An Analysis of the Process of Association Between Turkey and the European Community in the Context of European Integration and Cooperation

being a thesis submitted for the Degree of

PhD

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by

Tunc Aybak, B.A.

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In memory of my father,
and for my son Joseph Aydin.
'Turkey is part of Europe: today this means that Turkey is establishing a constitutional relationship with the European Community. Like the Community itself, that relationship is imbued with the concept of revolution.'

Ankara, September 1963.
The President of the Commission of the European Communities.
The Speech of Walter Hallstein at the signing of the Association Treaty.

'Our task is to less reassure ourselves of our common origins in the European Middle Ages than to develop a new political self-confidence commensurate with the role of Europe in the world of twenty-first century. Hitherto, world history has accorded the empires have come and gone but one appearance on the stage. This is not only true of the rising and falling empires in the Old World, but also for modern states like Portugal and Spain, England, France and Russia. It now appears as if Europe as a whole is being given a second chance. It will not be able to make use of this in terms of the power politics of yester-year, but only under changed premises, namely a non-imperial process of reaching understanding with and learning from other cultures.'

Jurgen Habermas
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Writing a Ph.D. is a lengthy process. It has been even lengthier in my case. However, I owe my explanation to Albert Camus who said 'What prevents a work from being completed becomes the work itself.' In my case my own identity on the face of my subject matter - European integration and Turkey - became the work itself during the development of my thesis. I came to Britain soon after Turkey applied for full membership. In the beginning of the late 1990s, there was optimism and hope for a free, united and peaceful Europe. Now, in February 1995, while I am about to submit my dissertation, I feel that that optimism is fading away on the face of ethnic and national prejudice, authoritarianism and despotism and narrow-minded religious fundamentalism. I came to Britain as a Pan-European enthusiast and today my convictions are even stronger. This research enabled me to meet and understand the actions and thoughts of those similar-minded people who believe in the common future of united, peaceful and just Pan-Europe of all religions, nationalities and ethnic groups living under one roof, free from ethnic and national violence and state oppression - a Pan-European civil society.

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Finally for the skill and speed with which she typed the final draft, I wish to express special thanks to Sue Wiles.

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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION

This study is an attempt to analyze the Association process between Turkey and the European Community (the EC). In other words, it is a process of interaction between two actors within an institutionalized and formal association system. One is a state and the other is a sui generis organization with supranational characteristics.

The main assumption of this thesis is that the Association link between the EC and Turkey acts as a framework of modernization for Turkey in its structural adjustment to the European integration project. In this context, it is suggested that Association patterns fulfil important roles in the transformation of Europe, provided that Associations are of a progressive character (cooperation towards integration) rather than being permanent frameworks in the relationship which institutionalize highly asymmetrical relationships between the advanced core and the periphery of Europe. In this sense Turkey's Association, as a pattern of cooperation, is relevant to European integration project. However, before we define our concepts and operationalize our theoretical models to analyze Turkey's Association process, it is necessary to review the relevant theoretical literature which will provide us with conceptual tools to put the phenomenon into its context. Our review of relevant background literature is by no means exhaustive. Later in this chapter we will introduce theoretical concepts, definitions, perspectives and methods that help us to give meaning to our findings and to shape and direct our arguments in the course of our research effort, in order to analyze Turkey's Association process within the context of European integration and cooperation.

I Challenges of the Modern World: Realism versus Pluralism

The State is still at the centre of the analysis of international relations. Given the power and importance of the States as organized political units, it is not surprising that for most of this century the state-centric realist paradigm has been an influential perspective for
the students of international relations. On the other hand, the process of modernization and globalization rendered the state-centric realist paradigm inadequate to explain and describe emerging political and economic structures, processes, actors and dynamics in the contemporary international system. Indeed, there is a qualitative difference between the world of the early twentieth century and the post-war international system. As a result of the growth of scientific technology and the dramatic improvements in transportation and communication, we have come to live in a constantly 'shrinking world' which is reflected in the rapid movement and interdependence of goods, ideas, services and people. This fundamental transformation can be best understood by the concept of 'modernization'. Modernization is defined as the social, political and economic consequences of industrialization and technological developments as well as the prerequisites for the progress and democratization.¹ It was this fundamental transformation that has brought realism under the criticism of scholars and has led to a new paradigm called 'pluralism'.

Before we deal with the critics of realism it is necessary to outline its core premises. However this cannot be done without risking oversimplification. It is impossible to summarize 'realism' since it has developed a long tradition from Thucydides, Hobbes, Machiavelli, Clausewitz through to the modern intellectual precursors Morgenthau and Kissinger et al.² Even though there are important differences among the realist writers its ideological frame of reference is basically conservative. It emphasizes the virtues of continuity rather than change and reform in the international system.³

The core assumptions of realist political theory are the following: the most important actor, as a basic unit of analysis, is the sovereign state, which is regarded as a unitary,

² For an overview of the realist tradition, see for instance, Smith, M.J., 'Realist Thought from Weber to Kissinger'. London; Louisiana University Press, 1986.
³ See for instance for the inherent characteristics in realist thinking and its impact on politicians and diplomats since the Second World War, Rothstein, R.L. 'On the costs of realism Political Science Quarterly LXXXVII (3) 1972 pp.347-362.
coherent and independent entity.\textsuperscript{4} States are treated in a fashion that they are not subject to any higher authority and thus pursue 'power' in a world of 'international anarchy'.\textsuperscript{5} States exercise ultimate legal authority within their territory and the use of military force both within and beyond their territory. Finally, military and political issues are dominant issues in international agenda and all other issues - ranging from trade to human rights - are regarded as secondary. Essentially, realists conceive of international relations as a struggle for power and security among the states. Therefore the realist emphasis is on the conflict and competition among the sovereign states rather than collaboration and cooperation.

Following these above assumptions, it seems difficult to apply the realist image to the advanced regions of the world where cooperation and collaboration are the usual conduct between the states who possess pluralistic structures. Even though military conflict is absent, this does not necessarily mean there is a lack of competition and conflict in a non-coercive fashion. But even the existence of non-military competition and non-coercive competition in pluralistic structures does not seem to verify the core premises of the realist paradigm, in analysing the pluralistic political patterns of the modern world politics.

First of all, it is not any longer, a valid assumption to suggest that the State is the only and most important actor in world politics. Pluralists have also disputed this aspect of the state-centric approach of the realists. Burton, for instance, contrasted the realist model of the international system which presents states as 'billiard balls' with clearly defined borders and in collision with one another, with what he called 'the cobweb model' which is descriptively a more accurate image of the world society. In his opinion, the cobweb model captures better the multitude of political, economic, social and technology interactions between the non-state actors as well as states. In addition to the state boundaries, there are also functional boundaries that are determined by functional ties of international interactions and

organizations. The pluralist model introduced a much more complex system which also includes the interactions and the behaviours of the non-state actors such as supranational and international organizations, subnational actors, banks, terrorist organizations, multinationals.

The process of modernization has also changed the character of the foreign policy of the states. Morse, for instance, argued: firstly modernization has broken down the ideal and classical distinctions between domestic and foreign policy; secondly it has changed the balance between 'high policies' (those associated with security and the continued existence of the state) and 'low policies' (those pertaining to the wealth and welfare of the citizens) in favour of the latter. Finally, modernization reduced the level of control that any state can exercise in the domestic and international arena.

More importantly pluralists questioned the use of force as a usable and effective instrument of policy. In their significant book, Keohane and Nye challenged the core assumptions of Realist thinking. While accepting the continued importance of the states they argued that increasingly it was international and transnational actors who set the international agenda. Increasing complexity in international relations means that power cannot be aggregated but must be understood as being distributed across a range of issue-areas. Moreover, increasing complexity is paralleled with the growth of interdependence such that military force is no longer an effective policy instrument in securing ends. Therefore, contrary to Realist thinking, military force becomes both a less effective and less viable means of obtaining the desired outcomes.

Keohane and Nye offered a competing model with the realist image which they call 'complex interdependence' which assumes three basic features. First there are 'multiple

7 See for instance, for 'mixed actor systems' Young, Oran 'The Actors in world politics' in Rosenau, Davis V. and East, M. The Analysis of International Politics London: Collier Macmillan 1972.
8 Morse, E.L. 'The Transformation of Foreign Policies: Modernization, interdependence and externalization' World Politics vol. XXII, no.3 pp.371-392.
channels of communications' between societies which include formal and informal links between various actors, both official and unofficial. Second, there is 'an absence of hierarchy among issues' which means that foreign policy issues are not arranged in an organized way with security issues on the top of the international agenda. Third, there is a diminished 'minor role for military force'. As a result of interdependencies in various issue areas among the states and the societies, the use of force has become a costly and unnecessary policy instrument. However as Keohane and Nye put it 'both complex interdependence and the realist portrait are ideal types. Most situations fall somewhere between these two extremes. But frequently complex interdependence will provide a better portrayal of reality.'

Pluralism also contested the realist assumption that the states are monolithic, unitary and coherent entities. They have disaggregated the decision making of the state and broken it into its component units such as interest groups, governmental and non-governmental elites, bureaucrats and the role of public opinion which is also important in the formation of foreign policies of modern democratic states. Furthermore, Allison, for instance applied three different models to US policymaking in the Cuban Missile crisis; the rational actor model, organizational processes and bureaucratic politics model. He questioned the rational actor model, but he did not deny the usefulness of it. He suggested that two latter models reflecting pluralist perspectives, raise questions concerning the suitability of relying exclusively on the rational actor model to explain foreign policy processes. Hence, he disputed the assumption that government is a monolithic, unitary foreign policy actor 'but consists of a conglomerate of semi-feudal loosely allied organizations, each with a substantial life of its own.' He also challenged the distinction between external and internal policy by

13 Ibid p.67.
introducing the importance of domestic policy in the process of foreign policy decision making.

The most important contribution of the pluralist school to international relations theory has been its challenge to the dominance of the State as a completely independent basic political unit, and its unitary, monolithic and impenetrable 'billiard ball' image as presented by the realists. The focus of the pluralists has been on the modifying and relatively decreasing role of the states. However, they have not denied the role of the States. In fact, in view of many pluralists, the state still remains an important actor as a political unit. According to Hanrieder, for instance, inspite of a growth of restrictions imposed upon state activities in the international arena there is an observable increase in the role of the State in the domestic area that results in domestication of international politics and contribute to the continuing vitality of the states.\(^\text{14}\) Moreover, Brown suggested that the 'world polity' is evolving into a 'polyarchy', with a variety of actors and processes for ensuring order in which the states still have a crucial role to play. However, he argued 'it is time that we start to view them as only one element of the world polity rather than its essence.'\(^\text{15}\) According to many pluralists, states are coming under pressure and must cope with a world where other non-state actors increasingly penetrate its territory and reduce is autonomy as a result of growing interdependence.\(^\text{16}\)

Pluralists have introduced to the analysis of international politics, the new set of actors, who are sub-national, transnational and supranational entities and international organizations with specific areas of interest and the scope of activities that can challenge and even modify the dominance and behaviour of the states. For instance, Pentland showed that international organizations can act as 'systemic modifiers of state behaviour' as well as acting as instruments of the foreign policies of the states and sometimes as actors in their own

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right. On the other hand, Keohane and Nye disputed the 'realist' claim that international organizations are merely instruments of state policies. They contended that such institutions may significantly affect political processes and outcomes in world politics within which civil servants try to co-ordinate policy with their counterparts or seek their support and define 'issue areas' by way of transgovernmental coalition-building processes.

Interdependence

For the pluralists interdependence is a key concept in explaining and understanding the behaviour of the states in contemporary international politics. Hence the focus of Pluralism is on managing the effects of interdependence by the formation of formal and informal international, transnational and supranational organizations. In pluralist conceptualization States are not independent but increasingly vulnerable to the effects of interdependence since they cannot any longer cope with the global and regional problems of security, environmental pollution and economic development and management of scarce resources on their own. The emergence and growth of international, transnational, supranational and sub-national actors in world politics and growing economic and political interdependence, result in a world where States try to retain their legal sovereignty but at the price of the loss of autonomy. Rothstein explained, for instance, 'the growing interdependence on economic, social, and cultural matters within the state system which obviously implies a system in which the autonomy and sovereignty of all members - great and small - is being eroded.' We shall make the conceptual explanations and distinctions between 'autonomy' and 'sovereignty' in a different section in this chapter.

The conceptual explanation of interdependence, as an important term of the pluralist paradigm, needs to be explained further. To put it in simple terms, the starting point for

20 Rohstein, op cit p.362.
interdependence is that no state is completely independent and free from the effects of the actions of the other states in the contemporary world within any given system. Although, the concept of interdependence means different things to different writers and the literature on interdependence is vast, it is possible to give some commonly accepted conceptual definitions of it. A broad definition, for instance, has been suggested by Oran Young as 'the extent to which events in any given part or within any given component of a world system affect (either physically or perceptually) events taking place in each of other parts or component units of the system'. On the other hand, according to the leading analysts of interdependence theory, Keohane and Nye, 'interdependence in world politics refers to situations characterized by reciprocal effects among actors in different countries [that] result from international transactions - flows of money, goods, people and messages across international boundaries.

Following on from the above definitions it is natural to think that states have become increasingly interconnected. However, interconnectedness does not explain the condition of interdependence. Interconnectedness, i.e. the effect of international transaction flow, differ from interdependence. Interdependence involves some degree of cost for the parties. As Keohane put it 'where there are reciprocal (although not necessarily symmetrical) costly effects of transactions, there is interdependence. Where interactions do not have significant costly effects, there is simply interconnectedness. Therefore it is the qualitative nature of transactions, not the quantity of them, that determines an interdependent relationship. The element of costliness in the relationship is important in understanding interdependence which is costly to break. In the light of this definition, two important terms are crucial to

21 Young, Oran R. 'Interdependence in World Politics' International Journal 24 August 1969, p.726.
23 See, for instance, Inkeles, Alex 'Emerging Social Structure of the World' World Politics 27 (4), 1976 pp.467-495.
24 Power and Interdependence, op cit p.9.
understanding interdependence. These are 'sensitivity' or 'vulnerability' interdependence. As it was defined, sensitivity interdependence involves responsiveness which is created by interactions within a framework of policies. 'How quickly do changes in one partner bring costly changes in another, how great are the costly effects?' As Keohane continued to explain 'sensitivity interdependence can be social, political as well as economic.' On the other hand, the vulnerability dimension of interdependence refers to 'the relative availability and costliness of the alternatives that actors of interdependent relationship face' as a result of the changes within the policy framework of interdependence.

What are the benefits of the interdependence? Keohane and Nye argued that 'interdependent relationships will always involve costs, since interdependence restricts autonomy; but it is impossible to specify a priori whether the benefits of a relationship will exceed the costs. This will depend on the values of the actors as well as on the nature of the relationship. Nothing guarantees that relationships we designate as 'interdependent' will be characterized by mutual benefit.'

Increasing interdependence may lead to increasing co-operation, but it has been suggested that it may also contain a potential for increasing conflict. According to many realists, interdependence is not necessarily a good thing since it can increase the vulnerabilities of the states. Increasing interdependence may be conducive to conflict rather than peace, thus less interdependence means less conflict. In a study based on statistical data ranging from 1880 to the present day Richard Rosecrance and his five collaborators concluded that '... The pattern of contemporary interdependence is much more mixed than many have believed. The amplitude to economic change has increased, and the response of one economy to another has become more predictable. Relationships no longer appear to be

26 Power and Interdependence op cit p.12.
stable across time. Interdependence may be becoming instable.\textsuperscript{30} However, the question of
whether interdependence can be avoided in a rapidly shrinking world with the global
economic, ecologic, demographic problems that all states face, is still difficult to answer. On
the other hand, interdependence may be a good thing because it implies collaboration and
cooperation. According to the pluralists, increasing interdependence can provide the basis of
cooperation among interdependent units in various issue areas such as trade, finance,
communications, environmental pollution and transfer of technology. Therefore managing
interdependent relations may involve construction of sets of rules and associated institutions
or international organizations to govern international interactions in different issue areas
which results in the emergence of 'international regimes' concept.

International regime concept has been subsumed within interdependence school.\textsuperscript{31}
As Keohane observed increased interdependence between states in different issues may lead
to increased demand for international regimes.\textsuperscript{32} International regimes, from an
interdependence paradigm, are significant to the extent that they regulate inter-state relations
and facilitate and encourage the development of co-operative behaviour among the states.
The most widely accepted definition of it has been given by Krasner 'sets of implicit or
explicit principles, norms, rules and decision making procedures around which actors
expectations converge in a given area of international relations.'\textsuperscript{33} This definition stresses the
normative aspects of international cooperation.

Regimes are also suggested to come into existence in various ways. According to a
leading pluralist writer, they can emerge spontaneously as a result of perceived common
interest and growing interdependence. Some of them may be formed by negotiation when a
particular issue is in a state of flux. Some may be imposed by a hegemonic actor. However

\textsuperscript{31} See Krasner, Stephen ed. 'International Regimes' special issue of International
Organization 36 (2) 1982.
\textsuperscript{32} Keohane, Robert O. The Demand for International Regimes International
\textsuperscript{33} Krasner, S. op. cit p.185.
they do not exist in themselves, they have to be perceived. They are of evolutionary character. Thus they may transform themselves or collapse. They can proceed and take various levels ranging from simple coordination to a single policy.\textsuperscript{34}

Puchala and Raymond in an important article on regimes contended that international regimes are mainly attitudinal phenomena. Thus they are subjective and exist mainly 'as participants' understanding, expectations or convictions about legitimate, appropriate and moral behaviour.'\textsuperscript{35} They also point out that regimes exist in every substantive issue-area in international relations where there is discernibly patterned behaviour.'\textsuperscript{36} However, there is a third definition that 'treats regimes as multilateral agreements among states which aim to regulate national actions within an issue area.'\textsuperscript{37} This definition is more practical and applicable in the general definition of regimes.

In a world of complex interdependence the regime theory is useful because it provides us with conceptual tools to understand international cooperation within transactional policy frameworks in a variety of issue areas among the states. On the other hand, it has to be noted that regimes are difficult to establish in the security area, because of the inherently competitive nature of many security issues, compared to the economic areas. As Jervis illustrated in his influential article on security regimes, one historical example of an effective security regime was the Concert of Europe that survived only from 1815 to 1823.\textsuperscript{38}

Regime studies relate regime stability to the existence of the leadership of major powers that together establish the basic rules of the game. This has led to the development of

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{34} See for instance, Young, Oran 'Regime Dynamics The Rise and Fall of International Regimes' \textit{International Organizations} 36 (2) Spring 1982 277-97.
\textsuperscript{35} See Puchala, Donald J. and Hopkins, Raymond F. 'International Regimes: Lessons from inductive analysis' \textit{op. cit} Spring 1982 p.246.
\textsuperscript{36} \textit{Ibid} p.247.
\textsuperscript{37} Haggard, Stephan and Simmons, Beth A., 'Theories of International Regimes' \textit{International Organization} 41 (3) 1987 p.495; See also for the review of the definitions of regime theories Haggard and Simmons' regime theory, Tooze, Roger 'Regimes and International Cooperation' in Groom A.J.R. and Taylor, Paul \textit{Frameworks for International Cooperation} pp.201-216.
\end{flushleft}
the concept of 'hegemonic stability.' Regimes simply aim to govern and regulate state interactions to manage the effects of interdependence by creating international regimes. However, it is suggested by some authors that the approach of regime theories resembles that of realists in the sense that the main motivation is to ensure international order and stability. This amounts to traditional power politics since regime theories emphasize the power available to states and the interests they pursue within an anarchic international context. As one writer within the regime theory school confirms, regime theories reflect the realist image of international politics, in which autonomous self-interested states interact in an anarchic environment. Susan Strange, for instance, has in an important article, questioned the usefulness of regime theories, contending that regime theories in the main are ambiguous and imprecise; value-biased towards order rather than change. Finally, they were based within limiting state centric paradigm.

On the other hand hegemony may not be a necessary condition for the stable international regimes as regimes may have their own life even after the decline of hegemonic powers the institutions, habits and rules may persist. Regimes may develop momentum of their own and outgrow their origins. Recently, Keohane suggested, it is self-interest among the states that produces the need for them to cooperate. This manifests itself in international regimes which manage conflicting and discordance interests among the states. In the final analysis, international regimes reinforce the existing international state system and qualify the sovereignty of the states. As Keohane explains 'International regimes should not be

41 Strange, Suzan' Cavel hic dragones: a critique of regime analysis' International Organization 36 (2) 1982 pp.479-496.
42 See on the persistence of regimes Ruggie, J.G. 'International Regimes, transactions and change; embedded liberalism in the post war economic order', International Organization 3 (2) 1982 pp.379-415; see also for the regime change Young, Ozan R. 'Regime dynamics: the rise and fall of international regimes' International Organization 36 (2) 1982 pp.277-297.
interpreted as elements of a new international order 'beyond the nation-state'. They should be comprehended chiefly as arrangements motivated by self-interest: as components of the system in which sovereignty remains a constitutive principle. This means that as Realists emphasize, they will be shaped largely by their most powerful members pursuing their own interests. 44

However, there are other theoretical models that analyze political patterns among states going 'beyond the nation-state' by refashioning, pooling or transcending the sovereignties of the nation-states. These are integration theories which provide us with some useful conceptual frameworks to understand the structures arising from the conditions of modernity. They pose the crucial questions of what other forms of political organizations - apart from territorially based nation states - are possible in contemporary international relations? How can they be achieved and under what conditions do they emerge?

Integration theories

We considered interdependence as a characteristic condition of the modern world. In this section we shall deal with theories of integration and cooperation, which explain the ways in which governments respond to and try to manage and institutionalize the conditions of interdependence.

It is usual that almost every introduction to the theory of integration starts with functionalism. Mitrany was one of the leading precursors of the modern integration theory who offered a functionalist strategy to attain and maintain a 'working peace system'. 45 As Pentland summarized the main strategy of functionalism was the creation of international institutions that will eventually create 'a working peace system a warless global community, by tying up the states in a complex web of interdependence and solving economic and social

44 Ibid. p.63.

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problems so efficiently and humanely that they erode the material and psychological bases of conflict. 46

What are the material bases of conflict? As it has been explained by another functionalist Inis Claude in an article on Mitrany's functionalism, that war is basically the product of objective conditions of human society. According to Mitrany, what causes war is neither the state's inherent nature nor man's evil instincts but the material deprivation in the economic and social circumstances of man. 47

Secondly, functionalism related the phenomenon of war to the inadequacy of the nation-state system which had become an obsolete institution for satisfying the needs of mankind. As Claude Inis continues:

'The state system imposes an arbitrary and rigid pattern of vertical divisions upon global society, disrupting the organic unity of the whole, and carving the world into segments whose separateness is jealously guarded by sovereignties which are neither able to solve the fundamental problems nor willing to permit them to be solved by other authorities.' 48

In what way does Mitrany propose to achieve such a working peace system? State sovereignty, as the ultimate frame of reference for nation-state, should not be attacked frontally but should be rendered harmless and obsolete until it has no functioning role. As Mitrany puts it sovereignty cannot be transferred by diplomatic formula but through a function. In this way, form will inevitably follow function. 49 As Mitrany put it 'By entrusting an authority with a certain task, carrying with it command over the requisite powers means, a slice of sovereignty is transferred from the old authority to the new; and the accumulation of such partial transfers, in time brings about a translation of the true seat of authority.' 50 Such transfers 'would overlay political divisions with a spreading web of international activities and agencies in which, the interest and life of all the nations would be

48 Ibid. p.611.
50 Ibid p.31.
gradually integrated.\textsuperscript{51} In other words, the growth of functional organizations will create a structural integration in the global system. This functional cooperation will eventually have independent effects on international peace and community. In short, the end product of the international functionalist strategy will resemble that of the cobweb model of international community. It should be noted at this point however, that the survival of governments are not incompatible with functionalism. As Taylor noted 'the functionalist approach allows the view that there is no point at which the state would necessarily lose its sovereignty ... It holds rather that the issue of sovereignty becomes irrelevant to the important issues in the emerging world society.'\textsuperscript{52}

In short, it would not be wrong to suggest that political boundaries of states may continue to coexist with functionally determined boundaries of international agencies. In this sense, the end product of functionalism will resemble a cobweb model in which the states might still be sovereign but the sovereignty may lose its functional significance as a point of reference in the activities of governments.

For Mitrany the starting point of functionalist strategy lies in the economic, technical and social areas, notably and supposedly non-political issues.\textsuperscript{53} In this sense, the only institutions which are based on systems of transactions that maximize welfare are genuinely functional institutions. The functionalists assume that it is easier to establish functional organizations which are narrow in their scope and in sectors such as energy production and distribution, transportation and communications control, health labour standards and customs union. The grand political designs have to be avoided because these may threaten national-states who are jealous of their sovereignty. Functional co-operation is more viable since these non-political bodies can be more attractive and mutually advantageous for participating states.

\textsuperscript{51} Ibid, p.35.
\textsuperscript{53} Mitrany, op.cit p.39.
By trying to solve their problems, individuals, groups and people and even governments, will be working and learning together to solve their problems and maximize welfare. Within this learning process, the loyalties of people will shift from national to these functional centers. In this fashion, an international sense of community will develop. The key functionalist concept is spill over (or 'ramification' in Mitrany's functionalist terminology). Functionalists propose that cooperation will grow and the scope of international organization will expand as positive experiences from cooperation in one issue area are generalized and applied to new areas (task expansion) as a result of functional imperatives.54

As we saw, functionalism is aterritorial. There is no fixed territorial basis of integration. It is a universal process. Indeed, Mitrany argued that regional integration provides an insufficient basis for international peace and may well contribute to the emergence of regional super states and promote interregional conflicts.55 Mitrany's functionalist approach to integration has some distinguishable features, compared to other recent theories of integration. Functionalism as a theory of community building at the international level, treats integration as an open ended process. There is not any specified terminal condition in functionalism. Another characteristic of the functionalist model is that it separates socio-economic welfare from political processes, suggesting that political issues are inherently controversial compared to technical issues. This aspect of Mitrany's theory has been criticized on the grounds that the separation between political and socio-economic issues is artificial. These allegedly technical issues may well be a matter of controversy among the governments under today's modern conditions.56

Another integration theorist, Karl Deutsch, was concerned with the conditions necessary to promote and maintain a sense of community among the populations in a given

region. In his book 'Political Community and the North Atlantic Area' Deutch defines integration as a condition in which the population of a given region have achieved 'a sense of community', which can be called 'a security community', in other words a consensus that common problems should be resolved without resort to great scale physical coercion. Moreover, members of such communities, have at their disposal, institutionalized procedures which are capable of ensuring 'peaceful change'.

Deutsch's emphasis is on the flow of transactions and communications (such as trade, tourists, letters and immigrants) to indicate the level of integration. Therefore his approach was known as a communications or transactionalist approach. He applied the concepts of cybernetics and general systems theory to regional integration. It is expected that such transactions will eventually lead to integrated socio-political systems. The success of integration, according to Deutsch, is dependent upon four background conditions. First of all, there has to be 'mutual relevance' of units with one another which can be indicated by 'the relative volume and weight of transactions among them, such as trade, travel and mail and other communications.' The second condition is the compatibility of values with some actual joint rewards. The conditions for mutual responsiveness means 'the presence of significant capabilities and resources for communication, perception and self steering.' Finally, some degree of 'common generalized loyalty' which can either be indicated by the frequency and saliency of perceptions of joint interests or the objective compatibility of the major values of the participating populations.

According to Deutsch, integration is a process of the formation of socio-psychological communities, leading towards political unification. There are two types of security communities. A successful process of socialization would lead to either 'amalgamated' or 'pluralist' security communities. In both cases, the essential prerequisite is the absence of violence. He suggests that pluralistic security communities are easier to establish and

maintain since the national states retain their sovereignty in the absence of a central authority. There are only three preconditions attached to pluralist security communities: Compatibility of values among decision makers; mutual predictibility of behaviour among decision makers of the units to be integrated; and mutual responsiveness.\(^{59}\) In this sense, Deutsch concluded that the North Atlantic area, although it is far from integrated seems to have already moved a long way towards becoming a 'pluralistic security community.'\(^{60}\) On the other hand, amalgamated security communities form a single integrated unit from previously independent units with a common government which may be unitary or federal. As an example Deutsch gives today's United States.\(^{61}\) However, amalgamated security communities are difficult to establish. Because several conditions were required to achieve this high level of integration.\(^{62}\)

Puchala suggested that the international transactionalist method (defined in terms of inter-regional contacts and dealings) is set in a descriptive model of regional integration. He argued that, although it provides reasonably reliable descriptive indicators for several social, economic and political processes that occur during regional integration, it is doubtful whether transaction approach research can explain regional integration beyond description towards causality. However, he concluded that when it is carefully and cautiously applied transactionalist flow analysis may explain the causal dynamics of regional integration.\(^{63}\) Deutsch was also criticized that he concentrated on the socio-psychological aspects of regional integration and failed to elaborate on what kind of political and institutional structures are likely to emerge as a result of this social assimilation process.\(^{64}\)

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59 Ibid pp.244-245.
61 Ibid p.6.
62 Ibid p.58.
hand, his transactionalist approach can be useful in describing the parameters of regional integration. This will be the subject matter of one of the following sections.

Neofunctionalist theory is an important school of integration theory, since it gives us crucial insights into our understanding of the dynamics of regional integration. Given that the EC has been the experimental laboratory for neofunctionalist theory, it has developed a sophisticated and complex (multidimensional) conceptual framework for the analysis of regional integration. Hence neofunctionalism cannot be briefly explained without doing serious injustice to it. However, for our research purposes, we have to limit ourselves to the neofunctionalist definition of regional integration and its main indicators of the integrative process to show what integration theories explain.

Neofunctionalism derived from the weaknesses of the functionalist approach. Therefore, it can be defined as the application of functionalist means to regional integration, for federal ends. However, only in its early stages, has it been functionalist as this applied to the European Coal and Steel Community in which supranational cooperation had been restricted to a single functional dimension.65 However, there are important conceptual differences between functionalism and neofunctionalism.

Whereas functionalism is a non-political universal approach to integration, which stresses the socio-economic welfare needs as the dynamics of integration, neofunctionalist emphasis is on political aspects of integration in a regional context. As Lodge explains, according to neofunctionalists, 'integration is promoted not so much by meeting socio-economic welfare needs on a technical, functionally specific basis, but by interaction of political and economic forces seeking to exploit them in order to maximize their own interests. Neofunctionalism is predicated on pluralism.'66 This pluralist setting for the neofunctionalist approach is crucial. Welfare tasks cannot be treated in isolation, since they inevitably involve the allocation of scarce resources between competing demands of interest

65 See Pentland in 'Functionalism Theory and Practice in International Relations' op cit pp.16-17.
groups. This is inherently a political process which requires the exercise of power. Thus, for functionalism power and welfare are inseparable under pluralistic conditions.

Neofunctionalist emphasis, therefore, in contrast to the functionalist approach, is on the interest groups in a pluralistic setting 'whose acceptance is the key to community building. The process does not depend upon mass support. The change in the attitudes of elite groups is an important indicator of integration. As Haas describes political integration is 'the process whereby political actors in several distinctive settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over pre-existing national states. The end result of a process of political integration, is a new political community, superimposed over the pre-existing ones'. As it has been described in this most commonly quoted definition, integration is not only explained in attitudinal terms, but also in terms of emerging central institutions, which result from this attitudinal process. Therefore, unlike functionalism and communication approach, it can be said that neofunctionalism combines both attitudinal and institutional aspects of regional integration.

The key concept in the neofunctionalist integration process is spill over. Successful integration of some functional tasks would tend to spill over into the integration of other tasks. In this context, Haas suggests that specifically defined economic tasks carry greater integrative potential whereas, military, defence cooperation have little spill over potential. This is 'the expansive logic of sector integration.'

The competing elites, as a result of this spill over process, come to see that their interests are better served by supranational rather than national solutions. This is a learning process in which the perceptions of elites change and loyalties shift towards new supranational centre. Haas concentrates mainly on the changes of the attitudes and

67 Harrison, op cit p.78.
69 See for the explanation of spill over concept, Harrison, Europe in Question, p.82, 86.
70 Haas, The Uniting of Europe op cit pp.283-317.
perceptions of non-governmental elites such as trade unions, business associations and the party leaders who will contribute to the integrative process towards supranational centre.71

On the other hand, neofunctionalists in the early 1970s started to put less emphasis on the shift of elite loyalty to a new centre and concentrated more on the way in which independent nation states give up some of the attributes of their sovereignty. For instance, Neofunctionalist Lindberg defined political integration as the voluntary transfer of 'factual attributes of sovereignty and decision making autonomy' from the national level to supranational level. Political integration, thus, was defined as 'the evolution over time of a collective decision making system among nations.'72 Furthermore, Haas in the late 1960s reached a new definition of regional integration suggesting that the study of regional integration is mainly concerned 'with explaining why states cease to be wholly sovereign.'73

This was a significant development in neofunctionalist theory that the concept of sovereignty, instead of loyalty transfers, was placed in the center of the conceptual analysis of regional integration as a crucial indicator.74 In the same article, calling all previous integration theories (functionalism, federalism and communications approach) as pretheories because they do not explain 'a recurring series of events made up of dimensions of activity casually linked to one another.'75 Haas introduced a master concept 'authority-legitimacy transfer.' This implies three possible outcomes of the regional integration process; a 'regional state' which has a central authority that is legitimized by 'regional nationalism'; a 'regional commune' lacks central autonomy and is less institutionalized but it is held together because its units are 'so highly differentiated in function as to be forced into interdependence'; and

71 Ibid p.xiii.
72 Lindberg, L.N. 'Political Integration as a multidimensional phenomenon requiring multivariate measurement' International Organization 24 (4) 1970 p.650.
75 Haas, 'The Study of Regional Integration' op cit p.623.
finally asymmetrical regional overlap' which has a center with some authority, but units also retain some authority but the arrangement of power is asymmetrical.76

However, as a result of the stagnation in mid-seventies integration theories started to change their direction. Given the attitudes of the governments towards integration in the EC, Haas came to acknowledge the fact that the theories of regional integration became obsolescent because the assumptions on which these theories have been based became irrelevant. For instance, it has been proven that the emergence of strong national leaders (such as Charles De Gaulle in France) could block the transfer of too much authority to regional institutions. This had not been predicted in earlier neofunctionalist writings. Moreover, in 1976, Haas reached a conclusion and described the contemporary period as a 'turbulent' one in which there are 'confused and clashing perceptions of organizational actors which find themselves in a setting of great social complexity.'77 Hence, Haas argued that gaining control over such complexity is emerging as the major political task during the late twentieth century. Significantly, states may be forced to seek non-regional solutions to the problems of energy, technology transfer, industrial policy, research and development, whatever may be the effects of such solutions on the objectives of regional integration. Thus, Haas concluded that his earlier 'theory of regional integration ought to be subordinated to a general theory of interdependence.'78 The stagnation of the EC rendered neofunctionalism 'out of fashion' in the mid-1970s. However, it has been recently suggested that the current developments within the EC (particularly after the Single European Act) seems to revalidate the applicability of the neofunctionalist theory to the European integration.79 The recent developments seem to have enhanced the theoretical validity of earlier neofunctional concepts which were elaborated by Schmitter in the late sixties. Two concepts of neofunctionalism, 'spill over' and 'externalization' are particularly relevant to the external

76 Ibid p.635.
77 Haas, Ernst B. 'Turbulent Fields and the Theory of Regional Integration' International Organization 30 (2) 1976 p.179.
78 Ibid p.199.
79 Taylor, Paul 'New dynamics of European Integration' in Lodge, Juliet. 'The European Integration and The Challenge of the Future' London; Pinter 1983 op.cit pp.3-25.
activities of the EC.\footnote{See for the application of Schmitter's earlier neofunctionalist concepts to the foreign policy activities of the EC Ginsberg, Roy H. \textit{Foreign Policy Actions of the European Community} London Adamantive Press, 1989 pp.20-27.} Spill over implies that the EC's internal dynamics are also in operation in the external relations of the EC whereby economic integration is linked to the other sectors of high politics. There is a spill over of the scope of the policy areas from the low politics to high politics areas. The recent creation and consolidation of European Political Cooperation (EPC) mechanism is a good example of this spill over effect on the foreign policy actions of the EC. Moreover as the number of applications for the EC membership rapidly increase, the EC is also gradually forced to act as a unit in its external relations. This is the externalization of European integration process which suggests that the EC will either extend its membership or compelled to offer some alternative forms to membership.

This neo-functionalist dynamic after the Single European Act and the Maastricht Treaty seems not relevant only to the deepening of process of European integration but also to the widening and the spill over of the scope of the EC competences and range of policy areas in the external relations of the EC. As Lodge explains\footnote{Lodge, Juliet \textit{The European Community and the Challenge of the Future} London: Pinter Pub 1993 p.xiv in Preface.}

'Enlargement itself is simply interpreted as meaning an expansion in the number of states that are members of the EC. While it is true that an increase in the number of EC members is a major challenge, problems revolve not simply around the issue of which states are full and which associate members. Enlargement has implications not just for the scope of integration but also for its level and therefore raises the question of widening and deepening. Widening is often merely seen in terms the number of members of the EC but it also refers to a widening in the scope of the EC's competences and range of policy areas.'

In the beginning of the 1990s the neofunctionalist concepts of externalization and spill over explain better the external activities of the EC to a certain extent. However, they are more useful and effective when it is applied to the deepening of the level and scope of integration among members themselves within the EC. As we have shown above, the transfer of authority to the central institutions is an important dimension of neofunctionalist
conceptualization which refers to the level of integration in different policy areas. This is particularly evident within the EC rather than in its external activities.

Federalism as an approach to international integration has developed a long and sophisticated philosophical and intellectual tradition in the course of history. It is impossible to explain federalism concisely within the confines of this section. There is vast literature on federalism. Therefore, we have to limit ourselves to the main and relevant aspects of the federalist approach to European integration. Federalism is more of a strategy than a conceptual framework, which explains systematically how integration, as a condition, is reached or, as a process, works. Federalism can be defined as an ideological movement to establish supranational entities in accordance with 'the federal principle' on a global or regional basis. In this section, we shall explain federalism as an approach to integration. However, we shall confine ourselves to identifying and underlying the significance of federalism in the context of modern integration theories, in order to put federal tendencies in the perspective of European integration. In so doing we shall try not to be ambitious but anticipate that this exercise will further contribute to our understanding of integration phenomenon from a federalist point of view. Federalism means different things to different people. Many definitions of federalism can be given from the vast amount of literature. However, we have to be selective for our research purposes.

Federalism has been described and explained in institutional, sociological and legal terms. It has been defined as a process. For instance Wheare defined 'federal principle' as the method of dividing powers so that the general and regional are each, within a sphere, coordinate and independent. According to this classic definition federalism is treated as an institutional and legal method of dividing the powers of political entities. Mackay described it with the same terms but offered a question to find out whether the federal

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82 Haas, *The Study of Regional Integration*, op cit pp.624; 625.
83 See for the different approaches to the study of federalism Birch, A.H. 'Approaches to the Study of Federalism' *Political Studies* 14(1) 1966 pp.15-33.
principle exists in a federal structure: 'does it embody the division of powers between central and regional authorities, each being independent of others?' Riker, for instance, defined federalism in constitutional terms and suggested that federalism is the product of a bargain between different levels of government.

The most enriching and encapsulating definition that contributes to our understanding of contemporary federalism as a crucial approach to international integration has been given by Friedrich. According to him, federal system is 'a group of unions, united by one or ore common objectives, but retaining their distinctive group character of other purposes.' This is a more flexible and broader definition of federalism, as Birch explains, because its application is not limited to a federal state 'but also to an alliance, a functional association of states, or a union of groups within a state.' In this sense, federalism is a federalizing process; that is the process of achieving a union of groups which retain their identity.

What is crucial in Friedrich's definition is that federalism is more than simple constitutional arrangement but a 'federalizing process' which allows 'differentiation and integration' simultaneously. It is this definition that contributes best to our understanding of the dynamics of federalism 'as an evolving pattern of changing relationship' in the course of integration towards a federal union; not the static, institutionalist model which is based on the state model of federalism which reinforces the principle and basis of sovereignty within the sphere of a federation. We are interested in an open ended flexible and broadly defined principle of federalism, that can best fit today's modern conditions in Europe. As Brugmans describes 'Everywhere federalism rejects uniformity as an objective. Everywhere it can only remain true to its essence, as long as it maintain openness to the outer world. But at the same time, it differs from one place to another, as it always aims to cope with the specific

87 Cited in Birch, op cit p.18.
88 Ibid
conditions of a given region, linguistic, ethnic and religious, social or geographic. It is this definition of Federalism that is crucial in achieving European unity through diversity, in the wider sense of Europe. We shall evaluate this later in this chapter when we deal with the operational context of European integration and cooperation.

We are not concerned with 'federalism' as a form of government in its existent state which applies to narrowly defined integrated state model. Our main concern is 'federalism' as an integration model or 'process' by which a community, state or group of states may be integrated into a unit. Therefore, we shall focus on inter-state rather than intra-state aspect of federalism as this applies to the present integration process in the European continent.

A crucial conceptual distinction has been made between 'federation' or 'federalisms'. Federation is mainly a legalistic and static institutional arrangement which may take the form of a sovereign state. Whereas federalism is a dynamic movement. As it was quoted by Burgess 'there may be federalism without federation, there can be no federation without some matching variety of federalism.' Federalism is suggested to be an ideological position, philosophical statement and empirical fact. Moreover, it has been defined as a 'mental attitude, a way of life, and advocate of federalism and devolution of power at all levels of society from governments to sports clubs.' While federalism is an organizing principle and ideology, federation is a specific organizational form which includes structures, institutions and techniques corresponding to this principle. In this ideological sense, it would not be too wrong to suggest that, more or less, all integration theories (except Mitrany's functionalism) suggest inherently and implicitly federal terminal conditions. They

91 See Lodge 'The European Community; Bibliographical Excursions op cit p.10.
92 Burgess, Michael 'Federalism and Federation in Western Europe' Great Britain; Croom Helm, 1986 pp.16, 22.
93 Ibid p.20.
94 Ibid.
95 Lodge, Juliet The European Community; Bibliographical Excursions, op cit p.8.
96 Burgess op cit p.17.
all predict or direct towards, in one way or another, a kind of 'federal union', albeit with different methods and arrangements.97

Federalism can be a way of reforming the sovereignty of states. This reorganization of sovereignty and autonomy could be done either from the base to the centre or from the centre to the base, upwardly and downwardly, in a given territorial basis. In this way federalism is expected to fulfil two important functions, efficiency and democracy. As Haas put it 'Federalism, in short, seeks simultaneously to meet the need for more effective governmental action in some domains (through centralization) and the democratic postulate of local control and local autonomy (through decentralization).98 In this sense, federalism is an organizational principle.

It is worth mentioning, at this point, about the distinction between federalism and confederalism which tend to be used interchangeably. The main distinction between federalism and confederalism lies in the presence and absence of sovereignty in the central body. A confederal arrangement refers to a common authority which deal 'with governments of associating states not directly with people.' Even though it varies, this kind of arrangement is called confederal.99 On the other hand, in a federal arrangement, there seems to be a direct relation between central authority and the people of the member states. In a confederation, member states retain sovereignty and autonomy whilst they accept the collective transfer of some limited functions related to the common defence and security or welfare of the states. Whereas in federation there is one sovereign state. Most critically the federal state has 'external sovereignty' - power to act as an actor in international affairs on behalf of member states.

However, according to Forsyth, confederalism and federalism are two ends of the same continuum. Forsyth defines the federalizing process from confederation to unitary state as follows: "Federal union" - as the spectrum between interstate and intrastate relations - and

97 Haas, The Study of Regional Integration op cit p.630.
98 Ibid p.624.
99 See for federal and confederal distinctions, Sawyer, G. Modern Federalism Australia, Pitman 1976 p.6, 7.
"federal state" - as the spectrum between federal union and the unitary state - would seem to be the two important categories of federalism.\textsuperscript{100} In the light of his broader definition of federalism (federalizing process), Forsyth illustrates historically that confederations have been stepping stones to federations. He gives the examples of the US and Swiss confederations which had been based upon security and defence that eventually became federations as did the German Zollverein which had been an economic union. More recently, Forsyth described the EC as 'a confederation or a union of states that may deepen and strengthen in the future. However, it will always differ in kind from the federal system of the United States of America, because of the immense depth of the ethnic differences between its various member states.\textsuperscript{101} The Federal orientation of the EC as a federalizing process not only provides a relevant model but also a sense of direction in the process of European integration.

As we showed, Federalism is a strategy to achieve a federal union. This particularly manifests itself in the context of European integration. The primacy of political means over social and economic determinism, is the main feature of this European federalist approach. Federalists tend to emphasize the political will of the parties and the political settlements as the driving force behind integration. To reach a federal union, Federalists rely heavily, not only on the propaganda, education and the mobilization of political and economic elites for federal ends, but also on the means for the legitimate transformation of autonomy and sovereignty through regional supranational institutions and the assemblies of the states. There has been a tendency of equating supranationalism with federalism. However, supranationalism is said to be 'a process or style of decision making'. As Haas explains 'a cumulative pattern accommodation in which the participants refrain from unconditionally vetoing proposals and instead seek to attain agreement by means of compromises upgrading common interests.'\textsuperscript{102}

\textsuperscript{100} Forsyth, Murray Unions of States New York; Leicester University Press, 1981 p.7.
\textsuperscript{101} Forsyth, M. Federalism and Nationalism Leicester; Leicester UP 1989 p.6.
\textsuperscript{102} Quoted by Keohane and Hoffman in 'The Dynamics of European Integration' ed. William Wallace London; Pinter Pub 1990 p.280.
whose other end is occupied by strict intergovernmentalism but implies, structurally, partial federalism, but not yet identical with federation. On the other hand, the presence of supranational institutions and decision making styles may well be indicating federalist tendencies and dynamics but not the same thing with the existence of federal structures.

Harrison observes two basic methods among European federalists who depend on a preparatory campaign for the achievement of constitutional federal union in Europe. According to Harrison the first strategy is more moderate. This is 'The federal pact' which has been elaborated by the European Federalist Henri Brugmans. Even though his approach is constitutionalist, according to him, European integration is not an immediate constitutional revolution but an evolutionary process in which existing nation states would retain their identity in a federal Europe. In this way, Europe will become a 'society of societies' rather than becoming another nation. According to this moderate federalist strategy; first, the activity of the EC and the Parliament, with supporting propaganda from the federalists, will draw the interest and probably secure the support of various groups in industry, commerce and agriculture to European unity. The second stage would be the election of European parliament by direct suffrage. And the final stage would be the drafting, the conclusion of the federal treaty by the parliament and its ratification by the member states. However this does not come about as simply as it seems but it may be a continuous and long process.

The second strategy for federal European union is said to be more radical. This is supported by the European Federal Movement (MFE). This is called the 'constituent method' which has been mainly elaborated by Heraud and Spinelli. The first task is to mobilize the public by international campaign and to convince individuals as well as elites, that nation-state is obsolete therefore an alternative needs to be created. In the second stage, the

103 Ibid; See also Taylor, Paul 'Supranationalism: the power and authority of international institutions' 'Frameworks for International Cooperation' London; Pinter 1991 pp.109-122.
104 Harrison, Europe in Question op.cit. pp.48, 54.
105 Quoted in Harrison, Ibid p.48; see also Brugmans, Orbis, op.cit passim.
106 Ibid p.50.
constituent assembly will draft a treaty of federation which will be ratified either by national
parliaments or national referenda.\textsuperscript{107}

Recently, some federalists in Europe adopted a more pragmatic federalist approach. This new strategy no longer seeks an immediate and direct attack on sovereignty but similar to incremental piecemeal strategy of the neofunctionalists. As a leading federalist, Pinder, for instance suggests the neo-federalist idea, 'is in some respects a synthesis of the federalist and the neofunctionalist approaches. It offers a way to supplement federalist theory, which has tended to focus on the design of a constitution by a constituent assembly without considering the process of steps which may make that feasible; and it fills gaps in neofunctionalism caused by the neglect of some essential political and economic forces, including the federalist motive, and of constitutional questions.'\textsuperscript{108} In this sense, while other conceptual approaches seek to explain, describe and predict integrative tendencies, federalism provides an important sense of direction and vision in the integration of Europe.

In our opinion, this federalist motive in European region is not only relevant to the future of integration for the member of the European Community is also relevant to the enlargement of the EC. It is worth concluding European federalism by quoting Pinder again: 'the neo-federal idea will be relevant, not only for the Community of twelve, but also for its extension to include most of Europe, and for eventual application in the wider world.'\textsuperscript{109} Pinder’s neo-federalist approach in fact fits the broader and more flexible definition of federalism as a 'federalising process' as defined by Friedrich earlier. As we understand from Pinder, neo-federalism is an open ended process which is not limited to the core of Europe. The EC enlarges its federalising sphere in a neo-functionalist manner. Indeed, Mitrany pointed out that an exclusive federal entity at the core of Europe would be tantamount to a greater sovereign state (a bigger regional state).\textsuperscript{110} This would not be conducive to peace.

\textsuperscript{107} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{109} Ibid.
Background Conditions for Integration: Regional Parameters of Integration

So far we have shown what integration theories explain, describe and predict. In this section we shall investigate the background conditions for integration. The following questions will enable us to detect the parameters of regional integration and integrative properties of units to be integrated. What are the most conducive properties of units to be integrated? What are the most conducive circumstances for successful integration? What structural properties carry greater integrative potential for successful integration? Who are the best candidates for participation in integration process? Background factors for integration are crucial in the sense that it may give us some theoretical clues about how far the EC can enlarge its integration domain.

As we explained, Mitrany was concerned with the building of an international community through functional cooperation. However, he did not explain what kind of specific conditions result in integration. He indicated the significance of the growing international interdependence which is evident in the increasing level of international transactions in the technical, economic and social areas as well as in the improvement of international communications. In this sense, Mitrany was preoccupied with 'generally favourable relational conditions' for international integration not concerned with 'the structural properties' of units and background conditions under which integration occur.\footnote{Harrison \textit{op cit} p.96.}

On the other hand, federalist approach stressed political will and consensus for the initiation of constitutional change. As we explained, federalism is more of an ideology and strategy for the achievement of federal union. Hence, they were not concerned with structural and specific background conditions for integration. However, some early classic federalists proposed some necessary conditions for the creation of a federal union. For instance, Wheare proposed the following background factors for federations: a common need for defence; a desire to be independent of foreign powers; an expectation of economic advantage; some previous political association; geographical neighbourhood; similarity of political
institutions. Nevertheless, federalists stressed psychological conditions and the perceptions of the political actors in an environment where federal arrangement is seen as an alternative to a territorially based nation-state. In other words, the existence of common political will to supplement and reform the existing-state system at a supranational level. Therefore, the existent perceptions of the non-governmental, governmental elites and the people about the functional role of nation-state, as an obsolete and ineffective political unit to create welfare and maintain peace, are important factors leading to federal end. However, some evolutionary federalists, like Friederich, put emphasis more on the social and economic conditions and forces that may facilitate and stimulate the federalizing process. Moreover, given the national opposition, the inertia of the state bureaucracies and political systems and protectionist interests of the nation states some federalists have come to adopt a neofunctionalist piecemeal approach to achieve a federal union. Nevertheless, the background conditions that federalist proposed still, in the main, remain prescriptive and descriptive rather than structural and causal explanations of conditions which facilitate and stimulate integrative tendencies.

Deutsch described the background conditions for integration more elaborately. He proposed that twelve dimensions of integration indicate the conducive conditions which may lead to formation of 'amalgamated security communities'. All these conditions refer to a relationship of similarity and the presence of interactions and communications between the units in a given region. As Harrison summarizes 'The basic assumption of the work is that similarities between states foster the development of communication, and communications bind societies together. Communication is ipso facto, integration and his categories are, consequently, dimensions of phenomenon. Although Deutsch's propositions are accepted as favourable conditions for regional integration, they do not seem

112 Birch, op cit pp.21-22.
113 See Supra.
114 Supra.
115 Deutch 'The Analysis of International Relations' op cit pp.243, 244.
to explain the structural dynamics of the integration and structural properties of units to be integrated. Deutsch's conditions are related to the interconnectedness or the intensity of the patterns of communications and the transactions and similarities in the behaviour patterns among the units (mutual relevance of units with one another) not to the structural characteristics of the units that explain how the dynamics of integration work. Deutsch explains conditions in quantitative not in qualitative terms in the sense that it examines the frequency, density and the relevance of the patterns of relationship not the content and nature of them. As Harrison put it all the emphasis is on 'relativities'.

Etzioni, on the other hand, examined the background dynamics of integration in the light of four contemporary efforts of political unification; The Nordic Associational Web; the United Arab Republic; The West Indies Federation and the European Community. He offered some variables which are very helpful to understanding especially the preunification state among units to be integrated. These are 'analytical', 'system' and 'individual' properties. By 'individual properties' Etzioni refers to the state of the units before the unification. How integrated and unified units themselves are before they participate in political unification? According to Etzioni, the degree of control over the means of violence and the nature of legitimacy in representing the various groups within the units constitute an important background conditions for integration. In this context, Etzioni observes that the most successful unions tend to be formed by post-nationalist states, in other words, the states who had previously completed their evolution of nationalism and established stable national unions. 'System properties', on the other hand, explains the presence and the degree of interdependence in transactions and communications of all kinds and levels before unification. Etzioni states 'All unification movements we are aware ... were initiated among countries that were previously interdependent to some degree.' 'Analytical properties', on

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117 See Haas 'The Study of Regional Integration' op cit p.626.
118 Harrison op cit.
120 Ibid p.18.
121 Ibid p.33.
the other hand, refers to the degree of heterogeneity and the distribution of unit properties which are comparative ethnic origins, comparative wealth, and similarity of cultural traditions, language and religion. Etzioni notes that 'not all background characteristics are of the same relevance to integration. Some may have great effect while others have very little or not effect; moreover ... the existence of heterogeneity might enhance rather than undermine integration.'¹²² Nevertheless, Etzioni reaches an important general conclusion at the end of his study which is the most crucial in explaining the dynamics behind integration 'Of the four unions studied, the two that succeeded are unions of modern countries [The European Community and Nordic Associational Web]; the two that failed are unions of traditional or transitional societies [The United Arab Republic and the West Indies Federation].¹²³ Thus, transitional and traditional countries are not the most likely candidates for successful integration. However, the condition of modernity as a structural background factor for integration, needs to be explained further.

As Harrison explains modernity is the most crucial aspect of integration. Modernity, as a structural condition, is especially relevant to the integration of the European Community. Indeed, 'the modernity premise' enables us to understand better the driving forces behind the integration process. Hence we shall concentrate on the explanation of the modernity premise as a background condition for integration. We find Harrison's explanation the most helpful in understanding the modernity. Hence, we extensively relied on Harrison's study.¹²⁴ Modernity is said to be not only a necessary structural condition for the initiation of integration but also for its eventual success.¹²⁵ As Huntington showed, modern societies can be distinguished from traditional societies by the existence of secular and rationalized central authorities. In modern societies, state is functionally differentiated and specialized. Moreover, it is dominant over traditional patterns of relationship and loyalties. Finally modern societies consists of highly organized interest groups who actively

¹²² Ibid p.19.
¹²³ Ibid p.318.
¹²⁴ Harrison op cit p.102.
¹²⁵ Ibid.
participate in the decision making. In short, modern societies are basically pluralistic societies. It is this aspect of modern societies that is crucial in the expansive logic of neofunctionalist integration.

The leading neofunctionalist Haas also refers to the similar properties of modern societies as the most important background factors. In the light of the European experience, he suggests that pluralistic modern societies are the best candidates for regional integration process. The existence of articulate voluntary associations led by bureaucratized but accessible elites who compete rationally for power and social status constitute the dynamic characteristic of the pluralistic societies. Moreover, these pluralist structures consist of highly mobilized populations who actively participate in the decision making process through mass organizations (like Trade unions, industrial and business corporations).

The second important background factor for integration is the relatively high level of economic and industrial development with the usual high degree urbanization. In modern countries, the majority of people tend to live in urban areas and work in the industrial, commercial and service sector rather than agricultural sector. Finally, the compatibility of the ideological patterns of the political parties constitute an important background condition for participation in the integration process. Because 'policies of integration are, in the first instance, advanced or blocked' by the activities of these parties and their leaders. Hence, parties of these countries 'may be used as an index of ideological homogeneity'. In short, Haas argues that it is this industrial-urban pluralistic environment that is an essential structural condition in which integration can be initiated, stimulated and facilitated, by responding to socio-economic demands of organized modern pluralistic societies.

Given modernity as a necessary condition, it is said that structural properties of developing countries may present difficulties in their participation for the integration
process. For instance, the existence of traditional structures and values along with secular values can conflict with the incremental integration processes. The challenges to central authority emanating from peripheral interests of ethnic groups or tribal loyalties and traditional patterns of behaviour can have anti-integrative implications for the integration process. This contradicts with the logic of neofunctionalism which relies on the role of educated and sophisticated elites and the expansion of functional interests, in an interest oriented capitalist society, rather than value oriented transitional societies. Moreover, the political role which the army plays in some developing authoritarian states can be detrimental to integration.\textsuperscript{130}

Conceptual Distinctions: Interdependence, Integration, Cooperation

So far we have shown what theories of interdependence and integration explain and describe. In our research we also used these concepts to explain and describe certain political patterns which are evident, particularly, in European politics. The concepts of cooperation and integration explain the ways in which the governments respond to, and try to manage, the consequences of interdependence (at all levels of society and in all kinds of issues) under pluralistic modern conditions, particularly in Europe. However, these concepts, namely interdependence, integration and cooperation, tend to be misused or used interchangeably to explain different political, economic and social patterns between the states. Therefore, we think that some working distinctions of these concepts needs to be made in the beginning of our research in order to eliminate conceptual confusions. However, we have to limit ourselves to our research purposes before we explain what association actually means in the light of our conceptual tools.

We hear and read the concepts of interdependence, cooperation and integration to describe and explain Turkey's association process with the EC. These concepts often tend to be used interchangeably. For instance, the Commission of the EC in its opinion on Turkey's application reads 'to contribute to the success of Turkey's modernization efforts [The

\textsuperscript{130} Harrison, op cit. p.105.
European Community will enable both partners to enter now on the road towards increased interdependence and integration within the context of the Association Agreement. In some documents again one often notices the word 'cooperation' with reference to Turkey's association process. As far as Turkish elites (governmental and non-governmental) are concerned one often overhears the phrase 'our integration process with the EC' to refer to the present state of the relationship. One can argue that the way we describe the phenomenon does not change the actual situation. However, the concepts and terms are very important tools in our understanding of the processes, structures and conditions to the extent that they aim to show how reliable and accurate our intellectual perceptions in defining and understanding the phenomenon. After all beliefs, perceptions and concepts etc. are the very stuff of the social scientist and part and parcel of the research student's daily exercise. It is, therefore, necessary to eliminate conceptual confusions before embarking on the conceptual definition of Association.

As we explained earlier 'interdependence' always refers to the effects of interactions in terms of the vulnerability and sensitivity of one partner to that of another, whether it is actual or anticipated. In this sense, interdependence differs from integration, because, 'political integration' involves attitudinal and institutional processes. Institutional refers to structures which can be explained as institution building at the supranational level. On the other hand, attitudinal focuses on the compatibility of attitudes of one set of people to those of another, who share a sense of common identity or mutual obligation. This refers to socio-political community building at the supranational level. For instance, Mitrany's and Deutsch's approaches are relevant to socio-psychological community building at popular level. Whereas, federalism is concerned with institutions and the division of political power within a new setting, which is similar to that of the federal state. Haas is concerned with a process for the creation of political communities defined in attitudinal and institutional terms. He stressed supranational community and institution building within pluralistic structures. In
In this sense the level and scope of authority transferred to the central decision making institutions and the change in elite attitudes are the indicators of integration.\textsuperscript{131}

Keohane and Nye place both integration and interdependence on the same analytical level. They compare the concepts of 'interdependence' and 'integration' and define integration 'as any level of association between actors, on one dimension or another.'\textsuperscript{132} In the light of this definition, they suggest that it is possible to speak of 'not only various types of integration, such as economic, social, and policy integration, but of various levels of integration' but also 'there can be various types and levels of interdependence as well as various levels of it. As with integration, relations may take place in a variety of issue areas and may be more or less intense.'\textsuperscript{133} However, there is a crucial conceptual difference between 'interdependence' and 'integration', in the sense that 'integration' involves attitudinal and institutional orientation towards a posited end. Integration refers not only to different dimensions of the phenomenon but to different types of processes as well. As Keohane and Nye explain 'interdependence' 'is a term not so closely associated with teleological and process oriented theory. Interdependence has normally be defined simply as a condition.'\textsuperscript{134}

Moreover, integration theorists are mainly concerned with 'peaceful change'. Therefore, in integration theories, there is a strong normative element. As Haas stated 'the main reason for studying ... regional integration is normative.' Apart from explaining and describing the integrative actions of units which provide a living laboratory for observing integration, integration theorists also try to predict the outcome of the integration process that may lead to 'the peaceful creation of possible new types of human communities at a very high level of organization'.\textsuperscript{135}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{132} Keohane, Robert O. and Nye, Joseph S. 'International Interdependence and Integration' in Viotti, Paul R. Kauppi, Mark V. 'International Relations Theory' New York; Macmillan, 1990 p.365.
\item \textsuperscript{133} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{134} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{135} Haas 'The Study of Regional Integration' op. cit p.608.
\end{itemize}
The theories of interdependence and integration share a number of assumptions that are associated with a 'pluralist' or a 'cobweb' image of world politics. They both stress the role of non-governmental actors and diminish the significance of state boundaries. However, there are important conceptual distinctions to be made between them. As we noted interdependence theories are not concerned with teleological and process oriented explanations of the institutional and attitudinal factors that may lead to a terminal condition of political union.

Interdependence mainly explains the conditions among the states. Institution building procedures for coping with the condition of interdependence under modern conditions does not concern interdependence theory. The shift of attitudes from national to supranational centres are not the main concern of interdependence theory. Whereas integration theory emphasizes the will and efforts of political actors in the deepening of international integration towards the formation of political communities. Interdependence, on the other hand, stresses 'the complexity and constraints of modern circumstances affecting the performance and growth of all institutions.'\textsuperscript{136} Integration stresses the competitive nature of structures, 'competitive markets to establish substantive links among issues'; the interdependence approach tend to deal with partial, or holistic association of substantive issues.\textsuperscript{137} Integration theory assumes that there is 'a definitive hierarchy of issues', interest and institutions; from low issue areas (Technical and economic) to high issue areas (foreign policy and security) interest of non-governmental groups followed by governments; finally, supranational institutions over national ones. Whereas, interdependence emphasizes the absence of hierarchy of issues. Military issues can be as important as economic ones and all actors can be important, including states, and all institutional outcomes are possible.\textsuperscript{138}

\textsuperscript{136} Nau, Henry R. 'From Integration to Interdependence Gains, Losses, and Continuing Gaps' \textit{International Organization} 33 (1) 1979 p.140.
\textsuperscript{137} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{138} Ibid.
particular region. However, this does not necessarily imply that interdependence can not be a regional phenomenon. For instance, in Europe, interdependence can define a wider regional condition while integration can apply to the regional core where a process of integration towards political union takes place within the framework of the EC.

In the late 1970s the failure of the EC to deepen integration further towards political union has undermined the confidence in the application of 'integration' theory to the processes of the European community. As a result, integration theory has been subordinated to the study of changing patterns of interdependence. Some students of European integration came to the conclusion that the modest formula of an 'international regime may be a more appropriate label for describing the rules and commitments of the EC' rather than a teleological explanation of neofunctionalism in terms of a progress towards an 'integrated political community'. Nevertheless, Haas noted that the emphasis on the teleological and process oriented approach is particularly useful in understanding 'a new set of phenomenon.' Integration theory continues to contribute to our understanding of the emergence of new political entities beyond the territorially based nation state. Hence integration theory seems to retain its relevance especially with reference to the recent institutional and political changes in the EC towards 'political union'. Given the progress of the EC after the Single European Act and the Maastricht Treaty, it would not be too daring to suggest that international integration, in fact, seems to go beyond the nation-state. Therefore, interdependence may be more helpful in defining the optimal area for cooperation in Europe, but not very useful when it applies to the core of regional integration process which has irreversible implications for the sovereignties of the member states.

At this stage, another conceptual distinction between 'cooperation' and 'integration' should also be made. As we explained, integration theories are about reforming the existing

139 Haas, Turbulent Fields and Theory of Regional Integration op cit p.208.
141 See Pinder, John, 'European Community and Nation State: a case for neorealism?' International Affairs January 1986 p.48.
state system in a new setting and building communities at international and supranational level rather than state and nation preserving theories. In integration, as a result of institutional and attitudinal changes in patterns, there is a qualitative transformation of the state system, although this is felt gradually and in the long run rather than immediately. The impact of integration on the state system is structural. Because integration may lead to irreversible derogation of the sovereignty of the states. As Lindberg suggested, political integration involves voluntary transfer of 'factual attributes of sovereignty' and in this sense differs from 'more classical modes of cooperation'.142 As Haas noted, the main concern for the study of regional integration is 'with explaining how and why states cease to be wholly sovereign, how and why they voluntarily mingle, merge and mix with their neighbours so as to lose the factual attributes of sovereignty while acquiring new techniques for resolving conflict between themselves.'143 Haas goes on to explain 'Regional cooperation, organization, systems and subsystems may help to describe steps on the way [to integration]; but should not be confused with the resulting condition.'144 However, regional cooperation, organizations and sub-systems can be relevant to the regional integration. This is where association as a regional sub-system comes into the picture of regional integration. These regional interstate cooperative frameworks may not be integration themselves but they can be used as evidence of integrative tendencies in a regional sense. We shall elaborate on this later in this chapter.

Recently a conceptual distinction has been made between co-operation frameworks, which take place within the existing state systems and integration theories which envisage the rebuilding of the existing state system or go beyond the nation state. Even though, within various cooperation frameworks, integration can be sought without substantial structural impact (parallelism, harmonization or association) 'Co-operation' frameworks do not clearly fit the conceptual definition of integration theories. As Taylor explains integration theories

142 Lindberg, op.cit p.650.
143 Haas, Ernst B. 'The Study of Regional Integration' 1970 op.cit p.610.
144 Ibid.
mainly 'describe and explain a qualitative change in the context of decision making; integration theories are about a fundamental change in the international state system which is expected to be persistent at one or more of four levels of the state.\footnote{Taylor, P. 'Frameworks for International Cooperation' 1990, p.17.} On the other hand, it has been observed that patterns of cooperation take place within the existing state system and do not have any substantial impact on the sovereignties of the state.

Although co-operation frameworks can be the result of international modernization and necessities of technological change, economic development, diplomatic dispute settlement, maintenance of international order and other features of modernization, they do not go beyond existing state system. This implies, unlike integration, there is no reform of existing state system that requires substantial constitutional or political modification in the sovereignties of the state.\footnote{For instance, the accession to the European Community normally leads to the modification of the constitution of the states concerning the aspect of their sovereignties.}

There are various patterns of co-operations, which have been properly called 'adjustment theories', that do not result in irreversible derogation of sovereignty. However, this is depended upon the form and substance of the co-operation framework. Some cooperation frameworks might lead to or even themselves be the result of the loss of autonomy of the states in international politics. In this sense, a distinction between sovereignty and autonomy is necessary. We shall explain this later.

