THE UNIVERSITY OF HULL

'Psycho-Analysis and Textual Production'

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by

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This piece of writing is dedicated to my parents with love.

Rosalind Cox

&

Don Cox
PREFACE
Preface

'Psycho-Analysis and Textual Production'

As its title suggests, this study is divided into two separate but related parts. Each part of the thesis is then sub-divided into sections. Part I is evolutionary in nature, building its argument in a more linear and expository style than those sections which comprise Part II which stand in a more dialogical relation to each other and are self-sufficient in form. The title of the thesis uses the term 'psycho-analysis' as it was first introduced by Freud with reference to a systemic methodology. It should be noted that the 'textual production' to which I refer in the title should not suggest a Marxist-based analysis. Instead, it refers to the activation of the text in conjunction with its encounter with the reading subject. As such, it does not refer to the creation of an author, nor to the material production via institutions in the strict historical sense. It does, however, refer to a material affect of the signifier in its interpretative rendering by emphasizing its bodily interlinking with the imaginary of the reader in a scene which is analogous to that of hysterical symptomatology. Part I is entitled 'Psycho-Analysis' and consists of three sections which explore the beginnings of psychoanalysis, its main theories on hysteria and the relationship between Josef Breuer and Sigmund Freud. The theoretical base of hysteria is considered to be illuminating to analyses of critical procedures such as those employed in literary criticism. Part II is entitled 'Textual Production' and is comprised of six sections of textual readings. These readings are presented as discrete in themselves yet of an interlocking character. This study of psycho-analysis and textual production has attempted to examine the mechanisms of critical encounter in relation to the psychoanalytical text and the literary text. Theories offered by psycho-analysis formulated with reference to hysteria are considered to offer an illuminating parallel to those processes which occur in critical practice.
Psycho-Analysis and Textual Production

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INTRODUCTION
INTRODUCTION

As its title suggests, this study is divided into two separate but related parts. Each part of the thesis is then sub-divided into sections. Part I is evolutionary in nature, building its argument in a more linear and expository style than those sections which comprise Part II which stand in a more dialogical relation to each other and are self-sufficient in form.

The title of the thesis uses the term 'psycho-analysis' as it was first introduced by Freud with reference to a systemic methodology. Its hyphenated form here draws attention to the interest of the thesis in the historical evolution and aetiological beginnings of psychoanalysis as we now term it. In its divided form, it is also suggestive/redolent of the analyses and analytical procedures devised and employed by literary critical encounters. This thereby draws attention to the shared linguistic base of both disciplines and the active dimension of written and spoken textuality in both domains. At other times in the thesis, I employ the term 'psychoanalysis' to refer to the present-day discipline in its application. The collapsible nature of the earlier term into the later synthesis allows a distinction to be made between a system based upon linguistic distinction and its subsequent methodological application which has facilitated a new terminology and vocabulary established within its own domains. This transmutation therefore might suggest that any discipline is systemic to itself, allowing its thoughts and textual production to be shaped and determined by its own methodologies.

It should be noted that the 'textual production' to which I refer in the title should not suggest a Marxist-based analysis. Instead, it refers to the activation of the text in conjunction with its encounter with the reading subject which provides an arena of virtual space. As such, it does not refer to the creation of an author, nor to the material production via institutions in the strict historical sense. It does, however, refer to a material affect of the signifier in its interpretative rendering by emphasizing its bodily interlinking with the imaginary of the reader in a scene which is analogous to that of hysterical symptomatology where the latent text finds its 'inscription' in the living flesh, a symbol made manifest in the body of the hysteric. In this way, it may be seen to link with the living history assumed by the reading/writing subject engaged in the signifying act for, according to Lacan, "[i]t is certainly the assumption of his history by the subject, in so far as it is constituted by the speech addressed to the other, that constitutes the ground of the new method that Freud called psychoanalysis" (Lacan: 1977, 48).

Part I: 'Psycho-Analysis'

Part I consists of three sections which explore the beginnings of psychoanalysis, its main theories on hysteria and the relationship between Josef Breuer and Sigmund Freud. Texts of early psychoanalysis are examined in relation to theories formulated on hysteria. This is not a static or purely historical exploration but one which seeks to utilize concepts and neglected theoretical strata from Breuer and Freud's Studies on Hysteria (1895) to comment upon critical practice. Studies on Hysteria is given close attention in order to explore the theoretical base of hysteria represented there as one which may prove illuminating to analyses of critical procedures employed in the younger academic application of literary criticism. As the springboard of all later psychoanalytical theorization, the phenomenon of hysteria - precisely because it was not regarded as a clearly defined clinical entity by Breuer and Freud - must be
understood as offering an aetiological cross-section of all subsequently classified neuroses. More pertinent to the premise of this thesis, it also offers a clinical scenario of an intense semiotic encounter.

Because the psychoanalytical texts selected are of an early character in the history of psychoanalysis, through their discussion of the aetiology of hysteria the aetiology of psychoanalysis itself may be displayed. It is interesting to note the close attention paid to language in the establishment of psychoanalytical theory and practice. It may be seen to exist as an application of a system of semiotics in which the lived affects of the signifying practices may be traced through the symptomatology with which it is presented. It is also through and by the same signifying practice that psychoanalysis offers both its therapy and analysis. In other words, its therapeutic application is subject to the same linguistic mechanisms as the object of its scrutiny: its object is most manifestly its subject. The same observation may be made regarding the critical encounter with the literary or indeed any other text. The means by which critical interpretation presents itself shares the same linguistic base and may use the same figurations as the text with which it is engaging. It would seem therefore that there is an argument for an hysterical splitting of scenes in both psychoanalysis and literary criticism.

Historically, the mythical dimension of the aetiology of psychoanalysis is explored as an area of investment for subsequent critics by which their own criteria are displayed for all to see. Anglo-American feminist interpretation of the history of hysteria, even when it engages with psychoanalytical theory, often misrepresents aspects of its therapy and perpetuates myths with regard to its practitioners (Hunter: 1983, Price Herndl: 1988, Gallop: 1985). French feminist theorization in this area has often sought to claim the hysteric as a feminist heroine, a talking subversive in the face of Herr Doctor (Cixous and Clément: 1996 [1975]). The figure who has suffered most in such accounts and analyses has been Dr. Josef Breuer and the first section of Part I concentrates upon him as a medical practitioner. Whilst his name has been, for the most part, forgotten as an original thinker integral to the beginnings of psychoanalysis, it is often cited in feminist critiques as an easy by-word for the repressive machinations of the patriarchal apparatus instilled in medical science. It is therefore an interest of these first three sections to recuperate the work of Breuer and to install his figure as central to psychoanalytical theorization. Although his biographical details are commented upon, and in this area the thesis is indebted to the investigative scholarship of Albrecht Hirschmuller, it is not the intention here to establish a truer life story but to highlight how subjectivity itself is textualized and how textual distortion may become systemic within a given discipline so that it may maintain its tenets. It is with a sense of irony that the figure of Dr. Breuer also provides us with a figure of mastery within the confines of the thesis.

Breuer’s ‘Theoretical’ contribution to Studies on Hysteria is examined in the second section in order to draw out neglected areas of his theory in relation to later psychoanalytical theorization by Freud. It is also considered that Jacques Lacan, in his reformulation of Freudian theory, inherited some of Breuer’s theoretical and stylistic constructs. The reading of ‘Theoretical’ concentrates upon Breuer’s theoretical metaphors, his textual reflexivity, and his formulation of symptomatology. His extensive electrical analogies are given thorough attention as it is considered that they provide an illuminating model of the psychical mechanism of the organism. The last section of Part I concentrates upon the case history of ‘Fräulein Anna O.’ and is used to comment upon present-day formulations of gender. It considers the role of bodily topology in the constitution of the ego and argues that gender may be understood as the inhabitation of a phantasy, a lived metaphor. The subsequent work of Freud on ego configuration and Lacan on the imaginary and bodily topology are drawn upon to develop this argument in conjunction with the research of Paul Schilder on the image of the human body.

Although the sections which comprise Part I make use of clinical scenario and theoretical observations, they also constitute a responsive textual arena in which the
psychoanalytical text is subjected to a theoretical scrutiny consistent with its own postulations. The psychoanalytical text is then placed in a co-existent relation with other texts so that an intertextual interplay may be seen to operate within the confines of the section itself in order to accentuate the overdetermined structural dynamic at play in the topology of theoretical writing itself as a practice. I argue later that the position occupied by the hysterical subject offers a correlative to the position taken up in writing and reading and is therefore inherent to critical practice. This says less that the critic is an hysteric per se than that he/she occupies an hysterical postioning. It points to a base shared by psychoanalysis and literary analysis which is split in its theoretical application between its application and its means, i.e. that it is dependent for its production upon the same material out of which the textual product is wrought so that its existence is produced by its means of production. This points to an inherent materialism at the base of the signifying practice so that within its production it carries absolutely the means of its reproduction.

Part II: 'Textual Production'

Each section of Part II comprises a textual reading. These textual readings are presented as discrete in themselves yet of an interlocking character. It is hoped that Part II will be seen to consist of a construct of moveable sections which interlink in stylistic and thematic terms and in their theoretical suggestibility. By 'suggestibility', I mean an openness to suggestion existing in the text understood as an organic unit. Although dependent upon being read for activation, the text gathers an agency as it is engaged in a reciprocal activation of the reading subject as text. The texts selected for analysis are treated strictly as texts rather than aesthetic or 'literary' forms. Their differences are sewn together by the common thread of the thesis which posits hysterical structuration as being central to critical process. Some of the texts examined are not strictly 'literary', such as the contentious Story of O or the life story of Princess Diana.

The textual productions of Part II range in focus from children's fiction, twentieth-century pastiche of the Victorian ghost story, pornography/erotica, contemporary 'women's fiction' and biographical/cultural texts to the pattern-verse of the last great mythical 'poet figure' of the twentieth century. All of these texts are run through, I would argue, by a post-modern awareness of the machinations of their textual existence, displaying self-reflexivity in form, style and subject. The texts may be seen to interlink in their interests in the temporal elements of narrativity, the affects of haunting, topological inter-dimensionality, processes of grief/mourning, virtuality, hysterical positioning, workings of power, desire and critical engagement, and a challenge to the liminal boundaries of textual production. A strong element of inter-textual cross-reference constitutes an area of haunting within these texts and is brought to bear from outside or extra-textually. These ghostly reverberations in textuality may be said to constitute an area of haunting in which the textual is revenant to itself, drawing attention to the temporal and topological aspects of textual representation and production.

The textual analyses here represented constitute areas where some of the textual affects of what has been technically presented in Part I will be seen to operate. In this way the consideration of the symptom as a virtual dimension is related to the metaphoric space of the textual body. Hysterical actiology is referred to in order to critique the critical endeavour and to comment upon the manifest text and its condition seconde. Freud's concept of Nachträglichkeit, or 'afterwardsness' is employed to comment on the backward completion principle operative in the reading process and in literary form as a tensile aestheticism dependent upon the workings of memory and recollection. The phenomenon of transference is viewed as contiguous with the textual virtuality whilst liminal challenge represented in and by the textual body is tied to the Lacanian concept of jouissance. The readings themselves are considered to be texts produced in response to other texts and in this way seek to open up and display the dynamic of textual production itself, a working illumination of a scheme in which
theory and text interact within a textual arena made specific to the discourse of psychoanalysis.

Because mechanisms described by psychoanalysis are activated in the reading/writing process, there is more attention to clinical detail and practice than to ‘set’ complexes and notions in the readings offered in the thesis. The text is regarded as a structure which comes into contact with the living structuration of the reading-writing subject by which it is mobilized and energized. This contact takes place in a third space which exists between text and subject. This scenario is analogous to Wolfgang Iser's exploration of the reading process when he states that,

The literary text activates our own faculties, enabling us to recreate the world it presents. The product of this creative activity is what we might call the virtual dimension of the text, which endows it with its reality. This virtual dimension is not the text itself, nor is it the imagination of the reader: it is the coming together of text and imagination. (Iser: 1988, 215)

This is not to suggest that reader response is wholly responsible for the affects of its energizing response because this would waive the textual intrusion into the space of the subject. The third space is analogous to the ‘place’ of transference and as such constitutes an active virtuality. It is the place of a two-way haunting. This proposition of a third place or an arena of constructivity that exists as a coalition between textual structure and subject structure posits a virtual space as a locus of inter-projection. The subject, engaged in the reading process, enters the dimension of the text to be inhabited by the textual structure itself in a reciprocal exchange. In a complex of intertextual mechanics, it must also be considered that the reading subject exists as an area of receptivity inhabited by the cross-referential haunting operative in the text itself.

Psycho-Analytical Practice: The spoken text

...it is in the very movement of speaking that the hysteric constitutes her desire. (Lacan: 1994, 12)

Because the linguistic arena of psycho-analysis consists solely in the arena of speech in terms of its ‘therapeutic efficacy, it must be stressed that the thesis draws as much upon the mechanisms of its clinical practice which are based upon the trajectory of speech as its written theoretical aspects. The spoken performance of the linguistic crossed through by its written counterpart is a constant presence in the work of Jacques Lacan who states that "my recourse (in rewriting) to the movement of the (spoken) discourse, restored to its vitality" marks its function in its very scriptibility (Lacan: 1977, 147).

Psychoanalysis as a practice concentrates upon the linguistic dimension between subjectivities which exists as a virtual dimension. All it has to work on are the words thrown into space between analyst and analysand: the arena which constitutes the dimension of ‘full speech’. “Its means are those of speech,” according to Lacan (Lacan: 1977, 49). Freud, in his Introductory Lectures, states that “[i]n psycho-analytic treatment nothing happens but an exchange of words between the patient and the physician" (Freud: 1968, 13). Lacan considers that the psychoanalyst’s "whole experience must find in speech alone its instrument, its context, its material, and even the background noise of its uncertainties" (Lacan: 1977, 147).

Directed as a trajectory to an other as the affirming destination, speech becomes an irresistible urge and response to organic excitation. Somatic and psychic disturbance is thereby linked to cathartic release via linguistic presentation. Bertha Pappenheim remarked in the 1920s that “[p]sychoanalysis is in the hands of the physician what the confessional is in
the hands of the Catholic clergy" (Edinger: 1963, 12 cited by Sulloway: 1992, 57). Breuer writes that “[t]here is a normal, appropriate reaction to excitation caused by very vivid and irreconcilable ideas, namely to communicate them by speech" (Breuer & Freud: 1991, 288). Here Breuer communicates a precedent for linguistic trajectory as transmissible carrier of affect in an arena between one and other, although the concept of transference is not yet developed, of course, as third space. It is through the projection to the other by which 'I' am constituted in the dimensions of self. That there is an agency assumed in telling is the basic premise of psychoanalytic therapy. That this telling must be matched by an interpretation based upon auditory sensibility is a mechanism which is analogous to that existing between the reader and the literary text. Reading, that most silent cerebral act, is subject to an innermost imaginary voice projection. Its machinations have an auditory performative element which is projected inwards in the imagined dimensions of the subject. This sensory/bodily foundation of reading - and writing - is often overlooked by its intellectual status. Reading is then passed through by speech, textual activation implicates the voice.

The cathartic imperative of telling is linked to its performative status. Yet the therapeutic performative is not so straightforward for, in its act of utterance, the sentence is transmissive of a meaning which is not always represented there. It sometimes ‘does’ just what it doesn’t say. This performative element of the ‘talking cure’ is one which is implicitly related to critical reception as the third space becomes a region in which transference takes place, not as an exchange but an embodiment and ‘fullness’. J.L. Austin writes that, “Once we realize that what we have to study is not the sentence but the issuing of an utterance in a speech situation, there can hardly be any longer a possibility of not seeing that stating is performing an act” (Austin: 1975 [1955], 139 – emphasis as original). The analysand does not simply throw words into an empty air-space between one and other but those words constitute a locutionary act which is itself a dimension, a wished-for performative fullness. Here language may be linked to substitution for a lost object which points to a mourning base of the signing subject. (The thesis offers a textual reading of Philippa Pearce's Tom’s Midnight Garden which explicitly explores this dimension of subjectivity, loss and signing. Its readings of Dylan Thomas and Diana are offered as examinations of the habitations of a performative ‘I’ which lives in lies of true fiction which is the stuff of subjectivity.) In its relation to discovery and uncovering, academic endeavour may be considered as implicitly related to deathliness as it wishes to submit its revelation to the scrutiny of ‘the real’.

In textual hysterics: Body and text

The thesis will assume a continuity between Breuer, Freud and Lacan in its exploration of the textualized body as a somatic conception of the mind and body traditionally separated by western metaphysics. In its formulations, it considers that Lacan does not ignore the bodily, biological aspects of the signifier as has been suggested by those post-structuralists who wish to present Lacan as metaphorical Freud minus the biology. Instead, it may be seen that Lacan pays great attention to biological detail in order to present the imaginary bodily image in conjunction with anatomical dimensionality of the organism. In 'The subversion of the subject and the dialectic of desire' (1960), Lacan speaks of the movement of the signifier in relation to desire. Its trajectory is formulated in relation to corporeal limits represented by "the rim of the anus, the tip of the penis, the vagina, the slit formed by the eyelids". Even "respiratory erogeneity" plays a part integral to the desiring and signifying subject which forms its ego in complicity with body image (Lacan: 1977, 314-5). The body image is considered as essential to the human imaginary as the sight of another member of the species is for the maturation of the gonad of the female pigeon (Lacan: 1977, 3). The “constitutive presence” of the subject is governed by "his movement, his grip, his muscular and visceral emotion" (Lacan: 1994, 71). This bodily linguistics explored by Lacan is implicitly tied to Breuer and Freud’s theorization in Studies on Hysteria.
In the hysterical re-covery of the past, the analysand presents an arena of speech through which the past is represented by present means. It is by interpellating into that place, passing through the past to displace the historically constituted 'I', that the hysteric may recover. The 'staging' of the affects of the past may be traced in the hysterical symptomatology as a biological constructivity where signifiers lodged in the flesh offer themselves for interpretation as metaphors. This body text which is constitutive in the interpretative act may be considered as congruent with the positionality of the critical body as it is rendered hysterical by its habitation of a second scene. This is because in negotiation with the textual, the critic enters a condition seconde. In his Seminar XVIII, Lacan presents us with his 'four discourses' which geometric model offers the discourse of the hysteric as being but one turn from that of the university and that of the master. In this scenario, the critic allied with the discourse of the university treads a knife-edge between the postures of mastery and hysteria. Because interpretation of the written word is highly dependent upon an imagined auditory sensation existing within the confines of the subject, it might be seen that readerly response is written through the skin in a reciprocally constitutive relation with the text. In this model, it is the text which is made symptomatic via the critical presence.

My use of Lacan assumes a distinct absorption of Freudian 'biologism' as an extra-textual dimension and constituting an area of intimate co-relation with the flesh. In Critical Practice, Catherine Belsey states that Lacan’s reading of Freud is tantamount to a Copernican revolution for liberal humanism because “Lacan consistently rejects a concept of humanity based on a quasi-biological theory of instincts and insists that the subject is constructed in the symbolic order” (Belsey: 1980, 131). Contrary to this view, I would seek to argue that Lacan’s presentation of bodily configuration is quite consistent with Freud’s and that the ‘Copernican revolution’ had already taken place for liberal-humanist thought in Freud’s own writing. “For it is a question of grasping more precisely what Freud in his doctrine himself articulates as constituting a ‘Copernican’ step” (Lacan: 1977, 295). Belsey’s wished-for rejection of the “quasi-biological” is based on a failure to recognise the textuality of biology (or the biological base of metaphor) and furthermore that a Copernican revolution can only be the result of liberal humanism itself. This correlates with Foucault’s conception of resistance as a result of and inherent in power. Subversion is therefore a construct dependent notion. Belsey’s reading then relegates Freud to liberal humanism and sidelines the textuality of bodily configuration of which both Breuer and Freud were well aware in the Studies. This points to the liberal-humanist grip on all critical endeavour and recognizes that post-modernist challenge is implicit to liberal-humanism itself. (The tension existing between post-modernism and liberal humanism is examined in relation to identity in the section below relating to Diana, Princess of Wales.)

Analysis & Power : Positions of mastery and postures of knowledge

How was it that the author arrived at the same knowledge as the doctor — or at least behaved as though he possessed the same knowledge? (Freud, 1907 [1906] ‘Jenson’s Gradiva’. PFL 14: 79)

In analysing a text, the critic-reader places himself in the same position in relation to the text as the doctor to the patient, so playing analyst to the textual analysand. In this scheme in which the agency of the analysand is dependent upon the activating pressure of the analyst, the analytical situation may be described as one of feedback where the critical function meets head-on the ghosts inhabiting its own ego structuration as they, in turn, become activated by the text. It is into the text that the critic looks for confirmation of himself as master of the situation until it is quite clear that in the moment of apparent mastery (i.e. interpretation), the critic is quite undone by a series of symbols and marks. The text may be said to be quiescent until ‘triggered’. Once triggered, however, it is set loose to haunt the critic, entering his configuration and running through subsequent acts of reading/writing consciously or
unconsciously. It becomes constituent to a critical topology reverberating through future acts of reading, inhabiting textual structures as yet unread.

In a functional role, the critic as a writing authority might be said to occupy a position parallel to the doctor presumed to know, i.e. critical functionality is dependent upon the masquerade of knowing with which the reading subject may be embroiled in varying degrees. Yet within this relation of engagement is a reciprocity between the reading subject and the read object for it relies wholly upon the dynamic of seduction. It is necessary that the critic be seduced by what is inanimate in order that it may be animated by passing through and indeed altering the dimensions of the critical body itself. In this mechanical exchange, the critical venture mirrors the psychoanalytical therapeutic promise which relies upon this phantasied relation between analyst and analysand. The critical posture is indeed an imposture. Its analytical power is reduced to nothing more than a submissive reading which inhabits a postural phantasy of knowing. Such positions of mastery are dependent upon the phantasy of the subject operating as that subject's fixation on the Other in which the fascination must be instilled. It might be argued that this relation follows the logic of a sado-masochistic mechanism where a fetishization of 'authorial' intentionality is made operative in the space of the text. It is important to note that this reverential homage paid to the master-author occurs at the same time as the critic seeks to establish him/herself in the place of master of the text, mastering the master as if to usurp the template of its impositional knowing. The critic, engaged in analysis, is therefore seeking to over-top the authorial function through a wished-for displacement of the writing 'I' which occurs in the place of the critical reading/writing 'I' as it projects itself in a textual response to the stimulus text. The subject is indeed pleasurably incarcerated in signifying chains. (In order to explore the narrative affects of such a theoretical scenario, Part II offers a textual reading of Pauline Réage's infamous text Story of O in conjunction with Lacanian theory on subject construction in relation to signification. By isolating the power relation implicit to the signifying act, this reading considers how the subject is made subject by being made subject and accepts the pre-condition of a transcendental signified as central to any production of meaning.)

The thesis as a whole accepts that subversion can only take place in the place of power, that it is a construction-dependent position. The phallus must therefore be integral to any displacement or slippage which may occur in the anchorage of the signified meaning, however illusory, as any movement must always be definitively relational. Lacanian theory offers us points de capit un by which to understand that glissement may be buttoned, these occasional 'catches' between signifier and signified result in a quilting of the linguistic effects. (This is examined as a linguistic affect in the reading of Philippa Pearce's Tom's Midnight Garden). This is contrary to and diametrically opposed to the Derridean position of free play for it considers rather that jouir can only occur in the hinge of the structure itself, i.e. that it is constituted in and by rigidity.

Critical Practices & Hysteria : Hysteria of interpretative acts

The 'hypnoid state' of hysteria described by Breuer in his 'Theoretical' is one which accords closely with the relation between writing and abstraction. With reference to the creative writer, Freud writes that "[h]e creates a world of phantasy which he takes very seriously- that is, he invests it with large amounts of emotion – while separating it sharply from reality" (Freud, 1990 [1908]: 132). Furthermore, it may be seen that the reading body, suspended in its state of phantasy, enters a second state which might be described as auto-hypnotic where the subject may become anaesthetic and openly suggestible to the movements of the text as object of attention. The critical process may then be described as one of shunt or by-pass in the critical body. I refer here to the electrical phenomenon of the shunt circuit which I describe in detail in Section 2 of Part I with reference to the work of Josef Breuer. It is also clear that the retention theory of hysteria is also characteristic of the reading/writing act which
draws upon those mnemic traces which are lodged within the signing subject like foreign bodies.

The interpretative act is one which is analogous to a hypnoid state in which there is an intense concentration upon an object. The greater the stress laid upon the text, the more associative mnemic ideas are employed. These mnemic aspects/traces are often the residual after-effects of preceding texts so that the past prefigures the present, intercepting the critical relation like a ghost from an interpretative futurity. Interpretation thereby becomes ‘overdetermined’ and the critical ego off-centred in direct relation to the amount of intensity upon the object of scrutiny. This off-centring of subjectivity in reading is such that the reader interacts with the text so that his interpretative organism is invaded or modified by that of another which is operative in the arena of text. (This process is explored via the performatic dynamic of textual presentation in the section below which offers a reading of Dylan Thomas’ ‘Vision and Prayer’.) Reading is an uncovering procedure which draws us on and in and forward whilst reaching back through the text to mnemonic images which inform our forward trajectory. It is important to note that these mnemonic images lie dormant like foreign bodies which are passive or inert until their significance becomes apparent in relation to later narrative events, i.e. they become retroactivated. The recuperative element of the trajectory of analysis presents a theoretical base of symptomatology which is itself contiguous with linguistic functioning and semiotic presentation whilst retroactivity is the mnemonic dynamic of textuality. As a mechanism described by psychoanalysis, retroactivity brings temporal and topological alteration in the organism. The act of reading, placed under pressure by the critical imperative, causes mnemonic modification in the reading apparatus as it is traversed not just by the present text but by past textual encounters as they are retroactivated in what becomes a state of intermutability. As the activation of a secondary scene in the critical process, the retroactive recovery of textual mnemonic bodies occurs only in the virtual dimensionality into which the critical body is projected.

The text acts as projected object to which the reader directs his/her desire but in direct proportion to this projection, the reader is subject to the recompensing revenant of their investment when they become ‘haunted’ by the text. The reader then becomes a dimension entered by the text in an interactivity of colliding structure. The reader-critic is inhabited by the vicissitudes of a text which then haunts. Far from possessing the text, the reader is possessed by the text. The extent of this possession is in correlative proportion to the critical investment brought to bear upon the text, i.e. in relation to the amount of desire to which it is the object – or, in Lacanian terms, the objet a. It is important to note, however, that the activating ingredient - desire - does not occur independently but is itself agitated by the text. Desire is produced in accordance with the textual structure which is itself based upon drawing attention to the elusive, the absent, the fictitious ‘missing component’ which would render the text ‘whole’ and provide the impetus to a perfect interpretation, spelling death to critical endeavour and dismissing the critic from their post via the movements of their own practice. In this, critical capacity is an implicitly death-related function.

Aesthetic By-pass: “Pater patter”

As this thesis offers a strategy of writing and reading intermixed with theory, it is itself inscribed within the dimensions of an analytical amalgam. In what is posited as a clash of texts in which arena theory is offered as text and text as theory, it would seem that questions of literary aesthetics become matters of recognizable style within a field of established parameters. Is theory itself an aesthetic pursuit? What could be more stylistically suggestive than Lacan’s virtuoso writing which is not writing? Lacan’s declaration at the entry point of his text entitled ‘The agency of the letter’ that “this will not be writing” seems to point to areas normally considered the domain of the aesthete (Lacan: 1977, 146). His text is written through by the “formative effect[s]” of the spoken, situating itself as “half-way between”
writing and speech, thereby leaving the analytical reader in the role of the analysand by inverting the 'normal' object of critical scrutiny (Lacan: 1977, 146). Through such modification, the reader finds himself caught in the cross-fire of a hybrid trajectory which challenges him to recognize that his position as analyst is wholly dependent upon the trajectory by which he is traversed, thereby cancelling through any postulated security of functional role in relation to the text by asking the reader to meet himself within its dimensions. This indeed "leaves the reader no other way out than the way in" by asking him to pass through the strait gate of its own aestheticism as text (Lacan: 1977, 146).

The aesthetic pursuit, it might be said, has an inherent dependence upon the long shadow of theory. The aesthete's object is crossed through by deathliness without which it may have no meaning and no strictness of form. There is a tension in the aesthetic object between its 'beauty' and wholeness/complete state and its vulnerability to destruction. Aesthetics gives way to literary postures and critical imposture, in which the aesthetic is postured as that by which the literary critic 'guarantees' his/her own place, underwriting it by an appeal to higher logic. Literary criticism posits itself as a practice which seeks to eschew any methodological roots by hiding its head beneath the veil of beauty and 'literariness'. There is an anti-theoretical stance which places theory in the same place as terrorism. Literary criticism, as a practice, prizes the inestimable quality of the 'well written' yet this is the very same practice which throws up its hands at what some critics deem the mystery and impenetrable impasse that is presented by the discourse of psychoanalysis.

Writing Practice and Psychoanalysis

Both psycho- and literary analysis apply language to language in their practice. It is clear that, just as psychoanalysis is a science which applies itself to what produces it so that its diagnostic tool is also its object, the responsive dimension of literary criticism must be present itself as inscribed in and circumscribed by the dimensions of the very same signifying practices as those it is examining so that its means too is systemic to its ends. In 'An Outline of Psycho-Analysis', Freud writes "[e]very science is based on observations and experiences arrived at through the medium of our psychical apparatus. But since our science has as its subject that apparatus itself, the analogy ends here" (Freud: SE XXIII, 159). This creates a feed-back situation for the ego in transaction with the object as it is crossed through by the parameters set by linguistic systems by and through which it approaches the textual object of its scrutiny. The following sections examine the retroactive aspects of signing, the temporal and topological models of textuality, the haunting affects of the intertextual, and the virtual dimension entered by the reader. By regarding Breuer and Freud's theories on hysteria as the bedrock of psycho-analysis, they seek to explore the transferential alliance between the literary analytical and psycho-analytical practice as it exists today by returning to this early theoretical study. It is this which enables an exploration of the relationship between the hysterical mechanism and critical practice.

It must also be recognized that this thesis is written through by a fascination with the constructs and mechanisms it describes and engages with and as such is itself a virtual dimension in which the desires of the writer are installed.

Words and magic were -in the beginning one and the same thing, and even to-day words retain much of their magical power. By words one of us can give to another the greatest happiness or bring about utter despair. (Freud, 1968, 13)
PART I: Psycho-Analysis
The Parameters of Interpretation: "Fulfilling the law of the pendulum"
The Parameters of Interpretation: "[F]ulfilling the law of the pendulum"

Josef Breuer and the strange case of 'Fräulein Anna O.'

...anything that goes beyond [experience] is merely fulfilling the law of the pendulum, which governs all development.

Breuer, Letter to Auguste Forel. 21 November 1907. (Cranefield: 1958, 319)

The famous first case history of psychoanalysis needs almost no introduction as it has been incessantly examined by feminist scholars and historians of science. Described by Josef Breuer as "the germ-cell of the whole of psycho-analysis", it draws attention to the philosophical positioning of medical theory in the early twentieth century and the working through and reasoning behind its new science of psycho-analysis. (Cranefield: 1958, 320) Its radical roots have been to a large extent ignored within feminism which concentrates its attentions upon the feminine subject as she is captured within the case history of Herr Doctor. Such accounts ignore the background theory of Breuer and Freud set out in Studies on Hysteria (1895) and in which the case history of 'Fräulein Anna O.' is presented.

As the bedrock of psychoanalysis, this case-study can present issues at the very centre of the mind-body and sex-gender debate as symptoms are literally written upon the hysterical body. What is this relation between text and gender, text and sex, text and body? And how do these questions relate to the writing body of the doctor himself? What is our role in the re-writing of his textural presentation and what is the nature of its legacy as we loop back through re-interpretation into interpretations which off-centre the case history itself? Have we really addressed the questions which Breuer and Freud presented us with or have we, in our interpretative act, merely reiterated the liberal humanist philosophies they were interrogating?

In this section, I consider textual responses to the work of early psychoanalysis, to Breuer and to his case history, 'Fräulein Anna O.' I do this in order to examine how, in the re-presentations of this case such accounts present us with, Breuer has himself become a textuality entwined with the case and has become marginalized through and by what he wrote. The voice of Breuer has become silenced, muffled in the tissue of textuality which is interpretation and reinterpretation. I turn my attention to some feminist interpretations in order to attempt to clarify what exactly is under scrutiny here as it seems that critical attention displaces the text in its consideration of 'Anna O.' as a 'real' storyteller. It is interesting that in these recuperative accounts an area of erased voice occurs. Breuer is pushed to the sidelines, dismissed from the scene as if of only peripheral interest to the text which he produces.

In this side-lining process, the critic jumps into the place of the doctor thereby betraying the vested interest of the critic as they engage unknowingly with their own desire to 'author' this text. In order to offset this, I then unravel some of the knots of textuality which hold Breuer tightly and present another view of Breuer, itself a textuality but based upon an unravelled knot in order to release this voice from historical stranglehold so that we might consider anew what offering Breuer might present us with in this scenario so that the pendulum might swing to the other side for a while. I also consider the complicity of Freud in this erasure of Breuer's voice as further evidence of how the story of an other becomes implicated in the story of the subject and the representations of self.

I end this section by considering the nature of critical desire as it is involved in the acts of interpretation and indeed re-interpretation. I shall argue that this area represents an intertext, a locus of critical desire which offers a corollary of the transference situation due to its positioning between signifying subjectivities. It therefore invites the question of the
relation of the critic to that of the hysteric, oscillating between two scenes and hallucinating another space occupied through projection of the symptom. The text (both that under consideration and that produced by the critic) would then represent that mid-point – the point of fetish that is 'the centre' of its attention - over which the pendulum irresistibly swings in a perpetual fascinated dance.

Critical Questions: The case history of the feminist literary critic

Keep it well in mind, and this should not require a great effort, that the word 'hysteria' means nothing, and little by little you will acquire the habit of speaking of hysteria in man without thinking in any way of the uterus... Charcot, *Leçons de Mardi à la Salpêtrière*, 1888-1889. (Guillain: 1959, 134)

Feminist interpretation of the case of 'Fraulein Anna O.' has rested upon reading through the unified subject so beloved of the western philosophical tradition. It has sought to reclaim the story of Bertha Pappenheim as a whole and integrated being fully present to herself, operating as a Jewish feminist writer and agitator for women's rights. Such interpretations ignore the radical divisions of subjectivity operative in the symptomatology of hysteria and recognized in the psychoanalytical scheme of the "talking cure" in which feminists are eager to point out that Pappenheim was to play a vital part. This is wanting it both ways: Anna O. as Pappenheim on terms of equality and Anna O. as 'Fraulein Anna O.' the extraordinary patient. It also ignores the fact that were it not for Breuer's 'incarcerating' case narrative, there would be no 'Anna O.' for our critical attention.

'Fraulein Anna O.' has been read as a literary text by the same literary critics who are resistant to the idea of psychoanalysis on the grounds that it is a prescriptive text which seeks to analyse real women in its own terms. That this might constitute a radical response to the question of literariness or facilitate a questioning of the aesthetic qualities which make a text 'literary' remains to be seen. Its recent inclusion on English Literature degree course modules allied to feminist study makes no such undertaking; it is accepted as worthy of literary study and therefore exists as a literary text: an interesting slippage which does not make any moves to question itself. Its interest for feminist literary criticism seems to be based upon its easy alliance with subsequent post-structuralist theorization which is then utilized in feminist representation of women's exclusion from the 'symbolic order' à la Lacan. In order to examine this non-questioning of feminist endeavour by feminism itself, I shall make reference to two influential and often cited essays on 'Fraulein Anna O.' by feminist literary critics. In doing so, I will make commentary upon a critical textuality which asks to be accepted uncritically, existing within its own working critical boundary, while it pays insufficient attention to the boundaries of other types of text different from itself.

Dianne Hunter, in her influential essay "Hysteria, Psychoanalysis and Feminism", states that she offers "a psychoanalytical feminist reading" of the Pappenheim case (Hunter: 1983, 467). Hunter concentrates upon a recuperation of the Pappenheim biography whilst harnessing it to a literary interpretation which is itself filtered through an amalgamation of different psychoanalytical theories which do not declare their source. This feminist psychoanalytical confusion might provide an interesting correlation in its deranged mixture of theory with Pappenheim's laborious and "nearly unintelligible" presentation of different languages, what Hunter refers to as "mumbo jumbo" (468). In order to analyse this linguistic display by Breuer's patient, Hunter offers a description of psychosexual development which she allies to Pappenheim's upbringing. Hunter writes that "[o]ut of the infinite potential identities each newborn infant brings into the world, a single way of being is activated" via its symbiotic relation with the mother (473 – my emphasis). This statement offers no critique of the problematic of primal being such a scenario presents us with or the illogical hypothesis of "infinite potential identities" in a psychoanalytical account which must take account of the
dialectically cross-sectioned subject constituted only in language. Such a statement also ignores the fact that potentiality can only ever be a retroactive conception of hindsight, in other words can only be perceived of by the already subjected identity. When a young Bertha Pappenheim writes that “I daily must learn anew to find myself”, she does so only from the standpoint of an already constituted ‘I’ which is the very precondition of splitting, constituting a dialectical consciousness between the writing ‘I’ and a new posited self which is represented in her writing as futurity (Hirschmüller: 1989, 297). In this respect, her view of what her new self may consist of is absolutely tied to her past conception of self, it is a retroactive concept which masquerades as future and unknown. This contradictory scenario may be connected with liberal humanist social projection coupled with self-knowledge which seems to be the therapeutic aim of psychoanalysis and its uncovering of the ‘I’ as radically split. It is this paradox which is translated in feminist accounts which seek to support women’s agency whilst entering into a tryst with a therapeutic practice which initially formed itself around what may be termed a feminine complaint, paying attention to the silent protest of middle class women. In her account of psychosexual development, Hunter moves from a questionable liberal humanist philosophical premise to present a confusing amalgam of theory drawn from Kleinian object-relations to Kristevan concepts of the 'semiotic' to the Lacanian symbolic which is then presented through the theories of Nancy Chodorow without once acknowledging its sources or specifying its critical intentionality in the use of such theoretical combination (474-5). Neither is any awareness apparent of Hunter’s wish to analyze Breuer’s patient using the tools of subsequent theoretical positioning which was itself influenced and shaped by the scenario to which it applies itself, offering therapy to its own theoretical progenitor. The result presents itself as a neat and literary reading, seemingly unproblematic in its methodology, which takes the edge off the radical nature of psychoanalysis by blunting and blurring its boundaries thereby making it safe for handling by the literary critic.

That there is likewise no agenda of self-reflection in Diane Price Herndl’s essay, ‘The Writing Cure: Charlotte Perkins Gilman, Anna O., and "Hysterical" Writing’ (1988) is also troubling from a methodological point of view. Like Hunter, Herndl presents us with a reconstituted story of Bertha Pappenheim replete with details from Breuer's case history. She then places this hybrid narrative side by side with a study of Charlotte Gilman Perkins' The Yellow Wallpaper without qualification of such a critical choice. There is no examination of the aesthetics in considering a psychoanalytic case history in the same study as a literary text or vice versa, no questioning of the textuality of biographical details which have become as second hand as the items for sale in Pappenheim's own story collection: her own 'troddeblade' of personal history. Herndl lists Pappenheim's writings, including her 'literary' productions, without any consideration of their writerly qualities, as examples of the 'writing cure' which this essay posits. By the same token, The Yellow Wallpaper is offered as a pseudo-case history due the convergence of biographical details of the author's life on the text. Through the alliance of biographical detail - posited as true - with the fabrication that is textuality, Gilman's text then moves out of its literary pivot into therapeutic practice just as Breuer's case-history of Pappenheim is made to fit into a literary groove as the 'story' of Anna O. To posit a 'writing cure' is to present a seamless correlation of self-present agency and authority with fragmentation and illness. It is to accept the contradictory premise of potentiality in a situation which is read in reverse, i.e. reaching for what it is possible to be by looking back through a textual fabric to which we add threads of retrospective knowledge, thereby altering its materiality. In this, it can be seen that a text itself becomes whatever a discipline dictates to it. We may make thereby a ‘text of becoming’ out of a text which we have ourselves embroidered.
Anna O. tells no story

Without entering into a debate on the aesthetic qualities of 'literary' textuality, suffice it to say that 'Fräulein Anna O.' is not a literary text. Neither can it be said to be Anna O.'s text as it is not authored by Anna O. but by Josef Breuer. Anna O. tells no story. Feminist literary critics have behaved as if they are interpreting 'her' narrative simply because she is represented as having told stories to her analyst in Breuer's case history. This is not the same as her actively constructing a story, she is not actually engaged in the act of authoring nor is she the agent of her telling. This is because she is active only as a representation of that which may or may not produce representations in a story form which are then enclosed in a case history. It is interesting that in its elaboration as a text, the case history of 'Fräulein Anna O.' becomes shortened to just 'Anna O.' as if to erase its medical significance and to conveniently separate it from its context in the co-authored Studies on Hysteria. The text becomes synonymous with its name – it is 'Anna O.' 'Anna O.' then becomes the title of a dis-placed text and the pseudo-biographical centre of its critical attention.

In treating Breuer's case history 'Fräulein Anna O.' as a literary text entitled 'Anna O.', an interesting evasion of place takes place. Critical attention can be seen to shift its locus by altering the parameters of what it thinks is applying itself to: the textuality it finds is the textuality which it is looking for and is indeed fabricated by that encounter. In seeking to claim Anna O.'s autonomy in a text where she has none, critics seek to claim her as author of her own storyline, i.e. to perfect the cure for her illness, to reconfigure her as a seamless, functioning author of her own existence, to streamline her from a talker to a writer, from a representation to a representer. (All this, of course, ironically cuts across the still radical theories of psychoanalysis which are not taken on board by humanist feminist readings which, whilst supposedly supplying the commentary to one of the case-histories as new grist for its critical attention, generate another wave of inaccuracies and misrepresentation due to remaining within the confining boundaries of what has become its own academic convention.) Yet despite later biographical details supplied to supplement the patient = author correlation, details which shift the locus of attention from the literary to the biographical without usually a blink of a qualifying eye, Anna O. is not author of this storyline any more than author of her self as storyline. What critics appear to be doing in examining this case history is engaging in an endeavour to uncover the 'real story' of Anna O., to somehow give a unified and fully present authorial status to a study of a radically divided subject at the turn of the century with no consideration given to the nuances of theoretical hindsight as we approach the end of another century or homage paid to the radical questions raised by the context in which this case history is presented. In seeking to save her from her own radically divided condition, they place themselves in the position of Dr. Breuer himself. Here is yet another displacement of Breuer as author because the critic, it seems, wants to doctor his patient. What is this correlation of critic with doctor? The literary critic attempts to jump in between the patient and her doctor as if to do so would be to absorb her stories unmediated. There is no questioning of this persistence of critical phantasy, a phantasy which it might be argued exists in most literary analysis. The critic, it seems, has become a lover come-a-wooing; the critic, swooning with ambitious desire, wants to impregnate the supine body of poor Anna O. all over again, interfering with Dr. B's patient so that their own baby can be born through the medium of an hysterical woman represented in a case history written in 1895. Literary analysts then become pseudo-psychoanalysts riding rough-shod over theories of hysteria whilst seeking to cure its analysand and return her to a full presence upon the stage of feminist history, to birth Dr. B's child where it can be delivered as a comfort into the safe humanist arms waiting at the other end of a century wracked with civilized discontent.
Authorial questions

It is very difficult, purely from one's own memory, to separate the contributions in the case of work carried out so very much in common as that which produced this book.

Breuer, Letter to Forel. 21 November 1907. (Cranefield: 1958, 319)

As the critic jumps in the doctor's place in order to maintain the critical fantasy of analysing his patient unmediated by the doctor's narrative an interesting displacement occurs in terms of the authoring of the text which must needs remain fatherless, reduced to orphaned status by critical attention which seeks to foster the daughter within. The doctor exists only on the sidelines of his own text: an expelled author. Josef Breuer is subject to author displacement as he has been elbowed from the scene of textual authorship continually. The muting of Dr. Breuer's voice through critical attention might be compared to that academic feminist reception and celebration of his loquacious patient's incessant story telling which brought his activities to an end due to the "medically unprecedented amount of time" he was obliged to spend in her company (Hunter: 1983, 471). In a letter to Auguste Forel of 21 November 1907, Breuer writes that "I vowed at the time that I would not go through such an ordeal again" (Cranefield: 1958, 319). The interest accorded to 'erasure of voice' by feminism and its examination of the position of repression being allied to 'femininity' must become pertinent here as it may be seen that feminist recuperative readings of the Pappenheim case actively silence and effectively erase Breuer from historical consideration. As 'sex' has now become loosened from 'gender' through feminist argument, and even men can be 'feminine', the marginalization of Breuer must be a matter of concern if feminism is not simply seeking to reverse the power construct. In this post-modern theoretical setting, it is troubling if Breuer's repression and mis-representation in the power construct of critical enquiry remains unanalyzed. In a scenario which seeks to 'feminize' Breuer, it would appear that feminists really do want things both ways, to reject the uterine theory of hysteria, (and Charcot already had way back in 1888,) whilst holding tightly onto it and never letting go. Hysteria is then used as a token of proto-feminism; feminism becomes what Hunter terms "transformed hysteria" (485). In what is a paradoxical argument, Dianne Hunter talks of male hysteria as the "repressed femininity of men" in what must be a repression of repression. Such an argument also nominates a glorification of repression as allied with feminine (485).

It seems that Josef Breuer is twice punished for being the first physician to take the complaints of a female hysterical patient seriously and affording the time and space for her to cathartically off-load on to her family doctor.3 The therapeutic relation between this doctor and patient was an extraordinary situation for the time of which Ernest Jones wrote:

In those days, to devote hours every day for more than a year to a single patient, and an hysterical at that, signified very special qualities of patience, interest and insight. (246)

Indeed, this exemplary scenario afforded the starting-point of psycho-analysis. That the erasure of Breuer's voice is an unrecognized problematic in the consideration of the Pappenheim case history and its accompanying status as the seminal text of psycho-analysis must be of inherent interest to an analysis of the aetiology of a discipline. This elision has taken place on several levels: historically - in the representation of the beginnings of psycho-analysis; biographically - in the writings of Freud and Jones, and those who absorb their accounts as the definitive and authorized versions; critically - in the feminist examinations of the case of 'Fraulein Anna O.'; and theoretically - in the lack of critical attention paid to the theoretical contributions of Breuer. It is also worrying that, in the quest to mark neatly the beginnings of psycho-analysis, it is the break between Breuer and Freud - as it has been represented by Freud - that is taken for 'authorized truth'. It is seen that the theories of Freud were more progressive than those of Breuer and that the older doctor, with his obstinate attachment to 'hypnoid states', was a burden to the young reformer. This theoretical area of
contention represents another level of elision in the 'genesis' of psycho-analysis and in the
contribution of Breuer to that 'genesis' and it is to this area that I shall return for later
consideration. In the meantime, I shall turn to historical matters and examine the pathological
'writing out' of Breuer from his own story by the stories of others.

Hysteron Proteron

I was always the bold oppositionist...

The name of Josef Breuer (1842-1925) is very often subsumed under that more famous name
of Sigmund Freud who is latterly perceived to be the young and dynamic inheritor of the older
doctor's research. Indeed, Breuer's contribution to Studies on Hysteria was omitted from the
first two German editions of the collected works of Freud. Freud has been elevated to heroic
status by perpetuation of a myth in which he is seen to be battling with ignorance and
prejudice against his early work on hysteria. Accounts of Freud's presentation of a paper to
the Viennese Society of Physicians on 15th. October, 1886 entitled 'On Male Hysteria' seem to
support this view of the isolated innovator. In this paper, Freud challenges the old uterine
theory of hysteria based on his period of observation and learning with Charcot. The Society
of Physicians gave his paper a hostile reception because, according to the chair of the meeting,
Heinrich von Bamberger (a professor on the committee which awarded Freud his travelling
bursary to Paris), the work presented nothing new as male hysteria had been encountered by
its members for some considerable years. He is reported as having said that, "I was unable to
find anything new in the report of Dr. Freud because all that has been said has already long
been known" (Schnitzler cited by Sulloway: 1992, 38). Rebuttals were also voiced by
Theodor Meynert and the neurologist Rosenthal. Freud's perception of the meeting was quite
different; he represents the occasion as one where his new ideas are rejected and this is bitterly
recollected in 1925 (1924) in An Autobiographical Study (SE XX, 15-16) where he states that
"I found myself forced into the Opposition" (SE XX, 16). He then goes on to give an account
of his expulsion from the laboratory of cerebral anatomy and his withdrawal from academic
life and from the "learned societies" (SE XX, 16). That this was not the case is borne out by
accounts to the contrary. Jones gives a similar view of events which supports those of Freud
but does speak of the "enthusiasm, perhaps over-enthusiasm" of the young Freud setting out to
educate his elders in order to qualify the poor reception of the paper. Although Jones does
not support Freud's version in terms of the details of his resignation from the society, he
nonetheless supports the impression of the beleaguered young neurologist as a precocious lone
innovator; he writes that "Freud was bitterly disappointed at the very outset of his endeavours
to convey new ideas to his conservative seniors" (Jones:1953, 255).

Both Freud and his biographer Ernest Jones have been instrumental in presenting us
with what has been definitively absorbed into biographical accounts of Freud. It is not my
intention to claim that Freud's expansion of earlier ideas on hysteria or his subsequent
pioneering work which became psychoanalysis is anything short of an achievement of
astonishing proportions but that sufficient homage has not been paid to those who did the
groundwork and helped Freud along the way to developing the science of the unconscious.
There has been a veil drawn over the beginnings of psycho-analysis, an area of enigma which
seems to obscure and exclude the name of Josef Breuer. Several myths have circulated
around Breuer which have worked together to confound the beginnings of psychoanalytical
theory and to deny Breuer's place in the scenario of scientific discovery, most of them
derogatory to the man himself. The break in personal terms between Freud and his early
mentor may have been instrumental in how the break between them in theoretical terms has
been represented; indeed, it seems impossible to separate these two events as one was
instrumental to the other. In his autobiographical study, Freud wrote that "[t]he development
of psycho-analysis afterwards cost me his friendship. It was not easy for me to pay such a
price, but I could not escape it" (Freud, SE XX, 19). In consideration of this auto/biographical scenario and its textual fabric, let us now turn to consider some historical threads from the life of Josef Breuer which may help to unravel some of the psycho-analytical knots in which he has been implicated.

"I wonder what his story is!"

(Divine in Female Trouble, dir. John Waters, 1974)

Breuer was of very considerable importance to Freud personally . . . but [ ] his intellectual contributions were of less importance. . . (Jones: 1953, 244)

Breuer and Freud first met during the course of their researches in Ernst Brücke's Physiological Institute where Freud worked from 1876 to 1882 and the two men soon became very close. On a personal level, Breuer was indeed very important to the young Freud. Breuer extended friendship and offered professional and financial support when Freud needed it most. As a well connected and respected physician, Breuer introduced and supplied patients to Freud when he was just beginning his private practice and thereby helped to establish the young doctor. This resulted in them maintaining many of the same contacts in what was quite a small Viennese circle and, as if to cement their relation, Freud named his first child after Mathilde, Breuer's wife. Freud's debt to Breuer was also a monetary one and this rankled with Freud in later years as he never managed to pay off this debt due to Breuer's refusal to accept payment. Breuer made regular monthly payments to Freud when he worked in the Physiological Laboratory and this ultimately resulted in him lending quite a significant amount of money to Freud. In a letter to Fleiss, Freud estimates the amount lent as about 2,300 florins, a very large amount in those days.

Contrary to what Jones says on the subject, it would appear that Breuer also provided Freud with a strong intellectual impetus. In many respects, it seems that Breuer may have been an inspiration to the young Freud to look outside his science in order to define the parameters of his new science. Breuer was exceptionally well educated and cultured. He was well read not just in his own field but also in the arts, literature and philosophy. On his known reading list were authors ranging in diversity from Plato, Kant, and Spinoza to Voltaire and H.G. Wells. Albrecht Hirschmüller has traced references to Breuer's reading by careful examination of his correspondence and makes reference to "Breuer's profound knowledge of philosophical literature" in addition to providing reference to the breadth of Breuer's knowledge (Hirschmüller: 1989, 41-2). Hirschmüller also records that Breuer was a skilled rhetorician and an entertaining and well-informed speaker. To talk with Breuer, said Freud in the earlier days of their relationship, was "like sitting in the sun" (Jones: 1953, 183). In addition to his intellectual achievements, several sources pay homage to him as a kind, generous and forgiving person. "One does not adequately characterize him by only saying good things about him," writes Freud, "one has also to emphasize the absence of so much badness" (Jones: 1953, 183).

