests that the horse valuation stipulated in Dagworth's indenture, was not actually carried out. It may be, however, that Dagworth was trying to bend the rules (by including second-string horses, for example), for his retinue's losses are heavy even allowing for the intensity of his military operations in 1346. This possibility is supported to some degree by the fact that he also attempted to secure £120 for the loss of 120 archer hackneys, whilst simultaneously claiming in his wages account that not one of the 240 men in his company missed a single day's service during a period of 346 days. There was no precedent for the compensation of archer mounts and this part of the account has been duly crossed out, but like so many others, Dagworth's wages claim appears to have been accepted without demur.

84. E101/25/17.
85. The rates are very favourable: the standard rate of regard would yield about £9 per man-at-arms for a year's service.
Whatever the correct interpretation of Dagworth's intriguing account, this case does serve as a reminder that the terms of indentures, if not corroborated by evidence of performance, should be approached with more than a little caution. Quite apart from the efforts of profiteering captains, unforeseen circumstances of all kinds could intervene to disrupt the smooth operation of indenture provisions. In April 1352, the earl of Stafford was no doubt expecting to have his retinue's warhorses appraised at Southampton prior to departure for Gascony, but as his expenses account shows, his expedition was disrupted by a common logistical problem. A shortage of horse transports forced a substantial number of the earl's men to leave their warhorses in England, so that they were obliged to buy suitable mounts on arrival in Gascony. Stafford's account indicates that the Crown agreed to reimburse the cost of these purchases (£686 13s. 4d.), whilst also paying Stafford £500 in compensation for lost horses. The latter looks suspiciously like a lump sum, an estimate not based on the evidence of inventories, and it is likely, therefore, that none of Stafford's horses were valued either in England or Gascony. None of this improvisation affected the operation of the standard rates of pay or regard, however.

Of the benefits which captains offering their services for field campaigns in the 1350s might reasonably expect to receive, horse

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86. Unfortunately, the original indenture has not survived and the details supplied in Sir William le Neve's collection of indenture abstracts are obviously not complete (B.L., Stowe Ms. 440 fo. 9); but there is no reason for thinking that horse appraisal was not envisaged when the indenture was drawn-up on 3 March.

87. E101/26/25. Cf. the provisions of Stafford's indenture for service in Ireland in 1361, which include the Crown's guarantee of reimbursement of the cost of horses bought on arrival: E101/28/27 m. 4.

88. Similarly suspicious is the payment of 1,000 marks to Sir John Chandos for 100 'coursers' lost whilst implementing the terms of the treaty of Brétigny in 1360-61 (Prince, 'The strength of English armies', p. 368; idem., 'The indenture system under Edward III', p. 294 n. 4).

89. The wage bill totalled £3,614. 11s. 8d., whilst the cost of regard was £328; E101/26/25.
appraisal was the one most prone to disruption and the most costly in terms of administrative effort. As we shall see, these considerations may have contributed significantly to the Crown's decision to abandon *restauro equorum* in the 1370s. In the preceding decades horse appraisal was withdrawn from some forms of military service. On occasions this was because a very different form of payment had been adopted, as for example with the all inclusive annual fees paid to keepers of the town of Berwick. But even when a garrison commander was paid on the basis of standard daily wage rates, together with *regard*, it will often be found that his men were serving without the insurance of horse appraisal. Thus, for example, *restauro equorum* is not mentioned in the terms of service of the captains of Calais in the 1350s. This is, perhaps, a surprising omission, as such a garrison was not intended to be an immobile force - a fact that the Crown recognised by providing *eskippeson* for horses at the start of a contracting period. By the 1350s, however, the great majority of English garrisons in France were not on the king's payroll at all: there were simply insufficient resources available and 'increasingly the authorities had to allow troops to live from the uncontrolled proceeds of ransom districts'.

The establishment of a balanced scheme of remuneration for military

90. Thomas de Musgrave served as keeper of Berwick from February 1347 to October 1349 for a fee of 2,000 marks a year: E101/25/30. Later keepers received annual fees as low as 400 marks (e.g. 1369: E101/73 mm. 17 & 18); 1000 marks (e.g. 1351 and 1367: E101/68/3 m. 70, E101/68/4 m. 86) or as high as 4000 marks (e.g. 1356: E101/68/4 m. 75).

91. These are the indenture terms for Sir Robert de Herle, appointed Captain of Calais in 1351, and Sir John de Beauchamp in 1356: Rymer, III, i, pp. 222, 324. The terms of the latter indenture are confirmed by the accounts of the treasurer of Calais (E101/173/7) where *regards* are termed *feoda*.

92. Fowler, *The king's lieutenant*, pp. 165-70, which draws on the same author's article, 'Les finance et la discipline dans les armées anglaises en France au xivème siècle', *Les Cahiers Vermonnais*, iv (1964), pp. 55-84. For Sir Walter Bentley's memorandum to the king's council, which outlined with great clarity the impossibility of maintaining military discipline amongst the English troops in Brittany without regular pay, see Froissart, ed. Lettenhove, xviii, 'Pièces Justificatives, 1319-99', no. bxxx, pp. 339-43. The council's responses included, in effect, a definition of the terms of service for garrisons in France: customary pay rates and a fee for the captain.
service - pay, regard, restauro equorum and shipping - was essentially a phenomenon of continental expeditions, but it did come to embrace operations in that rather less fashionable centre of Edwardian military activity: Ireland. The turning point came with the duke of Clarence's expedition in 1361, for it was the first of five expeditions over a period of fifteen years which were financed, in the main, from England and subject, as a consequence, to the terms of service which operated for English campaigns in France. Before 1361, the justiciar in Ireland was appointed to serve with a retinue of stipulated proportions and the wages of these men, together with his fee (from which he was required to maintain a further twenty men-at-arms) were paid by the Irish exchequer. An unusual documentary survival from the term of office of Sir Ralph Ufford in the mid 1340s allows a fascinating insight into the operation of the system. Ufford was required to employ a retinue of forty men-at-arms and 200 archers, but it is clear that he had more than forty men-at-arms at his disposal for most of his period of duty. It must have been extraordinarily difficult for a justiciar like Ufford to hire good men for a longish term of service in Ireland. Initial recruitment in 1344 was probably made easier by a lull in the French war, but the Irish

94. For example, in 1349, Sir Thomas Rokeby was required to bring twenty men-at-arms and forty mounted archers, in addition to the company (twenty men-at-arms and twenty archers) which he supported from his £500 fee: C.C.R., 1349-54, pp. 47-48.
97. Exactly forty men-at-arms received pay without fluctuation from July 1344 to December 1345, which suggests that there were in fact rather more than forty in service, thus enabling gaps in the retinue (arising from departures or fatalities) to be filled immediately. Ufford would be required to maintain at least twenty further men-at-arms from his fee as justiciar. For a summary of the pay accounts, see Frame, 'The justiciarship of Ralph Ufford', p. 44, Table B. Frame takes the personnel numbers at face value, despite the fact that the nominal records for Ufford's retinue, even allowing for a steady turnover of manpower, strongly suggest a larger number of men-at-arms.
exchequer was only willing to pay 12d. per day for each of Ufford's men-at-arms, irrespective of the fact some of them were knights. It was probably in order to facilitate recruitment that Ufford issued fees to sixty-nine of the men who served with him in Ireland, together with the prospect of *restauro equorum* should they lose any horses. Judging by the respectable number of knights and veteran esquires listed in the fee roll this added inducement appears to have had the desired effect. Whether Ufford was setting a precedent in providing supplementary benefits of this kind is not clear; certainly the *restauro equorum* list exhibits a number of decidedly unconventional features. If it was an experiment, then it was drawing on long-established practices. The terms on offer - fees, *restauro equorum*, as well as wages - resemble those of many indentures of retinue. But the financing of this exercise in retinue formation came not from the personal resources of the captain, but from those of the Irish exchequer. It seems that Ufford had perceived the inadequacy of existing rewards for service in Ireland and, with a certain amount of improvisation, created a scheme of payments which resembled more closely those which were beginning to be paid by the Crown for campaigns in France. This was essential if a retinue of respectable quality was to be maintained in Ireland at a time when altogether more 'attractive' conflicts were taking place elsewhere.

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98. C260/57 m. 28. Eighteen knights and fifty-one esquires received fees for varying lengths of time from two years (twenty-nine men, but only four knights) to six months (ten men in all). The annual fees awarded to knights ranged from £10 to 40 marks; those for esquires from £2, 10s to 10 marks. The largest fees may have been awarded to those bringing small companies with them. Sir John de Carreu, who received 40 marks, had served with a small retinue in Brittany in 1342-43 and was to bring one to Ireland in 1361 (E36/204 fo. 107; E101/28/21 fo. 6v). Of the men named in the *restauro equorum* list, all except one were recipients of fees. Of those receiving or requesting letters of protection (of whom some would have been non-combatants), about half (thirty-five) appear on the fee roll. There were at least nine knights in Ufford's retinue who did not receive fees. For the protections, see: *C.P.R.*, *1343-45*, pp. 244-45, 255, 257, 259-60, 301, 310; C81/1741 mm. 5, 7, 8; SC1/41 m. 102. For discussions of the backgrounds of the men in the retinue, see Frame, 'The justiciarship of Ralph Ufford', pp. 13-15; idem, *English lordship in Ireland*, pp. 265-66.

99. See below, pp. 268-69.

100. Thirty-five, or about half, of the fee-recipients were in service for one and a half years or longer. There was a steady exodus of personnel from Ufford's command in 1345 and 1346, balanced to some
It is a little ironic, therefore, that it was only during the 'Peace of Brétigny' that the system of remuneration which had been developed for campaigns in France also came to be applied to the Irish theatre of war. Walter de Dalby’s *vadia guerre* accounts for the duke of Clarence’s expedition (1361-64) show all the English captains to have been in receipt of the normal rates of pay and *regard*.\(^1\) Less certain is whether all of the men-at-arms who participated in this expedition did so with appraised horses. The indentures of war which have survived stipulate *restauro equorum*, along with *gages acoustumes de guerre, le regard acustume* and shipping allowances,\(^2\) but the collection of inventories for this expedition is obviously very incomplete. Not only are some important retinues not represented, but of those which are listed, several have only partial coverage.\(^3\) It is possible, of course, that what we have are the survivors; that many of the original inventories, including that for the duke of Clarence’s retinue, have long since perished. This is unlikely to provide a complete explanation, however, for of the thirty-five horses included in the *restauro equorum* section of Dalby’s account book, only one (that of Sir Thomas de Nauton) does not appear on one of the surviving inventories.\(^4\) The natural conclusion to be drawn from this is that horse appraisal, and thus *restauro equorum*, had been extended to only a proportion of the men-at-arms serving in Ireland in the early 1360s. That the full package of service benefits had not been uniformly applied might not be particularly surprising, given that this was the extent by late arrivals.

\(^1\) E101/28/21 fos. 3v-10v. For the passage and re-passage allowances, see ibid., fos. 13v-14.

\(^2\) E101/28/27 mm. 4, 6, 10, 11.

\(^3\) E101/28/11; E101/29/5. For a fuller discussion of these documents (which are the last surviving inventories from the period), see below pp. 262-64.

\(^4\) E101/28/21 fo. 14v. Conversely, only one of the retinues included in the original inventories (Sir Thomas de Hoggshawe’s) does not appear in the *restauro equorum* account.
first time that they had operated in Irish conditions. It comes as rather more of a surprise to find that they were inconsistently applied for the last major continental campaign of the 1350s.

At first glance, the *vadia guerre* accounts for the Rhine campaign of 1359-60 are105 appear to provide the clearest possible evidence of the extent to which the terms of service offered to English captains had broadened since the experimental days of Edward III's early Scottish campaigns. Captains received payments under five headings: wages, *reward*, *restauro equorum*, outward sea passage and return sea passage.106 Yet closer examination of the accounts reveals that only a minority of retinue commanders benefitted from all five payments. The irregular receipt of 'passage' and 're-passage' payments does not present a problem, for such payments were made only to those retinues which could not be transported by requisitioned transport vessels. It is also understandable that some retinues, particularly the smaller ones, could have come through the campaign without losing any appraised warhorses.107 But we would have expected that every retinue which included paid men-at-arms would qualify for a *reward* payment. This, however, does not seem to have been the case. Indeed, no mention is made of *reward* for the majority of separately accounting companies, and whilst most of these are small, size per se does not appear to have been the essential criterion for receiving regard (nor,
indeed, the period of service or whether *restauro equorum* was being paid). Thus, the retinues of Sir Michael de Poynings and Sir Thomas de Ughtred both included twenty men-at-arms, but the former received *regard* and the latter did not. 108 Sir Richard de Pembroke served with two *scutiferi* and received *regard*, whilst Sir Thomas de Berkeley served with three and did not. 109 It is possible that Farley’s accounts omit payments which were in fact made; but there seems to be a strong possibility that the terms of service had not been fixed and that some captains had negotiated a more favourable ‘package’ than others. The case of Sir Thomas de Beauchamp is a good example of the diversity of terms which were offered. Whilst in most cases the captain was included in the total of men-at-arms for which *regard* would be provided, Sir Thomas received *reward* only for his two *scutiferi*. 110 The *restauro equorum* payments similarly offer an occasional glimpse of flexibility. Sir William de Grannson was allowed £600 for unspecified losses, whilst Sir Frank Hale received 1000 marks for the loss of forty-three warhorses. In both cases the payment appears to be a lump sum, based upon an estimate of the value of losses rather the precise evidence of inventories. 111

By the time of the treaty of Brétigny, a balanced scheme of remuneration, involving wages, allowances for costs incurred and compensation for losses sustained, had become firmly established as the normal terms of service for English men-at-arms serving in royal

108. They served for similar periods (266 and 254 days respectively) and they both lost horses (5; 9): ibid. fos. 81, 81v.
109. Once again, their periods of service and equestrian losses were similar: ibid. fos. 82, 82v.
110. £12. 13s. for 264 days service: ibid. fo. 83v.
111. Ibid. fo. 86v.
armies on the continent. Whether it was a particularly advantageous scheme of benefits, representing a significant improvement upon those available for paid military service earlier in the century, is open to question. Standard wage rates in 1360 were at the same levels as under Edward I. *Restauro equorum* was still the norm, though expenditure on warhorses may now have been less crippling than had hitherto been the case. *Regard*, or an equivalent type of fee, had not normally been offered as a supplement to pay prior to the 1340s; this, therefore, was new. But this, as we have seen with Farley's *vadia guerre* accounts, might not be extended to all captains participating in an expedition and it is uncertain how far the ordinary man-at-arms, at a lower level of the military hierarchy, benefitted from *regard*. At the same time, it must be suspected that the man-at-arms' costs were increasing during the period, a trend which probably explains the establishment of *regard* as the norm for most forms of military service from the mid 1340s - and, indeed, probably in part lies behind the increased rates of *regard* (and sometimes wages) offered to captains following the resumption of the French war in 1369. It is to these, and the other changes in the terms of service which occurred during the last years of Edward III's reign, that we must now turn.

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112. The terms offered to foreign mercenaries serving in these royal armies might well be less advantageous. Farley's *vadia guerre* accounts for the Rheims campaign suggest, for example, that the 'German' contingents received pay, but not *regard* or *restauro equorum*.

113. See Chapter VI for a discussion of the trend in warhorse prices in the second half the century.

114. A period which spans the Black Death and during which the fighting man's armour became increasingly sophisticated and expensive (see, C. Blair, *European armour* (3rd. impression, London, 1979), Chapter 3).

iii) The end of *restauro equorum*

For the Rheims campaign, *regard* had been offered at the standard rate - 100 marks for thirty men-at-arms for a quarter of a year's service - and the long-established scale of wages had also continued to operate. The same rates applied to the duke of Clarence's Irish expedition of the early 1360s, but the resumption of the French war was accompanied by a change. For John, duke of Lancaster's expedition in 1369, both *regard* and wages were offered at one and a half times the normal rates, whilst horse appraisal and *restor* of losses, and provision of shipping, continued *en manere acustumee*. These terms of service appear generous, but those which were secured by Lancaster and Sir Walter Hewitt for service in Gascony in 1370-71 were still more advantageous: double *regard* and double the usual wage rates, as well as the normal arrangements for horse appraisal and sea transportation. Such generosity was not to be repeated; indeed, these two expeditions under Lancaster's command were the last for which the Crown was to offer the well-balanced package of payments and benefits which, over the preceding twenty years, had become the norm for field campaigns. The most significant change was the abandonment of *restauro equorum*. Sir John atte Wode and William de Humberstane, who had been sent to Calais *pur preiser les chivalx* of the retinues of the duke of Lancaster and the earl of Hereford, were the last royal

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1. E101/28/21 fos. 3v-6v, 7v-9, 10-10v.
2. The terms of service are laid out clearly in two surviving indentures, those of the duke of Lancaster himself, and Henry de Percy: E101/68/4 mm. 87, 88. The detailed pay roll for this expedition has not survived, but other records (e.g. a file of privy seal letters ordering Henry de Wakefield, Keeper of the Wardrobe, to account with individual captains: E101/396/13) show the operation of the usual 'package' of benefits: wages, *regard*, *restauro equorum* and *eskippeson* payments. For excellent treatment of Lancaster's expedition, see Sherborne, 'Indentured retinues and the English expeditions to France, 1369-80', p. 720-23; idem., 'John of Gaunt, Edward III's retinue and the French campaign of 1369', in *Kings and nobles in the later Middle Ages*, ed. R.A. Griffiths and J. Sherborne (Gloucester, 1986), pp. 41-61.
4. E101/396/13 m. 1.
officials to supervise warhorse appraisal for a major English army; and it is particularly to be regretted therefore that the inventories which they compiled, or indeed those drawn-up for the much smaller expedition to Gascony in 1370, have failed to survive the passage of the intervening centuries. The end of horse appraisal was, indeed, sudden and it was final. The expedition of 1370, jointly led by Sir Robert Knolles and three other captains, was experimental in its financial arrangements, so it is not surprising to find no mention of horse compensation. But it is not to be found in the records for any subsequent expedition by an English army in France, Scotland or, indeed, elsewhere.

Why did the English Crown - and, indeed, several continental states - abandon *restauro equorum* at this time? Was it simply a question of cost? Although at times the cost was very great, indeed prohibitive, it was more usual for *restauro equorum* to have represented a comparatively modest element in campaign expenses. Thus, for example, the cost of horses lost during the Breton campaign in 1342-43 constitutes about 11% of total payments due to captains in Edward III's army. For the Rheims campaign, the corresponding figure is

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5. Lancaster's *Register* offers glimpses of some of the horses lost by men under his command: for example, *J.G. Reg.*, 1371-75, nos. 896 (1370, Gascony), 908 (1369, Normandy and Picardy).


7. Knolles' indenture stipulates double wages and regard at one and a half times the normal rate - but these payments would be forthcoming for only the first quarter of a year: E101/68/4 m. 90. For this expedition, see Sherborne, 'Indentured retinues and the English expeditions to France, 1369-80', pp. 723-25.


9. For example, the cost of the horses lost or sold by the company of Hainaulters in England in 1327 amounted to nearly £21,500, which represents over half of the total bill presented by John of Hainault for this period of service (E101/18/4 m. 1), and is roughly twice the size of the total *restauro equorum* cost for the Rheims campaign of 1359-60. Cf. Italy in the 1320s: L. Green, *Castrucci° Castracani* (Oxford, 1986), pp. 132-33.

10. £3,407 6s. 8d. was due for *restauro equorum* and £30,472 11s. ½d. for wages: E36/204 fos. 88v,
9%,\textsuperscript{11} whilst for the Low Countries expedition of 1338-39, it is as low as 6%\textsuperscript{12}. Clearly, by comparison with the Crown's expenditure on wages, the outlay demanded for the replacement of lost warhorses was not very great and although the heavy financial demands of the renewed war effort in 1369-70 (combined with a consequent political crisis in the 1371 parliament)\textsuperscript{13} may have prompted a review of military expenditure, it is unlikely to have been on grounds of cost alone that the English military establishment was moved to abandon \textit{restauro equorum}. A further contributory factor may have been the reduced role of the warhorse in English military practice. By the 1370s, with the Edwardian military machine no longer primarily based upon the service of men-at-arms on armoured steeds, horse appraisal and \textit{restor de cheval} must have seemed far less important than it had a hundred years earlier. The great majority of equestrian casualties for which the Crown was obliged to pay were being sustained not in combat, but as a consequence of the rigours of the march; and as the typical man-at-arms employed a less expensive horse,\textsuperscript{14} so \textit{restauro equorum} came to occupy a less central place in his terms of service than earlier in the Edwardian period.

The cost of \textit{restauro equorum} may well have been viewed as increasingly unacceptable in view of the transformation in English military practice, but it is likely that the Crown was as much concerned with

\textsuperscript{110v.}

11. The cost of lost horses amounted to £11,658 and the total of all payments due to captains (which included wages, \textit{regard}, \textit{restauro equorum} and some sea transport) was £133,820 16s. 6½d. The latter figure appears at the foot of the last folio of the \textit{vadia guerre} section of Farley's accounts (E101/393/11 fo. 116v).

12. Out of a total outlay of nearly £120,000 (wages, \textit{restauro equorum} and a modest amount for re-passage) only £6,656 was owed for horses lost during the campaign: Prince, 'The payment of army wages in Edward III's reign', \textit{Speculum}, xix (1944), p. 150.


the weight of the administrative burden which horse appraisal entailed. As we have seen, the valuation of warhorses and the recording of losses were very considerable administrative tasks - particularly so, where continental campaigns were concerned. They had, moreover, very often been shouldered by Wardrobe personnel. But from the middle of the century, the Wardrobe was to take only an intermittent role in the financial organisation of war as, increasingly, captains prosecuting the king's multi-front strategy were recruited by indenture and accounted directly with the Exchequer. The absence, from all except the major royal expeditions, of the 'elaborate administrative machinery' and reservoir of experience in dealing with horse appraisal which the royal household could provide will have added weight to the arguments in favour of abandoning resto\textit{r}o\textit{r}\textit{u}m; and the prospect of a major modification to the man-at-arms' terms of service will not have appeared unduly unsettling during a period which witnessed significant changes in a number of different areas of military administration.

The administrative motives underlying the abandonment of resto\textit{r}o\textit{r}\textit{u}m amounted to more than a simple desire to remove a major bureaucratic burden. Behind the changes of the 1370s can be perceived a positive determination to formulate a better package of terms of service; a package which was more attuned to prevailing military conditions and which covered the costs of campaigning more...
effectively. It is clear that *restauro equorum* was most imperfect in this respect. At first glance, an abandonment of *restauro equorum* might seem to be to the ordinary man-at-arms' financial disadvantage; his warhorse, after all, represented a major investment. But, as we have seen, horse compensation was not offered for all forms of military service and even when it was, only one of a man-at-arms' warhorses would be embraced by the appraisal process at any one time. Thus as a means of meeting the cost of equestrian casualties it was far from comprehensive and it did not provide a mechanism enabling men to acquire immediate replacements for lost horses. It was, therefore, an insurance policy for a carefully specified item, rather than a general 'cover' for losses, and although a man might feel confident that he would eventually regain the full cost of a prized warhorse, payment would only be forthcoming long after the dust of the *chevauchée* had settled.

The shortcomings in the *restauro equorum* system were probably very important in urging the Crown to undertake a complete overhaul of the terms of military service. Administratively cumbersome and offering less than satisfactory coverage for even equestrian costs, it was to find no place in the re-fashioned 'package' of terms offered by the Crown from the early 1370s. The operation of the new package can be seen clearly enough in indentures of war and pay accounts. In essence it involved improved rates of *regard* and more advantageous terms for the division of spoils - both, essentially, to offset the withdrawal

17. See above, Chapter II, pp. 52.
of *restauro equorum*. The emergence of these new terms would be a little easier to detect were it not for a certain amount of continued experimentation in the 1370s, but by 1372-3 the reformed terms of service were firmly established. Thus, for example, the indentures of war drawn-up in February 1372 specify standard wage rates, together with double *regard* for gentz darmes; but they also emphasise very firmly that the captain ne demandera ... pur lui ne pur nul de ses gentz restor de chivalx perduz en dit viage. The indentures of March 1373, for captains accompanying Lancaster to France, offer the same terms: *gages de guerre acustumez* and *regard acustumez double sanz priser de chivalx.*

These, then, had become the normal terms of service for continental

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18. The connection between *restauro equorum* and *regard* has been commented upon by Prince ('The indenture system under Edward III', p. 294) and Sherborne ('Indentured retinues and English expeditions to France, 1369-1380', p. 743 n. 6); but they do not notice the end of horse compensation in the early 1370s, nor do they make the further connection with the division of spoils. For N.B. Lewis, the increases in the rates of pay and *regard* from 1369 were 'special financial attractions', necessary for recruitment at a time when the pool of manpower had been 'drastically reduced' and the war was becoming less popular; he does not perceive the end of *restauro equorum*. N.B. Lewis, 'The last medieval summons of the English feudal levy, 13 June 1385', *E.H.R.* lxxiii (1958), pp. 9, 12.

19. For the terms of Knolles' expedition of 1370, see above p.152 n. 7; for those for the 1375 campaign in Brittany, see Sherborne, 'Indentured retinues and English expeditions in France, 1369-1380', p. 730 n. 6.

20. The new package may itself have been intended as an experiment when it was introduced for the 1372 campaign. But the withdrawal of the Wardrobe's administrative machinery from the prosecution of the war, following the re-channelling of military finance through the hands of a separate war treasurer from the end of 1372 (Given Wilson, op. cit., pp. 122-3) would have reinforced the need for a package of terms of service which involved only minimal administrative overheads. They had been tried out some years earlier: the indenture drawn-up in September 1360 between Edward III and Thomas de Holand, earl of Kent for the latter's service as 'captain and lieutenant in France and Normandy' stipulated standard wages and double *regard*, and made no reference to horse appraisal (*C76/40 m. 5*). Cf. the terms offered to the earl of Warwick, serving as king's lieutenant in Normandy from May to September 1360: double pay, standard *regard, restauro equorum* and return passage (*E101132/26 m. 3*).


22. For example, Edward, Lord Despenser's indenture (*E101/32/26 m. 3*); for his account, see m. 4. Lancaster's own indenture with the king employs similar wording: *J.G. Reg.*, 1372-76, i, no. 52.
land campaigns. The cessation of horse appraisal was compensated for by the doubling of regard and, thus, an insurance cover of very restricted scope and offering little prospect of speedy pay-outs had been replaced by an assured fixed payment, part of which was issued in advance of service. The sum involved was certainly not enormous: 'single' regard was worth about £9 a year to a man-at-arms, assuming that he was in receipt of Crown rates. Yet whilst restauro equorum had only been available following the loss of an appraised warhorse, regard could be used to cover a wider range of campaign costs, including those incurred in preparing for expeditions which were cancelled at the last minute. In as far as it was applied to equestrian expenses, it could contribute to the purchase price of a horse at start of an expedition, or help to finance an immediate replacement during the course of a term of duty. It is significant that the English Crown chose to increase regard rates, for in the case of some continental states, the abandonment of restauro equorum was accompanied by an increase in wage rates. In England, however, from the time of its general introduction in the 1340s, regard had been intended as a contribution to campaigning costs including the replacement of unappraised horses, and so it was natural that it,

23. As, for example, the Breton expeditions of 1375 (see Walker 'Profit and loss in the Hundred Years War', p. 103) and 1380 (see Goodman, 'The military subcontracts of Sir Hugh Hastings', p. 118) and the earl of Cambridge's expedition to Iberia in 1381 (B.L., Stowe Ms. 440 fo. 7). Less generous terms of service were offered in other theatres of war. For Richard II's expedition of 1385, regard was only paid in exceptional cases: N.B. Lewis, 'The last medieval summons of the English feudal levy, 13 June 1385', E.H.R., lxxiii (1958), pp. 9, 12-13, 21-22. Given the close connection between the regard payment and warhorse costs, and the fact that no allowance for restauro equorum had been made for royal expeditions to Scotland since the 1330s (above pp. 125-6), the absence of regard in 1385 appears rather less 'a departure from tradition' than has been thought: cf. J.J.N. Palmer, 'The last summons of the feudal army in England (1385)', E.H.R., lxxiii (1968), pp. 773-74.

24. It was usual for half a year's regard to be paid in advance, with subsequent payments at quarterly intervals: Prince, 'The indenture system under Edward III', p. 293. The earl of Hereford's indenture in 1372 emphasises the importance of prompt pre-payment: double regard was to be delivered hastivement en main pur la moite du dit an (E101/68/4 m. 92).

25. In the event of cancellation, captains retained advance payments of regard: Prince, op. cit., p. 293.

26. In Venice, for example, the end of restauro equorum was accompanied by a 33% pay increase (Mallett and Hale, The military organisation of a Renaissance state, pp. 17-18; but cf. 138-9). For minor variations in English wage-payment practice, see Prince, op. cit., pp. 291-93.
rather than wages, should be increased in the 1370s.

The association between regard and warhorse costs is, as we have seen, made explicit in some the indentures for continental land campaigns of this period; but records relating to maritime activity emphasise the point still further. For naval expeditions, such as that led by the earl of Salisbury during the winter of 1372-73, regard was paid at only one and a half times the standard rate, presumably because horses were not required for military operations of this kind. In the case of expeditions to Gascony, on the other hand, a captain might be offered a special level of regard, higher than the normal double rate. This may have been in recognition of the high risk of equestrian casualties during the long sea voyage, but it was also no doubt intended as an incentive to men to buy their warhorses upon arrival in Bordeaux, rather than transport them from England. The latter interpretation offers an intriguing perspective on the re-fashioning of the terms of service in the early 1370s. Was the general switch to pre-payment of costs, as represented in the bolstering of regard, intended, in part at least, as a response to the perennial logistical problems involved in the assembly of transport fleets? If such was the case, then the scale of the conflict as it unfolded during the two decades after 1369 would most certainly have shown it to be justified. These were years of almost unremitting warfare, 'a long war of attrition'. The demand for shipping was

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27. B.L., Add. Ms. 37494 fos. 10-11. Thus, Edward, Lord Despenser's retinue received 1½ regard for naval service in 1372 and double regard for a land campaign the following year (E101/32/26 m. 4). The frequency of naval expeditions during this phase of the war, as compared with the years prior to Brétigny, is particularly striking. Quite apart from strategic considerations, such 'horseless' operations may have been attractive because they did not require the assembly of huge numbers of horse transports - the cause of regular, acute problems for Edwardian military administrators.

28. See, for instance, the clause included in the earl of Hereford's indenture in March 1371: E101/68/4 m. 92.

commensurately heavy and, after the introduction of *tontyght* in 1380, the cost of maintaining naval forces, increasingly expensive. Horse transports, moreover, constituted a large proportion of a typical expeditionary fleet. Seen in this light, if the provision of double, or higher, rates of *regard* allowed men to acquire horses on arrival in France, without requiring them to dip too deeply into their own pockets, then it could offer very considerable relief to both the Crown and the English merchant marine.

By abandoning *restauro equorum* and concentrating on a general contribution to costs through the *regard* payment, the Crown had reduced the magnitude of the administrative and logistical problems attendant upon the raising of an army, whilst at the same time improving the terms of service of men-at-arms. In effect, there had been a shift in responsibility, with respect to campaign expenses, from the Crown to the individual man-at-arms - or more accurately, perhaps, to the individual captain. The onus was now rather more on the combatant to decide on the quality and numbers of warhorses which he brought on campaign. The Crown, it is true, maintained a basic minimum standard and captains continue to insist in their subcontracts that troops should be well mounted and arrayed, so as to avoid 'loss

32. On the Crown's diminishing concern for the quality of warhorses, see above, pp. 177-8. In the 1370s we see a change in the terms relating to horse shipment. Hitherto, men had been allowed a fixed sum (e.g., 6s. 8d. in early 1340) for *each horse* accompanying them - usually a prescribed number, determined by their rank (Prince, op. cit., pp. 294-95). But in the mid 1370s there was a shift to providing a fixed sum for *each man*, irrespective of his rank, military status or the number of horses he actually had. Thus Lancaster was allowed 7s. per man for the return from Gascony in 1374 (Prince, *The payment of army wages in Edward III's reign*, p. 159 n. 1), whilst for the repassage of the English army from Brittany in 1375, the allowance was 13s. 4d. for each man *cum equo* (E101/34/5; E101/34/6 m. 4). This may reflect a view that the English military machine now needed fewer warhorses than it had in the past, but also probably a desire to simplify administrative processes.
or reproach at muster. But if the abandonment of *restauro equorum* will not have resulted in an immediate, dramatic slump in warhorse quality, it is likely nevertheless to have been responsible for some decline (in fact, a further decline) in the calibre of horseflesh used on active service. For although a man might participate in several campaigns without incurring any equestrian casualties, the death or disablement of horses was always a very real possibility; and the loss of even one, if reasonably priced, would serve to negate the effect of the doubling of *regard*, allowing a man, at best, to break-even at the end of a long campaign. It may, indeed, have been to offer a further incentive to potential recruits, by extending the opportunities for individual gain, whilst cushioning the impact of horse losses and other costs, that the reformed package of terms of service offered by the Crown in the 1370s included a further significant change: an adjustment to the established arrangements for the division of the spoils of war in order to offer rather more advantageous terms to the combatant.

What were the normal arrangements for the division of spoils prior to the reforms of the early 1370s? On the one hand it is clear that the Crown had an established right to the ransoms of the most important...
and valuable prisoners of war. Such captives were to be delivered
into the king's custody and their original captors would receive
reasonable compensation. 36 But before the last quarter of the
fourteenth-century, the terms relating to the sharing out of profits
arising from the ransoms of lesser prisoners and from booty are rarely
specified precisely in surviving indentures of war, whether between
the king and his captains, or between captains and lesser combatants;
and such transactions are not the concern of the *vadia guerre*
accounts.

In general terms, the Crown had an undoubted right to a proportion of
the profits of those troops who were receiving pay and other benefits
for serving in a royal army. The size of the royal portion certainly
varied in different parts of Europe; and very probably also within
each individual state, as different levels of remuneration would be
accompanied by different terms for the division of spoils. It is no
wonder, therefore, that Honoré Bouvet, writing in the 1380s,
considered that 'the law on the matter is involved and by no means
clear, and expressed opinion is doubtful'. 37 Yet, largely as a
consequence of an influential article published in the 1950s by Denys
Hay, 38 much of the recent secondary literature concerned with military
matters in late medieval England offers a deceptively confident view
of the division of spoils. Hay felt that the evidence, though far
from abundant, pointed very clearly to one conclusion. By the 1350s,

36. Prince, 'The indenture system under Edward III', p. 295; D. Hay, 'The division of the spoils of
38. Hay, op. cit., pp. 91-109; and see also idem., 'Booty in border warfare', *Transactions of the
Dumfriesshire and Galloway Natural History and Antiquarian Society*, 3rd. ser., xxxi (1952-3),
especially pp. 157-63. K.B. McFarlane's brief treatment of the division of spoils in his second 1953
Ford lecture must have been composed at about the same time (*The nobility of later medieval
England*, p. 28). The subject had attracted little previous attention, apart from a brief examination
by A. E. Prince ('The indenture system under Edward III', pp. 295-96).
he argued, 'we have ... proof that troops in royal pay were liable to surrender a third' of their profits to the king; and in all probability, the third, 'of old standing in the royal household', had been extracted from captains leading retinues in royal armies for a not inconsiderable period before this. Some magnates, it was admitted, can be seen, during the first phase of the French war, to be claiming a half rather than a third of the profits amassed by their retainers. But the 'royal system of taking only a third was gradually adopted [by English captains] during the period after the Peace of Brétigny, and was pretty universal by the last decade of the reign. Thus by the time of the Ordinances of Durham of 1385, the 'system of thirds' was firmly in place. It had become normal practice for a superior contracting party to claim a third of the total spoils accumulated by immediate subordinates. A captain would seek, from each of his subcontractors, a third of the value of the ransoms and booty which they had amassed during the course of a campaign. The king in his turn would claim from each of his captains a third of the total spoils which they had assembled (i.e. their own, combined with that which they had gained from their men).

Denys Hay's neat chronological scheme for the development of uniform practice in the division of spoils has been widely accepted: it has

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40. Hay, 'Division of the spoils of war', pp. 105-6. The gradual, but ultimately uniform, adoption by the English military community of royal household conventions on the division of spoils is seen to be the consequence of the 'growth of the indentured army'.

41. Ibid., pp. 95-96. The 'system of thirds' did not, therefore, require the ordinary soldiery (as individuals or a group) to surrender a third of their profits to the king and a further third to their captain, as seems to be suggested by M. Keen in The laws of war in the late Middle Ages (London, 1965), pp. 146-47, and as is quite explicitly stated by A. Tuck in 'Why men fought in the Hundred Years War', History Today, xxxiii (April 1983), p. 38.
been echoed regularly in both detailed articles and textbooks.\textsuperscript{42} Although it is possible to point to a sprinkling of aberrant cases,\textsuperscript{43} there is certainly no doubt that the 'system of thirds' had indeed become 'pretty universal' at all levels of the English military community by the mid 1370s. From this time forward, references to thirds and 'thirds of thirds' become a commonplace in indentures of war for service on the continent.\textsuperscript{44} But Hay's analysis for the period prior to the mid 1370s is far less reliable. He misinterprets the evidence for the 1350s and '60s, because he fails to see how arrangements for the division of spoils fitted into a broader 'package' of terms of service; and as a consequence of this he fails to perceive how the widespread adoption of the 'system of thirds' in the 1370s formed an integral part of a general reform of this package of terms.

At the centre of these changes, as we have seen, was the abandonment of \textit{restauro equorum}. Prior to this, the certainty of receiving compensation for warhorse losses had rested squarely upon an acceptance that \textit{half} of the profits of war should be surrendered to the agency supplying \textit{restauro equorum}. Captains would render this substantial portion to the king; subcontractors would deliver it to their captain. Thus, men-at-arms had an insurance policy for their


\textsuperscript{43} See, for example, Given-Wilson, 'The ransom of Olivier du Guesclin', pp. 24-25; Walker, 'Profit and loss in the Hundred Years War', pp. 102-3.

\textsuperscript{44} For example, in 1381, Thomas de Felton leading a substantial force to Brittany, was to receive \textit{la tierce partz de touz les prouffis gaignez par la personne du dit [subcontractor's name]}\textit{ et la tierce part du tiers du prouffit de sa retenue}: E101/68/8 mm. 195-6, 200; 68/9 mm. 201-12. Cf. Goodman, 'The military subcontracts of Sir Hugh Hastings', p. 116; and N.H. Nicolas, \textit{History of the battle of Agincourt} (3rd. edition, London, 1833), Appendix, pp. 10-12 (indenture between the earl of Salisbury and William Bedyk, 1415). For further fifteenth-century examples, see Hay, 'Division of the spoils of war', p. 97.
principal warhorses which could cost them nothing, or a very great deal, depending upon the fortunes of war. When this insurance policy was not provided - when warhorses were not appraised at the start of a campaign, as was the case with various forms of military service under Edward III - then the portion of profits surrendered to the superior contracting party was a third, rather than a half. It was, therefore, entirely consistent with earlier practice that the Crown's complete abandonment of *restauro equorum* in the 1370s should be accompanied not only by the doubling of *regard*, but also by a reduction in the 'royal portion' of the spoils of war from a half to a third. If the near uniform employment of the 'system of thirds' from the last years of Edward III's reign is to be explained in terms of 'the growth of the indentured army', then it was only in as much as that development was itself a contributory factor to the abandonment of *restauro equorum*.

At the heart of Hay's thesis was a process of increasing uniformity of practice; a progression from a state of affairs where 'the methods of dividing the spoil varied from magnate to magnate' to a general acceptance of 'the royal third' at all levels of the military community. But it is in his discussion of the 'variety of usages' in

45. J.M.W. Bean's recent suggestion that 'a retainer paid over a third of his winnings to his lord if he provided his own horse, but gave up a half if his horse was provided by his lord' (*From lord to patron*, pp. 238-44) is founded upon a misunderstanding of the terms of service and, in particular, a confusion between, on the one hand, the supply of warhorses by lords to selected retainers at the start of a period of service and, on the other, the payment of *restauro equorum* for appraised horses which have been lost during the course of a campaign. Bean's case is actually supported by only one piece of evidence: the terms of a military indenture of 1420, which is concerned with the service of archers; and it is flatly contradicted by a miscellany of fourteenth-century indentures (e.g. ibid., p. 243 n. 12, dismissed as 'special circumstances'). In fact, the evidence overwhelmingly suggests that the great majority of men-at-arms supplied their own warhorses (see below, pp. 306-7) and that if they were appraised and thus eligible for compensation, they would be required to surrender half of their winnings to their captains. The same portion of profits would be due from those who were supplied with a warhorse by their captain, but if the horse was appraised by the Crown and subsequently lost, the captain would probably keep the *restauro equorum* payment himself - though he might provide a replacement mount for his man. In the case of a gift from the king, the horse would not be appraised and, thus, would not be eligible for compensation (see above, pp. 61-62).

the mid fourteenth-century that the principal flaw in Hay's thesis lies.\textsuperscript{47} In the first place, the bulk of the evidence at subcontract level suggests that there was, in fact, a remarkable degree of uniformity in the arrangements for the division of spoils. The evidence, it is true, is not abundant. Many military subcontracts and indentures of retinue make no mention of the spoils of war.\textsuperscript{48} Yet prior to the 1370s, all of the examples which do refer to the division of winnings stipulate that, when engaged in service with horses which have been appraised and are therefore eligible for compensation, the retainer should surrender a half of his profits to his captain. Thus, an indenture between Edward, Prince of Wales and Sir Thomas Fournival, dated 1 May 1347, makes provision for the latter's warhorse losses and the handing over of half of any ransoms secured whilst in the Prince's service.\textsuperscript{49} A decade later Sir Warin de Bassingbourne was reminded that half of the 500 marks which he had secured from a prisoner of war should be surrendered to the Prince, 'as he well knows'.\textsuperscript{50} It might be imagined that the Prince of Wales was particularly well placed to demand a substantial proportion of his retainers' winnings; but lesser magnates were also insisting upon a half during the 1340s and 1350s. An indenture, dating from March 1347, whereby Sir Hugh Fitz Simon agreed to serve with a company of men-at-arms for a year in Ralph, Lord Stafford's retinue allows Hugh \textit{gages accustumez} (or \textit{bouche de court}), a fee of 100 marks and valuation of his \textit{grantz chivalx}; but it also requires that \textit{des prisoners qui serront priz del avantdit}

\textsuperscript{47} Ibid., pp. 99, 103, 105.

\textsuperscript{48} For example, the indenture of 1340 whereby the earl of Northampton retained Sir William Talemache for life: DL 25/32. Similarly, the indenture of retainer between Henry, earl of Lancaster and Sir Edmund de Ufford (1347): printed in Fowler, \textit{The king's lieutenant}, p. 234.

\textsuperscript{49} \textit{B.P. Reg.}, i, pp. 128-29. The majority of the surviving indentures issued by the Prince of Wales make no reference to the division of spoils: e.g. \textit{B.P. Reg.}, i, pp. 83, 127-28; \textit{B.P. Reg.}, ii, pp. 45-46; \textit{Report of MSS. of Lord Middleton of Wollaston Hall, Nottinghamshire.} Historical Manuscripts Commission, Report No. 69 (London, 1911), p. 98.

\textsuperscript{50} \textit{B.P. Reg.}, iv, p. 249; cf. also \textit{B.P. Reg.}, iii, 251-52, 294-95.
Hugh, ou de ses gentz, le avanddit Monsieur Raufe aura le moytie des proffitz de lour ransom. Denys Hay, himself, cites a further contract, drawn-up in March 1350, involving an equal share in captured prisoners, this time between the earl of Arundel and Sir Gerard de Lisle. Yet he felt that it would be 'premature' to conclude from these cases 'that the normal procedure in the 1340s, at any rate in continental campaigns, was for the spoils to be divided by half'.

If Hay's was an unduly cautious view, even for the state of knowledge in the mid 1950s, then it is now surely untenable, for 'fresh evidence' as it comes to light serves only to augment the group of mid fourteenth-century magnate captains who can be seen demanding half of their subordinates' winnings. Thus, for example, the indenture drawn-up in July 1347 between the earl of Salisbury and Geoffrey Walsh stipulates that the latter's chival darmes sera preise & encas qil sera perdutz en le service le dit counte, le dit Geffrei avera restitutionn; and, appropriately enough, the earl would be given half of any ransoms which came Walsh's way par fortune de guerre. If we turn to a military subcontract drawn-up by the same earl of Salisbury in March 1372, we find that the terms of service were now rather different, for the intended continental expedition of this year, as we have seen, was the first for which the Crown employed the reformed package of terms of service. The indentures between the king and the captains of major retinues explicitly exclude the provision of restauro equorum. At the subcontract level, the indenture between the earl of Salisbury and an esquire of modest status, Roger

51. Crecy and Calais, p. 192.
52. Hay, 'Division of the spoils of war', p. 102.
53. E101/68/3 m. 68.
54. See above, pp. 156. Although the 1372 expedition eventually took the form of a naval operation, the original intention was for a chevauchée in France (the indentures include, for example, provision for the shipment of horses to the continent).
Mautravers, simply omits to mention the valuation of warhorses; but it, unlike those between the king and his captains does make specific provision for the division of spoils. Now, without the possible weighty financial burden of *restauro equorum* to worry about, the earl claims only a third of Mautravers' profits of war.\(^55\)

The evidence of the earl of Salisbury's subcontracts are particularly valuable because they straddle the change in the terms of service in the early 1370s and they, unlike the bulk of indentures between the Edward III and his captains, are explicit about arrangements for the division of spoils. The largest body of evidence of a similar kind concerns the retinue of John of Gaunt.\(^56\) There must always be an element of doubt as to how far conclusions based upon the behaviour of an individual of such exceptional status can be generally applied to the broader military community. The greatest magnates are likely to be more independently minded, more able to stand aloof from developments occurring around them and perhaps simply slower to change established practices, than their less elevated contemporaries. Indeed, one of the most interesting features of the collection of Gaunt's indentures is the way that, apparently unlike the earl of Salisbury (and one suspects the majority of magnate captains)\(^57\) the

55. E101/68/5 m. 107. The earl's indenture with the king for this expedition is E101/68/5 m. 102.

56. On the size and composition of John of Gaunt's indentured retinue, see Bean, *From lord to patron*, Appendices II and III. Appendix III provides a list of the surviving indentures - fifty-six for knights and 102 for esquires - together with tabulated summaries of some aspects of their contents. The great majority of them are to be found in *J.G. Reg.*, 1372-76; *J.G. Reg.*, 1379-83; and *J.G. Ind. of retinue*. But see also S.K. Walker, *John of Gaunt and his retainers, 1361-99* (Oxford, D. Phil thesis, 1986), Appendix III: 'Unpublished indentures of retinue with John of Gaunt, duke of Lancaster'.

57. The surviving military subcontracts (as distinct from indentures of retinue) from the 1370s and '80s frequently offer a package of terms which allows a margin of profit for the captain. The subcontractor receives a lump sum for a year's service which represents rather less than would be realised by standard pay and double *regard* for the same period. He agrees to surrender one third of profits to his captain; and there is no mention of *restauro equorum*. See Sherborne, 'Indentured retinues and English expeditions to France, 1369-1380', pp. 743-44; Goodman, 'The military subcontracts of Sir Hugh Hastings', pp. 118-19; Walker, *John of Gaunt and his retainers*, p. 69. Some subcontractors negotiated favourable deals, however. Sir John Strother, serving with a company in the earl of March's retinue in 1375, secured a 'personal *regard* of £60 in addition to normal wages and double *regard* for his men (Walker, 'Profit and loss in the Hundred Years War', p. 103).
duke continues to offer *restauro equorum* to retainers well into the mid 1380s, despite the Crown's abandonment of it as an element in the terms of service a decade earlier. The registered indentures of retinue from the period 1379-83 generally include provision for horse valuation and compensation\(^{58}\) and the last indentures surviving in any form to do so date from 1384 and 1385.\(^{59}\) So, with respect to *restauro equorum*, the duke, it seems, took over ten years to bring his household arrangements into line with royal policy.

