OPIUM AND HEROIN PRODUCTION
IN PAKISTAN

BEING A THESIS SUBMITTED FOR THE
DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
IN THE UNIVERSITY OF HULL

BY

AMIR ZADA ASAD BSc (Peshawar) MA (Peshawar)

NOVEMBER 1999
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I owe thanks to many people.

I cannot sufficiently express my indebtedness and gratitude to my supervisor, Professor Robert Harris, without whose expert guidance, encouragement and friendly attitude, this study would never have materialised.

I would be failing in my gratitude and thanks if I did not especially mention the University of Peshawar and Professor Karam Elahi (ex-Dean, Faculty of Social Science), without whose sponsorship and support I would not have been able to study in UK.

During my stay at Hull University many people have been very congenial to me. Of them I specially mention the names of Rahmat Aziz Salik, Minister Hull Mosque and UK Islamic Mission, and his sons (Zia Salik, Abid Salik and Atique Salik), Chaudhry Khurshed-uz- Zaman and his family, Zaheer Iqbal, Nadeem and Suhail Qayyum, Dr. Gardiner of the Mathematics Department of Hull University for his help with the statistical analysis, Liz Stevenson, Librarian IIMP Wolds, for her support in providing valuable literature, Mr. A. Z. Hilali of the Department of Politics and Asian Studies, Hull University.

I wish to thank Eileen Palphramand and Dennis South of the Social Work office, for their respectful treatment of me during my stay in the department.

I am grateful to Sher Gul Khan (Lala Jan), Shekeel Khan, Asif and Dr. Aamer Khan of Bradford who treated me well and provided me with intimate companionship.

During my fieldwork in Pakistan in winter 1996-7, many people gave me special assistance: financial, physical, moral, and academic. Without their generous support this study would have never been completed. I owe special thanks and indebtedness to my friends Muhammad Shafi Khan of Shah Alam village and the late Muhammad Shah Alam Khan (died in September 1997) of Babuzai village who accompanied and escorted me throughout my fieldwork.

Malik Hazrat Gul and his sons of Village Manogai, Utman Khel Bajaur Agency made possible my access to Muhamand Agency for data collection, and escorted
me to this far area. I am thankful to them. Mr. Usmani Gul and Javed Khan of village Jolagramm, Malakand Agency made possible my access to Sharbatai, Bajaur Agency for fieldwork. I thank them very much. Muhammad Islam Afridi helped in my fieldwork in Khyber Agency, the most awesome field. I am grateful to him.

Syed Kamran Shah, Section Officer, Civil Secretariat Peshawar, Arbab Shah Rukh (then political Agent Bajaur Agency), S. Muhammad Javed (then Deputy Commissioner Dir), Mr. Shad Muhamad Khan, District Social Welfare officer, Dir, Malik Siddique of NAS Peshawar, Mr. Simon and Jehgangir Khan of Dir District Development Project, Timargara, Dir, Garry Lewis of UNDCP Islamabad and DAPRC Islamabad, who provided literature and permission to reprint of some photographs and maps, are some of the officials who helped me a lot. I am indebted to them. I also thank the management of Weekly The Newsline, Karachi for their prompt response to my request for some archives on drugs politics and politicians involvement.

I am thankful to my parents who kept me remembered in their prayers and made this study easy for me.

I especially wish to mention Nargis, my wife, and my children, Jawad, Talha, Sara, and Yusra, whose love supported my spirit and energy, enabling me to work.
In Affectionate Memory of

Iftikhar Ahmad (my brother)

and

Shah Alam Khan (my friend)

who desired to see me a Ph.D.

but, sadly,

passed away before my work’s completion
# CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledgements</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dedication</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List of Tables</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List of Maps and photographs</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter 1 : Introduction</strong></td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan Introduced</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Current Research</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drug Production: The Regional Context</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North-West Frontier Province: An Overview</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opium and Heroin Production in the Indo-Pak Sub-Continent</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Present Thesis</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter II Opium: The Poppy, the Drug, and Opium Derivatives</strong></td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Opium Poppy</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opium the Drug</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opium in Pakistan</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opium Derivatives</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter III : Politics of Drugs in Pakistan</strong></td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1 Internal Factors</strong></td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Divergent Administrative systems in NWFP</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. The Party System</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Causes of Narcotics Boom</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Some Problems with the Statistics of Addiction</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Corruption</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2 External Factors</strong></td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. The Iranian Revolution</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. The Afghan-Soviet War</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section</td>
<td>Page</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter VIII: Summary and Conclusion</td>
<td>217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bibliography</td>
<td>233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Methodological Appendix</td>
<td>244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annexure</td>
<td>245</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LIST OF TABLES

Table 1  Family Size (Opium Cultivators) 132
Table 2  Household Size (All Drugs Producing Areas) 132
Table 3  Education Level in the Family (Opium Cultivators) 134
Table 4  Education Level in the Family by Area 134
Table 5  Family Income (Opium Cultivators) 136
Table 6  Areawise Distribution of Income 136
Table 7  Family Expenditures (Opium Cultivators) 137
Table 8  Family Expenditures by Area 138
Table 9  Size of Land Holding 138
Table 10  Size of Land Holding by Area 139
Table 11  Land Holding Status of the family 141
Table 12  Opium Cultivation (Do you cultivate opium?) 141
Table 13  Reason for Opium Cultivation 142
Table 14  Attitude of Opium Cultivators 144
Table 15  Income from Opium 145

Chi-square Test of Data 146

Table 16  Household Size by Drug Production Table 146
Table 17  Size of Land Holding and Opium Cultivation 147
Table 18  Family Income and Opium Cultivation 148
Table 19  Family Expenditures and Opium Cultivation 149
Table 20  Income from Opium and Opium Cultivation 150
Table 21  Afghan War Effects and Drug Production in Pakistan 151
LIST OF MAPS AND PHOTOGRAPHS

MAPS:
- Pakistan: 10-A
- Narcotics Producing and Consuming Areas of South west Asia: 18-A
- North West Frontier Province: 23-A
- Poppy Cultivation Areas in NWFP: 27-A
- Muhmand Agency: 116-A
- Bajaur Agency: 119-A
- District Dir: 121-A
- Khyber Agency: 123-A

PHOTOGRAPHS:
- A Poppy field in Muhmand Agency: 49-A
- Thinning, weeding and hoeing an opium poppy field: 51-A
- Poppy field in bloom: 52-A
- Poppy lancing stage: 54-A
- Opium collection stages: 55-A
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

Pakistan Introduced

Pakistan is situated in the north-west corner of the Indian ocean, South Asia, between 24 and 37 North latitude and 62 and 75 East latitude. It constitutes an area of about 530,000 square miles. It is bordered by India to the east, Iran and Afghanistan to the west, and China and Russia to the north. In the south it is bordered by the Arabian Sea. It is predominantly a Muslim country.

Administratively Pakistan is divided into four provinces, a federally administered tribal area (FATA) which comprises the seven tribal agencies along the border with Afghanistan, and the Federal Capital Territory area, or Islamabad District (see map on page 10-A). Other than in times of martial law or political crisis, the four provinces are each under the administration of a provincial governor, and an independent elected provincial legislature led by an elected chief minister and his cabinet. These provinces are Punjab, NWFP, Baluchistan and Sind. The tribal area is situated within NWFP, but, due to their distinct politico-legal status, tribal people are direct subjects of the federal government. Pakistan's penal code and other laws do not apply to them, but hundred years old laws of the colonial era are applied to the areas. Accordingly the political administration acts as virtually a divine administration, with the people powerless. In theory, they live politically as an independent people with their own laws, Pakhtoon wali, unwritten laws based on custom and tradition; but in practice they are subject to every political misdeed of the god-like officers. The Federal Capital Territory area is a small area within the Punjab province, but, being the location of the federal capital of the country, is, as occurs in, for example, Australia (with Canberra) and Malaysia (with Kuala Lumpur), named after it, and given special status.

The approximate population of the country is 134.5 million with an estimated annual growth of 3.0%. Out of this population, Punjab accounts for about 57.6%, Sind 21.6%, NWFP and the tribal areas 16.8%, and Baluchistan, although the largest

---

2 The News (London: June 30, 1999).
3 Government of Pakistan, Housing and Population Census of Pakistan (Islamabad:
province by area, only 3.8%. The Federal Capital Territory contains about 0.4% of the total population. In theory, national resources are distributed according to the population of the provinces, but this has never materialised in reality.

Topographically and climatically, Pakistan encompasses considerable variation, ranging from snow-covered peaks in the north, to arid deserts in Sind and Baluchistan in the south and south-west. Geographically it can be divided into three regions: the mountain ranges of the north and north-west; the uncultivated tableland of Baluchistan in the west; and the plains of the Indus Basin. Annual rainfall varies from 5 inches in Baluchistan to 30 inches in Punjab. The maximum temperature in June and July exceeds 50°C, while the winter temperature goes below freezing point in the western and northern areas.

Punjab is the bread basket of the country, and has the most fertile land, irrigated through one of the best networks of irrigation channels in the world. Sind comes second in food production, particularly rice and cane sugar. Baluchistan has no agriculture at all. North-West Frontier Province, being mostly mountainous, has only subsistence agriculture, and to a large extent depends for food on the two fertile provinces of the country. Other natural resources abound, but are unexploited due to lack of technology and resources. Price hikes, money devaluation, less export and more imports and upshore siphoning of national wealth into personal accounts by politicians and bureaucrats, combined with the absolute poverty of the masses are the characteristics of the economy. Corruption, including embezzlement, loan sharking by influential people and politicians in particular, is rampant.

Economically, Pakistan has been a poor country for the 52 years since her independence in 1947. Economic indicators have shown very little improvement since then. Overall, Pakistan's economy is underdeveloped, and the country struggles under an external debt of over US$40 billion - more than the GNP of the country. There is a big gap between the 'haves' and the 'have nots'. There exists extreme poverty, and, according to international reports, 30% people live under the

---

4 Ibid. p.2.
poverty line\textsuperscript{5}. However one counts it, though, nearly 10 million people get less than 1,000 rupees (£12 sterling) a month\textsuperscript{6}.

At the time of independence Pakistan had not a single industrial establishment, as all industry was concentrated in the areas constituting India. After fifty years of independence Pakistan is still an agrarian, surplus labour economy. Despite the disproportionately and unevenly scattered character of much industry in the 1950s and 1960s, much of it cottage industry textile manufacture, agriculture still predominates, accounting for 32\% of value added in gross national production. Cotton, wheat and rice are grown in the plains of Punjab and Sind provinces, but not in NWFP and Baluchistan, which lack the necessary irrigation network. The rural: urban population ratio is 72: 28\textsuperscript{7} Manufacturing accounts for only 16\% of GNP, other industries 8\%, and services for 44\% of value added in gross national production. Mismanagement and state level corruption have caused Pakistan to face an internal and external debt problem of more than US$50 billion, accumulated in the course of independence.

The process of social change has been very slow in Pakistan. The most depressing feature of this stagnation is poor performance in the area of \textit{education}. In 1981 (the last population census as the results of the 1998 census of population are yet to be published) the adult bare literacy rate was a mere 26\%, whereas in other low-income countries it was 32.2\%, the gap having remained constant since 1960\textsuperscript{8}. And more recently, and using a less stringent test of literacy, a UN report showed that some 50\% of the population fell below the accepted literacy level as only 2\% of the GDP goes to the social action plan against the average 8\% of GDP in South Asia\textsuperscript{9}.

Of even greater concern is the very slow progress Pakistan has made in increasing the population of school-going children. Here the gap between Pakistan and other low-income countries has widened over the period 1960-80 from 8\% to over 10\%. 17 million children are not able to attend school, and over 12 million children are working in factories for periods of over 16 hours a day because of poverty\textsuperscript{10}. One of

\textsuperscript{5} The News (London: April 5,1999).
\textsuperscript{9} The News, \textit{op.cit.}
\textsuperscript{10} M. Haq, (Former Finance Minister of Pakistan) in The News (London: December 25,
the most depressing aspects of this situation is that the Government introduced a literacy surcharge, *iqra surcharge*, in 1980, to increase the literacy ratio, and by 1997 had collected 80 billion rupees. To this day, however, and despite the fact that Pakistan has supposedly had democratically elected governments and parliaments since 1988, no one knows where this money has gone. So primary schools are attended by no more than half of eligible children - largely because of the low enrolment rate of girls, on religio-cultural and economic grounds. The proportion of children attending secondary and higher secondary schools is frankly disgraceful: 17% and 2% respectively. There is only one teacher for 115 school age children.

In health, too, Pakistan faces major challenges. A somewhat redeeming feature of Pakistan’s social progress is life expectancy at birth (51 years) - slightly above the rate of other low income countries in the region, normally ascribed to the relatively higher nutritional status of the population following the green revolution of the 1960s. Pakistan has a population growth rate of 3% per annum, and its infant mortality rate, which is 152 per 1,000 live births, particularly among female children, is still 8% higher than that of the other third world countries. The reason for this appears to be institutional discrimination against female children. The overall sex ratio (males per 100 females), according to the 1981 census, was 111, whereas among children below the age of 4 years the proportion of females is higher. No satisfactory explanation of this phenomenon has so far been offered, except the suggestion that girls are much less cared for than boys. Among other health indicators, average daily intake of calories is 8% below the FAO’s minimum requirements. Only 38% of the population has access to safe (if not necessarily hygienic) water; 60 million people are deprived of health facilities. There is only one doctor for every 4,600 persons, one nurse for every 10,030 people and one hospital bed for every 2,200 people. In England and Wales by contrast, in 1991 there was one physician for every 451 persons (assuming total population as 50

15 M. Haq. *op.cit.*
millions, there were 82,073 physicians and 28,793 general practitioners), one hospital bed for every 175 people, and one nurse/midwife for every 130 people.¹⁶

The Current Research

In this first chapter I introduce key aspects of opium and heroin (hereinafter drugs or narcotics) production in North-West Frontier Province of Pakistan (herein after NWFP), and demonstrate that these opiates are produced there in the face of ineffective and sometimes counterproductive national and international control efforts. I shall argue that, in NWFP as in the world generally, socio-economic conditions and the political climate are strongly associated with drug production: opium is characteristically produced in economically disadvantaged and politically turbulent areas of the globe.

I shall show that inter-provincial and intra-provincial disparities in development programmes in the country as a whole, which largely work to the disadvantage of NWFP, lack of job opportunities and other economic resources throughout the province but in poppy cultivating areas in particular, are the key factors which make narcotics production probable. Further, as we shall see, the Afghan war, which some would argue was exploited if not generated by the superpowers for their own interests and which certainly blocked the traditional trade routes of the heroin producing areas, created political as well as economic disorganisation and insecurity within NWFP in particular.

It was in good part to overcome these economic insecurities that some people in Khyber Agency shifted to heroin production with foreign technical assistance¹⁷ as an alternative source of livelihood, so I shall suggest that the precipitants of the current production and manufacture of opium and heroin respectively lie in these recent phenomena. To give an analytic framework for the exploration of these points, and in spite of the fact that this study is, for reasons which will become apparent, necessarily both descriptive and exploratory as well as hypothetico-deductive¹⁸ I initially proposed the following hypotheses:

1. the greater the economic uncertainty, the greater will be economic pragmatism in the shape of opium and heroin production;

the greater the political uncertainty in the region as well as the country, the greater will be the likelihood of opium and heroin production in the former.

Big family size, small agricultural land holding size, expenditure exceeding income, comparative high income from opium cultivation and the negative impacts of the Afghan war on business would be consistent with these hypotheses. As I assumed the interrelatedness of the political and the economic, with unstable economic conditions giving rise to unstable political conditions and vice versa, in the event that economic reasons for drug production proved more significant than other causes the hypothesis that political instability is a major cause of drug production would be confirmed.

I was aware, however, that, given the nature and scale of this research, it would be difficult to obtain reliable information on questions dealing with the definition of political uncertainty Hence the interview method, the primary means of enquiry, has been supplemented by discussions about the different laws prevalent in the same province, and about narcotics traffic or narco-politics, as contributors to drug production in Pakistan.

In addition to contemporary political and economic factors of this kind, both historical data and current cultural values concerning drug use and the existence of drug sub-cultures are important if we are to gain a rounded understanding of the nature and evolution of a problem which transcends discipline boundaries. Though the current (and quite recent) explosion of drug production, and the involvement of Pakistan in an international network of large-scale drug supply was indeed precipitated by politico-economic events, the predisposition to produce opium and heroin is much more longstanding. Hence, to focus solely on these recent events would not give a full picture. Inevitably, there is about this study much that is preparatory for later work: there is much groundwork to be done before depth study of specific contributory factors can be usefully undertaken, and before such precise questions as, say, "What was the respective contribution of the Afghan War and the Iranian Revolution to the development of opium production in NWFP?" can be answered. In the absence of this groundwork, this thesis does not have a mature intellectual tradition on which to build, and I have therefore had to spend time and space providing basic (but still frequently new) information, which will not only enrich this study but also prepare the ground for others.
Accordingly, in addition to exploring my two hypotheses I consider opium and heroin production in Pakistan in relation to considerations which include the extent to which the geography and economic conditions of the research areas are instrumental in promoting drug production; the extent to which current and recent political conditions in Pakistan are responsible for this situation; the ways in which an understanding of the history of drug production in the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent, particularly in a post-colonial context, helps us understand the current character of the drug problem; and the extent to which cultural factors encourage or discourage the use of opium in Pakistan.

In exploring issues raised by these points, the study has the following aims and objectives:

1. to study, from primary sources where possible, but necessarily more often from secondary ones, aspects of the historical development of opium and heroin production in NWFP. Opium production has been a part of the agri-economy of the region for more than two millennia. But historically drug production had entirely different social, cultural and economic logics, and only with the beginning of the use of the drug crop for political purposes in the Mughal period in the early seventeenth century - a practice perpetuated, adapted and developed by the colonial power - did production become recognisably 'modern' in its character. Because these historical traces 'drive' both production and usage today, it is necessary to consider drug development in NWFP in the light of policies adapted by the colonial masters who put the drug business on an international footing;

2. to investigate the drug culture in NWFP in order to understand the character, nature and purpose of opium use in the area. Opium, we shall see, has been used not only for euphoric purposes or for processing into heroin (a relatively recent activity) but as a centuries-old part of folk medicines, particularly the tibbi unani system of medication. But its social and cultural meaning has changed drastically with the ascent of the 'drug problem' and its contemporary criminal as well as clinical characteristics;

3. to investigate the economics of drug production in the area. As we shall see, economic conditions in an area play an important role in drug production the world over, drug producing areas normally being those where economic conditions are harsh and choices few, and where governmental resources are unable to provide
alternative means of livelihood for the people. Accordingly, this study explored empirically economic conditions in the opium and heroin producing areas: factors such as per capita income and agriculture and employment resources are presented to test (as precisely as possible in a study undertaken on such limited resources as this one) in what ways economic conditions are associated with opium and heroin production;

4 to analyse the political factors, national and international, relevant to drug production in NWFP. This will include an analysis of the geo-politics of the area, including an assessment of the impact of the Iranian revolution, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the American intervention in the region which, while ostensibly intended to defeat communism, effectively threw petrol on the smouldering fire of the drug trade. At a more local level I shall show the relevance of the existence of different political systems in a single province, and in particular how the involvement of power elites and patronage have facilitated the trade. But narco-politics and political corruption on a national level and localised poppy politics in the opium producing areas themselves have interacted not only with each other but with the general culture of Pakistani society to create and sustain the present situation.

5 to consider theoretical issues concerning control. There is a substantial body of literature which either concludes or takes as its starting point that in many cases attempts to control or suppress a criminal activity with strong economic logic for suppliers and equally strong hedonistic (and in some cases clinical) demand from consumers are not only doomed to failure but actually produce more negative symptoms than the original problem which they are seeking to address. This issue is debated when I grapple with the policy question of what is to be done.

So while it is beyond my scope - beyond, indeed, the scope of more extensive studies than this one - to offer a comprehensive and irrefutable theory of drugs applicable the world over, I shall identify factors which, both individually and interactively, affect the likelihood of opium and heroin production occurring and being sustained in other parts of the world; and, which, by implication, must be addressed nationally and supranationally if production is to be curbed.

How they might be addressed and how they should not be addressed also feature strongly in this study. It will become clear that for the most part coercion is
impractical and likely to be counterproductive; that the provision by Government of equally lucrative alternative sources of employment is equally so (other, perhaps, than as part of a concerted international effort of a kind not immediately plausible, and which would itself be vulnerable to unintended consequences, as US involvement in the region certainly has been). So while the ideal long term solution may well lie in socio-economic development, including increasing the power of drug producers in the global labour market, and removing, by political and economic reform and popular education, both the opportunity and the incentives for political corruption, including the patronage, nepotism and cronyism so prevalent in Pakistan today, it would be utopian to believe this can be easily secured. But attempts to buck a global market which includes willing producers, huge multinational demand, and the involvement of both national governments and organised criminals, are unlikely to be either simple or straightforward; and they may, indeed, ultimately prove futile.

This is not to say, however, that nothing can or should be done, and it is in part for that reason that brief reference will also be made to questions of rehabilitation (which currently scarcely exists in Pakistan) and to market control by localised intervention in the supply-demand nexus. It is, however, important to be realistic, and not to permit personal commitments to get in the way of dispassion; and not, above all, to believe that problems which, if they have any solution at all, fall within the remit of international cooperation and supranational intervention, can be solved at an individual or local level. While palliative interventions may be possible locally (though this study casts some doubt on the practicality of even this option on anything other than a very small scale basis in Pakistan), we should not delude ourselves into believing that palliation is cure, that to damp down the fire is to extinguish it.

**Drug Production: The Regional Context**

It is impossible to understand the geo-politics of opium and heroin production in Pakistan without locating that country in the geographical context of south-west (and, to a degree, south-east) Asia (see map on page 19-A). After all, until the recent emergence of the Central Asian States of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, some eastern European countries and Mexico as new opium
INDIA
IRAN
1000 MT/YEAR (LICENSED)
200 MT/YEAR (ILLEGAL)

BALUCHISTAN
AFGHANISTAN
4600 MT/1999

PUNJAB
NORTH-WEST FEDERAL PRED

PAKISTAN
130 MT/YEAR

INDIA
1000 MT/YEAR (LICENSED)
500 MT/YEAR (ILLEGAL)

SIND

NARCOTICS PRODUCING AND CONSUMING AREAS OF S. WEST AREA
producers\textsuperscript{18} almost all the world's illicit cultivation of opium poppies was in these regions, and nearly 50\% of it was produced in India and the Pakistan-Afghanistan border areas - approximately 2205 metric tons. Still the two regions account for 90\% of world supply\textsuperscript{19}.

Pakistan is a part of the Golden Crescent, a politico-geographical area comprising Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan - though “Golden” in no way reflects the economic conditions of the region’s poverty-stricken hill tribes who produce opiate narcotics; rather it is a reference to the money to be made by international traffickers. The name was coined by the western media in the early 1980s during the Afghan-Soviet war to designate the mountainous area which is “golden” for these opiates narcotics production and trafficking, and generated by the Afghan war, rather as the Golden Triangle was generated by the Vietnam war.

The Golden Crescent is important to this study because events in the region led the people of NWFP to commercialise and export their opium production in the late 1970s. Whatever the magnitude of the trade and production of these narcotics in the area, it seems that some western powers exaggerate the figures for production, consumption and trafficking in opium and heroin for political reasons\textsuperscript{20} and local officials may underestimate them for different ones.

These ploys are made possible in good part because no exact figures for the acreage of poppy are available, due to the political, geographical and topographical complexities of the growing areas. In Pakistan, the Narcotics Control Board or PNCB (now the Anti-Narcotic Force or ANF) is responsible, and collects information about production and trafficking. Foreign countries or agencies in Pakistan collecting information are the US Agency for International development (USAID), the US State Department's Narcotics Affairs Section (NAS), the US Embassy Islamabad, the US National Narcotics Intelligence Consumers Committee (NNICC), the UN's Drug Control Programme (UNDCP) and the UN Development Programme (UNDP); but the estimates of all these agencies contradict each other.

Where access is possible and production per acre or hectare known, production estimates can be made from ground surveys on a sampling basis, and where

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{18} S. Kumar, “Drug Trafficking in Pakistan”, Asian Strategic Review (1994-5), pp.196-7.
\item \textsuperscript{19} UN Drug Control Programme Report in The News (London: June 27, 1997).
\end{itemize}
production areas are known estimates can be based on aerial photography, but the problem of measuring the cultivated land remains unsolved, as most of these cultivating areas in Pakistan are not in Government revenue records, are geographically dispersed, or are physically inaccessible. Production estimates are also unreliable, as production varies from area to area according to weather, availability of water and the nature of the land.

This situation is extremely sensitive, and Pakistan and the United States in particular have never agreed production and cultivation figures. Legal production in Pakistan has never been estimated accurately, and the production of illegal drugs is difficult if not impossible to measure. This problem is further complicated by internal political considerations. Inside Pakistan the statistics of opium acreage are underestimated by the political administration of the producing area, in part to show their efficiency in drug control and in part for corrupt purposes discussed elsewhere. Conversely, however, the Pakistan Narcotics Control Board exaggerates the figures, mainly to support its claims for international aid. The USA, on the other hand, exaggerates or minimises the figures depending on its short term objectives: crudely, when it wants to pressurise Pakistan, it exaggerates the figures, but when Pakistan asks for aid to combat production it underestimates production, in a cycle which has continued since the early 1980s.

Bearing in mind current figures of opium production and heroin consumption, however, it appears certain that Pakistan is a net importer of opium and other narcotic drugs. Out of a total trade of about US$400 billions per year in illicit narcotics the world over, the “Golden Crescent” has a share of US$5 billion per year only, though no reliable figures are available as to its share in the business. The UNDCP Director claimed that:

... illicit drug business in the so-called Golden Crescent of Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan was estimated at $5 billion per year in a global drug trade of $400 billions. Big money is certainly not made in this part of the world. When we take the illicit market or size of business of all these drugs, it has been estimated around $400 billion per year... When we look at the region, it is very difficult to separate what is going on in Pakistan or Afghanistan or Iran, the things are quite intrinsically linked. We do estimate that the volume of the drug trade is about $5 billions... one kg (2.2 lbs) of heroin was worth US$3,000, in Pakistan’s industrial
port city Karachi compared with a street value of more than US$50,000 in the USA.²¹

A quarter of a century ago the World Opium Survey 1972²² reported that the Afridi Pathans of Khyber Agency controlled and dominated the opium trade and traffic in Pakistan. To meet increased demand in Iran, the Afridi either transported their produce through Afghanistan or, through tribal relationships, passed their opium to the Shinwaries (a big tribe across the Afghan border around Landi Kotal, still in Khyber Agency) and the Ghilzais (a nomadic tribe from Afghanistan who travel to the plains in Pakistan during the winter and return in summer) for onward transportation.

Pakistan’s opium yield fell from some 800 metric tons in 1978-9²³ to 155 metric tons in 1996²⁴ - some 50 times less than that of Afghanistan²⁵. Of Afghanistan’s yield, however, 80-90% is imported into Pakistan for processing into heroin²⁶. Afghanistan is now the largest opium producer in the world²⁷. This expansion began immediately after the withdrawal of Soviet troops, as leaders of the major resistance parties were involved in opium and heroin production, processing and trafficking to finance the war²⁸. It has been estimated that 200,000 families, one million people out of a population of 17 millions, were at this time involved in opium production and related businesses. Whereas in 1995-96 some 38,740 hectares of scarce arable land were given over to poppy cultivation, with an approximate yield of 1250 metric tons²⁹ the year 1999 saw this figure increase to an estimated yield of some 4,600 metric tons of raw opium which is 75% of the world’s total opium production³⁰.

---

³⁰ The Times (London: August 11, 1997).
Afghanistan has become a stateless country, where there exists no centralised power, as a result, first, of the twelve year war with the Soviet Union, and then, after 1991, the fighting between Afghans. If the civil war continues there is every likelihood that production will increase further: War needs money and opium provides it. 93% of Afghanistan’s total opium production comes from areas under the control of the Taliban Government, which has effectively legalised cultivation by making opium, together with all other produce in the areas under their control, subject to a 10% tithe (called ushr).

So even if the Government could eliminate poppy production in Pakistan, the problem of Afghanistan would continue. So for the foreseeable future heroin production cannot be checked, because those responsible for its control are involved in its development.

The other major producer in south-west Asia is India, with the world’s largest yield of licit opium for her domestic pharmaceutical industry and export to the western market\(^{31}\) and a considerable yield of illegal opium for processing into heroin. In 1995-96, some 800 metric tons of opium are known to have been produced from a cultivated area of 26,200 hectares of land\(^{32}\) but UN/Pakistani sources in Islamabad suggest that the real figure is 13-1500 metric tons (see map on page 22-A), some of which, in addition to that produced illicitly, is processed into heroin, with which Indian traffickers had also started experimenting in 1984 because of the country’s high levels of opium production and stockpiles. At this time India was thought by many to be posing an international threat as another significant heroin producer in south-west Asia\(^{33}\). This is not mentioned specifically in any of the western reports, however, perhaps because so much Indian opium is sold to the western pharmaceutical industry\(^{34}\).

In south-east Asia, the Golden Triangle area, comprising the north-east border of Myanmar, Northern Thailand and Northern Laos\(^{35}\), has traditionally been the


\(^{34}\) D.E. Miller, *op.cit.* p.vii.

largest producer of opium. Of its annual production of 2545 metric tons for the year 1995-96, Myanmar produced 2340 metric tons from a cultivated area of 154,070 hectares\(^{36}\) (slightly more than the combined production of Pakistan, Afghanistan and India but from twice the land - 154,070 hectares, as against 71,890, the land in south-west Asia being more favourable for the production of opium than that of south-east Asia, which includes Myanmar).

**North-West Frontier Province: an Overview**

*When God had finished making the rest of the world*, say Pathans, *'He took all the odd pieces left over, and threw them down sideways to make the North-West Frontier Province'\(^{37}\)*

This local saying exactly reflects the physical nature of NWFP. It is this structure of the land with narrow passes, steep mountains, defiles and unlevelled plains which has made the living of Pathans so hard. The eastern, northern, north-western and southern parts of the Province are mountainous areas with little agriculture but no other source of livelihood.

I shall say more of what follows when I discuss the sampling frame and methodology later. For the moment, however, and by way of introduction I may say that administratively NWFP is divided into seven Divisions, each under a Divisional Commissioner; these Divisions are further sub-divided into nineteen Districts, each under a Deputy Commissioner. Malakand and Hazara Divisions, in the north and east of the province, are mountainous with very little agriculture; Kohat Division is situated in the arid salt mountain region (see map on page 23A), where no agriculture is possible; Mardan and Peshawar Divisions are the main plains where extensive cultivation and agriculture take place. The dry Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan Divisions are located on the plains and could be irrigated very easily from the mighty Indus river if the proposed "Right Bank Canal Project" at Dera Ismail Khan, promised since the early seventies, were executed - but it has still not materialised.


Location of poppy cultivation
The tribal belt, stretching from north to the west along the 1300 mile border with Afghanistan, is a mountainous area with no significant agriculture or other economic activity. NWFP lags behind Pakistan as a whole in terms of physical and social infrastructure. Some indicators are presented in the Table below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Pakistan</th>
<th>NWFP</th>
<th>Drug (Tribal) Areas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Area (sq. km):</td>
<td>803,940</td>
<td>74,521 (9.4%)</td>
<td>26,970 (4.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Population (m):</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>No reliable figures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Population density:</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Literacy rate (%):</td>
<td>26.17</td>
<td>6.70</td>
<td>6.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. % Children at school (5-9 yrs)</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>42.7</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Doctor: Population ratio</td>
<td>1:4,600</td>
<td>1:7,000**</td>
<td>1:19,120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Electric Consumption (kw/capita):</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Road length (per 100 sq. km.):</td>
<td>28.11</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Access to potable water (%)</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Comparative Socio-Economic Indicators; Pakistan, NWFP and Drug Producing Areas.


As can be seen from this Table, excluding the tribal areas NWFP comprises 9.4% of the total acreage of Pakistan, making it the geographically smallest of all provinces; while the tribal area accounts for a further 4%. By 1998 the country’s estimated population was 160 millions. We have seen that no reliable population figures are available for the tribal area, due to inaccessibility and lack of interest on the part of political administrators, though it is clear that density is sparse indeed, a situation made more striking by the inevitable rural-urban exodus.

Other indicators indicate that the drug producing areas suffer on a number of deprivation indices in comparison with a developing country where standards as a whole are themselves poor. For example, we have seen that in Pakistan the literacy rate is even lower than among other developing countries in the region, a little over

** Salim Khan Jagrha (Secretary Health NWFP) The News (London: March 29, 1999)
one quarter. In the tribal areas however, the figure is as low as 6.38%, with less than a third of 5-9 year old children attending school, as against almost one half for Pakistan as a whole and over 40% for the non-tribal areas of NWFP.

Health indicators, reflected in the availability of doctors using western medicine, reflect a similar situation: non-tribal NWFP scores lower than Pakistan as a whole, and tribal NWFP scores lower still. — in this case much lower: with medical availability in the tribal areas running at almost one doctor for 20,000 of an impoverished and therefore unhealthy population, one can describe the situation as one of effective non-availability other than (if one is lucky) in the case of dire emergencies. The virtual non-availability of electricity (in spite of the fact that it is produced in or very near to the tribal areas) is, of course, associated with the problem of medical non-availability. The Table also demonstrates a remarkable lack of potable water in the tribal provinces. Though water is available in abundance in the province as a whole, it is mostly used for power generation, and is mainly available in the plains or areas outside the tribal belt. NWFP is the major hydro-electric power producer for the country, but electricity in this power-producing province is more expensive than in other provinces, and hence industrialisation has been made difficult for both local investors and domestic users. In the tribal areas not only is agriculture rain dependent, but the people also depend for drinking water on rain, for the most part sharing their rain water reservoirs (jowarhs), which are open to many forms of pollution, including animal excreta, with their cattle.

The story is similar in communications and road transportation: the situation is bad throughout the country, but in the tribal areas, which have only 3.49% of the total available road length, it is even worse. While, NWFP being mountainous, it would be costly and difficult to give it communications channels equal to those in other parts of the country, this is not the whole story, which has more to do with politics and economics than problems of geography and civil engineering. Mostly, the roads are in the urban areas and rural areas are very sparingly attached to the cities, which are, of course, the centres of political power.

NWFP has had no industrial base since independence, a fact admitted officially for the first time by a Chief Minister of the Province in 199738. The major industries

38 M. A. Abbasi, Chief Minister NWFP in The Daily Khabrain (Islamabad: May 29, 1997).
are situated in Punjab and Sind, and such scattered industry as exists in NWFP is mainly of a cottage type, and normally non-functional. In 1986, in a bid to destroy the poppy crop, the government paramilitary forces massacred the poppy cultivators in Gadoon Amazai area. At this scene of US inspired massacre of 26 farmers, the US Government defrayed the cost of human lives by compensation in the form of establishing an industrial estate (alternative development) in the area, in order to provide alternative sources of livelihood, as hitherto this area has depended upon opium cultivation. In 1988, in the first General Election after eleven years of martial law, the PPP (Pakistan People’s Party) came into power. This party, headed and run mainly by feudals and the landed aristocracy, established this industrial estate with many incentives for investors, including tax holidays, cheap electricity, and rebates on the import of machinery. Within three years more than two hundred industrial units were in operation. But the inter-provincial politics of ethnic rivalry and the economic dominance of Punjab are not conducive to industrialisation of the area. This caused considerable tension with the established industrial class in Punjab and Sind, and in 1991 and 1997 when the Pakistan Muslim League (PML) Government under Nawaz Sharif, (the biggest industrialist in the country) which represents the interests of the urban and industrial classes, came into power and withdrew all the incentives under pressure from the industrialists. So today the industrial estates offer a bleak and deserted picture, all the machinery having been transferred to Punjab and Sind.

Agriculture in NWFP is of a subsistence nature, carried out in the plains of Peshawar and Mardan only. Formerly, Swabi District was famous for agricultural production, but since the construction of a dam at Turbela, most of the area has been waterlogged and useless. Such agriculture as there is comprises food and cash crops, and due to the scarcity of land and widespread poverty, cash crops, not only opium but also sugar cane, tobacco, wheat, maize, rice, barley, mustard and vegetables, are given priority. This means that industrial production in the Province is seasonal in nature.

McCoy believed that opium in Pakistan was produced mainly for local consumption. Even in 1972 this was unrealistic, given the huge quantity of raw opium produced combined with an addiction rate of less than 1% throughout the

---

Province. While the 1972 World Opium Survey showed the licit production of opium in Pakistan as 12 tons, it gave figures for illicit production of up to 160 metric tons, twice the present day production of opium. Similarly, in their study of drug addiction in Pakistan, published nine years later, Spencer and Navarathnam observed that "in spite of extensive cultivation of poppy, the percentage of addiction among the population is negligible" and another thirteen years on, UNDCP, in its report on the Dir District Development Project, stated:

*Despite the widespread growing of opium, there does not yet appear to be a serious narcotics abuse problem in the district. A subsequent survey by a local voluntary agency identified about 120 heroin addicts within the district.*

Given that the population of Dir is around 1.476 million, 120 addicts constitute no more than 0.008% of the population. Further, there exists a hatred for the drug addicts in the country, and atypical areas where there does appear to be an 'addiction culture' - such as Liyari, an urban slum in Karachi, and Kurya, a village in Buner District of NWFP, where, according to Spencer and Navarathnam, writing in 1981, some 70% of the male population were addicted - cannot be generalised to the entire country or related to a specific drug of addiction. In Karachi, for example, a big international seaport and a route for drugs trafficking from South East Asia, people were familiar with heroin-like drugs much earlier than in the rest of the country; and Kurya, where, as we shall see later, consumption has anyway been exaggerated, none the less had atypical consumption patterns for its locality.

The 1996 report of the Islamabad based UNDCP regional office for south-west Asia identified the main opium producing areas as Dir District and the Tribal

---

44 Ibid. p. 12. In fact, in the course of his fieldwork the researcher visited Kurya and was told that people had abused opium in the past, but not on such a large scale as reported. This was subsequently confirmed when later the researcher obtained the Pakistan Government/PNCB report The Buner Model: Buner Agriculture Development Project cited as a source by Spencer and Navarathnam. This report in fact indicates 52 persons out of a population of 425 were addicts, giving an addiction rate of approximately 12%.
POPPY CULTIVATION IN N.W.F.P.
Agencies of Bajaur (Malakand Division), Muhmand and Khyber (Peshawar Division)(see map on page 28A), with only negligible quantities produced in other tribal agencies. According to these sources 25-50% of the Pakistan poppy crop is grown in Dir District, where, in parts of the main poppy valleys, as much as 80% of crop land, mostly on irrigated land, is devoted to poppies. Their share of opium gum production is probably even greater as a result of the higher yields than in the climatically less favourable southern agencies. The average yield in the District is estimated to be 12 kg per acre dry gum on irrigated lands and 10 kg per acre on rain dependent lands, compared to the average national yield of about 8 kg per acre. Depending on the yield estimates used, the total annual production of dry gum in Dir District is between 70 and 90 tons.

Malakand Division, in the north of the Province bordering Afghanistan, and divided into the Districts of Chitral, Dir, Swat and Buner, Bajaur and Malakand Agencies, is a mountainous area with agriculture extremely scarce, and limited largely to the terraced fields in the mountains and the limited plain lands on river banks. Dir, Swat and Chitral Districts were former princely states ruled by local feudal chieftains given official titles (Nawabs in Dir, walli-e-Swat or Mian-Guls in Swat, and Mehtar in Chitral) by the British, in return for their loyalty to the British Crown. Despite Dir, Swat and Chitral being merged into the district administration in 1969 to bring them to a par socio-economically with the other parts of the country, in spite of some improvements mentioned below, many things changed very little.

**Dir District** lies between 35 50' and 34 22 N and 71 2 and 72 30E. It is surrounded to the west by Afghanistan, to the east by Swat District, to the north and

---

46 Ibid.
49 Ibid. This family, the descendants of a pious person named Abdul Ghausoor, later became known as Saidu Baba. Abdul Ghausoor was a poor herd boy from Gujars. As the local Pakhtoons were in a state of continuous tribal war with each other, the eldest son of Saidu Baba, known as Bach Sahib, was installed as chief of Swat, with a title of Wali-e-Swat or Mian Gul in 1926.
50 Ibid. Mehtar-e-Chitral is also a royal title, given to the rulers of Chitral in 1895.
north west by Chitral District and to the south and south west by Malakand and Bajaur Agencies (see map on page 121-A). It comprises 5,282 square miles and has an estimated population of 1.6 million\(^{52}\). Dir is formed by a complex of mountain ranges of 10-14,000 feet above sea level, from the north to the south-west. There are two rivers, the Panjkora and the Swat. The Panjkora's source lies in the permanently snow covered area of the northern Hinduraj mountain range, and flows south, mainly in deep gorges, offering little water for irrigation other than on the plains. The Swat flows on the eastern boundary of the District, again yielding water only to the low lying areas. The area between the two rivers is on a high elevation and non-irrigable.

Dir is a narrow mountainous valley or pass, connecting Peshawar Valley with Chitral and Gilgit, through the Lowari pass, 13,000 feet above sea level. This mountainous tract has a rugged surface with deep and tortuous valleys, which at various places turn into narrow gorges. Mountainous passes along the Panjkora's tributaries are situated on high altitudes, so farming, where it is possible, depends on rain or seasonal springs, which are normally sufficient to the purpose as droughts are rare. Climatically it ranges from sub-tropical to highland, with minimum and maximum average January temperatures between -2°C and 38°C.\(^{53}\) Rainfall (or snow in winter) also varies widely, with Chakdara recording 32.5 inches and Dir 47 inches.