Breuer was already a well-established physician of some eminence and an accomplished neuroscientist with several publications to his name when he met Freud. It has often been assumed that his contribution to Studies on Hysteria, shrouded in the mists of co-authorship, is the only contribution of value that Breuer made to the world of science yet nothing could be further from the truth. As a medical student working under Ewald Hering in the Helmholtz School, he made an important physiological discovery of the feedback mechanism of breathing: what is now referred to as the Hering-Breuer reflex of the vagus nerve arising from a set of nerves attached to the medulla oblongata (Breuer: 1868). He also pioneered a dissection method of the semi-circular canals of the inner ear, thereby elucidating their function and recognizing it as a site of reflex mechanisms pertaining to equilibrium in the
organism (Breuer: 1874 & 1875). As an indication of the importance given to the work of Breuer, he was nominated for membership to the Viennese Academy of Sciences in 1894 by three outstanding professors of the day: Mach, Hering, and Exner.

Dianne Hunter states that Breuer obstinately looked for the 'somatic foundation' only of Pappenheim's illness (Hunter: 1983, 476). This is a view that cannot be borne out if only by considering how much time Breuer patiently gave his patient in an unprecedented situation in which he listened tirelessly to her stories to the detriment and erosion of the normal organization of his own life. In his letter to Auguste Forel of 21 November 1907, Breuer writes that "it was impossible for a 'general practitioner' to treat a case of that kind without bringing his activities and mode of life completely to an end" (Cranefield: 1958, 319). His 'ordeal' has not been alluded to in feminist considerations. That he would look only for 'somatic' causes is also not borne out by Breuer's deviations from the so-called 'Helmholtz School' of medicine presided over by Ernst Brücke, under whom both he and Freud worked. Whilst it is true that he certainly looked for some psycho-physical parallelism, he did not ascribe uncritically to the physicalist laws of Brücke, Helmholtz and DuBois-Reymond (founders of the biophysicalist movement with its mechanistic view of natural science). His research was carried out under the tutelage of Ewald Hering, whose own work challenged the doctrine of Brücke. The fact that both Hering and Breuer were members of the so-called Helmholtz school actually challenges what has been perceived as the unproblematic unity of a Helmholtz school at all. Historical accounts of the Helmholtz school overlook its rather diverse and divided condition. Again, we must draw attention to the convenient categorization of hindsight and the formulation of critical surveys for ease of presentation and narrative style.

In his obituary of Josef Breuer, Freud wrote that there was nothing in Breuer's background which would suggest his future involvement in the treatment of hysteria and his subsequent role in the beginnings of psycho-analysis.

Nothing in his education could lead one to expect that he would gain the first decisive insight into the age-old riddle of the hysterical neurosis... (Freud SE XIX, 279)

Yet it would appear that Breuer had exactly the education and temperament which might lead him to become involved in psychical research and the formulation of a new science. Breuer already possessed a wide breadth of reading on the theory and therapeutic uses of hypnotism and had practical experience of the experimental treatment of hysteria by such a method through the work of Moriz Benedikt. (Breuer makes reference to the theoretical position of Benedikt amongst others in his 'Theoretical' contribution to Studies on Hysteria.) He was, therefore, familiar with extensive research in an area which was then closely allied to the treatment of what was considered a neuro-physiological ailment. It is also interesting to note that hypnosis as it was being developed in relation to psychology held an interest for philosophical scholars at that time. Franz Brentano is known to have been one such interested philosopher and his family physician was none other than Josef Breuer. With his fluent French and interest in psycho-physical development, it is also known that Breuer was familiar with developments in France and the work of Charcot. When we consider Breuer's extensive physiological experience, and interest in neurological disorders set against this type of background knowledge and reading, it is hardly surprising that he should be involved in the beginnings of psycho-analysis. Bertha Pappenheim was treated by an experienced and theoretically aware neurophysician who, due to the distorting mists of time and what has now become his 'historical role' as last of the old bastions before Freud broke upon the scene, is now portrayed dismissively as a bumbling old doctor. Dianne Hunter, for instance, confidently proclaims that "Breuer [ ] arrived as an old-fashioned physician with black bag in hand to treat Bertha Pappenheim's malady" (Hunter: 1983, 471).
Strike the father dead

In this relationship the gain was naturally mine. (Freud, SE XX, 19)

I became the sole administrator of his legacy. (Freud, SE XX, 22)

In what could be a classic Oedipal scene described in his own later work on sexuality, the younger doctor seeks to strike out the authority of the older physician by scrambling the chronology of the father-son relation. In the development of psycho-analysis, Breuer has been portrayed not as he who supplied the precedent but as an antecedent, an inept follower of Freud. He has been portrayed as an frustrating and obstinate nuisance to Freud whose eager insistence caused him to write up a case history he would sooner forget. This case history is then perceived to provide a stepping stone to a pioneering individual who was struck with a singular talent divorced from any theoretical precedent. Freud talked of his "[I]ong battle" to publish Breuer's findings in what was to become Studies on Hysteria. In a letter to Wilhelm Fliess of 1896, Freud wrote with reference to Breuer, "I believe he will never forgive that in the Studies I dragged him along" (Masson: 1995, 175).

Although Freud always took care to officially allude to Breuer with respect, his private letters to Fliess document a less harmonious side to the relationship where disagreements in theoretical approach found their repercussion in deteriorating personal relations. There Freud refers to Breuer as a tiresome and cumbersome colleague, a dead weight. Through these letters, we become privy to Freud's efforts to avoid any meeting - accidental or otherwise - with his old friend and benefactor.

It tends to be forgotten that Breuer's work on hysteria was not contemporaneous with that of Freud but that he was, in fact, writing up a fifteen-year-old case study for inclusion in Studies on Hysteria. It is his work as predecessor that is glossed over. Breuer was engaged on the case of 'Fräulein Anna O.' some three or four years before Freud set off to study Charcot in action at the Salpêtrière, Paris. Bertha Pappenheim first fell ill during the autumn of 1880 and Breuer treated her from December 1880 until June 1882 which represents an official cut-off date although there is evidence of his further involvement after this date as he continued to be informed of his former patient's progress. Freud's study visit to the Salpêtrière, funded by a government-sponsored travelling grant, took place between 13 October 1885 and 28 February 1886. Breuer communicated details of the case to Freud before he went to Paris. The first published mention of the case is in a letter to his fiancée written on 13 July, 1883 where "strange case histories" are mixed up with a growing intimacy between the two men. Freud writes, "your friend Bertha Pappenheim also cropped up - and then we became rather personal and very intimate" (Freud: 1961, 56). According to Jones, however, a letter written by Freud to Martha Bernays referred to the Pappenheim case as early as 18 November, 1882 (Jones, 1953: 248). This letter dated 19 November 1882 remains unpublished. Breuer's extensive collaboration with Freud on many other cases is also forgotten in the shifting text which tells the story of the beginnings of psycho-analysis. Breuer and Freud worked together on such cases as that of 'Frau Emmy von N.' (Fanny Moser) and, most important to their theoretical development, that of 'Frau Cacilie M.' (Anna von Lieben) which was unpublished due to privacy reasons. Breuer makes reference to several other unnamed cases in his 'Theoretical' contribution.

As the forefather of psychoanalysis, Breuer's pioneering work has been largely forgotten, enveloped as it is by the mythologizing textuality which tells of the making of the young hero, Freud. This distorting fabrication which surrounds the beginnings of psychoanalysis, referred to as a "mythical bubble" by Sulloway, is one in which Freud himself was himself self-consciously involved (Sulloway: 1992, 5). Freud displayed a surprisingly precocious awareness of the narrative of his future biography. He destroyed his papers,
including his manuscripts, diaries, notes and letters, in 1885 and 1907. The first of these dates is surprisingly early in his career. He wrote to his fiancée on 28 April 1885 of his intention to frustrate his future biographers "as yet unborn":

As for the biographers, let them worry, we have no desire to make it too easy for them. Each of them will be right in his opinion of the 'The Development of the Hero', and I am already looking forward to seeing them go astray. (Freud: 1961, 153)

In another letter to Martha Bernays on 2 February 1886, trumped up on cocaine, Freud writes of himself as "an extremely daring and fearless human being" and that he "could gladly sacrifice [his] life for one great moment in history". "One would hardly guess it from looking at me and yet even at school I was always the bold oppositionist", he writes (Freud: 1961, 215). Here then is early evidence of his desire to stamp his name on the history book.

The radical revelations of psycho-analytical theories of fragmentary subjectivity are here undercut in the telling of the story of authorial genesis. In the interests of artistic unity as we are presented with Freudian 'Bildungsroman' in the style of an immoveable metanarrative.

Sex, Lies & Hysteria

If we are to believe the Freud and Jones accounts of the termination of Breuer's treatment of Pappenheim, we might be led to believe that Breuer did not become involved in cases of hysteria ever again. In his 1914 paper, 'On the History of the Psycho-Analytic Movement', Freud states that, after terminating the Pappenheim case, Breuer "broke off all further investigation" due to the sexual nature of the "untoward event" that later became classified as transference (Freud, SE XIV 12). Freud later alludes to the frightened Breuer running in terror from the scene and Ernest Jones refers to a "profoundly shocked" Breuer who "fled the house in a cold sweat" (Jones: 1953, 247). Breuer did, however, continue to treat hysteria patients after the Pappenheim case. In the course of his research, Albrecht Hirschmüller discovered documents at the Bellevue Sanatorium, Kreutzlingen, pertaining to other cases dating after the termination of Pappenheim's treatment (Hirschmüller: 1989, 137). What is uncertain is whether or not Breuer used the so-called 'cathartic' method in their treatment; the case-histories are certainly not as long and arduous as those pertaining to his exemplary treatment of Bertha Pappenheim. Hirschmüller has found evidence that Breuer took on another case of hysteria in a female in the same month as the termination of that of Bertha Pappenheim; furthermore, contradicting Freud's perception of a sexually frightened Breuer, this case had a clear sexual aetiology (Hirschmüller: 1989, 131).

It suited Freud to perpetuate the myth of a sexually retarded Breuer running scared in the aftermath of his treatment of Bertha Pappenheim, in order to establish himself as the bolder and more innovative of the two neurophysicists. A remark made by Breuer in the case history has been cited ad infinitum in order to support and perpetuate the notion of Breuer's reluctance to face sexual matters in relation to hysteria. Every commentator on 'Fraulein Anna O.' must be familiar with that well-worn phrase from Studies on Hysteria with which Breuer shot himself in the foot:

The element of sexuality was astonishingly undeveloped in her. 24

(Breuer and Freud: 1991, 73)

This remark has often been used against Breuer as evidence that he was not able to see what was staring him in the face. It was a remark that was used by Freud to support his later view that Breuer simply could not admit the element of sexuality into the actiology of hysteria. It must be noted that this is Freud's later formulation and not one which occurred to him in his
work contemporary to Breuer's in *Studies on Hysteria*. The *Studies* show evidence of Freud's reticence with regard to sexual matters consequently considered pertinent to hysteria. It is, therefore, unfair that Freud should specifically refer to Breuer when he records that,

Breuer wrote of the girl, who has since become famous as his first patient, that her sexual side was extraordinarily undeveloped. It would have been difficult to guess from the *Studies on Hysteria* what an importance sexuality has in the aetiology of the neuroses. (Freud, *SE* XX 22)

This view has been accepted unquestioningly by feminist critics such as Dianne Hunter who state that Breuer overlooked the "frustrated sexuality" of his patient (Hunter: 1983, 470).

This picture with which we are presented is not, however, congruous with the textual content of *Studies on Hysteria* where Breuer comments directly and repeatedly upon the sexual nature of hysterical symptomatology. There he states that [t]he most numerous and important of the ideas that are fended off and converted have a sexual content. They are at the bottom of a great deal of the hysteria of puberty" (326-7). Breuer discusses the effects of the repression of sexuality due to ideas of moral purity in the individual.

They repress sexuality from their consciousness, and the affective ideas with a content of this kind which have caused the somatic phenomena are fended off and thus become unconscious. (Breuer and Freud: 1991, 327)

He then theorises about the different experiences of women and men with regard to sexuality, stating that "[m]arriage brings fresh sexual traumas" (327). He goes so far as to say that "I do not think I am exaggerating when I assert that the great majority of severe neuroses in women have their origin in the marriage bed" (328 - Breuer's emphasis.) Furthermore, we are left in no doubt about the difference in opinion between Freud and Breuer on this matter as Breuer argues for the inherently sexual nature of the hysterical symptom.

Certain sexual noxae, which consist essentially in insufficient satisfaction (*coitus interruptus, ejaculatio praecox*, etc.), result according to a discovery of Freud [1895b] not in hysteria but in an anxiety neurosis. I am of opinion, however, that even in such cases the excitation of the sexual affect is quite frequently converted into hysterical somatic phenomenon. (Breuer and Freud: 1991, 328)

And if we were in any doubt about Breuer's position on the role of sexuality, he adds that,

...it is perhaps worth while insisting again and again that the sexual factor is by far the most important and the most productive of pathological results. The unsophisticated observations of our predecessors, the residue of which is preserved in the term 'hysteria' [...] came nearer the truth than the more recent view which puts sexuality last... (328)

In his theoretical contribution to *Studies on Hysteria*, Freud appears to be the more sexually reticent in his discussion of sexual neuroses in regard to the foundation of hysteria. He begs a forbearance from the reader which he was not able himself to later extend to Breuer: the forbearing allowed by those with the gift of hindsight. He states that he had "overlook[ed] the points of view that were of importance as regards sexual neuroses, the reason given is that these histories date some distance back" and that he did not, at that time, attribute sufficient importance to sexual factors (Breuer and Freud: 1991, 343). Let us not forget that his problematic 1886 paper was arguing for stepping away from the sexual aetiology of hysteria, directed as it was at the diagnosis and treatment of male hysteria. This was in line with the teachings of Charcot who stipulated that hysteria did not have a sexual impulse and that the ailment was in no way connected with etymological unraveling of its
name. In defiance of the uterine theory, Charcot declared that "the word 'hysteria' means nothing" (Charcot cited by Guillain: 1959, 134).

In his biographical study, Jones states that Freud "displayed less than the average personal interest in what is often an absorbing topic . . . . He always gave the impression of being an unusually chaste person - the word 'puritanical' would not be out of place" (Jones: 1953, 298). This constitutes a surprising turn-about for a theorist who has been popularly perceived as sexually obsessed and who later admonishes Breuer for running from the scene of an undiscovered and unwelcome sexual impulse in the course of his treatment of Bertha Pappenheim, an action which Freud perceived as sexual reticence on his part and which constituted an unwillingness to admit sexuality into the theorization of the hysterical pathogenesis.

"The door to the mothers": Dr. B.'s baby and the termination of treatment

At this moment he held in his hand the key that would have opened the "doors to the Mothers", but he let it drop. With all his great intellectual gifts there was nothing Faustian in his nature. With conventional horror he took flight...

Freud, Letter to Stefan Zweig. 2 June 1932. (Freud: 1961, 409)

If Breuer was the sexually timid partner in the Freudian narration of this scene, then the implication is that it was a bold and virile hero who picked up the key and claimed the theoretical spoils. Furthermore, this hero must be of the proportions of those heroes of Germanic literature, a superman who travels the regions of metaphor borrowed from literary production. It is interesting that, in the Studies, Breuer himself uses the same metaphor borrowed from Goethe's Faust (Part II, Act I) in order to illustrate the need to return to a philosophical premise as the basis upon which research is conducted.

I must ask to be forgiven for taking the reader back to the basic problems of the nervous system. A feeling of oppression is bound to accompany any such descent to the 'Mothers' [i.e., exploration of the depths]. (Breuer and Freud: 1991, 267)

In Breuer's text, the Faustian reference is illustrative and topological in relation to the reader; in the Freudian text it is employed to illustrate the implicit heroic nature of the writer. Where Breuer uses metaphor to illustrate and follow through the swing of the pendulum of his thinking, Freud uses the same metaphor to underscore his own position as the locus in relation to which the pendulum swings.

The story of the unheroic Breuer taking flight conveniently lends itself to sexual interpretations but, as I hope I have illustrated, this flight was not from the sexual aetiology of hysteria of which he had demonstrated he was well aware and unafraid. If Breuer took flight, it was from the sudden and violent contractions of a fully incubated transference phenomenon, the real 'baby' of his treatment. It is about this that Freud was able to be wise after the event, although at the time of Pappenheim's treatment he was himself a student and it is highly unlikely that he would have recognized the future life of the term 'transference' in a flash of inspired anticipation of a science not yet born. Forrester writes,

Freud, looking back in retrospect, implies that Breuer could have made the discoveries he himself later made, if only he had been able to recognise this sexual transference... (Forrester: 1994, 18 – emphasis as original.)

'Dr. B's child' then was truly the result of a significant labour and represented the beginnings of the most powerful therapeutic tool of psychoanalysis. This is where "[t]he door to the
Mothers" leads us - into the chamber of virtuality that is the cross-sectioned desire of the patient in analysis.

Let us now return to the scene of the biographical text. Freud and Jones present us with accounts of the birth of Dora Breuer as an event from Breuer's private life interwoven with myths of the genesis of psycho-analysis. Both Freud and Jones tell us that Breuer's youngest daughter was conceived on a second honeymoon with which Breuer placated his jealous wife, Mathilde. This was "not without significance for the deeper connections!" states Freud in the letter to Zweig (Freud: 1961, 409). Jones goes a step further and distastefully connects not just the birth but also the death of Dora Breuer to her father's implication in the hysterical childbirth of Bertha Pappenheim, "the girl born in these curious circumstances was nearly sixty years later to commit suicide in New York" (Jones: 1953, 247).

According to official data, however, Dora Breuer was actually born before the termination of Pappenheim's treatment. The child that was supposedly born in June 1882 had actually already been born on 11 March 1882.26 It would appear that the accounts of Freud on this matter do not stand closer reading; it is important to note that his interpretation of events are constructions based upon shifting sands of speculation and might be seen to constitute what Borch-Jacobsen has termed "a spiteful piece of slander that built up over a period of several years" (Borch-Jacobsen: 1996, 34). It would seem that Freud pushed the pendulum too far so that it swings into a tentative area about which he chose to write with bold certainty, presenting as truth what was only guesswork. The letter to Zweig says as much,

What really happened with Breuer's patient I was able to guess later on...

(Freud: 1961, 408)

He states that this is based upon recollection as "I suddenly remembered something Breuer had once told me". This might be an opportune moment to recall Breuer's comments on Freud's work in his 1907 letter to August Forel. There he writes that,

Freud is a man given to absolute and exclusive formulations: this is a psychical need which, in my opinion, leads to excessive generalization... In the main, however, his views... are derived simply from experience; and anything that goes beyond is merely fulfilling the law of the swing of the pendulum... (Cranefield: 1958, 320)

It would appear that sometimes, as in the story of the birth of Dora Breuer, the pendulum swung too far because it was pushed. We are presented with the screen of a rewritten history as Freud alters the story of the birth of psycho-analysis after its inception; each retelling is different from the last and each has an off-centring effect.

Freud's fluctuating narrative on the birth of psychoanalysis provides a parallel to the scene of the unexpected transference. He tells different stories in different places, producing a textual pseudocyesis in response to the hiatus in Breuer's text. In place of Breuer's dignified silence on the matter, Freud fills up the space with opportune and profligate stories. In his series of lectures at Clark University, Massachusetts in 1909, Freud writes that,

If it is a merit to have brought psycho-analysis into being, that merit is not mine. I had no share in its earliest beginnings. (Freud, SE XI 3)

By 1914, writing On The History of the Psycho-Analytic Movement, he has had second thoughts on the matter and reins in his previous credit to Breuer in no uncertain manner when he states that,
Critical Desires: Authorial Transference

If the beginnings of psycho-analysis provide a veiled area of enigma around which stories and re-presentations congregate for one who has been perceived as its progenitor, this raises questions about what it might mean to those who receive those second-hand stories second-hand and incorporate them into their own re-interpretations for further proliferation and generation.

This story of origins provides a rich play-area for those who approach the case history of 'Fraulein Anna O.', so closely allied as it is with the evolution of a new science. It is interesting, however, that few readings from the discipline of literary criticism pay any sustained attention to this psycho-analytical genesis or, more importantly, to the transformative element that such readings might generate. In other words, the act of reading always alters the text it applies itself to and nowhere more so than when it innocently applies itself, uncritical of its own process, to a story that is not a story at all. That there is no direct access to the stories of 'Anna O.' seems to have been overlooked by feminist critics, so eager are they to redeem and transform a sick woman into a heroine, to make of her a "feminist doctor-saviour", an astonishing occupation of three exemplary roles at once (Herndl: 1988, 68). A sensitive point then becomes apparent in the employment of psychoanalytic theory by feminism proper; this tension proceeds from an ambivalent position in itself relating to the 'genesis' of psycho-analysis. (If Anna O. really invented the so-called 'talking cure' as a feminist manoeuvre and escapist impulse, why do feminists spend so much time attacking her wonderful invention?) There is here an area of great concern for in this clash between feminism and psychoanalysis lies an unresolved problematic which insidiously manifests itself in the hot and cold attitude of feminism itself towards the employment of a theory it declares itself to have been instrumental in developing. Perhaps this collision course between feminism and psychoanalysis is due to the bourgeois roots of feminism combined with its egalitarian quest which promotes the wholeness of women in the world set against the radically fragmented subjectivity psychoanalysis presents it with as it critiques western capitalism from within the nuances of its very own structures. Feminist reception of psychoanalytical theory is set on a see-saw edge where any full engagement with psychoanalysis might undermine feminism's presence and intentionality as a theory. Feminism therefore engages itself in an ironic rebuttal of the more radical theories of psychoanalysis in favour of the unified feminine subject whilst at the same time claiming an hysterical woman as a heroine. Dianne Hunter's statement that "feminism is transformed hysteria" seems to point to an unacknowledged paradox (Hunter: 1983, 485). Furthermore, I would argue that, whilst claiming 'Anna O.' as the 'true' creator of psycho-analysis and therefore acting as her own doctor (a gross misreading of the therapeutic situation of the transference), feminist critics actually undercut this proposed position of the heroine by occupying the interpretative role and thereby doctoring the text themselves.

If, in the critical reception of these case-histories, the critic plays doctor, we are faced with a textual corollary of the counter-transference as the text space is one of a transferential intertext which constitutes a projection between reading and writing subjects. This space of the transference as it figures as intertext presents us with an intellectual transpositioning which layers the critical response into separate spheres in which the critic is engaged with reading as a re-writing of the text as object of desire and in so doing occupies an hysterical position, negotiating with a condition seconde as it is interposed in the reading process. The interpretative act is an interlude of gestation, a process of parturition, whilst 'full' interpretation leads to the 'baby' of critical desire: it exists as an archi-structure which is...
entered usually unbeknown to the critic (feminist or otherwise) unless theoretically aware. The critical reader is therefore caught in an engagement with what Lacan terms the objet a as the locus of critical desire: phantom of the phantasy of a 'real' text.

The intertext as space must be a different space from that afforded by either the text or the reader separately, rather it is a place of activated marks rendered up through the desiring process. That there is an operative dialectics of the reading process is recognized in and by psychoanalysis. This space offers the reader a 'door to the Mothers', as an entrance to an unknown and wonderful realm - made by us yet unknown to us - a mystery in our own mechanism, and carried in our mechanics of relativity as reading and writing organisms. In this space lies a somatics of the textual.

In our wish to write a lucid narrative, we tell ourselves and each other stories uncritically. In representation is inherent misrepresentation, whatever that may mean in a proliferation of meaning excluded by the containment that constitutes the form of writing. Here is the fantasy of critical desire, the hallucination to which we submit and admit to 'truth'. This then is the structure of unity we strive to write and, once written, inhabit. This is the use of metaphor or narrative for similitude, our alliterative glittering prize as 'I am reflected in my unified story. It is the unacknowledged desire with which we engage in critical pursuits. The manifest text is that mid-point over which the pendulum swings first one way then the other in an endless fascination with the centre of its attention: a dance around a centre which is itself perpetually displaced by the process of reception and erupts from within whilst continually held in place by the very same process, thereby constituting an ironic outbreak in which the sign itself becomes a histrionic display in direct proportion to its interpretative rendering.

In this section, I have travelled between accounts of the history of the beginnings of psychoanalysis, feminist literary criticism of its first case history, autobiography and biography to consider questions of critical receptivity of the case of 'Fräulein Anna O.' In doing so, a complicated area of dense textuality has been encountered, constituting an over-compensation for what has been lost irretrievably. In response to an historical hiatus, stories have been incessantly constructed in a proliferation which shifts the parameters of the 'originary' story itself. These stories however, each contributing another version of an already overworked text, dance noisily over what is a still silence, an absence made by the erasure of the author: Dr. Josef Breuer. It seems that beneath the post-modern masquerade of the death of this particular author lies a wish to concentrate upon the character in the story, a dangerous impulse which will return us to a humanist grounding while we dance beneath the banners of a proclaimed theoretical stance.
The Hen and the Hawk: Breuer's 'Theoretical' contribution to Studies on Hysteria (1895) and its influence on psycho-therapeutic theory
The Hen and the Hawk

Breuer's 'Theoretical' Contribution to Studies on Hysteria (1895) and its influence on psycho-therapeutic theory.

Freud's intellect is soaring at its highest. I gaze after him as a hen at a hawk.
Breuer, Letter to Wilhelm Fliess. 5 July 1895. (Hirschm6ller: 1989, 315)

This section will concentrate upon Josef Breuer's theoretical contribution to Studies on Hysteria (1895) co-authored with his younger colleague Sigmund Freud. Through a close textual reading of Breuer's paper entitled 'Theoretical', it will argue that the ideas presented there have not received due attention. Although notoriously wavering in his accounts of the beginnings of psycho-analysis and fluctuating in the amount of credit he felt able to bestow upon his estranged friend, Freud found himself able to write in 1925 in his obituary of Breuer that his theoretical contribution to the Studies was "far from being out of date; on the contrary, it conceals thoughts and suggestions which have not even now been turned to sufficient account" (SE XIX, 280). Despite the valuable recuperative work of Albrecht Hirschmüller, this comment is sadly still applicable today. Freud's debt to Breuer's theories have still not been properly acknowledged; indeed it was in Freud's interests that he propagate heroic myths to present his overriding mastery as originator of psycho-analysis. These myths have, of course, been amplified by later presentations of this period in the life of Freud. It is my view that the ideational lineage of Freud's subsequent psychoanalytical theories can be traced to their beginnings in his older colleague's sharp argument, philosophical style and rich allusive writing. Indeed, psychoanalysis as a theory and a practice has not fully recognized its debt to Josef Breuer and his acutely aware textuality, indulging in a mis-recognition perhaps with regard to its own beginnings. That this mйconnaissance is written into literary criticisms of psychoanalytical theory as it is employed in textual readings is also self-evident. The name of Freud is synonymous with the famous complexes which, reeled off by any student of literature, have become set and static in their usage as if in defiance of what should be a dynamic and enlivening process of textual encounter. That Breuer already engaged with this quickening encounter with textuality in his theorizing has been forgotten and suppressed in the obscuring mists which have risen up around the beginnings of psycho-analysis. His presence in the later theories of Freud might be said to be like the 'foreign body' retained in the theoretical flesh, a thorn in the side of a psychoanalytical hysteria with regard to its aetiology as a theory, buried but still active under the surface of what has become a textual pathology of the defence theory in the interests of Freud. It is necessary to excavate backwards through Freudian theory in order to uncover the activating body of Breuer's ideas.

Mechanistic Energy Models: Sharing the same perch

Breuer and Freud shared a common physiological legacy as they both worked under Ernst Brücke (1819-1892) at the famed Physiological Institute at the University of Vienna. Freud wrote that Brücke was "the greatest authority who affected me more than any other in my whole life" (GW XIV, 34 cited by Jones: 1953, 31). Ernest Jones writes that Freud so revered Brücke that the remembrance of the professor's reprimanding eyes haunted him throughout his life (Jones: 1953, 44). In 1892, Freud named his youngest son Ernst in memory of his respected teacher who died the same year.

The Helmholtz school originated in the early 1840s and was composed of Emil Du Bois-Reymond (1818-1896), Ernst Brücke, Hermann Helmholtz (1821-1894) and Carl Ludwig (1816-1895). "From its very beginning," writes Siegfried Bernfeld, "this group was driven forward by a veritable spirit of crusade" (Bernfeld: 1944, 348 & 1949, 171). Emil du Bois-Reymond wrote in 1842 that:
Brücke and I pledged a solemn oath to put in power this truth: No other forces than
the common physical chemical ones are active within the organism. In those cases
which cannot at the time be explained by these forces one has either to find the
specific way or form of their action by means of the physical mathematical method,
or to assume new forces equal in dignity to the chemical physical forces inherent in
matter, reducible to the force of attraction and repulsion.


It was within this pioneering environment that Breuer and Freud conducted their research.
Both Breuer and Freud's theoretical work needs to be set within the physiological
schematology of Helmholtz. It represented a principle to which Freud adhered for the rest of
his theorizing. In his study of 'Freud's Scientific Beginnings', Siegfried Bernfeld states that,

...in the fundamentals as well as in many details the Freudian concepts and theories
have their roots in the Brücke Institute; that, to a certain degree, they are
transformations of the ideas and methods Freud had learned there.

(Bernfeld: 1949, 170)

In his 'Project for a Scientific Psychology' (1950 [1895] SE I), Freud presents us with a
dynamic-energetic model stressing 'discharge' amongst neurons as the base of psychical life.
Stressing dissipation of physical energy and the organic aim of achieving a constancy of
energy in its system, this is what Breuer refers to as the "tendency on the part of the organism
to keep tonic intracerebral excitation constant" (Breuer and Freud: 1991, 273). 1 Freud, under
Brücke's tutelage, undertook biological observations and conducted neurological studies
supported by illustrations and translated into diagrams which, it could be argued, formed the
basis of much of his thinking on hysteria with its attention paid to nodal systems of
interlocking nuclei. A visual display of the physical may be carried through into observations
of the psychic via the neurological model. This may explain the way in which Freud was keen
to speak of psychical structuration in terms of a series of interconnecting nodes, "points at
which two or more threads meet and thereafter proceed as one" (Breuer and Freud: 1991,
376). Breuer's was a theory based more upon the laws of dynamic energy inherent in a system
of attraction and repulsion found in the physical laws of electricity as they perpetuate
themselves through the organism. In relation to Breuer and Freud as observers of hysterical
structure, it is pertinent to remember their observation of biological or neurological structure
in the laboratories of Ernst Brücke. The biological and the psychic can be seen to interlock in
the aetiology of psycho-analysis as a theory.

Of Hens and Hawks

I believe he will never forgive that in the Studies I dragged him along and involved
him in something where he unfailingly knows three candidates for the position of one
truth and abhors all generalizations...


'Hawk' : a diurnal bird of prey;
a person who is grasping or who preys on others;
to carry about for sale, 'to hawk a manuscript';

(Longman Modern English Dictionary)

In his theorizing, Breuer was acutely aware of his role in the writing and presentation of ideas.
He often remarked that his use of metaphor to present these "half-understood processes" (316)
might be as misleading as it was helpful in extrapolation. The danger lay in a setting of the
methodology of the mind so that the accustomed methods of presentation would set the
parameters of knowledge thereafter. This is not a concern found in Freud's paper on the
psychotherapy of hysteria where he is found to be confident in his presentation and vocabulary, more given to the definite than Breuer in order to present himself as the one who may be deemed to know, the master of the scene. In a letter to August Forel written 21 November 1907, Breuer states that,

Freud is a man given to absolute and exclusive formulations: this is a psychical need which, in my opinion, leads to excessive generalization. There may in addition be a desire 'd'épater le bourgeois' [sic]. (Cranefield: 1958, 320)

In comparison, Breuer can be seen to maintain an openness in his views, reserving judgement on many concepts and this perhaps did him no favours historically as Freud was only too eager to grab the theory and claim the spoils. By giving the impression of a sure set of truths, Freud was more convincing in his presentation than the more reticent Breuer. In a letter to Wilhelm Fliess of 24 October 1895, Breuer writes with some bitterness that,

I keep in mind with all my views and actions the possibility that everything might be quite otherwise than I think it is. For this reason I envy you very much - on my highest holidays I should like to be as sure in my views as you are on any day of the week. (Hirschmüller: 1989, 318-9)

The deteriorating relationship between Freud and Breuer is documented in Freud's letters to Fliess at this time in which he makes reference to his colleague's pedantry. This view is continued by Jones in his account of the state of affairs between the two former friends.

Breuer, so it would appear, had certain characteristics which were particularly antipathetic to Freud's nature. One was a weakness in his personality that made it hard for him to ever take a definite stand on any question. The other was a pettifogging kind of censoriousness which would induce him to mar any appreciation or praise by searching out a small point open to criticism - an attitude very alien to Freud's openhearted and generous spirit. In just these years Freud was in his most revolutionary stage . . . The boycotting to which he was subjected induced in him a response of defiant rebelliousness. And when he was most in need of a companion with whom to share this, the one man who had the intellectual knowledge for the purpose and who had been the one to start him on his path only damped his ardour and withdrew from the fight. (Jones: 1953, 281)

It was during this time shortly after the publication of Studies on Hysteria that Breuer wrote to Fliess on 5 July 1895 that "Freud's intellect is soaring at its highest. I gaze after him as a hen at a hawk" (Hirschmüller: 1989, 315). This is the generous remark which Hanna Breuer describes as "most typical of Breuer" in her letter to Ernest Jones in which she objects to Jones' portrayal of her father-in-law. "I have never known a person more given to happy and often enthusiastic recognition of others' merits", she writes. (Hanna Breuer to Ernest Jones, 21 April 1954. Reproduced in Borch-Jacobson: 1996, 109.) It is evident that Fliess communicated Breuer's comments in the letter to Freud as Freud's own letter to Fleiss of 13 July 1895 makes reference to Breuer's "ornithological communications" (Masson: 1985, 133). His letter of 16 August 1895 also states that, "Breuer not withstanding, I am not a bird" (Masson: 1985, 135). Accusing Breuer of pedantry, the hawk also had this to say of its nurturing other, "he unfaillingly knows three candidates for the position of one truth and abhors all generalizations, regarding them as presumptuous" (Letter to Fliess. 1 March 1896. Masson: 1985, 175).

Differences between the two men may be detected in their writing styles in the Studies. One, determined to become the hero of history, writes confident prose in which 'I' is projected constantly whilst the other is more modest and self-effacing, drawing attention to
the space of the text as a place of configuration which is active in constituting knowledge. Freud writes himself into place as master in the place of knowledge whilst Breuer almost writes himself out of the scene in a readiness to admit not-knowing. In place of Freud's persistent 'I', Breuer more often writes 'we' or 'our'. Freud is hawkish in his arguments, bolder and more direct in his textual presentations. He may be said to be linear in respect of his own writing discharge whilst Breuer scratches and picks his way between positions which are themselves subject to the scrutiny of the textual analysis in which they are installed.

"[N]othing original": the dissemination of ideas and money & the doctors' spending power

In his theoretical writing, Breuer displays a modesty which almost leads him to erase himself from his own script, a tendency which was fully exploited by later developments in the field of neurology in addition to that of psycho-analysis where others were eager to lay claim to his ideas. Freud writes that, "A kind of reserve was characteristic of him, an inner modesty, surprising in a man of such a brilliant personality, had led him to keep his astonishing discovery secret for so long that not all of it was any longer new" (Freud: SE XIX [1925], 280). The strength of Breuer's ideas and his newly communicated terms should have been enough to stand on their own but were later utilized and subsumed by Freudian theory, passing with some modulation into everyday language without proper credit being given to their reticent originator.

The 'ownership' of ideas is given attention by Breuer at the beginning of his theoretical paper where he speaks of the difficulty of maintaining and attributing ownership in a fast-moving field of research (Breuer and Freud: 1991, 259-60). He is meticulous in scholarly crediting, carefully referencing other authors and citations, giving space to preceding forms of analyses of hysteria and the foundational work done by others. By doing so, he displays a generous and fair character and the ability to place theories in the context of contemporary theoretical framework. By way of preface to his own theories, he provides the remarkable comment that "[o]riginality will be claimed for very little of what will be found in the following pages" (260). It is interesting that Breuer does not lay claim to ideas where Freud very often speaks of 'ownership' of 'property' with regard to ideas, later dividing up the different property of both authors with regard to Studies on Hysteria.

In his attention to ideas as property, Freud presents an intellectual scenario closely allied with the money-making incentive of the doctor in a capitalist exchange mechanism with his fee-paying patients who freely enter into a contract based on an exchange between the postulated knower and the postulated unknowing subject. We may remember Breuer's comment on Freud's generalizing tendency being d'eperer le bourgeois. Ideas are the currency in this system of competition which then brings reputation and position as the doctor is maintained by the gold of the analysand. Freud's letters to Fliess make reference to the referral of patients between himself and Breuer: hysteria offers itself as a means of living (Masson: 1985, 108, 249,414). Freud's letters to Martha Bernays display an acute consciousness of money. It is patently apparent that the marriage of the analyst is dependent upon the transactional contract of analysis. The ills of the bourgeois will maintain the ambitions of its class, paying for its sickness by maintaining its sickness through the money of the paying patient.
Temporary Structures: Breuer's writing in 'Theoretical'

Every theory is a temporary structure.


Breuer's writing style in the Studies is marked by an acute textual reflexivity and self-reflection. His work is punctuated by a conscious and extended use of metaphor and working example, drawing attention to psycho-analysis as a textual encounter, a new science in which "[e]clecticism is nothing to be ashamed of" (332). Breuer employs an intertextual mesh through which ideas on hysteria are filtered and fore-shadowed. His wide use of literary allusion and reference from classical sources provide an unusual textual play-area in the field of science. He makes special use of Goethe, referring to his review of the theoretical foundations of hysteria as a "descent to the 'Mothers'" (267). Goethe was also a favourite author of Freud's who later supplemented his psycho-analytical writing with literary and classical allusion although it is not evident as a feature of his preceding work nor is a feature of his therapeutic paper in Studies on Hysteria. Breuer seems to have set a precedent by way of his writing style, expanding the notion of science and stretching the arena of a scientific paper, providing the example of what the new science-art of psycho-analysis might incorporate. In his theorization, he also makes reference to Schiller, Horace's Odes, Uhland, and classical myth. Shakespeare's A Midsummer Night's Dream is used to describe the theories of psychical processes as nothing "but shadows" (333). This eclectic use of texts within text provides an arena in which textual activation by other texts is seen to operate in the stories we tell about ourselves and the presentation of narrative to an other via the trajectory of speech as it is transmitted in analysis. Breuer presents us with a complex picture of the way in which we might conceive of hysteria by an awareness of its representation as it is incorporated in a theoretical text shot through with other diverse textual traces. This approach is one which invites us to a consideration of the parameters set by the means and terms available to us to think in and the impossibility of stepping outside metaphor and text. This was a question which was of central importance to Breuer in his 'Theoretical'.

Breuer's reflexive writing style in his presentation of theories of hysteria displays a sharp awareness of short-fall in the use of terminology. This is a reflexive attitude which is not found so readily in the work of his younger colleague who wished to avoid 'pettifogging'. Breuer pays close attention to his own use of terminology, vocabulary employed and the metaphors by which he communicates the psychical processes. His theorizing is self aware and applies a critical attitude to itself. It is interesting that in his writing he is aware that he is presenting a construction of the structuration of hysteria. Breuer writes of

The attempt that has been made here to make a synthetic construction of hysteria out of what we know of it today... (332)

Breuer is aware of the nuances of theory itself which effect a transubstantiation with regard to what is being observed, i.e. that the observed is formulated by the observer and the means of its observation so that "[e]very theory is a temporary structure" in which "[t]he observer is largely under the influence of the subjects of his observation" (312). In a letter to Gomperz dated 25 July 1895, he displays a critical distance combined with the topological metaphor which is so distinctive of his writing:

If we can realize that only the outworks of organic phenomenon have fallen to physico-chemical analysis whilst the fortress itself remains untouched, then we must doubt the validity of the assertion that is only a question of time and of cracking the central problem also by means of physics and chemistry.

(Hirschmüller: 1989, 224)
Breuer pays such attention to the topology of theory and to the topology of psychical processes that it might be said that he theorizes through metaphorical conceits. By inhabiting the metaphor he employs, he develops a theory in parallel with it. The space of theory can be seen to be shared by the space of the symptom itself, each crossing the path of the other in a dynamic exchange in the place between analyst and analysand, reader and text. Breuer also draws attention to the relation between theory and speculation in terms of psychic processes and physiological exposition of the mechanisms of the mind when he writes,

... how far we still are from the possibility of any such complete understanding of hysterical! With what uncertain strokes have its outlines been drawn in these pages, with what clumsy hypotheses have the gaping lacunas been concealed rather than bridged! (332-3)

Studies on Hysteria (1895)

The book I am doing with Breuer will contain five case histories; an essay by him, from which I wholly disassociate myself, on the theories of hysteria (summarizing and critical)...

Freud, Letter to Wilhelm Fliess. 22 June 1894. (Masson: 1985, 83)

Studies on Hysteria makes reference to three types of hysteria: retention hysteria, hypnoid hysteria, and defence hysteria which is presented as a later theoretical development and discussed more by Freud in his therapeutic chapter. These forms of hysteria are not to be regarded as discrete in themselves but one may be inhabited by or co-dependant with another. Freud and Breuer questioned the symptoms hysteria shared with many other pathological states. What is its difference from neurasthenia, anxiety neurosis, phobias, or from aphasia, for instance? Because all of these conditions may all be present within the structure known as hystericia, this would seem to call for a special architectural space of the hysterical within which other pathological complexes may exist or co-exist, independently or in a state of mutual dependance as conjunct components. "[I]f hysteria generally appears as a component of a mixed neurosis, the situation resembles that in which there is a mixed infection", writes Freud in his psychotherapeutic paper (344). There is also the neurological to consider - paralyses, tics - and the physiological - rheumatic and muscular pain - in a complicated picture of the interplay between the physiological and cultural. By unshaking the concept of hysteria as a single therapeutic entity, Freud and Breuer were already unsettling contemporary theories on hysteria. The Studies opened up the analysis of the psychical through the means presented to it by the clinical picture of hysteria. Freud states that it is his "opinion that hysteria is not an independent clinical entity" (342). It is clear that within this nexus of reference named hysteria is a complex interconnection of theoretical paths which interact with each other on a textual and historical basis.

Tempo-Psychic Models

Nothing takes the past away
Like the future.
(Madonna, 'Nothing Really Matters'. Maverick Records, 1998.)

Retention theory as it is presented by Breuer and Freud is the outcome of Breuer's discovery; through his treatment of Bertha Pappenheim, of a forgotten trauma which is still active in the organism. The existence of a covert memory trace pointed to hidden areas of the brain which Breuer termed the subconscious and the unconscious. This becomes the buried object, the foreign body still active in the flesh of the present which is referred to in the "Preliminary
Communication' of 1883. Breuer attributes the notion of 'hysterical phenomena of retention' as a developed theory to Freud (288) whilst Freud, in his psychotherapeutic chapter clearly attributes it to both of them and then goes on to doubt its importance as a concept when he argues that such terminology may be rejected in favour of an extension of the concept of defence and its role in hysterical pathology (371-2).

This rejection of 'retention' as a concept drawn from Breuer's clinical practice and its erasure under the wider enveloping concept of defence might be seen to ignore the tempo-psychical aspect of a symptomatic complex for the sake of the establishment of a new terminology. It is clear from later developments in Freud's theory that the concept of 'retention' figures under a different guise: the concept of Nachträglichkeit in the 'Wolfman' case is implicitly related to this early theory. What retention presents us with is the temporal relations of this retained psychic scene. The mnemic image exists on simultaneous tempo-psychic levels, each interactive with the other. Although it is in part a remnant or trace of the past and retained by the mnemic apparatus of the brain, it cannot, of and in itself, exist except through the activation of the present and as such is also subject to the projections of the future as they are formulated in the present of the living organism. Here then is the germ of Freud's Nachträglichkeit or 'afterwardsness', the retroactive imperative of all psychical activity.

To the dictum that "[h]ysterics suffer mainly from reminiscences" of the 'Preliminary Communication' (58), Breuer adds this temporal distinction:

...the memory of the psychical trauma must be regarded as operating as a contemporary agent, like a foreign body, long after its forcible entrance ... then we must admit that unconscious ideas exist and are operative. (299-300 - emphasis as original.)

Breuer gives the example of forgetting to make a medical visit and the unsettled feeling which subsequently pursues him through the day. He says that "the idea of the visit has been all the time operative, that is to say present, but not in my consciousness" (301 - my emphasis).

He also emphasizes the recall element of the mnemic as a disparate mechanism discrete from the mnemic in and of itself, if indeed there is such a thing. By emphasizing the authors' view posited in the 'Preliminary Communication' that "the determining process (that is, the recollection of it) continues to operate for many years", Breuer draws attention to temporal models of psychical mechanisms (58 cited on 299). Discussing the stimuli of dreams as purely reliant upon mnemic sources whilst the organism is shut off from new external perceptions, Breuer describes this stimulus as a "retrogressive' excitation, emanating from the organ of memory and acting on the perceptual apparatus by means of ideas" (264). Despite Freud's denial of the importance of the retention mechanism, it is to just this which he returns as a mechanism called by another name and which provides the temporal basis of all psychoanalytic exchange in the domain of the spoken through the backwards completion principle that is Nachträglichkeit.

Topological Models and Metaphors

All our thinking tends to be accompanied and aided by spatial ideas, and we talk in spatial metaphors. (307)

Breuer offers a topological model of the mind via metaphors of structure, i.e. through the topology of theory itself. With regard to theories of the nervous system, he offers images of an underground system, speaking of a "descent to the 'Mothers' [i.e., exploration of the depths]" (267). The unconscious becomes "a difficult and obscure region" for the explorer (300). Invoking Goethe when speaking of the discharge of affect in the organism, he states
that "we can follow the same process even up to the highest regions of human achievement" (282). It is clear that in his use of metaphor, Breuer is building a theoretical map by which to explore the psychical. A result of this practice is that there is a two-fold system of presentation confluent in its splitting with the splitting of the mind described. The cartography of theory then interplays and superimposes with the cartography of psychical processes being invoked. It is through the spaces of theory that we are led into the spaces of the psychical model.

Breuer was aware of the dangers of such a presentation which might encourage a solidification of metaphor into physical correlates. He writes of a need to maintain a "safe[ty] from our own figures of speech" (307). He states that,

It is only too easy to fall into a habit of thought which assumes that every substantive has a substance behind it - which gradually comes to regard 'consciousness' as standing for some actual thing; and when we have become accustomed to make use metaphorically of spatial relations, as in the term 'sub-consciousness', we find as time goes on that we have actually formed an idea which has lost its metaphorical nature and which we can manipulate as easily as though it was real. Our mythology is then complete. (306-7)

With regard to the conscious and unconscious, "we almost invariably form pictures" of trees and buildings where "roots in darkness" and "dark underground cellars" may represent the unconscious (307).

If, however, we constantly bear in mind that all such spatial relations are metaphorical and do not allow ourselves to be misled into supposing that these relations are literally present in the brain, we may nevertheless speak of a consciousness and a subconsciousness. But only on this condition. (307)

Through topological metaphor we are offered a way of explaining the multi-dimensionality and inter-functionality of the mind where the conscious and unconscious ideas alike may have their origin in the same cerebral cortex (307). Freud also makes topological references by way of archeological exegesis and diagrammatical explanation of the aetiology of hysteria via its mapping of the conscious and unconscious. Where Freud, however, uses this concept of excavation or evacuation by systematic removal of layers, so presenting us with what is a teleological model, Breuer's use of topological metaphor presents a complex interplay of synergetic structures at play between theory and the theorized. Parameters are thereby set by the metaphorical representation with which we become familiar so that our thinking becomes a process gauged to the liminal edges of theoretical space and shot through by its own suggestibility via implicit or implied references. The observers of the structuration of hysteria are therefore subject to the space available to them in which to theorize, the concealed acts as an instigator, activating the momentum to discovery only to be subject to the mode of its uncovering. The mechanism of the lure alters what is, if anything, bidden beneath the layers of metaphor so that the excavator may find an archifact of his very own making. Whilst the observer is under the influence of the observed, subsequent observations will modify prior observers' theories so that subsequent observation is set within parameters which qualify and quantify its findings in a self-sustaining system out of which it is difficult to break. Breuer refers to the modification of his present views by subsequent observations "for it is certain that we have only taken the first steps in this region of knowledge, and our present views will be substantially altered by further observations" (317).
Topology of the Mind

ideas exist and are operative beneath the threshold of consciousness. Indeed, the whole conduct of our life is constantly influenced by subconscious ideas. (301)

In his presentation of hysterical phenomena, Breuer pays close attention to theoretical vocabulary and its suggestive connotations. He astutely examines the seemingly contradictory concept of the 'idea' as an unconscious construct through an interrogative approach to technical connotations of terminology and its conceptual framework in its enabling and restrictive aspects.

The objections that are raised against ‘unconscious ideas’ existing and being operative seem for the most part to be juggling with words. No doubt ‘idea’ is a word belonging to the terminology of conscious thinking, and ‘unconscious idea’ is therefore a self-contradictory expression. (301-2)

He combines this interrogation with a vocabulary of topological dimensions, describing the idea rising above the threshold of consciousness or existing beneath it and posits the further construction of terminology such as 'ideational sub-stratum' in order to circumvent apparent contradiction and to facilitate further conceptual navigation.

The physical process which underlies an idea is the same in content and form (though not in quantity) whether the idea rises above the threshold of consciousness or remains beneath it. It would only be necessary to construct some such term as 'ideational sub-stratum' in order to avoid the contradiction and to counter objection. (301-2)

It would seem that hysteria is an illness with a sense of geography as the theorization of its aetiology and therapy presents itself through topological imagery and metaphor. The schema of this malady is such that, for Freud especially, it offers its tiered stages as evidence for discovery by the doctor-archeologist, its processes of symbolic displacement become a model of the therapeutic practice of psychoanalysis. For Breuer, however, the process is to be understood not so much as one of discovery and backward trajectory through buried layers but a complex interconnection of the many in the one: a manifold structure which presents itself as singular. Its ontology is therefore complicit with its presentation. Through careful figurative rendering of hysterical phenomena, Breuer's theorization is such that it draws attention to the anaglyphic linguistic structure that is metaphor and its power to enable conceptual perception. His use of imagery builds a theory in which the conceptual framework shapes what it is presenting. Breuer uses metaphors of buildings and houses to facilitate an understanding of the complicated lay-out of hysterical space.

If the basis of hysteria is an idiosyncrasy of the whole nervous system, the complex of ideogenic, psychically determined symptoms is erected on it as a building is on its foundations. And it is a building of several storeys. (326)

We understand through metaphor so that a concept cannot exist a priori but always dependent upon the armature of understanding it presents us with so that the concept does not exist on its own to be rendered through language but is tied to it the linguistic mechanism in an holistic relation, “[i]ust as it is only possible to understand the structure of such a building if we distinguish the plans of different floors” (326). In this way, Breuer's theorization of hysteria is a counterpart to the positioning of the hysteric. Through over-simplification or failure to understand the manifold inconnecting honeycomb of associative and deterministic conceptual features, “[i]t is just as though we tried to insert the different rooms of a many-storeyed house into the plan of a single storey” (326).
In writing of the 'psychical material' of hysteria, Freud also thinks of a "structure in several dimensions" (374) but immediately organizes those dimensions into an ordered layering which is "stratified in at least three different ways" (374). This imagery again lends itself to the questing teleology of an archeological dig for therapeutic 'finds'.

It is interesting that in her presentation of women as robber birds in negotiation with the symbolic, Cixous continues these topological metaphors in what is perceived to be a re-working and challenge to Freudian terminology. In "The Laugh of the Medusa" (1976), Cixous postulates that through 'feminine writing', écriture féminine, "every structure is for a moment thrown off balance" (Marks and de Courtivron: 1981, 249). Playing on the double meaning of voler, Cixous writes that women “go by, fly the coop, take pleasure in jumbling the order of space, in disorienting it, in changing around the furniture, dislocating things and values, breaking them all up, emptying structures, and turning propriety upside down" (Marks and de Courtivron: 1981, 258).

That such topological metaphor has a base in ego constitution in relation to body image is illustrated by the account of Anna O.'s spatial disorientation in her illness. Breuer tells us that her family had moved house in the spring of 1881 but because, in her condition seconde, she lived in the time dimension of the winter of 1880-81, she continued to formulate her psychical and physical existence with reference to that particular temporal dimension.