The evidence for the division of spoils is less clear-cut. Although the majority of Lancastrian indentures prior to the mid 1380s refer to both warhorse appraisal and the apportionment of spoils, only in a minority of cases is the duke's portion specified precisely. Generally speaking a retainer will be treated as *autres esquiers ou bachelers de son estat et condicion*.\(^{60}\) The exceptions to this seem, at first glance, to lend support to Denys Hay's view of the matter. Only six of the hundred or so registered indentures are specific about the duke's portion (five from the early 1370s and one from 1381), but of these, five stipulate that the duke *avera la tierce partie* of the retainers' gains of war, whilst also offering *restauro equorum* in the fees offered in some indentures of retinue represented a rate of remuneration substantially higher than even double regard (e.g. *J.G. Ind. of retinue*, no. 3: Sir John de Neville, 1370).

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\(^{58}\) *J.G. Reg.*, 1379-83, i, nos. 23-52, 55.

\(^{59}\) *Life indentures for Sir Thomas de Wennesley, 10 December 1384 (J.G. Ind. of retinue, no. 6); Sir Ralph de Bracebridge, 4 April 1385 (Historical Manuscripts Commission, Report No. 69, pp. 99-100); and Richard Riston, 30 April 1385 (Walker, *John of Gaunt and his retainers*, Appendix III, no. 3; the translation of this indenture in *E.H.D.*, iv, no. 653 is defective). N.B. Lewis regards the dropping of warhorse appraisal and compensation as but one aspect of 'a general tendency towards standardization and simplification of the substance of the contracts, generally in a way that leaves the duke with more latitude to use his discretion and the retainer with less specific guarantees for his rewards or allowances' (*J.G. Ind. of retinue*, p. 80). Cf. the 'restore' payments which Grace Stetton noticed in Bolingbroke's accounts for his crusading expeditions in the early 1390s, though these are New Year's gifts to minor household personnel and not authentic *restauro equorum* payments for warhorse losses (G. Stretton, 'Some aspects of medieval travel, with special reference to the wardrobe accounts of Henry, earl of Derby, 1390-93', *T.R.H.S.*, 4th. ser. vii (1924), p. 81).

\(^{60}\) Sir John de Neville's indenture of 1370 adds *et selon le manere de pais*: *J.G. Ind. of retinue*, no. 3. This is significant, for terms of service might vary according to the theatre of war concerned.
usual manner.\textsuperscript{61} Does this suggest that the duke of Lancaster offered a package of terms of service to his retainers which was different (decidedly more advantageous, in fact) from that which was available from other magnate captains of the period? Perhaps - but probably not. In the first place it is inherently unlikely that the greatest of secular magnates, whose lordship would always be greatly sought after, would feel the need to offer terms which were markedly more favourable than the norm. Secondly, the fact that the great majority of the registered indentures imply the operation of established and well understood terms for the division of spoils may well suggest that the duke's portion is spelled out only when the terms concerned deviate from the norm. We may reasonably expect that some individuals would negotiate better terms than others, often for reasons that are difficult now to fathom.\textsuperscript{62} But it may also be significant that three of the five cases where \textit{restauro equorum} is accompanied by the duke's third are found in indentures drawn-up in January or February 1372 - shortly before the first continental expedition for which the Crown implemented its revised package of terms of service.\textsuperscript{63} At such a time of transition we might reasonably expect an unusual degree of diversity in terms offered and secured in different corners of the

\textsuperscript{61}J.G. Reg., 1372-76, i, nos. 782, 788, 789; ii, no. 868. J.G. Reg., 1379-83, i, no. 45.

\textsuperscript{62}Janckyn Pole de Hertyngton, who was retained in September 1381, appears to have been just such a favoured individual, for he was allowed normal horse appraisal and shipment terms, but of his \textit{profites de guere} the duke \textit{avera ses tiercez}: J.G. Reg., 1379-83, i, no. 45. The same balance of arrangements are outlined in John de Swynton's indenture of 1372, but in his case the tailoring of terms for a particular individual is further emphasised by the fact that \textit{restauro equorum} and the surrendering of a third, rather than a half, are once again explicitly stipulated just over two years later when Swynton, now a knight, entered into a new retaining agreement with the duke (J.G. Reg., 1372-76, i, no. 789; ii, no. 868). S. Armitage-Smith (J.G. Reg., 1372-76, i, p. xxii) asserted that 'the proportion [of profits] taken by the lord varies with the rank of the retainer', but the evidence does not support this view.

\textsuperscript{63}J.G. Reg., 1372-76, i, nos. 782, 788 and 789. The other Lancastrian indentures dating from this period make reference to \textit{restauro equorum}, but are unspecific about the division of spoils. Simon Walker places the 1372 indentures (generous also for the scale of their fees) in the context of Gaunt's planning for 'the invasion of Castille to which his recent alliance with Portugal had committed him': recruitment at a time of heavy demand for manpower obliged the duke to 'bid high' (Walker, \textit{John of Gaunt and his retainers}, p. 67).
military community, as many magnate captains made adjustments in response to the Crown's initiative.

If the handful of Lancastrian indentures of retinue which allow for both 'thirds' and warhorse appraisal can with reasonable certainty be dismissed as special cases, there is fortunately some evidence to suggest that Lancaster did offer the normal balance of terms to his men, both before and after his final abandonment of _restauro equorum_ in the mid 1380s. Six of the twelve surviving indentures from the second half of the 1380s, whilst omitting any reference to the valuation of horseflesh, stipulate that the duke's portion of _profitz de guerre_ would be a third.64 After 1390, none of the remaining enrolled indentures make specific reference to the duke's third, probably because it had by then become the established and well-understood norm. For an insight into normal practice during the period before the abandonment of _restauro equorum_, it is necessary to rely upon two indentures which are a little more detailed in their provisions than was usual - apparently because they make allowance for a certain amount of deviation from established practice. That for Sir William de Beauchamp, drawn-up in February 1373, outlines in customary fashion that the warhorses of Beauchamp's company will be covenablement preisez, et selonc le dit pris restor ly serra fait si nulles de eux soient perduz en le service de nostre dit seigneur. The price of this insurance for his horseflesh would be _la moitie des profitz de guerre_ secured by Beauchamp and his immediate entourage, but only _la tierce partie_ of the profits of his other men _si nulles de_

64. _J.G. Ind. of retinue_, nos. 10-14, 18.
leur chivaux ne soient perduz. Nicholas de Atherton's indenture of March 1370 underlines the crucial relationship between warhorses and the division of spoils in a slightly different way. Atherton's chivaux de guerre would be appraised and in the event of loss, restor would be paid come reson demande; but in return the duke was to receive la moitie des prisoners et gayns de guerre prisee et gaynez par le dit Nicholas. So much was entirely conventional, but the indenture adds: si null' des chivaux lavantdit Nicholas ne soient prisez, alors aura le dit duc sinoun' la tierce partie des profitz de guerre issint par le dit Nicholas gaynez. In Beauchamp's case, then, 'thirds' will apply if no restauro equorum claims are made; in Atherton's, if his warhorses are not appraised. These two cases can perhaps be attributed to the prevailing conditions of the 'period of transition' in the early 1370s. But although representing deviation from - or at least elaboration upon - customary practice, they are nevertheless extremely valuable. In order to allow for unusual provisions, it has been necessary to outline the normal package of terms - restauro equorum and half profits to the superior contracting party - and thus has been revealed what in the great majority of John of Gaunt's indentures goes unstated because it is taken for granted.

Prior to the abandonment of restauro equorum, then, it was normal for the king and his magnate captains to demand a half of the spoils of those who served with appraised warhorses. But what of the cases of 'thirds' during the 1350s and 1360s, to which Hay has drawn attention?

65. J.G. Reg., 1372-76, i, no. 832. The wording of this indenture is a little ambiguous. The intention may have been to offer a reduced 'ducal portion' to the whole of Beauchamp's company in the event of no restauro equorum claim being made. Such concessions would no doubt have been more readily available to men of Sir William's status (the son of an earl); cf. Bean, From lord to patron, pp. 240-41. The other unusual feature of Beauchamp's indenture is that it seems to suggest that the duke would take a direct third of the profits of Beauchamp's men, rather than a third of Beauchamp's third. For a similar arrangement, see Walker, 'Profit and loss in the Hundred Years War', pp. 102-3.

66. J.G. Ind. of retinue, no. 2.
The evidence for thirds from this period is not in fact abundant and it is, moreover, a body of evidence of a very distinctive kind. If there was 'a variety of usages' with respect to the division of spoils in the mid-fourteenth century, the diversity arose not so much from differences at the level of the magnate household, as from the particular circumstances of certain forms of military service. As we have seen, the package of terms of service as it developed during the course of Edward III's reign varied according to the theatre of war and military context concerned; and as an element in the package, arrangements for the division of spoils need to be viewed in the same light. When *restauro equorum* was offered, as was the case with major expeditions to France, the superior contracting party would receive half of his immediate subordinates' profits. When it was not, as is often found with garrison service, we might reasonably expect the portion surrendered to have been a third. At times it is clear that it was. Thus, Sir Walter Bentley, as king's lieutenant in Brittany in the early 1350s, sought a third of the profits of men who, though in receipt of the king's pay, were serving without the benefit of appraised horses or regard. It is probably as a consequence of this kind of minimal package of remuneration that the garrison forces in Normandy during the 1350s were also expected to surrender a third of

67. According to Hay, 'the evidence ... is fairly plentiful'. But the cases he cites arise from unconventional forms of military service: not mainstream royal expeditions, but garrison service in Brittany and Normandy during the 1350s and the Najera campaign ('Division of the spoils of war', pp. 103-6).

68. But it is equally clear that no single set of terms for the division of spoils amassed by garrison personnel existed. Indeed, the terms operating for the garrison of a particular town or castle might fluctuate with changes of captaincy or even during the course of a single captain's period of command. During the 1370s, for example, a captain of Brest might be required by the terms of his indenture to surrender all, half or none of the profits derived from ransoms: M. Jones, *Ducal Brittany, 1364-1399* (Oxford, 1970), pp. 149-50. Cf. Cherbourg: C. Given Wilson, 'The ransom of Olivier du Guesclin', *B.I.H.R.*, liv (1981), p. 25.

69. Bentley was authorised to take a third of the profits of both paid and unpaid troops: Hay, 'Division of the spoils of War', pp. 103-4. On service in Brittany, see above pg. 144 n. 92.
profits during periods of formal warfare. Garrison service in Scotland appears to have involved similar arrangements. Certainly since the start of Edward III's reign, _restauro equorum_ had not normally been offered by the Crown to the personnel of English garrisons in Scotland and the border country. In many cases the financial arrangements were very simple: a captain would agree to maintain an adequate garrison in return for a fixed annual fee. Terms for the division of spoils are not usually specified in indentures for such service as this, so the detail supplied in that concerning the Lochmaben garrison in the early 1370s is very valuable; and it may well be representative of widespread practice. The new constable from March 1371, William de Stapleton, who was serving for a fixed fee (initially £200 _per annum_), agreed to deliver a third of his 'gayne', including a third of the third which he would secure from his men, to the superior contracting party, the earl of Hereford and Essex.

If, in the context of the continental theatre of war prior to the early 1370s, the arrangements for the division of spoils depended upon the form of military service being undertaken, in the case of operations in Scotland the 'system of thirds' had probably been the norm for both royal expeditions and garrison service since the start of Edward III's reign. As we have seen, _restauro equorum_ had not been offered to armies led by the king himself since the 1320s. As a

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70. Hay, 'Division of the spoils of war', p. 104. In 1361, Thomas Fog delivered £800 to the Chamber in part fulfilment of his obligation to surrender a third of the gains accumulated whilst serving as a captain in Normandy and elsewhere: _C.P.R., 1361-64_, p. 126.

71. For a discussion of the evidence, see above pp. 132 n. 44; 144 n. 91.

72. _Bain_, iv, no. 178. But, as in France, garrisons in Scotland were probably subject to a variety of terms. In the later 1340s, for example, Lochmaben captains surrendered two-thirds of their profits to the earl of Northampton: _Bain_, iii, no. 1459. D. Hay used the arrangements at Lochmaben to support his argument for the gradual adoption of 'the third' at all levels of the military community during the mid fourteenth-century. Hay, 'Booty in border warfare', p. 158.

73. See above, pp. 129-35.
consequence of this, and in complete contrast with expeditions to France, it was natural for the Crown to demand a third rather than a half of the winnings of war. Seen in this light, the provisions for the division of spoils in the 'Ordinances of Durham', issued for Richard II's Scottish expedition of 1385, were outlining terms of service which had been in operation for half a century. Denys Hay was, therefore, right to regard these Ordinances as a 'statement of existing practice rather than an innovation', but he failed to recognise that with respect to the treatment of spoils this 'existing practice' had been long established only in as far as warfare in Scotland was concerned. The clause concerned with the 'system of thirds' may appear 'curiously matter of fact', but it had been applied to major expeditions to France for little more than a decade.

In part, then, the 'variety of usages' in the division of spoils (and, indeed, other terms of service) as experienced by the ordinary man-at-arms arose from diversity at the level of the individual magnate household; captains did not always offer the same terms to their subcontractors. But if it would be to do violence to the evidence to insist upon uniformity of practice at all levels of the military community, it is nevertheless important not to obscure the essential rules to which the bulk of the evidence conforms. Most captains, it is clear, were more like the earl of Salisbury than the duke of Lancaster; they would be strongly influenced by the terms offered to them by the Crown and would adjust the terms which they extended to subordinates accordingly. The nature of these terms would depend upon the theatre of war and whether the service involved a field campaign or garrison duty. Thus, when an indenture stipulates the treatment

74. Hay, 'Division of the spoils of war', pp. 96-97.
75. Or naval service: ibid., p. 101.
of spoils in the manner 'which was customary in the French wars', or which was accorded to others of the same rank, it is referring not to a single custom - a single fraction of booty - but to a range of practices which were closely associated with the *le manere de pais*\(^76\) and type of military service involved.

\(^{76}\) This phrase is used in the indenture of retinue between John of Gaunt and Sir John de Neville, 10 November 1370: *J.G. Ind. of retinue*, no. 3.
Chapter V

THE PERSONNEL OF EDWARDIAN ARMIES: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE SOURCES

The contribution of the horse inventories to our understanding of the character of English armies during the Edwardian period - and, indeed, to our knowledge of the military events in which they were involved - has several dimensions. The inventories can contribute much to the study of army structures (i.e. retinues and their component companies) and the tracing of those processes of structural change to which armies were invariably subject: the late arrival, early departure, fragmentation or regrouping of these retinues and companies during the course of campaigns. Some of the changes in army composition were the direct result of the rigours of warfare: the loss of manpower through combat, disease or desertion. As was seen in Chapter III, when they include details of horses killed or injured, the inventories can provide a most telling portrayal of the intensity of battle or the slow, continuous attrition of the march. These features of the horse inventories are important, but for the historian of Edwardian armies, the inventories are primarily of value as a guide to the identities of serving men-at-arms. In fact, as we shall see in Chapter VI, they offer far more than simply lists of names. By associating named individuals with warhorses of specified quality, they offer a unique insight into the character and attitudes of the chivalric class in fourteenth-century England. But before turning to this aspect of the subject, it is important to determine how this most distinctive collection of records fits into the overall corpus of documentation relating to late medieval military service. The personnel included in the inventories comprise a sample of the militarily active community of late medieval England; but what kind of sample do they represent and how does the profile of the military community which they reveal compare with that furnished by other military records?
1) The *vedia guerre* accounts

Although much scholarly attention has been devoted to the study of the impact of war on fourteenth-century England, comparatively little systematic, detailed work has been focused on the personnel of English royal armies and the composition of the military community in general. Whilst the patchiness of the records may make this understandable where the personnel of non-chivalrous backgrounds are concerned, it is rather the sheer bulk and inaccessibility of the manuscript sources which has discouraged reconstruction of the military lives of knights and esquires on anything other than a local level. But these voluminous records must be confronted, for only by attempting a quantitative approach to military service will it be possible to perceive change or continuity in the composition of armies and to gauge the size and character of the military community. It will soon be apparent that the task of reconstructing the military community of fourteenth-century England - of determining the number and identity of 'strenuous' knights and esquires in the military pool - can never be more than partially achieved. There are two dimensions to this problem. First, we cannot be sure of the overall numbers of men who took-up arms during this period. Second, of this uncertain number of militarily active men, only a proportion can be known by name.

Even if service in eastern Europe with the Teutonic knights or in Italy in the companies of *condottieri* is set aside - for such service must surely defy the efforts of the most determined quantifier - and attention is focused on those who joined the king's expeditions or served in his garrisons, it is rarely possible to determine with any
precision how many men were performing military service during a prescribed period. There are two reasons for this. On the one hand, the collection of source materials is incomplete; on the other, those records which are available possess a number of not inconsiderable interpretative difficulties. The period from Boroughbridge to Brétigny provides a good example. At first glance this appears to be a period well served by surviving pay rolls:¹ as far as the major royal expeditions are concerned, there are excellent series of accounts for the Scottish campaign of 1322, the War of Saint-Sardos in 1324-25,² the Scottish expeditions of 1334-38,³ the Low Countries campaign of 1338-39, those in Scotland in 1341-42 and in Brittany in 1342-43, and Edward III's last expedition to France in 1359-60.⁴ To complement the records for these major enterprises, there is a substantial corpus of pay accounts for military activity on a smaller scale: the English garrisons in Scotland and the borders during the 1330s are, for example, well served by such materials.⁵ Equally, however, there are important expeditions during this period for which no systematic pay materials are available. Much has been written about the Weardale campaign of 1327, from the vivid eye-witness account of Jean le Bel to a range of work by modern historians. But for this campaign and the next, which culminated in the dramatic

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¹ Prince, 'The strength of English armies in the reign of Edward III', provides a valuable guide to the records for the 1330s, '40s and '50s.

² For the materials for these two expeditions, see pp. 260-61.


⁴ For the 1338-39 campaign, see Norwell, pp. 325-62; for the expeditions to Scotland and Brittany in 1341-43, see E36/204 fos. 102-110v and Appendix 2; for the Rheims campaign, see E101/393/11 fos. 79-116v.

English victory at Halidon Hill, no systematic pay records have survived.6 Similar documentary unevenness afflicts the first phase of the Hundred Years War. Of the size and structure of Edward III's army which was so successful at Sluys and so frustrated in the siege camp outside Tournai, very little firm evidence survives. Similarly lacking is a full pay roll for the Crécy-Calais campaign of 1346-47.7 This is particularly frustrating bearing in mind that we do have detailed knowledge of some of the much smaller expeditionary forces commanded by Edward III's lieutenants at this time: for example, Henry, earl of Derby's army in Gascony in 1345,8 Sir Thomas Dagworth's in Brittany in 1346,9 and Edward Balliol's for a raid into Scotland in 1347.10

The unfortunate disappearance of the records for the Crécy-Calais campaign highlights one of the biggest obstacles to calculating the size of the active military community during the mid fourteenth-century. Where evidence for the size and structure of a particular army during the reign of Edward III is lacking, this will almost certainly be because the relevant vadis guerre records have failed to

6. Instead, there are miscellaneous accounts which are either very detailed but of restricted coverage, or wide-ranging but too imprecise. For the Weardale campaign, for example, a great deal can be known about the bishop of Ely's retinue (E101/18/6) and the London contingent (E101/35/2 m. 1 and E101/18/7); but John de Brunham's account book (E101/383/8), which reveals something of vadis guerre payments for this campaign (advances and debts for some captains), is inadequate for forming an impression of the army as a whole. These and other materials are discussed by V.B. Redstone, 'Some mercenaries of Henry of Lancaster, 1327-1330', T.R.H.S., 3rd ser., vii (1913), pp. 154-57; A.E. Prince, 'The importance of the campaign of 1327', E.H.R., l (1935), pp. 299-302; R. Nicholson, op. cit., Chapters 2 and 3; N.B. Lewis, 'The summons of the English feudal levy: 5 April 1327', Essays in medieval history presented to Bertie Wilkinson, ed. T.A. Sandquist and M.R. Powicke (Toronto, 1969), pp. 236-49; N. Fryde, The tyranny and fall of Edward II, 1321-1326 (Cambridge, 1979), Chapter 15. The only surviving financial document casting any light on the Halidon Hill expedition (B.L. Add. Ms. 35181) supplies no more than isolated details. For this campaign, see Nicholson, op. cit., Chapters 8 and 9.

7. See Chapter IV, p. 140 n. 78.

8. E101/25/9; see Fowler, The king's lieutenant, Appendix I.


10. E101/25/10; see Morris, 'Mounted infantry in medieval warfare', p. 100.
survive the intervening centuries, rather than because such records were never compiled. During Edward I's reign, as Michael Prestwich has shown, a substantial proportion of a royal army might serve 'voluntarily at their own expense'; they would appear, therefore, on neither feudal muster roll nor in the vadia guerre accounts, and can only be detected with the aid of less conventional sources.\(^{11}\) Unpaid service, whether voluntary or in response to feudal summons, can also be perceived during Edward II’s reign. The pay roll for the army which served in Scotland in the late summer of 1322 suggests a force of about 1,250 men-at-arms, but this does not include the feudal contingents listed on a proffer roll (over 500 men), not to mention an indeterminate number of men-at-arms paid for by retinue captains rather than by the Crown.\(^{12}\) By the 1330s, however, the attraction of voluntary, unpaid service appears very largely to have disappeared,\(^{13}\) whilst the Weardale campaign of 1327 was to be the only expedition of Edward III's reign in which unpaid feudal contingents were to play a part. Can it be safely assumed, therefore, that from the 1330s the pay accounts will present a true picture of army size and structure,\(^{14}\) even if the precise terms of payment might vary from one campaign to the next? In the case of some expeditions this may well be so, but on

\(^{11}\) Prestwich, 'Cavalry service in early fourteenth-century England', pp.147-48 (on Edward I's army in Scotland in 1300, which is illuminated by the Song of Caerlaverock). Cf. Prestwich, War, politics and finance under Edward I, Chapter III, which considers unpaid voluntary and feudal service for the whole reign.

\(^{12}\) B.L. Stowe Ms. 553 fos. 55v-63, 79v-83v; for the estimate of paid men-at-arms, see N. Fryde, The tyranny and fall of Edward II, 1321-1326 (Cambridge, 1979), p. 128 and n. 45; for the proffer roll, see C47/5/10; on the other unpaid troops, see above pp. 113-16.

\(^{13}\) There are a few traces of voluntary, gratuitous service. For example, in 1337 the Hospitallers supplied ten men-at-arms for the king's army (Lewis, 'The recruitment and organisation of a contract army', p. 13 n. 6); but, as Lewis observed, they 'had special reasons for wishing to be in the king's favour'. Another exception concerns the 'military community' of the Scots Marches, who would mobilise to defend the northern counties without pay, as during the brief Neville's Cross campaign in 1346 (Morris, 'Mounted infantry in medieval warfare', pp. 98-100).

\(^{14}\) Accepting, of course, that all armies would embrace a substantial number of non-combatants - camp-followers and servants - most of whom (i.e excluding engineers and craftsmen engaged in military duties) would not be paid directly by the Crown (Goodman, 'The military subcontracts of Sir Hugh Hastings', p. 120; J. Gillingham, The Wars of the Roses (London, 1981), pp. 43-44; cf. Contamine, Guerre, état et société, pp. 20-21, 24-25).
the whole we would be wise to approach mid fourteenth-century pay rolls with a degree of caution. This is not to deny that the evidence of financial accounts is generally more reliable than, for example, the testimony of narrative sources; but pay rolls contain many pitfalls for the unwary. On the one hand, a *vadia guerre* account, whilst giving the impression of completeness, might actually cover only part of an army's *paid* personnel. On occasions more than one paymaster operated simultaneously, with the result that more than one set of pay accounts would be produced. This occurred, for example, with the English forces in Scotland in 1337-38. Alternatively, part of an army might be financed in an unconventional way and, thus, would not find a place in the relevant *vadia guerre* accounts. Robert de Artois and William de Kildesby contributed substantial retinues (in all, perhaps 170 men-at-arms and 220 archers) to the second expeditionary force sent to Brittany in 1342, but they are not included in the pay roll for this campaign, apparently because both Artois and Kildesby had been granted assignments of wool to cover their wage bills.

Also apparently excluded from the *vadia guerre* accounts for the Breton

15. It has become customary to be critical of chroniclers' estimates of personnel numbers. See, for example, J.H. Ramsay 'The strength of English armies in the Middle Ages: estimates of chroniclers and modern writers', *E.H.R.*, xxix (1914), pp. 221-27. It is nevertheless clear that some mid fourteenth-century narrative sources do offer army size figures of the correct order of magnitude, though without the detailed breakdown at the retinue level provided by *vadia guerre* accounts; and it is possible, moreover, that chroniclers' figures may often have been inflated by the inclusion of non-combatants who do not appear in pay rolls. For balanced comments by modern continental historians see: C. Gaier, 'Analysis of military forces in the principality of Liège and the county of Looz from the twelfth to the fifteenth Century', *Studies in Medieval and Renaissance History*, ii (1965), pp. 209-11; P. Contamine, 'Froissart: art militaire, pratique et conception de la guerre', *Froissart: historian*, ed. J.J.N. Palmer (Woodbridge, 1981), pp. 134-35, 138-39.

16. Sometimes the gaps in the accounts are fairly obvious: for example, on the Roxburgh campaign, see Nicholson, *Edward III and the Scots*, p. 177 and Appendix III.

17. The paymasters were Edmund de la Beche, keeper of the wardrobe (E101/388/5) and Walter de Weston (E101/20/25): Prince, 'The strength of English armies in the reign of Edward III', pp. 358-60. Tout used Beche but not Weston (*Chapters*, iv, p. 100-1); J.E. Morris used Weston but not Beche (Morris, 'Mounted infantry in medieval warfare', pp. 93-94).

18. See Appendix 2.
campaign of 1342-43 are several hundred fighting men who were serving in return for charters of pardon.\textsuperscript{19} The terms whereby 'service pardons' could be obtained had not remained unaltered since their introduction as a recruiting device in the 1290s.\textsuperscript{20} On occasions, as for the Roxburgh campaign in 1334-35, pay was provided for those serving for a royal pardon,\textsuperscript{21} but by the early 1340s the terms of service were rather different. The privy seal warrants and captains' certificates of service for the Breton campaign in 1342-43 make it clear that the grant of a charter of pardon was normally dependent upon a year's service in the king's armies - and that a man served \textit{a ses custages propres}.\textsuperscript{22} The Crown was willing to make concessions: men who had served with the earl of Northampton from the summer of 1342 until the following January were awarded pardons with no strings attached.\textsuperscript{23} For a man who had only joined the campaign in the autumn, however, the grant of a pardon was conditional upon further service: \textit{il serra prest de perfourmir le remenant dun an en notre service a ses custages propres ou et quant nous lui voudrons assigner.}\textsuperscript{24} Mainpernors, whose names appear with the enrolled pardons,\textsuperscript{25} stood surety for the performance of this service. Whatever the precise

\textsuperscript{19} Enrolled, primarily, on the Treaty rolls: C76/17 & 18.
\textsuperscript{22} For example: C81 file 287, which includes many privy seal warrants; SC1/39 mm. 144-8 (certificates of service for a quarter of a year's service, issued by the earl of Northampton).
\textsuperscript{23} For example, C81/287 nos. 15177, 15186, 15192-93, 15196-97.
\textsuperscript{24} This is a standard formula: see for example C81/287 nos. 15178-85. These terms for earning a 'service pardon' had applied at least to the previous campaign: a warrant dated 17 September 1342, describes how Thomas Mankel \textit{chapellain}, who \textit{par certeine meiprise} was required to serve on the king's next expedition (i.e. to Brittany) at his own cost, was released from this undertaking at the request of the earl of Suffolk and in return for a promise \textit{de channter pour les almes de noz anncestres}: C81/286 no. 15008. The same terms can also be seen to have applied to garrison service at Berwick in 1342-43 (SC1/39 m. 154) and on the Isle of Wight a year or two earlier (C.P.R. 1338-40, p. 457).
\textsuperscript{25} For an insight into the process of finding sureties in Chancery or in the county court, see C237 (Bails on Special Pardons); file 6 concerns the period of the Breton campaign of 1342-43.
nature of their obligations, those who served at their own cost for a royal pardon would not be included in the manpower totals in an army's pay accounts. It will rarely, if ever, be possible to determine their exact numbers because the enrolled lists of pardon recipients are unlikely to be complete. Any adjustments to the figures given in *vadia guerre* accounts, to make allowance for unpaid troops serving in return for pardons, must therefore necessarily be tentative; but in those cases where service for pardons can be seen to have been unpaid, we should perhaps be prepared to add about 5-10% to the paid strength of an army.

If it can be shown that *vadia guerre* accounts can lead historians to under-estimate the strength of armies, then it must also be recognised that they are as likely to present a misleadingly inflated impression of army size. Troops who were receiving the king's pay were not necessarily on active service; the Breton campaign of 1342-43, once again, provides a good example. The *vadia guerre* accounts for the expedition suggest that the whole of the third expeditionary force under Edward III's personal command arrived in Brittany in late October. Other records show that part of the king's army - at the very least, the earl of Gloucester's retinue - was still in Plymouth on 15 November, but the pay roll gives no hint of this. Moreover, whilst it is possible that Gloucester's company never left England (his men appear to have lost not a single warhorse), it is more or

26. Sometimes, indeed, apparent *lacunae* in an army's structure may be explained in terms of the absence of unpaid units from the *vadia guerre* accounts. In 1335, for example, the earl of Cornwall served with 135 paid men-at-arms, but no paid archers (Nicholson, op. cit., p. 248); yet the Scots rolls for this year include the names of fifty-one men receiving pardons *per testimonium* the earl (C71/15 m. 16). The pardon recipients appear to be archers (none of them can be identified as men-at-arms with known links with the earl): if so, they must have formed a special 'felons company' serving at their own costs.

27. For a consideration of numbers of pardon recipients, see below pp. 203-6. The Rheims campaign of 1359-60 appears to be the last expedition for which 'service pardons' were issued in large numbers.
less certain that the some of the foot contingents raised for this expedition, and duly entered on the pay roll, never actually reached Brittany. 28

A more pervasive interpretive problem associated with many sets of pay rolls is a tendency to present an impression of unbroken continuity in personnel numbers, thus concealing the effects of mortality, desertion, authorised withdrawals, late arrivals and promotions on the size and structure of an army and its constituent companies. Some vadis guerre accounts do reveal the shifting composition of an army’s retinues with meticulous precision, 29 though the reasons for the changes in numbers are not always explicitly given. 30 But many pay rolls present a disarmingly simple picture. The numbers of paid personnel remain the same throughout a campaign, with no allowance apparently being made for campaign attrition or the arrival and departure of individuals. Thus, the earl of Derby’s retinue appears to have lost not a single man during the course of his remarkable

28. For a fuller discussion, see Appendix 2.

29. For example, the earl of Salisbury’s retinue in Scotland during the winter-spring campaign of 1337-38 (E101/20/25 m. 3; E101/20/26 m. 2 - the latter being a more detailed version of the account); personnel numbers are given for a series of consecutive time-spans (very roughly monthly intervals). Unfortunately for the modern historian the more usual method of indicating shifts in manpower numbers at the retinue level involves giving a single set of figures for the whole campaign, which is then qualified by deductions for ‘man-days’ lost. Such deductions, or vacaciones, are sometimes painstakingly detailed (e.g. the earl of Salisbury’s retinue serving at sea in 1373: B.L., Add. Ms. 37494 fo. 10), but as often they exhibit an air of artificiality.

30. The vadis guerre accounts for the War of Saint-Sardos (B.L. Add. Ms. 7967 fos. 30-93v) are an unusual exception. They reveal that eight men-at-arms died (five are named) and many others withdrew during the course of the campaign for reasons ranging from illness, to attendance at hastiludia. Two esquires left Sir Fulk Fitz Warin’s retinue to go versus partes Lumbard, presumably in pursuit of more lucrative campaigning conditions (ibid. fo. 30v). At times, where the pay rolls for an expedition consist of a series of retinue-level accounts, there is inconsistency in the amount of detail supplied. For example, of the retinue accounts surviving from Buckingham's expedition of 1380-81, only that concerning Sir Ralph Basset's company refers specifically to fatalities (E101/39/8 m. 2); yet we might reasonably expect this long, tough campaign to have given rise to a fairly high level of casualties (see A. Goodman, The loyal conspiracy (London, 1971), pp. 124-26). Indeed, when the Thomas, duke of Gloucester founded Pleshy College in the early 1390s, he made provision for annual commemoration of those who had died during the 1380-81 expedition: R. Gough, The history and antiquities of Pleshy in the county of Essex (London, 1803), p. 180.
chevauchées in Gascony in 1345-46.\textsuperscript{31} Meanwhile, Sir Thomas de Dagworth's company serving in Brittany apparently remained at full strength throughout 1346, despite an active campaign which included the battle of St. Pol de Leon.\textsuperscript{32} We are even less inclined to believe the incredibly neat pay accounts for the Rheims campaign. The Prince of Wales' retinue, for instance, remained the same size for pay purposes for the full 273 days of the expedition, though it lost 395 horses during the same period.\textsuperscript{33} A similar unconvincing neatness is exhibited by the pay rolls for a number of other major royal expeditions.\textsuperscript{34}

How can such artificially streamlined and uncomplicated pay accounts be explained? It is difficult to believe that no movements or losses of personnel actually took place; and yet such vacaciones and arrivals should have had an effect on the retinue wage-bills. The terms allowed to the earl of Salisbury in his indenture of 1428, whereby there was to be no reduction in wage receipts for soldiers who were ill or had died,\textsuperscript{35} do not represent normal fourteenth-century practice.\textsuperscript{36} On occasion it is clear that captains were serving with

\textsuperscript{31} E101/25/9.

\textsuperscript{32} E101/25/17.

\textsuperscript{33} Seven bannerets, 136 knights, 443 esquires and 900 horse archers: E101/393/11, fo. 79. Apart from withdrawals and casualties, one would have expected some allowance to have been made in the Prince's account for elevations to knighthood (cf. Scalacronica, p. 157 and other retinues in the pay roll which do allow for newly created knights: e.g. E101/393/11, fos. 83, 85).

\textsuperscript{34} For example, the Roxburgh campaign of 1334-35: Nicholson, Edward III and the Scots, p. 181 & Appendix III. The vadia guerre accounts for the Breton campaign of 1342-43 do allow for vacaciones, but many of the retinues, like Sir Hugh le Despenser's for example, remained wholly unscathed, at least for pay purposes, throughout the campaign (E36/204 fo. 106). Yet Despenser's retinue was involved in the hard-fought battle of Morlaix and one of his prominent knights, Edward le Despenser, was killed there (C61/54 m. 30; Murimuth, p. 127; C.I.P.M., viii, no. 395).


\textsuperscript{36} The arrangements whereby the wages of those who had been killed or taken prisoner would be paid for the period prior to their death or capture are conveniently articulated in the records for Buckingham's expedition of 1380 (which duly make allowance for vacaciones and promotions):
more men than the Crown was willing to pay for: in these circumstances a retinue, sustained by a plentiful supply of replacements, could legitimately maintain its maximum size in the pay rolls.37

Replacements were no doubt commonly employed by captains to fill gaps in their companies - and any assessment of the numbers of individuals serving in a particular expeditionary force needs to take account of this;38 and yet unless it was normal practice for captains to maintain a pool of manpower which was not supported by the king's pay, we must doubt whether sufficient numbers of unemployed men would always be on hand to plug gaps as soon as they appeared.39 There will often, therefore, have been short-term fluctuations in retinue numbers.

It is usual to explain the 'tidiness' of fourteenth-century vadia guerre accounts in terms of the fraudulent practices of profit-seeking captains, who were able to claim pay for 'absentees and even for non-existent soldiers' because the mechanisms of muster and review were insufficiently rigorous.40 Whether muster and review controls were quite as 'lax' as has sometimes been suggested is, however, open to question. Direct evidence, in the form of collections of muster rolls, is certainly patchy, but as has been seen with the horse inventories, the pattern of documentary survival may not adequately reflect the pattern of production. Where bundles of muster rolls have

E101/39/6 & 8.

37. For example, Sir Ralph de Ufford, as Justiciar of Ireland in 1344-46, was allowed pay for a company of forty men-at-arms: see above, pp.45-46.

38. A muster roll of Thomas, earl of Arundel's retinue in 1415 shows that in addition to the earl himself, sixteen men-at-arms left the siege of Harfleur because of illness and that a further two esquires died there. The majority of these men were, however, replaced, and the earl's pay account consequently makes allowance for only five vacaciones amongst the retinue's esquires. E101/41/7.

39. Despenser's army in 1383 was accompanied by 'countless persons with neither horses nor weapons', but such camp-followers were more a nuisance than a fruitful source of replacements (Westminster, p. 45). Cf. the 'large pool of soldiers' available to garrison commanders in Lancastrian Normandy: A. E. Curry, Military organisation in Lancastrian Normandy, 1422-50 (Council for National Academic Awards, Ph.D thesis, 1985), p. 207.

survived for field campaigns we see a system of periodic manpower checks\(^{41}\) - and not just at the beginning and end of expeditions. Sometimes, as at Clery on 5 August 1380, new rolls would be compiled for mid-campaign musters;\(^{42}\) alternatively, existing rolls could be marked (or 'pointed')\(^{43}\) and annotated where men had arrived, departed or died. Moreover, as we have seen, some vadia guerre accounts do document changes in personnel numbers with great precision. The pay rolls for the 1336 Scots campaign show, for example, that Sir William de Montagu's company of men-at-arms changed size eight times between 14 June and 3 December, as a result of arrivals and departures.\(^{44}\) Clearly regular checks had been made on the personnel of this and, indeed, other retinues in the army.\(^{45}\) During the following summer we see a further glimpse of the mechanism of inspection. On 25 July the marshal of the army was ordered to make regular reviews of men in the king's pay in order to restrict payment those who were actually present.\(^{46}\)

There can be no doubt that, given the opportunity, some - perhaps many - captains would inflate their pay claims with 'dead souls'. As


\(^{42}\) E101/39/7 m. 4; E101/39/9 mm. 3 & 4. In the case of Sir William de Windsor's retinue, a second mid-campaign muster roll has survived: E101/39/7 m. 3. It can be assigned to the period following 10 February 1381, when a number of personnel changes occurred.

\(^{43}\) For example, a roll of Sir Walter Huwet's retinue (dated only '20 July'): E101/35/2 m. 8. On the use of dots ('pointing') and crosses on muster rolls, see Newhall, *Muster and review*, p. 15.

\(^{44}\) B.L., Cotton Ms., Nero C. VIII fo. 241; cf. above n.29.

\(^{45}\) John de Houton had been appointed 'to receive and review the men-at-arms and others' in the English army, a task which included the valuation of warhorses (B.L. Cotton Ms., Nero C. VIII fos. 243v, 280v-81v; A.E. Prince, 'The payment of army wages in Edward III's reign', *Speculum*, xix (1944), p. 139 & n. 12). Muster rolls survive for the retinues of Henry of Lancaster and Sir Ralph de Neville: E101/15/12 and E101/19/36 m. 4.

\(^{46}\) *Rot. Scot.*, i, 497a; Lewis, 'The recruitment and organisation of a contract army', p. 4. Muster rolls exist for the retinues of four captains (including two for Sir Henry de Percy): E101/20/17 m. 2, 4, 5, 6; E101/20/18 m. 2.
McFarlane observed, 'had there been no disease, the cure would have been unnecessary'. But it is equally clear that the problem of pay fraud had been appreciated by the Crown long before the 1420s. It is true that the English occupation of Normandy, based upon several dozen garrisons (2,500-5,000 men), high-lighted the problem particularly forcefully, but garrisons had always offered particularly fertile soil for the flourishing of fraudulent practices. Long, uneventful terms of duty encouraged absenteeism; men were liable to go off *a leurs aventures*. Garrison captains might be counted on to maximise their personal profits if left unsupervised, even though, by employing an understrength garrison, they might endanger the security of the stronghold in their charge. So it is no surprise to find plentiful evidence that mid fourteenth-century garrisons financed by the English Crown were, indeed, kept under close scrutiny. Thus, for example, a review of the Edinburgh castle garrison was made on 18 May 1337 by Sir John de Swanland, the resulting roll forming part of a valuable collection of annotated muster lists, with associated detailed vadia guerre accounts, which survive from the English royal garrison in Scotland and the borders during the 1330s and 1340s.


49. See, Curry, *Military organisation in Lancastrian Normandy*, especially Appendices II-VI, which builds upon the classic work by R.A. Newhall.


51. As was alleged of Sir Richard Tempest, constable of Roxburgh castle in the early 1360s: *Bain*, iv, no. 64.

52. E101/19/24 m. 12; partly printed in *Bain*, iii, pp. 362-63.

53. See below, pp. 205-9. As with field armies, the comings and goings of personnel during an accounting period were usually recorded on a single annotated muster roll. Allowance would be made for personnel movements in accompanying pay rolls: the records for Edinburgh and Stirling castles, for the period 1340-42, furnish pay details of those who served throughout and then a series of sub-sections for individuals or groups who were present for only part of the time. For example,
Similarly, from the other end of the kingdom, there is every indication that the size and composition of the Isle of Wight garrison in 1338-39 was very carefully monitored by the paymaster appointed by the Crown, John de Windsor: the frequent changes in manpower numbers which his account record suggest that regular and fastidious musters were taken. Evidence from English garrisons in France in the fourteenth-century is admittedly rather more patchy. The indenture between Henry, earl of Derby and the Gascon captains of Bergerac (September 1345) required the garrison to be mustered for review by the earl's deputy every eight days. Bundles of surviving muster rolls testify to the regular scrutiny to which the personnel serving in the fortresses of the Calais region were subjected. But in respect of its paid garrison, Calais was somewhat exceptional. There was no prospect of the English Crown being able to pay the wages of more than a handful of garrisons in France, and so for the majority of 'English' strongholds, it was impossible to implement a system of muster and review.

The muster roll for Stirling shows that Sir John de Stricheley was killed on 10 October 1341 and, appropriately, the pay roll includes a separate section for 'one knight' whose pay ceased on that day: E101/23/1 mm. 3, 5.

54. E101/21/32. The Crown was evidently only too well aware of the danger of pay fraud on the Isle of Wight. In October 1347 an effort was made to establish whether the garrison maintained during the previous six months, by the keepers of the island and of Carisbrooke castle, had been of the proportions required by the terms of their indentures (C.P.R., 1345-48, pp. 459-60).


56. See, for example, an excellent set of rolls for 1356: E101/27/6.

57. Muster rolls have survived for a few garrisons: for example, St Sauveur in 1370-1 (E101/30/38 & E101/31/18) and Brest in 1378 (E101/37/2).

58. Fowler, *The king's lieutenant*, pp. 165-70. Some of the garrisons which were financed from England, such as those at Brest and Cherbourg during the 1380s, were paid for on the basis of the 'flat-rate' system. A captain received an annual fee, from which he had to maintain an adequate garrison; but numbers were rarely specified, nor was he required to hold regular musters (see M. Jones, *Ducal Brittany, 1364-1399* (Oxford, 1970), pp. 148, 152). The flat-rate system had frequently been employed for English garrisons in the Scots Marches, and in particular at Berwick (see above, p. 144). In the 1420s, it was used for a proportion of the 'least vulnerable' garrisons in Lancastrian Normandy: Curry, *Military organisation in Lancastrian Normandy*, pp. 222-3.
If, as the evidence seems to suggest, muster and review was a normal accompaniment to paid military service, whether 'in the field' or in garrison, are we to ascribe the not inconsiderable number of very 'tidy' fourteenth-century pay accounts to lapses in the system? Was it simply that rigorous muster and review mechanisms were applied to some expeditions and not others? Perhaps; but it must not be forgotten that the extraordinary tidiness of some pay accounts would have made them appear no more credible at the time of their presentation than they do now. The army paymaster or Exchequer officials are unlikely to have been deceived. We may be confident that captains, in their own interests, would keep a careful check on absenteeism and mortality in their retinues, and royal administration would be fully aware of this, so that an excessively tidy account could only be interpreted as a piece of pure fraud. The greed of captains must necessarily have been accompanied by a good deal of administrative acquiescence - unless, of course, the accounts were the product, not of deceit and collusion, but rather of

59. There appear to be no significant, consistent differences between the materials generated by armies recruited by indenture of war and those financed and organised by the Wardrobe. Periods of administrative experiment (often no doubt prompted by a desire to 'tighten-up'), such as that coinciding with the Scottish operations of 1336-38, have sometimes left a legacy of scrupulously detailed records and an impression, for the modern observer, of unusually strict muster and review practices.

60. On the work of captains' clerks, see Newhall, Muster and review, p. 54; for the employment of 'treasurers of war' by magnate captains, see McFarlane, The nobility of later medieval England, pp. 25-6.

61. Perhaps administrative complicity in obviously artificial pay claims should be seen as a kind of quid pro quo for tolerance by captains of heavy campaign costs or long delays in receiving pay from the Crown (cf. A.J. Pollard, John Talbot and the war in France, 1427-1453 (London, 1983), p. 109). Inflated claims may, thus, have been allowed to include an element of built-in 'interest' to compensate for probable delays in payment. In the later sixteenth-century, a captain in Elizabeth's army might be allowed pay for a number of men who were not actually serving, the extra payment being called 'dead pays' (see C.G. Cruickshank, Elizabeth's army (2nd. edition, Oxford, 1966), pp. 154-58). Thus, for example, for every ninety men in a company, a captain might receive pay for one hundred, the extra pay being intended as a bonus for the captain (and selected members of the company) to cover costs. There is no direct evidence for the operation of a 'dead pays' system in the fourteenth-century; regard payments, which begin to be offered for field campaigns during the 1340s, appear to have been intended to perform a similar function. But some form of system whereby Crown, in certain circumstances, allowed captains legitimately to claim pay for men who were not in service would go some way to explain the extraordinarily neat pay accounts which are such a common feature of the period.
the 'flexible' accounting practices of royal clerks. There is plenty of evidence to suggest that this was, indeed, the case: that the figures could be manipulated and summarised before they appeared in the final *vadia guerre* account. One way in which this was done was to allow departures and arrivals to cancel out. In this way, the personnel figures could be greatly simplified within the confines of the total wage-bill and the period of service, with the result that the pay roll would show a retinue with proportions which it never actually possessed during the course of a campaign. Thus, for example, Sir Ralph de Neville's retinue serving in Scotland for the period from mid May to early December 1336, as revealed by the final *vadia guerre* account, consisted of thirty-six men-at-arms, but with the qualification that three knights and ten esquires were absent for forty-two days and one esquire for four days. 62 A draft account for this retinue, a valuable rare survival, divides the period into seven sections and brings us closer to reality: the retinue consisted of thirty men-at-arms from mid May to mid June, attained a peak strength of thirty-nine in late August / early September, but dropped to only twenty during an eight week spell in the autumn. At no stage did it consist of thirty-six men. 63 For purposes of compiling a neat, compact entry in the Wardrobe Book, fluctuations in manpower numbers have been crudely ironed-out. The *vacaciones* which have been allowed for, bear no relation to actual periods of absence; they are simply accounting devices. This is by no means an isolated example. The account for Sir William de Windsor's retinue, part of Buckingham's army serving in France and Brittany in 1380-81, allows (amongst other things) for the deduction of 1,033 'knight-days' from a base figure of

63. E101/19/36 m. 4d; another version of this account is to be found on the front of m. 4.
twelve knights serving for a period of 308 days. The survival of a series of complementary muster rolls allows us to see, however, that this figure of twelve knights is purely arbitrary; and, moreover, that the vacaciones total has been arrived at simply in order to square the number of declared personnel with the amount of pay which was due to Windsor for the service of the twenty actual knights who, for varying lengths of time, were members of his retinue during this campaign.