Turning to employment, the total population of Dir according to the 1981 census as reported by the Government of NWFP in 1996, is 767,000 with an annual growth rate of 4.5%\(^{54}\). Of this population almost 281,863, or one in five, are of working age\(^{55}\). Estimates for 1998 are in the vicinity of 1.4 million. The major source of livelihood has traditionally been subsistence agriculture supplemented by casual labour by one or more members of the family in the urban industrial centres, and opium cultivation. Dir has been neglected both by the former Nawab and today by the Federal Government. After the merging of Dir State into the District Administration, however, the situation started to change, and for the first time some schools were opened. So it can be said that education in Dir was introduced only in

\(^{52}\) The Frontier Post (Peshawar: September 16, 1998).


\(^{54}\) Government of NWFP, Important District Wise Socio-Economic Indicators NWFP op.cit. p.2.

\(^{55}\) Ibid.
the second half of the twentieth century. At present there are 2052 educational institutions\textsuperscript{56} providing employment for 5080 male and 1135\textsuperscript{57} female teachers, as well as lower grade employees. Though physical infrastructural and institutional facilities are still lacking, this sector has provided relatively more jobs for the locals than other public sector departments. The result has been an increase in the literacy rate, now 10.16\% overall, comprising 16.93\% for males and 2.77\% for females \textsuperscript{58}.

A second God-given chance was the opening of the Middle Eastern labour market, where a fairly large number of people obtained jobs and sent huge sums of money back to the country, and this situation continues despite the declining labour market there. According to official statistics 11.6\% people went to work in the Middle East between 1971-8.\textsuperscript{59} There are different trends of labour export to specific areas by the people of different valleys. For example Sultan Khel people go to Middle Eastern countries, Painda Khel Karo Valley people to Baluchistan to work in the coal mines or to Kashmir and Punjab for physical labour; and Nihag Valley people go to Karachi for physical labour and work in industry.

Throughout the district there have been reported three industrial units, two flour mills and the Dir Forest Industrial Complex, closed down three years after its inception in 1975. Together these offered employment to 625\textsuperscript{60} persons. At present three flour mills constitute the total industry of the area. The actual annual income for Dir District is calculated as 6500 rupees (US$140) per family (see Table 5-6). The joint family system is prevalent in the area, with an average family size of 13 persons (see Table 5-2), giving an average monthly \textit{per capita} income of 500 rupees, or US$130 \textit{per annum}.\textsuperscript{61}

**Bajaur Agency** is an area of 1290 square kilometres,\textsuperscript{62} located between 34 25 and 35 5 north latitude and 70 1 and 72 east longitude\textsuperscript{63}. Though Bajaur has a lower

---

\textsuperscript{56} Ibid. p.38, 40.
\textsuperscript{57} There are 2052 educational institutions for males which comprise 637 mosque/maktab schools, 869 primary schools, 76 middle schools, 81 high schools, 6 higher secondary schools, 2 degree colleges, and 2 vocational institutes. For females there are 379 separate educational institutions, including 12 maktab schools, 327 primary schools, 29 middle schools, and 11 high schools throughout the District.
\textsuperscript{58} Ibid. p.50, 52.
\textsuperscript{59} Ibid. p.6.
\textsuperscript{60} Ibid. p.31.
\textsuperscript{62} Government of India, \textit{The Imperial Gazetteer of India. op.cit.} p.22-3.
\textsuperscript{63} Ibid. p.21-2.
altitude than Dir and its weather in summer is a bit warmer, the area overall is among the most inaccessible of all parts of north-west Frontier Province. Bajaur is surrounded by Dir District to the north and north-east, Malakand Agency to the south-east, Muhmand Agency to the south, and Afghanistan to the west and north-west (see map on page 119-A). The area is an extension of the Hinduraj or Hindukush mountains. The Bajaur and Muhmand area is considered a transitional zone, land routes in the shape of low height mountain passes connecting the agency to Afghanistan, the area accordingly being a transborder communication route. 40% of the area consists of rocky mountains with a maze of dry ravines or unsmooth land, with poor quality forest land. There are two rivers, the Rud and the Khar Khwar. The Rud rises in the Nawagai or Sur Kamar valley and flows in a west-east direction. No water is taken from the Rud for agriculture, though the Khar Khwar is utilised for very limited irrigation. Except in its southern part, water is a far greater problem than in Dir, since rainfall is rather unpredictable, ranging between about 470 and 850 mm. (though no record of rainfall is maintained by the Agency administration or any other official body). Overall, however, the Agency is more blessed with winter than summer rain, and accordingly has winter, November-May (kharif), rather than summer June-October (rabi) crops.

In fact no reliable climatic data at all regarding Bajaur are available, the nearest weather observatory being situated some 50 miles away in Dir. During the hottest months, May-August, however, the maximum daily average temperature ranges between about 32-39°C with a high humidity; while in winter (November to February) the maximum average temperature is 18°C, with minimum temperatures around freezing point. The plain can be frosty in winter and there is frequently snow in January and February in particular.

There are no authentic secondary socio-economic data on tribal areas available to elucidate the economic conditions of the area, and official figures are without doubt highly inaccurate. For example, the 1961 population census in Bajaur Agency gave the population of Bajaur as 280,200, whereas in 1972 it was recorded as 364,050, an implausibly high increase of 29.9% or 2.99% annually. In 1981, however, the population showed a dramatic decrease to 289,206. (a decrease of 20.65%, or

---

65 Ibid. p.5.
negative growth of 2.06% per annum)**. Assuming the 1981 figures as correct with a growth rate of 3.0%, estimates for 1998 are 436,701. In this regard an ex-political agent and anthropologist has observed that:

Demographic surveys, like most other census information in tribal areas, are based on answers provided by ‘leading maliks’ and are usually collected and collated at the Agency Headquarters or in Peshawar. The statistical accuracy of such surveys may be gauged from the fact that they are officially labelled as ‘estimates’ or ‘enumerations’... In the first census in 1951, after the creation of Pakistan, the population for the tribal areas was also based on estimates. This remained unchanged for the census of 1961 and 1971**.66

Any inaccuracy may be largely attributable to the fact that the figures are provided by the political administration. Before 1972, tribes were given subsidised food, so an inbuilt incentive existed for exaggerated figures to be provided by Maliks both to the political authorities and to census officials. This would certainly help explain the dramatic decline in the 1981 figures. But local politics and cultural trends are also involved in this official requirement:

Exaggeration of males and deflation of female number in questions regarding demographic or domestic statistics is a common tribal practice. In the eyes of tribesmen this interconnected formula is explained thus; inflated male number increases political (military) prestige and social status and thus commands that much more attention, and allowances from the political administration. The subject of females is strictly private and information regarding their lives is an infringement of this privacy... The inflation of population figures may also have a valid explanation. The two house system that many Muhmands maintain may result in double counting. According to the 1971 census, there should be 432 people per square mile in the Agency. However, a superficial visit to the agency with its vast, desolated area will indicate the considerable inflation in the population figures.67

There is no industry in the Agency, and though transport related employment has yielded a few jobs from time to time (notably on road construction), the main

** The actual population growth rate is more than 3.5% in the tribal area due to cultural and religious factors. No question of possible population decreases therefore arises.
67 Ibid. pp. 44-5.
occupation is rain-dependent single-crop agriculture (rabi). The two months of the sowing season (November and December) and the two months of harvest (May and June) are the busiest periods, the rest of the year most people being underemployed. Though some workers migrate to the urban areas in search of menial jobs, returning home at the harvest time, very few are believed to go to the Middle East - though once again, no figures are available.  

Another source of income is retail and wholesale business in the local markets. Bajaur has three bazaars, Khar, Nawagai and Inayat Kallay, where the main sale items are daily food, grain, arms and ammunition, and other items of daily use. Prior to the Afghan war the major source of income for the people was transborder trade with Afghanistan, which consisted mainly of exporting food items and importing foreign made electronics, tyres, silk and crockery through the mountain passes. This trade offered employment to a considerable number of people. But with the Afghan war, this business came to an end, as it did in other tribal agencies; and further, the influx of Afghan refugees led to business for the locals suffering from competition from refugees. Like many immigrants the world over, the Afghan refugees proved economically very active and aggressive, coming, in a short period of time, to dominate the local markets, leaving the locals in economic jeopardy, and leading to armed conflict between refugees and locals in several tribal agencies. The scale of the problem was considerable. According to a UNHCR (United Nations High Commission For Refugees) Survey in 1989, there were 194,580 registered Afghan refugees in Bajaur Agency, and of the 591 and 518 shops in the two main bazaars, Khar and Inayat Kallay, 245 and 362 respectively belonged to Afghan refugees.

Yet another source of employment is in public sector departments within the Agency, where employment is considered very attractive as jobs are pensionable. The Education Department particularly is a source of permanent employment for more than 1100 people as teachers, in addition to lower grade posts. According to official statistics there are 291 educational institutions in the Agency, with a total staff strength of 1197 in teaching and lower grade staff. On the assumption that all

---

70 Government of NWFP, Important Agency-Wise Socio-Economic Indicators 1994 (Peshawar: Bureau of Statistics, Environment, Planning and Development Department, 1994), pp. 14, 20. It should be noted that out of this number 1037 were males and 160
the teaching staff are from the Agency, it can be calculated that education alone gives employment to approximately 0.28% of the population.

**Muhmand Agency**, with an area of 2296 sq. km. and an estimated population for 1994 of around 243,000,\(^1\) lies north-west of Peshawar, at 33 30 and 34 40 N and 70 30 and 71 30 E longitude.\(^2\) To its north is Bajaur Agency, to its north-west and west Afghanistan, to the south-west Khyber Agency, to the south-east Peshawar Division, and to the north-east Malakand Agency (see map on page 116-A). Rainfall is low - 13 inches maximum - and weather conditions range from 45°C in summer to below freezing in winter. The Agency mainly comprises glens, valleys and hills, and has little vegetation other than coarse grass, dwarf palm (*mezrairai*) and scrubwood.

The Muhmand Hills cross into Bajaur in the transitional zone of the Hindu Kush range. The Sappar and Illazai ranges and the Malakand Hills are the main mountains. The barren Sappar range lies to the north, forming a divide with Afghanistan, though the Malakand Hills to the east have a thin cover of olive and wild oak. There is a small plain in the Kabul and Swat river basins. The Kabul has a dam and hydro-electric power station, but fertile land is found only where streams have pierced through the valley sides to form alluvial fans. Most of the very limited cultivable area, which is rain dependent, is drained by the Swat, but as this river flows into a deep gorge little cultivable land is found along its banks, though what there is a rich and alluvial loam, aided by floods from the upper areas. The bulk of the Muhmand Agency, however, is stony and infertile.

As with other tribal areas, in Muhmand Agency no reliable supportive data on the socio-economic conditions of the area exist, and figures are ‘estimates’ by the relevant departments. In 1961 the population was recorded as 294,215, rising by 30.2% to 381,922 in 1972, but falling by 57% to 163,933 in 1981.\(^3\) Assuming a 3.5% population growth rate, the estimated population for 1998 is in the vicinity of 260,000.

---


We have already discussed a number of possible reasons for the unreliability of figures of this kind, but in Muhmand Agency they particularly include the inaccessible nature of many areas: in Ambar, for example, no census was even attempted, the Government relying on local elders/leaders for data collection. They would have been liable to exaggerate their clan population for political reasons already discussed and would be ignorant of the importance of the census as well as suspicious of the Government; but even with the best will in the world they would not, anyway, have been technically or educationally equipped to undertake a reliable census.

The apparent population decline in 1981 has a number of possible explanations. These include emigration, the concept of dwa kora, or two houses, which leads to double counting, the negative attitudes of officials towards tribal peoples, the lack of public interest, and the prevalence of the joint family system, which entails three to four generations living together under one roof and pooling resources. This means that the average size of households is as high as 23.5 (Table 5-2), and while it has economic, political and social advantages, it does not necessarily aid accurate recording.

Muhmand Agency's literacy rate is 3.61% (males 6.07%, females 0.64%). There are 307 educational institutions (including some 'ghost schools' which exist on paper but not in reality, either through administrative incompetence or for corrupt purposes) throughout the Agency, offering employment to 1195 locals (if we assume that all the teachers are from the Agency) as teachers, and many more in lower grade positions. Another source of income is the local markets. Muhmand Agency has three large markets, at Ghalanai, Gandab and Yakaghund, with some 100, 100 and 200 shops respectively, where daily necessities are sold. No figures are available on the exodus to the Middle East for labour, and the economic and social impacts of remittances from there, but some individuals from the Halim Zai area were known to the researcher to be working as labourers in the Gulf region.

The agency lacks any industry. In 1977 an industry of glass and bottles manufacturing was established but as a ghost industry only: twenty years later it

---

*** The dwa kora system involves maintaining one house in the urban areas and the other in the native tribal areas.
74 Government of NWFP, Important Agency-Wide Socio-Economic Indicators 1994 op.cit. p.25.
75 Ibid. p. 20.
had still to commence production. The mainstay of the people is the migration to other parts of the country, including, most locally, Peshawar and Mardan in NWFP, for menial jobs and agricultural labour.

**Khyber Agency** lies between 33-45 and 34-20 North latitude and 70-30 and 71-27 East longitude, is bounded by Muhmand Agency on the north-east, by the Jalalabad or Ningrahar province of Afghanistan on the north-west, by Peshawar district on the East, by Orak Zai Agency on the south and Kuram Agency on its south-west (see map on page 123-A). It has an area of 2,576 square kilometers with a population of 422,000\(^76\). As the only northern land route connecting the subcontinent with Europe, the Khyber Pass in particular has had deep significance for invaders from Alexander the Great to the Moguls and Afghans. The region is like a fort or castle, and is appropriately named Khyber, a word from Hebrew meaning “a palace or castle”. The Pass begins at Jamrud, sixteen kilometres west of Peshawar cantonment, twisting through the Khyber hills for about 40 kilometres in a north-westerly direction, to Toor Kham border, 10 kilometres from Landikotal, a checkpoint with Afghanistan.

The terrain is predominantly hilly, with many small valleys in the shape of narrow strips. The mountains are steep and rocky, and unfit for vegetation; the valleys are situated in deep gorges. The climate is extreme, being cold to extremely cold in winter, with snow common on high altitudes, and warm to hot in summer. Water is scarce, with a precipitation of only 4-5 inches in summer and 10-15 inches in winter. Though two rivers, Bara and Choora, flow through Khyber, they are of little use to the land, very little of which is available for cultivation.

No significant industrial units exist. In 1976 the FATA Development Corporation completed a cigarette factory at a cost of 13.686 million rupees, which provided jobs to 105 persons, but it closed in October 1984 due to losses. Another factory of Marbles was also started by FATA DC in 1980 but also failed. In the private sector, there are currently one ghee mill, one ice factory and one cigarette factory at Bara.

The Districts of Dir, Chitral and Buner are the most backward, least known and poorest documented areas in narcotic matters. Dir and Buner districts in particular have become a focus for the international community, due to opium production.

---

In Malakand Division the average per capita income is about one third of the average for Pakistan\textsuperscript{77} as a whole, itself officially only US$420\textsuperscript{78} even including the value of agriculture produce consumed domestically. But independent observers claim that the per capita income in Pakistan is US$120 and the average Pakistani is living below the poverty line\textsuperscript{79}.

As for all Pathans, the extended and joint family system, (average size 15.4 [Table 5-1]), provides the basic necessities of life to every member of the family irrespective of earning position. Pakistan is not a welfare state, so there is no concept of family income support, child benefits, old age benefits or social security, and all male earners contribute to the family purse, women being economically inactive other than by helping with agriculture at the time of harvest or cultivation. Marriage and other ceremonies are celebrated with pomp and show, often beyond the means of the family concerned. Excessive expenditure is incurred on such ceremonies, and also on the eve of the two Eids every year. In the opium growing areas, this tradition of over-expenditure normally keeps the people in debt until the next harvest of opium ensures at least temporary solvency.

A characteristic of Pakistani society is the high birth rate (3.0\% per annum approximately), particularly in NWFP, where a large family is a sign of status, and where it is a common belief that the greater the number of males in a family the greater is the income of that family, all individuals pooling their income. In the desire for more and more male children, the reproductive life of married couples is very long, resulting in a high birth rate and increases in population. Another reason for producing more and more children is their uncertain life expectancy, due to an infant mortality rate of around 133/1000 live births, and an understandable desire to use male offspring as an insurance policy against poverty in old age.\textsuperscript{80}

In fact a look at the family income of the four main drugs producing areas gives an idea of the poverty of the people of Khyber Agency, with a mean family income of 11,500 rupees (Table 5-6), or 483.00 rupees \textit{per capita} per month (US$10) \textsuperscript{**}.

\textsuperscript{80} World Health Organisation, in \textit{The News International} (London: August 11, 1997).
\textsuperscript{**} Based on foreign exchange rate for January 1998.
Though no secondary data are available to assess factors such as the contribution of various sectors to productivity, employment income, visible trade and business in the three big markets within the agency area, give an idea of economic conditions.

The average literacy rate is 10.94%\(^81\) of which male literacy is 20.18% and female is 0.64%. There are 327\(^82\) educational institutions of which only 78 are for females including 70 primary schools, five middle schools and three girls' high schools. The education department provides employment for about 1500\(^83\) persons i.e. 0.9% of the working population, of a population of 421,000\(^84\). There are estimates of some 70,000 unemployed\(^85\) youth in the agency, or 41.6% of the population of working age.

Trade is the major source of income of the people. Afridies and Shinwaries characteristically concentrate on the transport and carriage business. Most inland transport, particularly in NWFP, is owned and controlled by them, though once again no reliable statistics are available. Due to the long border with Afghanistan and the Khyber Pass, smuggling is a major activity. Some of the big traders from Khyber Agency deal with international business in foreign made goods like electronic goods, cloth, and crockery, an activity which occupies a considerable number of locals.

Drugs are mostly produced in economically disadvantaged areas. In NWFP, as we have seen, there is absolute poverty, and far more of the people live below the minimum living than in the urban areas. I have mentioned the opportunity structure in these areas, where the only source of survival is drug production or off season migration to the industrial centres located outside the Province. Intra-provincial and inter-provincial inequality of opportunities has caused further deterioration. Wealth is concentrated in a few hands - the feudal, normally the politicians, the urban industrial class, and the bureaucrats. These classes control the state. As a result the general public is politically powerless. With respect to NWFP, where in effect there is no industry, only Government servants are entitled to a small pension. In order to compensate the unfortunates like widows, orphans, the poor and destitute, as well

\(^82\) Ibid. p. 14.
\(^83\) Ibid. p. 20.
\(^84\) Ibid. p.1.
\(^85\) Haji Khaista Khan, In Daily Mashriq (Peshawar: April 2, 1997).
as students of religious schools, who totally depend on the communities where they attain their education, a system of zakah was introduced by the government of General Zia ul Haq in the early 1980s, and currently more than 28 billion rupees annually are deducted from personal bank accounts under the zakah head. The religious text defines the purpose for which these funds may be used in very broad terms but none of the mentioned classes is compensated, and the money has been eaten up by every party in government and the public live in a culture of poverty.

The main source of livelihood in the drugs producing areas has traditionally been subsistence through rain dependent agriculture, particularly opium. Adden has detailed the reasons for poppy cultivation the world over. He doubts whether climate and soil conditions are the causes of opium cultivation but rather argues that it is the remunerative aspect of opium cultivation that is responsible, and is the only reason that can be counted towards opium cultivation in these poor areas. The climatic conditions and the geography of the area unlike those in other provinces of the country make the areas perfect for opium and heroin production.

**Dir District** with an area of 528,206 hectares, is characterised by great diversity in soil and climate conditions, due to varying altitudes ranging from 1,000 metres to 3,500 metres, and rainfall is reported to be from 600 mm in the southern areas to over 1,000 mm in the north. As the area is mountainous with steep slopes, crops and fruit trees are difficult to cultivate without proper terracing. As a result, agriculture is complex and hard, and yield and income both very low. Poppy is the main cash crop, giving many times the income of other crops – some 6,842 rupees per family per year (Table 5-15). Accordingly 80% of fertile land, mostly irrigated lands in the eastern valleys, is cultivated with poppies. The cultivated area during 1992-3 was reported as 85,885 hectares, with a cultivable waste land of 1416 hectares. Afforested areas are 171,585 hectares, and non-cultivable land totals about 10,320 hectares. Of the total cultivable area only 59,000 hectares are irrigated. A population of 1.6 million with an average family size of 13(Table 5-2)

---


puts tremendous pressure on the *per capita* available land of 4.7 *treebs* (Table 5-10) or 0.073 hectares.

Agriculture is the mainstay of the people, 85% of them directly depending on it.\(^1\) It is mostly very primitive, and in some parts very old crude implements are used to this day. Hand ploughs, planks, digging shovels to level and dig the soil and prepare it for cultivation, and hand hoeing and weeding remain common sights; there is little use of improved seeds, fertilizers and pesticides, and around 80% of cultivable land is terraced, where the use of any machine, unless specially devised, is practically impossible, particularly by the poverty stricken people of the area who cannot even afford to maintain a pair of oxen for ploughing.

The development of agriculture depends also on other factors, including roads, educational facilities, availability of expertise, use of modern technology in the agriculture sector, good health conditions and size of the land holding, all of which are lacking in Dir. As a result, other than by growing poppy, *per capita* yields are too small to meet farmers’ needs.

The United Nations, in its report on the socio-economic conditions of the area, remarked that:

*The government recognised at the outset that enforcement of the poppy growing ban could cause financial hardships to many poppy growing farmers, and that the ban was, thus, not likely to succeed over the long run.*\(^2\)

It further remarked that,

*Until recently, the valleys have not been easily accessible to the government. In addition, the inhabitants of these valleys are heavily dependent on opium and its elimination will seriously affect their household income.*\(^3\)

About the opium production, agriculture and lands in the area, a United Nations consultant reported on the Dir Development Project thus:

---

\(^1\) *Ibid.* p. 22.


I believe that the project, in conjunction with a government enforcement programme, will achieve the elimination of poppy production in Dir District. However, I am concerned that as the project stands, the result will be a less sustainable economy than presently exists. The area of concentration for the second phase, is characterised by limited arable land and consequently relatively small farms, often poor soil, large and young families with a high rate of population growth, high levels of illiteracy and few options for income generation off the farm. Many of the small farms appear to be incapable of growing sufficient subsistence crops to feed the rather large farm families and are dependent on poppy production, but to date the project has been unable to identify a cropping system that can effectively replace poppy production. With population pressure growing in any event, I fear one of the impacts of the project will be to accelerate the further impoverishment of small farmers.

Bajaur has an area of 129,035 hectares, out of which 56,000 hectares (43%) are available for cultivation. Only 26.3% of the land (14,720 hectares) has thus far been brought under irrigated agriculture, as the Government has dug some 100 tube wells in the Khar and Mahmund Tehsils since 1976. This gives a 6:1 persons:hectares ratio for irrigated land, while for non irrigated land this ratio of land/persons is 1:28. Land per family was, on average, 13 jreebs (Table 5-10). The major crops are wheat, barley and lentils, and mustard is grown on rain dependent lands. Though the trend of opium cultivation on irrigated lands has reduced for a time being, it has in the past been a major cash crop.

Agriculture in Muhmand, unlike Bajaur, is very scanty. Of a total area of 229,620 hectares only 13,500 hectares (5.88% of the total land) are available for agriculture of a rain dependent nature in the areas of Ambar Tehsil and some irrigated lands on the banks of the Swat and Kabul rivers in the low lying areas. Swat river basin consists of steep slopes and gorges, though Kabul river basin is open and good for subsistent agriculture. A main problem of agricultural development in the agency is the topography of the land, and no extension to bring more land or improve agriculture is possible. Even if the cultivable waste of about 17,331 hectares were brought under cultivation, it would have little effect on agriculture; the total area

---

95 Ibid. p. 3.
would be 30,000 hectares and average land per family would remain nearly 19.5 jreebs** (Table 5-10). Average family income was approximately 7,500 rupees per family (Table 5-6) giving an average of 320 rupees per capita per month or 3840.48 rupees (USS84 or £50)** per annum. As a result of low productivity and low income, people in Ambar Tehsil, who are poorer than the rest of the agency and where land is available for a single crop cultivation, cultivate opium to supplement their incomes.

**Khyber Agency**, has an area of 257,654 hectares, of which 13,990 hectares, or 5.43% of the total area, are available for cultivation. Lands for cultivation are available only on the banks of rivers and streams, however, and 87.21% of the cultivable area (around 12,200 hectares) is irrigated. The average family holding is 8 jreebs (Table 5-10).

**Opium and Heroin in the Indo-Pak Sub-Continent**

Drug abuse has quite possibly been part of many cultures and societies throughout the world since time immemorial, but there is little indication that drugs posed significant problems of social well-being until the 18th and 19th centuries. Certainly prior to that time the idea of a 'drug problem' appears nowhere in the literature which the author was able to trace. Around two hundred years ago, however, the abuse of opium and its derivatives began to assume alarming proportions in a number of countries, notably but not exclusively China and the USA. Indeed it has been said that in the early 19th century drug abuse was known as the “American disease”, and during the Civil War as “the soldiers’ disease”97.

Since that time the global community has become familiar with the often devastating impact of drug addiction on individuals, families and the social structure. Narcotic drugs, including opium and its derivatives, present major economic, social and political challenges to many countries, not all of which are well equipped to meet them. One such country is Pakistan; and my overall purpose is to show, from a multidisciplinary perspective, how a combination of social, economic, cultural, political, historical and geographical forces together make the problems associated with opium and heroin not only serious but seemingly

---

**Jreeb is a local measure of land. Two jreebs make an acre and 2.47 acres make a hectare.

** Based on foreign exchange rate for January 1998 @ 46 rupees = 1 US$ or 76 Rupees =£1 sterling.

intractable. This is the more so given Pakistan's status as a third world country with more than its share of the problems commonly associated with development (including political instability, poverty of immense severity, religious intolerance, corruption, illiteracy, health problems and population growth). About the economic plight of third world countries such as Pakistan, Jones writes:

*Poverty is the central problem. Most third world countries are poor and their people subject to many different forms of deprivation, powerlessness, hunger, urban squalor, landlessness, illiteracy, avoidable ill health, familial deprivation, the exploitation of women and so on. Most of the poverty in underdeveloped countries is concentrated in the rural areas where most of the people live. The various aspects of poverty interact. Inequality in education perpetuates inequalities in status and 'life chances'. Squalid living conditions adversely affect health and life expectancy. Inequality of powers stands in the way of any steps towards greater social justice. The interactions are endless.*

Pakistan has existed as an independent nation for over fifty years; for half that time it has been under emergency or martial law. It has fought three wars with India, became a front line state after the Soviet attack on Afghanistan, and has been suffering the consequences for twenty years. The politics of ethnicity have truncated it; religious and ethnic violence take a huge toll of human lives; political corruption is the order of the day. ‘State’ and ‘Government’ mean the capital of the country and rulers, and ‘state’ and ‘society’ could scarcely be further apart. Education is a privilege, not a right; health facilities are rudimentary; politics revolve around the accumulation of power and privileges used for amassing wealth. Like many post-colonial states, Pakistan has inherited many defects in its political structure. As faces change at the top, policies also change and the public suffers from government to government. There is no uniform legal system, particularly in the drug producing areas, and this situation indirectly and directly helps drug production.

International pressure to solve the problems associated with drugs increased considerably in the early 1970s, when the USA declared its first “war on drugs”. It was also in the 1970s that drug addiction surfaced as a problem in Pakistan - though at that time there was no inkling of how serious a problem it was to become. Heroin

---

was little known, but the use of such psychotropic synthetic drugs as barbiturates and amphetamines, and local drugs like opium and cannabis, was part of common culture. Though there are reports that a few people in the coastal city of Karachi had used heroin for some time, probably having acquired the habit during international travel\textsuperscript{99} or as a result of Karachi’s international trade and communications links, Pakistan’s first case of heroin addiction came to light in Baluchistan in 1979. A year later the first two cases in NWFP were identified in the provincial capital, Peshawar. Since then, heroin addiction has spread like a forest fire: some 100,000 people annually have become addicted to it for the last twenty years, and the number of addicts is now increasing by 7% annually\textsuperscript{100} with no treatment and rehabilitation of addicts at state level. I shall consider such issues in this thesis, particularly in Chapter VII.

**The Present Thesis**

This study, the first of its nature with respect to Pakistan, addresses illicit narcotics production in north-west Pakistan. This includes the production of raw opium, the mother of addictive and abusive drugs including morphine and diacetyl morphine (heroin). The study gives a description of the causes of the problem in order to clarify its existence because of the complex socio-economic and political conditions prevalent in the country. Although illicit drug production has reduced significantly during the last few years due to international efforts and that of the Government, this may well prove a temporary success, as no viable permanent solution has been offered to check the causes of its cultivation.

In this introductory chapter I have tried to explain the problem of drug addiction in Pakistan, as well as the drugs (opium and heroin) production situation in both region and country. I have asked why drug addiction is rampant in Pakistan, and outlined an argument that the answer is in part availability, supply driving demand more than the other way round. But availability can only be understood by a multidisciplinary analysis of the history, geography, politics, economics and culture of Pakistan. Because, however, a multidisciplinary framework poses so many problems (not least of tactics, presentation, length, integration and the necessary

---

\textsuperscript{100} *The News* (London: July 26, 1996).
breadth of expertise) an attempt has been made to restrict the analysis to answering some precise questions, (page 177-78 Chapter-VII) but to buttress the answers with substantial references, the pursuit of which will enable the interested reader to follow other preoccupations about Pakistan and south-west Asia in particular.

As we shall see, however, the ‘supply driving demand’ thesis holds only for the internal economics of production. Once Pakistan became a supplier of opium and heroin to rich first world user countries the reverse dynamic operated, since supply (and hence also the internal demand which was fuelled by that supply) was driven by the purchasing power of consuming countries, countries which, in many cases, found it politically more acceptable to be seen to tackle the supply side in faraway countries than demand in their own country. But even here, as I shall show, there was a substantial caveat; for, much as domestic policy in the United States in particular sought to ‘stem the tide of drugs’, not least by launching successive and high profile wars on it, foreign policy often took the country in an altogether different direction, since its tendency to fight international communist domination wherever the possibility of it arose caused it to make some rather doubtful bedfellows, in particular resistance groups be they in Afghanistan, Iran, central America or south-east Asia, which were necessarily financed by the international drugs trade.

Chapter II briefly introduces aspects of the history and politics of opium, as well as its mode of production, character, uses, bio-chemistry and forms of imbibing. These latter considerations lead naturally into a brief history of heroin, which gives an indication of its invention and use as a medicine, and its subsequent fall from grace. An account is also given of the history of heroin processing in Pakistan.

Chapter III considers the role of national politics in the development of opium and heroin trafficking in Pakistan. Without political patronage and a favourable political atmosphere drug production would be impossible. Drugs have the capacity to corrupt the political atmosphere of the producing country, and Pakistan is no exception. I discuss the role of political parties in the production and development of opium, the role of politicians’ involvement in the drugs trade which has fuelled the situation as well as the general ‘culture of corruption’.

External political conditions have also played a major role. The revolution in Iran and the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and the subsequent civil war in that
country have boosted the drug trade in Pakistan. How drugs came to be used as a source of weapon procurement during the Afghan war, the role of the superpowers in drug development in the region, and how heroin was used as weapon during war against the enemy are also considered.

Chapter IV initially describes the research strategy: sampling techniques, sources of data collection and why data were collected from different sources. An account is given of the dangers involved in researching in third world countries, particularly areas where regular state laws are not applicable. Details of the fieldwork and the responses of the different categories of respondent are also presented.

Chapter V presents and analyses the empirical data. These figures are put to statistical tests to demonstrate whether or not they support the hypothesis that bad economic conditions and political instability in the areas concerned are causes of drugs production in lieu of any other sustainable economic activity.

Chapter VI introduces ethnographic data which, after etching some more aspects of daily life in the research areas, comprises three case studies. These, in addition to putting ‘flesh on the bones’ of why opium is produced, include three balance sheets, drawn up by respondents, which highlight starkly the difference in the financial yield of growing opium as against what are in some, though not all, poppy growing areas, possible alternative crops - wheat and onion.

Chapter VII, which is divided into two parts, first rehearses attempts which have been made at, respectively, national and supranational level, to control the spread of opium and its derivatives, discussing the obstacles which have been faced and the extent to which they have been overcome. The second part begins by reflecting more broadly on the whole notion and philosophy of control, raising a number of questions which are then applied to the study of the possibility of legalisation, regulation and medicalisation in Pakistan. In politically unstable countries like Pakistan, laws and rules of governing vary from area to area and person to person. I have discussed the legal status of the drugs producing areas as defined by the constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, giving some idea how the relevant legal systems support the national drug scene.

Chapter VIII concludes the thesis.
CHAPTER II: OPIUM: THE POPPY, THE DRUG, AND OPIUM DERIVATIVES

The Opium Poppy

In much of my research involving the ancient history of the opium poppy, Papaver Somniferum, I have been left with a feeling of uncertainty... The geographical origin of the opium poppy also remains in doubt... many regions including South East Europe, Central Europe, south-west Europe, Asia Minor, the near East or Middle East and Central Asia, have been suggested as the native homes of this famous drug plant.

Though many medical histories of opium are available, no authentic history of the opium poppy itself is known to exist. While scattered references can be found, based on archaeological, archaeo-botanical and pharmacological findings these are shrouded in antiquity and the geographical origins of the plant are contested. Terry and Pellin suggest Mesopotamia, while Berridge and Griffith prefer Egypt, from where, they suggest, the plant spread to Asia Minor and onwards to Greece and Europe. Some claim Asia Minor itself, and Persia in particular. Merrillees opts for Cyprus, from where, he claims, it was exported to Egypt. Similar views are expressed by Neligan who asserts that the Egyptians were not introduced to opium cultivation before the Greek conquest of the area in 300 BC.

Nor is there consensus about the timing of the origins of the plant, though the use of opium has been traced back to the early Neolithic, Mesolithic or upper Paleolithic

---

4 Ibid.pp.54-57.
periods. The Sumerians, who settled in Mesopotamia around 6-5000 BC knew about *papaver somniferum*, and their successors, the Babylonians, took this knowledge to the east (Persia) and west (Egypt) of their empire. The first written record of opium poppies is in Homer (around 800 BC) who mentions a city near Corinth named Mekone (“Poppy Town”), the name signifying the cultivation of opium poppies in the area. Many subsequent references have been made to the plant. Hippocrates (460-377 BC) makes frequent mention of poppy as a medicine; Theophrastus and Aristotle (384-322 BC) also make many references to the poppy plant.

Etymology is equally contentious. According to Watt the Sanskrit name for opium, *ahiphena*, derives from the Arabic *afiun*; Babar, however, says that *ahiphena*, *afiun* in Urdu, Persian and Arabic, and *afim* in Pashtu are derivations or distortions of the Sanskrit word *ahiuphena* or *ohifaus*. The Sanskrit language is, of course, more ancient than Urdu, Persian or Pashtu.

Even botanists, from whom one might expect greater scientific precision, are uncertain about the plant's origins and ancestry, and its internal taxonomy is similarly controversial. While some plants can be traced to their original geographical ranges of distribution and identified with the real, natural-growing progenitor, in the case of the poppy the true wild ancestor is obscure. While it appears generally agreed that *papaver somniferum* belongs to the order *papaverales* or *rhoedale* an order of flowering plants of relatively primitive evolutionary development, one botanist, Campbell, suggests there are four families in the order, while another, Hutchinson, believes there are only two. The number of genera and species is similarly contested, Porter claiming to have identified 24

---

genera and 450 species\textsuperscript{18} while Core has found 28 genera but only 250 species\textsuperscript{19}. These taxonomic disputes contribute to the ancestral uncertainties to which I have already drawn attention. I address them only briefly here, however, since they are tangential to my theme.

If the history of the poppy is obscure to scholars, the contemporary conditions of poppy growing are misunderstood by laymen. It is not true, for example, that the poppy grows almost anywhere irrespective of climatic conditions, and skill and experience are required if the crop is to succeed. Though it is indeed a drought resistant crop which can grow on as little as 15 inches annual rainfall\textsuperscript{20}, the poppy requires particular soil and climatic conditions, as variations affect morphine content, and heavy rains can ruin a crop. So while in irrigated areas where soil is rich, production is relatively straightforward\textsuperscript{21}, in rain dependent locations like Bajaur and Muhmand Agencies 3-4 manual or bull ploughings are required for propagation, followed by carefully prepared manuring. In such areas the small size and irregular shape of the plots would make tractor ploughing impractical even if tractors could be afforded by the farmers. And after harvesting the \textit{kharif} (November-May or winter/spring) crop (normally the only crop on rain dependent lands) the whole process begins again.

Poppies with a high morphine content have been cultivated in tropical, subtropical and temperate climates all over the world\textsuperscript{22}. \textit{Papaver somniferum} has a number of geographical strains, and transplantation of one geographical race to another weakens plants, rendering them more susceptible to disease\textsuperscript{23}. For centuries the poppies of the southern form, those of Afghanistan, Iran and India, best grown in a dry and warm climate and requiring a shorter vegetative period, have been cultivated in NWFP, where two main varieties of opium poppy are currently cultivated, one with white, the other with red or purple flowers, normally at

\textsuperscript{22} T.J.J. Adden, \textit{The Distribution of Opium Cultivation and the Trade in Opium} (Haarlem: 1939), p. 5.
\textsuperscript{23} Ibid.
elevations of 2-6,000 feet. While the poppy normally requires a temperature of 3-6°C to germinate, once established it can withstand temperatures below freezing.

Nor is the poppy as amenable to different soil types as is sometimes imagined. Clays are unsuitable because of their higher moisture content, since under heavy rains, where the soil remains saturated for several days, the poppy will wither and die; sand is too drought-prone and infertile; and soils without good tilth are unsuitable because the small seed lacks strength to break through the crust. The preferred texture is sandy loam, augmented by heavy manuring. In NWFP the crop is usually sown during mid-October to end-November, when rain dependent land has been watered by the late monsoon or early winter rains. By the end of December the plant is normally 1-3 inches high, with two or three leaves, and can resist the cold (see picture on page 49A).

December and January are the months for weeding, hoeing and thinning, (see picture on page 51A) normally by women and children. These are labour intensive tasks, and often only a part of even a small field of size 35 x 10 feet can be cleaned in a day. Proper thinning and weeding create 3-4 additional branches and hence capsules. By March-April the plant attains its maximum height of 35-55 inches and soon afterwards blossoming starts, and for 2-3 weeks the area is a colourful sight of white, red and purple flowers (see picture on page 52A): the anthers crack open and expose the sticky pollen which enables wind as well as insect pollination (though the latter is more important for fertilisation). By mid-April the pod is exposed, and when the petals are totally dropped it is ready for lancing/incising. Then the third and last but toughest stage of labour begins. With the help of a small 3-5 bladed knife (panja) the incision of the corona starts. As the corona is incised, a white milky liquid oozes out (see picture on page 54A) and coagulates in 5-8 hours. This coagulated juice, which turns deep brown, is opium resin. Incision is normally done on alternate days in the afternoon, the gum being collected next morning with the help of a blunt scraper (see picture on page 55A).

At this point rain destroys the opium resin, so the heavy rains characteristic of spring in Pakistan constitute the main risk. The opium gum, moistened by nocturnal dew, must be scraped off before the sun gets warm and the gum dry and hard. Incising or lancing is a skilled and hard job: up to 6 incisions are needed, and if any incision is too deep the yield is damaged. Normally, in a one acre field, six persons lance and six (often the same ones) collect the gum. To collect one kilogram of raw
opium 40-50 man hours' work are needed, so production is only remunerative where there are poverty, large families and low wages. Opium is not produced by big land owners, but by peasants in tribal areas, who possess or rent as much land as they can work manually with their families. Production is further aided by the custom of ashar, under which, in times of need, relatives or local people must help out in return for rich food arranged in their honour. The beneficiary of ashar must reciprocate when he in turn is needed.

Following lancing, the capsule is dried on the plant for 10-15 days when the capsules are harvested by hand, sun dried and beaten and broken with a club. When it is certain that the seeds are no more in the capsules, the seeds are separated by filtering them out with a sieve.

Every part of this plant has its use. The seeds and broken capsules are packed separately for market; the dry stalk is used as fodder, for fencing the fields or as fuel; dry capsules are kept in private homes as medicine. It follows that opium's significance lies not only in sales, but rather it represents a whole domestic economy, culture and way of life, having a significance similar to that of the banana or coconut elsewhere. Growing and harvesting opium are traditional skills passed down the generations and, as we shall see, not always substitutable by alternative activities devised by supranational bodies or national governments. Though, as I have argued, the logic and meaning of opium growing have changed dramatically in recent years, it is important to understand the interrelationship between history and culture if we are to appreciate the nature of the problem those who seek to eliminate the crop will face.