She was carried back to the previous year with such intensity that in the new house, she hallucinated her old room, so that when she wanted to go to the door she knocked up against the stove which stood in the same relation to the window as the door did in the old room. (Breuer and Freud: 1991, 86)

Breuer describes how his patient, after relief from her condition seconde afforded by the 'talking cure', woke one night to find herself in "a strange room" and her fright was such that it disturbed the entire household (92). The "terrifying hallucination" which terminates her treatment is produced by "re-arranging the room so as to resemble her father's sickroom" (95). By placing objects in a room in an arranged and recognizable pattern in order to replicate a past living space, the subject is psychically 'determined' by being once more placed under the influence of the objects of her observation. By absorbing the object into the subject via its ego ideal, inhabited phantasy may be posited as the basis of bodily reality. The importance of perceptual space to the constitution of the ego is demonstrated through this exercise which is itself a physical counterpart of theoretical space where we may be seen to inhabit a metaphor.

Metaphors of the Dark Underground and 'feminine' connections

I live like the plants,
In the cellar, without light.
From 'Love did not come to me', poem by Bertha Pappenheim: c.1911. (Hirschmüller: 1989, 308)

The concept of the unconscious is one which lends itself readily to ideas of darkness and the metaphorical construct of an underground system. Breuer writes of the "darkness of the unconscious" gaining control over muscular apparatus and ideational activity (308). Breuer continues this metaphor with his characteristic use of literary and classical allusion when he writes that,

This half of a mind is therefore quite complete and conscious in itself. In our cases the part of the mind which is split off is 'thrust into darkness', as the Titans are imprisoned in the crater of Etna, and can shake the earth but can never emerge into the light of day. (309)
In the case history of 'Fräulein Anna O.', the patient tells her stories in a state of auto-hypnosis which occurs in the evenings. This nocturnal condition she named 'clouds' (80). In his early case history of Bertha Pappenheim recovered from Kreutzlingen Sanatorium by Albrecht Hirschmüller, Breuer writes that in her severely disordered mental state she experienced "[l]ucid periods inbetween [ ] when she complains of the deep darkness in her head" (Hirschmüller: 1979, 281).

It is interesting to compare Breuer's presentation of the 'darkness' of the unconscious with Freud's later formulation of femininity as a 'dark continent' rather like Breuer's representation of the unconscious as if picking up the metaphorical momentum from Breuer but transferring it to the idea of femininity allied with the unconscious and area topology, thereby introducing a cartography of sexual difference. In Freud's scenario, darkness is associated with the unknown region of the psyche in the feminine subject so that ideas of the unconscious are carried with this image as it is employed in descriptions of psycho-sexual development.

Breuer, it should be noted, makes no such comparison between the unconscious and any notion of the feminine. He refers to other writers who have described hysterics as the "flower of mankind" (321) whilst he himself alludes to the clear intelligence of his hysteric patients and argues specifically against Janet's formulation of innate degeneracy or hereditary taints. It is in this line of argument that he says "[a]fter all, the patron saint of hysteria, St. Theresa, was a woman of genius" (312). Although Breuer accepts some of the main theoretical ideas of Janet and pays homage to their founding importance, he disputes his view that hysteria is due to 'mental weakness' (309-312). In stressing the sexual aetiology in the underpinning of the development of hysteria, he refers to sexual libido as an energy which is not sufficiently dissipated by the organism by the means available to it. He makes no line of demarcation between the feminine or masculine subject in this energetic frustration as may be seen by his clinical example of the small boy with swallowing difficulties due to trauma suffered by being offered a man's penis in an urinal (289).

Electricity

It is entirely in line with the mechanist physical philosophy of the School of Helmholtz that Breuer should apply that most pure applied system of "attraction and repulsion" - electricity - to his most extended metaphor in his analysis of hysterical structuration. The vocabulary of electrical phenomena is very clearly related to the language of psychoanalysis. Electrical analogy carries with it the vocabulary of electricity: the mechanisms of resistance, conduction and discharge, and the functions of the capacitor and transformer offer themselves as examples. When the vocabulary itself is not being used, the idiosyncrasies of electricity as a phenomenon and the functional devices used in electrical systems are being utilized in the ideational constructs of hysteria with which we are presented. Conversion may itself be a modulation of the transformer, the reflex a form of capacitor whilst the concept of resistance and defence may be drawn from the role of the resistor in the electrical circuit. In his 'Project for a Scientific Psychology' (1925), Freud also employs this mechanized energy model when he puts forward the theory of three different types of neuron which all have separate and synchronic parts to play in the discharge of affect.

Whilst Breuer was at pains to point out that his use of the electrical metaphor was only an enlightening device and not to be taken literally, it is clear that the electrical analogy is drawn from its therapeutic counterpart in the established treatment of hysteria (amongst other illnesses) by galvanic muscle stimulation. Galvanic theories have established that the application of electrical current produces a reflex in the muscle. The muscle is stimulated by electrical currents which replicate signals sent by the brain via the central cortex to the nerve, causing the muscles to contract. If the nerve cell body is sensitive to electrical stimuli so that
it can perform its physiological function by by-passing the central cortex, this demonstrates
that the central nervous system is itself a charged system and that the muscle contraction
normally carries a low electrical current. Comparing the organism to "a widely ramified
electrical system for lighting and the transmission of motor power" (268), Breuer writes of a
"network of lines of conduction" with a dynamo engine ticking over which maintains the body
in its state of 'stand-by' (269). In a split energetic manoeuvre, the system itself is rendered
quiescent by expending "a given quantity of energy of this purpose" (269). Its quiescence is
therefore maintained by kinesis. In electrical terms, the organic system is 'charged' and
thereby "best prepared for work" (273). The potentiality of the system is manifest in its
charged state and "the whole immense network forms a single reservoir of 'nervous tension'
(269).

If we return to the idea of the splitting in the energetic to which I have referred above,
it is apparent that we are not indeed speaking of two different states of energy but of three.
This is because the energy which maintains the organism in its quiescent state is different
from the energy which is being suspended and, furthermore, the freed energy which is
directed into discharge "thereby transforming tensile force into live energy" (272) is
qualititively different from its quiescent form.13 The organism expends energy in order to
maintain its charged state, i.e. its quiescence or potentiality. This schema would not
contradict the notion that these three forms of systemic energy may be modulations of one and
the same energy, i.e. that the activated energy may itself be a transubstantiation of the
quiescent energy, and that the third quiescent energy is a split-off modulation of the energy
that is quiescent and simultaneously of the same derivation as the discharge. In other words, to
continue the electrical analogy, the same charge may be used for different purposes and those
purposes will entail some modulation of the charge via the different components of a circuit.
Throughout the entire interconnected network of the nervous system, "resistances are
interposed, which prevent the general, uniform distribution of excitation" (279).

This model was utilized by Freud in 1920 in Beyond the Pleasure Principle with
regard to primary and secondary psychical processes. In his exposition of 'free' and 'bound'
energy with regard to psychical processes, free energy would always precede or be anterior to
the bound form of energy. Free energy is in direct engagement of discharge whilst bound
energy is subject to different types of controls or resistances and are characteristic of a more
complicated or evolved system. The relation is the same as a simple electrical circuit to that of
a more complex circuit which is multi-functional and is modulated by means of a series of
electrical components. Freud refers to "Breuer's distinction between quiescent (or bound) and
mobile cathectic energy in the elements of psychical systems" (Freud: 1991 [1920], 235). It is
interesting, however, that whilst Freud clearly attributes the origins of the concepts of free and
bound forms of energy to Breuer, he makes reference to only two forms of energy where
Breuer has clearly stated three. Breuer refers to this three-fold model in a footnote in his
section on 'Intracerebral Tonic Excitation' (n.269). There he states quite explicitly that in
addition to the potential energy in the quiescent state and the unknown form of kinetic energy
which is the psychic discharge (i.e. that which is the transformed state of the quiescent), there
is "yet another quiescent state of nervous excitation: tonic excitation or nervous tension" (269
- my emphasis).

Apart then from a potential energy which lies quiescent in the chemical substance of
the cell and an unknown form of kinetic energy which is discharged when the fibres
are in a state of excitation, we must assume the existence of yet another quiescent
state of nervous excitation: tonic excitation or nervous tension. (269)

There is a layering of energy here in a tiered system, a topology of energized organic tension
which suspends the flesh in a kinesis of psychical and somatic inter-relation.
In the grand picture that Breuer presents, there are indeed two main forms of energy which maintain the organism, quiescent and the actual discharge. It is important to note, however, his tuning of this in his footnote in a presentation which is integral to his argument. It is clear that in this physical model there must be a third energy expended in the maintenance of quiescence or organic non-expenditure. The schema attributed to Breuer as it is re-worked and presented by Freud is repeated in Laplanche and Pontalis exposition of free and bound energy in The Language of Psychoanalysis (1988, 171-173). There they state that Breuer's thesis is founded on "two kinds of mechanical energy" in accordance with the physical principles of the Helmholtz School (171). This takes account of the grand or more manifest system described by Breuer but does not take account of the third form of energy to which he refers. They then go on to posit that,

Breuer is mainly concerned to define a kind of potential energy, present in the nervous system, which he calls 'intracerebral tonic excitation', 'nervous tension' or 'quiescent' energy. (Laplanche and Pontalis: 1988, 171)

Here Breuer's carefully differentiated modulations of energy defined by their purpose within the system are collapsed into one and the same, "a kind of potential energy". ([N]ervous tension' for example might allude to the third energy described or might describe a discharge affect.) His conception of "another quiescent state of nervous excitation" is completely lost. The interconnected model which Breuer presents of synchronic energetic modulations derived from the same source is effectively erased in this extrapolation which interprets Breuer's thesis as one of duality and polarity in the system. The reason for this might be that Laplanche and Pontalis approach Breuer through the texts and thesis of Freud which, whilst utilizing Breuer's ideas, also fail to recognize this third form of energy in the dynamic of his psychic model. The other reason for this might be due to overlooking the important and far-reaching modulations of his theory which Breuer presents in a footnote.

What I propose as a candidate for the second unknown form of quiescent energy, i.e. the third energy, is that which acts to provide the 'trigger' or 'signal' to the quiescent state to release the energy into its free form. This is because there must also be an energy involved in the act of discharge which is disparate from discharge itself. This 'trigger' must in fact itself be lying dormant or quiescent until called upon by the central nervous system to release its dynamic signal. It is also important to note that this quiescent energy which is the pre-form of the 'signal' is itself the result of a system of quiescence and discharge. In his electrical analogy, Breuer is presenting us with a complex interconnecting and tiered synergetic system of superimposed energy pathways. As a working example of this complex system of energetic synergy, Breuer offers a description of the energetic activation of the sensory nerve cell and its fibre and notes how the nerve cell is itself an activating carrier of energy to the nerve fibre through extension by contact. To illustrate this mechanism, he finds it useful to employ the comparison of a hydrostatic system (closed and self-maintaining system) to the free force of flowing water (simple hydraulic system); he also compares this with the relation between electrical tension and the electric circuit.

In his next step, he then places these interconnecting systems within another much larger system which is the total of all these interconnections so that "the whole immense network forms a single reservoir of 'nervous tension" (269). Here he is describing the secondary system in which all others are enclosed which actually presents itself to us as the primary system as it is the more obvious cohesive presentation of the forces of attraction and repulsion in the world. It is clear from the model that Breuer presents us-with in this footnote that he conceived of energy as a complex system of interlocking honeycombs in which three forms of energy are involved in each dynamic system of quiescence, discharge, and second quiescence (i.e. that which activates quiescence, that which provides the signal). We must then refer back to the topology of the system described by Breuer to apply his metaphor of a house of many storeys to this complex presentation of systems within interlocking systems of
energy at work within the organism. From the point of view of pathology it is obvious that, when this intricate and delicate system is then subject to overload and in a state of short-circuit or false by-pass, many complex new neural pathways may build up within the organism at a rapid and easily established pace.

It is clear that Freud, in his subsequent work, and Laplanche and Pontalis in their contemporary extrapolations of 'free' and 'bound' energy have misrepresented Breuer's theories by over-simplification of the topological energetic model with which they are presented. The metaphoric nature of Breuer's analogy is also lost in the attempt to present 'free' and 'bound' energy in what becomes a more mechanistic model in Freud. Breuer's theories offer a complexity of interconnecting circuits in a manifold system which, when taken into account with his metaphorical and self-reflexive theorization, offer a challenge to binaristic models of metaphysical thought and present a holistic model of somatic and psychical experience which is only now being taken into account in contemporary theorization of bodily experience.

State of Constancy

Breuer states that the organism works to maintain a constant state of energy (tonic energy): "a tendency on the part of the organism to keep tonic intracerebral excitation constant" (273). It works to maintain this constancy by dispersing excitation unless the system finds itself in a state of overload. It should also be noted that the converse of this scenario may also occur, i.e. when the organism finds itself in a state of under-excitation. This transpires when the system finds itself in a state of exhaustion due to which it will seek to restore its depletion of energy by shutting down its perceptive capabilities and entering the state of sleep. The organism is then a mechanism which seeks to maintain constancy via its own apparatus of self-regulation. It maintains an equilibrium in its system and may do this through re-charging by shutting down organs of perception or by a 'conversion' of excess energy, transforming it into physiological activation.

The organism relies upon its perpetual reservoir of energy in its compulsion to maintain this state of constancy. In a theory which might be regarded as a forerunner of Freud's formulations in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Breuer associates over-excitation or excitation without a discharge (i.e. a 'strangulated affect') with a resultant unpleasure. If energy is not employed 'functionally' this results in psychical pain or a feeling of unpleasure in the organism (272, 287).

I have already mentioned a view which should not, perhaps, be dismissed out of hand. On this view the clarity of our ideas, and consequently their capacity for being observed by our self-consciousness - that is, for being conscious - is determined, among other things, by the feelings of pleasure or unpleasure which they arouse by their quota of affect. (302)

It is clear that from the above extract that pleasure and unpleasure act as the conductors and resistors of the ideational in this system.

In a normal person, excess energy may find its direct discharge or, where this is not possible, it may be dealt with via transpositioning or substitution, says Breuer. We may go for a run instead of hitting someone, for instance. We employ 'stand-ins' to stave off excess psychical tension (278). Here is a schematology of displacement or physical metonymy which presents us with a 'normal' scenario in which there is a transpositioning of the affects of excitation activated through the act of substitution. This substitution is a means of modulating or by-passing the simple or more direct discharge via a re-routing of the physiological reflex so that the outcome is socially acceptable. This substitution should be kept distinct from abnormal modulations of the affects of energy which finds its discharge 'strangulated' and which are a form of 'short-circuiting'.
States of Overload

Because there is an optimum level of tensile energy in the organism (274), when this system of intracerebral excitation finds itself in an unpleasurable state of over-excitation due to an unconscious state which has prevented discharge, it will seek discharge by abnormal means via the route of least resistance. This is correlative to the laws of an electrical system in which the current will always, given the opportunity, travel by the easiest route, i.e. that of the lowest resistance. Breuer states that "the discharge follows the 'principle of least resistance' and takes place along those paths whose resistances have already been weakened by concurrent circumstances" (284). This furthers the electrical analogy by stating that abnormal facilitation of the system may be the result of weakening due to overload, setting up the conditions conducive to short-circuit (274).

If the tension in such a system becomes excessively high, there is danger of a break occurring at weak points in the insulation. Electrical phenomena then appear at abnormal points; or, if two wires lie close beside each other, there is a short circuit. (279)

Within the organism, 'abnormal facilitation' takes place along deviations from preformed motor paths or neural pathways (274-5). Just as in an electrical circuit, the charge from the system cannot be drawn upon for its proper purpose if current has been by-passed through short-circuit, "[i]n just the same way, the affect fails to appear if the excitation flows away in an abnormal reflex and is converted into a somatic phenomenon" (284n). When these abnormal neural routes become established through repetition, the conversion into hysterical symptom is complete (283).

Shunt Circuit and 'abnormal facilitation'

In a letter to Wilhelm Fliess written 24 October 1895, Breuer refers to an electrical apparatus used for 'abdominal electrization' employed in galvanic therapy. Breuer describes the principle of shunt circuit which will send direct current into the body and at the same time provide a shunt to prevent its full effect. Here is an extract from that letter:

It appears that the two electrode plates serve both for constant and for induced current, which should be 'mixed'. Then the secondary coil of the induction apparatus forms a shunt circuit for the constant current, and since it should be made of thick wire, with few windings, thus having very low resistance, the entire constant current equalises itself through it, and virtually nothing passes through the body.

(Hirschmüller: 1989, 318)

It is clear from the above that Breuer's understanding of electrical principle was thorough and detailed as can be borne out by his references to electrical systems in the Studies.

A shunt circuit is one in which the current is provided with an alternative easier route via thicker wire with less resistance which carries the bulk of the current in the circuit. There is still, however, a much smaller amount of the same current (and here it is important to understand that this is not a residue of the current or another current but one and the same current) which still seeks to complete the circuit through the thinner wire. This phenomenon is referred to as a 'shunt'. The current is shunted on, thereby forming a configuration within which a false by-pass forms another path of the circuit and the current running through another part of the same circuit is thereby reduced. I would seek to argue here that this electrical phenomenon of shunt could provide an illuminating model for the aetiology of the symptom as the somatic presentation of a short-circuit which thereby presents a scenario of splitting within what is one and the same energy in which the energy is modulated into two
different values and behaves in different manners until it is again in a state of common flow. It is fitting that in his analysis of the pathological splitting of the mind, Breuer uses the metaphor of "divided streams" to describe this process. This metaphor of divided streams is directly comparable to the concept of shunt circuit as it describes a process of psychic confluency (314).

"What seems hard to understand," writes Breuer, "is how an idea can be sufficiently intense to provoke a lively motor act, for instance, and at the same time not intense enough to become conscious" (302). He then offers the explanation that this is due to the organism's resistance to the idea becoming conscious, thereby protecting itself. This ties with Freud's emphasis on defence and repression in his chapter which are useful concepts to apply here in order to explain the pushing under of a very lively affect and its physical transubstantiation or substitution into the somatic symptomatology. What it also ties with, however, is the electrical mechanism of the shunt circuit where the thin wire offers more resistance to the current which takes the easy route through the thick wire leaving the circuit divided within like two streams but with one side able to offer itself for utilization as a low current 'circuit' running confluent with a current of greater value/intensity. A very 'lively motor act' which is 'not intense enough' to break resistance is due to its conversion or running off into an easier route which forms an alternative facilitation. The organism in its abnormality is then enabled to function after a manner, i.e. it is functioning by malfunction. This is an ironic manoeuvre on the part of the organism as it maintains itself by malfunction due to the compulsion to achieve discharge in order to maintain its optimum state. It achieves this even by means of a short-circuit so that the organism may maintain a state of energetic constancy even by abnormal means. The system of the organism here may be said to over-ride the organism (as entity) itself. This is due to the dominating impulse of the organism to maintain itself by whatever means.
Symptom as Symbol

The aetiology of the symptom as a reflex lies in its formation through an abnormal facilitation which becomes established in the neural pathways of the organism.

A surplus of excitation also gives rise to pathological phenomena in the motor sphere. Children having this characteristic very easily develop tic-like movements . . . they become permanent unless they are promptly checked. The reflex paths are very easily and quickly dug in deep. (325)

This points to an archeological aspect of the topology of the symptom, composed as it of a number of superimposed and interconnecting networks of energy. We can relate this to Breuer's argument that where there is a frustration of discharge in the normal organism, the energy must still find its release in discharge and it will seek to do this via a substitution or stand-in in conscious terms. There is a metonymic logic to the symptom. In a letter to Breuer written 29 June 1992, Freud outlines plans for the forthcoming Studies. In it he makes reference to symptoms; he says that "they are displacements [ ], in part along an abnormal path (internal alteration), of sums of excitation which have not been released" (SE I 148).

In the organism maintaining itself by abnormal means, these discharges become 'strangulated' and then find a release which is confined to the organism itself, i.e. it stays within its physiological limits in a scenario of psycho-neural feedback. (Here we may think of Breuer's analogy of the closed arena of the hydrostatic system opposed to the applied dynamic of the hydraulic system.) This, in a person with a nervous disorder, of which hysteria is but one as Breuer carefully points out (281), leads to conversion of the affect so that the symptom is a stand-in, a symbolic transubstantiation or a plastic impression of ideogenic origin. It is the bodily presentation of psychical affect as it is played through permutations of the neural pathways (281). We should also bear in mind that the ideogenic remains as an active and activating force which can lie quiescent until triggered.

If the original affect was discharged not in a normal but in an 'abnormal' reflex, this latter is equally released by recollection. The excitation arising from the affective idea is 'converted' (Freud) into a somatic phenomenon.

Should this reflex become completely facilitated by frequent repetition, it may, it seems, drain away the operative force of the releasing ideas so totally that the affect itself emerges to a minimal extent only, or not at all. In such a case the 'hysterical conversion' is complete. (282)

Abnormal facilitation finds its conversion through its replay so that the symptom then becomes a 'reflex' which replaces the idea which was its affecting impetus. This is to say that it is the somatic response to abnormal excitation as it follows the new configurations of the neurological network as the organism mis-functions in order to function.

It is a subtle and interesting argument against the charge of psycho-parallelism which is often levelled against early psychoanalytic practice that Breuer speaks of the repetition of the symptom which 'imprints' the ideogenic into body (299). This step in Breuer's theory is quite radical in its evasion of any simple mind-body parallelism. Whilst hysterical symptoms may be, for the most part, ideogenic in their origin, he says that it might be the case that:

. . . the repetition of them has, to use Romberg's phrase [1840, 192], 'imprinted' them into the body, and they would now no longer be based on a psychical process but on modifications in the nervous system . . . they would have become self-sufficient, genuinely somatic symptoms. (299)
This speculation, although tentatively expressed as "neither untenable nor improbable", is radical and far-reaching in its implication for it connects with some of our most modern thinking on the body and provides a clear line to Lacan's formulation of the linguistic intertwining with the fleshly put forward especially in 'The Mirror Stage' and more pertinently in 'The subversion of the subject and the dialectic of desire'. This argument is also one which alters the grammar we use and the philosophical divisions which colour our perceptive ability to challenge the categories of knowledge which themselves shape what knowledge is. Mind and body, two areas which have been separately established through dimensions of vocabulary and theoretical/philosophical practice, become synchronic in this scenario. Psycho-analysis offers us an anti-Cartesian move.

It is Breuer's use of 'into' not 'on' to describe the synonymous interplay (though this is, of course, the wrong word to use but there is no other,) of the ideogenic and the somatic, the mind and body, the psychical and the physical which is redolent here. If Breuer had used 'on', as he well might have with a less subtle mind, it would have implied a separation of systems, a body to be written upon. To write 'into' suggests an integral enfleshing of the ideogenic, that somehow the word has become flesh; that the body is a living cipher and the cipher is itself enfleshed.

**Association and the Symptom**

The symptom occurs as a result of what Breuer terms the repetition of "the facilitation of abnormal reflexes according to the general laws of association" (285). The short-circuit or organic malfunction coincides with a physical and ideational path which then carries the association for future misfunctions and so the short-circuit is 'set' into a reflex conversion. This is then "strengthened there by repetition" in the hypnoid state (295). Freud emphasizes Breuer's argument when he states that, 

> The point at which a symptom has already broken through once [see p.279] forms a weak spot at which it will break through again the next time. 

(Breuer and Freud: 1991, 347)

The symptom is manifested in a knot of symbolic relation to its precipitating causes. It is the reflex which is formed from a honeycomb of associative ideas in the unconscious. Breuer then adds on to this symptomatic scenario an important twist which turns what has been a kinetic model into a symbolic exchange in the field of speech.

Here we have determination through symbolism. What unites the affect and its reflex is often some ridiculous play upon words or associations by sound, but this only happens in dream-like states... (285 - emphasis as original)

Here we may note the slippage of the purely somatic into the somatological. We may draw what is a significant analogy with Freud's development of the technique of word-association as a new therapeutic tactic with which hypnosis may be replaced. In this therapy, the attention paid to word-play, slips, lapsus, and sound-association builds upon the symbolic relation as it presents itself in the symptom for unravelling in the analytic encounter. Continuing his discussion of 'determination' and 'overdetermination' of the symptom, Breuer states that,

> ...there must be a convergence of several factors before a hysterical symptom can be generated... Such symptoms are invariably 'overdetermined', to use Freud's expression. (289)

'Overdetermination' as the result of a number of converging associations is then linked to 'repetition of an affect' which is necessary in order to bring about a 'conversion' (290).
Language and Mnemic Chains

In his extrapolation of the train of association operative in the unconscious of the apparatus, and of underlying importance in the apparent purely somatic nature of the symptom, Breuer finds it useful to speak of the hysterical symptom which may result from a blockage or inhibition in the course of association. He illustrates this with a further linguistic analogy and uses the concept of a chain as that in which associations are linked together.

The simplest example and model of this is afforded by the excitation which arises when we cannot recollect a name or cannot solve a riddle, and so on. If someone tells us the name or gives us the answer to the riddle, the chain of associations is ended, and the excitation vanishes, just as it does on the ending of a reflex chain. (286)

In 'The function and field of speech and language in psychoanalysis' (1953) also known as 'The Rome Discourse', Lacan considers the linguistic element of the symptom as it becomes enfleshed. Taking into account the text provided by the patient in 'free association', Lacan speaks of the symbol and states that,

...in order to map it out at the points where its verbal forms intersect with the nodal points of its structure, then it is already clear that the symptom resolves itself entirely in an analysis of language, because the symptom is itself structured like a language... (Lacan: 1977, 59)

We might also refer to Lacan's attention to the signifying chain in 'The agency of the letter in the unconscious or reason since Freud' (1957) where he refers to the need for a "topological substratum" when speaking of combinational elements of the linguistic as a system of mutually syncopated and co-dependent components.

...the term I ordinarily use, namely, the signifying chain, gives an approximate idea: rings of a necklace that is a ring in another necklace made of rings. (Lacan: 1977, 153)

This need for a topological presentation of systems within systems is reminiscent of Breuer's terminology when speaking of energetic structures in the organism and their metaphoric analogy/relation to the structures of the symptom. The infinite en-chaining with which Lacan presents us is related to the infinite honeycombs of an interlocking and superimposing intricacy of circuitry with which Breuer provides us in his topological model. It is clear that the symptom both in presentation and extrapolation is the effect of an inhabitation of metaphor. "The mechanism of metaphor," says Lacan, "is the very mechanism by which the symptom, in the analytic sense, is determined... a symptom being a metaphor in which flesh or function is taken as a signifying element" (Lacan: 1977, 166 - my emphasis).

In this area of association, Breuer once again reaches ahead of his time when he advances the vocabulary of psychoanalysis with the notion of complexes. Each ideogenic impression may co-exist in an interlocking and reciprocal triggering mechanism which Breuer refers to as a 'complex'. Laplanche and Pontalis describe a complex as an "[o]rganized group of ideas and memories of great affective force which are either partly or totally unconscious" (Laplanche & Pontalis: 1988, 72). Breuer, writing of hemi-anaesthesia states that,

For the most part the sense-impressions that are not apperceived and the ideas that are aroused but do not enter consciousness cease without producing further complexes - mental strata withdrawn from consciousness... (310)
It has already been noted that Breuer's use of the word 'complex' is close to Jung's which is generally regarded as having been introduced ten years later (Strachey: 310n). Most authors, Freud included, attribute the term 'complex' to Jung but there is evidence in the Studies that Breuer preceded him in its usage. In Part II of his "History of the Psycho-Analytic Movement" (1914), Freud comments on his misgivings regarding the term 'complex' but it seems that by this time its received understanding had slipped into shorthand for the repressed rather than representing the system of enchained association and triggering that Breuer had described (Freud: SE XIV, 29-30).

'Hypnoid States'

The theory of the 'hypnoid states' provided the biggest theoretical divergence between the two authors of Studies on Hysteria. It was a theory from which Freud was keen to disassociate himself and he began by expressing doubts about its efficacy as a theory in his psychotherapeutic chapter in the Studies, stating that "I have never in my own experience met with a genuine hypnoid hysteria" (372). In a letter to Wilhelm Fliess dated 25 April 1900, Freud refers to an article by a Dr. Warda of Blankenburg which reviews Breuer and Freud's theories on hysteria. Annoyed at the persistent inclusion of 'hypnoid states' in consideration of his work, Freud refers to "the unfortunate 'hypnoid' that was forced upon me" (Masson: 1985, 411). By the time Freud came to give his Five Lectures (Clark University, Mass. 1909), he states that "Breuer's theory of hypnoid states turned out to be impeding and unnecessary, and it has been dropped by psycho-analysis to-day" (SE XI, 20).

The 'hypnoid state' thesis presents us with a theory which is most clearly Breuer's in its inception and development. It is central to his formulation of hysteria and its attendant revelation of psychical structures. Writing in 1901 in his 'Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria', also known as the 'Dora' case, Freud states that,

If, where a piece of joint work is in question, it is legitimate to make a subsequent division of property, I should like to take this opportunity of stating that the hypothesis of 'hypnoid states' - which many reviewers were inclined to regard as the central portion of our work - sprang entirely from the initiative of Breuer. I regard the use of such a term as superfluous and misleading, because it interrupts the continuity of the problem as to the nature of the psychological process accompanying the formation of hysterical symptoms. (PFL 8, 57. Also SE VII, 27n.)

Replying to August Forel's request for information regarding the origins of ideas which contributed to the development of psycho-analysis, Breuer claims clear ownership of the 'hypnoid state':

What follows immediately from the case of Anna O. is mine - that is to say, the aetiological significance of affective ideas, deprived of their normal reaction, which operated permanently like psychical foreign bodies; 'retention hysteria'; the realization of the importance of hypnoid states in the development of hysteria; analytic therapy.

(Cranefield: 1958, 320)

Here Breuer clearly links the hypnoid state with a correlative development of 'analytic therapy'. Interestingly, Cranefield notes that 'analytic' was written 'psycho-analytic' in the first instance and the 'psycho' was subsequently crossed out. Breuer goes on to state that in his development of the important defence theory, Freud was led to ignore the concept of 'hypnoid state'. "In comparison," writes Breuer, "the pathological effects of the 'hypnoid states' seemed to him negligible - which was not, I think, to the benefit of his theory" (Cranefield: 1958, 320).
From Breuer's comments to Forel in this letter, Paul Cranefield draws the conclusion that "[i]f by psycho-analysis is understood a discipline relying on the therapeutic technique of free association, psycho-analysis was solely Freud's discovery" (Cranefield: 1958, 322). This is a conclusion I would dispute by a closer analysis of Breuer's ideas of the 'hypnoid state' and the interplay of different influences brought to bear in that theory which might itself be capable of being presented as a theoretical complex, i.e. a convergence of different influences which become solidified into a categorizing vocabulary, what Breuer refers to as "juggling with words" (301). It is from this categorizing vocabulary, more than anything else, that the 'hypnoid state' was to suffer for it contains, as we shall see, many of the 'germ-cells' of Freud's later theories which were presented in a quite different vocabulary rather like the old friend under a new linguistic cloak to which Breuer refers in his opening page of 'Theoretical' (259).

It is Breuer's view, advancing the thesis of Moebius (1894), that hysteria must resemble a state of hypnosis. It is dependent upon the existence of what Breuer terms 'hypnoid states'. The existence of hypnoid hysteria denotes that psychical trauma may not find sufficient abreaction due to its ideational affects being 'trapped' within a secondary condition, i.e. the hypnoid state. It is in this state that the abnormal pathology will manifest itself. The organism maintains amnesia in relation to its condition seconde due to its unconscious content which is composed of an interplay of ideational complexes. The term 'hypnoid state' was used by Breuer to denote a state which occurs spontaneously in the organism yet is parallel to that of an induced hypnosis. This state, itself a condition of split-off, was used by Breuer to discuss the splitting of the psyche. The ideational complexes at play in this state are cut off from the conversation of normal associative discourse in the conscious state and so remain active in the condition seconde and resistant to what Breuer terms 'wearing away'. It is this amnesia which offers protection from wearing-away of the converted ideas, "a protection which leads, ultimately, to an increase in psychical splitting" (298). A state of hypnoid consciousness is open to suggestibility and constitutes a condition seconde of which the patient is ignorant in their primary condition of consciousness, maintaining full amnesia with regard to the extra rooms hidden away in the psychical house. We may see this inhabitation of two different spaces in the hysterics' oscillation between conditions primes and secondes. Breuer writes with reference to Frau Cécilie M. that:

After each of her momentary 'absences' - and these were constantly occurring - she did not know what she had thought of in the course of it. She oscillated between her 'conditions primes' and 'secondes', between the conscious and the unconscious ideational complexes. (318)

The hypnoid state was seen as the basis of much hysterical pathology by Breuer and, furthermore, viewed as a state in which the normal division of psychical processes were illustrated by abnormal deviations.

Because the hypnoid state reveals the organism in a suspended state with regard to perceptual experience, the organism then inhabits a sphere of virtuality which is dependent upon the mnemonic store. This state of shut-down with regard to new impressions and reliance upon the mnemonic image is a phenomenon which closely resembles sleep. Furthermore, this auto-hypnotic state has a "dream-like nature" (294). It is in this state, then, that the unconscious structure displays its intricate network of associative links. These links provide a collection of associative nodes which are of a symbolic nature and provide the underlying complex of the symptom which surfaces in the secondary consciousness of the hypnotic state. It is also a feature of the hypnoid state that, as in artificially induced hypnotism, the organism is highly sensitive to suggestibility of which it is amnesiac in its fully wakened state.
Hypnoid State and Unconscious Association

It is clear that this hypnoid state is one in which the unconscious fully displays its symbolic nature via the associative links at play in this organic arena. Breuer offers an associationist account of the chain between the causative and somatic phenomena, i.e. their 'symbolic relation' which is often found to be based upon the vicissitudes of the linguistic system so that, as Lacan posits in his Seminar XI, the unconscious is indeed "structured like a language" (Lacan: 1994, 20). Breuer writes,

Thus it is almost only in these states that there arises a somewhat complicated irrational 'symbolic relation between the precipitating cause and the pathological phenomenon' [p.55], which, indeed, is often based on the most absurd similarities of sound and verbal associations. (294)

Breuer and Freud's 'Preliminary Communication' of 1893 makes reference to the associative connections which lead to the conversion of the unconscious complex into the symptom so that "[i]t consists only in what may be called a 'symbolic' relation" (55).

With regard to this psychotherapeutic development by Freud, Hirschmüller puts forward the opinion that "with his concentration technique and free association Freud deviated even more from Breuer's views" (Hirschmüller: 1989, 183). I would argue, however, that Breuer's repeated discussion of associationism in relation to the aetiology of symptom implicitly relates the symptom reflex to association and provides the very foundation for Freud's later development of his pressure technique which became known as 'free association' (354). Freud abandoned the practice of hypnosis due to a combination of lack of aptitude and an embarrassing erotic encounter with a patient which was interrupted by a servant. Instead, he developed a therapeutic method which consisted of a modification of the laying on of hands called the 'pressure technique'. Following the example of Bernheim, Freud applied pressure to the temple region of the patient's head and combined this with an imperative to say anything which came into the mind. Far from being a radical departure from the 'hypnoid state', this technique of 'free association' does not really make sense without the ensuing discoveries of this forerunning theory which clearly operates to uncover links between the unconscious with associationism and symbolic phenomenon resulting in an underlying semiotics of embodiment. 20

Breuer gives an example of this active associative impulse by making reference to bodily sensations experienced by Janet's hemi-anaesthetic patients.

When their anaesthetic hand is repeatedly touched they feel nothing; but when they are told to name any number they like, they always choose the one corresponding to the number of times they have been touched. (317)

This would indicate that bodily perception at the liminal boundaries of what constitutes the ego as separate entity is involved in somatic interplay. There is an in-corporation or corporealization of the symbolic in this scenario where the organism's physical embodied experience is drawn through the process of symbolization and vice versa in a tight confluence of what is not really separate but becomes separated through socialization into an embodied and separate individual entity in a capitalist system built upon a Cartesian distinction between mind and body. This interesting scenario drawn from Janet's clinical experience also draws attention to the sharp distinction between the primary and secondary states. In its secondary state the organism may not register its perceptual experience which is nevertheless being registered in its primary state to be relegated to mnemic experience when it is used in the ensuing symbolic conversion which is clearly dependent upon associative input.
Hypnoid States: Virtual States

Every observer is under the influence of the subjects of his observation... (312)

Auto-hypnosis may arise spontaneously and this is its only difference from the artificially induced hypnotic state. It may arise, according to Breuer, during boring or mechanical activities such as knitting or playing scales due to a frustrated excess of energy which seeks its discharge in the virtual state of daydream or reverie. Here we are reminded of Anna O's 'private theatre' (313). Breuer then turns to consider other forms of mental abstraction or 'sensory anaesthesia', what he terms 'absence of mind'. He speaks of the investigator deep in a problem or a person engaged in application of creative imagination which renders them oblivious to certain external perception due to their concentration being employed elsewhere (295-6). These states of concentration are not, however, pathogenic where they are not accompanied by intense emotion and fatigue. "It is possible," says Breuer, "that these states differ only quantitatively from true auto-hypnoses and that they pass over into them" (297). The amount that these states of abstraction pass over into auto-hypnoses must surely be relative to the amount of concentration upon the object and the investment in the object as the centre of the subject's nervous attention. Reveries which occur in a state of high tension and emotion are to be regarded as pathogenic states of abstraction and of these states Breuer gives two prime scenarios which may provoke such a passing over to the other side, i.e. the full entry into the virtuality of the condition seconde of the day-dream or abstraction. These two scenarios consist in the intense conditions of the lover and the sick-bed nurse and may be contained in "the anxiety of a person watching at a sick-bed of someone dear to him, [and] the day-dreams of a lover" (296). Both of these conditions share the same intense "concentration on an object" (297).

Experience shows that sick-nursing and sexual affects also play the principal part in the majority of the more closely analysed case histories of hysterical patients. (314)

Breuer notes that "[e]very observer is under the influence of the subjects of his observation" (312). In an intense concentration upon the other acting as object of the organism's attention, the ego is overtaken by the object upon which one's phantasies are projected so that the ego of the sick-bed watcher or lover is quite taken over by its intense interest in the object. The object acting as a virtual nexus of projected phantasy is then absorbed into the ego and the organism quite literally converted into the place of the other whilst simultaneously and essentially occupying and maintaining its own place in this scheme of one and other where the other has no input apart from simply providing a focus for nervous energy. The anxious conditions of sick-bed nursing or being in love (with its attendant investment of sexual libido) results in the intense concentration on an external object - which then becomes internalized and enters one's own ego complexes, i.e. becomes 'in-corporated', entering even the flesh through somatic signs. The hypnoid state acts as a virtual sphere in which the affects of an overdetermined aetiology of symbolic superimposition converse in the unconscious.

Auto-hypnosis has, so to speak, created the space or region of unconscious psychical activity into which the ideas which are fended off are driven. (316)

This virtual state acts as the underside and anchor of every symbolic activity so that what is abnormal provides the model by which may be traced the mechanisms of normal psychical processes which lie as close to a pathological state as two naked electrical wires.

A Love Letter: "[D]ay-dreams of a lover" (296)

Writing about being in love, Breuer says that "the subject's longing thoughts about his absent loved one create in him a 'rapt' state of mind [and] cause his environment to grow dim" (297).
The situation of the love-lorn also involves the activation of the sexual affect, recognized by Breuer as being of prime importance in the aetiology of hysteria. The 'rapt' state of the lover brings his conscious perception to a static point which is overladen with emotional energy.

In view of Freud's vehement rejection of Breuer's thesis of 'hypnoid states', I take this opportunity to combine texts of psychoanalytical theory with texts written by the psychoanalyst in order to superimpose theory with private trajectory in what is a sphere of analysis. The texts to which I refer are those most private missives between lovers: love letters. These epistolary outpourings give an idea of the abstracted nature of Freud's protracted courtship of Martha Bernays, his own absent love object. Freud's love letters to his "Little Princess" Marty contain very many "day-dreams of a lover". These love letters act as mediating material between one and other as destination of its written trajectory. They serve as a pre-marital substitute for sexual possession, themselves a linguistic conversion or 'stand-in' for an excess of libidinal energy. In its very use of the symbol, the symbol is transgressed from within the confines of the love letter. This provides a parallel for the deconstitution of I through its very constitution, i.e. the liminality of subjectivity is transgressed due to there being limits in place - in the same way as jouissance actually underpins the symbolic by not being representable by it, or by not being contained in it yet being actually a constituent element of its functioning. It is what is missing and therefore provides the frustrated impetus towards full speech. In this way, the analytical situation is truly a lover's discourse. Writing 'A Love Letter' during his Seminar XX (1972-3), Lacan asks, "So what was I writing you? - the only thing one can do with a measure of seriousness, a love letter" (Lacan: 1982, 154).

Here is an extract from the newly engaged Freud to his fiancée written 19 June 1882.

I knew it was only after you had gone that I would realise the full extent of my happiness and, alas! the degree of my loss as well. I still cannot grasp it ... I would think it was all a beguiling dream and be afraid to wake up. Yet friends tell me it's true, and I myself can remember details more charming, more mysteriously enchanting than any dream-phantasy could create. It must be true. Martha is mine...

(Freud: 1961, 25)

It is clear that in his concentration upon the object with which he is in love, Freud occupies a locus of abstraction akin to the 'hypnoid state'. His frustrated excess of libidinal energy is not subject to a normal 'wearing away' due to being outside the desired marriage contract and is protracted by a combination of absence of the love object and a failure to achieve the financial security essential to bourgeois union. The much wished-for end of this suspended state is to be directly attained by Freud's success as a psycho-analyst. It is with this in mind that the letters display an acute awareness of monetary obstacles and expenditure which run parallel to the course of love in a transactional erotic economy.

If I would like to see you again? Darling, what a question! Where is the money coming from? Darling, I don't know.

Letter of 17 May 1885. (Freud: 1961, 157)

There is a strong displacement of ideas by money and money by the desired possession of the love object in an economy of substitution which might provide a biographical parallel to the conversion of affects noted in the theories of hysteria communicated by Breuer and Freud.
Jouissance and the Hypnoid State

It is interesting that in linking the development of hysteria with sexuality, Breuer uses arguments which, in example and vocabulary, prefigure some of the theoretical formulations of Jacques Lacan.

For, apart from sick-nursing, no psychical factor is so well-calculated to produce reveries charged with affect as are the longings of a person in love. And over and above this the sexual orgasm itself, with its wealth of affect and its restriction of consciousness, is closely akin to hypnoid states. (330)

What Breuer is describing here is a state in the organism which is provoked by its intense concentration upon an object, the other. The subject has been led, 'under the influence of the object of attention', to enter another sphere which is named the 'hypnoid state'. Within this hypnoid state, the organism is in a state of by-pass as regards its own ego. It is clear that this state described by Breuer is closely analogous to that described by Lacan as jouissance. The Lacanian concept of jouissance describes a state beyond language in which the organism, in its encounter with an excessive pleasure-pain, experiences a loss of self so that the libidinal boundaries of the ego are transgressed. As an encounter with the fullness of the Other, it is a state to be associated with deathliness, with passing through the petit mort of orgasm. It is a loss of 'subjeethood' by being fully subjected through an encounter with the other. The ego is side-stepped as it is involved in a tryst with what exceeds it, i.e. what constitutes it by exceeding it so that which constitutes its bodily limit is also the very means of its excess. By exceeding the boundaries of 'I', the organism escapes the subjection that is subjectivity and enters a surplus state that is jouissant and of which it can have no conscious experience nor can represent symbolically except by its absence in speech and by which speech operates.

Jouissance is a corporeal pleasure-pain that is unspeakable yet is written through and through by the symbolic structures which depend upon it. Prohibition of jouissance is contained in the symbolic structure of language and indeed underpins its very machinations. As such, jouissance is not just beyond language but actually integral to its operation. This unbearable pleasure which becomes painful to the organism is due to an overloading within the organism of energetic affect. It transgresses all laws of 'free' and 'bound' energy as Freud presents them in Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920). This is because the pleasure principle seeks to limit pleasure, acting as a check upon over-excitation of the organism which becomes unpleasure. Jouissance is patently a transgression of this principle so that "there is a jouissance beyond the pleasure principle" (Lacan: 1994, 184). If we cast our minds back to Freud's presentation of 'free' and 'bound' energy as a reformulation of Breuer's tonic excitation and discharge, we remember that in this and subsequent presentations of Breuer's thought in this area, there is a third energy (and, by analogy, subsequent layerings) posited by Breuer which has been completely subsumed in these readings. This lost energy (i.e. the second form of quiescent energy which is involved in triggering quiescent energy into discharge) may be that which is involved in triggering the organism back from the brink of jouissant extinction, providing a signal which returns the organism to subjectivity and acts in the interests of biological self-preservation when its libidinally invested schema of ego has been transgressed via the two-fold scheme with which Freud presents us. This would obviously render Freud's scheme inadequate to Lacanian reworking as it does not allow for the return of the organism to its state of stand-by as Freud's 'principle of constancy' is based upon the impossible null principle. To continue the electrical analogy, because Breuer's model has a trip switch, it allows for a state of compensatable fuse, a self-regulating over-ride within the system where Freud's would condemn the organism to permanent shut-down.

The hypnoid state occurs because the principle of constancy has been exceeded, i.e. the optimum energy level has been exceeded and the organism has fallen into over-excitability. It is a state of by-pass from within, a state of shunt or 'abnormal facilitation'
which maintains the organism in spite of its malfunction. 'Hypnoid states' therefore, although occurring because of over-excitation, actually work to maintain the principle of constancy. We may then draw on the parallel state of jouissance as a form of pass-over 'closely akin to the hypnoid state' as an extreme abstraction in which organism transgresses its very subjectivity through encounter with the other acting as objet a, the locus of projected phantasy on the part of the subject. Here we may easily see that unless the organism is to be fully consumed in this state so that it may not return from the dark hole of deathliness, a safety mechanism needs to be in place which maintains the organic basis of 'I' and provides the energetic trigger to pull the ego back through the schematological apparatus from which (and by which) it achieves jouissance as a temporary state tied to the erotic mechanism. Freud's model does not provide this model of shunting which is central to this state of functional by-pass and does not allow for a third energy which must be present in order to prevent jouissance becoming permanent, i.e. full incorporation in the Other or death. Analogously, the organism cannot permanently inhabit a hypnoid state or its near state of extreme abstraction but must 'return' to a lower storey of the psychic topology in order to function.

Interpretative Acts, Hypnoid States and the Jouissant Excess of Theory

Breuer describes highly abstracted states closely analogous to self-hypnosis which exist as closely parallel to 'hypnoid states'. He gives the example of "[a]n investigator who is deep in a problem" where intense concentration renders him/her "anaesthetic to a certain degree", in a suspended state with regard to new perceptive stimuli and inhabiting a region more dependent upon the mnemonic store (295). These comments throw light upon the theorizing process in which we engage so that the parameters of observation are set by the observed itself as it displaces the subject's concentration, i.e. the subject's ego is transposed by the object in direct relation to the amount of concentration upon it to the exclusion of all else. The act of observing is one of alterity, it is integral to the production of what is called the observation yet it alters the object of its scrutiny by filtering it through the lens of its projected phantasy and subjecting the object to the vicissitudes of ego configuration. The observation is itself a direct result of the parameters set and the theoretical complexes by which we frame our observation. (This situation is one which is analogous to that of electrical feedback.) Here it is clear that Breuer's theory of the hypnoid state and its closely contiguous states have repercussions in epistemological questions pertaining to the critical process.

What does this scenario signify for the evolution of theoretical observations and its illustrative schemata as the parameters which set the observation then set the parameters for future application? This scenario between one and other - subject and its object - actually reflects on the process of theorizing itself so that within the arena of the theory we enter we become inhabited by its structures and so "under the influence of the subjects of our observation" through the very perceptual schemata we bring to bear on the object of our scrutiny. By subjecting the object to our theoretical analysis, we 'subject' it, i.e. 'convert' it so that its conversion becomes relative to the amount of energetic tension we bring to bear through the application of theory. It is jouissant in proportion to the degree in which the critic reader/writer enters its virtual house in order to hallucinate another room.

Postscript

This exploratory section has woven together the theoretical with medical history, biographical details, and extrapolations of physical laws such as electrical phenomena. It is hoped that this eclectic blend of texts presents a post-structural arena in which, through the intertextual, the interplay of linguistic application may be stressed as it becomes activated through the applications of psycho-analysis. In focussing this section upon Josef Breuer's 'Theoretical' contribution to Studies on Hysteria, I have paid attention to some of the most derided areas of
Breuer's theory, namely his electrical analogy and his notion of the 'hypnoid state'. His extended electrical metaphor and the electrical analogies he employs have been regarded as simple physical-psychical parallelism yet a closer reading, as I hope to have demonstrated, reveals a complex psychic scenario of a honeycombed energetic model which has "not even now been turned to sufficient account" (Freud: [1925] SE XIX, 280). It offers an inspirational side-kick to Freud's later theories by pre-empting them and also challenging the foundations upon which Freud based his notion of 'free' and 'bound' energy. The much maligned 'hypnoid state' was long held in high regard by Breuer against Freud's opinion. Breuer stated that he thought it detrimental to Freud's theory that he rejected it (Cranefield: 1958, 320). The 'hypnoid state' represents an area of theory which has perhaps suffered from its own vocabulary as it has become solidified into an outdated theory smacking of the ogre Charcot and mesmeric experiments. A closer examination of Breuer's writing uncovers an area which, in its examination of states closely analogous to the hypnoid, offers a commentary on the anaesthetic critic engaged with the object of his/her scrutiny. In its attention to extinguished perceptive capabilities, it points ahead to Lacan's state of jouissance in the organism as a state fully dependent upon feeling the liminal edges of ego structure rubbing against it in order to transcend the ego as a temporary "I-escapee" from the symbolic.

Freud comments in his obituary of Breuer (1925) that Breuer's theoretical contribution to Studies on Hysteria was "far from being out of date" ([1925] SE XIX 280). That Breuer's ideas, absorbed into the work of Freud, are utilized without acknowledgement might be seen to support this view. This back-handed form of utilization, however, off-centres Breuer's theories due to their intercepted nature. The suggestions Breuer puts forward in the Studies may act as modifications upon the Freudian theory we have received and may activate further areas in Freud and Lacan in order to open up yet more rooms in an already many-storeyed theoretical house. From a critical point of view, Breuer's acute awareness of the dictates of vocabulary and metaphor in his writing raise epistemological questions with regard to the beginnings of psycho-analysis and the spaces of theorization it offers.
"In the new house she hallucinated her old room": Hysterical Topology and the Phantasy of Gender
This section considers questions of psychical and bodily topology in relation to the temporal dimension of signification. It also seeks to examine the idea of gender as a phantasy, an activated figure of speech or an extended metaphor that we inhabit and live through via the configurations of ego constitution. It does so by considering notions of the imaginary and its relation to the ‘the real’ as it is encountered by the inhabited space of the subject. This is then related to textuality via the working of metaphoric structure through and in the flesh. It thereby questions the relation between text and gender, text and sex, text and body.

The quotation in the title is from Josef Breuer’s case history of ‘Fräulein Anna O.’ and it is to this famous first case history of psychoanalysis that I will refer in order to examine the relation of the space of metaphor to the space of the body in a cohesion of mind and matter. I will consider that there is a direct correlation here with the operative dynamic of the two scenes of the hysteric. I then go on to relate this to ideas of gender and argue that it is not so easily separable from biology, that somehow the biological body is a constantly reiterating sphere of metaphor by physical means.

The separation of sex from gender, biology from culture, has become standard in feminist thought yet this separation raises problems because it does not question the parameters within which its careful manipulation of terminology takes place. It is problematic, for instance, around issues of sexuality. If sex and gender are separated, how do we fit the body into this scenario? In this separation of terms designed to escape determinist or essentialist accounts of en-gendering lies another determinism as our accounts within this framework are written through by a new vocabulary, made to fit a scheme of its own making. It would appear that these two terms – sex and gender – cannot be so easily separated and indeed are co-existent only within their own rhetorical framework. It is hoped that this section makes some contribution towards a new formulation of the bodily by offering a psychoanalytical phenomenology of the body. As the first interface between self and world, subject and other, the biological body must be reconsidered and written back into accounts of gender and the category ‘gender’ thereby challenged to the extent, perhaps, of being obsolete due to its dependence upon divisive and binaristic terminology.

The section will make use of Breuer and Freud’s theories on hysteria in conjunction with Freud’s later formulations on ego constitution. These theories are then combined with those of Lacan so that the section is fully aware of its own activation of vocabulary through a retroactive reach-back through theoretical space and time. The theories of Paul Schilder are referred to in order to offer an energetic forerunner to some of Lacan’s later theories on bodily topology, whilst offering an activating influence upon sexed positioning in corporeal terms. The section concentrates upon hysteria as a pathological area which offers a useful elucidation of theory due to being the ‘germ-cell’ or starting-point of all psychoanalytical theory. It is thereby able to offer a close working model of what psychoanalytical thought formulated itself in relation to and which then resulted in the proliferation of medical categories due to a theoretical positioning and vocabulary. The case history of ‘Fraulein Anna O.’ is the focus of this reading, due not only to its pertinent interest to any consideration of the area of bodily and psychical topology, but also because of its strategic interest as the seminal text of psychoanalysis.
Biology

Biology is truly a land of endless possibilities.