At the lowest level, 'co-operation' involves an agreement to fulfil specifically defined task without any expectation of task expansion or spill over into other areas which is limited both in scope and duration.\footnote{Taylor Frameworks for International Cooperation 1990, p.14.} This mode of adjustment was detected in classical balance of power system especially in the issues concerning security which involves some diplomatic techniques of 'negotiation', 'mediation' and 'arbitration', 'conciliation' and 'good offices'. Even though the role of international institution is important to facilitate procedures between member states by providing a framework, secretarial facilities, 'it is not itself an element in}
the stability of the system.' Thus, it was suggested that the success of co-operation is dependent on the actors' ability. Co-operation may take place within and through international institutions concerning political, cultural, economic issues in specific areas. However, issues are not connected and the overall task expansion is denied. One example of the adjustment policy was, for instance, The Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) in which the sovereign states of Eastern Europe co-operated on specific economic policies.

'Co-ordination', on the other hand, is defined as a process of continuous adjustments by governments, through a process of intensive consultation within an international organization designed to serve important goals. It is suggested that there are three distinguishing features of co-ordination as an adjustment theory: the actors retain formal powers and legal competencies in policy areas; there is an agreed goal that can be only achieved together; there is a programme which represents the common interests of the parties. The main feature is, in the process of co-ordination, the principle of sovereignty and the equality of states. Decisions are taken by unanimity. As a distinctive style of intergovernmental co-operation, co-ordination have been detected in some of international organizations such as the OEEC's drawing up its own Annual programme, in NATO's procedures for drawing up the Force Plan and in the policymaking in the European Communities, especially during the time when the supranational decision making style seemed unpopular and the scope of the Community widened.

'Harmonization' is a more institutionalized form of policy adjustment between the governments, which involves the common setting of standards and goals within an institutional framework. The interests and structures of the participating states in harmonization are compatible. 'Harmonization is wider in potential scope than 'co-operation' and less specific in its policy implications than 'co-ordination'.
interests and values which take the form of conventions that manifest principles and standards of parties that can be called partial agreements, requiring certain number of signatories to activate the agreement between the states. One example is the European Convention of Human Rights in which non-signatory members are expected to sign the conventions and agreements at a later date. Harmonization is detected in forum organizations rather than service organizations.\textsuperscript{153} Apart from laying down the standards and principles, another method of harmonization is 'specialized conferences' to activate national actors in the direction of international objectives and to 'encourage the development of international identity from which policy alignment follow.'\textsuperscript{154} Harmonization, as an adjustment procedure has been observed in the activities of the Council of Europe and the OECD's institutional techniques. In the latter, the techniques of research, review, mutual cross-examination and conferences are said to be conducive to harmonization.\textsuperscript{155}

These are the adjustment theories that do not lead to an irreversible transfer of sovereignty and take place within existing state system at an intergovernmental level. 'Association' must also be added to these. However it may have greater structural implications compared to co-operation, co-ordination and harmonization models. We shall analyze the concept of association with reference to Turkey's association pattern in the next sections.

It is also worth mentioning the 'parallel national action process', as an approach of policy adjustment which is regarded as the most conducive to attitudinal integration. Taylor defines its essential feature as 'a number of governments agree to co-ordinate their legislation in their separate decision-making procedures with regard to a wide range of business with the help of common institutions and arrangements.'\textsuperscript{156} This way of co-operation is more conducive to effective and practical integration in the attitudinal sense, compares to other adjustment approaches. There is no expectation or political will to create a political union.

\textsuperscript{153} Ibid p.58.
\textsuperscript{154} Ibid p.59.
\textsuperscript{155} Ibid pp.60-61.
\textsuperscript{156} Taylor, Ibid p.17.
The adjustment policy proceeds with expanding 'integrative behavioural code of conducts' operate on different levels of society such as political parties, civil servants, national interest groups, governments and transnational institutions. This type of adjustment is described as an integrative process which involves pragmatic, ad hoc, incremental decision making style in the way that classic functionalist theory suggests. There is no transfer of authority or loyalty to regional institutions. Its impact on the state system is limited. The best example of this form of cooperation is the Nordic Council.157

These are the conceptual distinctions in the application of interdependence, integration and co-operation frameworks. In the light of these conceptual definitions and distinctions, we can now draw our intellectual map in order to define Europe and locate association in this working definition of Europe. However, first of all, another important distinction has to be made between 'autonomy' and 'sovereignty' that are structurally related to these defined political patterns.

The Question of Sovereignty and Autonomy

Before we offer our working definition of Europe, it is necessary to understand the conceptual distinctions between 'sovereignty' and 'autonomy'. This is a crucial intellectual exercise to underline the impact of the condition of modernity on the existing state system in today's Europe.

In Hinsley's classical definition, sovereignty is defined as 'the idea that there is a final and absolute political authority in the political community, and no final and absolute authority exists elsewhere.'158 This definition hardly applies to the modern conditions under which nation states operate. Because, no state is absolutely sovereign in today's world. Even though the governments cling to their legal sovereignty, the material (technological, economic, sociological) basis of their sovereignty seem to be gradually eroding as a result of

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the modern conditions. As Goodwin puts it 'the capacity of states to exercise the rights that
derive from sovereignty has been so circumscribed by the increasing pressures of the modern
world and by growing interdependence and interpenetration of states that in practice
sovereignty itself has become something of anachronism.'

In the first place, the distinction between 'external' and 'internal' sovereignty is
necessary to understand the legal use of sovereignty in the conduct of international relations.
Internal sovereignty refers to the exercise of the supreme authority of the state within its
territorial jurisdiction and internal order; and this authority is not subject to the executive,
legislative or judicial jurisdiction of any foreign authority. External sovereignty, on the
other hand, emphasizes the independence and equality of the states under international law
and their power to act and represent themselves independently with one another in
international relations as subjects of international law. Indeed, the governments
frequently tend to resort to the legal uses of sovereignty in international politics to justify
their internal and external conducts. The assertion of sovereignty as the ultimate frame of
reference of national identity has always been a possible final recourse in the actions of the
states, not only in their external conducts to the other states, but also in their internal
conducts to their respective populations. Indeed, there are many examples in history that the
abuse of sovereign rights constituted threat to international peace and even led to internal
and international wars. Therefore, the transcendence of sovereignty is essential, perhaps
inevitable, under modern conditions, to create a conducive environment for peace in Europe,
in view of the dangers of nationalism.

159 Goodwin, Geoffry L 'The Erosion of External Sovereignty?' in Ionescu, Ghita (ed)
'Between Sovereignty and Integration' London; Croom Helm, 1974, p.101.
160 In this respect, the United Nations Charter, for example, reinforces the internal
sovereignty of the states as enshrined in Article 2 (7) on domestic jurisdiction which states
often resort to justify their actions within their territorial jurisdiction.
161 According to Article 1 of the Montevideo Convention of 1933 on the Rights and
Duties of States, states should possess the following qualifications: a permanent population; a
defined territory; a government, and finally a capacity to enter into relations with other
states. It is this last qualification that refers to the external aspects of sovereignty.
Theoretically, it was one of our concerns to explain the transition of sovereignty in pluralistic conditions under which the use of sovereignty, as a means of maximization of national security, becomes practically and effectively obsolete in today’s Europe. This chapter was also concerned with understanding the conditions and dynamics in Europe which present a conducive environment towards a peaceful transformation of the existing state system, through cooperation and integration.

However, our main theoretical interest in sovereignty is in its political sense as the basis of power. In this context, an important distinction has been made between 'autonomy' and 'sovereignty' to understand the substance and form of sovereignty in the modern world. It is worth quoting Cooper: 'The illusion of national autonomy is still widespread and is widely confused with national sovereignty. The latter concerns the formal ability of a nation to act on its own rather than under the instruction of another nation. That remains undiminished. National autonomy, in contrast, is the ability of a nation to achieve its objectives through unilateral action. That is heavily constrained, as we have seen, in an environment of high interdependence.' It is clear from this quotation that states, in general, retain the framework of their sovereignty, but lose the material substance of their sovereignty. As a result of the condition of interdependence the ability of the states to achieve and pursue their policies seem to have diminished. In this way, they gradually lose autonomy. Governments, while they try to retain their legal sovereignty as an ultimate framework of reference of their national identity, come under increasing pressure to secure the welfare and security of their own people, in view of competition for scarce resources, international prestige and other means of national enhancement. Thus, they are forced, in a way, under pluralistic competitive circumstances, to cooperate with one another in order to regain the autonomy to pursue their policies. In this sense cooperation seems the only way

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162 See for the different uses of sovereignty James, Alan 'Sovereignty in Eastern Europe' Millenium: Journal of International Studies 20(1) 1991 81-83.
for them to maximize their sovereignty and face the consequences of an interdependent world.

Moreover, the effects of growing interdependence seems also to limit the legalistic and monolithic character of the sovereignties of the states. As it has been observed, 'a wide array of shifting sovereign arrangements as a consequence of the fact that the very borders of nations are no longer under genuine sovereign control. The financial markets are now interconnected worldwide due to modern systems of communications; people ideas and criminals move across borders in great numbers; ballistic missiles reduce the relevance of borders; and free trade agreements and common markets render ideas of a state's self-contained economic system obsolete.' These practical developments have reduced the importance of sovereignty and its indivisible monolithic character. This is in a modern world where the sovereignty of modern state are constantly divided, shared and reformed, to cope with the consequences of interdependence. Indeed, states join integration because they think that they may have 'a better chance of influencing the world affairs as one of a group of sovereign states than as a single sovereign state on their own.' By joining the integrative ventures, the legal sovereignty of states are also being affected.

Unlike 'co-operation', however, joining 'integration' requires substantial modifications in the legal definition of sovereignties of states, in their own constitutional frameworks. It has a direct effect on the state systems. First, they accept the jurisdiction of supranational authorities in their internal order. Moreover, their external sovereignties are supplemented by way of joint action and representation in international politics. Therefore, governments who join integrative schemes for practical reasons, suffer from the unintentional consequences of the irreversible erosion of their sovereignty, as a result of the institutional dynamics of the integration process. This is the dialectical logic behind the integration that states, in order to recover the basis of their sovereignties, which have been undermined by

165 See Pinder International Affairs 1986 op cit p.46.
loss of autonomy, seem to be compelled to join integration. However, by joining integration voluntarily, they are inevitably compelled to refashion their sovereignties and accordingly transfer some of their powers to central institutions. As we have shown previously, unlike co-operation, in integration there is a constant interaction between autonomous central institutions (supranational) and governments (Intergovernmental) who compete for power and authority in the process of integration. For instance, within the EC there is constant competition between the Council of Minister representing the interests of the states and the Commission and the European Parliament which are the supranational bodies.¹⁶⁶

To conclude, the conventionally defined monolithic, legalistic use of sovereignty is constantly changing. As a result 'sovereignty', needs to be 'mitigated by the exigencies of interdependence'. Because 'sovereignty is a relative notion, variable in the course of time, adaptable to new situations and exigencies ...¹⁶⁷ From a pluralistic point of view, the transcendence of sovereignty is necessary for the peaceful transformation of Europe. In this direction, integration and cooperation processes reflect the ways in which governments respond to the condition of interdependence and adapt their sovereignty and autonomy according to the modern conditions, particular in today's Europe. They resort to cooperation and integration to manage the consequences of increasing interdependence in different issue areas. In this context, the Association process of Turkey is of particular relevance to cooperation and integration.

II  
A Working Definition of Europe: Association in the Process of Europeanization

In this section, we shall offer our working definition of Europe. In doing so we shall draw our mental map. It is within this contextual perspective that we will operationalize our association model. Hence, it is within this defined regional framework that Turkey's association link with the EC will assume a dynamic and progressive character in the process of Turkey's developing European identity.

¹⁶⁷ Quoted in Ruth *op.cit* p.43.
We are aware of the historical definitions of Europe. Indeed, as Dawson in his famous book on 'The Making of Europe' argued that Europe owes its political existence to the Roman Empire and its spiritual unity to the Catholic Church and finally its intellectual tradition to the classical tradition of Hellenism 'that have gone to the making of European unity.' 168 However, we are not interested in retrospective mythologies that define Europe as an exclusive regional cultural-historical entity. 169 We have to leave this historical aspect to historians. 170 We accept that 'common cultural heritage' is important but what we regard as crucial is 'a common vision' of Europe in terms of peace, democracy, the rule of law and an emergence of European civil society. 171

Our definition of Europe is not geographical either. We shall not attempt to draw a territorial map of Europe with clear cut borders. However, one can stretch it to the limits by referring to the Roman geographer Strabo who placed the boundary between Asian and Europe at the Taurus Mountains near the present southern border of Turkey. 172 One can shrink it by referring to the 19th century French politician Tallerand who suggested that Europe ends at the Pyrenees Mountains, the present border between France and Spain. One can quote Otto Von Bismark 'He who speaks of Europe is mistaken; it is only a geographical expression.' After all Europe is an extended peninsula of the Asian land mass. Therefore any definition of Europe is bound to be political and determined by social, economic and political condition of interdependence between states.

Hence, our definition will focus on the political and economic dynamics which manifest themselves in institutional, structural and organizational tendencies in the

169 See for instance, on the dangers of defining Europe against others in an attempt to form a kind of European supernation, Smith, Anthony D. 'National identity and the idea of European unity' International Affairs 68(1) 1992 pp.55-76.
170 See, for an overview of different historical and cultural perspectives and perceptions of Europe, Brands, M.C. 'Europe halved and united; from a split object to a restored cultural identity' in 'Europe from a cultural perspective' ed. by Rijksbaron, A. Roobol, W.H. (Nijgh and Van Ditwar Universitair 1987 pp.73-104.
171 See, for instance, Dahrendof, Ralf 'Reflections on the revolution in Europe London; Chatto & Windus 1990.
transformation of existing international state systems in Europe. The political, technological, economic and sociological interdependence, actual or perceived, is the underlying structural condition that determines the behaviour of the states in Europe today.\textsuperscript{173} Indeed, a modern definition of Europe, in this sense was suggested as 'a common cultural heritage, adherence to the fundamental values of democracy and human rights, geographical proximity and a high degree of interdependence in the fields of industry, trade and technological development.'\textsuperscript{174} In this context, we treat Europe as a regional framework - 'Europe paradigm' in which the existing state systems undergo a transformation. As a result of regional interdependence states lose their autonomy. In this European process states, in order to adapt to the conditions of modernity, are, in a way, compelled to qualify, redefine, reform, merge, share or pool their sovereignties through different frameworks of international integration and cooperation. In this way, it can be observed that traditional international European system is being transformed by way of adjusting, refashioning and transcending the sovereignties of the states in order to cope with the consequences of this high level of regional condition of interdependence.

Hoffman once put it 'the critical issue for every student of world order is the fate of the nation state.'\textsuperscript{175} This issue seems to be at the very heart of European studies and remains the main question for the students of European politics. As it has been recently observed 'the whole system that evolved in the 16th and 17th centuries, of the nations state and its absolute sovereignty is being threatened. Sovereignty is being eroded by technology and the growing power of supranational bodies.'\textsuperscript{176} The existing state system, in Europe, is undergoing a period of transformation. State boundaries are becoming less and less relevant to the people living within the nation-states of Europe. As the American Secretary of State

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{173} See Wallace, William \textit{The Dynamics of European Integration} London; Pinter Pub. 190.
\textsuperscript{174} Wallace, William ed. \textit{The Transformation of Western Europe} London; Pinter 1990 p.34.
\textsuperscript{175} Obstinate or obsolete? The fate of the nation-state and the case of Western Europe' \textit{Daedalus} p.862.
\textsuperscript{176} \textit{The Economist} 26 December 1992 - 8 January 1993 p.47.
\end{footnotesize}
stated 'The most striking phenomenon across all Europe today is the combined and simultaneous evolution and devolution of the nation state.' Although the nation state is still an important political unit 'its political role is being supplemented by both supranational and sub-national units.'\footnote{Guardian 16 February 1993.} The transformation of the state system is a particularly European phenomenon that affect almost all state systems in today's Europe.

In structural and institutional terms, there are two Europes. First of all, there is an integrative core within which the integration process of the EC takes place. This manifests itself in institutional, attitudinal, economic and political integration of the member states of the EC which move towards a political union. Although, it is too early to clearly define 'European Union' at this stage it is possible to observe that there are strong federalist tendencies in the integration process.\footnote{Pinder, J. European Community Building of a Union' Oxford; Oxford University Press 1991.} The EC already acts as a supranational body in several policy areas which are related to economic aspects of the Single European Act. It might even assume more supranational characteristics in other policy areas after the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty.\footnote{The Treaty of Maastricht, The Independent 11 October 1992. See also for the recent developments and prospects of the EC, Archer, Clive and Butler, Fiona The European Community; Structure and Process London; Pinter 1992 pp.182-193.}

Karl Deutsch suggested that political integration is a nuclear process attracting a widening area around an initial core, in which 'stronger, and more politically, administratively, economically and educationally advanced political units were found to form the cores of strengths around which in most cases integrative process developed.'\footnote{Deutsch op. cit p.19. Quoted in Wallace, William ed. The Dynamics of European Integration' London; Pinter Pub. 1990 p.15.} Indeed, the EC can be regarded as a dynamic federalizing core at the centre of Europe which constantly deepens its scope and widens its domain through its integrative framework. The preamble of the Treaty of Paris, which set up the European Coal and Steel Community, implicitly indicated this federalizing notion of the EC which constituted 'the basis for a
broader and deeper community among peoples long divided by bloody conflicts'. 181 Furthermore, in 1957, the Treaty of Rome confirmed this federalizing orientation. The Treaty in its preamble provided for 'Determined to lay foundations of an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe'. 182 Indeed, as it can be inferred from the EC's legal and political history that it hints at a grander political design than a simple international organization. This has been further evidenced, during the negotiations on the draft of the Treaty of Political Union in Maastricht 1991. Then, it has been explicitly expressed that 'this Treaty [The Treaty of Maastricht] marks a new stage in the process leading gradually to a Union with a federal goal'. 183 Given the dynamic nature of the EC, it is predictable that it will have implications not only for the state systems of the EC but also for the non-member countries of Europe who are highly interdependent with or dependent on the EC. This might be more likely to be the case as the EC moves closer to 'Union' and acts more like an actor externally.

On the other hand this dynamic core, operates as an actor within a wider European cooperation process consisting of different intergovernmental organizations and frameworks of cooperations, notably the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe; the Council of Europe and NATO. These co-operation frameworks reflect the regional interdependence of the states in different issue areas: security, ideological affiliations and regional values that manifest themselves in different treaties within the context of European regional organizations. Within this intergovernmental process of European cooperation the states retain their sovereignties but voluntarily restrict their autonomies. However, between intergovernmental and supranational Europe there seems to be a dynamic relationship. As Wallace pointed out:

"It is more useful to think in terms of continuum than of a sharp divide, between intergovernmental cooperation among sovereign states and subordination within a supranational political system: a continuum which stretches from limited cooperation 'in dense policy spaces' within regimes..."
which 'contain norms and principles justified on the basis of values extending beyond self interest, and regarded as obligatory on moral grounds by governments' to political communities based on relatively stable structures of bargaining, legal authority, and popular acceptance."\(^{184}\)

This is where association structures come into the picture. We shall suggest in our research European association agreements, in general, and Turkey's association with the EC, in particular, constitute the dynamic instrument of this 'progressive identity' formation. This can be best explained by the Europeanization process. It is useful to understand some intellectual motivations that give meanings to the facts or explain attitudinal orientations in Europe today. This attitudinal environment can be explained by an ideological concept called 'Europeanism'. Europeanism is a persistent mental attitude which is existent in some fractions at the elite levels of societies in Europe, (politicians, intellectuals, bureaucrats and interest groups, industrialists) whether they are member or non-members of the EC. Indeed, the declaration of the intent to join the EC is the confirmation of the existence of this attitude as the educated elite are aware of the implications of joining the integrative framework of the EC. In fact, for the modernizing elites of Europe, Europeanism is a kind of ideal that Europe which created the nation state, should transcend it. This attitude is defined as 'the well being, destiny and institutions of major European states as so closely linked by geographical and historical circumstances that no cogent political action can be successfully pursued in one state without some reference to, and attempt to achieve integration with, the others.'\(^{185}\) This attitude persists not only at the level of elites within the EC (i.e. European Federalists) but also at the level of the modernizing elites of the other non-member countries for whom integration is seen as a means in the process of their modernization. This attitude has been described as 'the Europa Paradigm'.\(^{186}\) This 'Europe paradigm' contains the tradition of

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184 Wallace, The Dynamics of European Integration op cit p.19.
modernization and development of social, economic and political institutions. Association patterns in Europe must be seen from the perspective of this Europa paradigm so that integration and modernization are regarded as synonymous.

In the light of these considerations, we regard identity not as a static but dynamic component of international integration. As Wallace put it 'Successive wave of applications for Community membership, developing network of multilateral and bilateral agreements between the EC and other European countries, indicate a pronounced tendency towards convergence of institutionalized bargaining around the Community framework.' He continues to suggest that 'Confusion between 'Europe' and 'The European Community' may thus gradually resolve itself in a progressive identity between the two.' Hence, we assume associations, especially European association patterns, as important intermediary frameworks, will play important roles in the process of progressive European identity formation between the EC and wider European cooperation process. Puchala, for instance, denied that international integration is federalism. Regardless of whether we call European integration federalism or not, there obviously exists within the EC an integrative framework that seems to go 'beyond the nation state', particularly after the Treaty of Maastricht. Therefore, in this respect, Puchala's approach does not apply to the EC context. However, in the wider sense of European cooperation, Puchala's approach can be more applicable and useful to understand the wider framework of European cooperation. In this wider context, it is observable that there are a complete set of actors (supranational, national, subnational, intergovernmental) that operate within a distinctive process of institutionalized bargaining and an atmosphere dominated by pragmatism and mutual responsiveness.

187 Modernity, as a concept, refers to the emergence and development of various social practices, institutions, forms of life and experiences since 18th century. See, for instance, Habermas, J. The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity' Cambridge, 1987.
188 Wallace, The Dynamics of European Integration op cit p.20.
190 Puchala, Ibid. 279-284.
Furthermore, Puchala’s approach can be very helpful to understand attitudinal tendencies in Europe. For Puchala also denies that integration is a regional nationalism in terms of relating to one another which can be described as a sense of belonging to an exclusive entity - 'we-ness'. According to Puchala, what is more crucial is what people think about international co-operation and institutionalization and about supranational decision making.\(^{191}\) We think this is the crucial indicator of attitudinal environment in Europe today. What we regard as more important are the perceptions of people about integration and co-operation rather than the 'sense of Europeanness' as the formation of regional nationalism.

We see Europeanization as a learning process. Hence, being European is an additional identity that all states may learn and benefit from. European identity is not a static but a dynamic concept. It does not substitute or replace other identities whether subnational or national but it seems to supplement them. In Europe today, we are living in an environment of multiplying identities, which are the consequences of the modern world. As Wallace emphasizes 'Values and attitudes are not static. They are shaped by experience and social learning by mutual interactions over time by the imagery and persuasiveness of intellectual and political leaders, and shifts in the external environment'.\(^{192}\) Europeanization process, therefore, has to be seen as a process of identity formation on different levels of European society - regional, subregional, national and subnational, supranational and intergovernmental.\(^{193}\) In this context, we assume that European associations have important roles to play in the European cooperation and integration process in terms of progressive formation of European identity. We can now move on to explain our models which we will adopt to analyze Turkey's association process.

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191 Ibid. pp.267-269.
192 Wallace, The Transformation of Europe op cit. p.34.
193 See identity and Europeanization, Buzan, Barry, Kelstrup Morten The European Security Order Recast London; Pinter pub 1990 pp.219-220.
Definition of Association

Association is defined by different scholars with emphasis on the different aspects of association systems. In the first place a distinction between the association of states and the association of a state with an international intergovernmental or supranational organization must be made. Association of states refers to community states which connotes the relationship between the members of commonwealth or non-aligned movement.194 However, we are interested in the latter model of association which is more relevant to a bilateral cooperation framework between the EC and Turkey.

Groom, having compared to other adjustment policies, noted that 'the structural impact of association is greater since it is embodied in a formal agreement.'195 Even though the interests of the parties are of a complementary character in some areas rather than compatible, actors of association are disparate in their structures. However, it is said that association may promote integration in certain areas while restricting it in others. Thus, it is argued that the task expansion of functional imperative is limited to the framework.

Taylor, on the other hand, describes association as a process of consultation between parties proceeding with non-coercive way of conflict by means of bargaining and regulations on a regular basis. According to Taylor, association is a means of promoting long term interests while coping with the short term disagreements.196 In a similar way, actors concentrate on practical, functional arrangements and try to postpone or avoid associated questions of political commitment within the framework of the association relationship. In some cases, depending on the institutional and political nature of the relationship, political involvement, if not commitment, may be inevitable (Turkey's case). Particularly if the emphasis is on the value of the relationship in itself as a result of the common values and

196 Taylor, Frameworks for International Cooperation op cit p.16.
interests of the actors. However, as Taylor observed, in association systems 'the closer the approach to specifics, the greater is the probability of revealing disagreements.'\textsuperscript{197}

On the other hand, Kinnas, who has studied and written on association systems, gives a more comprehensive definition of association. According to Kinnas 'Association is a flexible, open decentralized and collaborative system which enables the governments and peoples, states and IGOs to work together to the extent in the form which suits them best individually.'\textsuperscript{198} To that end, association establishes an institutionalized relationship of 'symbiosis' between a nation state and supranational organization within a new systemic framework which allows integration in some areas while keeping other separate.

\section*{III Research Problems and Theoretical Criteria for Analysis}

Even though, it has been embodied in a formal agreement, Turkey's Association cannot be analyzed in isolation by looking at its legal form and content alone. It has to be seen in its historical, political and structural context within the framework of European integration and cooperation process. On the other hand, a historical account of the relationship tends to ignore the structural and institutional implications of the relationship. In general, we assume that associations, as regional sub-systems, are capable of performing some functional roles in the transformation of Europe. What we witness in the European continent today is a kind of symbiosis between nationalism and Europeanism which can be regarded as additional identity formation at a regional level through cooperative and integrative ventures. In this context, association agreements can contribute to European integration as progressive patterns of identity formation as political and economic catalysts of the Europa paradigm, which contains modernization and development traditions of Europe. Turkey's Association has to be analyzed in this light.

As it applies to Turkey's case, association can be called as a pattern of modernization and adjustment to European integration. It is an institutional component of Europeanization.

\textsuperscript{197} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{198} Kinnas and Groom in 'Frameworks for International Cooperation' op cit p.75.
process. It is one of our arguments in this research that the association acts as a political frame of reference for the modernizing elites of Turkey towards the EC and provides, 'the compelling public political framework and motivation for the country’s modernizing and democratizing policies and their rationale.' Hence, Turkey’s full membership of the EC is regarded as the natural conclusion of this modernization and democratization process. This is the case at least in the eyes of Turkish governmental and non-governmental elites who refer to association agreement as a point of reference in Turkey’s advance towards European integration.

In the light of these assumptions, an important research problem remains how to operationalize our research and to identify the sources and material to substantiate our arguments. This is a case study that aims to operationalise Turkey’s Association pattern within the dynamics of European integration and co-operation process. In this context, we are mainly concerned with tasks, transactions, perceptions and learning to detect the systemic tendencies in the Association pattern within the co-operative and integrative framework of Europe. We are not concerned with the maintenance of sovereignty, the maximisation of national interests and national security and military capabilities and balance of power among actors. On the other hand security interdependence and perceptions of security interdependence have been examined as long as these have an impact on the Association process. In our research security is treated as an asset and issue area within the general policy framework of interdependence in the bargaining process between the EC and Turkey.

As we emphasized, the Association process involves tasks learning, perceptions and transactions. By perceptions we refer to the negative and positive evaluations of the Association relationship by governmental and non-governmental elites and the interest groups over time. The richest source of data is available to measure the tasks in terms of approximation to common desired aims which was designed by the Association structures, in

other words the completion of customs union and the elimination of trade barriers and harmonisation of laws and the convergence of policies in the light of the aims of the Association framework. The same applies to the multiplicity of transactions in different issues which is crucial to detect the level and the nature of interdependence as opposed to simple interconnectedness. The research focuses on interactions within institutional framework. Within the structures of Association, regular contacts and bargaining processes are involved by linking different issues in the overall context of increasing interdependence. Structures as well as policies are important to understand the characteristics of relationship between the actors across time. On the other hand, even though we did not rely extensively and systematically on interview techniques, this does not mean that they are not significance. We occasionally used interviews to substantiate and to support our arguments. However, since the application of Turkey for full membership there is plenty of evidence and data available from secondary but reliable sources reflecting the general public mood and perceptions in the domestic and international establishments (such as the newspapers and journals. i.e. the Financial Times and The Economist) There are plenty of accessible sources, surveys, reports and monographs and books that provide information about perceptions of Turkish political and economic elites from the whole political and economic spectrum. We extensively relied on the quotations from these commonly accepted reliable sources since they are easier to confirm and verify. Literature and secondary sources provide substantial evidence to show elite perceptions in the form of interviews and institutional, structural and attitudinal characteristics and changes in the Association process. However, we also relied on the primary sources, official and legal documents which were produced by the EC (The Decisions and the Reports of the Community Organs: the Commission; the Parliament and the Council as well as the decisions of the Association Council) to reveal the institutional level, nature and the policy scope of the Association relationship. Within the policy framework of the Association, the research focused on 'the out puts' the steps taken by the actors as well as the 'inputs' the processes and arguments by which given policies were adopted by the actors. Thus we are interested in the substance of the Association policy as
well as the policy making processes between the actors. Empirical evidence is not selected arbitrarily or randomly. On the other hand, we cannot suggest that the empirical evidence has been investigated exhaustively since there is still a vast amount of data that can be found. Our scientific approach, in this sense is hypothetico deductive in the Poperian sense which suggests that we make our hypothesis first and test it against the selected empirical evidence by deducing certain results from the assumptions. After all what is scientific is only reliable until it is falsified in the light of new evidence.

Our aim is not only to find a theory that is applicable to Turkey's Association process but also the one that can give meanings to our empirical findings, adequately explains what happens and explains why stages occur in the process of Association. Moreover in the light of these, how helpful this theory is in predicting the outcome of the relationship under prevailing circumstances. Therefore we need a theory which is not only descriptive, explanatory but also enables us to predict the outcome of the relationship.

We adopted two theoretical models in analysing Turkey's Association relationship with the EC. These models, however, are not mutually exclusive but shed light on the different aspects and the dimensions of the same phenomenon. The first theoretical model is a process oriented approach in other words, 'co-operation towards integration'. The second is the interdependence, which explains the underlying condition of the Association relationship.

**Association as a Process**

The first approach is teleological which treats association as an adjustment process towards integration. In this sense, association can be interpreted as a limited integrative framework and as a process oriented approach - a prelude to eventual integration. By the teleological approach we mean that we shall investigate the process of Association in terms of approximating to the terminal condition as it has been envisaged in the Association Agreement, i.e. full membership. Therefore, it is normal to interpret the association relationship as a process oriented cooperation framework rather than a permanent condition.
It is because of this resulting condition association has to be treated as a preliminary framework for integration. The association, though, is an adjustment process to integration but not integration in itself. As we showed earlier integration is about the rebuilding of the state system at the supranational level. In integration there is a continuous transfer of autonomy which eventually leads to an irreversible derogation of sovereignty. Integration theories are about a fundamental change in the existing state system that can be persistent at different levels of the societies, from the popular to the non-governmental interest groups and governmental elites and political leaders.

However, association as an adjustment process takes place within the existing state system and there is no observable transfer of authority or loyalty to the central institutions. For instance, interactions mainly take place within intergovernmental decision making framework. Although it is difficult to detect the attitudinal changes at the popular level in the association relationship there are certain levels that may be affected as a result of process mechanisms. For instance, the perceptions and the attitudes of non-governmental interest groups, governmental elites and political leaders may change in the process of association.

Although association does not fit the conceptual framework of integration theories, it may have some limited structural impacts on the state systems of the associated state. For instance, the autonomy of the association state is restricted in some aspects of its economy as a result of interactions in the association process. In this sense, association can be a learning process for integration. Because elites learn to accept the consequences of increasing interdependence within the association relationship and adopt parallel policies with the integrative core, in accordance with the adjustment framework of Association, by voluntarily giving up some of their policy instruments over their economic autonomy. However, this learning process is limited to the integrative tasks within the Association framework.

**Customs Union**

Depending on the content and form, association agreements may include some important integrative tasks. For instance, as we shall see later in this research, the
establishment of a customs union is the most crucial integrative task in Turkey's association process. In this research the achievement of the customs union is regarded as crucial evidence of integrative tendencies within the Association framework. In this sense, the Association can be a learning process not only for the state who voluntarily and gradually gives up its autonomy over the instruments of policies in economic field but also for the non-governmental elites or interest groups who can accept and bear the consequences of a competitive economic environment within a customs union regime.

The conceptual explanation of the customs union is necessary. Although the 'Customs Union' is a stage in the process of economic integration, its implications can be much more political than economic. Therefore, association systems which include 'customs union' arrangements cannot be regarded as simple trade agreements but sui generis political cooperation frameworks, since 'Customs union' arrangements, in the association systems, are mainly adopted for political reasons.

Balassa, for instance, has identified different levels of economic integration, namely a free trade area, a customs union, a common market, economic and monetary union and total economic integration. According to Balassa's definition, at each stage states gradually eliminate discriminatory measures on trade and economy and adopt parallel policies towards economic integration. In free trade areas, tariffs and quotas are eliminated between the participating actors but maintained vis-a-vis third countries. Whereas, in a customs union, in addition to the removal of trade restrictions, participating actors adopt a Common Commercial Policy vis-a-vis third countries. In a sense, they form common economic borders within which member states apply common laws and regulations to trade with non-members. In contrast to free trade area, members of a customs union lose their economic

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200 The establishment of customs union have important political implications for the sovereignties of the states, for instance, in 1931 the preliminary agreement to establish Customs Union between Austria and Germany almost led to a European crisis. European states referred to the Court of Justice to ask whether Austria would be acting contrary to the provisions of the Treaty of Saint-Germain which had provided that 'the independence of Austria is inalienable'. It was concluded that the economic independence of Austria was in question. See Harris D.J. Cases and Materials on International Law. Fourth ed. London; Sweet & Maxwell 1991 p.105.
autonomy as they give up their external economic policy instruments in their trade relations with other non-member countries. 201 On the other hand, the common market involves the free movement of all factors of production-labour, capital and services - in addition to the free flow of goods. Economic union is a stage further than a common market. Economic union implies the harmonization of some national economic policies and a single currency. Finally, total economic integration involves not just product and factor integration but also the integration of economic policies and institutions. 202

Pinder introduced an important conceptual distinction between 'negative' and 'Positive integration', to indicate the stages in the process of economic integration. He explained that 'negative integration consists of the removal of discrimination, and positive integration as the formation and application of coordinated and common policies in order to fulfil economic and welfare objectives other than the removal of discrimination.' 203 The customs union is an important stage in this process of economic integration. Indeed, by way of establishing Customs Union, states do not only eliminate the trade restrictions between themselves but also start to adopt common policies particularly with regard to 'Common External Policy'. Association systems may possess not only negative integrative tasks but also positive ones. For instance, Turkey's association Agreement also provides for the free movement of production factors and harmonization of economic policies. In this sense, it will be proposed that the customs union constitutes the threshold level between negative and positive integration. This will be examined in the relevant chapter.

Within the policy framework of the Association, these processes take place in different institutional settings and at different level of decision making. Within the supranational setting the central institutions gradually gain autonomy to expand the tasks into other areas free from the intervention of the national decision making once they gain

203 Pinder, John 'Positive Integration and Negative Integration: Some Problems of Economic Union' in European Integration ed. by Hodges op cit p.126.
competencies. Whereas in the process of association there seems to be a parallelism in the way in which decisions are taken and implemented. The association decision making organ, the Council, does not seem to enjoy any autonomy of its own. Each of the parties takes the measures necessary to implement the decisions of the Council in accordance with the provisions of the Association framework, within their domestic jurisdiction which is similar to a parallel action process.

As far as the aims of the Association are concerned, the fulfilment of the integrative tasks of Turkey's Association system implies that association process reached the stage of 'quasi membership'. The terminal condition of association is qualitatively different from the beginning of the Association process. Hence, elite perceptions and attitudes change in the process of interactions by learning of rewards from cooperation and penalties from incompatibilities as result of interactions within the Association system. Under these ideal conditions, it is expected that the fulfilment of the tasks of Association, are supposed to transform Turkey into the full membership of the EC in the light of the original objectives of the Association Treaty. However, the perceptions of Association are important in the sense that the demand for full membership might be the consequence of dissatisfaction with the Association. Association might become or be perceived by the elites, as an obsolete framework for the management of relationship, as a result of systemic changes in the environment. Throughout this research we are going to explain different stages of association within different background conditions, motivations and characteristics in the process.

Kinnas, for instance, who studied association systems suggest that within the association systems there are two oppositive forces working. 'One leading towards the transcending of the nation state identity and the other toward rebuilding, or at least maintenance, of the identity of the nation state'.204 The maintenance of the separate identity as an extension of sovereignty is only one aspect in the dialectic of association processes.

States who do not wish to participate in the integrative framework might seek an association relationship to protect their identities or to qualify their sovereignties without undermining their national identities. Association, in this sense, can be an extension of sovereignty, politically, legally and rhetorically as an ultimate frame of reference in the expression of national identity. Regardless of the original intentions, however, we are interested in the systemic changes in the association system that lead to the transcending of the national state. Association, as a process then can be described as an identity formation process in attitudinal terms that might encourage the transformation of nation states' identity by supplementing national identity with a supranational one. As we suggested earlier we see this as the formation of progressive identity is not the formation of supranationalism (nation building at the supranational level) but the positive perceptions of the elites about supranational decision making style is more important. In this sense, Association, in general, and Turkey's association, in particular, may contribute to European integration. The fulfilment of integrative tasks in the learning process of association might transcend the initial objectives of association towards the supplementing of the identity of the nation state with a supranational identity which is the main structural trend within the integrative framework of the EC. This is where our prediction exercise enters the analysis of the Association in our process oriented approach.

In our teleological approach, the last stage of the Association is considered as a terminal stage, which is very difficult to define. However, we shall ask the following questions: What is the origin of Turkey's Association? Where is the course of the Association leading to? What is the actual final stage of Association? Does this final stage really exist? If so, under what conditions and arrangements (i.e. the completion of customs union)? 'Can this be simply called association or is it some form of de facto full membership or 'association plus'? Or does this terminating of association so affect the dependent subsystem that it becomes some kind of satellite of the EC for an indefinite period? Can the Associate state disentangle itself from the EC if its expectations are not fulfilled and Association is seen as an instrument of dominance? If this disengagement is not possible, what kind of association
systems will emerge in European cooperation and integration process and what form will they take within the new European architecture? These are some of the questions we hope to answer when we complete our research. In order to answer these questions, the explanation of the underlying structural condition of Association is necessary.

Association as a Condition

We explained the conceptual definition of Association as a process oriented approach, which is explained as a pattern of modernization in its adjustment to European integration. Apart from this teleological approach, Association can also be explained by the condition of interdependence. In this context, Association is an institutional procedure, devised by governments to cope with the consequences of increasing interdependence. Hence, interdependence, is particularly useful to explain the underlying condition of the Association relationship. As we emphasized earlier, Keohane and Nye distinguish interdependence from other process oriented and teleological approaches, that focus on the attitudinal and institutional tendencies between the actors. However, interdependence is useful in explaining the Association as a condition, rather than treating it as a process. We use the interdependence theory to show the degree of asymmetry between the actors. Despite the rhetorical use of interdependence, which often carries egalitarian and positive overtones, interdependence can be highly asymmetrical, 'depending on the characteristics of issue areas and interests of elites as well as aggregate levels of power of the states.'

Even within a relationship that is beneficial to all parties involved, interdependence can be highly asymmetrical. As is Turkey's case, one actor may be dependent upon the other, to a much greater extent. Asymmetry is politically important. Because being less dependent than other actor, in an interdependent system, can be an important source of power. Thus asymmetrical interdependence is the best way to explain the structural condition of Association at any given time, but not the process of Association that eventually allows the Associate state to participate in the integrative framework of the EC. In this sense,

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association as a process oriented theory is progressive (the catalyst or the agent of modernization) - the adjustment process to European integration. Whereas as a condition of interdependence between the EC and Turkey, it may reveal highly uneven condition of an institutional relationship within the Association structure.

There are various types of interdependence and levels of it. But in our research we are particularly interested in two types of interdependence to show the vulnerability and sensitivity of the Associated partner to the change of policies within the framework of the EC. The first is economic and social interdependence. It was argued by Keohane and Nye that the volume of transactions are not reliable indicators of economic (and social) interdependence. Instead, as we explained in the section concerning the concept of interdependence, 'sensitivity' can be used to indicate the asymmetry in economic and social interdependence in terms of which actor in the system is most vulnerable to the changes in the rules, or to a drastic reduction in the level of transactions in the system. Another useful conceptual tool of interdependence is 'vulnerability', which concerns the cost of disengagement from the Association relationship. In order to indicate the degree of vulnerability in the interdependence, the crucial question is: who is going to be affected most from drastic changes in the system, or the termination of the relationship? As Keohane suggests 'vulnerability interdependence is particularly relevant for the analysis of the structure of relations in a common market or in an issue area'.

Another type of asymmetry may occur in the policy interdependence which 'refers to the extent to which the decisions taken by actors in one part of a system, affect (intentionally or unintentionally) other actors' policy decisions elsewhere in the system'. Policy interdependence may be direct or indirect. Where policy interdependence is indirect there is no direct contact between the policy making centers. They affect and manipulate each other's behaviour without consultations. On the other hand, in direct policy interdependence,

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206 Ibid.  
207 Ibid. p.368.  
208 Ibid. p.370.  
209 Ibid.
'governments may take action deliberately designed to affect other's policies, may threaten to do so, or may be in such a situation that such actions or threats are continual possibilities'. 210

When we apply these direct and indirect policy interdependence to the Association process to detect asymmetrical policy interdependence between the actors we observe that both direct and indirect policy interdependence are existent in the relationship of Association.

Keohane and Nye argued that 'It is asymmetries in dependence that are most likely to provide sources of influence for actors in their dealings with one another. Less dependent actors can often use the interdependent relationship as a source of power in bargaining over an issue and perhaps to affect other issues.' 211 Thus asymmetrical interdependence is a source of power in the sense that 'power as control over resources, or the potential to affect outcomes'. 212 On the other hand, the most interesting aspect of interdependence is that the more dependent partner might also benefit from this relationship and influence the outcomes by turning it to its advantage. However, 'power measured in terms of resources or potential is different from power measured in terms of influence of outcomes.' 213 A student of interdependence explains further the use of asymmetrical interdependence as a source of influence in the bargaining process. It is worth a full quotation:

'A has power over B in a particular issue area where B is asymmetrically vulnerable to A. On the other hand, although B may be weaker than A, it may be more determined and have superior bargaining skills which may make it more powerful than A in terms of political effectiveness' ... [Moreover,] 'What is interesting in interdependence paradigm is the connection of power with asymmetrical vulnerability, and the idea that an actors' power will vary according to issue under consideration. At a given moment A could exercise power over B with respect one set of issues, but B could exercise power over A in respect of other sets of issues.' 214

Asymmetrical interdependence may still provide the dependent partner with some source of influence, who is more powerful in certain issue areas. This is important because asymmetrical interdependence still provides 'a first approximation of initial bargaining

210 Ibid.
211 Power and Interdependence op cit 11.
212 Ibid.
213 Ibid.
advantages available to either side.\textsuperscript{215} In this way, in a world of interdependence where there are no hierarchies among issues, actors can use their power in different issue areas to get what they want in the bargaining process of the policy framework of interdependence. This means even more dependent partners in a relationship of asymmetrical interdependence can turn and manipulate the situation to their own advantages, by using their assets in the issues in which they are more powerful.

As we explained the integration and interdependence approaches look at security issues in a different way. Within the integration process, there is a hierarchy of issues ascending from economic to security issues. Security issues in integration process are, at least initially, avoided because of their highly controversial and sensitive character. However, in the interdependence relationship, security issues can be part of the bargaining process in the policy framework of interdependence as well as economic issues. For instance, even though security issues are avoided in the process of Association, the security interdependence within the context of European security and defence cooperation, albeit indirectly, seems to affect the course of the Association. In the light of this preliminary assumption, Turkey's geopolitical and strategic assets will be used as an important issue area in the bargaining process of the Association relationship with the EC. We also try to find out how important this security aspect of the relationship is in the condition of interdependence between the EC and Turkey, in Turkey's advance to European integration project. Thus, Turkey's Association relationship, within the context of European defence and security cooperation will partly be the focus of our research.

\textbf{The Theory of Association as a Form of Dependence}

So far we have analyzed the relevance of integration and interdependence theories to the Association relationship. Our approach in this research derives in general from the concepts of pluralists. However, on the surface of it, it could be argued that the structural theory of dependency and centre-periphery analysis seem to be more relevant to an

\textsuperscript{215} Power and Interdependence \textit{op cit} p.19.
association relationship between the dominant actor, which consists of highly industrialized powerful European powers, and a relatively weak state. Therefore, we owe an explanation about why we did not adopt a theory of dependency and centre-periphery analysis in our approach to the Association process between Turkey and the EC.

A brief explanation is necessary to show similarities and differences between structural and pluralist perspectives. While the pluralist approach is mainly concerned with the peaceful change in an increasingly interdependent world, the main focus of structuralists is on the development of global capitalism since the beginning of the industrial revolution. Their emphasis has been on the mechanisms of domination and the uneven development between centre and periphery. The key concepts in the structuralist approach are class, industry and capital or the accumulation of capital. They concentrate on economic variables such as the mode of production and the socio-economic consequences of these economic processes. However, structuralists and pluralists seem to share some similarities. Both approaches stress the significance of the political economy and deny the separation of high politics issues from low politics issues. But for the structuralists the driving force is always the underlying economic factors. Both approaches break states into their component parts as opposed to the realist image of states as impenetrable unitary sovereign entities. However for the structuralists the state is a more class-biased entity and the global capitalist context is the determining factor in explaining the international relations. Both approaches emphasize the welfare and socio-economic issues. However, there are important differences

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216 We prefer to call these dependency and centre-periphery schools of thought as structuralists, but they are also known as globalists. However, it should be noted that pluralists use globalism in terms of the globalisations of interdependence. Whereas, by globalism the structuralists imply the growing global system of capitalism and the imposition of this by the global centres of power on the rest of the less developed and the developing world.

in their perceptions of the interstate relationship. In general pluralists seem to have a normative commitment to peaceful change. In other words, international relations is viewed as a 'positive sum' game in which inter state relations are reorganized and managed through bargaining and compromise. In the end, all parties are allowed to gain to a certain extent. On the other hand, the structuralists tend to view international relations as a 'zero sum' game in which one party's losses are another's gains which means the global capitalist centre is expanding at the expense of other less developed and developing countries. They are less optimistic about peace and gradual change but more concerned with contradictions and drastic changes in the international system. This can be summarized at the expense of over simplification that the structuralists perceive international relations as the struggle between the rich capitalist centre and the poor underdeveloped peripheral states, such as the North - South divide.

There is a vast amount of literature that can be referred to within the parameters of this school of thought. However we shall concentrate on Galtung's work since his approach is particularly relevant to the analysis of Turkey's Association relationship. For instance, Galtung views the relationship between the core and the periphery Europe as a form of penetration (ideological and policy dependence), exploitation (economic dependence) and fragmentation (among the third countries).\(^{218}\) His work is very valuable and enriching in understanding the relationship between the centre and periphery of Europe but says little about the institutional processes that involves bargaining, issue linkages, compensation mechanisms and trade offs among the actors. Galtung's argument can be valid as long as patterns of domination in the relationship persists and becomes a permanent pattern of relationship between the core and periphery of Europe. However, it is too early to conclude this since it is difficult to tell at this stage what form and content the final restructuring of European political and economic space will assume. Galtung draws our attention to the uneven nature of the relationship between the center and the periphery of Europe but does

\(^{218}\) Galtung, Johan *The European Community: A Superpower in the Making* (London: Open University Press, 1972)
not suggest any alternative possibilities other than self-sufficiency, autonomy. Even though this is an attractive option it is increasingly difficult to achieve for the developing states who are gradually caught in the web of interdependence in a global world in many issue areas such as economic, commercial, technological social and ideological. Galtung's analytical framework presents some empirical difficulties. It is difficult to prove, for instance, how penetration works and how this is measured and tested. This is also the case for fragmentation, it is relatively easy to sense but it is difficult to substantiate and verify it by hard evidence. (For instance, the EC's dealings with the Turkish Greek relationship) This is mainly because intentions (or conspiracies against the periphery) are difficult to prove. Galtung also ignores an important aspect of integration that offers its integrative framework to the other countries of Europe (developing peripheral countries) as a peaceful and voluntary process of widening. It allows other peripheral countries (e.g. the case of Greece, Portugal and Ireland) to be part of its policy making (participation in its decision making), distributive and compensation mechanisms (Social welfare and structural funds). Indeed, interdependence and integration perspectives offer possible alternatives for restructuring in international relations other than territorial sovereign state and institutions for managing the relationship between periphery and the center. More importantly, in general the structural approach ignores the relationship between the development of political and economic structures of these peripheral countries and integration project as a point of reference in their advance to modernization. Indeed, Integration and co-operation are the way in which many states try to cope with the consequences of the levels of increasing interdependence or dependence in Europe today.

As we suggested interdependence does not necessarily imply an even relationship. On the contrary, as Gereffi argues that as a result of the globalization of capital since the Second World War states have become increasingly interdependent, the levels of dependence
are not symmetrical and power is still concentrated at the centre of the world economy. Interdependence theory does not deny that the levels of dependency can be highly asymmetrical particularly when economic interactions take place the expense of weaker partners. On the other hand, interdependence school provides us with accurate tools to measure the level of asymmetries in terms of sensitivity and vulnerability of actors in different issue areas within the framework of the institutional relationship not only between equal but also unequal partners. But it also offers alternatives on how to manage and to cope with the consequences of increasing dependence within global and regional institutional settings and policy processes. Another weakness in the structuralist approach seems to stem from the lack of focus on these institutional and policy processes. In fact these institutional structures and policy processes involve compromises, political and economic bargaining procedures, regular consultations, mutual commitments and tasks to commonly desired ends and trade-offs through which symmetries can be restored in some issue areas to a certain extent. In the real world, even between equal partners the nature and level of interdependence can be far from being perfectly symmetrical. Even though the structuralist approach can enrich our understandings about the characteristics of relationships between the centre and the periphery in Europe, the analytical tools that the pluralists provide are much more useful and accurate when it is applied to an institutional and policy process like the Association pattern between Turkey and the EC. However, by using either approaches one can reach the same conclusions albeit with different descriptions. What is dependence for the structuralists could be highly asymmetrical interdependence for the pluralists. In our opinion, however, the difference really matters when it comes to offering predictions and alternatives towards peaceful change in the restructuring of the interstate relations between the centre and the core of Europe. In the final analysis, analytical perspectives of dependency

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219 Gereffi, Gary 'Power and dependency in an interdependent world: a guide to understanding the contemporary global crisis' International Journal of Comparative Sociology Vol.25, nos 1-2 1984 pp.509-528

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theory seems to be more conducive to conflict and instability between the centre and the periphery in Europe.

The Object, Hypothesis and Plan of the Thesis

No single theoretical framework can adequately explain the issues of world politics. Therefore, eclecticism, is to a certain extent, inevitable, since each theory tends to emphasize and analyze only one aspect of the phenomenon. This is particularly the case when one investigates a complex phenomenon like the process of Association between the EC and Turkey in the context of European integration and cooperation. Nevertheless, what we hope to achieve by using different theoretical levels to analyze Turkey's Association relationship is as follows: We think these two theoretical models are helpful in reaching conclusions that Association, as a process oriented adjustment pattern to European integration project, is a progressive pattern and may prescribe changes and help to decide upon the changes we ought to take in order to reach the goals we prefer in the peaceful transformation of Europe. Otherwise, as permanent patterns of the uneven relationship, associations may perpetuate and institutionalize the dominant-dependent pattern between the EC and the developing peripheral countries of Europe.

Apart from the normative concerns, what we tried to explain in this chapter is that the state-centric realist paradigm provides an inadequate theoretical framework for the analysis of Turkey's Association process in relation to the European integration project, with which the Association operates and is determined by the condition of interdependence and influenced by pluralistic dynamics. Indeed, pluralism provides the most fruitful concepts and analytical tools to understand Turkey's relationship with the European integration project under modern circumstances.

This research will be based on the following hypothesis: Turkey's Association framework is a progressive pattern of cooperation in the adjustment of the Turkish economy and state system to the European integration and cooperation process. The main hypothesis is made up of several assumptions.
1. Turkey's Association framework was devised as a *sui generis* pattern of cooperation that will one day enable Turkey to join as full member into the European integration project.

2. The Association created the framework of increasing interdependence between Turkey and the EC, whilst it has an important role in the management of interdependence on the basis of the even distribution of costs and benefits.

3. The Association has a potential role in creating functional cooperation and may be the basis of increasing interdependence between Greece and Turkey.

4. The Association can be a learning process about the initial effects of integration for the governmental and non-governmental elites. In this sense, the completion of the customs union is the most important task of the Association framework, that will bring Turkey to the threshold of the integrative framework of the EC.

5. Whatever the initial motivations are (political), it is inevitable that the Association process generates pluralistic dynamics in the domestic politics.

6. Depending on the external environment, the Association also generates pluralistic dynamics in the formation of Turkey's foreign and security policies within the context of Pan-European cooperation and integration process. Given the increasing security and defence interdependence between Turkey and the EC within the European security and defence structures the spill over of the political cooperation into the Association relationship is highly likely.

These assumptions will be tested in each chapter in the following manner. Chapter II investigates the main motivations behind the formation of the Association relationship and analyses the political and legal foundations of Turkey's Association relationship. Chapter III examines the first decade of the operation of the Association and addresses the question of how the increasing interdependence was handled by the Association structures and how successfully the tasks of the Association framework were achieved. Chapter IV looks into the Association within the context of the Turkish-Greek relationship. What were the implications of Greece's full membership for Turkey's Association relationship? Chapter V investigates the main political and economic motivations behind Turkey's application for full membership and assesses Turkey's Association relationship in the light of application and within the EC frame of reference, by using the EC documents. The last section concerns the impact of the full membership request on the Association process. Finally, Chapter VI assesses the Association in the context of European security cooperation in the light of the Post Cold War
security dynamics, and addresses the question of what are the implications of these new
dynamics for Turkey's Association relationship with the EC.
Chapter II

ASSOCIATION IN THEORY: THE FORMATION OF A 'SUI GENERIS' RELATIONSHIP

The aim of this chapter is to analyze the form and the content of Turkey's Association framework, which has established the political and legal foundations of the institutional relationship between the EC and Turkey. However, the Association Treaty can not be analysed in isolation from its historical, political and structural context. Thus our approach will be contextual in this chapter. We shall analyze this contractual relationship in its political and historical context.

In order to understand the legal, political and institutional characteristics of the Association, we shall pose the following questions: Under what conditions has the Association Treaty been created? What was the legal and doctrinal basis of the association policy, during the formation of Turkey's Association pattern within the EC frame of reference? What is the main objective of the Association Agreement? How are the integrative tasks, if any, defined to achieve this main objective? What kind of institutional structure has been devised for the functioning of the Association?

This chapter deals with the period between 1964 and 1970. In fact, the Association framework consisted of two main agreements, a treaty of association and additional protocol. Even though the Ankara Agreement which was signed in 1963 established the foundations of the Association relationship between Turkey and the EC, the conclusion of the subsequent Additional protocol in 1970 marked the end of the pre-Association stage. Hence, the conclusion of the Additional protocol completed the formation of the Association framework. Therefore, the period between the application for the Association and the conclusion of the Additional protocol can be regarded as the formative years of the Association relationship.

In the first section of this chapter, we shall deal with the background conditions, motivations and characteristics during the formation of the Association from both Turkey's point of view and within the EC's frame of reference. Later we shall analyze the Association Treaty itself. This chapter will conclude by examining the Additional Protocol.
The late fifties and early sixties were the formative years of the European Community. However, Turkey, regardless of the uncertainties of what direction the EC would take in the future, had been one of the first countries that sought an association relationship with the EC. Even though, the EC was mainly concerned with economic matters, at least during the formative years, the motivations behind Turkey's application were mainly political. For Turkey, the association link would permanently and politically tie Turkey to the integration project of the Western Europe.

The application was mainly the job of the Turkish Foreign Ministry which was anxious to establish permanent political and institutional links with the Western Europe as manifested in its memberships of the other post-war Western European regional organizations i.e., NATO, the Council of Europe. Even though no major public discussion in the press and in the Parliament took place, there was not any opposition to the application either. The application for association was seen as another foreign policy matter that was regarded as the prerogative of the Foreign Ministry. Thus the Foreign Ministry played an active and determining role throughout the negotiations.¹

The fundamental characteristic of the Turkish foreign policy has been its western orientation.² As it was observed by a student of Turkish foreign policy 'The national policy of Turkey is to be, or to become, a member of the European Community of nations and an

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¹ Decision for application has been made at cabinet meeting of which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs convinced the Prime Minister and the Cabinet. Documentary records of the negotiations and interviews with the Community authorities and senior Turkish diplomats who negotiated the Association Treaty (Ankara Agreement) can be found in the book written by a prominent journalist who was the head of the Brussel's office for the Turkish daily Milliyet. Therefore I owe a great deal to Birand's book which is the first detailed and documented historical account of the relationship between Turkey and the EC written in Turkish: Birand, M.A. 'Turkey's Common Market Adventure' (Istanbul; Milliyet Publishers 1987 3rd ed., pp.163-164.

² See for a good analysis of the main characteristics of Turkey's westernization Policy as a factor of continuity Sander, Oral 'Turkish Foreign Policy: Forces of continuity and change' in Modern Turkey: Forces of Continuity and of Change Ahmet Evin (Opladen; Leske und Budrich, 1984) pp.115-130.
equal in status, civilization and prestige. Accordingly, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs staunchly pursued this policy of Europeanization. Hence it was logical for Turkey to apply to the EC for an association agreement. Indeed, association was of special significance among other institutional ties with Europe. For Turkish foreign policy makers, 'the Association initially had greater importance as a step towards the realization of Turkey's long range aspiration to become an integral part of Europe'. A senior Turkish diplomat who was one of the high ranking bureaucrats who had initiated and negotiated the application of the Association, admitted that the political considerations weighed much more heavily than the economic ones. The main political concern for the decision makers of Turkey’s foreign policy was not to be excluded from the integrative process of European integration which might eventually lead to a political union. In this sense, the Association Treaty was seen as an important political and economic programme that might eventually enable Turkey to participate in European integration. This was the persistent conviction at least in the eyes of the majority of governmental elites since that time.

Although Turkey's foreign policy orientation has been a determining factor in the application to join the EC, there was another tactically important political motivation. This was the Greek factor. Indeed, within a few weeks Turkey followed Greece in applying for an association relationship with the Community. It was the Greek application that determined the timing of Turkey’s application. As a prominent Turkish journalist who closely observed the period put it 'if Greece had not applied, Turkey would have taken much longer to decide what kind of relationship to establish with the Community. As it was the Greek application

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3 Vali, Ferenc A. *The Foreign Policy of Turkey* (Baltimore; The John Hopkins Press, 1971) p.70.

4 Bahcheli, Tozun S. 'Turkey and The E.C.: The strains of Association' *Journal of European Integration* 3 (2) 1980 p.222.

provided sufficient reason for immediate action. In fact this epitomized Turkish foreign policy attitude in the immediate post-war period that, Greece must be strictly followed, so as to preclude it from using its Western European ties against Turkey. For both countries the simultaneous membership of European organizations have been the feature of their Post-war relation with the Western Europe. For instance, this has been manifested in their simultaneous accession to NATO and the Council of Europe. In the same way, Turkey's application for an association relationship resulted from the fear and the perception that Greece had been and was still the 'golden child of the west' who might use its institutional tie with the EC against Turkey in order to maximise its national interests. Hence Turkey did not want to be isolated in its foreign policy with regard to its bilateral issues with Greece.

Another impact of the Greek application on Turkey's advances to the Community was the form and the content of the legal framework of the relationship which Turkey wanted to establish. Greek demands in respect to the association relationship, created an immediate precedent. During the negotiations Turkey insisted on an identical association agreement with Greece. In view of the similar political status of both countries within the Western European institutional framework, especially with regard to NATO, Turkish negotiators saw no reason why they should not establish an identical contractual link with Europe as Greece had done.

As a matter of fact, as far as the Turkish economy is concerned, Turkey's position was weaker than Greece's. The economic situation of Turkey did not fit an association relationship that required reciprocal obligations. Turkey's economy was mainly agricultural with 75 per cent of its labour being employed in the field of agriculture. For instance, according to a community document cited by Birand, the annual national income of Turkey was $180 per capita in comparison to Greece's $400 dollar. Whereas the EC average was

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8 Birand, 'Turkey and the European Community' op cit p.52.
9 Birand, Türkiye'nin Ortak Pazar Macerası op cit p.63.
Moreover, Turkish economy which was strongly protected by import substitution policies was not suitable for a customs union. However 40 per cent of Turkey's exports went to and 30 per cent of its imports come from the European Community countries.\textsuperscript{11}

In spite of the fact that Turkey was economically less eligible for an association relationship, Turkey's foreign policy negotiators were very well aware of its strategic importance within the NATO framework. Within this condition of security interdependence Turkish negotiators bargained for Turkey's politically advantageous position during the negotiations, in order to obtain the same economic, as well as political rights, as Greece had achieved. Indeed, the Italian representative of the Council of Ministers, Emilio Colombo, later admitted to a Turkish journalist in an interview that "the driving force behind the Treaty of Association was political. It was of utmost importance to the EC at that time that, Greece and Turkey should have been treated equally because of their position in the south-eastern Europe vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. Therefore it was impossible for them to say no to Turkey. Eventually Turkey insistently used its political advantage to reach a treaty of association.\textsuperscript{12}

Hence, the EC was cautious not to upset the subtle balance between Turkey and Greece. It was this caution that enabled Turkey to use its politico-strategic advantages within the framework of the Western European defence structure to gain economic and political concessions from the EC in the course of negotiations.

There were also other economic considerations behind Turkey's application for the Association. However, they were of secondary importance. First of all, given that Turkey and Greece specialized in the same agricultural products such as figs, tobacco, dried grapes, Turkey, therefore did not want to lose its agricultural export market to Greece. Secondly, the EC was another source of financial credit. Turkey urgently needed financial capital for its

\textsuperscript{10} Given information derives from the European Commission document 500/PP/63F September 1962 cited \textit{Ibid} p.145.


\textsuperscript{12} Quoted in Birand \textit{Turkey's Common Market Adventure} \textit{op cit}, 147.
economic development. Finally the economic rationale of the Association Agreement was designed to increase Turkey's exports in order to obtain hard currencies.\textsuperscript{13}

However, in the interim, whilst negotiations continued with Turkey, the Treaty of Association had been signed in Athens in July 1962. The Athens Agreement provided for the gradual establishment of a customs union during an automatic transition period 12-22 years; financial assistance of $125,000,000 for the first five years; the harmonization of economic policies and the development of common activities and common institutions, namely the Council of Association and the mixed Parliamentary Committee. Finally, the Athens Agreement provided for the possibility of full membership.\textsuperscript{14}

The signing of the Greek Association Treaty caused public concern for the first time with regard to the future of the negotiations between Turkey and the EC.\textsuperscript{15} On the government side the reaction to the conclusion of the Greek Association Treaty was immediate. The representative of the Ministry of Foreign affairs, Tevfik Saracoglu, has been sent to Brussels to protest the EC's attitude, and the Ambassadors of the six was summoned to the Ministry of Affairs and a pronouncement of protest was made.\textsuperscript{16} Thus, it was asserted that the signing of an association Treaty with Greece, before negotiations with Turkey had finished, apparently upset the delicate balance between Greece and Turkey in favour of Greece. It was obvious that the main anxiety of Turkish negotiators was the balance between Greece and Turkey.

On the other hand, another reason for the delay was the military coup d'etat of 1960 in Turkey. However, this did not change the main course of the foreign policy of Turkey with the Western Europe. It is interesting to note that the Foreign Ministry influenced the

\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{13} Saracoglu \textit{op cit} pp.6, 7
\item\textsuperscript{14} See Yannopoulos, George N. \textit{Greece and The European Economic Community} London; Sage Pub., 1975, pp.5, 6 also Official Journal of the European Communities 293, 294, 7 July 1963.
\item\textsuperscript{15} The Turkish newspaper Milliyet wrote that Turkey sacrificed its economic development for defence. Having referred to the reliable sources it stated that unless Turkey was accepted to the European Community she had to seek alternative ways for the development and cut the defence expenditures. \textit{Milliyet} 14 July 1961.
\item\textsuperscript{16} Birand Turkey's Common Market Adventure \textit{op cit} pp.112-133.
\end{itemize}
Military Government to include a section on the new government programme with reference to the application for the association agreement. There it was stated that the new government was going to maintain the negotiations for the accession of Turkey to the Association Treaty. Furthermore, new economic, commercial and financial reforms were suggested to facilitate Turkey’s integration into the common market. More importantly, foreign investment was regarded as beneficial financial aid and, it was emphasized, was to be encouraged. Even though these reassurances were welcomed by the Community the negotiations had been slowed down until the new elections.17

The most important reason for the delay, in fact, concerned the formation of the Association regime with Turkey. Given the economically backward condition of Turkey the EC had difficulty in finding a suitable association formula on the basis of reciprocity for Turkey. As it was inspired by the Greek Association Treaty and the provisions the Rome Treaty the Turkish demands during the negotiations, eventually focused on three main issues.18 First, it was to be an association treaty on the basis of Article 238 of the Treaty of Rome. Second, the clause about a customs union was to be included in the Treaty. The most important Turkish demand was a written guarantee of full membership at the end of 22 years. In addition to these major demands, Turkey wanted to have free access to the EC for its agricultural and industrial products. Moreover, a clause was to be included for the protection of Turkish industry in the Treaty. The implementation of the Treaty, which consists of three stages, was to be arranged according to deadlines. However, due to the economic situation of Turkey the EC wanted for a long transitional period and assessment of the progress by the decision-making in the beginning of each stage.19 Turkey, on the other hand, insisted on automatic transition. The most controversial issue in the negotiations was the formulation of the customs union regime. Given the import substitution policies, the high level of government intervention and the state presence in a mixed economy, it is difficult to

17 Cited in Ibid p.89
18 See for the detailed account of the negotiations by a Senior Diplomat, Saracoglu, op cit, pp.25-53.
19 Passim Ibid.
understand the insistence of Turkey on the customs union. In fact, regardless of the economic implications of the customs union for the Turkish economy, it was thought by the political elites, that the customs union was a political instrument that, in the long run might facilitate Turkey's economic and political adjustment to the European integration.\textsuperscript{20} Apart from this political motivation, the demand for a customs union stemmed from the consideration that the Athens Agreement included a customs union clause. Thus, in the opinion of Turkish foreign policy makers the balance between Turkish and Greek Association Agreements should be maintained.\textsuperscript{21}

Eventually, the final stage of the negotiations between the EC and Turkey started in 1963. The discussion was centered on the establishment of the customs union. Turkey was in favour of an automatic transition towards the implementation of the customs union after a short preparation period. On the Community side this was not seen as being feasible because of the uncertainties of Turkey's economic future. Therefore the EC was for an open ended preparation period. The Turkish negotiators insisted on the establishment of the customs union, since they saw it as a crucial economic integrative mechanism that may accelerate the association process towards full membership.\textsuperscript{22} At the end of the negotiations, although Turkey succeeded in securing the customs union clause, the automatic transition to the gradual establishment of the customs union was not included in the Treaty. However, Turkey secured the written guarantee of full membership. Apart from these main points, the EC made some unilateral concessions to Turkey for some agricultural products and financial aid. Finally, Turkey had to strengthen its economy in the first 5 year preparatory period. At the end of this period, the Association Council would decide, after studying Turkey's economic situation, whether or not the transition period and the gradual implementation of the customs union should begin.