Opium the Drug

The history of opium itself, as medicine and source of euphoria, stretches back before recorded history. Though opium is the name of the coagulated juice or latex of the poppy plant, obtained by the incision of the unripe but mature capsule of the plant, such importance now attaches to the word that in English the plant as a whole is popularly called opium, albeit that Pashto in particular has a richer vocabulary, using different words for the seeds (khash khash), the plant (koknar), and the capsule or corona (doodha or ghootai).
THINNING, WEEDING AND HOEING POPPY CROP
Historically, the circumstances of the introduction of opium to the sub-continent are obscure.\textsuperscript{24} Some scholars, including Bergmark\textsuperscript{25}, are of the opinion that the plant originated there, whereas Kritikos and Papadaki say it originated in the west and spread to India.\textsuperscript{26} There seems, however, to be a consensus among many non-Muslim writers\textsuperscript{27} that opium was introduced to the East by Arabs\textsuperscript{28}; a number of Indian scholars believing that as their sacred books, the Vedas, do not make any mention of the plant\textsuperscript{29} it must have come late into India, probably with the Muslims or Arabs. Some Muslim scholars\textsuperscript{30} on the other hand say there is in fact mention of drug plants in the Vedas: Babar, for example, quotes Regveda of 500 BC as saying "drug plants preceded even the Gods". Many authors,\textsuperscript{31} however, do believe the Arabs of the Mohammedan era or Muslims took opium to this area around the 7-8th century AD. Anslinger goes further, saying (controvertially for many Muslims) that the rise of Mohammadanism provided a stimulus to the spread of opium use through its concept of the separation of the spiritual and physical nature, and that as Islam forbade the use of wine, people switched to opium and other sources of

\textsuperscript{24} M. C. Sharma, "History of Narcotic Control in India" In M. Desai, H. S. Sethi et al. (eds) Current Research in Drug Abuse in India (New Delhi: 1981), p. 274.

\textsuperscript{25} Cited in P.G. Kritikos, and S. P. Papadaki, op. cit. p. 38.

\textsuperscript{26} Id.


\textsuperscript{30} K. Babar, op.cit. p. 119.

intoxication\textsuperscript{32}. Sharma\textsuperscript{33} suggests that the earliest mention of opium as a product of India is found in the memoirs of Barbosa in 1511 AD. Certainly opium was used as a medicine and to pacify infants under Muslim rule, and cultivation and usage rapidly spread so rapidly that by 1000 AD it was widely used throughout the social spectrum\textsuperscript{34} and was (for unclear reasons) actually banned by Emperor Allauddin Khelji in 1310 AD.\textsuperscript{35}

According to one oral tradition, \textit{Chandu}, a form of smoking opium was introduced by and named after a Hindu Prince, Chandan Kumar alias Chandu, who took to opium smoking in China and on his return introduced it among his close aides, the practice gradually filtering down.\textsuperscript{36} It is certainly possible that during the British opium trading period, influential individuals had access to opium and introduced the habit. According to oral tradition in Muslim NWFP and Eastern Afghanistan, however, opium was introduced by the Greeks. This is supported by records which show that Alexander the Great took opium and the poppy with him, introducing it to India on his mission of conquering the world, and using it for his army.\textsuperscript{37} In view of the medicinal value of opium as an analgesic, anaesthetic and anti-diarrhoea preparation, this seems plausible, particularly as the areas most extensively cultivated for centuries have been Persia, Turkey, India, Afghanistan and Central Asia, Alexander’s route to India in 334 BC.\textsuperscript{38}

The idea that opium was introduced to India by the Greeks receives support from archaeological excavations in Charassandra, in Peshawar Division. In 1958 the \textit{Journal of the Numismatic Society of India} published a report entitled "The City Goddess of Pushkalavati", about a small gold coin in the British Museum. But again conflicting descriptions exist, one speaking of a portrayal of a “Greek City Goddess... holding a poppy-head (Indian Legend)”, another identifying the object as a lotus, and a third saying it was neither a lotus nor a poppy-head but some

\textsuperscript{32} D. E. Miller, \textit{op. cit.} p. 5.
\textsuperscript{33} M. C. Sharma, \textit{op. cit.} pp. 274-5.
\textsuperscript{35} \textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{36} Interview with Khan Sultan Khan of Tangi, 22 May 1997.
\textsuperscript{37} P. G. Kritikos and S. P. Papadalci, \textit{op. cit.} p. 38.
object akin to a club. In fact it is hard to see how the object could be a lotus, as the lotus fruit is flat in the centre and circular, but nor is it necessarily a poppy; so clearly much more work is needed.

Certainly, however, the Greek physicians, later popularised by the Arabs as *unani hakeems*, have extensively described the medical use of opium. In Swat, which was then a Graeco-Bactirean valley, and its adjoining areas of the districts of Dir, Swabi, Chitral and Bajaur, opium was cultivated and extensively used for medical purposes - in winter for colds, influenza and coughs, in summer for diarrhoea, relieving pain and inducing sleep.

Zaheerud Din Babar conquered India in 1526 AD and founded the Mughal dynasty, giving opium Government patronage for revenue generation purposes. Poppy cultivation then became a state monopoly, and opium not only an important article of trade with China and other eastern countries where usage was much greater than in India but an elite recreational drink used by Akber the Great himself, in a form called *charberga* or four leaves. In imitation, the common people also started to use it:

*Although they take it in small quantity, it is a merchandise in great demand everywhere it is consumed, for if they do not take it they are in danger of death, and this is the reason why in the countries I am talking about it is very expensive. They always try to keep a supply of it (as they keep wheat for May). Those who take it go about sleepy, and they say they take it so as to dispel cares.*

*I would order poppies to be sown in all fields of Portugal and command afyum [opium] to be made.... and the labourers would gain much also, and the people of India are lost without it, if they do not eat it.*

According to Buddenberg, before the western occupation of the Indian subcontinent all governments depended on land revenue for their wealth and power.

---

Lancing the poppy pod
Trade had little importance compared to what was to come later, for example in the lucrative trade in spices, particularly pepper. The focus of the imperial administration was the accurate assessment of agriculture revenue, and its transfer to the centre of power in coins. This agrarian base supported courts, army and administration. Agricultural production was mainly directed to self-sufficiency, so priority was given to food crops, and while the revenue collected from opium was at this time higher than revenue from food grains\(^45\) (though later to be overtaken by wheat and rice), opium is mentioned in records as but one of the agricultural goods thus taxed or monopolised by Government. No special position was given to opium either as a drug crop or a dangerous commodity, nor were special measures taken to control it.

The greatest development in drug production, and the one with the deepest historical repercussions, took place during the colonial era. All colonial powers benefited from opium trading in the East and every stage of opium development has been shaped and formed by the rise and fall of the western empires. The present massive opium production in South Asia is the culmination of 400 years’ western patronage of opium: opium smoking was introduced by the Portuguese and Dutch in 1500, and by the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries every European colony had its official opium dens.

The British involvement at this time is especially notorious because of her involvement at state level in superintending a trade declared illegal by China, patronising smugglers and waging war on the pretext of impeding the business in opium. The British did not, however, enter the opium trade until the mid-eighteenth century, when, following the battle of Plessey (1764) Bengal, the richest province in the continent, fell to the East India Company (EIC) under Robert Clive. Assuming control of the area, the EIC leased out the trade to Patna traders and ordered farmers to give up food production and convert their lands into a monoculture of opium poppies:

\(\text{It was impossible to get them to continue producing opium except by compulsion; either legal, as in those districts where it could be claimed that tenancies would be forfeited unless poppy was grown as the company’s agent was also the magistrate he could also lay down, as well as enforce the law, or financial through the}\)

\(^{45}\) D. Buddenberg, op. cit. p. 4.
Opium gum
manipulation of advances in order to get the cultivator into debt and keep him there, so that jail and eviction would face him if he disobeyed.\footnote{DE Owen, \textit{op.cit.} pp.3-10.}

In 1773, as Governor General of the EIC, Warren Hastings brought the opium trade under the direct control of the Company,\footnote{D. Buddenberg, \textit{op.cit.} p.8.} abolishing the Patna syndicate and giving the EIC or its agents exclusive rights to purchase opium from Bengali farmers and auction it for export. In Bengal over 500 square miles were cultivated with opium, involving over one million registered farmers, 500,000 acres of prime land\footnote{J. Stratchey, \textit{India: Its Administration and Progress} (London: Macmillan, 1903), pp. 133-42.} and 2,000 agents employed by the Company to collect the crop.\footnote{A. W. McCoy, \textit{The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Trade} (New York: Harper and Row, 1994), p. 81.} The commercial attractiveness of opium led to conflict within India, and it is often said that Britain’s first opium war was in India as early as 1818,\footnote{D.Buddenberg, \textit{op.cit.} p.11.} when Marhatta State exported opium to China in direct competition with British traders and was suppressed.

Partly as a result of the supply of narcotics by the EIC, opium addiction had become a social problem in China by the nineteenth century, and, depending on one's sources, between 40 million\footnote{R. Stevenson, Winning the War on Drugs: to Legalize or Not. \textit{Hobart Paper 124.} (London: Institute of Economics, 1994), p. 76; US Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract 1915, p. 713. (Cited in A. W. McCoy, \textit{op. cit.} p. 88).} (27% of the adult male population) and 100 million\footnote{A. Jamieson, “The Global Drug Trade”, \textit{Conflict Studies} 234, (London: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, 1990), p. 2.} Chinese were addicted, enabling Great Britain to export 6,000 tons of opium annually to China\footnote{A. Masood, \textit{Esi Bulandi Esi Pasti} (Rawalpindi: Ahsan Publishing House, 1981), p. 19.} by the late nineteenth century. In order to check the growing menace of opium addiction the Chinese authorities planned to stop smuggling and ordered confiscation, and in 1839 20,000 chests of opium worth £2,000,000\footnote{G. Watt. \textit{op. cit.} p. 143.} owned by some British and American companies\footnote{R. Stevenson, \textit{op. cit.} p. 75. Also see A. W. McCoy, \textit{op. cit.} p. 86} were confiscated by the Chinese authorities, leading to the first Opium War of 1839-42, the cession of Hong Kong\footnote{A. Jamieson, \textit{op. cit.} p. 2.} and the payment of heavy compensation in the Treaty of Nanking.\footnote{J. Rowntree, \textit{op. cit.} p. 68; G. Watt. \textit{op. cit.} p. 143.}
Chinese ports for opium trading by Britain.

But concern about the situation in China and America combined with public unease in Britain about the morality of the Opium Wars to trigger a change in official attitudes. The Quaker William Storrs Fry asked in 1840, for example:

What would happen if French wines were banned in Britain and the French government, holding a wine monopoly, had proceeded deliberately to make wine to the British taste; established depots ships off the English coast; corrupted the English customs services by bribery; when warned, taken no notice; and when intercepted, employed armed crafts to fight their way through with the contraband wine? Would this not inevitably have led to war?58

A report published in The Times in 1842, after the First Opium War, reads:

... we think it of the highest moment that the Government of Great Britain should wash its hands once for all, not only of all diplomatic, but of all moral and practical responsibility for this (the Opium) traffic; that we should cease to be mixed up with it, to foster it, or to make it a source of Indian revenue...We owe some moral compensation to China for pillaging her towns and slaughtering her citizens in a quarrel which never could have arisen if we had not been guilty of this national crime.59

Such resistance effectively shamed the British Government into agreeing to restrict opium supplies to China60 by 10% annually, ceasing to trade by 1916,61 and heightened international awareness that drugs posed a global problem. But then as later, efforts to curtail or, ideally, eliminate drug use were a tale of failure. The political and economic power of opium and its derivatives has always been stronger than any wish to curb it. Opium was a legal drug when the present day powerful anti-drug countries were involved in its trade and development, but when the trade passed into the hands of other, less powerful, countries, it became a forbidden substance, publicised so as to induce horror and fear.

59 Ibid.
In spite of the political impact in Britain of popular unease about the Opium Wars, it is naive to assume that international politics and finance can be driven mainly by humanitarian concern. This is well illustrated by the case of India. There, by 1869 the Bengal Government was taking active measures to increase the supply of opium to the Chinese market, including advancing interest-free loans to producers. By 1875 Bengal's production of 4,000 tons of raw opium was generating about 1/6th of India's total revenue, and by 1879 exports to China reached a peak of 105,508 300lb chests. The war against drugs being fought by the Chinese was subjugated by the gunboat diplomacy of the British in order to continue to profit from the opium trade, confirming the primacy of economic over social or moral considerations. Perhaps not surprisingly, therefore, Buddenberg observes caustically that “Politically, the British Raj was as addicted to opium as any twenty-pipe-a-day coolie in China.”

Britain consolidated its opium monopoly following the quelling of the Mutiny (or, depending on one’s perspective, War of Independence), by the Opium Act 1857. This Act prohibited the cultivation of opium poppies except under licence, and provided for Government procurement of the entire supply at prices determined according to quality and morphine content. Illegal crops were destroyed and cultivators prosecuted. The law, administered by the Opium Department, was supplemented by another Opium Act in 1878, which regulated not only trading but also possession for personal use.

Opium in Pakistan

Bengal was partitioned into Muslim and Hindu Bengal in 1947. The former comprised East Pakistan until the foundation of Bangla Desh in 1971, while the latter became a part of India. Opium is still officially cultivated in West Bengal, and though cultivation in East Pakistan was not permitted, illicit cultivation was rife until the mid-1950s, when jute production, for which the Korean War created a market, largely replaced opium. In fact Rauf claims that until 1953 Pakistan as a whole was largely poppy free other than in the tribal areas. But the fact is that opium was cultivated with little control in Punjab, including the part abutting

---

62 D. Buddenberg, op.cit. p. 11.
64 Ibid. p. 15.
Peshawar and Dera Ismail Khan, and the hill territories west of the Indus under the control of the Punjab Government (now NWFP) even before the colonial era as mentioned by some official reports. This shows that the present NWFP is the only territory in Pakistan where opium cultivation has been in practice even since pre-colonial times.

Contrary to some views, opium was not produced primarily for the use of local people. Originally opium was exported and processed into heroin elsewhere, opium factories only developing in response to increased demand from the late 1970s onwards. In a WHO sponsored survey of drug addiction in NWFP in 1975, only one village, Kurya, in the Buner District of Malakand Division, where 50 to 75% of the male population were said, controversially, to be addicted to opium showed signs of mass addiction. In fact a second report on Buner reported far smaller levels of opium addiction in the same village.


Stage 1: 1947-53: on independence, in order to meet demand the Government imported opium from India, selling it through the century old vend system. This consisted of shops licensed by the Excise Department to sell opium to registered users (private smoking having been made illegal in 1950) and hakeems. The shops were auctioned annually, on a district basis. At independence there were 328 such shops, of which 267 were in Punjab, with only a handful in NWFP where opium was abundantly available.

There were at this time 260,000-280,000 users (who included a few kasabgars [artisans], who supposedly used opium to increase their working efficiency, and landlords or members of ruling elites, who occasionally used the most potent form of the drug [chandu or madak] for recreational purposes) and 68,000 herbal

---

68 A. Masood, op.cit. p.12. see also C.P. Spencer and V. Navarathnam, op.cit. p.59.
70 UN, UN system in Pakistan: Cooperation Overview (Islamabad: UNDCP, 1993), p.4.
71 UN, Dir District Development Project Phase II: Project Document, op.cit. p.6.
practitioners, homeopaths and ayurvedics\textsuperscript{72} (and over 500,000\textsuperscript{73} in India). The medical needs of over 80\% of the population were met by the unani hakeems and other practitioners. It would be an error, however, to exaggerate the place of opium in these medication systems. Chopra and Chopra\textsuperscript{74} observe that out of 200-250 stock preparations of traditional medicines in the main dispensary of Ayurvedic and Tibbi college of Delhi, only a few contained opium, and these were sparingly used. Indiscriminate use occurred rather in the household, as a remedy for diarrhoea, dysentery, coughs, bronchitis, asthma, colic, piles, neuralgia, fevers, rheumatism, diabetes and similar complaints: as a folk medicine opium was administered to infants in NWFP, both in the belief that it protected them from such common viral diseases of dehydration as vomiting and diarrhoea (the major causes of infant mortality) and to lull them to sleep, freeing the mothers to do domestic and agricultural work. A tragic consequence of this mistaken belief, however, was a rising incidence of child mortality.\textsuperscript{75}

**Stage 2: 1953-56:** under the International Opium Protocol of 1953 Pakistan was permitted by the UN to produce opium. As a result importation ceased, and the Government, revoking the 1857 and 1878 Opium Acts, permitted cultivation in Punjab (though not in NWFP), initially using seeds imported from India\textsuperscript{76}. An opium factory was established in Lahore to supply opium to the vend shops, but this was not a success: though the Punjab is famous for cotton and wheat, opium cultivation failed through weather problems, labour intensiveness (which, in the different social structure there, made it uneconomic), and lack of farming expertise.

**Stage 3: 1957-72:** as a result of the failure of the Punjab experiment, in 1956-7 the Government allowed poppy cultivation in NWFP. Licences were issued to farmers in Swabi, Mardan and Peshawar districts, and regulated cultivation started in these settled areas in addition to unregulated cultivation in the tribal areas. Under the 1956 Constitution, responsibility for opium production transferred to the Provincial Government, whose responsibility it became to procure the gum from licensed

\textsuperscript{73} S. C. Dwarkanath, *op.cit.* p.19.
\textsuperscript{76} Interview with Sardar Sajjad Hussain Zahid (December 16, 1996).
farmers. This system increased production, and by 1958 the number of vend shops had increased to 789.

Individual licences were issued to farmers directly, but joint licences, specifying the acreage which could be cultivated, were issued to villages, under the administration of the headman (lamberdar) who, in return for 2% commission, was charged with dividing the quota according to farmers’ land holding size, and ensuring that all the opium was procured. Opium purchase depots were established and farmers informed in advance of the venue and date of procurement.

Though contravention of the law was punishable with a fine, imprisonment or both, it was widely flouted, by officers as well as farmers: bribery was common, with licensing officers extracting money from licensees on the threat of reporting over-cultivation. When in 1974 the Federal Government sent in the Pakistan Narcotics Control Board (PNCB), the ratio of bribes actually increased, as officials took bribes from licensees and non-licensees alike. The extent of the enforcement problem can be judged from the fact that by 1977-78 an acreage of 8,960 was recorded whereas licensed acreage was only 2500 acres.

Stage 4: 1973-78: while this stage is characterised by increased control efforts, it was, paradoxically but significantly, a period of massive expansion. Administratively this was facilitated by the undefined role of PNCB, instituted under Article 13 of the UN Single Convention of 1961. Opium and poppy cultivation remained a provincial responsibility, and anomalies appeared in the respective roles of PNCB and provincial opium officers, causing ambiguity as to the respective responsibilities of the Federal and Provincial Governments. The ensuing confusion gave officials opportunities for corruption, and with both PNCB and Opium Department officials extracting money from farmers, enforcement failure ensured that opium production was effectively unmonitored.

Stage 5: 1979-Present: prior to 1970 some 24% of the world’s total illicit opium production, estimated at 1400 tons a year, had come from the whole of south-west Asia, but by 1978-9 NWFP alone was producing some 800 metric tons, of

77 Ibid.
78 Extracted from Opium Officer Peshawar and Tehsildar Swabi Office Records.
which only 4.77\textsuperscript{81} metric tons were legal. The illicitly produced crop was either locally processed into heroin or transported to Iran or Turkey to be processed there. Realising the bumper crop for the season 1978-9, the UN and some western countries pressurised Pakistan to outlaw opium production. As a result, in 1979 the military Government promulgated the Hudood Ordinance, an Islamic law banning the use, traffic and production of all intoxicants, including opium, and abolishing the vend system. Though presented as an Islamic provision the Ordinance was likely motivated less by Islam than by American pressure.\textsuperscript{82} Certainly it misinterpreted Islamic law, for Islam does not forbid agricultural produce, whether poppies or the barley, grapes and apples which are processed into beer, wine and cider. Though in fact the law said nothing explicit about poppy cultivation\textsuperscript{83} it was interpreted by the bureaucracy as doing so until, in 1995, a Presidential Ordinance clarified the situation\textsuperscript{84}.

In 1979, following the Iranian Revolution, opium production was declared unlawful there too, a situation which opened a substantial new market for Pakistani and Afghan opium. In the same year Soviet troops entered Afghanistan, and an unprecedented influx of Afghan refugees fled to Pakistan, with NWFP in particular becoming a reinforcement camp for Afghan resistance. The lawlessness in Afghanistan led to opium cultivation on a large scale, as no other crops could resource the fighters and their families to the same degree. Since 1979, therefore, opium production has been a political issue not only in Pakistan but internationally.

Opium, therefore, was used first as a medicine and euphoric, then as an economic and political commodity. Its value, as cough depressant, anti-diarrhoeal, soporific, analgesic and anaesthetic medicine, is undeniable. It has been variously, if immoderately, described as the world’s great pain-killer,\textsuperscript{85} God’s own medicine,\textsuperscript{86} the most hypnotic and the most potent of all drugs in the pharmacopoeia\textsuperscript{87}, the

\textsuperscript{82} A. W. McCoy, 1994, \textit{op. cit.} p. 447.
\textsuperscript{83} R.A.K. Sahibzada, \textit{op.cit.} p.6.
\textsuperscript{84}Government of Pakistan, \textit{Gazette of Pakistan: Extra Ordinary} (Prohibition and Punishment, Chapter II, section 4) (Islamabad: Ministry of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs, April 18, 1995), p.2.
oldest narcotic, the stone of immortality and a remedy for seven hundred problems. The medical attractiveness of opium lies chiefly in its special analgesic action, which makes it a master anaesthetic. References to its pharmacology have existed at least since the 5th century BC, when it was called a drug "which numbs the senses and induces deadening sleep". In Pharaonic times in Egypt, opium was used much as we use aspirin today.

From numerous descriptions of the properties of opium it is clear that in the Indian sub-continent it has been used for the treatment of complaints which include insomnia, nervous irritability, dyspepsia, diarrhoea, dysentery, neuralgia, neuritis, rheumatic pains, influenza and coughing, apparently with no problems of addiction. Whole communities in the late nineteenth century were known to take a small amount of opium daily, apparently exhibiting no tendency to increase the quantity.

In Europe, opium was once so heavily prescribed that the Dutch physician and chemist Sylvius de la Boe declared that without it he could not practise; among the educated class it was believed that it "causes an increase in the intellectual powers and stimulates the imagination"; and in Britain in particular it was cultivated in Buckinghamshire, Somerset and Edinburgh. In America, where it was cultivated in Virginia, Tennessee, South Carolina, Georgia, Vermont, New Hampshire and Connecticut, research on its medicinal value began around the time of the War of Independence, and it came to be used for spasms, dyspepsia, violent hysteria, hypochondriasis, dropsy, tetanus, typhus, venereal diseases.

nervous headaches, fractures, palpitation, asthma, stomach problems, vomiting, dysentery, diarrhoea, rheumatism and fevers.\textsuperscript{98}

In NWFP opium has traditionally been used mainly by two groups: lower class labourers and artisans, and a relatively rich group of the petty land owning class. Among the former, opium consumption had an economic logic, as housewives would give infants a little opium to make them sleep during the peak season of work, and their husbands took the drug believing that by doing so they could avert tiredness and so do more work. The low cost was believed to be more than compensated for by the additional income which resulted. Among the latter group, the situation was quite different. Opium was taken hedonistically, and frequently proved a serious drain on resources, with many small landowners selling their possessions to buy drugs. A couplet in the shape of a dialogue between a husband and wife portrays the situation:

\textit{Husband: } O poppy you are really nice to my heart. I wish to cultivate your plant all over the world. You cost little, but you give swing worth a million.

\textit{Wife: } O poppy, I wish to eradicate your plant, because you made us sell all our belongings and gave us the beggar's bowl in our hands.

This cultural trait of disapproval has helped keep consumption to manageable levels. It occurs elsewhere too: an opium user is called an \textit{amali}, a derogatory word meaning 'idle, absurd day dreamer'. Another indication of disapproval refers to opium's constipating properties: a man who spends a long time defecating is called an \textit{afimi}. This is both a joke and a medically proved fact: opium abusers do indeed spend a long time defecating, producing stools which are dry and hard, and ejected, with considerable strain, in the form of \textit{scybala}.

Stories exist about the power of opium to increase sexual potency and reduce the likelihood of premature ejaculation; equally, it is often said that opium is not bad for the wealthy who can afford a rich diet. The older generation used opium orally and prepared it differently, however; even today some affluent old people who use it for euphoric purposes boil it in milk for a long time, believing this reduces the morphine and codeine content of the opium, rendering it less dangerous; and it is

still taken orally in many of my research areas, including Dir, Bajaur, Swat, Buner, Chitral, Swabi, Muhmand, Peshawar and Charsadda.

Patterns of usage have, of course, changed in the 50 years since independence, as they have in most parts of the world. Up to the mid-1960s raw opium (and also cannabis and local derivatives), and a country-made alcohol, tarra, were mainly used, tarra in particular being attractive to low income people and non-Muslims, who were permitted the use of alcohol. The élites, who patronised imported alcohol, held local drugs in contempt, and opium remained primarily the province of the two categories of user already discussed. Subsequently Pakistan was by no means unaffected by changing patterns of drug use elsewhere. In the 1960s many Pakistani youths smoked cannabis in imitation of their western counterparts, though mainly in a crude form, so that users absorbed smaller quantities of harmful substances than was the case in the west; and subsequent years saw increases in the use of synthetic drugs. As elsewhere, barbiturates, stimulants, depressants and hallucinogens or pills had a deep cultural impact: to sleep, many people now take sleeping pills, to keep awake they buy amphetamines; diazepam, seconal and ativan have become common.

There are three main methods for the preparation and smoking of opium or its derivatives: chando, madak and dhoda. These were demonstrated to the researcher as part of his fieldwork and are reported briefly here. They all have side-effects and are all, to a degree, dangerous. I hint, in discussing the first of these three methods, chando, at anthropological significance, and a similar point could be made about madak and dhoda, but as this is not part of my analytic framework I do not pursue it here. The justification for including these brief accounts - which could, of course, have been much fuller, substantial ethnographic studies in their own right - is similar to the justification for my historical accounts. It lies in their descriptive relevance, given the task earlier defined of not focusing on a narrow depth study of some small part of my subject matter (of which the chando ceremony in particular could well have been a part) but of painting with a broader brush, in order to offer knowledge which currently exists nowhere, and to do some of the groundwork necessary for later, more detailed work.

---

First, chando is a particular and notorious method of preparation and consumption. The method arranged for the author's observation during field work in a feudal village guest house simply entails raw opium being boiled in water to remove impurities and until a smooth, brown paste is obtained, of a consistency which sticks to the end of a metallic needle. The utensils or apparatus for smoking this manufactured opium consist of a specially designed smoking pipe, a needle (normally, the spoke of a bicycle wheel), a lamp, dewa, filled with mustard oil or butter oil (ghwari), and a wooden bowl with a bulb at the lower end to cover the lamp, and an aperture at the top, through which the needle is passed. The smoker lies down on the floor with a brick or stone beneath his head. He places the wooden bowl on the lamp, holds one end of the pipe in his mouth, and places the other end of the pipe on top of the bowl. He passes the needle through the aperture and holds it over the flame of the lamp with the other hand. As the opium burns it produces smoke inside the bowl, which is inhaled with the help of the pipe. Another person may help the smoker by holding the needle over the flame, and periodically more opium is taken on the tip of the needle and inserted into the hole over the lamp. This process goes on until the smoker becomes benumbed or can no longer hold the pipe.

To anthropologists, the way in which this drug is administered has symbolic as well as functional meaning. Lying on a hard floor with a hard brick or stone pillow has ritualistic aspects, involving going to another world. When a dead man is buried he is laid on hard ground with a raised portion under the head. Thus the position of the chando smoker is similar to that of a dead man. And as the dead belong to another world, so the opium smoker takes flight to another world of fantasy.

Chando is restricted to a few people. Whereas once places where chando was prepared and smoked were isolated places like deserted water mills or ruins, nowadays it is prepared in the guest houses of feudal villages to which police or other law enforcing personnel cannot gain access. In NWFP, chando smoking is known to take place in Charsadda, Mardan, Peshawar and Mansehra districts, all fertile areas with productivity far above subsistence level, which is probably what led to the development of pleasure-seeking psycho-cultural impulses. This form of

---

opium smoking is very dangerous, and a small overdose can be fatal.

A second method of preparation and consumption is madak, the history of which is also uncertain. Madak seems to be the invention of the poor who could not afford chando (in which pure opium is smoked) or who were addicted to opium smoking but who were not such hard smokers as chandobaz. Madak is also a type of prepared opium for smoking, but less dangerous to the nervous system. The preparation is similar, with two differences; the paste is more dilute, and charred rice or barley husk is mixed with the opium solution to the extent that the solution is absorbed and then pills are made of it. These pills are normally smoked in a hubble bubble, though the event witnessed by the researcher involved a tobacco pipe not a hubble-bubble, apparently to make it appear that the smokers were smoking not madak, but imported tobacco. They also kept the madak pills in the imported tobacco containers to maintain secrecy.

Thirdly, a few individuals, like beggars and mendicants or the poor and disabled, use dhoda, the unlanced or lanced dry capsule, ground to a powder and taken with water. In NWFP dhoda is a commonly used remedy for a multiplicity of diseases, including coughs, diarrhoea, headache, dysentery, asthma and digestive troubles in children; if administered to pregnant women it is said to cause an abortion. Its symptoms and effects are generally milder and less long lasting than those of opium. A few minutes after taking the potion the user feels a sense of relaxation and well-being, and a marvellous change in attitude and behaviour can be observed. From a condition of lethargy, fretfulness, moroseness and peevishness the user passes into one of gaiety and talkativeness. This lasts for 1-2 hours, after which he looks depressed and drowsy, and may fall asleep. In many cases menial workers like kochwans (horse-buggy drivers) and malangs (mendicants) use dhoda both to avoid tiredness and for subsequent sleep. Habitual use of dhoda makes the abuser forgetful. He may sit in one place for hours doing nothing, a habit which well suits beggars or, conversely, go on working hard for hours without feeling any strain.

Opium Derivatives

Opium's alkaloids have made it a source of many other products, most significantly heroin. It is this complexity - opium's simultaneous potential for good and harm, and strong attractiveness to users - which explains, respectively, its importance in the history of medicine, the criminality and corruption often associated with it, and
its capacity to generate wealth for those involved with it. Wherever it has been
cultivated it has produced both benefits and dangers - medicinal, economic,
ritualistic and, significantly, political, through its use as a source of state finance, a
weapon against enemies, and a tool of political blackmail of individuals and
nations.

Opium comprises gum (25%), resin (4%), rubber (6%), oils (2%), water (10%),
meconic acid (1%), morphine (10-15%), codeine (1-2%), pigments and other
extraneous matter (24%). Its seeds contains 50% oil,101 and some 32 alkaloids have
been extracted from it, including narcotine, narcerine, laudanine and papaverine
(15%)102 of which morphine and codeine are the most commonly used.

**Morphine**, opium's major alkaloid,103 was isolated in 1804, but commercial
production started in 1827,104 gaining popularity in America as a self-prescribed
medicine during the Civil War, and becoming the first source of heroin
manufacture in Great Britain. It is so powerful that it is believed that the versatility
of opium is largely due to this single constituent's analgesic, anaesthetic, narcotic,
stimulant and depressant properties. It can be extracted either by a chemical process
involving ammonia or directly from the poppy heads and stalk before the poppy
goes into the opium stage105. Morphine is addictive, causing physical as well as
psychological dependence,106 but was in the past used therapeutically for pre-
surgical anaesthesia and post-surgical analgesia.

Its other major licit use is in conversion into **codeine**, the second important alkaloid
of opium, with up to 90% of licit morphine being converted into this and other anti-
tussives107. Codeine is less addictive, stimulant and depressant than morphine,
causing no euphoria but stimulating the spinal cord and the lower part of the brain.
Small doses are soporific, large doses cause restlessness and increase reflex
excitability. Its major illicit use is for conversion into heroin.

In 1874, an English chemist, Wright, accidentally synthesised diacetylmorphine by

---

102 Ibid. p. 307.
reference see M.M. David, op. cit. p.25.
104 A.W. McCoy, 1994, op. cit. p.5.
105 Ibid.
heating morphine and acetic anhydride, known as AA. The drug was subjected to further experimentation, but after careful analysis and experiments on dogs it was identified as producing such negative somatic effects that further experimentation ceased. In 1890, however, a German chemist, Dankwortt, synthesised diacetyl morphine by heating anhydrous morphine and acetyl chloride, and soon the medical profession accepted the drug as a effective, non-addictive anaesthetic and analgesic, as well as a treatment for morphine addiction (rather as they had previously seen morphine as a treatment for opium addiction). With the approval and encouragement of the medical profession, therefore, the Bayer Pharmaceutical Company, Germany, in 1898, started commercial production and gave it the market name heroin.

Heroin soon outstripped both penicillin and cortisone in the treatment of respiratory diseases, which, in the cold western world, were major causes of fatality, particularly among the old. Heroin soon came to be regarded as a super drug, demand stoked by an aggressive campaign promoting it as a "respiratory, stimulant, sedative, expectorant and analgesic in the treatment of cough, bronchitis, laryngitis, pneumonia, whooping cough, asthma, colds etc" which dissolved on the tongue.

The USA and Austria declared heroin an official drug in 1906, the American Medical Association recommending it as an effective substitute for morphine and codeine, saying, however, that, while safe in small doses, in large doses it could induce "dizziness, nausea, and occasionally constipation and in poisonous amounts, twitching of the extremities, great exhaustion and dimness of vision", while an overdose "cripples the body's central nervous system, plunges the victim into a deep coma, and usually produces death within a matter of minutes." Official support for heroin was short lived, its manufacture and import being outlawed in America in 1924, around the time that, as we shall see in the next section, the League of Nations was beginning its attempts at eradication.

Heroin addiction became a problem in China, where 27% of all male adults were
addicted to opium in the early years of the century.\textsuperscript{114} The Government had banned opium smoking, however, and the compulsory registration of opium addicts encouraged users to discover the potency of heroin and morphine instead, to such an extent indeed that in 1934 the Shanghai Municipal Council reported that heroin smoking had exceeded opium smoking. Though the Government declared the production and trafficking of heroin a serious crime, the anti-drug policy was thwarted by political factors and the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war in 1937, when Japanese occupying forces were so aggressive in their sales of opium and heroin that some estimates suggest that one in eight of the population of Nanking were being poisoned.\textsuperscript{115}

Iran, too, is a traditionally heavy user of opium derivatives. According to US estimates, by 1949 11\% of the adult population were opium addicts, a number outstripped only by China.\textsuperscript{116} In 1955, however, the Shah peremptorily banned opium production, causing the needs of these addicts to be met by supplies from Turkey, Afghanistan and Pakistan - a significant early, if not first, step towards expanding the opium market of the Pak-Afghan cultivators. The lifting of this ban in 1969 was associated with compulsory registration, but few addicts registered, the majority continuing to obtain supplies smuggled from Afghanistan and Pakistan. As with China, Hong Kong and Laos, in Iran, too, the sequence of prohibition leading to regulation promoted the rise of heroin, which, by 1972, was feeding some 30,000\textsuperscript{117} local opium addicts who had avoided registration. By 1974 Iran was a heroin exporting country. Production was an estimated 200-400 metric tons in 1988-9 and the heroin addicted population some two million.\textsuperscript{118} Opium is still produced in the tribal Irani Baluch and Irani Kurdish areas.

In Pakistan the first step towards heroin manufacture, morphine synthesis, started in the early 1970s, when the Pakistan Council of Scientific and Industrial Research (PCSIR) developed techniques of morphine sulphate synthesis from raw opium cultivated by farmers as well as by various research organisations. In 1972, in spite of the fact that the processing of this alkaloid was illegal, PCSIR Laboratories

\textsuperscript{116} A.W. McCoy, 1994. \textit{op.cit.} p.443.
\textsuperscript{117} \textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{118} A. Jamieson, \textit{op.cit.} p.11.
Peshawar sold the formula for morphine sulphate manufacture to a pharmaceutical company, Sharex Ltd., at Sadiqabad, Punjab Province. The Government banned production, and court action followed. In 1973 the High Court decided in favour of the Government, and processing ceased.

Like previous prohibitions this one drove the technology underground, clandestine manufacture starting in inaccessible areas like Swat, Gadoon and Amazai, where opium production was heavily concentrated. The first clandestine morphine sulphate laboratory, owned and operated inside his house by a man known as Wakeel sahib, a relative of the ruling family, was unearthed and demolished by the PNCB in Swat in July 1975, under the leadership of the Assistant Deputy Director, Mr. Sardar Sajjad H. Zahid. The second such laboratory was destroyed by the PNCB in Zulfiqar Garhi, Khyber Agency in 1976, to be followed by six more 'busts' during the next year. The International Narcotic Control Board expressed concern, predicting that the "traffickers' next step could well be to promote local heroin manufacture."

These apprehensions proved correct, and the first heroin laboratory, owned by Shahwas Khan, the biggest opium vend contractor in the country, was unearthed by PNCB in Gadoon, Swabi district, in 1978 — a laboratory which, due to political pressure and corruption, was described as a morphine sulphate manufacturing laboratory. By this time, opium production in NW Pakistan was probably over the officially quoted 800 metric tons, since at this time drought conditions had caused production in the south-east Asian Golden Triangle of Thailand, Myanmar and Laos to fall from 600 to 200 tons per annum, forcing prices up in Pakistan, and so making production financially attractive.

---

119 Sardar Sajjad Hussain Zahid, retired assistant Deputy Director, Pakistan Narcotics Control Board, Peshawar, was given an award in the shape of a shield inscribed:

"Sajjad, H. Zahid, Assistant Deputy Director, For Significant Contribution in immobilising the first opium base conversion laboratory, Mingora, Swat, July 1975.

The shield consisted of an insignia with a handcuff. Sardar Sahib was kind enough to give me time for a detailed interview at his residence at Kochi bazaar, Peshawar City on 16.12.96.

120 Government of Pakistan, op.cit. p.20.


123 S. Sajjad H. Zahid, *op.cit.*


When the PNCB expanded its efforts to locate such laboratories of heroin manufacture, the drug barons moved into the tribal areas in NWFP, areas which, with their different political and legal status (points to be analysed in greater detail in later chapters) were the safest locations. The first heroin laboratory in a tribal area was established by an Afghan, Haji Umar, in Lakarho, Muhmand Agency, in 1978. Haji Umar belonged to the Muhmand tribe inside Afghanistan and was living in the heroin processing Herat province of Afghanistan, and when PNCB officials raided the laboratory, Haji made his escape into Afghanistan.

On the question of who introduced the technology of synthesising heroin from opium manufacture in the tribal areas there is no consensus. Some attribute the discovery to a kochai - a nomad from Afghanistan - though this kochai was probably Haji Umar Muhmand himself. Others say a chemist from PCSIR Laboratories Peshawar introduced the technique, but this is inauthentic. The origins of heroin manufacture in Khyber Agency, however, can be more confidently described. Research at the Quid-e-Azam University Islamabad reveals that heroin processing in the Gadoon area was first introduced by German chemists. In Khyber Agency many local people were of the belief that westerners, probably Germans, had started the manufacture. These Germans had been coming into the area for many years in order to trade in hashish, and had introduced the technology of THC, or hashish oil, and later imparted heroin knowledge to local people.

By 1978 brown (No 1) heroin was being manufactured in the area. This heroin is not water soluble but is smoked over a tin foil with the help of a pipe, panne ("chasing the dragon"). The higher grade China White (No 4 and 5) heroin manufacture started in the Khyber Agency in 1979. Haji Ghilzai was the first to

---

126 S.Sajjad H.Zahid, Interview op. cit.
127 I.Haq, op.cit. p.7 ; Interview with Karam Elahi (Retd.Professor of anthropology, University of Peshawar, on December 10, 1996.
129 Interview with Hakim Khan Afridi, (Assistant Director Social Welfare Department, Government of NWFP) May 8, 1997. Hakim Khan is the nephew of the late Chief of Kokikhel, Wali Khan, whose house and village were bombarded by the government in 1984 on charges of running a heroin laboratory in the village. Khalid Khan Shinwari, interview on 16.3.97. Khalid Khan Shinwari is a dealer in auto-tyres, before the Afghan war doing business in Kabul and Jalalabad. He has also been personal secretary to the known drug baron Haji Ayub Afridi, now extradited to USA and imprisoned for five years and fined 100,000 dollars. I am extremely grateful to Kokikhel and Shinwari for their detailed and frank discussion about drug manufacture in the area.
start with a clandestine 'bath tub laboratory'\textsuperscript{130} but now the business has spread to the industrial centres.

The quantity of heroin clandestinely manufactured in the tribal areas has never been known. The extent of its production can, however, be estimated by the number of laboratories detected and destroyed, and their output capacity. In 1982 the US DEA reported that 15-20 such laboratories\textsuperscript{131} had been demolished; in 1985 the \textit{Daily Telegraph}\textsuperscript{132} reported that 47 had been demolished in the first nine months of that year in the tribal areas, of which some 90\% were located in Khyber Agency, each with a production capacity of over 50 kg heroin per month, with 65-80\% purity for brown, and up to 90\% purity for white, heroin powder.

The Hudood Ordinance 1979 was to become, effectively, a licence for heroin\textsuperscript{133} Pakistan's rapidly increasing opium using population provided a considerable heroin market\textsuperscript{134} which pushed opium production to far flung areas in the tribal belt, where government control was almost non-existent. While opium cultivation has been a part of NWFP's local economy for many years,\textsuperscript{135} in the late 1970s, when heroin production was introduced, cultivation increased as the crop offered an infinitely more attractive yield than could be obtained from the few other crops which would grow on land where irrigation water could not be provided\textsuperscript{136}. Pakistan, therefore, is now a major producer and transit country as well as consumer of heroin:

\textsuperscript{130} Interview with Muhammad Iqbal Khan. May 11,1997. Iqbal Khan is a group leader or Deputy Superintendent Police (DSP) with Anti Narcotics Force(ANF), based at Kotal check post Kohat at the time of interview. He confiscated in a haul some 150 mounds of opium in 1996 in a Punjab bound truck. His assertion was that opium was to be carried to the settled areas for no other purpose than converting into heroin. His assertions are supported by the \textit{Daily Nation Lahore} internet edition of 7.7.97 , in which it was reported that AA is sold unlawfully from a state owned factory near Lahore. According to Iqbal Kahn Haji Ghijai was a famous figure of the area , and his sons have a very impressive business, running an English Daily from Peshawar and lahore. In a 1992 CIA report, the sons of the said Haji are mentioned as traffickers. His son Rahmat Shah was arrested on 1,4.99 on drugs charges.