(Freud Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 1920)

Body and sexuality, biology and gender are implicitly related in the psychoanalytic scheme. In a sense, biology is destiny, to borrow Freud's famous dictum, but it is an unstable and unfixed destiny which is constantly shifting and rewritten, as fluid as bodily secretions. For there is no pre-given body, no originary biology, no flesh which has not been trained. For the speaking subject all is subject to the trace of the signifier. This is not to say that the flesh is written upon which would represent a passive body in discursive production, the tabula rasa. To the contrary, it is the locus of the activation of flesh and simultaneously a locus of activating flesh: the space of the body is a space of writing itself, an intertextual incorporation by which we image ourselves. Space becomes a seduction.

Body Image: The seduction of space

Thou hast clothed me with skin and flesh, and hast fenced me with bones and sinews.

(Job 10.11)

All there is for the flesh-habitation called 'I' is the body-image by which we relate to our corporeal frame. This body-image is itself subject to continual shift according to our internal and external experience. Bodily space is labile, continually reassembling itself in an orthopaedic display of inhabitation and dis-inhabitation. In The Image and Appearance of the Human Body, Paul Schilder states that

The image of the body is not a static phenomenon from the physiological point of view. It is acquired, built up, and gets its structure by a continual contact with the world. It is not a structure but a structuralization in which continual changes take place. . . (Schilder: 1935, 173-4)

Following on from the work of Schilder, Lacan presents a scheme where body image is implicit in the constitution of the ego. 'The mirror stage as formative of the function of the I' (1949) presents the dispersed biology of a fragmented body assembled before the reflective surface of the other. This constitutive transitive relation between self and other had also been noted by Schilder:

The postural model of our own body is connected with the postural model of the bodies of others . . . We experience the body-images of others. Experience of our body-image and experience of the bodies of others are closely interwoven with each other. (Schilder: 1935, 16)

The complex of instincts and drives run through the 'virtual complex' of space as it is presented through the mirror of the other to what Lacan terms its "alienating destination": "the transformation that takes place in the subject when he assumes an image" (Lacan: 1977, 2). 'Subject' might be replaced by 'pre-subject' here in this inadequacy of grammar to provide us with a word for what is pre-subject as linguistics allows us no exit from its own grammatical and semantic spaces. This geometry of being is our spatial location invested with 'libidinal dynamism'.

This jubilant assumption of his specular image by the child at the infans stage, still sunk in his motor incapacity and nursling dependence, would seem to exhibit in an
exemplary situation the symbolic matrix in which the I is precipitated in a primordial form... (Lacan: 1977, 2 – emphasis as original.)

This mirror of the other is one of flesh: its reflective surface made of skin, its frame is the bone which supports the ego.

This then is the passage from the Innenwelt to the Umwelt. Here a méconnaissance is operative so that the disassembled pre-subject may project itself in the disassembly that is the unified 'I'. 'I' is a statue into which the ego projects itself in order to operate in the world. This rigid configuration, what Lacan refers to as 'orthopaedic', is far from fixed, however, for it is by breaking out of the inner circle of the dyad that we enter into the endless configuration of the ego. This mirror 'stage' is the stadium du miroir: a never ending piece of theatre which constantly stages its drama of what Lacan terms "inexhaustible quadrature" (Lacan: 1977, 4). In this scenario, 'I' becomes a geometry of psychical planes. The effects of framing via the symbolic is not a stage to be passed through, indeed it is never past but continually present, continually re-enacted in a bid to confirm the stability of ego identification in the face of a radical alienation in the organism. This is where the seduction by space leads.

...the subject, [is] caught up in the lure of spatial identification, the succession of phantasies that extends from a fragmented body-image to a form of its totality that I shall call orthopaedic - and, lastly, to the assumption of an armour of an alienating identity, which will mark with its rigid structure the subject's entire mental development. (Lacan: 1977, 4)

The body image then may be allied to an anatomy of fantasy. The subject is indeed caught up in the lure which it feeds back to itself in a psychic looping of seduction, it is seduced by the armature of 'I' to which it must inevitably succumb.

The body map is that by which we configure ourselves, it is the mapping of flesh by which we orient ourselves in a cartography of desire. On a more practical plane, the psychical investment in body image allows us to judge space, insert ourselves into gaps, orient ourselves round objects, insert objects even - putting pierced earrings in, guiding the object into that tiny puncture mark with amazing accuracy. Here is our own bodily geography: the topology of self, the cartography of skin as we travel to and fro with this built-in body map. The ego investment in flesh may be illustrated by the phenomenon of the ghost limb, a space no longer occupied by flesh yet its fleshy sensations are still active in an hallucinated filled space. The neurological patterns are so established and trained in their psychical runways.

Skin: The Limits of the Ego

In The Ego and the Id (1923), Freud makes several important references to the skin of the organism as central to the ego. The surface of the body is the interface between internal and external and is formative of consciousness, constituent in the ego.

The ego is first and foremost a bodily ego; it is not merely a surface entity, but is itself the projection of a surface. (Freud: 1991, 451)

This idea is continued in a footnote added to the English translation in 1927:

I.e. the ego is ultimately derived from bodily sensations, chiefly those springing from the surface of the body. It may thus be regarded as a mental projection of the surface of the body... (Freud: 1991, 451)
The "conscious ego", he says, "is first and foremost a body-ego." The cutaneous surface of the body in the constitution of the ego is not prior to ego-configuration but constitutive of and interactive in it as the flesh is trained into zones, invested and fetishized with erotogenic sensation by the ego and the ego formed by these in the very same process. Here is a reciprocal interaction of psychical and bodily space as the human organism organizes the relational topology by which it traverses internal and external spaces.

That the ego is formed in conjunction with the projection of the cutaneous surface of the body is indicative of the liminality of subjectivity. Here is a subjective intertext of skin, a dermodectic-bound volume. In Life and Death in Psychoanalysis, Jean Laplanche refers to the "sack of skin" in reference to the constitution of ego founded as it is upon an introjection of the other, a psychical act "modelled upon a bodily process". He states that identification with the other is "an identification with a form conceived of as a limit, or a sack: a sack of skin" (1985, 81). Libidinal investment in the structure of the ego is a biological function, one is not reducible to the other but synonymous with it and involved in an interactive dynamic which incessantly reconstitutes itself in the face of a primary loss, a primal scene of absence.

Some interesting "facts" about the skin borrowed from the world of biology state this - that it is the largest organ in the body, it "constitute[s] approximately one-eighth of the weight of a normal individual" (Wood and Bladon: 1985, 1). And this -

The epidermis arises from the embryonic ectoderm and forms most of the cutaneous appendages including the sweat and sebaceous glands, and the hair, and the nails.

(Freud: 1991, 235)

Schilder, with reference to ectodermic sensation, also notes that "[i]t appears that all our internal sensations are in this sensitive zone close below the surface" (Schilder: 1935, 89).

The Perforated Ego

The liminality of the body is important in figuring the boundaries of 'I', subject as they are to labile movement. The in-out orifices of the body through which we ingest and expel provide the loci of the biological processes upon which ego configuration lays claim, as the relation between self and other is usually based upon an aggressive introjective fantasy as the infant seeks to control its surroundings. These areas of anatomical boundary become invested with erotogenic meaning as it is in these places of perforation that the organism is socially trained and learns to transpose its sexual drive through the mechanism of Verwerfung (the Freudian concept of 'refusal' later reworked by Lacan's notion of 'foreclosure'). In 'The Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectic of Desire' (1960), Lacan specifically speaks of the the function of the cut in discourse and its relation to the "lips, 'the enclosure of the teeth', the rim
of the anus, the tip of the penis, the vagina, the slit formed by the eyelids, even the horn-shaped aperture of the ear" (Lacan: 1977, 314-5).

The orifices and rims of the body are the privileged sites of erotogenic investment, they set and by so doing represent a grammar of the body. Here is the locus of biology and culture in a clash of instinct and drive. These holes have been carefully trained; the etiquette of social attention has been especially attentive to these cuts in the bodily surface. These are the apertures through which the textuality of self becomes apparent. Kristeva speaks of this in Powers of Horror as "a primal mapping of the body" (Kristeva: 1982, 72). Desire jumps these gaps and flickers over these bodily rims in the dialectic set up between one and other. It is in absence that we assert/insert ourselves, absence is the missing across which desire flickers incessantly. That these bodily apertures relate to the textuality of the subject may be borne out by examination of the famous first case history of psychoanalysis, Breuer's 'Fraulein Anna O.' Anna O. presents her story through 'absences', activating an aperture, a lacuna in her text. It is in the face of absence that we signify.

Here we may recall Freud's reference to a "hiatus" in Breuer's text; this textual hole in the case history is an absence in response to Bertha Pappenheim's hysterical pregnancy - a lacuna in response to an hallucinated erotic fullness. In The Psychotherapy of Hysteria, Freud compares his own analytic practice to evacuating a cavity in the flesh:

I have often in my own mind compared cathartic psychotherapy with surgical intervention. I have described my treatments as psychotherapeutic operations; and I have brought out their analogy with the opening up of a cavity filled with pus, the scraping out of a carious region, etc.

(Breuer & Freud: 1991, 392 – emphasis as original.)

We may think here of the analytical process of retrieval of the 'foreign body' of the primary scene trauma of hysteria. There is an operative eroticism of the hole in the organism. Physical development literally turns us outside-in.

Invagination

[N]ot because the sea urchin is a particularly interesting animal. . .

(Breuer, 'Fraulein Anna O.' 1991, 96)

In biological terminology, the physical process of turning outside-in has been specified by the use of the term 'invagination'. Its representative dimension has been utilized by Merleau-Ponty in The Phenomenology of Perception (1962) to comment upon the ambiguous interface between one and other in phenomenological perception; he thereby offers a philosophical reading of a biological term. It is to its biological employment that I wish to return for a moment. In his Introductory Lectures (1916-1917), Freud refers to "W. Bölsche's valuable book" to posit a phylogenetic origin of the development of the libido; this gives an evolutionary nature to the constitution of the ego. The popular work of Wilhelm Bölsche (1861-1917), Love-Life in Nature (1898-1903. Trans. into English 1931) comments on the use of mouth-intestine orifices in sexual union, what he referred to as 'anal love' in both sexes, as a practice drawn from primitive organic development (Bölsche: 1931, 673). It is important to note that Bölsche's formulation utilizes the work of Ernst Hackel (1834-1919) on primeval development (1874 and 1875). Haackel posited that all multicellular organisms share a common pattern of early development via invagination in order to form a stomach. From this primeval gastrea, other invaginations follow to form the mouth, ears, eyes, anus, vagina, etc. Simple marine organisms such as the sea sponge and sea urchin with its exo-skeletal structure are used as fixated examples of this primary process to relate to the development of the human
embryo with its formation of apertures of the cutaneous surface. We can, through this embryological model in which the external membrane is turned outside in so that even the cortex is itself related implicitly to the interfacing ectoderm, gesture towards an understanding of ego formation as itself of an invaginated nature. This then forms an armature of being for the organism so that the cultural and organic may be seen to be so intertwined as to be inseparable. Didier Anzieu, in The Skin Ego (1989 [1985]), also comments upon this biological phenomenon of invagination and the intimate relation between the cortex and the ectoderm. He asks the question, "what if thought were as much an affair of the skin as of the brain? And what if the Ego — now defined as a Skin Ego — had the structure of an envelope?" (Anzieu: 1989, 9). This suddenly makes the sea urchin seem a particularly interesting animal, offering a physical model of what might be regarded as the most simple form of phenomenology by process: an holistic metaphor. By positing this simple organism as a metaphor in the living flesh, I am of course turning terminology inside out in order to draw attention to how such terminology operates, drawn as it is from the regions of rhetoric interposed with physical procedure. If the hysterical symptom is to be regarded as a metaphoric substitution in the flesh, making visible upon the interface of the organism what is invisible and 'buried' within its psychical apparatus, does it not appear that the organism is simply culturally reiterating a corporeal rhetoric which has become systemic? The developmental process of turning outside-in is a spatial procedure in biology which has its psycho-textual parallel in Freud's 'partial instincts' of the sex drive. The partial instinct always backs around itself and returns to base passing through the rim of the body in its passage. Lacan actually describes this process as one of invagination in The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis:

Does it not seem that the drive, in this turning inside out represented by its pocket, invaginating through the erogenous zone, is given the task of seeking something that, each time, responds in the Other? (Lacan: 1994, 196)

That the drive is searching for a reflection indicates a parallelism at the level of the organism which points us to the primal narcissistic economy of ego configuration based in transitivism.

Lacan uses a diagram to illustrate the recuperative path of the partial drive as it embarks on its backward journey (Lacan: 1994, 178). This parallels the linguistic base of the subject as it is activated bodily illustrated by the four Che voui? graphs (Lacan: 1977, 303, 306, 313, 315). The rim of the organism formed in invagination is retroactively invested with erotogenic sensation; it is privileged in the zoning of the body according to the fetish of culture. In the Lacanian scheme here presented, this process has its linguistic parallel in the retroactive path of the signifier in its recuperation of a lost object; it sets sail on a course of desire which inevitably leads it back to the place from which it set off as unsatisfied as ever before. Now we are in the realm of the invaginated text because just as the bodily surface is itself presented as a series of rims and holes to be contextualized and textualized so too it offers itself as model of textual mechanics. Metaphor is made flesh as the terminology of biology is transpositioned by that of philosophical phenomenology, "a symptom being a metaphor in which flesh or function is taken as a signifying element" (Lacan: 1977, 166). What is imaginary becomes 'real' via its framing rigidity. The body which is textualized becomes the forerunning paradigm of all metaphorical substitution which takes place in the body of the text which becomes its subliminal counterpart, its sophisticated substitute which, once taken into a geography of its own making via the tools of rhetorical interplay, actually feeds back into the body per se. This constitutes an area of feed-back into the organic by the cultural mechanisms of the trained organism.
Textual Invagination

The textual aperture is the hole by which we enter, the rim of the organic text we traverse in our encounter with the signifier. The outer edge of the text is the point of narrative investment, it points up the boundary of the story: what is said and what is unsaid are operative within its presence as hole. This presence-abscense oscillation presents us with the condition seconde of the text. The fading of the signifier as it passes through the rim of the absence present in the text provides the dynamic of the text. Here we may think of the cut-up of the textual body into sections, its beginnings and endings, chapters, headings, division of word groups. All texts are produced in relation to zero-being, a reaction to loss. There is a reverse chronology operative which refers back and thereby completes its meaning with the last term which activates the preceding terms thereby cutting across spatio-temporal ordering and upsetting the teleology of the sentence, "each term being anticipated in the construction of the others, and, inversely, sealing their meaning by its retroactive effect" (Lacan: 1977, 303).

In a reverse chronology which correlates with hysterical recall of trauma, narrative is haunted by ghosts of the primary scene in its backward recollection. Anna O's narrative flows backwards day by day, according to the private diary of her mother to which Breuer refers. The retrograde effect of the signifier in its path of desire relates to the retroactive affect as it links to the looping path of the partial drive. This compelled return of the signifier refers us forward to the repetition compulsion due to the reiterable nature of desire in relation to the compelling need to reinstate the ego in the face of an irrecoverable loss.

Repetition Compulsion: The dimension of the lost object

I dayly must learn anew to find myself...

('Report by Bertha Pappenheim on Her Illness' [1882]: Hirschmuller: 1978, 297. Original written in English, spelling as original.)

Re-configuring 'I' is a process which never ends. The concept of 'I' is in perpetual shift, constituted as it is in insecure and powerless circumstances as a response of the organism to the armature that maintains it. Freud describes this process in Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920) in the famous 'fort-da' game in which he observed his grandson playing with a cotton reel, throwing it out of its cot and retrieving it in a game of repetition by which he consoled himself for the absence of his mother. By doing so, he gains power in his powerlessness. Here then is the story with which Freud illustrates the genesis of the repetition compulsion as the ego is constituted in the dimension of the lost object. In no-space 'I' configure.

The presence of the organism 'I' with its topology of drives inhabits a framework of absence. We endlessly compensate the lost object with the language which replaces it, stuffing the cavities of our mouths with words in a repeated substitution attempt. Words jump in the other's place. The topology of the lost object is still active as a ghost running through and through the performance. Linguistics and the topology of the body are intrinsically related: here is the hysterical typology of the body. It is the hysteric's 'sudden loss' for which she must compensate, transposing the libidinal investment in the lost locus to a phantasy located in her own body: a rigid limb, a contracture, a tic. This configuration through which we re-present ourselves and project ourselves into this grammatical armature called 'I' is pure phantasy, an insistent circuit of hallucination. Based as it is upon a lacuna (and here it links with those body holes), it is through the act of affirming myself for others that 'I' pass through the shadows of deathliness. Freud's discussion of the repetition compulsion implicit in the sex drive is inherently linked to the concept of the death drive. In the en-gravement of the signifier, I erect myself, an assumption which has passed through the valley of death.
It is in effect as a desire for death that he affirms himself or others... and no being is ever evoked for him except among the shadows of death.

To say that this mortal meaning reveals in speech a centre exterior to language is more than metaphor; it manifests a structure. (Lacan: 1977: 105)

In his reading of Freud in 'The agency of the letter in the unconscious or reason since Freud' (1957), Lacan uses the term 'instance' to purvey this orgiastic repetition of identity operative even at the level of the signifier. In Écrits: A Selection (1977), Alan Sheridan translates Lacan's use of the term 'instance' as 'agency' but 'instance' gives a better indication via word play of the irrepressible and urgent nature of the signifier as revenant and its structuring of identity for "it is in the chain of the signifier that the meaning "insists"" (Lacan: 1977, 153). In addition to this insistent power, the word also carries connotations of solicitation and legal power so that the authority of the letter is also represented in the use of 'instance'.  

This compelled retrograde return of the signifier refers us forward to the compulsion to repeat. It is the compulsion to repeat which facilitates signification so that it is possible to say that the ego is an implicitly reiterative structure. This is because 'I' is never fully formed but always and ever in process, it is constantly re-staged in the stadium of the subject. Its reiterative construction is always in the face of dissolution and, it must be stressed, because of the threat of such dissolution. 'I' must constantly assert myself in order to avoid having my 'I' cut off.

This repetition compulsion is due, it may be seen, to an acute anxiety at the base of the ego; there is a constitutive insecurity in the identificatory processes of the organism. In the face of the loss of the object, we are powerless and need to compensate in order to control and thereby master loss. Here there is an aggressive mastery at work in the very depths of powerlessness: the master-slave dialectic, borrowed from Hegel, is reworked by Lacan to relate to the paranoic base of subject constitution. The subject lives under a sentence then. Compelled to repeat in order to continually reassert 'I' in the phantasm/mirage of a unified ego, the subject incessantly sloughs off this mortal coil of the signifier to rise again through its affective excess. This excess is produced in spite of the signifier's function, for the more insistent and authoritative the signifier is in its purpose, the more it slips up in the excess which it produces.

As we remember the insistent return of the partial instincts of the sex drive, compelled to be cut short in their passage due to risk of total annihilation of the organism (petit mort of orgasm), we may link text here with sex. Because the set up of sexuality is crossed through with the function of the cut in signification, it may be noted that sexuality is closely positioned to the death-drive. The sexual drive is therefore a melancholic structure as it compulsively seeks to recapture a posited wholeness prior to primal loss through a bio-cultural iterative imperative. There is also an active linking of jouissance here as an excess of enjoyment which returns to transgress the limits of pleasure and seek death. Performative iterability and deathliness may here be seen to be implicitly linked. It is at this bodily-textual crossroads where sex, biology, and sexuality are presented in drives and instincts that the affects of a cultural interpellation of named bodies can be seen in action, operative as the metaphoric phantasy through which we live. In a scenario which presents itself as deceptively binaristic due to the vocabulary available to it, the instinct itself may be seen to be operative as a writing agency whilst being written into place as it transmutes into the dimension of drive. In the space of the body, biology is both harnessed and harnessing for on the one hand it proffers the idea of the phenomena of untutored flesh whilst operating as an academic-scientific category within which any concept or postulation of the fleshly is placed. Is there any place where the flesh does not pass beneath the shadow of the sign?
Hysterical Typology: The space of the sign

The hysteric symptom reveals the structure of a language, and is deciphered like an inscription... (Lacan: 1977, 50)

The links of the repetition compulsion with the reiterability of the organism cross-sectioned by the death-drive has a tied link with the condition seconde of the hysteric.9 The whole of Anna O.'s story is constructed around a death, an activated hiatus in her text - it is a concatenation of stories spinning around a central absence: the withdrawal of the libidinally invested object. These are the stories of a young woman waiting by a death-bed, nursing her sexual drive until it becomes transposed upon representations of the paternal function written in her own flesh. (It is indeed this over-investment in the paternal function - represented in her self by the articulate and multiple acquisition of the symbolic - which explains her precocious linguistic access.) Not for nothing does Josef Breuer compare sick-bed nursing with being in love. (Breuer and Freud: 1991, 314) She is compelled to tell and tell again her stories round a hole. Anna O. "talks herself out" (Breuer and Freud: 1991, 79), her symptom speaks her: she is the performatively of her own words. Her text is written through with punctuations of the body, marked by muscular pulsions and biological rhythms. Her language is of the flesh: performed through the body. What is repressed returns.

The symbol is here the signifier of a signified repressed from the consciousness of the subject. A symbol written in the sand of the flesh... (Lacan: 1977, 69)

Writing with reference to the self-induced 'hypnoid states' as he referred to the delusions of hysteria, Breuer states in his 'Theoretical' contribution to Studies on Hysteria that "the hysterical symptom remained restricted to the hypnotic state and is strengthened there by repetition." He continues, stating that "the repetition of them has ... 'imprinted' them into the body" (Breuer and Freud: 1991, 295, 299).

This points to the performative plane of narrative and the fleshy space by which it presents itself. The repetitive imperative is that which injects the body of narrative with what has already been narrated and projects it forward by pointing backwards into the impulse of a new performance. In 'The subversion of the subject and the dialectic of desire', Lacan describes the retroactive affect of the signifier as it recuperates its treasure, i.e. the object a as fantasy of desired wholeness (Lacan: 1977, 292ff). This might be cross-sectioned with the performative plane of narrative to highlight the materiality of the signified affect in terms of shaping the flesh, thereby altering the terms of biology. The narrative itself is a phantom pregnancy as Dr. B's child is born over and over again in each re-reading: its textual space is stuffed full of the marks under which the signified is supposed to obligingly slide. Yet the performative imperative of grammar and the hallucination it produces in hysteria might be indicative of a process which may not be so easily shaken off due to the deeply textual and contextual dimension of flesh. The separation of 'sex' from 'gender' in feminist theory may be seen to clear a space in which to theorize culturative influence and to question and challenge essentializing and naturalizing discourses fluctuating around 'biology'. Such academic practice, however, must be recognized as raising a new set of problems disseminated by the feedback of terminology to itself. In its qualification and establishment of the category 'gender' lies an integral acceptance of the term 'sex' as somehow discrete and independent from gendered positionality in a manner which ignores the phylogenetic development of ego in a holistic dimension of what we conveniently term the 'cultural' and 'biological' in representational practice. Interestingly, such practice also simultaneously ignores the phylogenetics of theoretical rhetoric and vocabulary itself which also seeks to assert itself reiteratively. The interface between one and other, inside and outside, subject and object is wholly called into question when such terminology breaks down. Within the domain of discipline, vocabulary must be called to account due to its profulgation of such categories of
thinking. There is need of a new formulation of phenomenological experience of the body in co-relation with the psychical which recognizes that iterability may indicate a performance which the organism is not in control of.

**Gender Phantasy: The signified sexual symptom**

Hysteric hallucination correlates with the lived phantasy of gender: the solidified metaphor, the signifier made flesh. This is the sexual passion of the word which would become 'me'. Gender is nothing but a textual hallucination as the refusal of biology transposes itself upon the other scene of a theoretical space. Gender must be constantly and compulsively reasserted and repeated as a phantasy hallucinated in 'the real'. Speaking of 'foreclosure', Lacan states in his Seminar II: The Psychoses that "whatever is refused in the symbolic order, in the sense of Verwerfung, reappears in the real" (Lacan: 1993, 13). What is refused in conscious psychological space does not simply disappear, it simply resurfaces in 'the real'. The signifier turns inside out displaying its visceral apparatus to become what it says it is: it enters the referent.

Anna O's refusal of the loss of her "adored father" in psychic terms has an affect in physical terms as the forced withdrawal of libidinal investment transposes itself - in a reversal of the phantom limb scenario - on another part of the body in hallucination. This is the result of a trans-position, an occupation of parallel spaces: Anna feels that she has two selves, that she occupies both a new house and her old room (Breuer and Freud: 1991, 86). The "two scenes" of the hysteric might be compared to a dyadic structure which emulates the subject-other relation which underscores all the moves 'I' might make, directed as they are at obtaining the reflective recognition of an other. In Breuer's account, Anna O. "cross[es] over" to the condition seconde in order to tell her stories, her narratives require her to take up a position of otherness within her self in order to direct her speech to an other (Hirschmüller: 1989, 282). These doubling manoeuvres are analogous of the turned outside-in movement of embryological development which is the forerunning base of ego constitution if, with Freud, we regard the ego as the projection of a surface, a psychical entity intimately constituted in and by an armature of the skin. In Anna O's illness, which causes a co-existence yet radical separation of scenes, we may trace the interplay of signifier with body through the manifest symptom. Illness gives us a clue to 'normal' structures which run a path close to the pathological. In our 'normal' state, we are free to designate separation of terms to facilitate theorizing - sex and gender, body and mind, for example - yet 'normality' indicates that signifier and body have become implicit one to the other, masquerading as seamless until disrupted by psychological disturbance. In our theorizing which requires us to carry conceptual notions within vocabulary whilst being fully implemented and produced by such vocabulary, we occupy a thinking position which posits two scenes. 'I' who theorize am hysterical whilst 'I' place myself as central through the act of theorizing. When we theorize, we do so as a coherent 'I', we are obliged to speak from the position of a projected unity, our 'scenes' neatly stacked and collated, inter-related and fully cross-referencing in varying configurations according to changing circumstances. It is perhaps only the ability to live through and maintain the illusion of a unified 'I' - the ability of self-consciously sustain metaphor - which separates normality from abnormality. It would seem that the parallelism required by such terminology as sex and gender, whilst it offers itself as new vocabulary with which to counter old divisive vocabulary, reproduces yet more binaristic parallelism so that theory becomes, in Anzieu's terms, an envelope to itself. As 'gender' itself becomes naturalised within feminist discourse, it too must come under scrutiny as a theoretical concept in its reproductive capacity.
Hysteric Typology: Oedipal disturbance

Anna O. displays a number of different language disturbances typical to diagnosed hysteria. In his study of the life and work of Josef Breuer, Albrecht Hirschmüller reproduces a document from Kreuzlingen Sanatorium which is Breuer's case history of Pappenheim contemporary with her treatment. In this report, Breuer writes that his patient had suffered from complete aphasia "for about 2 weeks" after being offended by her father (Hirschmüller: 1978, 282). For some part of the time, she loses the capacity to communicate in her native German language; divided from her mother tongue, she is able to communicate only in English. She writes in a report on her illness that "I, a native German girl, am now totally deprived of the faculty to understand or to read German" (Hirschmüller: 1978, 296 - in English in original, spelling as original).

Linguistic access or non-access indicates an organic or psychical base of origination and as such may be unique in offering a psycho-somatic scenario which offers itself as a knotting of physical and mental processes which may not be separated but only re-tied in a different configuration to enable normal functioning according to cultural convention. Aphasia or its antithetical counterpart of manifold language by which Anna O. communicates during her illness constitute linguistic disturbance which may be considered as indicative of a disturbance at the level of ego configuration. Such disturbance also, however, demonstrates how intimate the links are between ego and somatic organization. If, in the process of transitivism, the ego has absorbed the projected ego of the other through the screen of the ego ideal, this results in a space of virtual reality based upon a transtigibility between self and other so that "[e]very observer is largely under the influence of his observation" (Breuer and Freud: 1991, 312). Here the interface between self and other, subject and object is a permeable interface which is jealously guarded in direct ratio to the perceived fragility or strength of its constitution. When Anna O.'s father dies, the qualifying object of her subjectivity is withdrawn, the object of her intense observation is removed and her ego constructed and tied together with bonds of love is cast adrift in a shattering encounter with 'the real'. Grief at this loss finds its symptom in a bodily absorption of the signifier: the body becomes the word. The two scenes of the signifier transpose until it becomes itself and breaks down distinction between metaphor and metonymy, displacement and condensation.

It is here that we can see the linking of space and ego again, especially if we remind ourselves of the hallucinated space in the symptomatology of the hysteric so that while she occupies one space she hallucinates another, thereby living in two rooms. The substitution, through foreclosure/refusal, of the genital with other parts of the body is a process of transpositioning. Schilder states that "[w]hat goes on in one part of the body may be transposed to another part of the body... There is said to be a transposition from one part of the body to another part of the body. One part may be symbolic of the other" (Schilder: 1935, 171). This metaphoric substitution of the body becomes an hallucination: it enters 'the real' of the patient.

This represents a challenge to the Oedipal structure yet it is the Oedipal structure which actively produces this dissent by off-centering precisely through encouraging over-investment in the paternal function as it figures within this scenario. For such a challenge to be understood, we must conceive of the Oedipal not as a stage but as a constantly reiterating structure operative within all symbolic acts that the organism engages in "since by binding himself in signification he is placed under the sign of the pre-conscious" (Lacan: 1977, 299). It is synonomous with the function of the cut in Lacanian discourse. With reference to analysis, Lacan says that "we must bring everything back to the function of the cut in discourse, the strongest being that which acts as a bar between the signifier and the signified" (1977, 299). If this bar is tied to the Oedipal prohibition, barring the subject from what must not be admitted consciously, (although still operative and actively formative of the subject, however,) we must ask why it is necessary that it be repetitively asserted and strenuously
protected through legislative and cultural codes which make of it a negative law. Such over-investment and perpetual assertion might be seen to indicate excessive fragility where such a show of strength oscillates.

As a structural repetition which seeks to continually establish the boundaries of the organism, (here the ego may be regarded as an organic process,) the Oedipal drama is one in which substitutive energy is constantly transubstantiated not just psychically but also in the flesh which is the warm metaphor of the living signifier. Because the irresistible return of the signifier is not always to the same place from where it set off due to the viscissitudes of its journeying trajectory in relation to desire, the act of signification may be seen to off-centre itself through its very process. This would constitute a challenge to the Oedipal through the Oedipal and as such might effect some modulation in the monolithic incest taboo as that prohibition upon which cultural ordering rests.

If, through incest taboo modulation, the bar between the signifier and the signified is traversed, and if we follow Lacan in his reversal of the Saussaurian scheme by privileging signifier over the signified, then it is the signifier which occupies the place of primary and becomes active in the jump into the signified. The relation between signifier and signified will therefore no longer be arbitrary. On the contrary, by the reiterative (and culturally agreed) use of the signifier in conjunction with the signified, the trans-figuration into 'the real' constitutes a performative grammar. By jumping the bar into 'the real', the signifier becomes itself, it is what is says it is, it no longer refers but is referent. This is not to say that, in jumping out of its designated place, the signifier does not continue to function in discourse but rather that this forced symbiosis occurs synonymously with its 'normal' functionalism. It is through such an understanding that we may then trans-functionlalize the signifier. From here we may turn to consider the topology of a decentred sign: a typological space, to play upon a substituted letter.

**Topology of a decentred sign**

The reassertion and continual performance of the signifier results in a shift in the status of the signified. Here is true primacy to the signifier as that which is named is instilled in its name: this then is the 'In principio' of hysteria. The word is the thing. This hysteric extreme draws attention to how the subject dis-places itself through 'normal' signification. Normative displacement occurs during linguistic operation and this relates to the loss trauma constitutive of the ego. Freud says that "every developmental process carries with it the seed of a pathological disposition" (Freud: 1995, 71-2). There is a psychotic base to the 'normal' individuation process from which we may never escape but may instead produce decentering displays in our captivity by which we may challenge the normative whilst contained and enabled within its structuration. The normative is, therefore, to be regarded as both enabling and displacing.

The signifier will be seen to jump its own bounds, it literally jumps out of its skin as it crosses the bar that holds it in place and lives beneath the surface of another, lodged as an activating "foreign body": a hypnoid kinesis. The signified becomes synonymous with the signifier so that the flesh is the word. It is in the realm of 'the real' that we signify hysterically. Word and flesh write themselves together in the place of solidified metaphor. As the metonymic chain is arrested, metaphor becomes frozen as the signified is fully replaced by the signifier. The body comes to bear the signifier of its sex. But if the signifier of its sex is already 'mis-placed' according to the body-image of the individual in accordance with Schilder's representation - he says that, "we shall have a variation in the structure of the body-image according to the psychosexual tendencies of the individual" - then new transformations of the body-sexuality rhetoric may occur which must radically shift any theorization of gender per se (Schilder: 1935, 124-5). In his discussion of body image and sexuality, Schilder writes,
Manifold investigations and experiments have shown me clearly that the difference in the libidinous structures is reflected in the structure of the postural model of the body. Individuals in whom a partial desire is increased will feel the particular point of the body, the particular erogenic zone belonging to the desire, in the centre of their body-image. It is as if energy were amassed on these particular points. There will be lines of energy connecting the different erogenic points, and we shall have a variation in the structure of the body-image according to the psychosexual tendencies of the individual. (Schilder: 1935, 124-5 – my emphasis)

In this scenario, the structuration of the body is in accordance with a desire felt in the flesh which correlates with “the psychosexual tendencies of the individual”. This is far removed from the postulation of biological destiny of which psychoanalysis is often accused. The reception of psychoanalysis in this biology=destiny fashion may occur because we have not shifted our inherited philosophical base which insists upon a binaristic model. The difficulties in the conception of such a model may also lie in the vagaries of linguistics itself. Language, rooted in lack, is always a cover-up, always a transmission from one to other and therefore dependent upon lack and articulated towards a fantasied fullness in order to constitute itself. Perhaps the difficulties of an holistic understanding of the intricate interlacing of flesh and culture is due to the vocabulary which obliges a division of terms: flesh and culture. Any symbolic framework must posit a here and a there due to its substitutive imperative which is after all thrown into the face of absence so that representation is tied with the death of the real thing. Here the place of 'the real' is riddled with deathliness for its backward passage to complete satisfaction is where the organism encounters the shadow of death. This place of radical subversion in the Oedipal is a place of delight and a place of danger. By turning outside in repeatedly via our encounters with the other through the bodily interface, we traverse the revenant signifier in the flesh. By so doing we may challenge gender as a textual space but we do this in face of a danger of actually falling back through the holes and encountering the other into which we may be fully absorbed, full satisfaction obtained at a mortal cost: an impasse of our own making.

**Gender: The necessary phallus**

In terms of the morphology of the text, we may not exit its body but must remain within its economy to retain the narrative affect, just as there is no exit from the symbolic. For we may only negotiate space through the idea of space, can only be subversive when there is a law, can only signify if there is a mechanism to button movement: take away the armature and this endless glissements leads nowhere - only to a dazzling display. We are already inserted within its spatio-temporal arena of the signifier, it already holds us firmly within its literary lips. Our challenge to it is therefore dependent upon it even though formulated in resistance to it. Foucault states that no form of resistance can ever be anterior to that which it is resisting. He says that:

> Where there is power, there is resistance, and yet, or rather consequently, this resistance is never in a position of exteriority in relation to power.  

(Foucault: 1990, 95)

It is the slippage of the reiterated form that is of interest. In spite of itself, the authorized symbolic offers subversion: power offers us its undoing in its very operation. It is in the desperate reiterative process of the performative that the symbolic slips up. If the normalizing process needs reiteration, its base must be insecure. Here between the signifier and the signified is a place of ambivalence, representing as it does a challenge to the incest taboo on which the symbolic is overlaid. The idea of transgressing the incest taboo upon which
western cultural signification and symbolization is based brings us back full circle to Anna O.'s substitution of the paternal function in herself as object-ideal. Here is slippage in the Oedipal function as it constantly needs to reassert itself through symbolic representation. This constant need to repeat points to fragility at the constitutive base and this must be the locus of new possible configurations in the narrative of the subject.

In reproducing the model of mind and body, sex and gender, we demonstrate seduction via grammatical practice and notional division. We may be seen to enter the solidified space of our own commonly received metaphor and fail to question our own rhetoric. In his contribution to Studies on Hysteria, Breuer uses the metaphor of a many-storeyed house to illustrate the idea of psychical space, he then warns against the "danger of allowing ourselves to be tricked by our own figures of speech" (Breuer and Freud: 1991, 307). As a post-structuralist exercise, let us think of the word 'gender', let us think of the two spaces of this sign.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Gender: signifier</th>
<th>Gender: signified</th>
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<td>[Sight+Sound]</td>
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In a feminist scheme, these spaces of gender are then traversed by sex and sexuality, adding more rooms to an already problematic linguistic topology. At what point does the space of the signifier 'gender' become en-fleshed, at what point is biology conceptualized as gendered? Where is the referent of 'gender'? Does gender as a concept have any entry into 'the real'? Is it possible that its entry into the real is merely the effect of a reiterated metaphor which would mean that there is no such thing as gendered space at all? If there is no such thing as gendered space, it must exist only as a phantasy of a lived system of rhetoric. In 'The Seven Veils of Fantasy', Zizek writes that

The first thing to note is that a fantasy does not simply realize a desire in a hallucinatory way. Its function is rather that of a Kantian 'transcendental schematism'. A fantasy constitutes our desire, provides its coordinates, i.e. it literally 'teaches us how to desire'. (Zizek: 1998, 191)

It is this systemic phantasy of gender which haunts us for it correlates with the hallucinated 'real' of the hysteric where the word has become enfleshed. In this scenario, we are all of us in the grip of a possession by a frozen metaphor. Only by repositioning the biological with respect to textualizing the body can any configurative subversion take place in gender. Indeed, it would be necessary to fully excise 'gender' from the vocabulary as a misleading and divisive chimera. There is a need for new interactivity of biology and gender, sex and sexuality in a superimposition which is actively constitutive of this visceral concatenation of signifiers. To negotiate this, we need to re-negotiate the "old room[s]" of theory in an unhinging of terminology with which we have become familiar to search out a new grammar by which 'I' am identified lest in our new house we simply hallucinate 'old rooms' and be led by the hand of rhetoric to ignore the "endless possibilities" of biology.
PART II: Textual Production
"I have no story to tell!": Maternal Rage in Susan Hill's *The Woman in Black*
"I have no story to tell!": Maternal Rage in Susan Hill's The Woman in Black

This section considers Susan Hill's novel The Woman in Black, a text which, despite its adaption by Stephen Mallatrat into a long-running theatrical production for the West End, has received little critical attention in terms of literary analysis. This reading makes use of psychoanalytical and post-structuralist theory to comment upon the location of the writing subject and the production of narrative in relation to a maternal presence operating as a schematic absence in Hill's text. Just as the fictional mother haunts the textual production of Hill's main character, Victorian ghost story motifs and textual references haunt the storyline of her novel so that a mechanics of intertextuality may be seen to operate within its literal dimension. Its own narrative mechanism also offers a haunting from within as stories within story are unravelled so that just as the narrative 'I' is haunted by its terrible tale, the story itself is revealed within another layer of narrative. This presents us with a complex interleaving of narration reminiscent of the convoluted narrative structure of Emily Bronte's Wuthering Heights except that in this parodic tale "the wind did not moan through the casement" (Hill: 1983, 95).  

The intertextual references contained in the textual body of The Woman in Black function by means of the implied extra-textual presence which is actually a mechanics of operative absence in the textual structure. The storyline is haunted by these other texts which pre-exist it and relies upon the reader's recollection of past textual encounters which may be called up by the interpretative act. This scenario of reading echoes the replay of past events to which Kipps is subjected in his own psychical arena. When the affairs of Mrs. Drablow are first related to him, he notes that "[t]he business was beginning to sound like something from a Victorian novel..." (28) He later describes Eel Marsh House as "like the house of poor Miss Havisham" (61). The activation of such comments rely upon the reader's recognition of the motifs, characters and conventions of Victorian texts. Wilkie Collins' The Woman in White (1860) is an absent presence in the text due the inference carried in its title. Kipps may be said to occupy the place of the detective in a structure which is dependent for the success of its revelatory movement upon the depiction of tantalizing suspense. What is hidden provides the page-turning impetus to reveal whilst its horror is directly dependent upon remaining concealed. To stave off his terror of the unknown, Kipps reads the poetry of John Clare and Sir Walter Scott's The Heart of Midlothian (93-4, 107) as if wishing to displace himself from his 'present' situation by being absorbed into texts tied to other spaces and places. It is perhaps ironic that Clare's poem, 'I Am' contains the lines,

I long for scenes, where man hath never trod  
A place where woman never smiled or wept  

Ricks: 1987, 169)

Another character who reads himself to sleep due to the affects of an unsettling haunting is Professor Parkins in the M. R. James short story, 'Oh, Whistle, and I'll Come to You, My Lad'. Events of the day cause him to "get out a book" whilst being contained within the pages of one (James: 1994, 83). The Professor, formerly possessed of a certainty that ghosts are 'not real', is haunted by a nothing which comes in answer to a whistle. The name of this short story will be recognized as the title of Hill's chapter, 'Whistle and I'll Come to You' in which Spider the dog comes to his name in a direct performative result of the auditary signifier. It is interesting that another dimension is added to this intertectual scenario by James' implied reference to the Robert Burns' poem, 'Oh, Whistle, and I'll Come to You, My Lad'. This tertiary haunting of text within text within text is analogous to the mechanics of the story with which we are presented in which Jennet's story is contained within Kipps' narration of the ghost story which is recollectively placed within his primary narration with which the text opens. This results in a breakage of the narrative 'I' which becomes dislocated in its very localized existence tied as it is to the conventions of textual representation. 'I' becomes 'not-I' in this intrusion of sign systems one into the other.
Kipps writes his ghost story against the stereotyped conventions of the Victorian ghost story, his tale will not tell of “dank charnel houses and overgrown graveyards, of footsteps creaking upon staircases and fingers tapping at casements, of howlings and shriekings, groanings and scuttlings and the clanking of chains. . .” (17) His story thereby posits itself to be ‘more true’, ‘more real’; his is not a tale to be told out loud for the delection of others because “[t]he truth is quite other, and altogether more terrible” (19). His story is one in which the Victorian ghost story is cut across by a twentieth-century awareness of the psychical processes forwarded by psychoanalytical theory. Childhood memories interplay with a recurrent replay of trauma and affects of the unconscious undercut any full or stable presence that this narrator might lay claim to so that his “I was living in another dimension” (82). Kipps writes that,

I knew now that I had entered some hitherto unimagined – indeed, unbeliev-ed-in – realm of consciousness, that coming to this place had already changed me and that there was no going back. (72)

This realm of consciousness is one analogous to the locus of a transferential desire set up within the dimensions of the text as it is transmitted from one to the other. It is an arena in which the absent is given agency in its very vacancy. The intertextual ‘presence’ in The Woman in Black does not issue from a static presentation of textual reference existing as a source or mother text in the linear sense. It exists rather as an activating circuit in which the novel’s enclosed semiotic system is haunted by other semiotic systems which are activated in their absence by the scriptible function which is overlaid by the interpretative act thereby adding another dimension of transferential virtuality.

In considering the haunting effect of an absent text, this section will argue that there is a radical estrangement in the very establishment of the writing ‘T’. It comments upon the function of the scriptor in relation to the non-presence of the woman in the Lacanian scheme. It also considers how writing always produces an excess which might be attached to the workings of horror via a repudiation of the subject by itself. The climax of story is therefore attached to the death drive; jouissance is carried in the signifier as it relates to the cut which demarcates it so that its very presence is an en-gravement.

The style in which this section is written attempts to reflect the subject matter it is examining by presenting a textual dimension shot through with different textual ghosts. Just as the narrator, Kipps, in order to establish his narrative performance withdraws from the scene of telling, the full presence of critical authority is avoided in order to try to present a space in which the reader may encounter a dynamic of absence/presence in the writing as it reflects upon Hill’s storyline in conjunction with the psychoanalytical theory used.

Mother

The word mother is one of the sweetest words in our language. It has more power over us than any other.
Rev. Richard Newton. Pebbles from the Brook: Sermons to Children. 1897. (90)

All the things thou canst desire are not to be compared unto her.
Proverbs 3.15

The Woman in Black is a tip-tilted text where the darkness of maternal rage and murderous horror at the centre of subject formation is depicted. The missing or dead mother of so many
popular Victorian texts haunts these pages - she has become an avenging presence. The mechanics of maternal attachment, encountering the loss of the infant as object, loops back into infantile anger which is boundless and transgressive. The mother's loving gaze becomes the instrument of death. Her jealous rage that states, "he is mine, mine, he can never be yours" (100) is displaced onto the children of all those who look upon her. The scopophilic investment in the sign first formulated in relation to the mother as Other is turned upon those who dare to signify whilst the mother is bereft. A robber mother.

**Passing Through**

There was no sign at all of the woman in black. (59)

Hers is a death which has been passed through. The signified woman passes through the signifier of her own presence to occupy a place in the 'real', however fictional: "she had been real. She had been there..." (61) Hers is a place based upon her own absence. She is a Woman in Black. She is a sign of all-encompassing love set adrift from its anchorage in a signifying system which denies her appellation as "mother" to her own child. Hers is the "passionate love" (123) which may not lie down, hers is the anguish which transgresses lines of 'the real' and breaks the signifying chain: her leap over the line (of maternal demarcation) as resurrected woman. She represents the The referred to by Lacan in 'God and the Jouissance of The Woman'. She exists via a crossed-out "nothing" which has the effect of the trace, the stain of black ink which strikes through The woman to raze her down with excision, a blow from which she may rise again by virtue of her excess, surplus to the signifying which demarcates her position. She who has always been the recipient of left-overs becomes the most powerful left-over of all. Jennet Humfrye's 'real' presence in the story is one based upon the banished existence which underpins her very presence both as a mother and a ghost. Her crossing-through is visible, her 'nothingness' is quite something. "Was there something I still did not see?" (128), asks Kipps in his scopic quest to round off the narrative, to solve the mystery, to see it through; unaware that he has already seen 'nothing'.

...once the the of the woman is formulated by means of not all, then it cannot be written. There can be no the here other than crossed through. This The relates... to the signifier 0 when it is crossed through. (Lacan: 1982, 151 – emphasis as original.)

This is a novel of 'passing through'. In terms of its internal story mechanics and narrative presentation, the text presents a turn-about, a flip-over point, a bib-bob of turnings within and without its own constitution - demonstrating the necessary otherness of narrative dynamics and its dependence upon transferential desire. It contains story within story whilst the ghost of m/Other traverses its pages as a moveable function: she enters stories freely, indeed they are all her story, she is its name (who has no name), most importantly, it is they which are her function. The functional absence which is at the heart of the text becomes activated within its own negative mechanics in a repudiation of the text in which it is lodged and the character precipitates its own movements. With reference to the role of transference in the backward completion process in the analytical situation through the analysand's narration of a recollected past to an other, Lacan writes that

...there is no progress for the subject other than through the integration which he arrives at from his position in the universal: technically through the projection of the past into a discourse in the process of becoming. (Lacan: 1982, 72)

Like the child predeceasing its mother, the future is seen to haunt the past. The ghost becomes the very machine of this fiction. We effectively start reading at the end which is just the beginning of Kipps' tale. His tale precedes itself as the story progresses by revealing a process through which Kipps has already passed but has not yet occurred in narrative terms, i.e. it is
outside the text and may not masquerade as 'real!' The text has death as its basis, not just thematically but structurally, as it is implicit in its being written. The schema predisposes the subject in a mapping of points of cross-section in the interplay of drives. Lacan describes this constitution of the subject as "the topology of a four-cornered game" (1977, 304), thereby denoting the diagrammatical nature by which the subject fills the gap which is the prerequisite of its subjection. Just as the narrative progresses by means of an operative absence, so the subject necessarily invests in a fetish which exists around the vanishing point of subjectivity, the hole, the zero of becoming. Deathliness then is the motivation for the propulsion of narrative, its very structure depends upon the shadow beneath which it must pass.

It is in effect as a desire for death that he affirms himself for others...

To say that this mortal meaning reveals in speech a centre exterior to language is more than a metaphor; it manifests a structure. (Lacan: 1977, 105)

The Woman in Black passes through Victorian texts whilst maintaining an internal masquerade of late Victorian narrative. Its own story is a passage through Kipps' middle-aged years to his young manhood, infancy, and back again in a motion of recollective detection which is the catharsis of trauma. Here is a place for everyone's ghosts as each individual is moving about its mother (as she about hers) in an institutionalized social formulation that runs rings around us all. The hole boxes us in: as subjects we depend upon our very subjection in order to function. The text demonstrates how the past is never past but always and ever 'passed through'. Time is unhinged as the future of Kipps' story is the past of itself and its future thereby haunts its movement like a time-traveller so that as readers we are enmeshed in the to-and-fro movement in the place of the Other as the narrative "I" begins to doubt itself in a loss of focus and identity. The careful temporal and spatial location of Kipps' narration gives way due to a transferential disphoria. "I began to doubt my own reality," says Kipps in an ironic statement which draws attention to the true lies of fiction with which we are presented (110). Disorientated in the obscuring frets and mists of the textual encounter, "I" loses "all sense of time and ordinary reality" (104).

...between an extinction that is still glowing and a birth that is retarded, 'I' can come into being and disappear from what I say.

An enunciation that denounces itself, an opportunity that loses itself, what remains here if not the trace of what must be in order to fall from being?

(Lacan: 1977, 300 — emphasis as original.)

Just as textually, the novel enters a space where its structure reaches backwards in terms of its own construction and narrative, the basis for the story-teller within its confines is always one of retarded movement, always searching for the missing Other to whom it must project its story. Kipps' tale is a compensation for not being able to verbally tell, it is an expelled gift to an other whose own 'treasure' is also buried in a primeval place. In this scenario, a network of love and loss is set in motion to which we are attracted in a net of transferential desire. Because every body loves a good story, we are sure to turn the page in an attempt to uncover what must necessarily remain hidden for the dynamics of the tale to continue to be operative.

In Passing: Acts of Story-telling

As a writerly function, what is named Kipps displays an obsession with his narrative "I" in an irresistible drive to reach 'the end', to solve the mystery of the woman in black, to unveil her darkness. The woman in black holds him in thrall to his desire.

Such is the woman concealed behind her veil: it is the absence of the penis that turns her into a phallus, the object of desire. (Lacan: 1977, 322)
This writer's wish is to resolve the mystery of her hidden name and uncover her identity, the impossible desire for the revelation which will supply us with what is missing which lies at the heart of narrative interpellation. Story-telling is revealed as a dilemma, an attempt to unveil by veiling further. It is a contradiction, a mesmeric drive to cover up/over the hole left by the unrecoverable, to veil the veil which disguises loss but is itself borne of that self-same loss. Kipps the writer experiences "desolation" (107) and "an overwhelming grief and sadness, a sense of loss and bereavement" (112) which results in a breakage of the self due to the threatened loss of the primary object which lies at the heart of his haunting and is integral to the textual tactic by which he deals with grief. In 'Coming to Writing', Cixous states that

...we move away from and approach Death, our double mother, through writing, because writing is always first a way of not being able to go through with mourning for death. (Cixous: 1991, 38)

The narrative drive is then one of nostalgia as all drives return to a primary source of remembered satisfaction. It must be remembered that this remembrance is achieved through the signifying system and as such is a representation, a phantasy through which filters the vicissitudes of present recall of the past. This is the story of a narrative subject embroiled in the mechanics of its own subject formation as it is figured in narrative function. Through the figure of Kipps, the story-telling capacity may be shown to exist in relation to a primary Other against whom all signification is measured and indeed comes into being. This birthing process of the narrative is a metaphor which reverberates as a literal passing through. It echoes the physical passage that breaks the borderline of the maternal body as a reciprocal exchange between one and other, between 1 and 0 on the relational scale. It is in relation to the phallic 1 of Mother that the infant passes through its own nothingness to become itself 'one': its subjection depends upon the very threat of its extinction, a reduction to zero. By doing so, it passes through what, in his discussion of the mirror stage, Lacan terms "the circle of the Innenwelt" whilst simultaneously tethered to its confines in a never-ending staging of the borders of subjectivity. From her own nothingness, the zero-point of her own becoming which is replayed in all her acts of signifying, the mother too retains the operative ghost of "the circle of the Innenwelt". She carries its effects through her body set in relation to the infant who squares up to its fear by learning to substitute, to frame through metaphor in order to die and live again through the resurrection of the signifier's excess.