\textsuperscript{20} Birand Turkey's Common Market Adventure \textit{op cit} p.86.
\textsuperscript{21} \textit{Ibid}, p.138.
\textsuperscript{22} \textit{Ibid} and Saracoglu \textit{op cit} p.15 and pp.41-50.
The Association Treaty, known as the Ankara Agreement, was signed on 12 September 1963. The signing of the Treaty was regarded as a political victory and the confirmation of Turkey's European identity. The establishment of the Association relationship between Turkey and the EC was regarded by Turkish press and public as 'the most permanent and productive step in Turkey's efforts of the last 150 years to westernize and become an equal member of the Western world.' The Agreement was ratified unanimously in the Parliament and in the Senate. The Union of Chambers of Commerce and Industry welcomed it. The only Trade Union Organization of the period 'Turk-is' received the signing of the Treaty very favourably. The only opposition came from the left, Turkish Worker's party which had no representatives in the Assembly.

It is important to note, however, that from the very beginning a team of senior bureaucrats particularly from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other relevant sections of the Government (The Ministry of Commerce and Industry) initiated, prepared and negotiated the Association Agreement. Inspite of the economic implications of the Association Agreement, the involvement of the non-governmental interest groups in the process was limited and insignificant. In general, as it was observed by Birand 'Public opinion was almost unanimous in its interpretation of the Ankara Agreement as a political act'. However, this attitude was bound to change once the dynamics of the Association process started to affect the interests of the non-governmental businessmen and industrial elites. This will be the subject matter of the next chapters with regard to the operation of the Association.

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24 Ibid p.38.
25 In a conference on the role of Bureaucracy in Turkey it was recently asserted by a senior bureaucrat who had also served as minister that the decision to apply for the Association Agreement was really made by three high ranking bureaucrats. See Heper, Metin 'Bureaucrats, Politicians, Officers' in Modern Turkey: Forces of Continuity and of Change, ed. by Evin, Ahmet, (Opladen: Leske und Budrich 1984 p.80; footnote 38 ibid.
26 Birand in World Today op cit p.54.
Before we analyze Turkey's Association Agreement we shall look at the formation of the Turkey's Association relationship from the Community perspective in order to understand it in a broader institutional and historical context.

**Association Policy of The EC: The Political Foundations of Turkey's Association Agreement**

In this section we shall look into the basis of Turkey's Association Agreement. We shall answer the following questions: What was the policy of association of the EC during the signing of the Association Agreement? What sort of legal instruments are used and why? What was the decision-making procedure in relation to Turkey's Association? What political and economic factors affected the policy of Association of the EC, particularly in the case of Turkey's Association pattern? The answers to these questions are expected to provide us with the understanding of the legal, ideological and institutional basis of the Association Treaty within the ambit of the EC. The aim of this section could also be summarized in one general question. To what end the Community frame of reference were used to form a special association agreement with Turkey, in institutional, political and legal terms?

The signing of Turkey's Association Treaty coincided with the first phase of the EC's Mediterranean policy until the mid 1960s. The EC was at the stage of developing its external policies. Thus the EC lacked a coherent and clear cut doctrine of global external policy, particular in relation to the Mediterranean. It was observed that during the course of association negotiations 'external policy has evolved - the response to external stimuli rather than the product of an *a priori* rationally conceived doctrine'. For this reason bilateralism was the main characteristic of this period. The Agreements of this formative period were signed on a bilateral basis and political imperatives rather than technical and economic considerations shaped the form and the content of the frameworks of the Associations. Although the decision-making continued in a doctrinal vacuum with regard to external

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27 See for a good analysis of the external relations of the EC in the formative years, Henig, Stanley *External Relations of the European Community* (London; Chatham House 1971), p.6.
28 Except multilateral Yaounde Agreements that resulted from the colonial ties of some member states.
relations, the Community had certain ideological priorities, legal instruments and economic means that were used for political ends in some cases.29

Greek and Turkish Association agreements were the first Association Agreements that, in the main, resulted from political considerations in the formative years of the EC. Although the EC lacked an overall coherent doctrine with regard to the Mediterranean countries, it had some set of doctrinal principles and legal instruments regarding its association policy, particular in relation to Greece and Turkey.

Some document produced by the EC in the formative years can be helpful in understanding the association policy of this period. In fact, Article 238, which provided for the possibility of association was from the outset designed as an invitation to the other European states, who were not yet willing or not able to join the EC, to establish close links with the Community. As it was observed by an analyst, first the Spaak Report reflected this sentiment and eventually Article 238 reiterated the same objective in its formulation.30

In the course of the immediate post-war organization of European cooperation, there was a general idea of some kind of wider European association which was to be a multilateral general agreement of a liberal kind when approaching trading problems. This was an abortive attempt because of the diverse economic interests of some European countries. The establishment of the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) by the seven other members of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) was created as a result of this period. Two memoranda of this period prepared by a special committee, consisting of the Commission and the Government representatives of the EC, reflected the general attitude of the Community in its external policy.31 While stating the need for a multilateral European economic association, the most significant aspect of this memorandum was that it referred to the Rome Treaty as the normal basis for closer relationships with other European countries. Moreover, for the developing countries of Europe, some sections proposed that there should

29 Henig op cit p.7.
be special regimes covering customs, quotas and financial aid arrangements. The first memorandum invited 'any European countries already anxious to go further in economic integration to bring into play 237 and 238 of the Treaty of Rome'. Accordingly, the new members must accept the Rome Treaty and its fundamental principles 'more or less in its entirety'. However, the arrangements of association 'could be bilateral or multilateral and could range from near-acceptance of the entire Treaty to a very limited agreement'. The developments after these memoranda showed that the Community's external relations progressed mainly in two directions. First the arrangements with other European countries were to be dealt with in accordance with the general framework of GATT in terms of trade liberalization. On the other hand, the countries who were seeking a close relationship with the EC turned to the relevant articles of the Rome Treaty, namely Article 237 or 238. While Article 237 concerned the full membership which required the acceptance of the Treaty of Rome in its entirety. As for countries who seek an association relationship, the establishment of customs union and interest in economic cooperation were not enough but they should also show that they were politically committed to the Community's ideals. This was particularly the case with Greece's and Turkey's applications for association relationship for which the main political motivation was for them to become full members of the EC.

Another relevant document of the period regarding the EC's external relations is particularly helpful in understanding the Community's association policy in the period of early 1960s. This is Birkelbach Report. This Report is worth examining since it was the first attempt by the European Parliament to lay down the doctrinal basis of the Community's association policy. In many respects, this report reveals the political considerations behind association policy as a framework of cooperation with other European countries. According to the observation of a member of the European Parliament, Sir Bernett Cocks, the Report indicated that 'full membership should be reserved for those democratic states politically and militarily aligned with the West. Agreements of association might be made with

32 Quoted Henig ibid p.27.
economically less sophisticated countries, but there would be no question of the permanent association which could be a full member of the Community. As the Report shows, association patterns were originally designed for European countries, who were politically and militarily aligned with the West but not economically ready for full membership. To this end, associations seemed to be designed to serve as cooperation frameworks of transitional kind to adjust the economies of these countries to the EC. Indeed, according to the Report association agreements were regarded as progressive patterns of European cooperation towards integration rather than as a simple economic cooperation and trade relationship the EC. In the same way, Henig argued 'the Report sees similar geographical and political conditions applying to Article 238 and 237, whilst denying the normality of permanent association for a European country.' However, as subsequent developments showed Article 238 did not exclude the possibility of limited economic cooperation and trade agreements.

As the relevant documents demonstrated, the EC's association policy, in theory, envisaged and allowed closer and continuing organic political links with the EC within the scope of Article 238. In fact, in addition to ideological and military alignment with the West, the eligibility of a third country for association were determined by its interest in sharing the Community's ideals and efforts rather than an interest only in financial and trade relations. This was particularly the case with the Community's first association patterns which were established with Greece and Turkey. Indeed, Greece and Turkey were the first two European countries who made use of Article 238. Whilst the EC was in the process of developing its external policies, the applications of Greece and Turkey to establish close institutional relationship with the Community put the association policy of the EC into practice.

At this point a general crucial distinction needs to be made between countries which established association relationship within the Community's subsequent Mediterranean

35 Henig External Relations of the European Community op cit p.38.
policy. As it was recently suggested in relation to the formation of the EC's Mediterranean policy 'the EC has been obliged to develop a Mediterranean policy serving two distinct ... groups of countries. The first is, an internal one, is composed of those states on its southern flank; the second is an external collection of member states within the [Mediterranean] basin with whom the EC sustained close trading relations.' Our argument will proceed on the assumption that the relation with the EC which Greece and Turkey established was not an external but an internal one to the extent that both were the members of the southern flank of NATO, as were the original members of the EC. The following considerations also support our assumption that the applications for association by Greece and Turkey were placed in the context of the European Unification with the rest of Western Europe as a result of the imperatives and ideological affiliations arising from the Cold War circumstances during the formative years of the European Community. Indeed, as Community official put it 'in the case of the Agreements with Greece and Turkey the motivation was patently strategic: stable political and economic conditions for these as members of NATO were essential to counter Soviet penetration'.

To that extent, it is normal that Turkey and Greece differed from other Mediterranean countries, which subsequently established commercial relations with the Community. The Association Treaties of Greece and Turkey were far from being merely commercial or even treaties providing for the establishment of a customs union. They envisaged far broader political designs and are designed to serve the ideological values and interests of the EC in order to anchor the developing countries of Western Europe within the framework of the Western European liberal camp.

Despite the fact that the competencies of the EC, in its formative years, were exclusively economic, it was still difficult to regard the EC as a mere economic organization.

38 See the article of once the Head of the Commission's Office in Ankara Papa, Gian Paolo 'The Mediterranean Policy European Yearbook VXX 1974, p.67.
Therefore the decision-making bodies of the EC were not entirely free from political apprehensions of its external environment. Even though the EC functioned in a political vacuum, it still had political priorities and ideological considerations in the implementation of external policies. As Henig Suggests

'Since the Community's political institutions are not autonomous from those of the member states, they are available as instruments of the member states, and vehicles for national foreign policies. The interplay of national political motivations has helped to shape the Mediterranean policy which has, therefore, never been entirely conditioned by economic factors. Indeed the evolution of Mediterranean policy is an interesting case study in an area where decision-making has not been exclusively delegated to the common institutions.'39

This characteristic of the decision-making style was particularly evident in the conclusion of the Greek and Turkish Association Agreements. It was the political motivations of the member states rather than economic factors determined the course of the negotiations. Indeed, during the negotiations it was the Commission as an autonomous and technical body that was trying to draw the Council's attention to the economic situation of Turkey, as Turkey's economic structure was not suitable for an association relation of a reciprocal kind on the basis of customs union. On the other hand, the Council of Ministers was aware of the sensitivity and insistence of Turkey on the establishment of an identical association pattern, similar to that of Greece. Hence the Council was anxious not to upset the delicate balance between the two indispensable members of the southern flank members of NATO under the cold war circumstances. But at the same time it was at pains to find a suitable association formula for Turkey.40

In the beginning, the Commission was in favour of a limited cooperation agreement providing Turkey with commercial concessions and financial assistance. In this case the legal

40 My information derives from excerpts from the Commission and Council Reports and opinions cited in Birand 'Turkey's Common Market Adventure' op cit pp.77, 79. See also Saracoglu op cit passim
basis of the treaty would be Article 111. Since this would involve tariff concessions for four main products of Turkey i.e. tobacco, raisins, nuts and figs. For tobacco and raisins Turkey was a major supplier, whereas it was not for figs and nuts. This would have had a damaging impact on some members of the Community in accordance with the rules of the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) that reductions in tariffs must be extended to all parties to the agreement, (the most favoured nation clause). This was not acceptable for the Community's Mediterranean countries which produced the same agricultural products. Another obstacle was that the tariff changes for these two products would require Greek approval. This was unlikely. The possible circumvention of the institutional problems of Gatt was to establish an association treaty with Turkey since the establishment of new tariff preferences were only permissible if two or more countries were establishing a free trade area or customs union according to a precise timetable, laid down in advance, and covering a substantial trade between them. In this sense, the technical terms of Gatt in a way determined the formation of Turkey's Association framework.

On the governmental front, during the prolonged negotiations in the meetings of the Council of Ministers, Italy and France were anxious about the trade effects of the Association relationship with Turkey because they specialized in some of the products Turkey exported. On the other hand, German and Dutch representatives always emphasized the political significance of such a relation which was to facilitate Turkey's political integration with the Western Europe in the long run. Especially the Dutch representative, Joseph Luns, and German representatives were insistent on an association agreement in view of the political repercussions of upsetting the balance between Greece and Turkey. Eventually,

41 In this case any other country would enjoy a similar non-discrimination agreement with the EC. The concept of the most favoured nation implies that non-preferential tariff concessions are negotiated only with the major supplier. In tobacco and raisins there were also other suppliers who could gain something for nothing in the case of a most favoured nation reduction.
42 See for the technical discussion of this aspect Henig 'External Relations of the European Community' *op cit* pp.29, 31 See also for the account of these Saracoglu *op cit* passim.
43 Interviews with the negotiators cited in Birand 'Turkey's Common Market Adventure' *op cit passim*.
irrespective of the economic implications of association, the EC decided to establish an
association relationship with Turkey. In the end, political considerations had prevailed. As
the then Commissioner Jean Rey emphasized '[Greek and Turkish Association Treaties]
entails sacrifices from those community states producing the same things, but they have
accepted this interference with the equilibrium of the Community structure in view of the
political importance of such association links in the process of European unification and in
the hope that other European countries will eventually join up with the Community either
through membership or through association.' Indeed, this citation reveals the originally
conceived political role of association patterns in the process of European unification.\textsuperscript{44} In
the EC's external policy, both countries were placed within the context of the process of
European unification through organic association patterns with the prospect of full
membership. It was mainly because of their ideological affiliations and military alignments
with the Western Europe. Although the economic structures of both countries were not
ready for a reciprocal kind of association patterns which envisaged customs union
arrangements - Turkey was more backward - mainly the political imperatives formed the
nature of their association framework with the EC.\textsuperscript{45} It is worth quoting Henig again who
provides us with the most comprehensive analysis of this first period of the Community's
external policy, particularly with regard to the EC's policy of association, 'such a relationship
essentially political, no decision to establish a customs union or free trade area could be made
on purely economic criteria' and what is more significant is such a relationship 'could be only
based on association, implying organic links of political kind'\textsuperscript{46}

So far we have looked into the ideological basis of the Association Treaty and the
characteristics of the negotiations with Turkey from the Community point of view. We shall

\textsuperscript{44} 'Association Grece et Turquie a la C.E.E.' \textit{Annuaire European} V. XI 1965 p.62.
\textsuperscript{45} The weekly Times wrote 'But Turkey will be by far the market's poorest sister ... The
Eurocrats chose to take in Turkey ahead of many other suppliants because it is allied with
NATO politically and seems on the right track economically.' \textit{Times} 27 September 1963.
\textsuperscript{46} Henig, Stanley 'Mediterranean Policy of The European Community' \textit{op cit} pp.181, 182.
now analyze the legal basis and procedural characteristics of the Community's association pattern.

The Legal and Procedural Basis of the Association Treaty

The European Community has legal instruments at its disposal to establish relations with non-member countries. The Treaty of Rome deals with external relations in different places. First fall under the heading of 'commercial policy' Chapter 4 (3) Articles 110-116. The Articles 110-116 give the power to the Community Institutions to conclude, not only tariff and trade agreements, but also embrace almost all aspects of common commercial policy such as: credit and finance, export aids and development policies, aids to third world countries. These agreements are technical, economic and mainly commercial in their characters. The subject matters and procedures of commercial agreements are more precisely expressed in the Treaty of Rome. Secondly, Part IV of the Treaty deals with the relationship with overseas colonial territories. Thus, the provisions of Articles 131-136 of the Treaty falling under Chapter IV, provided for automatic association of the overseas African countries and territories, which were the former colonies, or had special relations with Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy and The Netherlands. The framework of relations with these countries was modified subsequently after their decolonization. The Article 131 reads that the purpose of association with these countries 'shall be to promote the economic and social development of the countries and the territories and to establish close economic relations between them and the Community as a whole'. As it can be inferred from the content of this Article the framework of the relationship between these countries and the Community was limited to the promotion of the economic relations and to improve their economic and social development. Even though these agreements are called association agreements, they are mainly multilateral agreements with developing African, Caribbean and

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48 The Rome Treaty Articles 131-136 Ibid.
49 The Rome Treaty Article 131 Ibid.
Pacific Ocean (ACP) Countries which eventually led to the Lome Conventions. The EC treats these countries as one trading unit.  

Finally, the Community has Article 238 at its disposal to establish an association relationship which was the basis of the Association Treaty with Turkey and Greece. In fact, Article 238 is broader in its scope and more equivocal in its content, compared to other provisions concerning the external relations of the Community. Article 238 reads that the Community 'may conclude with a third country, a union of states or an international organization agreements creating an association embodying reciprocal rights and obligations, joint actions and special procedures'. The vagueness in the meaning of Article 238 allows any type of relationship from exchange of information to quasi-membership. Therefore, unlike commercial treaties and simple cooperation agreements, Article 238 constitutes the most appropriate basis for an association agreement of a political kind. Inspite of the vague and general meaning of the Article, it is clear that there must be an element of reciprocity in the relationship creating mutual rights and obligations. More importantly, the article mentions joint actions and special procedures that distinguishes it from other forms of relationship in institutional terms.

Contrary to the explicitly specified procedures in the Articles on commercial agreements (Articles 111, 113 and 114), in Article 238 there are no details with regard to procedures for concluding Agreement. Nevertheless, Article 238 provides that the agreements are to be concluded by the Council, acting unanimously and the European Parliament had to be consulted. In this case, since there are no procedures for the opening of negotiations and no specific negotiating bodies were mentioned, general negotiating procedures, which Article 228 provided for, would apply. In accordance with Article 228, the

50 See for the history and analysis of these multilateral association relationship between the EC and the developing world Twitchett, Carol Cosgrove 'Europe and Africa: from association to partnership' England: Saxon House 1978.

51 The Rome Treaty Article 238 op cit.


53 Gesau op cit p.94.
negotiations are conducted by the Commission under the Council's directions and agreements are concluded by the Council unanimously after consulting the Parliament. This consultation procedure was excluded in the conclusion of commercial agreements. Another difference was that the Council would conclude commercial agreements by a qualified majority.\(^54\) Indeed, Henig makes a crucial distinction between the legal basis of association and commercial cooperation agreements 'Article 238 seems more forward looking than Articles 111-114. The Commission is given apparently greater power and the Assembly involved. In European jargon Article 238 is more 'communautaire'. One explanation for this apparent absurdity-the implications of association may well be much more far reaching than those of a common commercial policy - is that association is after all very much a community matter'.\(^55\) This observation indeed underlines the political nature of Article 238 in establishing progressive, transitional and organic association relationship with the EC.

Another aspect of the judicial basis of the Association Treaty, particularly regarding Greek and Turkish association patterns, concerns the scope of Article 238 and the competences of the Community institutions. Indeed, Article 238 was the most discretionary for the form and the content of the Agreement which the EC sought to establish with these countries. As Bott argued 'This type of agreement may compromise any of the issues dealt with in the European Community. And practice amply demonstrates that Article 238 has been interpreted in a larger sense.'\(^56\) It is this elasticity of the meaning of Article 238 that allowed the community decision-making bodies to create broad political frameworks works of cooperation in the form of association agreements particular with Greece and Turkey. In some cases the competences of the Community seemed to have been circumvented. For instance, the financial commitments which were 'subjects not explicitly dealt with in the Rome Treaty' were granted in the context of association agreements of Greece and Turkey.\(^57\)

\(^55\) Henig 'External Relations of the European Community' op cit p.12.
\(^56\) Bot, op cit p.290.
\(^57\) Ibid..
Therefore, member states also became contracting parties to the Greek and Turkish Association Treaties to ensure the effectiveness and to reinforce the legitimacy of the operation of association patterns.\textsuperscript{58} To conclude, Article 238 provided the ideal legal foundation for the establishing of an association relationship of a special kind. On the other hand, it is difficult to suggest that the decision-making procedures were strictly followed.\textsuperscript{59} For instance, the Council did not consult the Parliament which had the right to be consulted in accordance with Article 228 before concluding the Turkish and Greek Associations. This was a shortcoming in the decision-making procedure as far as the parliamentary legitimacy of the Greek and Turkish Association Agreements. The Parliament, however, objected to this conduct of the Council. Subsequently a reservation was added by the Council. It was stated that the Community would be obligated by either of the agreements only after 'the procedures described by the EEC Treaty, particularly the consultation of the European Parliament had been completed'\textsuperscript{60} Nevertheless, the Parliament then, which was not elected as a body of popular representatives, had no power to prohibit the conclusion of the Agreement.

Having analyzed the judicial basis of the Association Treaty we can now move on to the analysis of the Association Treaty of Turkey itself which was concluded in 12 September 1963 in Ankara.

\textbf{The Ultimate Political Objective of the Association Agreement:}

The ultimate objectives of the Agreement reveals its political character. In the preamble of the Treaty, the phrase 'to establish ever closer bonds between Turkish people and the peoples brought together in the European Community' clearly implies a dynamic increasing forward movement of cooperation towards political integration.\textsuperscript{61} It hints at a

\textsuperscript{58} See Feld, Werner 'The Association Agreements of The European Communities' \textit{International Organization} Vol. XIX 1965 pp.224, 225.


\textsuperscript{60} Feld \textit{op cit} p.225.

\textsuperscript{61} The Association Agreement of Turkey \textit{Official Journal of The European Communities No C113/2 24/12/1973.}
grander political design than a mere economic agreement. Indeed, the following paragraph continues in the same way, 'the support given by the European Economic Community to the efforts of the Turkish people to improve their standard of living will facilitate the accession of Turkey to the Community at a later date'. Moreover, in the final paragraph of the Preamble the Treaty reads that the parties 'resolved to preserve and strengthen peace and liberty by joint pursuit of the ideals underlying the Treaty establishing the European Community'. As it is clear from this declaration of intent, that the political aims of the Association Treaty are consistent and identical with the ideals and objectives of the European Community in Turkey's parallel process of cooperation towards political unification. Apart from the preamble (the wording of the possibility of membership is also exactly the same in both Greek and Turkish Association Treaties) the Treaty continues to read in Article 28 of the Turkish Agreement (Article 72 in Greece's Association Treaty) that 'As soon as the operation of this agreement has advanced far enough to justify full acceptance envisaging full acceptance by Turkey of the obligations arising out of the Treaty establishing the Community, the contracting parties shall examine the possibility of the accession of Turkey to the Community'.

To that end, in accordance with the framework of association, Turkey was to adjust its economy and prepare itself for the assumption of duties following the result of accession. In this sense, the economic objectives of the Association were instrumental in achieving the ultimate objective of the Association. Therefore, apart from the interpretations of the political intent of the parties, it is necessary to examine the more concrete objectives and economic tasks.

Instrumental Objectives, Processes and Tasks of the Association

There are two important intermediate economic objectives of the Treaty: the gradual establishment of the customs union; and the harmonization of the economic policies.

Particularly, the customs union is the most important instrumental integrative task, a *sine quo non* of the Association process, to achieve the ultimate political objective.

Article 2 of the Treaty provides for the long term economic objective of the Association:

'To promote the continuous and balanced strengthening of trade and economic relations between the parties, while taking full account of the need to ensure an accelerated development of the Turkish economy and to improve the level of employment and the living conditions of Turkish people.'

To that end, the Treaty envisaged the gradual establishment of a customs union regime which consists of three stages: a preparatory stage; a transitional stage; and a final stage. In this respect, Turkey's Association Treaty differed from Greece's Association which was to establish a customs union with the Community occurring only over a transitional period of twelve to twenty two years. This was an automatic transitional period and no decision-making was required. On the other hand, in Turkey's Association Treaty there was to be a preparatory stage of five years during which the Turkish economy was to be strengthened with the help of the EC. The EC would give unilateral concessions to four basic Turkish agricultural products such as tobacco, dried grapes and dried figs and hazelnuts. A financial aid of $175 million was also given to Turkey for this preparation period. The reason for the existence of a preparatory stage was, as we showed in the background section, the economic backwardness of Turkey in comparison to Greece.

The preparatory period was to last from five to eleven years but no more than that. At the end of this preparatory period, the Association Council, having studied the Turkish economy, was to decide (the governments of six and of Turkey) whether the transitional period to start. In order to begin the transitional period, an additional protocol would be signed to lay down the terms, conditions and timing for the progressive introduction of the customs union and the approximation of the respective economic policies. In this transitional

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63 Article 2 of Turkey's Association Treaty *op cit.*
64 Provisional Protocol, Protocol no.1 annexed to the Association Treaty *ibid.*
period that would last not more than twelve years the gradual establishment of the customs union and the harmonization of the economic policies are to be realized. Finally, the Treaty provides for a final stage which envisages the formation of customs union and closer coordination of the economic policies of the parties to the Association. The Treaty provides for the abolition of all customs duties on imports and exports and of charges having an equivalent effect, quantitative restrictions and the adoption of Common Customs Tariff which cover all trade in goods. The Treaty also deals with the extension of trade relations in agricultural products 'in accordance with special rules which shall take into account the common agricultural policy of the Community'.

Moreover during the preparatory and transitional period freedom of movement of workers, the establishment of services were to be facilitated progressively. More importantly, Article 16 referring to Title I of Part III of the Rome Treaty concerning competition, taxation and approximation of laws would, in the same way, apply to the relations between the EC and Turkey within the association framework. The policy concerning economic stability in the balance of payments, the rate of exchange and the transfer of payments were to be pursued for common commercial purposes of the Association. Finally Articles 20 and 21 provides the free movement of capital and foreign investment between Turkey and the EC that can contribute to the economic development of Turkey.

As the content of the Association Treaty shows there are important similarities with the provisions of the Rome Treaty. The Association Treaty is consistent with the principles and foundations of the EC. The gradual establishment of customs union and the harmonization of economic policies seem to be inspired by the progressive provisions of the

67 Article 4 and 8 of The Association Treaty and Provisional Protocol Article 1 ibid.
68 Article 2 of the Association Treaty ibid.
69 Article 10 of the Association Treaty ibid.
70 Article 11 The Treaty of Association. ibid.
71 Article 12, 13, 14 The Treaty of Association ibid.
72 Article 16 of The Association Treaty ibid.
73 Articles 17, 18, 19 of the Association Treaty ibid.
Rome Treaty. When it is compared in fact the Association Treaty is a kind of a replica of the Treaty of Rome. 74 However, the Association Treaty is short and the wordings of the provisions are general. It was a general framework agreement which laid down the principles of the Association relationship. In other words it was less elaborate in comparison to Greece's Association Agreement. The reason for this was that the EC was not certain about the terms and conditions of the transitional period. But, as we shall see later in this chapter the conclusion of the Additional Protocol removed the differences between two association treaties. It would not be wrong to suggest that Turkey's Association process was at its pre-association stage. Subsequently the signing of the Additional protocol marked the end of the pre-association stage and the beginning of a full association process. However, before moving on to the Additional protocol the institutional framework of the Association which was set up by the Treaty of Association needs to be investigated.

The Institutional Structure of The Association

As Article 238 reads, association involves 'joint actions and special procedures' to attain the objectives of the Agreement. We showed the political and progressive character of Turkey's Association agreement which, differs from other international simple cooperation frameworks, simply by providing for the exchange of mutual benefits. Apart from its political and progressive nature, another important aspect of Turkey's Association framework is its institutional framework which 'distinguishes an association agreement ... from mere trade and cooperation agreement' 75 Like the EC itself, the Association provides a central executive judicial body to 'ensure the implementation and the progressive development of Association' 76 This central executive body is the Council of Association consisting of the representatives of Turkish Government on the one hand, and of Commission and the Council members of the EC on the other.

74 See for the comparisons of the provisions between The Rome Treaty and the Association Treaty of Turkey made by one of the architects of the Association Treaty Saracoglu, passim op cit.
75 Feld op cit p.237.
76 Article 6 of the Association Treaty op cit.
The Composition of the Council of Association reflects, in theory, the bilateral and
equal nature of the Association. It concerns two parties: The Community and Turkey.
Although this reflects the bilateral nature of the Association, on the Community side we see
both supranational (the Commission) and the intergovernmental (members of the
Governments of the Member States of the Community) decision-making characteristics of the
Community. However, the status of the Association is neither fully subject to governmental
nor to supranational jurisdiction, but is a mixture of these both intergovernmental and
supranational elements, that affect the outcome of the decision-making. The participation in
the Association organs take place both at the Government and the Community level. Each
side has one vote and accordingly unanimity is required to reach a decision. The
Presidency of the Council alternates every six months between the Turkish Government and
the Community. The Council of Association adopts its rules of procedure and it has the
right to set up committees to assist in the performance of its tasks and more important a
special committee to ensure the proper functioning of the Agreement.

The Meetings of the Council of Association are normally held at the Ministerial level.
However, there is provision for members to arrange the meetings to be presented at
ambassadorial and other official levels. The internal rules of The Association provided
beforehand that the Council should meet at ministerial level at least once every six months
unless there is a decision to the contrary. Apart from these cases the Council would meet at
the level of representatives.

What are the powers of the Council of Association? In the light of the objectives of
the Association, the Association Council has the power to take decisions in the cases specified
in the Association Agreement. These decisions are binding for the Association partners and
accordingly they are obliged to take the measures necessary to implement decisions within

77 Article 23 of the Association Treaty Ibid.
78 Article 24 of the association Treaty Ibd.
79 Article 234 of the Association Treaty Ibid.
80 Article 23.2 of the Association Treaty Ibid.
their jurisdiction. The Association Council may also make recommendations for the proper functioning of the Association. Unlike decisions, recommendations are not binding.

In a way, like the Council of Ministers of the Community itself, important powers of decision-making were entrusted to the Council of Ministers by the Treaty of the Association, for the attainment of the objectives. Even though the Agreement did not pronounce the requisite powers, the central place of the Council of the Association in the functioning and the attainment of the objectives of the Association Treaty is crucial. In fact, the Association Treaty provides the Council with implicit powers in addition to express powers conferred upon it by The Association Agreement. As from the Transitional stage Article 22/3 allowed the Council to use implicit powers to attain the objectives of the Association. Therefore, it would not be wrong to suggest that the Council was given some teleological powers to make decisions to facilitate the achievement of the objectives of the Association particularly when joint actions are necessary but the requisite powers are not granted in the Agreement.

However, there is an important difference between the direct effect of the decisions between the Council of Association and the Council of the European Community. This concerns the direct application of decisions. In contrast to the certain acts of the Community institutions, the decisions of the Association Council cannot be applied directly to nationals of the contracting partners. In this sense, the Association Council does not enjoy any supranational powers. Rather it represents the characteristic of parallel decision-making procedure in which each of the parties takes the measures necessary to implement the decisions of the council within their domestic jurisdiction.

Apart from these general powers, the Association Council was given some ad hoc powers with regard to the implementation of the preparation period. The Council had some specific competences to decide whether or when the transitional period should start. It would also determine the terms of the Additional Protocol. The powers and the

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81 Article 22/1 of the Association Treaty. 
82 Article 22/1 of the Association Treaty. 
83 Article 22/3. 
84 Provisional Protocol Article 1.
competences of the Council were stated as general provisions in the Treaty. Subsequently, the Additional Protocol elaborated the competences and the procedures of the Association Council in relation to the progressive establishment of a customs union and the introduction of the measures leading to the harmonization of economic and commercial policies by various provisions.

Apart from its decision-making powers, the Council acts as a conciliatory body. It is within the competence of the Council of Association to settle the disputes between the parties. Indeed the parties may submit 'any dispute relating to the application or interpretation of this [Association] Agreement which concerns the Community, a member state of the Community, or Turkey'. Accordingly, the Council of Association may either settle the dispute or refer it to the Court of Justice of the European Communities or to any other court or tribunal for settlement. The decisions are binding for both parties. But if these do not solve the dispute the parties may demand arbitration. In this case the Council of Association can determine the procedures for an arbitration or for any other judicial procedures.

Another important aspect of the institutional framework concerns the Parliamentary body of the Association. The Association Treaty provided that the Association Council must take steps to facilitate operation between the parliaments of the EC and Turkey. Accordingly a mixed Parliamentary Committee which was composed of 18 members of the Turkish Grand National Assembly and 18 members of the European Parliament was established. The importance of the joint Parliamentary Committee cannot be underestimated since its main function is to observe the functioning of the Association Treaty.

There are other bodies related to the Association. The Treaty provides the Council with the powers to create any other committees which can assist the Council in its fulfilment

85 Article 25/1 of the Association Treaty Ibid.
86 Article 22/2 The Association Treaty Ibid.
87 Article 25/3 of the Association Treaty Ibid.
88 Article 25/4 of the Association Treaty Ibid.
89 Article 27 of the Association Treaty Ibid.
of the tasks.\textsuperscript{91} For instance one of the important Committees which was established by the Council was the Customs Union Cooperation Committee.\textsuperscript{92}

The institutional structure of the Association distinguishes it from other forms of cooperations. Its decision-making structure has a crucial role to play in the progressive achievement of the tasks. The competences of the Association Council does not only cover trade relations, but also the gradual establishment of the customs union. Therefore, it is a process oriented machinery with certain tasks to achieve. In this sense the institutional structure of the Association is central to the functioning of the Association, which is not the regulator, but the promoter, of the common objectives and ideals of the Association framework. Since the decisions of the Council of Association have important political implications for the parties decision-making bodies can be regarded as political rather than strictly consultative body.

II The Additional Protocol

The Backgrounds, Motivations and Characteristics of the Additional Protocol

As we have shown, the passage to the transitional stage was not automatic. It was for the Council of Association to consider whether the time was right, four years after the Treaty had come into force, as to whether or not to start the transitional period in the shape of an additional protocol, on the basis of the economic situation of Turkey. In 1968 when Turkey demanded that negotiations should start in order to move into the Transitional period, it was only the fourth year of the preparatory period.

During the preparation period, there had been no significant development in Turkey's exports to the Community.\textsuperscript{93} On the contrary, Turkey's trade deficit with the EC was increasing. It was observed that despite the new concessions in some textile products, hand-made carpets and citrus fruits, the ratio between Turkey's exports to and its imports

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{91} Article 24 of the Association Treaty \textit{Ibid}
\item \textsuperscript{92} The Council Decision 2/69 Saracoglu, Kitap II \textit{op cit} p.85.
\item \textsuperscript{93} Seyda, Meymet 'Effects of EEC membership on Turkey's exports' \textit{Turkish Economic Review} X (May-June 1969) no 2 and 3, p.30.
\end{itemize}
from the EC dropped from 71 per cent in 1966 to 74 per cent in 1973.\textsuperscript{94} According to a study, this was explained in 'the limited nature of the concessions granted by the EC. Only 6 per cent of Turkish manufacturing products were benefitting from the concessions while 22 per cent of agricultural and industrial products benefitted from partial concessions.\textsuperscript{95} Moreover, the growth rate lagged behind the targets of the Development Plan in 1968 and 1969. The industrial output was low and the growth rate was not up to the expectations to move into the transitional stage.\textsuperscript{96} The decision to move into the transitional period was made under these circumstances.

However, there were several motivations for Turkey to seek negotiations to move into the transitional period as soon as possible. These motivations were predominantly political again. First of all, there had been a military coup d'état in Greece. This was regarded as a favourable diplomatic environment for Turkey to remove some differences between the Ankara and the Athens Treaty. Moreover, Denmark, Britain and Norway had applied for full membership. It would have been easier to gain some concessions before this first enlargement of the EC took place. Moreover, another advance in the form of an additional protocol could further tie Turkey to the EC. This was still the main political motivation as the Association was seen as a progressive form of cooperation that in the long run it would bring Turkey closer to the integrative framework of the EC.\textsuperscript{97} Finally during the Cyprus crisis of 1963-1967 Turkey was disappointed with the diplomatic support it had received from the US. This also encouraged Turkey's advances towards the EC which was seen as 'counterbalance' to overdependence on the United States'.\textsuperscript{98}

Even though economic considerations were secondary, they played a more significant part than they did in the signing of the Association Treaty. Given the economic

\textsuperscript{94} Ilkin \emph{op cit} p.39
\textsuperscript{95} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{97} Birand in The World Today \emph{op cit} p.52. Ilkin \emph{op cit} p.40
difficulties, Turkey needed more hard currencies. Thus it wanted to increase the flow of Turkish workers to Europe which, by then, had become one of the main sources of its foreign currency reserves. According to documents, in this preparation period, the number of Turkish labour working in Europe reached more than 700,000 in the early 1970s compared to a few thousand in the beginning of the 1960s. For instance, the remittances from the Turkish Workers covered almost 95 per cent of the Trade deficit with the EC in 1971. Therefore Turkey wanted to secure the inflow of foreign currency earnings from Turkish workers by an additional protocol since the provisions of the Association Treaty did not deal with this in detail.

Given the increasing trade deficit, Turkey was not satisfied with the trade concessions given by the Ankara Treaty. It wanted to have more access to the EC market. This was particularly evident in Turkey’s agricultural and textile sector. Therefore, it was thought that by a new protocol, further trade concessions could be gained. Finally, there was a need for a larger volume of financial credit.

The negotiations for the transitional period started in 1968. However, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs this time was not alone in conducting the course of negotiations. It was now confronted with new opposition from within the ranks of civil service over the negotiations of the Additional protocol. The State Planning Organization whose main function was to make planning for the development of Turkish economy, had been established by the 1960 Constitution. The main dispute, at first, seemed to be a conflict of authorities over the conduct of negotiations between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the State Planning Organization (SPO). The former state department was still in the opinion that the relation with the EC was mainly political matter and the part of the long term national state policy to fully participate in European integration. Therefore, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not want to share its prerogative in a foreign policy matter with the SPO. Subsequently, it was

99 This information derives from the Tables from OECD Economic surveys, cited in Rosenthal *Ibid* 20, 21 and figures given in Diplomat Saracoglu’s book on the preparation period *Kitap II op cit*.
100 Birand in *The World Today op cit* pp.54-55.
understood that the heart of the matter was that SPO was not in favour of the Transitional period on the grounds that a customs union might hinder the development of Turkish industry.\textsuperscript{101} Given the level of the development of Turkish industry, this justification was well founded. It would be premature for Turkish Industry to enter into an economic relationship of a reciprocal kind in view of the damaging impact of trade liberalization on Turkish industry. A report produced by SPO report in this period clearly argued against this:

'when sufficient foundations for such basic industries as metal, machinery production, oil and chemicals have been laid ... [and when] ... the economy ... has a structure of such strength, form a standpoint of quality, then it may adopt some basic structural characteristics peculiar now to the Western European and North American countries.'\textsuperscript{102}

It is interesting to note that in this period the head of SPO was Ozal who also initiated the application for full membership when he was the Prime Minister in 1987. However, its was because of this dispute between two government agencies that the Additional Protocol took three years to conclude. However, in the end, the political concerns prevailed. Eventually, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs succeeded in securing the signing of the Additional Protocol in 1970.\textsuperscript{103}

In spite of the economic drawbacks, thanks to the efforts of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the political considerations had once again, in a way compelled the conclusion of the Additional Protocol.

The Additional Protocol was signed in November 1970. The final product of the negotiations was almost identical to the Greek Association Treaty, in the sense that it elaborated the technical details of the Association Agreement. By the conclusion of the Additional Protocol Turkey’s Association process completed its pre-association stage and the framework of the Association relationship was fully formed. We can now examine the Additional protocol itself.

\textsuperscript{101} See for Cemal, Hasan 'Disisleri-Planlama arasinda ortak Pazar kavgasi Cumhuriyet passim
\textsuperscript{102} DPT, 'Turkiye’nin Ortak Pazar Tam Uyeligi Hazirlayici Sanayilesme Ihtiyaci: Gerekce (Ankara: 1968) cited in Ilkin op cit p.42.
\textsuperscript{103} Ibid.
The Additional Protocol

Whereas the provisions of the Association Treaty laid down only the general principles of the relationship, with the exception of an elaborate preparatory period the Additional Protocol provided the timetable and the terms and the conditions of the transitional period which was a process of fulfilment of reciprocal rights and obligations, leading to a final phase. The provisions of the Additional Protocol are of a more detailed and concrete nature. This especially applies to the implementation of the customs union.

The Additional Protocol laid down the terms and the timetable of the customs union in a detailed way. First on the European Community side, the Community was to eliminate customs duties and charges (customs tariffs) on imports of industrial products from Turkey as soon as the Protocol entered into force. However, certain petroleum and textile products were excluded. The Community was to abolish all quantitative restrictions on Turkish goods. While the EC abolished all customs duties, Turkey undertook to reduce its duties step by step by 10 per cent and 5 per cent respectively according to the two timetables over twelve years for products on one list and over 22 years for products on the other. The gradual implementation of Common Customs Tariffs was to be made over the same periods; 12 years for goods on the first list and 22 years for products on the second. Turkey also undertook to abolish the quantitative restrictions on imports from the Community which was to be completed over 22 years according to a timetable. As it is clear from the provisions of the Additional Protocol, it envisages the completion of the customs union regime and the Common Customs Tariff over 22 years. This means, from the

105 The Additional Protocol is longer than the Treaty. The Association Treaty consists of 53 Articles including provisional and financial protocols whereas the Additional Protocol contains 64 Articles in itself.
106 Article 9 of the Additional Protocol op cit.
107 Article 24 of the Additional Protocol Ibid.
108 Articles 8, 10 and 11 of the Additional Protocol Ibid see the tables at the end of this chapter.
109 Articles 17, 18, 19 of the Additional Protocol Ibid.
110 Article 25 of the Additional Protocol Ibid.
entry into force of the Additional Protocol, by 1995 the customs union regime was to be fully established provided that the parties duly follow the implementation of the timetable.

As for the agricultural products, Turkey was given a period of 22 years within which to adopt its agricultural policy to that of the EC. However, for the interim period Turkey was provided with some agricultural concessions for its exports to the EC.

The Additional Protocol also provides for a gradual introduction between the twelfth (1986) and the twenty second year (1996) of freedom of movement of Turkish workers between Turkey and the EC. Social security measures in favour of Turkish workers were also included.

The provisions of the Protocol also deals with the closer harmonization of the economic policies between the EC and Turkey in accordance with the principles of the community. The Council of Association would decide the rules and the conditions for the application of Articles 85, 86, 90 and 92 of the Rome Treaty with regard to the Community legislation concerning competition, taxation and approximation of laws. Furthermore Article 41 provides for the right of establishment and freedom to provide services. A Common Commercial Policy was to be established progressively between the European Community and Turkey in relation to the third countries. Last but not least, in the case of serious economic difficulties affecting the financial stability or a particular region or a sector in the economy of the contracting parties, the Additional Protocol allows parties to take safeguarding measures.

Conclusions

In this chapter we analyzed the legal and political foundations of Turkey's Association framework and the formation of a special relationship between the EC and

111 Article 33 of the Additional Protocol Ibid.
112 Under Title II The Protocol deals with the movement of persons Article 36, 37.
113 Article 39 of Additional Protocol Ibid.
114 Article 43 of the Additional Protocol Ibid.
115 Article 53 of the Additional Protocol Ibid.
116 Article 60 of the Additional Protocol Ibid.
Turkey. As it was evidenced by this chapter, the Association pattern between Turkey and the EC was devised as a process oriented adjustment framework to European integration with a vision of full membership. In this sense, the Association constitutes not only the legal and economic but also the political framework of the relationship between the EC.

In general, the political rather than the economic concerns determined the form and the content of the Association Agreement. Despite the structural and economic incompatibilities of Turkey, in the formative years the Association was facilitated by the perceptions of the political elites and ideological interdependence between Turkey and the EC. The Association policy of the EC in the same period also created the conducive legal, ideological foundations to establish a *sui generis* cooperation framework. This period can also be called a period of optimism for both sides.

On the other hand, the use of association as an extension and maximization of the external sovereignty of Turkey to counterbalance Greece within the Western European structures was an important factor throughout the inception of the Association Framework.

Although the reasons were political, once it was installed the pattern of Association would have its own systemic dynamics and characteristics. This will be analyzed in the next chapters. As a progressive framework of cooperation with important objectives and tasks the Association has significant structural implications for Turkey. In the beginning association was an abstract concept that was perceived by Turkey's governmental elites as a pattern of cooperation that will facilitate Turkey's participation in European integration. This abstract concept would become a reality in the course of the operation of the Association that will influence and transform the perceptions of the Turkish elites, whilst affecting the wider and the deeper levels of the society, regardless of the original intentions of the parties and the instigators of it.
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Chapter III

ASSOCIATION IN OPERATION: THE FIRST DECADE

In the previous chapter we explained the formation of Turkey's sui generis Association framework. This chapter deals with the period during which the Association system was in full operation. This covers roughly the time between the ratification of the Additional Protocol in 1973 and the interruption of the functioning of the Association in the aftermath of the military coup d'état in 1983.

Our aim is not to give a chronological and detailed account of the Association relationship. What we want to be able to answer when we conclude this chapter is the following: whether the sui generis pattern of association facilitated the convergence of policies between the EC and Turkey or simply led to increasing interdependence. How this increasing interdependence was managed and what were the operational characteristics of this first decade? The first section analyses the background characteristics of the period from Turkey's point of view in terms of structural policies, the perceptions of governmental and non-governmental elites and attitudes of political parties as regards the Association relationship. The second section is concerned with the EC dimension and external policies of the EC in the same period that affected Turkey's Association. The chapter will continue to examine the emerging patterns of interdependence in various issue areas in the implementation of the Association.

I. The EC Dimension: The Background and Characteristics of External Policies

Soon after the signing of the Additional Protocol in the 1970's that had transformed Turkey's pre-association framework into a full Association framework, the EC found itself in a different and rapidly changing international environment. The EC was gradually growing into a global economic power. The international developments had, in many ways, compelled the EC to assume global economic responsibilities and political commitments and in turn to adopt global policies which were a response to the events occurring in its
increasingly globalising environment. Moreover, as a result of its economic success during the sixties, the EC had become a centre of attraction for other countries. The application of Britain, Denmark and Ireland for membership resulted in the first enlargement of the EC. This was the first sign of the increasing globalization of the EC. More specifically, by Britain’s accession, the scope of the EC’s policies have been extended into other areas where Britain, as an ex-colonial power, had economic and political links. The accession of these three countries to the EC had brought their experiences, relationships and political and economic interests within the scope of the EC policies. This inevitably affected the way in which the policies were made, in relation to the special association frameworks which the EC had established in its formative years, especially regarding Turkey’s association link with the EC. In the mid 1970s this was further compounded by the applications of Greece in 1975 and Spain and Portugal subsequently. These marked the first signs of change as the EC’s external policies shift from bilateralism to more multilateral (global) policies, in general with regard to the developing countries of the world and in particular to the Mediterranean countries.

The emergence of the Mediterranean policy, as one of the first global policies of the EC, was an attempt to respond to the rapidly changing political situation in the Mediterranean basin. The October war of 1973 between the Arab countries and Israel, the increasing naval presence of the Soviet Union in the Mediterranean and the following oil crisis posed new challenges to the EC. As far as the physical and economic security of the EC is concerned, the political stability in the Mediterranean became a crucial issue for the member states of the Community. Given that the Mediterranean littoral countries were economically dependent on the EC, the technical agreements of cooperations which provide

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for financial aid and preferential treatment were seen as the relevant tools of maintaining stability in the Mediterranean.4

Indeed, these two developments; the enlargement of the EC and the emergence of a global Mediterranean policy had an impairing impact on the Association Framework of Turkey. In the 1970s Turkey's special bilateral association framework became in practice just another Mediterranean agreement. As a result of consolidation and globalization of the EC's external policies the reciprocal character of the Association Treaty of Turkey had been weakened. As we shall elaborate in this chapter, the concessions and advantages that have been provided for in the Association Agreement on the premise of reciprocal and balanced rights and obligations have gradually been eroded by the external policies of the EC. Before analyzing the issue areas arising from the operation of the Association it is necessary to put it in the international context within which it operated.

By 1972, the EC had concluded some and was about to conclude trade and association agreements with the countries of the Mediterranean on the basis of Articles 238 and 113 of the Treaty of Rome. These agreements were not the end products of preconceived or coherent policies, but rather actions in response to external demands. Therefore lacking an overall framework of a Mediterranean policy, the EC responded to the requests of the Mediterranean countries by signing various kinds of association, trade and preferential trade agreements on a bilateral basis. The result of this period was a series of agreements that were divergent in their form and content, institutional structure and aims.5 However, subsequently, as a result of the enlargement of the EC, the oil crisis and the increasing instability in the Mediterranean, the relationships with the Mediterranean countries assumed new forms and contents during the 1970s. The Commission’s assessment of its Mediterranean policy reflected the new policies of the EC towards the region.6

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6 See for the birth of the Mediterranean Policy, Commission of The European Communities The Europe South Dialogue Brussels 1988, p.41.
Commission, having recognized 'the considerable overlap of political and economic interests' in the Mediterranean stressed the importance of 'development of the Mediterranean as a natural extension of European integration'. Hence, it admitted that agreements concluded with the Mediterranean countries were an 'inadequate expression of the interest had in the region.' In response to the Commission's assessment of the situation, the Head of the Governments of the EC confirmed, in 1972 at the Paris Summit the political importance of its commitments in relation to the Mediterranean and adopted a 'balanced and overall approach' in its external policy in relation to the Mediterranean countries. This marked officially the beginning of the Mediterranean Policy, which constituted the basis of the more generous trade and cooperation agreements. Accordingly, between 1972 and 1978, all the previous bilateral contacts which were due to expire, were revised or replaced by new agreements in accordance with the principles of the Mediterranean policy. The EC negotiated and concluded for the first time trade and cooperation agreements with all the Mediterranean countries, except Libya and Albania.

Given the generous characteristics of these Agreements, the negative impact of the Mediterranean policy on Turkey's Association was evident. What were though, the main characteristics of these agreements? In general, these Agreements took the form of overall cooperation and trade agreements for an unlimited period. They provided for preferential trade arrangements and financial and technical cooperation. More specifically, the removal of restrictions and preferential treatment for their substantial part of agricultural trade, the progressive dismantling of all tariffs in manufactured goods and financial and technical aid were included in the agreements of the Mediterranean Countries. In fact these agreements gave advantageous positions over Turkey's Association Agreement in three sensitive areas i.e.; agricultural products, semi-industrial products (textile and steel) and finally they

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7 Ibid.
8 Commission of the European Communities Europe Information 6/78.
provided for favourable conditions for the employment of the labour immigration from these
countries. These constituted the substantial part of Turkey's exports to the EC and privileges
which were provided for in the Association Agreement. As a result of the Mediterranean
Policy the trade preferences granted to Turkey within its bilateral reciprocal Association
framework had lost their significance. Turkey's preferential status, which had been
negotiated and concluded before the installation of the Mediterranean Policy, was eroded by
these new Mediterranean Agreements in the 1970s. This Community Policy meant more
favourable trade preferences to those subsequent Mediterranean countries who signed
asymmetrical cooperation agreement without the reciprocal obligations of special association
relationship. Although Turkey's Agreements created far reaching commitments, these
Mediterranean Agreements granted more generous tariff reductions than those granted to
Turkey, especially in agriculture and textile. As a senior Turkish diplomat observed in this
period 'Algeria and Spain received 65 per cent to 75 per cent tariff cuts. To Israel, the
Community provided better terms than to Turkey on 53 items. All in all, these preferences
for third parties affected Turkish exports to the Community to the extent of 200 million
annually'.

Another characteristic of the EC's external policy in the immediate aftermath of the
conclusion of the Additional Protocol was the introduction of the Generalised System of
Preferences (GSP) by the EC. This allowed duty free access within tariff quotas, for the
industrial exports of 111 developing countries. This further eroded the preferential
treatments for tariff and concessions which were granted to Turkey by the Additional
Protocol, especially for textile and manufactured agricultural products. Even though
Turkey asked to be included in GSP, its request was refused on the grounds that Turkey is a

10 Eren, Nuri Turkey, NATO and Europe: a Deteriorating relationship? The Atlantic
Papers no.34 Paris; the Atlantic Institute for International Relations, 1977 p.30.
11 The Commission Report 5 May 1971 SEC (71) 1632 quoted in Birand Turkey's
Common Market Adventure op cit p.294. See also Ilkin op cit p.44.
European country with an Association Agreement envisaging full membership. Thus it should not be treated in the same category as the Third World countries.\(^\text{12}\)

Apart from the Mediterranean Policy and the proliferation of the preferential trade agreements, the enlargement of the EC has also had an important impact on Turkey's Association link. The first signs of this became obvious after the first enlargement. For instance, Britain's accession led to more generous tariff reductions in relation to Mediterranean countries.\(^\text{13}\) Britain was a major customer for the agricultural products of the Mediterranean countries. When it acceded to the EC the external tariffs of the Community were higher than Britain's, particularly in the horticultural agricultural products. The Mediterranean countries who had been enjoying access to the British market on lower tariffs faced losses in their trade. Accordingly, after the accession of Britain the EC offered them new tariff preferences and trade concessions to compensate for their losses in the framework of its Mediterranean policy. As a result, 43 per cent of Turkey's total export was negatively affected by the consequences of the enlargement.\(^\text{14}\)

Consequently, the globalization of the external relations of the EC and the enlargement had a negative impact on Turkey's special Association status, which had been negotiated and concluded before these developments. The concessions and preferential arrangements given by the Additional Protocol have been reduced to insignificance in the course of the 1970s. In the eyes of new member states, Turkey's Association became another Mediterranean agreement, regardless of its reciprocal character. Turkey no longer enjoyed advantageous position over third countries. This situation was further aggravated by the prospect of the membership of the three Mediterranean countries, Greece, Spain and Portugal. The effects of the second enlargement would be felt in the 1980s which culminated in Turkey's application for full membership. This will be dealt with in the fifth chapter.

\(^{12}\) The publication by the Commission Office in Ankara \textit{Turkiye - AET Iliskileri} Ankara; Avrupa Toplulugu Yayinlari, 1976 p.90.

\(^{13}\) Ginsberg \textit{op cit.} p.161.

\(^{14}\) For these figures \textit{ibid.}
These were the general characteristics of the external policy of the EC that affected the operation of the Association Agreement in the first decade after the conclusion of the Additional Protocol. We can now look at the perceptions, policies and attitudes of the Turkish side affecting the operation of the Association in the same period.

II. The Background Conditions and Characteristics: Turkey's Policies and Perceptions of Association

In this subsection we shall investigate the attitudes of the Political Parties, the polices of the Governments and the perceptions of interest groups in the course of the implementation of the Additional Protocol, notably the first ten years of the transitional period.

In order for it to be implemented, the Additional Protocol had to be ratified by Turkey and by the Member States of the Community, an interim Agreement was concluded to implement the commercial provisions of the Additional Protocol. In the meantime, the Memorandum of March 1973 delivered by the Chief of Staff to the Government, intervened with the public discussion of the Additional Protocol. During the ratification of the Additional Protocol, the deliberations in the Grand National reflected the opinions of the Political Parties. The opinions of the Parties with reference to the Additional Protocol are worth dealing with since they affected the Governmental decisions in the course of the negotiation process with the EC, during the unstable period of 1973-1980. In fact, this period was characterized by a series of weak coalition party governments. Therefore, as far as Turkey's decision-making within the association structures is concerned, the period between the conclusion of the Protocol in 1973, and the collapse of the Association system, as a result of the Military coup of 1980, can hardly be called stable. In fact, the period 1973-1980 witnessed five changes of government of which three were coalition governments. Accordingly, the policies and demands of Turkey in the course of the operation of the

Association were inconsistent and constrained by the divergent views of the Parties who took place in the Government. As a consequence, the Association policies often changed.

When the Additional Protocol was finally ratified in the Grand National Assembly by the majority of members, the support from Western European Governments for Turkish democracy, which was under the shadow of the Military Memorandum, was seen as a reassuring factor. However, certain reservations were made regarding the implications of the Additional Protocol for the economic sovereignty of Turkey. The conservative Justice Party (JP), was the main proponent of the relationship with the EC, and was in power when the Additional Protocol was signed. The Justice Party emphasized that the implementation of the Additional Protocol would facilitate the structural adjustment of the Turkish economy to the international markets. On the other hand the main opposition party from the central left, the Republican People's Party (RPP), while it was in favour of the Association in principle, objected to the provisions of the Additional Protocol on the grounds that it would hinder the industrialization process of Turkey. A quotation from the records of the Assembly shows the opinion of the RPP was the following:

'If we fail to protect our economy, especially at its moment of birth or adolescence, with some protective measures, we shall soon find ourselves in the position of people who repeatedly suffer the loss of their offspring ... The calculations made in Turkey indicate the present status of the Turkish economy as an economy that is still at the stage where protection is imperative ... So what sense does it make to claim that an economy [the product of] which is expensive and low quality, which is still in the process of establishment and which has no previous experience with foreign competition, can develop better under competitive conditions?'

In fact, while both main parties the RPP and the JP were in favour of the maintenance of the relationship with the EC and emphasized the importance of the Association relationship, the RPP was of the opinion that the revisions of the Additional Protocol was necessary to restore the disparity in the Association Framework. In the course of the implementation of the Association, the RPP when it came to power, asked to have the

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17 Ilkin op cit, p.44.
18 Ibid, pp.42, 43.
19 Quoted ibid p.43
20 Eren op cit p.10.
provisions of the Additional Protocol reviewed in order to obtain new concessions. As Ilkin
observes, in fact, the opinion of the RPP reflected the criticisms of the Additional Protocol
voiced by the State Planning Organization. On the other hand, the Justice Party’s opinion
was associated with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs who always stressed the political
significance of the Association link and its Additional Protocol in the long run. Although the
Justice Party did not object to the Protocol in the beginning, later it came to argue that the
minor modifications in the Transitional period were necessary particularly regarding the
encouragement of exports to the EC ‘for reducing dependence on foreign sources’.21

However, the Justice Party's revisionism was less radical compared to the RPP and only
limited to the new concessions in the Trade. Whereas the RPP was in favour of the complete
revision of the Additional Protocol including the customs union. Indeed, when it came to
power in 1978 it attempted to suspend the implementation of the customs union. This will be
dealt with in detail later in this chapter.

The other small parties' opinions should also be noted since they took place in the
fragile coalition governments of the RPP and the JP in the 1970s. To a certain extent they
influenced and even constrained the Association policies of the Governments. For instance in
1975 when Greece applied for the full membership, Turkey, contrary to its traditional foreign
policy, failed to counterbalance by following Greece's suit. This was mainly because of the
fear that the JP's coalition partner Islamic oriented National Salvation Party could have
withdrawn its support in the Assembly and so the application would have led to another
governmental crisis.22 Therefore the National Salvation Party, which participated in three
coalition governments between 1973 and 1980 became the crucial third party in this period.
The emergence of this Islamic oriented Party in the 1970s can best be explained as a reaction
to the rapid development of Turkey. As Keyder explained 'the National salvation Party
attempted to translate the discontent of the small town traditional petty bourgeoisie into a
platform of Islamic revivalism. The NSP combined a shopkeeper ideology with demands for

21 Ibid.
22 Bahceli op cit pp.228-230.
state interventionism in large industry, thus guaranteeing the transition to monopoly should occur without the destruction of the small business.\(^{23}\) Therefore threatened by the big business and capital centres gradually industrializing and integrating into a network of trade and credit relationship with Europe it was ideologically manifested in the attitudes of the Party that the EC was a Christian community and there was no place for Turkey.\(^{24}\) As it was stated:

'Turkey ought not to be in the Common Market of the Western States but in the Common Market of the Eastern Nations. Turkey is backward in relation to the Westerners but advanced in relation to the Easterners. If Turkey enters the Common Market under today's conditions it will become a colony.'\(^{25}\)

On the other hand, while its opposition to full Turkish membership persisted, NSP's perception of interdependence between the EC and Turkey became particularly evident in the course of the operation of the Association, the Party leader, when he was in the office as a deputy Prime Minister of a coalition Government in 1975, asserted that:

'all the states of the world may one day become a world state. While we think this possible, we do not consider it appropriate at this time that Turkey under present-day conditions in the world should be broken away from the one to which she belongs, be carried off, and become a single state with the countries of the West. Therefore we have not accepted the political goals of the Common Market. But on the other hand we consider the economic aspects of the Common Market from many points of view advantageous at the present time ... We want Turkey to industrialize. We want to compete with the Western nations in the world market.'\(^{26}\)

Apart from the NSP, another minor party, Nationalist Movement Party (the radical right and pan-Turkic) (NMP) was against the EC mainly on the grounds that the close relationship with the EC would undermine the development of Turkish economy and corrupt the Turkish national identity.\(^{27}\) However, the NMP never had more than a few members in

\(^{23}\) Keyder, Caglar, The Political Economy of Turkish Democracy' *New Left Review* 1979, p.35.
\(^{24}\) Eren *Op cit* p.10.
\(^{25}\) Ahmad, Feroz, *The Turkish Experiment in Democracy*, London C. Hurst 1977 quoted in Rustow, Dankwort, Turkey and the Community in Mediterranean Challenge V Sussex European Papers no.10, p.31.
\(^{26}\) Quoted and translated from Turkey EEC Relations 1976 by Rustow *op cit*, p.32.
\(^{27}\) Tarihiye - AET Iliiskileri Ankara: Avrupa Tophlugu Yayinlari *op cit* p.248.
the Assembly. Another minor party, National Reliance Party was also in favour of the improvement of the relationships with the EC for mainly political reasons.\textsuperscript{28}

Apart from the opinions of the political parties, in the course of the 1970s, after the conclusion of the Additional Protocol, the Association relationship with the Community became more and more a matter of public discussion for the interest groups and their representatives, academic circles, government agencies and trade unions. This was a different characteristic of the period from the formative years of the Association in which it was merely regarded as a political agreement and a matter of foreign policy left to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In this sense, the political concerns of the formative years were replaced with the perceptions of economic interdependence and in the process the effects of the Additional Protocol were gradually felt by the interest groups, particularly in the field of economy and trade. Indeed, according to a newspaper survey, the Association with the EC was regarded as one of the most important national issues by the majority of respondents. As it was noted

'Foreign trade was given top priority, followed by Turkey's membership of the EC. Foreign investment was third, while the problems of Turkish workers abroad were the most frequently cited issue.'\textsuperscript{29}

The incompatibility of the economic policies with the basic principles of the Association framework (the elimination of trade restrictions and the alignment of common external tariffs) was another characteristic of the period. Indeed, Turkey's industry was built behind the high protective tariff barriers since the establishment of the Republic. The state played an important encouraging role where the private sector lacked the capital for investment. The state intervention and mixed economy were the main characteristics of the Turkish economy. Historical experiences contributed to the perceptions of Turkish elites such as the negative experiences of the free trade area agreements signed during the Ottoman Empire. These Capitulation Agreements had provided the European powers with extra territorial trade privileges that eventually led to the peripheralization of the Ottoman Empire.

\textsuperscript{28} Eren \textit{op cit} p.10.
\textsuperscript{29} \textit{Ibid} p.90.
These negative perceptions of the free trade arrangements persisted even after the establishment of the Turkish Republic.\(^{30}\) Thus liberal economic policies were received with the suspicion that they can undermine the national sovereignty of Turkey. This was particularly evident in the programme of the Republican People's Party which established the ideological basis of the modern Turkish Republic. Even though there were earlier attempts at liberalization of economic policies, these faced the resistance of the Turkish industrialists who enjoyed the profits of the important substitution policy. The bureaucratic traditions in the state apparatus were also promoting the import substitution policies.

Indeed, the policy of the State Planning Organization which was established to produce development plans every five years, epitomized this attitude in the State apparatus. Even though the statements superficially referring to the adjustment of the economy according to the Additional Protocol were in existence the import substitution policies for industrialization remained as the main economic policy orientation for the SPO. The policies of this important government agency which set the policy priorities in the Turkish economy was in fact in conflict with the spirit of the Additional Protocol.\(^{31}\) For instance, in 1976 in a special Report to the Prime Minister's Office with regard to Turkey's Association relationship, the SPO suggested that 'there [was] need for radical changes in the existing relationship ... The necessary changes in the relationship can be effected either within the framework of the Association Agreement or by considering new alternatives outside an Association Agreement.' In its conclusions the SPO continued 'There are alternatives such as a Preferential Trade Agreement, a Non-Preferential Trade Agreement, and an Agreement on Commercial and Economic Cooperation. The advantages and disadvantages of these alternatives should be carefully examined.'\(^{32}\) Penrose, who studied Turkey's Association policy with the Community in this period, observed that, 'on the one hand, by the

\(^{30}\) See for a good analysis of the political economy of Turkey, Keyder, Caglar *State and Class In Turkey* London: verso 1987.

\(^{31}\) Ilkin *op cit* p.45.

\(^{32}\) The Second Special Committee Report regarding the EC, Ankara, SPO 1976 Report. Quoted and translated in Rustow *op cit* p.33.
Association Agreement, Turkey [was] committed to trade liberalization, which presupposes international specialization and exchange. On the other, Turkey has in practice, until very recently been pushing ahead with a broad policy of important substitution which aimed to make Turkey self-sufficient in almost every branch of industry.'33

Thanks however to the import substitution policies Turkey was able to sustain a high growth rate in the early sixties and seventies.34 On the other hand, this was also due to the stable international economy that created a conducive environment for the development of the Turkish economy. But, starting from the mid-seventies, the effects of international economic crisis (oil crises) was to be felt gradually culminating in the stagnation of the Turkish economy and leading virtually to the collapse of the economic system. This was compounded by increasing political violence which eventually led to the military coup of 1980.

In the mid-seventies, the early optimistic perceptions of the industrialists about the Association relationship were replaced by concerns about the competitive threat from Western Europe in view of the establishment of a customs union regime. These fears were gradually compounded by the widening trade gap between the Community countries and Turkey which constituted 40 per cent of its trade deficit with the World. [This will be dealt with in detail as a separate issue in the next sessions]. However, the Industrialists were not speaking with one voice. For instance, the Istanbul Chamber saw the Association with the EC as 'an indispensable part of Ataturk's road to Westernization', while the Ankara chamber was against it on the grounds that Turkey should 'preserve its own economic identity.'35 These divergent views reflected the differences between the large and export-oriented business interests of Istanbul, Izmit and Bursa (the main industrial cities) and smaller, domestic market oriented firms in Eskisehir, Ankara, Kayseri and Aegean hinterland. The

33 This inconsistent Association policy persisted at least until the beginning of the 1980s.
34 See Caglar for the political economy of import substituting industrialization State and Class op cit pp.141-163.
35 See for the perceptions of interest groups and the reflection of these on the Governmental policies Bianchi, Robert Interest Groups and Political Development in Turkey New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984, pp.62-263.
main dispute was between the different industrialization strategies of the Parties. The former was in favour of an industrial policy that should lead to the achievement of the Customs union. Whereas the latter was for the maintenance of the import substitution policies.36 However, under the severe international competition and crises of the mid-seventies, the Industrialists came to a common agreement when they publicly called for the suspension of the implementation of the Customs union regime.37

But, it was not until the 1980s that these negative attitudes towards the Association changed. The important substitution policies failed as result of increasing interdependence. It was difficult to sustain an economic policy of self sufficiency and self reliance under the circumstances of international interdependence. As Turkey became more sensitive and vulnerable to the changes in the international economic environment, particularly within the Association context, Turkey's vulnerability to the EC became an acute problem. We can now investigate how this increasing interdependence was managed in different issue areas.