\textsuperscript{132} \textit{Daily Telegraph}, (London, October 5, 1985).

\textsuperscript{133} A. Masood. \textit{op.cit.} p.57.


\textsuperscript{136} A. Masood, \textit{op.cit.} p.50.
The development of the heroin problem in Pakistan provides an interesting national case study demonstrating the impacts of change in the availability of heroin. During the 1970s Pakistan had no problem with heroin. The local farmers and tribesmen rapidly appreciated the financial implications of this new technology and from 1980s began to grow large amounts of opium poppies which were then turned into heroin. The area of heaviest cultivation and refining activity was the North West Frontier Province (NWFP), much of which is under the control of fiercely independent local tribes which have defended their activities from government interference, and not least, from drug enforcement activities.\textsuperscript{137}

Heroin usage spread rapidly in the 1980s and subsequently. According to official statistics, by the end of 1980 there were some 5,000 heroin addicts in Pakistan, rising exponentially to 20,000 in 1981 and 657,000 in 1986\textsuperscript{138}. The million threshold was crossed in 1988, and by 1993 the number had swelled to 1,524,000\textsuperscript{139}. According to a 1996 report of the UN Drugs Control Programme (UNDCP), of the 3.1 million people in Pakistan addicted to various drugs, 51% were addicted to heroin. On the basis of an annual increase of 7% it was estimated that by the end of 1996 the total addiction figure would have gone beyond 3.6 million\textsuperscript{140} with the heroin addicted population reaching 2 million by 1998.

These figures are broadly consistent with PNCB statistics, which identified 3.2 million drug addicts, of whom 2 million were heroin addicts, including an increasing proportion of females\textsuperscript{141}. In somewhat similar vein a report to the Senate Standing Committee on Narcotics in 1995 claimed that Pakistan had some 1.5 million heroin addicts.\textsuperscript{142}

Expansion brought problems of theft, burglary, family violence and trafficking, and in particular the increasing criminal involvement in the trade of politicians and influential people. This involvement created a nouveau riche class who have since used drug money to pursue personal power, not least to enter the national political arena. The association of drug production and supply with political corruption

\textsuperscript{137} M. Gossop, \textit{op.cit.} p.33.
\textsuperscript{139} Government of Pakistan. \textit{National Survey on Drug Abuse in Pakistan} (Islamabad: Narcotics Control Board, 1993), p. 24, Table 3.3.
\textsuperscript{141} \textit{Daily Jang} (London: April 24, 1996).
\textsuperscript{142} \textit{The News} (London: August 7, 1997).
which this nexus heralds makes finding a solution uniquely difficult: how does one tackle corruption when members of the legislature and the executive are themselves beneficiaries of this lucrative crime? When there is no recourse to the law making process because that process is itself undermined?

By 1981 Pakistan was a fully-fledged production country, its authorities seizing some 400kg of indigenous heroin in 1981 against less than 10kg a year earlier: "during the fourth quarter of 1981, Pakistani heroin accounted for 73% (265 kg) of all heroin seized in Europe, the Mid-East, Africa and Central Asia. During the same time frame Pakistani heroin accounted for 90% of the heroin seized in UK, 56% of the heroin seized in the Netherlands and 24% of the heroin seized in Italy."143

**Conclusion**

We have dealt in this chapter with a number of key features in poppy cultivation, and reviewed the main literature on the history of the poppy and its usage. In terms of early history the main data are archaeological or archaeobotanical descriptions of fossils and objects, and I established that little is certain about these origins, either globally or in the sub-continent. We have seen that, subsequently, colonialism has left a deep impressions on the politics and economy of Pakistan, and that it is impossible to understand the history, geography or politics of poppy production today other than in a post-colonial context. Nonetheless it would be wrong to pursue postcolonialism as a main explanatory framework for current problems in Pakistan: 5 of the 6 historical phases of poppy production identified occurred after independence, and present an interesting political case study, with policies designed first to develop, patronise and extend opium production, and then to control and, ideally, eliminate it.

This chapter has been part literature review designed to set the scene historically, and part fieldwork derived. I have already indicated that this thesis does not restrict itself to a formal hypothetico-deductive approach, because its field of enquiry is insufficiently mature and developed, and too large in scope, for such a method to be feasible. Further, however, this chapter stands testimony to the author's belief in the importance of setting contemporary social studies in a broad historical and cultural context. And 'context' is really what this chapter offers, for it is not for the most part based on original archival research but on an extensive trawl of relevant literature,

---

which seeks to evaluate competing arguments in areas where there is confusion or disagreement - for example on the origins of *papaver somniferum* or on its introduction to what was then the Indian sub-continent.

Sometimes, as we shall see, these historical disputes have direct contemporary significance, reflecting, for example, ancient tensions between Muslims and Hindus or Pakistan and India; or the impact of colonialism in, say, the partition of Bengal; or of supranational authorities (in particular the United Nations) or the superpowers (both Iran and Afghanistan have been theatres of conflict in the cause of 20th century colonialism within the last 20 years). At other times the inferences are there to be drawn - as in the generational transmission of cynicism, exploitation and greed from the former colonial masters to the generation of corrupt officials and politicians familiar in the Pakistan of today, and relevant to the maintenance of the geo-econo-politics of the poppy. In a post-colonial context, who is to bear the greater share of blame for the human misery associated with poppy production? Is it the former colonial masters, the leaders of present day corrupt and impoverished Pakistan, or the foreign policies of the first world countries which, sometimes in direct contradiction of their overseas aid policies, not only permit but, when it suits them, encourage, the spread of drugs and the dependence of the impoverished tribal people on their production?

After all, if foreign policies were driven by humanitarian concerns, the continued legality of tobacco and alcohol, drugs responsible for more deaths than opium and its derivatives but valuable sources of government revenue throughout the world, would be called into question. In fact most national policies on such substances are of doubtful effectiveness, with countries requiring variably worded health warnings on cigarette packets and advertisements, variably enforced age limits on consumption and purchase, geographical restrictions on smoking areas, and variably tough restrictions on advertising and sponsorship. Advertising and sponsorship restrictions in particular, which often relate to sporting activities, are, as manufacturers are well aware, largely ineffective given modern global communications, or by agreement with international sporting authorities, where self-interested opposition is liable to be strong and corruption possible. Many countries, particularly in the developing world increasingly targeted by tobacco manufacturers in particular, do little to restrict consumption.
These political questions require a political answer. My more limited aim is to raise and assemble knowledge required to address them. But the history of these matters is not so well documented that I can fillet my discussions so ruthlessly as to omit materials not of demonstrable relevance to my hypotheses, or even broader questions posed for consideration. So some of the history is simply there because we cannot know our topic without it. The fieldwork, too, was undertaken in such a spirit. The *chandos* session, described only briefly here, does not necessarily enlighten us as to the politics of the poppy (though it is, as it happens, an interesting, though implicit, case study in the social stratification of drug use, as well as an intriguing metaphorical anthropology of death as a transcendental, euphoric moment), but it offers a unique insight into the lives of the people smoking opium by this dangerous method, and it is included because I believe the thesis as a whole would be poorer without it.
CHAPTER III: POLITICS OF DRUGS IN PAKISTAN

In this chapter I discuss the various political aspects of drugs production in Pakistan. There are two aspects of the politics of drugs - internal and external. With regard to the internal reasons I discuss the various administrative systems prevalent in North West Frontier Province. This is arguably a main cause of drug production there, since, as we have seen, state criminal laws are not applicable in the tribal areas. The role of politicians and political parties is also pinpointed. I also discuss narco-politics, whereby important people are involved in the business, and the laws are flouted by those who make them, an aspect of corruption prevalent in that society.

External factors are also important. The Afghan war with the former Soviet Union and the unending civil war in Afghanistan have fuelled the fire of narcotics. The involvement of major western powers in the narco-business to finance the Afghan war is of primary importance here. Also discussed is the Iranian factor, a cause of heroin manufacture in Pakistan.

1 Internal Factors

A Divergent Administrative Systems in NWFP

The Province lies in the north-west of the sub-continent and has a unique and divergent administrative structure. NWFP was originally part of the Punjab during the British Raj, but removed in 1901 due to the political problems stemming from its 1200 mile border with Afghanistan and the freedom loving nature of its inhabitants. Three distinct administrative systems were put in place at this time - the settled administration, comprising the conquered areas, the tribal areas which lay outside British control, and the former aristocratic states of Dir, Swat, and Chitral, which now make up Malakand Division, whose rulers received annual grants from the British in exchange for loyalty.

All the laws of British India were applicable to the settled administration, with the so-called black law, officially known as the Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR), and still in force, applicable to the tribal areas. These areas were divided into Agencies, each headed by a political agent. They were subject to no formal laws, but the agents had wide discretionary powers to act in the interest of the colonial power. This duality was preserved under the Act of India 1935, the tribal areas
remaining both part of and apart from the state. From then on the Provincial Governor had a dual responsibility - constitutional Head of the Province in respect of the settled districts, and agent to the Viceroy/Governor General (now to the President) in respect of the tribal areas. The administrative structure of these areas remains unchanged other than nominally, in that they are now called Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATAs), or, in the few instances already mentioned, Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (PATAs).

At present there are seven agencies, of which six, Bajaur, Muhmand, Khyber, North and South Waziristan and Kurram Agencies lie on the Afghan border. The Agencies are the responsibility of Federal Government, and the only state criminal laws applicable to them are those prescribed by the President himself. Their affairs are otherwise settled by unwritten customary laws pukhtoon wali, and by the Government, through a network of trusted maliks linked to the political agent, who effectively run affairs on the basis of treaties with the administration.

The constitutional status of these areas is laid down under Article 247 sections 3, 6 and 7 of the 1973 Constitution. Section 3 affirms that:

No Act of Parliament shall apply to any Federally Administered Tribal Areas or to any part thereof unless the President so directs, and no Act of Parliament or a Provincial assembly shall apply to a Provincially Administered Tribal Area or any part thereof unless the Governor of the Province in which the Tribal area is situated, with the approval of the President, so directs.

This law was amended in 1993-4 in response to an upsurge of tribal peoples demanding Islamic Sharia as a panacea for their problems with the corrupt and brutal central administration. At this time that the administration of the PATAs was transferred to the Provincial Government.

Section 6 of the Constitution states that:

The President may, at any time, by order direct that the whole or part of a tribal area shall cease to be a Tribal Area and such order may contain any incidental and consequential provisions as appear to the President to be necessary and proper; Provided that before making any order under this clause, the President shall ascertain, in such manner as he considers appropriate, the views of the people of the tribal area concerned as represented in tribal jirga.
Section 7:

*Neither the Supreme Court nor a High Court shall exercise any jurisdiction under the constitution in relation to a Tribal Area unless Parliament by law otherwise provides*.1

The variety of administrative entities did not and does not permit the adoption of a uniform model of intervention in relation to narcotics. Government control is tenuous, for the areas have maintained their freedom for more than a hundred years, their warlike inhabitants being armed to the teeth, so that any armed intervention by Government to safeguard the international interest could lead to heavy bloodshed.2

This in fact happened in 1986 in the Gadoon Amazai area, where many opium cultivators were killed by the law enforcers. So although western countries are of the opinion that the Government of Pakistan must take action to assert its control over these areas, and have indeed offered to defray any expenses incurred by such a move3, Government officials are very aware that "to disarm the tribes you would need the Pakistani and US armies."4

A primary consideration is the amount of weaponry in the tribal areas, which raises the question whether the paramilitary forces could actually take on such an encounter without help from the army. In 1989 the then Inspector General of Police of NWFP said:

... it is always people from other provinces or other nations who make such suggestions. They forget the area was largely under the rule of Afghanistan until 1818. It's very difficult fiddling around with the tribes - the British and the Russians found that out to their cost.5

We have also mentioned, in recounting the history of drugs in Pakistan, that the laws regulating opium production are more than 150 years old, and that the next applicable law came in 1979, in the shape of the Hudood Ordinance, which, in spite

---

2 Among all these areas, Dir is the most formidable. According to some reliable reports its population of 1.6 million are thought to possess over four million AK-47 guns, in addition to other heavy armaments.
of its use to control poppy cultivation, according to a high official in the Ministry of Narcotics in Pakistan:

... penalised everything from production and possession to transportation and conversion but planting of opium poppies did not fall under it.\(^6\)

This point was not really clarified until the law was amended for the second time in 1995 by presidential ordinance, and poppy cultivation brought under state law.\(^7\)

Under these conditions it is difficult for any government to fulfil its international obligations, as this could only be done at the cost of its own people, particularly in the present dangerous circumstances. Government may accelerate its efforts to suppress opium production, as to be seen to be doing so will bring greater wealth in the shape of foreign aid, wealth which can continue to be used for corrupt purposes. It is hard, however, to envisage the end of heroin production, which is a major source of corrupt income which can continue to be received by the exploitation of Afghan opium, now produced on a scale which outstrips the rest of the world.

B The Party System

In addition to the fact that in Pakistan drugs are produced in areas where government control is limited or non-existent, local communities depending upon the income from their small land holdings, the political party system also supports drug production. State policies change from person to person and government to government, every opposition party criticising the ruling party's drug policies and supporting and encouraging growers and producers – until it acquires power. Conversely, a party in government may try to eradicate opium poppies, but only until it comes into opposition.

In Pakistan there are more than fifty political parties, but in the drugs producing areas there are four - the National Awami Party (ANP), the Pakistan People's Party (PPP), the Pakistan Muslim League (PML), and Jamaat-e-Islami (JI). All the members of these parties from the area have supported drug production at different


\(^7\) Government of Pakistan, *The Gazette of Pakistan: Prohibition and Punishment*, Chapter II section 4 (Islamabad: Ministry of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs 1995), p. 359, which reads: "No one shall cultivate any cannabis plant, coca bush or opium, or gather any portion of a cannabis plant, coca bush or opium plant."
times, no doubt because, in the words of one official, "No one can win elections in the area without the poppy farmers' support."8

Like all political parties in the area, ANP (Awami National Party), a party known for pleading ethnic politics for Pashtu speakers, and which has been mostly out of Government, has the slogan *khpala khawra khpal ikhtiar* "in our land, we are the masters" or, literally "our land, our choice", which has brought it strong support in the poppy growing areas, particularly Dir, where previously it had a very limited foothold. Commenting on Government policies regarding narcotics production in the area, the Leader of the ANP, Khan Abdul Wali Khan, has said:

*The opium crop should simply be bought up by the State. Their lives depend on it. We tell the farmers that unless the government comes to an honourable agreement, it is their right to grow poppy. No such decision could be made without reference to Kabul. Approval from Kabul is required under international treaty... There is nothing wrong in growing opium but it is wrong to refine it into heroin. The raw material is not harmful. It has been eaten for many years*9.

These, however, are examples of poppy politics on the provincial level. On the local level no politician can afford to annoy the farmers, and so they openly support them. Even members of parliament from districts not directly involved with narcotics are obligated to the Deputy Commissioner and project officials.10

More significantly, Sultan Khel and Painda Khel areas, where opium is cultivated to the maximum, are known for their support of the Jamat-i-Islami, a religio-political party. Candidates and members of the party from the area in the provincial assembly are themselves cultivators of the crop, and oppose the ban on its cultivation on religious grounds. A party activist said of poppy economics and politics:

*None of the crops fetch even one-third the price of what we receive from poppy. How can the US ask us to stop poppy cultivation? Have we ever asked them not to*

---

10 Bakht Baidar Khan, MPA of the Pakistan People's Party told me that the deputy commissioner gave him a foreign made handgun out of the Narcotic Fund.
produce guns, tanks and bombs, which also kill people? We prefer to die fighting, rather than to die from hunger\textsuperscript{11}.

One ex-member of the Provincial Assembly of Jamat-i-Islami,\textsuperscript{12} himself a cultivator, in 1997 distributed poppy seeds free of charge;\textsuperscript{13} another\textsuperscript{14} led a march against the poppy ban in December 1995, and the misuse of the narcotics fund by senior officials.

The 1988 and 1997 elections fell before and during the poppy seasons, and the polls looked like 'poppy polls'. During the 1997 campaign, in Usherai Dara, Sultan Khel, the Government sprayed herbicide on a few standing poppy crop fields during the night, causing the locals to block the main road and stone every official vehicle and policeman the following day. The ruling party candidate quickly started negotiations with the Deputy Commissioner and other officials, and finally the officials were accused of interference with the election campaign of the Pakistan Muslim League and threatened with dire consequences. The matter was resolved, and the rest of the crop harvested.\textsuperscript{15}

\section*{C Causes of the Narcotics Boom}

It is widely believed that three main events led to the present narcotics boom in Pakistan: the Hudood Ordinance of General Zia, the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and the Iranian revolution,\textsuperscript{16} though there is less agreement as to which was the primary cause. CIA reports point to the Iranian revolution, but inside as well as outside Pakistan opinion is divided, some experts favouring the Afghanistan-Soviet war,\textsuperscript{17} while to others the Hudood Ordinance is the basic

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item M. K. Jalal Zai, \textit{op.cit.} p. 41.
\item Muhammad Shah Haroon Mujahid alis Badalai Malik, was elected to the Provincial Assembly in 1985. He retained his seat in 1988 election on Jamat-e-Islami ticket. Data for this study were collected from his village Badalai.
\item NewsLine, December 1989, \textit{op.cit.} p.28.
\item Malik Bahram Khan alias Dogram Malik, is an aggressive supporter of poppy cultivators and himself cultivates it. He led a march of the locals on 12.12.95 to press for their demands concerning poppy cultivation in the area. See the \textit{Daily Jang} (London: 16 December 1995).
\item The researcher was on survey of the area on 28.1.97. PML candidate Malik Jehanzeb fully supported the locals and assured them that the Government would not destroy their crops. On condition of supporting the farmers he was assured of support from them, and as a result he is now a member of the Provincial Assembly and minister for narcotics control in the provincial cabinet.
\item CIA Report on heroin in Pakistan “Sowing the Winds”, \textit{The Friday Times} (Lahore : March 26, 1992), p.3.
\item A. Inayatullah, \textit{Aik Cigarette Aur}, (Urdu) (Lahore : Rohtas Books, Temple Road, 1990)
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
reason. In my opinion the first two factors - laws in the country, particularly the Hudood Ordinance, which was the foundation stone of drugs development, and the Afghanistan problem - are interrelated. The Iranian factor is of less importance to drug production in particular, though its more general political significance, which may impact indirectly on drug production and supply, cannot be disregarded. In addition, however, today's sectarian terrorism in Pakistan between the Iranian backed Sipah-e-Muhammad (Shia) and the Saudi Arabian and Kuwaiti backed Sipah-i-Sahaba (Sunni) groups, currently killing each other in the name of Islam, involves an annual toll of one thousand lives in the Punjab alone, inevitably contributing to destabilisation relevant to drug production and supply.

The researcher believes the Hudood Ordinance, promulgated on 10th February 1979, was the main cause of Pakistan's drug problem. It was ill-timed and ill-planned and possibly enforced under US pressure, though it is yet to be established definitively whether this was the case or whether it was imposed by Pakistan's rulers to monopolise the drugs trade without interference from competitors. Certainly after the promulgation of the Ordinance the drug trade was confined to a few hands at the helms of affairs and their accomplices. On the other hand, American pressure, and superpower responsibility are, truthfully or not, held responsible by General Zia himself in his assertion that his Government "did not harbour the scourge of drug trafficking and so it was not his problem. It was America's doing and she should handle it."

Drug development has three aspects: financing, logistics and political patronage. In Pakistan all three have been and still are readily available: political patronage of the bureaucrats and politicians, CIA patronage during the Afghan war, National Logistic Cell (NLC) of the Pakistan Army during the Afghan war, and the finances and money laundering by banks like BCCI and some Pakistani and American banks.
D Some Problems with the Statistics of Addiction

According to the best available figures, in 1993 there were 3,005,649 drug addicts in Pakistan, of whom 50.7%, or 1,523,864, used heroin.23 By mid-1997 the number of addicts had risen to 3.7 million. Assuming an annual increase of 7%,24 by mid 1997 the number of heroin addicts would have been over two million. The sources of the above figures reported an increase in heroin addiction of 12.1% during 1982-88, while during 1988-93 it reduced to 6.8%.

These are quite conservative figures in the face of the increasing number of addicts and the ineffectiveness of official control efforts. The National Drug Abuse Survey of 1986 reported an average daily consumption of 0.9 grams of heroin per addict.25 Combining the two reports it can be assumed that with 1.7 million addicts the total daily consumption of heroin in Pakistan is 1,530 kg. In terms of opium equivalent, one kg of heroin is made out of 10 kg of raw opium,26 which means that Pakistani heroin addicts daily consume some 15,300 kg of raw opium, or 55,84,500 kg or 5584.5 metric tons of opium annually. This amount of opium is in addition to the amount consumed by 315,000 opium addicts who, on average, consume 1.3 grams per head of opium a day, or 150 metric tons annually.

These are remarkable figures, for Pakistan produces only about 120 metric tons and is without doubt an exporting country, while Afghanistan produces about 2500 metric tons. So from where does the rest of opium come? US Government reports suggest a little over 475027 metric tons of raw opium were produced in Asia in 1995, so if these figures were accurate it would follow that Pakistanis consume more opium than the total Asian production.

These figures are obviously exaggerated. There are three possible reasons for this:

---

24 The Dawn (Karachi, June 26 1996)
25 Government of Pakistan, National Survey on Drug Abuse in Pakistan (Islamabad: Narcotics Control Board, 1986), p.150 (Table 5.13)
1st. Officials are exaggerating consumption to attract more foreign aid, a good part of which, as we have seen, goes into overseas bank accounts;

2nd. Administrative authorities of the opium producing areas are underestimating production. None of the opium producing areas has been measured, so we do not know exactly the amount of land cultivated with opium. The concerned administration, in order to show their efficiency, might submit low figures: in addition, as none of them ever bothers (or perhaps dares) to visit these areas, they must depend upon local informants or community elders, who may give biased estimates or fail to understand the measuring units. The main reason for any local understatement, however, is corruption. Every deputy commissioner or political agent is in charge of development projects financed by foreign governments, and embezzles large sums, submitting lower figures of opium production to reassure. Similarly, most NGOs are headed or owned by political figures for their own economic benefit and status, and, in order to get more and more grants-in-aid, they are liable to give false area based addiction figures which then become a basis of national statistics.

3rd. defective survey methodology. National Drug Abuse Surveys in Pakistan employ snowball sampling, which dispenses with a sampling frame, using known respondents to identify unknown ones - "obtaining a sample by having initially identified subjects who can refer you to other subjects with like or similar characteristics." Snowballing was used by Parker, Bakx and Newcombe to establish the number of unknown drug addicts in USA, and they detail its demerits, including the knowledge of known users about other users, the uncertain ratio of known to unknown users, the size of the total heroin user population, the questionable generalisability of data established by this means, the problem of double counting and the impact on the study's reliability of researchers depending and relying on personal relationships with users.31

E  Corruption

Pakistan is a post-colonial, overdeveloped bureaucratic state, where economic and political institutions are weak but bureaucrats strong. International corporations and organisations gain access to the Pakistani market and institutions by bribing the bureaucracy. Normally the social and economic position of bureaucrats is lower middle or middle class, and they rely for upward mobility on kickbacks for giving contracts, or on other forms of institutionalised bribery.  

Institutions responsible for the elimination of drugs are particularly affected, and a job in these departments is known to bring a relative fortune to employees. Accordingly these jobs are normally sold to the highest bidder, not by ordinary officials but by federal ministers; so an employee who has spent a hefty sum to secure employment will have to earn sufficient to pay this off before his investment becomes profitable.

Pakistani politics have traditionally been dominated by landed aristocracy and feudal lords. By the 1960s the urban commercial and industrial class had entered the political scene, patronised by the power centre of the country; but in the 1980s a new class entered politics, with few political aims other than accumulating wealth and political power. This new class was bred under the patronage of dictators, and their presence continues to affect the political process. One such was General Zia-ul-Haq, at that time the Martial Law Administrator and President of Pakistan, famous for Islamization of the country, but among the first to flout his own law and become involved in heroin smuggling in his official plane.  

In 1983 one Raza Qureshi was arrested at Fornebo Airport, Oslo, with heroin in his possession. On assurance of a reduced sentence the accused revealed three persons, Hamid Hasnain, Tahir Butt and Munawar Hussain, as the leaders of the drug cartel responsible for smuggling heroin to Norway. Under diplomatic pressure from Norway, Hamid Hasnain, then zonal chief of the Habib Bank, was arrested. According to an American magazine, The Nation, Hamid Hasnain was the person handling General Zia's and his family's accounts in the bank. Hasnain later acknowledged that "as chief of Habib Bank Ltd. he was responsible for the

33 "Heroin was smuggled in Zia's aircraft", The Frontier Post (Lahore 7 May 1997).
President's family's accounts." Hamid Hasnain was released on bail on health grounds but when he was sentenced to fifteen years imprisonment and a one hundred thousand rupees fine by the Federal Shariat Court, in February 1989, his solicitor said that his client had been made a "scapegoat" and that the investigations had been conducted improperly.

The active involvement of the anti-drugs law makers in the drug business provided an impetus to business in the country. The most trusted and vocal of General Zia's friends, General Fazal Haq, a patron of most anti-narcotics NGOs, such as the Green December Movement, is said to be actively involved in the business to the extent that he raided the heroin factories of the rivals to monopolise the business. Some sources have termed him the primary protector of Pakistan's heroin industry.

Drug money has increasingly come to play an important role in politics by creating a new class, now financing political parties irrespective of changes of government or leadership, and capable of destabilising Government if business is threatened. Many of them are socially respectable people, including politicians, industrialists, sportsmen, businessmen, military men, publishing magnates and even philanthropists. An English magazine carried on its title page the heading "Narco barons... influential politicians, ministers and Members of Parliament."

Narcotics money has fuelled the political system. The election to the National Assembly of people like Salim Khan, from Peshawar, reflected his support from the drug interest. The election on the ANP ticket of Seth Saifullah, a drug pusher arrested in Karachi for running strong dens like Sohrab Got, is also known to the locals. Haji Ayub Afridi a known heroin manufacturer and drug pusher, was

---

36 A. W. McCoy, 1994, op. cit. p. 454
37 NewsLine, op.cit.
38 Salim Khan, a jobless law graduate with a poor family background, was elected to the National Assembly of Pakistan in the non-party elections of 1985. It is commonly believed that he was supported by drug syndicates of the area against his strong rival candidate.
39 Haji Ayub Afridi is currently in prison in the United States. He voluntarily surrendered and is serving a sentence of one year's imprisonment and US$100,000 fine. His surrender is a very interesting story. The husband of the then Prime Minister, Benazir Bhutto, Asif Ali Zardari, notorious for his corruption, asked him for 100 million rupees to remove his name from the list of drug barons. Afterwards, Zardari asked for more money and tried to
elected to the National Assembly in 1990. He was known to the law enforcers but had immunity from arrest as a Member of Parliament.

Not only the martial law Government, but also the civil elected governments, are said to have been involved in drug money. Benazir Bhutto, who is popular in the west, announced a war against drugs, repeatedly claiming that drug money was being used to destabilise her Government. But this was mere propaganda: her husband, Asif Ali Zardari, also a minister in her Cabinet, converted the Prime Minister's House into a safe heaven for the heroin trade, and sold drugs to western traders, as was later discovered by a Scotland Yard police officer.\footnote{Bhutto's Husband was targeted in a US drug sting” in \textit{Sunday Times} (London, 23 February 1997). Recently, his assets in UK and Switzerland have been under investigation, and it is suspected that he acquired the property through drug money.}

Further, an accused in a drug trial, Haji Iqbal Baig, claimed that he had financed the 1985 election of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, and the 1988 election campaigns of PPP candidates Aitzaz Ahsan, Jehangir Badar, Faisal Saleh Hayat, Meraj Khalid and Salman Taseer, then ministers in the Bhutto cabinet. He said that his final surrender was negotiated with Benazir Bhutto by the then Speaker of the National Assembly, and the then Prime Minister, Meraj Khalid.\footnote{NewsLine, op.cit. pp. 14-16. Iqbal Baig's statement was supported by the then Prime Minister Meraj Khalid in an interview with the \textit{Khaleej Times}, quoted by daily KASOOTTI, Peshawar, 4 March 1997. He said that Benazir Bhutto had sought support from the Drug Mafiosi in 1989. On the other hand, Benazir Bhutto said that she did not give a ticket to Meraj Khalid as he was very close to Iqbal Baig and other drug Mafia members.} But the case most widely publicised in the western media concerned the foreign minister in the Bhutto Government, and a former minister of narcotics, for smuggling of 400 kg of narcotics in rice bags from his rice mills in Pakistan, and some parliamentarians from the tribal areas and a Minister of State in her Government.

More recently, the election campaign of IJI (Islami Jamhori Ittehad) under Nawaz Sharif was allegedly financed by drug money; and Nawaz even used drugs money to buy the loyalties of some Pakistani generals to remain in power.\footnote{CIA report on "Heroin in Pakistan: Sowing the Winds, op. cit. p.3.}
The interaction of drugs and politics in Baluchistan is even closer than in the rest of the country. According to reports, seven out of 40 members of the provincial legislature, including ministers, and four members of the National Assembly out of twelve from the province, were involved in the trade.\footnote{NewsLine, op.cit. p.28.} On the national level, a 1992 CIA report on heroin in Pakistan detailed the involved politicians and MPs. They included Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, the then President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, his personal secretary and a senior civil servant, then a minister, Roidad Khan, four National Assembly members from Khyber Agency, as well as the Baluchistan representatives.

The most recent entrant in the political scene is the renowned cricket player Imran Khan, head of The Pakistan Justice Movement (Pakistan Tehrik-e-Insaf or PTI), whose political slogan has been of social justice for the oppressed Pakistani masses and calling to account those who amassed wealth through unethical means. Though the fact that he was planted into politics by Pakistani intelligence people is a well known fact in Pakistan, it was believed by ordinary Pakistanis that his late British father-in-law's wealth, combined with his own fame as a cricket hero, would help him in Pakistani politics, where success is not possible without great wealth. But he was also financed by the drug Mafia and by traffickers in northern Punjab. While such allegations are unbelievable to ordinary Pakistanis, the evidence is persuasive.\footnote{Interview with Mr. Hussain Shah. Mr. Hussain Shah is a Pakistani British citizen serving an eight year sentence in England (HM Prison Wolds, Everthorpe, East Yorkshire) for his involvement in heroin import into UK. He very plausibly admitted to the author that he had spent hundreds of thousand of rupees on Imran Khan's election campaign in the belief that he was a sure winner of the general election; and that he was promised that his name would be removed from the drug smugglers' list in UK.}

The latest list of drug barons issued by the Sharif Government includes 353 names of civil and military personnel, including an air chief, colonels and brigadiers, a president, prime ministers, governors and chief ministers of NWFP, ministers and MPs, bankers, owners of influential newspapers, leading political families, and heads of intelligence and law enforcing agencies, including the Head of the Anti-Narcotics Force.\footnote{Rahmat Shah Afridi, owner of the only English daily from Peshawar, was arrested by Pakistan's Anti-Narcotic Force (ANF) on 1st April 1999 for his involvement in the drug business.} While this kind of list must be regarded as having obvious

\footnote{PPP releases govt's list of 353 drug barons: civil and military bigwigs among the accused" in Frontier Post (Peshawar, 25 May 1998).}
attractiveness in terms of propaganda, given the present political culture in Pakistan, it nonetheless gives some indication of the gravity of the situation: when the power elites are involved in the drugs trade there is no political solution, corruption becomes the norm, and the norm will filter down to every stratum of society.

Money laundering is another aspect of narco-politics. In 1993 the Government declared a *jihad* against drugs, saying that their production, processing and trafficking posed a national threat of immense proportions. Five weeks later, the Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan publicly invited citizens to open foreign currency accounts or “step-in with 100,000 rupees and allow the bank to do the rest”. Prospective depositors were assured that "no question will be asked by any authority about the source of acquisition of Foreign Exchange."46

Many subsequent advertisements have appeared, inviting narco-barons to invest in various sectors, particularly property, as, because of widespread corruption in Pakistan's Land Revenue and Registry System, no proper documentation of sale and purchase is needed and transactions can be conducted under different names. It is also said, though not proven, that Government's privatisation programme is aimed to launder narco-money and bring it under Government control; similarly suspected is the involvement of the army in the drugs business. Proof is closest in relation to the Intelligence Branch, ISI, during the Afghan-Soviet war, where the CIA and the Pakistan army conspired to deploy drugs as a political and military weapon.

The involvement of politicians in the drug business has had profound consequences for Pakistani society, economic, social, political and to some extent psychological as well, though the economic repercussions are the most fundamental. Experts believe that the trade penetrates every aspect of the economy, but though it is not measurable directly they mention the indicators most liable to be affected as “inflation, money supply, interest rates, traditional contrabands, foreign exchange reserves, black market currency, property value, wages and the cost of goods and services.”47

---

Both parochial and market corruption are found in Pakistani society and polity. The former entails forms which meet traditional obligations (such as nepotism), the latter corruption for personal profit. Nepotism and bribes are culturally and institutionally comprehensible in Pakistan, visible in the political culture, where it is not considered shameful to give or receive bribes and kickbacks in spite of legal and religious laws which may prohibit them. So seven years ago a CIA report analysed corruption in Pakistan thus:

Pakistan is at a stage in its development wherein corruption is simply the norm. Those who have any kind of influence or access to the corridors of political powers flout the laws of the land with impunity. Pakistanis are not far wrong in their belief that the country's elite leaders, politicians, industrialists, generals, bankers, landlords with few exceptions use their positions to enrich themselves, their families, their relatives... positions throughout the public services are valued for the wealth their holders can amass: jobs in the country's bureaucracy are literally purchased: those moving up or laterally to more lucrative position buy it from those above. And, if the highest bidder lacks the capacity to honour his bid right away, he simply takes the money out of the salaries of those below him. This has affected the police as much as any other part of the administration. Jobs in the police from the Station House Officer (SHO or Thanidar) at the bottom of the management cadre to the provincial Inspector-general of Police are now routinely sold.

In June 1996 the Anti-Narcotics Force (ANF), an institution primarily responsible for the suppression of drugs and its trade, seized two tons of heroin, the biggest seizure in the country's history, in Baluchistan, and invited foreign diplomats to watch its destruction and analyse the haul. "But with that Pakistan's credibility also went up in flames" since, according to US analysts who denounced the drama as a hoax, the ashes contained only traces of heroin. The answer to the obvious question of what happened to the real heroin is easy to find. Nearly every month a Pakistani is executed in Saudi Arabia on charges of drug smuggling, but how they manage to carry the drugs can be understood from the revelation of a smuggler that he was helped by an FIA (Federal Investigation Agency of Pakistan or Federal Police)

---

49 "CIA report on Heroin in Pakistan: "Sowing the Winds" in *Friday Times* (Lahore, 26 March 1992), p.17
officer to board a Copenhagen-bound flight with a false passport. He was arrested on the German border with one and half kg of heroin, and sentenced to five years imprisonment.

Heroin power, therefore, has come to infect the body politic of Pakistan. Heroin trafficking, one of the many scourges gifted to Pakistan by the Afghan jihad, is now a fully-fledged industry which has spawned drug barons with enormous fortunes which not only render them invincible to the law but enable them to purchase political power. The narco-barons are now among the pillars of the structure - MPs and senators, ministers in the provincial and federal cabinet, with access to the highest offices in the land. Narco-money funds political parties, finances election campaigns and buys votes and the favour of the generals who frequently determine which politicians remain in power and which fall from grace.

Of all these indicators, the devaluation of the currency and the existence of a black economy have been the most dramatic. During the first ten months of 1997 the Nawaz Government devalued national currency six times, and while speaking in the Senate Pakistan Finance Minister admitted that a black economy to the tune of 1,500-2,000 billion rupees existed in the country. In Pakistan, the official and black market currency rate are the same, the result of this "quick-richness" in Pakistan being the inhibition of long-term investment in the industrial sector, with the Government seemingly trying to offer incentives to foreign investors on their terms, not on terms most favourable to the national economy.

The Prime Minister claimed in 1997 to have washed away the label of "the most corrupt country in the world" from the face of Pakistan. A month later he said "Pakistan is now number 5 in corruption in the world." On the other hand some international independent sources claim Pakistan is still the second most corrupt country in the world after Nigeria. It would be difficult to overstate the

---

51 Javed is from Dir district and nowadays lives in hiding to save himself from the Mafia, as three attempts have been made on his life for his revelations to CIA, including the claim that a former federal minister from the Punjab is the head of the Mafia.
55 Transparency International Report in The Nation Weekly (London, 1-7 August 1997), vol. 3 No 31; though it must in fairness be added that at the time of writing (February 1999) Pakistan was 71st out of 85 in TI's Corruption Perceptions Index (http://www.transparency.de/documents/cpi/index.html).
significance of institutionalised corruption in any study of drug production and
supply in Pakistan. To suggest, as some writers have, that corruption brings
economic benefits\textsuperscript{56} could scarcely be more wrong, and the overwhelming and more
recent evidence is that in addition to upsetting markets it does fundamental
corrosive damage:

\textit{The effects of corruption are especially disruptive in democracies: by attacking
some of the basic principles on which democracy rests... corruption contributes to
the delegitimation of the political and institutional systems in which it takes root. It
is for this reason that political corruption is rightly a central focus of concern in
contemporary democracies.}\textsuperscript{57}

2 External Factors

A The Iranian Revolution

Iran has been producing opium for centuries, and has a considerable addicted
population whose need is satisfied by heroin from neighbouring countries. Iran thus
serves as a market for heroin manufactured in the region, a transit country for
opium to Turkey and elsewhere, and an opium producer. Like Pakistan, Iran has
tribal areas (including Irani Baluchistan and Kurdish territory) where opium is
cultivated, but its magnitude has not been widely reported since the 1979
Revolution. According to US Government reports, Iran produced some 50-70
metric tons of opium in 1993,\textsuperscript{58} though, given the great number of heroin users and
the corruptibility of law enforcers,\textsuperscript{59} there must be a strong likelihood of heroin
processing occurring on a substantial scale in the far flung areas near the borders
with Pakistan and Afghanistan.

The western media and many Pakistani experts\textsuperscript{60} believe the Iranian Revolution was
a cause of drug development in Pakistan. Though opinion differs on the extent and

\textsuperscript{56} A. Heidenheimer (ed.) \textit{Political Corruption: Readings in Comparative Analysis}. (New
\textsuperscript{57} P. Heywood (ed.) \textit{Political Corruption} (Oxford: Blackwell for the Political Studies
\textsuperscript{58} United States Government, \textit{International Narcotics Control strategy Report}
(Washington DC: Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law
\textsuperscript{59} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{60} "CIA report on "Heroin in Pakistan: sowing the winds" op. cit. p.3; see "Asia's 'Golden
Crescent' heroin floods the west", \textit{Christian Science Monitor} (9 November 1982), p. and
p.12; I. L. Griffith, "From Cold War Geopolitics to Post Cold War Geonarcotics"
nature of this, there seems to be a consensus that the strict anti-narcotics laws which followed the toppling of the Shah contributed to the problem. In the year following the Revolution opium production increased, reducing demand for Pakistani and Afghan opium. But when the Revolution stabilised, the Government ordered the persecution of drug traffickers and businessmen.

As a result, the Mafia in Iran left the country, and some came to Baluchistan to establish their business there. They also introduced Pakistani smugglers, who had previously sold opium solely or mainly to Iranians, to the international market. When Iranian experts came to Pakistan they not only established heroin laboratories and made advance payments to farmers in the Helmand province of Afghanistan, but were already familiar with the international Mafia. The contribution of the Revolution to drug production in Pakistan was certainly not minimal, therefore, but it impacted most directly on Baluchistan, but less on NWFP’s tribal areas, which had always had traditional kinship ties with Iran irrespective of the political turmoil in that country; but the migration of Iranian drug barons contributed to the internationalisation of Pakistan’s production, and to its increasing involvement in organised distribution networks.

B The Afghan-Soviet War

Afghanistan is the second most important factor in drug development in Pakistan after the Hudood Ordinance. Afghanistan’s impact on the drug situation in Pakistan can be divided into three stages - 1978-1979, 1980-1989, and 1989 to the present.

The impact of the first stage of the Afghan crisis on the drug situation in Pakistan began immediately after the pro-communist coup which, in April 1978, toppled the kingship and Sardar Daud Khan’s Government, replacing the latter with a pro-Moscow regime. In the same year the US ambassador was killed in doubtful circumstances. The Americans were watching the situation carefully, and created anti-communist resurgence groups inside Afghanistan, masterminded from Peshawar. The Americans knew the strategic importance of Pakistan for anti-Soviet activities, and were creating financial resources for the long expected anti-communist war. In April 1979 the drama started when CIA and Afghan resistance

groups started working together, eight months before Soviet troops entered Afghanistan.