The 'man-at-arms' in the pay rolls begins, therefore, to resemble a convenient unit of accounting; at times, indeed, that was precisely what he was. According to the final vadia guerre account for the 1336 Scots campaign, Sir John de Tibetot's retinue consisted of nineteen men-at-arms and its size remained unchanged through the summer and into the autumn. Once again, a complementary record reveals how the pay roll misrepresents the truth. A horse inventory for Tibetot's company includes only fifteen men-at-arms, but on the same membrane are listed the names of twelve mounted archers, which (a note adds) are accounting as four men-at-arms. In the final pay roll these twelve archers have actually become four of the nineteen men-at-arms in Tibetot's retinue and were it not for the survival of the horse

64. E101/39/7 m. 2.
65. E101/39/7 mm. 1, 3, 4. For the first two months of the campaign there were ten knights in Windsor's retinue. Five new knights were created on 24 August 1380, but numbers gradually declined to a low point of nine in mid/late January 1381, followed by a slight increase to ten, a figure which was sustained until the end of the campaign at the start of May. For only one short spell (a little over a week in early January 1381) were there actually twelve knights in Windsor's retinue.
66. The method of calculating the vacaciones total of 1033 days involved a partial matching of late arrivals with early departures: 193 days between the departure of three knights and the arrival of three new recruits; 386 days following the withdrawal of four further knights, without subsequent replacement; 454 days before the late arrival of two knights. No account is taken in this calculation of the five newly created knights, nor of the fact that three of them withdrew from service in the early weeks of 1381.
68. E101/19/36 m. 5d. Each archer was being paid fourpence per day and so three of them cost the equivalent of a single man-at-arms.
inventory, we would be wholly unaware of that these four 'men' are no more than convenient units of account. As far as the royal clerks were concerned the all-important thing about the final account was that it should record the correct pay total for each retinue. A wholly understandable desire to present the less essential (and in draft documents extremely bulky) information in concise form was felt to justify a process of summarisation which must often have involved a degree of distortion.\(^69\) The historian can only regret that, very often, he must be content with suspiciously simple views of an army's component retinues. As we have seen, by no means all pay rolls appear to be afflicted by this problem; but it is difficult to know when and to what extent the clerical scalpel has been at work. Comparatively few really useful muster rolls and draft pay accounts have survived, so we are often left wondering what might lie beneath the surface of comparatively innocent looking pay rolls, such as those for the Breton campaign of 1342-43. In this particular case, of the twenty-seven retinues shown as fielding at least ten men-at-arms, only eight make allowance for *vacaciones* among the men-at-arms.\(^70\) Where losses are allowed for, the numbers involved are very modest and the periods of absence rarely extend for longer than a few weeks. The impression given is, to say the least, improbable, bearing in mind that this was a campaign marked by much hard fighting - including a pitched battle at Morlaix, a series of assaults on fortified towns and several sieges - and ending with a tempestuous passage back to England, in which several ship-loads of men were lost. According to the pay roll, of the 200 men-at-arms in the earl of Northampton's retinue (which served in all for 203 days), one knight and two esquires were absent for

\(^69\) Sometimes this was difficult: the earl of Salisbury's retinue in 1336 grew from six to fifty-eight men and such dramatic changes in retinue size could not easily be summarised (B. L. Cotton Ms., Nero C. VIII fo. 241).

\(^70\) *Vacaciones* amongst the archers in these retinues are rather more numerous: in seventeen of these twenty-seven retinues.
thirty days and one esquire for forty-seven days.\textsuperscript{71} There is a strong
odour of accounting invention here; whatever the real extent of
manpower fluctuations in Northampton's retinue, all have been
concealed by a cloak of clerical summarisation. The pay which would
be due to a retinue of the strength presented in the account very
nearly matches the pay that was actually due to the earl at the end of
this arduous campaign, and the difference, a surplus of £6. 7s., was
easily accounted for by inventing some very modest \textit{vacaciones}.

'Medieval official documents', it has been observed, 'are not always
strictly factual statements of what they purport to record'.\textsuperscript{72} The
historian of late medieval English armies would be wise to take heed
of these words and to approach the \textit{vadia guerre} records with a very
considerable measure of caution. The pay rolls are, of course, highly
enticing. They are neatly laid-out, not infrequently finely detailed
and they may give no obvious hint of incompleteness. They appear to
be an historian's dream, but as a rule they cannot be taken at face
value. They may offer a false impression of personnel numbers; and
even if the representation of army size at the start of a campaign is
of the correct order of magnitude, the continuous turnover of
personnel - late arrivals, early departures, fatalities and deserters
- is all too often concealed from view. Thus, as a source for the
numbers of men engaged in military service during a particular
campaign, such records may offer a less than wholly reliable guide: a
consideration which must be borne in mind when attempting to use them
as a means of measuring the size and proportions of the military
community as a whole.

\textsuperscript{71} E36/204 fo. 106. The 'absence' of forty-seven days is rather longer than usual; but even so, if the
account is taken at face value it suggests that the retinue suffered no losses during the early weeks of
the campaign, and in particular during the assault on Morlaix or the battle immediately afterwards.

ii) Letters of protection, charters of pardon and muster rolls

A calculation of the numbers of men employed in expeditionary forces or garrisons in various theatres of war is but a first step to developing an understanding of the military community. An assessment of the size, social composition and changing membership of the military community, depends fundamentally upon the identification of the men involved - upon the uncovering of their names and, where possible, the separation of those with the same or similar names into distinct career profiles. It is, indeed, the identification of individuals and the reconstruction of their careers that presents the most intractable problem for the historian of fourteenth-century military service. Although it will often be possible to establish a fairly accurate estimate of the numbers of men-at-arms serving in an army, it will usually only be a minority of them who can be known by name - and a smaller number still who can be identified with absolute confidence as men who served in other campaigns.

What are the principal source materials for the names of serving men-at-arms? The most consistently available are the lists of letters of protection enrolled on the Chancery rolls. Protections, together with enrolled appointments of attorney, are very much the staple diet of the student of Edwardian armies. They need, however, to be handled with care. In the first place, the enrolment of a letter of protection is not an absolutely reliable guide to military service:

1. They appear, depending on the theatre of war in which their recipients are to serve, on the Gascon, Patent, Scots or Treaty rolls. Compared with the huge number of enrolled protections, very few of the original letters patent have survived. A very rare example, with remains of the Great Seal still attached, is that issued to Henry de Pipe for service in the duke of Lancaster's retinue in 1359: E313/4/16.

2. For an assessment of the importance of letters of protection see Saul, Knights and esquires, p. 48; as will be apparent, the present writer would differ to some degree with Nigel Saul's conclusions. The evidence of protections was used to good effect by J.E. Morris in his pioneering work on Edwardian armies: see, for example, The Welsh wars of Edward I, pp. 243-46, 260-62, 290-91 and 'Mounted infantry in medieval warfare', p. 85 n. 2. Cf. also Prestwich, War, politics and finance under Edward I, pp. 62-65, 237; Fowler, The king's lieutenant, p. 227.
they are statements of intent, rather than firm evidence of performance, and their essential purpose - to provide the recipient with security from a range of legal actions during a period of military service - was open to abuse. A propertied man intending to join the king’s army would be well advised to acquire a protection before leaving, in order to guard against the risks of legal skulduggery in his absence. A man who failed to take this precaution might well find himself discomforted par malice de ses adversers.

There were, on the other hand, many who sought protections simply as a means of delaying the legal process or evading it altogether. Most men would probably actually perform the promised military service, but some clearly defaulted: having been issued with a protection they failed to appear at muster. John de Lambron was such a man. According to an anonymous captain, he had received a protection, but est demorrez en pais & ne vint pas ovesque moi en dit voliage [as partes Descoce]. It is difficult to assess the extent of protection

3. In 1345, for example, proceedings in King’s Bench involving Thomas de Bernardeston were postponed sine die following his production of a letter of protection showing him to be about to depart for Brittany in the retinue of the earl of Oxford (C76/20 m. 22): Public works in medieval law, i, Selden Soc., xxxii (1915), pp. 309-10. Cf. cases cited in Morgan, War and society in medieval Cheshire, p. 152. Some legal actions, such as assizes of novel disseisin, were excepted from standard letters of protection (Prince, The indenture system under Edward III, p. 296; D.W. Sutherland, The assize of novel disseisin (Oxford, 1973), pp. 54-55), so that it was often necessary for men to seek, and the Crown to allow, broader based legal immunity. In November 1336 Edward III ordered that assizes of novel disseisin should be delayed in the case of men in the king’s service: C.C.R., 1333-37, pp. 725-26. For a good example of a man faced by two assizes of novel disseisin whilst serving overseas and seeking remedie solonc les ordinances, see SC1/39 m. 135. Cf. C81/287 mm. 15139, 15141, 15158, 15170 for men seeking delays in assizes of novel disseisin during the Breton campaign of 1342-43; each of them had, in addition, secured an ordinary letter of protection (i.e. with clause volumus). Robert de Sussex’s essoin in King’s Bench during the Michaelmas term, 1342 (KB121/7 m. 26d), was probably necessitated by his service in Brittany; he does not have an enrolled protection for this expedition. (On Sussex’s career, see below p. 314.) For a fuller discussion of the ‘several methods by which the law took account of royal service’ in the fourteenth-century, see J.S. Critchley, ‘The early history of the writ of judicial protection’, B.I.H.R., xlv (1972), pp. 196-99. The Year Books, Edward III (Rolls Ser.) provide insights into the day to day treatment of protections in the courts.

4. SC1/39 m. 135.

5. SC1/41 m. 147. Occasionally we find complaints from aggrieved parties in legal cases: see, for example, the assertion by the abbot of York that one of the abbey’s debtors, Nicholas de Portington, was living at home and not on active service (SC1/39 m. 100). Cf. Rot. Part., i, p. 162a for a similar petition.
fraud in quantitative terms. The bulk of the evidence, consisting of either letters from captains requesting that an absentee’s protection should be revoked or formal orders of revocation enrolled on the Chancery rolls, appears to date from the later fourteenth-century, and a good deal of it concerns garrison service. This may suggest a worsening problem, but is more likely to reflect tighter administrative controls: it may be that more rigorous muster and review methods were obliging captains to notify the authorities when men failed to appear, when previously it would have been easier for them to keep quiet and pocket the absent men’s pay.

A more significant deficiency of the protection lists is their incompleteness. Of the men-at-arms serving in an army, only a proportion would have enrolled protections: rarely would a captain secure protections pour lui & toutes ses gens qui irront en sa compagnie. Thus, for example, whilst the combined total of men-at-arms for the three expeditions to Brittany in 1342-43, as presented in the pay rolls, was about 1,900, there are enrolled protections for only 722 individuals. Bearing in mind that the pay rolls

6. There are few enrolled revocations for the period prior to Brétigny (but see, for example, e.g. C76/23 m. 8d [1346], C76/30 m. 6 [1352], C76/37 m. 21 [1359]); but this evidence can be supplemented by records of investigations into individual cases of fraud. In 1360, for example, the sheriffs of London found that Nicholas Mate, who should have been in France with the earl of Warwick, had remained in domo sua in warda de Crepulgate London: C258 (Certiorari - corpus cum causa), file 13 m. 2; cf. similar cases in files 11-13. A torrent of revocations appear in the 1370s and ’80s. On 4 August 1370, for example, twenty-three of the men who should have served in Aquitaine with Sir Walter Huwet had their protections revoked: C61/83 mm. 1, 2, 5, 7 (protections), C.P.R., 1367-70, pp. 457-8 (revocations). From the 1380s, in addition to the evidence on the Patent rolls, there are a number of surviving requests for revocation: e.g. by the Bishop of Norwich (C81/1735 mm. 33-36), by Thomas de Percy, captain of Brest (SC1/41 m. 79), and Hugh de Calveley, keeper of the Channel Islands (SC1/43 m. 52; cf. C.P.R., 1385-89, p. 267). Such requests are rather scarce for the early decades of Edward III’s reign; but see SC1/41 m. 147 and Bain, v, no. 733.

7. A closer control on protection fraud from the 1350s seems to coincide with the ‘interposition of the privy seal into the chain of warrants’: the privy seal office’s increasing control over the issue of protections, as a natural adjunct to its handling of military indentures. See A.L. Brown, ‘The authorisation of letters under the great seal’, B.I.H.R. xxxvii (1964), pp. 130-31.

8. As envisaged by Sir John Chandos’ indenture of war, dated 20 September 1362: E101/68/4 m. 83.

9. For the manpower totals of these expeditions, see Appendix 2. The great majority of letters of protection for this campaign are to be found on the Treaty rolls (C76/17 and 18), but those for Sir
underestimate the number of men-at-arms serving in this army and that a few protection recipients were non-combatants, it is clear that little more than a third of the men-at-arms involved in this campaign had acquired legal protection for their absence from England. The proportion of men-at-arms who were protection recipients varied from retinue to retinue: Sir Bartholomew de Burgherssh senior had secured protections for two-thirds of his knights and esquires, whilst the earl of Salisbury had done this for less than a fifth of his.10 Quite as uneven was the proportion of protection recipients from one campaign to the next. There are indications that the intended theatre of operations played a part in determining numbers. There is, for example, a clear tendency for a larger percentage of men-at-arms to have protections for overseas expeditions, than for campaigns in Scotland.11 As a consequence (bearing in mind the overwhelming importance of letters of protection as a source for military service) we are likely to know rather more about the continental dimension of men's careers than about their service against the Scots - a distorting factor which must always be borne in mind when considering the composition and service horizons of the mid fourteenth-century military community.

Why is it that protections evidence is available for only a proportion - often a minority - of serving men-at-arms? Could it be that a large number of protections were being requested but not collected, or issued but not enrolled? The survival of large numbers of captains'

Hugh le Despenser's retinue were for some reason entered on the Gascon roll (C61/54).

10. See Appendix 2 for details.

11. Perhaps as many as two-thirds of Edward III's army in the Low Countries in 1338-39; see below pp.230-31. By contrast, of the men-at-arms serving in Scotland during the Roxburgh campaign (1334-35) and the great expedition of the following summer, about 20% on each occasion have enrolled protections on the Scots rolls: C71/14 & 15. For the size of these two armies, see Nicholson, Edward III and the Scots, pp. 174-81, 198-200.
fist warrants for protections\textsuperscript{12} might provide a clue, as it is often possible to correlate warrant and enrolment. In 1327, Sir Henry de Percy requested the issue of protections for no fewer than forty-two men, including twenty-three knights; but of these, only seven appear with enrolled protections on the corresponding Scots roll.\textsuperscript{13} There are many similar cases of imbalance between the number of protections requested and the number enrolled. On occasions, a marginal cross indicates those names listed on the warrant which do not appear in the corresponding enrolment.\textsuperscript{14} Whilst this may represent issue without enrolment,\textsuperscript{15} it is far more probable that it marks men who did not collect their protections from Chancery. Some may have withdrawn from the expedition; some may have felt that they could do without a letter of protection or were unable to make arrangements for its collection; but others, it seems, resented having to pay two shillings for the privilege. The earl of Northampton surely expressed the feelings of many when he wrote to the Chancellor, Master John de Offord, to complain about the clerk of the hanaper's refusal to issue protections.

\textsuperscript{12} Most of these authorising bills from captains relate to early/mid fourteenth-century campaigns. The main series, organised alphabetically by captain, is to be found in Chancery Warrants (C81), files 1719-56; but there are many more in files 1675-1718 and in the volumes of Ancient Correspondence (SC1). A few examples have found their way into the files of Ancient Petitions (SC8). Increasingly from the 1350s captains sent protection request bills to the privy seal office rather than directly to the Chancellor. The bulk of these 'captains bills' were destroyed by fire in 1619, but the records which represent the next stage in the administrative process, privy seal bills authorising the issue of protections, are to be found in large numbers in a long series of Chancery Warrants (C81) files. For example, file 932, containing bills of privy seal for the period 20 June - 30 June 1370, includes many protection warrants for Sir Robert Knolles' retinue. On protection warrants see: Brown, 'The authorisation of letters under the great seal', pp. 130-31; H.C. Maxwell-Lyte, \textit{Historical notes on the use of the great seal of England} (London, 1926), pp. 210-11.

\textsuperscript{13} C81/1736 m. 75; C71/11 m. 5. The ratio of knights to esquires suggests that Percy was not seeking protections for all of his men (unfortunately no pay roll survives for this campaign). An undated warrant from an unnamed captain states explicitly that\textit{ les autres de ma compaigne neont pas demande protection}: C81/1752 m. 64.

\textsuperscript{14} For example, a warrant for Sir John de Norwich's retinue bound for Gascony in 1337: twelve of the forty-one names do not appear on the Gascon roll (C81/1750 m.33; C61/49 m.17). The one enrolled name which does not figure in the warrant, Bartholomew de Estone, appears to have been an afterthought. In a separate letter John de Norwich asked for a protection for this one remaining man,\textit{ auxi come vous avez fait a mes autres gentz q[ui] tront en ma dite compaignie & la dite protection vous plaise liever au portour de cestes}: C81/1735 m. 41.

\textsuperscript{15} Brown, 'The authorisation of letters under the great seal', p. 129.
without being paid *pour le seal*. The earl's men, it seems, would not pay because *il lour semble dur pour ceo qils mettent en aventure vie et membre*.

Being the product of an earlier stage in the process of retinue recruitment, warrants for protections are likely to contain a larger proportion of men who ultimately did not serve on campaign than their enrolled equivalents. The numbers of 'drop-outs' are not, however, likely to be large; and against the occasional error from this source, should be set the considerable numbers of additional names which the protection warrants supply. They are, in fact, superior to enrolled lists of protections in several further ways. They are usually clearer about a man's military rank, often subdividing their list of names into 'knights' and 'esquires' in a wholly unequivocal fashion; and they often provide insights into the company structure of retinues - an aspect of military organisation which is rarely illuminated by enrolled protection lists. There are, however, problems in using the *fiat* warrants. They are less accessible than enrolled protections and it is likely that only a modest proportion of the original number have survived. The fact that they are a very fragmentary source (a warrant might contain one name or a hundred) and that they are rarely fully dated - and often not at all - means that correlation with the enrolled lists or, indeed, any kind of chronological sorting would be a very laborious task. When, however,

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17. For example, a undated warrant from the earl of Derby indicates the numbers of men-at-arms brought by the more important knights in his retinue: C81/1724 m. 49.

18. The protections for a single retinue might be requested by means of a whole series of warrants, but rarely have a complete set survived. Such fragmentation can provide a useful insight into the processes of retinue formation. For example, the earl of Pembroke, whilst awaiting embarkation at Lymington, issued warrants for protections on the 1st, 3rd, 12th, 15th, 17th, 19th and 23rd June 1347 (C81/1736 m. 10, 11, 13, 14, 55, 57, 61).
they take the form of long lists of names, neatly grouped according to rank - and when they can be precisely dated - they provide a most valuable source for military service and for the composition of magnate retinues.\textsuperscript{19}

Warrants for protections frequently offer, therefore, more information about military personnel than their enrolled equivalents. They reveal some previously unknown members of the military community and they help to fill out military careers which would otherwise remain rather sketchy. Sir Thomas Dagworth's early career is a case in point. If we confine ourselves to enrolled letters of protection, this most celebrated English knight appears quite suddenly on the military scene as one of the earl of Northampton's principal lieutenants during the Breton campaign of 1345;\textsuperscript{20} yet his military apprenticeship with the earl is revealed by his inclusion on protection warrants for two earlier campaigns.\textsuperscript{21} Taken as a group, the collection of warrants for protection issued by the earl of Northampton for a series of continental campaigns - and especially those which are substantial retinue lists - include the names of a great many of the earl's men-at-arms, and certainly rather more than are listed in the enrolled lists of protections. Yet a captain would rarely seek a protection for each and every man-at-arms in his retinue: the lists are not complete, but nor are they likely to provide a random selection of

\textsuperscript{19} See, for example, Saul, \textit{Knights and esquires}, Chapter 3. Retinue composition is frequently far less clear in the enrolled lists of protections. Disorderly arrangement and excessive abbreviation often leads to ambiguity which can only be resolved if the corresponding warrant survives.

\textsuperscript{20} C76/20 m. 21; the corresponding warrant would seem to be C81/1735 m. 21 which places him top of the list of Northampton's retinue. He had been a member of this earl's retinue for a diplomatic mission in the autumn of 1337: \textit{C.P.R.}, 1334-38, p. 531. By January 1347, he had been appointed king's lieutenant in Brittany: Prince, 'The strength of English armies in the reign of Edward III', pp. 364-65; M. Jones, 'Sir Thomas Dagworth et la guerre civile en Bretagne au xiv\textsuperscript{e} siècle: quelques documents inédits', \textit{Annales de Bretagne}, lxxvii (1980), pp. 621-39, provides the most complete survey of Dagworth's career.

\textsuperscript{21} Dagworth is at the bottom of the list of the earl's knights on one warrant (C81/1735 m. 22), whilst if we push back a little further we find him amongst the \textit{armigeri} (C81/1734 m. 40).
personnel. The protection warrants, with their neat grouping of names according to military rank, show this particularly clearly, for they often include a disproportionately high number of knights.\textsuperscript{22} The reason for the preponderance of military personnel of higher status is clear enough. The men who sought letters of protection (or for whom they were sought by captains) were primarily, though not exclusively,\textsuperscript{23} those with landed interests which needed to be legally secure during their absences on campaign. The enrolled lists probably underline this distortion still further. Thus our principal source for the study of military personnel is biased towards the propertied. For the most part excluded are sons awaiting their inheritances, landless younger brothers and men of obscure origins making a career of soldiering.\textsuperscript{24} This is a most serious deficiency because such men, whether serving as ordinary men-at-arms or horse archers,\textsuperscript{25} without the strong commitments to county society which could restrict heads of families to serving only occasionally,\textsuperscript{26} seem to have provided the back-bone of the king's armies, as well as a very useful source of recruits for mercenary companies in Italy and crusading expeditions in eastern Europe. Occasionally the curtain of obscurity is raised by chance references in other records. Sir Roger de Beauchamp's will,

\textsuperscript{22} An extreme example lists thirty-five knights, followed by thirteen esquires (C81/1734 m. 24); a more typical ratio would be thirty-three to thirty-five (C81/1735 m. 15).

\textsuperscript{23} As Nigel Saul pointed out, many lists of protection include a sprinkling of non-military personnel, such as servants and clerks (\textit{Knights and esquires}, p. 48). We must also take account of men of all levels of society who sought a protection simply to gain relief from creditors: e.g. C.P.R., 1370-74, p. 295; P.E. Russell, \textit{The English intervention in Spain and Portugal in the time of Edward III and Richard II} (Oxford, 1955), pp. 371-72.

\textsuperscript{24} The bias of these records has not always been recognised by scholars: M. Powicke, for example, has argued strongly that 'knights were in fact more active militarily than esquires or men-at-arms, while the baronage were most active of all' (\textit{Military obligation in medieval England}, p. 171). A similar interpretive flaw lies at the heart of a recent study of the military service of the Leicestershire gentry: G.G. Astill, \textit{The medieval gentry: a study in Leicestershire society, 1350 - 1399} (Birmingham Ph.D thesis, 1977), pp. 245-263.

\textsuperscript{25} Enrolled letters of protection for men explicitly styled archers (e.g. Thomas de Shirburn, for service in the Calais garrison in 1372: C76/55 m. 42) are rare prior to the later fourteenth-century.

\textsuperscript{26} See Saul, \textit{Knights and esquires}, pp. 52-59.
dating from 1379, mentions that one of his sons, Philip, was *tenuz en un so'me darg' a un Chivaler en Lombardye gauoit a Nou' mons* John Thornebury and adds that another man, John St. Martin, was with him.27 Many of the deponents before the Court of Chivalry were men of this kind, veterans of numerous campaigns - either in the king's service, as mercenaries or crusaders - though often remaining esquires throughout their careers: men like William de Thweyt of Heton, who though serving on at least nine expeditions, obtained a protection at Chancery for only one of them.28

The bias towards the propertied members of the military community which exists with the evidence of letters of protection is not evident in the case of another important source for military service during the Edwardian period: charters of pardon. This does not mean that pardons, whether in the form of authorising warrants or as enrolled lists, are entirely free of interpretive difficulties of their own.29 They can offer, of course, only partial coverage of fighting personnel: fifty-seven of the 400 men in John of Gaunt's *comitiva* in 1359-60 had enrolled pardons, for example.30 As with letters of


28. For Thweyt's career, see Andrew Ayton, 'William de Thweyt, esquire: deputy constable of Corfe Castle in the 1340s', *Somerset and Dorset Notes and Queries*, xxxii (1989), pp. 731-38. Six of the nine campaigns are mentioned in Thweyt's Court of Chivalry deposition in 1385 (C47/6/1, no. 92); he does not mention the one period of service for which he secured a letter of protection (Gascony in 1337-39, as a member of Sir John de Norwich's retinue: C61/49 m. 17; C81/1750 m. 33).

29. The pardons are enrolled on the main series of Gascon, Patent, Scots and Treaty rolls and on special supplementary rolls (e.g. the Norman and Calais rolls for the Crécy-Calais campaign). The enrolments should be used in combination with the privy seal warrants (C81) which authorise the issue of pardons. In addition, a scatter of certificates of service, written by captains on behalf of men in their retinues, provide invaluable insights; these are to be found in various volumes of Ancient Correspondence (SC1) and amongst the files of protection warrants (C81/1719-56). Original charters of pardon have survived in local collections (see, for example, W.G.D. Fletcher, 'Sir Richard de Sandford, knight, 1306-1347', *Transactions of the Shropshire Archaeological and Natural History Society*, 3rd. ser., vi (1906), p. 162; Shropshire Record Office, Sandford collection, 2/63); but see also Chancery Files, Cancelled Letters Patent, C266 file 5, for original service pardons from Edward I's reign, which were never collected by recipients or proxies.

protection, the number of enrolled service pardons varies considerably from one campaign to the next. In part this arises from the vagaries of documentary survival. Not all pardons were enrolled, whilst the collection of surviving warrants is inevitably very incomplete; some of the rolls themselves have either disappeared altogether or survive only in a fragmentary state. Naomi Hurnard concluded that 'the total of service pardons was undoubtedly higher than the numbers which can now be traced'. Whilst this is certainly true, the historian must face a further problem: the fact that these materials may not always be offering a reliable guide to military service. Take, for example, the 1330s. A huge number of pardons arising from the Halidon Hill campaign are to be found on the Scots roll, but they must be approached with caution, for it is likely that amongst the criminals serving in return for a royal pardon, are many who did not take-up arms at all. That the Crown was only too well aware of the extent of fraud in 1333 is made abundantly clear by a series of tightening-up measures. Justices were not to accept the validity of pardons without corroborative proof of the performance of military service. For the next campaign, during the winter of 1334-35, the numbers and organisation of serving felons were strictly regulated. For the great expedition into Scotland during the following summer, the number

31. N.D. Hurnard, *The king's pardon for homicide before A.D. 1307*, p. 316. For the Breton campaign in 1342-43, a fragment of a separate pardon roll (C67/28A) strongly suggests that only a proportion of the pardons awarded for service during this campaign were enrolled on the Treaty rolls (C76/17 & 18).


34. They amounted to only two hundred men serving in two separate companies: Nicholson, op. cit., pp. 130, 174.
of pardons increased significantly once more, but now their issue appears to be based upon the authorisation (per testimonium) of retinue captains - a system which continued to operate during the French campaigns and which, as a consequence, probably ensures that pardon receipt becomes a far more reliable guide to military service during the second decade of Edward III's reign. Most of the major campaigns during the period up to Brétigny gave rise to several hundred charters of pardon, but a peak was reached for service during the siege of Calais, for which at least 1,800 were awarded, a figure which is roughly comparable to the number issued during the last part of Edward I's reign.

It is, therefore, necessary to adopt a cautious approach to pardons. They can be a useful source for serving military personnel, but unlike letters of protection, they cease to be a numerically significant source after 1369. Prior to Brétigny, they are not always available in large numbers; and when they are, they may not be wholly reliable. They are, moreover, frustratingly unclear about social origins and military status. If letters of protection concentrate for the most part on the wealthier men-at-arms in an army, lists of pardons provide a very different cross-section of personnel, probably more representative in its make-up. But whilst the geographical origins of pardon recipients are sometimes specifically stated - and that of their main pernors, very often - it is usually far more difficult to

35. 1335: C71/15 (large numbers on mm. 10-16, with a scatter on other parts of the roll). By contrast, there are very few on the roll for the following year: C71/16 mm. 29, 36.


37. The Calais figure is offered by Prestwich, The three Edwards, p. 193. Service pardons for homicide in England numbered about 1,700 during Edward I's reign; if all felonies are considered, 'the grand total must have been well over 2,000' (Hurnard, op. cit, p. 316-17).

38. See, for example, the enrolled pardons for service during the War of Saint-Sardos: C61/37.
assign an individual to a particular branch of the army. Military status is not consistently supplied and it is particularly difficult to distinguish between ordinary men-at-arms and archers.\textsuperscript{39} As we have seen, there may often have been little difference in social terms between these two branches of the army, but an analysis of military personnel does need to be able tell them apart. Whilst it is probable that the majority of pardon recipients for all campaigns were archers or ordinary foot soldiers,\textsuperscript{40} there were plenty of members of the chivalric class amongst their number. At times, indeed, gaps in the evidence supplied by enrolled letters of protection can be filled if recourse is made to rolls of pardons. If attention is confined to the small number of recipients who were specifically described as knights, we find for example that in 1335, whilst four pardon recipients were also in receipt of letters of protection, three others were not.\textsuperscript{41} We learn, indeed, not only that these three knights served in Scotland, but also the identity of their retinue commanders. The need for the captain's certification has ensured, therefore, that pardons (like letters of protection) can provide a most useful guide to retinue composition.

The combined use of letters of protection and charters of pardon furnishes an impressive body of information for a study of the personnel of Edwardian armies; but it will be clear from the foregoing discussion that the coverage is both very far from complete and riddled with interpretive difficulties. If muster rolls had survived

\textsuperscript{39} The records are only very occasionally specific. For an unusual example, see Sir Hugh de Hastings' request for chartres general de tout manere de trespas for two of his archers: SCI/41 m. 43.

\textsuperscript{40} Pardon recipients were often, clearly, the dregs of society. In 1370, Sir Robert Knolles recruited diverses gentz de religione eschapez et apostates et ensement plusours larounes et robbers de diverses gaioles (Anonimalle, p. 63).

\textsuperscript{41} The three with pardons, but without protections, were Sir Hugh de Morizby, Sir Thomas Morieux and Sir John de Lortie: C71/15 m. 10, 12, 13.
in abundance (as they have for some later periods), protections and pardons would be relegated to no more than a supportive role. As it is, the survival of fourteenth-century muster rolls is very patchy, especially for the period before Brétigny. Those which are available serve only to demonstrate the magnitude of our loss. As far as field campaigns of the early to mid fourteenth-century are concerned, there are but a handful of surviving muster rolls. Single retinues are highly illuminated, whilst the remainder of whole armies lie in shadow. This is certainly the case, for example, with the Weardale campaign. Muster rolls have survived for only two of this army’s retinues - those of John de Bedford and the Bishop of Ely - and the latter does not, in fact, provide complete coverage. The bishop’s company consisted of two bannerets, thirty-five knights (including four who were 'created' at Stanhope) and 133 esquires; but whilst all the bannerets and knights are listed on the muster roll, only fifty-five of the esquires are named. Despite the shortfall, the muster roll still reveals a great deal more about the bishop’s men than the corresponding list of protections enrolled on the Scots roll. Thirty-nine men have protections, but as usual, a high proportion of these are bannerets or knights; only one of the esquires named on the muster roll also appears in the protection list.

Thus, muster rolls, even if few in number and imperfect in their coverage, enable the historian to escape to some extent from the restricted view of the military community which dependance on letters

43. E101/18/6.
44. Of the twenty men who appear on both muster roll and protection list, all except one were bannerets or knights.
of protection tends to impose. But as far as major field campaigns are concerned, they can provide no more than fleeting glimpses of ordinary men-at-arms. This might be enough to enable geographical and tenurial patterns of recruitment to be established for certain retinues, but for analysis of continuity of service it is necessary to have a series of such detailed records. Thus, although we have a full muster roll for Henry of Lancaster's retinue in 1336, only 36 out of the 95 men listed can be seen to have served with this captain in at least one of his later campaigns. The transitory nature of so many mens' association with Lancaster is almost certainly misleading, as the bulk of our evidence for subsequent campaigns is drawn from letters of protection and the only other full retinue roll dates from the expedition to Gascony in 1345-46.

There are aspects of Edwardian military activity which are illuminated to some degree by series of muster rolls. Garrison service is one of these. Individual muster rolls have survived for a miscellany of royal garrisons during this period, but the most useful series derive from English-held fortresses in Scotland and the borders during the 1330s and '40s. Good muster rolls survive for Berwick in 1338-

45. For other valuable muster rolls of individual retinues, see E101/25/9 (Henry, earl of Derby; Gascony, 1345-6), E101/25/18 (Sir Thomas Dagworth; Brittany, 1346), E101/24/20 (Sir James Audley; Gascony, 1345). On the last of these retinues, see Morgan, *War and society in medieval Cheshire*, pp. 75-76. Muster rolls are rather more plentiful for the field campaigns following the resumption of war in 1369. The 1380-81 expedition in France and Brittany is, for example, quite well served (E101/39/6, 7, 8, 9).

46. E101/15/12. This document consists, in fact, of two muster rolls of Lancaster's men-at-arms (the first for the period 1 May to 8 September, the second - only a fragment - for the period 9 September to 12 November) and a *restauro equorum* list.


48. It is therefore not surprising that whilst only a third of knights and bannerets listed on this muster roll have no further known military contact with Lancaster, the comparable figure for the esquires is two-thirds.

49. For example, Windsor castle, 1338-39 (E101/21/22); Isle of Wight, 1330s (E101/21/33); Dover Castle, 1344-49 (E101/531/21).
41, Edinburgh in 1335-37 and 1339-42, Perth in 1338, Roxburgh in 1336 and 1340-42, and Stirling in 1336-37 and 1339-42. Combined with the evidence from other sources - principally letters of protection, pardons and horse inventories, but also a few muster rolls for individual retinues serving in the Scots march - these garrison rolls cast illumination of unusual brightness on a discernible sub-set of the military community of northern England: that which regarded the manning of royal fortresses as a semi-permanent career.

This relatively abundant supply of garrison muster rolls also casts invaluable light on the military retinues of a selection of English captains. The group of men who served under the command of Sir Richard Talbot in the 1330s and '40s will serve as a good example. He was in command of the Berwick garrison in the late 1330s and early 1340s - a period for which two garrison rolls have survived - but in addition, there is a good retinue roll of the troops which Talbot had commanded in the Scots March during the summer and autumn of 1337, and another of his comitiva whilst he was Keeper of the town of Southampton in 1340. This small collection of retinue rolls reveals a certain degree of continuity - and versatility - of service.


51. For example, the retinues of Sir John de Lisle in 1338 (E101/20/24), Sir John de Segrave in 1340 (E101/612/2), Sir Thomas Wake de Lydel in 1342 (E101/23/25).

52. Cf. the Cheshiremen engaged in the defence of Principality of Aquitaine in the second half of the fourteenth-century (Morgan, War and society in medieval Cheshire, pp. 121-84).

53. For a summary of Talbot's career, see G.E.C., xii, part 1, pp. 612-14.


55. E101/20/18: roll of forty-two men-at-arms (including six knights) and forty horse archers.

56. E101/22/34: roll of thirteen men-at-arms (including one knight) and nine archers.
Fourteen of the men-at-arms who had served with Talbot in 1337 are also to be found in his retinue in the garrison of Berwick. Rather more striking, however, is the appearance of two of these Scots borders veterans in the small Southampton garrison in the spring of 1340. John Buktot and Richard de Tynemuth are present on all four retinue rolls as men-at-arms, which would suggest either a close attachment with Talbot or that they were 'professionals'. Two other men appear in Talbot's retinue in both Scotland and Southampton - Richard Colingbourn and William Hanys - and they are particularly interesting because having served as archers on the south coast in 1340, they appear as hobelars in the Berwick garrison in 1341. Shifts in military status of this kind were no doubt commonplace in the mid fourteenth-century military community, but they will rarely be perceptible unless complementary muster rolls are available.57

Muster rolls, such as those considered here, offer an occasional, highly detailed view of the military community in action. In their absence, we must be content with a far more restricted view of army composition. Had the four rolls for Talbot's retinue not survived the test of time, the military service of only three of the 150 or so men-at-arms listed on them would have been revealed by letters of protection enrolled on the Scots rolls.58 However, in this particular case, it would not in fact have been necessary to rely wholly upon letters of protection, for there are two further documents which reveal a little more about Talbot's military companions at this time: a horse inventory drawn-up at the end of 1337 or early in 1338, and a resturo equorum account detailing losses during the spring of 1338.59

58. Sir Adam de Shareshull (C71/17 m. 11, C71/18 m. 13); Philip de Buktot (C71/18 m. 13); Alexander de Chesewyk (C71/18 m. 3).
59. E101/35/3 m. 2; E101/388/5 m. 20. The latter shows that Talbot's retinue lost five horses from March to May 1338, with a total value of £51 13s. 4d. Apart from Talbot himself, two men appear in
The section of the inventory covering Talbot's retinue is rather unusual. Talbot is allowed three horses for *son corps* (not including one for *son baner*) and of the remaining eighteen horses on the list, nine are not allocated to a named man-at-arms. Nevertheless, the two documents combined provide eleven names, only one of which can be seen amongst the enrolled protections for this time.  

How does the view of military personnel provided by horse inventories compare with that offered by conventional muster rolls? In one respect the inventories must be regarded as inferior. As it was only the horses of the 'armoured' military class which were valued, the inventories allow us to see the men-at-arms in an army, but not the archers nor even the hobelars. Thus, in isolation, horse inventories cannot provide insights into 'military mobility', of a kind which are sometimes offered by muster rolls. In spite of this deficiency, horse inventories and *restauro equorum* accounts undoubtedly represent the most important type of nominal military record available to the historian of Edwardian armies. For the period from Bannockburn to Brétigny, which forms the main focus of this study, they have survived in respectable quantities and despite the importance of muster rolls for the study of Scots border garrisons under Edward III, the horse inventories provide a far more significant coverage where field armies are concerned. They can offer only a sample of serving men-at-arms, but it is a sample which, as we shall

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60. Eight of whom are familiar from Talbot's other Scottish muster rolls. The three extra names are John de Stanworth (full inventory), Sir Adam Banastre and John de Eylesford (*restauro equorum* account).

61. Philip de Buktot: the protection is dated 24 June 1338, i.e. after he lost his horse (C71/18 m. 13).

62. The inclusion of a list of horse archers at the end of Sir John de Tibtot's inventory in 1336 is highly unusual (E101/19/36 m. 5d).
see, penetrates to the very heart of the Edwardian military community.

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iii) The horse inventories

How complete a view of the 'armoured' military class do the horse inventories provide? As has been seen, administrative experimentation ensured that inventories were compiled for only a proportion of campaigns during the Edwardian period. Even when a complete set of inventories were drawn-up for a particular army - including all men-at-arms in receipt of royal pay, from the loftiest of magnates to the least substantial of ordinary men-at-arms - only a proportion of the original records will have survived. Some campaigns, such as the war of Saint-Sardos, certainly have good coverage;\(^1\) but for none do we have a full set of originals and, for some, we are wholly dependent upon *restauro equorum* accounts. Those inventories which have survived are, moreover, something of a mixed bag and thus it is not possible to generalise about the overall value of this type of record without a certain amount of qualification.\(^2\)

Some inventories provide no more than a snap-shot image of a retinue at a particular moment: they have not been altered by subsequent annotations or additions and they do not, therefore, reflect the changes in structure and composition which medieval armies continuously underwent during the course of campaigns. Take, for example, the inventory of the earl of Cornwall’s retinue, drawn-up at Perth on 8 September 1336.\(^3\) This is certainly a most useful document, for all too little is known about the personal following of the enigmatic younger brother of Edward III, but it is also a problematic

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2. For a sensibly sceptical approach to one set of inventories, see N.B. Lewis, 'The English forces in Flanders, August-November 1297', *Studies in medieval history presented to F.M. Powicke*, ed. R.W. Hunt, W.A. Pantin, R.W. Southern (Oxford, 1948), pp. 310-11. This chapter concentrates on the inventories and other nominal records for Edward III’s campaigns, but the conclusions apply equally well to the essentially similar records from the reigns of his father and grandfather.
3. E101/19/36 m. 1; the earl, one banneret, eleven knights and forty-nine esquires are listed.
The inventory had a very short practical life, for the earl died on 13 September and his retinue appears to have withdrawn from active service as a result.

An unannotated inventory, such as that for Cornwall's retinue in 1336, can provide a wholly reliable guide to serving military personnel for only the day upon which it was compiled. It is recording those who intend to serve and there were always a few men who withdrew from service after their horses had been appraised. Such withdrawals can sometimes be seen in those inventories which have been annotated. Thus, for example, several names were erased from Aymer de Valence's horse inventory of 1315 quia non venit. Eustace de Hardeshull intended to join the expedition sailing for Gascony during the summer of 1324 and secured a protection for the period of his absence. At the last minute, however, he decided not to go and on the annotated version of the inventory, which was drawn-up at the port of embarkation, his name has been crossed out and that of William de Hardeshull written-in instead.

Most inventories acquired annotations and amendments during the weeks and months following their compilation and thus may offer a guide to

4. The retinue (the earl, two bannerets, fourteen knights and sixty-eight esquires) were paid from 28 July. Sixteen of these men were absent for ten unspecified days during this period, but even allowing for this, there should have been rather more names on the inventory (B.L. Cotton Ms., Nero C. VIII fo. 240).

5. Fourteen esquires seem to have left Perth during the course of the autumn, but the majority remained there with the earl's body until 8 December. It is no surprise to find that all of the retinue's appraised horses came through the campaign unscathed.

6. E101/15/6; cf. E101/20/17 m. 8, for similar erasures in Sir Ralph de Neville's retinue for 1337.

7. C.P.R., 1321-24, p. 429; E101/13/35 m. 2. Eustace did in fact go to Gascony in 1325 (E101/16/39 m. 1d).
fluctuating military fortunes and changing personnel. These records must, nevertheless, be approached with caution, for interpretive problems are likely to remain. The other surviving inventories for the English forces in Scotland in 1336 provide a good example of this. They note when and where individual horses have been killed or *redditi ad elemosinam*, sometimes providing excellent detail in the process; but they offer only a partial impression of the comings and goings of individual men-at-arms. In the case of Sir Ralph de Neville's retinue, the incomplete coverage of the horse inventory can be seen particularly clearly as a consequence of a chance survival of a range of complementary records. The inventory certainly appears to list fewer men than it should: fifty-one men-at-arms have appraised horses, whilst the main *vadia guerre* account for these operations allows pay for fifty-six. However, a muster roll and a quite separate pay account (now bundled with the horse inventories for this campaign) present a rather clearer picture. They show that the composition of the retinue changed every few weeks as men joined and left the king's service. The peak strength of fifty-nine men-at-arms (thirty-nine in Neville's retinue and a detached unit of twenty, forming part of Henry de Percy's company) was reached in late August and early September, but the muster roll shows that sixty-eight different men-at-arms (including Neville) served in this retinue during this period. Of these, seventeen are not listed in the inventory: excluded are all those who joined the retinue on 14 June, plus four of the original company (who presumably left early or had inadequate horseflesh), one of the men who arrived in August and all four of those who appeared in

8. E101/19/36 m. 3d; Nero C. VIII fo. 240v.
9. E101/19/36 m. 4 & 4d; there are two versions of the pay account.
11. Thirty-seven men began the campaign on 18 April; thirteen joined on 13 May, a further eight on 14 June, six on 25 August and four on 1 November.
November. Thus, it can be seen how the inventory came to be in its present form. All those who were members of the retinue on 13/14 May—a time when Neville himself was about to take a detachment to join Henry de Percy's retinue, but just after a new contingent had joined—are listed; and the only other addition to be made occurred when Sir Henry le Scrope arrived with a small company of five men-at-arms on 25 August, though for some reason one of his men, Thomas de Boulton, is not included.

It is not clear whether the seventeen men-at-arms who are not included in Neville's inventory in 1336 served without appraised horses and thus without any prospect of gaining compensation for any they might lose, or whether they were included on a different inventory, which has since been lost. The latter is a possibility and might be confirmed if the *restauro equorum* account for this campaign, in the section concerning Neville's retinue, included men and horses which do not appear in the full inventory. But the fact that all of the thirteen horses in Neville's section of this account can be seen in the full inventory would seem to suggest otherwise. In fact there is firm evidence that some men were serving in 1336 without appraised warhorses: Sir William de Montagu received £100 in compensation for horses which had been lost, but had not been valued. On the other hand, it is clear that on occasion a retinue's horses could be divided-up amongst several inventories. Thus, for example, the surviving inventory for English forces in Scotland in 1338 includes only a section of Sir Henry de Percy's retinue. During the early months of 1338, Percy's retinue consisted of eighty-four men-at-

13. Ibid. fo. 282.
arms, but of these, only five knights and fifteen esquires had their horses appraised outside the walls of Dunbar castle on 2nd February 1338. Eighteen of Percy's men are included in a *restauro equorum* account for this campaign, but there is no repetition of the horses listed in the inventory, so it can safely be assumed that an additional inventory must at one time have existed for all or part of Percy's retinue. Indeed, bearing in mind the fact that a *restauro equorum* account can bring together horses lost on many different occasions over a fairly lengthy space of time, it may well be that we have lost not one inventory for Percy's retinue, but a whole cluster.

It is clearly difficult to generalise about the usefulness of horse inventories as a record of serving military personnel; so much depends on the nature of individual documents. As has been seen, they may provide a complete record for a particular moment in time, but give no impression of subsequent changes in personnel. Alternatively, they may include some, but not all, changes in composition or they may embrace only part of a retinue, but without making this partial coverage apparent. It will be clear from the foregoing discussion that a collection of related inventories is likely to include a selection of these different 'types'. Whilst it might be possible to determine the precise extent of their coverage if an array of complementary records have survived, we will rarely find ourselves in so happy a predicament. In most cases there will be an inexact match between the proportions of retinues as suggested by inventories and by pay rolls. The interpretive problems which ensue are often

14. E101/388/5 m. 14: Percy, 1 further banneret, sixteen knights and sixty-six esquires.
15. E101/35/3 m. 2; these may have been new arrivals, although there is no indication of this in the *vadia guerre* account.
16. E101/388/5 m. 19. The horses were lost during the relief of Edinburgh castle, at the siege of Dunbar and elsewhere in March, April and May 1338. The only man to appear in both inventory and *restauro equorum* account is John de Umfraville, but he has a different horse in each.
frustratingly insoluble. But although they should always be borne in mind when assessing the evidence of the inventories, they should not deter us from making the fullest possible use of these most valuable records, for we can be sure that when they survive in reasonable bulk, they will provide an unrivalled insight into the personnel of an Edwardian army. To consider a practical example of this, let us return to the collection of inventories which have been glimpsed already: those which illuminate the English forces serving in Scotland in the later 1330s.

The military operations conducted against the Scots during the years 1336-38 are well served by surviving documentary materials. There are horse inventories and *restauro equorum* accounts for each of these three years and, in addition, a range of other records including a complete run of *vadia guerre* accounts. By comparing the evidence of the inventories with that of the pay rolls, it is possible to offer an estimate of the proportion of serving men-at-arms who are known by name as a result of the valuation of their warhorses. Let us begin with the records for 1336. Inventories exist for all of the retinues occupying the first two folios of the *vadia guerre* account and two of those on the third. Apart from the small company of John de Houton, who had been appointed to 'receive and review' the English troops and who supervised horse appraisal, inventories survive for none of the retinues listed on the remaining six folios of the

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17. Horse inventories: E101/19/36 (1336); E101/20/17 (1337); E101/35/3 (1337-38). Although no more precisely dated by the P.R.O. (*List and Index No. xxv*, p. 39) than temp. Edward III, the last of these can by internal evidence be assigned to the English operations in Scotland during the winter of 1337-38. *Restauro equorum* accounts are to be found amongst the Wardrobe and Exchequer accounts: B.L., Cotton Ms., Nero C. VIII fos. 280v-82, 284v-85 (1336 and spring/early summer 1337); E101/20/25 and E101/388/5 mm. 18-20 (for autumn 1337-38).