III Substantive Issues in the Transition Period

Agricultural Issues

Agricultural was one of the most frequently raised issues by Turkey after the signing of the Protocol. The erosion of its preferences in the agricultural field was one of Turkey's main concerns in the negotiation process within the Association framework. Given that in 1978 60 per cent of Turkey's export to the Community was made up of agricultural products, Turkey was discontent with the eroding concessions of the Additional Protocol as a result of the EC's global policies.38 For instance, according to The Economist in 1976 the EC offered an 80 per cent cut on citrus fruit imported from Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria on the other hand the tariff reduction granted to Turkey for the same products was 40 per cent.39 Indeed, this was regarded by Turkey as a denial of its special status. Turkey claimed that the framework

36 Ibid., p.61.
37 Penrose, op cit, p.66.
39 The Economist, 23 October 1976.
of relationship between the EC and Turkey was a special Association pattern of a reciprocal kind which stipulates the establishment of the customs union. Therefore it required a balance between rights and obligations. Since Turkey undertook to establish a customs union regime within the Association framework, it was asserted that Turkey deserved better treatment in relation to the other Mediterranean countries who established simple trade and cooperation agreements without any substantial obligations.

Arising from the above considerations, throughout the seventies Turkey constantly demanded increased access to the EC market for certain agricultural exports to compensate for its eroding rights in agricultural field. In 1975 Turkey submitted a list of concessions to the Community covering the items of horse meat, fresh vegetables, citrus fruit, hazel and other nuts, olive oil, tomato concentrate, and fruit and vegetable juices, which were not included in the Additional Protocol. In response to the Turkish demands, the EC came up with a shorter list. This list of concessions was not accepted by Turkey as it 'could not regard it as an acceptable basis for negotiation'\(^\text{40}\). In 1976, the EC, in an attempt to settle the agricultural issues, offered a new improved list of concessions as part of its global policy. This offer was finally accepted as a basis for negotiation, and concluded the second agricultural review required on a two yearly basis under Article 35 of the Additional Protocol. Apart from the most important concession, olive oil, Turkey's gain in agricultural concessions were mainly marginal.\(^\text{41}\)

In fact, Turkey's commercial loss in agricultural products was not substantial; 93 per cent of Turkish Agricultural products enjoyed preferential treatment. Turkey's main agricultural products which were exported to the EC were notably dried figs, raisins and tobacco.\(^\text{42}\) However, the Turkish demands on tariff reductions can be explained by political rather than by purely economic factors. For Turkey this was a matter of principle. Turkey was an Associated state with a special reciprocal agreement working towards the


membership of the EC. Therefore, she should receive better treatment than third countries. On the other hand, the Community justified its position with its global responsibilities that its policy with one country should not limit it in its dealings with other countries. Thus, for the Community, the emphasis in the Association framework should be more on 'cooperation' and less on the tariff concessions.

Finally, the agricultural preferences that Turkey enjoyed were eventually improved upon by an Association Council decision in 1980. Taking into account 'the specific nature of the Association links with Turkey' the Council agreed to a new approach so that customs duties on imports into the Community of Turkish agricultural products between 1981 and 1987 would be eliminated in four stages. According to the decision of the Association Council the customs duties charged on imported agricultural products were to be entirely lifted by January 1 1987. It was also added in the Council decision that the 'gradual elimination of the customs duties actually applied by the Community to imports from Turkey shall not prejudice the principles and machinery of the common agricultural policy'. This constituted the legitimate basis of the restrictions of the concessions on agricultural products in view of their impact on the Common Agricultural Policy of the Community. In fact, when it is read in the light of the provisions of the Additional Protocol, this appears to be in conflict with the spirit of the Additional Protocol, which envisaged the gradual adjustment of Turkey's agricultural policy to the CAP.

However according to the Additional Protocol, for its part, Turkey undertook progressively to eliminate its quantitative restrictions within 22 years and adjust its agricultural policy to the EC's. In the same period, the EC did virtually enjoy no preference in the agricultural field. It must be noted, however that the share of agricultural products in Turkey's exports substantially decreased from total 68 per cent in 1972 to 19 per cent in the

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43 Penrose, op cit. p.65.  
mid 1980s. The export value of agricultural products such as hazel nuts, dried fruits, cotton and tobacco relatively declined in the overall export of Turkey’s external trade pattern.\textsuperscript{47}

Accordingly, the salience of agriculture as an issue area would inevitably diminish as a result of the changes in Turkey’s trade patterns in the eighties. This will be dealt with in more detail in chapter five concerning Turkey’s application for full membership.

**Trade Gap**

The EC was Turkey’s largest trading partner and since the inception of the Association framework the volume of its trade with the EC continually increased. Between 1973 and 1975, on average, 45 per cent of Turkey’s export went to the Community reaching the highest level in 1976. Moreover, the EC remained the largest export outlet for Turkey and it was the main supplier of its imports particularly in industrial goods.\textsuperscript{48} Despite the growth in trade, there was a gradual widening trade gap between the EC and Turkey. As figures illustrate, over the period 1963-1976, the exports from Turkey to the Community increased 257 per cent, whilst imports from the Community to Turkey increased 742 per cent.\textsuperscript{49} This shows the increasing asymmetry in the trade balance between the partners.

The exports of Turkey to the Community started to decline relatively, while the EC’s share in Turkey’s imports continued to increase. In 1977, for instance, Turkey’s exports to the Community stood at 1.487 million dollars while its imports from the Community reached 5,218 million dollars reaching the highest trade deficit of 3,731 million dollars.\textsuperscript{50} It is difficult, however, to blame only the eroding concessions in the Association framework for the rapidly growing trade deficit. In fact, according to an expert group, which was set up by the Association Council to study the causes of this growing imbalance were ‘structural’ (high inflation, high unemployment, growing foreign debt and internal consumption and the vulnerability of the infant Turkish industry by import substitution policies) and ‘cyclical’ (a

\textsuperscript{47} See for a detailed analysis of ‘Turkish Agriculture and the Common Agricultural Policy’, Hale, William in *Turkey and The European Community* ed. by Evin op cit pp.141-153.
\textsuperscript{48} European Report no.508 op cit p.9.
\textsuperscript{49} Europe Information 9/78 op cit p.6.
\textsuperscript{50} European Report op cit.
general deterioration of the economy of developing countries after the oil crisis and the rapid increase in the prices of raw materials and industrial goods). This was also due to the nature of the trade pattern between the EC and Turkey. The Turkish imports in this period (1970-1980) consisted of manufactured goods and raw materials while its export earnings relied extensively on agricultural products which caused shortages in its foreign currency reserves.

According to a comprehensive study concerning the trade relations between the Community and Turkey, in the period between 1973 and 1982, it was observed that since 1978 Turkey’s exports moderately increased from 1.0 billion in 1978 to 1.2 billion in 1980 and to a higher level of 1.7 billion in 1982. However this was also due to the governmental policies which had previously introduced credit subsidies and tax rebates for export oriented products in order to encourage Turkey’s exports. Nevertheless, it was concluded that 'in relative sense Turkey’s exports to the EEC which stood at 49.5 per cent in 1977, took a downward trend dropping to 42 per cent in 1980 and 30 per cent in 1982.' On the other hand, Turkey’s imports from the EC increased from 1.8 billion dollars in 1978 to 2.5 billion dollars in 1981, almost 35 per cent increase over this period. Although, subsequently the imports from the EC seemed to have dropped comparatively, this was due to foreign exchange constraints and the severe economic and political economic crisis in Turkey during 1979-1982 period. The same study concluded that the general perception of the Association relationship in the first ten years of the operation of the Association was that Turkey had not benefitted from the trade relations with the EC. The trade gap constantly widened in the 1973 and 1978 period but it was even worse in the period 1980 and 1982.

Even though the reasons for the widening trade gap were partly structural and cyclical as the expert group concluded it can also be explained by the restrictions imposed by

52 Karatas, Cevat 'Turkey's Association with the EEC and Sectors with Export Potential under Tariff Liberalization' Turkish Review - Quarterly Digest V 1 no5, Autumn 1986, p.68.
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid, pp.67-68.
the Community on the fairly competitive manufactured products of Turkey such as textiles. Therefore, we need to devote a separate section to the textile issue because of its salience as an issue area to be managed within the Association framework. In general, however, the widening trade gap as a general structural issue remained unresolved between the parties in the course of the 1980s.

Textile Issues

Another more specific issue of saliency concerns the textile question. According to a study published by 'Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association' (TUSIAD), textile exports to the Community increased from $2 million in 1968 to $107 million in 1974.55 Moreover textiles constituted on average 20 per cent of the manufactured products in Turkey's exports between 1970 and 1980.56 This explains the significance of textiles as the most competitive industrial export product of Turkey to the Community. Hence, in the course of the transition period of the Association, trade in textiles was to become one of the sensitive issues between the EC and Turkey. In fact in the 1970s Turkey became one of the ten largest suppliers of the textile imports of the EC (see Table 3.1).

According to the Additional Protocol the Community had undertaken to abolish, immediately following the entry into force of the Additional Protocol, all customs duties and 'charges having equivalent effect' on industrial imports from Turkey to the Community. In Annexes 1 and 2 to the Additional Protocol, however, some exceptions were made to the trade liberalization of industrial products. Apart from some petroleum products, three important textile products, on which the reduction of duties would be gradually introduced were: cotton yarn not put up for retail sale; other woven fabrics of cotton; and machine-made carpets of wool and of fine animal hair. See annex 1 and 2.57 According to Annex 2 of the Additional Protocol, the EC undertook to introduce the reduction of tariff quotas by 25 per

56 Avrupa Economic Toplulugu ve Turkiye Iliskileri *Hava harb Okulu Bulteni Eki* Volume 1 no 3 October 1983, p.62 in Turkish.
57 The Additional Protocol *op cit.*

Yet the general textile policies of the EC, following the recession and massive redundancies in the textile sector, started to have an impact on the Association policy of the EC in relation to Turkey in the mid 1970s. The first signs of this were felt after the accession of the UK, who was one of the most important textile traders within the Community. In 1974 the UK introduced the first unilateral restrictions against Turkish exports of cotton yarn.59

Furthermore, the conclusion of the Multi Fibre Agreement (MFA) which operated within the framework of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and was established in 1973 to regulate trade in textile and clothing provided the EC with the technical instruments for the control of imports, where they threaten the textile sector within the Community.60 The MFA allowed the Community to make bilateral agreements for voluntary export restraints with other main textile exporting countries, including Turkey. From 1977 onwards, the EC started to impose restrictions on the basis of bilateral 'voluntary agreements' within the framework of the MFA. This constituted another major issue area between Turkey and EC. In the eyes of Turkey as an aspirant member tied to the Community with a special Association agreement, the imposition of restrictions in textile trade by the EC within its global textile policy, constituted a breach of the provisions of the Association in the

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59 See Bourguignon, Rostwitha 'The History of The Association Agreement between Turkey and The European Community' in Turkey and The European Community ed. by Evin 1990, op cit p.52.

sense that the trade restrictions were in conflict with the objectives of the Association framework which had stipulated the establishment of a customs union.

In view of the substantial increase in Turkish exports to the Community in the cotton yarn sector, in 1977 textiles appeared again on the agenda of the Association framework at the Association Committee level. The Committee held two meetings in an attempt to resolve the difficulties. At the end of the meetings an unofficial agreement was reached by the parties in order to reconcile the disagreements. 61 Nevertheless the exports from Turkey to the Community continued to reach unacceptable levels for certain countries of the Community. In 1978 the EC, at the request of the UK, resorted to unilateral safeguard measures on imports of Turkish cotton yarn into the British market on the basis of a Council Regulation (EEC) No. 1842/71. 62 In 1979, the problems between the Community and Turkey were further deteriorated because of Turkey's refusal to agree to arrangements with regard to its exports of sensitive textile products to the Community. Despite Turkey's protests, in November 1979, the EC resorted to the safeguard clause of Article 60 of the Additional Protocol in order to restrict the export of Turkish cotton yarn to the United Kingdom on the basis of the Commission's Regulation (EEC) no. 2465. 63

The situation in the textile field worsened even more, following the military coup of 1980 which resulted in the suspension of political activities within the Association framework. The working of the Association had been reduced to the technical problems therefore the Association bodies mainly met at the Committee and Ambassador level, to discuss issues specifically concerning technical textile arrangements. In fact, in the early eighties the textile trade was to become the most controversial issue area. Unlike other Mediterranean countries, as the main supplier of low price textile products to the Community, Turkey refused to agree to qualitative restrictions on its textile exports.

particularly in cotton yarn, on the grounds that its Association link with the EC constituted a cooperation framework going beyond a simple trade arrangement.\textsuperscript{64} Hence in 1981 the Commission decided to impose a provisional anti dumping duty of 16 per cent on imports of Turkish cotton yarn to the Community.\textsuperscript{65} Since a substantial amount of Turkish textile continued to enter the Community market and an agreement was not possible to reach in the Association Council of 2 April 1982, the Council of the European Communities confirmed a definitive anti dumping duty of 12 per cent on Turkish cotton yarn exports on the basis of Regulation (EEC) No 789/82.\textsuperscript{66} Turkey retaliated by imposing 15 per cent duty on imports of certain iron and steel products originating from the Community.\textsuperscript{67} After prolonged negotiations, however, at the meetings of the Council of the Communities on 26 April 1982, an arrangement with the Turkish Government and exporters was finally reached in July 1982. Turkey finally agreed to respect 'a system of minimum prices for exports of cotton yarn' and the implementation of 'a dual monitoring system to ensure compliance with provisions regarding both and quantities'.\textsuperscript{68} The anti dumping duty imposed on imports of Turkish cotton yarn since April 1982 was abolished by Council Regulation (EEC) No 2306/82 of 19 August 1982.\textsuperscript{69} Accordingly Turkey abolished the tax of 15 per cent on imports of steel and iron originating from the Community.

However, textiles, for the rest of 1982, continued to be the main source of friction between the EC and Turkey. In view of the substantial increase and spill over of Turkish exports into the other varieties of sensitive textile products (T-shirts, shirts and cotton fabrics), certain member states started to demand the application of safeguard measures in accordance with the Community's own textile policy. Towards the end of 1982, measures were taken by certain community countries and the Community to stop textile imports.

\textsuperscript{64} The General Secretariat of the European Communities \textit{Thirtieth Review of the Council's Work} 1982 para. 374.
\textsuperscript{65} \textit{Official Journal of the European Communities} L90 3.4.198.
\textsuperscript{66} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{67} Thirtieth Review of the Council's Work \textit{op cit.}
\textsuperscript{68} Ibid.
originating from Turkey and included the following: Italy stopped imports of crude linen originating from Turkey until the end of December in 1982; The EC stopped the import ready-to-wear goods until October 1982; France banned the imports of Turkish made shirts and jackets; The EC provided France with the right to stop the free circulation of certain textile goods.\textsuperscript{70} Given that Turkey had heavily invested in textile industry and bought 90 per cent of its textile machinery from the Community, the restrictions of the Community on Turkey’s exports led to negative reactions among the Turkish interest group and the general public opinion towards the Community policies.\textsuperscript{71} In the eyes of Turkish interest groups, given the fact that textiles were Turkey’s most competitive industrial product, Turkey should have received better treatment. First of all Turkey, as a developing country, who had established a special Association relationship with the Community needed to have access to the European market for its most competitive product. Secondly, this was against the spirit of the Association Treaty that required the removal of the trade restriction between the parties. By referring to its general policies and by using its own decision-making organs in textile issues, the EC undermined the policy framework of the Association. Moreover, the Association framework was reduced to a position of a simple trade agreement of the Community with a third country. At the end of 1982 to retaliate against the safeguard measures taken by the Community Turkey again imposed a tax of 15 per cent on imports from the Community, mainly in iron and steel sector.\textsuperscript{72}

In 1983, at a single meeting convened at Ambassador level, the functioning of the Association was again devoted to a single issue area, in other words, the difficulties in the textile sector. The Commission, while protesting against Turkey’s restrictions on the grounds that it was contrary to the provisions of the Association revoked the safeguard clause again.\textsuperscript{73} At the same meeting the Community protested against the surcharges imposed by Turkey on the iron and steel sector. As textile trade continued to be the main trade issue

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\textsuperscript{70} Financial Times Survey Textile and Clothing May 14 1984 p.16. \\
\textsuperscript{71} Ibid and Bahceli \textit{op cit} p.226. \\
\textsuperscript{72} Thirtieth Review of the Council’s Work \textit{op cit} para. 375. \\
\textsuperscript{73} Article 60 of the Additional Protocol \textit{op cit}. 
\end{flushleft}
between the Community and Turkey in the first half of the 1980s, the downgrading of the operation of the Association to its technical level did not particularly help in reaching an arrangement. The textile issue remained unresolved until the first signs of normalization became evident in the process of Association. Therefore, it was not until 1985 that an informal arrangement was reached in textile trade.74

Labour Issues

As we have shown in the previous chapter, the Association Treaty (Article 12) and the Additional Protocol (Article 36) had provided for the free movement of Turkish workers between Turkey and the EC which would be 'secured by progressive stages between the end of the twelfth and the twenty-second year after the entry into force of that Agreement', in other words between December 1976 and 1986.

However, in the field of labour, the operation of the Agreement did not run as smoothly as had been envisaged in the framework of the Association. Labour issues constituted one of the most controversial issue areas between the EC and Turkey.

As the export of Turkish labour to the Community grew rapidly during the 1970s, the Community labour market has been the most important export outlet and the source of foreign currency for Turkey in terms of remittances of workers. Whilst the figures of labour migration stood at thousands in the beginning of the 1960s, in the late 1970s they reached almost a million. What was then West Germany became the main export destination with the highest Turkish labour population abroad.75 (See the table 3.2). More importantly, given the rapidly widening trade gap with the Community during the seventies, the remittances from the Turkish labour in Europe became the main source of income in covering Turkey's trade deficit. In 1973 they even contributed to a substantial balance of payment surplus.76

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75 See Bahadir, Sefik Alp 'Turkey and Turks in Germany', Aussen Politics, 1979.

By the mid seventies there was a steady increase in the recruitment of Turkish workers in Europe, except for a short recession period in 1966-67 in Germany, reaching its highest level in 1973. [See Table 3.2] However, following the worldwide recession of 1974, the labour importing countries of Europe began imposing restrictions on the recruitment of Turkish workers. In 1975, the migration of Turkish workers to the Community came to a halt because of the international recession and high unemployment in the EC countries, particularly in the Federal Republic of Germany. The most affected by this recession were the Turkish workers in Germany. In the same year the number of Turkish workers in the Community were already 750 thousand, of which 650 thousand were in the Federal Republic of Germany. However, even after the recession was over the individual countries were reluctant to lift these restrictions on the inflow of labour from non-member countries. The main reason was explained by the OECD Report 'As worker's migration within the European Community is liberalised the weight of future restrictions would therefore seem to fall on would-be emigrants from countries outside the EEC'. However, the ban on the recruitment of Turkish labour did not lead to a sudden interruption of immigration, particular to the Federal Republic of Germany, as the families of the Turkish workers continue to emigrate to join their partners as part of family unification policies. Thus in the beginning of the eighties, the Turkish population living in Germany reached almost 1.5 million which constituted the largest group of foreign residents.

Although the export of Turkish labour to the EC was arranged through bilateral agreements with individual countries of the EC, the recruitment ban on the influx of Turkish labour contradicted the provisions of the Additional Protocol, that provided for the gradual implementation of free movement of Turkish workers within the EC, starting from 1976.

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78 Europe information 1978 op cit p.6.
79 Rosenthal op cit p.20.
onwards. This was due to be completed in 1986. Therefore, labour issues were at the top of the list in the agenda of the Association Council meetings of 1976. Turkish requests were mainly concentrated on the equal treatment of Turkish workers with other workers within the European Community and priorities over those of non-member states. However, after prolonged discussions, the only concession that Turkey could secure was the 'second priority'. This second priority provided them with opportunities for employment unfulfilled by the EC workers but above those of non-member states. In fact, the outcome of the Association meeting was the improvement of the conditions of the Turkish workers within the Community for an initial four year period, rather than facilitating the gradual implementation of free movement of labour between the European Community and Turkey in accordance with the provisions of the Association Treaty. The Association Council failed to address the principle of free movement provided in the Association framework. The Association Council also adopted provisions in the field of social security and concerning their family unification. In general, however, the Turkish side was disappointed with the outcome of the Association meetings on the grounds that one of the most important elements, which was the free movement of the Turkish workers, 'in the overall balance of agreement' was upset within the balance of rights and obligations of the Association framework. This was understandable as the remittances from the workers constituted one of the balancing factors in the condition of interdependence between the Community and Turkey within the Association framework.

After a three year period of interruption in the working of the Association meetings because of Turkey's dissatisfaction with the functioning of the Association process, labour again became the central issue in the negotiations with the Community in 1979. Following the return of a new government (Justice Party) which had requested the normalization of the

80 Ergun, The problem of Freedom of Movement of Turkish Workers in 'Turkey and The European Community' ed. by Evin op cit p.189.
81 European Report No 508 op cit p.5.
82 Europe Information 9/78 op cit p.4.
83 Agence Europe no.1933 5 March 1976 p.8.
association in 1979, the EC and Turkey were finally able to meet at the ministerial level in 1980 to reactivate the Association. The Association Council reached important decisions in the labour issues.\textsuperscript{84} The arrangement again mainly concerned the improvement of the rights and conditions of the Turkish workers and their families within the Community in the field of social security and employment. The gradual implementation of free movement was not on the agenda of the Council of Association.\textsuperscript{85} Moreover, attempted reactivation of the Association was interrupted by the Military Coup in September 1980. This was to undermine the principle of free movement further. In view of the influx of political asylum seekers, the EC countries decided to reimpose visa restrictions for Turkish nationals. This was protested at an Association meeting at the Ambassador level.\textsuperscript{86} The question of free movement remained the most important unresolved issue in the 1980s. This will be analyzed in its relevant context concerning the factors leading to application.

Financial Issues

Financial cooperation was crucial for Turkey’s adjustment to European integration in the transitional period of the Association. This was due to Turkey’s special Association framework, which was established on the basis of reciprocity of rights and obligations, in order to achieve its objectives which is full membership of the EC. Given the inherent structural asymmetries in the relationship between a developing country like Turkey and an economically advanced entity like the EC, financial cooperation provides assistance towards self-help in the achievement of the objectives of the Association. Thus it was particularly essential for the Associated country to bear the consequences of reciprocal obligations with the developed EC economy arising from the Association framework. Moreover financial assistance acts as a balancing element in the condition of interdependence between unequal partners.

\textsuperscript{84} See Agence Europe 2 July 1980 no.2940.
\textsuperscript{85} Agence Europe no 1933 5 March 1976 p.8.
\textsuperscript{86} Twenty Eighth Review of the Council’s Review para. 292.
Financial cooperation was provided in the framework of the Association Agreement to contribute towards the accelerating development of the Turkish economy, as stated in Article 2 of the Association Treaty. The Financial assistance, which is arranged periodically, renewed and mainly took the form of loans from European Investment Bank. The first Financial Protocol provided Turkey with a loan of 175 million European Currency Units (ECU) for the period of 1964-1969 which was annexed to the Association Protocol.

The Second Financial Protocol, signed in November 1970, represented a commitment of 210 million European Currency Units up until 23 May 1976 and for the first four years of the transitional period of the Association following the entry into force of the Additional Protocol. The object of this was again to contribute to the accelerated development of Turkish economy in accordance with Article 2 of the Association Protocol. The second Financial Protocol was annexed to the Additional Protocol.

The third Financial Protocol was signed in May 1977, but it took the Turkish Government almost two years to ratify it. This was because of Turkey's deteriorating balance of payments. In 1976 the financial assistance was high on the agenda of the Association Council meetings since the second Financial Protocol was due to expire. On the Turkish side, however, there was a sign of reluctance to conclude the third Financial Protocol because of 'the Government's anxiety to avoid parliamentary debate on relations with EEC while they were strained and contested by certain sectors of the public and some political parties.' This was understandable given the strained Association relationship in other areas such as labour, textile, agriculture as shown in the previous sections. In the summer of the same year, taking into account the difficulties arising from the substantial deficit in Turkey's trade balance with the Community, the Community made a statement which showed 'a large measure of understanding for Turkey's problems in this sphere, and recommending that the

87 Article 2 the Association Agreement op cit.
88 Annex to the Association op cit.
90 Agence Europe 5 March 1976.
scope of the Association should be extended to a new sphere' that was financial '
'cooperation'. Accordingly, the Community proposed 310 million European currency units
after long negotiations. However, it took two years for the Turkish Government to
conclude and ratify the third Financial Protocol. Besides, in view of the substantial trade
deficit, largely as a result of the imports of industrial products from the EC, the amount
offered by the Community was not sufficient to compensate for the overall problems in the
Association relationship. Eventually, the third Financial Protocol was concluded. Finally, the
Third Financial Protocol represented a financial commitment of 310 million Euro currency
unit until 1981; 90 million of these were in the shape of loans from the European Investment
Bank from its own resources, 220 million were in the shape of loans granted on special terms
by the Community and allocated to the European Investment Bank from budgetary
resources. Compared to the 267 million Euro currency unit given by the Second Protocol,
the increase which was only 17 per cent. This was considered inadequate on the basis of the
previous amount which was allocated especially in view of the increasing gaps in key issue
areas between the Associated partners. This led to delaying tactics in the ratification of the
Protocol.

From 1977 onwards the Turkish balance of payments and trade deficit further
deteriorated and the problems reached unbearable proportions as a result of the oil crisis of
the early seventies and general structural problems in the Turkish economy. Turkey had to
borrow heavily to meet the rising oil prices. The worker's remittances declined and domestic
measures failed to solve the balance of payments problems. Given the widening economic
gap between the Community and Turkey, the Turkish Government asked the Community for
substantial aid to help overcome its immediate balance of payments difficulties. This aid
amounted to half of its foreign financing, (about $8 billion) which the five-year plan had
provided. For the community, 'the Turkish demands go beyond anything that could be

91 Twenty fourth review of The Council's Work op cit para 226.
92 Ibid.
imagined.' However, taking into account Turkey's economic situation the Community suggested that 'it would be necessary to combine the efforts of the Community, the OECD and the bilateral effects of the Member States and use imagination in looking for suitable instruments.'

In view of the dramatically worsening balance of payments situation, international action for covering the external deficit of Turkey was finally arranged in 1979 through the OECD, the European Community and the individual member countries of the EC. The OECD granted Turkey financial aid amounting to $906 million. Of this $661 million was provided in the form of balance of payments credits and $245 million in the form of export credits. The Community members would contribute $440, mainly Germany. The Community was also ready to grant Turkey with aid in addition to the funds allocated within the third Financial Protocol.

In 1979, in Turkey the Ecevit's Government (RPP) was replaced by the government of Demirel (JP) who showed willingness to reactivate the Association process. In the light of the Iranian Revolution and the invasion of Afghanistan, in 1980, in order to improve the destabilizing internal economic and political situation in Turkey and to reactivate the Association process, the Community Commissioner William Haferkamp stressed that additional financial aid for Turkey was necessary. To this end, a Community Report indicated that it was in the interest of the Community to reassure Turkey by supporting 'pro-Western forces' in the country, and 'giving Turkey the feeling that it belongs to the European family and has privileged relations with the Community'.

It was in these circumstances that the Fourth Financial Protocol was put forward at the end of the Association Meeting of July 1980 in July as part of a 'cooperation' package. The Community accepted the substantial 600 million European Currency Units required for financial assistance in the Fourth Financial protocol. Of this 225 Currency Units was to come

95 Agence Europe 13 October 1978 No 2538 p.4.
97 Financial Times 7 May 1980.
from the European Investment Bank’s resources and 375 million would come from the EC budget. However, the Military coup of 1980 brought the operation of the Association to a halt. Accordingly, the fourth Financial Protocol was suspended. This Protocol was never to materialize again. As we shall see in the next chapters, for Turkey the implementation of the fourth Financial Protocol was to become a symbolic issue that indicates the political willingness of the EC to reactivate the Association process.

Operation of the Association

So far we have dealt with the specific issue areas arising during the implementation of the Association framework. In this section we shall put the operation of Association in its general context.

Article 7 of the Association Treaty, like Article 5 of the Treaty of Rome of the EC, provides that ‘the Contracting Parties shall take appropriate measures, whether general or particular, to ensure the fulfilment of the obligations arising out of the Treaty’ and ‘refrain from any measures liable to jeopardize the attainment of the objectives’ of the Association Agreement. As we explained in the previous chapter, the main function of the Association Council is to ensure ‘the implementation and the progressive development of the Association’. Therefore, the Association Council acts as a central political organ rather than a consultative body. Thus, the meetings and outcomes of the Association Councils do not only reflect the level of policy convergence in the Association process but also show how the parties managed the condition of increasing interdependence or maintained the balance in the pattern of interdependence between two unequal partners.

Increasing interdependence has been dealt in the light of particular issue areas in the previous sections. In this section we shall look at the functioning of the Association

99 The Association Treaty Article 7 op cit.
100 Article 2 provides for ‘the aim of [the Association Agreement] is to promote continuous and balanced strengthening of trade and economic relations between parties’ The Association Treaty Article 2 op cit.
structures and the political significance of the meetings and outcomes in the Association Council meetings during the transitional period. (See Table 3.3) How far, if at all, did the institutional mechanisms facilitate the attainment of the objectives and parallelism in the policies?

With the signing of the Additional Protocol, the competences of the Association Council which had been limited to the tasks of the preparatory stage, were enlarged to the implementation of the transitional period. As Article 3 of the Association Treaty provided that 'Once the transitional stage has been embarked on, the Council of Association shall adopt appropriate decisions where, in the course of the implementation of the Association arrangements, attainment of an objective of this Agreement calls for joint action',\textsuperscript{101} Therefore, the coordination of parallel policies among parties within the Association Council framework, is a necessary precondition for the attainment of the Association objectives. Accordingly, the parties are obliged to take necessary measures in accordance with the decisions of the Association Council, in the light of the defined objectives and the tasks of the Association framework.

The first three years after the entry into force of the Additional Protocol the Association progressed smoothly in accordance with the time-table of the Association framework. As was provided for under the Additional Protocol, Turkey started to implement reductions in the customs union for goods originating from the Community. Custom duties were reduced by 20 per cent, for products which must be completely liberalized in 12 years, and 10 per cent for products to be liberalized in 22 years. In 1974, the tenth year of the Association Treaty, the Association Council, having assessed, among other things, the state of the Association and the results concerning trade, unanimously expressed 'their satisfaction with its institutional operation' moreover they emphasized that 'one day Turkey would be called upon to become a full member of the Community.'\textsuperscript{102}

\textsuperscript{101} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{102} Twenty-second Review of the Council's Work para 196.
However, the meetings of the Association Council in 1975 marked the beginning of a strained relationship in the Association process. This was mainly due to Turkey's increasing trade deficit with the community and its unsatisfied demands for concessions on the agricultural products that were affected by the Community's global policies. Although the attempts were made to satisfy Turkey's requests, Turkey refused these offers as they did not constitute an acceptable basis for negotiations. Added to this, another emerging issue was the implementation of the free movement of Turkish workers to the Community. Accordingly, the Council gave its assent to its sub-committees to study these questions. Finally, Greece's application for accession to the Community became another issue area in the light of Article 56 of the Additional Protocol which provided for, in the case of the accession by a third state to the Community, a consultation procedure to ensure that the mutual interest of the Community and Turkey arising from the Association relationship was protected. Greece's application was going to have a substantial impact on Turkey's Association process. Therefore, we shall devote the next chapter to the Turkey and Greece Relationship within the context of Association. In this section we confine ourselves to the operation of the Association framework in the light of its objectives.

Although in 1976 Turkey carried out the second reduction in customs duties as provided for in the Additional Protocol, the Council meetings in 1976 were particularly significant. In a way the Association meetings of 1976 displayed the first signs of the strained Association process. The four main items on the agenda were: the gradual implementation of free movement of workers; agricultural concessions; trade deficit and financial cooperation to balance the widening economic gap between the partners. For the most part of 1976 the Parties could not reach an agreement on these main issues. This was partly because of the lack of consensus among the members of the Community on issues and partly it was due to Turkey's dissatisfaction with the concessions and offers made by the EC. The second Council meeting of October 1976 was postponed again because, as a Turkish diplomat put it 'the

Association was dying.  

Finally, in December 1976 at the Association Council meeting, Turkey and the EC managed to reach a series of partial arrangements and signed the third Financial Protocol and adopted preliminary measures in the field of social issues and granted some concessions in the field of agriculture. The Community also showed its willingness to develop cooperation with Turkey within the Association framework while it accepted that 'there could be a certain amount of flexibility in the application of the time-table of customs union in view of the economic crisis in Turkish economy' in view of the deteriorating economic gap between the Community and Turkey. This was the last Association meeting before the Association Council could meet again on a political level in 1979.

In 1977 Turkey postponed the first planned tariff alignment in its external tariffs with that of the Community and in relation to non-member states which was due to be put into operation on this date. During 1977 the Association institutions operated on the Committee level which was held to discuss only issues within the cotton yard field as a result of the substantial rise in the exports of Turkey to the Community.

In view of the serious economic crisis in Turkey, in January 1978, Turkey postponed the application of the third reduction of customs duties by 10 per cent in 12 year's list by invoking the safeguard clause under Article 60 of the Additional Protocol. In return, the Community, at the request of the United Kingdom, imposed safeguard measures on imports of sensitive textile products of cotton yarn into the United Kingdom. Turkey, on the Committee level, questioned the legal and economic grounds for these safeguard measures. Turkish diplomats expressed their disappointment that these would hinder the normalization of the cooperation in the Association process.

In 1978 the most important political development was the Prime Minister Ecevit's visit to a number of Community capitals and also to the Commission to have talks with the

104 Financial Times 15 October 1976.
108 Ibid para 304.
Community officials in order to explore the possibilities of revitalizing the Association process.109 In line with this RPP's revisionist policies in relation to the Association framework, a reform package to improve the relationship. The main points of the package were as follows: Firstly a five year suspension of Turkey's obligations in the field of customs union during the five year development plan (1978-1983); request for a substantial amount of financial assistance to help Turkey to overcome its immediate balance of payment difficulties; review of agricultural concessions providing further concessions; the removal of all tariff and other obstacles to Turkey's sensitive industrial products, particularly in the textile sector.110 In a way this was tantamount to downgrading the special reciprocal character of Turkey's Association, which was seen by the RPP as an obstacle to the development of the Turkish economy, to a preferential trade agreement.111 In the light of these proposals, the Commission agreed in principle and referred its proposal to the Council of Ministers to deliberate and conclude its position.

In the beginning of 1979, the Turkish Government under Article 60 again, postponed a fourth reduction of 10 per cent and a third reduction of 5 per cent on tariff duties and charges having equivalent effect on Turkish imports from the Community. These were due to be implemented in January 1979.112

In November 1979, Ecevit's RPP Government was replaced by the Government of Demirel's Justice Party. Accordingly, the new government adopted a different association policy and withdrew the proposals of the Ecevit Government. At an ambassador level meeting in March, Turkey emphasized its ultimate objective as being full membership of the community and expressed its willingness to normalize the Association process to this end.113 In fact the Association policy of the new Government was in line with the objectives of those ideologically committed to a liberal economy and supported by industrialists who were all

109 Ibid para 301.
110 Agence Europe 13 October 1978 2538 p5.
111 See European Report 508 op cit p.7.
113 Ibid para 274.
for an open economy and liberalization rather than import substitution policies. In the same way, they started to introduce radical economic liberalization policies in the Turkish economy in 1980.114

1980 was an important year in the Association process. The Association Council finally met at the Ministerial level to reactivate the functioning of the Association which had been interrupted since 1976. The conclusion of the Association Council was politically significant to the extent that 'the resumption of the dialogue within the Association Council at ministerial level and to emphasize the major political importance they attach to reactivation and development of the fundamental objectives of the Agreement.'115 Furthermore, they also confirmed their ideological affiliations with the fundamental principles of democracy and peace underlying 'the special nature of the Association link' between the Community and Turkey. The Community also emphasized its satisfaction with Turkey's request to reimplement the progressive application of the Additional Protocol. More importantly, the Association was redefined as a framework of cooperation 'facilitating the accession of Turkey to the Community at a later date in accordance with the Ankara Agreement.'116

In parallel with these conclusions, in July 1980 the Parties, after long negotiations at the ministerial level, reached an agreement on a 'cooperation package' to reactivate the Association process towards full membership.117 As explained before in detail in the previous sections, these included, the gradual elimination of tariffs on agricultural products by 1987, new social security arrangements for Turkish workers in Europe, economic and technical cooperation in industry, energy, agriculture and education. Finally, 600 million Euro-currency units of financial aid to facilitate cooperation between the Parties.

However, all these efforts to promote cooperation between the Parties were interrupted by the military coup of 1980. At the political cooperation meeting in Brussels,

115 Twenty Eighth Review of the Association Council para 288.
116 Ibid.
117 Agence Europe 2 July 1980 no.2940.
immediately after the coup, on 16 September the Ministers of the nine adopted a common declaration as follows:

'The Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Nine held an exchange of views on the situation in Turkey and expressed concern at the turn of events in that country. They took note of the assurance given by the Military authorities concerning the rapid establishment of democratic institutions, the observance of human rights and guarantees regarding the treatment of those politicians currently under house arrest. They are deeply anxious that these assurances should be fully and speedily put into effect. It is in this spirit that the Community will pursue its cooperation with Turkey.'\textsuperscript{118}

Despite the assurances, the problem of Turkey's economic eligibility was further complicated by the problem of Turkey's political viability, not only for full membership but also for the association link. From 1980 on, the political eligibility of Turkey for membership was another matter of concern for the Community.\textsuperscript{119} Also from this date onwards, the operation of the Association institutions were suspended and the agenda gradually reduced to trade and technical issues of the Association. In general, the Association entered a new era of uncertainty. Furthermore, after the accession of Greece, the Association relationship with the Community was to be seen in a different light and operate in a different context. This will be the subject matter of the next chapter.

Conclusions

In this chapter, we evaluated the operation of the Association framework in the first decade of the transitional period after the signing of the Additional Protocol. The way the Association structure handled the issues and facilitated the objectives of the Association, were also one of the main concerns of this chapter. As it emerges from the content of this chapter, Association as a process oriented framework of cooperation failed because of the lack of parallelism in the policy of the actors. The result was an increasing condition of interdependence. The optimism of the earlier years was replaced by the negative evaluations of the perceptions of the Association, as Turkey became more vulnerable and sensitive to the general policy framework of the European Community in certain issue areas such as labour,

\textsuperscript{118} \textit{The Twenty Eighth Review of the Council's Work} 1980 para 291 \textit{op cit.}

\textsuperscript{119} \textit{Thirtieth Review of the Council's Work} 1982 para 372.
textile and trade. As governmental and non-governmental elites felt that the distribution of the benefits were unequal in the Association process, the Association link was considered as being negative. Policy interdependence within the Association did not lead to the expected level of policy cooperation. However, this was also the general result of structural problems between unequal and structurally dissimilar partners. However, given the increasing vulnerabilities and sensitivities of Turkey to the Community policies in this period, the Association can not be regarded as a successful framework of cooperation in the management of interdependence and the maintenance of the balance between the Parties. In general, the reciprocal special association framework was reduced to a de facto trade agreement and lost its sui generis character as an adjustment framework to European integration.

However, as a result of increasing pattern of interdependence, the Parties never attempted to sever their relationship even in the highest point of the political and economic crisis during the process.
### TABLE 3.1
Imports into the Community from the Ten Largest suppliers in MFA ($m)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>150.7</td>
<td>127.3</td>
<td>128.1</td>
<td>211.5</td>
<td>83.4</td>
<td>65.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>144.6</td>
<td>114.8</td>
<td>125.7</td>
<td>134.9</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>82.9</td>
<td>79.0</td>
<td>92.2</td>
<td>100.8</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>84.8</td>
<td>60.8</td>
<td>80.4</td>
<td>91.6</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>13.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>54.8</td>
<td>47.7</td>
<td>65.6</td>
<td>81.0</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>23.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>65.2</td>
<td>81.7</td>
<td>83.1</td>
<td>80.0</td>
<td>-3.1</td>
<td>-3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>62.0</td>
<td>61.8</td>
<td>71.6</td>
<td>78.5</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>9.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>76.5</td>
<td>70.9</td>
<td>53.9</td>
<td>74.5</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>38.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>53.7</td>
<td>56.6</td>
<td>65.4</td>
<td>71.1</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>56.8</td>
<td>56.1</td>
<td>57.6</td>
<td>60.0</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
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</table>

### TABLE 3.2

Development of Turkey's external migration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Work Permits</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Work Permits</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>1.476</td>
<td>1972</td>
<td>85.229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>11.185</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>135.820</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>30.328</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>20.211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>66.176</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>4.419</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>51.520</td>
<td>1976</td>
<td>10.558</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>34.410</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>19.084</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>8.947</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>18.852</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>43.205</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>23.630</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>103.975</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>28.503</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>129.575</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>58.753</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>88.442</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>49.388</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,023.685</strong>*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


* These are the official figures of Turkish labour migration accepted by the EC, workers departing as tourists, who afterwards have taken a job; persons departing as members of a family of Turkish workers; Turkish re-migrants are excluded.

### TABLE

Workers' Remittances in the Turkish balance of Payments (US $ Million)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Exports</th>
<th>Imports</th>
<th>Trade Balance</th>
<th>Remittances in per cent of the Trade Balance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>464</td>
<td>572</td>
<td>-108</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>588</td>
<td>948</td>
<td>-360</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>677</td>
<td>1171</td>
<td>-494</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>855</td>
<td>1563</td>
<td>-678</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>1317</td>
<td>2086</td>
<td>-769</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>1532</td>
<td>3777</td>
<td>-2245</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>1401</td>
<td>4738</td>
<td>-3337</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>5129</td>
<td>-3169</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>1753</td>
<td>5797</td>
<td>-4044</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>2288</td>
<td>4599</td>
<td>-2311</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>2261</td>
<td>5069</td>
<td>-2808</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>2910</td>
<td>7200</td>
<td>-4290</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 3.3
The Operation of The Institutional Framework of the Association

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Association Meetings</th>
<th>Political Level</th>
<th>Technical Level</th>
<th>Parliamentary Level</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>Minist. 1</td>
<td>Cttee. 4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>Minist. 1</td>
<td>Cttee. 8</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Minist. 1</td>
<td>Cttee. 8</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>Minist. 1</td>
<td>Cttee. Several</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>Minist. 2</td>
<td>Cttee. 7</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>Postponed</td>
<td>Cttee. 2</td>
<td>postponed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>Postponed</td>
<td>Cttee. 2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>Ambass. 1</td>
<td>Cttee. 3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>Minist. 2</td>
<td>Cttee. Several</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>Ambass. 1</td>
<td>Cttee. 1</td>
<td>none</td>
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<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>Ambass. 1</td>
<td>Cttee. 1</td>
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<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>Ambass. 1</td>
<td>none</td>
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<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>Cttee. 1</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chapter IV

ASSOCIATION IN THE CONTEXT OF THE TURKISH-GREEK RELATIONSHIP

Our aim in this chapter is to assess the Turkish-Greek relationship from the perspective of European integration. We shall limit our investigation to the characteristics of their interactions vis-a-vis the EC. In this respect we will try to answer the key question: Can Greece and Turkey transcend their national identities within the integrative framework of the EC? In order to address this problem we have to ask the following relevant questions: Firstly how do they define their national identities? Also what are the core elements of their identities and how are they associated with their national sovereignties? And in what way and to what end did Greece and Turkey use their institutional links with the EC? What are the political uses of these institutional links with regard to their advance towards European integration? What is the general disposition of the EC? What is the functional role of Turkey’s Association framework, if any? Finally what is the legal and political basis of the veto power of Greece?

In order to answer these questions it is necessary to deal with the background conditions, motivations and characteristics that form the substance, direction and quality of the foreign policy of both countries, not only in reaction to each other but also with reference to European integration.

I Background Conditions, Motivations and Characteristics.

Historical Legacies and the Definitions of National Identities: Mutual Perceptions

In order to understand the nature of the Turkish-Greek relationship it is necessary to give some insights into the national perceptions of both countries against a brief historical background. Indeed the historical memories do not only affect the content of their policies but also determine the conduct of their foreign policies. Both countries still seem to mistrust each other. The elements of this mutual distrust are mainly psychological. As a specialist
observed 'fear' and 'prestige' comprise the main characteristics.\(^1\) The Greek fear stems mainly from the perceived threat of Turkish expansionism.\(^2\)

On the other hand, the Turkish side is more concerned with the political and physical isolation of Turkey by Greece, whose main national interest is seen being the isolation of Turkey from all European regional organizations and structures. In the eyes of Turkish people, Greeks are seen as the most favourable and 'the spoilt child of the West' which was basically enhanced by the romantic idea of the nineteenth century European philhellenism.\(^3\) These national perceptions are crucial to understanding the underlying nature of the Greek-Turkish relations.

Despite the fact that the Greeks and Turks have been in a state of war throughout in history, the pattern of their relationship has not always been determined by ethnic and national conflicts. Indeed, as the historian Toynbee closely observed, Greek and Turkish people lived within the borders of the cosmopolitan and multiethnic Ottoman Empire 'on the whole peaceably, for at least five centuries - side by side in a relationship of cultural, social, political and economic interdependence.'\(^4\) As Toynbee argued, it was the introduction of the European idea of nationalism that led to mutual hatred and massacres between these two nations, who had lived side by side within the framework of territorially undefined borders. It was the application of this principle of European nationalism that led to ethnic and nationalistic conflict. The result was the massive reallocation of populations living on the wrong side of the borders of national states, not only between Greeks and Turks but also

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2. For instance, the Greek mistrust was reflected in a survey carried out in Greater Athens in 1987 that 93 per cent of the respondents still believed that Turkey constituted 'the greatest threat to Greece' EURODIM (Athens) IV (4) April 1987. Cited in Mango Ibid. See also Gurel, Sukru, 'Turkey and Greece: A difficult Aegean relationship' in Turkey and Europe Ed. Balkir, Canan and Williams, Alan M. (London: Pinter Pub., 1993) p.163 and footnote 3.
among other Balkan nationalities. The consequences of this 19th century European ethnic nationalism can be observed in the Balkans even today.

Modern Greece emerged as an independent nation as a result of a national liberation struggle against the Ottoman rule. Turkish nationalism, as a late comer, was also the product of a liberation war against Greece. As the Head of the Greek Department in the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs put it 'Greece gained its independence fighting against the Ottomans. We gained our independence in 1920 fighting against the Greek occupation ...' 5 Moreover, a Turkish scholar summarized 'Turkey and Greece have shaped their nation state identities through struggle against and interactions with each other.' 6 Hence the definition of the national identities of Greece and Turkey in opposition to each other is still an important factor that reinforces the mutual distrust and antagonism between them. The fact that anti-Greek and anti-Turkish feelings are exploited in both countries' educational, religious and military establishments does not help to improve their relationship. 7

These perceptions can be better understood against a brief historical background. 8 The Greek war of national independence started in 1821. Soon after the establishment of an independent Greek state, Greece started to follow an irredentist Pan-Hellenic policy which was known as 'Megali idea' aiming for the unification of all Greeks. Between 1821 and 1919 the total area of Greece enlarged three times at the expense of the collapsing Ottoman Empire. This expansionist policy continued until the failure of the Greek invasion of Asia minor in 1919 which in turn had been encouraged by victorious powers of the First World War, namely France and Great Britain. As long as the Greek attacks were directed to non-Turkish territories of the disintegrating Ottoman Empire, no reaction was forthcoming. But the invasion of the core Turkish areas triggered the Turkish nationalist movement under the

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7 *Ibid* pp.162, 163.
leadership of Ataturk. In the eyes of Turkish people, Greece had been given a free hand by
the European powers in the invasion of Asia Minor. It is due to this historical experience
that, in Turkey, today there is a popular tendency to see the problems with Greece as part of a
Europeanization problem in which discrimination against Turkey and in favour of Greece
can be a hindrance to Turkey's advance to the European integration project.

Following the successful war of independence by Turkey, against Greece, the Treaty
of Lausanne was finally concluded with the Allied powers and Greece and Turkey's present
borders were established. The Lausanne Treaty of 1923, in essence, laid the legal and political
foundations of the present Greek and Turkish relationship on the basis of the division of land
and people. Despite the fact that Turkey had gained its independence as a result of a struggle
against Greece and its European Allies the Modern Turkey did not hesitate to adopt secular,
constitutional and republican ideologies in its modernization and westernization process in
parallel with the core ideologies of Europe.

Reconciliation and Detente

Less than ten years after the disastrous Turkish-Greek War, Greece and Turkey were
able to sign two amicable agreements.9 These were 'the Neutrality Reconciliation and
Arbitration Agreement of 30 October 1930' and 'the Treaty of Friendship of September 1933.'
Apart from these bilateral cooperation Agreements, the Balkan Entente of February 1934
between Greece and Turkey, Yugoslavia and Romania clearly expressed the political will of
both countries for cooperation concerning security in the Balkans. Moreover, in the post war
period (between 1945-1952) both countries were incorporated into the organizational
framework of Western Europe. Accordingly and simultaneously they became the members
of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), the Council of Europe and
finally they were accepted to NATO in 1952. In the 1950s, there were even suggestions of a

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9 See for this detente period Bahceli, Tozun Greek-Turkish Relations since 1955 London:
Greek-Turkish Customs Union within the framework of the Western European cooperation.10

Sources of Conflict

The policy of rapprochement within the Western European Cooperation was short lived. The Cyprus crisis of the 1950s would lead to the proliferation of political problems between Greece and Turkey. Moreover, their bilateral problems as a result of their membership of European organization would assume a European dimension whereby Western European forums became new arenas of conflict and exercise of their external sovereignties against each other. It is beyond the scope and purpose of our research to give the detailed and technical assessment of all these issues between Greece and Turkey. However, the general and brief explanation of these issues are necessary since these issues are closely associated with the core elements of the national identities of both countries. Moreover, any compromise or concession over these issues is seen by the public and the nationalistic sections of their respective societies as the loss of sovereignty. After thirty years of coexistence, in the middle of the 1950s the Cyprus issue marked the beginning of the deteriorating Greek-Turkish relationship.11

From 1571 and 1878 Cyprus was under the rule of the Ottoman Empire. Since then the population of the island consisted of an Orthodox Greek majority and a Muslim Turkish minority. In 1878 the island became the colony of the British Empire. Under the British rule the main struggle for Greek Cypriots was self-determination and unity with Greece (Enosis) whereas the Turkish Cypriots were concerned with their position as a vulnerable minority.

11 There is a vast amount of literature on the Cyprus issue. For instance the most recent one among others: McDonald, Robert 'The Cyprus Problem' The Adelphi Paper no.234 Winter 1989/1990 Borowieck, Andrew The Mediterranean Feud New York: Praeger, 1983. For the Greek Cypriot's point of view see Polyviou, P. Cyprus: Conflict and Negotiation 1960-1980 For the Turkish-Cypriot point of view Ertekun N.M. The Cyprus Dispute and the Birth of the Turkish Republic of Cyprus (Nicosia: K. Rustem, 1984 2nd ed.)
In 1960, Cyprus became independent by the Zurich and London Agreements which were signed by the three guarantor powers: Turkey, Greece and Britain, who pledged to guarantee the territorial integrity, political independence of Cyprus and the constitutional status and rights of the Cypriot Communities. However, the creation of an independent Cyprus did not produce a lasting solution. The inter-communal ethnic violence between the Turkish and Greek Cypriots and particular the aspirations of the Greek Cypriots for the unification of Cyprus with mainland Greece undermined the legitimate basis of the Constitution of and created a state of turmoil in the island. The final blow to the independence of Cyprus came when the military junta in Athens decided to conspire a coup with the pre-enosis forces to unite the island with Greece. This was followed by the military intervention of Turkey in order to protect the constitutional rights of the Turkish Cypriot Community. The Turkish intervention was justified by Turkey by reference to the Treaty of Guarantee, that provided for the right of intervention. By this unilateral action Turkey's position was confirmed that the bi-zonal, bi-communal Cyprus on the basis of the separation of land and people, was also vital for the maintenance of peace and safety of the Cypriots on the island. Accordingly, the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus was proclaimed unilaterally in 1975. The subsequent inter-communal talks between the two Communities, in which Greek Cypriots demanded status quo ante proved inconclusive and had failed. Finally, in 1983 the independent Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus was declared. By this declaration the position of the Turkish side was made clear that 'their final aim was to achieve a partnership with Greek Cypriots within a federal framework.'

The Cyprus issue remains the most salient and unresolved source of conflict between Greece and Turkey. Moreover, this conflict has spilt over into other issue areas involving conflicting claims of sovereign rights in the Aegean. The proliferation of these sensitive

12 Gurel op cit pp.175-181.
13 See Kourvetaris, George A. Greek and Turkish Inter-ethnic Conflict and Polarization in Cyprus Journal of Political and Military Sociology 16 Fall 185-199.
15 Gurel op cit p.179.
political issues have inevitably had an impact on the national perceptions and behaviour patterns of both countries, which would inevitably make their relationship more susceptible to conflict. However, the Aegean and Cyprus questions are technically separate 'a division that has been recognized by both sides'.16

The 'Aegean dispute' consists of several separate but related complicated legal and political issues concerning territorial claims over the sea, continental shelf, territorial waters and the air space. It is beyond the scope and purpose of our research to deal with these issues in detail. Therefore, we shall briefly explain these issues in order to show the multiplicity of them.17

The first issue concerns the delimitation of the continental shelf of the Aegean. Greece claims that the islands in the Aegean are entitled to their own continental shelves.18 Given that the continental shelf underneath the Aegean Sea would, in its entirety, belong to Greece, Turkey wishes to resolve this through negotiations. Greece brought the issue before the International Court of Justice. However, the Court decided that it lacked jurisdiction regarding the problem. The United Nations Security Council passed a resolution in 1976 and called on Turkey and Greece to resolve their problems through negotiations. The parties agreed to sign the Berne Agreement which provided for the delimitation of the boundaries of their respective continental shelves through negotiations. They also agreed to avoid any activities prejudicing the existing solution.19 This issue surfaced again in 1987. The resumption of Greece's oil drilling activities in the disputed areas was interpreted as the violation of the Bern Protocol by Turkey.20 This nearly brought parties on the brink of the war.

16 Wilson op cit p.18.
17 See for the technical and legal background Wilson op cit.
18 According to the Geneva Convention of 1958 and the Law of the Sea Convention 1982 islands are entitled to their own continental shelves. But Turkey is not party to these conventions.
20 For the Protocol see Wilson op cit p.30.
Another issue which is closely related to the above concerns is the territorial waters. At present, both countries maintain a six miles territorial sea limit in the Aegean. However, Greece claims that the Law of the Sea Convention gives her the right to extend its territorial waters to twelve miles. However, for Turkey, this is potentially explosive issue since the extension of Greek territorial waters would reduce the proportion of the high seas from 59 per cent to 26.1 per cent and at the same time increase Greek territorial waters from 35 per cent to 63.9. On the other hand, the Turkish territorial waters would only increase from 8.8 per cent to 10 per cent.21 This implies that all Turkish ships sailing from the Aegean ports to the Mediterranean would pass through Greek territorial waters. Turkey declared on several occasions that the extension Greek territorial waters would be interpreted as a casus belli. Thus the question of territorial waters remains a potential and serious source of conflict between Greece and Turkey.

Another aspect of the Aegean dispute between Greece and Turkey concerns the militarization of the Eastern Aegean islands by Greece. Turkey claims that the Treaties of Lausanne 1923 and the Treaty of Paris 1947 put Greece under the obligation to demilitarize the Eastern Aegean islands.22 On the other hand, Greece argues that the 1936 Montreux Convention has demilitarized status of the Turkish Straits. Since conditions have changed, rebus sic stantibus, Greece claims that she is under no obligation to maintain the demilitarized status of the Eastern Aegean Islands. This dispute over the status of the Eastern Aegean Islands caused considerable arguments within the NATO framework. In the 1980s, the inclusion of forces on the island of Lemnos in NATO exercises have been a focus of this dispute.23

Another issue involving the dispute over the sovereign rights concerns the use of air space. While the limit of its territorial waters stand at six miles, Greece maintains an airspace

21 Wilson op cit p.5.
22 Pazarci, Huseyin 'Has the Demilitarized Status of the Aegean Islands determined by the Lausanne and Paris Treaties Changed' Turkish Quarterly Digest 1986 No.7 pp.29-46.
of ten nautical miles since 1931. Turkey objects to this on the basis of the Chicago Convention which provides for the breadth of territorial sea should correspond to the breadth of national air space.\textsuperscript{24}

The last but not least, another problem involves the minorities living in both countries. There is a Greek Orthodox minority which numbers 10,000. On the other hand, the Turkish minority of Thrace in Greece stands at 130,000.\textsuperscript{25} These were the minorities who were exempted from earlier population exchange and protected under the Treaty of Lausanne. However, the emergence of the Cyprus crisis in the 1950s created an inhospitable environment for the minorities living on the wrong side of the borders. The mistreatment of the Greek minority of Istanbul in the mid-1950s and the Government decree banning the Greek community of Istanbul from selling their own property in 1964 were the direct and dramatic result of the Cyprus crisis. This has not only provoked nationalist feelings but also, as it was put by a Greek scholar, caused irreparable damage to Greek-Turkish relations.\textsuperscript{26}

On the other hand that mistreatment of the Turkish Minority in Western Thrace, by Greece, since the mid 1960s until today, one of the concerns of the Turkish Government. This problem recently caused serious frictions between Greece and Turkey.\textsuperscript{27} According to a report published in 1990 by the Helsinki Watch Committee, the Turkish minority in the Western Thrace has suffered from several human rights violations over the years.\textsuperscript{28}

These are then an outline of the problems that stand in the way of the building of long lasting cooperation and peace between Greece and Turkey. Apparently, they have an effect on the national psyches of both countries and manifest themselves in their daily foreign policy actions. However, for the rest of this chapter, we shall assess their relationship from the European Community perspective. In our opinion, this is important since there are also

\textsuperscript{24} See Article 1 and 2 of the Chicago Convention Harris, Cases and Materials on International Law, \textit{op cit} p.17.
\textsuperscript{25} Wilson \textit{op cit} p.17.
\textsuperscript{27} See Poulton, Hugh \textit{The Balkan Minorities and States in Conflict} London: Minority Rights Publ. 1993 pp.182-188.
\textsuperscript{28} Gurel \textit{op cit} p.175.
different dynamics at work within the European cooperation and integration that may have potentially different structural impacts on their relationship in the long run.

II The Question of Greek Membership: The Erosion of the Political Balance of Turkey's Association

In the post war period, the most dynamic cooperation frameworks established with Eastern Europe for Greece and Turkey were their Association frameworks with the EC. The EC, due to its dynamic nature, had structural implications for Greece and Turkey's political and economic systems, and may also play a constructive role in the future of both countries. Moreover, the EC is inherently capable of qualifying them as European countries, not only in their attempt to modernize their social, economic and political systems, but also to include them in a long lasting cooperation framework through its integrative mechanism.

Greece and Turkey, as we have shown in the second chapter, were the first Associate members of the EC. Turkey followed Greece's suit and managed to secure an identical Association Agreement as the Greek one. The most important political motivation for Turkey, at that time, was to establish a political balance in relation to Greece through an identical association Agreement. In fact, given the customs union arrangements embodied within the framework of the Greek and Turkish Associations, these first two association agreements were sui generis agreements of a political character. Both countries signed these Agreements in the hope that one day they would join the EC through their Association frameworks.

However, as the subsequent developments have shown, Greece's Association performed relatively better than Turkish one. This was mainly because of the structural problems and incompatible policies of Turkey, which rendered it difficult to implement the reciprocal obligations of its Association framework. On the other hand, in Greece's case, even during the seven years of rule of the Military junta, the process of tariff abolition continued uninterruptedly, whilst the operation of Greece's Association was reduced to its

\[29\] See the previous chapter.
'current administration' whilst the financial cooperation and the harmonization of agricultural policies were suspended.\textsuperscript{30} In 1968 Greek industrial exports entering the EC were completely duty free. In 1974 two thirds of the EC exports to Greece had duty free access.\textsuperscript{31} In 1975, when Karamanlis as the head of the new democratic government applied for full membership Greece had already adopted most of the EC's common external policies toward third countries.\textsuperscript{32}

On the other hand, apart from the economic benefits for Greece of full membership, the main initial motivation for application was political. It was not a coincidence that the application was tabled immediately after the Cyprus crisis. One of the most important political motivations was that full membership would improve Greece's position \textit{vis-a-vis} Turkey. Indeed, as it was expressed by the Greek Ambassador to the Community during the negotiations 'in the event of a conflict breaking out between our two countries (Greece and Turkey), the Community would intervene.'\textsuperscript{33} Moreover, from the Greek point of view, being a member of the EC would enable Greece to maximise its political weight in its foreign policy activities, particular in relation to Turkey.\textsuperscript{34}

Another important factor was the disappointment of Greece with NATO and the US since, in the eyes of Greeks, the US failed to prevent Turkey's intervention in Cyprus within the framework of the NATO alliance. It was this consideration that led Greece to withdraw from the military wing of NATO in the immediate aftermath of the Cyprus crisis. As Tsakaloyannis put it 'the EEC provided the right framework to counter NATO's favouring of Turkey which had been dictated by strategic considerations.'\textsuperscript{35} The EC, as a civilian power

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Featherstone \textit{op cit} p.188. See also Coufudakis, Van 'The European Community and the 'freezing' of the Greek Association 1967-1974' \textit{Journal of Common Market Studies.}
\item Quoted by Kohlhase, Norbert 'the Greco-Turkish Conflict from a European Community Perspective' \textit{The World Today} April 1981 p.128. See also Tsakaloyannis, Panos European Community and Greek Turkish Dispute \textit{Journal of Common Market Studies} V 19 (1) p.44.
\item Kohlhase \textit{op cit.}
\item Tsakaloyannis \textit{op cit} p.51.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
was, for Greece, a relevant political platform that would counterbalance Turkey's political weight and was enhanced by strategic considerations within the NATO framework.\textsuperscript{36} However, given the increasing Soviet military presence in the Mediterranean, the EC was not entirely free from security concerns. The significance of Turkey from the Western European Security point of view was felt by some members of the EC within the European Security platforms like Western European Union (WEU).\textsuperscript{37}

The European Commission submitted its opinion on the effects of the Greek entry into the EC in January 1976. The Commission report reflected the EC's cautious approach and recognized and confirmed the delicate political balance that existed between Greece and Turkey. The Commission opinion is worth quoting:

'Until now the balance in the Community's relations with Greece and Turkey has found its expression in their identical status as Associates, both of them with the possibility of full membership as the final objective, albeit with different timetables. Unavoidably the prospect of Greek membership of the Community introduces a new element in this balance. In the view of the Commission specific steps will need to be taken ... [to ensure] that the examination of Greek application for membership will not affect relations between the Community and Turkey and that the rights guaranteed by the Association Agreement with Turkey would not be affected thereby.'\textsuperscript{38}

Despite this political reassurance, in view of Greece's accession to the EC as a full member, the political balance between Turkey and Greece de facto altered in favour of Greece. Greece's accession process would inevitably upset the balance. As it was noted 'no binding legal guarantee [could] in fact be made to that effect.'\textsuperscript{39} Indeed, the subsequent developments proved that the relationship between the EC and Turkey would never be the same again. In March 1976 the Greek application was unanimously accepted by the Council

\textsuperscript{37}Tskaloyannis op cit pp.50, 51.
\textsuperscript{38}Commission of the European Communities, Opinions on the Greek application for membership Bulletin of the European Communities Supplement 2/1976, pp.6-8.
\textsuperscript{39}European Report 1978 No.508 op cit p.8.
of Ministers of the Community. Given that the maintenance of balance between Greece and 
Turkey was the political raison d'être of Turkey's association link, this endorsement of Greek 
membership at the highest political level within the EC, was a further blow to the political 
basis of Turkey's Association framework. In July 1976 Greece's accession negotiations were 
opened. Greece's formal accession to membership marked the beginning of deteriorating 
relations between Turkey and the EC within the Association process.

An interesting question concerns: why did Turkey not follow suit and apply for full 
membership as Greece did?

The main reason for this is that the Cyprus crisis created unfavourable circumstances 
for a demarche of this kind for Turkey. The Cyprus crisis had caused frictions between 
Europe and Turkey. Secondly the economic and political situation in Turkey would not 
allow for such a bold decision. The existence of anti European Community elements within 
the Governments, which relied on narrow parliamentary majorities prevented the main 
parties in the office from application for full membership. Even though, the main parties 
were inclined towards the application of full membership of the EC, between 1973-1977 they 
only managed to come to power with the support of radical right-wing minority parties 
(Islamic National Salvation Party and extreme right National Action Party) who were 
ideologically opposed to the EC. This constituted the main political obstacle in following 
Greece's suit. The third main obstacle in the way of application for full membership was 
the political turmoil and the deteriorating economic situation of Turkey. Moreover Turkey 
had been disappointed with the treatment of the EC in its association relationship. Leaving 
aside the possibility of full membership, Turkey had difficulties even in implementing the 
obligations of its Association framework.

In the second half of the 1970s, in order to counterbalance Greece's accession to the 
Community, Turkey, instead of pressing ahead for full membership, concentrated its

40 See Bahceli op cit p.230; Burrows, Bernard A Community of Thirteen. The Question 
of Turkish Membership of the EEC' Journal of Common Market Studies V.17 (2) December 1978 
p.143.
diplomatic efforts on upgrading its institutional participation in the Political Cooperation framework of the EC. The Political Cooperation mechanism, in which members of the EC try to harmonize and coordinate their foreign policy actions in order to define and implement a common European foreign policy, was particularly important for Turkey since Greece could use this political platform against Turkey.\(^{42}\) In fact, when Greece and Turkey signed their Association Agreements, the Community did not have any political consultation mechanism at work in the field of foreign policy. However, the subsequent Additional Protocol of Turkey, which was signed in 1970, introduced a political consultation mechanism to Turkey's Association framework. Article 56 of the Protocol provided for:

> 'In the event of a third state acceding to the Community, appropriate consultations shall take place in the Council of Association so as to ensure that account can be taken of the mutual interests of the Community and Turkey stated in the Agreement of Association'.\(^{43}\)

Greece's Association framework did not possess such a mechanism. Hence, Turkey was in a better position in relation to Greece in the field of political cooperation.\(^{44}\)

Although the political consultation mechanism was limited to political matters directly related to Turkey, this was regarded by Turkey as a political advantage over Greece's Association process in the field of political cooperation. Indeed, as Tskaloyannis, a student of Greek-Turkish relations emphasized 'the forging of closer political ties with western Europe' constituted 'the most important aspect' of their political relationship with the EC.\(^{45}\) This is understandable since the Political Cooperation mechanism presents participating countries with the opportunity within its policy framework to maximize their external sovereignties in foreign policy matters. However, after the restoration of Greek democracy, the political imbalance between Greece's and Turkey's Association frameworks was restored.\(^{46}\)

In the late seventies Turkey's main concern was the possibility of Greece becoming a full member of EPC. The reason for Turkey's concern was that Greece would use its

\(^{42}\) Birand, The World Today 1978 *op cit* p.60.
\(^{43}\) Article 56 The Additional Protocol *op cit*.
\(^{44}\) Tskaloyannis, *op cit* p.48.
\(^{45}\) *Ibid* p.49.
\(^{46}\) *Ibid*.
membership within the political cooperation mechanism of the EC to exploit bilateral political issues between both countries. Under these circumstances, Turkey did not seem to have any alternative but to demand full participation in the EPC process. But this was refused by the EC on the grounds that the EPC was only open to full members of the EC. In 1976, Turkey responded by withdrawing from the political information process. But in 1978, Turkey again pressed for full access to the political cooperation machinery, before Greece had become an integral part of this process as a result of it becoming a full member.