Afghanistan had been an opium producer since time immemorial, exporting raw opium to what is now Pakistan for medicinal as well as non-medical uses. When opium production began in Pakistan (in addition to that traditionally produced in the tribal areas) following the 1953 UN Protocol, Iran, which banned production in 1955, quickly became Pakistan's main market as the ban fuelled a demand which continued until 1969. In that year the Iranian Government again allowed opium production, and as a result all the opium was channelled to Turkey and other western countries for processing into heroin, so encouraging Pakistani and Afghani cultivators to produce more opium.

Following the coup, internal unrest, disorganisation and a blockade of the traditional opium smuggling route led to a fall in production. In Pakistan, meanwhile, the Hudood Ordinance temporarily disturbed and disorganised the trade. For some time smugglers stockpiled opium at Turkham, a border town between Pakistan and Afghanistan, perfecting their skill and introducing heroin processing to the area on both sides of the border in order to maximise profit by exporting heroin rather than the bulkier and less valuable raw opium.

The second stage of the influence of the Afghan war, from 1980-1989, saw the involvement of the CIA. Though Mark Mansfield, a CIA spokesman, told a press conference "in the strongest possible terms that the CIA neither engages in nor condones drug trafficking" later incidents and official reports, even reports of the US Congress, suggested that this was far from the truth. For example, in the words of a State Department official:

"We are not going to let a little thing like drugs get in the way of the political situation... and when the Soviets leave and there is no money in the country it's not going to be a priority to disrupt the drug trade."

---

It is now widely acknowledged that drug abuse, trafficking, and money laundering in Pakistan were undertaken with the collusion and complicity of both US and Pakistani intelligence agencies in the wake of the Afghan war. Drug money financed the resistance to the Soviet invaders, and so, to the Americans, drugs were on the side of the angels. The Red Army deliberately destroyed crops, ruining rural dwellings to suppress growing resistance inside the country. Afghans were reorganising and many emigrated to Pakistan and Iran as refugees. The Americans committed themselves to the war against the communists, and had established contacts with leading figures in Afghanistan through Pakistan. The objective of their association with the Afghan resistance was clear. As a western expert observes:

*American cold warriors embraced a military anti-communist ideology. In their mind the entire world was locked in a manichaean struggle between "godless communists "and the "free world"... In this desperate struggle to save "western civilisation, "any ally was welcome and any means was justified. The CIA became the vanguard of American's anti-Communist crusade, and it dispatched small members of well-financed agents to every corner of the globe to mould the local political situation in a fashion compatible with American interests*.64

McCoy similarly states that:

*During the 1980s the CIA's two main covert operations became interwoven with the global narcotics trade. The agency's support for Afghan guerrillas through Pakistan coincided with the emergence of southern Asia as the major heroin supplier for European and American markets. Although the US maintained a substantial force of DEA agents in Islamabad during the 1980s, the unit was restrained by US national security imperatives and did almost nothing to slow Pakistan's booming heroin export to America*.65

The hollowness of the denials and refutations of the CIA in particular were further exposed by Senator Kerry's statement to the US Senate that:

*On the basis of this evidence, it is clear that individuals who were involved in drug trafficking, the supply of the contras network was used by drug trafficking

organisations and elements of the contras themselves knowingly received financial and material assistance from the drug traffickers. In each case, one or another agency of the US government had information regarding the involvement either while it was occurring or immediately thereafter.\textsuperscript{66}

This was not America's first involvement in overt or covert operations against communists through drugs. During the cold war era she had organised gangs to counter communist activities, giving them a free hand to deal in drugs. The role of the CIA in the drugs business in China through the "Red Gang" and "Green Gang", its support for the KMT in China and Taiwan, and her role in the Vietnam war and drugs business which so contributed to the creation of the Golden Triangle, is also on record. Similarly, economic and military aid to Pakistan was intended to purchase loyalty in the Afghan-Soviet war, which, according to many western analysts, "was a proper marriage of mutual interests",\textsuperscript{67} and the result was the Golden Crescent.\textsuperscript{68} The Americans depended on their appointee, the guerrilla commander Hikmatyar, recipient of more than half of America's aid, but very late came to notice that he was involved in the drugs business under the CIA's nose, running at least six heroin laboratories utilising the opium harvest of Afghanistan's Helmand province.\textsuperscript{69} Certainly the international Press believed the Afghan war was financed by drug money.\textsuperscript{70} So the \textit{Washington Post} claimed that "US officials had ignored Afghan complaints of heroin trafficking by Hikmatyar and ISI, an allegation that at least one senior American official confirmed... Hikmatyar's commanders close to ISI run heroin laboratories in south west Pakistan."\textsuperscript{71}

In 1986, a report to the US Congress on the American contribution to the anti-drugs effort reflected the resultant dilemma nicely:

\textit{In this region, as in Central America, the CIA and drug enforcement officials are in effect against each other. The CIA wishes to maximise Mujahideen war efforts against the Russians in Afghanistan. This includes assistance in weapons

\textsuperscript{66} Muhammad Shafiq Khan (Maj. Retd), "TAs Socio-Economic Structure-III, in \textit{The Frontier Post} (Peshawar, 7 April 1997).
\textsuperscript{67} A.W.McCoy, 1994.\textit{op.cit.} p 449.
\textsuperscript{68} A.W. McCoy, 1972. \textit{op.cit.} pp.7-29
\textsuperscript{69} A.W. McCoy, 1994. \textit{op.cit.} p 454.
procurement... The Mujahideen are, however, undersupplied with armaments, as recent Western news reports have indicated. Unless the US increases military aid, the only other real source for arms funding is the drug trade in hashish, heroin and opium. 72

But the CIA and the Mujahideen not only sought to finance the war through drug money, they also meant to use drugs to undermine the Red Army morally and physically. One Afghan freedom fighter was quoted as saying:

"We try to poison the Russians with it... they sell opium and hashish mostly but now also heroin to the Russian soldiers in exchange for guns and to poison their spirit" 73

This was confirmed directly in fieldwork conducted for this study. In an interview with Rahmat Gul Shinwari (on 16 March 1997), Shinwari stated, pointing to a building in Landi Kotal bazaar, that that was the place where US, Pakistani and Saudi Arabian intelligence agents would fill cigarettes with hashish and heroin, for the political administrator to give them to Pakistani and Afghan drivers with instructions to offer them to Soviet soldiers in Afghanistan as they crossed the frontier.

Another report of the then UN representative on the Soviet-Afghan issue, Diego Cardoviez, discussing the American efforts to demoralise the Communists, writes:

But Moscow had its own growing worries about Afghanistan as illness and drug abuse spread in the ranks of Soviet forces... some reports indicated that half of the men in certain combat units were ill at any given time... In January 1987, out of six people in Moscow surveyed in a government sponsored opinion poll openly criticised the war, blaming it for widespread drug addiction and juvenile delinquency 74.

This second stage, then, covered the 1980s, when heroin processing became widespread in both Pakistan and Afghanistan. In Afghanistan opium production began on an unprecedented level under the patronage of the guerrilla leaders, and the country was converted into a mono-culture. In Pakistan heroin became almost

72 I. Haq, op. cit. p.20.
73 Christian Science Monitor, op. cit.

99
an ‘ordinary-daily-use’ commodity, sold openly and cheaply in markets like Jamrud, Bara and Landi Kotal, with free samples distributed to potential users in and around Peshawar University campus.

The third stage, the post-Afghan War era, will have far reaching impacts on the drug situation the world over. It has already rendered ineffective the efforts of the Pakistan Government in narcotics control; rather it has boosted both consumption and production. Afghanistan was under Soviet occupation for nearly twelve years, and the subsequent and protracted civil war and lack of centralised authority or government aggravated the narcotics situation, with Afghans faced with a superpower, self-sufficient in weaponry, while they were reliant on others even for small assault arms. Soon after the Soviet invasion the Afghans began to realise the value of their opium crop, and “drugs for arms” became the business of the day. Though they received arms supplies from many western countries, this was never going to be sufficient to fight a superpower. This tremendously increased opium production, which came increasingly to be converted into heroin inside both Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Another important factor was that the war had provided most of the male population with jobs. Their families were looked after properly inside Pakistan with the help of the international community, and they were free of the pressure of earning their livelihood. With the Soviet withdrawal, western aid began to dwindle, eventually drying up completely. Pakistan could no longer afford to feed five million people out of her own resources, and consequently they had to repatriate the Afghan refugees. This repatriation, undertaken without international aid or pre-arrangement, brought another round of misery. The Soviet Union had deliberately destroyed the Afghan infrastructure: the lack of roads, irrigation channels or dwellings in which to hide from extreme weather conditions, the millions of land mines in the fields, and above all a lack of any centralised authority led the repatriated people to look towards sure and prompt sources of survival. The obvious source was opium cultivation on lands available for agricultural purposes. As a result opium cultivation escalated, and, according to official sources in Islamabad, for the first time Afghanistan was on target to outstrip Myanmar in opium production in 1998, and so become the largest opium producing country in the world.75

The civil war therefore further fuelled opium production. The different warring factions in that country ordered opium cultivation with, according to western sources, all the warlords running heroin processing laboratories and procuring arms through its sale.\(^\text{76}\)

**C The Impact of the Afghan War on the Local Economy of NWFP**

For centuries in Khyber Agency there has been no sure source of livelihood. History shows that, in the absence of agriculture, impossible in most parts of the Agency, people had three main sources of livelihood. Some were migratory, descending in winter from the cool uplands of Tirah, bringing their flocks and herds to graze in low country round Peshawar;\(^\text{77}\) secondly, the poorer people carried firewood into Peshawar to sell there as a principal occupation (a surprising and difficult activity since the rocky land is incapable of sustaining flora). The third occupation was raiding the neighbourhoods in order to survive.\(^\text{78}\)

In a region strongly characterised by cross-border smuggling, trade in guns and ammunition has also been a major source of livelihood for the Afridies in particular.\(^\text{79}\) In the inhospitable arid belt along the border, no other gainful occupation is possible. To the locals, 'smuggling' is a meaningless concept, as customs laws are not applied and smuggling is perceived simply as a form of trade - in firearms, electronic and luxury goods of foreign make and, now, narcotics, conducted for centuries regardless of the shifting of national boundaries, and since the 1950s carried out in *bara* markets\(^\text{80}\) designed exclusively for merchandising smuggled goods. Initially this trade was conducted only in Landi Kotal, but by the 1960s *bara* markets extended to other parts of the Agency under government patronage. In these markets luxury goods were available at much lower prices than in the settled areas. As a result business flourished, in a short time bringing prosperity to the locals, as no outsider could trade without their permission. These markets spread

\(^{76}\) *Ibid.*  
\(^{78}\) *Ibid.*  
into Government controlled areas, their main supply source being Afghanistan, from where such items were imported and being sold on to Pakistani businessmen.

Another source of income was Pak-Afghan transit trade. Afghanistan is a landlocked country, and access to developed countries is only through Pakistan or Iran. Accordingly imports into Afghanistan were channelled through Pakistan ports and transported through Khyber Agency, the shortest and safest route into Afghanistan. But Afghanistan, a poor country with electricity only in Kabul, did not need imported electronics and other luxury goods, which, in consequence, were intercepted in Khyber Agency and found their way into the bara markets.

The Afghan-Soviet war blocked this trade in three ways. First, most of the trading class had migrated out of Afghanistan with the start of the war, so there was no importer; secondly, the Soviets marketed their own goods at very cheap rates, though they were not popular due to low quality and negative public attitudes; and thirdly the routes were at the mercy of Soviet troops who demanded heavy bribes on such trading. Since the Afghan fighters also levied heavy taxes on such imports-exports, the business in the Pakistani tribal areas came to a standstill, compelling the locals to seek alternative sources of livelihood, most notably heroin processing.

D Drugs and United States Politics

Internationally, drug politics are very effectively used as a propaganda tool for defamation and blackmail. This has political consequences for aid-receiving countries like Pakistan, and has been used as a pretext to interfere with the internal affairs of other countries.

Pakistan has been engaged in controlling drugs through eliminating opium production and combating trafficking since 1979, but these efforts never gained recognition in the United States. As we have seen, attempts have been made to eliminate opium crops from some areas through destruction by herbicide sprayed from US-supplied thrush air crafts flown by Pakistan army pilots81: a counterproductive approach already discussed, the conduct of which is normally supervised by DEA officials from the US Embassy in Islamabad; and, with more constructive intent, by crop substitution programmes. These programmes, however, have generally been so meagre that their impact is negligible. Further, as American

official documents acknowledge that crop substitution is not a promising strategy for reducing drug production even in more promising regions such as the Andes, how could it be suitable for Pakistan?

Despite successive ‘wars on drugs’, it must be questioned whether the USA has really achieved its objectives, or whether it has simply added to the number of addicts inside America. And, it must further be asked, is the war on drugs primarily to be waged inside or outside that country? In 1971 there were 560,000 heroin addicts in the United States;\(^2\) by 1988 the number was much the same, but the number of cocaine addicts was close to 6 million, and there were also 18 million marijuana users. Together these make the USA the country with the world largest user population\(^3\). So the wars on drugs have scarcely been a great success at home, and it must be asked whether they were mainly a ploy to trap economic and politically weak countries, which America wanted to manipulate for political purposes. Whereas in Pakistan Zia-ul-Haq’s regime was responsible for the spread of drugs through high level corruption, on his death the State Department called General Zia "a strong supporter of anti-narcotics activities in Pakistan" and expressed the fear that his death "would slow the fight against drugs"\(^4\). Inside Pakistan there has been a feeling that, in the garb of a war against drugs, American drug agents and other diplomats are interfering with the internal affairs of the country. But such interference has been justified first by the fact that historically, Pakistan is a an aid-dependent country, vulnerable to US pressure and liable to lose international aid or loans unless a certificate of good conduct and support of American interests, required under 1986 US laws, is obtained. Since 1971 America has used diplomacy as well as financial and military assistance to deal with producer countries like Pakistan, but her efforts have had no discernible impact on drug availability. This is because her anti-drugs policies mostly conflict with her foreign policy, a contradiction which lies at the heart of American policy and, such are the size and influence of the only remaining superpower, at the heart of international control efforts.

The second American justification for intervention is the corruptibility of Pakistani officials and politicians, who receive massive aid for drug control in Pakistan with

---

\(^3\) P. D. Scott, "Spread of Drugs' Crack-down or Crack-up" in *The South* (London, August 1988), pp.9-10
one hand, and, with the other, transfer it to the western countries where most drugs
profits are invested and where, according to some reports, Pakistani politicians
have up to US$140 billions in various banks. Benazir Bhutto alone has US$1 billion in Swiss bank accounts.

How Americans are using drugs as political propaganda against Pakistan can be
understood from the US role during the Afghan war. As we have seen, US and
Afghan resistance fighters financed their war effort by drugs money. For Afghans it
can be said that they had no resources, and, saying "all's fair in love and war", were
using every available means of fighting a powerful enemy. But why did Americans
not stop them, or at least report the drug business? Until the end of the war in 1989
even the western media did not mention the unholy alliance between Americans
and the Afghan leaders or drugs dealers yet the day following the Soviet
withdrawal was signed, the Afghan Mujahideen (holy fighters), hitherto saluted as
heroic freedom fighters, were branded fundamentalists and terrorists.

In relation to Pakistan, American policies change repeatedly. During Zia's regime,
when the CIA and the intelligence branch of the Pakistan army were hand in glove
and busy in the trade to finance the Afghan war, the issue of drugs was never
raised. When Nawaz was elected Prime Minister, the CIA report mentioned earlier
cited him as a protector of his cousin-in-law, who was busy in the drugs trade. But
still the Americans announced their support for Nawaz's policies during his second
tenure as prime minister, and the said cousin-in-law was received as a state guest
during Nawaz’s visit to USA in 1998.

Nonetheless, the US International Narcotics Control Strategy Report for 1995-6 felt
able to claim that “neither the GOP nor any senior official of the government
courages or facilitates the illicit production or distribution of narcotics or
psychotropic drugs or other controlled substances, or the laundering of proceeds
from illegal drug transaction”.

85 Victor Mosquera Chaux (Colombian Ambassador to USA) in International Herald
Tribune, op. cit.
86 The Nation (London, 12-18 September 1997
87 Ibid.
89 Daily Jang (London ;March 13,1997)
Nonetheless, during Benazir Bhutto's Government (1993-1996), while the Americans insisted on the extradition of some unimportant drug barons, they never mentioned that both her husband and foreign minister (ironically a former minister of narcotics control) were involved in the trade inside the Prime Minister's own house. When Scotland Yard police officers pointed this out, US officials replied that they did not want to destabilise Pakistan.\textsuperscript{91} Shortly after Bhutto's fall, however, in 1997, the US Government blamed Pakistan for supporting drugs trafficking and money laundering.\textsuperscript{92} How the US tried to use narcotics for political blackmailing, can be judged from the fake drama of the arrest of an officer of the Pakistan Air Force arrested at Dallas airport with two kg of heroin. On investigation it came to light that this was a pre-planned operation designed to malign and embarrass the Pakistan Army and the DEA agents in Islamabad had trapped some officers in order to defame the Pakistan army on the Colombian pattern, and give a pretext for American blackmailing. But Pakistani intelligence agencies were smart enough to foil this US plot, and protested over the matter. As a result, for the first time in the fifty years of Pakistan's history, the US formally apologised to Pakistan over the DEA agents' conduct.\textsuperscript{93}

**Conclusion**

Drug production and supply in Pakistan have internal and external causes. Internally the country is unstable: institutions are weak but bureaucrats strong. There is a multiplicity of laws and administrative arrangements in different parts of NWFP, and the resulting confusion benefits politicians, government officials and drug producers. Political parties oppose drug production when in power but in opposition support and even encourage it to get the farmers' votes. External factors include the political conditions of the region, and international narco-politics. Pressure from neighbouring countries is unlikely to reduce in the short to medium term, and the use of narcotics-related issues against Pakistan by some western countries will continue to have an impact, as the Pakistani public's attitude towards

\textsuperscript{91} "Bhutto's Husband was targeted in US drugs sting" in *Sunday Times*, op.cit.
\textsuperscript{92} *Daily Pakistan*, (Islamabad, 3 March 1997), see also *Daily Khabrain* (Islamabad, 4 March 1997.
\textsuperscript{93} "US apologise over DEA's agents' conduct" in *The News* (London, 8 July 1997) The story is very famous and led to the arrest and then capital punishment of a DEA Pakistani agent, Ayaz Balooch. But ironically, the Air Force officer, who was arrested in USA, is enjoying as a state guest in the US and was never handed over to Pakistan for trial.
some such countries is becoming increasingly hostile generally. At a regional level
the problem seems to have no foreseeable end, as more countries are becoming
involved in production.

The role of the United States in drugs development in Pakistan and Afghanistan has
been that of an active, if hypocritical, collaborator and protector, condoning or
supporting the trade depending on the *realpolitik* of the moment.
CHAPTER IV: RESEARCH REPORT AND METHODOLOGY

Introduction: the Framework of the Chapter

This chapter explains the basis for the selection of research areas, discusses the research methodology, presents the theoretical basis of the study, and states the hypotheses to be tested.

It will be clear that the execution of the present study involved a number of unusual features. The research offers a multidisciplinary framework buttressed (but not wholly driven) by the empirical data to be reported in the next chapter; it offers, by definition, new knowledge since (so far as the author is aware) no study of this kind exists anywhere in the world; as will become clear in this chapter it is a study which could have been undertaken only by a very small number of people, of whom the author is one; even for him it involved at times danger to life and liberty; and it was conducted with few financial resources, so considerable personal resourcefulness was necessary.

A distinguishing feature of this study is the use of ethnographic techniques by the researcher as being an 'insider' or 'native'. This methods helps the researcher understand the meaning of the social phenomena. As drug use is a very sensitive topic internationally, lay people do not know the political and economic implications and historical aspects of the problem in Pakistan. This insider's access or ethnomethodological approach to the field reveals the history, politics and economics of drugs production which can be generalised to the drugs situation the world over. "Ethnomethodology requires the close-up involvement of the researcher in some form of participative role, in the natural, "every-day" setting to be studied. The main focal research instrument in the method is the 'researcher's own inquiry' experience, in joint emergent exploration with people who once were called 'native' and now are called 'Insiders'".

In this method the researcher attempts to draw a picture of what some phenomenon ‘looks like’ from an insider’s account of the phenomenon.


Like all other research methods, according to social scientists this method has also some advantages and disadvantages. The major disadvantage associated with this method is the possibility of subjectivity, or manipulation or exaggeration of facts by the researcher as a result of his relationship with other participants. This situation is more often found in covert studies and in a study of open access and overt nature like the present one, this tendency is minimised\textsuperscript{102}.

The advantages of this approach with respect to the present study outweigh the demerits. “Ethnographic approach to study small groups is recommended for explorative phase of a research and is also used as a supportive or supplementary technique to collect data that may complement or set in perspective data obtained by other means”\textsuperscript{103}.

The major advantage of this insider’s approach to the study of opiates production in the NW Pakistan is the value of ‘directness’, a method in which people in groups are watched as to what they do, and listened to as to what they say. In the present study a triangulation or ‘pick and mix’\textsuperscript{104} approach is adopted, in which we have asked people’s views on the causes of drugs production in order to minimise the traditional risk of being biased or ‘subjective’ in interpreting the drug phenomenon.

The research is not, therefore, building, as much PhD research does, on a well-established tradition, but is itself a path-breaking study, predominantly exploratory in focus, which, as well as offering a unique empirical contribution, draws together data from a number of distinct areas of knowledge (official, governmental and UN data, and scholarship in a number of disciplines) and current or recent newspaper reports. This combination of sources offers an insight into the 'actual' context in which the research was conducted - a context of political instability and corruption, some of it inherited from colonial times, though much of it a post-colonial product. The picture is of life in territories outwith state law and largely uninfluenced by social developments elsewhere; of the experience of poor people, whose lives have been largely unchanged for centuries, being offered a single chance of riches; and of the consequences of this for them and their communities as they experience the

\textsuperscript{104} Ibid. p.191.
'sharp end' of the corruption of officials and others determined to 'muscle in on the action'.

The researcher's blood ties with many of his subjects enabled him to cope with these problems, so he was able not only to survive the fieldwork (itself not a foregone conclusion) but to produce generally reliable data of a kind which would not have been available to other researchers or to NGO, Federal Government or United Nations officials.

In addition, therefore, to offering a conventional account of project methodology, this chapter has some of the characteristics of a narrative. This, anyway, is the view of western audiences who have been exposed to drafts of this work. It follows that certain allowances need from time to time to be made by the scientifically positivist reader, but it is hoped that a certain generosity of spirit there will be rewarded by an account which is (certainly) original and (the researcher hopes) accurate.

**Description and Methodology**

**Gaining Access**

In Pakistan, tribal society is a closed society, and the entry of an outsider, even from a neighbouring village, is immediately noticed. Every male member of the village who meets a stranger outside or even inside the village asks about his host or asks whom the guest (melma) wants to meet. The outsider must reveal the purpose of his visit and name the person(s) he or she wishes to meet; the villager will then lead the visitor to the proper place or village guest house (hujra) whereupon the outsider becomes a guest of the entire village.

On the face of it there should have been no problem, ethical or practical, in gaining access to the field for data collection from local people or officials, as this was an overt study involving open access. In a cohesive and accommodative culture like that of the Pathans of north-west Pakistan, access to such information collection depends upon the cultural value of melmastia (hospitality) which:

> ... involves a set of conventions whereby the person on the home ground has obligations towards the outsider to incorporate him into the local group,

---

temporarily be responsible for his security and provide for his needs. The obligation is brought into play by the visitor presenting himself in the alien setting. 

Secondly, the researcher was a university teacher, and teachers are deeply respected by the people as a religious obligation. Certainly having this status helped him gain access to the field for data collection. Thirdly, the researcher belongs to the area and has tribal blood as well as reciprocal social relations with people from the opium growing communities. This helped him gain access to areas where even local administrators did not dare venture.

Nonetheless, access was far from simple or safe. While I discuss in detail how access was gained to individual areas later in this chapter, the conflict between the poppy cultivators and the Government under way at the time made it very difficult to enter those physically inaccessible mountainous areas and discuss with the local people their problems, the causes of opium poppy cultivation, their output, and the role of the Government officers responsible for the development of these areas through international aid and donations. Such questions as these could have caused the cultivators to believe the researcher to be a Government agent or a person from a development project only interested in destroying the poppy crops through aerial sprays or herbicides. Such suspicions would have had dire consequences, as in many communities at that time poppy crops were being destroyed during dark nights by Government functionaries by means of herbicides, and cultivators were actively trying to identify Government agents. These communities are situated in mountain terrain of the tribal areas accessible only with great difficulty and by foot-trails. They are regions where state law is not applicable, another legacy of colonial rule, and the law and order situation in the country during 1996-7 made it unsafe to travel to these areas without a proper escort, or without having made prior contact with influential members of the communities concerned.

Members of the community, however, were by no means the only danger: Government officers who had embezzled huge amounts of foreign aid in the name of developing the poppy growing areas were not exactly keen to have outsiders probe their activities, and these officers were known within the community to have

---

106 F. Barth, Political Leadership Among Swat Pathans (London: Athlone Press, 1953) p. 120.
been instrumental in kidnapping a number of outsiders in order to keep them away from the scenes of their crimes.

An example of the conduct of political relations in the tribal areas, and one which can affect a stranger, is *baramta*. Here an innocent outsider is arrested and kept in confinement as a *baramta* hostage. This is a local custom to recover disputed money. If a person from one part of the tribal area owes money to someone from another part, and it is difficult to trace the debtor or the debtor refuses to pay, the aggrieved party will take as a hostage a person or persons of status from the debtor's village, and send a message to the debtor as well as the family of the hostages that the hostage will be kept in *baramta* unless the debtor repays the debt or comes and sits in a *Jargah* tribal council to resolve the dispute. In many cases the debtors do not go, and the relatives, family, tribe or village of the hostages pay the hostage takers and then charge the actual debtors. A few cases of such disputes involving debtors from his own community were known to the researcher, and these could have caused him problems. Fortunately, the researcher's blood ties elsewhere in the tribal areas proved helpful in enabling him to walk into the poppy fields, albeit escorted by armed kinsmen, and to have frank discussions with the cultivators.

Most areas of poppy concentration are very far flung and the researcher had to travel by foot for about 8-12 hours in the steep mountains, sometimes in temperatures in excess of 40°C to reach the sampled villages. This caused the researcher health problems and hyper-exhaustion.

**Opium and Heroin Production Areas and Sampling Methodology**

NWFP has an area of 74,521 square kilometres and a population of about 16 million. As I have mentioned, it comprises seven Divisions. The tribal area, FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Areas), is a part of the province in terms of both geography and ethnicity, but has a separate political status and comes under the control of the Federal Government. Confusingly, however, some parts of the tribal areas are under the control of Provincial Government, and these are known as PATA (Provincially Administered Tribal Areas). We are concerned with those
parts of the Divisions of Malakand and Peshawar which produce opium and heroin; other Divisions are drug free\textsuperscript{109}.

Malakand, areawise the largest Division of the province, is sub-divided into the Districts of Dir, Buner, Swat and Chitral, and the tribal Agencies of Bajaur and Malakand. It is headed by a Divisional Commissioner, sitting at Saidu in Swat District. The people of the area retain a tribal pattern of living, and few state laws are applicable there as a result of its peculiar political conditions as a PATA not a FATA. Peshawar Division, on the other hand, consists of the Districts of Peshawar,Charsadda and Nowshera, and the tribal Agencies of Muhmand and Khyber and some special areas called as FRs or Frontier Regions, which are treated as FATAS. In most parts of the District there has been no drug production since the promulgation of the Hudood Ordinance of 1979, but the two tribal Agencies of Khyber and Muhmand, which are FATAs, are drug producing areas. I have taken these two agencies for this study.

According to international reports, in NWFP as a whole in 1995-6 1,038 hectares\textsuperscript{110} were cultivated with poppies, of which 1,027 hectares were in Dir (474 hectares), Bajaur (400 hectares), Muhmand (114 hectares) and Khyber (39 hectares). Heroin is processed mainly in Khyber Agency\textsuperscript{111}. The reminder of the province is largely opium free, except for negligible levels of production in South and North Waziristan tribal Agencies.

In order to address the 'why' of opium and heroin production in the area, samples were drawn from the above mentioned opium producing and heroin processing areas in order to represent each of them and find out what circumstances led these different areas to produce opiates. With only insignificant exceptions therefore, the study embraced the entire opium growing and heroin manufacturing parts of NWFP. While they have the common characteristic that they lie on the border with Afghanistan, are mountainous in nature and inaccessible, they are in other respects very diverse, being occupied by different sub-tribes of one ethnic group, Pathans or Pakhtoons (Pushtu speaking people), and being part of different administrative units.


\textsuperscript{111}\textit{Daily Telegraph} (London: 5 October 1985).
The samples were drawn from different areas, not for comparative study (for the decision was taken early that for practical and resource reasons it would be impossible to undertake a systematic comparative study of opium producing versus opium free areas) but to represent as fully as possible the drug producing tribal areas of the province. The researcher assumed that poverty, lack of regular subsistence income sources, inaccessibility, geographical location, political status and external conditions in the region concerned increased the probability of drug production, and certainly opium producing areas have a greater preponderance of these variables than do opium free areas as according to 1986 official reports poppy yielded 46% of the gross value added in agriculture and 40% of the total income of the communities concerned. The gross value added per unit of cultivated area for poppy was more than twice of the next crop and constituted 82% of the total sale by the agriculturists.

Keeping in view the characteristics of the area, a multi-stage sampling procedure consisting of both probability and non-probability methods was adopted for comprehension and representation of each area. The following procedure was involved in sample selection:

**Cluster/area sampling:** The universe consisted of the two clusters/areas of the north (Malakand Division) and west (Peshawar Division). From the northern cluster, comprising the entire Malakand Division, the districts of Dir and Bajaur Agency were poppy cultivating areas. In the western cluster of Peshawar Division the two opiate producing areas were the tribal Agencies of Muhmand and Khyber. In the rest of the agencies, opium production is either prohibited totally (with reasonably effective enforcement) by the Government, or is cultivated to only a negligible extent in areas not investigated, again for practical and financial reasons.

**Stratification:** Villages in the tribal areas of Dir, Bajaur, Muhmand and Khyber were selected for data collection. To learn something of the 'why' of opium in Dir, Bajaur and Muhmand Agencies, and the 'why' 'when' and 'who' of heroin production in Khyber Agency, data were collected from the following three strata:

1 farmers/opium cultivators in Muhmand, Bajaur and Dir Agencies
2 tribal leaders/opinion leaders in Khyber Agency

---

3 opinion leaders/intellectuals in the Province.

**Stratum 1: Farmers/Opium Cultivators in Dir, Muhmand, and Bajaur Agencies:**

40 cultivators from the poppy cultivation areas in Dir District, Bajaur Agency (Ghar Utman Khel area) and Muhmand Agency (Ambar Tehsil) were selected for interview on a proportional basis which followed a United Nations report about opium production in the Province\(^{113}\). Proportionality was determined on the principle that “the greater the area cultivated in a district/agency, the greater was its representation” and was calculated using the formula:

\[
\text{Sample size} = \frac{40 \times \text{area cultivated with poppies}}{\text{Total area cultivated with poppies}}
\]

(Total sample size = 40). With rounding this gave the following sample size for each area:

a. Dir 474 hectares = \(\frac{40 \times 474}{988} = 19.19 = 19\)
b. Bajaur 400 hectares = \(\frac{40 \times 400}{988} = 16.19 = 16\)
c. Muhmand 114 hectares = \(\frac{40 \times 114}{988} = 4.61 = 5\)

To achieve even an approximation of randomisation proved extremely difficult. It will be clear from the account which follows that, though randomisation was sought, there were points in the process where its attainment was less than perfect. In particular selection had to be based on local advice and support, and the status of some of those providing this advice and support was too high for their opinions to be ignored. Nonetheless, it was decided to obtain an official list of all poppy cultivating communities, villages and cultivators from the appropriate deputy commissioner or political agent, the Pakistan Narcotics Control Board for NWFP, or the area development office. On going into the field, however, it was learnt (both from the Deputy Commissioner of Dir and the political agent of Bajaur) that none of these bodies had any such list. Accordingly, personal visits had to be made to the areas before data collection began, and complete lists of the villages/communities and cultivators were made with the help of local influential community leaders, particularly school teachers, and other contacts and kinsmen of the researcher. This list constituted the sampling frame, so it was from within this list that, as described

below, poppy cultivating villages in each of Dir, Bajaur and Muhmand Agency were randomly selected, and, within these villages, a census of cultivators prepared to allow for random sampling of prospective interviewees.

Interviewees were questioned about their economic circumstances. Those who had cultivated poppies were asked why they had done so. They were also asked about the role of area development projects in the development of the area, including agriculture development, crop substitution and job creation. Some were asked about opium production and its religious position. To access these farmers, formal and informal arrangements were made, and they were approached at their residences or poppy fields and interviewed. Fieldwork commenced in the first week of December 1996: this time was chosen as the poppy crop would be ready for weeding and hoeing, and most cultivators would be at their homes to look after their crops.

The provincial Home Department was approached to seek permission to go into the tribal areas for data collection. Personal relations and the researcher's status as a university teacher were of great assistance here, as it is difficult to approach high officials for such help. The Home Department was kind enough to request the Deputy Commissioner of Dir, political agents at Khar Bajaur, Muhmand and Khyber Agencies and the Director of the Anti-Narcotic Force (ANF, formerly PNCB) to extend every assistance (though unfortunately the ANF Head Office in Peshawar proved non co-operative and indifferent).

Obtaining access to research areas in Dir and Bajaur Agencies was facilitated by personal as well as blood relations, as the researcher had been a teacher at the Agency Headquarters High School at Khar Bajaur Agency during 1976-1980, and his former students were now responsible and respected members of their communities. As noted previously, teachers, whether of religious or secular institutions, are much respected in Pakistan's rural society, as a religious obligation, and considered spiritual parents. So while no official of the political administration, unless a local person (who would anyway tend to avoid direct contacts with tribal people, considering it below their status to mix with them) can go into the tribal areas without being properly escorted or having prior information from the locals, teachers are looked after and respected.

One issue should be disposed of at this point. These opium cultivating farmers are not organised criminals who protect their crops and do not allow outsiders to go in
and ask them about their crops. Rather, they are desirous that someone come and
listen to them and help them out of their disadvantaged economic and political
conditions. Economically they are poor, and politically they are oppressed, through
a multiplicity of laws called Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR), laws which have
existed since the early 19th century as part of the attempt by the colonial power to
subjugate the tribal people. The researcher did not, therefore, face the problems of
evasion and dissimulation commonly associated with criminological research, other
than - as will become apparent below - in situations where there was suspicion of
the involvement of Government agents.

There follows a description of the research areas, presented in such a way as to
offer an appreciative understanding of the people and their communities as well as
the research process.

**Stratum 1 Area A: Muhmand Agency:** The most difficult area to penetrate was
Muhmand Agency, as I did not know anyone influential in the area, and nor did the
local political administration have any information about the communities and
locals who cultivated poppies. The area is physically distant and mostly
inaccessible. Eventually access was gained through the good offices of my blood
relatives in Bajaur Agency, who were asked to identify villages known to them to
be ones where opium was cultivated. Some ten villages in the Ambar Tehsil of the
Agency were listed, of which one, Pai Khan, was selected randomly for data
collection.

The same relatives were asked to contact key people in the village of Pai Khan.
Conduct of the fieldwork in Muhmand Agency was a priority, because the opium
crop is harvested there earlier than in the rest of the poppy cultivating areas and the
locals migrate to the urban areas after the harvest.

After two weeks I was informed that the mother of the village chief had passed
away, and if possible I should go with them to offer *fatiha* (condolence). This was a
God-sent chance, as sharing and participation in the *Pakhtoon* grief is always
remembered and reciprocated. I accordingly travelled to Khar Bajaur by road, and
from there on foot for six kilometres to my relatives’ village, Manoogai, in Utman
Khel. The next day, at 6 am, we set off for Pai Khan on an eight hour journey
through Mount Kohimoor, the highest mountain in Bajaur. After offering *fatiha*, we
were invited to stay overnight, as it was too dangerous to go back in the dark. We
Location of poppy cultivation
walked through the poppy fields with our host (Mohammad Yar Khan), who inquired about my tribe, occupation, residence and other such matters, and my relatives told him that I wanted to talk to his people for my book about the poppy crop. After dinner, arranged for all the guests by another villager (according to both culture and religion a family in mourning does not cook food for three days) we talked in detail about the opium crop and the general problems of the area. The next day our host told us he would invite us back at some appropriate time when the rituals of *fatiha* had been completed.

He was as good as his word, and on 5 January 1997 my relative informed me that an invitation had been received. On 6 January I reached Bajaur, and the next day we went to Pai Khan across the mountain, on foot again. This time the journey took only seven hours, as the track was more gently sloping, albeit longer than the previous path. After dinner in the guesthouse (*hujra* or *dera*), all the males of the village gathered to welcome and converse with us. Most of the time the villagers talked about their problems, presumably in the hope that one of us would convey them to the high authorities and that they would get help.

During the conversation a list of all the opium cultivators was made. Out of 23 cultivators five were selected for interview. Our host asked these five people to stay at home the next day, to be at our service. On that day, 8 January, we were invited by another villager, the first cousin of our host, for tea, and in a sense this was our first interview. It took some three hours, as more than the scheduled questions were asked, and both participation and general observation for orientation purposes were involved. On that day three persons were interviewed, leaving two for the next day.

The following day, after completing the interviews we walked through the poppy fields and saw a ruined house-like dwelling. I was told that the villagers wanted to educate their children but could not do so due to lack of the required facilities. This dilapidated house had once been a school, which the villagers had run on a self-help basis, paying the teacher 'in kind' - 1/4 seer (1/2 lb) of opium per house, irrespective of the number of children. This brought the teacher about 30 kg of opium yearly. However, due to the uncertain future of opium and constant pressure from the political administration to destroy opium poppies, the teacher left, and now there is no school within eight kilometres for the children of the near 120 families of the area.
Pai Khan is named after its founder. Administratively, it is in the jurisdiction of Muhmand Agency, but is occupied by *Aseel Utman Khel* of Bajaur Agency. Hence the villagers have more social contacts with people in Bajaur than in Muhmand. Pai Khan is a small village of about 30 households. It is very isolated, the nearest market being 20 kilometres away. Geographically Pai Khan is situated on sloping land surrounded by mountains on three sides; the fourth, the west, leads to the main road, some ten kilometres away. The village is spread over about 100 acres, its width varying from 100-250 metres from one edge of the mountain to the other. It is totally lacking in facilities. It has no school and no dispensary: in the event of emergency villagers put the sick person on a stretcher or *kat* and carry him or her on their shoulders for 25 kilometres across the steep mountains to Ghalanai.

This sort of situation is especially embarrassing as well as distressing when women with complicated child delivery cases have to be carried to the hospitals, and in many such cases the woman as well as the baby dies before getting any help. Nor is there any electricity. No road exists for accessibility. Towards the west, a road which, if in good condition, is usable by jeep, joins the village to the main road. The major source of communication is by foot or pack animal. Water, carried by women or pack animals, is very scarce, and particularly in summer is not available for drinking purposes in sufficient quantity. In winter some water is available in the shape of springs and seasonal streams in the mountains, but this availability is very short lived. People from this area are known for very seldom taking a bath, and when they do they collect the used waters in a pit and use it for cattle.

The soil is mostly sandy, made by the torrential rain from the nearby mountains. There is no visible economic activity in the area except for opium production. Agriculture is single cropped, and, apart from opium, mainly comprises barley and mustard, neither of which even approaches the economic benefits of opium. Barley is harvested as a grain but, during the severe months of November to February when grass is scarce, it is used as cattle fodder. To an extent the same is true of mustard, whose husks are used as cattle feed; though the leaves are used as a vegetable by the majority of the people, who also crush the seeds to extract oil.

**Stratum 1 Area B: Bajaur Agency:** Bajaur Agency is also mountainous and mostly inaccessible, particularly the opium growing areas of Salarzai on the Pak-Afghan border, Arang and Barang Tehsil areas, where opium poppies are cultivated. Salarzai and Arang grow fewer opium poppies than Barang Tehsil,
where seven opium villages were identified, out of which two, Amankot and Sharbatai, situated at opposite ends of the Tehsil, were included in the sample.

**Amankot** is twenty kilometres from Agency headquarters, and accessible by a non-metalled road then under construction with USAID help. Like Pai Khan it is inhabited by *Aseel Utman Khel*. The area has been very popular for opium growing for a long time, opium being the only possible crop due to the non-availability of irrigation water. Land is scarce, and as the area is overshadowed by Mount Kohimoor, it receives little sunshine, particularly in winter. There is a primary school, but health care, drinking water and electricity are non-existent. Electricity poles have been erected but locals are pessimistic about the prospects of getting electricity in the near future. The existing road has been constructed with the help of USAID/NAS, but the widespread local view is that the Government's main objective in building it was not public welfare but to increase the area's accessibility for its own atrocities.