18. On the military operations during this year, see Prince, 'The army and navy', p. 335; Fowler, *The king's lieutenant*, p. 32; Morgan, *War and society in medieval Cheshire*, pp. 41-42.

account. The coverage is therefore partial, but it is by no means modest nor is it random. Most of the larger retinues are covered and these comprise a quite distinct section of the English forces which served in Scotland in 1336. Whilst the small army brought in June by the king himself does not figure at all in the surviving inventories (and with the exception of the earl of Cornwall's retinue, nor do any of the troops who arrived in Scotland later in the summer and during the autumn), the army which commenced service in May under the command of Henry of Lancaster is represented almost in its entirety. Of the 520 or so men-at-arms serving in Lancaster's command, all except about forty are listed in the surviving inventories. Records are missing for two of the smaller retinues, accounting for twenty-two names, and only four-fifths of Lancaster's personal retinue are listed. But against these slight blemishes in the evidence must be set the remarkable parity, for the great majority of retinues, between the numbers of men-at-arms receiving pay and the numbers who appear with their horses in the inventories. There is usually a good explanation when the match is not exact. Thus, for example, the apparent disparity between Sir John de Tibetot's inventory, which lists fifteen men-at-arms and his vadia guerre account, which allows pay for nineteen, is explained by the inventory itself: twelve mounted archers are shown to be providing the service equivalent to four men-at-arms. 'Flexible' accounting might also explain the discrepancy in the figures for Lancaster's retinue, but potentially more serious than the omission of a few men-at-arms from Lancaster's inventory is

20. For a discussion of the reason for this, see above pp. 134-35.
21. Lancaster was capitaneo et duci exercitus domini regis consisting of about 500 men-at-arms and 1,000 mounted archers.
22. See Appendix 1.
23. The unusual intermingling of the Neville and Percy retinues and the composite nature of Neville's inventory have been discussed above.
24. See above, pp. 192-93.
the loss of names as a consequence of damage to the documents. Part of
the membrane which contains the retinue inventories for Lancaster and
Warwick has been torn away, with the result that a large proportion of
the names have been partially or wholly lost.\textsuperscript{25} Fortunately, the
survival of complementary records serves to minimise the loss. A
muster roll for Lancaster's retinue for the period 1 May to 8
September lists the names of two bannerets, sixteen knights and
seventy-seven esquires: in total, ninety-five of the hundred men-at-
arms for whom Lancaster received pay.\textsuperscript{26} Twenty-one of Lancaster's men
are also listed in the \textit{restauro equorum} account for this year. This
account is, however, of far greater value where Warwick's retinue is
concerned, for it supplies the names of thirty men, of which twenty-
three relate to the part of the inventory which has been damaged.\textsuperscript{27}
All except three of the retinues with inventories in 1336 have
corresponding entries in the \textit{restauro equorum} account. Of these
three, the earl of Cornwall's inventory (as we have seen) had a very
short practical life, whilst that of Sir Robert de Tong consisted of
only two names. Sir Thomas de Ughtred's inventory shows that one of
his men did in fact lose a horse - a loss which has been omitted for
some reason from the compensation account.\textsuperscript{28}

The most striking feature of the \textit{restauro equorum} account is the fact
that it includes only one retinue for which there is no corresponding
inventory: a small company commanded by Sir Geoffrey de Mortimer which

\textsuperscript{25} Membrane 7: none of the horse valuations have been lost. Damage to m. 5 has affected the earl
of Angus' retinue to a limited extent.

\textsuperscript{26} E101/15/12. The number of personnel appears in fact to have been 101: Henry de Rammeheyne
esq., was serving \textit{avec deux} [unnamed] compagnons, whilst Sir Robert de Roos had four wadletz who
are not separately listed.

\textsuperscript{27} B.L., Cotton Ms., Nero C. VIII fos. 280v, 281.

\textsuperscript{28} Robert de Longvill lost a 'hobby' worth 10 marks at Perth on 6 September. On the other hand
the \textit{restauro equorum} account includes a number of equestrian fatalities which are not mentioned in
the inventories (for example, in Lancaster's retinue). There are many minor discrepancies between
these two records, particularly concerning horse descriptions.
served from mid August until November, a period during which two of its seven men-at-arms lost their appraised horses. Thus, of the 105 men-at-arms listed in the *restauro equorum* account, 103 appear in the surviving inventories. What should be concluded from this? Bearing in mind the patterns of both documentary survival and horse losses, it seems likely that inventories were drawn up for only some parts of the English forces serving in Scotland in 1336. The retinues serving under Lancaster in the late spring had their horses appraised, together with a few others at a later date. Montagu's retinue, as we have seen, did not, and he was awarded a gift of £100 to cover the cost of unappraised horses which had been lost. The lack of any reference to horse appraisal in the *vadia guerre* accounts for retinues outside Lancaster's command, suggests that Montagu's predicament was not unique; but few were in as good a position to extract royal favours as the architect of the Nottingham castle coup. In fact, as we have seen, there are good reasons for thinking that horse appraisal was not at this time extended to armies fighting in Scotland under the direct leadership of the king. In this case, then, the pattern of documentary survival is very similar to the pattern of production, but this should be regarded as an exception rather than the rule. A glance at the records for 1337-38, for example, offers a far less consistent picture. The *restauro equorum* accounts for the early summer of 1337 do not, it is true, suggest the compilation of any inventories additional to those which have in fact survived; but, by contrast, it is clear from the compensation records spanning the period from the autumn of 1337 through to the spring of 1338 that the

29. B.L., Cotton Ms., Nero C. VIII fos. 243, 282. These two lost horses are also listed on a separate *restauro equorum* fragment (E101/101/14 m. 4), together with two further equi (belonging to Sir John de Leukenore and his esquire) which do not appear in any other known record.

30. The association of the commencement of pay with the appraisal of horses, so common a feature of the accounts for Edward II’s reign, is explicitly made in the case of the retinues of Lancaster himself, Warwick, Oxford, Angus, Buchan, Percy, Badlesmere and Bohun.
surviving inventories (which all date apparently from December 1337 or early 1338) represent only a selection of the original series. In particular, none of those which must have been drawn-up during the late summer of 1337 have survived.

The dates given on many of the surviving inventories from 1336 show that for most retinues horse valuation coincided with the commencement of royal pay. This bundle of horse rolls offers, therefore, a remarkably complete record of the composition of a small English army at the very start of a period of service. There are, it is true, few indications of subsequent changes in composition. Apart from the inventory for Neville's retinue, which as we have seen gives some (albeit incomplete) indication of arrivals after the first muster, the only notes on the inventories which confirm that particular individuals continued in service at a certain date are comments on horse mortality. But although not as subtle and informative as we would like, the horse inventories for 1336 provide as complete a view of the armoured cavalry of a small mid-fourteenth century English field army as could realistically be hoped for. The contrast with the larger, but less comprehensively documented, royal armies of the earlier 1330s is indeed very striking. The materials for 1336 form,

31. E101/20/17 and B.L., Cotton Ms., Nero C. VIII fos. 284v-85; E101/35/3, E101/20/25 and E101/388/5 mm. 18-20. Seven retinues appear in the restauro equorum accounts, but not the inventories, for 1337-38. The earl of Gloucester's retinue appears in an inventory dated December 1337 (E101/35/3 m. 1) and in two quite separate restauro equorum accounts: the horses listed in the inventory match with those in one of these (E101/20/25 m. 3), but not with those in the other (E101/388/5 m. 19). The second of the accounts, itemising horses killed in February to April 1338, must be based on a later, lost full inventory.

32. Including, for example, that for the retinue of the earl of Warwick: four of his esquires lost horses during September and October 1337 (E101/388/5 m. 19).

33. It may be significant that Neville, as seneschal of the royal household, was directly involved in the process of horse appraisal. Awards of compensation for horse losses were made per testimonium Neville and John de Houton: B.L., Cotton Ms., Nero C. VIII fos. 280v ff.

34. The annotations usually reveal the date and place of loss. From these scraps of information we can see that many in Lancaster's original army took part in Edward III's dramatic ride into the highlands in July. For example, Ralph de Conyngsby's horse, valued at £10, was killed in montibus on 20 July: E101/19/36 m. 3d.
moreover, the most valuable part of an impressive block of inventory evidence which extends into 1338. Whilst the inventories for 1336 list the names of rather more than 500 men-at-arms, the combined total for the following two years is about 700. The inventories for the army commanded by the earl of Warwick during early summer of 1337 supply the names of 341 men-at-arms, or perhaps about three-quarters of those in pay in early/mid June. The comparable records for the autumn 1337-spring 1338 period - the campaign which petered-out in the fruitless siege of Dunbar - offer the names of about 350 men-at-arms, or a little less than half of those receiving pay in the English field army at the start of the new year. This is clearly the least well documented of the Scottish campaigns of the later 1330s, but the figure of 350 men-at-arms is also not strictly comparable with those of the preceding years, as the surviving retinue inventories supply no more than 275 of the names, with the rest appearing only in the \textit{restauro equorum} accounts for this campaign. Yet to know the names

35. This excludes the names lost from Warwick's inventory, but includes the extra evidence supplied by Lancaster's muster roll. As regards \textit{horse values} for 1336, the total is nearer to 550.

36. This is something of an estimate, as the evidence of the inventories cannot be matched to that of the pay accounts quite as easily as in 1336. Some of the horse lists are not dated and there was a great deal of fluctuation in retinue size during the summer of 1337. Of the eleven retinues with more than twenty men-at-arms, seven (including the largest) appear amongst the inventories: E101/20/17; B.L., Cotton Ms., Nero C. VIII fos. 245-47. For an illuminating discussion of Warwick's army in 1337, see N.B. Lewis, 'The recruitment and organisation of a contract army, May to November 1337', \textit{B.I.H.R.}, xxxvii (1964), pp. 1-19.

37. For the size of the English forces 'during the first fortnight of the year 1338', see Prince, 'The strength of English armies in the reign of Edward III', pp. 359-60.

38. Inventories have survived for only a handful of the major retinues involved in the siege of Dunbar; and in sharp contrast with the inventories for 1336, those for the Dunbar campaign appear to be incomplete: others drawn-up earlier or later have been lost. For example, the earl of Salisbury's retinue-inventory, compiled on 1 January, lists 86 men, but the \textit{vadia guerre} accounts show 130-140 men-at-arms in his company at this time: E101/35/3 m. 2d; E101/20/25 m. 3.

39. There are, in fact, 296 entries in the horse inventories, but ten concern extra horses for retinue captains or their (unnamed) banner bearers, and eleven other entries lack names. A number of the men-at-arms' names in the earl of Salisbury's retinue are only partially legible. Seventy-one names (20%) are unique to the \textit{restauro equorum} accounts; a further thirty-nine appear both there and in corresponding inventories (E101/35/3; E101/20/25 and E101/388/5 mm. 18-20). Horse compensation records make little contribution to the 1337 total: all told, they provide only fifteen names and all of these are to be found in surviving inventories (E101/20/17; B.L., Cotton Ms., Nero C. VIII fos. 284v-285).
of approaching half of the men-at-arms involved in an English expedition to Scotland represents, from the perspective of many campaigns, a position of relative documentary abundance. Taken as a collection, the horse inventories, *restauro equorum* accounts and other complementary records serve to make the English armies of 1336-38 amongst the best documented of the fourteenth-century. They offer invaluable illumination of the English military community in action at a most important stage in Edwardian III's reign, when the principal focus of royal ambition was in the process of switching from Scotland to France.

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The importance of the horse inventories for our knowledge of the manpower of English armies of 1336-38 is thrown into sharper relief by a consideration of the other available sources for the military personnel of these years. Had it been necessary to rely upon letters of protection, as with so many other campaigns, the nominal roll would be shorter, less reliable and decidedly unbalanced in its make-up. Whilst the horse inventories and associated documents for 1336 offer the names of over 500 men-at-arms, the Scots roll for this year lists fewer than 250 letters of protection. The combined total for the years 1337-38 is even more striking: 300 enrolled protections as compared with the names of nearly 700 men-at-arms in the horse inventories and *restauro equorum* accounts. The global figures are, moreover, misleading. On the one hand, the retinues fully illuminated

40. Including for 1337, for instance, the muster rolls for the retinues of Sir John de Mowbray, Sir Henry de Percy and Sir Ralph de Neville which have been bundled-up with horse inventories for this year: E101/20/17 mm. 2, 4, 5, 6.
41. C71/16.
42. C71/17; C71/18.
by inventories are covered very much more thinly by protections than these figures might suggest; on the other, the protections do provide useful evidence of military activity upon which the inventories cast no light at all. Thus, whilst all except one of the 1336 inventories were compiled in May or early June, the great bulk of the protections for that year have dates which fall during the second half of the year. Of the 520 men-at-arms serving in Lancaster's army during the early summer, no more than a handful have enrolled protections; but thirty-nine were issued in mid-August to Sir Anthony de Lucy's garrison at Berwick and twenty-one in late October to Sir Ralph de Stafford and his men. The pattern of evidence for 1337-38 is broadly similar. There are lists of protections of respectable length for two retinues which lack inventories, but very few of the men-at-arms whose horses were valued in May and June 1337 can be found to have had enrolled protections. For example, of the sixty men in Sir Ralph de Neville's retinue who appear on the inventory which was drawn-up at Tweedmouth on 2 June, only two have protections on the Scots rolls. There are equally few enrolled protections for most of the retinues which are embraced by the inventories compiled during the winter of 1337-38.

In fact, there are even fewer protection recipients amongst the men listed in these inventories than there appear to be at first glance. A not inconsiderable proportion of men receiving a protection for

43. There are no enrolled protections for Lancaster's own retinue (100 men-at-arms). On the other hand, nine of the earl of Oxford's twenty men have them. More typical are the eight protections for the earl of Warwick's retinue, which consisted, in all, of seventy-four men-at-arms.

44. C71/16 mm. 6, 16. If the fifteen protections which had been issued in January are added, the Berwick garrison can be seen to have accounted for no fewer than 20% of the protections enrolled on the Scots rolls in 1336: C71/15 mm. 3, 4.

45. Sir Ralph de Stafford's retinue has twenty protections (mainly in April) and Thomas, earl of Norfolk's has thirty-four (mainly in September): C71/17.

46. Sir Ralph de Neville himself and one of his esquires, William de Crathorne: C71/17 m. 18.
service in a specified retinue simply cannot be found in the relevant inventory. At times this is almost certainly because the documents have significantly separated dates: at the time of horse valuation, some men with protections have not yet arrived, or have already left. But it must also be remembered that letters of protection are less reliable than horse inventories as a guide to the service of men-at-arms. Some men who secured protections did not actually serve. Others were not fighting men at all: servants and other non-combatants are often mixed indiscriminately with real men-at-arms in enrolled lists of protections. Some concrete examples from amongst the very few retinues in 1337-38 for which more than a mere handful of protections were issued can serve to illustrate these points very clearly.

Although fourteen protections were enrolled for Sir Thomas Wake and his men - apparently a very respectable proportion of the twenty-five whose horses were valued on 6 June - three are duplicates, and four were issued to men who do not appear in the retinue inventory. Two of these unlisted men may have arrived several months after the original muster and we might suspect that one of the others was not a fighting man at all. Thus, between a quarter and a third of the men-at-arms in Wake's retinue can be seen to have had enrolled protections. If the majority of retinues in 1337-38 had a rather smaller proportion of protection recipients than this, there was at least one in which the percentage was substantially larger. Sir Giles

47. Sir Gerard Salvayn has a protection (dated 30 May) for Wake's retinue, but does not appear in the inventory; in addition, his name has been crossed-off Neville's inventory, with the words non venit. A further protection dated 24 July may suggest, however, that he did eventually join Wake's company. C71/17 mm. 19, 21; E101/20/17 mm. 8, 8d.

48. It should be noted that Wake's inventory may not have been complete: according to the vadia guerre account the retinue consisted of forty men-at-arms from 7 May (B.L., Cotton Ms., Nero C. VIII fo. 245). It is unlikely, however, that the four missing men are all to be found amongst these fifteen extra men-at-arms.
de Badlesmere's retinue, paid from 6 December, consisted of twenty-four men-at-arms and, appropriately enough, this is the number (plus the captain's banner-bearer) listed in his inventory. Of these men, as many as sixteen can be seen to have had enrolled protections, dated 4 December, on the Scots roll. But there were four protection recipients who, though apparently members of Badlesmere's retinue, were clearly not serving in a military capacity. This is undoubtedly an exceptional case, in as far as a captain can be seen receiving protections for two-thirds of his combatant retainers: a third would be the norm for Scotland. It may be less unrepresentative, however, in its suggestion of a 20% non-combatant or defaulting element amongst protection recipients. Indeed, the circumstances of other retinues suggest that the non-participatory group amongst protection recipients may sometimes have been rather larger. Twenty-eight men have enrolled letters of protection for service in the retinue of the earl of Salisbury during the winter of 1337-38, but only ten of them are listed in the earl's horse inventory for this campaign (dated 1 January). Nearly eighty of the men on the horse list were serving without the security of an enrolled protection. Some of the eighteen protection recipients who cannot be traced in Salisbury's inventory, may nevertheless have been serving in a military capacity, for we know that about forty men-at-arms were excluded for some reason from the process of horse valuation. But even allowing for this - and a few late arrivals - it is clear that a significant proportion of the protection recipients were not members of the earl's military retinue.

49. E101/20/25 m. 4; E101/35/3 mm. 1-2.
50. C71/17 m. 3. Of these four men, one (Robert Flemyng, parson of the church of Berughby) is clearly a non-combatant.
51. C71/17 mm. 5, 11; C71/18 mm. 22, 23; E101/35/3 mm. 1d. & 2d.
52. The inventory lists eighty-six men-at-arms for 1 January, whilst there were 130 receiving pay at this time (and 140 soon after): E101/20/25 m. 3.
The records of 1336-38 offer a good opportunity to assess the relative merits of letters of protection and horse inventories. A comparison of their evidence serves to emphasise the importance of the inventories to an understanding of the military community, whilst underlining with particular forcefulness the shortcomings of protection evidence. There can be no doubt that enrolled lists of protections embrace a broader spectrum of military activity: they will often encompass both field armies and garrisons and they will often be the only substantial nominal record source available. But their depth of coverage is usually inconsistent, with some companies being well served, while others are hardly touched upon at all; and the evidence may not be wholly reliable. By contrast, the inventories will often have a narrower coverage, only a selection of companies being illuminated; but for these, information will probably be far more complete and almost certainly more reliable. The inventories afford, therefore, a cross-section of the strata which make-up the military community, whereas the evidence of protections rarely penetrates very far below the topmost layers. Most or all of a retinue's knights will appear in a list of protections, but only a selection of its esquires. Even when protections are more abundant, as will often be the case with continental campaigns, their coverage will remain essentially biased towards the wealthier members of the military community. Thus, to return to a previous example, all of the five knights in Giles de Badlesmere's retinue in 1337-38 have protections. For the names of the eight esquires who do not, it is necessary to turn to the horse inventory - a source which in addition, supplies the ranks of all who are named and the internal company structure of the retinue.

The horse inventories, then, take us to the very heart of the military
community. So do the *restauro equorum* accounts, though in a slightly different way. At first glance they can appear a decidedly inferior form of military record. The evidence which they provide will usually be less bulky than that offered even by protections; after all, only a proportion of an army’s appraised horses would be lost during the course of a campaign. But even if comparatively modest, the losses would usually be spread throughout the retinues of an army, thus ensuring that the resulting *restauro equorum* account offers a representative sub-set of all serving men-at-arms. Thus, if protections could be said to offer a restricted view of a non-random selection of the military community, and full horse inventories a comprehensive view of that part of the community covered by surviving records, then we may well find that a *restauro equorum* account can provide a random sample - a sample which, rather than being weighted in favour of a particular section of the military community, is determined by the fickle fortunes of war. If so, then the *restauro equorum* accounts would represent a most valuable sub-category of source material.

*Restauro equorum* accounts are quite plentiful for the 1320s, '30s and '40s. For the Scottish campaigns of 1336-38, as we have seen, the *restauro equorum* accounts perform a useful supporting role, filling gaps in the evidence provided by the full inventories. The same applies to some extent to the materials which record horse losses during the War of Saint-Sardos. For a number of other campaigns, the original inventories have all been lost, so that the surviving *restauro equorum* accounts must stand on their own. In the case of the materials for the Scottish campaign of 1322, they are not extensive enough to provide a really useful source for the names of serving men-

53. B.L. Add. Ms. 7967 fos. 104-106v; see below, pp. 260-61.
at-arms. But for the Cambrésis-Thiérache campaign of 1338-39 and the Breton campaign of 1342-43, horse compensation accounts have survived which are far more substantial and which make important contributions to our knowledge of the military community and their warhorses.

Of the two, the accounts for the Cambrésis-Thiérache campaign offer the most material. In all they contain details of 540 lost horses, but only 450 of these were appraised mounts (the rest being 40s. beasts). If attention is confined to English men-at-arms, these accounts provide about 330 different names, or in the region of 20% of those who were serving in the Low Countries in the autumn of 1339. This global figure conceals significant fluctuations at the retinue level. Some substantial retinues, such as that of Sir Walter de Mauny, are completely missing from the restauro equorum account, whilst sixty (about half) of the earl of Salisbury's men are listed with their lost horses. The norm for several of the larger retinues is about 25%. This might seem a rather modest figure, particularly when it is recognised that perhaps as many as two-thirds of this

54. B.L. Stowe Ms. 553 fos. 69v-71. The whole of folio 70 and a few entries on folio 71 are concerned with appraised horses, thirty-four in all. The rest of the restauro equorum section is devoted to the unvalued horses of men attached to the royal household, for the loss of which their owners were awarded a fixed sum: 40s.

55. Norwell, pp. xciii-xcv; 309-25. But note that over seventy of these horses were lost by foreign companies and that a further handful of continental men-at-arms lost horses whilst serving in the retinues of English captains.

56. Over 1,600 men-at-arms were in pay (in 'English' retinues) during the period 23 October to 16 November 1339: Prince, 'The strength of English armies in the reign of Edward III', p. 361.

57. Mauny had a retinue with a maximum strength of ten knights and thirty-three esquires: Norwell, p. 331.

58. Salisbury's retinue (which consisted of just over 120 men-at-arms) lost sixty-five horses, but five of these were the earl's and one of his men (Sir Robert de Burton) lost two: Norwell, pp. 312, 327-28. The following discussion assumes that the pay rolls offer an essentially accurate picture of manpower numbers; this, as we have seen, may be an unwise assumption to make.

59. Twenty-one members of the earl of Northampton's retinue (total: ninety men-at-arms) lost horses; and twenty-four of the earl of Derby's (maximum ninety-four men-at-arms). Norwell, pp. 309-10, 312-13, 326-27.
army's men-at-arms had letters of protection enrolled on the Treaty rolls.  

60 At times, indeed, an even larger proportion of a retinue appears in the enrolled protection lists. Thus, for example, as many as eighty-eight men serving in the earl of Northampton's retinue had protections. Even allowing for the inclusion of a certain number of non-combatants, this is an astonishingly high figure, bearing in mind that the pay roll suggests that Northampton was paid for only ninety men-at-arms throughout this period. In this particular case it is not surprising to find that the _restauro equorum_ accounts furnish the names of only three men who are not also to be found amongst the lists of protection recipients.  

61 Turning to the earl of Salisbury's retinue, however, we find that the balance of records is reversed. Less than a third of his men-at-arms have enrolled protections (or attorney appointments) and yet because half of his military retainers lost a warhorse during the course of the campaign, we still know the names of nearly three-quarters of his retinue. More than half of those who are known by name - thirty-nine out of seventy-seven - appear only in the _restauro equorum_ account. This retinue is as unrepresentative as Northampton's,  

62 and yet it serves further to underline a point which has emerged before: that horse inventories and, it seems horse compensation accounts, can do much to correct the misleading impression of military service which dependence on protections tends to create. For whilst only half of Salisbury's men who appear in both protection and _restauro equorum_ lists are esquires, of those whose names are to be found only as a result of losing a

60. About 1,700 letters of protection and attorney appointments are to be found on the Treaty rolls for 1338-39 and, bearing mind a significant amount of duplication and renewal, about 1,000-1,100 separate individuals appear to be involved (Treaty Rolls, 1337-39; C76/14).

61. Sir Adam de Shirburn, Hugh de Neville esq. and Nicholas de Meynill.

62. The earl of Derby's retinue appears more representative for this campaign. Sixty-two (two-thirds) of his men have enrolled protections or attorney appointments, yet nine additional names are to be found in the _restauro equorum_ account.
horse, three-quarters are un-knighted men-at-arms. Although offering far fewer names than the enrolled lists of protections, the *restauro equorum* accounts for the Low Countries expedition of 1338-39 appear to be providing something approaching a genuinely random sample of that section of the 'armoured' military class which participated in this campaign. The earl of Salisbury’s retinue shows this particularly well. Of the total paid men-at-arms serving under him at the end of the campaign, two-thirds were esquires; and of the sixty men listed in his *restauro equorum* account, two-thirds can be seen to have been esquires.

These conclusions appear to be equally applicable if we turn to the *restauro equorum* account for the Breton campaign of 1342-43. At first glance, however, this seems to be a less promising collection of materials. Only 226 men are are listed, a figure which represents perhaps about 12% of the total number of men-at-arms who served for pay during this campaign. The proportion of men with lost horses is sometimes higher at the retinue level: the figure is 18.5% for the earl of Northampton’s company (with 200 men-at-arms, the largest in the army) and over 50% for Sir Thomas de Bradeston’s. The tendency for higher percentages of lost horses at the retinue level is in part explained by the absence from the account of several very substantial retinues: in particular, those of the earls of Gloucester, Pembroke and Oxford and of Ralph, Lord Stafford, but also the great majority of the very small companies. With a significantly less substantial

63. E36/204 fos. 86v-88; see Appendix 2.

64. The *restauro equorum* account includes 228 appraised horses, but the earls of Northampton and Devon each have two listed for their personal use.

65. Just over 1,900 men-at-arms: a combined figure for all three expeditions (Mauny’s, Northampton’s and the king’s). Some individuals will be included twice in this total (e.g. those who served under Mauny in the spring and then returned with the king in the autumn), but they would have had a separately appraised horse for the second period of service.
restauro equorum account at our disposal than we had for the Cambrésis-Thiérache campaign, can we be confident that we still have a representative sample of the men-at-arms in the army? Whilst one in four of all men-at-arms involved in the Breton expeditions were knights or bannerets, the restauro equorum sample appears to include a rather smaller proportion of knights: thirty-four men, or about 15% of the sample. *Restauro equorum* accounts are, perhaps, likely to be less reliable about the military rank of the men they list than the full inventories from which their information has been drawn. Some mistakes of this kind have certainly been made. Only two of the earl of Derby’s men are defined as knights, yet other sources indicate that at least a further three of the remaining sixteen men-at-arms named in the account were also of this status. \(^{66}\) With most retinues it is simply a matter of making very slight adjustments. Eleven of the thirty-five men listed for Northampton’s retinue are presented as knights and we would only wish to add a twelfth. \(^{67}\) Overall, use of the evidence of complementary records would increase the number of men of knightly status to forty-four (19.5%) and, thus, allowing for a sprinkling of further undetected knights, the sample provided by the *restauro equorum* account appears to be as near a representative subset of the whole army - as far as rank-structure is concerned - as is realistically likely to occur.

Indeed, a slight weighting in favour of the non-knightly section of the armoured military class would not be unwelcome, for as compared with the 226 names supplied by the *restauro equorum* account, 722 separate individuals have enrolled letters of protection for this campaign. Thus, perhaps rather more than a third of the serving men-

\(^{66}\) Sir Adam de Everingham, Sir Richard de la Vache and Sir William de Silithwait, who are shown to be knights by their enrolled letters of protection for this campaign: C76/17 mm. 24, 27, 39.

\(^{67}\) Sir John de Hothum of Bonby: C76/17 m. 36.
at-arms to take part in the three expeditions to Brittany took the trouble of securing a letter of protection before their departure. 68 These, as has been seen, will not represent a balanced cross-section of the men-at-arms in King Edward's army, for the bulk of protection recipients were men concerned to take out a temporary insurance policy on their property. Some would go a stage further and appoint attorneys to ensure that 'seignorial administration continued unhindered' in their absence. 69 In 1342, 234 men did this before leaving for Brittany. Of these wealthy men, only eighteen had not also secured enrolment of a letter of protection. 70 These, then, represent the top stratum of the English military class; for a view of the lower layers it is necessary to look elsewhere. In the first place, it would be worth examining the vadia guerre accounts. 71 These supply as many as 255 different named individuals, including 158 who were not protection recipients and well over a hundred whose involvement in this campaign could not be ascertained from any other source. The men mentioned in the pay accounts are, however, a very mixed bag. There are certainly a few conventional members of the chivalric class who go unmentioned in the other records for this

68. C76/17; C76/18; C61/54. It is difficult to be precise about this. Firstly, there will be a number (probably small) of non-combatants included amongst the protection recipients. Secondly, some sections of the army (notably the companies of Robert d'Artois and William de Kildesby) do not appear in the vadia guerre accounts, and are, thus, not included in the manpower total; but their letters of protection (including those for fourteen of Artois' men, and nine of Kildesby's) were enrolled with all the others on the Treaty Rolls.


70. Amongst these eighteen were some very prominent men, including an earl and three bannerets.

71. E36/204 fos. 105v-10v.
campaign. Leaders of small companies form an interesting group. Such men could not rely upon a prominent captain to secure their letters of protection; perhaps, as ordinary knights, they lacked the authority or the experience to do so for themselves. It is useful, also, to be able to identify the leaders of the archer companies; these, too, form an interesting section of the military community. The great majority of the extra names supplied by the vadia guerre accounts belong, however, to members of the royal household and although a number of these were esquires with, no doubt, a good sword arm, many of them were servants and clerks who were not engaged in a military capacity. If such men received *dona pro restauro equorum* they would usually consist of flat-rate payments of 40s. for unappraised animals which were not employed in war.

For a more valuable, unbiased view of the English military class in action in 1342-43, we must return to the restauro equorum accounts. Although apparently offering far less nominal record evidence than letters of protection - and a little less even than that supplied by either appointments of attornies or the vadia guerre accounts - the horse compensation accounts also provide a far less narrow view of

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72. These include Sir Thomas Beaumont, Sir Robert Fitz Elys, Sir Nicholas Langford, Sir Thomas Swinnerton and Alan, Otes and Thomas Holand. Most retinue commanders are also to be seen in the Issue Rolls, receiving part or all of their wage-arrears at the Exchequer. Thus, for example, the three Holand brothers had not yet been fully paid off in February 1346: E403/336 m. 31. The Issue Rolls supply a few names which do not appear in the vadia guerre accounts: for example, Thomas Forcer and eight other [unnamed] archers were still receiving arrears for the Breton campaign in October 1345 (E403/336 m. 7).

73. Cf. in 1355, the Black Prince's administration can be seen actually supplying parchment to the king's chancery, apparently to expedite the issue of protections for the prince's men: Tout, *Chapters*, v, p. 342 n. 6.

74. For example, John Ward, *ductor* of a company of 80 mounted archers from Cheshire: E36/204 fo. 109v. For Ward's career, see Morgan, *War and society in medieval Cheshire*, pp. 43-49.

75. For example, Edward atte Wode and Guy Brian, who both lost horses during the course of the campaign. According to a contemporary narrative, Edward atte Wode met a violent death during the Crécy campaign (*The life and campaigns of the Black Prince*, ed. R. Barber (Woodbridge, 1986) p. 35.

76. See, in particular, the lists of names on fos. 108 and 108v of the vadia guerre account.
serving men-at-arms than these other sources. About a third of the army's men-at-arms had protections and, appropriately enough for a source which is supplying a random cross-section, exactly a third (seventy-six) of the men listed in the *restauro equorum* account can also be seen to have been recipients of protections. The 150 men who do not have protections (and the slightly smaller subset of 139 men, whose participation in the Breton campaign is known only as a consequence of their loss of a horse) are more important than their numbers might suggest, for they are representatives of those other elements in the make-up of the active military community which are otherwise too rarely evident to historians. The great majority of them are ordinary English esquires, but they also include a few foreign mercenaries, both of knightly rank and ordinary men-at-arms.

The retinue-level distribution of these shadowy military figures is interesting. In some companies they constitute exactly, or very nearly, two-thirds of the men listed in the *restauro equorum* account, but with others, they form a significantly larger proportion. Of the twenty-four men-at-arms in Sir Walter de Mauny's retinue who lost horses, only four had enrolled protections. In fact, comparatively few (less than 10%) of the men who served with Mauny during either the spring or autumn campaigns in 1342 appear to have secured protections. It may well be that a captain of foreign extraction without long-established tenurial ties in England was most likely to recruit large numbers of landless English 'professionals'.

77. Although comprising two-thirds of the men in the *restauro equorum* account, they include only ten of the forty-two knights listed there. The few knights without protections probably include a number of 'young men, living under the shadow of their fathers, [for whom] soldiering abroad provided alternative occupation' and income (Walker, 'Profit and loss in the Hundred Years War', p. 102).

78. For example, Sir Walter de Landesbergen, in Sir Walter de Mauny's retinue. He had served in Edward III's army in the Low Countries in 1339, where he had also lost a horse: Norwell, pp. 318, 339.

79. For example, the retinues of the earls of Northampton and Derby: twenty-two out of thirty-seven and twelve out of eighteen respectively.
and foreign mercenaries.

In simple numerical terms, the particular contribution of the *restauro equorum* account to our knowledge of Edward III's army in 1342-43 appears comparatively modest. The men whose involvement in the Breton expeditions is known solely as a consequence of appearing in the *restauro equorum* account represent little more than 7% of the total number of men-at-arms receiving pay; with only three of the larger retinues do such men amount to significantly more than 10% of men-at-arms. Yet the horse losses list provides by far the best means, for this campaign, of looking beyond the topmost layer of the military community. There are other sources, certainly, but their contribution to a nominal roll of men-at-arms will either be very slight or unreliable. Thus, for example, only a handful of deponents before the Court of Chivalry in the 1380s claimed involvement in the Breton campaign of 1342-43, whilst the evidence provided by charters of pardon, although impressive in bulk, is less useful than it might be because it is usually insufficiently explicit about the military status of pardon recipients. Knights will usually be distinguished, but it will normally be difficult to separate ordinary men-at-arms from archers. The same will apply to many casual references to military service which are to be found in other records. On occasion, however, the documentary context ensures that the historian is well

80. The retinues of Sir Hugh le Despenser, Sir John Darcy senior and Sir Walter de Mauny.

81. For example, Thomas Rose esq., who had served with Sir Robert de Morley en le viage del Counte de Norhampton a le rescuse de Brest and Sir Robert de Marennys who had been at the siege of Vannes: C47/6/1 deposition nos. 20, 27. Neither of these men had enrolled protections for this campaign. For a fuller discussion of the evidence of Court of Chivalry depositions, see below pp. 243-45.

82. Enrolled pardons are primarily to be found on the Treaty rolls (C76/17 & 18), but there is also a fragment of a separate pardon roll for this campaign (C67/28A). Not all pardons were enrolled, however, so for completeness it would be necessary to use the authorising warrants included in the privy seal files (C81/287 onwards), together with the scatter of original captains' warrants (e.g. SC1/39 mm. 144-48, from the earl of Northampton).

83. For example, Sir John de Rotse: C81/289 m. 15321.
enough served. In May 1343, for example, Henry de Percy of Wiltshire received a pardon for not assuming knighthood in response to the distraint order of 1341; he had, in fact, become a knight on the previous 29 August whilst serving with Robert de Artois at the siege of Morlaix.84

84. * * * * *

84. C.P.R., 1343-45, p. 33.
As has been seen, a significant proportion of the men-at-arms in Edwardian armies, particularly for Scottish campaigns, saw no necessity for a letter of protection. These included men who, though born into the lesser gentry, had (as yet) little or no landed property of their own; men of rather more obscure origins seeking to make a living, and perhaps gain social advancement, through regular campaigning; and men from abroad, placing their swords at the disposal of the English crown. For many campaigns, the identities of such men as these remain resolutely obscured from view. Yet some at least will be visible if horse inventories or restauro equorum accounts have survived.

Not infrequently, where these less prominent members of the military class are concerned, our knowledge of an individual's career is wholly based upon his appearance in a series of inventories. Bearing in mind the healthy concentration of records for the Scots campaigns of 1336-38, it is not surprising that there are a number of men-at-arms who can be seen serving during these years, but at no other time. Most served consistently in the retinues of either Henry de Percy or Ralph de Neville and, as members of the military community of the north, they were perhaps unlikely to be participants in continental campaigns. But away from the retinues of the northern magnates are to be found fighting men of a more cosmopolitan frame of mind. That we know anything of the career of William Carless in the later 1330s arises from his appearance in three separate inventories for the retinue of the earl of Warwick; he is next seen serving in Brittany in 1342-43. The inventories cast occasional shafts of light on a number

1. For example, Gilbert de Ergom and William Walram (Neville) and Walter de Wessington and Richard de Horsleye (Percy). In each case these men appear in the full inventories for 1336 and 1337 and in the restauro equorum account for 1338.

2. B.L., Cotton Ms., Nero C. VIII fo. 281; E101/20/17 m. 7d.; E101/388/5 m. 19. Carless lost a horse in Brittany (E36/204 fo. 88), but he also had a protection for this campaign (C76/17 m. 39).
of other men whose careers straddle the opening campaigns of the French war. Some, like William Carless, were loyal to a single lord; others were free-agents, offering their services to a series of different captains for expeditions in both Scotland and France. Robert de Longvill served under three different captains in Scotland, but remained with the last of them for the campaign in the Low Countries in 1338-39. Edmund de Roos, who fought in at least two different retinues in Scotland in the later 1330s, appears to have moved from one company to another during the course of the first campaign of the French war.

The bare-bones of Edmund de Roos' career in arms have been revealed by a fortunate combination of horse inventory and *restauro equorum* entries, but many others are likely to have been less well served by the uneven survival of evidence. Thus, for example, Henry Banaster, Martin Durward and Simon Peverel - all, like Roos, esquires in the retinue of Giles de Badlesmere in 1337-38 - seem to make only this one appearance in the king's armies; but this is more likely to arise from the fickleness of the records, than the brevity of their military careers. It may be that they never acquired the necessary position in landholding society or the military community to justify letters of protection on a regular basis. Others, however, did manage to acquire this status. For some, the Scottish campaigns of 1336-38 represented the early stages of careers which were to be recorded

3. For example, Nicholas de Gernon, who is seen serving with Henry of Grosmont in 1336 (E101/15/12), 1342 (E36/204 fo. 86v) and 1349-50 in Gascony (E403/355 m. 19; E404/508 m. 78).
4. E101/19/36 m. 2d; E101/20/17 m. 10; E101/35/3 m. 2; Norwell, p. 316.
5. E101/19/36 m. 2d; E101/35/3 m. 1. During the Cambrésis-Thiërache campaign, Roos is listed with a lost warhorse in two different retinues: Norwell, pp. 311, 314. This may well be the 'Esmond de Rose esq.' who, at the age of sixty-nine *et autre* gave (rather limited) evidence to the Court of Chivalry in the Lovel-Morley case: C47/6/1 deposition no. 91.
6. Martin Durward does have an enrolled protection for the winter of 1337-38, but the proportion of Giles de Badlesmere's retinue who have protections for this campaign is unusually high (C71/17 m. 3).
regularly in the military records. Another of the esquires listed in Badlesmere's inventory in 1337-38, Eymer de Rokesle, was to serve repeatedly in the campaigns of the French war, but on only one occasion must we rely upon a horse inventory in order to see him. Richard de Totesham, who was a loyal campaigner with the earl of Northampton in the early campaigns of the continental war and who became a middle-ranking captain in Brittany in the mid 1340s, is listed amongst the ordinary men-at-arms of William de Bohun's inventory in 1336. Some of the men who appear on the military scene for the first time in the 1336-38 horse inventories were to become celebrated figures in the French war. Thus, for example, amongst the esquires in the earl of Salisbury's retinue who had their horses valued at Mepath on 1 January 1338, are to be found Walter de Bentley and Nigel de Loring.

In addition to illuminating the lower strata of the English military community, the horse inventories also cast invaluable light upon a further important group of Edwardian army personnel: foreign men-at-arms in the pay of the English crown. The fluctuating role of foreign contingents in Edwardian armies can be traced, to some extent,

7. Rokesle lost a horse during the first major campaign of the French war (Norwell, p. 311); he then served overseas in 1340, 1344 and 1346-47 (C76/15 m. 23; C76/19 m. 23; Crecy and Calais, pp. 97, 184-85).

8. Protections in 1338-39 (Treaty Rolls, 1337-39, nos. 291, 653), 1340 (C76/15 m. 20) and 1342-43 (C76/17 m. 36). In early 1344, Totesham was the leader of the largest retinue (thirty men-at-arms and sixty mounted archers) in a small expeditionary force to Brittany: E403/331 m. 29. He is well known as the keeper of the besieged town and castle of Roche Derrien at the time Dagworth's dramatic rescue in 1347: Avesbury, p. 389.

9. E101/19/36 m. 5.

10. E101/35/3 m. 1d. Cf. Loring's appearance in the pay rolls for this campaign (E101/20/25 m. 5), a reference noticed long ago by J.E. Morris (Welsh Wars of Edward I, p. 52). A Walter Betle is listed amongst Sir Richard Talbot's garrison at Berwick in 1339 (E101/22/9 m. 1), but the future renowned soldier of the war in Brittany was surely serving in the Low Countries at this time: Norwell, pp. 318, 321.

11. This includes a significant number of Scotsmen. Patrick de Dunbar, for example, who figures in inventories in both 1337 and 1338 (E101/20/17 m. 7; E101/35/3 m. 2), had acted as a guide for English forces advancing versus partes de Selkirk in 1335 (B.L., Cotton Ms., Nero C. VIII fo. 274).
in the *vadia guerre* accounts, but it is the horse inventories and
*restauro equorum* accounts which allow the historian a little closer to
the members of these mercenary companies. The records of the
Cambrésis-Thiérrache campaign offer a good example. In addition,
foreign mercenaries form a small but interesting component of retinues
led by English captains in all theatres of war. Thus, for example,
the earl of Oxford's retinue-inventory, drawn-up at Tweedmouth on 12
May 1336, includes a John de *Ispaynea*; and a certain *Theodoric de
Allemannia* lost a horse whilst serving in Sir Reginald de Cobham's
retinue in the Low Countries in 1338-39. Some of the alien men-at-
arms were more exotic. Sir Ralph de Neville's retinue in 1337
included a man who was called, interchangeably, *Henry Sarasyn* or
*Sarasyn Henry*.

* * * * *

The horse inventories, then, allow attention to be focussed on the
non-knighly element of Edwardian armies; the section of the military
community which, though constituting the great majority of serving
men-at-arms, can so easily be neglected in studies of military
service. Such men as these may not have been lauded by the
chroniclers of chivalry to the same degree as their knightly comrades
and they appear by name only very irregularly in lists of protections
and in the pay rolls, but they represented, nevertheless, the backbone
of Edward III's armies. Other, less systematic records do have a part
to play in the study of this intriguing section of the military

12. *Norwell*, pp. 315-16, 321, 324. For a valuable study of German mercenaries serving in Italy
(including many documents), see K.H. Schäfer, *Deutsche Ritter und Edelknechte in Italien während
13. E101/19/36 m. 6; with a 10 mark horse which died at Perth on 26 June.
15. E101/20/17 mm. 6, 8; he had a horse valued at £8.
community. Ordinary men-at-arms figure very prominently, for example, in the records of the Court of Chivalry. There can be no clearer indication of their standing in the military community - that their knowledge and experience of war and its usages carried great weight - than the fact that of the deponents in one of the Court's cases in 1380s, the Lovel-Morley case, esquires outnumbered knights by two to one. The career outlines which these esquires (and indeed the knights describing their early military lives) provide during the course of their depositions represent evidence of the greatest value to the historian of military service. In many cases a window is opened on a career about which the conventional record sources reveal little. Many of the deponents would remain beyond normal visibility for the greater part of their careers, whether as regular participants in the king's great expeditions, specialists in garrison service or naval operations, or in their ventures into hethenesse; some would be wholly unknown, were it not for their depositions. Where a group of associated knights and esquires contribute to a particular court case, fascinating insights can be gained into the composition and activities of a local military community or a magnate's extended military affinity.

16. Sir Hugh Browe of Tushingham testified that his twenty years in arms had been spent 'in the garrisons and companies in France, and never on the great expeditions': Scrope-Grosvenor, i, p. 82.

17 Most of Thomas Rose's deposition relates to naval activities: he served with Sir Robert de Morley during the earl of Northampton's passage to Brittany in 1342 and also when Morley fist arder v villes des costes de Normandie; and he was at the battles of Sluys and Winchelsea. C47/6/1 no. 20.

18. In the Scrope-Grosvenor case, 'at least fourteen individual crusaders either testified or were mentioned, their exploits of the previous twenty-five years stretching from Egypt to Lithuania': Christopher Tyerman, England and the Crusades, 1095-1588 (Chicago and London, 1988), p. 259. For an earlier discussion of crusading activity as revealed by Court of Chivalry evidence, see M. Keen, 'Chaucer's knight, the English aristocracy and the crusade', English court culture in the later Middle Ages, ed. V.J. Scattergood and J.W. Sherborne (London, 1983), pp. 45-61.

19. For example, John Raven, who told the Court of Chivalry of his service at Sluys, the siege of Tournai, Crécy and Calais, the sea-battle of Winchelsea and the Rheims campaign: C47/6/1 no. 6. It is possible that he is to be identified with the John Raven (d. 1395), who is commemorated by a neat little brass in the parish church at Berkhamstead (J.E. Cussans, History of Hertfordshire (3 vols., London, 1870-81), iii, p. 69).

20. Many of the supporters of Sir Robert Grosvenor in 1385 were militarily experienced Cheshiremen (Morgan, War and society in medieval Cheshire, pp. 128-30; Michael Bennett,
It is important, however, to recognise the limitations of the Court of Chivalry evidence. Of the five hundred or so depositions which survive from the 1380s, many reveal comparatively little, either because of the youth of the deponents, or because their comments are insufficiently precise to be very helpful. Often it is clear that a deponent is not revealing the whole story about his former military life. William de Thwyt, for example, furnishes an impressive list of six expeditions in which he claims to have played a part; but he fails to mention serving in Gascony in 1337-39, Brittany in 1342-43 and Ireland in 1344-46. Some men, it seems, mentioned only what they felt to be strictly relevant to the case in hand, whilst one or two of the older deponents admitted to having defective memories. It is possible, moreover, that the records as we have them do not represent verbatim transcripts of the proceedings. As far as the compilation of nominal rolls for individual armies is concerned, for most campaigns (except the most recent) the Court of Chivalry depositions can do no more than fill gaps left by the more bulky conventional records. It is certainly useful to have a few extra names, for example, for Edward III's army at Halidon Hill, and perhaps a few dozen for the Rheims campaign roll; but the real strength of this category of evidence is


21. This excludes the 'civilian' depositions, although these can occasionally be useful in an indirect way.

22. C47/6/1 no. 92; C61/49 m. 17; C76/18 m. 9; C260/57 m.28.

23. For example, Sir Nicholas de Goushill: C47/6/1 no. 29.

24. The Lovel-Morley roll offers four men who claim to have been at this momentous battle (Henry de Hoo, Sir Nicholas de Goushill, William de Thwyt, and Sir Alan de Heton: C47/6/1 nos. 10, 29, 92 and 97), whilst the Scrope-Grosvenor depositions provide a number of additional names (e.g. William Hesilrigge and Sir Adam de Everingham: Scrope-Grosvenor, i, pp. 126, 240-41). The prior of Marton revealed that his church possessed an embroidered coat of arms worn by Sir Alexander de Neville at Halidon Hill (ibid. pp. 139-40). None of these men have enrolled protections on the Scots roll for 1333.
less quantitative than qualitative. They present a picture of the military community in action which, in revealing the roles of both the knightly and non-knightly elements in Edwardian armies, is far more balanced than that presented by the evidence of letters of protection, and which, thus, serves to complement - and reinforce - the evidence offered by the horse inventories and other full muster records.

Shafts of light are occasionally cast upon some of the more obscure recesses of the fourteenth-century military community by records of other kinds, but the information supplied tends either to be irregular and anecdotal, as for example with pleas of knighthood before the Exchequer, or to be restricted to individual armies - as with the proffer roll for the Scottish campaign of 1322, the Carlisle roll of arms for the summer expedition of 1335, and Henxteworth's journal for the Black Prince's expedition of 1355-57. Bearing in mind the very considerable interpretive drawbacks of the pardon rolls and the inconsistent coverage of (in their different ways) both enrolled letters of protection and surviving muster rolls, it is clear that the horse inventories and *restauro equorum* accounts are the most important of the nominal records for the historian of the Edwardian military community. They have not survived in huge quantities; indeed, their survival after the 1320s is decidedly patchy. Rarely, moreover, is an

25. For example, John de Colby, who claimed to have taken-up knighthood at Crécy: E159/121 m. 228. See also, Powicke, *Military obligation in medieval England*, pp. 176-77; Saul, *Knights and esquires*, p. 42.