While France was against any special treatment for Turkey on institutional grounds, Britain, along with the Commission, was in favour of information by all the Member States. The EC finally agreed to a 'two way information procedure' in which Turkey would be informed of the Political Committee decisions by a 'troika' system - the existing presidency as well as the previous and the following presidency. This was to ensure the balanced interpretation of the decisions communicated to Turkey in case of Greek presidency. However, this information procedure was only limited to the decisions affecting Turkey or the Eastern Mediterranean. It was noted, that this was only 'a two way information procedure and there was no question of consultation which would imply the idea of commitment.' However, this limited arrangement of a 'mutual information' process in the field of political cooperation was seen as inadequate by the Turkish Government.

1980 was a turning point in Turkey's relation with the EC. The new Government of Demirel seemed more determined to upgrade its political and institutional links with the EC before Greek membership became effective in January 1980.

The first formal meeting at the Ministerial level, that is since Greece had made its application, took place in February 1980. This was the first productive Association meeting.

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47 Ibid.
49 Agence Europe 12/13 June 1978.
51 Agence Europe 12/13 June 1978.
52 Burrows op cit pp.266, 267.
since the interruption of the normal process of Association in 1976. At this meeting the Parties agreed to reactivate the Association 'with a view to facilitating the accession of Turkey to the Community at a later date'. As we had explained, this included a 600 million ECU unit provision in the field of financial cooperation. However, the cooperation package, which was produced at the end of the Association Meeting in July 1980, to give momentum to the Association process, was invalidated by the Military Coup d'etat of 1980 in Turkey. This was to reduce the operation of the Association to its current trade relations, while the financial cooperation would remain suspended in the 1980s.

In January 1980, Greece became an official full member. This marked a beginning of the political isolation of Turkey from Europe. The Association process between Turkey and the EC entered a new stage under the shadow of the Greek veto. The political situation in Turkey was to make her more vulnerable to Greek influence within the Community. The relationship between the EC and Turkey would never be the same again. In the following section we shall assess the impact of Greek membership on the normalization of Turkey's Association process.

The Impact of Full Membership of Greece on the Normalization of Turkey's Association Process

For Turkey the first half of the 1980s were the years of isolation from Europe and transition to democracy, whilst Greece gradually institutionalised and strengthened its position within the decision-making process of the EC. Greece's experience in the Community's institutions gradually gained ground. The impact of Greece's full membership was felt more tangibly, when the normalization of the Association process started in 1986 (as a result of Turkey's gradual transformation to democracy). The first signals of reactivation of Turkey's Association process by the EC, under the Dutch presidency and with the endorsement of Britain, induced Greek objections. The Greek Minister for European Affairs, Pangalos, openly criticized Britain and the Netherlands for trying to improve the EC's

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relations with Turkey since Britain was 'a guarantor of Cypriot independence'. The Netherlands also criticized Turkey's human rights records.\(^{56}\) However, following the consensus reached by the Foreign Ministers at the Council meeting on 17 February on the basis of the developments towards democratization and as a result of the initiatives of the Turkish Government at the national level, the Commission decided to adopt proposals to reactivate the Association process with Turkey.\(^{57}\) In addition to trade, financial matters and some improvements in the condition of Turkish labour within the EC, the Commission proposals included adapting the Association Agreement to take into account the enlargement, notably of Greece, Portugal and Spain and an initial transfer of 10 million ECU for 1986. This was part of a 29 million ECU financial package which had been left over from 1980.\(^{58}\)

The Greek position was confirmed on 16 September 1986, when Greek representatives boycotted the first ministerial level meeting of the Association Council.\(^{59}\) This was the first such high level meeting between representatives of the Turkish Government and the EC since the 1980 coup. More importantly, Greece, for the first time, was participating in the Association Council on the Community side as a full member. This provided Greece with the power of veto in Turkey's Association structures. Indeed, she did not fail to miss this opportunity to exploit the bilateral dispute within Turkey's Association framework, and insisted that the normalization of Turkey's Association should be attached to the Cyprus issue.\(^{60}\) It was officially manifested that Greece was prepared to reduce its institutional powers to block cooperation with Turkey in order to maximize her national interests, rather than activating the potential functional role of the Association framework in a positive way. Thus, given Greece's obstructionist position in this first Association meeting

\(^{56}\) Financial Times 14 February 1986.
\(^{59}\) See Agence Europe 18/9/86.
\(^{60}\) Financial Times 16 September 1986.
the normalization of Turkey's Association relationship with the Community became, for Greece, another bargaining chip in her bilateral competition with Turkey.

However Greece's use of power over Turkey's normalization process was not limited to Turkey's Association framework. She also raised her voice within the Community institutions to exploit its bilateral national issues with Turkey. For instance, according to a prominent Turkish journalist who specialized in Community affairs 'At five of the twelve summit conferences which Greek Minister Papandreu has participated in during the last six years, he has not failed to lodge complaints against Turkey. During 1981-1987 there have been a total of 123 questions, resolutions and draft resolutions. Of these, 78 put forth by Greek parliamentarians of all political colours; the rest were co-sponsored by those parliamentarians.' Greece, in the eighties, persistently used its institutional powers to frustrate Turkey's normalization process, by bringing its national problems with Turkey, particularly Cyprus, before the Community institutions.

Furthermore, while it was exercising its full powers within the Association structures which were set by the Association Treaty, Greece also refused to sign the adaptation protocol acceding it to Turkey's Association framework. Over this issue, Greece's national interests again overrode its commitments to European integration. According to the European Community law, the new member states are under the obligation of accepting and implementing the previous legislation and legal obligations. In the Community's terminology, this is defined as *acquis communautaire* which consists of the Treaties of the EC and the regulations, directives, decisions and recommendations arising from them. This also comprises the policies, the Treaties, as well as institutional structures which a new member country must accept. In this sense, Turkey's Association framework, and its aims and


principles as well as its institutional structure, constitutes part of this *acquis communautaire*. This was also a condition for Greece's membership and it was accordingly undertaken in Greece's Accession Treaty. Indeed, with reference to agreements with certain third countries, Article 118 of the Accession Treaty provided that 'As from January 1981 the Hellenic Republic shall apply the provisions of the Agreements referred to in Article 120.' Among others, there was Turkey's Association Treaty.63

Apart from the Cyprus issue, there were also some other conditions that were attached to the reactivation of Turkey's Association process. At the European Council meeting in The Hague in June 1986 Papandreou insisted that two conditions should be met before Turkey's Association Agreement is reactivated. These were: First, the rescindation of legislation dating back to the early 1960s preventing the Greek citizens in Istanbul from selling their assets; and secondly Greece's exemption from the free movement of Turkish workers for security reasons.64 However, compared with the salient issue of Cyprus, these were mainly tactical and short term demands.

Greece was also successful in blocking the release of the Financial protocol, which had been proposed as the 1980 cooperation package (600 billion ECU) and suspended as a result of the coup of 1980. Greek veto was only effective in the decisions relating to the overall reactivation of the Association framework and which requires unanimous decision-making procedures. However, she was not entirely successful. For instance, the other Community members were, despite Greece's objection, able to provide Turkey with $10 million financial aid by using other procedures in which unanimity is not required.65

Given the institutional powers of Greece within the Community decision process which could block the normalization process of Turkey's Association in the late 1980s, Turkey had no diplomatic avenues left to explore within the framework of the Association, but to apply for full membership, in order to clarify its position and secure its rights arising from

64 *The Economist* 12 July 1986 p.60 Keesing Contemporary Archives p.34637.
the Agreement. In 1987 the Ozal Government officially applied for full membership. This new development led to the Davos process of rapprochement between Turkey and Greece. The Davos process is worth devoting a separate section to in order to shed light on the opportunities for cooperation as opposed to the potential for conflict.

Turkey's Application for Full Membership and the Davos Process

The full membership of the EC was on the top of the agenda for the Government of Ozal.66 Considering that the main obstacle to Community membership for Turkey was Greece, a policy of reconciliation with Greece seemed a necessary demarche in this direction.67 In this sense, the crisis in March 1987 in the Aegean Sea, which had nearly brought the two sides on the brink of war, played a role of catalyst.68 In fact the leaders of both countries were so distressed with the idea of war that this led to a process of rapprochement, resulting in the Davos meeting in 1988. The Davos Communique later confirmed their apprehensions 'such a crisis should never be repeated'.69 However, as Pridham notes, the most significant motivation for this rapprochement was 'The Turkish determination certainly Ozal's strong commitment here, to gain entry to the European Community - an application had recently been sent to Brussels - on the belief that the road to securing this lay via Athens'.70 However he continues to argue that 'while the Turkish Government hoped that dialogue would help to undermine Greek intention to use a veto, Papandreu certainly saw this issue as a possible means for extracting concessions over Cyprus.71 More importantly, the emphasis of the Turkish side during this rapprochement process was on real economic cooperation, while Papandreu categorically stated that he was against Turkey's membership unless Turkey made some concessions on Cyprus.72

68 The Economist 4 April 1987 p.50.
70 Ibid.
71 Ibid.
72 The Economist, 4 April 1987, op cit p.50.
The leaders of both countries finally met in Davos in Switzerland on 30-31 January 1988. The most important aspect of Davos was that both sides agreed not to resort to military means over their disputes in the future. In their joint communiqué they declared that:

'cumulated problems in time due to different approaches are, at times, exploited by certain circles. It is imperative that this should not be permitted: the crisis in the Aegean brought the two countries to the brink of war ... from now on, such a crisis should never be repeated: rigid frames of minds have been created in various segments of their societies ... which is the case even in text books: a thaw and a rapprochement ... would require determination, sustained efforts and building of confidence ... in order to create an environment conducive [sic] to working out lasting solutions.'73

While both parties agreed to differ on fundamental political issues, they decided to cooperate in other non-contentious issues of an economic, administrative and cultural nature. In fact, this technique of separating low politics issues from high politics issue areas, was a novelty in the diplomatic history of Greek-Turkish relations. Moreover, for the first time, they recognized the socio-psychological dimensions of the problem that influence the mutual misperceptions of parties working at the popular level and create an environment conducive to conflict.

More specifically, both leaders agreed to establish two two-ministerial level committees, one economic, one political. The former would explore commercial cooperation in trade and the joint ventures of tourism and communications. The political committee, on the other hand, would tackle the fundamental political issues dividing both countries and explore possible solutions. In doing so, the political committee would 'define the problem areas, explore the possibilities of closing the gap and move towards lasting solutions'.74 The leaders also agreed to set up a telephone 'hot line' and visit each others' countries at least once a year.75

Indeed, the 'spirit of Davos' meeting has been reflected in the Greek-Turkish relations during the first half of 1988. On February 6 Turkey lifted its 1964 decree which had frozen

73 Agence Europe 1-2 February 1988, p.3
74 Ibid.
75 The Economist 6 February 1988, pp.43-44.
the Greek assets in Istanbul. On March 5 Ozal and Papandreu met again in Brussels to further the Davos process. Following this meeting, a delegation of Turkish industrialists visited Athens to hold a meeting with Greek industrialists in order to explore possible areas for joint ventures. On April 18 Ozal met the Greek Orthodox Patriarch Demetrios who was then granted a permit to travel abroad, to fulfil his duties in his capacity as a spiritual leader of the Orthodox Church. The most important product of the process of Davos was Greece's ratifying the Accession Protocol therefore binding it to Turkey's Association Agreement with the Community. At the same time, however, Greece continued to block the release of the new financial protocol. As it was noted, 'Greece [was] making concessions very cautiously, and one at a time'. In May 1988, the Greek Minister of Culture visited Ankara to improve cooperation in the cultural field between the two countries. On 30 May 1988 the Political committee managed to produce some decisions which would abolish the mutual visa requirements for diplomatic and service passports and adopt a memorandum of understanding on military activities in international waters. The parties also exchanged views on the fight against terrorism, drug trafficking and smuggling. At the first meeting of the joint committee on economic cooperation in the beginning of June, before Ozal's scheduled visit to Athens on 14 June, some concrete decisions were taken: The parties agreed to avoid double taxation. Moreover, they signed some draft agreements for cooperation in shipping, as well as in the economic, industrial and technical fields and tourism and energy sectors.

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77 Agence Europe 5 March 1988.
81 Agence Europe 21 April 1988.
83 Agence Europe 30/31 May 1988.
In spite of these positive developments, the Greek-Turkish relations within Turkey's Association process did not run so smoothly. For instance in April 1988, despite Greece's accession to Turkey's Association Agreement, the Association meeting, which was the second attempt in the normalization of the Association since 1986, was cancelled because of Greek insistence that reference to the Cyprus issue should be introduced into the preliminary statement of the Council meeting. In protest against the threat of Greek veto, the Turkish delegate walked out of the meeting. It was confirmed that Greece was still adamant in using its veto power to maximize its interest in the Cyprus issue, within the Association framework. 85 In the course of the Davos process, Papandreu, in fact, stated that Greece's veto would continue unless no progress was made with the Cyprus issue. On May 21 1988 he said 'there was absolutely no question' but that Greece would back Turkey if the troops go, that for me would be sufficient. 86 The Cyprus issue continued to constitute the main stumbling block in the rapprochement process between Greece and Turkey. Later developments have shown that because of the Cyprus issue, the actions of leaders were constrained by their domestic environment. 87

Ozal visited Athens in the middle of June 1988 as was scheduled. However, his visit marked an anticlimax in the Greek-Turkish rapprochement process. Despite the two parties' determination to avoid contentious issues, the Cyprus issue was to surface as the main item on the agenda of this summit, as a result of domestic pressure. 88 As Pridham notes 'in late May, a poll indicated that only one third of the Greek public supported rapprochement; a few weeks later another survey showed that 30 per cent saw Ozal's forthcoming visit to Athens as a 'provocation'. At the same time, 45 per cent of the Turkish public rejected absolutely any partial removal of Turkish troops from Cyprus. 89 Given these domestic constrains, the end result of the meeting was not very productive. 90 Once again, the substantial national and

87 Pridham op cit p.83.
88 The Economist 18 June 1988 pp.53-54.
89 Pridham op cit p.85.
political issues which are associated with the core of Greek and Turkish national identities, such as Cyprus, inevitably intervened in the process of rapprochement. 91

In the aftermath of the Athens summit there has not been any significant progress. This was partly because the leaders were involved with the increasing domestic leadership struggles. In July 1988 Papandreu postponed his scheduled visit to Turkey on the grounds that Greece would assume the presidency of the EC. 92 This was not surprising given that the presidency of the EC would reinforce the already strong political status of Greece vis-a-vis Turkey. This was an important opportunity again for Greece to maximise its interests against Turkey.

Even though in the second half of 1988, the Davos process had lost its momentum, the Greek-Turkish joint committee was able to meet in September and reach decisions on some secondary measures. These included some official statements providing some arrangements 'to prevent incidents and accidents in international air space and waters' and to strengthen cooperation to combat terrorism and drug trafficking, and the removal from school books of the 'negative terms' that reinforces the mutual mistrust and misperceptions of Turkish and Greek people. 93 This was the last meeting before Papandreu's expected visit to Turkey. Instead, however, Papouloas proposed to Prime Minister Yilmaz (in the meantime Ozal became the President) that there would be another summit in Brussels in March 1989. Unfortunately, this summit has not been realized. 94

In the course of 1989, the Cyprus issue was again at the forefront of Greek-Turkish relations. In fact, Greece's position concerning this issue seemed less compromising and very different from the previous statements made by Papandreu in May 1988. (see supra) With reference to Turkey's possible membership, the spokesman of Greek Government Kanellapoulos declared in September 1989 that 'the settlement of the Cyprus problem' rather than 'a simple withdrawal of Turkish occupation forces from the island' is 'the condition to

91 The Economist 18 June 1988 p.53-54.
our agreement to Turkey's adhesion to the Community.\textsuperscript{95} This was made in response to Ozal's previous statement that Turkey might withdraw its troops if Greece's answers to Turkey's application was positive.\textsuperscript{96} It was clear that Greece was prepared to force Turkey into making more and more concessions over the Cyprus issue, by using its veto powers. By then, however, it was confirmed that the Spirit of Davos was dead. The diplomatic method of putting aside the contentious issues like Cyprus and Aegean did not help the process of rapprochement, given the constraining influence of Greek public opinion and the Foreign Ministry.\textsuperscript{97} As it was observed by the \textit{Financial Times} 'The Greek position was adjusted to identify Cyprus as the key to the future of the Davos process' that did not coincide with the position of Turkey which was to keep the Cyprus issue in the background during the Davos process.\textsuperscript{98}

At the beginning of 1990, the spill over of conflict into other contentious issue areas further deteriorated Greek-Turkish relations. More specifically, the alleged violation of human rights of the Turkish Minority in Western Thrace, led to diplomatic retaliations between both countries.\textsuperscript{99} 

In spring 1990 Mitsotakis's New Democracy came to power in Greece. Although, when he was in opposition, Mitsotakis had stated that he did not oppose Turkey's membership, his intention to start a serious dialogue between Turkey and Greece was overshadowed by the statement he made in June in London before both parties had met. As he restated on 3 July 'the Cyprus problem creates obstacles to Greek-Turkish dialogue. Reason demands a solution to the problem so that the obstacle at the root of our differences will cease to exist.'\textsuperscript{100} As one writer observed, the enthusiasm of the parties to revive the Davos process was 'somehow muted and the developments following the London summit further indicated that a Greek-Turkish dialogue at a high political level would not be easy to

\textsuperscript{95} \textit{Agence Europe} 21 September 1989.  
\textsuperscript{96} \textit{Ibid.}  
\textsuperscript{97} \textit{Financial Times} 1 February 1989.  
\textsuperscript{98} \textit{Ibid.}  
\textsuperscript{99} \textit{Agence Europe} 5/6 February 1990.  
\textsuperscript{100} \textit{Agence Europe} 4 July 1990.
start in the near future.\textsuperscript{101} At the beginning of his term Mitsotakis's position was clear, that Greece's veto was subject to the settlement of the Cyprus issue. This is not surprising given the element of continuity in Greece's foreign policy tradition, which is to maximize its national interests against Turkey in all possible political forums since the beginning of the Cyprus issue.

Although the Davos process failed to produce immediate and lasting positive results, it is still possible to draw some positive conclusions and learn about the potential dynamics of the cooperation process between Turkey and Greece.

The first significant conclusions to be drawn from Davos is that the interest oriented business elite was the most enthusiastic about \textit{rapprochement}, as opposed to public opinion and the military and the governmental elites. Indeed, since Davos, as it was observed 'Greek Turkish business contacts have multiplied as never before'.\textsuperscript{102} As Pridham noted 'the president of the Greek federation of Industry said, once politicians gave the green light, businessmen on both sides were all set to ride :this wave of euphoria" after Davos. This was one example of where political initiative at the top could set in train a process of \textit{rapprochement} at different levels.'\textsuperscript{103} The enthusiasm of business oriented elites to exploit political opportunities can also be explained by the lack of substantial economic transaction between both countries. Potential for cooperation in the economic field was one area where considerable and rapid progress can be made. Inspite of being neighbours, Greece and Turkey are still far from exploiting the opportunities in potential functional technical and economic areas. For instance, according to a paper submitted in an international conference, Greek ranks 34th in Turkey's imports and 20th in her exports according to 1985 figures. [See Table 4.1] In 1989, for instance, the share of Turkish exports to Greece was 1.3 per cent and the share of Turkish imports from Greece was 0.7 per cent.\textsuperscript{104} It was also observed by an

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{101} Gurel \textit{op cit} p.181.
\item \textsuperscript{102} \textit{The Economist} 18 June 1988 p.54.
\item \textsuperscript{103} Pridham \textit{op cit} p.81.
\item \textsuperscript{104} Figures were extracted from \textit{New Spot} Turkish Weekly Digest, The Directoire General Press and Information 7 September 1989 Turkey's Foreign Trade by Countries.
\end{itemize}
economist that even when the political relations were strained, 289 exporters and 300 importer Turkish businessmen were able to maintain their business links with Greece.\textsuperscript{105} However it was assessed by a Turkish scholar that there is an obvious direct link between economic interactions and political relations.\textsuperscript{106} As the same scholar observed 'whenever there was a strain in the political relationship the level of economic activity suffered accordingly.' Given the figures between 1962 and 1985, the year 1975 is given as a good example of this correlation. Immediately after the Cyprus crisis in 1975, Turkey's exports fell to an all time low of 521,000 dollars. In 1982 when tension was low, approximately 130 million dollars worth of goods were exported to Greece. A similar pattern was observed with imports as well.\textsuperscript{107} In 1985 the exports from Turkey stood at the 76 million dollar level and the imports from Greece were at the 47 million dollar level. Almost 87 per cent of the exports from Turkey made up industrial products and almost all imports from Greece were industrial goods.\textsuperscript{108} However, Turkey has the competitive edge over Greece. According to the Centre of Export Research and Studies, Turkey is one of the most important competitors with Greece in foreign markets. This economic aspect was regarded as a threat to the Greek economy in foreign trade.\textsuperscript{109}

The business-like nature of Davos was another notable aspect of this rapprochement process between Greece and Turkey. In fact the involvement and initiatives of non-governmental economic elites added, in the process, new dynamics and expectations to the Turkish-Greek relationship. The characteristic of the Davos process can be related to the recognition of mutual interests for cooperation in certain economic fields. In the process the parties discovered the functional areas that can be exploited by joint actions. In fact the Davos process enabled parties to detect the initial functional areas of economic cooperation

\textsuperscript{105} Sen Faruk Cumhuriyet Turkish newspaper 17 January 1989.
\textsuperscript{106} Onulduran Ersin 'Recent Developments in Turkish Greek Relations' in The Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean ed. by Manisali E., International Girne conferences p.43.
\textsuperscript{107} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{108} Figures given Ibid
\textsuperscript{109} See Stephanou, C. and Tsardanides, C. 'The EC and Greece and Cyprus' in Constas The Greek Turkish Conflict in the 1990s op cit p.218 and footnote 28. See also World Competitiveness Scoreboard in Agence Europe Selected Statistics 2 July 1990.
that might have potential dynamics for cooperation. Potential areas for economic cooperation were detected in the following sectors: the contribution of a Greek merchant fleet to the development of Turkish trade; the establishment of joint ventures in tourism; cooperation in agriculture; the common exploitation of the natural resources in the Aegean and the development of a communications and transportation network. It was noted that the communications and the infrastructure of transportation do not provide the adequate infrastructure between Greece and Turkey 'to engage in horizontal economic intercourse.' Thus, joint investment in these areas might also be conducive to economic and social transactions between both countries.

Despite the fact that the Davos process helped the parties to detect the potential areas for functional cooperation, the contentious issues constituted the main obstacles in the way of lasting cooperation. It was observed that these salient political issues, influenced and shaped the perceptions of the public, to the extent that the compromise and even concessions in these contentious national issues, which were closely related with the core of national identities, were regarded as the loss of national prestige and pride for both countries. In an important case study in which the dynamics of the Davos process were analyzed from the perspective of linkage politics, these interactions 'between both inner and outer directed linkages' were important factors in assessing the success of the Davos process. As the analyst concludes 'Increased demands by one side [in sensitive high politics issues] (whether official or not) only stiffened the opinion on the other side, which in turn increased constrains on the government in question'. Moreover, in general, as this case study shows, 'leaderships very often have only limited room for manoeuvre, whatever the element of personal commitment to a policy and whatever the formal power they may enjoy. "Dynamics from above" often do not suffice alone to secure an historical breakthrough in policy approach.'

111 See Luciani, Giacomo Italy, Greece, Turkey: Economic Cooperation International Spectator V22 (1) 1987 pp.28, 29.
112 Pridham op cit p.86.
113 Ibid.
The Davos process seemed to have failed because of the short term expectations in reaching solutions in highly sensitive issues and the negative perceptions of the Parties about the motivations of each other. In order to achieve lasting cooperation (institutionalization of interdependence rather than preventive diplomacy) what seems more essential than the efforts of political leadership, we think, is 'the dynamics from below', i.e. the change in the national perceptions of both countries at the elite and popular level of the societies within the framework of increasing interdependence. In this sense the leadership and elites still have an important role to play in initiating the processes by facilitating the framework for further cooperation between both countries.

However, Greece's blocking of Turkey's Association process within the Community framework, and its use of veto against Turkey's membership, stand in the way of real cooperation between Greece and Turkey. The popular basis for the Greek veto is still there and constitutes significant constraints on the decision-making of Greece. According to Eurobarometer, 99 per cent of Greeks are still against Turkey's membership. Therefore, in the light of Turkey's application it is necessary to assess the political significance of Greece's veto power, and its political implications for Greek-Turkish relations in a separate section.

III The Use of Veto Power by Greece and the Question of Turkish Membership

As we have shown, the Greek veto was to become a real obstacle in the reactivation of Turkey's Association process with the EC. Greece also possesses the power of veto to block Turkey's application process, since the admission of new members requires unanimity. In this sense, Greece's veto power within the Community decision-making framework provides it with important political leverage to achieve its national interests vis-a-vis Turkey.

It is important to assess the significance of Greece's veto power and its use, by Greece, in the Community decision-making process. Given that Greece is a small state, with a small population, its political weight has been enhanced by its membership of the

114 Agence Europe 12 June 1991 on the other hand, 55 per cent of European citizens support Turkey's membership.
Community political status. This is not only because it gives Greece an equal say in decision-making along with the other big European states, but it has also strengthened its external sovereignty in its foreign relations, since its membership has given Greece the relevant institutional powers to affect the decisions of the Communities in relation to third countries. In fact during the first ten years of its membership, Greece has used the framework of European Political Cooperation to assert its national interests, rather than to promote the common position of the European Community in foreign affairs. She has not been in tune with the spirit of European Political Cooperation which was established to strengthen and enhance the Western European identity in world affairs, by the joint actions of the national European powers. Greece's participation was more a matter of self-interest, rather than commitment to European integration. Within the EPC machinery, Greece's main concern was to Europeanize its disputes with Turkey, and to reinforce its position against the perceived 'Turkish threat'. As one analyst of the EPC observed 'Greece and its partners have greatly differing perceptions of the nature of the external threat. Orientating its foreign policy entirely towards the threat posed by Turkey, and resentful of the lack of support of its partners for its position, Greece adopted 'atypical' positions on most important international problems.'

This Greek policy had a direct impact on certain aspects of Political Cooperation and added a European dimension to their bilateral conflicts. It was observed by another analyst that 'During its first ten years, Athens made no contributions to the achievements of Political Cooperation; it [had] particular difficulty in accepting Political Cooperation'. It follows from these observations that Greece failed to contribute to the EPC framework in a constructive way, because she single-mindedly followed a policy to promote her national interests against Turkey, instead of contributing to European integration in the political field.

115 Serre, Francois de la The Scope of National Adaptation to EPC in European Political Cooperation in the 1980s p.204.
117 Cahen, Alfred Consequences of the EC Enlargements for political cooperations The Jerusalem Journal of International Relations V 10 (3) 1988 p.4.
As we have shown in the beginning of this chapter the enhancement of Greece's political position in the international arena was one of the most important key factors in Greece's application. Indeed, soon after accession to the Community, it was confirmed that Greece would hold on to its veto power to maximize its interests. In 1983 during the discussions for the 'Solemn Declaration on European Union' by the European Council, Greece demanded that specific reference should be made to the Luxembourg Compromise, which had established the right to veto for member states on issues affecting their national interests. Moreover, a Greek MEP objected to the supranationalist Spinelli initiative, on the grounds that 'unanimity on matters affecting national interests can not be abandoned because it constitutes a last resort, the ultimate means of overturning unfavourable decisions which are harmful to the interests of the small countries in the Community'. Thus, it would not be wrong to suggest that Greece as a small state, in order to maximise its national interests, adopted an intergovernmentalist policy rather than promoting supranationalist methodology within the Community framework.

In the 1980s, Greece had also used its powers of veto as a bargaining chip to gain substantial financial benefits from the accession of new members, notably Spain and Portugal. During the accession negotiations with Spain and Portugal, Papendreu threatened to veto Spanish and Portuguese accessions unless Greece was provided with sufficient financial aid under the EC's 'Integrated Mediterranean Programmes'. The Spanish and Portuguese entries were possible only after the Community satisfied the Greek demands. As one senior Community official put it 'The Greeks have acted like most others to promote their own interests. But they have had the enormous advantage of being able to threaten a veto of the Spanish and membership bids in order to win a massive Community aid programme for the southern members, from which they will benefit disproportionately.'

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118 Agence Europe 16 June 1983.
The use of the threat of veto in relation to the Spanish and Portuguese memberships, enabled Greece to secure substantial financial aid. According to calculations, by 1991 the amount of aid received by Greece under Integrated Mediterranean Programmes reached £1.4 billion. Overall in the first ten years of its membership Greece benefitted from £7.5 billion financial assistance. In fact, during the first decade of its membership, Greece effectively exploited its veto to obtain financial aid from the Community's financial resources whenever this was possible.

The use of veto, for Greece, is politically more crucial in the case of Turkey's application. It seems that Greece this time will use its power of veto to obtain political rather than economic concessions from the EC. As we have shown above, for Greece, the most important national issue which stands in the way of Turkey being admitted to the Community is the Cyprus issue. Given the precedent, Greece obviously will use its veto power to gain political concessions from Turkey over the issue of Cyprus. Amongst the other bilateral issues, Greece particularly insists on the settlement of the Cyprus issue since the status quo in the Aegean is more favourable to Greece. On the other hand, for Turkey, the opposite is the case. In other words, the settlement of issues in the Aegean have the first priority. Therefore, any positive improvement for Turkey in the Aegean may contribute to the solution of the problems in Cyprus. At the same time, however, Turkey insists that the physical separation is vital to the security of the Turkish Cypriots. It is in favour of bizonal and bi-communal federal solutions rather than restoration of a unitary Cyprus.

As long as the Cyprus issue remains unsettled between Greece and Turkey, Greece will continue to block Turkey's advancement towards European integration, not only in the application process but also in the implementation of the Association framework. As the same Turkish journalist who is the political correspondent of a popular Turkish daily in...

122 Ibid.
123 Financial Times 3 February 1983.
124 See Supra.
125 For the discussion of these issues see Birand, M. Ali A Turkish View of Greek-Turkish Relations Journal of Political and Military Sociology V 16 (16) p.174.
Brussels observed, 'Greece has made it quite clear that it plans to submit two separate invoices, one economic the other political, to the EC against Turkey's application. For its part, the EC is likely to prefer to satisfy Athen's political demands than accept such a bill as the $3.5 billion it ended up paying Greece when Spain and Portugal became members.'\(^{126}\) As a matter of fact, the EC recently moved in this direction by linking the question of Turkey's membership to the Cyprus issue. In the Dublin summit of June 1990 it was declared that:

'The European Council, deeply concerned at the situation, fully affirms its previous declarations and its support for the unity, independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cyprus in accordance with relevant UN resolutions. Reiterating that the Cyprus problem affects EC-Turkey relations and bearing in mind the importance of these relations ...\(^{127}\)

In fact, the Dublin summit has for the first time, at the highest political level, established a link between the solution of the Cyprus issue and Turkey's relationship with the EC. As one writer pointed out this 'was unusually strong support for Greece's position on the issue.'\(^{128}\) Earlier in 1989 the Commission, in its opinion on Turkey's accession request, had made a reference to the Greek-Turkish dispute. However, this was less explicit in its wording. The Commission Report stated that 'examination of political aspects of accession of Turkey would be incomplete if it did not consider the negative aspects of the disputes between Greece and one member state of the Community, and also the situation in Cyprus remains unresolved.'\(^{129}\)

These official statements by the EC unambiguously indicated a departure from the Community's earlier neutral position in relation to the Greek-Turkish dispute. The Commission, in its opinion on Greece's accession request, was quite cautious about not upsetting the delicate balance between Turkey and Greece. Indeed, with regard to the Greek Turkish dispute, in 1976 the Commission had stated that 'It is evident that the success of these initiatives does not depend on the Community alone and it would therefore be inappropriate

\(^{126}\) Ibid.
\(^{127}\) Europe Documents Conclusions of the European Council 29 June 1990.
\(^{129}\) Europe Documents Commission Opinion on Turkey's Accession Request 20 December 1989 The Commission Report will be evaluated in detail in the next chapter.
for the decision on Greek membership to be dependent on it.\(^\text{130}\) As can be inferred from this statement the EC attached no political strings to Greece's membership, with reference to the Greek-Turkish dispute over Cyprus. On the other hand, the Commission Report and the Dublin Summit both indicate that Turkey's membership has been made conditional on the settlement of the Cyprus question between Greece and Turkey. In fact this might be regarded as the \textit{de jure} confirmation in that the EC became unavoidably party to the dispute since the full membership of Greece \textit{de facto} altered the situation in favour of Greece and against Turkey. By this \textit{dernarche} the EC seems to have lost its neutral position as an honest broker in the Turkish-Greek dispute and become party to the conflict on behalf of one of its member countries - Greece. This is the case at least from Turkey's point of view. Whether Turkey is ready to pay this political price to satisfy Greece's political demands remains to be seen. This is dependent upon a cost and benefits analysis of Turkey's membership, not only in economic terms but also in political terms. It should be noted that some nationalist sections of society see the concessions in Cyprus as an unacceptable political price to pay and is not worth full membership.\(^\text{131}\) After all, it is difficult to dismiss one writer's comment on this matter, which suggests that 'one can hardly agree to accept Turkey as a full member only on the condition that it suggests some type of solution to the conflict, since Greece was accepted into the Community on no conditions.'\(^\text{132}\) Given the Community's precedent in the past, its institutions have avoided any political involvement in international disputes between members, such as those between the UK and Spain over Gibraltar, Britain and Ireland over Ulster and Spain and France over the Basque country.\(^\text{133}\) It is normal to expect the same in the case of Turkey. However, the EC did not then have the political competences to intervene in these matters. The recent institutional trends indicate that the more political

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\(^{130}\) \textit{Bulletin of the European Communities} 2/76 Supplement pp.6, 7.

\(^{131}\) Interview with the one of the leading social democrat members of the Turkish Parliament, Prof. Muntaz Soysal, who has also been negotiator in the Cyprus talks, suggested that the political gains in Cyprus can not be sacrificed for the sake of full membership. London, 5 November 1993/

\(^{132}\) Esche, Mathias 'A History of Greek-Turkish Relations in Ahmet Evin \textit{op cit} p.113.

\(^{133}\) McCondald, The Cyprus Problem. Adelphi Paper 234 p.71 \textit{op cit}. 

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the scope of the EC the more likely the EC will be compelled to be involved in these political matters, before the negotiations with potential members start. The question however remains as to whether or not these political issues should be solved before the accession or during the accession negotiations, or gradually within the integrative framework of the Community.

However, Cyprus's recent application to the EC drastically changed the situation, by introducing a new element into the triangle relationship between Greece, Turkey and the EC. The Greek-Cypriot government's application for full membership was encouraged by the recent declaration made on Cyprus, in the Dublin Summit of June 1990. Therefore, it is difficult to regard the application of the Greek Cypriots in July as a coincidence. The application was, in fact, promoted by Greece in an attempt to reinforce its position further against Turkey in relation to the Cyprus issue. As the spokesman of the Greek-Cypriot Government, Akis Fanyis reveals 'we wish to underline the intensive efforts made by Greek government for the promotion of the application of Cyprus and to express thanks to the Minister of Greece, Mr Antonios Samaras, for his personal contribution.'134 As a result of the Greek Cypriot-Government's application for full membership the problem is complicated further. As the European Commission's representative to Cyprus put it the Community 'recognizes only the [The Greek Cypriot Majority] Republic, [and] does not wish to confirm the division of the island by accepting the Republic as a member.'135 Hence, given that all the parties involved in the conflict have close political and institutional relationship with the Community, Greece is a full member and Turkey and Cyprus have Association links and both have applied for full membership, the Europeanization of all these issues seems inevitable. Therefore, as a European problem, these problems require European solutions within European structures.136 But reaching these solutions will not be easy in the light of the multitude of problems which were highlighted above. Nevertheless, as a result of the Greek-Cypriot application, Greece has gained further diplomatic leverage to pressurize

136 For instance, it was suggested by the European Commission's first Ambassador to Cyprus that there might be a solution within 'a European Confederation' see Ibid.
Turkey over the Cyprus issue. The status quo seems to have changed in favour of Greece. Apparently, Turkey will come under further diplomatic pressure to make concessions in Cyprus if she wants to achieve full membership. It seems, for Turkey that this can not be realized without any political costs.

For the time being Greece's obstruction of Turkey's full membership suits the EC and saves other members from having to express their own reservations. On the other hand, the Greek obstruction of the reactivation of the Association process between Turkey and the EC is less permissible by the Community. In fact, it is likely that Greece will come under increasing pressure not to block the Association process. The early signs of this were felt in September 1990, as the Greece Weekly reported that the 'overwhelming majority of the EC Foreign Ministers had placed severe pressure on Samaras for Greece to agree to the reactivation of the 600 million ECU 4th EC-Turkey Financial Protocol.'

It is also important to ask whether Greece, as a small country within the Community decision-making process, is able to afford exercising its veto power against Turkey indefinitely. The maintenance of the Greek veto only seems possible for as long as the majority of members do not disagree with it. On the other hand, Greece herself needs the community backing with her economy. Greece's economic performance is not impressive within the Community. For instance, according to unpublished community figures given in The Economist, its GDP per person fell from 52 per cent of the EC average in 1983-1985 to 48 per cent in 1988-1990 despite 7 million ECUs substantial aid. For this substantial amount of aid, a political price is not unusual to expect, in order to satisfy the expectations of the net contributor members of the EC to the Community budget. Therefore, Greece can be compelled to adopt a more compromising attitude towards Turkey. Moreover, the collapse of the Cold War in the Balkans has had direct effects on Greece's foreign policy. It is highly likely that Greece will also use its veto power within the framework of EPC to...

137 Greece Weekly op cit.
140 Ibid p.50, 51.
maximize its national interests in the Balkans. It will be more and more difficult for Greece to veto the common positions of the Community in all foreign policy issue areas which affect its national interests. In addition to its bilateral problems with Turkey, Greece's problem could multiply in its immediate external environment, particularly in the Balkans. This was already confirmed, for instance, in the meeting of Foreign Ministers in Portugal in May 1992, when Greece again adopted an inflexible position towards Turkey and Macedonia. As The Economist put it Greece's attitude 'maddened ministers from other countries.' Nevertheless, Mitsotakis was adamant to protect Greek interests. In the long run, this can expose a more non-conformist Greece within the EPC. After all, Greece cannot afford to act as an awkward partner as it might need more Community funds to put its economy in order. All these new economic factors will have an eroding effect on the basis of Greece's veto power.

On the other hand, the changing perceptions of the other members vis-a-vis Turkey will put more pressure on the use of veto power. As a result developments in the security field, particular Turkey's role in the Gulf Crisis, Greece's power of veto against Turkey has been weakened. As a prestigious Greek newspaper 'To Vima' wrote 'as an important regional power that borders with inflammable Middle East, Turkey will be called upon to play a new role in the future, a role that bears no relation to the one played during the Cold War era ... the problem is how will Athens deal with the strengthening of Turkey which directly threatens Greek national interests.' Greece's veto power is likely to come under increasing political pressure as the other member states' positive perceptions of Turkey's new security role might reinforce Turkey's vocation in a new European security system.

Not unexpectedly, these recent developments have, in some ways, forced the Mitsotakis Government of Greece to adopt a more maximalist policy to European integration

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141 The Economist 9 May 1992 op cit.
142 Turkey's security assets within European security context will be analyzed in the next chapter.
143 Quoted in the Guardian August 15, 1990.
144 This will be dealt with in the sixth chapter.
in the security field, as opposed to the minimalist approach it had adopted in the past. For instance, Greece has recently followed Turkey's suit and applied for full membership of the WEU. This was not unexpected, as the developments after the demise of the Cold War in Greece's immediate external environment, compelled her to put the security aspect of European integration at the top of her agenda. During the discussions of the Maastricht Treaty the Greek Government indicated that it was prepared to veto the entire Treaty unless it was given assurances of early admission to join WEU. The main driving force behind this Greek move towards WEU can also be seen as an act of counterbalancing Turkey's consolidating regional role and security assets, especially since recent developments prompted the other members of the Community to 'associate Turkey as fully as possible' with the WEU. Nevertheless, Greece, by acceding to WEU as a full member, managed to gain another institutional safeguard against Turkey. Given that Turkey is only an Associate member, Greece, as a full member, is in a stronger position to obstruct Turkey's incorporation into this security structure. It is also likely that Greece will use its veto power within this security structure to promote its national interests and maximize its external sovereignty in the European security field against Turkey. Greece's institutional powers are, in fact, the only means to counterbalance Turkey's real assets in the security fields of the Balkans and the Middle East. As a small state Greece is likely to exploit its institutional advantages (like the presidency of the Community) to the full in all issue areas whenever and wherever this is possible. Therefore, it is for the EC to show that Greek interests are not identical to European interests, had the EC wished to create a positive image in Turkey.

Conclusions

147 The Independent 9 December 1991.
As this chapter has shown, Turkey's Association framework has been subordinated to Greek national interests as a result of Greece's full membership of the EC. Since its accession to the Community, Greece effectively used its institutional power within the Community framework to maximize its external sovereignty and promote its national interests against Turkey, rather than fulfilling its commitments and obligations to European integration in accordance with 'acquis communautaire'. Finally, Greece signed the Adaptation Protocol to the Association Framework and accordingly became party to Turkey's Association process. The Association of Turkey constitutes an integral part of the Community patrimony, with its explicitly defined principles and objectives. Greece, like other members of the Community, is bound by Article 7 of the Association Treaty, which provides for 'the contracting parties to refrain from any measures liable to jeopardize the attainment of the objectives of this agreement.' Despite its submission to the Treaty, Greece still blocks the release of the Fourth Financial Protocol, which constitutes an important aspect of financial cooperation between the Community and Turkey, in order to facilitate the objectives of the Association Framework.

On the other hand, the potential for functional cooperation towards integration exists within the Association framework and provides for the establishment of a customs union regime between Turkey and the EC by 1995. Provided that Greece does not block the implementation of the Association, a customs union regime will also normally be established between Greece and Turkey. Indeed, in the first half of 1994, Greece will assume the presidency of the EC. Thus, the success of the Association process is not entirely dependent on Turkey but also the political willingness of Greece to cooperate rather than try to promote her national interest through the Community decision-making framework.

Thanks to the Greek efforts within the Community, the normal working of the Association has been made conditional to the Cyprus issue. Greece's obstructionism in the long run may bring about more isolated and antagonized feelings among Turkish economic and political elites particular vis-a-vis Greece and in general with the EC. The association of Greece's national interests with the EC's interests may, in the eyes of the Turkish elite, create
a more conducive environment for strong nationalist feelings against the EC and Greece, which is not in the interest of the involved parties. It is unlikely that Greece will relinquish its exercise of veto against Turkey. The popular basis of its veto against Turkish membership is still there and national issues like Cyprus still stand between Greece and Turkey. The mutual mistrust continues to persist. A positive change cannot be expected in one generation. This can only be done within a relationship of increasing interdependence and transactions between both societies; this is a prerequisite for a long lasting peace. In this sense, the Association as a crucial initial framework for cooperation, might generate vested interests in the reduction of tensions and the smooth resolution of interstate conflicts. Positive peace building dynamics through cooperation and integration rather than negative peace established through preventive diplomacy, are structurally more crucial.

In the long run, the EC offers Greece and Turkey its integrative framework to transcend national identities within which the identification of common interests and a significant degree of confidence can be established by supranational methodology. The full implementation and reactivation of association between both countries might initiate cooperation to that end. Turkey's application for full membership cannot be dismissed, as Turkey and Greece can repeat the same process undergone by France and West Germany. The 'zero sum' game can be turned into a positive sum game, in which both parties learn and gain from cooperation, while they gradually find solutions to their political problems. They still regard one's loss as the other's gain in their sensitive national issues. In this sense, their opposing sovereignties are seen as the ultimate frame of reference, particularly in the definition of their national identities. In a world where the significance of national boundaries are gradually being lost, particularly in the industrial and democratic parts of it, the boundaries between Greece and Turkey may one day become irrelevant, particularly within the integrative framework of the European Community. However, at present, as this chapter has shown, there is no real evidence to suggest that this will occur in the foreseeable future.
### Table 4.1

**TRADE BETWEEN TURKEY AND GREECE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>(000$) % of Total</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>(000$) % of Total</th>
<th>Rank</th>
</tr>
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<td>29</td>
<td>3.861 1.01</td>
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<td>3.358 .91</td>
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<td>3.837 .93</td>
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<td>40</td>
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Chapter V

ASSOCIATION AND FULL MEMBERSHIP

In this chapter we shall assess Association in the light of Turkey's accession request. Throughout, we shall consider the implications of application for the Association relationship. This chapter is divided into three main sections: first, the background characteristics and motivations behind the application are discussed; second, the Community assessment of Turkey's eligibility is evaluated, particularly with reference to the Commission opinion on Turkey's accession request; and thirdly, the reactivation and the redefinition of the Association framework is considered in the light of 'the Matutes Cooperation Package.'

I. Background Characteristics and Motivations of the Application

As we analyzed in the previous two chapters, Turkey's application for full membership in 1987 was the result of two long term developments. First, in the first decade of its operation, the Association framework failed to maintain an equal relationship within the balance of rights and obligations of the Association Agreement. Thus, as a framework of cooperation, the Association failed in the management of interdependence and created a condition of highly asymmetrical vulnerability for Turkey. Moreover, the Association System collapsed as a result of the Military coup of 1980. Secondly, as a result of Greece's accession to the EC as a full member, the Association has been politically reduced to a de facto void framework of the relationship between Turkey and the EC. The question of normalization of Turkey's Association process, as was shown in the previous chapter, has been subordinated to Greek national interests. These were the main factors that led to Turkey's application. However, there were other circumstantial political and economic considerations that prompted Turkey to apply. In this section we shall give the circumstantial account of the motivations and characteristics behind the application. It is also important to show how far the perceptions of Turkish political and economic elites changed during the process of Association culminating in the application bid.
The Economic Characteristics and Motivations

In the beginning of the 1980s the structural adjustment policies introduced to the Turkish economy were aimed at integrating Turkey into the world-free market system. Thus, the application for full membership of the EC was a crucial step in the attempt to integrate Turkish economy into the world economy through participation in European regional integration. Given Turkey's dependence on the EC as a main and constant trading partner, the application was not entirely surprising. [See the table 5.1] But the application for full membership must be seen in the light of the culmination of a series of economic imperatives, that resulted in Turkey's request to join the EC in 1987. In this section, we shall elaborate on these economic characteristics and motivations.

The process of economic liberalization started in 1980 under the Demirel Government. The convergence of economic policies in general with the West and in particular with the EC, were seen as the only way out from the economic dilemmas of the 1970s. One of the most obvious ways of doing this was to apply for the membership of the Community. Inspite of unfavourable internal circumstances, the political will and the endorsement of the major economic elites to apply for full membership seemed to be present at that time.¹ However, this was interrupted by the Military coup of 1980.² For this reason, Turkey's application had to wait until the transition to democracy.

The 1983 general election brought the Ozal Government to power. In fact, Ozal has almost been a permanent policy maker in the Turkish economy since the late 1960s and was associated with centre right governments.³ He had also been an influential personality during the negotiations of the Additional Protocol.⁴ He was the conductor of the 1980 economic reforms in the last centre right Government and his influence continued in the decision-making structure of the Military Government as a deputy prime minister. In 1983

¹ See Penrose, T The Mediterranean Challenge op cit pp.68-69.
⁴ Financial Times 16 September 1986.
when his newly established political party, the Motherland Party, won the first general
election after the coup of 1980, he had full authority and new powers to speed up the
liberalization of the Turkish economy.\(^5\)

It should, however, be noted, that Ozal's attitude to the EC has changed considerably.
One may remember his objections to the Association Agreement, when he was the head of
the State Planning Organization in the late 1960s and early 1970s. During the negotiations of
the Additional Protocol Ozal had clashed with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the grounds
that the customs union regime would undermine the industrialization of Turkey.\(^6\)
Nevertheless, Ozal this time justified his bid for full membership of the EC on the basis of the
modernization and liberalization of the Turkish economy. As the *Economist* observed, he
regarded integration with Europe 'not as an end in itself, simply as part of [making Turkey a
strong industrial nation].\(^7\)
According to him, the import substitution policies and protectionist national economy had fulfilled their aims to establish a sufficient industrial base for Turkey. Thus, given the shortages of hard currency for vital imported components and
the international debt payment difficulties of the 1970s, what was required now as to compete
in international markets. In this sense, the full membership of the EC was seen by Ozal as a
prerequisite for achieving these aims.\(^8\)
However what led to the application in 1987 can be better explained by the specific economic imperatives of the 1980s.

One of the most important characteristics of the 1980s has been Turkey's export boom
in its external economic relations. Export oriented policies of the early 1980s led to the rapid
expansion of export outlets in two main directions. While the export outlet to the EC was

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6. See Birand for a detailed account of the ideological struggle between two government agencies the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and SPO over the conclusion of the Additional Protocol in Turkish Turkiyenin Ortak Pazar Macerasi (Turkey's Common Market Adventure), *op cit* 211-213.
steadily improving, between 1980-1985 Turkey's exports to the Middle East grew five fold.\(^9\) For the first time the Middle East has been the largest export outlet for Turkey. Turkey's active neutrality policy towards Iran-Iraq war of 1980s was a contributing political factor in this rapid export expansion to the Middle East. Between 1980-1985, for instance, exports to the Middle East remained above the export figures to the EC.\(^10\) However this was a short term trend. The collapse of oil prices in 1986 showed that the Middle East markets were of a volatile and unstable nature.\(^11\) It became obvious in the mid-1980s that the Middle East was far from being an alternative reliable export outlet to the EC. As one Istanbul businessman put it 'in the long run the Middle East [is] relatively important for [Turkey] at least by comparison.'\(^12\) But, as an export outlet, it is only of a complementary character to the EC.\(^13\) In fact, between 1982-1988 Turkey's exports to the EC more than doubled and the increase of trade volume was stable and steady.\(^14\) According to the information provided by the European Commission's office in Ankara, in 1988 Turkey ranked 21st among the Community's suppliers and 16th among its export markets. Contrary to its political relationship, the trade with the Community has progressed smoothly.\(^15\) It was this steady and stable performance that brought the businessmen and the industrialists closer to the EC. In 1987 almost 50 per cent of Turkey's exports went to the EC and 40 per cent came from the EC.\(^16\)

The change in the attitudes of economic elites in favour of the EC, did not only stem from the stability and the steady growth of trade volume with the EC, but there was also increasing self-confidence in the business and industrial circles. These attitudes were

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10 Ibid p.565.
11 See for instance article written by a leading Turkish industrialist Koc, Vehbi 'Why Turkey wants to join the EC' European Affairs, Amsterdam 1987 Vol.2, p.49.
12 Financial Times 16 September 1986.
13 For the comparison of export structures and market analysis between the EC and the Middle East see Akder, op cit pp.563-566.
14 See for trade trends Table 5.1.
15 Information provided by the Commission Office in Ankara.
16 See Table 1 Also Financial Times Survey, Turkey Financial Times 8 December 1988.
different from those of the 1970s, when business circles demanded higher trade barriers to protect their domestic interests. Indeed, as the export structures indicated, 80 per cent of Turkey's exports now consisted of manufactured goods. Compared with the earlier trade patterns of the 1970s this was a qualitative change. As one economist concluded this shift in the pattern of Turkey's foreign trade in favour of manufactured goods 'rendered participation in the customs union in industrial products meaningful.' This explains the change better in the attitudes of the business circles towards the Community, which was a new factor that played an important dynamic role in the application for full membership. For instance, one of the leading industrialists, Koc, wrote in his article when explaining why Turkey wanted to join the EC that 'Among the latest three full members of the EC, the economic potential of Greece and Portugal half of that of Turkey's and the competitiveness of their economies lower than that of Turkey'. Moreover, the Economic Development Foundation (IKV) which was set up to coordinate the relations of the private sector with the EC, concluded in a study that 75% of Turkish industry can compete with the EC. The IKV study cites textiles and clothing, leather products, wood, paper, steel, aluminium castings glass, cement, some commercial vehicles and synthetic fibres as among the strongest sectors for competition.

Unlike the 1970s when different voices were being raised from among the ranks of industrialist and business elites who were against the establishment of a customs union with the EC, in the 1980s there was a growing consensus among more confident business and industrial elites who came to see full membership as being in their interests. As the Financial Times observed 'The consensus among Turkish industrialists in favour of joining seems

17 See for the cited perceptions of private sector regarding the full membership The Economist Turkey; Survey 18 June, 1988, pp.23-27.
19 Kazgan, Gulten in Balkir and Williams External Pressures and the new policies outlook' p.93 op cit.
20 Koc, Vehbi op cit p.50.
21 IKV Turkey's position in the face of the EC's IKV Studies 1988 Istanbul and also earlier studies in Financial Survey, Turkey 19 May 1985 see also for different conclusions reached by Baysan, Tercan Some Economic Aspects of Turkey's Accession to the EC' Journal of Common Market Studies V, XXIII (1) 1984, p.15-34.
Moreover, there is evidence to suggest that there is an increasing involvement of Turkish interest groups at the Community level. In the mid 1980s, even the more domestic oriented business elite of Ankara appeared more favourable towards the customs union. For instance, by mid 1980s the Chamber of Commerce of Istanbul and Ankara issued a common press release stating that the Government should make application for full membership before it is too late. In the interviews with the industrialists and businessmen, the question of whether Turkey was ready for full membership of the EC was responded to mainly in the affirmative.

Textiles have been a driving force behind the application for full membership. As we saw the trade in textiles has always been a sensitive issue between the EC and Turkey. Even during the difficult period when the functioning of the Association framework was reduced to the 'current administration' of the relationship, Turkey managed to become the main supplier and the competitor with the Community in its textile products. In volume terms Turkey's textile exports to the Community expanded very rapidly, by as much as 90 per cent in dollar terms in the two years from 1986 to 1988. In fact 70 per cent of Turkey's global export in textiles went to the EC. Textiles constituted over 50 per cent of Turkey's total exports to the EC and this compares with one-quarter in the beginning of the 1980s.

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23 See an important study, which includes a comparative analysis of interest groups and their insertion into the Community network, analyses four countries: Greece, Spain and Portugal including Turkey, albeit an associate member. The author concludes that 'given the various factors', Turkey as well as these three member Mediterranean Countries 'offer sufficient common traits to be considered as a 'valid general framework which enhances their comparative demarches' The authors add however 'Total homogenity is not imaginable, but are not the interest groups there in order to encourage progress along this path?' Sidjanski, Dusan and Ayberk, Ural L'Europe du Sud dans la Communaute Europeene' Paris; Presses Universitaires de France Paris 1990 summarized in Bulletin Quotidien Europe. No: 5186.
24 See Chapter 3 for the comparison of the perception of different interest groups.
25 Dunya Daily Turkish Newspaper, 3 September 1984.
26 Milliyet Daily Turkish Newspaper, 2 October 1986.
27 Information was provided by the Commission's Library in Ankara. See also 'Pressures on Textiles threaten shake out' Financial Times Survey Turkey 23 May 1988, NewSpot 20 January 1989.
seen as being in the interest of Turkish textile industrialists. In fact, as a result of the quotas and voluntary restrictions over Turkish textile products, this has encouraged the diversification of textile products in Turkey’s exports to the EC, and raised expectations for joint ventures in the textile sector. Despite the provisions of the Association Agreement, providing for the establishment of a customs union in the industrial sector, the quotas and trade barriers were still obstacles in Turkey's export drive to the Community. In this sense, full membership was seen as the only way to secure Turkey's free access to the Community. Thus the textile lobby was seen as being an important pressure group, that was influential in persuading the decision-makers for an immediate application for full membership.

Last but not least, another accelerating factor behind Turkey's application can be related to the developments within the EC, i.e. the conclusion of the Single European Act in 1986, which provided for the completion of the internal market and the deepening of the integration process within the EC by 1992. The decision-makers felt that if Turkey failed to table its application immediately, Turkey would be permanently excluded from this regional initiative. As one official stated 'Turkey can not wait indefinitely and will want to know where she stands before 1992'. At the time of application, it was feared that it would be much more difficult for Turkey to join the EC once the deepening of the Community framework and its external borders were consolidated.

The Free Movement of Turkish Workers: Legal and Social Considerations

Another important motivation in the application concerns the free movement of Turkish workers. The large number of Turkish migrant workers living in Western Europe, was one of the major factors behind encouraging Turkey to apply for full membership. As

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28 See 'case for joining the EC' Financial Times 11 April 1988.
29 For the opinions of leading textile industrials see Financial Times 8 December 1988 op cit
30 See survey on World Textiles 'Quotas that hold back Turkey' Financial Times 22 March 1989
31 See 'Relations between the European Community and Turkey' Tore, Nahit European Access 3 June 1990 p.9.
32 Quoted in Financial Times Survey Turkey 'Mismatch of Perceptions' op.cit.
one writer observed 'There were strong pressures within Turkey for continued emigration and powerful financial pressures to maintain and encourage the flow of remittances from immigrant workers in West Germany to Turkey.' By 1987 the number of Turkish immigrants living in the EC reached 2 million, of which 90 per cent lived in what was then West Germany.

According to the timetable provided by the Association framework, the EC undertook to establish step by step, the free movement of Turkish workers between the EC and Turkey by 1986, in other words between December 1976 and December 1986. However, the EC failed to honour its obligation in this field, as a result of the economic crisis and the globalization of its responsibilities in the 1970s. Moreover, starting from 1980 on, the members of the EC, particularly in West Germany, where 90 per cent of Turkish workers lived, adopted visa policies against Turkey in order to restrict the further influx of Turkish workers into Europe. On the other hand, since 1980, the Turkish population living in West Germany continued to increase, mainly due to the policies of family reunification and political asylum applications.

For Turkey, under the circumstances, it was difficult to maintain the export of its Turkish labour force to Europe. Ozal in 1986, stated that 'Turkey would apply for full membership' so that, during the accession negotiations, 'some problems concerning the freedom of movement issue could be removed'. He added that 'until then we can keep our rights in abeyance'. Thus, the application for full membership was seen by Turkish decision-makers as one way of clarifying Turkey's special Association status, and securing its rights, since the EC refused to honour its obligations within the Association Agreement and its Additional Protocol which provided for the free movement of Turkish workers between

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34 See the Table 5.2 concerning the emigration of Turkish workers.
35 Ergün, in Evin 1990 op cit pp.184, 185.
36 Quoted in Schlegel, op cit p.298.
Turkey and the EC from 1986.\textsuperscript{37} As far as Turkey is concerned, the free movement issue was a matter of principle, within the balance of rights and obligations of the Association framework, that must be honoured by the EC. Therefore, not surprisingly, Turkey based its arguments on legal, rather than socio-economic considerations.

It is, however, interesting to assess a case which was brought before the European Court of Justice and one that sheds light on the legal nature of this issue. Since it coincided with Turkey's application the case is of greater political significance than legal. Thus, it is worth a detailed assessment. In 1986, the Administrative Court in Stuttgart referred to the European Court of Justice (ECJ) to obtain a preliminary ruling on the effects of the provisions concerning the free movement of workers provided in the Association Agreement and its Additional Protocol between Turkey and the EC. The subject matter concerned whether the provisions of the Agreement could be relied on before German Courts, by a Turkish worker who was the subject to deportation proceedings.\textsuperscript{38} The ECJ held that the Association Agreement is an integral part of the Community's legal order and thus the interpretation of the validity of this could be obtained from the Court of Justice under Article 177, which provides for a preliminary ruling. However the Court felt that the provisions, with regard to the free movement of labour in Article 12 of the Association Treaty and Article 36 of the Additional Protocol, were essentially in the nature of a programme, a general plan, or a declaration of intent and 'were not sufficiently precise and unconditional' to regulate and to have direct effect on the movement of Turkish workers.\textsuperscript{39} Thus, these provisions must be seen in the light of the objectives of the Association. Furthermore, according to Article 36 of the Additional Protocol, the power to regulate and lay down specific rules for securing the progressive stages of freedom, were exclusively conferred on the Council of Association. However, a decision in this direction by the Council of Association had not yet been made.

\textsuperscript{37} Keesing Contemporaries Vol.XXIII 35137.
\textsuperscript{38} See for the detailed legal analysis of this Case by Nolte, Georg Common Market Law Review 25 1988 403-415.
apart from the limited decisions of the Council in 1980, which was just a consolidation for the legal position of Turkish workers who were already living and working in the Community.\(^\text{40}\)

In general, the Court concluded that the provisions of the Association Agreement with Turkey constituted mainly a political programme and cannot be relied upon before German Courts by the Turkish worker, who was the object of a deportation order.\(^\text{41}\) Thus, it can be interpreted that the realization of the right of free movement for Turkish workers was left to the discretionary powers of the Parties within the decision-making of the Association, rather than a strict legal interpretation of the commitments and rights of the Parties from the viewpoint of Community law.

Even before this decision was delivered, the application for full membership was seen by Turkish decision-makers as a last resort to compel the EC to secure Turkey's rights from the Association Framework. As the Foreign Minister of Turkey expressed before Turkey's application was made, with regard to the free movement of Turkish workers in Europe, 'the cooperation potential within the existing arrangements with the EC has been exhausted.'\(^\text{42}\) In short, the application was motivated by Turkey's discontent with the Association structures within which the solution to these problems did not seem possible. Thus it was hoped that the Application could play a role or catalyst, by way of cutting the Gordian knot in the blocked Association process.

**The Political Characteristics and Motivations**

As was the case in the application to establish an association relationship with the EC, the application for full membership was also entirely consistent with the mainstream Turkish foreign policy of westernization and modernization. Indeed, as the Foreign Minister in office during the application process expressed:

'Turkey, in line with its determination to become part of the process of European integration, has chosen not to remain outside of this important development and consequently signed ... an Association Agreement foreseeing full membership ... The signing of the Ankara Agreement marks

\(^{40}\) Nolte CML Rev. 1988 *op cit* p.414.

\(^{41}\) *Ibid* p.414.

\(^{42}\) Quoted in *Financial Times* 13 November 1986.
the beginning of a historical stage in Turkey's traditional foreign policy. Turkey, thus became in political terms a part of integration-oriented Europe in conformity with its foreign policy, the foundations which were laid by Ataturk.43

It is clear from this statement that the Association relationship is seen by Turkey as the most organic institutional relationship that would facilitate Turkey's full integration into Europe and eventually complete the process of westernization.

A further development encouraging the application was Mediterranean enlargement. In addition to Greece's Full membership, the accession of Portugal and Spain to the EC in 1986 led to the feelings of isolation, that Turkey, as a NATO member, was left as 'odd man out' on the Northern Mediterranean. If Turkey had not applied for full membership it feared that the exclusion would have been irreversible. The linking of NATO membership with the EC was an element of justification again. In Ozal's words

'All European nations of NATO, once again save for Norway (who has refused to join the Communities through a national referendum) and Iceland (who has a policy of its own), are members of the EC. Thus it becomes impossible for Turkey to remain outside this Community of European nations whose Mediterranean dimension has been intensified with the entry of Spain and Portugal.'44

However, unlike the application for the Association, the application for full membership was not merely the result of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' instigation. As one student of Turkey's relationship with the EC explains 'relations with the EC are thus seen by most of the country's political and economic elite in a context that goes far beyond foreign policy considerations. The existence and identity of the Turkish nation are directly affected.'45 For the modernizing elites of Turkey, Europe has always been a constant point of reference in the development of Turkish society and institutions. Thus the full membership of the EC was seen as a leverage that would facilitate this process of modernization.46

44 Ozal, Turgut The Prime Minister in Economic Dialogue 'Turkey Reached the point' 1986 op cit p.13.
45 Kramer 1984 op cit p.102.
46 See, for instance, in a recently published survey which contains interviews with writers, journalists, academics and trade unionists, diplomats, businessmen virtually all those representing all the major ideological and political opinions of the intelligencia on the
Apart from the opinions of the intelligencia, there was also a political consensus at the level of political parties that Turkey should become a full member of the EC. As one Turkish scholar accurately observed 'For the first time in Turkish history, all major Turkish political parties, for different reasons, are unanimously agreed that Turkey should work toward becoming a full member of the Community'. 47 The only opposition came from the Islamic oriented Welfare Party. 48

There were also some tactical considerations that determined the timing of the application. As it was shown in the previous chapters, the Military coup of 1980 had considerably damaged Turkey's political eligibility as an associated country with the EC. However, the general elections and subsequent progress towards democracy led to a rapprochement process between the EC and Turkey. 49 Furthermore, the attempted reactivation of the institutional structures of the Association in September 1986 was regarded by Turkey, as a positive signal for the application, in that the EC came to recognize Turkey's transition to democracy. However, on the European Parliament front, there were still some reservations. 50

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<td>47</td>
<td>The published proceedings of an International Seminar concerning the relationship between Turkey and the EC towards the Year 2000 Turkish Political Science Association 'Turkey in the Year 2000'; Ankara 1989 p.38 see also Steinbach, op cit p.248 and The Economist 21 February 1987 p.57. See also NewSpot 8 March 1990 'There is national consensus for full membership.'</td>
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<td>48</td>
<td>The Listener Keay, John Turkey and the EEC 2 July 1987 pp.9-10. According to the Ambassador Nuran Nurey in the general elections of 1987 only 7 per cent went to this religious oriented political party and this percentage has been steady. Interview with the Ambassador Nurey, Nurey in London 20 May 1990.</td>
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<td>Financial Times Relations with the EC improving 13 November 1986.</td>
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Finally two factors which speeded up the application, can be related to Turkey's term of presidency in the Council of Europe and the Belgian Presidency of the Council of the EC. The former was important for Turkey in the sense that, despite its symbolic importance, the assumption of the presidency of the Council of Europe was thought to strengthen Turkey's case in the application process and was an acknowledgement of democratization. This was seen as 'as important step in the campaign of EC membership'. The latter concerns the Belgian Presidency. Given the positive attitude of the Belgian Presidency towards Turkey, especially 'Mr Tindemands [was] personally well disposed to the timing of the application', Turkish decision-makers felt that this was the most appropriate time for the official tabling of the application. The tendency to apply immediately was also enhanced by the fear that the succeeding countries might have some reservations: Denmark for human rights concerns and Germany for the issue of the free movement of Turkish workers. Finally Greece was due to assume the presidency in the second half of 1988 and that might indefinitely slow down the application process. As a result of these tactical considerations, Turkey officially lodged its application for full membership of the EC in April 1987.