...the reader should recognize in the metaphor or the return to the inanimate... that margin beyond life that language gives to the human being by virtue of the fact that he speaks, and which is precisely that in which such a being places in the position of a signifier... this body itself. (Lacan: 1977, 301)

Our narrator Kipps finds his experience takes him "to the very edge of the horizon where life and death meet together" (80): a place where his identity is under violent threat. The writing subject, haunted by the ghost of the maternal, is in danger of losing itself through its writing process which requires the subject to negotiate with the absence in spite of and because of which it asserts itself as a signifying body. The scriptible function presents itself as an ambivalent territory which offers an opening up but may also carry a terrible penalty.

That Which Has Passed Away: Engraving "I"

The Woman in Black is the story of a dispossessed subjecthood, of the castration that exists at the time of writing and the anguish that is at the basis of scripting. We, who are dispossessed, rely on this bereavement for our subjectivity. We, in order to say "I", must already have lost and only melancholia or madness may follow if we rebel in our subjection. Connected by the causeway, cut off by the sea, crossing to the past, our main character enters a regressive state under threat of having his "I" cut off. Unwilling to relinquish the
misrecognized certainty of his own seamless, perfectly welded state of autonomous presence, Kipps moves through various positions of madness and terror, anger and hysteria. Initially he is unable to accept the ghost of mother fluctuating within himself and by which he is undermined in his individual imperialist ambitions. The woman in black's rage that the maternal is also a place of unrecognized loss and castration is, however, forced upon him.

... it was as though she were searching for something she wanted, needed - must have, more than life itself, and which had been taken away from her. (58)

The empire-building "I" is in its turn crossed through/traversed by The woman, herself crossed through to present a text of a double negative. The castrated mother, doubly bereaved by law and death, dares to become powerful in her powerlessness, dares to look back in her anger at the castrated subject and embroils him in her drama which is implicitly his. By violent intervention, Kipps must return to the "wom[a]n's tale" which is the very basis of his own (87). Cixous describes this as

...the desire to remain as close as possible to Her, death, our most powerful mother, the one who gives us the most violent push of desire to cross over, to leap, since one cannot stay close to her, she desires and incites desire; and this desire is split, it is simultaneously its own opposite, the desire to approach her close enough to die from it, almost, and to hold oneself extremely far back from her, as far as possible.

(Cixous: 1991, 37)

This transferential desire network between one and Other is complicated by the presence of narratives internal to the main narrative, all of which are contained within the main character of Kipps who is pregnant with many stories. He carries the mother within the body of 'his' text in a paradoxical reversal so that his writing body is split. His narrative is a complex cross-sectioning, haunting itself in an intense display of a subversive wish to drive out any semblance of the stable narrative of classic realism whilst simultaneously offering itself as a parody of that very same stability.

We live on that border, crossroads beings, crucified beings ... A mother is a continuous separation, a division of the very flesh. And consequently a division of language... (Kristeva: 1987 [1976], 254)

'He' is at the mercy of drives which are contrary to his own position as the Story-Teller. Kipps is our mother in this fiction as he struggles in his anguish to "retain control of [him]self, rather as a mother will feel obliged to put a brave face on things in order to calm her frightened child" (103). He carries his textual treasure and keeps it to himself for fear of the consequences. He is disoriented in his tale-bearing, unable to admit that he is in the family way as the condensation function of his signing collapses and he is unable to distinguish what is 'real' anymore. He cannot reveal to his wife and family "whatever will surely follow" (128). His pregnancy must be a well-kept secret as he cannot admit his 'story' within its own boundaries, i.e. in familial terms. His 'unnatural birth' must be expelled beyond the circle of the family, a 'familiar story' thrown out as a bastard birth so that his narrative position mirrors that of Jennet Humfrye's exile. This infant progeny is vomit retched from a body struggling to retain its clean and proper place as patriarch. Responding tetchily to his step-sons' request for a Christmas ghost story, he exclaims that,

'I am sorry to disappoint you ... But I have no story to tell!' And went quickly from the room, and from the house. (19)

His story remains far "too real" to be told (21). Without oral manifestation, its 'authenticity' may only be written. Indeed it is thereby posited that to be written is to be
authentic as seeing is believing. His tale therefore remains a visual phenomenon, a méconnaissance on the page.

I decided at once that it should be, at least during my lifetime, a story for my eyes only. (21)

His constructed "I" and its dissolution within its own boundaries is a fictional display of the fracturing effects of the misrecognition which is the predicate of the ability to say "I am". Here then is a display of the psychical ghosts which inhabit our framing as subjects and which haunt the borderlines of identity in a raging bid for proper possession. In his encounter with the haunted nursery which causes him to remember his own childhood, Kipps says that "I felt strangely quite unlike myself..." (107)

And if there were no forward direction? No other forward than, ambiguously, that which had taken place before?

Speaking from this place pervaded by restlessness, how could I have said 'I am'? (Cixous: 1991, 25)

Moving beyond then and now, between 'present' narrative 'I' and its past 'I' represented in its trajectory results in a multi-structure where 'I' is utterly dislocated. 'I' escapes its own quadrature, slips the noose of its méconnaissance, shakes itself out of the textual frame only to expose the more its implicit dependence upon such structuration. The narrative presence of Kipps as story-teller becomes synonomous with the hysteric's symptom, at once a representation and a representing activity. His story is actualized on paper and yet simultaneously retained as a foreign body within the textual enclosure, activating its movements through by-passing itself in its own set-up. His story is both disseminated and retained, it is told by not being told. Kipps' tale is stowed away as a treasured offering for his wife-mother who, in a spiteful touch, he hopes to "be beyond" at the time of her reading which must necessarily re-activate the ghost story.

I have been quite unable to tell her anything at all, she has no idea what I have been going through or why: she will have no idea until she reads this manuscript and at that time I shall be dead and beyond her. (136)

Unable to Pass: The 'author' as retentive function

Pause. (96)

I could not get my breath and felt as if I was pushing against a heavy weight which I must remove before I could go any further. (132)

If babies are born through the anus, then a man can give birth just as well as a woman. (Freud: 1990, 160)

By expulsing himself from his own disowned text of 'no story', Kipps has shit out: producing turds in his own hiatus. After writing of his young and arrogant bid to reveal the mystery of the woman in black, his own enclosing story reaches its end and he cannot tell "the last thing left to tell" (135). He finds himself unable to write.

I have sat here at my desk, day after day, night after night, a blank sheet of paper before me, unable to lift my pen... (135)

Accosted by the signifying process in which he is enmeshed, confronted by the consequences of narrative, Kipps is shitting himself as he realizes that the story is perfectly capable of
breaking its own boundaries and entering his. The story of the woman in black has physical repercussions. Reading Jennet Humfrye's letters, he feels "a terrible, cold, sickening sensation . . . so that I was sure I would either vomit or choke" (124). His "I" becomes unclean, his self abject. Here is the real horror story. Speaking of the subversion of the subject in its encounter with desire, Lacan says that,

...this subject, who thinks he can accede to himself by designating himself in the statement, is no more than such an object. Ask the writer about the anxiety that he experiences when faced by the blank sheet of paper, and he will tell you who is the turd of his phantasy. (Lacan: 1977, 315)

Hiatus is represented in and by the text as the story empties itself of its residual story within, discharges itself in numerous emptyings of internal narratives. Physical depletion is attendant upon the writing procedure as if its weakening diarrhoea places itself beyond itself - this paper discharge is an exorcism in the 'present' writing of the story.

...now at last . . . I will use the very last of my strength, that has been so depleted by the reliving of those past horrors, to write the end of the story. (136)

In order to maintain a clean cut-off point from the mother's story contained within his own, Kipps must supply an ending to his narrative in order to pass his story to others in a passage of goods from one to the other. This transmission of treasured goods which Kipps has long held on to, signals his release from the suspended horror - the fantasy that excrement might bite back and consume the body which produced it as the mother-made-abject threatens to consume the infant - and exit from the story in fictive terms so that he may emphatically declare, "I have told it. Enough" (139).

The location of that self-inscription is set in specific relation to the mother; it is in Mrs. Drablow's meticulously retained personal papers that Kipps finds "a map to buried treasure" enabling him to circumnavigate the active absence central to his telling (118). In the round of narrative, the mother around whom all stories circulate determines the enclosing circuit of the story. She who is enclosed in his serves to expose this fraud as it is he who is properly enclosed, encircled by the woman who trained his writing flesh as the mother regulates the infant's rhythms, drives, and sphinctral spasms that are the forerunners of the symbolic order. When Kipps admits to holding onto a story, it is described in terms of an incorporative bodily inscription: "Yes, I had a story . . . it was now woven into my very fibres" (20). In Powers of Horror, Kristeva describes how the flesh is partitioned through the symbolic via the agency of the maternal.

Through frustrations and prohibitions, this authority shapes the body into a territory having areas, orifices, points and lines, surfaces and hollows, where the archaic power of mastery and neglect, of the differentiation of proper-clean and improper-dirty, possible and impossible, is impressed and exerted.

(Kristeva: 1982, 72 - emphasis as original.)

Passing Over: Literal Ghosts

The Woman in Black is a novel of false starts. It begins in a display of containings, haunted by intertextual ghosts, repeating itself and propagating narrations in an internal tryst with desire. It is so full of story as to be spewing them in all directions. Story within story, circuits within circuits of telling, the narrative propulsion is itself an uncovering manoeuvre as the trace of the past is seen to be working through the 'present' and future of the narrative.
This trace relates no less to what is called the future than to what is called the past, and it constitutes what is called the present by this very relation to what it is not, to what it absolutely is not. (Derrida: 1976, 143)

Like the trace of a trace, "the faint memory of a memory" (20), the remembrance of an other story is one of abjection as the "trace has, properly speaking, no place, for effacement belongs to the very structure of the trace" (Derrida: 1976, 155). Kipps' story is "[l]ike an old wound, it gave off a faint twinge" (20), it is a sore that has "pierced me through" in a stigmata of "I". Kipps is crucified on the prick of his own castration as the irresistible drive to tell places him in danger of losing control of his clean self, leading him to a place where he may be "weakened and broken, by what? A woman?" (80). His literary defence is to produce something visual, a 'real' gift with which to placate the murderous mother. By representing her in his text, he thereby attempts to separate from her, to drive out her ghost whilst ensuring that her "passionate love" will always rise again in the place of the visual signifier, i.e. in the reading process.

I recalled that the way to banish an old ghost that continues its hauntings is to exorcise it. Well then, mine should be exorcised ... I should tell my tale, not aloud ... I would write my own ghost story. (20-21)

The classical privilege of speech over writing is here reversed so that writing becomes the primary means of tale-telling. Telling = writing = exorcism. In this scenario, reading the 'story' raises the ghost whilst the act of writing is the exorcism. Black ink is the intermediary host, the transmitting mirror and screen through which the written 'trace' must pass. This scriptor-priest is compulsively confessional: "I confess I can't explain it..." (87), "I don't mind confessing..." (119), "I confess..." repeats Kipps the lawyer in a quasi-religious, hysterical outpouring by which he hopes to achieve cathartic release from the affects of a haunting which has left him "prone to occasional nervous illnesses and conditions" (11). His hysteria consists of a lost faith in 'the real', he is unable to "explain it"; within his own story he is no longer able to distinguish between the signified and the signifier as the signified rushes into the vacuum of its loss which precedes its being signified and transgresses the reality of the referent. For the signifier always carries excess in spite of itself so that the beyond might be attained by stepping through itself under a pressure which shatters the preconditions of signification. This surplus aligned by Lacan with the feminine is what shatters 'the real' so the anger existing in the heart of an other transgresses its place and enters that of the subject which is then haunted by the ghost of the signifier which has passed through its signified place. The subject is then broken by the trajectory of his own narrative, run through by his own stories so that "[t]hey all but broke me" (112).

In what is a denial of negation, this story-teller is stuck in a refusal to deny the mother, a necessary step in order to signify as a separate entity. Kipps is mortally afraid of the consequences of his own tale-telling. Suffering from a severe crisis in the signifying function, he is unable to experience the seen and the heard together, he is visited separately by a vision and haunted by a child's cry. He is locked in the dimensions of a symptom, a separation of the functions of the signifier: endlessly replaying audio-visual ghosts in a circuit of haunting (102). Seeing "nothing" is therefore the result of the signifier crossing over to the 'beyond' to become its own 'real' and bringing life-in-death. His trauma is a denial of the cut which is the basis of signing. His fear is bound up with "whatever will surely follow" the interpretation of the sign (128). The wish to escape from the inevitability of the narrative drive, to avoid "whatever will surely follow" is indicative of an implicit fear of the story-telling imperative, a wish to avoid the ghosts that are called up by the signifier in its audio-visual display. Kipps' so-called written text which spells out what cannot be, tells a story which he does not wish to speak of. His story is of an illicit visitation, called up by a radical separation of the auditory and visual aspects of the signifier. Kristeva writes that,
. . . when the condensation function that constitutes the sign collapses (and in that case one always discovers a collapse of the Oedipal triangulation that supports it), once the sound image/sign image solidarity is undone, such a splitting allows one to detect an attempt at direct semantization. . . (Kristeva: 1982, 53)

This re-temporalizing of speech and writing results in a divorce of time and space which is equal to the place of The Woman: "I wonder who she was? Is? . . . I hardly know how to refer to her!" (80) She is in excess of time and space, a mystery that may never be looked upon due to its veiled nature.

Thou canst not see my face: for there shall no man see me and live. (Exodus 33.20)

As readers, we are shielded from the predatory look of the Woman in Black, we are intercepted by the text which represents her. No-one may enter the terrifying place of a thwarted maternal, the aching gap and open wound left by a taken child where exists a rage which forces barricades and rips open the purpose of the cut in the signifying function. She has crost the bar. Her grief is not decent, it breaks bounds, it will not R. I. P. To look upon her place would be to die of fright. Our look is, therefore, itself veiled.

Each sighting of the wasted woman brings a child's death for this is the "climax" (130) of the story as it represents the inevitable drive towards the zero point by the visually signified. The "climax" of the story = death. The crux of representation passes through the little 0 of orgasmic narrative fulfilment in the death of the subject embroiled in the dialectics of desire set up through the screen of the teller. This is a death which may be passed through in reading, existing as a jouissance called up by the quickening interpretation of the dead letter. It is Kipps' wish to arrest the transmission of the story by intercepting the visual sign of The woman. His fantasy is to hold onto the tale, retain the treasure and thereby arrest the chain: "Oh, pray God . . . that the chain is broken - " (135). To foreclose, to end forever by finding out the perpetual 'truth': the 'author's' impossible fantasy is to oust the woman by taking her place. "If I could uncover the truth, perhaps I might in some way put an end to it all forever" (118). This constitutes freezing the glissement of the signifying chain, petrifying the name of The woman so that her signification may not have any affect, i.e. by possessing the mother fully so that the hole may be filled, his wound salved, and full satisfaction attained - the end of desire, the end of the subject, zero point . . . death . . . Yet her desire reaches through the veil of the grave as there is "[a] jouissance beyond the phallus" (Lacan, 1982 [1972-3],145).

Nearly at the close of her life her voice and speech failed; but she was frequently heard to whisper, 'I want, I want.'

"Through a door": Retroactive Narrative in Philippa Pearce, *Tom's Midnight Garden*
"Through a door": Retroactive Narrative in Philippa Pearce, Tom's Midnight Garden

...Tom opened the door wide and let in the moonlight. (24)

Tom's garden is a midnight garden. It is a place where a different sun shines, shedding its "white daylight" upon the exiled (Pearce: 1984, 24). It is in this territory that two subjects meet, separated as they usually are by conventions of time and space. Outsiders in an outside world, they find a play-area in which their mutual fantasy is installed and in which their differences intersect.

Opening on the word 'Exile', Tom's Midnight Garden explores the radical strangeness at the root of subject constitution. It presents a story of banishment, isolation and prohibition; conversely it also presents a story of fantasy, laughter and liberation. It is in the frightening unhinging of the familiar that playful subversion finds its route. Two scenes lie side by side, in narrative terms and in story content so that the story of Tom and Hatty takes place in "a time between night and day" (40).

There and Back: The Second Childhood

The most crucial aspect of psychoanalysis for discussing children's fiction is its insistence that childhood is something in which we continue to be implicated and which is never simply left behind. (Rose: 1991, 12)

Childhood can never die -
Wrecks of the past,
Float o'er the memory
Bright to the last...
( Abby Hutchinson c.1840, Hymn 324 in Sunday School Hymnary, c.1918)

Tom's Midnight Garden brings together the childhood yearnings of a twentieth-century boy and a late-Victorian girl. Or so it would seem for the story has a twist in that these desires intersect in the mind of an old woman "dreaming the scenes of her childhood" (39). Tom's incarcerated unhappiness beats about the house and meets the loneliness of Hatty.

He had longed for someone to play with and for somewhere to play; and that great longing, beating about unhappily in the big house, must have made its entry into Mrs Bartholomew's dreaming mind... (215)

It is in the grown-up Hatty's dreams that the children meet so that the whole narrative of the text is actually back-to-front for it actually takes place in the past whilst dependent upon the present.

The Victorian orphan motif of so many nineteenth-century children's stories mingles with a twentieth-century angst at separation: Hatty's actual orphaned state makes her "a monster" (95), isolating her and placing her outside familial law so that she is "a shame... a liar, a criminal" (95). Tom, meanwhile, is a virtual state orphan; his rage is one of separation from the mother. The modern child, having culturally passed through the historicity of psychoanalysis, angst-ridden at the prospect of the virtual real, finds himself face to face with
"the real' in the shape of "a tiny little figure, all in black" (96). "Tom had never seen a grief like this" (96).

'What are you crying for?' asked Tom gently.
'For home!' she wept. 'For my mother - for my father!'

Then Tom understood the meaning of the funeral black she was wearing and of that desolate, ceaseless crying. (97)

It is the grown Hatty's memory of her unhappiness which provides her with a back-to-front companion in childhood longing. It is Tom's intersection of her story that "had brought back to her the little Hatty of long ago. Mrs Bartholomew had gone back in Time to when she was a girl" (96). This going back in time is not, however, a regression but a retrograde motion operative in the narrative. It is by moving backwards that the story moves forward.

"Time no longer" (157)

For us believing physicists, the division into past, present and future has merely the meaning of an albeit obstinate illusion. (Einstein cited by Zeh: 1992, 164)

Pearce's text upsets the conventions of 'normal' time in its story-line and by so doing draws attention to this unsettling of time at work in written texts and operative in narrative production. That this is a feature of children's fiction in general is indicative of the fluidity of childhood perception, it allows a movement which comes from the less rigidly held laws of an ego-in-transition. This transitional openness correlates with a feminine positioning which is both the cause of celebration and a cause of hysteria: an openness which is jubilant yet dangerous.

Through the same opening that is her danger, she comes out of herself to go to the other, a traveller in unexplored places... (Cixous: 1996, 86)

Tom is a boy in exile, dislocated in time and space so that "(h)is home now seemed a long, long misty way away" (63). He has been banished from the locus of ego formation and in his howling loss finds a compensatory object. He reaches for the maternal figure in Hatty and becomes her grandson-lover in return in a Harold and Maude type drama. Their love-story is an in-between land where each provides the fantasy for the other as a reciprocal relation of desire is set in motion. It is this desire set loose from beneath the frozen surface of suspended life that allows Tom to time-skip, "to burst the walls" (18) and to leap the boundaries of ordinary time and space.

Tom was thinking about the Past, that time made so far away. Time had taken this Present of Hatty's and turned it into his Past. Yet even so, here and now, for a little while, this was somehow made his Present too - his and Hatty's. (143)

He enters the time of the other: a place not of "Time no longer" but "Time no longer as we know it", a place "full of enormous possibilities" (160) for narrative. He is propelled through the narrative by reaching back through the structure in which he is incarcerated as function. It is this action which so neatly mirrors the narrative process as a transposition of one upon the other.

By the very act of narrating, the subject of narration addresses an other; narration is structured in relation to this other. (Kristeva: 1986 [1980], 45)

This entry into the other is through deathliness; "time no more" is the proclamation in Revelations X by the angel who ingests the text: it is post-Judgement and therefore in a place
of extra-time. This proclamation is tied firmly to signification and time, written as it is on the pendulum of old Mrs. Bartholomew's grandfather clock, itself moving through space in an endless oscillation from one side to the other. The text operates as the locus of the activation of two 'scenes'. It is the implicit deathliness of the sign to which Lacan refers in Ecrits.

It is in effect as a desire for death that he affirms himself for others . . . no being is ever evoked by him except among the shadows of death.

To say that this mortal meaning reveals in speech a centre exterior to language is more that a metaphor; it manifests a structure. (105)

All who signify must pass incessantly through the shadows of the valley of the signifier and shall fear not the defiles and traces of its path, though they are constantly dying in the fading of their speech, they shall fear not death for they shall rise again anew in the endless configuration of the signifying system. This is the faith that is required of those who would signify.

It is from a stultifying suspended life, incarcerated in a flat with no garden and from behind a barred bedroom window that Tom finds a new world so that "(he) lived his real and interesting life at night-time, when he went into the garden; in the daytime he wanted only peace - to think back and to think forwards, always to the garden; to write. . . " (99). From his depressed position comes forth liberation for this is the locus of (re)negotiation with the symbolic order.

Black Sun: Melancholic Exile

What proof have we that the sun which we see by day, also shines at night?
The Bible Class Magazine: 1848, 148

The thing that hath been that is that which shall be; and that which is done is that which shall be done: and there is no new thing under the sun.
Ecclesiastes 1:6-10

Melancholia and depression in the subject position is due to denied negation of the primary object: the mother. It consists of a refusal to negate the primary object of cathexis investment. Yet "the loss of the mother is a biological and psychic necessity . . . Matricide is our vital necessity" (Kristeva: 1989, 27). The depressed subject is one who engages in a refusal to kill off the mother, a necessary step in order to enter the symbolic. It is integral to becoming 'subject' to commit matricide in order to project the ego into the statue of "I".

. . . the possibility of concatenating signifiers (words or actions) appears to depend upon going through mourning for an archaic and indispensable object . . . Mourning for the Thing - such a possibility comes out of transposing, beyond loss and on an imaginary or symbolic level, the imprints of an interchange with the other articulated according to a certain order. (Kristeva: 1989, 40)

Just as the subject negotiates with enforced extrication from the maternal apparatus, the reader howls in abandonment by the primary text. This disengagement may also, however, lead to subversion due to outbreak from the liminal for where no law is, there may be no transgression. This motion leads back to the essential function of the Symbolic in the Lacanian subject knot, i.e. the triadic configuration of Symbolic-Imaginary-Real in the configuration of 'I'.
On the symbolic level, abandonment and the refusal of the subject (Tom) to relinquish the mother leads to anger, melancholia and a skewed time-sense as he compensates in fantasy for what is missing in the Real.

The vanishing speech of melancholy people leads them to live within a skewed time sense. It does not pass by, the before/after notion does not rule it...

(Kristeva: 1989, 60)

The maternal apparatus is intercepted by the shadow of Hatty, the trace of Tom's desire is written in his relation to Aunt Gwen as she calls his name.

The voice recalled him without his understanding at once to what: his eyelids opened on to his own bedroom, but his eyes printed off the shadowy figure of Hatty against the barred window and the cupboard and between himself and the figure of his aunt at the foot of the bed. Hatty's image haunted the room for Tom.

Tom suffers a depressive's insomnia and withdrawal, he lives through a daytime suspension: "He did not want to sleep, but, all the same, the daytime in the flat was like a period of sleep to him" (100). His longing is excessive, it is what Kristeva terms the depressive's "impossible mourning for the maternal object" (1989, 9). For Kristeva, "the Thing is an imagined sun, bright and black at the same time" (1989, 13). For Tom, "the garden was the thing. That was real" (29).

By opening the door into the midnight garden, Tom enters the dark side of the page which tells his story. It is a place which explores the unwritten at work within the writing itself, the dark shadow which underpins the text and activates the narrative body with its long exhalation of deathliness.

At the very origin of narration, at the very moment when the writer appears, we experience emptiness. (Kristeva, 1986 [1980], 45)

Aggression: The story in bits and pieces

...depression, like mourning, conceals an aggressiveness toward the lost object...

(Kristeva: 1989, 11)

In its depressed state, the subject displays an aggression which correlates with the paranoid aggressivity endemic to ego-formation. This is due to the negotiation with the primal object which takes place in the narcissistic stage and which, according to Lacan, "dates from the deflection of the specular I into the social I" (Lacan: 1977, 5). Tom displays this aggressivity in his exile, he "raged that he had to leave" his little garden at home and his brother Peter (7). He says goodbye to his mother "angrily" (9) and his words are bitter (8). He is "darkly intent" (30).

This aggression underpins the subject's negotiation with textual production for the entry to the symbolic order is marked by the melancholic trace, the shadowing of the refusal to commit matricide in order to become fully subject. To write is to make a mark, to incise like Hatty's knife upon a tree-trunk as she "half scratched, half pressed" her mark there. In writing to his brother, Tom makes "stab-marks" upon the paper (61). This process harbours aggression and is built upon an introjective process for it is with our mouths that we speak our desire and by introjection we attempt to hold the other in our mouths as if to enter the other by it entering us through the linguistic system in a reciprocal game of body-snatching.
It is here where the moveable mosaic of "I" is assembled that the subject is most paranoid, terrified by the signing which writes him/herself. For the textual product is an attempt to hold together what is split apart: a phantasmagorical relation to the other.

If one grants that every signifying practice is a field of transpositions of various signifying systems (an intertextuality), one then understands that its 'place' of enunciation and its denoted 'object' are never single, complete and identical to themselves, but always plural, shattered... (Kristeva: 1986 [1980], 111)

As readers, we pass through liminal boundaries of the narrative as Tom passes from one world to the other. This is a door-opening process, as physical as the turning of a page. The manoeuvre of 'going through' the text is a painful yet radically subversive process for it is in negotiation with the other that the one may change configuration. Tom displays this ambivalence of attitude as he finds himself able to go through physical barriers and pass through doors: "I'm going through,' Tom gasped, and was seized with alarm and delight" (53).

...in his half-dreaming, he became two persons. (15)

Suspense of these fragments of telling is operative in sustaining the reader's desire as s/he is kept in an agony of awaiting revelation, left as we are peeping in a voyeuristic fascination as flashes of story pass us by like "the flick-flick-flick of Tom" (45) in another landscape.

...dark - light - dark - light - dark... (41)

The Retrograde Motion

Check out the retrograde motion.

The Fugees, 'Zealots': Ruffhouse Records, 1996

By making Tom's story operative by its entry into another scene supposedly preceding it in logical time but actually constitutive of it in narrative time, Tom's Midnight Garden actively presents in the shape of its own narrative, the signifying system which writes it. It locates two scenes in story-time, two scenes which write themselves together in an interactive narrative. The intrusion of a third term into this equation is represented in the story-line by Tom's brother, Peter, almost a twinned function to Tom. His desire to enter the scene of writing correlates with the reader's position as s/he enters story-space as a traveller-exile traversing the structure of an other whilst simultaneously changing its boundaries: to haunt the machine is to be haunted by the machine.

In this coming-and-going movement between subject and other, between subject and other, between writer (W) and reader, the author is structured as a signifier and the text as a dialogue of two discourses. (Kristeva: 1986 [1980], 45)

Tom is locked in a dialectic with Hatty which allows him to enter her story after it has been told in the usual train of chronological telling. It is this seemingly impossible relation which so succinctly offers a working paradigm of novelistic textual production drawn from a signifying system itself built upon this retrograde movement.

By making reference to a preceding system, the narrative propels itself forward and makes reference to a retrograde movement of the subject which projects itself by means of a retarded identification which is never solved.
The precedence of the real in the Lacanian system, as the point of the subject's confrontation with an endlessly retreating reality, signals this definition of the subject in terms of an object which has been lost, rather than towards a totality which it anticipates. (Rose: 1991, 183)

It is in our confrontation with this howling loss of our first object that we signify. In our desire to attain the other, we comfort ourselves in signifying compensation. This movement of one to other is operative on the level of signifier to signifying system and it is here that ghosts of the system may fluctuate as the entire operative system depends for its tensile coherence upon this structure which rolls back upon itself continuously as the retrieval of the signifier's treasure is in a backward motion. By passing through the oscillation from one to other which is the relation of pure signifier to signifier in the system via the movement of desire installed in speech, the subject becomes doubly split: split in its saying and split by its saying for "it is as a derivation of the signifying chain that the channel of desire flows" (Lacan: 1977, 259).

This is a retroversion effect by which the subject becomes at each stage what he was before and announces himself - he will have been - only in the future perfect tense. (Lacan: 1977, 306)

Lacan refers to this retrograde effect in the construction of the sentence unit for we cannot know the destination of the full statement until the last word is written/read or spoken/heard. It draws attention to this incessant rolling back upon oneself in the linguistic apparatus: that which would be 'present' may only project itself fully by referring backwards both spatially and temporally.

The diachronic function of this anchoring point is to be found in the sentence even if the sentence completes its signification only with its last term, each term being anticipated in the construction of the others, and, inversely, sealing their meaning with its retroactive effect. (Lacan: 1977, 303)

This entry of one into other is an intertextual effect at work in the base of narrative construction and it correlates with the unending dialogue of "I" which is what Kristeva refers to as the subject-in-process: a moveable mosaic continually de-centred and criss-crossed by the other. This kaleidoscope of subjectivity is as variable as the place of the child looking through a window. Hatty helps Tom discover that there is more than one garden: "Through each colour of pane, you could see a different garden outside" (79). What is seen depends upon the positions of the viewer and the viewed in a reciprocal relation which swings from here to there as one transposes upon the other in an equation where each player is in a perpetual state of flux. Narrative production, by interlocking with the reader within, is always unsettled. It is a kinetic dialogue.

"Time and Time Again" (161)

The narrative of Tom's Midnight Garden is parallel to the re-play of the signifier as it re-visits itself in its projection which must ultimately lead it to transpose itself upon itself in the seemingly illogical sequence that is signification. Echoed words and mixed narratives result as each one enters the other in a transpositioning which is parallax telling.

'You've bars across the bottom of your windows,' said Tom, 'as if this were a nursery.' And somewhere in his head the words seemed an echo of something he had once heard or said; and, indeed, the bars across the windows were like a remembrance of something once seen. (141)
This is the *déjà vu* effect of the spoken as the utterance haunts itself in its own uttering as if the present is itself a ghost fluttering in the past. It is the cause of "the only real quarrel that ever took place between" Tom and Hatty as they are both unable to conceive of themselves as anything except fully present (104). Having passed through the deathliness of the signification, the characters within the text address each other through their "games and tales" (75). They are effectively inserted backwards into the narrative which tells their stories by traversing the zero point of authorship as they play a scriptible function for each other in a permutation which is at play at the level of the signifier in its back-and-forth motions.

The subject of utterance, in relation to the subject of enunciation, plays the role of addressee with respect to the subject; it inserts the subject of enunciation within the writing system by making the latter pass through emptiness.

(Kristeva: 1986 [1980], 46)

In their mutual transpositioning, Tom and Hatty engage in an oscillation from one to other which forms the "dialogical dyad" described by Kristeva in 'Word, Dialogue and Novel' (47).

... the words spoken by Hatty made a little echo, and her voice and its echo filled the silence after Tom's speaking, so that he was somehow comforted by the sound. (185)

**Tenses: Semantic Time**

'tense' n. (gram.) any of the forms of a verb expressing the time of the action or the state of being. (*Longman Modern English Dictionary*)

One day, hardly speaking aloud, Tom began a sentence... (103)

*Tom's Midnight Garden* upsets the usual conception of time and consequently upsets the usual conventions of narrative time. If time cannot be relied upon to "march[ ] onwards in the way that it is supposed to go" (98), to flow in a "reasonable" and reliable manner, what must this mean for the tenses by which our grammatical system operates and by which it represents time in the semantic sense? The grandfather clock is "senselessly wrong" (13).

*Tom's Midnight Garden* displays a mixture of tenses combined with story-telling technique, moving between preterite, present perfect, future conditional (25, 102), and future perfect in an easy technical display of its own narrative interests. It is a text obsessed by the time it takes to tell and the space in which this telling is conducted: its temporal unfixings are parallel to its spatial fixations. The narrator's knowledge of geography moves between then and now as if this space is constant and it is only time which changes. "At last, however... and now... and here they were where the river curves in..." (183). The locus of the signifier which represents 'the Real' of topographical location is always constant whilst the subject's constitution moves back and forth, to and fro in irresistible relation to it.

They had stopped talking and thinking - their legs and arms and bodies seemed to throw from side to side with the precise, untiring regularity of clock pendulums... (183)

The *point-de-capiton* is the stable fixing point, albeit temporary, over which the subject oscillates configurations in its negotiation with it.

The projection of the sentence in the future perfect tense indicates that at a point of future time an event will be in the past. "These holidays they would have built." (8)
When we use the future perfect we are viewing the event from the future whilst actually stating it in the present. If, meanwhile, we write in this tense, the present in which we write and the present in which what we have written is read is always changing and itself subject to haunting by itself.

This is a retroversion effect by which the subject becomes at each stage what he was before and announces himself - he will have been - only in the future perfect tense. 

(Lacan: 1977 306)

The sentence can be seen to move further from itself in the use of future perfect tense, a tense favoured in the narration of Tom's adventures. The reader is given previews as we are told of events before Tom, the fir-tree falls in Chapter 6, "although Tom did not know this until much later..." (56). There is an omniscient non-sense at work here for what can "much later" mean in this context of a moveable mosaic of textual time pieces?

**Anti-Chronology of Telling**

As readers, we are given answers without questions in reference to the backward completion principle of the text. We are not informed of Tom's "last question" which precedes our entry into Chapter 7.

'Not unless you put the clock back,' Uncle Alan said carelessly, in answer to Tom's last question. (58)

Time-slip in story narrative is matched by time-slip in the act of narration itself. The narrator informs us that,

In following the course of Tom's historical researches and his reasoning, we have gone a little ahead upon the order of events - as Tom perceived them - in the garden. 

(113)

The story is not chronological and draws attention to this upsetting of the 'normal' temporal progression of story-telling. It undoes itself in its own writing and intercuts itself with previous 'scenes' which the reader is then expected to inhabit like a ghost from the future time of the reading act.

The tree-house in which he and Hatty quarrelled was not built until immediately after the episodes of the geese upon the lawn and the little girl in mourning... (114)

The view from the window of the room in which there is "no Hatty" (147) shows an unfallen ivied fir tree: "He was looking only for Hatty, so he did not linger over this view, but later he had cause to remember it" (134). Time in the garden is "unreliable, confusing" (98) as it moves "forward to a tree's falling, and then back to before the fall; and then still farther back again, to a little girl's first arrival; and then forward again" (98). Tom's 'last' visit to the garden, in Hatty's midsummer memory is out-of-synch with the rest of narrative time (56, 211, 212): "...and Tom remembered the silence... and the cry..." (212). The fir-tree is the constant in the upset chronology of episodic story-telling sequence. Story time is a configuration of present-past-future in the sentence completion factor itself as the subject approaches the utterance of itself as 'One' or "I", a number of apparatus operating on multiple time-levels all collapse together to present the pretence of a fully present subject known by the pronoun of its pronounced presence to itself. The stadium of re-constitution of the subject in the dialectical relation of the transmission of desire is the place of the subject in relation to the
interlocuting lover. Hatty as an old woman is still a child within, the stadium of the subject is a place where the tale is never fully told.

Two Scenes: Narrative Parallax

Tom and Hatty live in parallel worlds, both exiled and living with their aunts; their experiences of isolation and desire to play is what allows their meeting at a sticking point in time. This correlates closely with the idea of the signifying chain as a confluence of signified and signifier in Saussure's diagram which is utilized by Lacan in his notion of the point de capiton (Lacan: 1993, 261). The quilting-point of the subject is that where the signifier catches, however temporarily, against the signified to produce a staticity of affect. A generation of the framing apparatus is continually at work in the constitution of the ego so that the subject-in-process is the locus of transposition, a polyphony of voice which operates as a fugue.

There is in effect no signifying chain that does not have, as if attached to the punctuation of each of its units, a whole articulation of relevant contexts suspended 'vertically', as it were, from that point. (Lacan: 1977, 154)

Caught within the textual apparatus, Tom and Hatty are mechanisms which display the mechanism. Ghosts in the fictive structure, they haunt the storyline in which they are written and in which they represent a scriptible function. The characters rattle the chain which represents them. Tom does not leave a mark, "his blades left no cut or bruise upon the surface of the ice in travelling over it" (182). He is a non-scriptor, caught as a function in the story of an other whilst still operative in that which is being narrated. He is arrested in his relation with Hatty and cannot leave a mark behind him, be it auditory or visual. Yet he has an affect in her story-space. Hatty is inside the story, a function; Tom is a secondary technical function re-entering her narrative space. They inhabit different time zones yet can "keep[ ] time together, stroke for stroke". Hatty and Tom are "two skaters on one pair of skates" (181).

Two scenes are activated here and it is in this respect that we can invoke the time mechanism of the hysteric as she lives her symptom through the chronology of a past trauma, a dialogic trace is set up in which the present becomes operative through the past. In Josef Breuer's account of the case of Anna O., he accesses "a private diary kept by her mother" to confirm that she is actually living in an active past scene of trauma in the present of her treatment (Breuer and Freud: 1991, 87).

The Big Freeze: Arrested Signifying Chain

'But I meant, is the river really frozen over?' (177)

The skating expedition of Tom and Hatty is out of time for they are skating over the surface of frozen river water: a surface which is suspended in its usually onward motion. The river of signification made up of signifiers is also completely arrested. Tom and Hatty move over the frozen signifying chain, buttoned in suspended glissement. There is no movement as it is temporarily arrested to allow a breakout to occur.

Old men give advice to the young skating Hatty as she makes her mark upon the ice: "There's already someone went through..." (191). 'Going through' the door of the defrosted signifying chain brings deathliness as the subject truly fades beneath the shattered surface of
signification, i.e. the subject has gone to pieces, had become de-quilted, unbuttoned, unhinged: dead or mad. As the chain is arrested in its movement temporarily, it allows the O/other to pass through it; as it begins its incessant movement once more, those who have been seduced by the frozen surface, instead of playing on it, pay the price. This price is full access to the Other which is the end of desire and constitutes the dissolution of the subject: death.

Going beneath the surface of the signifier - dying by going beneath the ice - presents the danger of breaking the symbolic boundary: as deathliness is written through the sign as its precondition. Tom's wish to go back to the past in the past of the garden challenges the chronology of Hatty's dream sequence so that she may be "a little girl again... waiting to spin her tales for him" (200). It is here at the close of the text that Tom is "in a panic to get out" (201) and it is here that he is caught again within the system like the birds beneath Abel's strawberry nets, his call to Hatty "sharp like a bird's warning" (202) as the subject is caught once more within the lure of the Oedipal, the law of the third term interrupts the two scenes activated here by desire. It is "reasonable" Uncle Alan who "ran forward and caught Tom" (202) to return him to the fully sliding glissement in which the knot of discourses which is the subject functions.

The boy sobbed and fought as though he were being taken prisoner... he began weeping softly now, but as though he would never stop. (202)

Hatty too is caught in the system by an intrusion of the third term for it is as she is dreaming of her midsummer wedding that Tom is refused entry to the garden. She is reined in, her 'course' on the ice wavers (193) as she re-encounters the intrusion of the third term which regulates her negotiation with the symbolic. These scenes of 'return' are places to which we are not admitted as readers but are active in the text itself. We do not visit Tom in his own family and Hatty as a married woman, these are scenes which are beyond the confines of the text yet these projections are poised in the place of the Black Sun which still shines although we may not see its light. Like the garden, it always there.

You might look and see nothing, and you might think there wasn't a garden at all; but, all the time, of course, there is, waiting for you. (79-80)

Hatty has her invisible friend with her whether or not others can see him, "she had a companion with her, even if they could not see him" (183).

It is in the place of the Black Sun that Hatty and Tom are able to skate over the arrested flow of the signifying chain. This negotiation with a Black Sun is due to a new ego configuration in relation to 'the Real' and the shifting subject boundaries this constitutes as the whole signifying relation is altered. Without becoming mad, this alteration in the signifying relation can only be temporary and offer radical new possibilities of being in a creative encounter with the signifying system per se.

Melancholy persons, with their despondent, secret insides, are potential exiles but also intellectuals, capable of dazzling, albeit abstract, constructions. (Kristeva: 1989, 64)

In their daring outbreak, Tom and Hatty break the confines of their own representation within the text which writes them. In other words, they re-write themselves as subjects. By sliding beneath the surface of the signified they find themselves slipping beneath the surface of that which anchors them. Yet they must be necessarily anchored in order to slip and it is this very anchoring which allows the means of escape. In every construction lies its own re- construction/deconstruction as its limits bar the excluded. The outlaw is what make the law operative: the outlaw upholds the law. The cries of Tom and Hatty are thin and high, compared to birds; free so that they might go through doors in the text, go "beyond the
garden" (120) and slide out from beneath the walls and confines of the territory into which they are written.

**Outbreak: Play and Laughter**

So, at once, their play began again in the garden, and went on as though the garden and their games need never end. (116)

During their skating expedition on the river Ouse, Tom and Hatty notice the new fashion of figure-skating. An orange acts as the centre-pin in the middle of a figure-skating company.

In one place an orange had been set centrally upon the ice, and four top-hatted, dignified gentlemen were describing a harmony of figures to it - from it - round it. (181)

This physical object acts as the linchpin, the static point round which the subject revolves, the centre resting point in reference to which the pendulum swings, the tower of Ely in relation to which the traveller locates itself. Yet this linchpin is out-of-place, stolen by a street urchin and the skaters are set free in their movements upon the ice. Tom and Hatty's laughter at the theft of this pivot is euphoria at a de-centred dance. The theft and flight which follows relates to Cixous' use of the term *voler* as a feminine gesture in negotiation with linguistic access.

She flies/steals.

To fly/steal is woman's gesture, to steal into language to make it fly.

(Cixous: 1996, 96)

In 'Women's Time', Kristeva notes the connection between the primary object relation and "the appearance of the first spatial references which induce the child's laugh and then induce the entire range of symbolic manifestations which lead eventually to sign syntax" (Kristeva: 1981, 15-16).

As they laugh together, Tom and Hatty engage in a transitivism operative at the identification process in the mirror stage described by Lacan. It is this transitivism which is formative of the spatial identification by which the subject will project itself into the mirage of "I". In the case of Tom and Hatty, it is located specifically in their laughter: "...and Hatty laughed; and Tom laughed too, but no one except Hatty heard him" (183).

Like Tom, Hatty laughed... (181)

...and Hatty would laugh and Tom too. (117)

Like Tom, Hatty laughed aloud at the impudence of the theft; but all the time she was looking around her sharply and a little nervously (181).

It is Tom's invisible accompaniment which allows Hatty to break free of the text which binds her as she engages in an audacious adventure for a late-Victorian woman. In her feminine outbreak, Hatty is literally ahead of her time. By leaving the familiar restraint of story-time, she engages with subversion in textual terms. The place of feminine outbreak is inhabited by the child within the story, a place of never-ending possibility and configuration of the subject within the signifying system.

'What do you see beyond the garden, Tom?' Hatty whispered up to him, her curiosity having overcome her fears. (120)
The vision of freedom that Hatty and Tom gain by looking "beyond the garden" comes from pushing the boundary of what encloses them: opening a door. It is as Tom gazes freely about him atop the garden wall that "he was taken by a sudden joy" (119). It is this overpassing the limit and 'going beyond' that allows access to a never-ending tale.

She opened doors for him. (77)
Negotiating Theories of Feminine Writing: Michèle Roberts, In the Red Kitchen
Negotiating Theories of Feminine Writing: Michèle Roberts, *In the Red Kitchen*

Hysterics suffer mainly from reminiscences. (Breuer & Freud: 1991, 58)

... she, the outcast, has never ceased to hear the resonance of fore-language. She lets the other language speak - the language of 1,000 tongues which knows neither enclosure nor death. (Cixous: 1981, 260)

*In the Red Kitchen* is a text preoccupied by the act of feminine textual production. Its frame of reference includes psychoanalytical and post-structuralist theory in conjunction with new French feminism. Its referentiality is such that it engages with theory in a fictional domain, drawing upon its reader's awareness of the body of work which is pulled into the circuit of its telling. Within its own domain, it examines what it means for the feminine subject, as theoretical exile, to inhabit the symbolic. Evicted from the means of representation in her own right, it follows her wanderings as she becomes stranger to herself - separate from what names her - and explores her relationship with such estrangement. Rage, submission and hysteria are written through and underwrite her means of subversion before she is able to write in her own name, as if to write a name implies full possession and authority. She must face a double eviction, a double castration for she has had her nothing cut off: she has undergone negative castration. In his essay, 'Difference', Stephen Heath writes that,

... the woman experiences the symbolic castration from a site elsewhere to the man: the penis has never been a part of her, the 'you are not the phallus' of castration with its process of being and having accords differently, difficultly for her; she passes from loss of an imaginary part of herself - the doubling, the partition - to the loss of an organ that can only be a superimposition on that other loss which it continues to figure. (Heath: 1978, 68)

This feminine castration is a lost loss: a wound without a mark. Her hurt can't be seen: internal bruising with no display upon the body yet integral to it. A thing not of the body but a fleshly thing still. How may she then write 'I' while side-stepping that fatal rigidity? How may this double loss be confronted in order to write a name upon it? She must open what has been invisibly sutured and yet remain whole, intact in her opening up: "Woman must put herself into the text" (Cixous: 1981 [1975], 245).

Within this scenario, the script is engaged in an encounter with the invisible that is its own ghost, its condition for existing as such. Such absence is the insurance of the signifier's place, underwriting its meaning and supporting its attempt at stability in denial of its unconscious great beyond. When 'she' writes her story, her prehistoric existence remembered in the dark is ancient history. Hat, exiled from kingship, travels through time and black space to figure in another woman's story as recollected echoes and interruptions. As the castration trauma becomes a mechanism which is replayed in every utterance, it is an active left-over of the signifier in its incisive path.

This moment of cut is haunted by the form of a bloody scrap - the pound of flesh that life pays in order to turn it into the signifier of the signifiers, which it is impossible to restore, as such, to the imaginary body; it is the lost phallus of the embalmed Osiris. (Lacan: 1977, 265)

The feminine position in relation to desire is, therefore, complicated by the duality of her position, she occupies a place of superimposition, negotiating with the figure cast by a ghost-limb. She enters a locus of virtuality in her negotiation with the signifier. Doubled-up in her theoretical positioning, a woman writing may claim privilege through a loop-back into the
system, a loop-hole in the Law which writes her as The Woman. Each woman's script reaches back and forth in the red kitchen to recoup a loss and negotiate a future in a narrative of her own making.

...my own past leaps back at me in flashes. Impossible to hold gleaming drops of water in my fingers; the past leaps away in a silver trail of silver; yet I need to go on trying to hold it... I want to tell you my stories. (Roberts: 1991, 17)²

Her tactic for survival becomes a retrieval system: a projection of the recollected and fragmented past into the virtual space of the future. She negotiates the impossible loss of what she never had, what has written her in theory as missing from view. Writing becomes premonitionary, producing a script in the process of which she may become whole and rise again through her stories and "watch[ ] the past change into the future" (54).

**Narrative Diaspora: "I am an exile..."** (133)

I sensed that there was a beyond, to which I did not have access, an unlimited place ... A desire was seeking its home. (Cixous: 1991, 1)

The feminine dispossession with which *In the Red Kitchen* concerns itself is offset by its representation of a proliferation of female authorship. In this sense, it seems to engage in a multiplication of the the phallic function from which the feminine is supposedly exiled. Within its covers, the stories of five women overlap so that many 'I's are established in one textual space. The story-tellers swarm like hungry worms crawling over the face of the dead father so that in the singular authority of saying 'I' lies a simultaneous community and recognition of a radically split subject. Historically unwritten, banished from signification, there is no afterlife for posterity, no female history or testament for the dispossessed woman. She does not inherit after the father's death, her symbolic access is only operable through him, by his licence, in his name. She is displaced, scattered afar in her diaspora. King Hat laments,

I am an exile, doomed to wander in the night, homeless, searching for something I shall never find. (133)

The fortunes of the signifier lie walled up within the secretive tomb. Hat may not inherit Kingship. She is denied access to this afterlife through the flight of the signifier as she is excised from the record, deleted from history.

I have been unwritten. Written out. Written off. Therefore I not even dead. I never was. I am non-existent. There is no I.

...I have lost the great male force that was once in me ... I am a spirit condemned to roam forever through the dark never to find a resting place ... I have lost the carved and painted house that sheltered my remains. (133)

King Hat's beard as sign of virility has been removed, she loses what she didn't have in the first place. The feminine position is that of the castrated subject, her symbolic penis has been cut off: "the sign of my kingship has been broken off me" (132). She must turn grave-robber and desecrate the father's holy places by robbing the pyramid of its withheld treasure and use her knowledge for subverting the codes which bar her. She flies through the dark to find an amaneumsis: "She flies/steals. To fly/steal is woman's gesture, to steal into language to make it fly" (Cixous: 1989[1986]: 114-115).
The daughter's anger allows her to break the frame, the father's forme spills what it attempted to lock up tight. Flora escapes from Salpetriere by smashing through the representation that incarcerates and infantilizes women by placing them "inside a cot with bars" (121).

...she's not mad, she's angry... She leaps from her cot, through the black bars that frame her and try to hold her still, she smashes through the glass of the photograph... (130)

She must negotiate with the symbolic order, inherit the paternal legacy and embrace the phallus by which she may name herself in her subjection. This is the feminine double bluff required to survive - her subterfuge in submission.

They think they have guessed our secret thoughts. How can they? We don't speak. We just dance for them, which is all they want. They are delighted with our performance. Delighted daddies... (128)

The daughter negotiates with the position of femininity as a survival tactic, a screen through which she may reach for the "stolen goods" that she may acquire from the symbolic. She becomes a raider of the ark of the 'A' in diference. In 'Womanliness as a Masquerade', Riviere writes that,

Womanliness therefore could be assumed and worn as a mask, both to hide the possession of masculinity and to avert the reprisals expected if she was found to possess it - much as a thief will turn out his pockets and ask to be searched to prove that he has not the stolen goods. (Riviere: 1986 [1929], 38)

Tomb of the Word: The Great Beyond

Through the high gates we go. (72)

Writing, I live; I enter that world beyond the false door of the tomb... (24)

The dead man's family, now seen in public for the first time since his death, carry their distress into the shadows of the crescent-shaped colonnade just within the gates. (Barker and Gay: 1984, 8)

In the Red Kitchen offers a textual geography of superimposition, the text becomes itself a moving pastiche, a mosaic of bits-and-pieces in its representation of a feminine writing body. It employs the tactics of trickery required to find its a way around the maze of structuration that constitutes the writing 'I'. In its enclosure of different narrative bodies, the novel functions like a Victorian necropolis. It lays out its stories within a space where they are kept carefully separate but lie so closely to each other that one may enter the other in a display of dissolution, a patterning of narrative scraps. Its subject is the writing subject, its body consists of excerpts from five different women's writing in the form of letters and journal entries in an interlocking of fictional autobiographies. The writing 'I' presented here is one which passes through its own place, travelling through the designated framework of its telling. 'She' and 'he' are passed through as markers to enter 'you' as subject of narrative destination, as surely as the Egyptian Avenue leads to the Circle of Lebanon. The subject is caught up in a process of telling in what Lacan refers to as "the endless circularity of the dialectical process" (Lacan: 1977: 105). She transcends her necessary interpellation through the decentring of narrative 'I'.

103
...she's everywhere, she exchanges, she is the desire-that-gives. ... She comes in, comes-in-between herself me and you, between the other me where one is infinitely more than one or more than one, without the fear of ever reaching a limit...

(Cixous: 1981 [1975], 263-4)

From the resting place to the restless place where 'she' changes endlessly into new configurations/formations borne in spite of restriction, the text reaches through its narrative body whilst remaining contained in it. As readers, we move between its partitions, stepping over its story-coffins, picking a way between the repercussion of story elements as they are echoed within each woman's writing as if to write is a revisitation of an other woman's script, "an insistant memory that will keep breaking through" (54). The evolution of the writing "I" represented in the text is haunted by revenants. She speaks herself in an other's script whilst simultaneously kept firmly within her own written boundary, self-contained. "I'm a whole," says Hattie, "and I'm different parts" (17). This narrative dynamic is written by an escapist 'I' which must necessarily always have its structure left in place to escape from. Implicit in its desiring articulation is a deathliness which takes the form of a radical de-centering of the subject. The text unwrites itself just as it is set down, implicit in its making is its unmaking: "it is precisely because desire is articulated that it is not articulable" (Lacan: 1977, 302).