26. C47/5/10; the roll lists the names of over 500 proffered men-at-arms, the great majority of whom were ordinary esquires (for example, the six men performing the abbey of Shaftesbury's service of three fees). On the patchy coverage of the nominal records for the army of 1322, see Powicke, op. cit., pp. 163-4.

27. Cambridge, Fitzwilliam Museum Ms. 324 (see Denholm-Young, *The country gentry in the fourteenth-century*, pp. 101-5; cf. C.E.M.R.A., pp. 54-56). Although listing fewer than three hundred members of the knightly class, the last few folios offer the names of several dozen 'German' mercenaries.

expeditionary force comprehensively covered. Yet, they represent a
guide to military service which is as reliable as any form of muster
roll is ever likely to be; and even when inventories are available for
only a selection of an army's retinues, they usually provide a
complete roll of serving men-at-arms for those retinues: in effect, a
cross-sectional perspective through all layers of the military
community. *Restauro equorum* accounts, on the other hand, offer
something approaching a random sample of an army's men-at-arms,
usually large enough to be useful.

The inventories are, moreover, offering the historian rather more than
merely lists of men-at-arms' names. The arrangement of these records
in the form of retinue lists, sometimes sub-divided into companies,
provides a means of exploring patterns of recruitment and networks of
relationships. As a consequence, the more obscure members of the
military community acquire something of an identity by virtue of the
military context in which they can be viewed. The inventories for the
retinues of more prominent captains will reveal large numbers of
otherwise unknown military personnel and may well contribute
significantly to the reconstruction of a magnate's sphere of
influence. The manpower of the great retinues are, however, usually
illuminated to some degree by other source materials, whilst retinues
led by captains of lesser status are often very poorly served by, for
example, the evidence of letters of protections. The basic dimensions
of these smaller companies may be visible in the pay rolls, but few of
the men-at-arms will be known by name. Thus, for example, only one of
Sir John de Stryvelyn's twenty men-at-arms for the Breton campaign of
1342-43 has an enrolled letter of protection.29 It is for such

29. Walter de Heslerton (C76/17 m. 27). For the brief Scottish campaign during the previous winter,
Stryvelyn had served with twenty-three men-at-arms, none of whom had an enrolled letter of
protection: E36/204 fos. 102, 106v; C71/21.
retinues as these, therefore, that records possessing comprehensive coverage really come into their own.30 A glance at the materials for the 1336 Scottish campaign shows this quite clearly. Several of the horse inventories list retinues of ten to twenty men-at-arms.31 That for Sir John de Segrave's company, for example, consists of three knights and fourteen esquires, only four of whom have enrolled letters of protection.32 Whatever the size of the retinue, a single roll offers no more than a glimpse of a captain's recruitment policy: it can provide little impression of the permanence, or otherwise, of personal ties between the captain and the members of his comitiva. A series of rolls might begin to do this. In the case of Sir John de Segrave, we find that only two of the eighteen men in his retinue in 1336 were also serving under his banner in the Scots March during the summer of 1340.33 Over a shorter period we might expect greater stability of retinue composition, particularly when a captain possesses a significant regional power-base and can draw upon the support its military community.34 Thus, for example, the retinues of Henry, Lord Percy (d. 1352) drew consistently upon the gentry of Yorkshire: the great majority of his men-at-arms in 1336 (forty out of fifty-five) were also in his comitiva for the campaign during the following year.35

If some of their strengths are shared by conventional muster rolls,

30. For example, the muster roll of Sir John de Stryvelyn's garrison at Edinburgh castle on 18 May 1337 (E101/19/24 m. 12; partly printed in Bain, iii, pp. 362-63).
31. See Appendix 1.
32. E101/19/36 m. 5d; C71/16 mm. 27, 14. Two of the protection recipients were knights; a third, John Waleys, served with Segrave in the Low Countries in 1338-39 (Norwell, p. 315).
34. Cf. the pattern of recruitment of Sir James Audley's retinue in 1345: Morgan, War and society in medieval Cheshire, pp. 75-76.
35. E101/19/36 m. 3; E101/20/17 mm. 4, 5, 9.
the inventories possess one, fundamentally important, feature which sets them apart from other forms of muster record: the horse valuation. The inventories and *restauro equorum* accounts are revealing more about those who are listed than merely that they are performing military service under a particular captain; they are providing, through the warhorse valuations a measure of military status. All forms of muster and review records, including horse inventories, may include an implicit expression of military precedence. Thus, for example, in the case of Sir Richard Talbot's muster rolls (examined earlier in this chapter), Philip de Buktot's name appears high in the list of *hominí ad arma* on the three rolls in which he is included, and it is no surprise to see that he has become a knight by the mid 1340s. But the horse inventories are providing more than this: military status is given a numerical value. Having such a convenient means of gauging a man's position in the military community is particularly important for many of the men listed in horse inventories. For the prominent *milites strenui*, to be included on an inventory may well represent only one of many appearances in the military records - and it is undoubtedly true that the evidence of the horse inventories is used to best effect if combined with that from other records of military service. But, as has been seen, for a large proportion of men named in the inventories there is likely to be very little further evidence of their military careers, unless by good fortune they feature on other documents of a similar kind; their status will be such that they are unlikely to appear often in lists of protections. Thus, for example, of the men who are listed in the inventory and *restauro equorum* account for Sir Richard Talbot's retinue in 1337-38, few have enrolled protections for the campaigns

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which immediately precede and follow; but rather more information is provided by the appearance of four of them on other horse inventories. Very little may be known about these lesser men-at-arms, but if we know the value of their warhorses, then at least we have a guide to their place in the military hierarchy. If we have several consecutive values at our disposal, we have the means of detecting changes in military status - and, perhaps, in attitudes of mind.

37. Only Sir Adam de Banastre, 1339 (C76/14 m. 4); Richard le Hunter, 1344 (C71/24 m. 4; Berwick garrison).

38. Richard le Hunter and Geoffery de Wytrington in 1336 (E101/19/36 mm. 5d; 3); Philip de Buktot and John de Eynesford (alias Eylesford) in 1342 (E36/204 fos. 87; 88).
Chapter VI
THE WARHORSES OF THE EDWARDIAN MILITARY COMMUNITY

Only a comparatively small proportion of the horse inventories which are known to have been compiled during the Edwardian period have survived the passage of the centuries, yet those which have been preserved can be made to reveal a great deal. They can, as has been seen, offer invaluable glimpses of the military community in action; but what they can tell us of the warhorses of these fighting men? There is certainly much about these majestic animals which we would dearly like to know, but upon which the inventories and *restauro equorum* accounts cast absolutely no light. Thus, whilst they usually provide a simple description and a valuation for each horse listed, they do not reveal anything about height or age. But although limited in scope, the inventories offer an unrivalled source of information about the warhorses of the Edwardian chivalric class, particularly if the data (and especially the valuations) are viewed in bulk as well as in detail, and if analysis embraces both the horses and their owners. Such analysis, moreover, can throw much light upon the character of the chivalric community itself, for by examining their warhorses, it is possible to gain insights into the social, economic and military status of men-at-arms serving in Edwardian armies; and also, perhaps, to perceive something of their varied responses to the changing nature of warfare during a period in which the English military machine was radically transformed.

1) Chronological overview

It would be appropriate to begin by attempting a broad overview of the evidence. Table 6.1 shows the mean values of warhorses for English royal armies from the 1280s to the 1360s - the full period for which inventories are available.
Table 6.1: Mean warhorse values, 1282-1364

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date &amp; Place of service</th>
<th>Mean Value (£)</th>
<th>No. of horses</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1282 Wales</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>635</td>
<td>C47/2/7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1298 Scotland</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>1356</td>
<td>Gough, pp. 160-237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1311-15 Scotland</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>1267</td>
<td>Bain, iii, pp. 413-32 (1311-12); E101/15/6 (1315)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1324-25 Gascony</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>689</td>
<td>E101/35/2 m. 7; 16/38; 17/2; 13/35; 16/39; 17/31; Add. Ms. 7967 fos. 104-6v.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1336 Scotland</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>542</td>
<td>E101/19/36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1337 Scotland</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>341</td>
<td>E101/20/17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1337-38 Scotland</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>367</td>
<td>E101/35/3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1338-39 Low C'tries</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>376</td>
<td>Norwell, pp. 309-25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1342-43 Brittany</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>E36/204 fo. 86v-88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1350s Gascony</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>E101/172/4; 170/20 fos. 75-76; E403/355 m. 19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1359-60 France</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>1160</td>
<td>E101/393/11 fo. 79-116v.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1361-64 Ireland</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>E101/28/11; 29/5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Presented in this form, the horse valuation data exhibit a number of striking features. The level of values prevalent at the time of Edward I's second Welsh war appear to have been broadly similar to those of the 1360s, but values fluctuated significantly during the intervening period. There would seem to have been a steady increase in the general level of warhorse values during the reigns of Edward I and II, followed by a slight fall during the first decade of Edward I.

1. Thus continuing what appears to have been a steady rise in warhorse prices since the time of the Norman Conquest. A respectable warhorse would cost about £2 in c. 1100 and, a hundred years later, perhaps 10 marks: F. Barlow, *William Rufus* (London, 1983), p. 284 n. 92; A.L. Poole, *Obligations of society in the twelfth and thirteenth-centuries* (Oxford, 1946), p. 52. Matthew Paris' estimate of the value of an ordinary man-at-arms' horse in 1257 (four to ten marks) accords well with the evidence of the earliest inventories from Edward I's reign: H. Chew, *The English ecclesiastical tenants-in-chief and knight service* (Oxford, 1932), p. 93. Although the increase in warhorse prices is usually seen as an indication of qualitative improvement, prompted by heavier armour and...
III's rule. Far more marked is the contrast between the average values for the Scottish campaigns of the later 1330s and those for the early campaigns of the Hundred Years War, but the peak achieved by English warhorse values during the Cambrésis-Thiérache campaign was not sustained. The warhorses taken to Brittany in 1342-43 appear, on average, to have been rather less highly priced than those involved in the first campaign of the war, and the values for the 1350s and 1360s show a far more marked decline. Thus, the mean value of the warhorses employed during the Rheims campaign was only a little over half the peak-level of twenty years earlier, and with the Irish expeditions of the 1360s we find a return to the low level of the early 1280s.

A table of mean values can reveal the general trend in warhorse values during the Edwardian period, but it also conceals a great deal: in particular it gives no impression of the spread of real values lying 'behind' the mean value for each expedition. Table 6.2, a grouped frequency distribution, summarises the spread of values found on each collection of inventories.

equipment, it does seem broadly in line with general price movements for livestock: H.E. Hallam, ed., The agrarian history of England and Wales, II, 1042-1350 (Cambridge, 1988), pp. 745-55, especially Table 7.4. 'Livestock prices by decades, 1160-1356'.
Table 6.2: Spread of warhorse values, 1282-1364

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date &amp; Place of service</th>
<th>Under £10</th>
<th>£10-£19.9</th>
<th>£20 and over</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1282 Wales</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1298 Scotland</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1311-15 Scotland</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1324-25 Gascony</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1336 Scotland</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1337 Scotland</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1337-38 Scotland</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1338-39 Low Countries</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1342-43 Brittany</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1350s Gascony</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1359-60 France</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1361-64 Ireland</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This table also has a number of striking features. The proportions of low-value (under £10) and high-value (£20 and over) warhorses can be seen to have fluctuated a great deal, whilst the middle-value range was more stable, accounting for between 25% and 35% of all warhorses for most sections of the data series. The surviving inventories for the Scottish operations of the later 1330s are dominated by low-value horseflesh. The rolls for 1337 in particular have only a handful of high-value horses, whilst the higher mean for the winter 1337-8 expedition can be seen to have been achieved through an expansion of the high-value group, combined with a commensurate reduction in low-value horse numbers. The peak in the series of mean values - the first campaign of the Hundred Years War - is seen in Table 6.2 to have resulted from a very significant shrinkage in the numbers of low-value warhorses.

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2. Sources: as for Table 6.1.
3. Seven with valuations of £20 and one appraised at £40.
4. Forty-one horses valued at £20 or more, with twelve of these having valuations of £40 or above.
horses, with a corresponding growth in the high-value category.\(^5\) The slight dip in the overall level of values for the Breton campaign was the consequence of a swelling of low-value horse numbers, whilst still holding a high proportion, nearly one in four, of high-value mounts.\(^6\) Although it must be interpreted with a certain amount of caution, the data for the decline in warhorse values after the 1340s appears particularly interesting. The balance of values for Gascony of the 1350s is practically identical with that for the War of Saint-Sardos of the mid 1320s; but as seen in Table 6.1, with the Rheims campaign the level of English warhorse values declined quite steeply and the trend downwards appears to be continued with the Irish expeditions of the 1360s. Table 6.2 shows this development to have been the result of a dramatic collapse in the numbers of high-value horses,\(^7\) and a massive consolidation in the low-value range: about three out of four warhorses were appraised at less than £10. This compares with two out of three in the early 1280s, but by the later fourteenth-century, the low-value range had become narrower, for it no longer embraced horses valued at under 100s. as it had earlier in the century.\(^8\) One hundred shillings was now the minimum acceptable value and a great many horses were assessed at exactly this amount.\(^9\) The imposition of such a

\(^5\) About 9% of warhorses had values of £40 or above, an extraordinarily large proportion of highly priced animals. For the Falkirk inventories, for example, the equivalent figure is 2%.

\(^6\) 6% had values of £40 or above.

\(^7\) The data for the Rheims campaign may be a little misleading. Because the information appears in aggregated form in the original source, only a very small subset is available for analysis in Table 6.2: there is disaggregated information for only sixty-six individual horses. Although the mean value of this subset (£8.3) is only a little less than that for the whole group of 1,160 horses, it probably includes a rather smaller proportion of high-value horses than would be truly representative. Of the 135 warhorses appearing in the Irish expedition inventories of the 1360s, only five fall into the high-value category; four were valued at £20, the fifth was the earl of Stafford's 80 mark destrier.

\(^8\) The Welsh and Scottish campaigns of the earlier fourteenth-century show a declining presence of low-value horses: those appraised at less than £5 represent 21% of the total in 1282, 15% in 1298 and about 10% of those on the inventories of the later 1330s. For overseas expeditions from the time of the War of Saint-Sardos, minimum valuation appears to have been £5; see Chapter IV, pp.127-28. In fact, most horses valued at less than £10 for continental campaigns were registered at either 100s., 10 marks or £8; see Chapter III, pp.83-85.

\(^9\) For the Irish expeditions of the 1360s as many as 35% of appraised warhorses on the surviving inventories are given values of 100s. The pattern is is not consistent at the retinue level: 50% of Sir
minimum valuation may well have served to keep the overall level of values a little higher than would otherwise have been the case.

* * * * *
ii) The reliability of the evidence

The reasons for the fluctuations in the level of warhorse values will be considered shortly, but before proceeding any further it would be prudent to assess the quality of the sources which lie behind the summary statistics presented in Tables 6.1 and 6.2. A relatively abundant collection of horse inventories has survived from the reigns of Edward I and II (particularly the former), and it would have been unrealistic, and perhaps unnecessary, to attempt to utilise them all. The first four entries in the tables summarise the contents of a representative selection of these documents. For the period after the accession of Edward III rather less relevant material is available and the tables incorporate practically all significant horse inventories and related sources to have survived from the remainder of the fourteenth century. As the half century from the 1320s to the 1360s forms the main focus of the present study, it was perhaps desirable to attempt a complete coverage of the source materials for this period. Even so, suitable data is available for only a minority of years and a 'comprehensive' approach has necessitated the use of a miscellany of records including not only full inventories, but also restauro equorum lists and summary accounts. Thus the data series is very incomplete, inconsistent in provenance\(^1\) and contains parts which may not be strictly compatible.\(^2\) But does it still offer an essentially reliable impression of the warhorses of the Edwardian military community?

It would be perfectly natural to assume that the most reliable parts of the data series would be those which are based entirely upon complete inventories. This is certainly the case where the

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1. The inconsistency arises, certainly, from the various forms in which the surviving sources exist, but also from the fact that the inventories were compiled by many different horse appraisers over a long period; see Chapter III, especially pp. 81-85.

2. For this reason, the data has been left in the form of annual mean values, and the more sophisticated forms of presentation appropriate for prices data have not been attempted.
inventories are lengthy and embrace all, or at least a very significant proportion, of an army's contingent of men-at-arms. In the event, not a single major military operation is illuminated by a complete set of inventories, and few are blessed with more than very partial coverage. Conclusions are always more surely based upon a substantial body of evidence, but the main problem arising from the incompleteness of the surviving stock of inventories is not simply lack of bulk; it is that the available data may not constitute a representative sample of the now admittedly unreachable whole. Some attention will be devoted in due course to the relationship between warhorse value-levels and the standing of retinue commanders, but suffice to say at this stage that a collection of inventories that embraces only a selection of an army's retinues may well be offering a distorted impression of the level of warhorse values for the army as a whole. Armies are themselves 'samples', each with a very individual 'character'. An army will include only a proportion of the active military community and the make-up of its personnel, together with the quality of warhorses which each man-at-arms chooses to bring on campaign, is very much determined by the circumstances and locality of service. To establish with confidence the individual character of armies, it is necessary to be sure that due allowance is being made for the 'distortion factor' introduced by incomplete collections of inventories.

Many of the gaps in the inventory evidence arise quite simply from the hazards of time, but there is an additional cause of incompleteness, particularly prevalent during the reigns of the first two Edwards, which is that inventories were only compiled for those sections of
armies which were receiving royal pay. The horses of feudal contingents and of those serving voluntarily but without pay, were not recorded. In the main, it is unlikely that their mounts would differ significantly in quality from the appraised warhorses of paid troops.

Nevertheless, the problems arising from the incompleteness of the evidence need always to be borne in mind, even when dealing with the most ample collections of inventories. In the case of Edward I's reign, there are several such collections for important royal armies and the data provided by two of these, for the second Welsh war of 1282 and the Falkirk campaign of 1298, have been included in the Tables 6.1 and 6.2.

After the turn of the century, evidence on this scale for major expeditions is far less abundant. Horse inventories are lacking for all of the royal expeditions to Scotland during Edward II's reign. What we have instead are horse lists for smaller forces - a miscellany of retinue-level inventories which form an impressive, exceedingly varied but essentially incoherent bulk. Perhaps the most substantial single set concerns a group of English garrisons in Scotland in 1311-

3. Moreover, as we have seen, the valuation of warhorses was no longer an automatic accompaniment to paid military service under Edward III.

4. However, some of those who served with unpaid retinues were the kind of men who might be expected to be found leading companies with unusually high-quality horseflesh - men like Thomas, earl of Lancaster, for example. Cf. a later earl of Lancaster, Henry of Grosmont, below, pp. 319-20.

5. On the inventories for the second Welsh war and the Falkirk campaign, see Prestwich, War, politics and finance under Edward I, pp. 50-51, 68-69. The inventories for 1298 list over 1,300 men and may provide an essentially complete record of paid men-at-arms, yet 'there were probably two or three times as many unpaid cavalry in the English army' (Prestwich, Edward I, p. 481). There are several further important collections of inventories for this reign: see for example, the materials discussed in N.B. Lewis, 'The English forces in Flanders, August-November 1297', in Studies in medieval history presented to F.M. Powicke, ed. R.W. Hunt, W.A. Pantin, R.W. Southern (Oxford, 1948), pp. 310-11.

6. Evidence for the warhorses involved in the Bannockburn campaign is restricted to a small collection of Wardrobe debentures concerned with restauro equorum payments: E404/482 files 31, 32. A restauro equorum account exists for the 1322 campaign, but it is surprisingly brief (thirty-four appraised horses) bearing in mind the hardships which the English army is said to have endured during this campaign: B.L., Stowe Ms. 553 fos. 69v-71.
There are 773 appraised horses listed with a mean value of £9.5, a low figure which reflects the nature of the service involved and the fact that the garrison rolls include very few knights. The men of these garrisons do not form a typical sample of the chivalric class of the 1310s. If, in the composition of a major royal army, we might expect to see a balanced cross-section of the military community, then in garrison personnel will surely be found a very distinctive sub-set of that community. The many smaller-scale sets of inventories for this period display similar drawbacks: they are a very mixed bag and in only a few cases is the historian brought nearer to the wider chivalric community. On the one hand, there are the retinues of veteran captains of the border country, like Sir Andrew de Harcla. The majority of those who served with Harcla were local men. They had low-value warhorses (75% were valued at less than £10), presumably suited to the rough campaigning terrain and thus the mean value for Harcla’s retinue was never high: from £6 to £9. On the other hand, there is the earl of Pembroke’s small army which served in the Scots Marches in the summer and autumn of 1315. A total of 293 warhorses have an average value of £18.4, with one of the four retinues in Pembroke’s command having a mean as high as £22. Here are to be seen the flower of the English military community, with a most

7. B.L., Cotton Ms., Vespasian C. XVI fo. 12-19v; printed in Bain, iii, pp. 413-32.
8. Fewer than 5% of the men-at-arms listed are knights. The pay rolls for these garrisons (Bain, iii, pp. 393-412) show that the small number of knights listed in the inventory is not the consequence of scribal imprecision.
9. The means for Harcla’s retinues: £9 in January 1313; £6.8 in July 1314; £6 in November 1314. In each case, his company numbered a little over thirty men; in the second and third cases, nearly half of his men had horses valued at less than £5. E101/14/15 mm. 2, 4, 5.
impressive array of horseflesh: men like Robert, lord Mohaut, who was able to afford an £80 horse for himself and to provide an 80 mark mount for his retainer, Sir John de Bracebridge. On the evidence of this inventory, J.E. Morris suggested that there had been an increase in horse values since Edward I's reign. But the level of values prevalent in Pembroke's force is, as much as those of the English garrisons and Harcla's borderers, unlikely to be wholly typical of the broader chivalric community at this time. The norm, which might be expected for a major field army composed of a more balanced selection of personnel, probably lay somewhere between the extremes which have been considered. Accordingly, in Table 6.1, the evidence of the Scottish garrisons and Pembroke's army has been combined in a single figure: £11.9. The resulting mean value is offered only very tentatively, but it is probably not altogether misleading.

That the mean value for the early 1310s is, indeed, of the right order of magnitude is suggested by the data for the English expeditionary forces in Gascony in 1324-25. The army involved in the War of Saint-Sardos is one of the most fully documented of the later Middle Ages. An excellent set of pay rolls offers a most detailed insight into the shifting size and structure of the army's myriad component.

11. Of the men in Pembroke's army, 75% had warhorses valued at £10 or more; 35% at £20 or higher. By comparison, of the garrison troops discussed above, 40% had horses appraised at £10 or above and only 10% at £20.

12. E101/15/6 m. 2; for Mohaut's provision of Bracebridge's horses, see M. Jones, 'An indenture between Robert, lord Mohaut and Sir John de Bracebridge for life service in peace and war, 1310', Journal of the Society of Archivists, iv (1972), pp. 384-94; Bean, From lord to patron, pp. 53-54.


14. The earl of Pembroke was one of the foremost political and military figures of his day and, moreover, his retinue included a high proportion of knights and bannerets (over 25%), which would serve to boost the number of high-value warhorses.

15. For example, Sir Henry de Percy's retinue, serving from Carlisle in 1306, had a mean value of £14: E101/612/15 m. 1.
companies. The pay rolls are also unusually revealing about serving personnel, but for this our main source of knowledge is an excellent collection of horse inventories. Although not a complete set, they do offer a very impressive body of evidence, listing 329 men and warhorses from the earl of Kent's retinue and the fleet which arrived in the autumn of 1324, and 360 from the second fleet, which reached Gascony in May 1325. It is unlikely that the loss of a comparatively modest proportion of the original inventories has introduced a serious element of distortion into the evidence. The picture presented is, indeed, a very consistent one: the mean for the first fleet (217 values) is £10.7, whilst that for the second (234 values) is £10.3. Although the corresponding figure for the warhorses in Kent's company is much higher - £18.9 - this is wholly in keeping with the earl's status and a fair reflection of the calibre of the men in his retinue.

16. The vadia guerre sections of Nicholas Huggate's account book: B.L., Add. Ms. 7967 fos. 30-75. This can be supplemented by a number of further accounts: E101/17/5; B.L., Add. Ms. 17,363 and 26,891 (fos. 1-49v); B.L., Cotton Ms., Julius C. IV, section 16 (Latin and French versions of parts of the pay roll). For the course of events, see The war of Saint-Sardos (1323-1325), ed. P. Chaplais, Camden Soc., 3rd ser., lxxvii (1954); cf. N. Fryde, The tyranny and fall of Edward II, 1321-1326 (Cambridge, 1979), Chapter 10.

17. The earl of Kent's expeditionary force: E101/35/2 m. 7; the 'first fleet': E101/16/38, E101/17/2, E101/13/35; the 'second fleet': E101/16/39, E101/17/31 (Warenne's retinue). The first, fourth and sixth of these records have not hitherto been identified. On the duplicate inventories for the 'first fleet', see above, pp. In all, the inventories provide the names of nearly 700 men-at-arms, about twice as many as appear in the lists of protection for this campaign (C.P.R., 1321-24; C.P.R., 1324-27; C61/36). There is an additional roll listing over 200 pardon recipients (C61/37), but as usual these are drawn from a rather broader-based body of personnel.

18. Although there are 689 separate warhorses listed, a fair proportion of them (173) lack a valuation, either because omitted from the inventory (as with the whole of Warenne's retinue, and part of Kent's) or because of documentary damage. It is also evident that some of the original inventories have not survived, for the restauro equorum section of Huggate's book of accounts (B.L., Add. Ms. 7967, fos. 104-106v) lists seventy-six appraised horses, and thirty-five of these cannot be traced in any of the existing inventories.

19. The mean value of the thirty-five lost horses which do not appear in the inventories is admittedly rather high (£15.7); but, as we shall see, restauro equorum accounts quite often include a disproportionately large number of high-value horses, and this is certainly the case with the Gascon materials of 1324-25.

20. Only 30% of warhorses in Kent's retinue were valued at less than £10, and 45% at £20 or more; the corresponding figures for the first and second fleets are more than 50% and about 10%.
The War of Saint-Sardos is the last major continental expedition for which a substantial collection of original inventories has survived. Thereafter, the only comparable materials relate to the expeditions in Scotland in the later 1330s. They form an impressive corpus of documents, but their coverage is very far from complete. As was seen earlier, the most comprehensively covered expeditionary force is that led by Henry of Lancaster in the early summer of 1336; and yet, even in this case, Lancaster's troops formed only a part of the English forces serving in Scotland during this year. It is also a little unfortunate that, as with Edward II's reign, the available inventories serve to illuminate minor military operations directed by magnates, rather than major expeditions led by the king himself; and that a disproportionately large number of the personnel in these inventories were members the military community of the north. Yet despite the prominent involvement of northern magnates and their retinues, the inventories from the later 1330s (and particularly those for the army which concentrated its efforts on the siege of Dunbar during the winter of 1337-38) do include large numbers from the wider military community, many of whom, a little later, are to be found serving with the king's armies on the continent.

To some extent, incompleteness mars the value of the only other collection of original inventories for Edward III's reign: a small bundle of materials which throws light on some of the retinues serving with Lionel, duke of Clarence' expeditionary force in Ireland in 1361-21. For an analysis of these inventories, see Chapter V, pp. 213-27.
Table 6.3 summarises the contents of these documents.

Table 6.3: Mean warhorse values for retinues serving in Ireland, 1361-4.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Captain:</th>
<th>No. horses</th>
<th>Mean value:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sir Eustace d'Auberchicourt</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>£6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sir Robert de Aston</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>£6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sir John de St. Lowe</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>£6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sir William de Windsor</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>£7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sir William de Hoggeshawe</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>£6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earl of Stafford</td>
<td>50(21)</td>
<td>£10.0(£9.5)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The evidence is incomplete on two levels: not all of the retinues in Clarence's army are included, and of those that are there, several are not completely listed. Although based upon information for fewer than 100 horses, the data would seem to be remarkably consistent in character. The overall mean of £8.5 may, however, be rather high, inflated as it is by the dominating influence of Stafford's retinue.

A *restauro equorum* account tends to confirm this impression, and so do the horse values of a slightly later inventory of Sir William de

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24. Only the first two-thirds of the roll for the earl of Stafford's retinue can be read with absolute confidence, but the mean value given here is reliable enough; this is supported, indeed, by the corresponding figure for Stafford's lost horses (in brackets in the table): E101/28/21 fo. 14v. Of those included in Table 6.3, only Stafford's retinue served from the autumn of 1361 (his horses were valued in Bristol on 18 August). The retinues of Windsor and Hoggeshawe were paid from June 1362 (but their horses were valued later), those of d'Auberchicourt, Ashton and St. Lowe, from March or April 1363: E101/28/21 fos. 5, 7v, 8, 10, 10v (the *vadia gums* account).

25. Of those serving from the autumn of 1361, most notably the duke's own retinue (5 knights, 64 esquires and 70 archers), but also Sir John de Careu's company, do not have horse inventories: E101/28/21 fos. 3v, 6v.

26. Only Ashton's and St. Lowe's companies are fully covered; about half of d'Auberchicourt's men-at-arms and considerably fewer of Windsor's and Hoggeshawe's are listed. Windsor's inventory is in fact a list of lost horses: it tallies exactly with his entry in the *restauro equorum* account for this army.

27. He was the effective commander of the expedition and his retinue was the largest in the army: 1 banneret, 17 knights, 78 esquires and 100 mounted archers, from the outset of the expedition (E101/28/21 fo. 5).

28. E101/28/21 fo. 14v. A total of 35 lost horses have a mean value of £8.9, but as we shall see, *restauro equorum* accounts often tend to exaggerate the overall quality of horseflesh.
Windsor’s retinue, preserved on a sadly faded inventory drawn-up in Liverpool on 1 February 1364. If the figure of £7.8 in Table 6.1 is perhaps a little speculative, bearing in mind the incompleteness of the records and their variable legibility, it is unlikely to be too wide of the mark.

If the evidence for the Irish expeditions of the early 1360s rests upon a combination of rather imperfect inventories and an insubstantial *restauro equorum* account, for the French campaigns of the preceding decades we must rely wholly upon records of horse losses. *Restauro equorum* accounts are necessarily only partial in their coverage, for only a proportion of an army’s appraised warhorses would be lost during the course of a campaign. Could this mean that they are offering a misleading impression? Might not, for example, the appearance of a dramatic increase in the level of warhorse values at the start of the Hundred Years War be in part the product of our dependence upon *restauro equorum* accounts? An answer cannot be wholly conclusive: a *restauro equorum* account should always be handled with caution. But, on balance, it is likely to provide a sub-set which is broadly representative of the quality of the whole army’s warhorses, provided that the number of horses lost is both fairly large and forms a reasonable proportion of the whole.

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29. E101/29/5.

30. As the first three entries, including Windsor’s own horse, are missing, we might expect this mean to be a slight under-estimate.

31. Thus, for example, 19.5% of the horses listed in the surviving inventories for the Scottish campaign of 1336 are to be found in a corresponding *restauro equorum* account. The mean value of the horses in the full inventory is £8.5, whilst that for those which have been lost is £8.7. In the case of the Scottish expedition of the summer of 1337, only 4.7% of the horses listed in the full inventories were lost and whilst the mean value of these sixteen horses is £11.3, that for the complete inventories is only £7.6 - a very significant discrepancy. E101/19/36; E101/20/17; B.L., Cotton Ms., Nero C. VIII fos. 280v-82.
during the Low Countries campaign of 1338-39 and the Breton campaign of 1342-43 are both of respectable length, the former consisting of 450 horses (though fewer than 380 of these were lost by members of 'English' retinues) and the latter of 228. Since these figures represent, respectively, in the region of 20\%\textsuperscript{32} and about 12\%\textsuperscript{33} of the total numbers of horses appraised at the outset of these campaigns, it would seem probable that the \textit{restauro equorum} accounts are, indeed, offering broadly representative samples. They may, it is true, slightly exaggerate the quality of their respective armies' warhorses,\textsuperscript{34} and thus rather stretch the apparent leap in values at the start of the French war. Equally, there is the possibility of wayward figures at the retinue level, where horses of unusually low or high value amongst small numbers of lost mounts would give a misleading impression.\textsuperscript{35} But such extremes balance out when the data is examined on the level of the whole army. Indeed, the great advantage of a good \textit{restauro equorum} account is that very often it will cover a whole army, utilising, and drawing samples from, a very large and varied collection of retinue-level inventories. It has been

\textsuperscript{32} This is a very approximate figure: it includes only those warhorses lost by English retinues and uses as a 'total of appraised horses', the number of men-at-arms in pay in October/November 1339: about 1,600 (Prince, 'The strength of English armies', p. 361). The number of horses appraised during the lengthy period of service in the Low Countries in 1338-40 must, however, have been considerably greater than this (there were, it will be recalled, a number of men who received compensation for more than one lost horse), and it is against that higher figure that the total of fatalities should really be compared.

\textsuperscript{33} Based upon a total of about 1,900 men-at-arms receiving pay for service in Brittany; for a discussion of the size and structure of this army, see Appendix 2.

\textsuperscript{34} This is common with less substantial datasets, as for example is the case with the horses lost by Aymer de Valence's company in 1315 (E101/15/6). The evidence for these losses takes the form of annotations on the original inventory. The mean value of the 293 horses listed is £18, whilst that of the twenty-seven which were lost (generally rendered \textit{ad Elemosina}) is £21.7. By contrast, bearing in mind the level of warhorse prices in Edward II's reign, we might suspect that the mean value of the thirty-two horses recorded as lost during and immediately after the Scottish campaign of 1322, £8.5, rather under-represents the level of horse values for the English army as a whole. It includes, for instance, four horses for which the earl of Louth received compensation at a flat rate of £5 each. B.L., Stowe Ms. 553 fos. 70, 71.

\textsuperscript{35} In the case of the Breton campaign of 1342-43, mean values at the retinue level (taking into account only those which have lost at least ten horses) range from £7.9 to £24.6, but as we shall see, such variation may arise not only from the distorting effects of unrepresentative subsets, but also from the rank structure of individual retinues and the status of captains and men-at-arms.
seen already how such restor accounts offer a representative cross-section of personnel, an excellent mix of men from all levels of the military community; we may be fairly confident that their warhorses will also constitute a balanced sample of those appraised for a particular army.

This is an important conclusion, because records of horse losses, as distinct from horse appraisal, provide the main pillars of evidence for the first phase of the French war. Thus, our knowledge of warhorse values for the Rheims campaign also rests very firmly on restauro equorum data, albeit at an even further remove from the original inventories than is usually the case. The evidence involves a very large number of horses (1,160 with a mean value of £9), but it is offered in the form of aggregates (horse and value totals) at the level of the retinue. Information about individual horses and their owners is therefore lacking, but in every other respect the data should be comparable with conventional restauro equorum records, and in particular with those emanating from the early campaigns of the war. The size of the sample is certainly adequate, representing about 30% of the total number of warhorses appraised at the start of the campaign. There is, not surprisingly, a certain amount of diversity

36. Included amongst the vadia guerre accounts in Farley's Wardrobe Book: E101/393/11 fos. 79-116v. These figures exclude the evidence from two retinues: Sir William de Grannson (fo. 86v.), who was allowed £600 for an unspecified number of lost horses; and Sir Frank Hale (ibid.), who received 1000 marks for restauro equorum. The latter looks like a lump-sum payment, probably unrelated to the actual value of the horses lost. See Appendix 3, Table A, for retinue-level figures.

37. Except where a captain is claiming for only one lost horse. There are sixty-six such retinues and this subset of individual horses has a mean value of £8.3: a little less, therefore, than the average for all horse losses in 1359-60.

38. The army included about 3,750 English men-at-arms. In addition, over 1,000 men-at-arms were provided by continental captains (Prince, 'The strength of English armies', p. 368), but none of their pay accounts mention the loss of horses and their mounts may not have been appraised. The army consisted of a large number of separately accounting units: of about 550 retinues or companies included in the vadia guerre account, nearly 400 were lead by Englishmen. The proportion of appraised horses lost is very inconsistent at the retinue level. On the one hand, the Prince of Wales claimed £3,355 6s. 8d. for 395 horses, suggesting that two-thirds of his men-at-arms lost a warhorse during the campaign. On the other, Sir Edward Kendale accounted for the loss of a single £6 horse (E101/393/11 fos. 79, 84v). The accounts of about two-thirds of English captains include no mention
of mean values at retinue-level,\textsuperscript{39} but the high and the low averages tend to balance out and the majority in any case lie quite close to the overall mean of £9\textsuperscript{40} - a figure which we can be fairly confident summarises the level of warhorse values for this army quite well.

The evidence for the level of warhorse values provided by Farley's pay rolls for the Rheims campaign, though offered only in aggregated form and, thus, at some distance in administrative terms from the horse inventories compiled at the outset of the campaign, forms an essential component in the data series presented in Table 6.1. It constitutes the main source of evidence for a decline in warhorse values during the post-plague period. As a major royal expedition to northern France, the circumstances of the Rheims campaign are directly comparable with those of the two well-documented campaigns early in the war. By contrast, the remaining relevant data from the 1340s, '50s and '60s (not all of which is included in Tables 6.1 and 6.2) derive from rather different forms of military endeavour: service, sometimes in garrisons, in Gascony and Ireland in small armies led by magnates. These materials are, in addition, far less weighty than those which are available for the Rheims campaign: fragmentary and rather miscellaneous in form, they can do no more than supply supportive evidence. This evidence certainly seems to fit quite neatly into the time series, but it is necessary to be aware of its manifest shortcomings.

In the first place it is exceedingly sparse. Of the many inventories of lost horses.

\textsuperscript{39} Of those retinues which have lost at least ten horses, the highest mean is £20.3, for the earl of Warwick's company, and the lowest £6.3, for the earl of March's. However, Sir Thomas Ughtred's nine horses averaged at £5.9, and Sir John de Beauchamp's eight at £5.4.

\textsuperscript{40} For example, the horses of the Prince of Wales and the duke of Lancaster (who combined lost 611) had means of £8.5 and £9.8 respectively.
and related administrative documents which are known to have been
drawn up, very few have survived. References to horse inventories are
occasionally to be found in the records for this period and they
have left their mark in summary _restauro equorum_ payments; yet the
original rolls have, for the most part, disappeared. The picture for
the 1340s, after the Breton campaign of 1342-43, is particularly
bleak. Indeed, there is but one reasonably substantial document - a
record of horse losses during Sir Ralph de Ufford's term of office as
Justiciar of Ireland in the mid 1340s - and it poses a number of
interpretive problems which rather diminish its usefulness. It is
very unlike any other _restauro equorum_ account to have survived from
the fourteenth-century. It consists of two parts. The first
comprises ten valued horses, which rather than being assigned to
specific men-at-arms are given names incorporating a recognisable
surname or title (e.g. Bayard Derby, Morel Ufford). The second part
consists of a more conventional list of thirty-nine men-at-arms with
associated valued horses, but it is unusual in that horse descriptions
are not provided - and, more significantly, in that fifteen of the men
are claiming for two horses and one, Sir Adam Percevall, for three.
Here, as on a number of other occasions during this period of
experiment, normal practice was clearly not being adhered to, and the
evidence of the resulting _restauro equorum_ account is not, therefore,
directly compatible with that of other records of warhorse losses.

41. For example, the _cedule contenance aucuns chivaux_ of the earl of Pembroke _prisez avant son afer
vers les parties de Gascoigne & illoeges perduz_ (E159/123 m. 99d).
42. For example, in Henry of Lancaster's account for his service in Gascony in 1345-7: E101/25/9 m.
1.
43. C260/57 m. 28.
44. As we have seen, it was customary for only one warhorse per man-at-arms to be appraised at the
start of a period of service. Although a replacement horse would be valued, most of Ufford's men
who were claiming for more than one horse had sustained their losses on a single occasion. Eight
men each lost two or three horses in a sharp skirmish in the Moiry Pass in 1345. Robin Frame, 'The
justiciarship of Ralph Ufford: warfare and politics in fourteenth-century Ireland', _Studia Hibernica,
Many of the horses in Ufford's list, appearing either separately or in multiples, have very low values, whereas, for other campaigns after the start of the French war, a minimum value of 100s. appears to have become the norm. Some of the horses appearing in Ufford's list may not have been 'first string' warhorses at all, but palfreys or hackneys: extra horses of a kind required by all men-at-arms on active service, but not usually qualifying for compensation if lost. Some of them might even be archer mounts. This suspicion is reinforced by the inclusion of seven sumpters and eighteen cart horses in the list; such animals would certainly not normally be found in a restauro equorum account. The list does include, on the other hand, a respectable amount of high quality horseflesh: eleven of the horses (one in six) were valued at £20 or above, with the best, the 'Bayard de Leyston', worth £50. Although calculation of a mean value for Ufford's retinue would serve no useful purpose, the significant proportion of high-value horses in Ufford's inventory is instructive, and provides supportive evidence of a kind for the level of values presented in the restauro equorum accounts for the Cambrésis-Thiérache and Breton campaigns. A fragment of evidence from another quarter appears to offer even more forceful evidence for the high level of warhorse values during the early years of the French war. For the loss of forty-three 'destriers, coursers and other horses' during his term of service in Gascony in 1345-47, the earl of Derby claimed the enormous sum of £1,384 13s. 4d., which represents a mean value of £32. It may be that warhorse values really were reaching a peak

45. Of sixty-six horses listed, at least twenty one have values under 100s; the lowest valuation (20s.) was for two horses lost by Thomas Burton.
46. However, service in Ireland, like Scotland, was very different from France. The nature of the terrain would have persuaded many to make use of small, hardy and inexpensive horses.
47. These horses (not included in the totals quoted in n.45 above) were also lost in the Moiry Pass; the combined value of all twenty-five was £55.
48. E101/25/9 m. 1.
during the mid 1340s, but equally it must be suspected that Derby's men had lost horses of unusually high quality, the magnificent horseflesh reflecting the large proportion of knights and bannerets in the retinue and the high calibre of personnel which the earl was able to attract into his service. Unfortunately, comparative evidence for the years immediately preceding the Black Death is lacking. The horse inventories for the Crécy-Calais campaign have been lost, whilst the records of *restor* payments which are available are unhelpful.49

The evidence for the 1350s, prior to the Rheims campaign, is as patchy and inconsistent as for the latter part of the previous decade. The only serviceable material derives from English operations in Gascony and this may not be offering a view of the warhorse which is typical of the wider military community at this time. Although the only genuine horse inventory to have survived is but a fragment,50 a mixed bag of related records compensate to some extent for this deficiency. A *restauro equorum* account for the mid 1350s provides a list of fifteen horses owned by English knights and esquires.51 A file of warrants authorising payment of compensation for lost horses, together with a set of corresponding receipts, yields a further twenty-four.52

At a greater remove from the realm of conventional horse inventories are two lists of horses delivered into the hands of the constable of Bordeaux by Englishmen about to leave the duchy for England. The first, dating from 1350, concerns the retinue of the earl of Lancaster

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49. Mixed *restauro equorum* and wage payments on the Issue Rolls: e.g. for Sir John de Stryvelyn's retinue for the Crécy-Calais campaign: E403/340 m. 34.

50. E101/172/4 m. 45: part of Sir John de Cheverston's retinue in 1356. Only the first nine horse values have survived.

51. E101/170/20 fos. 75-76. Similar fragments cast a little light on the horses of Englishmen in Gascony in the 1330s (E101/166/11 mm. 36-37 and E101/167/3 m. 32) and the 1350s (E101/170/12 fo. 61).

52. E101/172/4 mm. 1-43: warrants and receipts dated from February 1354 to October 1361. These are invaluable for the light which they cast on administrative processes.
and provides a list of twenty-seven men who between them received payments for forty-two horses. 53 Thus, we have information about the warhorses of approximately a third of Lancaster's men-at-arms. 54 Although, in the case of ten men, the prices of individual mounts are concealed by the fact that a lump sum is being received for the sale of more than one horse, 55 the amounts which were being paid do not appear ungenerous. 56 The second list dates from a couple of years later. Unfortunately the prices agreed by the constable of Bordeaux when he received the horses of some of the earl of Stafford's men-at-arms prior to their departure from Gascony towards the end of 1352 have not been recorded. What the list offers are the sums which were secured when twelve of these horses were re-sold. 57 The prices are very low - nearly all are less than £5 - possibly because the animals were in poor condition. 58 But whatever the explanation, although this 'horse list' is of value for the list of serving men-at-arms which it provides, it is obviously incompatible with the other sources for English warhorses in the 1350s. There remains, therefore, a total of

53. E403/355 m. 19. The debentures for all but one of the men listed on the Issue Roll have survived: E404/508 mm. 51-72, 74, 76-79. The horses were sold shortly before Lancaster's departure for England in March 1350: Fowler, The king's lieutenant, p. 88.

54. 2 bannerets, 23 knights and 54 esquires, as well as 87 mounted archers, returned to England with Lancaster: Fowler, op. cit., p. 86 n. 14.

55. Six men-at-arms were selling two horses and three were disposing of three. Sir Stephen de Cusyngton sold four horses including a destrier valued at 100m.

56. The wording of the debentures suggests that the horse values were determined for the purpose of the sale, rather than being taken from an existing inventory. The overall mean value for this group of warhorses (£13.7) is probably lessened by the inclusion of 15 'second string' mounts, which would not be included in a normal horse inventory. The mean for Lancaster's retinue in 1350 is less than half that for the horses lost by his men in 1345-47.

57. In addition to these twelve, there are five others which had been acquired from men serving with Sir John de Cheverston: E101/170/20 fos. 19-21v. The great majority were sold to Gascons; the exception was a horse, previously owned by Hugh Pauffot, which was sold to Thomas de Hampton for £3. 4s. The earl of Stafford's retinue left Gascony at the beginning of December, having been in the duchy for less than five months; some, at least, of their horses were taken back to England. For this period of service, Stafford received £86 13s. 4d. to cover the cost of horses bought for his retinue in Gascony, as well as a restauro equorum payment of £500, a suspiciously neat sum (E101/26/25). The latter payment may well include the value of the horses acquired by the constable of Bordeaux: his account (E101/170/20 fo. 19, 20, 21) states that they had been delivered to him quasi perdit.

58. Cf. above, pp. 44-45.
ninety horses for an entire decade, with an average value of £12.3. As with the data for the 1310s, this figure conceals disparate elements, but with the additional problem that it is based on rather too little data. Lancaster's retinue of 1350 contributes nearly half of the total number of horses and, as might be expected from a prominent captain, the mean value is quite high: £13.7. The mean for the remainder is £11, and this, indeed, is probably inflated to some extent by the *restauro equorum* list mentioned above which has a mean of £15.2.59 A figure of just over £9 would probably be a more representative average for the horses of Englishmen engaged in garrison duty in Gascony,60 with a rather higher mean value likely in the case of some of the expeditionary forces sent out from England.61

The evidence is anything but water-tight, but it seems to point to a decline in warhorse values during the 1350s. Certainly by the time of the Rheims campaign they had subsided to a level only a little above half that which they had occupied at the start of the French war. The evidence for developments after 1360 is hardly more plentiful.62 The data from the inventories for Clarence's Irish expedition indicate a further decline in values63 to a level similar to that for the second Welsh war of eighty years earlier. Bearing in mind the very

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59. E101/170/20 fos. 75-76.

60. Based on the materials contained in E101/172/4. Such garrison troops were a distinctive group within the military community of mid- and late fourteenth century England.

61. As we have seen, no proper evidence for Stafford's expedition has survived. Sadly, the same applies to the Prince of Wales' expedition in 1355-57, although it is known that horse inventories were compiled (Hewitt, *The Black Prince's expedition*, p. 33).

62. For example, the cost of 201 horses lost by John of Gaunt's retinue in Gascony in 1370-71 is buried in a general payment of £32,380: J. Sherborne, 'The cost of English warfare with France in the later fourteenth-century', *B.L.H.R.*, 1 (1977), p. 139. It is difficult to draw wholly reliable conclusions from a scatter of *restauro equorum* references in John of Gaunt's register for the early 1370s, but the tendency is for horses to be valued at 100s. or 10 marks (e.g. *J.G. Reg.* 1371-75, ii, nos. 896, 939, 1031). By the 1370s, a 25 mark warhorse, such as that lost by Sir John Cresy during the 'last voyage' in Normandy and Picardy, is a mount of above average quality (ibid., no. 908).