II Turkey's Application within the Context of Decision Making Process of the EC and after the Single European Act

In April 1987 the Turkish Government officially submitted its application bid for full membership. Following this, the Council of the EC considered the Turkish application for accession and decided to implement the procedures which were provided by the Treaties, and where in accordance with the Single European Act and which modified accession procedures to the Community. Article 237 states that an application for full membership in the Community must be addressed to the Council. The Council makes the final decision by a unanimous vote to start negotiations for accession. However, this takes place after having

51 Keesing's Contemporaries op cit 351137.
52 Financial Times 7 April 1987.
53 Ibid.
obtained the opinion of the Commission. The Commission's opinion is not to pass a political
decision but to give an assessment of the applicant country's eligibility from the Community
frame of reference. The opinion of the Commission is not legally binding but provides
important data for the political decision of the Council of Ministers. However, it is the case in
the past, that despite the negative opinion of the Commission, the Council went ahead with
the accession negotiations with Greece.55

Having considered the Turkish request for accession, on 27 April 1987, the Council
duly asked the Commission to produce its opinion.56 Although the final decision to admit
Turkey would need unanimous support, a simple majority of the 12 members is enough to
implement the application procedures. It is important to note here that the Community,
despite the reservations of some members, particularly Greece's opposition, accepted
Turkey's accession request without any rejections in the first place.57 In fact, the only explicit
formal condition for accession to the Community is that the applicant should be a 'European'
state.58 As far as Turkey's Europeanness is concerned this was not a contentious issue within
the decision-making of the Community. Turkey was obviously considered to be sufficiently
European enough and at least eligible for the initiation of the application procedure. On the
other hand, the application of Morocco, later in September 1987, was refused out of hand on
the grounds that Morocco was not a European State.59 The right to apply for full
membership did not even arise in Morocco's case. Thus, the application of Morocco for full
membership following the Turkish application by a few months, was refused in the first place
without opening any examination procedure.

Apart from being a European state, there are also other conditions that should be met
by an applicant country so that she can fulfil the obligations of full membership, since
admission of new members requires that applicants must accept and comply with the basic

55 See Opinion on Greek Application for full membership The Bulletin of the EC
Supplement 2/76 op cit.
58 Article 237 of The Treaty of Rome.
59 Agence Europe 16 September 1987.
principles of the Community. These include the original Treaties, the policies and the subsequent legislation of the Community, i.e. Acquis Communautaire. Therefore it is essential that the applicant country should have a political and economic structure that enables her to assume the obligations arising from full membership. The political and economic structural similarities are implicit prerequisites for full membership. In this sense, a would-be member, who is structurally dissimilar to the Community, is not allowed to upset the structures of the Community already established.

Since the Single European Act came into force at the time that Turkey’s application was being considered, this has had institutional and political effects on the assessment of Turkey’s membership request. The Single European Act reiterated the democratic principles of the European Community:

'Determined to work together to promote democracy on the basis of the fundamental laws recognized in the constitutions and laws of the Member States, in the convention for the Protection of Human Rights Fundamental Freedoms and the European Social Charter, notably, freedom, equality and social justice'.60

Thus, it is essential that the applicant country should have a democratic representative form of government to fit the democratic institutions of the Community, particularly to the European Parliament. In line with this, the Single European Act also enhanced the powers of the European Parliament. In addition to its right to intervene in the legislative process of the decision-making of the Community, ‘cooperation procedure’, SEA also provided the Parliament with an ‘assent’ procedure, to have a final say on the accession of new members and association agreements.61

The new procedural powers which the European Parliament has, have had an impact on the application procedure of Turkey.62 The first signs in the exercise of the Parliament’s

60 Commission of the European Communities Single European Act Bulletin of the European Communities Supplement 2/86.
62 Agence Europe 29 April 1987.
new powers, were felt in the field of the association treaties. According to a study, the European Parliament exercised its assent procedure in more than 30 cases between 1987 and 1989. As it was observed, the use of the assent procedure by the European Parliament 'has been far more significant than had been supposed by some of those involved in negotiating the Single European Act.' Indeed, Turkey has become one of the first subjects that was brought under the political scrutiny of the European Parliament, through its 'assent' procedure, in the field of human rights. For instance, in December 1987, the EP postponed considering two draft technical proposals which were amendments to Turkey's Association Agreement. The reason for this was the arrest of two left wing opposition leaders (the Communist Party of Turkey) upon their return to Turkey, accompanied by some members of the European Parliament. These protocols were approved subsequently in 1988. This illustrates that the Parliament has now the tactical advantage to postpone the Agreement until it decides to place the matter on its agenda, and gives its assent only by the majority of its members. Before this procedure no protocol can enter into force. The SEA has enhanced the political powers of the EP to the extent that it can now question not only the political eligibility of the Associate member, but also can have a final say on the accession of new members. In fact, the European Parliament acts as the consciousness of the European Community. Even though the European Parliament has a potential to reflect the attitudes of the member states, it is also, to a considerable extent, a promoter of the Community values of a political kind. In this context, if the assent procedure, which is required in Article 238, is a tool at its disposal for the democratic control of the association links of the Community, its assent procedure required in Article 237 is politically much more crucial, with regard to the

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64 Ibid.
accession of new members. The European Parliament is able to block the acceptance of new members on the grounds of violation of human rights and democracy.

In fact, the EP has been the most critical of Turkey's political eligibility on these grounds. As long as the European Parliament's misgivings about the political eligibility of Turkey persist, it seems that Turkey's accession may be blocked at the level of the European Parliament. Indeed, according to a recent survey carried out by the Weekly newspaper The European, among the members of the European Parliament, only 2 per cent seemed to support Turkey's accession to the EC.

Apart from these political and constitutional conditions, the applicant country's economy should be able to function without a free market economy, based on private enterprise. This requires that the economic structures must be consistent with the Community rules and structures, so that the applicant country is able to observe the rules on the free movement of goods, person, services and capitals. In other words, the applicant country's economy must be efficient enough to withstand competition without excessive reliance on safeguards or special arrangements. Therefore, the applicant country's economy must be either fully competitive or complementary to that of the EC. This economic condition is particularly important since SEA envisaged the creation of a single market by 1992. Thus full membership requires far greater commitments to economic integration than before, when Greece, Spain and Portugal were accepted.

As far as these political and economic conditions are concerned, the Commission report in the application process, is an important document, that assesses the structural

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68 The percentage of respondents who were in favour of the other countries' accession as follows: Austria 93%; Sweden 89%; Switzerland 77%; Hungary 77%, Czechoslovakia 73%; Poland 72%; Cyprus 48%; The Soviet Union 19%; Morocco 1%. Given in The European 1-3 February 1991.

eligibility of the applicant country. Therefore in the next section we shall evaluate the Commission report in the light of the above considerations.

III The Commission Report: An Assessment Of Turkey's Membership Request

The Timing and Context of the Commission's Opinion

The Commission's opinion on the accession request of Turkey was finally produced on 18 December 1989. Given the date of Turkey's application as 14 April 1987, it took two years and eight months for the Commission to present its opinion. In fact, in Turkey's case, by the Commission standards, it took much longer for the Commission to produce its opinion. This lengthy process can be explained by the Commission's and the Member Countries' reservations about Turkey's 'untimely' membership request. It was rumoured that the Commission used delaying tactics to prolong Turkey's application process. However, on December 1989 it was confirmed that the Commission was to produce its Report in late December.

It is important to place the assessment of Turkey's application in its international historical context. The most important external challenge that the EC faced in the late 1980s, and the early 1990s, was the question of enlargement. In fact, the Turkish application in 1987 was the first of a number of application waves. By 1990, Austria, Malta and Cyprus had applied and some other European countries were also expected to follow suit. All these application bids were encouraged by a number of developments that were taking place within the Community and in Europe. First of all, the prospect of the Single European Market by 1992 induced fears that the erection of external barriers against outsiders, i.e. the fear of 'fortress Europe', might undermine the economies of the non-member countries of Europe, (members of the European Free Trade Association) who were dependent on the EC.

70 In order to compare with previous applications processes see The Economists 11 April 1987 p.62.
71 The Economist 11 November 1989 p.72.
72 Agence Europe 2 December 1989.
73 Agence Europe Editoria 6/7 April 1987.
for their export outlet.\textsuperscript{74} The second development was the demise of the Cold War which opened the way for Eastern European countries to join European integration in their attempt to consolidate their democracies and establish free market economics. Whilst the EC was itself in the process of completing its internal market and consolidating its institutional structures in accordance with SEA, the external challenge of enlargement was becoming the most pressing problem on its agenda.\textsuperscript{75} These external and internal dynamics created two conflicting tendencies within the Community framework. One tendency was to go ahead with the process of deepening, which implied the completion of the internal market, the strengthening of supranational features of the decision-making was to form a more coherent and effective community structure, before any enlargement took place. The other tendency - the wideners - think that the Community must be open to new members, while the process of deepening continues.\textsuperscript{76} The main problem, for the Community, was how to respond to the application requests without undermining the deepening process of the integration. The tendency of deepening was especially stronger on the Commission side.\textsuperscript{77} Indeed, the first Delor Commission, at the time of the Turkish application, made it clear that no enlargement would be possible before 1992.\textsuperscript{78} Later, the second Commission reiterated the same position. In the main, the Commission felt that further enlargement would inevitably endanger the deepening process of the EC before the Community consolidates its internal institutional structures.

The Commission opinion was produced in the light of the above considerations. In fact, the Commission's report on Turkey's accession request was the first response to the challenge of enlargement, which resulted from a series of application requests. Therefore, the

\textsuperscript{75} The Economist 18 November 1989 pp.69-76 The Economist 25 November 1989 p.76; Financial Times 24 January 1990/\textsuperscript{76} See for the analysis of widening and deepening dilemma and different scenarios Wallace, Hellen Widening and Deepening: The European Community and the New European Agenda RIIA Discussion Papers 23 First Published 1989 Chatham House.
\textsuperscript{77} The Economist 3 February 1990 p.54.
\textsuperscript{78} Wallace, H. The World Today op cit p.32.
Report devoted its first section to the Commission’s opinions on the question of enlargement within which Turkey’s application request must be evaluated.\textsuperscript{79} As a result of its third enlargement and the entry into force of the Single European Act, the Report stated that the Community itself is ‘in a state of flux’ and entered into a new stage towards ‘European Union which is the ultimate objective of the Treaties’. The Report continued to explain:

‘The Community is progressing in accordance with the objectives of the Single Act on the road towards economic and monetary union and European Union, is improving the operation of its institutions and is thereby reconciling enlargement and consolidation. Only when it has carried out an objective assessment of the results achieved in this respect will the Community have at its disposal one component of data on which it will be required to base its assessment of any further enlargement. (The other data related to individual candidate countries) There should be reservations about taking any premature step here as the consequences could be very serious for the community’.\textsuperscript{80}

As can be inferred from this statement, the Commission explicitly states that, except ‘exceptional circumstances’ no accession negotiations before 1993 are advisable. In the general phrasing of ‘with regard to candidate countries’ the Commission seems to imply that this policy was not only referred to Turkey, but also other countries who intend to table their application bids. In a press Communique the Commissioner Matutes reiterated the same opinion. He stressed that the Community ‘must concentrate all [its] efforts towards the goals and tasks of the Single Act, and towards other initiatives for achieving economic and monetary union. Before negotiating with anybody’. He stated that ‘this opinion could serve ‘as a guide, a lighthouse’ for other countries who want to join the EC. This was the ‘global approach’ that was adopted when Turkey’s application was evaluated.\textsuperscript{81} No enlargement would take place before the completion of the deepening process.

\textbf{Substantive Issues Arising from Turkey’s Possible Membership}

The Commission points out the institutional implications of Turkey’s accession, for the Community decision-making structure. The Commission noted in 1989 that Turkey has a

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{79} The Commission Opinion on Turkey’s Request for Accession to The Community Europe Documents No 1589 20 December 1989.
\item \textsuperscript{80} \textit{Ibid.}
\item \textsuperscript{81} Agence Europe 18/19 December 1989.
\end{itemize}
greater geographical area and would eventually have a bigger population than any Community Member State (53 million in 1988, projected population 68 million in the year 2000). The Commission anticipates that Turkey will be 'monopolizing at least 20% of the votes' in the European Parliament, to this it must also be added the powers that Turkey will assume in the Commission (two Commissioners) and its weight of vote in the Council of Ministers (at least ten votes as has Germany, Italy, France, United Kingdom). The Commission fears that Turkey can use its powers to defend its national interests. Given 'the nationalistic traditions of Turkish policies' the Commission cautions against Turkey's accession that might undermine the institutional structures of the Community.

It should be noted that Turkey will not be the first country to join the Community with its nationalistic policies. However, it is also difficult to see how Turkey can, on its own, effectively block the decision-making process to defend its national interests, within an increasingly supranational decision-making structure and in view of the consolidating of the institutional structures of the Community. Like the other members within the Community, Turkey will be subject to the majority opinion in several policy areas. Nevertheless, the Commission opinion is at present justified on the grounds that 'with the existing institutional mechanisms the enlargement runs 'the risk of weakening its management and decision-making capacity'. Thus the institutional consolidation was a prerequisite and imperative, not only before Turkey's accession but before any accession takes place.

Moreover, given the low level of development and its large size, the Commission has certain doubts about Turkey's accession bringing additional burdens on the Community's own sources. Turkey's inclusion in the structural funds may cause budgetary problems. In the words of the Commission 'the additional burden ... would be even greater than at the time of the last accessions' of Greece, Portugal and Spain. Therefore, according to the

82 The Commission's opinion op cit p.2.
84 Ibid.
85 Opinion op cit p.2.
Commission, the Community's integration process in the economic field may be upset by the premature accession of Turkey. It was noted by the Commission even before its opinion was made public that Turkey's accession might cause a substantial financial burden for the EC. According to the Commission's initial estimates, which were 'based on the criteria at present in force' in 1989, net transfers which Turkey could benefit from the Community Structural Funds would be 'about six times higher than those which Greece or Portugal benefit from'. This means that Turkey's share from the Structural Funds would bring 'additional annual grants of between 6 to 8 billion ECU'.\(^\text{87}\) This may be another source of instability within the Community decision-making that can cause another political crisis concerning the net contributions of some Member States to the Community Budget.\(^\text{88}\)

Another impact of Turkey's accession to the Community structures, which the Commission refers to, is the access of Turkish labour to the Community market. According to the Commission this poses a significant threat particularly in the light of the level of unemployment within Turkey and the Community.\(^\text{89}\) The Commission notes that 'the estimated unemployment rate in 1988 is higher than in the Community (15.9 per cent according to OECD statistics) and tending to increase.'\(^\text{90}\) Moreover, given the high level of unemployment within the Community, the Commission notes that 'access of Turkish labour to the Community labour market, which would eventually have to come about, gives rise to fears.'\(^\text{91}\)

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\textit{87} Ibid.

\textit{88} However, according to a study which was done by the Head of Turkish Studies in Essen in 1988 Turkey's share from structural funds are estimated not to exceed 2 billion ECU due to Turkey's rapidly declining agriculture sector in its overall trade. Moreover, given 43 billion budget of the EC in 1988 Sen suggests that this is a minimal amount. Moreover, the contribution from Turkey's Value Added Tax income and substantial amount of its income from custom duties and levies will be transferred to the Community budget as a full member. Sen, Faruk 'AT a Getirebilecegimiz ekonomik yuk' Turkey's Economic Burden in the case of Accession \textit{Ekonomik Panorama} 13 Kasim 1988 p.45.

\textit{89} The Commission's Opinion Europe Documents \textit{op cit} p.3.


\textit{91} Opinion in Europe Documents p.3.
Apart from the first component of data which concerns the impact of Turkey's accession on the Community structures, the Commission Report also assesses Turkey's own economic and political eligibility for full membership. The Commission presupposes that 'a positive conclusion' is necessary to open accession negotiations, so that a candidate country is capable of assuming 'all the constraints and disciplines now applying to member states', i.e. acquis communautaire including the Single European Act.92 The Commission analyses Turkey's economic eligibility in a detailed separate report which is annexed to its opinion. It is worth examining the main points of this report, since it sheds light on the structural characteristics of the Turkish economy, in the face of its membership.

Structural Adjustment Problems

The Commission, first of all, acknowledges the fact that as a result of its economic policies of modernization and liberalization, Turkey, in its attempt to integrate into the international economy, managed to maintain an average growth rate of 5.4% between 1980-1988, compared with 2.0% average for the Community.93 Moreover a boom in exports has been achieved and trade structures have been diversified '80 per cent of exports are now manufactured products in which textiles make up the most important proportion.'94 Another positive development was noted thanks to receipts from tourism and remittances by Turkish worker abroad, that for the first time Turkey achieved a surplus of $1.5 billion in its current account in 1988. There has been also considerable improvement in its economic infrastructure, particularly in telecommunications and roads and irrigation. Inspite of these positive aspects, the Commission anticipates that 'the adjustment problems ... would confront Turkey if it were to accede to the Community in the medium term'.95 In this respect, there are several areas where structural adjustment problems can arise from Turkey's immediate full membership. These are evaluated as follows:

92 Ibid
93 See the Opinion p.2-3 op cit.
94 Ibid.
95 Ibid.
1. **Structural disparities in Agriculture and Industry;** The considerable proportion of labour is still employed in agriculture. According to the Commission figures, over 57 per cent of labour force in Turkey are employed in agriculture, compared with less than 9% in the Community. Agricultural productivity is low. Moreover agriculture still constitutes less than 18 per cent of Turkey's GDP, compared to less than 3 per cent in the Community. Inspite of low productivity in agriculture, industry makes over a third of GDP, in which the manufacturing output increased fastest between 1980-1987. As the Report notes 'as in the Community, manufacturing in Turkey accounts for over 25% of GDP' and labour productivity in industry 'in current ECUs is actually higher than industrial productivity in Portugal'. 96 Despite the existing structural disparities between Turkey and the Community, the gap is expected to narrow rapidly in favour of Turkey's industrial sector. However, by the EC standards the size of the agricultural sector is still large. [See the Sectoral breakdown of GDP and Civilian Employment Table 5.3] In this respect, Agriculture is seen as a burden for the Community structural funds (Common Agricultural Policy).

2. Another major structural disparity, according to the working document of the Commission, concerns the substantial development gap between the Community and Turkey. There are two main indicators that were used by the Commission. The first is related to the purchasing power. A comparison of GDP per head with the Community indicates that purchasing power in Turkey is one third of the Community average. [See for the comparison with Spain, Portugal and Greece Table 5.3 D.E]. The low level of development in Turkey as compared with the Community, also manifests itself in traditional standards of living indicators such as the number of private cars, the consumption of electricity and infant mortality. [See Table 5.3]. Another structural disparity is related to the distribution of income, which is very uneven. The Commission's Working Report refers to a study by the Institutional of Turkish Industrialists (TUSIAD) which illustrates that '20% of the

96 Commission of The European Communities 'The Turkish Economy: Structure and Development' *op cit* pp.6, 7.
population accounted for 56% of income, at the end of 1986, whereas the poorest 20% received only 4%.  

3. The major structural disparities are also detectable in macroeconomic imbalances. Inspite of stabilizing its external debt and improving its trade balance, the Commission points out that Turkey failed to achieve a macro economic balance. In this request, two drawbacks were indicated. The first is that Turkey has still a high rate of inflation that is several times higher than the Community average. In 1988, according to the Document, the inflation rate was 60-75% compared to the Community average of 4%. The second macroeconomic drawback is the rate of high unemployment (15.9% according to OECD statistics) that is higher than the Community average. However, the Report notes that it is difficult to compare unemployment rates between countries, because of the problems with the definition of unemployment. It was also due to the fact that there is no system of unemployment benefits in Turkey. Since registration is not compulsory, it is difficult to estimate the accurate number of unemployed people. In this regard, for the Commission, given the high level of population growth, the level of unemployment is of great concern, as the trend of unemployment will grow. Population growth rate is 2.5% per year in Turkey compared to 0.25 in the Community.

4. Another major structural problem concerns the high level of protectionism. Although the Commission acknowledges the fact that rapid industrialization was mainly because of Turkey's import substitution policies, the slowing down of the timetable for liberalization and the customs union and the introduction of new import taxes to protect its industry from competition, were in breach of the Association Agreement. However, in 1980 Turkey left the import substitution policy and adopted an outward looking economic policy, to integrate the Turkish economy into the international economy, in an attempt to increase its foreign

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97 Referred to in Turkey's International Role, Euromoney Pub, 1988 p.12 cited The Turkish Economy; Structure and Development op cit p.4.
98 Ibid p.93.
99 Ibid p.41.
100 Ibid p.38.
currency reserves and solve its foreign debt problems.\textsuperscript{101} The main components of these policies were: A flexible exchange rate policy; progressive liberalization of imports and export promotion by incentives. Despite the fact that import quotas were abolished in 1981, the protectionist policies took different forms. Notably the new import surcharges were introduced in the shape of special funds.\textsuperscript{102} As the Commission’s working document detailed ‘the number of import items generating revenue for the ‘Housing Fund’ rose from 40 in 1983, to more than 1400 in 1988. Since 23 September 1989, the number of items has reached 7,880 or 44 per cent of all products covered by tariff. These import charges, many of which are higher than the customs duties themselves ...’.\textsuperscript{103} The Commission also noted that in spite of lowering custom tariffs ‘the effective rate of important protection is not only much higher than the customs tariffs applicable but is also climbing steadily.’\textsuperscript{104} As far as the general level of protection is concerned, the Commission working document concludes that these surcharges, notably the contributions to the different funds, are inconsistent with the provisions of the Additional Protocol to the Association Agreement. Moreover, export subsidies are ‘generous’, especially in sensitive sectors. These, combined with import surcharges, ‘introduce an element of distortion into the economic system’ and contradict with the policy of liberalization. In conclusion, in order for Turkish industry to compete within the Community framework, a substantial reform of Turkish legislation is required, in order to comply with the competition rules of the EC, arising from existing community legislation.\textsuperscript{105} Indeed, Article 3f of the Treaty of Rome provides for ‘a system ensuring that competition in the common market is not distorted.’ In this sense, the competition is a \textit{sine qua non} for the member states to achieve the objectives of the EC.\textsuperscript{106} As it was concluded by the Commission Report, the existence of some protective measures in the Turkish economic

\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{101} See Toksoz, M. Turkey to 1992 Missing Another Chance? \textit{op cit} pp.25-61.
\item\textsuperscript{102} See the Table on the Special Funds \textit{Ibid} p.115.
\item\textsuperscript{103} Commission of the European Communities, Turkish Economy \textit{op cit} p.17.
\item\textsuperscript{104} \textit{Ibid} p.18.
\item\textsuperscript{105} \textit{Ibid} p.19.
\item\textsuperscript{106} Davidson, Scott ‘Legal Aspects of the Common Market in Goods’ in Lodge Institutions and Policies of the European Community \textit{op cit} pp.122-125.
\end{itemize}
system constitutes not only an important obstacle in the way of Turkey's full membership, but it is also incompatible with the objectives of the existing Association framework.

5. Last but not least, an important structural problem concerns the low level of social protection. The Commission's opinion refer to the low level of wages that affect the social situation of workers. It is difficult for Turkey, in the short term, to comply with the current and potential Community social norms. According to the working document of the Commission, hourly wage costs in manufacturing are 'probably some 13% of those in the Community.' Moreover, it notes that social security expenditure is minimal (3.4 of GNP) compared with the situation in the Community (18.2%) and in Portugal (over 19%).

Further criticism has been made on the trade union rights. Strikes are banned by law in sectors regarded as being of vital importance to the national economy, notably water, gas, electricity, oil, petro chemicals, public transport, fire service, hospitals, schools and banks, which constitute 10% of union members. Strikes are also banned in economic free zones for the first ten years of the operation. If a lawful strike constitutes a threat to public health or national security it can be suspended for sixty days. If not agreement was reached within this period the Higher Arbitration Tribunal can intervene to negotiate and impose an agreement. This arrangement is in conflict with the norms of the International Labour Organization. Even though, the freedom of association, the right of collective bargaining and the right to industrial action are guaranteed by the Constitution of 1982 the limitations imposed by the Constitution itself and by implementing legislation and practice largely deprive these rights of any substance. These are also incompatible with the Community norms and principles of social justice and will be even more difficult for Turkey to adjust its legislation to the Community Acquis Communautaire after the implementation of SEA and the ratification of the social charter, in the field of labour.

107 The Commission's Opinion in Europe Documents op cit p.3.
108 The Turkish Economy: Structure and Development Structure op cit p.46.
109 Ibid p.33.
110 Ibid p.45.
These are then the major structural adjustment problems that stand in the way of Turkey's case for its immediate accession. We can now move on to the political context.

Political Considerations

In another section, the Commission assesses Turkey's political eligibility. The Commission acknowledges that 'Since the military coup in 1980, Turkey has adopted new constitution. The system set up by a series of reforms and on the occasion of, or following various elections, has resulted in a parliamentary democracy closer to Community models.'\textsuperscript{111} Insipite of these positive conclusions, however, the Commission has some reservations concerning the democratic rights of certain sections in Turkish society. The Commission suggests that, insipite of the existence of legislation which contains 'provisions similar to those which prevail within the Community' there is still a need to 'open up the political arena to the whole range of political groups and to the trade unions.' These included Communist and other radical parties, and the prevention of trade unions from political activities in 1987.\textsuperscript{112} More importantly, referring implicitly to the Kurdish question, despite some positive developments in human and minority rights, the Commission concludes that 'these have not reached the level required in a democracy.'\textsuperscript{113} The most important paragraph within the political context concerns the Greek-Turkish dispute. This explicitly confirms that the assessment of Turkey's membership request cannot be made independently from the Cyprus problem, which concerns a member state of the Community, namely Greece.\textsuperscript{114}

\textsuperscript{111} Opinion in Europe Documents \textit{op cit} p.3.
\textsuperscript{112} Ibid
\textsuperscript{113} Ibid
\textsuperscript{114} For a detailed analysis of this aspect see the relevant previous chapter analyzing association relationship within the context of the Greek-Turkish relationship.
The Reactivation Of The Association Framework

As was elaborated in the above section, the Commission was not in favour of the opening of the accession negotiations for full membership with Turkey immediately, on the grounds that it would be premature for Turkey to become a full member as it is structurally 'neither ready or mature enough' to shoulder the difficult obligations arising from full membership, particularly after the introduction of the Single European Act. However, the Commission emphasized that the Community should 'under no circumstances close the door to [Turkey] forever'. The Commission proposed the idea of a periodic review of Turkey's accession, provided that Turkey's political will to join the Community persists. In its general conclusions, the Commission seems to confirm the progressive nature of the relationship between Turkey and the Community within the Association framework. To that end, to facilitate Turkey's modernization process and its development, the Commission proposes to reactivate the Association Framework which, 'without casting doubt on Turkey's eligibility for membership of the Community, would enable both partners to enter now on the road towards increased interdependence and integration in accordance with the objectives of the Agreement.' In other words, the Commission refers to the Association Framework as the relevant context of the relationship, within which both parties must work towards the objective of full membership.

The reaction of the Turkish Government to the Commission's opinion was not positive. Obviously, the conclusions of the Commission did not satisfy the expectations of the Turkish Government. As the Minister who was in charge of relations with the Community expressed, the Commission would produce a 'more concrete report' in which 'the possible start of negotiations would have been fixed'. In the words of Bozer, 'Turkish public opinion deservedly expects from the Community a more positive and more progressive

116 Ibid
117 Commission's Opinion in Europe Documents op cit p.3.
approach.\textsuperscript{118} However, it was accepted with a reserved satisfaction that, at least, the Community recognized Turkey's right to full membership.\textsuperscript{119} On the other hand, Bozer reiterated Turkey's main foreign policy orientation by stressing that Turkey 'will maintain its determination to become a Community member.' In this respect, he welcomed 'a wide ranging cooperation ... extending beyond our current relations with the main objective being the strengthening of [Turkey's] integration with the Community' within the existing Association Framework.\textsuperscript{120} Thus, the relationship between the Community and Turkey has been redefined as a pre-accession process to membership.

**The Reactivation of the Association Framework: Cooperation Package**

Following the presentation of the Commission's opinion on Turkey's accession request, on 5 February 1990, the Council of Ministers approved the opinion of the Commission 'the conditions required for the opening of accession negotiations do not as yet obtain, they nevertheless contain proposals for strengthening the cooperation with Turkey, in the context of the Association Agreement.'\textsuperscript{121} Greece, on the other hand, reiterated its reservation by linking the membership issue to its bilateral problems with Turkey.\textsuperscript{122} In line with the Council's approval, the Commission adopted some measures to reactivate the Association framework.\textsuperscript{123} The main purpose of the proposal was to contribute to the modernization of Turkey's economy and to allow Turkey to 'move as close to the Community' as possible.\textsuperscript{124} The Commission's 'cooperation package' consisted of four areas of interdependence where the cooperation should be strengthened.\textsuperscript{125} These areas of cooperation: achievement of customs union, renewal of financial cooperation, broadened and increased economic cooperation and political dialogue. The Commissioner Matutes added

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{118} *Agence Europe* 20 December 1989.
\item \textsuperscript{119} *Ibid*
\item \textsuperscript{120} *Agence Europe* 20 December 1989 *op cit*
\item \textsuperscript{121} *Agence Europe* 20 January 1990 and 5-6 February 1990.
\item \textsuperscript{122} *Ibid*
\item \textsuperscript{123} Communication on Strengthening Relations with Turkey *Information Memo* Brussels 6 June 1990.
\item \textsuperscript{124} *Agence Europe* 6 June 1990.
\item \textsuperscript{125} Commission of the European Communities 'Matutes Package' SEC (89) 1961.
\end{itemize}
that these measures are 'interdependent and cannot be separated from each other; they represent a whole.' In this context, these cooperation measures were defined as a 'qualitative leap' in the Association Process which aims to 'integrate Turkish economy in Europe's economic and social tissue.'

The most significant and crucial aspect of the reactivation concerns the achievement of the customs union which 'requires considerable effort on Turkey's behalf', since the establishment of the customs union by 1995 will have substantial structural impacts on the Turkish economy. The completion of the customs union regime implies that Turkey will adopt a Common Customs Tariffs, will abolish charges equivalent to customs duties. Provided Turkey meets its commitments, the Community has to lift restrictions imposed in agriculture and textile products.

Moreover, the Commission also proposed industrial and technological cooperation in the field of services, transport, telecommunications, energy, the environment, science and technology, tourism, training, culture and audiovisual media.

Finally, the reactivation of the fourth financial protocol, (600 million ECU) which had been suspended in 1981, was envisaged by the Co-operation package. The final point in the reactivation package concerns the reinforcement of a political dialogue between the Community and Turkey. This will be assessed in the next chapter dealing with Turkey's Association process in the context of European Security.

In the next section we shall evaluate the substantive issue areas arising from the reactivation of the Association process in the light of this cooperation package. This will cover the period from the approval of the package until 1993, in order to show how far the Association progressed.

**Substantive Issues Arising from the Reactivation of the Association Process**

**The Completion of the Customs Union**

126 7 June 1990 Agence Europe.
127 Information Memo 6 June 1990 op cit.
128 Ibid.
The completion of the customs union is instrumental in the attainment of the objectives of the Association Framework. Indeed, its completion is regarded as an 'extremely important step' in the integration of the Turkish economy into the Community.\textsuperscript{129} As we have dealt with in the third chapter, the transitional stage of the Association Agreement, progressing towards a customs union, started in 1973. Accordingly, the Community abolished all customs duties and quantitative restrictions on imports of industrial products (except sensitive products like textile and petrochemical products) from Turkey. In return, Turkey undertook to eliminate its duties on such imports from the Community within 22 years. However, as we saw in the relevant chapter, because of economic problems and structural disparities Turkey has repeatedly invoked the safeguard clause and stopped the implementation of a customs union scheme in 1977. As a result, Turkey has fallen behind the schedule of the customs union.

However, following the application request in 1987 Turkey resumed the programme of tariff cuts in accordance with the Additional Protocol. In fact, as a result of this liberalization policy, in the period between 1983 (the beginning of the structural adjustment) and 1988 the number of products for which an import licence is required was reduced from 1300 in 1983 to 33 in 1988 and then to 17 in 1989.\textsuperscript{130} As the Commission working document on the Turkish economy acknowledged, in 1988 'the unweighted arithmetic average of the effective rates was 25\% as against 20 for the Community (preferential rates). Since January 1989, there have been numerous reductions in erga omnes tariffs, affecting some 11,000 products out of a total of 18,000, and 1821 items have been exempted from duty.'\textsuperscript{131} Moreover, by 1989 the industrial goods from the Community were legally allowed to enter Turkey, below the rate of customs applied in 1971 and were as follows: 40\% for the less sensitive products on which duties should, according to the Protocol, have been abolished by 1985; 30\% for products recognized as more sensitive (the 22 year list) which should by 1989

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{}\textsuperscript{129} Agence Europe 6 June 1990 \textit{op cit}
\bibitem{}\textsuperscript{130} See Commission Report on The Turkish Economy SEC (89) 2290 18 December 1989 \textit{op cit} p.17.
\bibitem{}\textsuperscript{131} \textit{Ibid} p.18.
\end{thebibliography}
have reached 50%. Further steps towards the completion of a customs union regime, from the Turkish side, came in October 1989 as part of the structural adaptation programme. Turkey then adopted a new customs regime which introduced new anti-dumping regulations modelled on the EC ones which had been under study by Turkey since 1986. Inspect of the Commission's negative opinion on Turkey's membership request presented in December 1989, in January 1990, Turkey carried out a further 10 per cent tariff cut on industrial imports from the EC. As a result, the duty on the Community industrial imports were reduced to 40-50 per cent of which Turkey levied on other countries' industrial imports. However, the Commission were still not satisfied with 'the application of substantial quasi duties' in the shape of import surcharges to finance special funds which were still in place. In fact, since these special funds constituted an additional tax, they were in conflict with the provisions of the Additional Protocol.

On the other hand, the Turkish side drew the attention of the Community to some obvious contradictions in the Community's position, regarding Turkey's membership issue, particularly in the area of the customs union. As the Minister Bozer, who was in charge of affairs with the Community argued, that the Commission's opinion contained 'incoherencies and discriminations ... one of the proposals made to us is for customs union, which presupposes a sound economy, and elsewhere it is stated (in the report) that this same economy is not in a position to become integrated with the European Community.' However, despite the Commission's negative opinion on Turkey's membership, Turkish authorities emphasized that they accepted the objectives of a Customs Union regardless of the membership question.
In June 1990, as indicated above, the Commission proposed further specific measures to put the customs union into effect. These included, among other things, the harmonization of Turkey's economic legislation, and of its customs, taxation and competition regulations, so that the customs union can function smoothly.\textsuperscript{138} In the same way, Turkey undertook to eliminate state aid to industry, to guarantee protection of intellectual property and introduce the Common Custom Tariffs with regard to third countries and to accept and apply Community preferential commercial systems.\textsuperscript{139}

On the Community side, given the restrictions imposed on Turkish textile and some agricultural products, the Community, under a 'revived' customs union plan, promised to eliminate quotas on textile products by 1996.\textsuperscript{140} However, restrictions on Turkey's agricultural products were still in place and there is so far no sign of significant progress towards a full customs union in the agricultural field. For Turkey the effects of restrictions (non-tariff barriers) on Agriculture, have been only minimal, because of the recent structural change in its trade patterns in the last decade.\textsuperscript{141} Nevertheless, the Community restrictions are still in breach of the Association Agreement and no progress in this direction has been made to lift these restrictions in 1993.

According to the Commissioner Matutes, the completion of the customs union regime without any internal tariff barriers between Turkey and the Community would be as though Turkey were a member of the Community.\textsuperscript{142} However, it is difficult for Turkey to agree with this statement since the completion of a customs union without the rights and advantages of full membership will put Turkey in a position of second class membership. On the other hand, if the completion of a customs union was taken as a preliminary learning process towards full membership, the achievement of the customs union presents an

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{138} 6 June 1990 \textit{Agence Europe}.
\item \textsuperscript{139} 7 June 1990 \textit{Agence Europe}.
\item \textsuperscript{140} \textit{Financial Times} 7 June 1990.
\item \textsuperscript{141} As it was noted the share of agricultural products in total exports to the EC in the post 1980 period declined from 51.1 per cent to 15.2 per cent while the share of industrial products increased from 41.4 per cent to 82.7 per cent Balkir in Turkey and Europe \textit{op cit} p.119.
\item \textsuperscript{142} \textit{Financial Times} 7 June 1990.
\end{itemize}
important challenge to Turkish political and economic elites, in view of membership. This will also show that they can bear the consequences of the inclusion of the Turkish economy into the customs union area, even before the accession to the Community framework takes place. In this respect, in line with the Commission proposals to establish the customs union regime by 1995, it was noted that the reaction of the Turkish economic and political elite (including the political consensus among political parties, industry and trade unions) were generally positive regardless of aids, guarantees and advantages which stem from full membership.143

Thanks to the normalization of the Association Council meetings, starting from 1991, Turkey and the EC were able to work towards the completion of the Customs Union within the structures of the Association. In November 1992, the Association Council adopted further measures on the completion of the customs union.144 Following the meeting in January 1993 Turkey carried out a further 10 to 20% tariff reductions for imports from the Community, and abolished various special funds. Nevertheless the certain surcharges and transfers to the special funds were still in place, particularly the Housing Funds.145 On the other hand, as the first effects of the customs union measures in automobiles, pharmaceuticals and chemicals sectors were felt, the businessmen who felt threatened by external competition, put pressures on the Government to be exempt from the tariff reductions in certain sectors.146 However, the leading competitive sectors were ready to accept the governmental measures towards the completion of the customs union and already adopted strategies to survive the consequences of a customs union, as the average level of protectionism against the Community industrial goods fell by over one quarter from 21.6 per cent to 15.2 per cent, according to Community calculations.147

143 Agence Europe 7 June 1990 and 8 March 1990 op cit.
145 7 May 1993 Turkey, Financial Times Survey Financial Times Kramer, Heinz 'A fresh Start to an uncertain end'. p.V.
146 Ibid.
147 Protectionism falls' Tonge, David Ibid p.VIII.
Another important development within the Association structures took place in early April 1993 when the representatives of the EC and Turkey, in the Association Committee, decided to set up a Management Committee which is responsible for monitoring and progress towards the customs union. The Management Committee, also called the Customs Union Cooperation Committee, consisted of senior officials from the European Commission and the Turkish Government ministers. Its tasks were: to assess progress towards the customs union; to identify the areas where further action is needed; to ensure the free movement of goods and specify where Turkey must harmonize its legislation; and to adopt the EC's common commercial policy. In this direction, in August 1993 before the Association Council met in October 1993 the Parties agreed on a legislative agenda to bring Turkish commercial and legislation in line with the EC. As the Financial Times observed, this move was 'the final stage on the road to customs union which is seen by Turkey as a step towards full membership.'

Although the different funds (the Support and Price Stabilization Fund, Municipal Dues, Transport and Infra Structure Fund and similar taxes, which were regarded as equivalent to custom duties) were incorporated and reduced to a single tax in January 1993, the Housing Fund is still in place as an important obstacle, in the way of the completion of customs union. During the 37th meeting of the Parliamentary Committee in October 1993, the Vice President of the Commission, Sir Leon Britton specifically referred to the areas where further action is still needed to clear the obstacles to the customs union. Apart from the existence of the Mass Housing Fund, he stated that in the areas such as: business subsidies and competition, state aid, intellectual property rights, and the right of ownership in the industrial sector and the problem of counterfeiting, there is still substantial progress to be made. At the same meeting, the adviser to the Prime Minister's Office, Ali Tigrel

149 Ibid.
150 Financial Times 20 August 1993.
151 Interview with a senior civil servant from the State Planning Organization the Voice of Turkey 28 March 1993.
152 16 October 1993 European Report no.1894.
assured the Community that the necessary steps were being taken in the direction of the customs union, particularly in the area of the harmonization of Turkish legislation, related to patent rights, protection of intellectual property, competition, public purchasing and state aid.\(^{153}\) On the other hand, the Turkish side noted that, restrictive measures against Turkish products were still in place such as non-tariff barriers, anti dumping measures, quotas for textile, steel and iron products, electronic goods as well as counterveiling duties and seasonal restrictions for certain agricultural products.\(^ {154}\) The Turkish side also expressed its reservations about the completion of the customs union with the EC as being a 'difficult and costly business.' Indeed, according to a Turkish estimate, the revenues lost through the removal of customs duties, the Mass Housing Fund, and as a result of the establishment of Common Customs Tariffs will amount to $3.5 billion by 1995. Given Turkey’s 1.7 billion trade deficit with the EC in 1992 (2 billion in 1991) it is also expected that the establishment of the customs union will deteriorate this trade deficit even further, after the customs union is fully in operation.\(^ {155}\)

Despite these misgivings from the Turkish side, as of December 1993, the tax reduction level which Turkey carried out reached 80% for the 12 years list and 70% for 22 years.\(^ {156}\) On the other hand, the consolidation of the Common Customs Tariffs (CCT) reached 60% in the 12 year list and 50% level in the 22 year list. The 40 per cent in the 12 year list and 50% in the 22 year list remain to be completed by the end of 1995. In accordance with the Additional Protocol Turkey also undertook to eliminate the quotas and equivalent factors. Turkey’s obligation in this area was limited to 80 per cent. Nevertheless the Department of

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\(^ {153}\) Ibid.
\(^ {154}\) Ibid Balkir op cit p.121.
\(^ {155}\) Ibid A senior diplomat told me that the cost of the completion of customs union for Turkey might climb up to $5 billion 5 November 1993 London.
\(^ {156}\) See for the recent assessment of the Customs Union with the EC article written by Prof. Gunugur, Haluk who is the board member of Economic Foundation Found in Newsspot A fortnightly Turkish digest published by the Directorate General of Press and Information 16 December 1993 93/25.
Treasury and Foreign Trade decided on 100 per cent liberalization on quotas by the end of 1995 and applied three consolidation rates in January 1989, 1990 and 1991.157

As far as Turkey is concerned, the completion of the customs union is not completely free from problems. Apart from the lack of financial aid and advantages, to compensate for the revenues lost through liberalization under the customs union arrangements, Turkey might also face additional difficulties in certain areas. First of all, the Mass Housing Fund, is still, for Turkey, an effective instrument offering important protection for Turkish industry. Turkey claims that this should be classified as 'a custom duty of fiscal nature'. In fact, despite the opposition from the EC on the grounds that this constitutes an 'equivalent' tax, there are signs that the abolition of the Housing Fund will be implemented by Turkey, in accordance with a separate schedule, by 1998.158

Moreover, given the extremely low customs rates that the EC applies in its external commercial policy, towards the third countries (offers only 6-7 per cent external tariff protection), the full consolidation of a Common Customs Tariff poses an important threat to the Turkish economy. As a result of the Uruguay round negotiations, it is likely that the EC will reduce its CCT rate even further.159 Considering the policy interdependence, or rather Turkey's dependence on the external policies of the EC, it is inevitable that Turkey will be affected by the consequences of these tariff rates that the EC applies to the third countries. However Turkey, as a powerless partner, has no say in the decisions over the external tariff rates while she is in the process of the completion of the customs union with the EC by 1995. In this respect, the application of Common Customs Tariffs seems a very difficult task to achieve in a short period. As the deadline approaches and the effects of the customs union becomes more tangible, the perceptions of economic and political elites may not be as

157 Ibid.
158 Interview with a civil servant from State Planning Organization in Ankara 23 September 1993 and Ibid.
favourable as it has been up until now. Moreover, as the trade deficit widens, Turkey may resort to the safeguard measures of the Association as she had done in the late 1970s.

Re-establishing Financial Cooperation within the Association Context

The reactivation of the Financial cooperation within the Association context constitutes another important issue. The completion of the Customs union is not subject to any veto, and is dependent on the political will and determination of the parties, particularly Turkey. However, the reactivation of financial cooperation is subject to the veto power of member states. Unanimity is essential to implement important financial decisions. Similarly, Greece reiterated its position in the Council meeting of February 1990, when the Commission proposals concerning the renewal of cooperation between Turkey and the EC was discussed. She restated that as long as the Cyprus issue remains unresolved, Greece will oppose the release of the fourth Financial Protocol. The fourth Financial Protocol consisting of 225 million ECU in European Investment Bank loans, 325 million ECU in the form of special loans and 50 million ECU, in the form of grants, had been adopted to cover the period between 1981-1985. However, as a result of the Coup of 1980 this had been suspended. Subsequently, as a result of Greece’s accession to the Community, the Protocol has been subject to Greek veto. Thanks to Greece’s blocking, this Protocol still remains unexecuted. If the periodically arranged financial cooperation mechanisms had worked duly, Turkey would have qualified for a further two four year periods of financial aid. In this case, according to the Turkish estimates, Turkey’s gains would have reached between one and two billion ECUs by 1993.

Financial cooperation is an important mechanism to diminish the asymmetrical vulnerability of the Associated partner, within the balance of rights and obligations of the

160 Agence Europe 8 February 1990.
163 European Report 16 October 1993 no.1894.
Association framework. This is particularly crucial in an association agreement like the one between Turkey and the Community, which envisages the establishment of a customs union and puts the Association country under heavy obligations. For the Associated party to ease the initial effects of the customs union, (trade deficit and revenues lost through the reduction of customs duties) financial aid is an essential compensation. The Community, in fact, has been more generous towards other third countries who established simple cooperation agreements with the EC without any provisions that envisage the establishment of the customs union.\textsuperscript{164} Moreover, as one community official put it, Turkey, at present (in 1993) is 'the only country between the Straits of Gibraltar and the Sea of Japan not to get EC aid.'\textsuperscript{165}

Turkey's determination to complete the customs union does not seem to be affected by the lack of financial support in the Association process. Considering that the amount of financial aid (Fourth Financial Protocol 600 million ECU) within the 'cooperation package' is still financially symbolic.\textsuperscript{166} It is nevertheless politically important to show that the political will of the EC exists to cooperate within the Association process, since the financial assistance within the balance of rights and obligations of the Association Framework is one of the commitments that the EC undertook. On the other hand, it is difficult to suggest that the lack of financial cooperation within the Association framework will still be regarded as negligible, while the effects of the customs union are felt in the economy towards 1995.

\textsuperscript{164} According to the calculations of the deputy Director of the European Community Research Centre in Ankara, for instance, between 1966-1988 Turkey as an associate member received a total 734 million ECU in financial aid, whereas other Mediterranean countries received more. For instance Egypt between 1978 and 1991 891 million ECU, annual average of 69 million. Corresponding figures for Yugoslavia 800 million ECU annually 73 million ECU. The average figure for Turkey in the same period was 30 million, Tore, Nahit \textit{European Access} 1990 (3) June. In 1992 another analyst gives different figures Balkir \textit{op cit} p.129 between 1964 and 1992 Turkey received a total of 827 million ECU with an annual average of 30 million. The percentage share of community to GDP has been 0.10 per cent for Turkey while for the former Yugoslavia and Tunisia, respectively 1.25 per cent and 0.40 per cent. The figure for Portugal is 3.2 per cent while for Greece it is 2.7 per cent.

\textsuperscript{165} \textit{Financial Times} March 1992. It should be also noted, albeit unsubstantial, financial and technical assistance for different projects exists under the Commission's revised Mediterranean policy and cooperation and technical assistance in the areas such as the Medical and Health sector, \textit{Agence Europe} 15 February 1990 \textit{European Report} 28 April 1993 1854.

\textsuperscript{166} In 1992, Turkey received $4 billion financial investment from the individual member states. See The Prime Minister Demirel's Article in \textit{the European} 19-22 November 1992.
The Issues of the Free Movement of Labour

The Commission proposals do not deal with the issue of the free movement of labour, which is seen by the Commission as not being 'an achievement connected with customs union' within the reactivation of the Association process. On the other hand, for Turkey, the free movement of Turkish labour is crucial in two respects. Firstly, given the high unemployment and the rapid growth of the population, the Community is an important labour market for Turkey to export is labour force. Given the economic and demographic indicators, this is likely to continue to be the case in the foreseeable future. Secondly, remittances sent by migrant workers are still an important source of foreign currency to restore the asymmetry in Turkey's rapidly increasing trade deficit with the EC, in view of the completion of the customs union.

Since 1980 no substantial progress has been made within the Association framework regarding the field of the free movement of labour, except some measures to improve the working conditions of Turkish workers working within the Community. Even though the Association framework provided for the progressive establishment of the free movement of workers between Turkey and the EC by 1986, there was no indication that this could be established until recently. Indeed, the European Court of Justice, in its preliminary ruling

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167 Agence Europe 7 June 1990.
168 According to OECD sources 13.5 per cent of the workforce will be jobless in 1994 in Turkey given in The World in 1994 London; The Economist Publications 1993 p.125. In the last five years the Turkish Population increased about 2.17% a year in the light of this it is expected that Turkey will have a population of 67 and 70 million by the year 2000. According to a study by the Institute of the German Employer's Association, Turkey's unemployment could reach between 6.7 and 7.7 million in 2000 and to between 7.2 and 12.5 million in 2015. Another study concludes that in order for Turkey to prevent unemployment increasing further Turkey's GDP is required to increase by an average 8% a year until 2000. According to OECD surveys the average growth rate in recent years has been about 6% and Turkish economy is expected to grow at a much slower rate in the coming years. For all this information and sources, Honekopp, Elmar The Effects of Turkish Accession to the EC on Population and the Labour Market Intereconomics March/April 1993 p.70 and Commission of the European Communities SEC (89) 2290 Final 18 December 1989 op cit pp.39-40.
169 In 1992 The remittances of Turkish workers amounted to $3 billion while Turkey's trade deficit with the Community stood at $1.7 billion. Undersecretariat of Treasury and Foreign Trade Main Indicators May 1993, pp.56-63.
with regard to the right of the free movement of Turkish workers, laid the legal ground that the free movement issue is more of a political programme than a detailed legal technical commitment under the Association framework. In the end, the issue was left to the Association structures to determine.171 On the other hand, the Community, as a result of its own high unemployment, and in view of the influx of asylum seekers and economic immigration, started to consolidate its external barriers against further immigration. As a result of the Single European Act and Intergovernmental Conferences, it seems highly likely that the internal borders will be eliminated to facilitate the free movement of people within the Community, whilst the external borders will be consolidated against further immigration.172 However, the right of free movement within the Community is not applicable under EC law to Turkish nations, who wish to immigrate to or who are already in the Community.173 Their legal position is covered by the law of each member state. Broadly speaking, since the 1970s, all Community members have gradually introduced extremely restrictive immigration policies for non-community nations, including Turkish people. Since the introduction of the Single European Act, the EC immigration policy has become even more restrictive and 'fortress Europe' has become one of the characteristics of the EC's recent political tendencies in the immigration sector.174 As a result of the introduction of restrictive immigration policies since the mid-1970s, the emigration of Turkish workers to the Community came to a virtual halt in the beginning of the 1980s, nevertheless the emigration from Turkey to Germany continued to increase due to the family reunification schemes in the 1980s.175

171 See Supra.
175 Kadioglu 'International Labour Migration' in Balkir 1993 op cit pp.144, 145. Despite the restrictions, the Turkish populations in Germany increased from 1,028 in 1974 to 1,581,000 in 1982 and by 1990 the figure was over 1.6 million Ardagh, John Germany and the Germans Penguin: London 1991 p.276.
Despite the pressures coming from the Turkish Government within the Association structures, to export its labour, there is no evidence to suggest that the right to free movement of Turkish people will be established between Turkey and the EC in the short or medium term. The EC may impose further restrictions on the movement of Turkish workers from Turkey. However in the long term the demographic trends in Europe suggest that there is an observable decline in the number of the active population within the Community, as the proportion and cost of pensioners increases rapidly. The demographic patterns in Turkey indicate the opposite trends. According to a recent article written by an analyst who works in the Institute for Employment Research in Germany, this decline of an active young population has negative implications for the economy of the EC, such as: the loss of active consumers; the growth of social expenditure; the productivity; economic growth; the pensionable age. Given this trend, the EC, in the long term, is expected to be in need of an additional working population. For the time being, however, as a result of the collapse of the Cold War borders, the need for young and active workers seems to be satisfied by the immigration from Eastern Europe to the Community labour market. This seems to fulfil the level of immigration which is required, particularly in Germany. This implies that even on the assumption that the accession negotiations are opened with Turkey in the foreseeable future, there is almost no prospect of the free movement of Turkish labour between Turkey and the Community in the short and the medium term. Furthermore, the same research suggests that in the first decade of the next century, a controlled immigration of Turkish workers would be 'conceivable'. What is more, given the same demographic trends, the effects of the population decline might be felt further throughout the Community in the

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176 The rise in the ratio of pensioners to those working age is 'significant'. In 1950 the 'dependency ratio' in European countries was under 20%. By 2040, given present trends it is suggested that it will climb to 30% The Economist 16 November 1991 p.90.
177 Children under 15 years of age constitute 37% of the Turkish population whereas this figure for the EC is 18%. On the other hand in Turkey only 4% of the population is older than 64 years of age whereas the figure for the EC is 14%. Intereconomics op cit p.70; see also The Commission Report SEC (89) 2290 Final 18 December 1989 op cit p.39 p.70.
178 Honekopp, Intereconomics 1993 op cit p.70.
179 Ibid p.72, 73.
second decade of the next century. It would then be possible to grant the right of free movement for Turkish workers.\textsuperscript{180}

As far as Turkey is concerned, for the time being, the issue at stake is not the establishment of free movement between Turkey and the Community, but the political and social rights of the Turkish people who already live and intend to stay in the Community. Thus the condition of the Turkish communities within the EC is likely to be at the top of the agenda in negotiations between the EC and Turkey within the Association process in the coming years. At present, the largest group of Turkish migrants live in Germany. According to recent surveys in 1993 1.8 million of Turkish workers (with their families) live in Germany and 83 per cent of them are there to stay, although under the German law they are still regarded as 'gastarbeiter'\textsuperscript{181} (guestworkers) after three generations have lived there.\textsuperscript{181} What is more, the Turkish workers are not anymore mere industrial workers but also self-employed business people who have created 125,000 jobs and contribute 9 per cent to the German GNP and pay 7 per cent of the German total tax revenue. On the other hand, while they contribute 8 per cent to the pension funds, they only benefit 2.5 per cent because of their low average age. According to Schmalz-Jacobsen, Germany benefits more from Turkish migrants and 'yet [Turks] have no rights'.\textsuperscript{182} Turkish people have no political and civil rights and cannot enjoy the full legal membership of the German state since, under the German law, naturalization is an extremely difficult and complicated process. Descent 'by blood' rather than 'by birth' determines who is German.\textsuperscript{183} Furthermore, as a result of the collapse of the Cold war, the recent reunification of Germany and the influx of ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe, rendered the political and civil rights of Turkish people even worse. For instance, a newly arrived immigrant of German origin born outside Germany has instant access to social

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and political rights. On the other hand, the second and third generation Turkish migrants who were born and lived in Germany for the last thirty years are still deprived of their political and civil rights. According to the commissioner Schmalz Jacobsen, one quarter of the children of immigrants under the age of 18 of which two-thirds were born in Germany are still 'youths without a German passport'. Only 0.75 per cent of Turkish migrants have been naturalized because of the strict naturalization laws of Germany. Moreover, Turkish people constantly live under the threat of expulsion since even a residence permit is extremely difficult to obtain and can only be secured as a result of naturalization.

To conclude; it is likely that the social and political conditions of Turkish communities within the European Community will be the main issue of salience that affect the relations between Turkey and the EC in the coming years. There are a large number of Turkish communities living within the EC who are taxpayers and members of their democratic societies, but who are excluded from the decision-making processes, not only at the local level but also at the EC level. The frustrations of Turkish communities living in the EC, particularly in Germany, were recently voiced on the face of increasing xenophobia and racism and discrimination in Europe. Full legal membership of the EC is the only way to protect them from increasing racism and discrimination within Europe, otherwise we may witness, this time on a larger scale, a repeat of the riots by the Turkish communities which occurred in 1993, and were a response to the Neo-Nazi attacks on their lives. Discrimination and racism may create large alienated Turkish minorities in many European countries, particularly in Germany. The focus of attention for Turkey and the EC now is to be how to integrate them into the Community framework, in order to prevent them from being

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185 Interview in The Guardian 2 March 1993 op cit.
186 Ratzhel op cit p.33 Philips op cit pp.22-23.
187 Ratzhel Ibid See also Ardagh op cit p.288.
188 The Guardian 3 and 4 June 1993; The Guardian supplement 11 June 1993 p.14; The European 17-20 June on the rise in European Racism; the assessment of immigration crisis in Financial Times 3 June 1993 and The Independent 6 June 1993 'citizens of the thirteenth century.'
outsiders within the Community. In this sense the membership of the European Community through the full legal membership of the State within which they live, seems to be the only solution.

Conclusions

The application of Turkey for full membership in 1987 was the result of a culminating consensus among political and economic elites, who came to see that their interests can be better served within the Community framework as a full member, rather than within the Association Framework. In this sense, the application for full membership differed from the application for the Association, which was treated as a foreign policy matter and mainly initiated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Even though the political motivations of 'Europeanization' were present, as an element of continuity, the application was mainly encouraged by interest oriented economic elites. Economic considerations were predominant. In general, the application was the result of general discontent with the Association relationship, that had failed in the management of interdependence.

The Commission's Opinion was produced whilst the Community itself was undergoing a further deepening process, since the introduction of the Single European Act. The Commission provided the data on which the assessment of Turkey's full membership could be based. It concluded that Turkey was not yet ready for full membership, in view of the increased rights and obligations demanded by Community membership in the post-Single European Act period. First of all, Turkey's membership would provide Turkey with the right and the advantages of full membership, for the Community this was seen as too high a price to pay. Secondly, Turkey is structurally not mature enough to fulfil the obligations of full membership.

In the light of these considerations, the Community, without casting any doubts on Turkey's right to membership, redefined the existing Association process as the progressive pattern of cooperation that will result in 'increased interdependence and integration' and eventual full membership. This was a significant development, since the Association had lost
its progressive qualities in the late 1970s and in the 1980s and been reduced to a simple cooperation agreement. The application put it on its original legal and political footing as a progressive sui generis political link between the EC and Turkey leading to full membership. To that end, the Community proposed a series of measures, to reactivate the progressive mechanisms of the Association framework.

Inspite of the lack of financial cooperation and the still suspended right of free movement of workers between the Community and Turkey, it is still difficult for Turkey to maintain a symmetrical condition of interdependence within the balance of the rights and obligations of the Association Framework.

However, despite the lack of advantages and rights and guarantees of full membership, to compensate for the obligations and commitments arising from this special Association relationship, the determination and political will to complete the customs union among the elites is still in place. Moreover, the completion of the customs union is a crucial yardstick against which we can measure the success of the Association, as seen by the economic and political elites, for the fulfilment of the pre-accession period before the integration process starts with the EC. It is also important to show that Turkey can bear the consequences of full membership in the customs union area even before the accession takes place. However, this assessment can only be made when the deadline expires at the end of 1995.
<table>
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<td>11.3</td>
<td>35.1</td>
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<td>-31.2</td>
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<td>13.7</td>
<td>21.9</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>Iran</td>
<td>4.6</td>
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<td>-18.0</td>
<td>-82.5</td>
<td>328.5</td>
<td>-30.4</td>
<td>-82.9</td>
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<td>6.4</td>
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<td>-47.7</td>
<td>-22.0</td>
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<td>20.5</td>
<td>-32.5</td>
<td>50.1</td>
<td>24.9</td>
<td>-6.3</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>-42.5</td>
<td>70.9</td>
<td>4.3</td>
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<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.8</td>
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<td>-64.1</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>105.0</td>
<td>-19.5</td>
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<td>Libya</td>
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<td>-4.0</td>
<td>-53.0</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>-74.1</td>
<td>221.4</td>
<td>1.9</td>
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<td>-58.5</td>
<td>130.0</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>54.6</td>
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<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
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<td>1.6</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>-32.0</td>
<td>-4.5</td>
<td>36.8</td>
<td>70.8</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>-17.0</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>-21.0</td>
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<td>8.7</td>
<td>51.9</td>
<td>67.7</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>148.6</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>148.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>-2.1</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>0.6</td>
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<td>11.6</td>
<td>-6.3</td>
<td>36.7</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>-2.1</td>
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</table>

Table 5.2

TURKISH EMIGRATION

A. Emigration of Turkish Workers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>790,289</td>
<td>125,257</td>
<td>206,426</td>
<td>46,353</td>
<td>35,608</td>
<td>40,807</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of which EEC</td>
<td>733,063</td>
<td>22,750</td>
<td>490</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of which Germany</td>
<td>648,029</td>
<td>9,412</td>
<td>409</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

B. Turkish migrants living abroad (workers in brackets)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>End 1980</th>
<th>End May 1984</th>
<th>End April 1987</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL workers</td>
<td>2,023,102</td>
<td>2,404,031</td>
<td>2,347,807</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of which EEC</td>
<td>1,765,788</td>
<td>1,760,626</td>
<td>1,946,677</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of which Germany</td>
<td>1,462,400</td>
<td>1,552,328</td>
<td>1,481,369</td>
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<tr>
<td>workers</td>
<td>888,290</td>
<td>1,015,544</td>
<td>1,058,014</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>711,671</td>
<td>706,726</td>
<td>814,015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>590,623</td>
<td>542,512</td>
<td>609,515</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 5.3**

### Table A

**PRODUCTIVITY (GDP per head of civilian employment) (ECU 1985)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Agriculture</th>
<th>Industry</th>
<th>Services</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Index</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EUR 12</td>
<td>13,943</td>
<td>30,824</td>
<td>27,063</td>
<td>27,397</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>7,635</td>
<td>12,427</td>
<td>14,390</td>
<td>11,887</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>7,345</td>
<td>23,175</td>
<td>23,669</td>
<td>16,271</td>
<td>59</td>
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<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>2,452</td>
<td>7,377</td>
<td>8,634</td>
<td>6,660</td>
<td>24</td>
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<td>TURKEY</td>
<td>1,393</td>
<td>9,506</td>
<td>8,577</td>
<td>4,574</td>
<td>17</td>
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### Table B

**SECTORAL BREAKDOWN OF CIVILIAN EMPLOYMENT**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries</th>
<th>Industry (including construction)</th>
<th>Services (including tourism)</th>
<th>Total (Millions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EUR 12</td>
<td>8,6%</td>
<td>23,8%</td>
<td>57,6%</td>
<td>121,0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>28,9%</td>
<td>27,4%</td>
<td>43,7%</td>
<td>3,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>16,9%</td>
<td>32,1%</td>
<td>50,9%</td>
<td>10,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>23,9%</td>
<td>33,9%</td>
<td>42,2%</td>
<td>4,1</td>
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<tr>
<td>TURKEY</td>
<td>57,4%</td>
<td>17,4%</td>
<td>25,2%</td>
<td>15,2</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

* Source: Data based on the own calculations of the Commission of The European Communities, in 'The Turkish Economy: Structure and Developments' Brussels, 18 December 1989, p.66

### Table C

**SECTORAL BREAKDOWN OF GDP (1985)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Agriculture</th>
<th>Industry</th>
<th>Services</th>
<th>Total ECU Billion</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EUR 12</td>
<td>2,9%</td>
<td>38,6%</td>
<td>58,5%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>17,1%</td>
<td>29,3%</td>
<td>53,6%</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>6,0%</td>
<td>35,9%</td>
<td>58,1%</td>
<td>216</td>
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<td>Portugal</td>
<td>7,7%</td>
<td>36,7%</td>
<td>55,6%</td>
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<tr>
<td>TURKEY</td>
<td>17,9%</td>
<td>36,2%</td>
<td>45,9%</td>
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### Table D

#### GDP PER HEAD (1985)

<table>
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<th>GDP PER HEAD</th>
<th>Purchasing power parties</th>
<th>Current prices</th>
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<td>ECU</td>
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<td>EUR 12</td>
<td>12,568</td>
<td>10,340</td>
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<td>7,019 (5.9)</td>
<td>4,389 (42.5)</td>
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<td>Spain</td>
<td>9,089 (7.23)</td>
<td>5,612 (54.3)</td>
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<td>Portugal</td>
<td>6,689 (5.3)</td>
<td>2,658 (25.7)</td>
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<td>TURKEY</td>
<td>4,311 (3.43)</td>
<td>1,404 (13.6)</td>
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### Table E

#### Indicators Of Standard Of Living (1985)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GDP PER HEAD</th>
<th>Private Cars</th>
<th>Telephones</th>
<th>T.V. sets</th>
<th>Doctors</th>
<th>Hospital beds</th>
<th>Life expectancy</th>
<th>Infant mortality</th>
<th>Consumption of electricity</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Per 1000 Inhabitants</td>
<td>Years</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>KWH/year</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUR 12</td>
<td>327 (a)</td>
<td>466 (b)</td>
<td>333 (b)</td>
<td>2.5 (a)</td>
<td>8.9 (a)</td>
<td>75 (a)</td>
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<td>127</td>
<td>375</td>
<td>272</td>
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<td>5.8 (a)</td>
<td>72 (c)</td>
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<td>240</td>
<td>375</td>
<td>258</td>
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<td>6.2 (a)</td>
<td>73 (c)</td>
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<td>159 (a)</td>
<td>169 (b)</td>
<td>151</td>
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<td>69 (c)</td>
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(a) 1984
(b) 1983
(c) 1980/1985

Sources: Eurostat, *Review 1976-1985* (Series 1 A)
Eurostat, *Regions, Statistical Yearbook*, 1987 (series 1 A)
SIS, *Statistical Yearbook of Turkey 1987*
State Planning Organization SPO
Official Gazette, Government Programme, 1988
SIS, *Turkey in Figures*, 1986
Chapter VI

ASSOCIATION IN THE CONTEXT OF THE POST-COLD WAR EUROPEAN SECURITY

In this chapter, we shall place Turkey's Association link in the context of European security. The assessment of the security aspect of the Association relationship is not an arbitrary research exercise. As we have shown in the second chapter security concerns were predominant in the formation of an association link between the EC and Turkey. Moreover, Turkey's NATO membership was an important motivation behind Turkey's application for full membership of the EC. In this chapter, in the first place, we shall assess the political significance of NATO and its systemic effects on Turkey's foreign and defence policies in relation to the Western European integration project. We shall address the question of what the significance of Turkey's NATO membership is and its relevance to European integration project, and how this was used by Turkey under Cold War circumstances. Secondly, we shall re-evaluate Turkey's Association relationship within European security structures in view of new conceptual perspectives that are emerging in the post-Cold War European security environment. The key question of this chapter is whether the collapse of the Cold War rendered Turkey's security assets obsolete under changing circumstances. This will be re-evaluated throughout the chapter from the perspective of emerging pluralistic security considerations within broader structural dynamics in Europe. Finally, the structural effects of the Post-Cold War dynamics on Turkey's Association pattern will be assessed within the emerging new European security system.