As mentioned, the Provincial Home Department wrote to all the heads of administration of the poppy growing areas about my visits and asked for every possible help. In mid-March, the appropriate political agent arranged our visit to Amankot for data collection. The elders of the village were informed in advance, and the political Tehsildar Barang was assigned the duty of escorting me to the village. The Tehsildar and I were escorted by a dozen local levy personnel, and official vehicles were provided by the political agent. In a sense this was a very formal visit, as the locals were briefed in advance what to say about poppy production. Eight respondents had already been selected for sampling, and they were present on the spot. Interviews started in the presence of the Tehsildar but it quickly became apparent that the answers were prompted and pre-planned. Mostly, the farmers praised the local administration and Pakistani Government for solving their problems, though some exaggerated the income from opium production and attributed the present decline in opium cultivation to Government efforts in particular; others reported far less income from their opium harvest. In many instances the Tehsildar himself answered on behalf of the respondent. Due to his official status and my status as a guest it was impossible to request him not to represent the farmers, although his doing so was clearly damaging to the research. Accordingly, after the fourth interview I thanked the Tehsildar and asked to go
Location of poppy cultivation
back. He was co-operative and sincere, but did not understand research. Accordingly I had to make other arrangements.

After three days, on 19 March 1997, I went straight into the village without escort, heading straight for the village school, where a teacher was known to me through friends. I introduced myself as an ex-teacher of the Government High School in Khar and as a university teacher at present, and explained to him the purpose of my visit. We made another list of cultivators, and new respondents were selected, this time from three adjoining sub-villages of Amankot, namely Aseel Targhao, Tar and Anjokai. By the evening we had interviewed two respondents. The next day we interviewed three more people in the poppy fields while they were hoeing. A further three agreed to come to Khar Bajaur for interview rather than be interviewed that day, and by 21 March two of these three interviews had been successfully completed.

Sharbatai, also selected for data collection, is away from Bajaur Khar, being closer to Malakand Agency, across the River Swat. Two students of the University of Peshawar, Usmani Gul and Javed Khan, of Jolagram village, Malakand Agency, had relations in Sharbatai and they accompanied me there for data collection. It was the second week of May, very hot and with a temperature of over 40C. We travelled from Peshawar to Malakand Agency and the next day to Sharbatai. We travelled by car for about fifteen kilometres to the River Swat, and thereafter on foot.

Sharbatai is surrounded by steep barren mountains on all sides, and, due to its closed location, is very hot and suffocating in summer. Recently, with the help of USAID, the Government has started a road from the bank of the Swat to the village. Only two kilometres have so far been constructed, though a further 15 kilometre stretch which will connect Sharbatai with Khar Bajaur is planned. The road, however, will be of no use unless a bridge is constructed, since only one person at a time can cross the present suspension bridge. The village has no electricity and no hospital or small dispensary. There are separate primary schools for boys and girls, and a new middle school has been built. Water is scarce: irrigation water is not available and spring water is for drinking only. The springs are owned by local people, the biggest spring being in the lands of the village chief, who, because he stores the water for agricultural purposes, has better crops than the rest of the villagers.
Nine respondents were selected from the village, with the help of Karim Khan, the son of the village chief, who was himself an interviewee. The interviews took three days only, but the near unbearable heat made this the most difficult part of all the fieldwork.

**Stratum 1 Area C: Dir District:** Opium is cultivated in three eastern valleys of the District - Karo, Nihag and Usherai Dara. There was no problem of access to the area as I belong to one of the local tribes, Sultan Khel. Two of the three valleys, Nihag and Usherai, were selected randomly to yield the necessary 19 interviewees, and six villages each in Usherai and Nihag were randomly identified, out of which one from each, **Aligasar** and **Badalai**, were selected by the lottery method.

Arrangements for data collection from the faraway village of **Usherai Dara** were made for the third week of February 1997, immediately after Ramadhan. This happened to be the month of general elections after the dissolution of the assemblies and termination of the Government in November 1996.

On 15 February some known local elders were contacted for help in gaining access to **Aligasar**, which is about eight miles from the main Usherai road, which is only jeepable. But by grave misfortune, that night agents of the Narcotics Affairs Section (NAS) of the US Embassy in Islamabad (according to the locals' guess) had sprayed herbicides on a few poppy fields in the village, and local farmers had blocked the main road in protest. District officials were there to quell any untoward situation, and paramilitary forces and a heavy contingent of police were deployed. The locals, heavily armed, were ready for any consequences and had occupied strategic positions on the surrounding mountains. A candidate from the ruling party on his election campaign came to negotiate - a long and tortuous process. Though on the assurance of the authorities that no further crops would be destroyed the blockade was ended, data collection would not only have been dangerous, the locals considering every outsider an intelligence agent, but also against local conventions. Hence, no data could be collected.

The next step was to go into **Nihag Dara** for fieldwork. A local elder, Mulvi Muhammad Sherin, alias Baba, a former member of the District Council and a scholar, was our host and resource. On 8 March we went into the village, some twenty kilometres from the subdivisional headquarters, Wari. An irregular jeepable road constructed by local people on a self-help basis penetrates the area. The
village is about four kilometres from the roadside, high in the mountains, about 6000 feet above sea level.

**Badalai**, the biggest village of the area, with 380 households and a population of 5,000 is also isolated and lacking all necessities except two recently constructed primary schools, and a middle school for boys only. One of these was constructed by the then member of the provincial assembly from his quota of development works, a privilege given to the elected people\textsuperscript{114}. There is no electricity, though ample snowfall ensures abundant water. While most people go to urban areas of the country in search of livelihood, the major occupation of those who stay behind is logging. Hence, aided and abetted by the new road, the destruction of forests has accelerated.

From here 9-10 respondents were required. With the support of the said Mulvi sahib, and by going to the houses of interviewees, the data were easily collected in two days.

As our friends in Usherai Dara advised us not to go into Aligasar and talk about opium poppies as the locals were still in search of those who had sprayed their crops, data were collected instead from **Karo Dara**, close to my own native village. Physiographically and socio-economically the area is no different from the rest of the opium growing areas. Lack of necessities other than primary schools, isolated location and lack of sources of livelihood other than subsistence agriculture, are the main characteristics. A visit to the area was made, and villages with opium poppies were identified. Out of five villages, one, Manai, was selected by lottery for fieldwork. Most residents were known to me and a list of cultivators was easily prepared. Nine respondents were sampled on a lottery basis. Daily visits to the area were made for data collection. This took three days.

**Stratum 2: Tribal Leaders/Opinion Leaders in Khyber Agency:** Stratum 2 comprised ten respondents from Khyber Agency, five of them active in local politics (being members or supporters of a political party, market committee leaders or *khel* [lineage] leaders), and five educated persons, preferably civil servants in the

\textsuperscript{114} It is worth pointing out that construction of such institutions in tribal areas is made under an agreement with the Government. Whoever sells land for such institutions is also the contractor, or two persons from his family are employed. As a result, most constructions are substandard, and buildings meant for schools or dispensaries are considered more as the personal property of the family than as public buildings.
Provincial or Federal Government. The latter were selected purposively, preference being given to those who were indigenous and who had knowledge of all the changes that had taken place in the area. Because educational levels are very low, Government servants can be counted on the fingertips, and are also generally known. These opinion/political leaders in Khyber Agency were interviewed to try to establish the 'when', 'why' and 'who' of heroin production in the area, and what changes to the local economy they felt had resulted from it. They were also asked about the role of the political administration in the drug business.

Access to Khyber Agency was achieved through an ex-student of the Social Work Department at Peshawar University, Mr Muhammad Islam Afridi, presently in a responsible position with the Narcotics Control Division of the Federal Government. Afridi belongs to the Zakha Khel tribe, from an area famous for heroin processing and known for containing international drug traffickers. Mr Islam introduced us to many elders, of whom five were selected. The remaining five persons, including our resource person, were interviewed in Peshawar and Islamabad. There was no problem of access to these people, due to introduction by our host and the local custom of hospitality to outsiders.

Except for a metalled road leading from Peshawar to Afghanistan, the entire area except Jamrud and Landikotal lacks basic necessities. Water in Landikotal in particular is scarce, and people bring it from springs near the border check post, about six kilometres from the main bazaar. The existing water supply is only meant for officers of the political administration.

**Stratum 3: Opinion Leaders/Intellectuals in the Province:** As no proper work has previously been carried out on the history and politics of drugs production in the Province in particular and in Pakistan in general, no authoritative literature exists. In order to overcome this aspect of the problem, intellectuals and opinion leaders in the province were interviewed, and asked to explain the historico-political and economic bases of drug production problem, as well as the current situation and future of control. 16 respondents were selected purposively from the following categories:

1. Rural Sociologists = 2
2. Anthropologists = 2
3. Economists = 2.
4. Historians = 2
5. Journalists of international repute = 2
6. Political Scientists = 2
7. Psychologists = 2
8. Representatives of law enforcement agencies = 2

Total respondents = 16

Interviews and secondary data collection took place simultaneously, mainly between mid-January and mid-March. The overall sampling procedure is cluster-stratified-proportional-purposive and random.

Tools of Data Collection

Primary Data: a semi-structured interview method was selected. A questionnaire could not be used in a society where the majority of people are illiterate, and the distribution of a hand delivered questionnaire (which would have to be undertaken by the researcher himself) would have been no less time-consuming than interviews. Participant observation would have been impractical and dangerous, and would have yielded inappropriate data for the present study.

Three interview schedules (semi-structured interviews containing both close ended and open ended questions) were used for the three different strata of respondents. Cultivators in Dir, Bajaur and Muhmand Agencies were interviewed on interview schedule (IS) 1; IS 2 (which was geared to a discussion of the local economic impact of heroin production) was for opinion leaders in Khyber Agency; intellectuals and politicians were interviewed on IS 3.

Semi-structured interviews are interviews in between the structured (standardised) and the unstructured (focused) interview, and utilise techniques from both:

*Questions are normally specified, but the interviewer is more free to probe beyond the answers. Qualitative information about the topic can then be recorded by the interviewer who can seek both clarification and elaboration on the answers given.*
This enables the interviewer to have more latitude to probe beyond the answers and thus enter into a dialogue with the interviewee.\(^{115}\)

The method permits respondents to answer more flexibly than does a standardised procedure, but offers a better basis for comparability than an unstructured interview.\(^{116}\) Hence:

*It is an effective method of collecting information for certain types of research question and for addressing certain types of assumptions. Particularly when the investigators are interested in understanding the perception of participants, or learning how participants come to attach certain meanings to phenomena or events, interviewing provides a useful means of access.*\(^{117}\)

In this study, people from strikingly different walks of life, who might be expected to have different views on the causes of the problem, were interviewed, and the semi-structured interview was appropriate on the following grounds:

1. respondents were free to answer from their own specific perspective;
2. accordingly the researcher achieved a richer understanding of local socio-economic conditions and their relationship with drug production than would have been possible with closed questions;
3. on the other hand, quantification and coding of the data for statistical analysis were more manageable than would have been the case with qualitative data.

The interviews focused mainly on the following issues:

1. the economic conditions of the poppy cultivators (family size, number of educated people in the family, number of regular employed/working persons in the family, nature and size of land holding, family income and expenditure etc.)
2. how they acquired the technical knowledge for heroin manufacture; how the local market, which resulted in mass heroin addiction in the entire country, was created

---


\(^{116}\) Ibid.

why the Government resolved on the stern policy of suppressing the crops as well as the cropper in lieu of providing alternative means of economy

how much the poppy economy contributes towards the local economy, and the impact of poppy cultivation on the production of other crops

the relationship between national politics and drugs in the country

respondents' views about foreign involvement in the production, manufacture and spread of narcotics, with particular reference to the demoralisation of Soviet troops in Afghanistan through heroin addiction.

Data were recorded by a combination of field notes, tape recordings and photographs. Tape recording is particularly efficient, and appropriate when the researcher is joining the discussion to probe and direct the interview towards desired ends. At such a time note taking can hamper the grasp of important points and imply that the researcher is only interested in the data and not in the respondent as a person.118 On the other hand one has to be careful and sensitive, as tape recording is normally an unfamiliar technology in rural settings in particular, and can feed suspicions about the uses to which data may be put.

Some disadvantages are associated with the interview method generally. These include courtesy, or hospitality, bias119 with interviewees expressing only views which they think the interviewer or investigator or the guest, (melma), wants to hear. In some cultures, which include the ones in which this study was conducted, this can diminish data quality. This difficulty can only be overcome by constant awareness of the tendency, by probing and factual questions, and verifying answers by triangulation where possible.

Another type of interviewing bias is known as the "clinical witness"120 problem, a term coined by Mitchell to cover situations where interviews are conducted in the presence of a third person or persons, whom some researchers call clinical witnesses. In many countries, including UK, the confidentiality of views expressed

119 E. L. Jones, "Courtesy Bias in South-East Asian Surveys" in M. Bulmer and D. P. Warwick (eds) Social Research in Developing Countries (Toronto: John Wiley and Sons Ltd. 1983), pp 253-259.
in an interview is stressed by researchers, but the case is very different in rural Pakistan, where confidentiality and privacy are neither common nor highly valued, particularly on issues where Government and public views confront each other. Accordingly interviews were frequently conducted in the presence of others. This can have both negative and positive effects: while it can lead the interviewee to reflect the perceived views of the third party (a kind of vicarious courtesy bias) it can also discourage exaggeration and falsehood by increasing the chances of exposure. So far as confidentiality was concerned, in fact, many interviewers stressed that they were unconcerned about confidentiality and asked for their names to be associated with their views so that the Government should know what they had said. Interestingly, though, the actual presence of Government officials, however, appeared to have a different effect. In Bajaur Agency, as already mentioned, interviews conducted in the presence of a high official yielded evidently distorted answers, with some interviewees exaggerating their opium yield and income and others under-reporting them, for a range of personal and tactical reasons. Also in Bajaur it became clear that the use of official vehicles can also identify the researcher with the Government, and it became clear that respondents’ suspicions were further increased by the fact that the researcher was escorted by Bajaur personnel and provided with official vehicles.

Another difficulty is the understanding of the role of the researcher. In areas where educated people are few and outsiders seldom venture, the activity itself is not recognised, so, in the absence of respondent understanding of the purpose of the questions, researchers are liable to be mistaken for Government intelligence agents gathering information for official purposes. In Muhmand Agency, even attempts to explain the purpose of the research and mentioning Peshawar University as sponsoring the study did not convince. One interviewee said:

_University, like schools in this area is a government office and we know the school teachers here too, help with the Government, but you are a guest so we are bound to help you and whatever answers you want we will give._

In all interviews, resisting the temptation to lead the respondent is vital. But if it is true that leading cannot be wholly avoided in a human encounter it must at least

---

121 Interview with Abdul Ghafoor Khan in Pai Khan, Muhmand Agency, 8.1.97.
be allowed for, so Merton and Kendall’s advice that “Guidance and direction from
the interviewer should be at minimum” was followed. In the case of farmers and
cultivators who were illiterate people, particular care was taken that they were not
led in order to obtain any desired answers.

Methods of Statistical analysis

Another feature of this study is the use of quantitative methods. This method
represents the social phenomenon in figures and tables and “advocates use of
quantification of variables, positive in orientation: seeks objective facts and causes
of social phenomena with little or no reference to subjective state of individual ...
It is verification oriented, inferential, confirmatory and hypothesis testing and...
assumes a stable reality”.

This method has many advantages. It helps to clearly isolate causes and effects, to
properly operationalise theoretical relations, to measure and to quantify
phenomena, to create research designs allowing the generalisation of findings and
to formulate general laws. This approach also helps the researchers to generate
objective views and eliminate their subjective or biased analysis and to
document and analyse the frequency and distribution of social phenomena in the
population.

Our hypotheses were that economic and political uncertainties in the area
compelled people to look for alternative resources which have been opium
cultivation and heroin production in the area at present. In order to find out the
relationship between these socio-economic variables and drug production two
statistical methods; measurement of central tendency and chi-square test are used.
The former puts the frequencies in a tabular form and gives a bird’s eye view of the
events. The chi-square test is used to find out the association between variables of

51, 1946, pp. 549-50; see also W. Michelson, (ed.) “Behavioral Research Methods” in
124 Martin Bulmer et al (ed), Social Science and Social Policy: Contemporary Social
125 Uwe Flick, An Introduction to Qualitative Research (London: sage Publications Ltd,
1998),p.3.
our hypotheses, mostly the socio-economic indicators in the opiates production areas.

"A chi-square test is a very general test that can be used whenever we wish to evaluate whether or not frequencies which have been empirically obtained differ significantly from those which would be expected."  

"It is a test used to compare observed distribution of frequencies with expected frequencies on the basis of some hypothesis."

This test has many advantages over other tests of significance. This test is an omnibus test without particular alternatives in view and is a versatile test, readily adapted to problems involving nominal rather than numerical population and is not a biased test. It is regarded in the best position among its competitors which test the reality of a phenomenon than its intensity and are employed to make comparisons between frequencies rather than between mean scores. It is stressed by some statisticians that the sample size to be tested must be large enough for this test as an increase in sample size decreases the difference between the observed and expected frequencies and vice versa but there are scientist who do not consider this as a requirement. Another restriction imposed on chi-square test by some experts is that the expected frequencies should be 5 or more but again it is contested and many statisticians do not observe this rule and are of the opinion that a very large sample size yield statistical significance when there is almost no association between row and columns variables in a contingency tables. Thus it is applicable to small as well as large sample size. An other advantage of this test is that it is used to decide whether or not several samples came from the same population even when the model of the population is unspecified.

128 International Encyclopedia of The Social Sciences Vol.3 P.421
130 Hubert, M. Blalock, op. cit.
131 A.R.Ilersic, op.cit.
The two methodological approaches complement each other. The quantitative analysis in the next chapter shows that the majority of the people have large family sizes and less land holding of very low quality which are uneconomic if cultivated with other crops. Opium is a labour intensive crop requiring manpower which is already available in the form of unemployed youth, children with no schooling and, men and women unemployed due to the availability and opportunity structure in the tribal area in particular and in Pakistan in general. The chapter on ethnography and the case studies of the area explains the lives of the people, their social life, diet and dress, economy and politics. These two sets of data i.e. the ethnography and the quantitative data fully support each other that poverty, unemployment, lack of economic resources and opportunities all, makes the people produce opiates.

When the government of Pakistan intervened and the so-called development projects started, new crops and ideas regarding new crops production were floated which are yet to be put to practice and those which were practised, have failed miserably to compete with opium prices as a cash crop. Opium is an established crop in the area for centuries with an effective marketing strategy while the new crops need a further century to reach the opium status as a cash rewarding crop. The chi-square tests of the relationship between low income and drug production and more expenditures than income which are partly met through income from opium and heroin processing also support the case studies.

Conclusion

This study involves the ‘insider’s’ approach to the study of drug production in Pakistan. An ethnographic approach can best study this situation where opium is cultivated by small isolated communities in the mountainous areas of the NW Pakistan where official benefits seldom reach. There are some disadvantages associated with the ethnomethodological approach but in this case its advantages exceeds its demerits and hence, it was adopted. The use of quantitative method through the measurement of central tendency and chi-square methods for statistical analysis have been used and have supported the qualitative data.

Overall this research study has five main objectives:
• to understand and report the history and current practice of opiate production in the area
• to analyse its socio-economic and political causes
• to study the nature of the drug culture in the area
• to study its impact on opium production and heroin abuse
• to consider theoretically the policy options of regulation and suppression at both national and supranational levels.

Two clusters/areas were identified, where opium was cultivated and heroin processed: Malakand Division and the tribal areas under the administrative control of the Divisional Commissioner in Peshawar. From Cluster 1 Dir District and Bajaur Agency were selected; from Cluster 2 Khyber and Muhmand Agencies were selected. These areas are not significantly different ethnically or geographically but administratively they may be under either Provincial or Federal Government control, and were sampled on this basis. No attempt was made at comparative research, since, though such a study would be of much value, empirical work in non-producing as well as producing areas would have stretched the resources of time and money available to the researcher too far. This being so, our discussion of these areas is based only on library work.

Three strata were formed for data collection. Stratum 1 consisted of opium cultivators from Dir, Bajaur and Muhmand Agencies. Stratum 2 consisted of respondents from Khyber Agency, where there is substantial heroin processing. Information about the history, politics and economics of opiate production was collected from the intellectuals who comprised Stratum 3.

40 cultivators from Stratum 1 were sampled as randomly as circumstances permitted; 10 respondents from Stratum 2 were interviewed, of whom five were purposively selected to demonstrate the 'why', 'when' and 'who' of heroin production in the area; and in the third stratum 16 intellectuals were selected, also purposively, to discuss the history and politics of opium and heroin production in the area. The overall sampling methodology was therefore cluster, stratified, random and purposive.
CHAPTER V: Statistical Data Analysis

This chapter reports the data analysis in primarily tabular format, with both cross-referencing to other parts of the thesis where these points are relevant, and textual commentary in the chapter itself. I have used the method of central tendency measurement followed by Chi-square method of analysis to find the significance of relationship between the dependent and independent variables.

### TABLE 1  FAMILY SIZE (Opium Cultivators)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No of family members</th>
<th>No of families</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-12</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>35.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13-24</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>47.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 and above</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>17.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>40</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Average family size = 15.4

Table 1 shows that 14/40 (35%) respondents had 1-12 members in their families while 19/40 (47.5%) had a family size of 13-24. 17.5% of respondents had 25 and more members in their families. Average family size was 15.4 for the opium growing areas.

### TABLE 2  HOUSEHOLD SIZE (All drugs producing areas)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Family size</th>
<th>13-24</th>
<th>25-&gt;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1-12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dir</td>
<td>10 (52.6%)</td>
<td>8 (42.1%)</td>
<td>1 (5.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bajaur</td>
<td>2 (12.5%)</td>
<td>9 (56.2%)</td>
<td>5 (31.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muhmand</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>4 (80%)</td>
<td>1 (20%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khyber</td>
<td>1 (10%)</td>
<td>4 (40%)</td>
<td>5 (50%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>13 (26%)</strong></td>
<td><strong>25 (50%)</strong></td>
<td><strong>12 (24%)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Average family size (overall) = 16.9
Average family size in Dir district = 13.0
Average family size in Bajaur agency = 21.0
Average family size in Muhmand agency = 23.2

132
Average family size in Khyber agency = 23.8

Data from individual sampled areas (Table 2) show a variation in the average family size. For example in Dir District the average family size was 13, in Bajaur it was 21, in Muhmand Agency it was 23.2 and Khyber Agency as high as 23.8. This variation in family size can be attributed to factors which include geographical remoteness, lack of infrastructural facilities and services, and the local cultural features of revenge (badal), inter-family and inter-tribal vendettas (ghalimi) and high economic familial interdependencies, which increase the need for family cohesion in the shape of joint and extended families. Family members combine their resources, both material and non-material, for survival. Overall 26% families had a family size of up to 12 persons, 50% had a family size of up to 24 and 24% respondents had more than 25 persons in their families.

The average family size of 16.9 in all the drugs producing areas and 15.4 in the opium cultivating areas, is well over the average for the country as a whole, which is 7.8 according to the 1981 census of population. Large family size contributes to drugs production in the area. As Pakistan is not a welfare state, basic necessities like education are not available, never mind compulsory, due to the non-existence of educational institutions in such far-flung areas. These children and teenagers in particular have to be kept busy, mostly in the shape of child work or child labour on small opium farms.

Industry and other income generating sources are non-existent. The entire family, males, females and children, all work on their small lands at the time of sowing and harvest. Opium is a labour intensive crop and needs readily available labour at all stages. Thus large families with no other jobs and economic activities well suit the poppy cultivation and harvesting.
60% respondents had no education in their families while 40% had some, including school going children. The Table shows that in 50% of the households with education, the respondent or his children were educated only to primary level (5-6 years schooling). Thus, only 20% of households had members with more than minimum education, which might enable them to find skilled employment.

Among educated people 4/16 (25%) had completed high school or higher secondary school education (known as matric or Intermediate level) which qualifies people for any government white-collar jobs like school teaching and clerical work. 3/16 (19% approximately) had first degrees and only 1/16 (6.25%) had post graduate level education.

**TABLE 3 EDUCATION LEVEL IN THE FAMILIES (Opium Cultivators)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. of families with no education at all.</th>
<th>No. of families with primary edu/school going children</th>
<th>No. of families with metric/int Edu.</th>
<th>No. of families with BA/B.Sc. edu</th>
<th>No. of families with MA/ MSc.edu.</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>24 (60%)</td>
<td>8 (20%)</td>
<td>4 (10%)</td>
<td>3 (7.5%)</td>
<td>1 (2.5)</td>
<td>40 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We had 19 respondents from Dir, 16 from Bajaur, 5 from Muhmand and 10 from Khyber agency. This table show that in Dir 6/19, in Bajaur 5/16, in Muhmand 3/5 respondents and in Khyber all the respondents had education in their families.
The level of education also varies. In Dir District and Bajaur Agency the proportion of educated people was 31.6% and 31.3% respectively, while in Muhmand Agency it was found to be 60%, and 100% for Khyber Agency. These figures cannot be generalised, however, due to sampling error in the case of Khyber Agency and non-sampling error in the case of Muhmand Agency. For Khyber Agency, sampling was purposive and random. Five educated people (50% of the sample) were selected purposively to find out about the heroin business and its history etc. while the randomly selected five opinion leaders had high socio-economic and political status and were educated. In the case of Muhmand Agency, the cultural practice of maintaining two houses “Dwa Kora” one in the ancestral village and one in the urban areas to earn a livelihood and make use of other facilities like education and hospitalisation, or simply to avoid the familial disputes, makes it possible for some people to obtain education in the urban areas like Peshawar and Mardan districts. If we count only the sampling error, the literacy ratio is about 27% on the whole, which is fairly near to the national figure of 26%.

In Dir 50% respondents had education up to primary level, 33.3 % had matric or intermediate education and only (1/6) 16.7% had education up to first degree level in their families. Similarly in Bajaur 20% had primary level education, 60 % were matriculate or intermediate and 20% first degree holders in their families. In Muhmand 33.3 % families had primary level, matriculate and first degree each. In Khyber agency 20% were matriculate or intermediate, 60 % first degree holders and 20% post graduates. we have explained this phenomena of high education level in Khyber and Muhmand.

Education has the latent function of expediting social adjustment, and social and geographical mobility. In lieu of education, most people remain at their ancestral villages throughout their lives, never going out of the area. They do not know much about the external world and sources of income and living standards. They do not know the laws and how to respect them. In absence of education they remain unquestioningly loyal to their customs and traditions, becoming fatalist and resistant to change. But the major negative effect of the lack of educational facilities for the residents of these drugs producing areas, is child work and child labour. Culturally, male children are considered an asset, and are culturally bound to help parents earn their bread. Consequently, they are kept busy in the shape of working on their farms, and, other than in Khyber, which is close to the provincial
capital Peshawar, where education to University level is available, there is no pressure for schooling. This situation well suits poppy production, which requires intensive manpower.

TABLE 5 FAMILY INCOME (Opium Cultivators)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Family Income (Rupees)</th>
<th>No.of respondents</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Up to ----10,000</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11,000----20,000.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21,000----30,000</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mean income = 6,300 rupees

Table 5 shows the family income in the opium producing areas. 90% (36/40) of respondents fell in the lowest income category of up to 10,000 rupees while 7.5% (3/40) of families had a monthly income of 11,000-20,000 rupees. These groups together accounted for 97.5% of the respondents. 2.5% (1/40) families had income of more than 21,000 rupees. Average monthly income was 6,300 rupees (US $ 136 or £ 83.)

TABLE 6 AREAWISE DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Monthly Income (rupees)</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1-10,00</td>
<td>11-20,00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>31,000+</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dir</td>
<td>18 (94.7%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bajaur</td>
<td>15 (93.8%)</td>
<td>1 (6.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muhmand</td>
<td>4 (80%)</td>
<td>1 (20%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khyber</td>
<td>7 (70%)</td>
<td>1 (10%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>44 (88%)</td>
<td>3 (6%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Average income (overall) = 7,500.00 Rupees
Average income in Dir = 6,500 Rupees
Average income in Bajaur = 6,125 Rupees
Average income in Muhmand = 7,500 Rupees
Average income in Khyber = 11,500 Rupees
The monthly *per capita* income level was broadly similar (Table 6) throughout the drug growing areas. In the case of Dir District it was 6500 per family or 500 rupees (US $11) per capita, in Bajaur Agency it was 6,125 rupees per family or 330 (US$ 8.0) per capita, while in Muhmand Agency it was 7500 rupees per family or 320 or (US$7 approximately) per capita. In Khyber Agency people had a comparatively higher level of income at 11500 rupees per family per month or 469 rupees per capita (US $10). In Khyber Agency at present there is no agriculture at all and the local people depend upon the transborder trade.

The average annual *per capita* income in Dir, Bajaur and Muhmand areas is consistent with the estimates by independent foreign experts of US $80-120. I discuss elsewhere how economic conditions tempt the poppy growers and drug producers to continue with their production.

**TABLE 7 FAMILY EXPENDITURE (Opium Cultivators)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expenditure(Rupees)</th>
<th>No of families</th>
<th>percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Up to 10,000</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>77.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11,000-20,000</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>22.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total.</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Average expenditure = 7,362 rupees

This Table shows the expenditure level of the people in the opium producing areas. 31/40 (77.5%) were in the expenditure level of 1,000-10,000 rupees while 9/40 (22.5%) fell in the second expenditure category of 11,000-20,000 rupees. None belonged to the other higher expenditure groups. Average family expenditure was 7,362 rupees as compared to the average family income of 6,300. The expenditure-income level shows a significant difference of about 1,062 rupees per family. This means no savings, since, as we have seen, the practice of lavish expenditure on major social occasions does not permit this. Accordingly debt and poor living are endemic.
TABLE 8  FAMILY EXPENDITURE BY AREA (rupees)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Monthly expenditures (Rupees)</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Up to 10,000</td>
<td>11,000- 20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dir</td>
<td>18 (94.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bajaur</td>
<td>10 (62.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Muhmand</td>
<td>3 (60%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Khyber</td>
<td>5 (50%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>36 (72%)</td>
<td>12 (24%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mean expenditure (overall) = 8540.00 (Rupees)
Mean expenditures for Dir = 5552.00
Mean expenditures for Bajaur = 8937.50
Mean expenditures for Muhmand = 9200.00
Mean expenditures for Khyber = 13250.00

Table 8 shows area-wise expenditure patterns. In Dir District and Bajaur Agency almost all respondents belonged to the first expenditure group (94.7% and 93.8% respectively; in Muhmand 80% respondents belonged to this group. In Khyber Agency, however, the percentage of respondents (50%) in the first group was much less, with 30% respondents in the second group and 10% each in the two upper expenditure groups. Again, I discuss the situation of income and expenditure elsewhere.

TABLE 9  SIZE OF LAND HOLDINGS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size of land holding (jerebs)</th>
<th>No. of families</th>
<th>percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0.5--1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1--10</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>47.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10--20</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 and over</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Average size of land holding = 9.8 Jreebs or 4.9 acres (1 acre = 2 jreebs).

Land holding size determines the socio-economic and political status of a family in Pakistan in general and in NWFP in particular. The greater the land holding possessions of a man, greater is considered his social and political influence. According to local custom a landless person is not considered a true Pakhtoon, though he may speak Pushtu language. This gives a high importance to holding a piece of land. Table 9 shows that 20% (8/40) respondents had a minimum land holding of 0.5-1 jreebs including irrigated, unirrigated, uncultivated and cultivated land. The highest number of families, 19/40 (47.5%) were owners of up to 10 jreebs. 5/40 (12.5%) had up to 20 jreebs of land and 8/40 or 20% possessed more than 21 jreebs of land. On average the amount of land per family was 9.8 jreebs which means 0.6 jreeb per capita (assuming 15.4 as average family size - see Table 1). The land holding size again depends upon the structure and population of the area. Both in smaller, more mountainous areas and in more populous areas, landholding tends to be smaller.

TABLE 10 LAND HOLDINGS OF THE FAMILY BY AREA (jreebs)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Size of land holding (jreebs)</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>up to-1</td>
<td>1-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dir</td>
<td>5 (26.3%)</td>
<td>13 (68.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bajaur</td>
<td>2 (12.5%)</td>
<td>6 (37.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muhmand</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>1 (20%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khyber</td>
<td>1 (10%)</td>
<td>7 (70%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>8 (16%)</td>
<td>27 (54%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Average land holding (overall) = 9.5 jreebs or 4.75 acre. (1 acre = 2 Jreebs)

Average land holding in Dir = 4.7 jreebs
Average land holding in Bajaur = 13
Average land holding in Muhmand = 19.5
Average land holding in Khyber = 8.0

Table 10 gives information about individual drugs producing areas. In Dir, per family land was 4.7 jreebs or 0.36 jreebs per capita, in Bajaur Agency per family...
landholding size was 13 jreebs or 0.72 jreebs per capita, in Muhmand Agency the
family average landholding was 19.5 jreebs or 0.83 jreebs per capita. In Khyber
Agency per family land size was 8 jreebs or 0.32 per capita. All have a uniformity
of land possession which is less than one jreeb per capita. As far as the nature of
the land was concerned, in the two agencies of Bajaur and Muhmand, poppy was
cultivated on totally rain dependent land, while in Dir District it was irrigated
except where rain was abundant and no serious need for irrigation was felt. On
average, the total irrigated land per family was 0.85 jreebs, and rain dependent land
was 9.75 jreebs per family. The land structure and scarcity of land are due to the
geography of the area. Without unrealistic developments like mechanisation of
agriculture and use of machines to bring more land under cultivation (and even if
this could be done it would, as local people well know, be at the cost of destroying
forest and environs), the land under cultivation cannot be increased.

Without doubt, therefore, geography has played an important role in opium
cultivation as well as heroin processing. It has not only made the area inaccessible
to law enforcement agencies but has also made it impossible to develop more lands
or improve the existing land for cultivation. The existing lands are of a nature
which cannot be improved, mechanised and extended, and their usage is very
limited: they are not, for example, suitable for cereals. As a result, land will remain
scarce, suitable only for human physical labour. Climate is also an important factor
in opium production. I have already mentioned that opium is a drought resistant
crop, needs very little amount of irrigation water, and offers the highest yield in the
cold temperatures of the mountainous regions rather than in the hot weather of the
plains. So all these factors of land scarcity, low land quality, large families,
favourable climatic conditions and no alternative source of income and a location
inaccessible to law have given the people both the opportunity, and little realistic
alternative to opium cultivation, albeit that it is illegal. On the other hand, people in
the plains areas, where the prohibition of opium cultivation is accepted, do not face
the same set of circumstances: their lands are vast, irrigated, and fertile, per family
land holding sizes are considerably larger, and are certainly sufficient to feed the
families. Literacy levels are higher, and the people have access to a range of urban
benefits, including jobs, government employment, education, other sources of
livelihood and health facilities. The other key inhibitor to opium cultivation in these
areas is that they are visible and accessible to law, and any illegal activity can
therefore be easily detected.
TABLE 11  LAND POSSESSION STATUS OF THE FAMILY

(Opium Cultivators)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Land possession status of the family</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Owner-cultivator</td>
<td>Share-cropper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dir</td>
<td>18 (94.7%)</td>
<td>1 (5.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bajaur</td>
<td>16 (100%)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muhmand</td>
<td>5 (100%)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>39 (97.5%)</td>
<td>1 (2.5%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As already said, opium is being produced by small farmers with very little land holdings which cannot yield enough food crops to meet their families' needs. Because opium cultivation is a very labour intensive activity, extensive cultivation by a family is avoided, and most farmers have insufficient resources to be able to hire additional labour. Accordingly production is almost invariably small scale. Table 11 supports the point that virtually no cultivator is also a landlord, almost all (97.5%) respondents being owner cultivators and only 1/40 (2.5%) tenants, or share croppers (discussed further below, but normally men who cultivate land owned by someone else for equal distribution of the yield). In an area where land availability is scarce, holdings small, families large and, above all, no other viable sources of employment are available, land remains the sole source of employment for the majority of the people.

TABLE 12  OPIUM CULTIVATION ("Do you cultivate opium?")

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Cultivate Opium</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dir</td>
<td>17 (89.4%)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2 (10.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bajaur</td>
<td>9 (56.2%)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7 (43.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muhmand</td>
<td>5 (100%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>31 (77.5%)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9 (22.5%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In response to the question whether they cultivated opium in spite of the Government's ban, 31/401 (77.5%) respondents said that they did while 9/40 (22.5%) did not. Geographically, Muhmand was the top of opium cultivation as 100% respondents reported opium cultivation in the year of the research while Dir was second in order of opium cultivation. In Dir, 89.4% farmers had cultivated the crop, while 10.6% had not. In Bajaur Agency 56.2% had grown the opium crop while 43.8% had not done so the year of the research, but had done previously.

TABLE 13 REASONS FOR OPIUM CULTIVATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>No of opium cultivators</th>
<th>Reasons for opium cultivation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dir</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bajaur</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muhmand</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>29 (93.5%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Code:
1= land structure, size and climate.
2= Gives more income
3= Other reasons

A multiple choice question about the reasons for opium cultivation was asked to determine the major reasons for the existence of the poppy culture. 29/31 (93.5%) respondents said that they cultivated opium because of the nature of the soil and climatic conditions. The hard stony nature of the land makes it difficult for other crops to grow as it cannot retain the moisture necessary, particularly for summer crops. The nature of the land also influences the size and shape of the small poppy fields which cannot be mechanised or levelled to produce other crops. Human labour or bull-ploughs, which are manned by it is the only source of power to cultivate these lands. Irrigation, or the lack of it, is a major part of the reason for poppy cultivation, since, as I have already mentioned, poppy is a highly drought resistant plant and the lands in these opium producing areas are mostly rain dependent. In the high mountainous areas in Dir District in particular, some tracts
of land which do not receive enough sun and hence are termed “cold” lands, are not capable of producing any crop other than poppy. Elsewhere, because poppy has the advantage of an early harvest and is believed not to deplete the soil, it leaves the land available for summer crops such as maize. If such lands were cultivated with cereal crops such as wheat, the harvest (in late July) would be too late for the land to be cultivated with a second crop.

In Bajaur Agency all respondents cited land structure and climatic conditions as reasons for opium cultivation. Whereas in Dir rainfall is reasonable, in Bajaur the cultivating areas are totally dry and rain dependent. The only possible means of irrigation is tube-wells, an unrealistically costly process as tube-wells need electricity, which cannot be afforded by rural farmers who cannot even afford a pair of bullocks, never mind pay electricity bills running into thousands of rupees: But, more to the point, in these areas there is no electricity at all at present and hence no tube-wells would be possible, even if the running costs could be afforded.

In parts of Muhmand Agency there is no water at all for drinking and cleaning purposes. Poverty, remoteness, lack of infrastructure and the sandy nature of the land contribute to opium production and the unanimous response in this Agency was that these were the main problems of agriculture in the area.

In all areas, respondents unanimously said they cultivated opium because of its remunerative return as compared to other crops, whose harvest is never sure. Again, this is understandable as the land holding size is small and families are large. In none of the research areas can the lands produce enough by any other means to feed the large families. Consequently, the cultivators switch to crops which can bring them more food. Opium can give not only food supplies but also other necessities for which they can get advances from the opium dealers in the big bazaars or local small shops. When, later, I discuss “why people grow opium” in NWFP, we shall see the comparative economics of opium and other crops in the area.

9/31 (29%) respondents claimed to grow opium for reasons other than those explained above. These included a range of political justifications, in particular Pakistani officials’ corruption in the funds donated by foreign countries for the development of these areas and the hypocrisy of Pakistani governments which, when in power, oppose opium cultivation but when in opposition; and, an international political statement, the willingness of consumer countries to attack
Muslim morale and morality by providing wine and other alcoholic liquor to Pakistan (a kind of *quid pro quo* argument). Other reasons given included complaints about their land tenure, and a number of farmers set aside some of the crop for personal use.

**TABLE 14 ATTITUDE OF THE OPIUM CULTIVATORS TO THE LAW BANNING OPIUM CULTIVATION**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>No. of cultivators</th>
<th>Why confront the law?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dir</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bajaur</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muhmand</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>31 (100%)</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

|          |                   | (76.9%)| (76.9%)| (96.8%)| (51.6%)|

**Code:**

1 = We do not accept this law.
2 = We do not know this law.
3 = This is the only source of our survival
4 = It is a tribal area and Government cannot ban it.

This was a multiple-choice question to test the attitude of opium cultivators toward government policy on opium cultivation. Attitudes are contagious and can determine the future of the opium problem in Pakistan. As we have seen, since 1979, there has been a ban on opium cultivation, transportation and possession, but still people grow it. 1997 had been targeted as the year by which poppy cultivation would be eradicated, but the Government did not succeed, and, according to a United States Government report, opium cultivation has again increased in areas which were free from cultivation a few years ago.\(^1\) Respondents expressed various attitudes. 22/31 (76.9%) respondents were rebellious; they openly rejected the law.

\(^1\) *Daily Jang* (London, 22 February 1998)
and said they were the masters of their own lands. The Pakistani Government officers and politicians were cursed for accepting money from the western countries for their own selves and for banning opium cultivation; 22/31 (76.9%) respondents claimed (in an acerbic way), never to have heard of any such law; 30/31 (96.8%) said the law (now that those who had previously never heard of it knew it existed) was against the survival interests of the people or anti-social, and said they grew opium because it was a sure source of survival. If the Government could not provide them with the basic necessities, why should it take away their own bread from their mouths? 16/31 (51.6%) were of the opinion that in the tribal area where Pakistan's regular or criminal law is not applicable, the Government could not ban opium.

These responses combine the economic and the political, illustrating in particular comments made throughout this thesis on the distance which exists in Pakistan between the rulers and the ruled. There has never been confidence between Government and public. Public representatives are not considered as representatives but rather as instrumental in helping voters with 'private' problems such as securing a job. This is a characteristic of the Pakistani polity. As a matter of fact, the general public cannot expect any welfare from politicians and government functionaries, the latter in particular considering the public as their subjects and treat them with contempt. Law making seldom proceeds with public consent and is often against the public will. Interviews revealed that the attitudes of the farmers towards the opium poppy were highly biased. The 22.5% of respondents who did not cultivate were in some cases forced not to do so, but their plight revealed much hardship, though they could not admit this.