63. See above, pp.262-64.
specialist nature of service in Ireland, more directly comparable with the evidence for the Rheims campaign is the award of 1000 marks in compensation for the loss of 100 horses by Sir John Chandos during his mission to implement the terms of the treaty of Calais. He was, therefore, being given a fixed rate of 10 marks per horse,\textsuperscript{64} whereas Sir Thomas Dagworth was compensated at a fixed rate of £10 per horse for losses in Brittany fifteen years earlier.\textsuperscript{65} Perhaps in this simple comparison we have as clear an indication as any of the general trend in warhorse values in the mid fourteenth-century.

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\textsuperscript{64} E101/28/10. Chandos' retinue had lost twenty-seven warhorses during the Rheims campaign at an average value of £12.6: E101/393/11 fo. 82.
\textsuperscript{65} E101/25/17.
iii) The warhorse in fourteenth-century England: rise and decline

The glaring lacunae in the inventory evidence after the early 1340s cannot be filled by warhorse prices data of a conventional kind, for (as was seen earlier)\(^1\) that too is exceedingly sparse - and, indeed, the little which there is may well be simply misleading.\(^2\) But is it not possible to confirm the pattern of the statistical series of warhorse values, and in particular the weaker parts of the series, by reference to the general trend of prices during the Edwardian period? After all, it is usually felt that luxury goods, although defying attempts at conventional prices analysis, 'are likely to have joined in the general price trend'.\(^3\) In fact, the match is found to be very imperfect. The pattern of horse values which has been considered in this chapter is only in a very general sense related to the trend in ordinary livestock prices in the fourteenth-century, and at several points (for example, in the mid 1310s and at the start of the Hundred Years War) it departs very significantly from that trend.

Conventional prices data and the evidence of warhorse inventories are, thus, decidedly uneasy companions; but there should be no surprise in this, for they are the product of very different processes. In the first place, account must be taken of the influences affecting the decisions of horse appraisers. Although concerned to secure a reasonable degree of accuracy in their valuations, they were restricted by their own experience and knowledge, by the conflicting interests of their royal master and the horse-owners who came before

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2. In 1342, for instance, Sir Ralph de Stafford sold two destriers with a combined value of £80 to John Brocas, keeper of the king's horses (E36/204 fo. 79v), whilst in 1348, Brocas bought a destrier worth £50 from John de Grey de Ruthyn (E403/341 m. 5). Such expensive horses could hardly be said to be typical, but the pattern of surviving records would ensure that they would bulk large in any statistical series.
them; and by the fact that they were concerned to reflect normal price levels and not short-term fluctuations. Even if the horse values do approximate to normal price levels, there are good reasons for thinking that the inventories will not necessarily offer data which is directly comparable with standard national prices data. The problem arises from the selectivity of the horse inventories: from the circumstances determining the calibre of the warhorses appearing in these records. No set of inventories will offer a wholly random sample of the warhorses in the kingdom at any given point in time; all are strongly influenced by the particular section of the military community which is being drawn-upon - by the status and backgrounds of the personnel concerned - but also by the theatre of war in which they are to operate and the identity of the captain with whom they are to serve. Thus, behind each inventory must be imagined a complex of individual decisions: men choosing what they feel to be suitable mounts from their own stables or from horse-dealers, according to where and with whom they are to serve. Since the time series of warhorse values is composed of a sequence of such records, all very much determined by the character of the manpower listed and the nature of the military task in hand, is it any wonder that the pattern of summary statistics which can be compiled from them are inclined to diverge dramatically from the normal trend of prices data?

What were the determinants of the pattern of warhorse values which have been observed for the late thirteenth- and early fourteenth-centuries? For the most part, the fluctuations in the data series can be explained in terms of changes in the quality of horseflesh: an improvement in the overall quality of warhorses from the late thirteenth-century, but with ups and downs in the level of values in keeping with the character and circumstances of individual armies; as
a consequence, that is, of the choices made by individual fighting men faced by the prospect of a particular form of service. Thus, when we see sharp shifts in the level of values we should imagine sharp contrasts in warhorse quality, and not horses of uniform quality whose prices have been subjected to inflationary or deflationary pressures. This is not wholly to discount the role of underlying economic trends. At several stages during the period they appear to have reinforced the 'movement' of horse values. But it is one thing to accept the background influence of economic developments and quite another to see the fluctuations in inventory valuation levels as a response to short-term economic impulses. 'Naturally', as Contamine has observed, 'the price of warhorses varied in accordance with the laws of supply and demand'; 4 but the prices charged by horse-dealers shortly before a major campaign and the valuations recorded on inventories were not necessarily closely related.

The high level of warhorse values exhibited by the inventory of the earl of Pembroke's army serving in the Scots Marches in 1315 has been discussed earlier. 5 In this inventory, as clearly as any from the early decades of the fourteenth-century, can be seen the result of a concerted breeding programme, initiated during the early years of Edward I's reign, aimed specifically at the production of 'great horses'. Such grands chivaux are few in number in an inventory from the second Welsh war of 1282: a mere 7% of the horses have values over £20 and the most costly of over 600 horses listed are two which are valued at £40. 6 By contrast, over a third of the three hundred

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4. Contamine, *War in the Middle Ages*, p. 131. For example the increase in horse prices in 1445 shortly prior to Charles VII's creation of the ordonnance companies: as Olivier de la Marche put it, 'every gentleman thought if he were to appear on a good horse he would be more easily recognised, sought after and received into the companies'.

5. Just under 300 warhorses, with a mean value of £18.4: E101/15/6.

6. C47/2/7.
warhorses on Pembroke's inventory of the mid 1310s have a value of £20 or higher, and over 10% are registered at £40 or more.\(^7\) The production of high-quality steeds was only the most striking aspect of a general improvement in the stock of the kingdom's warhorses and although less spectacular than the emergence of the 'great horse', the shrinkage in the numbers of low-value warhorses employed in the king's armies was a further most significant feature of the period.\(^8\) These two aspects of the Edwardian horse-breeding revolution combined to produce a steady increase in the overall level of warhorse values from the 1280s to the 1310s (and indeed beyond, although masked in part by the nature of the data). Allowance should be made for the underlying economic currents of the period, but with due caution. Whilst it is probable that the price inflation of the early fourteenth-century contributed to some extent to the general increase in the level of warhorse values,\(^9\) we must strongly doubt whether, for example, the unusually high values registered in Pembroke's inventory in 1315 can be explained in terms of supply shortages arising from the prevailing adverse agrarian conditions - and particularly the livestock murrain - of the 1310s.\(^10\) A factor in the high horse values may have been the severe losses suffered at Bannockburn;\(^11\) but such a level of

\(^7\) There are twelve £40 horses, eleven at £50, six at £65, one at £80 and one at £100.

\(^8\) Pembroke's army in 1315 had no horses valued at less than £5. This may be exceptional, but in the garrison inventories of 1311-12 (which we might expect to include a rather larger proportion of cheap warhorses than normal) they constitute less than 9% of the horses listed, as compared with nearly a quarter in the corresponding records for 1282. This contrast is particularly striking when it is remembered that fewer than 4% of the garrison personnel were knights or bannerets, whilst about 24% of men-at-arms in the 1282 inventory were of knightly status.


\(^10\) The livestock farming catastrophes of 1315-17 were 'largely though not wholly confined to sheep' and there is no direct evidence of murrain affecting warhorses (Kershaw, op. cit., pp. 103-11). Although horse murrain is reported on individual studs at various times, there is no sign of a significant, widespread outbreak in the fourteenth-century. On the evidence for murrain, see Davis, The medieval warhorse, p. 93.

\(^11\) There is little detailed information for English horse losses at the battle of 'Stirling', but the nature of the battle and the consequent disorderly flight from the field by the English army would suggest that many good warhorses were lost.
equestrian values appears to have been the norm for troops under Pembroke's command - in 1307, the mean value of his retinue's horses was an astonishing £28.9 12 - and the explanation is surely quite simply that his men were serving with very fine horseflesh, the product of several decades of specialist breeding.

If, as has been argued, the fluctuations in warhorse values as presented in summarised form in Tables 6.1 and 6.2 are essentially a reflection of contrasts in quality, then how is the most dramatic quality-contrast, that of the later 1330s, between the level of values for the Scottish campaigns and those of the first royal expedition of the Hundred Years War, to be explained? The English warhorse, it seems, reached its apogee at the start of the French war and this inspite of general economic stagnation and a steady fall in prices during the 1320s, '30s and '40s. The idea of a peak in warhorse quality needs, however, to be amplified - and qualified. The level of values achieved in 1338-39 is certainly impressive because it embraces the equestrian resources of a major royal army. There had been (and would continue to be) assemblies of troops on a smaller scale which exhibited higher levels of warhorse values, but the mean and spread of horse values for the Cambrésis-Thiérache campaign was for a much larger and more diversified body of manpower and seems, therefore, to demonstrate the widespread availability of high-quality warhorses amongst the Edwardian military community at this time. This wealth of great horses could not have been assembled over-night; it was the result of a long process of specialist breeding. But the pattern of documentary survival has ensured that it had not been fully revealed by earlier expeditions. Thus, the apparent suddenness of the peak, together with the depth of the preceding trough, would be highly

12. Based upon an account summarised in Bain, v, no. 655.
misleading if not viewed in a proper context.

Allowance must always be made for the fact that conditions at the time of horse appraisal could serve to inflate or deflate the overall levels of horse valuation. Even so, it is clear that men were employing warhorses of relatively modest quality for the Scottish theatre of war and considerably more expensive ones for campaigns in France. About 64% of horses appraised for the three Scottish expeditions of the later 1330s had values of less than £10 and only 5% were registered at £20 or above, whilst the corresponding figures for the first campaign of the French war were 34% and 29%, with about 9% valued at over £40. A number of explanations can be offered. To some extent we are seeing in these figures the warhorses of different sections of the military community. A number of magnates and many members of the gentry of northern England exerted an influence on the character of English armies, and especially garrison forces, in Scotland and the Marches, but played little or no part in the continental war. On the other hand the fact that a substantial section of the military aristocracy, a powerful group of magnates and king's bannerets, contributed retinues to expeditions in both Scotland and France ensured that many members of the military community were faced by the prospect of serving in two very different theatres of war, contrasted sharply in terms of topography and the demeanour of the enemy.

13. The question of demand will be considered in connection with the Rheims campaign. Suffice to say here, the English army of 1338-39 was not one of the larger ones of the period. It is possible, but not on balance likely, that the horse appraisers had been instructed to be more generous than usual in their assessments: the Crown was, it will be remembered, offering double the customary pay rates for this expedition. It is also unlikely that the operation of a minimum valuation of £5 for overseas expeditions, but not for those in Scotland, has introduced a serious element of incompatibility. If all the under £5 horses on the inventories for 1336 (sixty-seven), 1337 (fifty-five) and 1337-38 (eight) are treated as though valued at £5 the effect on the overall mean for each expedition is scarcely detectable; if they are removed altogether the mean for each expedition increases by less than £1 (i.e. to £9.2, £8.4 and £10.8 respectively).

Practical considerations no doubt played a prominent role in decisions about horseflesh. It is clear that Scotland's rough, inhospitable terrain, combined with the minimal opportunities for true chivalric encounters, caused many men to leave their best warhorses at home; there was simply no point in exposing them to unnecessary hazards. It is difficult to see how the 'great horse' could be an asset during a Scottish campaign, but it took some time for the English chivalric class as a whole to appreciate this (particularly while there remained the possibility of a major setpiece equestrian battle, as at Falkirk and Bannockburn), even though it had long been recognised by the military community of the northern borders. The contrast, as we have seen, between the horseflesh of Sir Andrew de Harcla's men and those employed by the earl of Pembroke's command in the mid 1310s is striking indeed. But in 1327 an eminently sensible royal proclamation emphasised that men-at-arms should bring *runcinos veloces fortes et asperos* for service against the Scots and that they should not postpone their departure *pro defectum equorum dextrariorum*.15 There are, as has been seen, very few highly priced steeds on the horse rolls of the later 1330s and only a tiny minority (thirteen horses: 1% of the total) are described as *destriers*, the true *equis magnis*. An alternative to the destrier, of high quality but more suited to the campaigning conditions of the north, appears to have been found in the *courser*, perhaps best described as a heavy hunter. Fifty-three coursers, representing over 4% of the horses listed, are to be seen in the Scottish inventories of the later 1330s: a rather larger proportion, indeed, than are to be found in the *restauro equorum* records for the Low Countries campaign.16

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16. Cf. 6% of the warhorses in the *restauro equorum* account for the Breton campaign, where they would be suited to the terrain. They were also the favoured type of 'prestige' horse for service in
The first major expedition of the French war brought the prospect of very different campaigning conditions: terrain amenable to cavalry and the expectation of worthy, chivalrous opponents. Is it entirely fanciful to see, in the peaking of horse values for this expedition, the desire of the English military class to cut a dashing chivalrous figure on the continental stage; a spontaneous re-assertion of their traditional identity, after years of unrewarding and uncomfortable campaigning in the inhospitable north? They would be allied with, and pitted against, the flower of European chivalry. If reputations were to be maintained and, indeed, enhanced in such company, it was essential both to create a splendid display and to maximise military effectiveness. Faced by this challenge, men-at-arms at all levels of the military hierarchy can be imagined selecting the finest warhorses from their stables and from the stocks of horse dealers. The consequence was a dramatic leap in the level of horse valuations and a return of the destrier - eighteen of them, comprising nearly 5% of the total number of horses in the restauro equorum account.

There is a certain amount of speculation in this, but it will always be difficult to ascertain the motives lying behind the actions - and choices - of such shadowy figures in the past. Yet, in this particular case, it is at least possible to demonstrate what those individual choices were, for behind the fluctuations in the summary statistics for warhorse values lie the decisions of hundreds of individual men, and some at least are recoverable. The incomplete nature of the records, and especially a reliance on restauro equorum accounts for some campaigns, means that it is necessary to be content with evidence of comparatively modest bulk, but there is enough to

Ireland.
convey a very clear picture. Of about seventy men who appear in the horse appraisal records for both the Scottish and the French expeditions of the later 1330s, three-quarters served with a more expensive warhorse in France. The increase can be seen to have occurred at all levels of the military hierarchy and in the case of half of the men concerned, the value of their mount had at least doubled. In part this may be attributable to normal career development: the broadening of military experience, the assumption of knighthood, elevation to the status of retinue commander, or transference into the service of a more prestigious, or munificent, captain. Sir Robert de Rouclif’s £20 warhorse for the Low Countries expedition was a very considerable improvement on the 100s. mount with which he is listed for the 1337-38 winter campaign in Scotland; but, then, he does seem to have assumed the order of knighthood during the intervening period. In 1336, Roger de Beauchamp had been an esquire in the earl of Cornwall’s retinue with a £10 warhorse, but in the records of the first campaign of the French war we see him, now one of the king’s household knights, with a magnificent £27 steed.

Advancement is certainly most strikingly reflected in the quality of horseflesh employed and yet it is clear that such factors did no more than provide an extra impetus for an improvement in equestrian quality which was stimulated in large part by the contrasting nature of

17. A further eleven served with horses of similar value in both theatres of war. Walter de Rossington, for example, had a 10 mark warhorse in 1336, a £10 one in 1337 and, for the continental campaign, a £10 in 1338-39. The majority of the cases of decline involve only marginal shifts in value: for example, Roger de Dallingridge, from 10 marks (1336) to £5 (1338-9). On Dallingridge’s career, see Nigel Saul, Scenes from provincial life (Oxford, 1986), pp. 38, 67-8.

18. In some exceptional cases the increase had been four- or five-fold: for example, Sir Nicholas de Cantilupe (£20 in 1336; an £80 destrier in 1338-9). Sir William de Bohun had been a retinue captain during the summer of 1336 with a £20 destrier, whilst during his first major continental expedition as an earl, he lost a destrier of the highest calibre, appraised at £100.

19. Rouclif had served with a £10 horse in 1336. A considerably less dramatic increase following knighthood can be seen in the case of Sir Robert de Longevill: a rise from 10 marks to £10. Rouclif and Longevill served in Sir John de Beaumont’s retinue in both Scotland and the Low Countries.

20. Norwell, pp. 301, 325, 346, 389. Sir Nigel Loring’s career mirrored Beauchamp’s quite closely: he had an £8 horse during the winter of 1337-38 and a steed valued at £26. 6s. 8d. in 1338-39.
military service in Scotland and France.

With the Breton expeditions of 1342-43, the next of Edward III's military enterprises to be illuminated by a *restauro equorum* account, the general level of warhorse values was still high, but as the summary statistics in Tables 6.1 and 6.2 show, the heights which had been reached in 1338-39 were not maintained. The overall mean value was £14.3 as compared with £16.4, the fall being the consequence of a significant growth in the numbers of moderately-priced mounts (£5 - £9.9), at the expense, fairly evenly, of both middle- and high value horses. 21 Once again, examining the evidence at the level of the combatant reveals the individual decisions which lie behind the summary statistics; and again, the pattern of individual experience tends to confirm the overall trend of values. Men going to Brittany continued to select warhorses of a higher quality than they had employed in Scotland during the previous decade, 22 yet many who had served in the Low Countries in 1338-9 appear with less expensive warhorses in the records for 1342. 23 The experience of Sir Otes de Grandison reflects the overall trend precisely: he had warhorses appraised at £20, £40 and £30 for service in Scotland, the Low Countries and Brittany respectively. 24 The pattern of individual

21. The numbers of high-value warhorses remained very respectable, however: fifty-four (23%) of £20 or more, with fourteen of these of £40 or higher value.

22. Of nearly thirty men who are included in the horse appraisal records for both Scotland in the later 1330s and Brittany in 1342-43, two-thirds employed a more expensive warhorse for the overseas expedition and in only five cases do we see an actual decline in value. At all levels of horseflesh quality major leaps in value can be perceived. Roger de Wodeham had served twice in Scotland (1336, 1337-38) with a 100s. horse, but joined the earl of Northampton's retinue in Brittany with a £10 steed. Sir Walter de Selby (on whose unfortunate demise in 1346, see Anonimalle, pp. 23-24) had a 20 mark horse in 1336 and a 40 mark courser in 1342. But, for most men the upward curve of advancement was rather less steep. Nicholas Gernon, for example, had a 10 mark horse in 1336 and a £8 mount in 1342; in Ireland in the mid-1340s he lost two horses with a combined value of £10 (C260/57 m. 28); and in Gascony in 1350 he sold a horse valued at 20 marks (E403/355 m. 19; E404/508 m. 78).

23. 58% of the thirty-six men for whom a comparison is possible.

24. In addition, his 40 mark horse for the War of Saint-Sardos fits very well into this sequence: E101/35/2 m. 7. On Grandison, see G.E.C., vi, pp. 65-66.
behaviour is by no means uniform, which is only to be expected given
the comparatively modest decline in the overall level of values from
1338-39 to 1342-43, and the fact that such a tendency would operate
against the forward momentum of many individual careers.25 There are,
evertheless, plenty of cases broadly in line with the overall trend
of mean values; and some, indeed, which display an extraordinary fall
in value between 1338 and 1342. Thus, for example, Sir Richard de la
Vache’s warhorse in 1342 was only a third of the value of his mount in
1338-39 (£30-£10) and Theobald Trussell’s horse for Brittany shows a
similar sharp fall in quality (£20-10 marks). If most men’s horses in
1342 represent a rather less marked downward shift in value,26 then
there were, nevertheless, a group of veteran men-at-arms whose
warhorses for the Breton campaign had, in quality, slipped right back
to the level of the Scottish campaigns of the previous decade. Both
Sir Thomas de Morreux and Sir John de Neville, for example, had served
with 20 mark horses in 1337-38 and 1342-43, but with a £20 steed in
1338-39. In some cases, indeed, the warhorse which a man selected for
Brittany was given a lower value than that which he had employed in an
earlier Scottish expedition.27

Why did men take less valuable horses to Brittany? It is probable
that practical considerations were uppermost in their minds. The
voyage to Brittany’s western and southern ports was longer and more
hazardous than a quick cross-channel hop to the Low Countries, and a
general disinclination to expose warhorses of the highest quality to

25. For example, Sir Michael de Poynings as a knight bachelor in 1338-39 had a £20 horse, and as a
banneret in 1342-43, had a £40 steed.

26. For example, Sir Philip le Despenser who had 40 mark horse in 1342, as compared with a £30
one in 1338-39. This represented a very considerable improvement on the £10 horse with which he
had served in 1336. Sir Robert de Malteby served with a 40 mark horse in both the Low Countries
and Brittany.

27. This is the case, for example, with Roger Darcy and William de Lacy.
such a disorientating, debilitating and potentially disastrous experience is only to be expected.\textsuperscript{28} Although the loss of an appraised horse during the voyage would be compensated by the Crown, a man-at-arms would travel with several horses and he would have to meet the cost of replacing his unappraised mounts himself. Such considerations would apply as much, if not more, to service in Gascony and may well explain what appears to be a rather depressed overall level of values for the War of Saint-Sardos.\textsuperscript{29} By the mid 1340s, it was normal for men who were engaged for service in Gascony to be given the option of acquiring horses upon arrival in Bordeaux,\textsuperscript{30} and they sometimes sold them before returning to England.\textsuperscript{31} This may indeed help to explain the high level of warhorse values represented in the earl of Derby's \textit{restauro equorum} claim for his expedition of 1345-47. But in the case of the Breton campaign of 1342-43, we know that the English army's horses were transported from England and that during the stormy return-voyage several ship-loads were lost, thus no doubt confirming many men's worst fears.\textsuperscript{32}

The other likely explanation for the reduced level of warhorse values in 1342 relates to developments in the English conduct of war. A typical Edwardian campaign in France could involve fast-moving raids,

\textsuperscript{28} On the hazards of transporting horses by sea, see above pp. \textit{88-89}.

\textsuperscript{29} The mean for the greater part of the evidence for 1324-25 is about £10.5, but the figure for the expedition as a whole is forced up by the assembly of high-quality horses in the earl of Kent's retinue (which has a mean of £18.9).

\textsuperscript{30} For example, those of the earl of Derby's men who \textit{ne se voillent monter des chivaux decea la meer, mes faire le pourveance par delea} could have their horses appraised in Bordeaux rather than before leaving England (indenture, dated 13 March 1345, between Edward III and the earl of Derby: Fowler, \textit{The king's lieutenant}, Appendix IV, No. 1).

\textsuperscript{31} See above, p. \textit{45}.

\textsuperscript{32} \textit{Murimuth}, p. 135. It is uncertain how many horses fell victim to the storm. One narrative source states that 200 horses were lost, together with 300 men: \textit{Melsa}, iii, pp. 51-52. The \textit{restauro equorum} accounts for 1342-43 list 228 horses for which compensation is due, but do not supply details of the circumstances of horse losses; these accounts, moreover, give no indication of the numbers of unappraised horses which were lost during the campaign.
a protracted siege or a defensive battle in which the whole army fought on foot. The implications of this for the chivalric warrior and particularly his 'great horse' may well have been fully appreciated by the English military community by the early 1340s; for if all these aspects of warfare were to play a part during the course of a few months campaigning in Brittany, they had already been exhibited in earlier expeditions. It is impossible to be sure of the psychological effects of the long and fruitless investment of Tournai, or to determine how quickly men recognised the implications of the tactical dispositions at Halidon Hill and Buironfosse; or, indeed, whether they appreciated that the terrain in parts of the Armorican peninsula was very like that which they had come to know only too well in Scotland. But such considerations, combined with a certain justifiable anxiety about taking much-prized steeds on a sea-journey 'round the dangerous headlands of Finistere', will probably have contributed to some at least of the decisions over horseflesh in 1342.

The response of individuals to the prospect of the Breton expedition, as reflected in the quality of their horseflesh, was by no means uniform. Traditional attitudes concerning the role of the knightly class - and the equipment demanded by that role - would not disappear overnight; it was to be a few years before the full force of the Edwardian military revolution would be reflected in a significant decline in the quality of the English warhorse. By the 1360s this had taken place. The evidence for the Irish expedition of the early 1360s - a mean value of less than £8 and over three quarters of horses valued at less than £10 - provides a most striking contrast with that.

for the early campaigns of the Hundred Years War. Yet should not a depressed level of warhorse values be expected for service in a theatre of war which in some respects resembled conditions in Scotland? Should we not suspect, therefore, a decidedly unrepresentative impression of the English warhorse of the 1360s to be offered in the Irish evidence? This would not be because the personnel involved were drawn from an unrepresentative subset of the military community: operations in Ireland in the 1360s, as they had been in 1344-46, attracted large numbers of veterans from the French and Scottish campaigns. But the English men-at-arms serving in Ireland would surely choose horses, of modest stature and value, which were suited to the rough terrain in the same way as they had become accustomed to doing for expeditions in Scotland. In the later 1330s, as we have seen, the contrast between the quality of horses chosen for service in Scotland and for expeditions to France was often very great. For that period the evidence of the summary statistics is underlined very forcefully by the experience of scores of individuals.

34. It is difficult to illustrate this contrast with detail concerning individual men-at-arms. Few careers are sufficiently long and well documented and the consequences of natural career development would, in any case, tend to work against the general downward trend of values. Sir Nicholas de Goushill lost a £10 horse during the Low Countries campaign of 1338-39, whilst the courser with which he served in Ireland from November 1362 was valued at £8 (Norwell, p. 311; E101/28/11 m. 2).

35. 'In France [war] is carried on in a champaign country, here [in Ireland] it is rough and mountainous; there you have open plains, here you find dense woods': Giraldus Cambrensis, quoted in Katherine Simms, 'Warfare in the medieval Gaelic lordships', Irish Sword, xii (1975), pp. 98-99.

36. The captains and ordinary men-at-arms were predominantly English and many had experience of several theatres of war. Thomas de Hoggeshawe, for example, had a naval command in 1355 and served during the Rheims campaign: E101/26/34, E101/393/11 fo. 86. Another of the captains in Ireland, Sir John de Carreu, was a veteran retinue commander from the early days of the French war: the Low Countries, 1338-39 (Norwell, pp. 338); Brittany, 1342-43 (E36/204 fos. 107, 109); Normandy and Calais, 1346-47 (Crecy and Calais, p. 201). But he also saw service in Scotland in 1341-42 (E36/204 fo. 102v) and was a prominent member of Sir Ralph Ufford's powerful retinue in Ireland in the mid 1340s (receiving a 40 mark per annum fee: C260/57 m. 28). Of the fifty or so of Ufford's men for whom some record of other military service has been found, at least two-thirds also took part in continental expeditions before or after they went to Ireland and about half had seen service in Scotland. The incompleteness of the evidence almost certainly prevents an even larger proportion being detected.
Such detail is not available for the late 1350s and early 1360s, yet there is no reason to doubt the reliability of the summarised evidence. The mean value of over a thousand warhorses lost during the Rheims campaign is £9, whilst that for the surviving inventories of Clarence's Irish expedition is £7.8. The contrast in the quality of warhorses employed for very different campaigning areas is now, therefore, much reduced. Whilst the evidence of Clarence's Irish expedition is wholly consistent with similar military activity earlier in the century, the level of values for the continental theatre of war has fallen sharply during the two decades since the start of the French war.

In the data for the Rheims campaign there is unequivocal evidence of a major decline in warhorse quality, not simply for one section of the military community or for the prosecution of one dimension of the Edwardian war effort, but for the English chivalric class as a whole. This is not, it is true, disaggregated data: it is not possible to see individual men-at-arms and their steeds. Yet the pattern of mean values at retinue level conveys an unambiguous message. Of nearly 118 retinue-level means for the Rheims campaign, only thirty-three (28%) are of £10 or more. Of those seventeen retinues which lost at least ten warhorses, all except three have a mean under £10. The earl of Warwick's very high mean is exceptional, but more arresting is the string of modest figures for the other great English captains of the Edwardian age. The earl of Northampton's very low mean of £7.8 stands in striking contrast with the equivalent figure (£17.9) for the Breton

37. It is not possible to examine the quality of warhorses on the level of the individual, yet the hints that we have are suggestive. The mean value for the earl of Stafford's retinue in Ireland was £10, whilst the average value for the forty-six horses which his retinue lost during the Rheims campaign was £9.4. E101/28/11; E101/393/11 fo. 80.

38. By comparison, for the 1342-43 Breton campaign, of thirty retinue-level means, all except eight (73%) reach or exceed £10. For the Rheims campaign see Appendix 3, for the Breton campaign see Appendix 2.
campaign; the earl of Derby's mean for over 200 lost horses, £9.8, is less than a third of the figure for his losses in Gascony in the mid 1340s. The evidence for the decline of the English warhorse would appear to be clear-cut: a decline in values which runs contrary to the price-trend in continental Europe. 39

It has been argued that the decline in the English warhorse was essentially a consequence of the transformation of the conduct of war in the mid fourteenth-century; a by-product of the Edwardian military revolution. The traditional role of the 'great horse' had largely disappeared. Great barded horses, of the kind which had been spurred-on towards the Scottish schiltroms at Falkirk and Bannockburn, were no longer at the centre of English tactical thinking. 40 The rigours of the chevauchée called for different virtues - mobility and stamina rather than weight and stature - and these altered military priorities could be satisfied by less expensive horses. A few destriers continued to be taken on active service - the costly prestige symbols of the great 41 - but coursers were more suited to hard campaigning conditions 42 and they became popular amongst the wealthier section of the knightly community. 43 In general, and at all levels of the

40. Horse armour appears to have been little used by the English in the later fourteenth-century, away from the tournament field. Instead of the all-embracing 'bard', we occasionally see the chanfron, crinet and peytral, but often no form of horse armour is depicted in contemporary illustrations.
41. For example, the only destrier listed in the inventories of the Irish expedition of the early 1360s was an 80 mark horse belonging to the earl of Stafford. He also had a £20 trotter for more practical use; E101/28/11 m. 3. Destriers and other grantz chivaux retained an important role in the ceremonial activities of great men, including their funerals.
43. Coursers need not be expensive, however. All five of the appraised horses in Sir Thomas de Hoggeshawe's retinue in 1362 are described as coursers and their values range from 100s. to £8:
military community, men had become content with cheaper horseflesh. The result was a compression of warhorse values into a comparatively narrow band (see Table 6.2): the very great majority of horses now fell within the range £5 to 20 marks. The prospect of spending less on warhorses would have been welcomed at a time when combatants would have needed to spend more on personal body armour. The Crown's abandonment of horse appraisal and restauro equorum in the early 1370s can only have served to reinforce the tendency towards cheaper horses as men sought to ensure that the new terms of military service worked to their advantage.

But is this a wholly satisfactory explanation of the decline in English warhorse values? To what extent did the prevailing economic conditions during the years following the Black Death contribute to the downward trend? It would be natural to assume that the falling-away of warhorse prices during the 1350s was at least in part the consequence of a significant drop in demand, following the removal at a stroke of perhaps 25% of the traditional military class. Yet the decline in warhorse values is not mirrored by a decline in market prices in the 1350s. Initially, the sudden drop in demand did cause prices to plummet; as Knighton observed, 'a man could buy for half a mark a horse which formerly had been worth forty shillings,' and the

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44. For example, only five of the 135 horses on the inventories for Clarence's Irish expedition have values above 20 marks.


47. In the absence of systematic data for the sale of warhorses, we must rely on general prices data and in particular that for livestock.

chronicler's words are borne out by the prices data for livestock.49 But after 1350, prices quickly recovered and 'rose to levels higher than in the decade or so before the Black Death',50 largely as a consequence of monetary factors.51

Devaluation, then, had the effect of holding the general level of prices at an artificially high level, despite a general shrinkage in demand. Yet in the case of the warhorse, it might reasonably be doubted whether there had been a fall in demand during the 1350s. The evidence suggests that the landholding class was less seriously affected than the rest of the population by the first visitation of the plague and that the pestis secunda of 1361 was considerably more damaging.52 Moreover, there is every indication that the numbers of active combatants in the 1350s remained very high. In addition to the activities of the exceedingly numerous English garrisons and companies in France,53 there were major expeditions in the mid-1350s and the Rheims campaign of 1359-60 saw the assembly of one of the greatest armies of the fourteenth-century.54 It seems probable that the decade following the first visitation of the plague witnessed an expansion of the active military community, prompted by the success of Edward III's continental wars in the 1340s and 1350s. This expansion had two

50. Ibid.
51. Debasement of the coinage in 1344, 1346 and 1351 combined with a smaller population: ibid., pp. 721, 725; J.L. Bolton, The medieval English economy, 1150-1500 (London, 1980), p. 78. It was only in the later 1370s that prices began to fall, and with them the profit margins of the landlord class: see, for example, N. Saul, Scenes from provincial life, pp. 107-39.
53. Apart from garrisons paid for by the English Crown, many Englishmen 'had established themselves on their own account in many places throughout the realm of France': Scalacronica, p. 134. Sir Thomas Gray offers some useful glimpses of these 'young fellows who hitherto had been of but small account [but] who became exceedingly rich and skilful in this [kind of] war'.
54. About 3,750 English men-at-arms were involved (together with 5,500 mounted archers): Prince, 'The strength of English armies', p. 368. By comparison, there may have been about 5,300 men-at-arms (including foreign mercenaries) in the army before Calais in 1347: Crecy and Calais, p. 204.
dimensions: an increase in the level of commitment, a temporary 're-
militarisation' as it were, of the traditional chivalric class, combined with a broadening of the military community at its lowest levels, the levels which embraced both men-at-arms and archers. Contemporary observers were evidently very impressed by the massive turnout of the English chivalric class in 1359. As Jean le Bel observed, chascun s'apresta de partir, si ne demoura ne chevalier, n'escuier, ne homme d'onneur entre xx et xl ans en Angleterre, ou qui ne fust honteux de demourer, quant ilz virent que le noble [roy] leur sire retournoit en France si poissaument, siques tous princes, barons, chevaliers, escuiers et gens de toute sorte vinrent aprez le roy a Douvres, le mielx habilliez que poeurent. Here, if anything, there were conditions likely to produce an increase in warhorse prices through pressure of demand. How does this affect the interpretation of the level of values as revealed by the restauro equorum accounts for this expedition? Could they actually be inflated by the weight of an unusual level of demand?

Warhorse prices might be expected to rise shortly before every major expedition, but we cannot be sure of the magnitude of such increases, or how far this would vary regionally. There is evidence that horse-dealers were only too keen to take full advantage of conditions of increased demand. But we can only speculate about the number of men who would have been unable to supply all their mounts (i.e several horses for each man-at-arms) from their own stables and were, thus, forced to seek suitable horseflesh at the last minute; the

55. Jean le Bel, ii, p. 298.
56. Cf. France in 1302: 'the announcement of the expedition against the Flemings ... caused [horse] prices to rise': Contamine, War in the Middle Ages, p. 96.
57. For example, the complaint in Parliament in 1369 about the trop excessive pris charged by horse-dealers and armourers: Rot. Part., ii, 300a.
Prince of Wales cannot have been alone in this respect. Fortunately it is not necessary to rely upon the fruits of such speculation, for temporary price increases arising from short-lived surges in demand are unlikely to have had an effect on the inventory valuations. The horse appraisers at the ports of embarkation would base their judgements on the normal level of warhorse prices: they were interested in what a horse was really worth, not with what its owner had been obliged to pay shortly before; as agents of the Crown, they were concerned to record the lowest reasonable valuation for a horse, not an inflated figure which the king may in due course be required to pay. Moreover, despite the pressure of demand throughout the 1350s, there are no signs of major supply shortages which could have had an effect on long-term price levels. It would be unwise to read too much into the regular royal proclamations prohibiting the export of horses (or indeed into the trade restrictions which were regularly imposed upon England); nor should widespread epidemics be perceived in isolated outbreaks of horse murrain. None of these phenomena in themselves suggest that there was a crisis in warhorse supply. If direct evidence of horse breeding for the mid fourteenth-century is decidedly patchy, such as there is tends to suggest that steady demand for warhorses from the 1330s had served to stimulate the

58. In October 1359, 'the prince himself' bought a destrier costing £50 from Little Watte of Smethefeld: B.P. Reg., iv, p. 326. London was, no doubt, a very expensive place to buy horses: cf. B.P. Reg., i, pp. 79, 88.

59. For example, C.C.R., 1354-60, p. 111; cf. E101/508/19 (Cinque Ports). C.C.R., 1364-68, p. 370; cf. E199/25/57 (London). Such measures were are to be seen throughout the period.


61. For example, the murrain which caused the deaths of twenty-seven of the king's horses in the care of William de Fremelesworth between October 1357 and September 1358: E101/105/12.

necessary breeding programmes in England.\footnote{G. Parker argues effectively along these lines for the early modern period (The military revolution (Cambridge, 1988), p. 70), but the assumption may not always be valid. At times of intense military activity in the later thirteenth- and earlier fourteenth-centuries, France imported large numbers of warhorses from Italy - as many as 2,500 in 1296-7, for example (Bautier, op. cit., pp. 63-68).}

Horse-breeding by the Crown is illuminated by an impressive series of \textit{Equitia} accounts: as R.H.C. Davis has shown, the onset of the war with France in the late 1330s stimulated a resurgence of activity on the royal studs, which reached a peak in the early and mid 1340s, and although affected by the Black Death to a degree, held up well until the period immediately after the Treaty of Brétigny.\footnote{Davis, \textit{The medieval warhorse}, pp. 86-91. He is the first to admit that his has not been a detailed analysis: his conclusions concerning the fluctuations in royal horse-breeding are based upon a count of stud accounts, rather than a count of horses and personnel contained in those accounts.}

It is likely that the enthusiastic breeding of warhorses by the king had been mirrored by similar vigour on the estates of the nobility and gentry,\footnote{This can be seen where records exist: for the Prince of Wales' horses and stud farms in the 1350s, see \textit{B.P. Reg. iv}, pp. 15, 28, 330.} with the result that the English army in 1359-60, though undoubtedly making use of some imported beasts,\footnote{For royal purchases from a Lombard merchant in 1359, see Davis, op. cit., p. 91. For evidence of the high regard in which Italian horseflesh was held in English chivalric circles in the late fourteenth-century, one need look no further than the words placed by Chaucer in the mouth of his Squire (\textit{Canterbury Tales}, p. 130). Good warhorses could also be obtained from Germany at this time: in 1372, John of Gaunt spent £224 on horses from this source (\textit{J.G. Reg 1371-75}, ii, no. 896).} was able to rely to a considerable extent upon domestic supplies.\footnote{The 'passage' figures supplied in Farley's accounts for the Rhetims campaign appear to suggest that Edward III's army arrived in France with a serious shortage of horses. But this information should not be taken at face value, for it is revealing not so much the difficulties of obtaining suitable horseflesh in England, as the problems involved in assembling a large transport fleet. For a full discussion of this subject, see Appendix 3.}
iv) Knights and esquires

If the major mobilisation of the English chivalric class on the eve of the Rheims campaign gave rise to unusually heavy demand for warhorses, then in the main that demand was for substantially less valuable horses than had been required for the Cambrésis-Thiérache campaign at the start of the French war. The passage of twenty years, which had witnessed the full development of the Edwardian military revolution, had irreversibly changed the needs and the attitudes of the community of militarily active knights and esquires in England. But when a member of that community selected a warhorse for active service, his choice was influenced not only by the military developments of the period (both on and off the battlefield) or by the expected conditions of a particular theatre of war; it was influenced, indeed conditioned, by his personal circumstances - by his rank and wealth - and by the military status of the captain with whom he was to serve.

That there was a relationship of some kind between military rank and warhorse quality is only to be expected and, indeed, can be perceived readily enough through the most cursory examination of a horse inventory. But it is only when the evidence is viewed in bulk that the essential patterns of that relationship are thrown into sharp relief. Table 6.4 presents the mean values of warhorses employed by knights and esquires for a selection of the better documented expeditions of the Edwardian period.¹

Table 6.4: Mean warhorse values (£ sterling) and military rank\(^2\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Esquires</th>
<th>Knights</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1282</td>
<td>Wales</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1298</td>
<td>Scotland</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1311-15</td>
<td>Scotland</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1324-25</td>
<td>Gascony</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1336-38</td>
<td>Scotland</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1338-39</td>
<td>Low Countries</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1342-43</td>
<td>Brittany</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Throughout the period a sharp contrast can be seen between the quality of warhorses employed by knights and those taken on campaign by esquires: a knight's horse was typically twice as valuable as an esquire's.\(^3\) If the data for men of knightly status is examined a little more closely, a contrast of similar proportions can be detected between the warhorses of knights bachelor and those of knights banneret. Thus, for example, the mean value of a banneret's warhorse during the Scottish expeditions of the later 1330s was £22, whilst that for the mounts of ordinary knights was £13. The equivalent figures for the Cambrésis-Thiérrache campaign were £52 for bannerets and £27 for knights.\(^4\)

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2. Sources: as for Table 6.1. Knights banneret and knights bachelor are not consistently distinguished in the inventories and *restauro equorum* accounts; as a consequence, the 'knights' category in Table 6.4 includes men of both levels of knighthood. The data for Scotland in the 1310s includes the garrison rolls for 1311 (mean values: esquires, £9; knights, £25) and the inventory for the earl of Pembroke's army in 1315 (mean values: esquires, £12; knights, £36). The *restauro equorum* accounts for the Cambrésis-Thiérrache and Breton campaigns do not always distinguish between knights and esquires and this may influence the mean values for these expeditions in Table 6.4; the margin of error is unlikely to be significant, however. The data for campaigns after 1342-43 are either not suitable or insufficiently numerous to allow reliable means for knights and esquires to be compiled.

3. The contrast in quality might be underlined by the descriptive terminology employed by the horse appraisers. In an inventory for the Welsh war of 1282, the rouncies have a mean value of £6.7, the *equi* £13.3. All except eighteen of the 452 rouncies were in the possession of esquires, whilst the great majority of *equi* were listed next to the names of knights. The destrier, the true 'great warhorse' of the Edwardian era, was the preserve of the knightly class - and, in the main, the highest levels of that class. Rarely were more than 5% of the warhorses on an inventory classified as destriers and most were the prized possessions of bannerets or earls - as can be seen in the *restauro equorum* accounts for the campaigns of 1338-39 (where eighteen destriers have a mean value of £53) and 1342-43 (where eleven destriers have an average value of £57). Courser were, on the whole, less expensive than destriers (courser mean values: 1338-39, £29; 1342-43, £27), though not significantly more numerous in the inventories. During the earlier campaigns of the Hundred Years War the majority of them are listed alongside the names of prominent knights bachelor, but for service in inhospitable war zones (e.g. Scotland and Ireland) they became the preferred warhorse of the leaders of the chivalric class.

4. Thirty-seven bannerets and 214 knights can be identified in the inventories for the Scottish expeditions of the later 1330s. The mean values for the Low Countries campaign of 1338-39 are
A great deal of diversity lies behind these average values. Sir Adam de Ashurst's £8 warhorse - and, indeed, Sir Thomas de Fallesleye's, valued at a mere 8 marks - were considerably less valuable than many steeds appraised for esquires at the start of the 1342 Breton campaign. Such examples are not difficult to find, for poor knights and wealthy esquires were not uncommon in the English military community. Naturally enough, retinue commanders would often serve with warhorses of a quality higher than that normally expected of men of their rank: in 1342-43, the captains Sir Reginald de Cobham and Sir Walter de Mauny, both bannerets, appear in the restauro equorum accounts with warhorses valued at 100 marks and £100 respectively. But the warhorses of Edward III's most trusted lieutenants were exceptional beasts. Neither they, nor indeed the warhorses of unusually modest value listed against the names of some less affluent knights, should be allowed to blur the essential feature of the evidence, which is that there was a general tendency for men to serve with warhorses of a quality appropriate to their rank, or in other words, a framework of horse value 'differentials' based on rank (and reflecting the differentials in the pay scale), which persisted throughout the Edwardian period, underlying shifts in the general level of values during that time. Hints of these differentials are sometimes to be found in indentures of retinue. Retainers may be required to serve bien et covenablement mountez, armez et arraiez ...

based upon data for nine bannerets and seventy-four knights.

5. E36/254 fos. 87, 87v.

6. The intervals in the scale of daily pay rates for esquires, knights and bannerets (1s, 2s, 4s) are reproduced quite accurately in the warhorse value 'differentials': e.g. the means for 1336-38 were £7 for esquires, £13 for knights bachelor and £22 for bannerets.

7. P. Contamine has detected a similar pattern of 'rank differentials' in the values of chevaux d'armes recorded in fourteenth-century French inventories: Guerre, état et société, pp. 20, 655-56 (Annexe XII, A).
come a soun estat partent,\(^8\) or they may be given a warhorse come affiért por un Baneret.\(^9\) But the operation of the scheme of differentials can most readily be demonstrated by tracing the careers of individuals in the horse inventories: when a man's assumption of knighthood, or his exchange of the knightly pennon for a banner, can be seen to have been accompanied by a commensurate increase in the value of his warhorses.\(^{10}\) Thus, as an esquire, Roger de Beauchamp served in 1336 with a £10 horse, but two years later, now a knight, he is listed with a mount valued at £27. Similarly, Sir Hugh le Despenser's rise from knight bachelor to banneret during the course of the Scottish campaigns of the later 1330s, reinforced by his assumption of the role of retinue captain, was accompanied by an increase in horse value from 20 marks to £40.

How far does an examination of the relationship between military rank and warhorse quality contribute to our understanding of the general trends in English warhorse values during the fourteenth-century? Clearly the overall quality of an army's warhorses would be influenced to a degree by the size of the contingent of bannerets and knights amongst its men-at-arms. The fact that a very high proportion (40\%) of the men-at-arms in the earl of Derby's expeditionary force bound for Gascony in 1345 were men of knightly status (i.e either bannerets or knights) probably goes some way to explain the extraordinarily high mean value of the forty-three warhorses for which Derby claimed

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10. Enhancement of equipment, including horseflesh, was a necessary accompaniment to the assumption of knighthood. Newly created knights and bannerets would often receive grants from the Crown or a great lord to allow them to make the initial capital outlay and to sustain a more expensive life-style. John de Ipres, for example, received an annuity of £20 from John of Gaunt after being knighted on the field of Najera, *por le mielz meintenir lordre de chivaler* (*J.G. Ind. of retinue*, no. 1).
compensation: £32.11 On the other hand, it is clear that the very low mean for Sir Andrew de Harcla's retinues operating in the Scots border country in the 1310s (£7.3), is partly the result of the small proportion of knights (less than 8%) serving in these companies.12 Might not, therefore, the downward trend in English warhorse values during the second half of the fourteenth-century be due, in part at least, to a major fall in the numbers of knights serving in royal armies? Did the period which saw a decline in average warhorse values from over £16 for the Cambrésis-Thiérache campaign to £9 for the Rheims campaign, also witness a sharp reduction in the numbers of serving knights? Nearly fifty years ago, Noel Denholm-Young perceived 'a steady decline in the number of knights from the eleventh century to the end of the Middle Ages, interrupted only by a sudden and temporary rise begun by Edward I';13 and, more recently, several observers have argued that distraint of knighthood was employed by the English Crown until at least the 1340s primarily as a means of increasing the numbers of knights available for military service.14 Yet, whatever the overall numbers of 'fighting', 'actual' and 'potential' knights during the reigns of the three Edwards (and contrary to views expressed in some quarters),15 the detailed pay accounts available for many Edwardian expeditions suggest no really

11. E101/25/9 m. 1.

12. The mean value for the warhorses of Harcla's knights was £14.4, whilst for his esquires it was as low as £6.7: E101/14/15 mm. 2, 4, 5.