Background Characteristics and Motivations: Turkey's NATO Membership and the Western European Integration Project

Turkey applied for full membership of the EC under the Cold War circumstances. As indicated in the previous chapter, its NATO membership was an important motivation in its application for full membership. Even though strictly military issues were kept outside the jurisdiction of the EC, in 1987 a preliminary Commission paper on Turkey's application request emphasized that 'military defence is not a matter for the European Community, but
the NATO context cannot be ignored by Western Europe.' The same Report also stated that
the NATO membership was Turkey's 'ace' in the evaluation of Turkey's membership
request.\(^1\) Despite the fact that the EC was until recently mainly an economic organization,
the strategic importance of Turkey has always been a point of reference in the relationship
between the EC and Turkey in the past.\(^2\) Given the political significance of Turkey's NATO
membership, it was only normal for Turkish decision-makers to use this 'indispensable' Cold
War security asset as a bargaining chip in its advance to European integration. Indeed, in
1989, the Prime Minister Ozal stated that Turkey has been a part of NATO and therefore
involved in the defence of Europe 'We expect some reciprocity'. Having referred Turkey's
membership request to the EC Ozal continued to emphasize that if the EC was to refuse
Turkey there would be 'some effect' on relations with NATO.\(^3\)

It is important to assess briefly the historical ideological and strategic basis of
Turkey's NATO membership, in the course of the Cold War, in order to understand the
significance of this organization in Turkey's Foreign policy in relation to the European
integration project.

Between 1948-1951, Turkey made great efforts and constant demarches to become a
NATO member.\(^4\) In the beginning, Turkey's geographic position was regarded as 'outside' of
the Atlantic area. Thus a different role within different regional arrangements was
envisaged. The members of NATO feared that in case of war, any involvement in a remote
area would be risky. Britain, for instance contemplated a different strategic role for Turkey
within a Middle Eastern Pact. Another suggestion was an association status for Turkey. But
Turkey refused to accept any substitute for full membership. In fact, the achievement of
NATO membership was seen as the most important foreign policy issue in the immediate

\(^1\) Commission of the European Communities, Background Report ISEC/B9/87, 4 June
1987.
\(^2\) Cremasco, Maurizio, The Strategic Importance of Relations between Turkey and the
\(^3\) The Independent 28 January 1989.
\(^4\) See Ambassador Bilge, Suat 'Turkey's long quest for security ends with first
enlargement of the Alliance' NATO Review No.3-4, 1983, pp.36-41.

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Post War Turkish policy. The developments in the early 1950s created a favourable international environment for Turkey to be accepted as a NATO member. First of all, the acquisition of nuclear weapons by the Soviet Union rendered Turkey's geopolitical position and conventional forces an important strategic factor in the balance of power between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.\textsuperscript{5} Another contributing factor was the Korean War in the Far East. After an invitation by the United Nations Security Council, Turkey sent a brigade to Korea to join the collective security forces of the Atlantic Alliance. The Korean crisis was an important opportunity for Turkey to demonstrate its military strength and to influence to NATO members in its attempt to achieve NATO membership.\textsuperscript{6}

Subsequently the objections to Turkey's NATO membership was withdrawn and Turkey along with Greece was invited to join NATO in the Ottawa Meeting of NATO in 1951. Both countries were admitted to NATO in 1952. Accordingly, the modification and extension of NATO's geographical area and jurisdiction were required.\textsuperscript{7} Turkey's accession to NATO was regarded as the most momentous and successful achievement in the immediate post-war Turkish foreign policy. Turkey's admission to NATO marked a logical end to the formation of post war regional and global security arrangements and declared that Turkey ideologically and politically became part and parcel of the Western European political community of states. Following its admission to NATO, Turkey's Post War fate was closely linked with the political and military security of the Western Europe within the framework of Atlantic Security Alliance.\textsuperscript{8}

In the post war history of Europe Turkey's strategic role within the NATO framework has been evaluated basically in relation to the perceived Soviet threat, on the basis of a global strategic balance between the Soviet led Warsaw Pact and the American led

\textsuperscript{6} Ibid.
Atlantic Alliance. Because of its geopolitical location, Turkey was perceived as a crucial ally of the Western Europe in the defence of Western European security interests. Turkey's strategic role within NATO was enhanced and assessed by two important geopolitical factors. First of all, Turkey could check the Soviet naval access to the Eastern Mediterranean since it controlled the strategically important Straits connecting the Black Sea to the Eastern Mediterranean. The Mediterranean has always been an important transportation and communication line for Europe. The second aspect of Turkey's strategic significance was related to its strategic position in relation in the Middle East. Within NATO military and political framework, Turkey acted as a barrier against the extension of the Soviet political and economic interest to the Middle East. Given that the Middle East has been the main oil resource for the oil importing Western Europe, the political stability of the region was vital for European security in economic and political terms. The significance of this strategic aspect was particularly enhanced after the series of Middle East crisis of 1980s.

Since its admission to NATO in the course of the Cold War, Turkey's defence structures were gradually incorporated into NATO's integrated military structures.
Despite the fact that Turkey has the lowest per capita income in the NATO Alliance Turkey's burden sharing in the defence of NATO since its admission has been one of the highest among the members of NATO.\textsuperscript{13}

Apart from its contribution to the military structures at conventional force level, Turkey also allowed the presence of intelligence gathering and monitoring facilities an early warning stations of NATO within its territory, that enabled NATO to collect and monitor unique and important data during the crucial times of the Cold War.\textsuperscript{14} More importantly, in conformity with NATO nuclear planning, Turkey also allowed the deployment of nuclear forces and missiles in its territory since the introduction of nuclear doctrines to the NATO framework.\textsuperscript{15} Accordingly, Turkey was also incorporated into the permanent nuclear planning and policy-making bodies.\textsuperscript{16} Turkey's role in nuclear planning became even more significant after the adoption of 'flexible response' nuclear strategy, which was necessitated after the Soviet Union achieved a technological capacity to deliver strategic nuclear weapons to other parts of the World. Turkey's role in this strategic equation, as a country which shared common borders with the Soviet Union, was enhanced by the introduction of this 'flexible response' nuclear doctrine which required the gradual engagement of conventional, tactical and strategic nuclear forces to deter the Soviet Union at escalating levels of aggression, including escalation from conventional war to tactical and finally strategic

\textsuperscript{13} As a percentage of GDP Turkey spent average 4.5 per cent between 1985 and 1989 see the statistical Table on the Defence expenditures of NATO members on constant prices in The North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Facts and Figures \textit{op cit} p.457. According to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Turkey devoted 22.41 per cent on defence expenditures out of the national budget. Moreover the net aggregate increase in defence spending for the period 1983-1987 was 6 per cent and defence expenditures were estimated to increase in net volume by an annual average of 3.5.

\textsuperscript{14} \textit{South} March 1986, pp.91-92.

\textsuperscript{15} For instance, in 1957, for the first time, the Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (Thor and Jupiter) were deployed to Turkish territory in accordance with Nato's Massive Retaliation Strategy. The NATO Facts and Figures \textit{op cit} p.216.

\textsuperscript{16} These are the Defence Planning Committee DPC which consists of representatives of the member countries which participate in Nato's integrated defence and The Nuclear Defence Affairs Committee, open to all members and a smaller Nuclear Planning Group seven countries, since the inception of these bodies in 1966 Turkey participated in the planning meetings and held one of the rotating seats in the Nuclear Planning Group, \textit{Ibid.} p.70.
nuclear engagement under political control. For instance, in 1985, not long before the demise of the Cold War, the number of nuclear weapons which Turkey allowed in its territory reached 489. By allowing NATO's nuclear forces within its territory under NATO's 'flexible response' strategy, the territorial sovereignty of Turkey inevitably came under a potential Soviet pre-emptive strike. Thus the enhancement of Turkey's national security and the maximization of its external sovereignty within NATO was not without any potential risks.

In the Cold War period, NATO was perceived by the majority of Turkish elites as an essential element in the preservation of its sovereignty, against the Soviet ideological and military threat and in the promotion of Europeanization and the core ideological values of the Turkish Republic. It should be noted that NATO was not purely a defence pact but also has been, in the course of the Cold War, an important agent of 'Western ideology' in the division of Europe. In this sense, for Turkey, NATO acted as an important 'political' agent as well as a military organization. Therefore it is difficult to underestimate NATO's political role in the formation of Turkey's post-war foreign policy. As a Turkish foreign policy analyst put it NATO has not only been an effective instrument for Turkey's security but also an important step 'that would accelerate her Europeanization process and link her fate with those of the great democracies of the West.' As far as Turkish foreign policy is concerned, NATO was perceived as an important political organization within which Turkey deepened and asserted its European identity on the basis of its Europeanization ideology. As one American scholar who was a student of Post war Turkish foreign policy observed:

'NATO membership allowed for a continuous and spontaneous exchange of views between Turkey and her collective allies. The value of such diplomatic contact in political, economic and cultural relations is inestimable; more than

17 Ibid p.218.
20 Tashan, Seyfi 'Turkey and the Atlantic Alliance' NATO Review No.5 October 1977, p.19.
anything else it has enabled Turkey to establish herself as a 'European' power.\footnote{Vali, Ferenc A. Bridge Across the Bosphorus Baltimore and London: John Hopkins Press, 1971, pp.124-125.}

In the same way, in the eyes of political as well as military elites, NATO membership contributed to Turkey's sense of belonging to the western European community of states.

Considering that the conduct of NATO affairs involved the integration of National defence bureaucracies into this organizations' international defence structures, interactions within the NATO framework naturally created European minded Turkish transgovernmental political and bureaucratic elites and networks.\footnote{For instance, Turkey presided over the North Atlantic Council two terms between 1961-1962 and between 1977-1978 between 1952 and 1989 appointed 10 permanent representatives in the Council. The posts were also held by Turkish international civil servants in the principal official positions such as deputy secretariat general 1969-1971 and scientific affairs 1973-1979 in addition to its international staff in NATO. Moreover, between 1952 and 1989 two meetings of North Atlantic Council at the ministerial level and three Nuclear Planning Group meetings were held in Turkey pp.557-561. NATIO Information.}

Moreover, NATO's decision-making, as an intergovernmental decision-making style, is important in the coordination of the defence policies of the member states. In the course of the Cold War, this also played an important role in the Europeanization of Turkey's national defence and foreign policy within the Atlantic framework.

Given the political significance of NATO in Turkey's post war foreign policy, which was defined in the light of the condition of ideological, military and political interdependence between Western Europe and Turkey, the application for full membership was not surprising but the culmination of 'the growing tendency in Turkey to view its membership to the EC and its contribution to the defence of Western Europe as two complementary and interdependent dimensions.'\footnote{Karaosmanoglu, Ali L 'European Security and Turkey in a Changing Strategic Environment' Yearbook 1989 Special Issue: South Eastern Europe Athens 1990 Hellenic Foundation for Defence and Foreign Policy: Athens 1990.} Thus, it was normal that in the eyes of Turkish foreign policy makers, the membership of NATO cannot be divorced from the membership of the EC. As the Minister of Foreign Affairs stated before the application 'Turkey's relationship with the West in general and with Western Europe in particular should be considered in a broader
perspective. Turkey cannot be regarded as merely an out pot of NATO. It should also take its place in the economic and political integration of Europe. In other words, in the eyes of Turkish political elite, the EC was perceived as 'the economic arm of the Western Alliance.' Thus, the bid to join the EC was justified on the grounds that 'If Turkey is good enough to defend Europeans on the battlefield ... It is good enough to be in their club. 

To conclude this section on the political relevance of Turkey's NATO membership to its application for full membership of the EC, it is fair to say that Turkey's strategic importance mainly stemmed from the security interdependence against the Soviet threat under the Cold War circumstances. Therefore, as far as the Western European Security is concerned, Turkey's strategic asset was indispensable as long as the Soviet threat existed. However, the collapse of the Cold War order, soon after Turkey's application for full membership of the EC in the beginning of 1990s, presented a completely different set of problems that rendered the analysis of European security based on the Cold-War assumptions obsolete. Therefore a new conceptual framework for the analysis of European security is necessary, to re-evaluate Turkey's security assets and liabilities in the post-Cold War Europe so that we can answer the question of whether the recent developments have diminished the strategic value of Turkey for European security. The key question throughout this chapter: How is Turkey's security role, if any, going to be redefined in the light of new systemic changes that take place at the Pan European level?

II. Organizational Dynamics and New Challenges in the Post Cold War Europe

In the beginning of the 1990s three unprecedented events fundamentally changed the political map of Europe. These were: the reunification of Germany; the liberalization of Eastern Europe from the Soviet influence; and the eventual collapse and disintegration of the then Soviet Union itself as a result of the policies of restructuring and the openness of

24 Minister of Foreign Affairs Halefoglu, Halif NATO Review No.1 February 1986, p.6.
Moreover, the ideological and military competition between the Eastern Bloc and the Atlantic Alliance has ceased. The bipolar-system of the Cold War which was mainly determined and dominated by two Superpowers and two main ideologies has come to an end.

The sudden collapse of the Cold War system created an environment which is not only conducive to new potential patterns of conflict and challenges to security but also offered new possibilities for cooperation in a Pan-European context. This sudden change may be best described as a 'paradigm shift' - the moment a theory which has served well in the past is no longer seen to fit the facts. In fact, the collapse of the Cold War freed us from the conceptual jails of the Cold War discourse, but at the same time left us with uncertainties about the future organization of Europe. While we are in the middle of the rough sea of systemic changes in Europe, we are still in need of conceptual tools and preliminary assumptions in order to understand the new dynamics of European security. In our case we are particularly interested in the effects of these systemic changes on Turkey's Association process and post-Cold War security policies. Given that the security aspect was an important function of the relationship between Turkey and the EC, the question of how these changes will affect Turkey's relationship with Europe in general and with the EC in particular is a pertinent one, particularly with regard to the future of the Association relationship.

While the rigid Cold War divisions in the European Continent fade away what we witness at the moment is the shrinking of European political and economic space. This implies that Europe gradually becomes more interdependent not only at military issues but

26 See Financial Times Survey 'The Soviet Union' 12 March 1990 and papers published by International Landscape, Adelphi Papers no. 235; 236; 237. Also Financial Times 24 January 1990 Eastern Europe in Ferment; also De Neves, Renee The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe; The end of an era Adelphi Papers March 1990 no.249.
29 See Buzan, Barry The European Security Order Recast London: Pinter Publishes 1990 especially the first chapter.
also in economic, political environmental and social issues. The military issues of the Cold War, such as the nuclear and conventional balance between the Eastern Bloc (the Warsaw Pact) and the Western Bloc (NATO) and the military and nuclear strategies, intentions and capabilities between the rival ideological camps became irrelevant issues in the conceptualization of European security. Political and economic issues are gradually being linked. The distinctions between domestic and international European politics are gradually blurred. Moreover, Pan-Europe becomes a new focus of identity within which different collective identities, at different levels of society (from individual to state level) manifest themselves within different European structures and institutions. In other words it is possible to suggest that an overall process of Europeanization is at work.

Although new issues which dominate the agenda are multidimensional and pluralistic in their nature the old issue of military security remains on the new security agenda of Europe. As a result of the breakdown of the old post-Cold War order and the disintegration of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, the military conflict at the interstate and societal level between and within newly independent national states, poses an important threat to the stability of Europe. The revival of new hyper-nationalisms create an environment that is more conducive to inter-state conflict, particularly among newly independent national states who are still at their early stages in their nation and state

32 Kelstrup, Morten The Process of Europeanization. On the Theoretical Interpretation of Present Changes in the European Regional Political System Cooperation and Conflict XXV, 1990, pp.21-40; Recently, for instance, Europeanization was described as: the development of a European defence identity within NATO; the development of an independent Europe as a third force; the growing importance of all European cooperation, i.e. formation of identities at the state level through intergovernmental organizations; the re-emergence of a European security complex; the formation of a quasi-state European Union, connecting that to the process of European integration; also the development of European identity at the individual level, i.e. people seeing themselves as Europeans within a nation inventing project. See Kelstrup, M. and Wæver, Ole Europe and its Nations: Political and Cultural Identities in Waever op cit 1993 pp.62-92.
34 See Griffiths, Stephen Iwan, Nationalism in Central and South-Eastern Europe in McInnes 1992 op cit 59-81.
building processes, particularly on the periphery of Europe.\textsuperscript{35} Another threat arises from the spread of means of violence. As a result of the disintegration of the Soviet Union, some ex-Soviet states were left with nuclear weapons in their possession. The horizontal spread of the weapons of mass destruction towards other third countries, constitute another important threat to the instability of Europe. One of the most important security issues in the post-Cold War era also seems to be the integration of Russia into the political and economic framework. Indeed, the externalization of internal political and economic crisis of this country poses an important potential threat to all European security. The likelihood of a hyper-nationalist government and economic and societal breakdown in Russia has serious repercussions for the security of Europe. Russia remains and important military power which is in possession of nuclear weapons with a strong military presence. Finally, the new military threats from extra-regional sources are still in place, particularly the Middle East remains as one of the main sources of instability for European security.\textsuperscript{36}

The second issue is the increasing economic gap between the core and periphery Europe. While the questions of economic and political stability of Europe are being gradually interconnected, states are no longer contained within ideological, economic and political camps between Western and Eastern blocs, but are exposed to competition under pluralistic economic and political conditions. In this context, for Europe, the management of scarce resources between the core and the periphery emerges as an important issue. The relatively poor countries of Europe still lack technology, capital and know-how in order to sustain their development and to compete with the core industrial countries of Europe. On the other hand the gradual democratization of their internal structures is likely to enhance the material expectations of their populations.\textsuperscript{37} In this respect, the prospect of an increasing economic

\textsuperscript{35} Wiberg, Hakan Societal Security and the explosion of Yugoslavia Chapter 5 pp.93-109; Lemaitre, P. and Gerner, K. Hansen, Torben The Crisis of societal security in the former Soviet Union, Chapter 6, pp.110-130 in Waever 1993 \textit{op cit.}

\textsuperscript{36} Mortimer, Edward, European Security After the Cold War \textit{Adelphi Paper no.271} Summer 1992.

\textsuperscript{37} See the Article written by Jonathan Eyal 'Kind words cruel policies in \textit{The Independent} 27 January 1992.
gap between a rich and relatively poor Europe, might be conducive to nationalist and authoritarian forces in these countries, that may undermine the overall security of Europe.\textsuperscript{38} This will be even more acute as the interaction between people living on the periphery and the people living at the core of Europe intensifies as a result of the shrinking European economic and political space. Therefore, the smooth and gradual integration of the economies and political institutions of these countries, into the integrative political (democratic) and economic (free market) framework of the core Europe through cooperation, seems an imperative for the overall stability of Europe.\textsuperscript{39}

The third issue concerns human rights in the new Europe. Preventing the oppression of ethnic minorities and the protection of the rights and freedoms of individuals within the boundaries of national states, is gradually becoming an important Pan-European issue (in the consolidation of the European public order). Indeed, states, particularly the ones who have not reached their maturity (post-nationalist stage) in their national development, tend to exercise their sovereignties against their own people. The sovereignty is exercised by these countries in the name of maximization of their national security and the consolidation of Unitarian state systems.\textsuperscript{40}

Environmental issues have also gained prominence in Europe after the collapse of the Cold War.\textsuperscript{41} Given the proximity and multiplicity of the states in the confines of the European continent and the existence of international rivers, seas and lakes, the environmental degradation inevitably spills over beyond the boundaries of the states. The environmental pollution, in fact, is of a trans-boundary character. Thus, the management of the environment can no longer be confined to the national framework of the states. At the organizational level, what we shall witness in Europe, is an increasing involvement with environmental issues in the 1990s.

\textsuperscript{38} Nelson, Daniel Europe's Unstable East \textit{Foreign Policy} No.82 Spring 1991, pp.137-158.
\textsuperscript{39} See Kramer, Heinz The EC and the Stabilization of Eastern Europe \textit{Aussenpolitik} Vol.43 (1) 1992, pp.12-21.
\textsuperscript{40} Wheeler, Nicholas The Human Rights and Security Agenda in Rees \textit{op cit} pp.133-157.
\textsuperscript{41} See Spear, Joshua The Environment Agenda in \textit{Ibid} pp.11-132.
To this, must also be added the ideological security interdependence between the pluralistic elites of European countries in the core values and ideologies of Europe in democracy, free market and the rule of law as opposed to fundamentalism, extreme nationalism and authoritarianism. Indeed, in addition to the regional conflicts and the horizontal spread of weapons of mass destruction towards third countries, the President of the Commission of the EC, Delors, stressed, above all, the importance of the 'ideologies of exclusion' from the European Community, spreading within the other non-member countries of Europe, as a new issue area. He stated 'the security is not a military concept. It involves ideology, values, socio-economic systems, and the environment.'42 This is an important issue particularly for the pluralistic and European minded political and economic elites of the developing countries of Europe who promote the case of their countries' joining Europe. Thus the exclusion of these countries from the European integration project is likely to induce antagonistic feelings and negative perceptions of their populations. We witness the re-emergence of 19th and early 20th century conflict patterns.43 However, these forces now operate in a different context under the conditions of modernity and institutionalized interdependence in the late 20th century of Europe.44 In security terms, Europe has been defined as a 'regional security complex' within which 'a set of states whose major security perceptions and concerns are so interlinked that their national security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed apart from one another.'45 Issues that reflect the interdependence of Europe are mainly Pan-European and regional in character. Thus, what we may face in the next decade, is the Europeanization of problems that will require European solutions through existing European regional institutions, structures and mechanisms.46 In the beginning of

42 Delors, Jacques 'Europe's Ambitions' Foreign Policy No.60 Fall p.18 pp.14-27.
43 Freedman, Lawrence Potential European Instability: An Historical Perspective RUSI Journal Summer 1990 pp.65-70
46 Different conceptual definitions have been used to define the emerging political organization of Europe from the perspective of security as the main issue in question. It is
the 1990s, some writers predicted the prospect of a 'European Regional Security Community'.

However, we find the definition of Hyde-Price the most useful in understanding the emerging European structure. He defines Europe as a security system which refers to 'the overall pattern of interlocking security relations, commitments and institutional structures in a specific security area.' 'European Security system' is useful because it suggests that 'a degree of predictability and relative stability exists in European security area at least in terms of its core relationships.' As Hyde-Price put it, 'the ad hoc responses of the existing organizations to specific European security issues will have a major impact on the contours of Europe's security system.' Existing organizational frameworks created during the Cold War, are likely to play a central role in managing the peaceful transformation of Europe. In this sense, the legal and organizational frameworks of these organizations will constitute an important public frame of reference in the formation and the consolidation of a European security public area among the states.

In organizational terms, there are mainly three Europes within which different dynamics affect the existing state system in Europe in the beginning of the 1990s.

First, there has been a deepening and emerging core European structure and identity towards political union within the EC. It is difficult to summarize the deepening process of

still difficult to give precise definition of what terminal form of this emergent European complex is likely to take. In recent literature, some attempts have been made to give some structure to these developments. For instance, Europe was defined as an order and regime within the framework of Conference on Security and Cooperation (CSCE). The difference between regime and order is suggested to lie in the degree of legitimacy, irreversibility, institutionalization and the transfer of real power necessary for new order. In this sense, in organizational terms European security was defined as 'a dynamic order in which institutional structures play significant role to organize politics according to values and interests'. See Seidelmann, Reimund 'Perspectives for a New European Security Order after the end of the Cold War Journal of European Integration 1991 XIV no.2-3 pp.103-124. See also Binnendijk, Hans 'What kind of new order for Europe?' The World Today February 1991 pp.19-21 Sivonen, for instance, suggested that the existing organizational framework may constitute the basis of a European security regime. Sivonen, Pekka 'European Security: New, Old and Borrowed; Journal of Peace Research V.27(4) 1990 385-397.


the EC within the space of this chapter. However, there is sufficient evidence to show which
direction the EC is likely to take, as it was manifested by its recent legal and political
declarations. The process of completing of economic integration, which started with the
Single European Act in 1987, after two intergovernmental conferences, one on political union
and the other concerning economic and monetary union, brought the EC even closer to the
threshold of a federalizing process, by the time the Treaty on European Union was finally
concluded in Maastricht in 1991.49

The outcome of Maastricht was an agreement to create a European Union (EU)
consisting of three main pillars. The first, the European Community pillar, which is rooted in
the Treaties of Paris and Rome. The supranational competences of the European Community
and their scope have been extended to new policy areas on economic and monetary union.
Justice and home affairs constitute the second pillar. The third pillar consists of the common
foreign and security policy of the EU (Common Foreign and Security Policy CFSP).
However, this remains an intergovernmental structure in its character. The Single European
Act had provided for coordination on 'the political and economic aspect of security'. The
Maastricht Treaty extended this to the common foreign and security policy, 'covering all
areas of security policy', with 'all questions related to the security of the Union, including
eventual framing of a common defence policy which might in time lead to a common
defence'.50 Even though CFSP retains its intergovernmental style in its decision-making, it
allows 'joint actions' in some matters which majority voting will apply. In this context,
Article J 1 of the Treaty defines the objectives of the common security and defence policy as
follows: safeguarding common values, interests and the independence of the Union,
strengthening security; promoting international cooperation; and enhancing democracy.51 In

49 Pinder, John The New European Federalism: The Idea and the achievements in
Comparative Federalism and Federation ed. by Burgess, Michael and Gagnon, Alain-G London
Harvester-Wheatsheaf 1993 pp.45-66. See also Nicoll, William and Salmon, Trevor C.
Understanding the New European Community 1994 London: Harvester 1994 particularly the last
chapter towards European Union.
51 Ibid.
this sense, as a dynamic core, European Union is likely (and expected) to act as 'a consolidating core' and as 'a focus for economic integration and for growing political cohesion', attracting all of the rest of Europe.\(^{52}\) As a dynamic core the Union is likely to extend its integrative domain to the rest of Europe in a peaceful way, either through membership or through intermediary cooperation frameworks such as association and special partnerships.\(^{53}\) As proven by the recent increasing queue of applicants for full membership of the Union, the magnetic force of this dynamic integrative core seems to be evident. By the end of 199s Turkey, Austria, Cyprus, Malta, Sweden, Finland, Norway and Switzerland had already officially applied for full membership and other eastern European countries also hinted that they would apply.\(^{54}\) The second organization trend has been the emergence of a European Defence core within the Atlantic framework. The revival of the WEU under the French initiative since 1984 was one of the first indicators of an emerging European defence identity. In 1987 the WEU adopted a 'Platform on European Security interests' which confirmed the political intent of the member states of the WEU, who were also the EC members, to develop a coherent defence identity within the Atlantic framework.\(^{55}\) In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the question of whether to build European defence or Atlantic defence was resolved in the favour of the latter. Moreover, the recent organizational trends indicated that a stronger and more independent European defence pillar is likely to be placed within a NATO context rather than creating a fully independent autonomous European defence structure.\(^{56}\) In the early 1990s it gradually became clear that the WEU came to be seen as an 'integral part' of the European Union. However, this was conceived within the Atlantic framework. In parallel with the conclusions of Maastricht, the

\(^{52}\) Buzan 1990 \textit{op cit} p.42 and Hyde-Price in Rees 1993 \textit{op cit} p.25.

\(^{53}\) See for instance Laursen, Finn \textit{The EC and its European Neighbours: Special partnerships or widened membership?} International Journal XLVII winter 1991-2 pp.29-63.

\(^{54}\) See Spence, David \textit{The Enlargement of the European Community The Courier} no.138 pp.58-61.

\(^{55}\) Cahen, Alfred \textit{The Western European Union and NATO: Building a European Defence Identity within the context of Atlantic solidarity} p.18.

\(^{56}\) See for instance, Brittan, Leon 'Europe within NATO' \textit{RUSI Journal} Summer 1991 pp.35-38.
nine members of the WEU agreed on a 'Declaration on the Role of the Western European Union and its Relations with the European Union and with the Atlantic Alliance'. In their Declaration the WEU nine agreed to develop 'a genuine European security and defence identity and greater European responsibility on defence matters'. They noted that the WEU was integral to the development of European Union. However, this was compatible with the Union’s commitments to the Atlantic Alliance.\textsuperscript{57} As the Maastricht conclusions indicated, it was confirmed that WEU was accepted as a means of strengthening the European pillar of NATO, rather than being conceived of a fully independent European defence body.

While the structural convergence process between the European Union and the WEU continued, NATO’s key role in the transformation of European security was also confirmed in the NATO summit in November 1991. At this meeting the Atlantic Alliance adopted the ‘Declaration on Peace and Security’ and the Alliance’s 'New Strategic Concept'.\textsuperscript{58} The Rome Declaration confirmed that the Alliance would continue to play a key role in European Security. In the summit, the Alliance emphasized that NATO, the CSCE, the EC, the WEU and the Council of Europe have complementary roles to play in the consolidation and the transformation of European security and stability. The Alliance also welcomed the consolidation of the WEU 'both as a defence component of the process of European unification and as a means of strengthening the European pillar of the Alliance'.\textsuperscript{59} In fact, as it is clear from this statement that the WEU and NATO structures were confirmed as mutually reinforcing and complementary processes in the formation of the hard core of European security. At the Rome Summit the Alliance’s New Strategic Concept was defined from a broader security perspective. It confirmed that the previous threat no longer existed. However, it was stressed that new threats are multidimensional and stem from regional instabilities and uncertainties. Even though the old principles and objectives of NATO remained, the emphasis for the New Strategic Approach was on the political role of NATO.

\textsuperscript{57} The Treaty on European Union \textit{op cit} pp.233-253.
\textsuperscript{59} \textit{Ibid.}
preserving peace in Europe. In this direction, political dialogue, co-operation, collective defence, crisis management and conflict prevention were specified as the key political concepts in the 1990s. In line with the new objectives and principles, NATO invited the Central and East European states to join in the institutional framework of NATO through regular consultations. In early 1992, this led to the establishment of the North Atlantic Co-operation Council (NACC). Given the identical membership patterns of NACC with the membership of Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe its seems that the Pan-Europeanization of NATO is in motion. (See Table 1). This shows that NATO as a defence core of the Pan-European security system has a potential to play a key political role in promoting stability in a Pan-European framework in the next decade.

Another important organizational development in the early 1990s has been the consolidation and institutionalization of norm creating Pan-European Organizations in the peaceful transformation of Europe. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) is the most comprehensive security framework which was created to promote greater European security and stability through East-West cooperation during the detente period of the Cold War. However, in the beginning of the 1990s the CSCE assumed new characteristics in transforming Europe from the arena of confrontation and co-existence to all-European security and cooperation process. The conclusion of the Paris Charter for a new Europe, which was adopted at the end of the CSCE summit in Paris in November 1990, culminated in the broad consensus reached by the European Governments of Eastern and Western block that officially marked the end of the Cold War. The first and the most important achievement at the Paris Summit was the conclusion of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces (CFE) in Europe. This envisaged an unprecedented arms reduction between Eastern and Western military blocks since the Second World War. Moreover at the end of the

Summit the Parties endorsed that they were no longer adversaries and they will refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity and political independence of any state. This officially confirmed that the military confrontation between East and West ended.63

The most important product of the Summit was the signing of the Charter of Paris by the 34 participating countries which has 'opened a new era of democracy, peace and unity in Europe.64 The Charter affirmed the basic norms and principles in the conduct of state affairs in Europe. In fact, the important norms principles and objectives of the CSCE process originating from the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 were confirmed and codified. These are: among other things; to 'build consolidate and strengthen democracy as the only system of government'; to recognize 'human rights [as] the birthright of all human beings'; to uphold 'free and fair elections'; to affirm the right of all individuals to freedom of thought and to ownership of property; to protect 'the ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity of national minorities' and to develop 'market economics'.65 The CSCE links both state and societal level of security in a Pan-European context.66 It does not only cover the negative aspects of military issues such as confidence building measures and conflict prevention, but also seeks to promote positive cooperation in economic, scientific technological and environmental areas including the protection of human and minority rights and fundamental freedoms. Despite its organizational limitations, 'the CSCE offers a unique framework for communication and the raising continent-wide consciousness in terms of the development of common interests, rules and institutions'.67 However, until it was given effective powers by the Government it is bound to remain a non-binding security framework in organizational terms.

63 The Independent 20 November 1990.
65 Ibid.
66 Wheeler, N. and Booth, K. Contending Philosophies about security in Europe in McInnes op cit p.32.
Apart from setting the norms and standards of state behaviour, at the Paris Summit it was also decided to establish a secretariat in Prague to schedule bi-annual meetings of the head of the states and governments, a conflict Prevention Centre in Vienna and Office for free elections in Warsaw. The creation of these institutional bodies were a novelty in the transformation of the conference diplomacy style of the CSCE into a permanent institutionalized structure in the post-Cold War Europe.

Another organizational potential that will play an important role in the transformation of Europe concerns the activities and framework of the Council of Europe (COE). The COE, as a functional organization, generates the core values of Europe particularly in human rights and democracy. It was established in the Post War period under the Cold War circumstances. During the same period, it played an important role in promoting and protecting Western democracy, European political and cultural values and basic liberties through its legal instruments and its institutional mechanisms. It socializes the member states through its work of harmonization in a style of voluntary participation in the optional legal instruments. For instance, since the 1950s, 150 conventions have been signed and ratified within the framework of the COE. These helped set standards not only in functional areas of cooperation such as environment, mass media, education, culture, legal and technical matters but also human rights issues. Among these, the most important legal instrument concerning human rights is the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) which was signed and ratified by all 21 members of the Council of Europe in 1950. This Convention provides European states with the norms, the standards and the principles of human rights and democracy.

In fact, the legal orders of the COE and the EC are mutually complementary and reinforce in particular the shared core cultural and political values of Europe. For instance, in

its decision in the Nold case, the European Court of Justice of the European Communities stated that the ECHR 'can supply guidelines which should be followed within the framework of the Community law'. The direct applicability of the ECHR was also reinforced by the Rutili Case in a later decision of the European Court of Justice.\(^2\) Moreover, in 1977, the Community institutions, the Council, the Commission and the European Parliament in a declaration stressed 'the prime importance they attach to the protection of fundamental rights, as derived in particular from the Constitutions of members states and the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms'.\(^3\) There is a strong analogy which has also been made between the legal orders of both the EC and the COE.\(^4\) Indeed, the Human Rights Commission of the COE, regarding a case concerning the applicability of the ECHR to the happenings before the ratification of the Convention, declared that the aims and ideals of the COE, as expressed in its statute, were not merely to create mutual rights and obligations between contracting parties but 'to create a common public order'.\(^5\) In a similar way, the European Court of Justice in the famous Case of Van Gend en Loos stated that 'the Community constitutes a new legal order in international law'. In fact, the legal expressions of all forms of cooperations between European countries within these organizations, including NATO and the WEU and in our opinion the CSCE process, constitute the framework of 'a Pan-European Public order'.\(^6\) However, this varies in degree from the stricter supranational style of the EC at the core of Europe to the looser intergovernmental style of the COE within the wider but non-binding intergovernmental norm creating structure of the CSCE.

\(^4\) Brinkhorst, L.J. 'European Law as Legal Reality' in Hodges, Michael European Integration 1972 *op cit* p.305.
\(^6\) See Brinkhorst in Hodges *op cit*.
In this context, it can be suggested that the membership of the COE is, in many ways, a prerequisite for the full membership of the EC. Even though this does neither guarantee nor substitute for the full membership of the EC, the COE is an important initial framework within which the democratic credentials and human rights records of would-be members of the EC are tested and scrutinized. In this sense, the COE acts as an anti-chamber to the EC and functions as a waiting room for the EC membership. It plays an important part in building bridges and testing forms of partnership in the gradual enlargement of the EC to the rest of Europe, in terms of shared political and cultural values. Indeed, as it was manifested by a series of applications of Eastern European Countries for the full membership of the COE, this organization seems to have assumed a new Pan-European role in the democratization and the protection of human rights in the non-EC Europe.

Within the COE framework, Turkey's case is relevant. The COE played, even before the end of the Cold War, an important part not only in testing Turkey's association relationship with the EC but also in scrutinizing its full membership request in the light of the shared cultural and political core values of Europe. The COE is a litmus test of the commitments of European countries to democracy and human rights. In this respect, the COE framework can be regarded as a learning process of democracy and the rule of law since the member states voluntarily accept limitations in their internal orders originating from the effects of legal instruments of the COE. For instance, following its application for full membership of the Community in 1987, Turkey, in an attempt to improve its image in human rights records, accepted several important optional protocols of the COE. This should be seen in connection with Turkey's application. In January 1987, Turkey recognized, albeit with some reservations, the competence of the Commission of Human Rights under Article 25 of

78 By mid-1992 Hungary, Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, Poland and Bulgaria became full members and Russia, Romania and Albania, the Baltic states, Slovenia had special guest status. See for the Pan-Europeanization of the COE and its potential role and its relations with other European institutions, Lucas, Michael R. and Kreikemeyer, Anna 'Pan-European Integration and European Institutions: The New Role of the Council of Europe' Journal of European Integration V.XVI (1) pp.89-107.
the ECHR to receive applications from individuals alleging violations of their rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention.\textsuperscript{79} In November 1988 Turkey signed the European Convention against torture.\textsuperscript{80} Moreover, in December 1989, the Social Charter of the COE was ratified by the Turkish Grand National Assembly.\textsuperscript{81} Finally, Turkey recognized the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court of Human Rights of the COE.\textsuperscript{82} Under Article 90 of the 1982 Turkish Constitution 'international treaties duly put into effect carry the force of law'.

Given this, the Turkish Constitution in fact gives international treaties a hierarchically superior status vis-a-vis prior and subsequent ordinary legislation. Indeed, the Turkish Constitutional Court in its several decisions referred to the ECHR's superior status against ordinary legislation where there is a conflict of laws.\textsuperscript{83} Despite the incorporation of these legal instruments into the domestic law of Turkey, in effect, Turkey on several occasions was criticized by other European countries on the grounds that the provisions of the ECHR were not strictly observed and the violations of human rights were still widespread.\textsuperscript{84}

On the other hand, inspite of its intergovernmental institutional weaknesses and the lack of supranational enforcement mechanisms in the decision-making of the COE, the ECHR constitutes a powerful public political frame of reference for the society and elites of the member states of the COE in their struggle to improve their democracy, human rights and to establish the rule of law in their respective countries. Moreover, governments are forced to justify their activities in their internal orders, with reference to the terms of the legal

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{79} For a detailed analysis of this Cameron, Iain Turkey and Article 25 of the European Convention of Human Rights International Law and Comparative Law Quarterly V.37 Part 4 October 1988 pp.887-925.
\textsuperscript{80} Agence Europe 11 November 1988 This was ratified by the Turkish Grand National Assembly in February 1988 Agence Europe 22 February 1988.
\textsuperscript{81} Agence Europe 4 December 1989.
\textsuperscript{82} Agence Europe 28 September 1989.
\textsuperscript{83} Interview with head of the Constitutional Court Yekta Gungor Ozden 8 September 1992.
\textsuperscript{84} For instance, by 1992, the Council of Europe published a very critical report on Turkey's human rights records particularly on the practice of widespread torture and ill treatment of prisoners. 22 December 1992 The Guardian. According to a civil servant of the Ministry of Justice in 1993 there were about 300 cases of human rights violations brought before the COE bodies. See also Amnesty International Report London: Amnesty International Pub. 1992 pp.257-260.
\end{flushleft}
instruments of the COE in human rights issues. This is also an important constraining factor on the exercise of sovereignty by states against the populations living within the territory of the member states. In this sense, the norm creating legal instruments of the COE, combined with the CSCE framework in human rights and minority issues, constitute an important public framework for the emerging European civil society in their effort to limit the exercise of state sovereignties against the individuals and minorities.

Each of these organizations have the potential to generate cooperative attitudes between European states at different levels in societies and in different issue areas. In this context, they constitute the basis of an emerging European public order, since the legal expressions of all these cooperation frameworks and institutional mechanisms place constraints on the sovereignties of European states. It seems that the future security system of Europe will consist of a variety of levels of organizational frameworks of a complementary character. At the Pan-European level, given an increasingly institutionalized CSCE combined with the work of the COE, a European public order is likely to develop gradually receiving broad public and elite support. At the core of Europe, particularly after the implementation of the Maastricht Treaty, a gradual deepening and widening of the EC towards a 'Political Union' will happen. The economic and civilian aspects of security will be handled by this central actor. Finally, the WEU will be an interim framework between the EC and NATO in the Europeanization of European defence.

It is increasingly difficult to understand the national destiny of European states without reference to economic and political forces and structural changes occurring in Europe today. Thus this lengthy section was necessary to analyze Turkey's post Cold War vocation in the political map of Europe and its effect on Turkey's Association process with the EC. In the following sections, we shall analyze Turkey's emerging security and foreign policy orientation within these systemic developments.
III Have Turkey's Security Assets Diminished in the Post-Cold War Europe?

As indicated in the previous section, the end of the Cold War necessitated a substantial paradigm shift in the evaluation of European security. The concepts of nuclear escalation and strategic deterrence, as the main discourse of the Cold War, lost their significance. The issue of military balance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact became irrelevant. Thus, inevitably Turkey's strategic asset which was defined against the Soviet threat has been affected by these developments. Reflecting upon the perceptions of Turkey's declining strategic importance in the early 1990s, the Economist pointed out

"For nearly four decades successive Turkish governments have luxuriated in the assumption that, as a front line country within NATO, Turkey was indispensable to the West. It was a splendid bargaining lever in Turkey's dealings with its western friends. Now, as the Soviet threat recedes, the Turks sense they are no longer as indispensable as they were."

Indeed, as a result of the changes in the perceptions of Turkey's Cold War security assets, which had acted as a catalyst in Turkey's convergence with the EC, Turkey's strategic importance has become a contentious issue. However, it is necessary to address the question of how Turkish foreign policy-makers responded to these changes in the early 1990s. What are the perceptions of the policymaking elites of the Turkish and European organizations in the light of the recent changes in the strategic and political landscape of Europe? In order to answer these questions we shall evaluate Turkey's security assets with reference to the reconstruction of Post-Cold War European security order.

In the first place, it is imperative to point out that Turkey's strategic importance did not simply stem from the Soviet factor. Even though its membership of NATO was dictated by Cold War circumstances, Turkey's geopolitical position, regardless of the perceptions of the Soviet threat, has always been self evident. Indeed, Turkey's geographical location provides her with a unique strategic position. As one Turkish scholar recently explained 'Turkey is geographically situated in a very critical location at the intersection of the East-West and North-South division of the world power axes. This fact existed before Turkey's

85 The Economist 26 May 1990 p.63.
86 Newsbrief RUSI January 1990 V.10 (21).
membership of NATO and will continue to exist well after the possible dissolution of the Western and Eastern power blocks.\textsuperscript{87} According to the same writer, 'Turkey's objective strategic importance' will be the same despite the systemic changes in the international system.\textsuperscript{88}

As a matter of fact, the demise of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union has freed Turkey from the constraints of Cold War politics. This has created an environment which is more conducive to a pluralistic kind of foreign policy, less determined by military considerations and more geared to economic and political considerations within a broader Pan-European context. In this sense, despite the emergence of new sources of conflicts and regional instabilities, new opportunities for regional cooperative ventures seem to be present.

The developments of the early 1990s, taking place in Turkey's immediate regional environment (i.e. the Balkans, in the Caucasus, and in the Middle East) seems to have brought Turkey to the centre of the European security system.\textsuperscript{89} It was inevitable that there has been shift in the perceptions of Turkey's security rule as a result of these changes, as Prime Minister Demirel explained in an article written in 1992 'Turky is no longer a mere cold war asset with a strategic location, as the jargon of the past would have it. Today she is a regional pillar of stability.'\textsuperscript{90} Indeed, this was one of the first signs that Turkey was ready to assume a different security role, as an element of stability in the reconstruction of a Pan-European security structure.

Geostrategically, Turkey interlocks three politically sensitive regional subsystems, within a Pan-European regional security complex that has serious implications for the overall stability of Europe. For instance in a recent assessment made by the Commander in Chief of the Allied Forces in NATO's southern region, it was suggested that threats facing the NATO

\textsuperscript{88} Ibid. p.25.
\textsuperscript{89} See \textit{RUSI Newsbrief} 'Turkey from Sidelines to Centre Stage' August 1991 V.12 (8) pp.59-60; also Tusa, Francis 'Turkey watchful on three fronts' \textit{Armed Forces Journal International} p.64.
\textsuperscript{90} Prime Minister Demirel's article in \textit{The European} 19-22 November 1992.
Alliance shifted specifically towards South Eastern Europe. Turkey is located at the centre of these three sub-regional areas of turbulence that were related to the security of Europe. First of all the disintegration of the Soviet Union created a political vacuum in the south Eastern flank of NATO, that unleashed new potential nationalist conflicts in the Trans-Caucasus region. Secondly, the domestic and international turmoil and aggressive nationalism in the Balkans poses and important threat to the overall stability of Europe. Thirdly, the Middle East still remains an important source of instability as one of the most volatile and armed regions of the world. Since Turkey is at the centre of these three sensitive areas, it is likely and expected to play a central role not only in military terms but also in economic and political terms. In the following paragraphs we shall analyze Turkey's new security role from the broader Pan-European perspective.

First of all, Turkey's political role was enhanced by the collapse of the Soviet System in the Transcaucaus region. As the developments showed in the early 1990s, Turkey acts as a neutralizing force rather than exploiting the political vacuum in this region through power politics. Indeed, Turkey maintained a neutral position towards the conflict between Armenia and Azerbeijan over the Nagorno-Karabakh autonomous region. Despite its historical, cultural and religious affiliations with Azerbaijan, Turkey, from the very beginning of the conflict refrained from openly siding with Azerbaijan and continued to offer Armenia with humanitarian aid. Apart from refraining from active involvement in the conflict and intimidating its relatively small neighbour, Turkey positively started to improve its relationship with Armenia. At the expense of alienating Azerbaijan, Turkey also sought to promote cooperation with Armenia in the field of energy, trade and cultural issues.

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93 It was noted in the Financial Times that 'Turkey has done its best to maintain evenhanded approach, and to overcome the Armenian's traditional Turcophobia. [In early 1993] Turkey even supplied Armenia up to 100,000 tons of wheat, from stocks earmarked for domestic consumption, as an advance on wheat promised by the EC which was late arriving Financial Times Survey Turkey 7 May 1993 p.5.
Moreover, from the very beginning, Turkey was actively involved in the peace process under the auspices of the CSCE. In November 1991, the newly elected Demirel Government made it clear that it was prepared to act as a sole mediator to end the conflict. However, having failed to receive a formal recognition from both sides, Turkey started to advocate the involvement of the EC and/or the US to resolve the conflict through the CSCE process.\(^95\) In April 1992 in Helsinki, Turkey was appointed as a member of the CSCE peacekeeping mission to work for peace negotiations and a settlement of the dispute.\(^96\) Moreover, during the intensive negotiations in Rome, Turkey became an active member of the Minsk Group to work towards the realization of a formal peace Conference to be held in Minsk under the auspices of the CSCE. This group also included Russia among its ten members. However, Iran which is not part of the CSCE process, was excluded from it. In line with the conclusions of the Rome talks, the Turkish Foreign Minister also recently flew to Moscow to discuss the Karabakh issue with its counterpart Andrei Kozyrev. It was also reported that the Russian delegation would pay a visit to Ankara to discuss an alternative peace plan for Karabakh. In March 1993 the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan also seemed to be in favour of this new proposal.\(^97\) However, the peace process was far from being complete in the second half of 1993 because of the sudden change of leadership in Azerbaijan.

Turkey's policy in relation to Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict indicates that Turkey is ready to act as an agent of stability and as a mediator to consolidate its new post Cold War security role. Indeed, the European Parliament, in its resolution, acknowledged 'the significant role which Turkey has always played and will inevitably have to in settling the problems of the Near and the Middle East, Asia Minor and the Caucasus owing to its position in Europe and in Asia, its interest securing and consolidating peace in these regions and its determination to do so.'\(^98\) In this context, the European Parliament also recognized that

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95 Fuller, Elizabeth 'Mediators for Transcaucasia's conflicts' *The World Today* May 1993, p.90.
96 *The Guardian* 3 April 1993 Europe/Analysis in the Supplement p.27.
97 Fuller 'Mediators for Transcaucasia's conflicts' *op cit* pp.90-91.
Turkey should remain an element of stability in a region marked by grave political and ethnic problems' and welcomed 'the Turkish Government's positive attitude in the conflict between Azeris and Armenians in Nagorno Karabakh.' This officially confirms, at the level of the European Parliament, Turkey's new post Cold War security role as an indispensable component of European security structures was being redefined.

The second post-Cold War characteristic in Turkey's new security environment has been the emergence of Central Asia as 'an independent participant' in the modern Pan European international politics. With regard to this region, Turkey appears to be a potential country to act as a modernizing and Europeanizing force. It was suggested by some circles in the west that Turkey presents a valid model of development for the newly independent states of Central Asia, in terms of promotion of the core values of Europe, namely democratic, secular institutions and market oriented economic policies.

Indeed, Turkey was the first to recognize the independence of the newly independent Central Asian republics and to be interested in improving its political and economic relations with all of them. This provoked the other countries' fears, particularly another regional competitor Iran, that Turkey was actively trying to create a sphere of influence and to exploit its pro-western influence in the region. However, in response to the allegations of Turkey's expansionist policies in Central Asia, after his visit to Iran in November 1992, Turkish Prime Minister Demirel felt the necessity to reassure and explain this notion of the 'Turkish model'. He said that 'we are not going to run these countries, they will have to run themselves. If they adopt something from Turkey, it is their business, we are not going to

99 Ibid.
100 Fuller, Graham and Fuller, E. 'The Emergence of Central Asia' Foreign Policy No.78 Spring 1990 pp.49-67; also Menon, Rajan and Barkey, Henri J. The Transformation of Central Asia: Implications for regional and international security' Survival V.34 (4) Winter 1992-1993 pp.68-89.
101 Mango, Andrew 'The Turkish Model' Middle Eastern Studies V.29 (4) October 1993 pp.726-757.
103 Ankara stands to gain in vacuum left by Moscow The Independent 3 April 1992 also The Independent 3 March 1992.
impose our model on them. But we would like to see them as democratic, secular and market-oriented countries. If they ask us we will give them advise. In an attempt to establish close cultural, economic and political ties, Turkey initiated a number of activities in different economic sectors to improve infrastructural ties with these countries. These were mainly in the areas of transport, energy pipelines, telecommunications, and human resources. Moreover, despite its limited financial resources, Turkey managed to become the fourth largest provider of aid to the Turkic republics. However, links with these new Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) must be seen as supplementary to Turkey's relationship with the EC. As the Prime Minister Demirel put it, Turkey's links with CIS are just 'one of the new key dimensions Turkey can bring to the Community' rather than being seen as an alternative regional initiative. In an interview with the Financial Times Demirel also reiterated that:

'Our desire to be a member is not for economic reasons. We are Europeans. We would like to stay as Europeans. We would like to act with Europe. We share the values of European civilization in addition to our own values. As a member of NATO we have defended those values. Europe is not a geography: Europe is a set of values ... We can take those values to Central Asia. That is the extension of Europe, not as geography but as culture and as civilization.'

In answer to the question of 'are you implying that those countries, too, might be members of the EC? Demirel said that this was not possible for the time being but 'we can take European values to those countries.'

104 Quoted in Hussain, Mushadid 'Iran and Turkey in Central Asia; Complementary or Competing Roles?' Middle East International 19 February 1993 p.19. See also Hyman, Anthony 'Moving out of Moscow's orbit: The outlook for Central Asia' International Affairs V.69 (2) 1993 pp.298, 300.
105 Robins, Philip 'Between Sentiment and self-interest: Turkey's policy toward Azerbaijan and the Central Asian States Middle East Journal V.47 Autumn 1993 pp.593-610.
106 Given that the other three largest donors were Japan, The European Community and the United States this was a substantial economic commitment for Turkey. The breakdown of credits as follows Azerbaijan, $250 million; Uzbekistan $250 million; Kazakhstan $200 million; Kyrgyzstan $75 million; Turkmenistan $75 million. Information derives from Turkish mission to European Communities in Robins 1993 Ibid p.608.
107 Prime Minister Demirel's Article in The European op cit.
108 Financial Times Survey 7 May 1993 p.3.
Furthermore, the activities which took place in 1992 within the framework of the Council of Europe, as an organization representing the core political values of Europe seem to have underlined Turkey's ideological and political role between Central Asia CIS states and Europe.\textsuperscript{109} In September 1992, in an attempt to improve the Council of Europe's relations with the Central Asian Republics, the General Secretary of the Council of Europe Catherine Lalumiere, accompanied by the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, officially visited Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan.\textsuperscript{110} Moreover, in November 1992 at the special meeting of the Council of Europe's foreign ministers in Istanbul, where the foreign ministers of the newly independent states met and the Commission President Jacques Delors and the Director of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development Jacques Attali were also present, Turkey's role as a mediator in relation to Central Asian Republics was affirmed.\textsuperscript{111} However, given Turkey's own economic, political and social problems and the existence of competing external powers (Russia, Iran and Turkey) in this volatile region, it is difficult to predict how successfully Turkey will fulfil this role model.

Another important dimension of Turkey's post Cold War foreign policy concerns the Balkans. In the Balkans, Turkey has historical and cultural links and minority interests. Historically and geographically speaking, Turkey has always been a Balkan country and it is still an important component of the Balkan sub-security system.\textsuperscript{112} The Balkans traditionally resided at intersections between competing empires (Ottoman, Austria-Hungarian and Russian). In turn, these led to regional ethnic wars by proxy between Balkan countries. After the Second World War, the region was divided into rival ideological blocks as a result of Cold War politics. Even though these potential sources of conflict were contained within rival ideological blocks, the end of the Cold War unleashed old patterns of national and ethnic

\textsuperscript{109} See Demirel's statement on the role of The Council of Europe in an enlarged Europe and new talks it may be assigned Agence Europe 11 September 1992 No.5813.
\textsuperscript{110} Lucas and Kreimeyker op cit p.103.
\textsuperscript{111} Committee of Ministers of The Council of Europe, Special Meeting of the Council of Ministers in Istanbul, Conclusions of the Chair on Relations with the Republics of The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and Georgia, September 10-11, 1992 Ibid.
\textsuperscript{112} See Sander Oral The Balkan Cooperation in Perspective The Turkish Yearbook of International Relations 1966 pp.103-120.
conflicts, originating from the region's historical and ethnic make up. Today the re-emergence of old patterns of conflict and alliances pose an important threat to the stability of Europe.\textsuperscript{113} Indeed, as early as in 1990, one Turkish diplomat warned that 'to go back to Metternich and the Balance of Power [system] would be very damaging and risky for the continent's future.' Therefore, he called for a multilateral collective security system in post-communist Europe. He also underlined that 'We don't want to see countries trying to balance each other out in a system of bilateral arrangements.'\textsuperscript{114} In this direction, Turkey instigated a Black Sea regional cooperation framework which aims to link all the countries located around the Black Sea and in the Balkans within a process of peacebuilding. It is not surprising that, in this context, Turkey also invited Greece to participate in this initiative.\textsuperscript{115} In an effort to play an active cooperative role in this broader context, in the early 1990s, Turkey started to improve its relationship with the individual Balkan countries. A Bulgarian-Turkish 'Friendship and Cooperation Agreement' was signed in Ankara in May 1992.\textsuperscript{116} During the signing of the cooperation agreement, the Bulgarian Prime Minister Filip Dimitrov underlined Turkey's significance for Balkan stability. He stated that '[Turkey] is the biggest country that occupies part of the Balkans' it probably has the strongest economy. And it is a country which, following democratic ways, can exert substantial influence on peaceful and democratic developments in the Balkans.\textsuperscript{117} A similar cooperation agreement with Romania was also signed and an ever broadening relationship with Albania is developing.\textsuperscript{118} The improvement of bilateral relations with these countries should be seen within Turkey's Pan-European regional peace building efforts, rather than pursuing a balance of power politics by

\textsuperscript{113} See Larrabee, F. Stephen Instability and Change in the Balkans Survival V.34 (2) 1992, pp.31-49.
\textsuperscript{114} Quoted in the \textit{Financial Times} Survey on Turkey, 24 May 1990, p.iv.
\textsuperscript{115} The Black Sea Cooperation Region will be dealt with in a different section.
\textsuperscript{117} \textit{The Independent} 8 May 1992.
exploiting the re-emerging old patterns of conflict in Balkan politics. Indeed, in November 1992 when Turkey called a Balkan Conference in Istanbul in which all Balkan foreign ministers were invited to work towards the Bosnia-Herzegovina peace process in the Balkans, the Prime Minister Demirel stated that Turkey's aim was 'to create a belt of peace and stability' around its borders.

With regard to Turkey's post Cold-War Balkan politics, it is important to note that, even at the military level in Turkish security policymaking, security considerations are dominated not by simple military grammar, but by broader security considerations. Explaining Turkey's post Cold War security policy in London in June 1993, the Chief of General Staff of Turkey emphasized the importance of the pluralistic aspects of European security in the Balkans. He stated that, for Turkey, the 'Balkans constitute an integral part of the stability and security of Europe'. Opposing the changes of borders by force he stated that Turkey's security policy with regard to the Balkans should contain four important elements: Peace and stability should be preserved in the Balkans; Human and Minority rights should be guaranteed; economic cooperation should be developed; the existing lack of confidence and prejudice against the people of the region should be eliminated. To that end, General Gures continued to suggest that it is an imperative for the stability of Europe that 'countries in the region should take their places in the European integration process as a Balkan sub-group as soon as possible.' In fact, Balkan cooperation is seen as 'a top priority' in Turkey's post-Cold War security and foreign policies. As Sander put it 'Balkan cooperation will serve as a guarantee of Turkey's place in the integration process in Europe no matter what shape it is to take in the future.' It is possible to suggest that in the long

119 Larabee op cit p.42.
120 The Independent 24 November 1992 All Balkan Countries, Slovenia, Croatia, Albania, Hungary and Macedonia attended the meeting at the Foreign Minister level, Bulgaria, Romania and Italy were represented by the Foreign Ministry delegations. However, Greece and Serbia were absent. Newsport 3 December 1992 No.92/24.
121 General Gures, Dogan, Chief of the Turkish General Staff 'Turkey's Defence Policy: The Role of the Armed Forces and strategic concepts and capabilities' RUSI Journal June 1993 p.2.
122 Ibid.
123 Sander, 1990 op cit p.27.
run, Turkey's Balkan Policy is likely to be determined by its relationship to European integration. In any case, Turkey will continue to be an active participant in, and promoter of, the Balkan cooperation initiatives, in order to maintain its links with the core of European integration within the framework of Pan-European cooperation.

Finally, Turkey plays an increasingly active role in the Middle East. Turkey is the only country in this region which is also a member of the European defence and security structures. This security role was acknowledged by the Community even before the end of the Cold War. In December 1989 when the Commission made its opinion public on Turkey's accession request, the Commissioner Matutes, who is responsible for the Community's Mediterranean policy, affirmed that Turkey was an important political asset for the Community. Matutes underlined that "Turkey is a country with which [The EC is] interested in deepening political dialogue, "as one of the pillar countries of NATO, and also for its "moderating influence" in countries such as Iran and Syria with which the Community "had sometimes had difficult relations".124

Indeed, the following developments in the beginning of the 1990s in the Gulf region, proved that Turkey was an indispensable ally for European defence in the deterrence of the external regional threats emerging from the Middle East.125 As far as Turkey is concerned, the security threats originating from the Middle East 'now constitute a new but extremely important element in Ankara's strategic calculations' in the post Cold War defence policy.126 As far as security interdependence between the EC and Turkey is concerned, it seems that Turkey needs Europe as much as Europe needs Turkey within European defence structures. However, Turkey's security assets in relation to the Middle East, cannot be reduced to a simple military role. Thus, before we analyze Turkey's defence role during the Gulf crisis as a test case, it is necessary to assess its potential regional role in political and economic areas in the Middle East.

125 We shall analyze this in the next section.
126 Middle East International 5 February 1993 p.19 Gures op cit p.3.
Given the shortage of water resources, the management of scarce resources emerges as the most important security issue in the 1990s in the Middle East. According to strategic analysts, water is likely to be the most critical source of conflict in the future of the region.\footnote{127} As far as the politics of water are concerned, Turkey emerges as a key country in the management of the water resources, since it controls two important water resources of the Middle East (Tigris and Euphrates Rivers) that flow to the Gulf through Syria and Iraq. In an attempt to double the country's agricultural output and to improve the social conditions of people in its south eastern region, Turkey has been building a huge dam and irrigation project on these rivers.\footnote{128} Given that both Iraq and Syria are heavily dependent on these rivers for their irrigation systems, this project has been a critical source of friction in the region. Turkey has been accused by its Middle Eastern neighbours of using the water as a 'weapon' to manipulate the politics of the Middle East.\footnote{129}

Turkey formally announced that it would not use water as a political weapon. For instance, between 1987-1991, having seen water as an opportunity for regional cooperation, President Ozal championed a 'Peace pipeline project' that would transport water from the other two rivers to the Middle East (Seyhan and Ceyhan). This would convey water to Syria, Jordan and the West Bank through a western pipe and to the Red Sea coast of Saudi Arabia.\footnote{130} Unfortunately, this was an abortive attempt since the Middle Eastern countries were reluctant to participate in the project on the grounds that it would be susceptible to political manipulation and sabotage. Recently, Turkey seems to have shelved the pipeline project in the light of Turkey's growing dependence on its own domestic water resources.

\begin{itemize}
\item \footnote{127} Spirit of war moves on Mid-East Waters \textit{The Independent on Sunday} 13 May 1990.
\item \footnote{128} For a recent detailed and technical analysis of environmental, economic and political factors influencing water management and water disputes in the Tigris-Euphrates basin in the Middle East see Beschoner, Natascha 'Water and Stability in the Middle East' \textit{Adelphi Paper} 273 Winter 1992-93 pp.27-44.
\item \footnote{129} See for the politics of water by Robins, Philip \textit{Turkey and the Middle East} London: Pinter Pub 1991 pp.87-99.
\end{itemize}
However, in 1992, Foreign Minister Hikmet Cetin stated, concerning cooperation in water
that 'we are aware of its growing importance and its regional implications. We see it as an
integral part of overall regional cooperation. We are ready to cooperate in this respect, but I
must point out that we will do so in accordance with our own priorities and within the limits
of our potential.' 131 Although the water is said to be an excellent means to establish regional
cooperation in the Middle East, it still remains a critical source of crisis. The prospect of
regional cooperation in the Middle East in the field of water is entirely dependent on the
political will of the parties. However, the management of water resources will continue to be
a new source of extra regional crisis that might eventually threaten the stability of Europe. In
this respect, Turkey is a pivotal country that has a potential rule to act as a bridge between
Europe and the Middle East, as a regional stabilizer and promoter of cooperation in the
Middle East.

Apart from the management of scarce water resources, another important issue is the
proliferation of mass destruction chemical and nuclear weapons and the ballistic missile
proliferation in the Middle East. 132 What is more risky is that these sophisticated arms are in
the possession of authoritarian Middle Eastern regimes. This situation is even more
aggravated by uneven development and widespread poverty. 133 Given the proximity of the
region to Europe, this constitutes a critical source of instability for the overall security of
Europe in the 1990s. Therefore, the establishment of a framework for cooperation and
security in the Middle East is a prerequisite for the stability in the region. 134 Recently some
proposals have been made by some members of the European Community to extend the

131 Quoted in Beschorner op cit p.44.
132 See Miller, A.J. 'Towards Armageddon: The Proliferation of Unconventional
Weapons and Ballistic Missiles in the Middle East' The Journal of Strategic Studies V.12 (4)
December 1989 Navias, Martin S. 'Ballistic Missile proliferation in the Middle East' Survival
May-June 1989 v.31 (3) Lodgaard, Sverre 'Vertical and Horizontal Proliferation in the Middle
133 See for the underlying causes of conflict and violence in the Middle East and some
solutions, Nejad, Hassan Mahamadi The Middle East-Building a Community of Nations
134 See for instance Sayigh, Yezid 'Security and Cooperation in the Middle East: a
proposal' Middle East International 10 July 1992 pp.16, 17.
European-CSCE experience to the Middle East. In fact, Turkey is the only country in the Middle East which is at the same time a member of the CSCE process. Turkey's experience in the CSCE process in Europe can be useful in the establishment of a regional cooperation and security regime in the Middle East. Indeed, Turkey, in this direction, within the Islamic Conference Organization, suggested the establishment of a system of confidence and security building measures that can be applied to the Middle East. Moreover, there have also been suggestions by the Turkish side at the diplomatic level, that the application of European CSCE type of process to the Middle East, may produce a regional cooperation and security system that cannot only link both state and individual levels of security but also political and economic issues.

In short, Turkey also emerges as an indispensable component of an overall peace process in the Middle East, whose regional vocation was enhanced by its membership of pluralistic European security structures in accordance with the core values of Europe, in terms of democracy, rule of law and economic development and the attainment of regional peace in the region.

The Gulf War: A Test Case for Turkey's New Role in the Middle East

The invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in August 1990, marked the beginning of a new period in Turkey's foreign policy orientation towards the Middle East. From the beginning of the War to the end, it was proven that Turkey was a crucial ally and an active deterrent force against the threat originating from the Middle East. In this section we shall assess the impact of the Gulf War on Turkey's new emerging strategic role within the European defence structures, in relation to the Middle East.