**TABLE 15 INCOME FROM OPIUM LAST TIME/YEAR**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Income from Opium (Rupees)</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>up to 10,00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11,000-20,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>21,000-30,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>31,000+</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dir</td>
<td>13 (68.4%)</td>
<td>19 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5 (26.3%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 (5.2%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bajaur</td>
<td>6 (37.5%)</td>
<td>16 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 (12.5%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 (18.7%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5 (31.3%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muhmand</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 (20%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4 (80%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>19 (47.5%)</td>
<td>40 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8 (20%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4 (10%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9 (22.5%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Dir District mean income from opium = 6842.00
Bajaur Agency mean income from opium = 12183.00
Muhmand Agency mean income from opium = 18,000
Overall average Income from Opium = 10375 rupees

Opium yields income far greater than other crops to farmers, depending upon their landholding size. 19/40 (47.5%) earned up to 10,000 rupees per harvest, 8/40 (20%) respondents made up to 20,000 rupees per crop from opium, 10% of cultivators earned more than 30,000 rupees from their drug crop while a substantial percentage (22.5%) of farmers made more than 31,000 rupees per annum. Comparing the average income of 10375 rupees from opium with other crops, it is clear that this is the main reason for opium cultivation. For comparison see reference eight above and the case studies later in this chapter.

Geographically there were differences in the income from opium. In Dir District, where the average landholding was smaller than in the rest of the drug producing areas, the average income from opium was 6842 rupees, while in the rest of the areas the income was two or three times more than that of Dir. In Bajaur Agency it was 12,183 rupees, and in Muhmand Agency 18,000 rupees. In Khyber Agency, where the people have given up agriculture as unprofitable, or at least less profitable than heroin, no opium has been grown for the last ten to fifteen years.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opium</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Size of the Household</th>
<th>Row Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1-12</td>
<td>13--&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chi-square value DF Significance
Pearson 2.42 1 0.11
The two-way Table shows that 31/40 (77.5%) respondents cultivated opium, while 9/40 (22.5%) did not. The column percentages do not support the idea that there is a direct correlation between production and family size, as 92.3% respondents with small families (1-12) cultivated opium as compared to the 70.2% of larger families (13->). I had been of the opinion that opium was cultivated by those with large family sizes as poppy is a labour intensive crop and needs more man power - which is readily available in the shape of large families. As no source of livelihood is available in the area other than subsistence agriculture, people tend more to work on their lands to get maximum out of it. But the figures do not support the assumption that the larger the family size, the greater the likelihood of opium cultivation. Overall, 32.5% of the respondents had a family size of 1-12 while 67.5% had a family strength of 13 and over.

The observed Chi-square value (2.242) for 1 degree of freedom with a significance of 0.11, is more than the expected value of 0.05, showing no evidence of association between the two variables. No explanation can be offered for this phenomenon, and my initial hypothesis is, accordingly, not sustained by the evidence in this small-scale study. A larger scale study might wish, however, to consider using more complex definitions of small and large, possibly by creating a 4-5 part typology, and differentiating by gender and age of children.

### TABLE 17  LAND HOLDING SIZE AND OPIUM CULTIVATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opium</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Total land holding</th>
<th>Row Pct</th>
<th>Col Pct</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(Trees)</td>
<td>0.5-10</td>
<td>11-&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>77.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>71.0</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>81.5</td>
<td>69.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>22.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>55.6</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>30.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col Total</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>32.5%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chi-square Value  DF  Significance  
Pearson  0.75  1  0.38

In this very small-scale study the chi-square does not show a relationship between the size of land holding of the family and opium cultivation. The p. value from the chi-square test is 0.38, greater than 0.05, showing no evidence of association.
between opium cultivation and small land holding size. But the Table does show
that the majority of the opium cultivators were in the small land holding group
(71%), supporting the idea that opium is disproportionately cultivated by those with
small land holdings which cannot produce enough food to support the families. The
second group, with large land holdings and who cultivated opium, totalled 29%.

Of those who did not grow opium, 55.6%, a greater number, comprised those who
had a small land holding size and no reason can be offered to explain this situation
of non-growing of opium by them. Again, the same row shows that those with a
large land holding size and who did not grow opium were fewer (only 44.4%) than
those with small land holding, giving at least soft support to my idea that opium is
seldom cultivated by big landholders.

The column percentages also support the row percentages. In the first column, with
land holding size of up to 10 jreebs, 81.5% cultivated opium while only 18.5% did
not, against 69.2% and 30.8% respectively for larger landholders.

**TABLE 18  FAMILY INCOME (EXCLUDING OPIUM INCOME)
AND OPIUM CULTIVATION**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opium</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Family Income (Rupees)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Row pct</td>
<td>Col pct.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>85.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>(70.0)</td>
<td>(30.0)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Chi-square Value DF Significance**

Pearson  3.61  1  0.05

The hypothesis was that low family incomes in the opium producing areas
compelled people to look to other sources of earnings to supplement their incomes,
and at the moment the only other secondary source is to produce opium. The two-
way Table shows that the majority, 24/31 (77.4%) of respondents who cultivated
Opium had a low family income of up to 6,000 rupees, while a smaller number, 7/31 (22.6%) had an income in excess of 6,000 rupees. The overall picture is that 70% (28/40) of respondents belonged to the lower income group while 30% (12/40) were in the larger income group. This supports my idea that low income has a correlation with opium cultivation in the area, and the p. value of the chi-square test, at 0.05, provides evidence of an association between low family income and opium cultivation.

The column percentages show that of those with low income, 85.7% cultivated opium against 58.3% in the larger income group. The row percentages also show that of those who did not cultivate opium 55.6% were in the high income group supporting the belief that opium is cultivated by those with low income.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 19 FAMILY EXPENDITURE AND OPIUM CULTIVATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Opium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chi-square Value  DF  Significance
Pearson 3.58 1 0.05

The hypothesis that high expenditures and low income in the area lead people to cultivate opium is supported by the given columns in the chi-square two-way Table, with a value of 0.05. According to this Table, a majority, 58.1% (18/31) of families in the low expenditure group of up to 6,000 rupees cultivated opium, while only 13/31 or 41.9% of respondents who had family expenditures of more than 6,000 rupees did so. Of those who did not cultivate opium 22.2% were in the low expenditure group.
expenditure group and 77.8% were in the high expenditure group. The column figures also give some support, as 65% of respondents in the second column who cultivated opium were in the high expenditure group.

Overall, 50% of respondents were in the low income group and 50% were in the high expenditure group. The probability value of the chi-square test shows an association between family expenditure and opium production.

**TABLE 20 INCOME FROM OPIUM AND OPIUM CULTIVATION**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opium</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Income from opium (Rs)</th>
<th>Row total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Row Pct</td>
<td>1,000-15,001</td>
<td>15,000-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col Pct</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>61.3</td>
<td>38.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col. total</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chi-square Value DF Significance.

Pearson 2.20 1 0.13

It was assumed that people in these remote areas of North West Frontier Province cultivate opium because of its lucrative return in the absence of any other economic opportunities, but with a p. value (0.13) through the chi-square test there is no evidence that the income from opium makes people grow opium. This Table shows that 19 respondents (61.3%) out of a total of 31 made up to 15,000 rupees per annum, while 12/31 (38%) made more than 15,000 rupees. This is understandable because the majority had a small land holding size and could earn only up to the amount shown. This is also in accordance with the average income from opium, which is 10,375 rupees. A small number made huge profits from opium cultivation because of a small number of individuals with large landholding sizes but these are a minority.
TABLE 21 AFGHAN WAR EFFECTS AND DRUGS PRODUCTION IN PAKISTAN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>War effects</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Heroin production</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Row Pct</td>
<td>Col Pct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>75.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>75.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>25.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col Total</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chi-square Value DF Significance
Pearson 0.625 1 0.42

The two-way Table shows that 8/10 (80%) respondents were of the opinion that drugs are being produced in Khyber Agency. Out of this number 6/8 (75.0%) reported that the Afghan war had affected local business, and consequently many locals had switched to drug production. Two respondents said that the Afghan war had affected their own business but that heroin production was not related to the war. Two respondents also said that the war had had no effect on the drugs business in Khyber Agency or their own business. The probability value of 0.42 does not provide evidence that those interviewed believed that the Afghan war led to increased drug production in the area.

Conclusion

This part highlights the field data in figures. Tables 1 and 2 show the family size in the opium and heroin producing areas. The mean family size was 16.9 persons per family, but 15.4 in the opium growing areas. In the individual drug producing areas the family sizes were 13 for Dir, 21 for Bajaur, 23.2 for Muhmand and 23.8 for Khyber.

Tables 3 and 4 give the educational level of respondents in all the areas producing drugs. In the opium producing areas 60% respondents had no education in their families while 40% had some. Those family members who had been educated
yielded 50% to Primary level, 25% to matric level (the minimum educational level considered for government service) and 19% to first degree level. One person was educated to postgraduate level. But again there were striking differences by area, with Dir District respondents having an education rate of 31.6% and those in Bajaur having 31.3%. The high rates among respondents in Muhmand and Khyber Agencies is likely to be the result of sampling error: respondents in Muhmand Agency, the most backward agency in Pakistan, had a rate of education of 60%, while the official figures are 6.7% for males. This error seems to have arisen due to the “dwa kora” or ‘two houses’ concept of the dwelling among the Muhmands. Muhmands maintain two houses: one in the urban, settled areas where all facilities like jobs, education, health, etc are available, and one in the ancestral, native tribal area. The urban house is used for making available the above facilities for all members of the joint family/clan while the tribal dwelling is a symbol of their identity as a tribal Pukhtoon. In Khyber Agency, the literacy rate among respondents’ families was 100%, partly because of sampling method (purposive sampling increased the literacy rate by 50%) and partly because of sampling error, due to the close proximity of the part of Khyber Agency in which fieldwork was undertaken to the provincial metropolis. This meant that the people were relatively rich, and so able to afford education for their children. The actual literacy rate, according to official statistics, is 20.18 for males.

Tables 5 and 6 give statistics about the income of the area, with a mean income of 6,300 rupees per family per month for opium growing areas, against an overall mean income of 7,500 rupees per month per family. In Dir District the family monthly income was 6,500 rupees, in Bajaur Agency it was 6,125 rupees, in Muhmand Agency it was 7,500 and in Khyber Agency the monthly income was 11,500 rupees. This shows per capita monthly income for Dir as 500 rupees, for Bajaur 291.66, for Muhmand 323.27 and for Khyber 483.19 rupees.

Tables 7 and 8 give information about the expenditure pattern in the drug producing areas. According to the Tables, mean expenditure was 8,540 rupees a month per family, more than mean income of 7,500 rupees, which means indebtedness and poverty are endemic. By area too, expenditure exceeded income. In Bajaur monthly expenditure was 8,937.50 rupees against an income of 6,125.00, in Muhmand it was 9200 rupees against 7,500, in Khyber monthly expenditure was 13,250 against an income of 11,500 a month.
Tables 9 and 10 give figures about land holding in the drug producing areas. Overall the mean land holding size (cultivable and non-cultivable combined) was 9.5 jreebs or 4.7 acres. In Dir opium cultivators had the lowest possible land holding size of 4.7 jreebs, in Bajaur Agency the figure was 13 jreebs, in Muhmand Agency 19.5 jreebs and in Khyber Agency 8 jreebs.

Table 11 gives an indication of the land possession status of the cultivators. In the opium growing areas 39/49 respondents (97.5%) were owner cultivators, while one respondent was a share cropper. A share cropper is a person who rents land from another person who, for whatever reason, cannot cultivate all or part of his own lands.

Tables 12 and 13 indicate the extent of, and reasons for, poppy cultivation. It is clear from the Table that in Dir 89.4% respondents had grown opium that year, in Bajaur Agency 56.2% had done so, while the figure for Muhmand Agency was 100%. Across the three areas, 93.5% respondents cultivated opium for climatic reasons and because of the nature of their lands, which, typically, were small, irregular in shape and size and could not be mechanised. All respondents said that opium brought them more income than any other crop and this was the main reason for its cultivation. 29% respondents gave other reasons for opium cultivation. As explained earlier these included several political justifications, which largely boiled down to a technique of neutralisation which asserted that they were no worse than anyone else.

Table 14 gave an idea of the attitude of opium growers to the Hudood Ordinance. 70.9% of respondents resented the law and said they did not accept it. Since the same number said that being a tribal area they did not know of any such law, a number clearly resented a law of which they had never heard. Almost all respondents (96.7%) said that opium was their only means of survival, and that if the Government took it away from them they would fight for this right: they would rather die fighting than die of hunger. Table 15 confirms the economic importance of opium by indicating an average annual income from opium sale of 10,375 rupees, much more than could be secured from any other crop.

Chi-square test has been used to find out the association between the variables. This test is used because of its most frequent use and less demands and requirements.
Table 16 is the first of several chi-square Tables testing the association between various variables and poppy cultivation. Table 16 confirms the possibility of a relationship between large family size and poppy production, but does not establishes a significant association between the variables. Table 17 gives soft support to the belief that opium is cultivated on small lands which are cultivated manually, but again does not give statistical support to such an association.

Table 18 is about the income of the families and its association with opium cultivation and gives statistical support (p = 0.05) to the hypothesis that opium is cultivated by poor farmers to supplement their income in lieu of any other source of income. 77.4% of respondents who cultivated opium belonged to the low income group while only 22.6% were in the highest income group. Table 19 correlates family expenditure and opium cultivation, and confirms an association between expenditure and opium cultivation (p < 0.05). It will be remembered that in addition to the non-availability of alternative earning sources, local people have a number of costly expenditure customs and that in the case of respondents (and this is almost certainly a typical pattern) expenditure exceeds income. The excess money to spend is provided by opium. This Table highlights this situation.

Table 20 measures incomes from opium sale against opium cultivation and shows no statistical significance. 83.9% respondents made up to 10,000 rupees a year from opium sale, while 16.1% made more than 10,000. This appears to contradict my assumption that more income from opium makes people grow it; but actually the size of land also matters. Most of the cultivators had a very small land holding size, and income was related to this.

Finally, Table 21 involves questioning respondents about their opinion of the significance of the Afghan war for opium production. A majority of respondents said that the war had affected business in the area and, again, a majority (75%) said that Afghan war led to heroin production in the area. Again there was no statistical significance, but this is probably due to the small sample size.
CHAPTER VI: Ethnography

This part includes an ethnographic account based on the empirical work. We have discussed in chapter IV the values of ethnographic researches with reference to an insiders or 'native's' approach supported by other field methods and have discussed why this method is more suitable than others. The ethnographic discussion is followed by three case studies which support the quantitative data collected through field work.

The opium poppy, then, is cultivated mainly by small farmers living in mountainous areas, predominantly with large families and small land holdings. The cash income from opium is several times more than other crops, including the recently introduced cash crop of onion. The income from opium is an economically necessary means by which poor farmers close the gap between income and expenditure, as the land cannot otherwise produce enough to meet need. In addition to such data, however, an ethnographic account of the people of the area and their lives is necessary for a rounded picture to be formed. This now follows, alongside three case studies to demonstrate the economics of opium poppies and other crops.

Social Structure and Organisation

The sampled area is occupied by Pukhtoon (whose language is Pukhto), Pushtoon (Urdu, Baluchi), Pathans (English) and Afghans (Persian, Pushto). The main tribe is divided into many sub-tribes, qam or qaum, the largest social unit (now each one a tribe by itself). Each occupies a specific territorial area, and has a distinct dress and dialect of the Pukhto language. The qam is further divided into sub-tribes or Khels, a collection of a few extended families. An extended family is called a Koranai or Khandan. Pukhtoons mostly live in joint families, where parents and their married sons and their children live together under the same roof so long as compatibility permits.

They still live a tribal life, and behaviour is largely governed by formal and traditional laws and tribal codes, Pukhtoonwali. The central concepts are Gherat (honour, associated with bravery or defending one's ego) Nang (associated with sacrifice, unconditional support or obligation) and Izzat (respect associated with the ego of a person). If a Pukhtoon utters the words 'Khabara da Izzat da' his words of honour, he will not change his position taken in front of others even if he comes to
the conclusion that his initial decision was not the best one. The greatest insult a
Pukhtoon can receive, and for which he will kill, is being called a person without
honour ‘Begherata’ (a person who would not dare to take his revenge) or ‘Dala’ (a
person dependent upon others), generally signifying a person who acts against, or
fails to respect, the social norms.

Thus the life of a Pukhtoon seems a continuous struggle between independence and
dependence. On the one hand he is trying to keep his independence and
individuality, while on the other he is seeking power and influence - to make other
people dependent. It is a common saying that ‘a Pukhtoon is one who does it and
not one who speaks it’. Pukhtoonwali has specific features, including Jargah (tribal
council), Melmastia (hospitality or the honourable use of material goods), Hujra
(men’s guest house), Badal (vendetta, revenge or exchange), Toor and Peghoor
(stigma and sarcasm), Tarboorwali (kinship, lineage system or power blocks within
a Khel competing for power and prestige) and Nanawati, (arrangements for an
apology by a wrong doer through mediators).

These concepts have deep meaning, and embody deep rooted feelings of social
stratification and adherence to custom and tradition. Pukhtoons are patriarchal,
patrilineal and patrilocal. They claim their descent to a common ancestor in
Afghanistan, and in theory all Pukhtoons are equal,¹ and everybody having his
name on the genealogical chart of the khel has a right to inheritance, no matter how
small. The village area encompasses all lands over which Khels have ownership
rights. These are defined in terms of measurement units like ‘Motai’, ‘Rupai’,
‘Piasa’ and ‘Nimakai. The total number of shares relates to the whole of the village
area. Each type of arable land, whether annually or seasonally irrigated or rain fed
is geographically divided. Communal land, Shamelat, is normally left for pasture,
graveyards and mosques, as well, recently as for schools and other official
buildings. Shamelat areas are not divided.

The joint family system has not only political but also economic implications.
Politically it gives strength to the family, and having a large number of males in a
Khel family is socially desirable. In a poor subsistence economy all earners
contribute to the family purse, kept by the head of the family, either the father or
the elder brother, and each one obtains according to his needs, irrespective of

¹ D.N.Wilber et al. Pakistan : Its People, its Society, Its Culture (New Haven : HRFA
earning status. The difference between father and sons and between elder and younger brother is observed.

Marriages are invariably arranged by parents or guardians. Preference is given to marriage within the family, and particularly among paternal cousins or father's nephews. Marriages with the maternal cousin are also practised. This has some political and economic implications; for example, marrying within the family does not involve the transfer of the daughter's or sister's share in the landed property. It can also settle outstanding feuds, as the exchange of girls in marriage brings two families closer. Marriages and other ceremonies like the circumcision of a male child are celebrated with pomp and show, often beyond the means of the family concerned. This is promoted by a sense of competition, particularly among contending groups. Excessive expenditure is incurred on such ceremonies, and also on the eve of the two ids every year.

Pukhtoon society is highly stratified, based on a class system involving the political and economic dependencies of various groups who cannot claim to be Pukhtoons. Khans are the most powerful people, with most of the lands in the area and other sources of wealth in their possession. Maliks are second to Khans and possess political as well as economic power. Ordinary Pukhtoons are those who have their names on the Khel genealogical chart and have inherited nominal lands but have no other sources of income than their labour on the small family lands.

Land ownership groups with rights often consist of more than one Khel. The division of the village into groups to whom rights or shares are given takes place on the basis of kinship, place of living in the main village, or on a Khel basis, normally to give each Khel access to the same class or quality of land.

The lower classes are Kasabgars or professional people, including Nai (barbers), Shakhel (sieve and thorn makers) Dam (musicians), Jola (weavers) and Chamyar (cobbblers). Kasabgars are paid in kind at each harvest and have no rights of property unless the Pukhtoon do not want to buy from each other. Outside these two groups is another class of sacred or religious people, Astanadar, consisting of a number of sub-groups — Sayyeds (the highest religious class who are the descendants of the holy prophet Muhammad through his daughters Fatima and cousin and son-in-law Ali), Miagans (the descendants of a recent saint who may or may not be a Sayyed) and Akhunzadas (religious people descendants of a pious
person of local fame). Even more than in Pakistan as a whole, religion is a pervasive influence in Pukhtoon² as Islam was introduced into most of the present day Pakistan by Pukhtoon around 1,000 AD. Members of the Ulema religious scholars are called Mullahs, Mulvis, Maulanas, Mufti and Imams. Mulvi Sahib or Maulana Sahib and Mufti sahib are titles given to those who have acquired command in religious matters and have graduated from a Madrasa or seminary, and who can interpret religious laws and related matters. In the big mosques of the urban areas they lead the Friday prayers and deliver sermons in addition to other religious duties. A Mullah belongs to a Mullah family and may or may not be a scholar; the term Imam has many meanings but can be a person who leads the daily prayers in the mosques, or a paid official in charge of the mosque. The income of Imams and Akhuns are not secure and may be paid out of voluntary funds or just at the time of harvest.³

Political groups within a community are called ‘Dhala’ or power blocks. The creation of a power block leads by itself immediately to the creation of rival blocks by people who want to emphasise their independence and equality, and to resist the creation of a hierarchy. To take a village decision the two parties have to agree, which is often very difficult because one party will always oppose if the other is in favour. Each other’s positions are approached with suspicion, and considered to be taken out of self interest to increase their relative power position. The reaction of the opposing parties to each other is immediate and direct, though they may cooperate if they have to unite the power blocks against a common enemy, if there is a body with authority to solve (potential) internal conflicts, or if they are forced to cooperate by the creation of joint interest in another way. As Pukhtoons are always in conflict, whether with each other or with an outside body, for example the federal Government, these situations keep them united for collective defence.

Political issues are decided by a Jargah, the grand assembly of local men, which decides communal matters or conflicts pertaining to individuals or sub-tribes. The composition and nature of the Jargah varies. Among the Afridies and Shinwaries of Khyber Agency and Muhmand Agency where people have a relatively egalitarian outlook, people sit in a circle emphasising equality, with no head of the council. The matter to be dealt with is argued and argued until a solution comes out but the

² Ibid. p. 84.
voting system is never used. Among the Yousafzai in Dir, a Jargah consists of the representatives of the major power groups. The Jargah is variable in membership, reflecting the power relations of the moment and having a composition acceptable to all sides: it is this that gives it its authority. It is not a permanent body, but one which can be formed at different levels depending on the nature and level of conflict and the involvement of the village sections. Jargahs have the two main tasks of problem solving and regulation, to prevent problems from happening in the first place or from getting out of hand if they do.4

The decision of the Jargah is final and enforced by the society; decisions are reformative in nature than punitive, and though recently some changes have occurred, with criminal proceedings dealt with by the Deputy or Assistant Commissioner, they will still appoint a Jargah to settle the dispute.

Turning to hospitality, or Melmastia, the implication is that “wealth is not for amassing, but for use and basically without importance, that only the weak man is attached to property and makes himself dependent on it5. Hospitality is reciprocal, and its appropriate forum depends upon the socio-economic circumstances of the host and a range of local factors, but involves the allocation of publicly accessible space for the purpose, normally a special men’s house or sitting room. Melmastia provides the opportunity to demonstrate conduct which can be publicly judged; it gives the host an opportunity to exhibit his competence in management, resources and status, particularly the reliance others place on him; and it offers a means of converting wealth into political influence through hospitality. A Hujra or men’s house (it is not at all for women) is a place where all the men of the community gather and entertain themselves and their guests, and where they spend their free time; unmarried youths confine their activities to the Hujra and mostly sleep there; outsiders go straight into Hujras to visit their hosts without knocking on the door. A Hujra is a symbol of great political power. It may be maintained by the Khan or Malik of the village, or collectively by the people. If the Hujra is maintained by the lineage, on the visit of any guest the surrounding people bring in prepared food and share it.

---

Badal or vendetta, requires retaliation to be exacted when any physical or social injury is done to a member or prestige of the family. If a family member is killed it is the responsibility of the larger family to take revenge. As a result, feuds and factions continue for centuries — Pukhtoons say that if you take revenge after one hundred years it is not too late. Badl, however, is not solely negative, and also entails reciprocity of help and support at a time of need. So food and shelter, or physical help or money, offered when a person is away from his group and village, is remembered and reciprocated to people of that area.

Pukhtoons are very sensitive to their code of honour, and do not tolerate transgression irrespective of the status of the transgressor. Women and landed property are the two symbols of honour and shame: insult to a woman is Toor shame and stigma; and Toor is interpreted very widely, so that a stranger in the village cannot ask a young woman about his host, or even for travel directions. Any hint of sexual relations between a male and female is a great stigma and shame for the family of the woman, and can only be washed away with the blood of those involved - so both are killed. In many cases, however, the woman is killed but the man makes good his escape, so becoming an fugitive for life, unable to return home unless a compromise is reached between the two families. This often involves Swara, a woman from the aggressor family being married into the family of the aggrieved.

Accordingly women are closely guarded, indeed kept in Purdah, which normally restricts them to housekeeping, though they may also work on the family lands if a male relative looks after them. Unprotected women work in other's households as domestic servants.

Various cultural practices keep the Pukhtoons always indebted to each other. As a result a Pukhtoon will keep a good gun at home rather than having good food; he will keep and save money to feed his guest and reciprocate his social obligations, but have a poor life himself; he will sell land in preference to allowing his women to work for money. Federal laws are contrary to such cultural practices but a corrupt judicial system encourages the people to decide their matters themselves, either through a Jargah or with a rifle. An outsider may initially think Pukhtoon society lawless and disorganised, but these unwritten laws in fact keep it peaceful and organised.
In terms of food, wheat, maize and rice are the three most important foodstuffs, extensive agriculture being possible only in the two central divisions of Peshawar and Mardan, where cash crops including sugarbeet, sugar cane and tobacco are preferred. Maize, once the food of poor people, is today the food of farmers only. Rice is also common, being quick to prepare and relatively cheap. Broken rice is mostly used in poor families: simply boiled and salted, it is eaten with any Shoorva or Khoorva (curry) or Masta (curd), with butter oil if that can be afforded. Wheat, however, is the staple diet. It is customarily served in the form of wheat bread – Dodai, Nan depending on the language, and served with meat curry or vegetables. Spices like onions, garlic, coriander, and chillies are liberally used in food preparation, or used independently as chutney; chillies are crushed and normally eaten with bread, depending upon the economic conditions and locale.

Only limited quantities of food crops are grown, and local people mainly buy food from markets, in some areas spending more than 58% of their income on food, a figure which shows how uneconomic local agriculture is. Mostly people visit the markets weekly. In many rural areas meat eating is uncommon, and instead people have a diet of ingredients which include spinach, own grown vegetables and buttermilk. Tea is especially commonly used. Tea leaves, sugar or brown sugar are boiled, and milk if available is poured into the teapot and the mixture boiled again, and then sipped. In many households, particularly in remote areas where markets are non-existent and people poor, tea and bread are eaten instead of curry. In such areas spinach and dried vegetables are staple, as pulses and meat are unavailable or expensive. Most households keep livestock for milk which is used in tea making, or converted into curd and then buttermilk. Buttermilk is liked everywhere, particularly in summer, and is the favourite food of farming people, often taken with bits of maize bread wrapped in an onion leaf. Poultry is kept mostly for guests and social occasions, and slaughtering a chicken for a guest is not only common but also important.

Livestock farming, however, is undertaken by up to 90% of households with an average of 6.09 livestock per household to meet the demand for milk buttermilk and curd. Cows, oxen and a few sheep and goats are kept in the mountainous areas, though normally farmers avoid goats and sheep, which are associated with Gujars, a

---

nomadic people who travel with large flocks from high mountain pastures at the end of summer and return at the start of summer. Cows, oxen and buffaloes are kept by farmers in the plains. Oxen are kept by farmers for ploughing and breeding, and on average each household has 1.1 oxen. Dung is used for fuel and manure. Some land is allocated to the production of fodder, which comprises barley and Persian clover Shaftal, though maize straw is also used as fodder. Although the Persian clover yield on rainfed land, for example in Bajaur and Muhmand, is unsure, farmers grow the crop to ensure that they have extra fodder for livestock. The by-products of other food crops like wheat Bhoos, and rice Proorha or Palala are the important fodders in winter.

The common dress is Kamees and Partoog shirt and shilwar or baggy pants, stitched by tailors in the villages or big markets. The shirt is longer than its western counterpart, and generally made with buttons that extend only part way down the front. It must be pulled over the head and is not tucked in at the waist. Swati or Chitrali pakool hats, and turbans are the headgear, though younger people increasingly go bareheaded. Saplai made by local cobblers or from Peshawar and Charsadda are the common footwear but among the educated and well off people the use of boots is also very common. In poor communities people use the plastic footwear, which is low quality and non-durable. It was reported by some respondents that continuous use of these plastic and rubber shoes caused chapped heels and skin problems. Jumpers, coats and jackets, often second hand, are worn in winter. Women’s dress consists of kamees and Partoog and, outside the house, a big embroidered sheet parhoonai or tent-like Burqa usually made of light cloth, black, white or tan in colour. The Burqa is worn over other garments, completely concealing the wearer’s body, but with a square of loose netting in front of the eyes to permit some vision. Burqa is normally worn by women of high status and by those women who observe purdah or who prefer to remain inconspicuous in public places. Women in rural areas who work in the fields do not use Burqa.

Housing consists of stone walls around a courtyard, followed by a veranda and the rooms, each of which is normally occupied by a family. Inside the house there is often a room specified for cattle and fodder, but in many houses people and cattle live in the same room. The walls are made of stones with no cement or mud. Within them are pillars and log beams, so a room of 5 five square yards will have two to three logs. Over the logs are crossed small logs, then something like pine leaves
covered with earth. There are no windows, but in the roof a hole is made for the exit of smoke. Some people have metal sheets on their roof to avoid water running down the roof during winter rain or snow. There is no concept of a bedroom or living room, though a separate room for guests serves as a sitting room Bhetak when guests are present.

ECONOMICS OF POPPY CULTIVATION: CASE STUDIES

There follow some case studies of opium income compared with other crops in the area.

1 Mulvi Muhammad Sherin (Baba) of Badalai, Nihag Dara, Dir District

Mulvi Muhammad Sherin alias Baba (elder man), in his fifties, is a well known political and religious figure of in the whole of Painda Khel. He belongs to the Mubarak Khel clan of the Painda Khel tribe, and is a Pukhtoon land owner. His father was illiterate but sent him to a Madrasa (religious school) to get education. As a result of being a land owner and of his religious knowledge he is highly respected. He is a very vocal person, and even in official circles he is considered as someone who can arbitrate any problem. He was elected as a district counsellor in 1990 but soon realised that his type of person cannot go with the rest of the elected members whose sole or main purpose is to amass wealth by any means open to them, and as a result he resigned from his post in protest of the attitude of the Chairman of Dir District Council.

Mulvi sahib lives in a joint family of 12 persons consisting of his four sons, four daughters, one daughter-in-law and a grandson and his wife. His two elder sons are illiterate, while he sent his two younger sons to school in the village. The family owns two jreebs of terraced land, of which half is cultivable while the second half is cultivable waste, which only human labour can cultivate, even a bullock being unsuitable. As a result, the only possible crop is opium.

No one in the family was able to secure a government job and it is surprising – and a testament to Mulvi sahib's incorruptibility - that a member of the District Council could not get a job for his sons. The other source of livelihood for the family is a watch repair shop in main Bazaar Wari, where he and his sons work. According to him, all this labour earns the family about 3,000 rupees a month. Mulvi sahib is himself an opium cultivator. The researcher asked him, why they cultivated opium
when the Government has banned it. Mulvi sahib said that in March 1996 some
officials of the project came and talked about some developmental works to
substitute for opium cultivation, but that they never came again. He said that the
officers have claimed the area as opium free, but foreign governments have proof
that opium is being cultivated here, and that the next step will be the deployment of
troops to show their efficiency, and that this will create the worst possible situation.
Being well versed in Islamic jurisprudence, the researcher asked the Islamic
viewpoint about opium cultivation. Mulvi sahib said that Islam does not forbid any
land production. Opium, after all, has been cultivated in this village for 100-150
years and is widely used as a medicine. Commercial production is the innovation of
late seventies. He said the people do not understand why in an Islamic country,
alcohol is licensed but opium is banned. According to him, Islam allows believers
to eat even the flesh of a dead animal to save life if a person is starving to death.
Opium is not haram, forbidden, and if it was, under the present conditions of
starvation we could legitimise it. This view was shared by many other scholars of
the area and gained support from the Afghanistan Government, as I have mentioned
earlier. Mulvi sahib also detailed the economic advantages of opium, which are
presented below.

**Mulvi Muhammad Sherin: Cost and Income of Production of One Jreeb of
Opium Poppy**

**Costs**

1. Seeds 3 kg. @ 25/kg \(= 75\) (Own seeds from last year.)
2. Fertilizers Urea + DAP (1 bag each) = 550. (Purchased.)
3. Two ploughs 2 man days @ 50 = 200. (Family labour)
4. Levelling and breaking clods 4
   man days @ 50 per day \(= 200\). (Family labour.)
5. Sowing and hiding seeds (Kassai)
   2 man days @ 50 \(= 100\). (Family labour.)
6. Hoeing and weeding 12 man days
   @ 50 per day per head \(= 600\). (Family labour.)
7. Fertilizers, second dose, already purchased.
8. Hoeing and weeding second time
   10 man days @ 50 \(= 500\). (Family labour.)
9. Purchase of 10 punja (lancing knives) \(= 60\). (Purchased.)
10. Lancing and extraction of gum
   50 man days @ 60 per day/head = 3,000.  (Family labour.)

11. Capsule plucking and breaking,
   collection of seeds, 6 man days @ 50 = 300   (Family labour.)

12. Collection of stalk etc.  (Family labour)

**Total Cost. 610 rupees**

**Income**

1. 7 kgs. Gum sold @ 4,800/ kg. = 33,600.
2. 50 kg seeds @ 12 per kg = 600.
3. 3 bags dhoda @ 50/bag = 150

**Total income = 34,275 rupees**

**Net income from one jreeb opium = 34,275 – 610 = 33,665 rupees**

2  **Karim Khan of Sharbatai, Barang Tehsil, Bajaur Agency**

Muhammad Karim Khan is the son of the head of the village. The family belongs to
the *Aseel* sub-clan of *Utman Khel*. He is in his early twenties. He lives in a joint
family with his three elder brothers, father, mother, paternal uncle, uncle’s wife,
five cousins and the family of his elder brother, totalling thirty people in the
household. Education has been in the family, as his elder brother did his matric
from a school across the river in Malakand Agency while he is himself an
undergraduate college student at Government College in Bajaur Agency. The
family depends to the maximum on their lands which are more extensive than those
of any other person in the village - 27 *jreebs*, out of which 7 *jreebs* are well
irrigated as the springs occur in their lands. The remaining 20 *jreebs* are rain
dependent. Karim’s eldest brother and uncle are employed by the political
administration and earn 2,000 rupees a month each. His second brother goes to
Karachi to work as a labourer in the off season, while four men of the family are
engaged in agriculture. In terms of grain they are self sufficient except for rice
which they purchase from the local market, and the irrigated land produces
adequate vegetables, maize, green fodder like Persian clover, and wheat; most of
the rain dependent land is cultivated with opium poppies. No other man in the
village has this opportunity of cultivating a variety of crops and more than one
yield. Their irrigated lands are terraced and properly managed to produce more and
more; and because they are close to the family house inside the village they are carefully looked after.

The researcher asked Karim why his family cultivated opium. He replied in a very innocent tone by asking how he could go to college if there was no opium money. He spends more than a thousand rupees a month, borrowed from shopkeepers to whom they sell their opium. When asked whether they would continue opium cultivation he nodded affirmatively, but was visibly upset by the question. When further probed, he said they did not want to give up opium poppies but his brother and uncle would lose their jobs if the family did not comply with the prohibition. He was asked how they would manage if they gave up opium, and he replied that they would go to work as labourers somewhere in the country; getting a government job needed a lot of money and he could not afford to buy one either for himself or for his younger relatives.

Regarding the activities of the developmental projects he said they hoped to have a bridge on the river to connect the area with Malakand Agency, and a road to connect them with Agency headquarters, but that no other benefits were anticipated. He said electricity was three miles away from the village in Malakand Agency, and probably the Government would make cessation of opium production a condition of extending electricity to Sharbatai. He was then asked how optimistic he was about his future, and he said the tribal people had no hope of a good life if the present political system, whereby the rich, sitting around the political officers and praising them, could buy anything they wanted, continued to prevail.

He was asked about the costs and income of wheat, which they cultivate and in which they are self sufficient. He very accurately calculated the balance sheet presented below.

**Karim Khan: Cost and Income of Production of One Jreeb of Wheat**

**Costs**

1. Seed 15 Kg @ 5/kg. = 75 (stored from last year).
2. Total fertilizers for the harvest
   (1 Urea + 1a/sulphate) = 500 (purchased).
3. Plough/planking/ clod breaking
   4 man days @ 60 day = 240 (family labour).
4. Sowing seed and kassi
   (to cover the seeds 2 man days = 160 (family labour).
5. Weeding 3 man (Family labour/days
   @ 60/day = 180 (used as fodder.)
6. Threshing with bulls 2 man days
   @ 60/day = 120 (bulls borrowed).
7. Miscellaneous = 150.
8. Irrigation three times 3 man days
   @ 60/day = 180 (family labour).

Total cost (2+7) = 650 rupees

Income
1. 10 maunds of wheat @ 350/mnd = 3,500 (maximum production).
2. hay/straw (Bhoosa) = 1,500.

Total income = 5,000 rupees

Net income from one jreeb wheat = 5,000 – 650 = 4,350 rupees

3 Salamin Khan, Manrai Village, Karo Dara (Karo Valley)

Salamin Khan belongs to the Himmat Khel branch of Hussain Khel clan of Painda Khel tribe in Manrai village. He is an illiterate young man of 30 years of age, and the youngest brother in his family. His father, an octogenarian, mostly stays in bed, and Salamin is responsible for all family affairs, as his other brothers are in Baluchistan working in the coal mines. They live in a joint family of twenty-five people, including parents, all the three brothers and their families, while his one step brother lives in another village due to strained relations within the family. No person in the family has had any education at all. Salamin Khan is an ordinary land owner Pukhtoon with two jreebs of land fragmented in five pieces (pati or barhai) and jointly cultivated. All their land is irrigated as water has been channelled from a distance of about two miles by the village people.

He works all day in his fields to grow opium and onions. When asked why he cultivates opium, he answered that he knows only opium and onions, having had no experience of other crops since childhood. Opium brings not only food but money for other purposes as well, including marriage feasts and other social occasions. When he was asked why he grew only onions and opium he replied that he is alone:
his father cannot work on the lands, his brothers are away, the women are not allowed to work in the fields and there is no other person to help him. Wheat does not grow well on his land, and because onion is not a labour intensive crop he can manage it well. When told that opium is banned by the Government and they are therefore violating the law, he said that the head of the village had told him that too, but that he (the head) himself cultivates more than he does, and the villagers take their lead from him. If the Government banned its production, in his view people would resist strongly unless they were compensated.

He reported that onion brings much less money than opium, but that it would be a shame to leave his lands uncultivated. He calculated the costs and income of one jreeb of onion as follows.

**Salamin Khan: Cost and Income of Production of One Jreeb of Onion**

**Costs**

1. Preparation of land: plough/clod breaking 2 man-days @ 60/day = 120. (family labour.)
2. Preparation of beds for saplings 2 man days @ 60/day = 120. (family labour.)
3. Total fertilizers for the harvest 2 bags (300 + 200.00) = 500 (purchased).
4. Seeds 2.5 kg @ 200.00/kg = 500 (stored from last year).
5. Sowing saplings and irrigation 1 man day = 60 (own labour).
6. Weeding 12 man-days @ 50/day = 600 (family labour).
7. Preparation of land for transplantation of saplings 10 man days @ 50 = 500 (family labour).
8. Transplantation of saplings 10 man days @ 50 = 500 (family labour).
9. Weeding/hoeing 10 man-days @ 60/day = 600 (family labour).
10. Harvesting/cleaning/sorting 10 man days = 600 (family labour).
Total cost = 500 rupees

Income
1. produced 50 maunds onions sold @ 200/mnd = 10,000.
2. Sale of onion saplings = 1,200.

Total income = 11,200 rupees

Net income from one jreeb onions = 11,200 – 500 = 10,700 rupees

Conclusion

Most of the North West Frontier Province is occupied by a large ethnic group, Pukhtoons, who live in both the settled areas and the tribal areas. Whether settled or tribal, however, Pukhtoons have a code of life called Pukhtoonwali, unwritten customary laws prevalent for centuries, and which includes such key concepts as vendetta, guest house, lineage system and hospitality.

Pukhtoons have a rigid social differentiation based on a class system; there are no caste divisions. The dominant class comprises landowners, of whom the most senior are the Khans followed by the Maliks. Outside Pukhtoons there is a class of sacred people called Astanadars, who include Sayyeds, descendants of the holy prophets, Miangan, descendants of a Sayyed or non-sayyed saint of great fame, Mullahs and Akhunzadas, people with religious responsibilities and performance of day to day religious matters. They use lands given to them by the Pukhtoons for their sacred services, and their lands are called Seral.