15. For example, 'already in the fourteenth-century under the contract system knights were notably rare in war retinues': S. Wright, The Derbyshire gentry in the fifteenth-century, Derbyshire Record Soc., viii (1983), p. 8.
significant decline in the proportion of knights in royal armies until the 1370s.\textsuperscript{16} Over 15% of the men-at-arms serving with Edward I in Flanders in 1297 were knights,\textsuperscript{17} whilst a slightly higher proportion of the men listed on the inventories for the Falkirk campaign the following year were of knightly status. For several armies of Edward II's reign,\textsuperscript{18} the proportion can be seen to have been significantly higher: about one in four. The small army which saw service in Scotland under the earl of Pembroke's command in 1315 may not be wholly representative of the period: over 26% of its men-at-arms were knights or bannerets and the mean value of its warhorses was £18.4. But of the men-at-arms listed on the very full inventories for the War of St. Sardos, nearly 24% were knights or bannerets. The English armies of the early continental expeditions of Edward III's reign could boast an equally high proportion of knightly combatants: over 25% in the Low Countries in 1338-39 and over 26% in Brittany in 1342-43.\textsuperscript{19} The corresponding figure for the Rheims campaign was, however, rather lower: 20%.\textsuperscript{20} When it is further recognised that amongst the reduced numbers of knights were a smaller proportion of bannerets (a fall from about 12-14% of all knights being bannerets to less than 9%), it is possible to see how shrinkage in the numbers of participating knights could have contributed, in some degree, to the major slump in warhorse values which is to be perceived in the financial accounts for the army of 1359-60. But it would be unwise to argue the point too vigorously. In simple numerical terms, the

\textsuperscript{16} This assumes the general reliability of the pay rolls: that the balance of knights and esquires in retinues has not been altered significantly during the process of textual summarisation discussed in Chapter V (see above, pp. 190-94).

\textsuperscript{17} N.B. Lewis, 'The English forces in Flanders, August-November 1297', pp. 312-13.

\textsuperscript{18} But note for Edward I: the proportion of knights indicated by the inventories for the Welsh war of 1282 is nearer to 24%.


\textsuperscript{20} Prince, op. cit., p. 368.
turnout of knights for the Rheims campaign, over 750 men, was very impressive;\(^{21}\) and even as a proportion of all participating men-at-arms, the knightly element in this army was larger than that achieved for many campaigns earlier in the century.\(^{22}\) The decline in the numbers of knights was, therefore, a supportive rather than primary factor, serving to reinforce the downward trend in warhorse values stimulated first and foremost by developments in English fighting methods.\(^{23}\) It was only in the 1370s, when significantly fewer knightly personnel were recruited for English expeditionary forces,\(^{24}\) that diminishing numbers of militi strenui could have played a leading part in the decline of the English warhorse.

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21. Ibid, p. 368; Sherborne, 'Indentured retinues and English expeditions to France, 1369-1380', p. 745. By comparison, there were probably in excess of a thousand knights in the great army which lay siege to Calais in 1346-47 (Crecy and Calais, p. 204); but that was before the Black Death took its toll of the military community in England. Denholm-Young considered that in the reign of Edward I there were no more than 750 'fighting knights available in an emergency': 'Feudal society in the thirteenth-century: the knights', p. 86.

22. For example, the corresponding figure for the great army raised during the summer of 1335 was a little over 18% (Prince, op. cit., p. 357) and for the army serving in Scotland during the winter of 1341-42, 19% (E36/204 fos. 102-104). The figure for the army engaged in the siege of Calais may have been in the region of 21-22%.

23. In this connection, it is worth noting that the mean warhorse value for the Scottish expeditions of 1336-38 was low, less than £9, despite the fact that nearly 24% of the men-at-arms listed in the inventories were knights.

24. Only about 13% of the men-at-arms in John of Gaunt's army in 1373 were knights and the proportion fell further to about 5-6% for the expeditions of 1375 and 1380. See Sherborne, 'Indentured retinues and English expeditions to France, 1369-1380', pp. 729, 730, 732; and 744-5 (on the difficulties of recruiting sufficient numbers of knights during this period).
v) Captains and retinues

The quality of a captain's warhorse was usually a fairly accurate measure of his position in the military hierarchy. His horse would generally be more valuable than those of his retainers and often of higher quality than those employed by others of comparable military rank. The warhorses of the leading captains - those who were earls or prominent bannerets - were animals of the finest quality. Thus, for instance, the five earls whose retinues are included in the horse inventories surviving from the 1336 Scottish campaign, each have horses valued at £40, whilst none of the other captains on the list have a horse worth over £20. One of the seven bannerets leading a retinue in 1336, William de Bohun, was soon to be raised to an earldom: as such, he had horses valued at £100 in both the Cambrésis-Thiérache and Breton campaigns. But great warhorses were not the sole preserve of those captains who were members of the titled nobility. Loyal service could enable men of modest gentry stock to acquire both wealth and influence. In this respect, few careers were as meteoric as that of John Molyns and it is fortunate that a good deal of information about this man's warhorses survives in the records, providing apt illustration of the extraordinary nature of his rise to power and fortune. The *restauro equorum* account for the Scottish campaign of 1337 shows Molyns claiming for the loss of four coursers, worth, in all, £76. 13s. 4d. Multiple claims of this kind

2. The earls of Angus, Buchan, Cornwall, Oxford and Warwick.
5. B.L., Cotton Ms., Nero C. VIII fo. 185. They were worth £12, £18, £20 and £26. 13s. 4d. Early in the following year, Molyns lost a courser worth £20 in the Scots Marches: E101/388/5 m. 20. He had clearly built up a good stable, for in 1337 he was able to ingratiate himself with the king still further by presenting him with a destrier: B.L., Cotton Ms., Nero C. VIII fo. 283.
were unusual. Indeed, the account notes that it was satisfied 'by the king's special order', such privileged treatment being available to those who had been with the king on that fateful October night in Nottingham in 1330. Molyns' claims for losses in Scotland seem modest, however, when compared with those which he submitted as a retinue commander after the Cambrésis-Thiérache campaign.\(^6\) Although only a banneret, Molyns had served with a destrier valued at £100\(^7\): no doubt a magnificent animal, matched by only three others of comparable value in the \textit{restuaro equorum} account for this army.\(^8\) Molyns had risen to dizzy heights indeed - his former patron, the earl of Salisbury,\(^9\) had to make do with a destrier valued at £60\(^1\) - but it was a privileged status which was not to last.\(^10\)

A captain's military standing found expression not only in the quality of his own warhorses; it is also often to be seen in the level of horse values for his retinue as a whole. A typical army embraced retinues of various sizes, under the leadership of a range of major and minor captains, and horse valuation records will usually reveal a correspondingly wide range of retinue-level means. As might be expected, the retinues of the highest ranking, militarily-active members of the nobility were frequently those with high quality horseflesh. The overall mean value of warhorses killed during the Cambrésis-Thiérache campaign was, as has been seen, over £16, but for two of the earls involved, Northampton and Derby, their retinue-means

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\(^6\) The warhorses lost by the members of his retinue are discussed in detail below, pp. 312-15.

\(^7\) Norwell, p. 314.

\(^8\) Owned by the earl of Northampton, Sir John de Montgomery and Sir Peter de la Mare: ibid., pp. 309, 312, 317. There were probably other destriers of this quality which came through the campaign unscathed.

\(^9\) Molyns is described as Salisbury's \textit{scutifer} in 1332: B.L. Cotton Ms., Galba E. III fo. 186.

\(^10\) For his fall, late in 1340, and the great wealth which was confiscated by the king, see Fryde, op. cit., pp. 201-2; Elvey, op. cit., passim.
Yet there were others, who were not members of the titled nobility, whose retinues also lost an array of high-calibre warhorses during this campaign. One of these was Sir John Molyns: the mean value of his company's horses (over £31) was the highest of any in the army. Another was John Charnels, king's clerk and deputy treasurer of the exchequer, but holding the rank of banneret. Indeed, turning to the evidence for the Breton campaign of 1342-43, it is the untitled captains who lead the way. With the overall mean warhorse value for the army at just over £14, the captains with the highest retinue-level figures are Sir Reginald de Cobham and Sir Walter de Mauny: bannerets, who like Moleyns had amassed wealth and influence through their closeness to the king, but unlike him avoided overstepping the mark.

These examples, captains and retinues serving in the early campaigns of the French war, are all dependent upon the evidence of *restauro equorum* accounts: records which, because incomplete, must always be treated with caution. If an unrepresentative selection of a retinue's horses were lost during a campaign - a likely occurrence if the sample is very small - then a false impression of overall horse

11. Northampton (£24), Derby (£29). The earl of Salisbury, who had lost far more horses than any other captain in the army (65), was rather further behind, with a mean value of £19: Norwell, pp. 309-12.

12. Cf. the component elements of the earl of Pembroke's small army, serving in Scotland in 1315. The level of horse-values of Pembroke's retinue (£19.3) was practically equalled by that of Sir Bartholomew de Badlesmere's (£18.5) and surpassed by that of Sir Robert de de Mohaut's: E101/15/6.

13. Norwell, pp. 314, 317. Charnels' retinue-mean was over £23. Only those captains with retinues losing at least ten horses have been taken into account.


15. The full inventories for the Scottish campaigns of the later 1330s offer retinue-level means which are wholly reliable; but they display less dramatic variation than the records for the early campaigns of the French war. See below, Table 6.8.
quality will be conveyed. This may explain, for example, why the earl of Warwick's lost horses during the Rheims campaign have a mean value of £20, as compared with the figure of £9 for the army as a whole. The high mean for Warwick's retinue stands out because the corresponding figures for the great majority of the larger retinues in the army occupy a narrow range of values, very close to overall mean. The fact that the records for the Rheims campaign lack detail on individual horses and their owners makes it impossible to be sure about the reliability of the retinue-level means. At least with conventional \textit{restauro equorum} accounts it is possible to examine lists of the horses which have been lost and often an assessment can be made as to whether the sample of lost horses for a particular retinue is giving rise to a mean which is representative for all the horses in the retinue. At times, it is fairly clear that it is not representative: take, for example, the \textit{restauro equorum} account for the Breton campaign. The retinue of Sir Thomas de Bradeston lost eleven horses with a mean value of less than £8, but Bradeston's own horse is not included, nor it would seem are those of any of the

16. For a summary of the \textit{restauro equorum} data for the Rheims campaign, see Appendix 3. Warwick's men lost twenty horses, which represents 17\% of those appraised for the retinue. The mean value for Sir Frank Hale's retinue is also quite high (£15.5; 43 horses), but the amount which he received for his men's equestrian losses, 1,000 marks, looks suspiciously like a lump sum.

17. It is possible to measure how representative the sample of lost horses is when both full inventory and \textit{restauro equorum} account are available. Take, for example, the materials for the 1336 Scottish campaign. The mean value of the horses listed in the surviving inventories is £8.5, as compared with £8.7 for those which were lost during the campaign. Greater disparity is to be seen on the level of individual retinues, but this is not surprising as the number of horses involved is often very small. In the case of Henry, Lord Percy's retinue, the mean value of twelve lost horses (£8.4) is a very accurate reflection of the figure for the whole retinue (£8.5) and the same applies to the retinues of several other captains, most notably the earl of Warwick. For other captains the difference between the sub-set and the whole is rather greater, but (except where very few horses are involved) not so great as to have a seriously distorting effect. The mean value of Henry of Lancaster's twenty-one lost horses was, for example, £1 less than that for his retinue as a whole. It would probably be prudent to allow for a margin of error of this magnitude when using \textit{restauro equorum} materials which cannot be verified by consultation of the original inventories.

18. E36/204 fo. 88.
knights in his retinue. By contrast, the list of horses lost by Sir Reginald de Cobham's company includes the captain's own splendid destrier, valued at 100 marks, and the horse of Sir John de Gise, worth 40 marks. Had Bradeston's retinue lost a slightly different selection of horses, the retinue mean may have been very different, and indeed rather more in keeping with this captain's status, for like Cobham and Mauny, Bradeston was one of the rising stars of Edward III's regime.

Whilst usually offering an essentially random sample of an army when taken as a whole, a *restauro equorum* account can sometimes provide misleading evidence on the level of the individual retinue. But allowance can be made for this possibility and occasional flaws in the data do not obscure the existence of a relationship between the status of a captain and the equestrian resources of his company. How is it that the quality of a retinue's warhorses could be influenced by the identity of its captain? Did the captain himself provide the horses for the personnel of his retinue? Some observers have assumed that this was so, but whilst gifts of warhorses from lord to retainer are often mentioned in the terms of indentures (as well as in the

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19. Apart from himself, Bradeston received pay for three knights, fifteen esquires and seventeen mounted archers (E36/204 fos. 106v, 109). None of those who lost horses are given the title of knight (but the *restauro equorum* accounts appear to be inconsistent in this respect) and they do not include any of the knights receiving letters of protection for service in Bradeston's retinue - of whom, rather strangely, there were four (C76/17 m. 24).

20. E36/204 fo. 87. There are also four £20 warhorses listed.

21. During the Cambresis-Thiérache campaign, Bradeston received compensation for only two horses, but at 40 marks and £20 they were both considerably more valuable than any of the warhorses lost by his men in 1342 (Norwell, p. 315). Indeed, the owner of the £20 horse, John de Apprele, is also to be found in Bradeston's *restauro equorum* account in 1342, but this time with an animal worth only 20 marks. Here, once again, is seen the effect of the theatre of war on the quality of warhorse employed.

22. For Bradeston, see G.E.C., ii, p. 273; and Saul, *Knights and esquires*, pp 76-78. Like Molyns, Bradeston's career may have benefitted from his involvement in the Nottingham Castle coup: see J. Vale, *Edward III and chivalry* (Woodbridge, 1982), p. 61.

narrative sources of the period), it is evident that comparatively few men benefitted from this kind of largesse. A favoured retainer or a military subcontractor might be supplied with a warhorse by lord or captain, but in either case the superior contracting party would rarely be responsible for the horseflesh of the accompanying company of men-at-arms. In this way a leading captain could ensure that his principal followers and lieutenants were horsed at a level commensurate to his and their status; but to provide warhorses for all the members of a retinue would have entailed a prohibitive financial outlay. It seems clear, then, that most men-at-arms were responsible for supplying their own horseflesh and that a captain's influence on the quality of his retinue's warhorses arose, in the main, from his control over recruitment.

Only the core of a magnate's military retinue would consist of permanent, indentured retainers, but their importance was greater than their numbers might suggest, for some would, if required, be able bring small companies of their own into their lord's service. Most

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24. See, for example, Froissart's account of the careers of the German mercenaries, Bacon and Crokart: Society at war, ed. C.T. Allmand (Edinburgh, 1973), p. 89.

25. For example, the Black Prince's retainer, Sir John Sully (1353): B.P. Reg ii, p. 45-46; discussed in Bean, From lord to patron, pp. 58-59. Provisions of this kind are to be found in many indentures of retinue: see Bean, op. cit., pp. 45, 46, 49, 51, 53, 54, 57, 62, 63, 64.

26. For example, Sir Hugh Fitz Simond, contracting to serve with a company of twelve men-at-arms in Ralph, Lord Stafford's retinue for one year (16 March 1347): Crecy and Calais, p. 192. Similarly, in an indenture drawn-up a couple of weeks later, Sir Thomas Ughtred, who was to serve in the king's army with a company of twenty men-at-arms and twenty archers, was allowed covenable mouture pour son corps demesne sicome appertient a son estat: E101/25/33. Cf. Sir Maurice de Berkeley's contract with the Crown (18 April, 1315) for the defence of Berwick: Berkeley was to receive four chevaux darmes ... du donn le Roy, but his company of twenty men-at-arms were to be bien montez & apperaiillez a sa troveure (E101/68/2 m. 35).

27. This is stated explicitly in many sub-contracts and indentures of retinue. The terms of Geoffrey Walsh's agreement with the earl of Salisbury, drawn-up in July 1347, specified that Geoffrey serra a se mouture propre & son chival darmes sera preise & encas gil sera perduz en le service le dit counte, le dit Goffrei avera restitutionn: E101/68/3 m. 68. Indentures continued to stipulate that sub-contractors would be a son monture propre after the abandonment of restaura equonium in the early 1370s: E101/68/5 m. 107; Walker, 'Profit and loss in the Hundred Years War', p. 102; Goodman, 'The military subcontracts of Sir Hugh Hastings', p. 115.

28. For examples, see note 25 above. K.B. McFarlane's pioneering work ('Bastard Feudalism', B.I.H.R. xx (1945), pp. 165-66; The nobility of later medieval England, pp. 102-4) has been developed
men-at-arms served on the basis of a temporary contract, intended to last no longer than the duration of a single campaign. How were such men recruited? Many captains would raise their military retinues from amongst their neighbours and tenants, but they could also seek to enlist the services of military 'professionals'. Successful and prestigious captains would have a large pool of knights and esquires to choose from. If they had property in different parts of the realm, this would bring them into contact with several separate gentry communities. If they were close to the king - a member of the royal household or a trusted counsellor - they would have ready access to an even wider selection of the active chivalric class; and, during the course of previous campaigns, they would have become acquainted with the pick of English free-lance 'professionals' and foreign mercenaries. Prominent captains could offer the prospect of honour and the chance of great rewards and it was usually not difficult for a leading commander to build an impressive retinue from those offering their services - a retinue containing a mix of wealth and military reputation. It is this bringing together of chivalric talent that is to a considerable extent reflected in the high level of warhorse values in the retinues of notable captains. The fine array of personnel which accompanied the earl of Derby to Gascony in 1345 (eight bannerets and eighty-seven knights out of a total of 250 men-at-arms) is a good example of the kind of retinue which it was possible for a great captain to assemble and the very high level of warhorse values suggested by Derby's *restauro equorum* claim is


29. On subcontracts, see Sherborne, 'Indentured retinues and English expeditions to France, 1369-1380', pp. 742-44; Goodman, op. cit.; Walker, op. cit.. The prevalence of subcontracting should make us a little wary of reconstructing a magnate's 'permanent' retinue purely from the evidence of his military retinues (e.g. from lists of letters of protection). A man might serve regularly under a particular captain as a result of friendship, family or tenurial ties, or geographical convenience, but may never have formed a permanent retaining bond.
entirely in keeping with the standing of this most impressive assembly of (mainly) English chivalry.\textsuperscript{30}

Even the greatest of retinues contained a fair proportion of lesser men, however. There was never any shortage of ambitious young men - younger sons, junior members of 'parish' (rather than 'county') gentry families\textsuperscript{31} - seeking to join the retinue of a renowned captain: men for whom a quiet life in England held out few prospects and who saw that one way to advancement was through military service. This could become a lifelong career in itself, or it might lead to permanent settlement overseas; but, it might simply be a means of getting into close proximity with the great, of making a good impression and forging a lasting association. Such men often found their way into a great retinue as members of subcontracted companies; they can be readily enough detected, their warhorses providing ample testimony to their modest means. Some seem never quite to have achieved the breakthrough they were seeking. But a few were ultimately very successful: men like Walter Bentley, example. He is first seen serving in Scotland in 1338 under the earl of Salisbury with a horse valued at a mere £5.\textsuperscript{32} In the same retinue was another young esquire destined for great things, Nigel Loring.\textsuperscript{33} Bentley appears to be a member of one

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{30} E101/25/9. It is noteworthy that only fifteen of the ninety-fivebannerets and knights had a more permanent connection with Lancaster, involving the grant of land or annuities: Fowler, The king's lieutenant, p. 183.
\item \textsuperscript{31} On the 'parish gentry', see C. Given-Wilson, The English nobility in the late Middle Ages (London, 1987), pp. 71-73.
\item \textsuperscript{32} E101/35/3. Bentley was a Yorkshireman of rather obscure origins. For his career, see M. Jones, 'Edward III's captain's in Brittany', p 100 and the anonymously published, A brief note upon the battles of Saintes and Mauron, 1351 and 1352 (Guildford, 1918), which is rather more than its title suggests. The inventories illuminate the early careers of several men who, like Bentley, were to become captain-lieutenants in Brittany: for Sir John de Hardreshull, Sir John de Avenel and Sir Robert de Herle, see below notes 68, 84, 88.
\item \textsuperscript{33} Loring's horse was worth £8, but within a year he was serving in the Low Countries as a member of the king's household, with a horse valued at £26 6d 8d.: Norwell, p. 325.
\end{itemize}
The circumstances of Loring's recruitment are less clear: does it reflect his shrewdness in choosing the retinue of one of the king's closest confidants, or rather that of the earl, in securing a young man of great potential for his service? Either way, this example serves as a reminder that though a retinue will always contain men of modest means - their numbers determined to some degree by the status of the captain - amongst them may well be rising stars, their talents concealed by their present rank and the quality of their warhorses. Equally, there will be hardened veterans, eagerly sought-after by captains, their skills and experience invaluable but not necessarily detectable in the appraised value of their mounts. Some of these regular campaigners avoided knighthood, together with the public responsibilities and expense which the accolade entailed; and they have usually remained obscure figures as a result.35 Of those veterans who did assume the knightly estate during the course of long careers, many became respected, though hardly leading, figures in the knightly community. Sir Nicholas de Goushill was such a man: in 1362 we see him in Ireland with a warhorse valued at a mere £8.36 This modest steed was, no doubt, a response to the trend of the times - and also to the demands of the Irish terrain - yet it disguises the presence of a distinguished war veteran, a man who had first borne arms at Halidon Hill some thirty years before and who had been a participant in many of the great military events of his

34. He is described as the valet of Sir William de la Zouche.

35. William de Thweyt is a good example: for details of his long career see above, p.203 n.28. Although only an esquire, he was appointed marshal of Sir Ralph Ufford's army, numbering over 2000 paid troops, raised for the suppression of the earl of Desmond's rebellion in the summer of 1345. The very modest 'fee' (a bonus payment to supplement standard wages) which he received for this period of service (100s. for a year, when knights were in receipt of at least two or three times as much) is a reflection of his social standing, rather than his true military worth. In this sense, Ufford's fee roll (C260/57 m. 28) presents a view of the military community very similar to that offered by horse inventories.

36. Goushill's mount was a courser, but the next man on the list, an esquire, had a warhorse valued at £9: E101/28/11 m. 2.
age; a man, moreover, who as an esquire had served with a £10 warhorse in the first campaign of the French war.

It is not always easy, then, to detect men of true military worth in the horse inventories: the experience and skills of many reliable veterans, like Goushill, are scarcely conveyed by the quality of their warhorses and it is only by piecing together their careers from a range of sources that their important role in the Edwardian military community can be gauged. It is rather the men of wealth, the top stratum of the chivalric class, who stand out in the inventories: the senior members of county gentry families and the men of established military reputation who had capitalised on their campaigning experience. Men like Sir Nicholas de la Beche, Sir William de Greystoke, Sir Reginald de Mohun and Sir Richard Talbot: all principal members of magnate retinues in the Breton campaign of 1342-43 and all with destriers or coursers assigned a value of at least £30.

The heavy concentrations of such men as these in the retinues of the foremost captains of the period certainly contribute to the high level of horse values which these retinues frequently exhibit. Yet the

37. Goushill's career, which included participation in the sieges of Tournai and Vannes, in the Gascon expeditions of Henry of Lancaster and the Black Prince and in John of Gaunt's chevauchée of 1369, is illuminated by a deposition before the Court of Chivalry (C47/6/1 deposition no. 29 in the Lovel-Morley dispute, 1385). He also served in the Low Countries in 1338-39, in the Scots Marches during the summer of 1340 (E101/612/2) and in Brittany in 1360 (C76/40 m. 10; C.P.R., 1358-61, p. 542). He had become a knight by 1345: E101/25/9.

38. Norwell, p. 311. Goushill's campaigning life had not been blessed by lucky windfalls, but for him (as indeed for many of his colleagues in arms) the main cause of frustration and impoverishment lay in his domestic circumstances, and in particular the extraordinary longevity of his parents, Thomas and Agnes. Nicholas entered into part of his inheritance in 1370 (shortly after returning from what was to be his last campaign in France) and the rest followed four years later: C.I.P.M., xiv, no. 30 (Thomas de Goushill, Nicholas' father), cf. C.I.P.M., vi, no. 750 (Walter de Goushill, Nicholas's grandfather). Nicholas died in 1393. Robert Thoroton, The antiquities of Nottinghamshire, with additions by John Throsby (3 vols., London, 1797), iii, pp. 61-64; J.G. Bellamy, The parliamentary representation of Nottinghamshire, Derbyshire and Staffordshire in the reign of Richard II (Nottingham M.A. thesis, 1961), pp. 281-86. On the predicament of the man awaiting his inheritance, cf. Walker, 'Profit and loss in the Hundred Years War', pp. 101-2.

39. Beche (£60) and Greystoke (£50) served with the earl of Northampton; Mohun (£30) with the earl of Derby; Talbot (£40) with Hugh, Lord Despenser (E36/204 fos. 86v, 87).
incidence of high retinue-level mean values cannot always be so easily explained: the precise nature of the relationship between the captain and the quality of his retinue's horseflesh is sometimes difficult to interpret. Take, for example, the case of Sir John Molyns' retinue during the Cambrésis-Thiérache campaign of 1338-39. Molyns' life is a catalogue of extreme behaviour, fired it would seem by a tireless ambition to augment his personal wealth and enhance his standing in the political community. His retinue during the Cambrésis-Thiérache campaign, twenty-seven men-at-arms and twenty-four archers, was not large; perhaps about right for a prominent banneret.\(^{40}\) It was not in terms of numbers of men that Molyns sought to rival his social superiors, but rather through the splendour of his company's appearance - and in particular the quality of their warhorses. We know about this because Molyns claimed compensation for the loss of thirteen of them:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sir John de Molyns</td>
<td>destrier</td>
<td>£100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philip de Lymbury</td>
<td>courser</td>
<td>£40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John de Strechele</td>
<td>courser</td>
<td>£30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Cifrewast</td>
<td>courser</td>
<td>£25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alan de Holland</td>
<td>courser</td>
<td>£50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simon de Norton</td>
<td>courser</td>
<td>£30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edmund Rose</td>
<td>equus</td>
<td>£12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert de Sussex</td>
<td>equus</td>
<td>£12 13s. 4d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peterkin de Colonia</td>
<td>equus</td>
<td>£10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard Biroun</td>
<td>equus</td>
<td>20 marks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Peche</td>
<td>equus</td>
<td>£24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sir Corondus de Stene</td>
<td>equus</td>
<td>£50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard Courzon</td>
<td>equus</td>
<td>£14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Molyns claimed, therefore, £411 for thirteen horses, including his own destrier and five coursers.\(^{42}\) The mean value of these warhorses,

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\(^{40}\) Norwell, pp. 332, 357. Molyns' retinue during the summer of 1340 was of very similar size: twenty-four men-at-arms and twenty-four archers (E101/22/35).

\(^{41}\) Norwell, p. 314-5; Cifrewast appears, incorrectly, as Cisrewast in the printed text.

\(^{42}\) It is worth noting that of 376 horses included in the restauro equorum account for this army, only thirteen were coursers.
£31.6, is the highest for any single retinue and nearly twice that for the army as whole.\footnote{3} The abnormally high level of horse values cannot be explained in terms of the social standing of Molyns' men, for the retinue included no more than three knights and only one of these appears on the \textit{restauro equorum} list;\footnote{4} indeed, the consistently high level of values for horses listed alongside men who were not apparently knights is the most notable feature of the list. It would seem, therefore, that Molyns himself was responsible, though precisely how is not clear. The effect of his 'influence' on warhorse quality can be seen particularly strikingly in the case of two of his men-at-arms, who can be traced on earlier horse inventories. Both Philip de Lymbury and Simon de Norton had been members of the earl of Cornwall's retinue in Scotland in 1336: the former with a very cheap 5 mark horse, the latter with one valued at £8.\footnote{5} Lymbury is also known to have served in the north in 1337-38, this time with a horse appraised at £8.\footnote{6} In his case, therefore, the horse which he lost during the Cambrésis-Thiérache campaign was worth five times the value of his previous mount; in Norton's, the increase was four-fold. Even allowing for the usual inclination to take more expensive horses to France than to Scotland, the values of their horses in 1338-39 are exceptional.

It is possible that some captains stipulated a minimum acceptable standard of warhorse at the time of recruitment: the price, as it

\footnote{3}{This is, of course, an incomplete picture of the retinue's warhorses, but since about half of Molyns's men-at-arms are listed it would seem likely that we have a representative sample.}

\footnote{4}{The \textit{restauro equorum} list may be a little misleading: Corondus de Stone is clearly a knight, and John de Strechele was certainly a knight by the summer of 1340 (E101/22/35), but he may have been one of the four new creations of October 1339, noted by the \textit{vadia guerre} account (\textit{Norwell}, p. 332). Alan de Holand had become a knight by 1342-43 (E36/204 fo. 107) and Philip de Lymbury by 1345 (E101/25/9 m. 3).}

\footnote{5}{E101/19/36 m. 1.}

\footnote{6}{E101/35/3.}
were, of admission into a great retinue. The captain had, after all, his reputation and standing in the military community to consider. The normal rivalry between members of the chivalric class would further contribute to the same end: an individual man-at-arms was as much concerned for his own reputation as that of his master, and the quality of his warhorse could enhance, or detract from, that reputation. Arriving at muster with the necessary standard of warhorse would not present a problem for a wealthy knight. But we must doubt whether Philip de Lymbury or Simon de Norton had the means of acquiring the kind of horses listed in Molyns' *restauro equorum* account; and, in any case, if a high standard of horseflesh was expected, not all of Moleyns' men responded. Amongst the men with more modestly priced horses, the veteran campaigner Robert de Sussex served in the Low Countries and Scotland with mounts of very similar value. It appears very likely, therefore, that Molyns himself supplied some of the horses listed in the *restauro equorum* account, perhaps as a means of attracting sought-after men-at-arms into his service, or possibly in fulfilment of contracts with indentured retainers. There is little hard evidence concerning Molyns' retaining ties. Of the twelve men listed in the *restauro equorum* account, two (John de Strechele and Simon de Norton) were to continue in Molyns'

47. In both short- and long-term contracts, the retainer was usually required to appear 'well mounted and equipped'. In practice, the contracting parties probably understood in more precise terms the quality of warhorse that was required.

48. Robert de Sussex was a man of modest personal fortune, having only a little property in Market Overton (Rutland), acquired on lease in 1332: *C.F.R.*, 1327-37, p. 295; *C.I.P.M.*, xii, no. 165. Nevertheless he served in Scotland in 1338 with a horse valued at £12, rather above the average for an esquire, and showing a marked improvement upon his 10 marks mount of two years earlier: E101/19/36 m.7d; E101/35/3. By the outbreak of the French war, Sussex was a seasoned veteran, having campaigned in Scotland with near professional regularity throughout the 1330s under Henry de Percy (1333 and early 1334: C71/13 m. 31, C71/14 m. 26) and then Giles de Badlesmere (1334, 1336, 1337, 1338: C71/14 m. 13, C71/16 m. 28, C71/17 m. 3.). The connection with Badlesmere was a logical one, for he was lord of the manor of Market Overton; whilst Sussex's military association with Molyneux in 1338 (following Badlesmere's death), probably arose from Molyneux's acquisition of the rent of Sussex's leasehold property (*V.C.H. Rutland*, ii, pp. 141-42, 143).

49. At least two of Molyneux's men were German mercenaries: Peterkin de Colonia and Corondus de Stene, the latter with a very valuable horse.
service in the summer of 1340. Norton, at least, appears to have been closely tied to Molyns, and may have received his splendid £30 courser in 1338 as reward for services promised or already performed. But although his retinue’s warhorses certainly do reflect the extent of his newly acquired power and status, there is another possible interpretation of the evidence: that Molyns _restauro equorum_ claim was a fraudulent one, or rather, that he induced the appraising officers at the port of embarkation to record inflated valuations for ordinary horses. Such behaviour would, of course, be entirely in character and may provide the most plausible explanation for these unusual figures.

**Table 6.6: The warhorses of Sir Walter de Mauny’s retinue, 1342-43.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Horse Type</th>
<th>Valuation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sir Walter de Mauny</td>
<td>1 destrier</td>
<td>£100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sir Baldwin de Freville</td>
<td>1 destrier</td>
<td>£52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas de Belhous</td>
<td>1 courser</td>
<td>£40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walter de Laundesbergh</td>
<td>1 equus</td>
<td>50 marks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert de Wylughby</td>
<td>1 equus</td>
<td>50 marks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Almaric de Newhall</td>
<td>1 equus</td>
<td>50 marks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herman de Burgoin</td>
<td>1 equus</td>
<td>50 marks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John de Eston</td>
<td>1 equus</td>
<td>50 marks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walter de Byntre</td>
<td>1 equus</td>
<td>40 marks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henry de Romeseye</td>
<td>1 equus</td>
<td>40 marks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John de Corkele</td>
<td>1 equus</td>
<td>40 marks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert de Skardeburgh</td>
<td>1 equus</td>
<td>40 marks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas Buset</td>
<td>1 equus</td>
<td>£20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard de Derby</td>
<td>1 equus</td>
<td>£20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John de Ellerton</td>
<td>1 equus</td>
<td>£20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard de Stapelton</td>
<td>1 equus</td>
<td>£10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John de Saint More</td>
<td>1 equus</td>
<td>£10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert de Catfeld</td>
<td>1 equus</td>
<td>£10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Darras</td>
<td>1 equus</td>
<td>£8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John de Belhous</td>
<td>1 equus</td>
<td>10 marks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert de Newers</td>
<td>1 equus</td>
<td>100s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John de Kirkeby</td>
<td>1 equus</td>
<td>100s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John de Overton</td>
<td>1 equus</td>
<td>100s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henry de Arderne</td>
<td>1 equus</td>
<td>100s.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

50. C76/15 m. 21; E101/22/25. Both Norton and Strechele continued their military careers into the 1340s, after Molyns’ fall, under the banners of different captains. Two other men served in Molyns’ retinue in both 1338-39 and 1340: John Fitz Bernard and Roger de Puttenham (Treaty Rolls 1337-39, no. 331; C76/14 m. 13; E101/22/35). Philip de Lymbury fought under various captains (1340: C76/15 m. 22; 1342: C76/17 m. 25) before settling into the service of Henry of Lancaster in the mid 1340s (1344: C76/19 m. 19; 1345-47: E101/25/9 m. 3). For his later career see Fowler, _The king’s lieutenant_, p. 183 and n. 89.

51. He is described as Molyns’ valet in an application for letters of protection (C81/1733 m. 18) and, elsewhere, is seen carrying a letter from Molyns to Chancery (C81/1773 m. 24). Norton’s association with Molyns may not have been a long-standing one, however, for in 1336 he had appeared in a protection warrant as Sir Andrew de Sakeville’s valet: C81/1723 m. 16.
Few retinue-level horse inventories present such intriguing, if intractable, interpretive difficulties as Molyns' for the 1338-39 campaign; but, equally, there are few which pose no problems at all. The *restauro equorum* account arising from Sir Walter de Mauny's service in Brittany in 1342-43 is one of those for which interpretation is not entirely straightforward. Mauny, who arrived in England with Philippa of Hainault in 1327, carved out for himself a most distinguished place in the Edwardian regime, largely through loyal and effective service in the king's war in France and so we might expect him to have assembled a distinguished company of men - and horseflesh - for the Breton campaign. In the event, the very high level of warhorse values for his retinue (a mean of £24.58) stands well above those for the other significant companies of the English army in 1342-43: a full £5 above the nearest rival (Sir Reginald de Cobham) and £10 above the figure for the whole army.\(^52\) Mauny's horse list (see Table 6.6) contains an unusually high proportion of expensive warhorses. About two-thirds of them are valued at £20 or more, as compared with less than a quarter for the army as whole. Although this is a *restauro equorum* account,\(^53\) there is no reason for thinking that the selection of lost horses is unrepresentative of the whole retinue: that a disproportionately large number of horses were lost by the higher ranking members of Mauny's retinue. In fact, the very opposite appears to have been the case. Mauny's two retinues in 1342-43 both fielded significantly smaller proportions of knights than the army as a whole. Even so, only one of the men named in the *restauro equorum* account is recorded as a knight\(^54\) and the majority

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52. See Appendix 2 for retinue-level figures.
53. There is, in addition, a certain amount of complication arising from the fact that Mauny commanded the spring 1342 expedition and also served in the main expeditionary force in the autumn. It is not clear whether the *restauro equorum* account covers losses sustained by both of Mauny's two separate retinues, or only one of them.
54. The *restauro equorum* account is not a consistently reliable guide to military rank, but only two
were not recipients of letters of protection - the latter being a useful (though admittedly imperfect) guide to social standing and wealth.\textsuperscript{55} The evidence would seem to suggest that whilst Mauny had attracted few prominent members of the English knightly class into his retinue, many of those who did serve under him, did so with rather better warhorses than would normally be expected of men of their status. A dramatic leap in horse quality can be detected in the experience of several of Mauny's men. Thus, for example, Sir Baldwin de Freville £52 destrier represents a very marked improvement upon the £10 horse with which he is listed in the \textit{restauro equorum} account for the Cambrésis-Thiérache campaign.\textsuperscript{56}

With Mauny's retinue in 1342-43, as with Molyns' in 1338-39, one is left wondering how it was that such impressive horseflesh came to be recorded alongside the names of men of comparatively modest standing. It may well be that both Mauny and Molyns had felt the need to draw on their own resources: to supply warhorses from their own stables to some, at least, of their military retainers.\textsuperscript{57} It would have been useful, at this point, to compare these \textit{restauro equorum} data with similar records for other expeditions in which Mauny and Molyns were involved. Unfortunately, however, no comparative material for either Molyns or Mauny appears to have survived. Such comparison is possible for a number of other captains (see Tables 6.7 and 6.8) and in these others amongst those named in Mauny's list can be shown to have been a knights in 1342: Richard de Stapleton (C76/17 m. 17) and Walter de Landesbergen (Norwell, pp. 318, 339).

\textsuperscript{55} Of the twenty-four men who lost horses, only Mauny himself, Sir Baldwin de Freville, Sir Richard de Stapleton and John de Eston have enrolled protections.

\textsuperscript{56} The increase for the German mercenary, Walter de Laundesbergen, was from £9. 15s. (Norwell, p. 318) to 50 marks. A John de Eston appears with a £4 horse in the retinue of William de Bohun in 1336 (E101/19/36 m. 5d); he may be the same as he who served with a 50 mark warhorse under Mauny in 1342-43.

\textsuperscript{57} Little is known of Mauny's retaining ties, but several of those listed in his \textit{restauro equorum} account for 1342-43 are known to have served under him in earlier expeditions: John de Belhous, Walter de Bintre, John de Eston, Richard de Stapleton and Robert de Wylughby.
cases the relationship between individual commanders and the
equestrian resources of their retinues can be considered over a
sequence of campaigns in different theatres of war.

Table 6.7: Mean warhorse values: a selection of captains, 1336-60.58

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Scotland</th>
<th>Flanders</th>
<th>Brittany</th>
<th>France</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>earl of:</td>
<td>1336-38</td>
<td>1338-39</td>
<td>1342-43</td>
<td>1359-60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lancaster</td>
<td>8.3 (79)</td>
<td>29.1 (27)</td>
<td>11.1 (18)</td>
<td>9.8 (216)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northampton</td>
<td>8.4 (56)</td>
<td>24.1 (24)</td>
<td>17.9 (38)</td>
<td>7.8 (40)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salisbury</td>
<td>12.6 (89)</td>
<td>19.1 (65)</td>
<td>14.0 (10)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warwick</td>
<td>8.0 (145)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10.5 (12)</td>
<td>20.3 (20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John de Beaumont</td>
<td>6.8 (12)</td>
<td>13.7 (15)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regd. de Cobham</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9.4 (9)</td>
<td>19.4 (11)</td>
<td>7.8 (18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Darcy, snr.</td>
<td>9.3 (24)</td>
<td>12.2 (14)</td>
<td>9.8 (14)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H. le Despenser</td>
<td>11.4 (17)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>12.7 (16)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All warhorses</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The data in Table 6.7 highlight very clearly the spread of retinue
level figures lying behind the overall mean values for each
expedition. It is also very evident that the pattern of values for
individual captains are rarely in close conformity with the general
trend in values for the period. With some captains, it is true, there
is broad agreement with the general trend; and, where the evidence is
available, the sequence of mean values for most display a sharp
increase at the start of the Hundred Years War, followed by a decline.
But within this very simple schema, there is a much variation. The
course of individual career development was obviously important in
this. In general, few untitled captains scaled the heights reached by
the retinues of Edward III’s inner circle of earls. The mean values
for the companies of those captains who were not in the front rank

58. Mean values (£) with, in each case, the number of warhorses involved in brackets. Sources: as
for Table 6.1. For a captain to be included, information must be available for at least ten warhorses
for two or more theatres of war. The 'Scotland 1336-38' figures may consist of the data for one or
more campaigns; for a breakdown of these figures, see Table 6.8. The data from the inventories for
the Irish expeditions of 1361-64 have been excluded because earlier comparative evidence is
available for only one captain, the earl of Stafford. His retinue mean was £9.4 for the Rheims
campaign and £10 for service in Ireland in the early 1360s.
frequently fell short of the value for the army as a whole. Sir John Darcy's retinue is a good example of this.\(^{59}\) For both of the early campaigns of the French war, his retinue's mean was at least £4 less than that for the whole army. The pattern of figures for the earl of Northampton's retinue are appropriate for a captain of his standing. The extent of his retinue's increase in warhorse quality in the late 1330s was no doubt a response to Bohun's elevation to an earldom,\(^{60}\) but his mean values for 1342-43 and 1359-60 are very much in line with the general downward movement in values for the period - although the degree of contrast between the figures for 1338-39 and those for the Rhiems campaign is indeed striking.\(^{61}\) A fuller sequence of data is available for Henry of Lancaster, for in addition to the figures in Table 6.7, there is a little material arising from his spells of service in Gascony in 1345 and 1350. Lancaster was the greatest magnate outside the immediate royal family and perhaps the most accomplished English captain of the Edwardian age. The peaks in the sequence of mean warhorse values for his retinue amply reflect this prominence. The figure for the Cambrésis-Thiérache campaign is nearly twice that for the English army as a whole, but the mean value of the forty-three horses lost by his men during his chevauchées in Gascony in 1345-47, £32, is fitting indication of Lancaster's military status at this time, second only to that of the king.\(^{62}\) The corresponding

\(^{59}\) Sir John Darcy was a prominent figure in Edward III's court: he was successively steward of the royal household (1337-40) and king's chamberlain (1341-46); Tout, *Chapters*, iii, p. 89 and n. 1; vi, pp. 43, 46. His 'Scottish' mean, which refers to the army of 1337, needs to be seen in the context of an inventory which includes an unusually high proportion of retinues with depressed horse values.

\(^{60}\) Elevation to the earldom of Derby appears to have had a similar effect on Lancaster's retinue. Salisbury's high 'Scottish' mean, £12.6, refers to his retinue in 1337-38: i.e. after his had secured his earldom.

\(^{61}\) There is no reason for doubting the reliability of Northampton's figures: all four means are based upon a respectable quantity of individual values. The lower than average figure for 1359-60 does not appear to be the result of a deficiency of knights.

\(^{62}\) E101/25/9. As we have seen, Lancaster assembled a very distinguished body of men-at-arms for this expedition, 40% of whom were of knightly status. The low mean for the Breton campaign, a little over £11, is considered below, pp. 321-22.
figure for 1350, £13.7, is altogether less impressive. This may reflect the early stages of the general decline in the quality of the English warhorse, though it must be admitted that the source lying behind these data, a record of horse sales, may not be strictly comparable to the evidence of the inventories. The low mean for the duke's horse values in 1359-60 is, however, altogether more reliable and is firmly in line with the pattern exhibited by the great majority of the army's major retinues. For this campaign Lancaster headed a retinue which, including nearly 600 men-at-arms, was a small army in itself, rivalling in size and splendour the company of the Prince of Wales. Yet, the average value of the horses lost by his men-at-arms was less than £10. Although a little higher than that for the army as a whole, this was only about a third of the mean value of his retinue's horseflesh at the start of the continental war. By the late 1350s, then, Lancaster's men-at-arms, in common with the English chivalric class in general, were going on active service with warhorses of markedly more modest quality than had previously been the case.

Many of the features of the data presented in Table 6.7 - in particular, sequences of values running above or below the general trend for the period - can be explained in terms of contrasts in career development. Yet there are some figures which are very significantly divergent from the norm. They serve as a reminder that summarised values of this kind need to be handled with close

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63. E403/355 m. 19; for a discussion of this source, see above, pp. 270-71. The individual horse values ranged from 100 marks to 100s. In judging the significance of the figure of £13.7, it is worth noting that nearly a third of Lancaster's men-at-arms were of knightly estate and more than half of those listed in the sales list are recorded as knights. The overall level of values may, however, be somewhat depressed by the fact that fifteen of the horses sold were 'second-string' mounts.

64. Lancaster's retinue was perhaps a little deficient in terms of knights (only 17% of men-at-arms), yet the mean value of the Prince of Wales' retinue, with a higher proportion of knights (25%), was only £8.5.
attention to their documentary - and wider historical - contexts. Take the figures for Sir Reginald de Cobham's retinue, for example. The mean value for the 1338-39 campaign is rather lower than we might expect, whilst the figure for the Breton expedition represents an increase of over 100%: a total reversal, therefore, of the usual pattern of values. The low figure is actually not difficult to explain. Norwell's *restauro equorum* account lists the names of nine men with their lost horses. Cobham himself is not amongst them and none of those who are named are designated knights, yet the lost horses may well be fairly representative of the retinue as a whole. The retinue included a very small proportion of knights (four, including Cobham, out of thirty-seven men-at-arms) and it is the unusual preponderance of esquires which probably explains the low mean for this expedition. Cobham's retinue in 1342-43 had a slightly more impressive array of knights (seven out of forty-nine) and the general level of values for the retinue may well have been higher than in 1338-39, but equally it seems likely that on this occasion the list of lost horses included a larger proportion of the retinue's more impressive mounts, including Cobham's own 100 marks warhorse and five others valued at £20 or more. At first glance, the opposite appears to have been the case with Henry of Lancaster's retinue in 1342, for here the occurrence of an unusually low figure - a significant trough in this captain's sequence of mean values - seems to be the consequence of a disproportionately heavy representation of esquires in his *restauro equorum* account. These records are not, however, a consistently reliable guide to rank. Moreover, the presence of

65. Norwell, pp. 313, 330. Other factors should not be discounted, however. Only one of the men in Cobham's *restauro equorum* list can be traced on earlier inventories and he, John de Lulleford with a 10 mark horse, can be detected serving with a slightly more valuable (11 mark) warhorse in the preceding Scottish expedition: E101/35/3 m. 1.

66. Of eighteen warhorses lost by members of Lancaster's retinue, only two are assigned to knights; and only three were valued at £20 or more. At 22%, the proportion of men-at-arms who were knights was very respectable.
several men who can be traced with considerably more valuable horses in the *restauro equorum* accounts for the Cambrésis-Thiérache campaign \(^6/7\) may suggest that Lancaster's list of lost horses for 1342-43 offers an essentially accurate impression of a retinue, the quality of whose horseflesh has been more depressed than most by the prospect of a campaign in Brittany. \(^6/8\)

There are, therefore, a number of reasons why the equestrian resources of a captain's retinue can sometimes appear either to fail to reflect his position in the military hierarchy or to be at variance with the normal level of quality for a particular army. A captain might recruit an unusually high, or low, number of men of knightly status; or he might deviate from normal practice and supply warhorses to some or all of his men-at-arms. Alternatively, the warhorse lists could be offering misleading evidence. The values recorded in the inventories were liable to be inflated or depressed, according to the outlook and expertise of the team of appraisers at the port of embarkation; and a *restauro equorum* account will not infrequently present a sample of a retinue's horseflesh which is anything but random. Such factors as these (though it may not always be clear which) will account for many of the inconsistencies in the pattern of warhorse values at the retinue level, whether isolated cases of retinues with improbably high values.

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67. The drop in value for John de Dyngeley was from 40 Marks to 20 marks; for Richard de la Vache, from £30 to £10; for Theobald Trussell, from £20 to 10 marks. There were a few slight increases (e.g. Reginald de Mohun: £30 in 1342, as compared with 40 marks in 1338-39); but cases such as Nicholas Geron's (a 10 marks horse for Scotland, 1336; £8 for Brittany, six years later) tend to confirm the impression that the level of values for Lancaster's retinue were unusually depressed in 1342-43.