The text confronts its own "great beyond" (69, 97), using the narrative body as that which contains and thereby offers a converse armature upon which to transpose itself. It passes through whilst remaining complicit with the narrative enclosure. Turning itself inside out and opening up its writing space, it lifts the lid from within on its scriptible body. In a visceral turning out, this writing body may rise again through that which is always elsewhere in the trace of signification. Its parts may be gathered up in the textual afterlife to make a new beginning out of what has already ended. The text is itself a repository: a box of bones, a jar full of visceral organs, a cemetery stuffed with compartments for the dead labelled by the fictional scriptor's voice "in an attempt to classify and to keep separate bodies which were now dissolved into each other" (117). Roberts seems to be making a narrative out of theory when she portrays the feminine subject re-negotiating the symbolic with the result of remodelling the phallus as its transcendental signified. The paternal function is restored to a different wholeness as it passes through the redeeming fire of the fictional kitchen. Hat tells how, in the afterlife, "[a]ll the parts of my father will be held together ... His body will be made "new" (37). Hattie dreams that she feeds the fragmented body of her abusive uncle to the kitchen fire so that he may be reborn and made whole.

He is the body, and he is the blood. I sort his dismembered limbs. Bit by bit I feed him into the red fire in the range. (137)

It is in the place of the other to whom the narrative process is directed that the women's stories overlap: the reading other is the body their voices traverse and is the space where they overlap, echo and converge. The other is the medium who calls up these voices of a fictional past and into a 'present' heavily pregnant and split within its telling. This reading other is one which is operative both outside and inside the text as part of its story. Flora represents this reading other within the text, hers is the body which is traversed by the other women's narratives.

I am a hollow stick the spirits blow messages down. I'm the speaking tube ... a corridor for others' voices ... I am the cave they enter. I don't belong to myself anymore; I don't know who that is. (92)

By negotiating a text divided from within, the reader receives visitants from beyond the demarcated cells of its telling. It becomes a cartography of death, a mapping-out of the narrative body en-graved by the signifier as "[i]n the medium's body a death takes place" (94).
It is this very rigidity of black marking that is writing which allows a fluidity which is directly
due to what is repressed in shaping a story. That which runs around the marked place keeps it
in position, tethered to its own excluded unmarked 'great beyond' as the unconscious of the
manifest text. Deathliness is seen to be implicit in the structure and function of the signifier
even as it is an affirmation. Here is the grim other to whom every sentence we utter is
directed and is the active climax to all desire.

Seeing is Believing: Virtual topology

...doorways to that other invisible world. . . (116)

...in the new house she hallucinated her old room... (Breuer and Freud: 1991, 86)

For the estranged feminine subject to signify is to negotiate an imaginary topology, one which
has cast its shadow from the dominant discourse from which she is excluded. She enters
"another house, a secret one twinned with this one, invisible mirror image" (25). Because she
is made to bear the effects of a loss of that which she never possessed, she is required to
hallucinate a presence made of absence. A virtual reality of the symbolic is therefore more
directly inhabited by the feminine subject. (This is not to say that the phallic is any more 'real'
for the male subject but that he is more secure in his phantasy, more able to hallucinate full
possession of the phallus due the presence of the culturally invested penis.) This other
dimension of the signifier, the absence which underpins its presence, may act as that which
produces the signifier in its place. It is operable as that which runs around the mark in its
location, it is "the part you can't see" beneath Flora's petticoats (1). Here is the capacity for
passion without which the signifier would lie stone-dead without hope of the glorious after-
life. The sign is always in expulsion of itself, traversed by "that other invisible world" so that
in marking it always misses the mark.

In his essay entitled 'Differance' (1968), Derrida refers to Hegel's comparison of the
visual aspect of the letter 'A' to an Egyptian pyramid (Derrida: 1973, 132). The letter 'A'
comes to bear, through its graphic mark, the silent pronunciation of difference in which
Derrida locates repercussions in the signing system as the signifier rises again by virtue of
excess in a transfigurative gesture. "It is a tomb that (provided one knows how to decipher its
legend) is not far from signaling the death of the king", writes Derrida (1973, 132). Yet far
from "signaling the death of the king", I would argue that the presence of such a structure is
implicit to the point of reference which underpins it. In Derrida's renunciation of the "master
name" (159) lies an assumption of a presence which may only operate in relation to a concept
of transcendence.

In Roberts' text, King Hat of Egypt declares that

The tomb is the first book; the house of life; the body that does not decay because it is
written. Stone is cut into, cut out; this absence of stone, this concavity, this
emptiness, yet means a fullness: the words appearing, their presence overcoming the
absence of what they denote, filling emptiness with meaning, creating the world over
and over again. Writing I live; I enter that world beyond the false door of the tomb... (24)

In its visual presence, the sign – providing one knows how to decipher it – offers the promise
of conceptualizing that which is absent. This is to enter the imaginary space of the sign itself,
to enter the virtual space it offers through the reading process. In an extension of the
metaphysical conceit which Derrida's use of letter 'A' presents us with, we may explore this
structure as one which offers a diagrammatical parallel to the ambivalent mechanism which provides the dynamic of the signing subject. Because the pyramid consists of a triadic structure which is simultaneously squared off, it offers a monumental metaphor of the Oedipal structuration which gives way to what Lacan refers to in his account of 'the mirror stage' as "quadrature" of the ego (Lacan: 1977, 4). The triangular structure which holds the signifier in its place may be regarded as the repercussions of the Oedipal scenario which underwrites the subject's initiation into symbolic law. The framing of 'I' is therefore tied implicitly to its simultaneous triangulation, its squared off structure offers a framing screen upon which to project the animated ghost that is the ego.

Following the extended lines of the pyramidical apex through their own axis results in the virtual reality of a perfect mirror image, a gestalt space. It is by passing through the grounding of the signifier in its mark that its ghost is called up, raising it from the dead. By following the logic of the structure to its apex and following the rules of its constitution to the extreme, a virtual reality may be encountered. In this the ego passes through the screen of its very constitution like the little girl in Spielberg's Poltergeist. By entering the mirror image, the 'other side' of the text is encountered in a virtual reality. Boundaries are transgressed whilst remaining within them, thereby inverting the speculative. The 'reality' of the material world is dislocated as the rigid ego formation in relation to the 'gestalt' as body-map of 'I' is fragmented in the radically split subject. The wall of skin between self and world is in question as the formation of the subject is seen to be a continual negotiation process with the object of its projected observation. As Hattie decorates the house, she becomes aware of the enduring existence of the old house behind the new even though "[t]he house has had a skin graft, the clean membrane we've stretched over its walls" (54). The notion of breaking out of the frame is a repeated motif of In the Red Kitchen. The framing process of photographs, paintings, and printers' forms are counterpart to the structuration effect of the text as a square of mirror where the reading/writing subject may constitute itself. Writing her name for the first time, Flora discovers that "Flora is a small slate surrounded by wood" (19). 'I' am made to come to my name in the face of a "succession of phantasies that extends from a fragmented body-image to a form of its totality" (Lacan: 1977, 4). Flora makes HAT tie cross over from the 'other side', called up by the ouija board. Operating as ghosts, H A T and H A T T I E enter the fictional Victorian world in a two-way mirroring action, transgressing their own signed places within the text in which they are represented. They enter a place which is extra-textual to their own and yet constitutive of their stories, a place where they converge and act as echoes of each other. The reader may look back through the future, anticipating later developments in the text due to a disturbance in the temporal relations of the narrative.

The incestuous seduction of the daughter is repeatedly referred to in the narratives of which In the Red Kitchen consists. The identity of the subject which is properly constructed in relation to the incest taboo is here placed under a threat of dissolution as it is traversed by the structures which make 'I'. The narrative moves to accost the father, to "seize his arse with both hands, and draw him into me" (85). Crossing the prohibitive bar upon which the symbolic is laid is to unsettle the relationship between the signifier and the signified and to perpetrate a breakdown in the structuration of the subject's prehistory. Here the distinction is broken down between the structures that enable me to announce myself 'I' and those by which 'I' am named as subject within the embroiling meconnaissance of a seductive apparatus so that "I get confused forget which of us is which just darkness that has red in it" (115). A dissolution of the subject occurs, moving the borderlines that make me so that "I'm liquid darkness" (32). As a seven-year old child, Flora becomes "a dark fish swimming in dark water, released from [her] skin, free to be part of what was formerly outside [her]" (32). 'I' become mapped out upon the grid in a 'quadrature' of being as a result of the specular encounter which brings me into the frame and lets me out again on the understanding that its affect is carried within the ego as a perpetually constituting drama. In this way, it may be seen that every structure has its dissolution inherent in its being, buoying up its manifest content.
A Father's Love: "How great are his signs!" (Daniel 4:3)

Words mean life. The absence of words means death. (24)

Thy rod and thy staff they comfort me. (Psalms 23:4)

The need for the rod of correction becomes apparent. It is the black mark which allows this Lazarus-type recuperation, a rising-again from the secret silent grave of the letter. It is the "black gloved fist" on which we must bite in our grief (2). The writing daughter must negotiate with the paternal phallus in order to recoup the mother and write her own story. To deny the phallus is be cut off, exorcised and excised from the symbolic, to surrender any possible transfiguration or reshaping through the sign. Erection brings with it possible resurrection. As the resurrection of the signifier is a perpetual enactment of the loss which preceded its advent, its passionate embrace is with death. Its sign of kingship is as a rod of power with dominion over death. Writing is a memorial and a sign of phallic power for it is the sign of Hat's kingship that is broken off when her signifier is under erasure.

Now that my name has been hacked off the walls . . . the sign of my kingship has been broken off me.

I am lacking. I am a lack. I am nothing but a poor dead body that lacks the sign of life: I am female. (132)

It is in negotiation with the phallus as transcendental signifier that feminine textual production must retrieve the mantle of meaning for itself so that a woman may be mistress of her own story. She must find a way out of the "liquid darkness" of the semiotic and bring to signification a new resurrection of the sign which is produced within the female body (32). Hat declares that,

I shall dart forwards through hundreds of years, searching for a faithful scribe who will spell me right and let me rise. (133)

Passing through the pyramid of the silent 'A' is a mystery, the encryptment of differance will allow it to rise again in an erectile tissue of secreted meaning that is written and may pass through the place of the other.

When I swoop down through the darkness to re-enter my sepulchre and feast my eyes on its kingly splendours the air is made of spears and holds me back. The air resists and laughs at me. The air weaves a web of spikes across the entrance to my tomb and will not let me pass. (132)

To break the bar of signifier is to enter 'the real' where "(t)here is real treasure. There are the real signs" (132). To pass through the screen which is the base of the signifier in its function is enter 'the real', to animate what is dead, to achieve the impossible reversal. This is equal to the symptom of the hysterical where the signifier has entered 'the real' through psychotic malfunction so that "[w]ords are trapped in all the corporeal images that captivate the subject" (Lacan: 1977, 87).

Roberts' text posits the maternal as privileged in its access to the pre-signified by looking through the enclosure which demarcates the subject. Hattie dreams that she views her unborn daughter on a hospital monitor, a ghost image in a war-zone, a pre-aborted fetus on T.V. Her image pre-dates her birth which never occurs, "[s]hreds of flesh, that's all my baby was" (73).
"FLASH - instant of time or dream without time; inordinately swollen atoms of a bond, a vision, a shiver, a yet formless, unnamable embryo. Epiphanies. Photos of what is not yet visible... (Kristeva: 1987 [1983], 234)

She is alive only in the frame of medical representation, playing in the body of the other as an image projected upon a screen. It is the mother who looks beyond the tomb into an optics of virtuality, peeping through the opened wound of the grave ready to receive the loved one (4). Flora experiences her first sighting of King Hat by following her mother’s gaze as she stands transfixed by grief.

Her eyes don’t meet mine; they are clamped on some distant point in front. Beyond the grave. I follow the direction of her gaze...

Then the earth drops away under me, opening up to let me in . . . I swing down into the dark. (4)

This break in the continuity of subjectivity constitutes a haunting by an other. Sightings occur due to the breakage of the body of the signifier as the bar between life and death is crossed. It is here that the clairvoyant reader-writer operates. She looks askance as she is beside herself with grief at separation from the stiff being lowered into the ground. It is the chief mourner who turns voyeur. Falling into the "[b]lack lips of earth parted" (3) like Alice down the rabbit hole, the subject confronts the deathly imperative which runs through her signifying status. She enters a realm of ghosts and encounters the past as it is implicit in her future. Hattie too finds herself "watching the past change into the future" (54). In her extreme separation from herself in trance, Flora watches herself in the second person: "[s]he is the point at which opposite charges, opposite impulses, spark and meet: life explodes into death, heat into cold, past into future" (94).

Missing You: "lover, where have you gone?" (140)

Still in my dreams I rage for him, stumbling after him... (140)

The fact that the phallus is a signifier means that it is in the place of the Other that the subject has access to it. (Lacan: 1977, 288)

In Roberts' text, the loss of the loved one in story terms is made to designate the loss of the phallus as guarantor of meaning in textual terms. The paternal function must be maintained for without it "I'm nothing. I swing down into the dark" (4). Here is the dilemma for the feminine, for the symbolic may not be buried with the father but must fulfill its function through the daughter who has inherited his role as compositor. A re-negotiation needs to take place by which she may wear the "wide collar" (45) of the symbolic yet be unleashed from the place in which it writes her as 'Other': she must be tethered yet find freedom in her incarceration. It is necessary that 'I' be en-graved so that 'I' may be read and rise again. The "unwritten" Hat "seek[s] for a scribe who will write [her] name and let [her] live again . . . who will spell me right and let me rise" (133). In her search for a memorial, Hat seeks to be re-membered in the place of the other as a locus for her reconstitution. The other becomes host, a body to ventriloquize, as she speaks through it in a reciprocal possession. Flora Milk complains that,

No one who is not a medium knows what it costs to launch oneself between heaven and earth... I am changed... as I leave more and more of myself on the other side.
A transfusion. I am increasingly a changeling. (92)
Writing here becomes a form of time-travel, a transcendence of the present. It is always somewhere other than implicit in its marking for it points backwards and forwards in the moveable 'now' of the reading contract, throwing itself continually beyond its own borderline. It is as a ghost from the future that Hattie King enters Flora's story as she is writing it (46). The future of the written haunts it as it is read for we read in anticipation. Lacan states that,

... the sentence completes its signification only with its last term, each term being anticipated in the construction of the others, and, inversely, sealing their meaning by its retroactive effect. (Lacan: 1977, 303)

As we read the past in texts of the long-gone, we inhabit that region, raise it up and bring to it our own ghosts of the future as they inhabit the regions we have yet to reach. We are lodged within the narrative pulsions of the text, pushing us to its end. As we try to contain it, it contains us quite profoundly. We are in trance within the kitchen cupboard, bound within metaphor, echo chambers for the words of an other, "a corridor for others' voices" (92).

In Hysterics: Place of the Reading Subject

...the symptom is itself structured like a language. ... (Lacan: 1977, 59)

The reader becomes the true hysteric of this text as our phantasy rises before us in all its rigidity in an encounter with metaphor and textual conceit. Here we confront our own desire as split subjects in negotiation with the text. Disconnected voices inhabit us like "faceless whisper[s] in the dark" (136) so that this alphabet of desire spells us, makes us into receptacles of a tale, possessed by a voice not entirely our own. The subject cannot lay claim to owning all of what is or isn't said or written as the utterance always exceeds itself, becomes disconnected and activated on its own account. Words let loose becomes "real things in themselves" as they are assembled in reading into a meaningful body (24). The text is a corpus of signs where words are "bits of dead flesh and bone" (125). Here what is figured becomes 'real' as it is taken into the body of the reading subject: "There is the real treasure. There are the real signs ... which promise eternal life" (132). An elderly Flora Milk writes in her journal, "Why write it all down here? To make it real. To make the memory of this time real; should it pass" (86).

Coming to life again in signs is taken to its extreme in the hysteric's symptom as the sign is made flesh in a materialization of the signifier as "a message passed in silence through flesh" (125). This is the place of the mystic threshold represented in In the Red Kitchen, the medium upon which is written a parallel time in narrative enclosure; a locus of recuperated 'treasure'. A visceral exercise, writing is a way of "bringing back", it hurts the body of the writing subject in its production. This is the tomb that must be opened, the womb that must give birth, the medium who must materialize, the hysteric with her "body full of knowledge" (127) who must configure in gestures, the woman who must lend her kitchen to cook a dish of selected ingredients, the writer who must compose out of a lexicon of negative differentiation. Making something out of nothing. Writing supplies a cordial to the missing missing phallus. Flora writes her painful journal in order to restore the loss of her loved ones.

It hurts writing this ... I think I'm doing it to bring George back to me, to make Jo live again, to pick up my son's poor shattered body and mend it, to hold my husband in my arms and heal him. (141)
Recording the past entails reliving it in an inexorable narration.

I will go on. I will force myself to write down what happened. I will go back in there, and remember. (120)

The passed over is brought back before the subject in a pageant of ghostly masquerade which takes the dead and buried body of the past and re-orders it in the present, projecting its future life through the apex of its interpellation as "doorway[ ] to that other invisible world": a virtual after-life (116). The coffin has a moveable lid, it is an open book.

The tomb is the first book; the house of life; the body that does not decay because it is written ... this absence of stone, this concavity, this emptiness, yet means a fullness: the words appearing, their presence overcoming the absence of what they denote ... Writing, I live... (24)

In our confrontation with the reading process, we are turned orthographers, we are become amanuenses for In the Red Kitchen is a text where we must "spell me right and let me rise" (133). Fascinated by its story-telling postures, the reader is mesmerised by the stories within. This is a text tied very firmly to narrative enclosure whilst breaking open the story into different narrative bodies belonging to different feminine subjects represented in its fiction. It constitutes a veritable display as it attempts to enact in its narrative construct what writes the subject in her splitting and thereby presents

... a process of becoming in which several histories intersect with one another. As subject for history, woman always occurs simultaneously in several places.

(Cixous: 1981 [1976], 252)

The different narratives are connected by common metaphors operable as one story constantly invades, dis-places, or superimposes the other in an evasion of proper story space. This text is a show-off, a shameless hussy made to display its knowledge and theoretical awareness so that, in the reading process, its "message passe[s] in silence through flesh" (125). Yet it is simultaneously coy, shy in its self-consciousness, hiding its centre by fraying into different threads. Folded upon itself in narration, it leaves an undiscovered area that is specifically in the locus of the reading body as it is invited to speculate around this hole, this postulated missing centre, in an exuberance of desire to uncover what is not not there at all. In chasing after its configurations, the reader behaves like Dr. William Preston as he records Hattie's gestures in Flora's body.

He places me in different positions, lifting my arms, adjusting my leg, tipping my chin with his finger ... He opens the front of Hattie's robe to show her breasts, flicking the nipples to stiffen them ... her knees apart ... (122)

These are the postures of a story-teller. The text is left wide open, unhinged for speculation: a peep-show text, a hanky-panky narrative. In its postures, it turns on us for its openness is theoretically loaded. We are invited to play mystic, visionary, mother - whoring to it as we are inserted into its different narratives and styles, catering for every taste. In clambering to kiss the rod of the text, we embrace the absent but operative phallus that we may not lose our way in the textual maze, to maintain erection within its speaking tube. The phallus rises again over the flaccid flesh of the cadaverous sign so that the tomb may be broken open and the circuits of the body become a "corridor for others' voices" (92). This parallels the return of the repressed as it is written upon the body of the hysteric. "I must let my body shape words for me," says Flora at Salpetriere, "My body full of knowledge" (127). The split subject is traversed by voices across the abyss of time, pre-occupied by the past made present.
The Textual Tease: Narrative seduction

Her filthiness is in her skirts. (Lamentations 1.9)

Flora Milk is a monster in silk skirts. She looks like a woman, but she's a devil underneath, the part you can't see. (1)

To read is to be seduced by a narrative lure, this tease of a text never reveals all its secrets just as the medium never reveals all that is tucked under her skirts. Hidden beneath Flora's skirts, tucked in her "clean and exquisite" (49) underwear are her props. This is the "the part you can't see", what you don't see if you are "so in love with her" because "[h]er trick is to charm you" (1). Invited to search Flora's pre-seance person, Minny Preston is moved to write to her mother in praise of Flora's bodily presence.

...that soft breast! Shall I confess to you that the sight of her maidenly charms gave me no small pleasure. .? (49)

Here is the dynamic of seduction inherent in the spectacle, the romance of encountering those ensnaring "black marks that mean something" which demarcate the other as locus of the subject's story/history (19). Entrapment is enacted in this textual seduction which inserts the reading body into that of the narrative. The méconnaissance of the produced subject in the specular relation may be extended to written misrecognition, projecting my self into the text. The story is only as successful as these "black marks that mean something" allow it to become, using ensnaring ink as a decoy (19).

...the structure of all ideology, interpellating individuals as subjects in the name of a Unique and Absolute Subject is specular, i.e. a mirror-structure, and doubly speculary: this mirror duplication is constitutive of ideology and ensures its functioning. (Althusser: 1971, 168)

As we enter In the Red Kitchen, we are embroiled in a duplicity, a confidence trick. It is a text which opens to us in proportion to our theoretical knowledge. "She opens" (12) like the supine flesh of a desirable young medium entranced within an enclosing frame. Explorers, we are invited to poke our fingers into its secret places in an encounter with its theoretical display. We un-cover it, checking beneath its petticoats for tricks. Yet it is an entrapment, a lure into its constant referral to theories. It seems to lead to a history outside, to the biographical, to 'the real' of its fiction operating as a feminist chimera. We are invited to go all the way but the text pulls back. It appears to invite us to the centre of its enigma, to the beyond it represents in its storyline but supplies only a virtual beyond due to its theoretical display. Layer upon layer upon layer in orchestrated narrative movement, it holds us bound within its confines like the naughty girl in the cupboard. The text operates in the same manner as Flora Milk. As she is placed in a position of mesmeric surrender, dispossessed of her self, she is fully aware that in this very diaspora lies the power of spectacle as all who look upon her are in thrall, seduced by the appearance/place of seduction. In her subjection lies a strength, a privilege of access due to her 'unfinished' feminine state: what is traditionally the 'weaker vessel' is strongest of all. In the darkness she soars: she grows big in the dark place. "As a child in the dark I'm powerful" (18).

Most of her audiences are so in love with her, the ladies as much as the gentlemen, they forget to look sharp, anyway. (1)

Through the restraint of representation comes liberation, enabling her to smash through "the heavy black bars that frame her and try to hold her still" (130). The black marks of ink tell a story of suppression in areas of gender, class and religion - but it is the very same black
marking which produces a means of subversion in its repressed unconscious as discourse with which to counter so that "I live outside the edges of your paintings" (101).

The "opening up of this dark continent" (145) may itself wield a power as that which constantly escapes the dominant power structure, stepping outside established borderlines in new configurations as the quest becomes more strategic. It is in its alliance to this perpetual inaccessible place that we are embroiled in the reading experience: a reciprocal relation. The text and its reader are lovers who two-time each other; as one presses forward, the text retreats and vice versa. It becomes a matter of double bluff, of "how well I can hide my meaning while at the same time revealing it" (127). It is this already complex state that the novel complicates still further as this is its very subject, an elusive text which reproduces from within in reiteration of its radically split process of production, representative of Spallung. The desire between text and reading other is encompassed by and represented in the act of writing. "I want to tell you my stories" writes Hattie (17). As narratives are directed towards the other as locus of the subject's tale, the reader is enticed by the lure of interpretative treasure, by this relation multiplied by its fictional representation within. Stories overlap as the writing women's experiences are directed to each other, they become other within their 'own' stories, placing the reader in the frustrating fictional position of subject, making the fantasy of this fiction our object of desire and ourselves infinitely split and knowing it. The reader becomes an hysterical configuration. This fictional affect is achieved as the phantasies called up in the reading process are "the secret words my watchers want to guess" (127). The textual doctor is putting us through our paces as we take up the postures necessary to react to the different tones, stories, and theoretical references. Con Davis writes that,

Narration's manifest content is a product of the unconscious discourse that is both the precondition of narration and the site of its appearance. This says essentially that the subject of narration ... will always be other that what is signified in narration, or what is signifiable as narration ... narrative interpretation, too, [is] a movement, a trajectory, a contingent effect, within the larger (unconscious) discourse of the Other.

(Con Davis: 1983, 854)

To be caught up in this spatial play brings adjustments to the temporality of the text. It is here that "the past surrounds me and holds me, and my own past leaps back at me in flashes" (17). It is in the kinetics of Spallung represented as a split text that the reading other must insert itself in an encounter with the Other, i.e. their own unconscious locked in an inevitable transmissive relation with that of the text and its fictional representatives. It is here that 'I' really fluctuates as what is represented as writing 'I' in the story-line steps into the constitutive ego of the reading subject.

What is realized in my history is not the past definite of what was, since it is no more, or even the present perfect of what has been in what I am, but the future anterior of what I shall have been for what I am in the process of becoming. (Lacan: 1977, 86)

Con Davis describes Lacan's model of narration as "a split process, a two-fold process that swings metronome-like from side to side between product and production (manifest text and unconscious discourse), back and forth" (Con Davis: 1983, 857). As the metronome swings between manifest and unconscious text, the adventures of the inscribed 'I' are located and contained in the narrative and the dissolution of the subject in "the air outside time in which I'm tossed" (93). A moving display is produced, an oscillation in the gap which is the area of enigma in the text as the dynamics of desire between subject and Other are inherent in what is narrated so that "[n]arration is structured like a (subject in) language" (Con Davis: 1983, 853).

As the writing women are traversed by stories simultaneously their own and not their own, the main bodies of their narratives are interrupted with inserts from a 'present' which is itself past as it is passed through in its writing movement. Hattie's visit to Salpêtrière is
described in a superimposition of images from childhood onwards in a parody of the psychoanalytic encounter so that parallel time runs through her (120-129). Klein writes of analysis that it

... makes its way from adulthood to infancy, and through intermediate stages back to adulthood, in a recurrent to-and-fro movement according to the prevalent transference situation. (Klein: 1990, 173)

Ectoscopy of Telling

The mirror stage is a drama . . . which manufactures for the subject, caught up in the lure of spatial identification, the succession of phantasies that extends from a fragmented body-image to a form of its totality. . . (Lacan: 1977, 4)

The narrative becomes unwhole: a broken body, a story in bits-and-pieces, it occupies a paranoid-aggressive textual position. The "dismembered limbs" (137) of the paternal is a central metaphor for this fragmented body-image which prescribes what is a 'normal' developmental encounter with the ego-ideal in the reflective screen where the text is constituted. Before submitting herself to "the severest scrutiny science can provide! . . . the penetrating gaze" of William Preston, Flora checks her image in the mirror held by her sister (62).

She holds the looking glass for me, moving it up and down so that I can see myself in bits: neck, mouth, elbow, ear. I'll do. (59-60)

This dis-membering of 'I' in the mirrored encounter is analogous to that which occurs during a disturbance in ego formation in relation to the specular investment allied to the castrative function of the split constituted by such necessary identification with an imaged exterior.

The subject is a corridor for the 'other world' to speak through, a servant to be summoned by a disembodied voice as the word is activated and set loose to rattle through the apparatus of the text-in-process. It operates in the pre-written of the written as the grid upon which 'I'm mapped out. The maternal position is especially vulnerable for it is the place of a doubled-up split, a line of simultaneous weakness and strength: a place of danger yet with the potential to access the semiotic. Kristeva links this meeting point of body and the signifier in pregnancy.

We live on that border, crossroads beings, crucified beings . . . A mother is a continuous separation, a division of the very flesh. And consequently a division of language. (Kristeva: 1987 [1983], 254)

The novel is written around the scenario of pregnancy so that it represents a cemetery of mother's stories, positing textual production to be "full of mother's dead babies" (3). Hattie suffers miscarriage, Minny is pregnant and grieving the death of an infant, Hat wishes to birth herself through the use of another's body, Flora falls pregnant and is mother to many ghosts, including Hattie who she feels she has given birth to: "she's like a daughter: I've given birth to her, she's grown up and left me" (126). The relation between subject and other is broken down in this text. The body of the other subject speaks the voice of the child in its address to the mother as Minny's dead daughter speaks through Flora. Here is a mad cradle text where 'I' and 'you', 'me' and 'she' melt together in a dissolution of subjectivity. Flora's 'I' is split from itself as 'she' fragments into third-person consciousness as the other speaks through her in during spiritual possession: "I see . . . She is . . . She jerks . . . I watch . . . " (94). This de-construction of 'I' into second and third-person goes still further as the boundaries of the
subject break down so that 'I' lose any sense of personal geography and may not be
differentiated from what surrounds 'me'. This constitutes a simultaneous powerful and
powerless position for 'I' am everywhere and yet 'I' do not exist.

...the edges of me dissolve... There's no solid Flora anymore, just... a huge head
bobbing on a neck grown suddenly thin and long, a stretching and tearing of guts and
muscles. (91)

Flora's mother's hands are like "two dead rabbits to be skinned and chopped" (121) and her
words are spat out like "bits of dead flesh and bone" (125), the sound of Minny's dead baby
crying is "butcher's meat on a hook" (91), Hattie's 'I' is in crisis when she cannot distinguish
between the atoms that compose herself and what she calls "a chair, a table leg" (104). Minny
dreams of a cannibalistic prehistory of Flora where she is "half woman, half beast" (112)
gnawing on the flesh of Minny's "very own newborn babe!" (112)

These are the images of castration, mutilation, dismemberment, dislocation,
evisceration, devouring, bursting open of the body... imagos of the fragmented
body. (Lacan: 1977, 11 – emphasis as original.)

It is in the face of such frightening phatasmagoria that the child learns to negotiate 'the
real' mediated by a misrecognized unity: "I learn my own name, as something apart from
myself, as something I can create in front of me... One day it all falls into place" (19). This
trauma of constitution is permanently re-played in all our relations as the mirror stage is a
stadium in which the play in which 'I' act is perpetually running. The price at which the
subject buys its investment in ego projection by which to propel itself in the world brings with
it a basis of paranoid dispersion. This constitutes the split consciousness that is inherent in
linguistic application. Estrangement is caused by investment in the false image of unity due to
necessary ego formation by which to project 'I' into history. 'Normal' paranoic aggressivity is
the consequence of investment in a false image of unity necessary to social functioning. It is
this level of ego investment that is affected by abject breakage. In the dangerous disruption of
the liminal 'I' lies the possibility of an altered topology: a moving mosaic of becoming.

Abjection: Borderland

My flesh is clothed with worms and clods of dust; my skin is broken and become
loathsome. (Job 10:19)

...the narrative web is a thin film constantly threatened with bursting. For, when
narrated identity is unbearable, when the boundary between subject and object is
shaken, and when even the limit between inside and outside becomes uncertain, the
narrative is what is challenged first. (Kristeva: 1982 [1980], 141)

In narrative terms, In the Red Kitchen has no clean and proper body, its cells of telling exist as
structures in transitional space. It is a story in bits-and-pieces which must pass through the
fire of judgment to be re-membered. It presents the sujet-en-proces as its story is told by an
'I' in dissolution and recuperation. Its multiplication of the narrative act causes it to enter into
the stories of others and to encounter the Other there in an attempt to regain that blissful union
with the maternal phallus so that in writing 'I' am quite literally beside myself.

In its encounter with "those strange regions" (83), "those trackless wastes" (143), the
text continually expulses itself in a frenzied attempt to maintain some decorum, some
fastidious show, keeping its underwear as clean as Minny Preston's. Yet it is its very
preoccupation with structure which leads it to constantly dirty itself; pulling its orthopaedic structure into new configurations requires an adjustment to be made to pulsions of its body proper. As Flora offers her body up for medical examination/possession by spirits in order to let the other side communicate through her as a speaking tube, she is in a position of vulnerability as her investment in her liminal subjecthood is under question. She also occupies an area of privileged access to the semiotic, playing in a dark place where she may forge herself anew, finding strength in the 'weaker vessel' as "the weaker sex" in its "very openness and availability" (143). The text seems to posit a privileged access through a radically split consciousness produced by crossing the corporeal threshold. The undoing of 'I' could be the making of me.

Abjection is a resurrection that has gone through death (of the ego).

(Kristeva: 1982 [1980], 15)

The movement in the topology of a subject due to its geometric armour adopted in the specular relation is made manifest in textual terms by movement in the narrative casement. A hateful text is side-stepped, superimposed off-centre in order to write 'I' in a resistance to received history. An embrace of the corpse of the paternal is essential in order to cross the threshold of his story so that she writes over his dead body. After dismemberment, he must be made anew, passing from the tomb to the kitchen, cold to hot. He must be written into the daughter's story which cannot be produced without accepting insertion into the symbolic order and adopting the "sign of kingship". The father is thereby contained by the daughter, she goes where he goes into the warm mother's body: "She is her father's sword. She belongs to him. One night she dreams that thus she can go where he goes: into the warm sweet mother." (128)

With reference to the intellectual woman, Riviere writes that

...she identifies with the father; and then she uses the masculinity she thus obtains by putting it at the service of the mother. She becomes the father and takes his place; so she can 'restore' him to the mother.

[...]

As the primal scene the talisman which both parents possess and which she lacks is the father's penis... By depriving her father of it and possessing it herself she obtains the talisman... (Riviere: 1986 [1929], 41-42 - emphasis as original)

Horror of Undifferentiated Wholeness: The writer's fear of 'the real'

In 'A Sketch of the Past' (1939-40), Virginia Woolf explains her relationship with the writing process as one which posits an awareness of receptivity,

... a token of some real thing behind appearances; and I make it real by putting it into words. It is only by putting it into words that I make it whole; this wholeness means that it has lost its power to hurt me; it gives me, perhaps by doing so I take away the pain, a great delight to put the severed parts together. Perhaps this is the strongest pleasure known to me. It is the rapture I get when in writing I seem to be discovering what belongs to what... (Woolf. 1989, 81)

The fetish that is language must be embraced in order to ward off the horror of fragmentation, a fear of being introjected into the other functioning as 'the real' and becoming swallowed up by its 'wholeness' so that 'I' don't know where I begin or where 'I' end. This writer's fear is a horror at not being able to mark out and differentiate, causing a process of 'making real' with words. Hattie's recipes, by which she learns what to include and exclude, are part of the same process as that which Flora struggles with when she re-gathers herself after spiritual
possession. Hattie’s ghostly visitations where she reads the selected script on Flora’s ouija board cause her to question her subjecthood as a “loose collection of atoms” (104). All these shiftings are connected with the act of writing. Hattie declares that,

Through cooking I learned how much I was part of the world around me . . . and how much I was separate from it . . .

I imagined it must be the same with writing poetry: beginning with all the words in the world jumping inside in wonderful crystalline chaos, having to be sorted out, outside, into clumps and lines. (87)

Hattie’s recipes depend upon knowing "when to separate and when to merge" (87), a system of linguistic differentiation by which I ‘measure myself out in misrecognized entirety: a false entity. Attracted by the "beautiful" lettering on the Milk family headstones, she contemplates "this air outside time in which I’m tossed" (93) in which all signification slides and falls into non-meaning as its boundaries are broken through and "dissolved into each other” (117). To be without a name is to be dead forever because “[w]ords mean life. The absence of words means death" (24). It is to enter the horror of the undifferentiated whole: to have truly passed away.

The writer is a phobic who succeeds in metaphorizing in order to keep from being frightened to death; instead he comes to life again in signs.

(Kristeva: 1982 [1980], 38) 

The very act of unitary illusion has its correlative repression, to structure is to exclude, to maintain the liminal boundary is to make demons out of the excluded in a system based on aggressive investment. The very presence of words denotes absence of ‘the thing' for it is a stand-in for 'the real’. Roberts' theoretical awareness is apparent in her lecture on 'The Place of Imagination' (1994):

Language is founded upon absence. We don't point with our fingers at the chair in the room beside us; we use a word as a pointer to designate the chair that is not there.

Language erupts out of silence and splinters it. 

So when I write fiction I'm creating a presence. I'm depending on the materiality of words to conjure a show of that chair, that person . . . This presence that fiction creates is crucially connected, I think, with absence, an absence that can be felt as insistantly material. (Roberts: 1994, 18)

The process of transmutation is represented in the themes and motifs of In the Red Kitchen. Its encompassing title refers to a volume of broken off bits of stories all gathered together to be made up and joined by the reading act. Reading becomes a process of suture as it pieces together a ruptured text, its assemblage of parts become ingredients in a recipe written in the kitchen of a many-roomed text.
In Signifying Chains: Pauline Réage's *Story of O*
In Signifying Chains: Pauline Réage's *Story of O*

...desire is the furrow inscribed in the course; it is, as it were, the mark of the iron of the signifier on the shoulder of the speaking subject. (Lacan: 1977, 265)

There is a deception in amorous time (this deception is called: the love story). (Barthes: 1993, 438)

*Story of O* was written by Dominique Aury, a French journalist, translator and critic, and was first published in Paris in 1954. It was at first inception designed as a private trajectory between lovers. After writing it, Aury posted it chapter by chapter to her lover, Jean Paulhan, an academic at the Académie Française and a former editor of *La Nouvelle Revue Française*. It was, he declared, "the most ardent love letter which any man has ever received" (Llewellyn Smith: 1994, 12). In an interview with John de St. Jorre in *The New Yorker* in 1994, Aury confided her reasons for writing this text were deliberately seductive, "I couldn't paint. I couldn't write poetry. What could I do to make him sit up?" (Llewellyn Smith: 1994, 12). In this sense, the text is a performative of itself, a delivery which is designed to provoke a physical response in the recipient to enslave him to his mistress. Its dispatch is written through with an epistolary suspense, its love story is one which is entirely schematic in its desire and as such exposes the devices of all naturalized discourse which seeks to conceal its mechanism. Linda S. Kauffman writes that,

Since every letter writer is also a reader, epistolarity exposes the internal processes of the reading subject. What we call unique, transcendent passion is a compendium of the already read – already said -... (Kauffman: 1992, xxii)

Its love story seems to undermine the expectations of love-story, offering physical torture instead of tenderness, promiscuity in the place of monogamy, repulsion where there should be reverence. In its revealing engagement with fictional conventions, it is indeed "most ardent" in its resistance.

Until July 1994, Aury was concealed behind the pseudonym of Pauline Réage, using this name to hide behind like O behind the mask at end of her text. O, a fashion photographer, is incarcerated in different locations and subjected to sadistic sexual practices until 'she' seems to be no more than a sexual practice. By the end of the text, she is reduced to a deaf/mute but ever-watchful owl. Yet her incarceration and subjection are fully agreeable to O and consented to by her in a text where she knows what to expect, moving in advance of her own narration, a "lucky captive" in a story of her own undoing (72). "[F]or nothing would be forcibly inflicted upon her" as a fictional character (109). O's apparent loss of agency may be the exercise and celebration of agency within an arena of a fictional subjection. In this, the text is drawing attention to its own supremely fictional premise through an artificial frame of reference. In its constructedness, it de-centres its central character and this de-centring is indeed its very storytelling.

This section explores *Story of O* in purely textual terms, as what it claims itself to be: a story of O. The reading it offers sets out to examine the linguistic constraint at play in textual production, and to examine the control of and by signification through which we construct stories and by which we write ourselves as subjects. The projection of subjectivity in linguistic terms may be seen as central to this narrative in which desire is caught up for the writer and the reader. The figuring of the body is considered to be central to such a trajectory, not as a metaphysical counterpart to narrative pulsion and therefore peripheral in real terms but as absolutely inherent in linguistic control. By presenting deathliness in relation to

## References


signification, the reading seeks to explore the tension existing in the configuration of 'I' as a central result of the process of subjection by which we become subject. In this process of ambivalence, the subject may be regarded as ever-dying as it incessantly sloughs off the mortal coil of the signifier central to its constitutive presence. The construction of 'I' may be seen to be relation to nothingness, the establishment of the subject is itself subject to the perpetual threat of its own dissolution.

Master-Slave Dialectic

Was the master who beat me himself very different from me?
St. Augustine, Confessions of a Sinner. (St. Augustine: 1996, 18)

Story of O may be regarded as a literary enactment of Hegel's master-slave dialectic. It sets zero in relation to 1, nothingness in relation to being, like the body of O being possessed "now by one, now the other" (Réage:1992, 174)¹ This text is written through with a conflation of the states of power and powerlessness. For 'I'/one to exist, it must exist in relation to zero, to naught. The title of this text signifies nothing at the same time as it proclaims itself for it is a narrative written round an absence, an ambivalent construction around a sign that signifies nothing. It is indeed the story of the cipher for it has "no reality save in a closed circle" (68). The dictionary gives us this definition of the term 'cipher':

- a 0, zero, naught
- of no importance
- a sign
- method of transforming text to conceal its meaning by systematic substitution or transformation of its letters (to en-code)

(Longman Modern English Dictionary)

The Story of O is the story of the adventures of the cipher: the story of nothing then or the story of the sign? It is also a narrative of transformative substitution rendered by the synthesis arising between being and nothingness.

In this alternating state, the master and slave are locked in a dialectical relation: one's existence dependent upon the other. Her subjectivity set in relation to presence and absence, O gives the key of her apartment to Sir Stephen and understands the nature of her state of bondage to be one of perpetual oscillation.

Henceforth there would be no discontinuity, no gape, no dead time, no remission. He for whom one waits, because one awaits him, is already present, master already. (100)

Presence is here instated by anti-presence whilst a pre-history runs through the present of the subject. In linguistic terms, the absence of the signifier is confirmed via a pre-tracing of its function so that the signifier is in advance of itself and already activated by its affect in the signified. Here is a backward-completion principle of the signifier's mark as it is privileged over the signified. In relation to "her only master in the strictest sense of the master-slave relationship" (81), O finds herself "an ecstatic slave" (160) and receives a "mark that will remain forever" (160). This textual intrusion into subjectivity is not an impress upon an already formed recipient but actually constituent of its subjectivity so that it comes to bear its subjection; it is the living apparition of its mark.

The conflation of the master and the slave, the subject and its "single master" (65) may be regarded as having its base in the operative transitivism at the root of subject
constitution according to Lacanian topology. It is in this merging of self and other that the subject is first registered. The result of the tryst is the aggresive separation which must take place in order that 'I' might wrench myself from the other. 'I' is set in relation to the nothingness of the other then as 'I' seek to dominate him. This is what, in 'Aggressivity in Psychoanalysis', Lacan terms "normal transitivism".

The child who strikes another says that he has been struck; the child who sees another fall, cries. Similarly, it is by means of an identification with the other that he sees the whole gamut of reactions of bearing and display, whose structural ambivalence is already revealed in his behaviour, the slave being identified with the despot, the actor with the spectator, the seduced with the seducer. (Lacan: 1977 [1948], 19)

And of course the reader with the text. Lacan goes on to comment more upon this "structural crossroads" in ego formation.

It is in this erotic relation, in which the human individual fixes upon himself an image that alienates him from himself, that are to be found the energy and the form on which this organization of the passions that he will call his ego are based.

(Lacan: 1977 [1948], 19)

Within this economy, the domination wish is due to the paranoic base of ego-formation. Lacan describes an affective aggressivity which is operative in the ego. This is a result which issues from the subject investing with narcissistic libido that which is before his eyes, a fetishized place of other as self. It is in this dialectic exchange which grows from the imaginary stage that the dynamic of the master-slave discourse is installed and which lends itself to the sado-masochistic economy of desire. The subject has come to be through an absolute state of alienation (due to the alienating function of the signifier to which we are subject) so that "you utterly belong to something which is apart from and outside yourself" (17).

This is the affect of the alienating function of the signifier to which we are all subject and by which we are made subject. The subject is born, in this schema, through alienation by passing through the framing apparatus of the signifier. This framing process is itself a mechanism as coercive as the "barbarous apparatus" (138) by which O is tagged in the text, the metallic discs which pass through O's pierced flesh and bear the signifiers of her identity (137).

On one side, gold inlay; on the other, nothing. 'On the blank side . . . your name will be engraved, also your title, Sir Stephen's first and last names, and beneath that, a device . . . (137)

This is the device by which we know that we have this way passed, the mark in relation to which we circulate, one in relation to the other. I want to compare this with the power dynamic at play within narrative construction. Story of O draws attention to a power mechanics of story-telling existing as coercion implicit in the process of negotiating this text which writes me. In reading, 'I' submit to the mark of the signifier.

Story of O is one of those books which mark the reader - which do not leave him entirely, or at all, such as he was before: one of those books whose meaning is curiously bound up with the influence they exert . . . (Paulhan: 1992, 179)

There is an irresistible erotics of seduction at play in textual encounter, a tantalization which marks the reading so that the reader is made to feel the impress of the text itself, to bear the chain of signification. Just as we enter the body of the text that is O's story, we are
simultaneously entered by the text. The body of the reader surrenders to the agency of the story: reader reception turned inside out.

The story then is an O, an enclosure, an enclave, a linguistic territory which lures the reader into a fictional captivity where once we enter we may languish in the cavity of its opened up body. "Come, let me caress you, I want to tell you a story." [. . .] she yielded, 'Tell me the story'" (152). Its invitation to enter is written upon an illusion of readerly agency. The text is a tease, it seduces us as we engage in a desire relation with the missing other: 'I' enter the story of O then as another coupling in a text of couplings. In our love affair with the signifier, we are drawn back into méconnaissance as it is played and replayed back in entrapment in the linguistic snare, the noose by which we hang in the symbolic. Here then are "those powerful ligatures, those hair-thin cables" which bind us Gulliver-style to the back-side of the signifier (85).

As we enter the inner circle of the narrative, we engage with the omniscient mastery of the narrator and what the narrator 'knows'. We can see the functioning of this all-knowing mastery in the opening pages of this story. It oversees the opening by which we enter, enticed by what we do not know, intrigued by the unfolding of pages yet to come and in which warren of enigma we run in search of the crux of story in circuit upon circuit of never-ending jouissance. Here then are the lips of the story through which we pursue our desire through the opening of a text. What the narrator 'knows' is repetitively referred to at the beginning of the text: "And then I know that. . ." (8), "I don't know. . ." (8), "What I do know is that. . ." (9). The narrative 'I', usually absorbed into omniscience, occasionally gives itself presence. Referring to René, the narrator states that "during every violent scene I saw him" (118). The narrator is even able to inform us of the presence of O's lover when she is unaware and supplies the missing information in parenthesis: "O did not have time to observe their faces or recognize whether her lover was there (he was)" (10). O is reduced to nothing but a perfect function, a character without agency in a narrative in which her representation is synonymous with her narrative function. In other words, Story of O, by stripping its main character of any pretensions of agency, may be regarded as drawing attention to all forms of narrative characterization and mechanics of linguistic entrapment which posit freedom of expression via the closed circuit of its system. Again and again, O is told what is to come in advance of narrative enactment, she is offered a premonition of what will become her through the performative of narrative; she thereby becomes her function. As 'she' is narrated, she is complicit with the text which writes her. She is told what is going to happen to her as she passes through the set 'scenes' of a story in which she is going to be a willing participant. By consenting to the proffered text, she is the proffered text, the subject of its sentence, a full O.

In the story of 'she' here presented, 'she' is de-centred in pronoun investment. There is utter confusion of 'she' and 'her' as one enters the other in a "transpiere[ing]" of pronouns (23). As she submits to the will of Sir Stephen and René, to be what they wish her to be, she mimetically repeats the agreement after Sir Stephen, "repeating the phrases her lover dictated to her, dutifully substituting the pronouns: it was like a grammar exercise" (67). Here we may recall the meaning of the cipher – the function of O - as it is simultaneously no-thing, a sign, and a substitutive process. O substitutes 'you' with 'l' in a transpositioning of subjectivity. Here an intercourse of stand-ins, a place of the inter-said as she passes through the signifier into her signified place in the sentence. Lacan comments on the place of the 'inter-said' (interdit) as a 'between-two-subjects', "the very place in which the classical subject is divided and passes through the effects of 'fading'" (Lacan: 1977 [1960], 299). In her passing, the shades of deathliness are upon her as she passes out through the same door of her own be-coming. This is going Out through the In door.
Jouissance and deathliness: "In the name of the father...

For whom the Lord loveth he chasteneth... (Hebrews 12:6)

'Pleasure, we've got to move beyond that stage. We must make the tears flow.' (The "other voice", 11)

O passes through pleasure to the suffering of jouissance as it is produced in relation to the master. She plays in this excess. Desire and its inherent deathliness are co-dependents in this equation. Lo, though she walk in the circuits of desire, the shadows of death shall be with her in her own footsteps...

In the quasi-religious language of Story of O is instilled an erotics of submission to the all-encompassing body of the text. The simplicity of sentence-structure maintains the tensile arching of its textual body as it inter-cuts between two semiotic systems. It makes use of biblical spacing in its sentence-structuration through its repetitive employment of 'and' as a connective tissue is woven between two systems of textuality. To convey outrage in the flesh, Story of O replicates western religious rhetoric which has conventionally sought to separate the undentifiable essence of 'I' from bodily experience. In its parodic emulation, this narrative plays with a recognizable frame of reference by which the reader is placed upon a systemic crossroads so that the desire of the reading other body is set in relation to its own textual body. In coming to its language, we are nailed to its construct. In the name of the father we read. When O is chained up, her hands are "placed together "as when one prays" (22). When she performs fellatio on René, "[s]he received him as one receives a god, with thanksgiving heard his cry" (19). In this divine abjection, O passes through her signified place to a 'beyond' which is implicitly tied to structure. In this way, she experiences jouissance. In 'God and the Jouissance of The Woman', Lacan writes that,

There is a jouissance proper to her, to this 'her' which does not exist and which signifies nothing. (Lacan: 1982 [1972-3], 145).

In her sexual suffering, O is martyred, run through by "a long pin of words... which penetrated the middle of her body" (65). "[G]ripped by a terrible pleasure" (140), she receives the mark of the stigmata on her "perforated flesh" (143). When René, her "living God" (86) leaves her to languish, "[s]he felt like a pillar of salt, a statue of ash, bitter, useless and damned" (85). Her instruments of torture are nailed above her bed in "a pretty display, as harmonious as the wheel and the pincers in the pictures of St. Catherine's martyrdom, as the hammer and the nails, the crown of thorns and the lance and the scourges in the representations of the Passion" (147).

Her deliverance comes through the signifier as it moves. The passion of the lord and master is the passion of the word. The 'living god' is instilled in the function of the transcendental signifier by which all else moves. These are the signifying chains which bind us hand and foot, these then are the "blessed chains which bore [O] away from herself" (45). In the extremity of bodily intrusion and symbolic subjection, identity is loosened so that O vacates the place of her self in a "velvety [ ] anaesthetic" place of dissolution where her signified place is no longer collated with the system which is its premise. Lacan writes that,

... the signifier has an active function in determining the effects in which the signifiable appears as submitting to its mark, becoming through that passion the signified. (Lacan: 1982 [1958], 78)

In their essay, 'Fantasy and the Origins of Sexuality', Laplanche and Pontalis, commenting on Ferenczi's use of the notion of a language of passion, state that
... this language of passion is the language of desire, necessarily marked by prohibition, a language of guilt and hatred, including the sense of annihilation linked with orgiastic pleasure. (Laplanche and Pontalis: 1986 [1964], 11)

The function of deathliness in signifying and the trans-figuration that occurs thereby offers resurrection into the 'other world' by that which is signifiable. As O is released from her chained position in her cell, she makes an evangelical-style crossing to the "other side": "she felt her chain being detached . . . [she] felt herself being lifted and borne away (47). She has crossed the bar of the signifier's mark upon her flesh, traversing the function of the cut in the signifying chain. The risen sign upon the flesh is allied with the function of the phallus in Lacanian theory. In 'The Meaning of the Phallus', Lacan writes that "[t]he phallus is the privileged signifier of that mark where the share of the logos is wedded to the advent of desire" (Lacan: 1982 [1958], 82).

Deathliness is written through and through jouissance as the subject passes through the zero of becoming, face-to-face with its own annihilation in the petit mort of orgasm.

Beneath those stares, beneath those hands, beneath those sexes . . . she sank, lost in delirious absence from herself which gave her unto love and loving, and may perhaps have brought her close to death and dying. She was - who? anyone at all, no-one, someone else . . . (37)

Here is the zero-point of the subject as it passes back out through the constructed pleasures afforded by its fetishized body zones, the framed quadrature of the circuits in which it treads. These apertures in which the ego invests represent the in-out-in doors in which we lose our selves when we afford ourselves our sexual coming, what the text refers to as "pleasure's critical point" (102). Here is the "little mechanism which makes the doll cry" (159).

**Body Map**

We have discovered that in examining the erotogenic zones that these regions of the skin merely show a special intensification of a kind of susceptibility to stimulus which is possessed in a certain degree by the whole cutaneous surface.