With regard to the Middle East, Turkey had pursued a policy of neutrality since the 1950s which was guided by the main principles of non-interference in the domestic and

135 Niblock, Tim 'Towards a Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean and the Middle East (CSCM) in The Middle East and Europe op cit.
136 See, for Turkey's perceptions of the CSCE in the post Cold War Europe, Article written by Head of the Policy Planning Department of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Arsin, Ali, 'Changing East-West Relations: A Turkish View' NATO Review pp.14-17.
137 See for these proposals, Article by Turkey's Ambassador to Britain Nures, Nurver 'We can find path to peace' The Independent 26 March 1991.
interstate affairs of the Middle Eastern countries and the maximization of trade and economy in bilateral relations.\(^{138}\) For instance, before the invasion Kuwait by Iraq in 1990, Iraq was one of Turkey's largest trading partners in the Middle East.\(^{139}\) This economic link was further enhanced by the establishment of Kirkuk-Yumurtalik twin pipeline carrying more than half of the Iraqi oil to the Mediterranean.\(^{140}\) Thus, initially, following the invasion of Kuwait, it was not an easy decision for Turkey to shut the pipelines to comply with the immediate decisions of an economic embargo.\(^{141}\) Given the economic cost involved for Turkey, not only the loss of the oil transportation royalties but also the suspension of construction contracts and remittances from Turkish workers in Iraq and Turkey, the estimated cost of economic sanctions were substantial.\(^{142}\) However, once the basis for international legitimate action was established by the UN Security Council Resolutions 660 and finally 661, which prescribed complete economic sanction on Iraq, Turkey followed suit and shut the pipelines and imposed an economic embargo on Iraq (alongside) its NATO allies. Turkey shut the pipeline even before Saudi Arabia complied.\(^{143}\)

However, Turkey's departure from its conventional policy of neutrality towards the Middle East was not without any internal political controversies. Particularly at the level of the Parliament, bureaucracy and military, there have been objections that Turkey should not act as a policeman of the West in the region.\(^{144}\) The opposition was also worried that Ozal was dragging Turkey into a Middle Eastern war. However, inspite of the opposition which did not want Turkey to adopt a proactive and pro-western stand towards the conflict, thanks to his influential political position, Ozal managed to secure the necessary support to follow a

\(^{138}\) See for Turkey's Middle Eastern Policy Tashan, Seyfi Contemporary Turkish Policy in the Middle East: Prospects and Constraints' *Middle East Review* V.17 (3) Spring 1985 pp.12-20.
\(^{140}\) *The Independent* 6 August 1990.
\(^{142}\) The annual cost of economic sanctions was estimated to amount to $2 and 2.5 billion consisted of direct exports to Iraq and Kuwait $1; pipeline Royalties - $300; other invisibles - $700 million - $1000 million Hale, William 'Turkey, The Middle East and the Gulf Crisis' *International Affairs* 68 (4) 1992 pp.679-692.
\(^{143}\) 8 August 1990 *The Independent*.
\(^{144}\) *The Independent* 9 August 1990.
more active policy during the War.\textsuperscript{145} The Gulf War was seen by President Ozal as an opportunity to reinforce Turkey's image in the West, as well as to underline the Western dependence on Turkey's strategic assets within European security structures. He also thought that Turkey's active pro-western involvement would contribute to Turkey's bid to the full membership of the Community.\textsuperscript{146}

On the other hand, it is difficult to suggest that Turkey, as a country which was one of the most affected by the UN economic embargo, received satisfactory economic support from the allies.\textsuperscript{147} For instance, as a result of a divergence of opinions, it took for the Community members at least a month to agree on a financial relieve aid for the most affected frontal states, Turkey, Egypt and Jordan. Finally, in the beginning of October, the EC foreign Ministers agreed on aid totalling 1.5 billion ECU to be shared between Jordan, Egypt and Turkey.\textsuperscript{148} On the other hand, the initial Greek suggestion was that interest should be paid on the loan to Turkey, but this was refused by other members. The EC was also slow to deliver the provided financial aid to these countries.\textsuperscript{149}

Given the high economic cost of a UN embargo for Turkey, this amount was, when it was divided between three countries, only symbolic and thus unsatisfactory.\textsuperscript{150}

During the crisis Turkey's deterrence role within NATO was not limited to an economic embargo. Following the enforcement of UN sanctions on 10 August 1990, NATO's 16 foreign ministers endorsed the military deployment in the Middle East and announced that it would honour its commitments to Turkey. Indeed, as Secretary General Manfred Worner declared in August 1990 'It is clear that an attack on Turkey would be considered an

\textsuperscript{145} See for the internal political controversies Robins, 1991, \textit{op cit} pp.79-72.
\textsuperscript{146} Robins, \textit{op cit} p.71; Sayari \textit{op cit} p.14; \textit{The Guardian} 30 August 1990.
\textsuperscript{147} According to the Financial Times Turkish official estimates put the total costs of supporting the West $5 billion until the end of 1991. See also about Turkish disappointment with financial aids \textit{Financial Times} 10 January 1991.
\textsuperscript{148} \textit{Agence Europe} 7, 14, 15, 17 and 19 September and 3 October 1990.
\textsuperscript{149} Salmon, Trevor Testing Times for European Political Cooperation \textit{International Affairs} V.68 (2) 1992 p.246.
\textsuperscript{150} Even the initial Community assessment for Turkey which was based on the process oil for the period from August 1990 to December 1991 was 4 million. However, this did not cover other costs resulting from the trade and economic embargo, \textit{Agence Europe} 14 September 1990.
attack on all member nations.\textsuperscript{151} Given the proximity of Turkey to the centre of the crisis, as the only NATO member neighbouring the Middle East, soon after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, NATO Airborne Early Warning (NAEW) aircraft, which is a multilateral NATO force and consists of personnel from 13 NATO nations, was sent to eastern Turkey to monitor the military movements of Iraq in the region.\textsuperscript{152} Moreover, during the autumn of 1990, by deploying nearly 120,000 Turkish troops near the Iraqi border, Turkey pinned down about eight Iraqi divisions in the North of the country against a possible Iraqi attack.\textsuperscript{153}

While the crisis escalated, in response to Turkey's request, and in line with NATO's declaration made earlier in August 1990, in December the NATO Defence Planning Council approved the deployment of the Alliance Command, Mobile Air Force (AMF-A) to Turkey. This force was designed to show NATO's unity as a deterrent force against the Soviet threat, within the context of the Cold War. However, this time it acted as a deterrent force within a different context, which was against a threat emanating from outside of NATO's area of operation. In this sense, the deployment of AMF-A showed that, for the first time in its history, NATO has formally committed itself to out-of-area operations in the Middle East. This was a significant development in NATO's strategic thinking in the sense that it was used as deterrence against a new threat originating from a different area, defined outside NATO's operational area.\textsuperscript{154}

However, the deployment of AMF-A was mainly for defensive purposes.\textsuperscript{155} On the other hand, the discussions in Germany of whether Germany should commit itself to its NATO ally Turkey, in case of an Iraqi attack, caused embarrassment for Turkish-German relations.\textsuperscript{156} This German reluctance prompted Ozal to criticize the German attitude by

\textsuperscript{151} Financial Times 11/12 August 1990 Howe \textit{op cit} p.256.  
\textsuperscript{152} Howe \textit{ibid} pp.252-253.  
\textsuperscript{153} Hale \textit{op cit} p.685 and Sayari \textit{op cit}.  
\textsuperscript{154} Howe, p.251 The aircraft were provided by Germany, Belgium, Italy as follows: 18 Belgium Mirage fighter bombarders, 6 Italian F104 Star fighters.  
\textsuperscript{155} The Independent 3 January 1991.  
\textsuperscript{156} The Independent 30 January 1991.
describing Germany as 'a rich but unreliable ally'.157 Despite its constitutional limitations and its reluctance to engage in a conflict in the Middle East, Germany eventually sent 300 air personnel and 18 Alpha fighter air crafts to Turkey. In fact, the deployment of German forces in Turkey, during the Gulf crisis of 1990-1991, was the first military commitment of Germany outside German territory since 1945.158

Moreover, after the UN deadline expired on 15 January, Turkey allowed anti-Iraqi coalition air forces to use NATO bases within its territory for bombing the military targets in Northern Iraq. In doing so Turkey was compelled to consent to such limitations upon its sovereignty to secure a lasting peace order against the aggressors in the Middle East. In this sense, allowing the alliance forces to use Turkish NATO bases for offensive operations against Iraq, required specific authorization of the Turkish Parliament under Article 92 of the Turkish Constitution. Given the considerable opposition in the Parliament it was not an easy job for President Ozal to secure such a mandate. Eventually, however, the bill to send troops abroad and to receive foreign troops in Turkish territory was passed within the limits of the NATO Treaty.159 Accordingly, on 19th January, first allied air raids against Iraqi forces took off from the Incirlik NATO base.160

To conclude, the Gulf crisis once again underlined Turkey's strategic importance for European defence structures, particularly against out of area military threats originating from the Middle East. From the European security point of view, the Gulf crisis indicated that under the post Cold War circumstances, European security can no longer be confined to a specific geographic area. In this context, the increasing interdependence between Turkey and Europe in the maintenance of regional order against external aggressors, was confirmed. It is worth concluding this section by quoting from an analysis in a prominent defence review 'as the significance of out of area stability and the crisis management emerge, the collective

158 Trevor, op cit p.238.
159 Hale, pp.685-686.
security required to check this cannot be achieved without the cooperation of a geostrategically placed country like Turkey.\textsuperscript{161}

So far we have assessed Turkey’s security assets in the post Cold War European security context. In the next section, we shall examine the institutional implications of this increasing interdependence in defence and security issues between Europe and Turkey, that were manifested in the structural convergence process between Turkey and the hard core of European defence structures.

**European Defence Identity and Turkey and the Enlargement of the Western European Union**

Even before the end of the Cold War, Turkey was an integral part of the European defence structures within the Atlantic framework. For instance, Turkey was a member of Eurogroup which was established in 1968 by European members of NATO 'to ensure that the European contribution to the common defence [within the Atlantic framework] is as strong as and cohesive as possible'.\textsuperscript{162} It is an informal forum in which European defence ministers exchange views on main defence issues and promote practical cooperation in the field of defence. The Eurogroup plays an important role in demonstrating the significance of the European contribution to NATO. Although France's absence is an important constraint for Eurogroup to present itself as full and effective representative of the European defence identity, it has been successful in asserting the significance of European contribution to NATO defence. In 1988, it was given that the European members of NATO provided 90% of the manpower, 95% of the divisions, 85% of the tanks, 95% of the artillery, 80% of the combat aircraft and 70% of the fighting ships.\textsuperscript{163} In this context Turkey has been an important contributor to the European pillar of NATO. Indeed, Turkey’s Defence Minister pointed out that Turkey, as the alliance member with the lowest capita of income, dedicated 20% of its budget and 4.4% of its GNP to defence, keeping under arms the largest armed forces in

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{161} RUSI Newsbrief August 1991 V.12 (8) p.60.
\item \textsuperscript{162} NATO Handbook NATO Information Service, Brussels, 1989.
\item \textsuperscript{163} Ashford, Nigel *European Defence Cooperation* British Atlantic Contributions, London 1988.
\end{itemize}
NATO Europe. As a member of the European pillar of NATO, Turkey actively participated in the work of Eurogroup. Whenever Turkey had the opportunity to speak on behalf of the members of Eurogroup it expressed the significance and the cohesion of the European component within NATO structures.

Another important organizational element of the European defence identity within NATO structures concerns the Independent European Programme Group (IEPG). This includes all European members of NATO except Iceland. France is also a member. It is an independent body which is not strictly a NATO body. The US is excluded and because of the membership of France, the IEPG is an exclusive European cooperation framework which represents European identity and interest in the field of defence. It was established in 1976 in the context of growing concern about both American domination and increasing pressure on governments to reduce the costs of large weapon programmes through international cooperation. In 1986, when a high level official independent study group prepared a report under the auspices of the EIPG, the activities of IEPG was revitalized. The Report, which was called 'towards a stronger Europe' identified the main objectives of European cooperation in the field of defence industry. In line with the objectives and the principles of this Report, in 1988, an 'Action Plan' was approved by the defence ministers of the EIPG. According to this Plan, the EIPG was accepted as a major forum for coordination of European defence cooperation in the field of technology and industry and a 'common European arms market' was envisaged. The Plan advised Governments to open their national procurement policies to European competitors. It also envisaged a standardized reporting system for

164 Minister of Defence Giray, Safa 'Turkey's Contribution to European Defence' New European Winter 1989-1990 p.37. Turkey also supplied 25% of the manpower, 12% of the tanks, 19% of the artillery and 11% of the aircraft of the Alliance's integrated military structure.

165 Akmandor, Nese 'Turkish and European Security - The Role of Euro Group' NATO Review August 1979 pp.7-9.


167 This study group consisted of ten members, one being Turkey, others are as follows: Belgium, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain and the United Kingdom. See Vrediling, Henk 'Towards a stronger Europe' Nato's Sixteen Nations' December 1987 - January 1988, pp.20-23.
cross-border contracts. More importantly, for the developing defence industry countries - Turkey, Greece and Portugal - special equalizing treatment was offered in the areas of defence collaboration and competition.168

As far as Turkey is concerned, EIPG is an important forum in the formation of a European defence community, that will not only reinforce Turkey's European defence identity within the Atlantic framework, but is also a crucial entity within which Turkey may benefit from technology transfer, industrial collaboration and foreign investment to build up an effective defence industry. As one Turkish defence analyst observed the IEPG is one all European entity and 'allows Turkey to have the opportunity to take part in the process of the Europeanization of defence'.169 Indeed, Turkey was, in 1989 already participating in two joint projects.170 Furthermore on the political level the Luxembourg Communique offered Turkey the opportunity to succeed the United Kingdom in the chairmanship of the EIPG in 1991, for a two year term.171

In the context of the European defence industry, Turkey is an important market and attracts major European defence contractors. The relevance of this last point was enhanced by Turkey's recent defence modernization policy, to establish a competitive defence industry. The new legislation was introduced in 1986 to increase its defence expenditure and to attract foreign defence companies in joint ventures, in an attempt to modernize Turkey's defence industries.172 In this direction, many major defence projects were opened up to international competition by allowing interpenetration with European defence companies 'in the context of

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170 Ibid.
171 The Luxembourg Communique op cit p.177.
172 In 1986 a bill was passed (no.3238) concerning the establishment of defence industry development and support administration DIDA which will coordinate $11 billion defence modernization programme. See special issue on 'Defence and economics in Turkey' NATO's Sixteen Nations V.31 and Sadlowski, Manfred 'Turkish Armed Forces modernization receives major funding' Military Technology June 1986, p.6.
European effort and under Turkish coordination.\textsuperscript{173} Soon after Turkey's application for full membership of the EC, the impact of the lucrative defence contracts reflected in the attitudes of some member state of the EC towards Turkey.\textsuperscript{174} In the light of this evidence, it is possible to predict that defence will be one of the areas that will facilitate the structural convergence process and technological interpenetration between Turkey and the hardcore of European Defence Community.

In analyzing Turkey's institutional convergence process with the European Defence Community (the hardcore of European security) a more specific problem arises from Turkey's application for full membership of the Western European Union. Given that Turkey is a member of all European defence structures except the WEU, it is pertinent to ask what the organizational prerequisites of full membership of the WEU are? 'Platform on European Security Interests' which was adopted by the WEU ministers in the Hague in 1987, provides an important point of reference in addressing the question of the enlargement of the WEU.\textsuperscript{175} Indeed, as Gambles observed the 'Platform' defined 'a kind of European identity' in the field of security and set 'the parameters for the discussion of West European security interests and conditions for the admission of new candidates to that discussion.'\textsuperscript{176} Thus, it is worth assessing the contents of the 'Platform'.

The 'Platform' lays down specific prerequisites for the membership of the WEU. Considering that the members of the WEU are also members of the EC, it is only logical to

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{173} See for the major defence projects and joint ventures under way \textit{Armed Forces Journal International} June 1989 p.58 also for the main bidding defence contractors and joint ventures \textit{Financial Times Survey}; Turkey Defence Industries 23 May 1987. Another major European collaborative European defence programme in which Turkey participated within the framework of EIPG is Future Large Aircraft project (FLA). In 1991, the other participants in this European project were Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Spain. See \textit{The Report on Weaponry after the Gulf War - new equipment requirements for restructured armed forces} by the Technological and Aerospace Committee of the Assembly of Europe Document 1272 14 May 1991 \textit{Assembly of WEU 37 Ordinary session.}

\textsuperscript{174} For instance it was noted in 1987 that 'the French have duly noted Turkish signals any country which supports the Turkish application will be favoured in the allocation of defence and other contracts. Mr Chirac reportedly told Mr Halefoglu [Turkish Minister of Defence] that France would not stand in the way of Turkish membership' \textit{The Economist} 21 February 1987 p.57 also \textit{The Economist} 4 April 1987 p.59.

\textsuperscript{175} See Cahen, 1989 \textit{op cit} pp.18-22.

\textsuperscript{176} Gambles, \textit{op cit} p.31.
\end{flushleft}
assume that the membership of the EC should precede the membership of the WEU. In this sense, the member states of the WEU should be committed to European Union, as the Platform stated in 1987 'We recall our commitment to build a European Union in accordance with the Single European Act, which we all signed as members of the European Community. We are convinced that the construction of an integrated Europe will remain incomplete as long as it does not include defence and security.' 177 Indeed, the Defence Minister of Spain, in an official visit to Turkey concerning the defence cooperation within a European framework stated that 'Being admitted as a full member of the WEU before the admission to the EC would be tantamount to putting the card in front of the horse.' 178 Although the membership of the WEU cannot be divorced from the membership of the EC, it was logical that Turkey's request to join the WEU was an attempt to underline the interdependence between Turkey and the EC in the field of security and defence. As Prime Minister Ozal emphasized in 1989, with reference to European defence structures that:

'The success of these initiatives depends on their contribution to common defence and to the strengthening of the European pillar. In connection with this, it should be stressed that the scope of the European pillar of the Alliance should be well defined to also include the flanks. In such a process the Western European Union can play an important role within the overall framework of Western defence. It was with this conviction that Turkey expressed its desire to join this institution [WEU].' 179

Even at the military level, the desire and perceptions of the indivisibility of European integration in military and economic areas were evident. During the meeting of the North Atlantic Assembly, Vice Admiral Guvenkaya of the Turkish General Staff expressed his concern about the exclusion of Turkey from European defence structures, he said:

'If Europe excludes Turkey from its moves towards political, economic and military integration under the win umbrellas of the Western European Union and the European Economic Community ... How will Turkey's security be maintained? Is it in the global interests of the West for Turkey to be gradually pulled into regional crisis and disputes?' 180

177 See for the text of the 'Platform' in Cahen, op cit p.91-96.
178 Cumhuriyet 14 December 1988 Turkish Daily.
180 Quoted in Karasapan, Omer Turkey and US Strategy in the Age of Glasnost' Middle East Report September-October 1989 p.4 pp.4-22.
It is natural to assume that Turkey's full membership in the WEU is dependent upon its eventual admission to the EC as the precedent suggests. On the other hand, it was stated at the level of the Assembly of the WEU that 'the Assembly has never insisted on making membership of the European Community a prior condition for membership of WEU.' In this sense, 'The only present logical imperative for admission to WEU is a commitment to common defence through parallel membership of the Atlantic Alliance'. The Assembly recommends that 'two countries which merit earliest consideration in this context are Norway and Turkey.' Apart from the membership of NATO, the security imperatives, however, seem to play more important roles in the enlargement of the WEU, rather than formal organizational requirements. Indeed, the security imperatives acted as a catalyst in the institutional convergence process between Turkey and the EC, as Turkey's security role in the Middle East assumed new characteristics within the context of European defence. In the aftermath of the Gulf Crisis the WEU Assembly Defence Committee affirmed, in its Report that '[Turkey] has proved its resolve as a front line state, both in East-West terms, but more importantly now in the North-South orientation and is deserving of more recognition and consideration than has sometimes been apparent.'

It was only since 1987 that the WEU has recognized its security responsibilities for protecting Western Europe's out-of-area responsibilities. Moreover, the Gulf Crisis proved that, despite its lack of logistic base for its military operations, contingency plans and operational structures, the WEU was able to act as a one body capable of coordinating a European response. Indeed, during the Gulf Crisis in the Middle East, on 21 August 1991, with the WEU foreign and defence ministers, a 'Communique' was issued to define the framework of cooperation. Throughout the Gulf Crisis of 1990, Turkey was also 'specially

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182 Ibid.
183 Joint European mine clearing operations during the Gulf Crisis of late 1980s RUSI Newsbrief January 1990 v.10 (1) pp.6-7.
184 See for the response of the WEU to the Gulf Crisis the Article written by Secretary General of the Western European Union Eekeleen, Willem van 'WEU and the Gulf Crisis' Survival November-December 1990 V.32 (6) pp.519-532.
invited because of the context' and participated in the Council of Ministers meeting of the WEU as an observer.\textsuperscript{185} It was as a result of these security imperatives, rather than organizational formalities resulting from Community membership, that Turkey's organizational link with the hardcore of European defence has recently been upgraded from observer to associate status. Indeed, the Maastricht Treaty was the Community response to the recent challenges in the field of security.\textsuperscript{186} In a declaration attached to the Treaty on European Union, the nine members of the EC invited the members of the European Union (Greece, Denmark and Ireland) to join the WEU. Moreover, they also declared that 'other member states of NATO [Turkey, Norway and Iceland] are invited to become associate members of WEU in a way which will give them the possibility of participating fully in the activities of WEU.'\textsuperscript{187} Accordingly, on 10 November 1992 Turkey officially became an associate member of the WEU.\textsuperscript{188}

However, some specific issues arise from Turkey's association status within WEU, particularly with regard to the Greek-Turkish dispute. First of all, Article 10 of the Brussels Agreement allows for the recourse of disputes among the member states to the International Court of Justice. Indeed, Article 10 provides for disputes among member states to be resolved either by way of judicial settlement, in which the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice was recognized, or by way of reconciliation. Or both of the procedures can be applicable where this is appropriate.\textsuperscript{189} However, it was agreed in November 1992 in the London Treaty on Turkey's accession to the WEU as an associate member, that this Article would not apply to Associate members.\textsuperscript{190} Another specific issue concerns the commitment of mutual military assistance in case of aggression arising from

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{185}ibid p.524 and The Assembly Report 'The Gulf Crisis - Lessons for Western European Union' op cit p.4.
\item \textsuperscript{186}See Menon, A. Forster and Wallace, W. 'A Common European Defence?' Survival V.34 (3) Autumn 1992, pp.98-118.
\item \textsuperscript{187}See Council of The European Communities 'Treaty on European Union' Brussels 1992 p.246.
\item \textsuperscript{188}Newspot 19 November 1992.
\item \textsuperscript{189}Article 10 of the Brussels Treaty and Protocols in Cahen op cit pp.72-73.
\item \textsuperscript{190}Newspot 19 November 1992 op cit.
\end{itemize}
Article 5 of the Brussels Treaty. Article 5 provides for an automatic obligation to assist the attacked party in 'all the military and other aid and assistance in their power.'\textsuperscript{191} Article 5 would not be recoursed to in the case of a Greek-Turkish conflict.\textsuperscript{192} This last point was previously substantiated by the Petersberg Declaration which was adopted by the WEU Council of Ministers in June 1992 in Bonn. Part III of the Declaration stated that 'the security guarantees and defence commitments in the treaties which bind the member states within Western European Union and which bind them within the Atlantic Alliance are mutually reinforcing and will not be invoked ... in disputes between member states of either of the two organizations.'\textsuperscript{193} By the Petersberg Declaration, it was confirmed that existing members of the WEU were reluctant to be involved in a possible Greek-Turkish conflict, since the security guarantees given by the WEU to either side would only be encouraging the provocations, rather than deterring the aggression between Turkey and Greece. However, it is unreasonable to interpret the Declaration to mean that they have a free hand to attack one another, but rather to imply that the member states of the WEU are determined not to be party to a Turkish-Greek conflict. Given the risk of the Europeanization of the Greek-Turkish conflict, the political intent behind the Declaration is understandable.

Another issue concerns the scope of the WEU's operational area. Unlike the NATO Treaty which explicitly defines the limits of its area of operations, the WEU Treaty does not restrict member countries to engage in 'out of area' military operations. In this context and given Turkey's growing regional security role, in terms of its out of area crisis management and military contingency Turkey's association membership of the WEU seems to increase the operational advantages and the scope of the WEU framework. This 'out-of-area' role can be seen as a contributary factor towards the upgrading of Turkey's institutional link with the hardcore of the European security structures in the future. However, the final institutional form of the relationship will be dependent on the regional security imperatives, as well as on

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{191} Cahen, \textit{op cit} p.71.
\item \textsuperscript{192} Newsspot 19 November 1992 \textit{op cit}.
\item \textsuperscript{193} See for the text of the Declaration Europe Documents 23 June 1992 1787 No.79.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
the future of Turkey's bilateral relationship within the context of the Association process. We are going to examine this aspect of the relationship from a European security point of view in the next section. Before doing so, we shall leave Turkey's relationship with the process of European defence integration and move to the Pan-European context within which Turkey's post Cold War policy is determined.

New Regionalism in a Pan-European Context: The Black Sea Economic Cooperation Region

Another characteristic in the post Cold War European security environment of the 1990s, has been the emergence of regional groupings. The emergent regional identities at the Pan-European level became another feature of a developing European international political organization. However this pan-European regionalism should not be confused with regionalist tendencies within the EC. As a result of the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the opening up of a European political space freed states from the old patterns of the Cold war alliances, that used to divide regions into rival ideological blocks. This created an environment which is more conducive to potential sub-regional dynamics. However, it was observed that these projects are not anti-state in character, nor do they seek to transform the existing state order, but rather attempt to build additional regional identities from which states may benefit.

In this sense, they are determined by pluralistic forces that strengthen peace and stability in particular regions by generating common interest and economic intensives in

196 In a recent study concerning the future of European security, the emergent characteristics of these regional identities were observed. First of all, their cross national affinities were suggested to originate from historical links, and shared interests in economy and ecology rather than creating an ethnic identity and inventing a possible nation around an ethnic core. In this sense, these regional initiatives seem to act as 'organizing principles' at a Pan-European level which are often built around geography (sea or rivers) as organizing structures with environmental concerns. Secondly, they do not emanate from the broad masses but from cultural and political elites at the state level who want to exploit and benefit from additional identities in their immediate regional environment. More importantly, these sub-regional identities are Europeanist in their nature and compatible with the core of European integration. Buzan 1990 op cit pp.219-223.
functional areas, that may eventually have an inhibitive effect on potential conflicts. They can be building blocks in a new European order by institutionalizing and stimulating the deepening of interdependencies and by linking a European process of cooperation to the core of European integration.

Given the above conceptual observations, the Black Sea Cooperation region, that was instigated by Turkey, represents one example of these new regionalist tendencies emerging at the Pan-European level in the early 1990s. Thus, in this section, we shall assess the significance of this project in the formation of Turkey's post Cold War foreign and security policies with regard to the European integration project. We shall also attempt to shed light on the potential dynamics of this sub-regional project.

The idea of a Black Sea Economic Cooperation was conceived by a Senior Turkish Diplomat, Sukru Elekdag, and adopted by President Ozal in late 1990. It was originally presented by Turkey to Bulgaria, Romania and the Soviet Union. Initial preparation meetings took place in December 1990 in Ankara where the delegations from Bulgaria, the Soviet Union and Romania, participated and prepared the agenda of the cooperation. But, as a result of the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the negotiations were interrupted. However, in the meantime, membership multiplied and Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldavia and Ukraine also joined in as new members. A series of study meetings took place in Bucharest in March 1991, in Sofia in April 1991 and in Moscow in July 1991. Finally, in line with the consensus reached in Moscow, the Foreign ministers of nine countries, including the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union, met in Istanbul in February 1992 to sign a draft framework providing for the objectives and the principles of the

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199 See for the brief economic background on Turkey's Black Sea initiative Financial Times.
200 Newspot 20 December and 27 December 1990.
Black Sea cooperation framework. Greece and Yugoslavia who participated in the Moscow meeting as observers, were also invited to take part as full members and this was reflected in the conclusions of the Istanbul Conference. On 28 February, Greece also applied for membership and was accepted. Despite the Greek veto against Turkey's membership within the EC framework, Turkey did not block Greece's participation in the BSEC process and encourage Greece to take place in the process as a founding member. However, the membership of Yugoslavia was invalidated because of its uncertain future.

Finally, on 25 June 1992, and in line with the principles and objectives of the Istanbul Declaration, the heads of the eleven states and governments held a summit meeting to sign the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Pact, in which Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Moldova, Romania, the Russian Federation, Turkey, and Ukraine became the founding members of this regional organization. In fact, the Black Sea Cooperation initiative was seen, not as a simple multilateral economic cooperation framework, but rather as another regional initiative towards 'a new joint identity'. Indeed, the Parties acknowledged that 'the region is already faced by serious conflicts and there is the new danger of tensions arising.' Thus the main objective of this project was to transform 'the Black Sea into a region of peace, freedom, stability and prosperity.' Given the complicated political and poor economic characteristics of the Black Sea region, which is associated with 'incessant conflicts', this final objective seems too ambitious and extremely difficult to achieve. Against this background, however, some circles emphasized its significance in the peaceful transformation region. For instance, the Russian newspaper The Izvestia.
reported that a 'common association, even if it is an economic one, might become an important stabilizing factor, and additional mechanism to settle differences and conflicts.'209 In the same way, Georgian leader Eduard Shevardnadze suggested the establishment of permanent headquarters in Istanbul, regular top level meetings and mechanisms for solving regional conflicts in the region.210

The political contacts that took place between the states over security issues during the Black Sea Cooperation summit, in fact, emphasized its significance as a new political forum, in which the Black Sea problems can be discussed. This was a novelty for the states of the region. For instance, between Armenia and Azerbeijan some negotiations took place concerning the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict; the Presidents of Ukraine, Russia, Moldova and Romania negotiated a peace process to solve the Moldovan civil war; President Yeltzin of Russia and Kravchuk of Ukraine discussed the ownership of the Black Sea fleet; Some bilateral contacts also took place between Turkey and Greece concerning the security of the Balkans and Cyprus issue.211 Even though these meetings were not conclusive and some states had initial reservations concerning the role of BSEC as a political body, it was evident that the Black Sea Cooperation provided them with an overall framework within which exchange of opinions concerning the issues surrounding the region could be facilitated.212

The most important dimension of the Black Sea cooperation project lies in the functional nature of the cooperation areas. The Declaration Black Sea Economic Cooperation is a concise and general framework which consists of 18 Articles defining the objectives and principles of the project. However, it is a potentially dynamic initiative in the sense that it envisages functional cooperation in low politics areas such as transportation and communications, information technologies, the exchange of economic and commercial data, standardization, energy, mining, tourism, agriculture health care and science and technology.

209 Ibid p.11.
212 Fuller, The World Today op cit p.90.
Moreover, Ozal told Izvestia, on the eve of the Summit that 'the goal of the governments would be only to eliminate bureaucratic obstacles and create favourable conditions for a free movement of people, capital and goods.'\(^{213}\) Thus the dynamic role of non-governmental business elites were thought to be essential in the framework of cooperation, as these were instrumental in the transformation of the region into a free market economy.\(^{214}\) In this direction, the Black Sea Business Council, in which the private sector representatives as well as governmental representatives participated, was established. Accordingly, a series of Business Council meetings took place, on 30-31 in Istanbul and 6-7 December 1992 in Antalya.\(^{215}\) In these meetings, the top priority, on the agenda, was given to cooperation in the field of banking, trade and industry, environment agriculture, compilation of data and statistical information. In the meantime, the BSEC Working Group on the exchange of Statistical Data and Economic information met on 1-2 October 1992 in Istanbul. At this meeting it was agreed to establish a statistical data and economic information exchange system, and to harmonize statistics at the regional level on foreign trade, transport and communications, agriculture, environment and population.\(^{216}\) Moreover, the Parties also expressed their political will to establish a political forum at the parliamentary level, within the framework of the BSEC. At the end of 1992, in a visit by the speaker of the Turkish Assembly to the Russian Federation, the establishment of a BSEC Parliamentary Assembly was agreed with the Russian President Yeltzin and the other Parties were also invited to participate at the parliamentary level, to reinforce the democratic ideals of the project.\(^{217}\) Furthermore, in an attempt to solve the growing environmental problems in the Black Sea, the Black Sea states met in Bucharest 21-22 April 1992 to sign the Convention on the Protection of the Black Sea against Pollution.\(^{218}\) Recently, in addressing the third meeting of

\(^{213}\) Commonwealth of Independent States and the Middle East no.6 1992 op cit p.11.
\(^{214}\) See Ozuye op cit pp.52-53.
\(^{216}\) Newsspot 8 October 1992.
\(^{218}\) See for the Convention and three important Protocols International Legal Materials V.32 1993 pp.1101-1133 also Genckaya op cit p.555.
the Foreign Ministers of the Black Sea in Sofia in December 1993, the Bulgarian President emphasized that the improvement of the regional infrastructure in modern communications and transport should have top priority for the agenda of the BSEC project, in order to promote cooperation in the region. In the same vein, he invited the member states to work together within the framework of the BSEC 'to overcome anachronistic confrontations and ethnic religious-based hatred.' At the same meeting, the director and three deputy directors were appointed to the Secretariat of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization which was based in Istanbul. The Director was appointed from the Russian Federation, the Deputies were from Romania, Turkey and Ukraine. The most important development within the BSEC was the establishment of the Bank for Black Sea Trade and Development in December 1993. This was based in Thessaloniki, Greece.

In spite of all these positive organizational developments and statements revealing the perceptions of the elites of different Black Sea countries with regard to the political future of the Black Sea cooperation, it is too early to predict and evaluate the concrete results of this cooperation process. This factor of uncertainty was further deteriorated by the economic development problems that the Black Sea countries face. In this respect, the lack of a dynamic regional core, which is essential to promote overall regional cooperative and economic interactive incentives in the region, constitutes an important impediment in the promotion of functional cooperation. Even though Turkey is the only country at the centre of the region with an experienced free market economy, it is not possible for Turkey to play this pivotal economic role in the short run because of its own structural problems. However, in the long term, given that Turkey has a relatively stronger economy with free market policies and the oldest democracy (except for Greece) in this region, it seems to have the potential to act as a dynamic core in this regional cooperation. However, this will be dependent upon Turkey's own bilateral cooperation process with the core of European integration.

220 Newspot 16 December 1993.
221 See for these problems Sen, Faruk 'Black Sea Economic Cooperation: A supplement to the EC' Aussen Politics III 1993 pp.281-287.
Particularly, the completion of the customs union might give Turkey a competitive and technological edge in relation to other countries. In this context, Turkey's regional vocation can be a reinforcing factor in its ties with the EC, in its convergence process with the regional core of European integration.222

Another issue arises from the question of whether the BSEC was adopted by Turkey as an alternative to EC membership. Although some initial misgivings expressed in some diplomatic circles within the EC that this cooperation project could undermine Turkey's obligations arising from the Association framework, the Commission and the European Parliament did endorse Turkey's Black Sea cooperation initiative.223 This was further reflected by the EP in a resolution, in the hope 'that this cooperation forum will promote stability in the region and foster the development of relations between the states signatory to the agreement.'224 On several occasion, Turkish diplomats felt the need to deny that the BSEC was designed as an alternative to EC membership.225 Indeed, as the deputy director of the Multilateral Economic Relations, who is in charge of the negotiations, stated 'in fact, since the beginning of the process, the Black Sea Economic Cooperation has been conceived and elaborated as an integral part of Europe's new architecture' and 'as an instrument directed to achieve a higher degree of integration to the European and World economy.' 'It has never been considered as an alternative to any existing groupings in Europe.'226 In this context, the European character of the Black Sea cooperation project was reinforced by the references made to the CSCE process and the objectives and principles of the Paris Charter. Moreover, the objectives of the BSEC were also compatible with the core values of European integration. It was emphasized that the Black Sea Economic Project should be perceived, not as an

222 See for accelerated accession through complementary regional cooperation as alternative strategy Kramer, Heinz The EC and the Stabilization of Eastern Europe Aussen Politik 1 1992 pp.12-21. See also Turkish Daily Milliyet Article on the future of Europe and Turkey, in Turkish Hic and Kramer 23 April 1990.
223 Middle East International, 7 February 1992, p.11.
226 Ozuye op cit p.51.
alternative initiative, but as a complementary process to European integration. This was
reflected in Article VII of the declaration which provides for 'their economic cooperation will
be developed in a manner for contravening their obligations and not preventing the
promotion of their relations with third parties, including international organizations as well
as the EC and the cooperation within regional organizations. In conclusion, it can be
suggested that the BSEC project is an important sign of a new strategy adopted by Turkey in
its post Cold War security and foreign policy orientation, in its attempt to join the core of
European integration through Pan-European cooperation.

IV The Association in the Context of Post Cold War European Security: The Question of
the Enlargement of the European Union

Following the conclusion of the Treaty of Maastricht on European Union which laid
down the principles and policies on the final objectives of the deepening process of the
'European Union' towards political union, the Lisbon summit was a response to the challenge
of enlargement that the EC faced in the post-Cold War Europe of the early 1990s. The central
question was how to reconcile the process of deepening with the process of enlargement. It
was confirmed that the priority of 'completion' and 'deepening' over 'enlargement' was no
longer a feasible strategy under the circumstances of the Pan-Europeanization of issues and
the rapid opening up of a European political space. Under the pressure of the rapidly
growing number of applications, the EC decided to proceed to enlargement negotiations at
least with eligible countries (rich members of the European Free Trade Association EFTA)
once the basis for EC financing was settled. Secondly, the linkage between the core of
European integration and the overall Pan-European cooperation seemed inevitable and it was

227 Article VII of the Black Sea Declaration quoted Ibid.
228 Wallace, Helen 'The Europe that came in from the cold' International Affairs V.67 (4)
1991 pp.647-663 and Hassner, Pierre Europe Beyond Partition and Unity: Disintegration or
229 See for the Post-Maastricht analysis of enlargement question Michalski, Anna and
Wallace, Helen The European Community: The Challenge of Enlargement London: Royal Institute
of International Affairs 1992 also an article written by the Community Principal
understood that the effects of political integration cannot be limited to the core of Europe.\footnote{Pedersen, Thoms Problems of Enlargement: Political Integration in a Pan-European EC Cooperation and Conflict V XXV 1990 pp.83-99.}

If the stability of Europe is to be maintained, the EU has an important role to play in European security, as a consolidating and magnetic core.\footnote{Pinder, John ‘The future of the European Community: A Strategy for Enlargement’ Government and Opposition V.27 (4) pp.414-432.} Thus, as it was reflected in the Treaty on European Union, the EC officially recognized the fact that the security issues cannot be separated from other political and economic considerations in the post-Cold War transformation of Europe.\footnote{See for instance Lodge, Juliet ‘From civilian power to speaking with a common voice: the transition to a CFSP’ in Lodge 1993 \textit{op cit} pp.227-251.}

In this context, in line with the conclusions of the Maastricht Treaty which opened the way for further enlargement, the Council called on the Commission to prepare a report on enlargement for the next European summit which was to take place in Lisbon in July 1992. The Conclusions of the Lisbon summit, in fact, made the implicit prerequisites of membership more explicit by specifying, formalizing and codifying the conditions and criteria of membership of the Union. In this sense, the ‘Commission Report on the Criteria and Conditions for accession of new members to the Community’ is an important document which needs to be examined carefully, in order to understand not only the enlargement of the Union in this decade, but also its policies with regard to the non-member countries of Europe.\footnote{European Commission Report on the Criteria and Conditions of New Members to the Community \textit{Europe Documents} No.1790 3 July 1992.}

The Report refers to Article F of the Maastricht Treaty, which defines democracy, the respect for human rights and European identity as the basic characteristics of the member states of the Union. Thus, in the first place, an applicant country must fulfil these three basic conditions.\footnote{Ibid p.2.}

Another condition for membership concerns the applicant country’s capacity to accept the Community patrimony, i.e. \textit{Acquis Communautaire}. In this sense, the applicant
country should have 'a functioning and competitive market economy' and 'an adequate legal and administrative system in the public and private sector' in order to observe and to implement the obligations and rights defined by Acquis Communautaire including the Economic and Monetary Union. Given the new political and economic context of the post-Maastricht European Community, the political and economic commitments of new members will be even greater toward the political union, particularly for the developing countries of Europe which have high inflation, big budget deficits and external debt problems.

In the light of these economic and social conditions, the Commission notes that integration of certain rich countries of Europe (Austria, Finland, Sweden and Norway) would not pose any major problems. With a reasonable period of time given for these countries, membership is seen as a feasible form of relationship.

On the other hand, for those countries of Europe who are not yet ready for full membership and who could not shoulder the obligations arising from acquis, the best form of the relationship offered by the Community are association treaties that would eventually, not automatically, lead to full membership in the future when the conditions are right for full membership. In this sense, association agreements were designed 'to promote their economic and social development in such a way as to facilitate their integration into the Community' and facilitate the structural convergence between the core countries of European integration and the other applicant developing countries of Europe. In fact, in line with its association policy, the Community has been negotiating 'European Agreements' with the Eastern European countries and with several of them established by 1993 with an association

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235 The Reports define the Community's acquis as follows: The contents, principles and political objectives of the Treaties including the Maastricht Treaty; the legislation adopted in implementation of treaties, and the jurisprudence of the Court; the declarations and resolutions adopted in the Community framework; the international agreements, and the agreements between the member states connected to the Community's activities. *Ibid* p.3.

236 As we saw in the previous chapter, Turkey's application was refused by the Community on the grounds that it did not fulfil economic and social conditions for full membership. The Maastricht Treaty made this even more difficult.


238 *Ibid*. 
relationship which is similar to Turkey's Association Framework. However, the commitment concerning the question of accession was avoided within the framework of this new generation of European association frameworks. Indeed, the Community was cautious as the term of association (as it was understood in Turkey's case) came to imply that the country concerned can expect a relationship to develop to such an extent that full membership of the Community would eventually become a formality. Hence, the Community declined to define the end form of these association relationships.

Another important condition for full membership is the emerging acquis politique, that is, the acceptance of a developing common foreign and defence policy of the Union, both as it already exists and as it was extended by the Maastricht Treaty (Common Foreign and Security Policy). In this respect, the main obstacle in the way of membership for the members of the European Free Trade Association (Austria, Sweden, Finland and Switzerland) constitutes the policy of neutrality which they maintain in their security and foreign policies. It becomes increasingly obvious that there is a direct link between the European Union's acquis politique and the membership of the European defence organizations. In fact, none of the EFTA countries are members of the European defence organizations such as NATO (except Iceland) nor did they apply for full membership of the WEU. In this sense, the eventual membership of EFTA countries might have an undermining effect on the already emerging European defence and security identity. The problem of neutrality was already evident in the Commission opinion concerning the accessions of these countries in 1992. However, the old neutrality concept, which had been adopted by these countries under Cold War circumstances, seems to have become obsolete. Thus, the changing European security situation may lead these countries to modify their neutrality policies, in the course of their

239 See for the background and legal and political characteristic Horovitz, Dan 'EC/East European Relations; New Principles for a new era' Common Market Law Review V.27 (2) Summer pp.260-284 and for the characteristics of these association agreements article written by Vice President of the Commission Andriessen, Frans H.J.J. 'Change in Central and Eastern Europe: The Role of the European Community' NATO Review February 1990 pp.1-6.
240 See for the discussion of these issues Wallace 1992 pp.79-113 and Spence p.59.
accession negotiations, in order to adapt to the developing common foreign and security policy framework of the European Union.

As far as the *acquis politique* of the Union is concerned, the specific issue arises from Turkey's association framework. As noted earlier, Turkey was invited to the WEU as an associate member. In this manner, it seems that the Community recognized the strategic and political importance of Turkey as an indispensable component of the European security system. Indeed, the Commission, in its Report on the enlargement stated, with reference to Turkey's Association relationship that 'events have highlighted Turkey's geographical importance, and the role which it can play as an ally and as a pole of stability in its region; the Community should take all appropriate steps to anchor it firmly within the future architecture of Europe.'

This was also reflected in the conclusions of the Lisbon Summit Presidency:

>'with regard to Turkey the European Council underlines that the Turkish role in the present European political situation is of the greatest importance and there is every reason to intensify cooperation and develop relations with Turkey in line with the prospect laid down in the Association Agreement of 1964 including a political dialogue at the highest level.'

This confirms that the existing association pattern is far from providing a politically adequate alternative to full membership. Given the recent tendencies and Turkey's growing political importance in European security, the spill over of political cooperation into the Association framework could be the most likely outcome of this process. The official statements which were expressed at the highest political levels of the Community in Lisbon, can be interpreted as the first signs that the level of Association in political cooperation is likely to be upgraded by associating Turkey with the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the Union. However, this remains to be seen.

In fact, despite the fact that the Association within the Pan-European cooperation process is an *ad hoc* substitute for the countries who cannot yet become members for

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structural reasons, the Community offers them political cooperation. For instance Dutch Vice President of The Commission, Frans Andriessen, had offered 'affiliate memberships' in 1991 which would provide the East European associates the benefits of political integration into the Community, without all the immediate responsibilities of full membership. In fact, with regard to emerging security issues in Europe the dilemma between the widening and deepening of integration increasingly becomes an acute problem in the light of the increasing economic and social gap between member and non-members of the EC. In this sense, as the European Union assumes (after Maastricht) a Pan-European role in the 1990s, the institutionalization of political dialogue and cooperation between associates and the Union is an imperative if the management of interdependence in security issues is to be maintained.

At the theoretical level it was observed that the association links may generate new possibilities for a functional spillover. In this sense Pedersen argued:

>'Once Pan-European cooperation reaches a threshold level, Sachlogic will accelerate cooperation through linkage processes. Perceived linkages will in turn be integrated into the integration strategies of EC actors. Spillover is most likely in the economic sphere, but Pan-European economic cooperation combined with rapid transnational integration at the economic, political and cultural levels may result in some spillover into the political sphere.'

The same logic also applies to Turkey's association process.

Some models of integration emerged in the 1980s which are applicable at a wider European scale and seem to assume some validity in the emerging European system in the 1990s. In fact, these were suggested as flexible arrangements and strategies to manage the diversity of the members of the Community. On the other hand, they can also be seen as flexible arrangements to extend the scope of different policies of the core integrative framework of the EC to other non-member European states. Particularly 'variable geometry', which was conceptualized by Delors in the 1980s, allowed participation of non-member European states in different policy areas of the Community. However, in its suggested form

244 Pedersen op cit p.85.
and content 'variable geometry' was limited to energy and technical issues. Tugenhat offered a more pragmatic version of this variable geometry by giving this notion a broader structure. He suggested that we should think in terms of a Europe of concentric circles, with the Conventional community at the centre and other policies and forms of cooperation 'radiating out from it'. Indeed, what we have witnessed recently is the emergence of 'concentric circles', in other words, the gradual extension of the competencies of the EU policies to non-members in European security and defence issues (in addition to economic and social policy issues) towards the outer circles of association patterns. In conclusion, association constitutes an important functional dimension of this 'variable geometry' that falls within 'concentric circles' in a wider European context. In a sense, associations are not only patterns of cooperation in different policy areas to reduce the socio-economic differences between the core and periphery, but they can be also seen as the building blocks of a new European architecture, in the post-Cold War Pan-European system and towards the gradual enlargement of the core Europe.

Conclusions

In this chapter, we examined Turkey's Association relationship in the context of post Cold War European security. As we have shown at the beginning of this chapter, Turkey's strongest argument in its application for full membership of the EC lay in its Post war security assets, which were asserted in the face of the perceived Soviet threat under the Cold War circumstances. Turkey's membership of NATO helped it to maximize its external sovereignty and to assert the European identity. However, a rapidly changing strategic and political landscape in the beginning of the 1990s in Europe, has diminished Turkey's Cold War security assets as a NATO member. The realist thinking of the Cold War politics, which

246 Ibid pp.36-38.
247 Tugenhant, Cristopher 'How to get Europe moving again' International Affairs 1985 V.61 pp.421-429.
248 Wallace 1985 op cit p.44.
were dominated by military issues and strategic considerations, offers an inadequate framework for the analysis of Turkey's post Cold War security role in Europe.

When the security interdependence and structural dynamics of post Cold War Europe are evaluated in the light of broader pluralistic security considerations, Turkey's security role assumes new characteristics. These characteristics are determined not by strictly military issues, but also political, economic, social and ideological factors, in the process of the Europeanization of its defence and security policies. In fact, the end of the Cold War freed Turkey from narrowly defined Cold War strategic considerations and created an environment that is more conducive to regional cooperation.

Even when the military issues of the post Cold War are taken into account, Turkey has an important role to play against the threats originating from the extra regional potential aggressors in the Middle East, such as the Gulf War. At the organizational level, it can be observed that there is a continuous convergence process with the hardcore of European defence structures and European defence identity. The establishment of an Association relationship with the WEU as the defence arm of the European Union, was the clear indication of the Europeanization of Turkey's defence structures. The Maastricht conclusions brought Turkey even closer to the heart of the European security community. In this sense, the acceptance of the discipline of Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union does not pose any major obstacles to Turkey's membership.

In a wider Pan European context, Turkey adopted Pan European oriented foreign and security policies which are compatible with the pluralistic values of the European integration project. The Black Sea Economic Cooperation initiative is an example of Turkey's post Cold War orientation. In the post Cold War period it seems Turkey adopted a long term strategy, which is different from the short term expectations of full membership in the aftermath of the application in 1987. This strategy can be defined as integration with the core of Europe through Pan-European cooperation in the long term. In this sense, in the beginning of the 1990s there is a clear shift of policy from Cold War realism to post cold
pluralism. Thus, the emphasis will be on its Pan-European policies rather than NATO membership.

Given that Turkey is becoming an increasingly important component of European defence and security structures, the spill over of political cooperation into the framework of Turkey's Association structure is inevitable. In fact, this development parallels the developments within the EC. The Association generates pluralistic dynamics in the security and foreign policy of Turkey.
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* Ass. Association Status (established or offered in 1992)
** Yugoslavia is not included
Chapter VII
CONCLUSIONS, SUMMARY AND PROSPECTS

The main hypothesis of this work was that Turkey's Association with the Community, acts as a progressive kind of cooperation framework which is capable of generating pre-integrative tendencies, in Turkey's adjustment to the European integration project and its eventual participation in the European Community. This hypothesis was tested against the empirical evidence in each of the previous chapters, within different contexts. This research was completed in the beginning of 1994. As the material cover a lengthy period of 30 years, some explanations are necessary. First of all our aim was not to give a detailed account of the relationship by analysing a specific period, but rather to examine the evolution, the nature and the institutional characteristics of Turkey's Association pattern within the context of European integration and cooperation. Thus in our research the main emphasis was on the qualitative and systemic changes in the process of Association, corresponding to specific periods within which the Association relationship was determined by certain dependent variables.

The second chapter showed that the Association framework was theoretically devised as a sui generis progressive framework of cooperation with ultimate aim of future membership.

In the third chapter, we demonstrated that in the first ten years of its operation the Association created a condition of asymmetrical vulnerability for Turkey within the policy framework of increasing interdependence. The Association structures failed in the management of the even distribution of costs and benefits within the policy framework of the Association and increasing interdependence. The progressive mechanisms and the tasks of the Association came to a standstill because of the lack of parallelism in the policies of the actors and also their structural incompatibilities.

As we showed in the fourth chapter, following Greece's full membership, Turkey's Association framework with the Community became another source of conflict between
Turkey and Greece. Turkey's Association process became a hostage to Greek national interests. In this way, the functional dynamics of the Association (such as the establishment of the Customs Union between Greece and Turkey) that are capable of generating cooperative behaviour between Greece and Turkey, were wasted.

In chapter five, it was proved that Turkey's application for full membership was the result of the general perception that the Association, politically and technically, rendered an inadequate institutional form in the relationship between the EC and Turkey. However, as a result of the increasing political, economic and social economic interdependence between the EC and Turkey, the decision making elites did not have any other choice but to apply for full membership to reactivate the progressive properties of the Association framework. This time, however, unlike the time of application for the Association, the decision was generated by pluralistic concerns and was supported by the non-governmental elites, as well as by governmental consensus, and the motivations were mainly economic, rather than political.

The security affiliations of Turkey with Western Europe have been a reinforcing factor in the formation of the Association relationship, under the Cold War circumstances of Post-War Europe. The last chapter put the Association in the context of post-Cold War circumstances, and addressed the question of security interdependence from the perspective of the recently emerging pluralistic European security perspective. Our assessment showed that the Association transformed from a Cold War instrument, to a Pan-European pattern of cooperation by generating Turkey's pluralistic (cooperative) security and foreign policy activities in its immediate regional environment.

The conclusions drawn incidentally, in the previous chapters, do not need to be repeated and confirmed in full here. However, the broad lines emerging from our research findings throughout our thesis, point to the following general conclusions.

The Progressive Formation of European Identity and the Association

Since its inception, the Association pattern has been an important point of reference in Turkey's advance to the European integration project. Indeed, for the majority of Turkish
decision making elites and modernizers, (regardless of the costs and benefits in the course of the operation of the Association framework) the ideological value of the relationship has been an element of continuity. The Association link was never fundamentally questioned by the core sections of governmental and non-governmental economic and political elites. The issues raised concerned the specific issue areas, rather than the Association link with the EC itself. Although in general terms, there has been an agreement that Association was a good thing, when it came to specifics, divergent interests, priorities and structural factors intervened in the process.

In our research we could not find any substantial evidence to suggest that the Association, at least at this stage, is an integral part of the Western European nation-building process. In Turkey’s case, the process of Association did not transcend the nation state identity of Turkey, but supplemented it at the level of the state as an ideology of Europeanization and a practical way of achieving modernization of economy and political institutions through joining Europe. In this sense, Europe, for Turkey, was a kind of 'identity of convenience' and of political orientation, determined by long-term interests. However, among all Turkey's organizational ties with Europe, the Association is the most dynamic link which has a potential to accelerate the progressive formation of Turkey's European identity as a preliminary learning process. However, this can only be resolved in the long run and depends on many external and internal factors which are beyond the scope and the prediction of this thesis.

**Association as a Source of Maximization of Sovereignty**

One of the variables we investigated was the potential role of the Association system in generating peace through its functional properties in the Greek-Turkish relationship. (Chapter 3) Even though, the Association system has the potential to create the basis of an increasing pattern of interdependence among the actors, we have seen that cooperation frameworks can also be the basis of the maximization of the State sovereignty. Indeed, the recent developments and the evidence in the fourth chapter show that Greece will continue to
veto the implementation of Turkey's Association framework, particularly in the financial aid and Customs Union area, until the EC starts negotiations to admit a divided Cyprus to full European Union membership.

In general, Association structures as perpetuating systems on the periphery of Europe, can also be new sources of fragmentation between the core and periphery Europe, through competition between the rival member and non-member neighbouring associated countries, as illustrated by the Greek-Turkish relationship. This is likely to lead to fragmentation and discrimination on the periphery of Europe, rather than contributing to a Pan-European cooperation and integration process. Since a member country who has national interests at stake with a neighbouring European non-member always has the opportunity to use its institutional powers within the Community structures, against the Communitarian interests of the EU.

**Association and the Management of Interdependence**

As we explained in the beginning of our thesis, that interdependence is theoretically helpful for understanding the underlying condition of the Association relationship. It can thus be concluded that the increasing interdependence in different issue areas, have been the outcome of the Association relationship. It is now possible to speak of a genuine interdependence between Turkey and the EC which is costly to break. However, it is fair to conclude that Turkey is the more vulnerable and sensitive partner in this condition of interdependence. The issues in social, economic and financial policy areas are more critical to Turkey. Therefore, regardless of the question of Turkey's full membership, what really matters is how this interdependence will be managed. However, as we saw in the third chapter, concerning the first decade in the operation of the Association when interdependence was poorly managed, the Association became a source of disharmony, rather than cooperation, in critical issue areas. What prevents us from calling the Association a dependency model is the existence of political bargaining and consultation processes within which the gradual linkage of issues can be conceivable. Within this institutional structure,
the distribution of costs and benefits in different issue areas can be realized. However, this is dependent upon the bargaining skills and the potential advantage of the dependent partner in certain issue areas. For instance, even though security was not within the ambit of the Association framework, from the inception of the Association to the application for full membership (see the background and motivations in the second and fifth chapters) it was used by Turkey in the political bargaining process as an asset to restore the symmetry in the condition of interdependence. Even though security issues have never been high on the agenda of the Association process, they provided Turkish decision makers with important initial bargaining advantages. When the actors took a long-term view of their interests, linkage across issues of high politics and low politics became possible in the negotiation and consultation process of the Association process. Indeed, Turkey's valuable assets in the field of security made the relationship too costly to break for the dominant partner, i.e. the EC, as this manifested in the Community documents. (Chapter VI)

Another conclusion with regard to the nature of condition within the policy framework of the Association concerns the widening asymmetry in the policy interdependence. This manifested itself in both direct and indirect policy making structures. Direct policy interdependence exists within the Association structures, where there is direct contact between the parties. What we observed is that there is a highly asymmetrical direct policy interdependence, in the bilateral policy making process. Indeed, despite the fact that the decisions are made in the Association structures on the basis of bilateral equality, the material basis of the veto power of the dominant partner (the EC) is much more effective than that of Turkey in influencing the outcomes in the consultation and bargaining process. On the other hand there is also a highly asymmetrical indirect policy interdependence between the EC and Turkey, since the EC is in a position to affect the policies of the Association indirectly, by using its own decision making bodies to circumvent the institutional structures of the Association. Indeed, following the membership of Greece, the asymmetry in the policy interdependence between the EC and Turkey has increased, as the Community decisions are also subjected to Greek veto. Indeed, through its decision making powers, Greece can
directly and indirectly affect the Association policies, as we saw in the fourth chapter. We shall deal with this later in the next section.

The Association and Integration

Association itself is not a process of integration. But as it was shown in our research, there is evidence to suggest that it generates pre-integrative tendencies in the process. In this sense, it would not be wrong to conclude, in the case of Turkey, that the Association has been a learning process for the governmental and non-governmental elites, about the initial effects of integration. This is particularly evident in the voluntary loss of national economic autonomy, as a result of the gradual acceptance of a customs union regime in Turkey's Association process. In this sense, the customs union is one of the most important tasks of the Association, an important litmus test for eligibility.

As we observed in our research, the elite perceptions have, in the process, shifted from regarding and perceiving the Association as a condition of increasing negative interdependence, to a pre-integrative task as a process model leading to the full membership of the EC. (Compare the background conditions and motivations between Chapter 3 and Chapter 5). The comparison between the application for the Association and Full membership, reveals the change in elite attitudes, particularly at the level of non-governmental economic elites. Regardless of the rights and privileges of the full membership, for the time being the interest oriented Turkish elites, seem to bear the initial effects of a customs union regime, with the expectation that the loss of autonomy in the national economy will be compensated for by the qualification of Turkey's sovereignty, by incorporating it to the Community structures in virtue of full membership. In this sense, the establishment of the customs union, is the final stage of Turkey's Association process, (quasi-membership). In fact, it seems Turkey will be the only non-member of the EU who will have established, by 1996, a customs union regime with the European Community without enjoying the rights and privileges of full membership. This will make Turkey the integral part of the Community customs union area. Unless the accession process to the Community
framework starts soon following the completion of the customs union, we may witness the
reversal of these pre-integrative processes and the negative changes in the elite attitudes.

As long as the Association is regarded as a process oriented cooperation framework
by the Turkish elites, the reactivation and implementation of the provisions of the
Association framework will be the main efforts of Turkish decision makers to recover the lost
'sui generis' character of the Agreement. In its attempt to achieve full membership Turkey
will try to fulfill its commitments, while pressing the EC to honour its own obligations
(financial protocols, free movement of Turkish workers within the Community) arising from
the Association Agreement and its Additional Protocols. The attainment of the pre-
integrative tasks, the establishment of the customs union, the adoption of the common
external tariffs and free movement of productive factors and harmonization of economic
policies and legislation in accordance with the time table envisaged in the Association Treaty,
could virtually make Turkey a de facto member of the Community in economic terms to a
considerable extent, provided that these progress smoothly. The free movement of Turkish
people still remains a critical issue. After all, it is difficult for the Turkish people to accept,
when goods and money move freely, why the labour market should stop at the frontiers. On
the other hand, the completion of the customs union area is not an easy task. Even for the
developed economies of the EC it took at least 10 years to achieve the customs union. The
achievement of the customs union in Turkey's case might even be much longer than
expected. On the other hand, given the structural dissimilarities, if Turkey succeeds in
achieving the tasks of the Association by fully liberalizing its political and economic structure
without any help from the Community funds and any rights arising from full membership,
this will imply that Turkey is ready to assume the rights and commitments arising from the
full membership of the Community. However this should not be taken for granted. The
adoption of the customs union, without being qualified as a full member or before the
accession talks start, will remain a contentious issue. For instance, it would not be surprising
if Turkey resorts to derogation from the customs union in its sensitive sectors, unless the
envisaged financial compensations are granted. Indeed, according to Turkish officials the
loss of revenues, as result of the establishment of a customs union by 1995, are too costly to bear without any compensation of financial aid or the qualification of full membership.

On the other hand, before the full implementation of the Customs Union, which means lowering its trade barriers to EU good to zero and adopting the Union's common external tariff-on January 1, 1996, Turkey still has to cut tariffs and adopt legislation in harmony with that of the EU. According to the Community calculations Turkey's averaged weighted protection against the EU products is 12.8 per cent compared with 17.2 per cent for third countries while we are writing this conclusion in October 1994. There is also considerable harmonization of legislation to be done particularly in the areas of industrial and competition policy and intellectual property rights and technical standardization before the final timetable was adopted towards the completion of the timetable of the customs union. It is highly likely that if these policies are not in place in line with the EU policies, the implementation of the customs union can be delayed.

It must be noted, however, that the EC itself is a rapidly moving target, that Turkey is constantly trying to catch. Thus, by the time Turkey will achieve the objectives and fulfil the tasks of the Association framework, the European Union will be far more advanced in its integration process. Especially in the post-Maastricht period it is highly likely that the EU will qualitatively become a different political animal. The EC for which Turkey applied in 1987 was different from the European Union of today. In this sense, the European Union of tomorrow will be different from the EC of the 1980s in which the new democracies and the developing economies of Spain, Portugal and Greece had joined. (For instance, in Spain's and Portugal's case, even after they acceded to the Community structures and compensation mechanisms, the completion of the customs union took at least seven years). Thus, by the time Turkey achieved the objectives of the Association framework, the obligations and rights of membership might be too difficult to assume for Turkey, in order to participate in an entity with a completed single market, a single common currency. Some structurally less developed full members are already facing difficulties. Thus, it would be much more difficult for the poorer countries of Europe to join this economically coherent structure, which
by the year 2000 is likely to become a full economic and political union. The European Union is far beyond the customs union stage. It is easy to predict that the membership of the European Union will require far greater political and economic commitments to integration than the pre-1992 EC. The costs of membership might be economically too high to bear for the poorer countries of Europe. This economic aspect of integration is likely to exclude the less developed countries of Europe, outside the core framework of European integration.

Moreover, it is possible that the costs of full membership could exceed the benefits, depending on the perceptions of the decision makers. This is highly likely if the Turkish decision makers take a long view of their political and economic interests as being better protected within an association relationship. For instance, the reform of the structural funds and agricultural policies, the advantages of full membership for relatively backward economies like Turkey, may erode. Indeed, in order to have access to the single European market for its competitive industrial products, (e.g. textiles) Turkey does not need to be a full member since the provisions of the Association Agreement provides for these privileges. Under normal circumstances Turkey will have full access to the European market in the textile sector. If this is the case then it is likely that the Association framework is likely to take a permanent pattern of cooperation between the European Union within which more plausible and equitable alternatives, membership can be sought. In this case, Turkey may press for the restoration and reformation of the Association relationship. It is a safe prediction in general that the improvement and the reform of the Association in the form and the content of its framework can be a substitute for full membership, should Turkey’s full membership request refused in the foreseeable future. The final product of the relationship in this case would be a special permanent bilateral Association relationship (a kind of *sui generis* extraordinary Association status) between the EU and Turkey, which will be reinforced by a customs union regime and closer cooperation in the defence and security field.

However, the modernizing Turkish elite, for the time being, continue to see the Association and the eventual implication of the customs union as the catalyst of the process
of structural convergence between the EC and Turkey towards full membership. When the long-term view of the mainstream Europeanising elites were taken into account, the membership issues cannot be reduced to a simple cost and benefit analysis. Given the overall condition of interdependence in ideological, social, political and economic areas, between Turkey and the EU, the majority view that Turkey's modernization can be better facilitated and interests better served within the EU will not change. Thus, the membership and customs union issue remain mainly a political matter in its essence.

On the other hand, the completion of the customs union is neither entirely left to Turkey's decision nor is it a purely economic matter for the EU. In the final analysis, it is also subject to the political approval of the European Parliament, which is in turn concerned with the political developments in Turkey. At the time of writing this section, the developments in human rights and democracy in Turkey do not seem promising. Given the increasing powers of the European Parliament over the Association Agreements after Maastricht as an emerging supranational conscience of European integration, the process of the completion of the customs union can be at risk unless Turkey shows real progress in the field of democracy and human rights.

**Association and Security**

Even though security interdependence, which was determined under the Cold War conditions, has been a reinforcing factor behind the formation of the Association relationship between the EC and Turkey, the issues of high politics nevertheless have been kept outside the Association framework. However, as we demonstrated in the last chapter, association structures have transformed from being purely economic and functional cold war patterns.

Turkey's Association system was not an exception to this general systemic tendency, and was not free from the dynamics of the core integrative framework of the European Community. Indeed, the spill over of Turkey's Association relationship into security and defence cooperation with the hard core of the European defence identity, has been a recent feature of the relationship. Given the emerging security interdependence between the
European Union and Turkey, the deepening of political cooperation in defence and security between Turkey and the European Union within European structures seems more likely in the beginning of the 1990s. Indeed, this was manifested in the President of the Commission's words during his recent visit to Athens in January 1994 in which he appealed to Greece to adopt a 'realistic and strategic view of Turkey's importance.' The spill over of the Association relationship into security and defence, in parallel with the developments in the hard core of European integration, seems inevitable in the light of security interdependence. Having been freed from the constraints of cold war realism, there has been an opening up of pluralistic political and economic space for Turkey, by allowing mature cooperative policies in her immediate regional environment. Looking at the evidence in the last chapter, it would not be inaccurate to conclude that this regional cooperative attitude was encouraged and facilitated by Turkey's Association link with Europe. To a considerable extent, it is possible to conclude that Turkey's Association process with European integration generates mature cooperative behaviour and a pluralistic kind of foreign policy dynamics, by linking the hard core of European integration to Pan European regional subsystems.

The Question of Enlargement and Association

The most important conclusion can be related to the question of the enlargement of the European Union and the role of Association. The priority of the deepening process over the enlargement process is not valid anymore. It is almost certain after Maastricht, that the EC will enlarge, whilst the process of the deepening of integration is at work. In this context, the process of enlargement and the process of deepening are inter-connected. Thus, the extent and nature of the integration process cannot be addressed without reference to the challenge of enlargement. In fact, the enlargement issue constitutes the external stimuli for the core dynamics of European integration, since further enlargement will inevitably require more coherent and effective supranational decision making structures, and the reform of the agricultural, regional, social and structural policies of the European Union. The necessity of these reforms will be further enhanced by the fact that the entry of the less developed
countries of Europe will enormously increase the costs of these policies and complicate the
decision making procedures of the European Union. However, the probable accession of the
rich EFTA countries, who will be the net contributors to the budget, can be a balancing factor
in the redistributive policies of the Union.

In the final analysis, it is fair to assume that the level of deepening will determine the
extent of the enlargement of the EU. Thus, the enlargement will be dependent upon what
political form the EC will eventually assume. There are basically two rough scenarios that we
can envisage. These two rough scenarios are used for their explanatory rather than
anticipatory character and are not mutually exclusive in predicting the future of Turkey's
Association relationship. The first scenario is the emergence of an exclusive European club
with federalist tendencies, (the United States of Europe) consisting of rich and big members
of the EU. This hard core will continue to deepen integration towards political union, by
excluding the rest of Europe from the process of European integration. Even some less
committed members of the European Union can be marginalised within the Community
structures. This is the least conducive scenario to enlargement. If this occurs, Europe is likely
to be divided and fragmented between rich and poor Europe. In this scenario, associations
are likely to become permanent patterns of dependence, by excluding the poorer European
countries from the European integration project. This scenario can eventually led to
disharmony and fragmentation between the centre and periphery of Europe where a
nationalist and fundamentalist backlash against the Community, might manifest themselves
on the periphery of Europe. This scenario seems detrimental to the process of European
integration and cooperation in the long-run.

The second scenario is the wider Europe which allows flexible arrangements within a
wider European context, in which the looser the structure the more conducive to the gradual
enlargement towards the rest of Europe would be. This scenario consists of different layers
of integration and cooperation spheres within a Pan European context (European
Community of States). The hard core consists of the members who are the most committed to
integration. The second circle make up the members of the less committed member states of
the European Union. Indeed, the opt out clauses of the Maastricht Treaty created a favourable environment for the flexible arrangements, not only for the member countries of the European Union, but also for the non-member countries. (The British and Danish opt outs. The Danish over monetary union and in Britain's case over social policy). Finally, the outer circle consists of the Associated states. This can be called a training area for the less developed countries of Europe who will be prepared to participate in the EU. (As the evidence demonstrated in the last chapter) In this wider context, the Association structures constitute important components of this 'variable geometry' arrangement providing the other East and Southeast European countries with institutional frameworks for regular consultations and bargaining in the management of interdependence. Indeed, the association structures enable the associated countries of Europe to participate in compatible policy areas of the EU (like customs union, security and defence in Turkey's case) while excluding them from the dense and demanding policy spheres of the hard core of integration (like Common Currency). The Association renders partial integration possible in a wider European context. In this context, this structure can be called the European Community of States within which different associates are integrating gradually in different policy spheres of the core Community areas at different times. In this scenario, the Association patterns are likely to act as process oriented patterns of cooperation and modernization, that may eventually enable the less developed countries to participate in the European integration project.
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