68. The mean for the earl of Warwick's retinue is also unusually low and, once again, this may reflect a disproportionate representation of esquires amongst the losers of horses (ten out of twelve) or an unusual proponderance of low value horses in the retinue as a whole (nine out of the twelve lost horses were valued at 10 marks or less) or a combination of these factors. Two of Warwick's esquires (William Carless and Thomas Foliot) are associated with horses which are cheaper than those with which they had served in Scotland. Against this, Sir Robert Herle's £24 warhorse represented an improvement, though not especially marked, on his mounts of the later 1330s (valued at 20 marks and £20).
values (such as the cases of Molyns and Mauny considered earlier) or sequences of eccentric values, such as that for the earl of Warwick’s retinue from the 1330s to the Rheims campaign.69

Table 6.8: Scottish expeditions, 1336-38 - mean warhorse values for selected captains

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>1336</th>
<th>1337</th>
<th>1337-38</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>earl of:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angus</td>
<td>6.3 (30)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arundel</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>11.8 (41)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buchan (H. de Beaumont)</td>
<td>9.3 (36)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cornwall</td>
<td>8.7 (62)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gloucester</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>11.7 (62)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lancaster</td>
<td>8.3 (79)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northampton</td>
<td>8.4 (56)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oxford</td>
<td>10.3 (20)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salisbury</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>12.6 (89)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warwick</td>
<td>7.3 (74)</td>
<td>8.6 (67)</td>
<td>8.5 (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Giles de Badlesmere</td>
<td>9.0 (20)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8.9 (25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John de Beaumont</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6.8 (12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ralph Dacre</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7.6 (21)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Darcy, snr.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9.3 (24)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hugh le Despenser</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>11.4 (17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John de Mowbray</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7.0 (38)</td>
<td>11.7 (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ralph de Neville</td>
<td>9.5 (51)</td>
<td>7.3 (62)</td>
<td>14.0 (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henry de Percy</td>
<td>8.5 (56)</td>
<td>6.7 (90)</td>
<td>7.2 (38)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John de Segrave</td>
<td>9.3 (18)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John de Tibetot</td>
<td>9.5 (15)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard Talbot</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9.1 (28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas de Ughtred</td>
<td>9.3 (14)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7.7 (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas Wake</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8.7 (25)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All warhorses</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>10.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Though in some cases liable to be inconsistent, a captain’s influence on the quality of his retinue’s horseflesh was shaped, in particular, by his authority in the sphere of recruitment and, more generally, by the place he occupied in the military community. Earls and knights were members of different divisions of the chivalric league, of course, but a captain’s 'place' in the military community was not just

69. His retinue’s mean value in 1342-43 was even lower than Henry of Lancaster’s, whilst the figure for the Rheims campaign was over double that of the army as a whole. The pattern of his three retinue means for the Scottish campaigns, 1336-38, runs contrary to the overall trend conveyed by the inventories (see Table 6.8; and discussion, below, pp. 237-238).

70. Sources: as for Table 6.1.
a question of rank. There was always room for individuality, such as that which enabled Molyns and Mauny to rise to heights beyond that attained by most bannerets. And there was room, too, for the existence of identifiably distinct groups within the military community: separate communities with preoccupations which were narrower and more sharply focussed than those displayed by many who bore arms at this time. Edward III's captains were not, then, a homogeneous group. There were, certainly, a great many whose careers were far from narrowly focussed; men who fought in several theatres of war. The titled nobility, a substantial group of untitled magnates and the military resources of the royal household; these men the king could depend upon whether he planned to campaign in Scotland, Brittany, or the Low Countries. But the armies which served in the interest of the English Crown in Scotland and the borders were of rather different composition from those raised for continental campaigns. There was a section of the military community whose attention was permanently fixed towards the north: a group of magnates and a broad constituency of knights and esquires whose interests lay in northern England. Captains like Sir Henry de Percy and Sir Ralph de Neville, leading substantial retinues drawn from the gentry of the northern shires, made a significant contribution to major royal

71. For example, the community of the Welsh March: see R.R. Davies, *Lordship and society in the march of Wales, 1282-1400* (Oxford, 1978), pp. 67-85. Davies notes that, until 1300 at least, 'military vigilance was a precondition of lordship [in the Welsh March] ... war was less a pastime and more a way of life ' (pp. 67-68). Cf. the military community of Cheshire, which under Black Prince's lordship, were directed principally into the war in Aquitaine (Morgan, *War and society in medieval Cheshire*; M.J. Bennett, *Community, class and careerism* (Cambridge, 1983), Chapter 9 and, before them, the work of H. J. Hewitt). The preoccupations of the military community of northern England are considered below.

72. These retinues can sometimes be studied in detail. The basic proportions of Percy's, for example, can readily be ascertained for much of his active campaigning life (1322-23: B.L., Stowe Ms. 553 fo. 57; 1327: E372/173 m. 10; 1334-37: B.L., Cotton Ms. Nero C. VIII fos. 233, 236v, 240v, 245; 1337-38: E101/388/5 m. 13; Norwell, pp. 346, 362; 1341-42: E101/204 fos. 102, 103v; 1347: E101/25/10 mm. 5, 11). The names of the men-at-arms serving under his banner are known in large numbers for only a proportion of these expeditions: i.e. those which are illuminated by horse inventories and muster rolls (1336: E101/19/36 m. 3; 1337: E101/20/17 mm. 4, 5, 9; winter 1337-38: E101/35/3 m. 2). But lists of letters of protections offer evidence which is by no means negligible (e.g. seven protections for the Weardale campaign, sixteen for the siege of Berwick and sixteen for
expeditions to Scotland, but more significantly, they bore the brunt of border defence, whether routine garrison work or the altogether more strenuous efforts required to oppose a major invasion, as in October 1346. During the 1330s and 1340s, these northerners were on active service as often as any in the English military community, yet they took little part in military operations on the continent.73

The military outlook of the northern captains and the regular members of their retinues, hardened by the experience of decades of intermittent fighting in the border country, was well attuned to the conditions of the Scots marches. How far can this be seen in the quality of their warhorses as recorded in the horse inventories? The records from the later 1330s offer an excellent opportunity to consider this question. At first glance, there does seem to be a difference between the general level of horseflesh employed by northern retinues and that which is to be seen in the inventories of captains drawing on the manpower of other parts of England. The figures for the more substantial retinues in Table 6.8 show that the highest mean values are associated with the retinues of men whose centre of power was not in the north of England; and, indeed, that some of the lowest means are recorded for the retinues of northern magnates. The essential thrust of this evidence would appear to be that, either through inclination or the constraints of their personal

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The Roxburgh campaign: C71/11 m. 5, C71/13 mm. 28, 31; C71/14 mm. 2, 10, 11, 14, 15).

73. Thus, for example, a number of the captains serving in Edward III's army in Scotland in 1341-42 did not accompany him to Brittany the following autumn: Gilbert Umfraville (earl of Angus), Henry Percy, Thomas and Anthony Lucy, Robert Clifford, Ralph Neville (E36/204 fos. 102-4, 105v-10v). After the start of the Hundred Years War the defence of northern England was largely left to the military community of the counties north of the Trent (J. Campbell, ‘England, Scotland and the Hundred Years War in the fourteenth-century’, Europe in the late Middle Ages, ed. J. Hale, R. Highfield and B. Smalley (London, 1965), pp. 192-93). Men from this area were generally not encouraged to join continental armies, though a not insignificant number (particularly from counties not actually bordering Scotland, like Yorkshire) did pursue careers in the French war: men like Walter de Heslerton (C76/14 m. 4; C76/17 m. 27) and Sir John de Hothum (Norwell, p. 314 [40 marks horse]; E36/204 fo. 86v [£20]), both from the East Riding.
resources, the northern gentry served in the rough terrain of the borders and Scotland with rather less expensive warhorses than were normally employed by men from further afield. It is certainly true that some of the northern retinues included an unusually large proportion of low-value warhorses. Whilst 12% of all warhorses in the inventories of the 1330s were valued at less than £5, 20% of Henry de Percy's men had low-value warhorses and as many as 50% of the earl of Angus' company in 1336.\(^74\) By contrast, none of the earl of Salisbury's military retainers in 1337-38 had warhorses worth less than £5; and 17% of them are listed alongside mounts worth £20 or more (as compared with 5% of all those appearing in the inventories of the period).

The contrast should not be over-stated, however. Nearly all of the higher mean values - those in excess of £10 - are associated with the inventories for the 1337-38 campaign. Clearly it was the involvement of the earls of Salisbury, Arundel and Gloucester that was largely responsible for bringing the mean value for this army up to £10.6;\(^75\) but few 'northern' captains are included in the full inventory for this expedition, so a fair comparison is not really possible. The figure for the Percy retinue is certainly low, despite including a respectable proportion of knights (11 out of 38), but it seems that only part of his retinue is listed in the inventory and the *restauro equorum* account;\(^76\) and it is, in any case, only reasonable to expect the highest quality of horseflesh to be found in the companies of

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74. It is significant that only four of the thirty men-at-arms in Angus' retinue were of knightly status; but an adverse rank ratio is not evident in, for example, Percy's retinue.

75. Their high means are partly attributable to the fact that each of them had more than one (valuable) warhorse appraised for their own use: Salisbury (100 marks, £50, £40, 40 marks); Arundel (100 marks, £30, 40 marks, 20 marks); Gloucester (80 marks, 80 marks).

76. See Chapter V, pp. 216-17.
earls rather than in those of bannerets.\textsuperscript{77} The impression conveyed by the inventory for the 1336 expedition is, moreover, very different. The retinues of captains from outside northern England figure prominently in the horse lists, but on this occasion there is no difference between the retinue means of, for example, the earl of Cornwall, Henry de Lancaster and William de Bohun and that of Henry de Percy. The highest mean, for the earl of Oxford's retinue, is only a little higher than that for Ralph de Neville's.

The bundle of inventories for the 1337 expedition exhibit a low overall level of values: somewhat lower than that for the previous year and decidedly less than the corresponding figure for the 1337-38 inventory. At first glance, this appears to be the result of a preponderance of northern captains in the horse rolls for 1337: there are few leaders who are not from the community north of the Trent and theirs are not high value retinues.\textsuperscript{78} Yet there are reasons for believing that the means for the northern magnates in these records, and for Percy and Neville in particular, are artificially low. Although the mean for Warwick's retinue rose from 1336 to 1337, both Percy and Neville experienced a sharp fall of about £2 from their 1336 levels. The decline in values appears to be less a consequence of changing retinue composition,\textsuperscript{79} as a matter of the same men-at-arms serving with less expensive horses. Thus, of the 152 men-at-arms listed in the retinue inventories of Neville and Percy in 1337, seventy had served in the previous year. Of these, thirty-eight (54\%) brought less expensive warhorses in 1337 and nineteen (27\%) had mounts.

\textsuperscript{77} Nevertheless, several other bannerets have considerably higher figures: Badlesmere (£8.9), Talbot (9.1), Despenser (£11.4).

\textsuperscript{78} On the composition of this army, see N.B. Lewis, 'The recruitment and organisation of a contract army, May to November 1337', pp. 9 (& n. 6), 10.

\textsuperscript{79} The personnel of these two retinues were quite stable from 1336 to 1337, although larger numbers are listed in the inventories in 1337.
of identical value. Sir William de Aton, a prominent member of Percy's retinue and a veteran fighter against the Scots, was amongst those who registered a decline in warhorse value in 1337 (from 20 marks to £10). When he returned to Scotland the following winter, Aton's warhorse was assigned a higher value, £12. An improvement of this kind was shared by two thirds of those named on the three consecutive inventories of the later 1330s. In the case of Sir Ingram de Umfraville, the recovery brought the value exactly back to the level of 1336. It is easier to draw attention to this short-lived dip in horse values, than to account for it. Perhaps the men entrusted with the task of horse appraisal in 1337 were less generous than their counterparts in 1336 or 1337-38.

Clearly particular caution is required in interpreting the records prepared by the appraisers in 1337. Nevertheless, taking the collection of inventories from the later 1330s as a whole, it is clear that there was no significant difference between the level of warhorse values normally prevailing in northern magnate retinues and that for those companies originating from other parts of the realm - provided always that the captains were of comparable military status. There were, it is true, very few high-value warhorses registered against the names of members of the northern military community. Only seven out of the 304 horses appearing in the lists for Percy's and Neville's retinues had values of £15 or more. A rather larger proportion of the knightly class from the rest of England are assigned high quality horseflesh, but the numbers are still not very great. Salisbury's

80. In many cases, the decline was fairly modest (e.g. Sir Robert Bertram: 20 marks (1336), £12 (1337); Sir Edmund de Clavering: 20 marks, £10). But for some it amounted to a 50% or more fall (William fitz Henry: £10, £5; William de Foxholes: £8, 4 marks).

81. Twenty-one men figure in all three inventories. Fourteen of them show an increase in 1337-38, following a decline (or no change in value) in 1337.

82. £12; £8; £12.
retinue in 1338 is exceptional: a quarter of the eighty-nine men listed in his inventory have horses valued at £15 or over. But then Salisbury was in the best position to attract the flower of the wider chivalric community into his service - and to demand high standards of horseflesh from them. Men of the calibre of Sir Edward de Montagu, Sir Thomas de Berkeley, Sir John de Beauchamp, Sir Ralph de Ufford and Sir John de Sully, with horses valued at between 40 and 50 marks, were members of Salisbury's retinue in 1338. By contrast, none in Percy's retinue for this campaign had a horse valued at over £20, the highest values being registered for men from his own family or the Yorkshire gentry. To a degree, then, contrasts in levels of warhorse values are to be explained in terms of different patterns of recruitment. But Salisbury's 1338 retinue is an extreme case. The earl of Warwick's three horse lists from the later 1330s display very different characteristics. His recruiting net was cast quite widely - in 1337, it took in Sir John de Beauchamp and Sir Hugh le Despenser, as well as lesser men from various parts of the realm - yet only four out of 145 warhorses listed in his inventories had values of £15 or more; nearly three-quarters of them were worth less than £10 and one in ten, less than £5.

The majority of the most valuable horses in the inventories of the later 1330s were associated with men from outside the northern military community. But most of the ordinary knights and esquires listed in these rolls have more modest mounts and within this much larger group of personnel it is less easy to see any relationship between horse quality and geographical origins. Typical men-at-arms, of equivalent status, from north and south, would serve with horses of

83. For example, Sir William and Sir John de Percy (£20, £16), Sir William de Aton (£12), an unspecified knight of the Heslarton family (20 marks) and Sir Robert Bertram (£10).
similar quality. For the northerner, experienced in border fighting, the choice of a warhorse was not a matter for lengthy deliberation; and by the 1330s, it was clear to the active military community throughout England what was demanded by conditions in Scotland. Their's were essentially similar responses to the prospect of service against the Scots, but these were similar responses from very different stand-points. The differences, in character and outlook, between the northern military community and that from other parts of England are, thus, very largely concealed within a single 'Scottish' inventory. They are, however, clearly enough revealed when a broader perspective which embraces the whole corpus of extant horse rolls is taken. Sir Alexander de Hilton served under Sir Ralph Neville throughout the 1330s and John Tempest, esquire, was as consistent a military supporter of Sir Henry de Percy. Both appear in three consecutive horse inventories, their warhorses varying little in value from one roll to the next, but neither Hilton nor Tempest, nor indeed their captains, appear to have ventured further afield. Their military horizons stretched no further than the northern theatre of war. This cannot be said of many in the English military community in the mid fourteenth-century. When Laurence Basset and John de Goldesburgh followed their captain, the earl of Salisbury, from the siege of Dunbar to the Low Countries in 1338, they (along with the great majority of those who travelled from Scotland to the continent) acquired more expensive horseflesh on the way to the port of embarkation. They were choosing warhorses suitable for the expected

84. Cf. the 1310s when, as we have seen, the contrast between the warhorses brought by the men in the earl of Pembroke's army and those employed by Harcla's northern borderers is very marked (see above, pp.269-40). The experience of an individual, Sir John de Hardreshull, illustrates the change in attitude very well: he served in Scotland with a 40 marks warhorse in 1316 (E101/15/6 m. 1), but in 1336 opted for a mount valued at only 20 marks (E101/19/36 m. 1).

85. Hilton was with Neville at Halidon Hill; C71/13 m. 20.

86. Hilton: all three horses valued at 20 marks; Tempest: £8, £5, £6.

87. Valuation increases: Basset, £10 to £20; Goldesburgh, £5 to £12.
circumstances of the campaign in the same way as they had done prior to going to Scotland. A change in retinue or a rise in military status could have the effect of magnifying the increase in value. Thus, for example, when Sir John de Avenel joined Salisbury's retinue for the continental campaign, he brought a warhorse which, at £50, was worth five times the value of his mount for the recent Scottish campaign. The four-fold increase in Robert de Rouclif's horseflesh, appears to have been an accompaniment to his assumption of knighthood during the months separating service in Scotland and departure for the continent (in the retinue of the same captain).

* * * * *

88. This man (or perhaps more probably an esquire of the same name serving with a 10 mark horse in Scotland in 1338) may be he who later became captain-lieutenant of Brittany: E101/35/3 mm. 1, 2.

89. Rouclif had a £5 horse in Scotland and a £20 mount in Flanders, on both occasions serving under John de Beaumont.
vi) Conclusion

No animal is more noble than the horse, since it is by horses that princes, magnates and knights are separated from lesser people

Jordanus Ruffus

The potent symbolism of the great horse, as an expression of the status and function of the knightly class, was a commonplace feature of the art and literature of medieval England. By their association of the knights and esquires in the military community with carefully described and valued horseflesh, the inventories and restauro equorum accounts add substantial documentary weight to this imagery. But they go a good deal further than this, for through these horse descriptions and valuations the inventories provide a means of assessing the position of individuals within the knightly class. Assessment of a man's status through the quality of his warhorses depends, of course, upon knowledge of the broad patterns in the horse valuation data: the relationship between military rank, the standing of individual captains and warhorse quality; and the movements in the general level of values through the period, as well as short-term fluctuations related to the conditions of certain theatres of war. Against a background understanding of these patterns, it is possible to place the circumstances of thousands of individuals into proper perspective. A man's warhorse can be compared with both the mean value and the spread of values for a particular campaign and, indeed, with the norms for his rank and for the retinue in which he served. The value of his warhorse, combined with its other attributes, has thus become an index of his standing within the military community. Social and military status has acquired a numerical value.

Learning something about individual men-at-arms through the quality of

their warhorses is especially useful for those whose lives are but poorly illuminated by readily accessible information of other kinds - the thousands of faceless men about whom scarcely more than their names are known. There are admittedly limitations to using the horse valuation data in this way. It must be remembered that horse values were determined by teams of appraisers and that consistency of judgement, from team to team and from one campaign to the next, cannot always be relied upon. Quite apart from distortions introduced by the subjectivity of the appraisal process, it is not always certain that men were listed with warhorses of their own choosing. Whilst most fighting men would serve with their own horses, there would always be a proportion of them whose mounts were supplied by their captains; and occasionally a man can be seen taking over someone else's horse during the course of a campaign.\(^2\) Then again, we need to be clear about what a warhorse is likely to reveal about its owner. Weight of military experience was not necessarily reflected in horseflesh. It was only likely to be so, if accumulated experience was accompanied by personal enrichment and social elevation. Similarly, if in Edward II's reign it is sometimes possible to associate a certain type and standard of warhorse with a particular regional military community, by the 1330s such patterns are far less readily evident in the horse valuation data.

Though important, these limitations should be kept in proper perspective: they should not be permitted to obscure the potential of the horse valuations as a guide to a man's social standing and economic resources. The horse valuation is undoubtedly a very simple measure of wealth, but we would be unwise to under-estimate its value

\(^2\) For example, on 15 December 1324, Edmund de Duddeden took over the appraised warhorse of Sir Nicholas de Latimer, who had died on the previous day (B.L. Add. Ms. 7967 fo. 31v).
merely because of its simplicity. There are, after all, several good reasons for taking it seriously. Firstly, the existence of a relationship between a man's disposable income and the standard of his military equipment, including his horseflesh, is only to be expected; and, indeed, such a relationship forms the basis of many of the English crown's experiments in military assessment in the fourteenth-century. Secondly, though not in any sense a sophisticated source, the lack of complexity of the horse valuation data is in fact a positive advantage. The uncomplicated evidence of the inventories can be combined without difficulty with that offered by other military records (such as letters of protections and muster rolls), which can also offer (albeit less precise) indications of personal wealth and military precedence. Thirdly, the inventory evidence has a very wide coverage. A simple guide to wealth is offered for a very large number of men over a period of three reigns: a weight of evidence which stands in striking contrast with that which is to be derived from more conventional sources. The availability, for example, of manorial account rolls and rentals for gentry property is at best patchy; for some parts of England they are very scarce. Inquisitions post mortem, though more plentiful, are a much less reliable guide to economic resources. Their coverage, moreover, is largely confined to

3. For examples from the early 1320s and mid 1340s, see Powicke, Military obligation in medieval England, pp. 149, 196.

4. For example, Gloucestershire: Saul, Knights and esquires, pp. 205-6. Some small collections of accounts have received detailed attention: see for example, Saul, Scenes from provincial life, chapter IV (east Sussex); R.H. Britnell, 'Production for the market on a small fourteenth-century estate', Ec.H.R., 2nd ser., xii (1966), pp. 380-87 (Essex).

5. Saul, Knights and esquires, pp. 206-8 (which also considers the limitations of fiscal records); C.D. Ross and T.B. Pugh, 'Materials for the study of baronial incomes in fifteenth-century England', Ec.H.R., 2nd ser., vi (1953-4), pp. 186-89. Probably more reliable are the property details recorded during the course of distraint of knighthood proceedings in the Exchequer, for in these cases are supplied two views of an individual's property: the testimony of the landholder himself and the judgement of a local jury (for a discussion of procedure, see Powicke, Military obligation in medieval England, pp. 177-78). These depositions and inquisitions are to be found in the K. R. Memoranda rolls (E159), Recorda. Original files have survived for a few cases: e.g. E198/4/1 (Robert de Vere, 1357); E199/34/14 (Robert de Sallowe, 1344-47). The main drawback with distraint proceedings records is their lack of bulk. For example, about 150 names are included in the original sheriffs returns for the 1333 distraint (E198/3/18; C47/1/19), but only in a minority of cases did individuals
the property of tenants in chief. Therefore, the inquisitions post mortem can throw light on only a part of the English landholding community. The evidence of the inventories is wholly free from such in-built bias. It illuminates all levels of the chivalric class, from earls to the humblest of esquires, and by virtue of the relative precision of the horse valuations the subtle contours of the military community are brought into view. Of the knights, the wealthier can be readily distinguished from the less affluent. Esquires, apparently possessed of the resources for knighthood, stand out starkly amongst men of more modest wealth. Precedence within families is also reflected in horse values. In 1336, Henry de Cresswell senior had an £8 horse and his son, Henry, a mount valued at 10 marks. At a rather higher level of the military community, Sir Thomas de Poynings served with a £20 warhorse, whilst his son, Sir Michael, had a 20 mark steed.

The usefulness of horse valuations as a guide to the status and wealth of individual men-at-arms is perhaps most evident when it is possible to perceive changes over time: when a man's campaigning life is illuminated by a sequence of warhorse values. By setting an

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7. N. Denholm-Young drew attention to a group of rolls of arms dating from the 1330s, suggesting that they represented 'a Who's Who for 1334-5, or a Peerage, Baronage, and Knightage of England on the eve of the Hundred Years War' (The country gentry in the fourteenth-century (Oxford, 1969), p. 96). Although an extremely valuable source, they reveal nothing of men below the rank of knight.

8. E101/19/36 m. 7; B.L., Cotton Ms., Nero C. VIII fo. 280v.

9. The inventory (E101/19/36 m. 1) refers to both men as Thomas, but this is clearly a mistake (cf. a protection request bill: C81/1723 m. 17). In the War of Saint-Sardos, Thomas and Michael Poynings had served with warhorses separated in value by only a few shillings (E101/13/35). The size of the differential between father and son was usually greater than this. In the winter of 1337-38, Maurice Berkeley's £10 mount was much less valuable than either that ridden by his father (Sir Thomas Berkeley: 40 marks) or that supplied to his father's banner bearer (24 marks): E101/35/3 m. 2d.
individual within the context of the collective experience of the military community, it is possible to assess whether his career in arms has developed in a conventional way. Significant changes in status and/or wealth usually found expression in appropriate choices of horseflesh. Most obviously this occurred when men become knights or bannerets: Richard Blundell's exchange of a 10 marks $equus$ for a £20 courser as an accompaniment to the receipt of knighthood is but one of many examples of this.\(^\text{10}\) And, as we have seen, it could sometimes occur when men entered the service of a prominent captain. The valuation data can act, therefore, as a barometer for the measurement of shifts in status; but they are also a means of observing the responses of individuals to changes in campaigning conditions. For large numbers of men, it is possible to see how horseflesh quality was influenced by the prospect of service in different theatres of war or by the general developments in fighting methods which formed part of the Edwardian military revolution. For many military enterprises, fairly consistent patterns of behaviour can be detected; most men responded in an essentially similar way to the prospect of a particular campaign. Yet there were always some who appear to be swimming against the current. Whilst there are dangers in focusing too much attention on this minority group (it would be all too easy to blur the main thrust of the evidence), it is with such men as these that the horse valuations really come into their own as a guide to a man's fortunes. It might be the force of individual career development which has served to override the normal trend of the period. Whilst the general level of horse values for the 1342-43 campaign was rather lower than had prevailed in 1338-39, the value of Sir Michael Poynings' warhorse in Brittany was double that of his previous steed (£20 to £40); but this was only fitting for a man who

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\(^{10}\) E101/35/3 m. 3 (1337-38); E36/204 fo. 87 (1342-43).
had become a banneret, a leader of a company in the king's army - and the head of an important Sussex gentry family.\textsuperscript{11} Then there are those cases where an individual's warhorse values remained stable, or even dropped a little, at the start of the Hundred Years War, instead of following the normal trend of significant increase.\textsuperscript{12} Sometimes, no doubt, such cases can be explained in terms of a temporary cash-flow crisis or a more permanent contraction of disposable resources, for such were familiar problems for the medieval gentry.\textsuperscript{13} For some men, the cost of previous periods of military service (including the cost of replacing warhorses for which compensation was either not due or very slow in coming) will have restricted their purchasing power. Indeed, bearing in mind these costs, it is not difficult to see why war veterans are often to be found with horseflesh of very ordinary quality. But then, men with campaigning experience were the most likely to perceive at an early stage the full implications of current developments in fighting methods: developments which by the time of the treaty of Brétigny had contributed so decisively to a general decline in the quality of warhorses employed by English armies.

Perhaps Richard de Totesham was influenced by such considerations when he selected an unexceptional 10 mark warhorse for the Breton campaign of 1342-43 - a horse of identical value to that with which he had served in Scotland in 1336.\textsuperscript{14} Unfortunately we will never know.

\textsuperscript{11} Saul, \textit{Scenes from provincial life}, p. 37.

\textsuperscript{12} For example, William de Lacy and Roger Darcy both served in Scotland and the Low Countries with horses of similar value, but took a cheaper mount to Brittany in 1342. Roger Dallingridge had a 10 mark mount in 1336, but one valued at only £5 for the continental campaign of 1338-39.

\textsuperscript{13} Saul, \textit{Scenes from provincial life}, pp. 181-84; idem., 'A "rising" lord and a "declining" esquire: Sir Thomas de Berkeley III and Geoffrey Gascelyn of Sheldon', \textit{Historical Research}, lx (1988), pp 345-56. The lack of horse inventories during the last quarter of the fourteenth-century prevents us from seeing how far falling agricultural prices (q.v. J. Hatcher, \textit{Plague, population and the English economy, 1348-1530} (London, 1977), p. 50 - and sources cited there) found expression in the employment of cheaper horseflesh by a landholding community who were feeling the pinch.

\textsuperscript{14} E36/204 fo. 86v; E101/19/36 m. 5.
Rarely, indeed, are we be able to uncover with absolute certainty the circumstances lying behind a particular pattern of warhorse valuations. But by examining changes in an individual's horse values it may be possible to catch a glimpse of the life of an otherwise faceless man: to see something of his predicament and perhaps to gain a fleeting insight into his attitudes to military service. Little or nothing may be known from other sources of his status in the military community - and certainly nothing of his views concerning the military developments of the time - but through the careful description and valuing of his warhorses he acquires a few distinctive characteristics which help to make him an individual amidst the crowd of men-at-arms serving in Edwardian armies.
## Appendix 1

### The Scottish campaign, 1336

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Captain</th>
<th>Pay(^1) commenced</th>
<th>No.(^1) men-at-arms</th>
<th>Date of(^2) inventory</th>
<th>No. m/s(^2) listed</th>
<th>Horses(^3) lost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Henry of Lancaster</td>
<td>1 May</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1 May</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earl of Warwick</td>
<td>1 May</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>1 May</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earl of Oxford</td>
<td>13 May</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>12 May</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earl of Angus</td>
<td>14 May</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>14 May</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earl of Buchan</td>
<td>17 May</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>17 May</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sir Henry de Percy, bnt.</td>
<td>14 May</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>14 May</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sir Ralph de Neville, bnt.</td>
<td>14 May</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>? May</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sir Giles de Badelesmere, bnt.</td>
<td>4 May</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>4 May</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sir John de Segrave, bnt.</td>
<td>14 May</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>14 May</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sir Thomas de Utchet, bnt.</td>
<td>9/17 May</td>
<td>12/15</td>
<td>17 May</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sir Ranulph de Dacre, bnt.</td>
<td>21 May</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>no inventory</td>
<td>no inventory</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sir Bartholomew de Favacourt, knt.</td>
<td>1 May</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>no inventory</td>
<td>no inventory</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sir John de Tibetot, bnt.</td>
<td>5 May</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>4 June</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sir William de Bobun, bnt.</td>
<td>1 May</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John de Houton</td>
<td>9 April</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>13 May</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert Tong</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Earl of Cornwall                 | 28 July              | 85                     | 8 Sept                   | 62                    | -                 |
| Sir Geoffrey de Mortimer, bnt.   | 16 Aug               | 7                      | restauro equorum only    | 2                     |

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1. Based on *vadia guerra* accounts, B.L., Cotton Ms., Nero C. VIII fos. 240-44, except in the case of the retinues of Percy and Neville, which draw on the more detailed pay accounts included in E101/19/36 mm. 3, 4d. Neville’s fifty men-at-arms include a company of twenty which were about to leave to join Percy’s retinue (under the terms of an indenture of retinue; see Bean, *From lord to patron*, p. 57). Robert Tong’s company cannot be traced in the pay roll, yet he appears under a separate heading in the bundle of inventories.

2. Based on the bundles of inventories: E101/19/36. Most of the retinue inventories are separately dated. Neville’s inventory contains a number of mid-campaign additions; Tibetot’s lists only fifteen men-at-arms, but also the names of twelve horse archers providing the service of four men-at-arms.

3. Figures based upon inventory annotations and the *restauro equorum* account (B.L., Cotton Ms., Nero C. VIII fos. 280v-82).
Appendix 2

THE BRETON CAMPAIGN, 1342-43

What was the size of Edward III's army in Brittany in 1342-43? With an apparently complete and detailed vadis guerre account available for this campaign, calculating the basic proportions of the three separate expeditionary forces appears to be a straightforward task.

According to this payroll, Sir Walter de Mauny's force, serving from mid March until early July 1342, consisted of about 340 men (133 men-at-arms and 210 horse archers); the earl of Northampton's, in pay from late July, amounted to about 750 (403 men-at-arms, 336 horse archers, 10 foot archers), of whom rather fewer than 650 received pay until the end of the campaign; and Edward III's, which arrived in Brittany in the autumn, comprised about 4,500 (1,373 men-at-arms, 1,412 horse archers and 1,714 foot soldiers). These figures are misleading in a number of respects, however. The king landed in Brittany in late October, but parts of his army, though receiving pay (and therefore included in the manpower totals stated above), may not have arrived until much later - if indeed they arrived at all.

1. In the book of accounts of William Edington, Keeper of the Wardrobe: E36/204 fos. 105v-10v. Several historians have used these vadis guerre accounts to estimate the size of the English forces in Brittany in 1342-43. According A.E. Prince there were 1,820 men-at-arms, 1,890 horse archers and 1,150 foot archers serving from September 1342 ('The strength of English armies in the reign of Edward III', p. 363). Michael Prestwich estimated that there were 2,000 men-at-arms, 1,780 horse archers, 1,750 infantry 'in Brittany in the autumn of 1342' ('English armies in the early stages of the Hundred Years War: a scheme in 1341', p. 109), whilst Michael Jones calculated that 'Edward arrived with some 2,000 men-at-arms, 1,780 horse archers and 1,650 infantry in late October ...' ('Edward III's captains in Brittany' p. 107).

2. Twenty-eight of these served only from 15 May to 30 June: E36/204 fo. 105v.

3. Of these, 184 are in fact described as hominum armatorum et sagittariorum equitum: ibid., fo. 108v.

4. The earl of Devon's retinue (56 men-at-arms and 60 archers) left the king's pay in early November: ibid., fos. 107v, 110v.

5. Plus about 272 paid non-combatants, twenty of whom - Robert Werinton's company of twenty carpenters and engineers - did not start to receive pay until December. The earl of Oxford's retinue (35 men-at-arms and 24 horse archers) left the king's pay on 21 November (ibid., fo. 105v). Geoffrey le Baker states that Oxford was one of Northampton's lieutenants (Le Baker, p. 76), but this is not supported by other chroniclers (e.g. Murimuth, p. 125). The payroll indicates that he did not begin to receive the king's pay until 2 September and letters of protection were still being issued to members of his retinue as late as mid October (C76/17 m. 19).
earl of Gloucester, who received pay from 8 September for a retinue consisting of 106 men-at-arms and 80 horse archers, can be seen, from other records, to have still been in Plymouth on 15 November. Similar doubts surround the service of other, even more substantial sections of Edward III's army. It is clear from the *vadia guerre* accounts that the great majority of the archers and foot soldiers serving in separately recruited companies had left the king's pay by Christmas: about 800 men as early as mid November (only about three weeks after Edward III left Portsmouth for Brittany) and nearly 1,000 more in mid December. At best, then, these men served for only a short period in Brittany and there are good reasons for thinking that a proportion of them may not have reached the duchy at all. A company of 600 'Welshmen' under the command of Edmund Hakelut was forced by 'the fury of the sea' to abandon the journey to Brittany and land in the Isles of Scilly. Hakelut himself is not mentioned in Edington's *vadia guerre* account (although he is to be seen elsewhere drawing pay in September 1342 for a company of Welshmen intended for Brittany), but a company of 400 Welshmen, led by Kenric Duy, which is to be found in the account, may have formed part of Hakelut's command. A quite separate pay roll, that of John de Kermond, includes 350 English and Welsh archers assembled at Plymouth for the voyage to Brittany. Kermond's account covers no more than a short period in November 1342 and it is clear from an indenture attached to it that these archers, like the earl of Gloucester's retinue, were still in Plymouth as late

6. Ibid., fos. 106, 108v. Gloucester was party to two indentures dated Plymouth, 8 and 15 November (indentures attached to a set of accounts: E101/23/22). An expenses account for the men sent to appraise Gloucester's warhorses at Plymouth shows that they did not complete their task until 12 November (E101/23/36). The fact that Gloucester's retinue does not appear in the *restauro equorum* accounts may suggest that it took little or no part in the campaign.


8. E403/326 m. 30.

as the 15 November.\textsuperscript{10} Once again it is difficult to identify these men in Edington's \textit{vadia guerre} account. Only two of the company commanders figure in both pay rolls, Kenric Duy and William de Burton, and in both cases they have been assigned far more men in Edington's account than they have in Kermond's.

Edington's \textit{vadia guerre} account seems to be a most imperfect guide to the proportions of the army which actually served with Edward III in Brittany. Many of those receiving the king's pay can have spent very little time in the duchy and some at least may not to have left England at all. On the other hand there appear to have been companies which, though not discernible in Edington's account, did take part in the campaign.\textsuperscript{11} The impression of completeness conveyed by Edington's \textit{vadia guerre} account is particularly misleading where the earl of Northampton's expeditionary force is concerned. Two sizeable retinues which are known to have left England with Northampton's army during the summer of 1342 are not included in the pay roll: those of Robert d'Artois, who probably brought about 120 men-at-arms and 120 archers, for whose wages he was granted an assignment of 158 sacks of wool; and William de Kildesby, who was assigned 85 sacks and 3 quarterons of wool for the service of 10 knights, 39 esquires and 100 archers.\textsuperscript{12}

\textsuperscript{10} E101/23/22. The four companies of English archers (comprising a little less than half of the total) were paid for only seven days and appear to have left the king's service on 11 November whilst still at Plymouth. The Welshmen served for a few days beyond 15 November.

\textsuperscript{11} Madoc ap Houell (with sixty-five Welshmen), and Hugh de Woverham (with nineteen other archers) were issued with pay in May 1343 for earlier service in Brittany: E403/328 m. 10.

\textsuperscript{12} \textit{C.C.R.}, 1341-43, pp. 564, 569. \textit{C.P.R.}, 1340-43, p. 415. Protections (and appointment of attorneys) for fourteen of Artois' men and nine of Kildesby are to be found on the Treaty roll for 16 Edward III (C76/17 m. 8, 29, 36, 37, 38). Some of Artois' protection requests have survived: C81/1719, mm. 19-25. Kildesby is named by the chroniclers as one of Northampton's lieutenants (\textit{Le Baker}, p. 76; \textit{Murimuth}, p. 125). The absence of both Artois and Kildesby from the \textit{restauro equorum} account in Edington's Wardrobe Book (E36/204 fos. 86v-88) is only to be expected, given their absence from the \textit{vadia guerre} account. It is unlikely that their men's warhorses were appraised. Less easy to explain is the omission from the \textit{restauro equorum} account of several other large retinues which do appear on Edington's pay roll (e.g. those of the earls of Oxford, Pembroke and Gloucester and Sir Ralph Stafford). It is possible, though unlikely, that they came through the campaign completely unscathed.
Taking Artois' and Kildesby's retinues into account, Northampton's expeditionary force at the time of the battle of Morlaix may have numbered about 1,100 men, consisting of roughly equal numbers of men-at-arms and archers.\(^{13}\) Computing the size of Edward III's army on, say, Christmas Day 1342 is more problematic. After allowing for the departure (or non arrival) of significant numbers of men in November and December, the balance of evidence suggests that Edward may have had with him as many as 3,600 - 3,700 men (with men-at-arms and archers in just about equal proportions) receiving pay from various sources.\(^{14}\)

These manpower totals do not attempt to take account of those who were performing service in return for charters of pardon: men who, for this campaign, served 'at their own expense' and who, therefore, should not have been included in the pay roll personnel numbers.\(^{15}\) Nor have our manpower estimates made any allowance for the effects of campaign casualties, deserters and authorised withdrawals. The *vacaciones* (i.e. numbers of men absent for specified numbers of days) which are included in Edington's *vadia guerre* account have been ignored. They are quite clearly nothing more than accounting devices: a means of

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14. Excluded from this figure are all the retinues and archer companies which left the king's pay before Christmas Day. Included in it are the retinues of the earl of Gloucester (who is assumed to have arrived in Brittany by this date), Robert d' Artois and William de Kildesby. The inclusion of Artois' retinue is particularly conjectural, for he died in November (E. Déprez, 'La mort de Robert d'Artois', *Revue Historique*, xciv (1907), pp. 63-66) and we cannot be sure whether his men stayed in the king' service. One of them, the banneret Sir John de Hardreshull (C76/17 mm. 16, 18, 37), certainly did, for he (together with a company of three knights, eight esquires and six horse archers) was taken into the king's pay on 13 November. On 25 January, prior to the king's departure from the duchy, Hardreshull and Eon de la Roche, lord of Lohéac were appointed joint captain-lieutenants in Brittany. Hardreshull served with a slightly augmented company until his capture at Quimper on 28 April 1344. E372/188 m. 55; for Hardreshull's career, see Jones, 'Edward III's captains in Brittany'.

15. See above, pp. 181-83. Several hundred charters of pardon arising from this campaign are enrolled on the Treaty rolls (C76/17 & 18), but there is also a separate, fragmentary pardon roll (C67/28A).
ensuring that a retinue's stated number of personnel (itself a product of a certain amount of clerical manipulation) matches the total pay due to its captain. Neither actual losses nor indeed the precise size of retinues at various stages of the campaign can be recovered from the summarised personnel figures offered by the pay rolls.

The figures presented in Table A (the 'Total paid' columns), taken directly from Edington's *vadia guerre* account, need to be viewed in this light. They do not purport to represent retinue-level manpower numbers for any single point in the campaign. But they probably indicate the right order of magnitude for the campaign as a whole and offer, therefore, a reasonable measure of overall numbers of men-at-arms against which can be compared the numbers for whom protections were issued and the numbers who lost warhorses during the campaign.

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16. See above, pp. 190-94.

17. The table is concerned only with men-at-arms. All of the larger retinues are included; also, the smaller companies led by 'fighting' knights (i.e. excluding clerks of knightly rank).
## Table A

The Breton campaign, 1342-43.

Numbers of men-at-arms:

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<th>Captain</th>
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<th>bnts.</th>
<th>seqs.</th>
<th>total</th>
<th>Total paid</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>- with</th>
<th>- with</th>
<th>- losing</th>
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### First expedition, spring 1342

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<th>Total</th>
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<th>- losing</th>
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### Third expedition, autumn 1342

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1. Included in Mauny's retinue numbers are four men-at-arms who served with Sir Walter Wettewang. It is assumed that Mauny's section of the *restauro equorum* account, which lists 24 equestrian fatalities, is concerned with losses suffered by his retinue during the winter of 1342-43 following his return to Brittany in the king's expedition. Four of the 24 men who lost horses have letters of protections and all were issued in October 1342.

2. Clerks serving with the rank of banneret.
## Appendix 3

### THE RHEIMS CAMPAIGN, 1359-60

#### Table A: Horse losses

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1. Hale’s *restauro equorum* payment, 1000 marks, has the appearance of a lump sum rather than a true reflection of appraised values; cf. Sir William de Grannson, who received exactly £600 for an unspecified number of equestrian casualties. E101/393/11 fo. 86v.

2. Farley’s accounts include a second entry for the earl of Warwick, for service as king’s lieutenant in Normandy, May - September 1360: ibid. fo. 87. During this spell of duty his men lost three horses with a mean value of £15.78. He was paid for the re-passage of 203 horses.
Horse transportation: passage and re-passage payments

The *vadia guerre* accounts for the Rheims campaign include, for the typical captain, the composition of his retinue and the amounts of pay, *regard* and *restauro equorum* due. But, in addition, sums are allocated for the passage and re-passage of his retinue's horses, and in the process what appear to be exact numbers of horses taken to France in the autumn of 1359 and returning from Calais the following spring are given.¹ In this way, the Crown can be seen to have paid for the passage of 4,471 horses and the re-passage of 10,861. Bearing in mind that an army coming from England, which included about 3,750 men-at-arms and 5,500 mounted archers, would need over 17,000 horses,² the figures included in Farley's Wardrobe Book seem wholly inadequate. King Edward's army appears to have arrived in France with a serious deficiency of horseflesh.

How is this apparent shortfall to be explained? Was there a shortage of warhorses in England in the autumn of 1359? If so, many men would have had to acquire suitable horses in France, either by purchase³ or as booty, and although allowing for losses during the campaign (1,203 horses) and the sale of animals before leaving France, a significantly larger number would remain to be brought home, no doubt to the benefit of domestic breeding stock. Attractive as the horse-shortage theory

¹. E101/393/11 fos. 79-116v. These horse shipment figures have been quoted before, though for selected captains only: Hewitt, *The organisation of war under Edward III*, p. 88, who takes them to be 'the actual numbers of horses transported'. Cf. Hewitt, *The horse in medieval England*, pp. 73-74.

². This estimate is based on the normal shipment allowances (see above, p. 66) and assumes only one horse for each mounted archer. It also takes no account of package animals, although we know that this army was supported by a substantial supply train (see *Jean le Bel*, ii, pp. 312-13) *A pontis*, costing £55 8s., was built near Calais to facilitate disembarkation of the king's great army (E101/174/7 fo. 14).

might be, it can provide no more than a partial explanation. In fact, it does not really fit the evidence: a national shortage of warhorses would give rise to a pattern of figures very different from that recorded in Farley's Wardrobe Book. Of nearly four hundred companies led by English captains, only twenty-five were paid for the passage of horses in 1359. If we are to take the accounts at face value, therefore, the vast majority of retinues, including some of the largest, brought no horses at all to France. A great captain would certainly never arrive at a port of embarkation with a wholly un-horsed retinue; but, if faced by an insufficient supply of shipping, he might be obliged to leave some or all of his horses in England.

Shortages of horse transports, rather than warhorses, are known to have hindered many an English expedition in the fourteenth-century. In 1352, for example, many of the warhorses of the earl of Stafford's retinue were left in England because insufficient shipping had been assembled. Bearing in mind the size of Edward III's army in 1359, it is hardly surprising that the assembly of a sufficiently large transport fleet should present a severe administrative problem; and, indeed, Sir Thomas Gray, a member of the Prince of Wales' retinue,

4. The Prince of Wales may not have had as many good horses with him as would have liked. He was buying horses at the very last minute before leaving for France (see above p. 293 n. 58); and in addition, he bought a horse costing 80 marks from one of his knights, Sir John de Hide, during the campaign (B.P. Reg., iv, p. 355).

5. Ranging from the Prince of Wales, who was paid for the passage of 1,369 horses, to Robert Alein, who accounted for only one: E101/393/11 fos. 79, 111. See Table B, below.

6. Eight captains received payment for the re-passage of over a hundred horses, but nothing for the outward journey.


8. In the summer of 1338 a total of 361 ships (crewed by over 12,500 men) were mobilised for the transportation of an English army consisting of perhaps 5,000 men, about a third of whom were foot soldiers (Norwell, p. ciii; Prince, 'The strength of English armies', p. 361). By comparison, in 1359 nearly 11,000 Englishmen (the majority of whom were mounted) travelled to France with Edward III.
confirms that this was the case.\textsuperscript{9} But the shipping shortage was not as severe as Farley's accounts might lead us to believe; they cannot be taken at face value.\textsuperscript{10} In the normal course of events, captains did not receive allowances for the passage of their retinues. This was because the organisation of transport fleets - consisting, in the main, of privately-owned merchant vessels drawn temporarily into the king's service from a multitude of coastal communities around the shores of England - was the responsibility of the Crown.\textsuperscript{11} Indeed, it was only when royal administration was unable to organise sufficient shipping that it was necessary for individual retinue commanders to arrange their own transportation; and, for doing this, they received appropriate compensation from the Crown. Thus, the passage and re-passage payments in Farley's accounts were intended to cover the transport costs of those horses which had not been carried by the fleet mobilised and paid directly by royal administration. If any of Edward III's captains experienced difficulty getting their retinue's horses to Calais in the late autumn of 1359 it would, therefore, most probably have been those who received 'passage' payments! As it was always difficult to arrange shipping to transport armies back to England, it should be no surprise to find that Farley's accounts allow

\textsuperscript{9} The king 'was grievously delayed for want of ships, wherefore he could neither land [his forces] all at once nor at the place he intended': \textit{Scalacronica}, p. 145.

\textsuperscript{10} To do so would lead to difficulties. The duke of Lancaster (who was paid re-passage for 1,611 horses brought back to England in May 1360) received nothing for the conveyance of his retinue's mounts to Calais (E101/393/11 fo. 79v). Yet within a few days of arriving he had set off on a chevauchée through Artois and Picardy (Fowler, \textit{The king's lieutenant}, p. 201). The overall totals of horses transported would suggest the availability of more than twice as many ships for the return passage in the spring of 1360, as compared with the previous autumn, which is highly unlikely.

substantial re-passage payments for many captains in the army. 12 The horse-shipment figures in Farley’s accounts provide, therefore, a guide not so much to a domestic shortage of horses in mid-fourteenth century England as to the severe administrative problems posed by the transport needs of overseas expeditions.

12. 326 captains (the great majority of those coming from England) received re-passage payments (E101/393/11 fo. 79-116v). A useful comparison can be made with the return of Edward III’s army at the end of the Cambrésis-Thiérache campaign, in January and February 1340. A section of William de Norwell’s Wardrobe Book gives details of the amounts due to individual captains for the transportation of their horses from Sluys back to England (Norwell, pp. 386-92). The system employed on this occasion (more rigidly structured than that in 1359-60) is discussed in B. Lyon’s ‘Introduction’ to Norwell, pp. civ-cv.
### TABLE B: Horse transportation - passage figures

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I. MANUSCRIPT SOURCES

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