(Freud: 1991 [1905], 339)

... the epidermis outside and the membrane inside have to be sutured properly, the holes must coincide. (137)

Pleasure and its attendant suffering is afforded in accordance with a body-surface map which is invested with libidinal and psychic significance. "[T]ender membranes" are trained to signify the affect of desire as it is translated into pleasure (12). This cutaneous map acts as an armature into which the ego is inserted as it is constituted. In The Ego and the Id, Freud states that the ego is "a bodily ego . . . itself the projection of a surface" (Freud: 1991 [1923], 451). Here is the skin which keeps the subject in its place, its frame. This is not to say that 'I' is contained here but rather that identity is negotiated through a compulsively replayed topological orientation.

The body of 'I' then is ultimately a constitutive topology, identity is shaped in the flesh and subject to the movement of signifier in its symbolic function. Bodily zones are not only imbued with physical/psychical pleasures but are actually constitutive of those
physical/psychical pleasures and thereby we have the circuitous nature of interpenetrative fetishes. The bodily map may be deciphered according to a recognizable code and lend itself to the geography by which we set sail in the course of desire: a cartography of 'I'. The body is unwritten in its confrontation with orgasm: it has been de-ciphered by entering in at the door of its zones and working backwards in their constitution. The erogenous zones of the body surface reveal themselves to be a tabulated map of desire. This self-perpetuated system in conjunction with a social apparatus may be seen to act as a coercive mechanism which seeks to control the body as system. As such, it renders the subject as a text to be written and subsequently read. The regions of the body to which Story of O is so attentive draw attention to the symbolic ordering of the flesh through the functions it comes to fulfill. The novel upsets the 'normal' use of such fleshly zones by depicting sexual practices abhorrent to 'civilized' behaviour. Through mixing up different areas of the body as they are normally 'cut up' or partitioned, it questions normal ordering and regulatory practices by which we operate socially. The intrusion of one by the other, the interpenetration of place with that which occupies it, points to a cutting-up mechanism within the narrative itself as the narrator constantly displaces its presence. By inserting itself as 'I' in various places in the text, it stretches the very textual muscle which keeps it in place. It thereby tests the limits of its confined existence as textual presence by exercising control of the liminal edges of its own storyline.

Sphinctral control is central to the subjection of O. Her body is not her own nor "above all, any one of the orifices of [her] body" (16). Stretching rods are inserted into her anus "to keep that ring open and to stretch it. Thus was she spread, and spread wider and wider every day" (41). The leaking bodily fluids associated with such orifices are also thereby involved. Her tears flow into her open mouth (25), she pisses in front of Pierre the valet (45) "incapecible of holding back the water which was squirting from her body" (44). Drawing on the work of Mary Douglas, Kristeva analyses the effects of sphinctral training as an exercise of where "archaic power of mastery and neglect, of differentiation of proper-clean and improper-dirty ... is impressed and exerted (Kristeva: 1982, 72). In her consideration of the deterministic nature of external boundaries, Douglas writes that,

... all margins are dangerous. If they are pulled this way or that the shape of fundamental experience is altered ... We should expect the orifices of the body to symbolise its specially vulnerable points. Matter issuing from them is marginal stuff of the most obvious kind. Spittal, blood, milk, urine, faeces or tears by simply issuing forth have traversed the boundary of the body. (Douglas: 1991, 121).

The orifices are the breakpoints of the body, the fault-line of textual outreach; they are the cut-off point of the whole and it is they which are invested with meaning so that their liminality is fetishized. Kristeva states that human attentions to defilement "shift the border [ ... ] that separates the body's territory from the signifying chain; they illustrate the boundary between semiotic authority and symbolic law" (Kristeva: 1982, 73). Because these bodily holes are made to represent and carry a cultural code which shapes our desire, their very liminality constitutes a challenge to the symbolic via their biological imperative which draws attention to bodily function turning inside-out to the world. Their symbolic constitution is therefore dependent upon being crossed through with their own undoing in a domain which is constantly interruptive of cultural codes whilst implicitly reiterating them in meanings which are brought to bear upon such apertures. That the symbolic function of the flesh is constantly crossed through by a preceding archaic process, what Kristeva refers to as 'semiotic', is endemic to its establishment as meaningful flesh. It is a process which is never complete but ever and always in process and points to a potential solubility of the subject in negotiation with its own borders. Ritual repetition of behaviour with reference to these bodily zones seems to underline an iterable imperative in drawing the borderlines of anatomical 'I'. This iterability itself, whilst drawing attention to the fragility of constitutive processes, may also be
the source of pleasure due its exercise of power in the face of a constantly deconstitutive threat.

Body of Text: Transliminality and abjection

Just like O's "open body" (8), Story of O displays itself as it folds centre upon centre in its telling. It steps outside the confines of its own story as it offers alternative openings and endings to its textual body, thereby resisting resolution and closure. Its linguistic membrane ruptures as it engages in a telescoping of telling, encasing itself in circuits of narrative; it circles itself, wall around wall. In its beginning and ending, it proffers alternatives to the reader. Opening in the present it states that "[h]er lover one day takes her. . . " (5). A few pages on, the narrator states that "[a]other version of the same beginning was simpler, more direct. . . " (7). It also writes beyond its own ending; after the coda it announces that "[t]here existed another ending to the story of O" (175). The boundaries of liminal control and disruption which have been the focus of O's subjection extend then to the narrative.

Well, here was the ending, right here, where she wasn't expecting it, and in the most unexpected of all imaginable forms . . . (granting that this was indeed the ending and that there wasn't some other ending hidden behind it, or still a third ending hidden behind the second one). (68)

There is a disruption even within the sentence construction of this text. Qualifying repetitions are used as if the text is circuiting and indeed short-circuiting itself in a display of rhetorical feedback. Anaphoric repetition is continually used and in its use the presence and fictive agency of narrative voice is emphatically underlined.

"outraging, perhaps, perhaps outrageous" (75), "his lips to her welts, to all her welts" (28), "he loved her, still loved her" (86) "And then? And then. . . " (34), "she would swim in the nude when she swam" (145) "behind her and behind her" (115), "Much later, she was to remember, and when, much later, she remembered it. . . " (103)

Here then are the telling circuits which hold us in place through the strictures of marking. We pass over these black marks seeking out the trace of the other just as Sir Stephen reads the marks upon O's body, the red welts that are "the mark of the other, the trace of the other's passage" (74).

O has no place to call her own, she exists in a trans-liminal text, subject to abject breakage. She is quite literally out of place here where there is no sense. For O, the signifier is non-synchronic with the signified so that "(g)reen grass turned black, day ceased to be day, the night to be night" (85). There is a breakage of the subject by passing through the circuit of one's own story in which one functions as subject. In this textual scenario, the subject becomes object by passing back through its own structurations, turning its story inside out in a visceral exhibitionism of the textual body. The extremities which alter the body cause movement in the subject's constitution and therefore alter the relation with 'the real'.

There had been appalling couplings . . . mouths which had inhaled her lips and tongue like flaccid, repulsive blood-sucking leeches, and tongues and sexes, bestial and gummy and clinging . . . And if, despite all that . . . If her abasement, her abjection were sweet to her? (86)
The abject breakage of the body links with re-configurations of subjectivity in an evasion of proper body-space. Such topographical re-negotiations offer different frames in which to represent 'I'. In Powers of Horror, Kristeva writes that,

\[\ldots\]the abject appears in order to uphold "I" within the Other \ldots it takes the ego back to its source on the abominable limits from which, in order to be, the ego has broken away \ldots Abjection is a resurrection that has gone through death (of the ego).

(Kristeva: 1982, 15)

Here we may be, in Kristeva's terminology, 'strangers to ourselves' in a state of dis-possession of 'I'. The text tells its story of a diaspora of 'I', an exile and estrangement fantasy where O is "shaken by the place and the time" with "no night to offset the day" (99). Like a character in a story, "perhaps [ ] she wasn't existing at all" (68). Such trans-liminal movement in circuits of telling draws attention to the function of the cut in signification and the presence of deconstitution as a necessary threat to subjecthood. The sign is crossed through with deathliness: I say 'I' only in the circuit of the shadow of death, the habitation of the owl.

I am like an owl... (Psalms 102:6)
Visions and Prayers: Linguistic Incarnation and Performative Paradigm
Dylan Thomas, 'Vision and Prayer'
Visions and Prayers: Linguistic Incarnation and Performative Paradigm

Dylan Thomas, 'Vision and Prayer'

This section takes Dylan Thomas' poem 'Vision and Prayer' as the main focus of its attention but its ideas will also comment upon the body of Thomas' poetic production as references to Thomas' poetry are woven in. It makes use of psychoanalytical and post-structuralist theory in order to dialectically engage with the location of the subject, the performativity of the signifier and linguistic enactment. It also raises questions about the nature of authority as it operates critically, and what the position of the author is in relation to textual production. It examines how that position becomes fetishized through the act of critical attention. In considering how the interpretative act may actively off-centre the text, it is argued that the writer/reader may occupy an hysterical position as the supposed boundaries between author and reader become unsettled and permeable in an encounter with the text itself. This leads to questions about the mechanics of operative metaphor and the body in relation to the signifying act. It seeks to question the readily accepted post-modern notion of a radically divided signifier and signified by considering that one can never be free of the ghost of the other in relation to 'the Real'. Through this postulation, it is possible to argue for a new relation between these two components without becoming grounded in essentialism and notions of the authenticity of 'the Word' as originary source. By paying attention to the audio-visual aspects of the signifier and the performative element of language, Thomas' poem 'Vision and Prayer' is used as a paradigm for the writing/reading process.

Textual Address

Who
Are you. . ?

(Thomas: 1984, 129)

As the arena of a speaking/praying 'I', 'Vision and Prayer' is a text which examines the location of the interlocuting subject and its implicated other to whom/which the performative of the text is addressed and in which 'I' is written as function. 'I' has no more identity than 'you' "who is born in the next room", its prayer is offered "in the name of" those who remain un-named. The revelation of name is associated with an all-consuming fire where 'I' will be undone, annihilated as "he burns me his name" in an incorporative identity. This points to a problematic mechanics at work in textual address as the positionality of the speaking/praying 'I', whilst seeming to provide the anchored authoritative impetus of the text, is actively undercut in its very function. The centrality of incantatory 'I' is no centrality at all as the affect of this fictive authority is dissolution in its established place. Linguistic authority is dissolved, placed "[b]ehind the wall" of the text it produces as voice. The transmission of the text dis-places the 'I' which is its condition of transmission. It side-steps itself through establishing itself. This links with the Kristevan concept of abjection as place of repudiation necessary to the functioning of the symbolic. In Powers of Horror, Kristeva writes:

I expel myself, I spit myself out. I abject myself within the same motion through which "I" claim to establish myself. (Kristeva: 1982, 3 – emphasis as original.)

The 'I' is wholly dependent upon the other represented in the place to which 'I' projects itself. In 'Vision and Prayer', 'I' is relative to the place of the second and third person. All action in the first person is in reaction to this locus of other. "I must lie still as stone" in relation to the partitioned other in the next room. Far from being anterior to 'I' however, the other is guarantor of its address, indeed the other is inherent in the structuration of 'I'. It is the fulcrum.
in relation to which 'I' travel endlessly. There is then an interlocation of positions operative
here in the superimposition of the interlocuting 'I' and the other to whom speech is addressed
in the spoken performative of the text. Both positions are written as tensional functions in
relation to this locus of interchangeability.

**Location of 'I' : Alterity in Subject**

The problematic location of 'I' results in an alterity in subject position. As what Lacan would
term the "alienating destination" of the subject's speech, it is the place of the o/Other which
actually generates the energy of the signifier's movement. This is a dynamic process. There is
a kinetic mechanism at play. For it is 'you' which exists as the destination of operative desire:
in Lacanian theory, the other exists in the place of the objet a, the fantasied object of desire, the
locus of a treasure which always eludes the subject in its linguistic trajectory. This
radically upsets the manifest power relation of the poetic address here which would seem to
privilege the speaking 'I' over the powerless passive second person contained within the
rhetorical space of the interlocutor, incarcerated in the text. Yet within the boundaries of the
text, it is the other which occupies the position of an unstoppable power where "[t]he world wind[s] home".

The text is built upon the premise of the entry of the one into the place of the other, it
acts as an arena of transpositioning. This points forward to an intertextuality operative at the
level of pronominal signifier. By intertextuality I do not mean a simple study of source text
but refer to the Kristevan notion of an intrusion of one sign system into another at the level of
the signifier to which she refers in Revolution in Poetic Language. There she says that:

> If one grants that every signifying practice is a field of transpositions of various
> signifying sytems (an intertextuality), one then understands that its 'place' of
> enunciation and its denoted 'object' are never single, complete and identical to
> themselves, but always plural, shattered, capable of being tabulated.
> 
> (Kristeva in Moi: 1996, 111)

**Dissolution of authority/author as concept**

* I am nothing but a literary oddity...  
  (Thomas in Fitzgibbon: 1966, 62)

In the very establishment of the place of the signifier, a slippage occurs, splitting the locus of
signifier and rendering it open to otherness; it is passed through by the trace of the excluded,
haunted by the ghost of what lies beyond its boundary and becomes radically strange to itself.
Its transcribed place as cypher is opened up like an "exhaling tomb". Yet this all depends
upon maintaining its established place, creating an inherent structural tension. This might
parallel non-conformist preaching stances where the authorized place of the preaching 'I'
becomes subject to the invocation of the mighty Other passing through it at the very height of
its vocal power, displaying powerlessness at the heart of its power: this is the apex of religious
rhetoric, the "spiral of ascension" to which the signifier in performance can aspire. Here we
might examine authorial slippage as a place where the radical affect of the signifier in its
practice may undermine its 'intended' use in the written/read/spoken text. I mention 'intention'
because of the great attention paid in the past to deciphering Thomas' work, interpreting it,
looking for meaning which can after all only be the reader's own, set to sea as we are in an
elusive ocean of word-play and rhetorical high-tide, navigating with a storm of desire in our
textual negotiation. In the dissolution of located voice, the transgression of 'I' operative in
'Vision and Prayer' is a dissolution of the author concept at its height. Whose work could be
more allied to their literary life story - anecdote after anecdote - than that of Dylan Thomas,
the "Rimbaud of Cwmdonkin Drive"? The telling of stories, the spinning "whinnying" yarns
around a point which becomes more and more blurred with every addition to the web of
telling so that the tissue of textuality draws attention to the falsity of a pernicious concept: the
point of origin. All in search of an impossible lacuna, the objet a of critical desire: the 'real'
Dylan Thomas.

The author is then operative only as a phantasy of the reader, a named place of
fetishized investment: a fictional locus - a pivot point - around which is concocted a projection
of readerly desire. The signifiers 'Dylan Thomas' have themselves entered a "spiral of
ascension": "in the name of" Dylan Thomas we look for the vision, attempt to locate his
"colour of saying" (82).

Dissolution of the Subject

Is the place that I occupy as the subject of a signifier concentric or excentric, in
relation to the place I occupy as subject of the signified? - that is the question.
(Lacan: 1977, 165)

The annihilation of the speaking/reading/writing 'I' is through the relation with the other for
this relation is one of a virtual space, a projected theatre in which the hologrammatical text
plays to a captive audience of the subject for it is the reading subject who actively produces
this hologram. Here we see a geometrical dimension of the text as it is refracted through the
screen of the subject: its other. In this mechanism it is clear that a reciprocity of place of
subject and other is operative which is at the root of primary narcissism described by Freud. A
confusion of one and other is at play in the 'normal' constitution of the social subject. In
his exposition of the 'mirror stage', Lacan describes the "normal transitivism" operative
between infants, he relates how when one child falls the other cries, for instance. Elsewhere
he states that it is by means of identification with the other that there occurs a "structural
ambivalence" in the subject's behaviour (Lacan: 1977, 19). I suggest that it is this same
process at work here textually as the subject is annihilated under the gaze of the other as 'I' is
textually subsumed in the apex of the other, dissolved in its "high noon". Here is a radical
decstitution of subject at the very moment of its performativity. One enters the other and
undoes itself in a projected textual dimensionality where on one hand "I am found" and on the
other "I am lost in the blinding one."

There occurs a transmutation of the text in the reading or interpretative process: its
boundaries become radically unsettled as the narcissistic relation between subject and object is
enacted through the transmission of the word, there is a transitivism operative between one
and other. I am not I in my encounter with the text! In his study of 'The Reading Process'
(1972), Wolfgang Iser states that,

If reading removes the subject-object division that constitutes all perception, it
follows that the reader will be 'occupied' by the thoughts of the author, and these in
their turn will cause the drawing of new 'boundaries.' Text and reader no longer
confront each other as object and subject, but instead the 'division' takes place within
the reader himself. (Iser: 1988, 226)

Here in the "kingdom come" of the subject, split in its reading process, there is a reiterative
compulsion in the organism in the face of chaos which is related to the mechanics of the death
drive. I activate the death drive as I read, due to my compulsive wish to repeat and obtain
mastery in the face of an overarching fear of the chaos into which I may slip. As I read, I die
in a place where "[d]eath is all metaphors" (65).
Activating the death drive as I read: "I die"

It is in effect as a desire for death that [the subject] affirms himself for others ... and no being is ever evoked for him except among the shadows of death.

To say that this mortal meaning reveals in speech a centre exterior to language is more than a metaphor; it manifests a structure. (Lacan: 1977, 105)

The death drive operates in the irresistible iteration of the signifier as the subject returns to itself as misrecognized unified 'I'. This is the function of the cut operative within the text for without the death drive/threat of the cut the text remains unactivated, unenergized and is merely pre-text. Fully entering the Other, according to the Lacanian scheme, is death itself. To enter the Other as destination of the locus of the subject's desire is full satisfaction in an ironic in-corporation which is annihilatory; Lacan refers to this as jouissance in 'God and the Jouissance of The Woman' (Lacan: 1982, 147). There he describes a motion of moving beyond the other to enter the plane of the Other, a pleasure-pain so intense as to subsume the subject as it enters fully into the locus of Other in an orgiastic displacement: an annihilation of the subject in the "kingdom come" of its complete satisfaction. Here then is "the happening of saints to their visions!" A place where "the whole pain flows open and I die". Here where "I am found . . . Now I am lost." This is what Freud in Beyond the Pleasure Principle refers to as "[t]he backward path that leads to complete satisfaction" (Freud: 1991a, 249) as the speech act always retroactively seeks to locate the signifier in its recuperative interpellation: a journey from A ----> B and back again in an endless navigation back and forth. This might be referred to as a process of recovery of wholeness: a mechanism of the "common lazarus" in negotiation with the text for it is in the process of the "interpreted" that the virtual reality of textuality is entered.

Virtual Dimensionality of the Text : "burning ciphers on the round of space" (20)

The virtual space of the text is afforded by use of extended metaphor at work within an arena of rhetoric. Dylan Thomas' use of extended metaphor leads us as readers into the room of the text, a dimension of virtuality. "In [his] craft or sullen art" (120), he plies all the tools of his intricate trade to "hack this rumpus of shapes" [x]. The topology of the text is an apotheosis of its metaphor.

Breuer and Freud, in their collaborative work on hysteria, noted the spatio-temporal dynamics of thought and inherent relation to metaphor. In his 'Theoretical Contribution' to Studies on Hysteria, Breuer states that:

All our thinking tends to be accompanied by spatial metaphor and aided by spatial ideas, and we talk in spatial metaphors. (Breuer: 1991 [1895], 307)

The two scenes of metaphor correlate with the two scenes of the hysterical transposing upon each other. The place of the imaginary in ego formation is due to the topology of metaphor and leads to the organism's performance of its very own body: its flesh shaped by the symbolic as it is pre-figured in the imaginary upon which it is overlaid. The divided reading subject might be seen to inhabit a place of hysteria in reading. In his correspondence to Fliess, Freud comments that:

The mechanism of poetry [creative writing] is the same as that of hysterical phantasies... (Freud: 1966 [1897], 256)

If we link this two scene scenario to the hallucination of the metaphor that the reader lives through, we might compare this to a 'hypnoid state' of reading as, in its encounter with text, the subject is asked to retroactively work through the reading memory in order to activate the
signifier therein. Just as the hysteric has her symptoms imprinted into her body so the reader may wear the body of the textual-imposter, might assume a different armour for the signifier is undeniably material in its affects.

The spatio-temporal arena of the performativity of metaphor is itself written in the typographical response of the reading body. There are only a few active terms in 'Vision and Prayer', it relies instead upon formations of words in an uncertainty of semantic meaning; words and phrases are used as formulaic through associative repetition. Here where there is no narrative but that of sight and sound and a few operative terms by which to tie its movement, the text is anchored only by the interpretative response which fills the lacuna with its dynamic of desire. The topology of the text instead is one of superimposition, one scene overlaid by the other. Lacan refers to a polyphony of text, a vertical suspension of semantic space where "all discourse is aligned along several staves of a score" in fugue-like formation (Lacan: 1977, 154). The reader is required to inhabit the space of extended metaphor, subjected to its temporal dictates in an extension of textual space into the reading activating body, the enfleshing of the signifier "find[es] meat on bones" (59). The text we enter into is a "spinning place" of saying where, like Thomas, we are "at the mercy of words" (Letter cited by Wain: 1972, 12).

This represents a challenge to grammar as Thomas' overdetermined metaphoric dimension draws upon an anti-space in the Western philosophical tradition. It is by negative referencing that the text draws attention to the rules it is asking the reader to recognize that it is breaking. The dis-assembly of grammatical structuration, excision of punctuation, invented or compounded vocabulary, etc. all rely upon knowledge of structure proper, i.e. are dependent upon the rules which they deviate from. Cradled by the armature of tradition, the text is what it is not. It is the negative reference by which the text functions and from which it infers the structure of the grammar it is inverting; it is therefore subject to the shadow of a structure by which it functions. It is crossed by the shadow of authority and situates itself in a position of resistance to that authority although it may never be in a position of exteriority/anteriority to such. This is the function of the Other to which it is addressed working through its very grammatical structure in order to enter and support its semantic space. This supports the very few active terms in the text where all is rhetorical space invented by grammatical twist and turn of phrase.

Space of Text: Locus of desire

It is the world of words which creates the world of things. (Lacan: 1977, 64)
visual images: the spoken and the written, the vision and the prayer. As the screen of the ego ideal absorbs the object into the ego, the text becomes introjected through the flesh of the reading subject mouthing its words and therefore assumed through the reading process. It is en-fleshed, it assumptive of the armature of the reading other: its destined focus. The destination of the signifier exists not as a given but as an activation: a performativity. Although writing with reference to narration, Barthes makes the point in S/Z that "the message is parametrically linked with its performance; there is no question of an utterance on the one hand and on the other its uttering" (Barthes: 1992, 213).

Bodily Performance of the Word

There is then a bodily performance of the word. The assumption of the signifier is directly due to the relation between the visual and the auditory affects of the signifier as primal term in the phenomenology of the subject.7

The symbolic field is occupied by a single object from which it derives its unity... This object is the human body. (Barthes: 1992, 214-5)

By way of comparison, in a letter to Pamela Hansford Johnson written in early November, 1933 Thomas states that:

Every idea, intuitive or intellectual, can be imaged and translated in terms of the body, its flesh, skin, blood, sinews, veins, glands, organs, cells, or senses.

Through my small bonebound island I have learnt all that I know... All I write is inseperable from the island. (Fitzgibbon: 1966, 48 - spelling as original.)

The relation between the performative 'I' and the primacy of the signifier in the constitution of the subject is operative in the space of twelve short stanzas entitled collectively 'Vision and Prayer'. In these rooms of writing the structuration process of textual production is set in direct relation to the topology of the writing body. To state, as Thomas did, that words have a "real life" of their own might seem to cut across post-modern theory, to contradict the non-essentialist stance and to somehow magically imbue 'the Word' as originary source, an incantatory In principio from which we may never escape the perfect marriage of signifier and signified. Yet this linguistic carnality draws attention to the performativity of the word from whence it draws its naturalized affect. If, as Freud and later Lacan posit, language is a stand-in, a metaphoric substitute in the face of primal loss, it is a comfort which needs reiteration to afford the powerless elocutor the illusion of mastery in the face of abject fragmentation.8 By entering the symbolic, the organism becomes subject to an over-arching illusion of unity, projecting itself into the statue of 'I' by which it operates in the world. Yet this "I in my intricate image stride[s] on two levels" (30) for in the face of reiterated symbolic substitution lies a fear of fragmentation.

This illusion of unity, in which the human subject is always looking forward to self-mastery, entails a constant danger of sliding back into the chaos from which he started... (Lacan: 1953, 15)

This points to a fragility at subject ego base due to narcissistic investment and transitivism from which it is necessary to emerge and establish a boundary of 'I' but this boundary is, of course, never absolute and always and ever haunted by otherness and strangeness.

It is by looking back over its shoulder into the howling face of chaos - to a place where I "back to black silence melt and mourn" - that the subject propels itself forward via the anticipatory mirage of virtual dimensions of the material signifier written in its skin. As a correlative, it is by rolling back upon itself that the text moves forward in a recuperative
movement as the reader activates the referent due to a retrograde affect. This self-projection is a desperately reiterated action, what Freud, in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, termed "the compulsion to repeat". Through compulsive reiteration, the body comes to bear the signifier as it masquerades its naturalized affect as originary to itself. Its very own name is written in the flesh in a magical calling forth of (what can only be a fictional) essence in a fraudulent christening of "no one now or no one to be".

Speech is in fact a gift of language, and language is not immaterial. It is a subtle body, but body it is. Words are trapped in all the corporeal images that captivate the subject... (Lacan: 1997, 87)

Here is the 'vision and prayer' of the symbolic. 'The Word' as a performative induces vision through its grammatical and semantic transmission in space. The performance of the poetic mystic, the "bard on a raised hearth" (80) is a position which plays upon this misplaced congenital linguistics offering its transmission of lingual affect via its own trajectory flung into the "exhaling tomb" of primal loss.

**Audio-Visual Apparitions**

The affects of the signifier are split into the audio and visual spheres, "the noise, that is, that they make in the air and the ear, the contours in which they lie on the page and the mind, their colours and density" as Thomas wrote in a letter to the mysterious Mr. Klopper in May 1946 (Fitzgibbon: 1966, 289). It is an amalgamation of visual image and acoustic image which constitutes the dimensions of the signifier as a sign. These two scenes of the signifier transpose one upon the other; even if separated, one still carries the ghost of the other. This then traverses the signified as concept casting its long shadow like a thorn in the side of conceptual space so that the signified itself is actually subject to the trace of the signifier. This leads us to consider the affect of the signifier in 'the real': the referent may be constituted in the reiterated performance of the signifier in its audio-visual aspects. The membrane between imaginary and real may only be "thin as a wren's bone" after all. Yet this signified/referent is a labile apparition as signifier performance, although impulsive, is not identical to itself however much it may seek to be so for it is in the arena of its own performance that the signifier eludes its as-signed place, slipping up in any fallacious 'intention' it may carry.

The actual relay of the audio-visual performative is subject to continual shift in each and every new performance as no performance can be identical to the last, although it may seek to be so. Each new return cannot be to exactly the same location from where it came and hence no new performance can set off from the same place, each performance in seeking to exactly replicate the last actually de-centres itself in its own irresistible mission. The movement in the signifier is therefore in direct relation to the amount of stress laid upon replication. Intoning the prayer as a set formula of words does indeed, if continually repeated, render up its vision. By reiterating prayer, we "turn the corner of prayer". In reiteration then lies modulation, reconfiguring the signifier in its very usage. The textual is therefore actually constitutively dependent upon the last performance/intonation because without this back-referencing, it falls into a chaos of unmeaning and becomes un-spelled.

Here it links with the *Nachträglichkeit* (affectual deferral) of Freud and Lacan's reworked notion of this in the retroactivity of the signifier in its spoken arc of desire which returns its utterance to the subject like an echo of the future. *Nachträglichkeit* brings in the dimension of two interpoised scenes in a mechanics of transpositioning which might lead us back into the dimensions of metaphorical space.
Within this textual economy, the signifier becomes revenant, "like a wanderer [white/ With the dew.] come back" (151): here then is the atavistic memory of the signifier in its role as transmitter. The black marks of the signifier cast a long shadow which shifts them out of their graphic place as they transcend their locus into the apparition of the performative process, bringing reconfiguration by "bearing the ghost" in the "interpreted". Here is the trans-figuration of the signifier: a linguistic incarnation rendered by 'Vision and Prayer'.

Textual Boundary

Within these walls of words, this spin of spelling provides the geography of grammar by which 'I' and 'you' traverse the textual boundary. Here in this economy of division into subject and object we read: now the one, now the other of discourse as we know it. Thomas' poetic texts upset the location of signs: signifiers traverse each-other, transpose, transposition, echo, and recall one another; they become operative through back and forward referencing through the entirety of Thomas' work to produce formulaic phraseology. The texts become an arena of linguistic display and metaphoric conceit: words slip and skip into non-sense. There is a slippage of place as one word wriggles into the other in an exchange at the level of the signifier run through and through by the shadows and traces of meaning which pass through it: subject itself to "all places ways mazes passages quarters and graves" of the signifier's movement. This uncertainty of signifier function results in a moveable locus of the signified, dis-located in a "spuming cyclone" of meaning where thin walls tumble together in a linguistic space which challenges the grammar which writes it into place. There is a textual punctum operative as the skin of the signifier is broken open "and the dark run over [its] ghost". (It has "cros't the bar" of its constitution.) The signified is activated within the altered geometry of the sign as it is crucified upon the rack of its own configuration to resurrect itself in endless unhinged play behind "the spelling wall" (84).
Diana: Her True Story: Post-Modern Transgressions in Identity
Diana: Her True Story: Post-modern Transgressions in Identity

This section considers the life and death of Diana, Princess of Wales from a theoretical perspective. It makes use of post-structuralist and psychoanalytical theory in order to examine representations of Diana as a fetish point for cultural investment, a collective phantasy around which absence and melancholia oscillates for the post-modern subject. Andrew Morton's book Diana: Her True Story is referred to in order to concentrate upon her identity as a locus of textuality. The section considers the act of telling as central to such identity so that the destination of the story of self is fully implicated in recognition by the reading other. It moves on to comment upon Diana as intertext, a text which we all write and then re-write in negotiation with a never-ending loop of desire. This results in a complex textual web where any idea of 'true story' must be radically lost. The idea of biography as an 'authorized version' of an other will be questioned and with it what it might mean to be the ghost haunting the storyline of another purporting to tell the true story of one's self.

The section then moves on to comment upon the function of the scriptor in relation to the textual production and the intersection of the reading 'I' as it is implicated in the dialectics of desire set up within the dimensions of text and seeks to insert itself into the textual body. What are normally considered the private processes of ego configuration and individual identity are here in direct relation to the textual process as it is perpetuated in the public sphere so that a radical transgression in identity is implicated in the telling of one's own 'true story'. It is in the enforced closure of such a tale that has not been perceived to reach its end that a severe withdrawal and mourning process may occur which manifests itself as a grief that will not "go quietly". The section then comments upon this as a negotiation with deathliness as it is encountered in the narrative process on a large scale. It argues that the story of the life and death of Diana represents an ironic metanarrative for a post-modern arena.

Telling Stories

In Diana: Her True Story, Andrew Morton presents the reader with the story of a subject complicit in its process of telling. It is a very public narrative, purporting to be the "true story" of Diana, Princess of Wales and uses closeness to the source with which to secure its claim to truthfulness. It is seminal in its function as Diana's 'coming out' document, positioning itself as near as possible to being Diana's autobiography. Morton informs us that "[for all intents and purposes it was her autobiography, her] personal testament..." (Morton: 1998, 11). Morton's text then presents itself as biographical with hybridic elements of autobiography as it is written, in the first instance, to echo Diana's words sotto voce and, in its revised form, inserts Diana's words into the main body of the text. The edition of 1998 is prefaced by a section entitled 'In Her Own Words' and is a selection of excerpts from the taped interviews given by Diana to Morton in 1991-2. We are assured by the publisher that "[the words are all Diana's]" (25). This engages the reader in an edification via a direct reading position and is the means by which Morton's text is able to reify itself as being indeed a "true story". This "true story" is, however, one which draws attention to its own textual positioning by returning to the scene of itself six years later in a situation of textual déjà vu in order to tell a story even 'more true' than before by stretching itself beyond the confines of the living subject represented in its first edition. This is a "true story" which speaks beyond the liminal bounds of the lived positionality of the subject acting as its guarantor. It is indeed Diana's absence rather than her presence which anchors this text.

What does it mean to narrate an other? Morton's position is written into place via the manoeuvres of the text he is supposedly in control of, resulting in a slippage of the writing 'I' in relation to the written 'I' with which it is locked in a dialectical encounter. Morton's
seduction is clear as he engages with the object of his text: "She could be wilful, exasperating... her penetrating cornflower-blue eyes seduced with a glance. Her language knew no boundaries... She was endlessly fascinating..." (294). His function is one of a conduit of "true words" straight from 'the source'. He tells us that "I was asked to become the conduit of her true story" (14). He is the amanuensis of her telling, the text a locus of displaced voice as the "story in its pages came from her lips..." (11). He sexualizes this process when he refers to "the fear that Buckingham Palace would discover her identity as the 'Deep Throat' of my book" (17). This draws attention to the erotics of textual representation as it projects its presence in a fantasized encounter with its object of desire via a clandestine writing process in danger of being discovered. In the pressure point presented by this textual production, the author shared his object of desire with millions of readers in a lucrative situation for the writer and publisher.

By maintaining a credence due to the authority of "her words", Morton's is an authorized version which seeks to find its truth in the word, identity in a fixity of linguistic utterance as it transcribes Diana's tape-recorded voice. Whilst postulating as 'true', it covers its tracks as a fabrication; by speaking with 'her words', it conceals itself as a story. Morton's text speaks with a doubled-back voice, feeding back to itself the presence based on absence by which it defines its presence as structure. Diana's 'story' then presents us with a post-modern theoretical dilemma. As it has been popularly understood, Diana: Her True Story presents a narrative of a subject caught within a royal "gilded cage" and communicates the inmate's traumatic experiences via the textual trajectory, thereby allowing her to affirm herself as a subject. Whilst she was "voiceless and powerless", telling her story empowered her as a feminine subject and performed a step in her self-development which enabled her to later present us with "strong woman" therapeutic rhetoric: "[f]or the first time in her royal life she felt empowered" (15). In its operation, this story is in a long line of stories of feminist awakenings which locate the act of telling as central to identity in order to be recognized by the other as affirming destination of the story of self. This is what Rosalind Coward refers to in Female Desire (1984) as 'The True Story of How I Became My Own Person'. This process of telling where the narrative acts as a correlative of the evolving subject is theoretically problematic in its non-questioning of the fully present subjectivity (of the teller) which is the projected locus towards which its telling is directed. Diana: Her True Story positions itself within this tradition of empowering narrative yet, whilst paying homage to its subject and registering her presence beyond the visual and unspeaking icon, it simultaneously and unintentionally draws attention to her implicit non-presence in a complex web of telling and re-telling. There is then an oscillation between tangible and intangible in relation to its object and furthermore this is carried through its scriptible function as it implicates the reading other in its process. The reading other to whom the narrative directs itself is caught in its seductive web woven around a collective fantasy, a fetish point of intangible desire made solid by its biographical status. Each addition to its web ironically further obscures what it wishes to reveal as it seeks to position itself as 'more true' (and thereby more saleable) than the last account.

Doubled-back Identity

The metatext called 'Diana' is a text we all write and which then loops back in a rhetorical feedback situation to masquerade as originary to itself. "Her true story" is then no thing but a tissue of telling, a textual fabrication in which representation plays a central role for identity so that, through the proliferation of her story, Diana was no longer able to step outside the story 'Diana' and started "believing in herself" (166) as represented in her storyline. Morton reports that "[o]n one occasion Diana was so moved by the poignancy of her own story that she confessed to weeping tears of sorrow" (19).

Diana inhabits two spaces in her textual positioning. There is the reading Diana and the represented Diana: the enunciating cognitive subject and the subject represented in the
enunciation through which what Lacan refers to as "the alienating function of the I" is displayed (Lacan: 1977, 6). This situation is, however, made more complex by being doubled back through Morton's text where Diana reads and comments on the text of herself, and her splittings into representer and represented are then absorbed back into Morton's text, thereby putting this doubleness into a pressure-point of proliferated feedback. Diana is legion: we move from the one and 'true' Diana to a situation of infinite splitting. This is supported by Diana's repeated reference to herself in the third person and her insertion of her own name into her utterances as if she is talking of an alias operating as a separate locus under that name.

Morton describes her reaction to telling her story as one of extreme relief, a "form of confession" (15), a cathartic exercise.

... her words spilled out of her, almost without interruption and with her barely pausing for breath. It was a great release. (14)

This cathartic outpouring, described as an empowering but "draining process" (16), bears a striking resemblance to the narratives of female hysterics analysed by Breuer and Freud at the end of the last century. Josef Breuer's analysis of 'Fräulein Anna O.' echoes eerily through Morton's account of Diana's therapy by a Dr. David Mitchell who "came to see her every evening and asked her to recount the events of that day" (148). The emphasis is on narrative recapitulation in relation to a posited future stability of identity. In wholeness and integration lies the promise of being true to oneself.

True Stories : Tangible and Intangible Problematics

The notion of a "true story" presents us with an enticing but inherently contradictory narrative scenario. By promising to reveal Diana's "true nature" (21) through a textual process, it makes a fallacious claim. In seeking to establish ourselves as written subjects in history, we actively off-centre and exceed our written place which is therefore an ironic location as it becomes non-identical in its fixity so that 'I' becomes displaced by its very denotative marking. Here then is an anti-location which seeks to make tangible what can only ever be an intangible and unquantifiable quality, i.e. identity. To be a subject of one's own auto/biographical narrative is to make an identity out of that which seeks to 'subject' in power terms what cannot be identified. That which resists its place is what is ironically the attention of the spectre of meaning haunting the structure in linguistic terms. The text then becomes veiled and as such operates as an irresistible enigma. Speaking of Diana, Morton refers to "the invisible veil which separated her" (152). In his analysis of desire as it is operative in the constitution of the subject's utterance, Lacan draws an analogy to a feminine positioning in symbolic terms,

Such is the woman concealed behind her veil: it is the absence of the penis which turns her into the phallus, the object of desire. (Lacan: 1977, 322)

This indefinable location is that which activates desire: we are seduced by an absence which is covered up and lures us with trickery. Morton makes this comment with reference to Diana's development as a woman outside the royal marriage:

Since her separation she had slowly, cautiously - perhaps even unconsciously - performed a kind of striptease, unpeeling the veils of convention which had surrounded her. (264)

It is this concealment which entices the reader/viewer so that a perpetual fascination wields power over the reading subject in a reciprocal mechanics of power operating through the representative act. The concealed becomes an area of fetish over which readerly desire flickers in an incessant quest to close over the gap and seize the 'naked' but impossible truth as
it peeps out from behind its imposture, the truth which is nowhere present but operative only as an anti-presence or a masquerade.

**Representation = Absence**

I had shrunk into nothing... I had shrunk to nothing. (59)

Darling, I think I'm about to disappear...

(Diana's comment to Charles before fainting on 1985 Canadian tour. 159)

In its negotiation with the intangible, the Diana text is constructed around a central absence and offers itself for later re-construction by the reader. The story of the royal 'I' becomes the story of the other, subject to the other's power in which arena it is re-constituted and received as truth made tangible by reference to its speaking source, originary to its performative utterance. Here is the place where Diana might "dissolve like a Dispirin and disappear."6 What is patently a falsehood masquerades as a fully present consciousness behind the separating veils of the represented conspiring to crown itself queen there.

As a fetishized locus for cultural investment, Diana has functioned both as text and proliferator of texts. Her multiple representations, in every imaginable form and medium, point to how she came to function as a collective phantasy around which absence and melancholia oscillate for the post-modern reader, the consumer of her text/s. Representation implies the absence of the 'real thing', in psychoanalytical terms it is a substitute, a 'stand-in' for what is radically lost to the subject and therefore constitutes the subject's melancholy positioning. Representation acts as the means by which the subject seeks to redeem itself by inhabiting the posture of mastery in the face of irredeemable grief. Freud's formulation of this through his grandson's famous cotton-reel game is given in Beyond the Pleasure Principle. Through a repetitive game, the infant is made "master of the situation" (1991 [1920], 227). The infant's 'fort-da' forms a substitute and is uttered in relation to the first loss he experiences, that of maternal absence. It is this scenario which posits a useful analogy to the real absence of Diana for her admirers in an untiring metonymic negotiation.

**The Economy of Narration and Deathliness**

'Diana, Princess of Wales' stands a graceful 9" tall and is decorated by band in precious platinum.

...If I do not wish to keep 'Diana, Princess of Wales', I may return her and owe nothing.

(Advertisement by Compton & Woodhouse in association with Coalport English bone china.)

In relation to her actual death, the representation fetish circulating around Diana may easily be seen to operate through post-funereal products and souvenirs, tying post-modern grief to post-modern capitalist logic in a carefully orchestrated display of mourning to the tune of supply and demand. Here we may see the economic dynamic of 'false consciousness'.

In theoretical terms, the integral relation of representation to absence of 'the object' points to a deathliness operative in narrative mechanics. The act of telling spins around a central axis of nothingness, the reiterated copy it makes is in relation to this 'active' absence. In Butler's terms, these are copies without an original where 'the original' is "nothing more than a parody of the idea of the natural and the original" (Butler: 1990, 31 - emphasis as original). The result of this for Lyotard is that "[t]he social subject seems to dissolve in this
dissemination of language games" (1984, 40). This absence-presence dynamic is manifestly apparent in the textuality of Diana as identity becomes what its representation predicts in a reverse scenario which subverts any postulation of authorized versions of 'T'. This is illustrative of the implosion of representation into the lived real. "Darling, I think I'm about to disappear" in the textual process (58). The more it writes 'me', the less 'T' am.

This points to a textual area of mourning operative in every text and which Diana's life and death story presents in the most manifest and large-scale form so that it may serve an heuristic function as paradigm of this narrative mechanic as it is understood in psychoanalytical theory. Prior to the actual death of Diana, she was already dying as we told and re-told her story, the theoretical basis of which translates readily into 'the real'. Diana complained of "shrinking into nothing" (59), a metaphysical conceit of which we may read the imprint in her negotiations with bodily space and trysts with self-worth via the ravages of bulimia and self-harm. One may come to bodily harm by not fitting the narrative framework as armature of being. Playing the starring role in an "untrue story", the subject is alienated from self-identity and due to necessary organic paralogic is then required to believe in the story of self in order to function: "She knew in her heart that in order to survive she had to re-discover the real Diana Spencer. . . " (166). It is, in an appropriation of Lyotard's terms, "[t]his ultimate synthesis which constitutes the legitimate subject" (Lyotard: 1984, 33).

Morton's narrative acts as the aesthetic object which promises to reveal the subject and because of this, in its function as narrative proper, it is unable to pay tribute to anything but itself in order to maintain its biographical boundary. The narrative of a subject refuses to allude to the abyss of nothingness over which it stretches as it attempts to compensate for the 'real thing'. The biographical text is the most absolute example of this formative mechanic of narrative; it stands in for the 'real' person, it lays itself down as the means by which the reader 'knows' the subject described, thereby positing displacement as truth. The more 'authorized' or official the form the more pronounced is its displacement. My argument here is that biographical narrative is run through and through by the shadows of death, indeed deathliness is its foundational premise. Morton declares of his text that "[s]he may be gone, but her words are with us for ever . . . [t]he testimony which follows is her life story as she wanted to tell it. Her words are now all we have of her, her testament, the nearest we will now ever get to her autobiography" (22). It is precisely because of the shadow of death cast over its function that it is able to signify, that it is able to mean, it is this by which the text is able to 'be'. This is then an implicitly referential process; as statement postulates itself as presence, it implies and recalls linguistic negativity and the psychic devastation of grief. It is due to absence that representation takes its place: the object is then installed in an anti-locus. This process draws attention to our conceptions of the 'original' and 'true' as they are proliferated in accounts of Diana. Her designated place becomes fragmented into one of multiple proliferation, 'she' is no thing but a text without an original, a self which comes to believe in itself as text, i.e. a radically alienating and poignant investment in the performative power of representation in all its multitudinous forms. With reference to media coverage, Diana states, as if speaking of another person, that "Diana was listening and reading every line" (61).

**Intertextual Incest**

In her life Diana was a complex web. . . (294)

Diana operates as an intertextual icon, continually written into place by multiple effects of representation; a text we all read/write and then re-write in negotiation with a never-ending loop of desire, thereby allowing slippage in the sign system which writes her. She is indeed queen of our intertextual hearts, albeit an ironic one. In her 1967 essay, 'Word, Dialogue and Novel', Kristeva states that,
Any text is constructed as a mosaic of quotations; any text is the absorption and transformation of another. The notion of intertextuality replaces that of intersubjectivity. (Kristeva: 1986 [1980], 37 - emphasis as original.)

This results in a complex narrative web where any idea of 'true story' must be radically lost. The narrative becomes unstable in its very continuation of perceived stability and reiterated formulation of itself in such terms.

In our reading positions in relation to popular culture, we contribute to a textuality which is then absorbed back into the 'true story' of someone else, in a schematics of incestuous feedback, thereby creating a complex web of congested textuality which is operative as fetish. In his formulation of fetish in relation to gender theory, Robert Stoller notes that "fetish is a thing that has become a story" (Stoller: 1985, 126). There is then an aesthetics of fetish in this story of Diana as the body of the text is incessantly and incestuously fed back to itself. The 'normal' limits of textuality are transgressed by the intertextual transpositioning which challenges normative narrative patterning by reiterative allusion and proliferation, thereby altering the signing system. Kristeva locates this as an incestuous mechanism when she states that language is a fetishistic substitution (Kristeva: 1982, 37). We may invoke Barthes' idea of the 'stubborn after image' of other texts operative in our encounters with texts and haunting our readings so that we "become the prisoner of someone else's words and even of [our] own" as a useful means by which to allude to the reader's inhabitation of the text of Diana (Barthes: 1993, 37). The reader exists as a ghost in the machinery of her story-line, encountering their own dissolution in the effects of the feedback of their own desire there so that the search for 'truth' and meaning becomes an inherent struggle with identity for the reading subject because "[t]his is which approaches the text is already itself a plurality of other texts" (Barthes: 1990, 10). When this scenario is enacted on a large scale as it was in the case of Diana, its abrupt end results in massive withdrawal so that those who wrote the text are faced with the reversal of its affects through a violent un-writing. The bereaved reading/writing subject then encounters the real effects of the intangible it sought to keep at bay, i.e. a full frontal confrontation with loss.

The transformative element of intertextuality is again invoked by Kristeva in Revolution in Poetic Language (1974) where she formulates intertextuality as a process of transpositioning in order to communicate it as "the passage from one signing system to another [which] demands a new articulation of the thetic - of enunciative and denotative positionality" (Kristeva: 1986 [1984], 111). It is due to such transpositional action that the thetic is modified and the represented 'I' transgressed in reading, criss-crossed by what may be termed a 'mosaic' of references. This is not to posit a place of 'I' in prior denotation but that 'I' is actually constituted by such movement which continually threatens to undo its presence or identity. Diana refers to herself continually in "her own words" using the third person pronoun, undercutting herself in her utterance and questioning, albeit unintentionally, the liminality of identity. The source itself exhibits its splitting. With reference to her therapy, she speaks of what "the Diana that was still very much there" had decided, claiming an agency in her split-off state (46). She states that "I was 'a problem' and they had registered Diana as a problem" (47); at this time, she says that "what Diana thought was going to come into it - yet" (51). This split voice is continued in Diana's narration of her supernatural premonitions when a small voice inside her head tells her about her future: "And a voice said to me inside: 'You won't be Queen but you'll have a tough role'" (36). "From day one," she states, "I always knew I would never be the next Queen. No-one said that to me - I just knew it" (65). She claims to have inhabited another time and space as a nun and says that she experienced a premonition of her father's death (31). She also foretells the death of Charles' horse Allibar, pronouncing that he would fall dead with a heart attack. Morton reports that in true performative fashion the horse collapsed "within seconds of her uttering those words" (124). Diana also claimed to experience a lot of déjà vu with respect to places and people (69).
There is an evacuation of time and space in these common-place expressions of the supernatural, what psychoanalysis refers to as paramnesia. Here is a dis-jointed identity which is at odds with its own textual place, expressing an off-centring in what Diana refers to as "the set-up" (65). It is important to associate the amount of slippage in thetic identity with the rigidity of the "cage" so that the off-centring of 'I' is in reciprocal relation to the amount of pressure applied to it through the textualizing process proliferating itself "everywhere, everywhere, the system, and the media" (65). The subject of enunciation is then caught up in "the set-up" of the text, has indeed been set up by a linguistic exchange mechanism which iterates 'I' as non-reducible to tangible totality.

Speaking after her divorce, Diana stated that "[f]rom now on I am going to own myself and be true to myself. I no longer want to live someone else's idea of what and who I should be. I am going to be me" (Cited by Morton, 264). This acts as an ironic declaration by a subject so implicitly written into its place as Diana. 'I am going to be me' is a paradoxical statement which exhibits the split between the enunciating subject and the subject of its enunciation, between the cognitive 'I' and the subjected 'I' of linguistic mechanics. The 'I' is indeed rendered powerless in this 'set-up' at the very moment of its agency. Diana's postulation draws attention to a double space of identity as it is textualized with an attendant reference to process. It engages with the futurity of 'me' as destination of trajectory of 'I' so that intentionality is expressed only as a masquerade of 'full presence'.

Desire & Textual Subversion

In the proliferation of the story of Diana, one of the effects of her constant representation has been to off-centre the very notion of her definitive story. The transgression of her identity is set in direct reciprocal relation to how 'true' the story pertains to be, i.e. the harder it tries, the more it off-centres itself: in its authorized establishment lies its dis-establishment. In the readerly encounter there is an activated function of scriptor imploded into the text. This implosion takes place in relation to textual production as it intersects the reading 'I' which is intimately implicated due to its desiring agency. In the dialectics of desire set up within the structural dimensionality of the text, the 'I' seeks to insert itself in the textual body: "I felt I knew her personally." What are normally considered the private processes of ego configuration and personal identity are here in direct relation to a textual process as it is perpetuated in the public sphere so that a radical transgression of the category of what we refer to as identity is implicit to telling one's own 'true story' or that of an other.

The private/public transgressions of the liminality of identity are nowhere more evident than in contestations over Diana's body which constitutes an area of obvious debate in relation to questions of ownership, power and discourse. She has been bodily fixed at different times of her life, pinned down by the flesh rendered docile in its endless constitution via representation for mass consumption. For Foucault, "[a] body is docile which may be subjected, used, transformed and improved" (Foucault: 1977 [1975], 136). Hers was the sexy body of the fiancee in a flimsy skirt, hers was the thin body of the disappearing wife due to the protestations of anorexia/bulima, hers was the body pregnant with the nation's heir apparent. Later bodily manifestations included the body-guarded body, the muscled and 'strong woman' body, and finally the dead body publicly mourned and incessantly photographed though separated by a wall of lead. In these bodily presentations, 'she' is everywhere and nowhere at the same time: her fascination assured by never being fully present to the viewer, thereby maintaining the distance required by the fetishist.

In the receptive/reading process, the reader desires full but impossible possession of the other there represented, activating a phantasy of erotic fullness in the act of receiving the autobiographic text. She is "the venerated icon, the projection of millions of fantasies, hopes and dreams" (294). This desire is installed in relation to a central point of negativity, an
absence or loss which is related to deathliness in the Lacanian scheme which in a continuation of Freudian theory overlays nothingness by the symbolic. The rituals of mourning are then implicitly tied to symbolic loss. To continue this Lacanian analogy, when this loss became actualized in the death of Diana, there was an almighty crash between the imaginary and the real in millions of subjectivities. The radical diaspora of a desperately dispossessed identity reverberated through the investments of millions of bereaved subjectivities.

Mastery and Submission : Tales of Power

As the destination of a million and more fantasies, this royal pin-up girl of men, women and children offered a never-to-be-attained romantic liaison. Her fascination worked through distance, her enigmatic promise relied precisely on its impossible attainment. Her attraction was a lure, sometimes synthesized by media attention, whilst at other times, she was directly involved in offering herself up as an invitation in a carefully staged seduction bid aimed at the entanglement of "the people" in love with her image. When Diana became involved with Dodi Fayed, she teased reporters with forthcoming revelations, allowing herself to be photographed kissing Dodi on board his yacht, 'Jonikal'. This romance served a voyeuristic and vicarious pleasure for those who would never attain closeness with their idol: it positioned itself as a "true romance", the 'real thing'. Here we are offered the last great love story of this century. "As whirlwind romances go, this was a tornado" says Morton (279). Dodi informed his ex-wife Suzanne Gregard that "Diana and I are having a romance, a true romance" (278). Diana had at last entered the charmed circle of a real-life scenario of romance that she had so often read about.

The teenage Diana had been an avid consumer of Barbara Cartland's fiction. Morton tells us that "Diana was a great fan of the romantic novels of her step-grandmother Barbara Cartland, who brought copies of her latest books for Diana when she visited Althorp House" (Photo caption, 96-7). Cartland's fiction offers the reader a world of fantasy circuiting around power, an area where mastery and submission is eroticised, where the virginal (aristocratic) heroine is overwhelmed by the absolute power of the (aristocratic) hero. A photograph published in the Morton text shows a young Diana on the sofa surrounded by a plentiful supply of Cartland novels. A Touch of Love, a novel published in 1978 and contemporary with Diana's teenage years, gives us the following typical scene between hero and heroine:

... he made the hearth-rug seem almost a dais from which he reigned supreme and she was nothing but a supplicant coming before him almost on her knees.

(Cartland: 1978, 74)

It is significant to note that Cartland's heroines all have recourse to supernatural premonitions and interventions in the narrative much like the 'Princess of Hearts' herself. It might also be contiguous in rhetorical terms that Cartland was herself referred to as the 'Queen of Hearts' in a C.B.S. television interview in April, 1977. It would seem that elements of this fictive textuality were absorbed into the life text of Lady Diana to surface in her negotiations as Princess.

In her interview with Morton, Diana relates the fantasy that "my husband would look after me. He would be a father figure" (61). During Charles and Diana's courtship, Diana was required to refer to Prince Charles as 'Sir' and when asked to marry him, answered 'Yes please' (106, 36). Morton comments,

She was his willing puppy who came to heel when he whistled ... He called her Diana, she addressed him as 'Sir' (121)
Here then is an inequality in interpellation. She comes to her name, she is Diana, the performative designation of that signifier whilst Charles is designated by a title which renders him immobile in a staticity of absolute mastery and wields linguistic power over her. She is subject to his will, subjectified by his hailing of her; in an Althusserian framework, she is made subject by being made subject. Althusser states that

... all ideology is centred, [ ] the Absolute Subject occupies the unique place of the Centre, and interpellates around it the infinity of individuals into subjects in a double mirror-connexion such that it subjects the subjects to the Subject...

(Althusser: 1971, 168 - emphasis as original.)

It is important to remember that Diana entered this structure as a desiring pro-royalist, a willing participant in what the Archbishop of Canterbury referred to as "the stuff of which fairytales are made" (132). When the fairytale fell apart and the husband did not look after her, Diana twisted feminist rhetoric to romantic textual scenario to make a linguistic amalgam with which to re-negotiate her identity as a "queen in people's hearts", thereby transferring the rhetoric of romance onto her royal role. In her BBC Panorama interview (November 1995), she stated that "someone's got to go out there and love people and show it" (261). In a narcissistic investment with self-image, Diana cared for people and was shown to care for people by photographic evidence in a self-absorbed projection of failed romance onto 'the people' enlisted to supplement her own lack in a failed marriage.

In the classic scenario of romance fiction, there is an evacuation of identity in the jouissant encounter of one and other so that two subjectivities merge in a fantasised situation of perfect blissful union. Lacan refers to jouissance as an intense and excessive pleasure/pain associated with sexual coming and religious mysticism (Lacan: 1982 [1972-3]). In A Touch of Love, the heroine experiences "an ecstasy and a rapture that was indescribable sweep through her body. It was so vivid, so intense that it was partly a sharp pain" (158). Cartland goes on to associate this with the "very essence of love" which results in an ultimate out-of-body experience for the united couple (158). The undoing/dissolution of 'I' is here so intense that it evacuates identity and translates into the bodily location by which we orientate ourselves in time and space. In his study of the structure of romance, Northrop Frye identifies its "structural core [as] the individual loss or confusion or break in the continuity of identity". (Frye: 1976, 104) Here is a romantic diaspora of dispossessed identity which Diana had textual recourse to, writing herself into the heroine's place so that textuality might be said to have had its effects in her lived bodily experience.9

In this self-dissolution there is a transgressional ambivalence of the economic affects of one and other in a dynamic scenario in which one is the object of the other as it is subjectified through the dialectical power of synthesis in a Hegelian framework. Lacan relates this to a process of 'normal transitivism' through which the organism orders itself according to its bodily image. It is in its encounter with the other that it learns to place itself spatially and learns where 'I' begin and end. Lacan reveals this as an "erotic relation" between the organism and the other (Lacan: 1977, 19), a process which leaves a deep "structural ambivalence" in the subject.

...by means of an identification with the other he sees the whole gamut of bearing and display, whose structural ambivalence is clearly revealed in his behaviour, the slave being identified with the despot, the actor with the spectator, the seduced with the seducer. (Lacan: 1977, 19)

Here is an erotics of aggressivity related to primary narcissism in the subject base, i.e. in the constitution of its ego. This structural ambivalence may be traced through the Hegelian dialectic with which Lacan was working with reference to the constitution of the subject in the power mechanics of one and other: master-slave, captor-captive, hunter-hunted, torturer and
tortured. There is a kinetics of 'I' here in this crossroads of identity so that one is no longer aware of where one ends and the other begins. Morton describes Diana's love-hate relationship with her home at Kensington Palace "as hostages are said to do with their captors" (237). The place where she felt most trapped was also the place of which she said, "I feel secure here" (237). In her analysis of torture, Elaine Scarry explains this as the "objectification of the prisoner's world dissolution" and refers to the room in which pain is experienced as "a magnification of the body [and] simultaneously a miniaturization of the world" (Scarry: 1985, 38). In this power dynamic, we encounter the blurred boundaries between subject and object, 'I' and other, the story and the teller as it is negotiated through the body. Diana's identity was synthesized and drawn from such yet simultaneously she was "held captive by her public image" (202). The liminal boundaries of identity have been broken down in this scenario, the category 'I' is transgressed; as subject borders are crossed over continually, an oscillation in identification occurs which has its affects most readily around real bodily space. Morton tells that,

Nowhere was this ambiguous relationship more apparent than with her personal bodyguards. They were at once her gaolers and her friends. (251)

Hers was a body under siege, a disputed territory. Her acronym P.O.W. was commented upon by her friends "as meaning 'prisoner of war" (202). During her courtship by Charles, she complained of "the virtual siege she was living under" (118 - my emphasis.)

Transgressing the Liminal Boundaries of Identity

I always felt different - I felt I was in the wrong shell. (72)

To say we were hoping for a boy is to say to a daughter that she has let you down. (Orbach: 1978, 170)

Diana complained of being in the wrong body. In her own Spencer life script, she and her brother Charles would speculate as young children about whether or not either of them would have existed if their deformed brother John had lived: their lives were crossed through by the shadow of death. Diana's own birth was accompanied by the patriarchal-aristocratic imperative for a son and heir so that she was indeed in the wrong body.

In Diana's young mind her brother's gravestone, with its simple 'In Loving Memory' epitaph, was a permanent reminder that, as she later recalled: 'I was the girl who was supposed to be a boy.' (79)

It was a bodily disphoria which was to reverberate in her adult life, replayed in her absorption by the system in which she found herself, disappearing within the royal framework she referred to as a 'cage'.

The extent of Diana's self-alienation caused her to attack her own liminal boundaries of being through bulimia and self-harm. By making "score marks on her body" (140), she attempted to communicate the incommunicable, to signify bodily the pain of a fragmented identity at odds with the constant bombardment of texts it was being offered. Morton tells us that she "slashed at" her wrists with a razor blade, cut herself with the serrated edge of a lemon slicer and cut her chest and thighs with a penknife (140). Through breaking the skin and self-induced vomiting and perhaps her later fixation with colonic irrigation, Diana negotiated the limits of her corporeal frame. In Kristevan theories of the abject, the clean and proper self is maintained by a perpetual ousting of the repellant pollutant as that which threatens the perceived unity of the organism (Kristeva: 1982 [1980]). Within this theoretical framework, it is possible to interpret Diana's bodily negotiations as a means of maintaining
and controlling boundaries in what became popularly referred to as "the war of the Wales". Her battles in the face of dissolution became a means of identifying where the territory of 'Diana' began and ended.

As the container of the viscera of being, the skin is integral to our imago in the primal relation and therefore implicit to the constitution of the ego. It is through the surface of the body that the organism comes to feel and invest in its boundaries. In The Ego and the Id (1923), Freud states specifically that the "[t]he ego is first and foremost a bodily ego" and that furthermore "[i]t may thus be regarded as a mental projection of the surface of the body..." (Freud: 1986, 451). There is then a special relation between the cutaneous surface of the organism and its ego formation which has its beginnings in the primal relation between the maternal-figuring body and that of the infant who learns its limits through those of another. Acting in response to the maternal absence in her own life, Diana claimed that "I hug my children to death" (71). Disturbances in the primal relation have been linked to the psychical structuring that manifests its affects in self-harm and in anorexia nervosa and bulimia. To break the skin in textual terms is to cross the bar of the signifier into the signified and to tangle with 'the Real' in an encounter with that which cannot be signified. This would link the signifier to implicit presence which is only achieved through death or psychosis. This is because signification depends upon absence in order to properly 'stand in'. To achieve whole presence to itself, signification would need to invert the very precondition for meaning, turning itself inside out in a literal invisceration. Here is a place where text and body collide in a semiotics of carnality tied up in what Laplanche refers to as "a sack of skin" which is the ego (Laplanche: 1976 [1970] 81). Speaking of her persona as the Princess of Wales, Diana states that "it took me six years to get comfortable in this skin" (49). When Diana became more comfortable in "this skin", her 'special touch' was often commented upon. She was seen to be a tactile human being rather than an 'untouchable' member of the royal family.

The Broken Body - The Text in bits-and-pieces

It is a point to remember that of all the ironies about Diana, perhaps the greatest was this - a girl given the name of the ancient goddess of hunting was, in the end, the most hunted person of the modern age.

(Charles Spencer's funeral address, 6 September 1997 cited by Morton, 293)

In his funeral speech, Charles Spencer referred to the classical myth of Diana with reference to the relentless media hunt surrounding his sister. It was, he said, ironic that a woman named after the Roman goddess of hunting was herself hunted to death. In the ancient Greek myth, Acteon looked upon the nakedness of the bathing goddess Artemis and was subsequently torn apart by his own hounds. As ancient myths of disintegration are re-played across the spectrum of rhetoric and popular myth-making media, Diana turns vengeance on herself. In our modern version, it is Diana who is made to pay the price of the voyeur as the tale is turned back upon itself in an incestuous recoil of the narrative. She is herself violently punished and torn apart for being looked upon. Reports of her fate were scattered amongst newspapers across the world, each releasing different fragments for their readers' delectation thereby satisfying the narcissistic-aggressive impulses of mass spectacle. It can be seen here that theoretical postulations of our psychical constitution are implicitly tied to observations of social contract and power dynamic in a theory of civilized disease. Freudian theory posits that unpleasure is central to pleasure, that it is the threat of undoing that acts as agency to meaning. Fragmentation is then necessary to wholeness as that violence in relation to which the text holds together as a semiotic device. The 'wholeness' of the representation falls under the shadow of the stress applied to it so that the narrative functioning as the containing skin of the text which is named and synonymous in reading with 'Diana' may unperform itself through its very proliferation. The dead and dying body of Diana is incessantly picked over in attempts to
make sense of a story without an end. In the post-mortems we perform on Diana's story, we enter her textual body after death.\textsuperscript{10}

The broken and dying body of Diana ruptured the skin of the vessel of popular investment. Her damaged body in the wreckage of the car accident became embroiled in a mass fantasy of the kind imagined by J.G. Ballard's \textit{Crash} (1973). Her death became eroticised and photographed in a blaze of voyeurism as attempts to piece together the last movements of that dying body become an inter-national speculation of pornographic proportions. The woman who inspired books entitled \textit{Her Life in Pictures} became as photographed in death as in life as her dead body became a phantasmatic object of voyeuristic desire. The photographs taken of the funeral procession and of the coffin bear witness to this last desperate attempt to fully possess the object through the gaze of the lens.

In its unfinished state of premature ending, there is an open aperture in the Diana text acting as a gaping wound we enter and re-enter repeatedly in order to promulgate there our own desires and griefs. It acts as an arena in which our own negotiations with 'Thanatos' and unpleasure may reverberate with regard to the broken maternal in the shape of a story cut short so that we may never know its end or obtain its 'truth'. As a fetish point where the body is transgressed, we phantasize over her dead body. There has been a voyeuristic interest in Diana's 'last words' and macabre fascination over the existence of the 'last photographs' allegedly sold to a German magazine. The paparazzi pursuing the princess to death were condemned yet, through world-wide television coverage of the funeral, we were able to watch photographs of photographs being taken of a coffin-veiled body accompanied by a macabre applause echoing along The Mall. This body was still performing even in death.

In relation to Diana's narrative, we find ourselves installed on a collision course with theoretical positioning. Her story may be seen to interlock with the functioning of psychoanalytical theories of 'deathliness' as an encounter with 'the real'. Its result is seen in an outbreak of mass hysteria in which grief is expressed in the public space. Newspapers proclaimed this country to be a 'Cry-baby Britain' as the national body was perceived to be 'sick', displaying its ailments of bereavement to be filmed and re-played across the world. In a text turned inside-out, we became voyeurs to our own displays of 'suffering', playing 'Diana' to ourselves through blinking television monitors. In a supremely post-modern scenario, it is possible to locate the undoing of post-modernism in theoretical terms as the human looks for a narrative on a grand scale, seeking to supply the ending to its desperate diaspora.

\textbf{Enforced Closure and Grief}

It is in the enforced closure of such a tale that has not been perceived to reach its end that a severe withdrawal and mourning process may occur which manifests itself as a grief that will not "go quietly". So many people were affected by the death of Diana that there was a nationwide need for counselling due to re-awakened griefs. Doctors spoke of the 'Diana Syndrome' (294). With reference to theories of the post-modern, this would either seem to open up a very real divide between reality and theory here or work to illustrate operative textuality as a textual rhetoric which had found its way into mass consciousness. Whichever way we turn, this scenario offers us a very different position from Lyotard's conjecture that we no longer mourn for grand narrative when he states that "[m]ost people have lost the nostalgia for the lost narrative" (Lyotard: 1997 [1984], 41). This is a negotiation with deathliness as it is encountered in the narrative process on a large scale. There is then an argument that the story of the life and death of Diana, itself a post-modern phenomenon, represents an ironic story where post-modernism 'catches' against itself.
Ironic Metanarrative

'Born a Princess, died a Saint'

(Slogan on T-shirts printed to coincide with Diana's funeral.)

For as long as there are poets, playwrights, and men with hearts to break, tales will be
told of the princess who died across the water and returned home to be crowned a
queen, the queen of all our hearts. (295)

If this story of 'Diana' provides us with an ironic metanarrative for a post-modern arena, it is
exemplary of the fact that post-modernism cannot rid itself of the metanarrative. Far from
eradicating the metanarrative, post-modernism relies upon its operative concept for its very
existence. In its very post-modernity, the 'Diana' text refers us back to the metanarrative
through its return to the archi-apparatus operative in such established forms as christianity and
the monarchy, embracing what Morton refers to as "the monarchy of our dreams and
fantasies" (308).11 Much as the aesthetic object of narrative relies upon the referential
positionality of fragmentation and deathliness in order to define itself as complete and
circulating in 'the real', so the post-modern through its very proliferation of narrative position
and transgressive moves in the area of identity takes its pleasure in "new games" which pay
homage to metanarrative through their very dynamic.
AFTERWORDS
Afterwords

This study of psycho-analysis and textual production has attempted to examine the mechanisms of critical encounter in relation to the psychoanalytical text and the literary text. It analyses the literary text through the activating texts of psycho-analysis and likewise applies the tools of literary criticism to psycho-analysis itself. In doing so, it draws attention to the linguistic re-iteration which exists between the two disciplines and the cross-filtering of rhetorical space that occurs. Theories offered by psycho-analysis are considered to be flexible and activating, a living and full presence which has its parallel in the reading act which occurs in engaged critical practice as it is employed in textual analysis.

The early texts of psycho-analysis receive close attention in the first part of the thesis. This is to draw out the beginnings of a new critical practice which may be seen to be close to that of literary critical practice, especially when we take into consideration the attention paid by Breuer and Freud to metaphor and literary references. The interpretative act is central to both practices and the space in which such interpretative response takes place may be seen to occupy a new positioning with regard to the textual object of the subject's scrutiny: a responsive inter-position. That early psycho-analysis was developed in conjunction with contemporary theoretical problems presented by the phenomenon of hysteria gives an interesting picture of linguistic theory and analysis in practice and offers an especially rich area of metaphorical interplay in the texts themselves. The constant re-writing and re-presentations to which this area of psychoanalytical history has been subjected adds yet another dimension of textual interest, drawing attention as it does to the evaluative procedures at play in interpretation. The historical distortions which may come to bear upon an 'original' text reveal cultural mythology whilst simultaneously pressing us to question the 'true' and 'original'.

What may be seen to be a definitely historically located theory may be the result of a number of acculturative and interpretative conjunctures, an over-determination in textual terms to apply Freud's terminology used with reference to the hysterical symptom. Psycho-analysis is not therefore regarded as an ossified monolith or meta-narration, not a method to be applied but an evolutionary enactment in which texts may be seen to interact. That Josef Breuer should regard "every theory [as] a temporary structure" is illustrative of this critical awareness at the beginnings of psycho-analysis itself and imperative and integral to its very beginnings (Sulloway: 1992, 88). The interventions of Lacan and Kristeva are drawn upon in the textual readings of Part Two to illustrate this mechanism of activation in a post-modern setting.

The second part of the thesis is composed of different textual readings, each section is discrete yet closely interlinks with other sections due to the parameters within which such readings are activated. Each reading may be considered to be integral to its 'setting'. The various texts treated include realist narrative, the strict form of pattern poetry, cultural texts, 'feminist' fiction, the children's novel, and what is widely considered to be pornographic material. The various figures of these texts become meta-tropic as they traverse the boundaries of their own enclosure: the child, the bereaved mother, the daughter, princess and pervert wander in and out of each text and into the next whilst haunted by the last. These texts cross-reference each other thematically and in their activation of and by psycho-analytical texts whilst, it may be argued, displaying a parallel relation with hysterical positioning in their textual mechanism. As such, they may be regarded to be distinctly post-modern literary products and offer an interesting area for the re-modulations offered by theoretical encounter. Here post-modernism itself may be seen to have forerunning attachment to a doctor's concerns at the end of the nineteenth-century, illustrating the radical nature of Breuer and Freud's theorization of hysterical phenomena. Occupying a position of critical hindsight, the post-modern critic might be seen to operate as a ghost from the future in the texts of the past.
It is considered that such textual readings offer a new strategy of critical practice, a new reading practice which is an holistic coalition of psychoanalytical and literary analyses. If, in critical reception, it is accepted that the critic occupies the same position as the analyst, we are faced with a textual parallel of the psychoanalytical concept of counter-transference as the textual space may be seen to be one of a transferential intertext. Such a space might be constituted by a projection between reading and writing subjects. This space of the transference as it figures as intertext presents us with an intellectual transpositioning which layers the critical response into separate spheres in which the critic is engaged with reading as a re-writing of the text as object of desire. In so doing, the critic actively occupies an hysterical position, negotiating with a *condition seconde* as it is interposed in the reading process. The interpretative act is an interlude of textual haunting where the critic enters the text as ghost and is a reciprocal host to that of the text itself, thereby occupying a place of double haunting. 'Full' interpretation usually leads to an exorcism of such possession, a critical settlement which seeks to fully possess what cannot be fully possessed. It seems that the object of critical desire is to materialize what eludes us in reading. The critical reader might therefore be seen to be caught in an engagement with what Lacan terms the *objet a* as the locus of critical desire, the phantom of the phantasy of a 'real' text. The readings offered here seek to escape such established critical practice. They present themselves as interactive arenas, thereby emphasizing the topological dimensionality of the textual so that the tropes and metaphors of writing may be seen to be inhabited by the desiring reader/writer. Such practice offers a challenge to the established literary acquisition of psychoanalysis as a formulaic tool with which to prise open texts. It also seeks to escape from what have become mythical and monolithic aspects of psychoanalysis in literary practice as it is incessantly applied with respect to various set dramas such as the Oedipal crisis. Instead the readings here seek to present an activating space between texts, an 'in-between' critical space. This space must be different from that afforded by either the text or the reader separately, it is rather a place of activated marks rendered up through the desiring process. That there is an operative dialectics of the reading process is recognized in and by psychoanalysis. This space offers the reader a 'door to the Mothers', as an entrance to an unknown and wonderful realm - made by us yet unknown to us - a mystery in our own mechanism, and carried in our mechanics of relativity as reading and writing organisms. In this space lies a somatics of the textual. The textual readings presented here then seek to display the mechanism behind the therapeutic practices of psychoanalysis and ally them with critical analyses applied in textual encounters.

It is hoped that the thesis demonstrates the flexibility and interaction which may occur between theory and the text of its scrutiny, between theoretical text and literary text, which activates intertextual connections. The textual analyses offered are motivated not by the application of a stronghold of theory but a reading in conjunction with theory where the psychoanalytical is also treated as a text in a virtual encounter which opens up the space of critical practice. The form in which this study is written, split into two different locations or mirroring parts which are themselves composed of multiple sections, might be considered as illustrative of the split state of the reading and writing subject. In its presentation of its own somatic wholeness as a text via a number of conspiring and determining connective tissues and nodules of textuality, it balances between wholeness and fragmentation in its own argumentative functioning. It is hoped that by writing in such a format, the thesis mirrors its subject matter and enacts the shifting wholeness which may be attained in order to project subjectivity as presence. To write 'T' in the sentences of critical position is considered to be an ironic positioning of wholeness made possible only by the constantly reiterated threat of fragmentation as a necessary dynamic in any composition.

...the interest the subject takes in his own split is bound up with that which determines it... (Lacan: 1994 [1973], 83)
Notes

Introduction

1. Jones notes that the first use of the term 'psycho-analysis' was in a paper by Freud published in French, 30 March 1896 and in German, 15 May 1896. Both papers were submitted at the same time and were identical in content (Jones: 1953, 269).

2. Freud's description of Nachträglichkeit may be found in a footnote to 'From the history of an infantile neurosis ("The Wolfman")' (1918 [1914]). SE XVII, 45. It is interesting that, in an addition to Freud's footnote, Strachey refers to Freud's forerunning formulations of Nachträglichkeit in relation to retention hysteria in Studies on Hysteria.

The Parameters of Interpretation: "[F]ulfilling the law of the pendulum"

1. In 1890, Bertha Pappenheim published her second collection of short stories for children entitled In der Trodelbude (In the Second-Hand Shop). A second edition was published in 1894. (Published under the pseudonym P. Berthold.)

2. We do not, for instance, lift Nelly Dean from the pages of Wuthering Heights to promote her as primary story-teller. To do so would displace Emily Brontë from authorship of the text and would constitute a methodological error because it fails to demarcate representation from the act of representing. Because Nelly Dean is represented as a representer does not endow her with the agency to represent.

3. It has been suggested that Breuer's deep involvement with his patient was due to a counter-transference whereby many of the traumas of his patient reflected those of his own early life and that this caused a feed-back situation existing as a psychical dialectic between himself and his young patient. The transference phenomenon was, of course, then unrecognized and it was not until the termination of treatment that the erotics of the therapeutic situation became apparent. For a full account of this hypotheses see Pollock, George H. (1968). This bears resemblance to Ernest Jones' account of the relation between Breuer and Pappenheim where he states that "[i]t would seem that Breuer had developed what we should nowadays call a strong counter-transference to his interesting patient" (Jones: 1953, 246). For an account of the relationship between the doctor and his patient, see Hirschmüller: 1989, 126-131.


5. Frank Sulloway comments upon this mythmaking around the figure of Freud. (Sulloway 5-8) Erik H. Erikson writes of Freud as "a man who grew to be a myth before our eyes" (Erikson: 1957, 77).

6. I principally refer here to accounts by Freud (1925 [1924]) and by Jones (1953).

7. For accounts which run contrary to this, see Ellenberger: 1972, 439, 554. Ellenberger makes reference to several contemporary accounts of the occasion as they were reported in Viennese and German medical journals.
8. It is interesting that in the account of his own aetiology, Freud employs the same phrase. In *An Autobiographical Study*, Freud includes an account of anti-semitic feeling projected against him at university and writes that "at an early age I was made familiar with the fate of being in the Opposition..." (*SE* XX, 9)

9. See Jones 255 and Sulloway 42. Sulloway states that Freud continued to attend meetings and records exist of him having been present at the Society of Physicians on 13 May, 1887 and 21 October, 1887, and 3 February, 1888. On 16 February 1887, his name was proposed for membership and he was duly elected to the society. He remained a member until the outbreak of war in 1938. In terms of continued academic activity, he continued to present papers until 1904 and his University lectures continued until 1917.

10. See Jones 252-5 for another view of these events. Jones does point out, in his interpretation of Freud's account, that "[o]ne might gather from his remarks that he ceased attending medical meetings ever after, but that was very far from being so." It is therefore odd that after a period of nearly forty years Freud's emotions were still so agitated about the poor reception of this early paper.

11. There have been few studies carried out exclusively on Breuer. The most exhaustive and valuable research has been carried out by Albrecht Hirschmüller (1989 [1978]). Recuperative work has also been done by Henri Ellenberger (1970 & 1972) and Paul Cranefield (1958 & 1970). It is significant that there is no work available on or by Breuer existing in current print, the only exception being the co-authored *Studies on Hysteria*.

12. Records of their early friendship may be found in Jones (1953) and Hirschmüller: 1989, 133-135. The close and intimate relationship between the two men may also be traced through Freud's letters to Martha Bernays. See *Letters* 55-6, 87, 103-105 116, 118, 127, 215. See also Freud's letters to Breuer: *Ibid.*, 231-233 & 236. Freud's letter to Breuer of 3 May 1889 greets him as a "Dearest Friend and best loved of Men!" (236)

13. Bertha Pappenheim was also part of this rather incestuous circle of middle-class acquaintance where doctors and patients, friends and family were mixed up together. Bertha was friends with Martha Bernays, Freud's fiancée and reference is made to her in letters between the engaged couple. In his letter of 13 July 1883, Freud writes of a conversation with Breuer and there he says that "your friend Bertha Pappenheim also cropped up..." (Freud: 1961, 56) There is another interesting and pertinent link between Martha Bernays and Bertha Pappenheim. In 1880, after the death of Martha's father, her mother Emmeline appointed Bertha's father as legal guardian of her children. This would link Bertha's trauma at the death of her father to Freud's future wife's loss of her guardian and the implicit loss of her own father. (This account is given in Appignanesi and Forrester: 1992, 80-81. They give no reference to source material, however.)

14. See Masson: 1985, 294, letter of 16 January 1898 and 296, letter of 22 January 1898 where reference is made to debts to Breuer, "(2,300 florins, I would estimate)". For interesting details re. the ensuing "distressing disagreement" between the two men over this debt, see Freud's letters to Fleiss: 18 October 1893 & 16 January 1898. (Masson: 1985, 59, 60n, 294 & 296)

15. Jones makes a tentative suggestion that Breuer might have been instrumental in procuring for Freud the work of translating John Stuart Mill's *The Subjection of Women*. Jones suggests that Breuer may have passed Freud's name to Franz Brentano who then suggested it to Theodor Gomperz, editor of Mill's collected writings in German. (Jones: 1953, 61-2)

17. For accounts of Breuer’s research, see Hirschmüller 1989, 54-76 and Jones: 1953, 244. Breuer's research on the inner labyrinth of the ear was later plagiarized by Robert Bárány in his award-winning work on the inner ear and its role in the equilibrium function. (1914) When this was discovered in 1916, Bárány admitted having forgotten to cite Breuer's 1874 paper yet Breuer himself went on to make light of the incident and actually supported Bárány in the proceedings brought against him by the University of Vienna. (Hirschmüller: 1989, 75-76. Also Sulloway: 1992, 52)


19. Ernest Jones describes the relation as being that of father and son. Interestingly, he reports that the father turns against the son, rejecting him and cutting off support. (Jones: 1953, 338)

20. Jones writes, “In just these years Freud was in his most revolutionary stage, both intellectually and emotionally. The boycotting to which he was subjected induced in him a response of defiant rebelliousness. And when he was most in need of a companion with whom to share this, the one man who had the intellectual knowledge for the purpose and who had been the one to start him on his path only damped his ardour and withdrew from the fight.” (Jones: 1953, 281)


22. His break with Pappenheim was not so clean. His continued involvement is evidenced by documents of Bellevue Sanatorium in Kreutzlingen to which Pappenheim was removed after a relapse in her recovery (Hirschmüller 105-7). In a letter to Dr. Robert Binswanger of 27 August 1882, however, Recha Pappenheim details Breuer's refusal of further involvement in her daughter's treatment. She writes that "I should also have to accept a doctor in Vienna, since Dr. Breuer is unable to take over the treatment." (Hirschmüller 304).

23. For references to their collaboration, see Breuer & Freud: 1991 [1893/5]. Re. 'Frau Emmy von N., pp.110-11, 122, 136, 139, 161, 165. Re. 'Frau Cäcilie M., pp.33-4 where Strachey remarks on the joint treatment, pp.251. In addition to this Freud records in a note that Cäcilie is troubled by a hallucination in which "her two doctors - Breuer and I - were hanging on two trees next to each other in the garden." (255n.)

24. Dianne Hunter actually misconstrues this comment to the extent that the element of sexuality in a case of hysteria becomes something to do with sexual attractiveness. She states that, "Although Breuer states that Bertha Pappenheim was 'astonishingly underdeveloped' sexually, every commentator has remarked upon her physical attractions." (Hunter: 1983, 471) This reading is itself astonishing in its facile supposition and misappropriation in the interests of a crude feminist interpretation.

25. See also Freud, On the History of the Psycho-Analytic Movement (1915). (SE XIV 11-12)

26. Freud and Jones' version of events is refuted by Hirschmüller who refers to Freud's version of events as "an interpretative reconstruction. With increasing lapse of time after the events, this reconstruction became more and more consolidated and condensed. . . ." (Hirschmüller: 1989, 127) The pseudocyesis story is wholly disputed by Borch-Jacobsen
who states that “there is every reason to believe that it is sheer invention.” (Borch-Jacobsen: 1996, 33-44) Borch-Jacobsen takes issue with Jones’ account which claims that “[c]onfirmation of this account may be found in a then unpublished contemporary letter Freud wrote to Martha which contains substantially the same story.” (Jones: 1953, 247) Borch-Jacobsen reproduces this letter which, although it alludes to the relationship between Breuer and his patient, does not contain the same story. The letter which Borch-Jacobsen reproduces is translated by Peter Swales and is slightly different from the Paul Masson translation cited by John Forrester (Forrester: 1994, 19). This letter was to have been published as an appendix to the Masson edited Freud-Fliess letters but was later omitted. Borch Jacobsen is strong in his condemnation of Freud, “he’s lucky Breuer didn’t sue for defamation of character. A good lawyer, in two minutes flat, would have ripped Freud’s malicious ‘reconstructions’ to shreds” (Borch-Jacobsen: 1996, 43). That this nebulous area remains fascinating to Freud scholars in its elusivity is borne out by the recent publication by John Forrester and Laura Cameron in the International Journal of Psycho-Analysis of a previously unpublished letter from Freud to Sir Arthur Tansley, written in 1932. (Forrester and Cameron: 1999). The letter makes reference to the ‘Anna O.’ case and is compared by Forrester and Cameron to the Zweig letter, also of 1932. Its formulation of “a cure with a defect” provides the chief interest of their interpretation. The publication of these letters also raises questions around the access to early material from the Freud archives.

The Hen and the Hawk: Breuer's 'Theoretical' contribution to Studies on Hysteria (1895) and its influence on psycho-therapeutic theory

1. All subsequent unattributed references appearing in parenthesis in this section are to the 1991 Penguin edition of Breuer and Freud, Studies on Hysteria.

2. It should be borne in mind that Breuer is writing to Freud's new close friend after a difficult time in his relationship with Freud which later led to an estrangement between them.

3. This exchange is also commented upon by Jones: 1953, 266n.

4. Freud is here referring to the publication of Pierre Janet's Automatisme psychologique in 1889 followed by another study in 1892 which replicates some of Breuer's findings.

5. Evidence of this may be seen in Freud's letters to Fliess. Also see PFL 8, 57.

6. It is interesting that Freud makes a direct comparison between the possession of money and the hysterical symptom in his case history of 'Fräulein Elisabeth von R.' (Breuer and Freud: 1991, 248).

7. It is interesting to compare Freud's use of this metaphor borrowed from Goethe's Faust, Part II, Act I. In his letter to Stefan Zweig, he writes that Breuer did not have the courage to open the 'door to the Mothers'. (Freud to Zweig, 2 June 1932. Freud: 1960, 408-9) Continuing this psychoanalytic tradition, Lacan echoes this allusive metaphor when in Écrits he speaks of "[t]he return to the shades" (Lacan: 1977, 123).

8. The first appearance of the 'unconscious' as a term occurs in Breuer's case history of 'Fräulein Anna O.' It is, however, attributed to Freud by Strachey in his notes. The grounds for this attribution are not known.
9. This is a danger of feminist acquisitions of the Lacanian phallus.

10. Freud makes reference to the excavation of the trauma beneath archeological layers in his case history of 'Elisabeth von R.' He writes that "[t]his procedure was one of clearing away the pathogenic psychical material layer by layer, and we liked to compare it with the technique of excavating a buried city" (Breuer and Freud: 1991, 206).

11. We may compare Lacan's reference to the jouissance of St. Theresa in 'God and the Jouissance of The Woman'. Freud, in his contribution, also refers to religious mystics and erotic fantasies of nuns in analysis but does not make direct reference to St. Theresa.

12. Freud employed electro-therapy in his treatment of 'Elisabeth von R.' He writes that, "I reserved to myself treatment of her legs with high tension electric currents, in order to be able to keep in touch with her... she seemed to take quite a liking to the painful shocks produced by the high tension apparatus" (Breuer and Freud: 1991, 205).

13. My use of the term 'discharge' is used in the same sense as Breuer and Freud used it and is employed to denote freed energy. It is not used in the strict sense correct to electrical systems where it denotes an undesired leakage of energy.

14. Without wishing to complicate such a scenario at this point, it is necessary to point out that this third form of energy which acts as a trigger to discharge may also act in an inhibiting manner in order to maintain the system. Its trigger is one of discharge or inhibition in accordance with its regulating function. It may return the released energy to its quiescent state if the organism is in any way threatened with self-dissolution, i.e. overload of the system. When a certain threshold has been exceeded, the same trigger may be involved in returning the energy to a manageable state via an avalanche effect. At all times, this triggering energy is working in the interests of the system as a whole and its function is strictly tied to this context. In the electrical circuit, a correlative mechanism may be found in the regulating function of the zenor diode in its facilitation of a split system by allowing a reverse polarity system should a certain limit be exceeded. The inhibiting function of the trigger is explored in relation to the Lacanian concept of jouissance later in this section.

15. Here we may make another analogy with electrical phenomena in the function of the capacitor in the electrical circuit. Capacitors serve the function of a reserve in the electrical system, they have been charged and release stored energy when called upon to do so in what is a self-regulating scenario. This is a complicated picture due to peculiarities of the resistor with respect to AC and DC current, however.


17. Strachey notes that Freud comments, near the beginning of 'On the History of the Psycho-Analytic Movement' (1914) (SE XIV, 3 / PFL 15) on his name here in brackets. Freud states that although Breuer attributed this concept to him, the idea actually occurred to both of them simultaneously (Breuer and Freud: 1991, 282n).


19. Freud gives an account of this episode in An Autobiographical Study (1925 [1924]). Upon waking, the patient “threw her arms round my neck. The unexpected entrance of a servant relieved us from a painful discussion, but from that time onwards there was a tacit
understanding between us that hypnotic treatment should be discontinued. I was modest enough not to attribute the event to my own irresistible attraction, and I felt that I had now grasped the nature of the mysterious element that was at work behind hypnotism" (SE XX 27). Jones comments on the episode by comparing Freud favourably against Breuer: "Unlike the scared Breuer on a similar occasion, Freud regarded the problem as one of general scientific interest" (Jones: 1953, 267).

20. If we take this into account together with the influence of English philosophy on Freud, evidence of which may be found in his early monograph On Aphasia (1891), and Freud's formulation of the concept of regression drawn from Hughlings Jackson's notion of regression in his work on aphasia, then we may trace back the aetiology of Freud's technique of 'free association' to one in which a number of converging associative theories meet in what constitutes a state of overdetermination for a new psychotherapeutic therapy.

21. Freud and Martha Bernays became engaged on 17 June 1882. Freud was then 26 years old and Martha 21. They married in 1886, the same year in which Freud set up in private practice in Vienna.

22. Writing to Martha in 1885, Freud reminds her of the origins of his 'Little Princess' nickname for her: "I said that roses and pearls fall from your lips as with the Princess in the fairy tale and that one is left wondering only whether it is goodness or intelligence that has the upper hand with you. This is how you acquired the name of Little Princess" (Freud: 1961, 202).

"In the new house she hallucinated her old room": Hysterical Topology and the Phantasy of Gender

1. This section is to be published in modified form as a paper of the same title in American Imago. Forthcoming.

2. The hysteric's absorption of object into the self in face of loss is in direct correlation to the compensatory hallucination of the phantom limb. The loss of the limb must be a "sudden loss" according to Schilder and it is often hallucinated "rigid" (Schilder: 1935, 63-4). Here we may compare Anna O.'s rigid arm operative as a transposition of the genital in the face of trauma caused by the loss of her adored father.

3. James Strachey relates that Freud "with his fingers on an open copy of the book" told him of a hiatus in Breuer's text (Breuer and Freud: 1991, 95). This gap in the text constitutes an interesting and controversial area of Freudian myth-making surrounding Breuer's reaction to the mechanism of transference in his treatment of Bertha Pappenheim. As such, this hiatus provides a fascinating area of fetish around which different stories spin, operating as an investment area for the 'fathering' of psychoanalysis.

4. It has been noted by Sulloway that Freud's teacher Carl Claus wrote a critical review of Haeckel's theory in the same year that Freud enrolled in Claus's 'General Biology and Darwinism'. "It seems more than likely that Haeckel's theory, which aroused much attention at the time, was a subject of lively discussion in that course" (Sulloway: 1992, 262).

5. Freud comments on the backward recollection of the hysteric in a footnote to his case history of 'Frau Emmy von N.' He states here that "when one is resolving a current
hysterical delirium, the patient's communications are given in a reverse chronological order..." (Breuer and Freud: 1991, 134).

6. In his case history in Studies on Hysteria (1895), Breuer refers a diary kept in 1881 by Recha Pappenheim which "confirmed beyond a doubt the occurrence of the underlying events" as the result of re-living the previous year day by day (Breuer and Freud: 1991, 87).

7. See Benvenuto and Kennedy for their commentary on Lacan's use of the term 'instance' in this context (Benvenuto and Kennedy: 1986, 107).

8. Here it might be interesting to note the attention paid to orifices and bodily boundaries in sadomasochistic 'scenes'. In this power-play between one and other, it seems that there is a direct link between primary narcissism, biology and bodily image operative as a sexual imperative.

9. There may, of course, be more than two scenes but there is always, even in the multiple scheme, the need for the one to transpose upon the other and therefore the idea of a condition seconde remains accurate.

10. This structuration is, of course, also operative through the maternal function as it carries the paternal imperative operative within it as an inherited structural ghost or symbolic trace.

11. In their 'Preliminary Communication' of 1893 which prepared the ground for their Studies on Hysteria, Breuer and Freud state that "the psychical trauma - or more precisely the memory of the trauma - acts like a foreign body which long after its entry must continue to be regarded as an agent that is still at work..." (Breuer and Freud: 1991, 56-7).

12. The desire of the transsexual, of often articulated as annexed to being in the wrong body seems to offer a countermove to this scheme where it might be perceived that bodily mapping issues unproblematically in accordance with desire. It is important to remember that Schilder is, in fact, referring to a body image. The desolate gender disphoria experienced by the transsexual may therefore support this theory because it is strong enough to overcome 'the real' of the flesh so much so that the transsexual often refers to their former existence as being that of another person now deceased.

13. In Black Sun: Depression and Melancholia, Kristeva describes melancholics as dazzling creators (Kristeva 1989, 64). She links the depressed subject position with a skewed time sense and radical dislocation which may constitute a challenge to the oedipal. Melancholia and depression are explored by Kristeva in relation to denial of negation of the maternal object in order to enter the symbolic. The depressed or melancholic subject is therefore in a position of exile whilst operating within the symbolic and occupies a place balanced upon an edge of danger and creative brilliance.

"I have no story to tell!": Maternal Rage in Susan Hill's The Woman in Black

1. Susan Hill's novel The Woman in Black was first published in 1983. It marked her return to writing after a retirement of several years, a biographical detail which may correlate with the retentive scriptible function of the text's main character. The novel is set in the early twentieth-century but it tells a secondary story set in the mid-Victorian period. We are told the story in the form of a first person narrative by a retired solicitor, Arthur Kipps.
Having been repeatedly asked by his step-children from his second marriage to tell a Christmas Eve ghost story, he finds himself unable to oblige due to a past trauma induced by a 'real' and malevolent haunting to which he was subjected as a young man. He insists that "I have no story to tell!" (Hill 19) He withdraws from the happy seasonal gathering but finds himself suffering from the affects of the memory of his terrifying experience. He resolves to cathartically exorcise this ghost of memory by writing his story down on the condition that no-one may read it during his lifetime. He begins his 'real' ghost story by recollecting how, as a young solicitor, he was dispatched from London to the distant market-town of Crythyn Gifford to attend the funeral and organize the posthumous affairs of a Mrs. Alice Drablow of Eel Marsh House. It is during the funeral that Arthur first sights the woman in black. During his stay at the isolated Eel Marsh House, he discovers a series of letters by which he is able to uncover the identity of the woman in black as Mrs. Drablow's sister, Jennet Humfrye. He discovers that Jennet was exiled from her family for giving birth to an illegitimate son. The infant was subsequently adopted by her childless sister, against Jennet's wishes. The boy was killed in an accident and Jennet, wracked by grief and anger, died a slow death from wasting disease. Arthur is then subjected to an aggressive haunting by the woman in black whose overwhelming grief and anger at the double loss of her son causes her to wreak her revenge upon all who see her. During the excesses of emotion experienced by Arthur, he regresses to childhood experience and eventually becomes ill due to the traumatic stress he suffers. Upon his return to London, Arthur marries his fiancee Stella and they soon have a baby son. Jennet Humfrye takes her revenge upon Arthur for his happiness by appearing to him during a family outing, causing the death of his wife and child in a violent accident so that her story can be seen to have 'real' repercussions in Arthur's life story.

This section has been published as a paper of the same title in Intertexts 4.1 (2000): 74-88.

2. All subsequent unattributed page references in this section are to the 1984 Penguin edition of The Woman in Black.

3. In Violet Hunt's short story, 'The Prayer' (1895), the excessive and all-encompassing grief of a woman for her dead husband causes her to pray for his return from the dead: "My God, my God, he's mine - . . . - give him back to me!" (Dalby 265) She is later described as "like a lady - in black - " (Dalby 273).

4. These 'other stories' may refer to those internal to the primary narration of Kipps or to those intertextual references to other stories which are properly external to The Woman in Black but contained by it and activated within its arena.
story, Tom meets old Mrs. Bartholomew and finds that she is Hatty grown into an old woman and that he has been entering the scenes of her dreams night after night.

This section has been published as a paper of the same title in Versus 77/78 (1977): 145-160.

2. All subsequent unattributed page references in this section are to the 1984 Penguin edition of Philippa Pearce, Tom’s Midnight Garden.

3. Harold and Maude. Dir. Hal Ashby. Paramount, 1971. This film presents the story of Harold, a young man aged about sixteen years old, who has a love affair with Maude, a woman in her seventies. A tragi-comedy, the film is interspersed with fantasy sequences of Harold’s preoccupation with death and funerals. Harold grows up through his affair with Maude and comes to terms with her death.

Negotiating Theories of Feminine Writing: Michèle Roberts, In the Red Kitchen

1. Michèle Roberts’ novel In the Red Kitchen was first published in 1990. Its narrative is based on the interlinking stories of five female characters who are located in three different time dimensions: ancient Egypt, Victorian England, and modern-day London. Each of the character’s stories haunt each other and meet through the medium spirit of Flora Milk who acts as an amanuensis to their different voices. She becomes involved with the middle-class household of Dr. William Preston and his wife Minny with whom she stays as a protégé and subject of Dr. Preston’s research. During an illicit affair with the doctor, he takes her on a trip to Paris and attempts to incarcerate her at the Salpêtrière under the dictates of Charcot. Flora’s story is further complicated by intruding into that of the modern character named Hattie who lives in Flora’s house after her death and sights the young Flora in the kitchen. In a complicated scenario, their stories are then crossed through with that of King Hat, an Egyptian woman king whose power was seized upon discovery of her sex. Hat is seeking a scribe to tell her story and write her name in history. The story is one which has some basis in historical presentations and thereby questions the boundary between fact and fiction in representational accounts. King Hat appears to be based upon Queen Hatasu, daughter of Thothmes the First. After her father’s death, Hatasu assumed an unprecedented position for a woman as ruler of Ancient Egypt. She is shown in her portrait bust wearing an artificial beard as a sign of her power. In his study of Ancient Egypt, Rawlinson tells us that she "was a woman of great energy and of a masculine mind" and that "the ambition of Queen Hatasu was to hand her name down to posterity as a constructor of buildings" (Rawlinson: 1897, 173). Of great interest to our reading of Roberts’ text is his report that

[a] curious anomaly appears in some of her inscriptions where masculine and feminine forms are inextricably mixed up; though spoken of consistently as ‘the king’ and not ‘the queen’, yet the personal and possessive pronouns which refer to her are feminine for the most part, while sometimes such perplexing expressions occur as . . . ‘His Majesty herself’. (Rawlinson: 1897, 178).

Upon her death, her name was erased from many of her monuments. The character of Flora Milk also has historical precedent. In an author’s note with which she prefaces the text, Roberts states that Flora Milk is based upon the life of the young Victorian medium Florence Cook. The names used in Roberts’ novel coincide with those found in Florence Cook’s life story. Roberts also makes reference to Elaine Showalter, The Female Malady (1985) as a source text. Her novel weaves a narrative which draws upon feminist
psychoanalytical theory, using many of the motifs and metaphors found in new French feminist theory with reference to feminine signification. This intermingling of historical account, feminist and psychoanalytical theory with narrative construction draws into question the formation of categorising structure. It also has the curious effect of closing down the possible interpretations of what should a supremely open text. It should be stressed that the reading offered here of Roberts' *In the Red Kitchen* is an experimental textual response with a strong stylistic aspect.

2. All subsequent unattributed page references in this section are to the 1991 Minerva edition of Michèle Roberts, *In the Red Kitchen*.

**In Signifying Chains: Pauline Réage's Story of O**

1. All subsequent unattributed page references in this section are to the 1992 Corgi edition of Pauline Réage, *Story of O*.

2. Freud comments on the 'civilized' regulation of apertures and use or prohibition of mucus membranes as sexual orifices in *Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality*. We might compare the narrator's observation that O's "mouth was the same pink as the pink flesh of her open sex" (155) with Freud's comments on the use of the mouth for sexual purposes (Freud: 1991 [1905], 295).

**Visions and Prayers: Incarnation and Performative Paradigm. Dylan Thomas, 'Vision and Prayer'**

1. This section is to be published as a paper entitled 'Visions and Prayers: Linguistic incarnation and performative paradigm in the poetry of Dylan Thomas'. *The Swansea Review*. Forthcoming.

2. All subsequent quotations are from 'Vision and Prayer' unless stated otherwise. Those followed only by a page number refer to the 1984 Dent edition of Thomas' *Collected Poems: 1934–1952*.

3. In relation to 'Vision and Prayer', we may conceive of the shapes of the verses as a mobile structuration as its limits transpose upon its body. Its twelve stanza formation in relation to its strict visual patterning welds form and content in poetic dialogue. Jakobson states that "[d]esign and instance are correlative concepts. The verse design determines the invariant features of verse instances and sets up the limits of variations" (Jakobson: 1988, 44).

4. Freud's 1914 paper 'On Narcissism: An Introduction' (SE XIV) was reworked in 1915/17 to include the object as prefiguring the subject in 'Mourning and Melancholia' (SE XIV). This was then drawn upon by Lacan to support aggressivity in ego constitution and transitivism via the image of the other supplying the entrapment by which the organism models its own visual projection into the lure of a unified 'I' via the mirror stage. In this scenario, aggressivity is therefore endemic to the subject base.

5. Read in this way, the resulting fragmentary movement in the liminal edges of the text may relate to the surrealist effects of Thomas' poetry so often commented upon.
6. Lacan describes this process in 'The subversion of the subject and the dialectic of the desire' as one of retroactivity in the transmission of the signifier.

7. This process is explored by Lacan in The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis in his discussion of Merleau-Ponty's The Visible and the Invisible (1964). There he states that "the regulation of form, [...] is governed, not only by the subject's eye, but by his expectations, his movements, his grip, his muscular and visceral emotion - in short, his constitutive presence" (Lacan: 1994, 71).

8. Freud describes this comforting process of compensation for loss in Beyond the Pleasure Principle. There he illustrates the process by presenting us with an account of his grandson's cotton-reel game. By enacting his mother's absence, the infant is ritually empowering itself through representation even though that representation is built upon a radical loss (Freud: 1991, 225-6).

9. The Freudian notion of Nachträglichkeit, literally 'afterwardsness', describes a process whereby the second scene of trauma activates the primary scene of trauma which has hitherto been dormant. For Freud's account of this deferral of affect, see his footnote to 'The Wolf Man' case history (SE XVII, 45).

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Diana: Her True Story: Post-Modern Transgressions in Identity

1. This section has been published as a paper of the same title in the Journal of Gender Studies. 8.2 (1999): 323-337.


3. It also politicizes the textual cover-up over which Diana and Morton conspired. 'Deep Throat' was the name given to the anonymous press informant who blew the whistle on the 'Watergate' furore in the U.S.A.

4. The telling is, of course, also directed towards the reading other who acts as activating destination of the 'true story' of 'I'. This presents us with a scenario of multiple splitting in the narrative scenario which is not recognized by the feminist project of self-presence. The text is split three ways between the locus of 'I' telling the story, the fully-collated 'me' towards which it projects itself, and 'you' acting as the locus of the reading other. Diana's text is split still further by being channelled through a mediating 'you' towards which Diana's taped utterances were directed for interpretation.

5. Speaking with reference to his treatment of Anna O., Breuer states that "I would visit her in the evening ... and I then relieved her of the whole stock of imaginative products which she had accumulated since my last visit." He refers to her accounts as "evening narratives" (Breuer & Freud: 1991 [1895], 83).

6. Diana used these words during her April 1993 speech at the International Eating Disorders 93 Conference in London. Although she did not speak in the first person, she said that she had her information "on very good authority". Susie Orbach, who became Diana's therapist, was also a speaker at the conference.

7. It might again be useful here to invoke details from Breuer's case history of 'Fräulein Anna O.' in order to exemplify this rhetoric of psychical disintegration and its absorption into
thetic signing. Breuer refers to his patient's split-off state where she would complain of "having two selves" and the intrusion of different psychical states into one another. "[A] clear-sighted and calm observer sat, as she put it, in a corner of her brain and looked on at all the mad business" (Breuer & Freud, 1991 [1895], 77 & 101).

8. It is interesting that this perceived capacity for sixth sense or premonition is now being transferred to Diana's 'living image', Prince William. Morton tells that the night his mother died, William was reported to have said "I knew something was wrong, I kept waking up all night" (286).

9. This romantic diaspora of identity might also correlate with the real post-colonial concerns of Diana's last love affair. There was political concern that Diana's possible future father-in-law would not hold a British passport whilst the future king might be related to non-christian half-brothers or sisters. Her 'true romance' therefore posed a radical challenge to the constitutional identity of British monarchy.

10. It is ironic that, after utilizing the concept of a unified subject tailored to political agency as the most powerful means of mass subjection, the transgression of 'I' becomes licenced by state ownership as it is mobilised in power dynamics over the dead legal subject recognized by the social apparatus. The state wields its power over the dead body as the legal procedures pertaining to lifeless flesh become activated in the act of post-mortem. As Diana's body was already regarded as state-owned in the most manifest form, the knife was applied to the identity of the body politic as represented in the body of a princess. The overt results of this were seen in the political repercussions of the death for the status of the royal family and in interventions of state over monarchy in the funeral arrangements of "the people's princess" as Downing Street became involved in negotiations between the Spencers and the Windsors.

11. We may read this textual imperative in the media's rush to deify Diana after her death, paying homage in the received forms, thereby feeding old cultural reference back into the apparatus whilst simultaneously producing good saleable copy to be sold to 'the people' for reiteration.
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