The Khel, the centre of all social and political activities, controls all inter village and supra-village activities and politics, as well as being the nucleus of interpersonal relations both positive or negative. The Hujra or guest house is the place where all the male activities take place. It is an entertainment centre for the younger people, and mostly bachelors sleep here. Hujra is maintained by a Khan or Malik or collectively by the Khel or Cham or Kandai or Palo depending on the socio-economic and political status of a person or persons. Melmastia is another salient feature of the Pukhtoons of NWFP, which means the honourable use of material goods and space. This implies the offer of food and shelter and meeting any other need of a needy on the home ground of the host. Hospitality and Hujra
are also used for gaining political influence. *Badal*, though taken mostly in a negative sense of taking revenge or vendetta, has also the positive aspect of reciprocity or exchange. An insult or loss to someone or a good at a time of need is always remembered and reciprocated. The *Jargah* or grand council is the forum where all males have equal rights and are allowed to present their viewpoints.

These features of *Pukhtoon* culture keep the people busy and alert, co-operative and submissive to fellow people. A social change is occurring, however, and the practice of *Hujra* is giving way to drawing rooms and guest rooms but the remaining trends are still found, particularly in rural areas where change has been extremely slow.

Wheat, barley, maize, mustard, onions and opium are the major crops. Land possession is very small and uneconomic if cultivated with grain crops. Opium has been cultivated mainly due to its economic superiority. Other crops are sown either for food or mainly for fodder. Wheat is a staple food in the plain while wheat and maize are the food in the rural areas. Opium gives three to ten times more income than other cash or food crops, and the case studies offer at the very least a fair approximation of the comparative profits to be had from different crops. The balance sheets presented by the three interviewees in the case studies showed that an annual *per jreeb* net yield from opium was as much as 33,655 rupees, against 10,700 rupees from onions and only 4,350 rupees from wheat. When it is remembered that the mean annual family income is 6,300 rupees (Table 4-5) and expenditure 7,362 rupees (Table 4-7) the economic importance of opium becomes crystal clear and the 'solution' to the 'problem' all the more elusive.

Accordingly, in the next chapter, the final substantive one, I consider whether the 'problem' of drugs is in fact a problem, and, if it is, what kind of a problem it is, and whether the solution to it does in fact lie in prohibition, or whether an alternative approach, which might range from, at one extreme, legalisation of the entire process, through decriminalisation of certain aspects of it, to forms of regulation involving licensing and inspection, is more practical, and, perhaps even, given the immense harm done by attempts at suppression, desirable. As I have said before, the elimination of a global trade which combines impoverished suppliers with affluent, determined, and in some cases addicted, consumers; and which attracts the interest of both internationally organised criminals and, when it suits their *realpolitik*, first world governments, may be unrealistic. Beyond this,
however, it may be damaging, to the suppliers themselves, obviously, but also to the political process in supplier countries. This is both because drugs become a focus for the corruption of government officials and, as we have seen, of the polity itself, and because the act of suppression can destabilise internal peace and security, leading to civil unrest among producers, and to their further alienation from the political process.
CHAPTER VII: OPIUM AND OPIUM DERIVATIVES:
DILEMMAS OF CONTROL

Introduction: the Framework of the Chapter

This chapter falls into two main parts, each of which is further subdivided. The first part rehearses attempts which have been made at, respectively, national and supranational level, to control the spread of opium and its derivatives, and discusses the obstacles which have been faced and the extent to which they have been overcome. The story will not be very encouraging, unfortunately, as these attempts have for the most part been subverted by self-interest (both individual and national, not least by first world powers) and personal and political corruption. In some cases — crop spraying being a good example — the cure may have been worse than the disease, since the control attempts (which, as we have seen, were experienced very personally by the researcher during his fieldwork) reflect a failure to address the core reasons for opium production. The results have been breakdowns in civil order and political trust. Further, artificially disrupting the free market in opiates in one part of the world often leads only to changes in the market elsewhere. Such is the global nature of the trade that, as we have already seen, a change of policy in Iran has a direct impact on the political economy of drug production in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Civil strife in one country, which requires drug money to fund it, leads to changes in the geography of global production and supply.

In the second part of the chapter I reflect more broadly on the whole notion and philosophy of control. Are the problems encountered in this case study insurmountable? Is there, within a national or supranational policy of control, a feasible set of options, which would do more good than harm? Or is an entirely different framework necessary? ‘Control’ carries different meanings: it can be, and in this field often is, synonymous with suppression, even prohibition. But an alternative meaning is regulation — bringing the production and supply of opiates within an expanded legal sphere. Control in this regulatory sense already exists in many countries at an individual level by registration; is it necessary, feasible or desirable for this principle to be extended to production and supply at a national or even supranational level? These are questions which I then apply to the study of the possibility of legalisation, regulation and medicalisation in Pakistan.
Part A: Control Attempts at National and Supranational Levels

The National Effort: Pakistan

Pakistan is signatory to all UN conventions on drug production, trafficking and addiction, accepting an obligation to check illicit opium and heroin production within her territorial jurisdiction and to check heroin addiction. In particular, following the introduction of the Hudood Ordinance in 1979, Pakistan embarked on a two-pronged strategy to combat addiction through demand side reduction, including improved measures of treatment and rehabilitation, as well as criminal sanctions, and supply side control.

So far as demand side reduction is concerned, there is an almost complete lack of treatment and rehabilitation facilities, with only 200 treatment centres for three million addicts\(^1\) (one centre per 15,000 addicts) and detoxification the only approach available on a national basis. As a result, sepsis due to scars and wounds made by begging addicts to arouse public sympathy, unhygienic living conditions among beggars who live on or near garbage dumps and other unclean places, hepatitis and other liver diseases all contribute to the high death rate among addicts. Corruption among both politicians and law enforcement agencies has deterred the widespread use of criminal sanctions. These could, anyway, have little impact on the problem other than as part of a coordinated effort including also treatment and rehabilitation: a carrot as well as a stick. But there is a scarcity of resources in the health services, and such resources as do exist are unevenly distributed, both between and within provinces. Further, rehabilitation needs training, job placement and employment, but with a youth employment rate of only 46\(^2\) and a basic education rate of about 26\(^3\) the scope for funding rehabilitation is slight. Politically there is little to be gained by diverting resources into drug rehabilitation; indeed to do so to a realistic degree, rehabilitating two million heroin addicts being well beyond the capacity of the state or supranational aid agencies, would simply cause political embarrassment by bringing the problem into international focus.

---

2 The Dawn (Karachi: May 6, 1993), editorial.
Accordingly there exists no such rehabilitation programme\textsuperscript{4} in spite of the speed with which addiction is increasing. At present, according to reports, there is a new addict in Pakistan every five and a half minutes\textsuperscript{5}.

In NWFP there are just ten detoxification units in the public sector and six maintenance clinics in the private sector providing services for an addicted population of 589,000,\textsuperscript{6} of whom heroin users number 223,000. In public sector drug treatment centres 120-140\textsuperscript{7} beds are available, but official statistics show very low admission rates - an indication of the low commitment at state level to addressing the problem. Even if used to the maximum, at 140 beds for 223,000 heroin addicts, resources and facilities would in no way be commensurate with the number of addicts; as it is, their impact is inevitably minimal.

Detoxification is also carried out through outdoor treatment, which can involve not only conventional western medicine but also tibbi unani, homeopathy and acupuncture. No information is available on their respective effectiveness, but their impact is likely to be low. In addition, and inevitably, patent anti-drug medicines, marketed by many known and fake firms and hakeems, some laden with opium, have flooded the market.

While to deal extensively with supply side control would take us into debates beyond the present scope, it is clear that, on a national level at least, supply itself - or availability - itself fuels demand. So whereas at this level\textsuperscript{8} demand side measures, whether punitive or therapeutic, would, even if effective, merely hold the problem at bay, effective prevention requires supply side attrition. Three quotations illustrate the point:

\textsuperscript{5} \textit{The Dawn} (Karachi: 26 June 1997)
\textsuperscript{8} As we show in the second part of this chapter, the market operates by a different mechanism in the case of first world imports from developing countries. There the purchasing power of consumer countries is always sufficiently strong to generate an adequate supply by switching markets as necessary - a point which we argue has been insufficiently grasped by the United States, especially in the work of the DEA from 1973 onwards.
... the greater the availability of a drug in a society, the more people are likely to use it, and the more they are likely to run into problems with it.8

... the variables affecting the integration of a drug into a culture are, availability of the drug, the method of its introduction and existing traditions for similar substances.9

Availability affects the degree of use and acceptance into the culture......Production and cultivation of the substance is commonly a consequence of the cultural influence, but may also influence the rate of acceptance. As availability increases, use tends to increase. Further, when it is difficult to obtain one drug, another drug may be substituted10

Experts have identified four kinds of availability: physical, social (the extent to which drug use is socially sanctioned), psychological (an individual's personality, characteristics, beliefs and so on) and economic (whether drugs are affordable). All four are present in Pakistan. In the early days, heroin was sold in shops in the tribal area as a commodity in daily use. Economically, Pakistan probably has the world's cheapest heroin,11 the street price reaching an all time low during the early 1990s. Availability is an established fact for all major cities, small towns and even rural areas and villages.12 When, in the early days of production, free samples were distributed in and around Peshawar University to attract youths to the drug, prices were so low that one gram of heroin with 80-90% purity cost ten rupees (less than fifteen pence). During a visit in 1982, US Attorney-General William French Smith was surprised when one of his aides spotted heroin samples displayed in a shop in a public market near Peshawar.13 An expert on heroin in Pakistan observed:

The basic fact of its easy availability on stops on national highways from Peshawar to Karachi and other connecting routes as well as in cities and towns in Pakistan reveals clearly the underworld appropriate logistic maintaining the supply of the

---

12 L. Tullis, Unintended Consequences: Illicit Drugs and Drugs Policies in Nine Countries (London: Lynne Reimer Publishers, 1995), p.120.
drugs. This aspect of the problem is essential for epidemiological studies because the producers and manufacturers for their economic profits operate to promote the spread and continued use of drugs. The skills and intelligence they bring to the task of promoting the spread of drugs in opposition to law enforcement agencies successfully impair the effectiveness of control system\textsuperscript{14}.

The preferred means of combating the problem was for a long time crop elimination and destruction. This, however, was naturally resisted by the growers, and a theoretically more acceptable alternative, crop substitution, emerged, in furtherance of which some 4-5 foreign and UN assisted projects were introduced to provide alternative means of livelihood.

This was welcomed by many communities, but corruption emerged and the projects did less for local development than for those administrators and politicians whom they enabled to amass huge illicit fortunes. When the public raised voices against the corrupt practices of those in power, the policy switched again to forceful crop eradication, with disastrous personal, social, political and economic consequences. Law enforcers killed many farmers in different parts of NWFP to show their efficiency to donor countries and the international community; helicopters and land forces were used to eradicate the crops in areas easily conquered; where there was fear of armed resistance overnight herbicide spraying was used without concern for the chemicals' toxicity. To the researcher's knowledge, for example, dichlorophenoxyacetic acid and paraquat were sprayed on the crops in spite of the fact that most land sprayed with such herbicides cannot produce any other crop for at least four years. The damage to soil, water, plants and animals, as well as the farmers themselves and their families, has never been fully assessed, but some experts say that paraquat causes irreversible lung fibrosis, dermatitis, eye injury and severe nose bleeding.\textsuperscript{15}

So why cannot production and addiction be brought under control? What has hindered the law in eliminating these drugs? Is it socio-economic conditions in the drug producing areas, national politics, or both which have maintained opium and heroin production? And if politics are involved, are they internal or external? What


\textsuperscript{15} M. Gossop & M. Grant (eds) \textit{op.cit.}
solution can be suggested to overcome the problem of drug production and addiction.

Many drugs are produced in economically dependent and politically unstable areas such as Pakistan. Economic factors are often crucial in paving the way for a thriving parallel drug market. These countries have low per capita incomes, with numerous people living in poverty, and economic resources only available to those with political power:

Political instability is a major factor in the growth of the illicit drug trade and is one of the biggest obstacles to combating it. In the last twenty years the drug-producing countries of Latin America and of southern Asia have all experienced one or more of the following—coup d’état, revolution, tribal tensions, violent ethnic and/or religious protest, invasion, intensive guerrilla warfare. In materially impoverished, politically turbulent parts of the world, drugs have become the principal currency for the purchase of weapons and, as has been proved, the human and organizational structure for the one illicit trade have come to overlap or coincide with the other.  

Geography plays a dual role in the production of opium in Pakistan, not only comprising a permanent hurdle in land development but also keeping the areas inaccessible to control. The only economic resource of communities in such areas is small, poor quality land holdings which they cultivate to achieve what they can. Smith observes:

It is a fact the world over that those areas which produce narcotics, often lack any government support and basic social services like health, education, communicational infrastructure and security. As a result of these insecurities they make the best use of the only resources available, the land. Poverty is their main cause of all other social problems. They are socially and geographically isolated from the main stream of the society. 

Subsistence agriculture is the main economy of the backward poppy-producing areas like the districts of Dir, Buner, and the tribal Agencies of Bajaur and Muhmand. In most of these areas the lands are dry, rain dependant and produce a

single crop a year. Agriculture cannot be mechanised due to poverty and the nature
of the land, and the use of fertilisers and pesticide is in many cases beyond the
purchasing power of the farmers. Of the agricultural economy of drugs producing
areas it has been said that:

*It is precisely these countries which have been disadvantaged in the new*
*international global political economy, in part because they have not developed an*
*indigenous industrial or financial commercial class and now rely on whatever*
*agriculture product they can produce with minimal technology. The really powerful*
*demand and highest market price, are for drugs*18.

In these geo-politico-economic circumstances it is difficult to detect even a glimmer
of light so far as national control efforts are concerned. Demand is fuelled by
supply; supply is created by the economic position of the farmers, the political
position of the tribal peoples and geographical inaccessibility; it is supported by
both low and high level corruption, which ensure respectively that local control is
ineffective and that finances intended for policies which integrate eradication with
substitution are diverted. But even were they not, such is the economic attraction of
drug production and supply that it must be questionable to what extent substitution
is a feasible policy.

We have shown already that the proposition that opium and heroin are largely
produced for local consumption is wrong. Though Pakistan has problems of
addiction which are increasing phenomenally and are beyond its capacity to
address, the main demand for Pakistan's drugs comes from first world countries.
Without this demand, supply would diminish and the exponential growth in
addiction in Pakistan itself would also gradually decline. So in a global transaction
involving an exchange relationship between a powerful first world country and an
impoverished, unstable third world country, the financial benefits accruing to the
latter from its merchandise come at a high price. Much of the gain is diverted into
private pockets; the existence of the funding has brought organised, international
crime and national politics into close proximity; but the social cost has been a
public one.

---

18 M.J. McConohy and R. Kirk "Over There: American Drug War Abroad" *Mother Jones*
History shows that individual states have been unable to deal effectively with drug addiction, and that regional, national and supranational control efforts are interlinked. The problem is international, and if there is a solution - and there may not be – that is likely to be international also. But as we shall see, the United Nations, in spite of having several control agencies and engaging in a number of punitive exercises, has failed to prevent the problem growing exponentially.

Towards a Supranational Framework

The international character of drug production is crucial. Opium is produced and processed into morphine or diacetyl morphine (heroin) in countries like Pakistan, Afghanistan and Burma; the illicit opiates are then smuggled, mostly with the connivance of the control agencies, but almost always illegally, to the consuming countries of the west. But as we shall see, during the early period of the multi-control efforts of influential countries coordinated by the League of Nations, normally regarded now as an ineffective, even inept, body, the situation was better than at present. For example, opium and heroin production reduced considerably, from, respectively, 41,600 tons to 7,600 tons, and 20,000 kg to 2,200 kg, between 1906 and 1934.19

The subsequent increase in narcotics can be attributed to two factors. First, an international realpolitik emerged, which not only helped the business flourish but also protected it. Any so-called control strategies and donations to producer countries remained subservient to the foreign policies of a first world community theoretically opposed to drugs but willing to support drug production when, for example, drug money funded the military efforts of anti-communist freedom fighters. Secondly the continual shifting of poppy locations furthered the foreign policy ends of first world powers, mainly, of course, the United States, where the power of the poppy came increasingly to be seen as a tool in its Cold War global military strategy.

So the mid-1960s saw the European heroin industry served predominantly by Turkish opium, but before the end of that decade production had shifted to Iran and south-east Asia. The latter shift in particular was caused by the military support of western countries, particularly the United States, for anti-communist guerrilla

---

commanders — notably but not exclusively in South Vietnam - whom they knew to be heroin dealers and manufacturers.

When the Vietnam War was over, foreign policies changed again, leading to the shifting of opium production to south-west Asia, in particular Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran. The situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan became more alarming when heroin from this source flooded the western markets. Again, however, the foreign policies of some western powers conflicted with their trumpeted ‘war on drugs’, foreign policy taking precedence. To a large degree, today’s drug boom in Pakistan emerges from a confrontation between superpowers, with drug addiction a by-product of international politics and the regional Islamic Brotherhood. And though the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan heralded a decline in opium production in Pakistan, the anarchy unleashed in Afghanistan itself with the rise of the Taliban and the breakdown of state politics, has precipitated another, historically unmatched, round of drug production and processing.

The United Nations is caught in the middle of these conflicts. Largely funded by powerful consumer countries, neither it nor its predecessor body the League of Nations can exercise authority independent of the wishes of its most powerful members. Accordingly, in drug control as in much else, the UN will remain impotent unless the superpowers which largely fund it, very improbably, give it a decisive role. For the foreseeable future, however, the western powers will continue to prefer bilateral treaties based on national authority and interests to UN intervention. With drug producing countries like Pakistan, assistance in narcotics control has proved ineffective, if not counterproductive: while donor countries know the level of official corruption in third world drug producing countries they continue with cash donations rather than technical assistance, reflecting their political interests in supporting existing ruling groups.

In particular there has been failure to control the unintended side-effects of attempts to suppress by law any market where demand chases supply, and where demand is, by reason of the product's addictive qualities, never satisfied. These side-effects include health problems (both through lack of product control and user education) and high prices, which lead to user criminality to feed the habit, the criminalisation of otherwise law-abiding users by dint of drug use, users' consequential vulnerability to intimidation and blackmail, and the introduction into the supply chain of organised international criminals.
These phenomena most obviously occurred in early twentieth century America, where the origins of the supranational approach are to be found. As is well known, prohibition, while achieving reductions in narcotic and alcohol usage and creating cultural disapprobation in many parts of the country, did so at a high price. It paved the way for mass abuse, particularly of black market heroin, in the large cities in particular, and led suppliers to develop codeine as a substitute. Since, however, 2-6 times more codeine than heroin was required to achieve the same effect, demand for opium increased - the opposite of what was intended. Opium was a legal drug when the present day powerful anti-drug countries were involved in its trade and development, but when the trade passed into the hands of other, less powerful, countries, it became a forbidden substance, publicised so as to induce horror and fear. How these US-inspired international efforts started is an illuminating political story. In the florid language of two observers:

*Governments who capitalize on public shock-horrors have a splendid means of diverting public attention and anger from real issues and for interfering in the affairs of other nations, even to the extent of sending spies and troops.*

In February 1909, the United States, which then had no domestic laws regarding narcotics use (though which, in a face-saving measure, was quickly to pass one), convened a conference in Shanghai, the Opium Commission, of 13 countries with interests in the Far East (Russia, China, France, Japan, Persia, Britain, Germany, Siam, Italy, Austria-Hungary, Netherlands, Portugal) to consider opium trafficking. The Commission passed a number of resolutions aimed at the gradual suppression of opium smoking, limiting the uses of opium to medical purposes and restricting international trade in opium and its derivatives.

American motives for convening this conference, according to Musto, were primarily to protect her own financial interests and domestic welfare. In the depression of the 1890s, Chinese labourers, imported to help railroad construction in the boom years of the 1870s, with whom opium smoking was popularly associated, came, as an identifiable immigrant group, to be deemed an economic threat, experience antagonism and be the object of attempts at expulsion.

---

During this period, however, American economic interests in China were increasing, it being said that "a pair of shoes sold to each Chinese would keep American shoe factories busy for years", and any forced exclusion of Chinese labourers would have impacted negatively on her Far Eastern policy. But opium smoking appeared a safe reason for victimisation. Even this was to prove risky, however, for China, resenting the treatment of Chinese people in America, responded badly, heightening economic and political tensions between the countries.

Additionally, the USA had her own interest in the narcotics trade, in which she was anxious to increase her market share. She was keen for the Shanghai Conference to soften Chinese attitudes to protect her economic interests, and it can indeed be said that this Conference, because it spawned another, more important one, in The Hague in 1912, laid the foundations for contemporary global attempts at drug control. From the first, however, there were differences between participating countries. America wanted The Hague Convention to be a diplomatic meeting leading to official commitments, but at the request of Britain and the Netherlands it was termed a Commission, mandated to establish facts and make recommendations only. Britain had no wish to discuss the lucrative but embarrassing Sino-Indian opium trade in an international forum, claiming it was a matter between London and Peking and believing that her withdrawal from the trade would simply lead opium producing countries like Persia and Turkey to take her place, or to China growing more opium of her own.

The Hague Convention placed heroin in the category of morphine and cocaine, imposing an obligation on all contracting members to use their best efforts to limit its manufacture, sale and use to medical and scientific purposes. At this Convention, a definition was given to opium for legal purposes, and some 1909 Commission resolutions dealing with international co-operation were operationalised, including provisions on trade, exchange of laws and statistics, and extension of the coverage of the Treaty to morphine and cocaine as well as opium.

During this period, in the USA morphine and heroin were the most abused drugs, and the pace of domestic legislation increased. Realising drug addiction was a social problem, Congress passed the Harrison Act in 1914, making heroin.
morphine and cocaine prescription drugs. The Act, however, was widely ignored, a single illicit New York 'dope doctor' apparently prescribing 68,282 grains of heroin, 54097 grains of morphine and 30280 grains of cocaine in a month.

The advent, in 1920, of the League of Nations, was significant. The first Assembly established the Advisory Committee on the Traffic in Opium and other Dangerous Drugs. Three conventions followed during the League's existence. At the 1925 (Geneva) Convention the League established a Board (later to become the Permanent Central Narcotics Board), requiring import and export permission for the traffic of heroin and other narcotics (with transaction records maintained), and banning the transit of opiates through a third country. Secondly the 1931 Limitation Convention called on drug manufacturing countries to restrict production to medical and scientific necessities and to introduce a compulsory quota system according to the needs of each country, and creating a Drug Supervisory Board authorised to declare an embargo against any country importing narcotics in excess of its declared quota. In contrast to the situation in 1925, the articles of this Convention were binding, and, partly in consequence, between 1906 and 1934 world opium production fell from 41,600 to 7,600 tons, and heroin production from 20,000 to 2,200 kg. Thirdly, the 1936 Convention (for the Suppression of the Illicit Traffic in Dangerous Drugs) prescribed punishments for illegal trade.

After World War II, when the responsibilities of the League transferred to the United Nations, the Commission on Narcotic Drugs was instituted, to replace the former advisory body. The Commission's attempt, in 1946, to bring all new drugs under full control led to the Paris Protocol of 1948. This extended the control efforts of the supranational organisations to any drug not covered under previous legislation, an approach which, however, failed to address the technological and commercial advances perpetrated by the criminal underworld. The Protocol of 1953 restricted poppy cultivation, production, use and international trade to medical

---

24 Ibid. pp.54-60.
25 Ibid. p 150.
28 A.W. McCoy, op.cit. p.10.
and scientific purposes, permitting only India, USSR, Bulgaria, Iran, Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia\textsuperscript{30} to export opium, and Pakistan to produce its own opium, and empowering the Permanent Central Opium Board to employ supervisory and enforcement measures (though only with the consent of the government concerned), to impose an embargo on opium import or export, or both. As one expert observed, however, "the control would not bite very deep and the international machinery so established was more showy than efficient."\textsuperscript{31}

During the period 1912-1960, international narcotic laws had grown haphazardly and become unwieldy, and a UN plenipotentiary meeting was called to discuss all previous international laws on drugs control. This led to the Single Convention of 1961, implemented in 1964, which unified all previous laws and formulated new ones. The Permanent Central Opium Board was renamed the International Narcotics Control Board; emphasis was placed on the treatment and rehabilitation of addicts; opium, coca-leaf and hashish use for non-medical purposes was prohibited; and all narcotics, including cannabis, were put on the control list\textsuperscript{32}. A new Schedule IV was created for dangerous drugs considered to have no therapeutic benefits, including heroin, (still controversial) and member states were recommended to prohibit dealing in them. The Convention specified conditions under which cultivation should be banned, but left implementation to national legislation. It prescribed import and export certificates for the transportation of poppy straw; authorised all countries to produce and export up to five tons of opium annually (requiring countries wishing to export more than five tons to seek the approval of the Economic and Social Council); and added new countries, including Afghanistan, Vietnam and Burma, to the exporting countries list.

The Convention's ineffectiveness can be judged from the American refusal to ratify it for six years, largely on the ground that it was more permissive than its predecessors - a step backwards, not forwards. Without doubt the Convention marked a significant shift in controlling strategy from the supranational body to national governments, an approach rather akin to letting suspected criminals decide whether to be tried, and a microcosm of the problem that supranational bodies can move only with the consent of the most reluctant member states. Even sympathetic member states may be reluctant to permit the erosion of national sovereignty in case

\textsuperscript{31} A.S. Nane, \textit{op.cit}. p 261.
\textsuperscript{32} United Nations, \textit{op.cit}. p.7

184
they are in the future forced to accept measures contrary to their national interest. And since the legitimacy of supranational bodies stems from inclusivity, expulsion can be used only in the most extreme circumstances.

It was eleven years before political circumstances changed, and the UN was able to replace the 1961 Convention with a more acceptable provision. The 1972 Protocol, which came into force in 1975, with more enthusiastic American support, expanded and enhanced the powers of the International Narcotic Control Board to limit the illegal traffic, production, cultivation and use of drugs and to provide treatment and rehabilitation services. This Protocol was signed a year after the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Drugs called on the basis of concerns expressed by the World Health Organisation and the Commission on Narcotic Drugs over the harmful effects of psychotropic substances like amphetamines, sedatives, hypnotics and hallucinogens, all capable of creating mood alterations and dependency effects, but placed under international control for the first time by this Convention, which, in doing so, considerably expanded the international drug control system.

In spite of these efforts, further increases in drug trafficking in the late 1970s led the General Assembly to ask the Commission on Narcotic Drugs to prepare a 'comprehensive' and 'workable' control strategy. This resulted in the 1981 International Drug Abuse Control Strategy, a five year master plan dealing with every aspect of drug control, including the establishment of a new balance between legitimate drug supply and demand, the eradication of illicit drug production and trafficking, demand reduction, and the treatment, rehabilitation and social reintegration of addicts. The Strategy called for increased inter-governmental co-operation, the participation of NGOs, and intra-UN co-ordination to support member states in law enforcement, crop substitution and preventive education. The General Assembly asked the Commission to consult other interest groups and establish a task force to review, monitor and co-ordinate implementation, and to report annually.

Nonetheless, 1984 saw another wave of trafficking, and the UN responded in two ways. First, a resolution was passed by the General Assembly that, because a new international instrument was needed to address aspects of illicit trafficking inadequately covered by existing treaties, the Commission on Narcotic Drugs

---

should produce a draft convention. This appeared the following year and was implemented in 1988. It contained 14 Articles, addressing issues ranging from illicit production to narco-money laundering, and designed again to strengthen international co-operation and institutional co-ordination, and to provide effective legal guidelines. Secondly, terming trafficking and abuse a collective responsibility and an "international criminal activity demanding greater and urgent attention and maximum priority", the General Assembly adopted the **1984 Declaration on the Control of Drugs Trafficking and Drugs Abuse** which declared:

*The illegal production of, illegal demand for, abuse of and illicit trafficking in drugs impede economic and social progress, constitute a grave threat to the security and development of many countries and peoples and should be combated by all moral, legal and institutional means, at all national, regional and international levels.*

Reflecting the perceived magnitude of the problem, the Secretary General's 1985 report to the General Assembly addressed drug abuse and illicit trafficking, urging the international community to expand efforts to eliminate this "peril" and proposing a world conference to deal with all aspects of it. The ensuing **International Conference on Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking in Vienna** mandated the UN "to generate universal action to combat the drug problem in all its forms at the national, regional and international levels." This led to the **Comprehensive Multidisciplinary Outline of Future Activities in Drug Abuse Control 1987**, which proposed fighting drug abuse and suppressing narco-trafficking according to the economic, social and legal conditions of a given state. Like many other UN Declarations, the CMO is not a formal legal instrument, but a handbook for nations and interested organisations to use as a source of ideas to be translated into action in accordance with local circumstances.

What impact did these developments have on Pakistan? First, it had come to be increasingly accepted by the late 1960s that punitive measures could not succeed unless cultivators were offered alternative sources of income. Accordingly the

---

36 Ibid.
United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control was established in 1971. UNFDAC is a voluntary fund which finances projects designed to put an end to the illegal and uncontrolled production, processing, manufacturing and marketing, through approaches such as crop substitution and law enforcement.

In 1973 the Government requested UN assistance in tackling drug production and devising a developmental intervention programme. UNFDAC granted US$3.3 million and Pakistan contributed US$2.4 million for an initial period of three years, later extended to five. The programme was executed by UN Division of Narcotic Drugs in association with the Food and Agriculture Organisation, WHO, the International Labour Organisation, and PNCB.38

Two strategies were adopted - an agriculture development project in the Buner area and a countrywide network of treatment facilities. The first component was really needed as rural areas had been seriously neglected since independence, with strong political preference being given to urban areas in spite of a rural: urban population ratio of 72: 28. As far as treatment is concerned, it is clear from the PNCB report that addiction was not at that time a problem in the drug producing areas:

*At the time of the 1974 study, except for Kurya village where there were 52 hard-core opium addicts out of a total village population of 425, addiction was negligible in the area. In the other five villages, there were only eight reported cases of addiction. Among the 52 cases from Kurya, 30 were over 45 years old, including two women over sixty. The remainder were between 20 and 45 years of age, and eight were dependants of their parents... Poppy was extensively cultivated for its profitability, which was almost 70% higher than the next crop. Cultivators thought that a ban on poppy would ruin them. But the fact remained that poppy cultivation had done nothing for the uplift of the community. Hence high yield substitute crops would willingly be accepted.*39

The Government, however, was more interested in securing the UN money than in Buner and treatment, and police and paramilitary forces were used to prevent cultivation and destroy standing crops by aerial sprays and land forces. The project

---


was revived in 1978 by a joint UN/Pakistan Government evaluation mission, emphasising upgrading crops already known to farmers, like wheat and maize, and developing irrigation techniques. In a ten year period, and with an input of 115,237 million rupees, however, the project achieved no more than 17 irrigation schemes, 8 tube wells, 93 kilometres of road, 12 water supply schemes, 1855 acres land levelling, distribution of 320 tons wheat seeds, 60 tons maize seeds and 60 tons cane sugar seeds. 520 acre fruit orchards and elimination of 10,000 acres opium crop. Perhaps not surprisingly, opium cultivation resurfaced in 1981 on a small scale in some areas. 

After the Buner area development project, UNFDAC, now the United Nations Drug Control Programme (UNDCP), offered assistance in the elimination of poppy production from Dir. The Dir District Development Project started in 1985, for a five year period under UNDCP control, but the original agreement was not acceptable to the Government of NWFP, and the project was transferred to the Federal Government in 1987.

Since 1985, over US$30 million has been spent by UNDCP on infrastructure and green sector development in the area, particularly road construction, primarily to open up areas inaccessible to law enforcement agencies for crop destruction rather than for developmental activities. Only around 367 developmental projects have been completed in ten years, including 39 drinking water schemes, 7 bridges, electrification of 35 villages, and 744 small developmental schemes such as culverts, flood protection dikes, street improvements and land levelling schemes. In addition, a number of other projects in the tribal Agencies of Bajaur, Muhmand,

---

1 The locals reported that they constructed the road without any wages, on a communal basis, but have been shown a record of the project nonetheless.
2 Buner does not produce cane sugar. It was for experimental purposes which failed, but which are still shown on the record.
3 Opium fields were destroyed by force through aerial sprays and paramilitary forces used to crush the crop, not through the project input efforts.

---

43 The Frontier Post (Peshawar: October 25, 1997).

188
Khyber and Malakand and Kala Dhaka area have been undertaken with US support, though few or no details have been made public. It is widely believed in the area that no visible development works have been completed other than the construction of non-metal roads in areas previously unknown to the Government. In some, probably many, cases these roads were constructed by local communities, as in Badalay Nihag Dara, in Dir, but fraudulently claimed to be project-financed schemes. Similarly, foreign aid has been fraudulently used to claim the costs of electrification of rural areas. In these tribal areas these developmental projects are widely seen as political bribes, not the meeting of a state responsibility.

Part B: Drugs as Global Enterprise: Thinking the Unthinkable?

The Possibility of Legalisation: the Global Picture

I have spent twenty years dealing with this, and things have got steadily and steadily worse.... The government and the Home Office ignored this message at their peril.... It would be a philosophy born out of despair at the failure to solve the drug problem.44

Legalise the Drugs now: it is the only answer 45.

Repressive anti-drug legislation in the US has contributed to one of the major social disasters of the country's development...... such a situation as has developed in the States, should be avoided in other countries at all costs.... prohibition of intoxicants in a free society does not work. When such a policy applied to alcohol in the USA, it failed dismally, applied to heroin, the outcome has been a disaster on national and even international scale. Why should a counterproductive measure be pursued in the face of the evidence46?

Prohibition has failed before in America, and many believe that the war on drugs has failed.47

45 E. Ellison (Drug Squad Detective Chief Superintendent) 'Legalize the Drugs Now: It is the only answer' in *The Daily Telegraph* (London: October 5, 1993).
47 J. Elders (Surgeon General USA), in *The Economist* (January 22, 1994), p.44.
Simply stated, legalising cocaine, heroin, and other relatively dangerous drugs may well be the only way to reverse the destructive impacts of drugs and current drug policies\textsuperscript{48}.

These are some of the opinions expressed about the legalisation of drugs in countries where the use of such drugs has caused alarm for the concerned societies. There are many aspects to the drug problem but the two main ones are production and consumption. Production wise, as will already be clear, all the many efforts made, nationally and supranationally, have failed, and production is still on the increase: the main result of the various counter-measures has been to change the location of production.

In the West, where not only opium but numerous other drugs, including cocaine based ones, are consumed but, other than cannabis, seldom produced, much emphasis is put on reducing drug abuse, and the elimination of drug production and producers is the main thrust. Accordingly, economically poor and politically unstable countries like Pakistan, which are in consequence vulnerable to American pressure on a number of fronts, have been pursuing drug control policies in accordance with US dictates. But the fact is that the production of cannabis in the United States itself makes that country one of the biggest drug producers in the world, 25% of her domestic needs being met by this internal production.\textsuperscript{49} And if all efforts to curtail its own cannabis production have proved ineffective or counterproductive why does the US continue to press others to eliminate drug production?

At present a full theory or model of drug legalisation has still to be developed, but it results from the experience of nearly a hundred years of fighting drugs, in societies who put emphasis on enforcement. Full legalisation is, of course, an extreme and probably reckless possibility, with medicalization or restricted decriminalisation constituting steps along the way. The argument for legalisation is voiced thus:


\textsuperscript{49} R. Stevenson, \textit{Winning the War on Drugs: To Legalize or Not?} (London: Institute of Economic Affairs, 1994), p.35; See also \textit{British Journal of Addiction} Vol. 84 No. 9, 1989, p.995.
The attempt to eliminate drugs from our civilisation has failed. The demand for drugs has lingered despite all efforts, and everything points to the fact that we will have to continue living with drugs and drug users in the future.\(^{50}\)

Since, as *The Lancet* points out, more harmful and addictive drugs than opiates, like alcohol and tobacco, are considered "respectable"\(^ {51}\), the question arises why using one drug use is a crime and violation of social norms while using another is not only socially acceptable but often socially necessary. Many believe the difference is based on an artificial barrier between the two\(^ {52}\) and is a hypocrisy.\(^ {53}\) History shows that the basis for social acceptance of some drugs and not others is not rational or consistent, and has proved negative in its consequences. So reports from the United Nations and other sources indicate increases in the use of legal drugs, with harmful consequences in most parts of the world, not least in the advanced countries, and particularly in the USA, which currently has some 9-10 million known alcoholics.\(^ {54}\) Substance related deaths have been estimated at nearly five million annually for alcohol and tobacco\(^ {55}\) against 200,000 for injecting drug abusers.\(^ {56}\) According to a recent WHO report, tobacco alone causes 10,000 deaths a day globally.\(^ {57}\) Life years lost through disability related to drug dependence have been estimated for 1990 at 39.3 million years world wide for males and 13.3 million years for females.\(^ {58}\)

The idea of legalisation is not a new one, nor it is a demand of some liberal psychiatrists and reforming or reformed addicts. These are the voices of law enforcement experts in the field of drugs, politicians, highly respected members of the medical professions and social scientists. But as a matter of fact, the issue of policy on drugs has been controversial since prohibition:

---

\(^{57}\) World Health Organisation Report in *The Dawn* (Karachi: June 1,1999).
Fear and anger have been the primary causes of society's intolerance of drugs, and such emotions have distorted public memory so grotesquely that it becomes useless as a point of reference for policy formation. Historically, the issue of drug use and the consequent laws labelling a drug addict as a criminal have been the subject of arguments between two groups: one calling for strict penalties, the other advocating greater tolerance. These two groups are the 'absolutists' and 'relativists' or 'conservatives' and 'liberals.' The conservative group is headed by American policy makers, while the liberal group has gained strength and support from experience of the policies adopted by some European countries since the early 20th century. While the former reflects an American "deviance model" of drug abuse, an approach which received formal ratification in the years following the 1914 Harrison Act, when drug abuse came to be deemed a crime and all hard drug users criminals, the competing "disease model", popular in many western European countries and reflecting a need for treatment among addicts, is by no means absent from American thinking. In the case of problems with legal drugs the disease model is strongly held in America, and publicity associated with high profile alcoholics such as Betty Ford have done much to support the idea of alcoholism as a "respectable" illness. Indeed lucrative private practices have emerged to provide therapy of a psychological as well as medical kind for people struggling with addictions.

With illegal drugs, however, the position is even more complex, a fact demonstrated, as we shall see, by legislative equivocation by the Supreme Court on this matter. Culturally as well as legally, while the self-evident fact that addiction, once experienced, is likely to be beyond personal will-power to resolve is widely accepted, the involvement of criminal elements, including organised criminals, is similarly so, and the convenient distinction between 'pushers' and 'users' appears to justify a model of addiction which perceives 'criminals' and 'victims' co-existing within an overall framework of illegality. 'Victim' users are contaminated by 'criminal' pushers; but, for reasons of deterrence, both require condign punishment. Hence the victim-to-criminal-to-victim approach, which has operated

---

60 J. Young, op.cit. p. 49.
61 M.D. Lyman and G.W. Potter, op.cit. p.365.
in the United States for the last century, with, on the whole, negative consequences.

The Harrison Act, widely believed today to have been the first step towards contemporary American internal drug policy, has not always been accurately recalled. The Act involved taxing opiates, seeking to licence all those involved in their distribution -importers, manufacturers, distributors, physicians, and pharmacists - so that appropriate dispensing could be verified from import to patient. Slightly optimistically the Act required records to be kept of all such transactions and registration of all those in this distribution chain. The dispensing of narcotics was to be restricted to pharmacists and physicians for legitimate medical purposes, and the Act did not attempt to deny addicts legal access to narcotics, or to spell out "legitimate medical practice" - which it assumed physicians were in the best position to define.

The Harrison Act appeared to satisfy everyone. International commitments, including efforts to control the narcotics trade and American relations with China, had been met; criminal groups found it difficult to acquire opiates without going through a physician (which pleased the public); physicians and pharmacists were given their due right, which they had demanded; addicts, though not mentioned in the Act, had been reassured that they would not be cut off from their supply, and physicians - for the time being anyway - maintained their addict patients on constant dosage.

This latter practice was, however, prohibited by the Bureau of Internal Revenue the following year, and it was this prohibition rather than the Harrison Act which was the first step towards the criminalization of addiction, in that it made the possession of more narcotics than prescribed an offence. This was followed in 1919 by a Supreme Court ruling that maintenance was not a legitimate medical practice, a decision which led to the prosecution of physicians who, believing that reduced doses would have negative effects on their patients, continued to prescribe the existing dosage. Possession of narcotics by unregistered addicts was termed a crime, and labelling addicts criminals if they lacked a prescription for the drugs

63 Ibid.
65 Ibid. p.107.
they possessed lodged the association of crime with addiction in the public mind, and during the 1920s, NGOs and other anti-narcotic groups, lodges and civic clubs fed public anxieties by launching massive propaganda campaigns against the evils of narcotics, associating crime, particularly violence, with drug abuse:

*The narcotics laws have made a crime out of a weakness in order to protect persons from the consequences of this weakness and, as a result, many of the weaklings have of necessity been sent to prison.*

Although the US Supreme Court in 1925 declared drug addiction to be a disease and not a crime, the Government continued with the enforcement approach. From 1925 to 1951 the prosecution of addicts continued, but depended on the court and judges, though in 1951 the Boggs Amendment provided for a mandatory minimum prison sentence of two years on first conviction of drug addiction, raised to five years by the Narcotics Control Act 1956, when addiction became officially and constitutionally a crime. In 1962, however, under a liberal minded Democrat presidency, the Supreme Court reverted to regarding addiction as a disease, deeming punishment for addiction as cruel and unusual. The following year the Presidential Commission on Narcotics and Drug Abuse recommended that the mandatory minimum imprisonment be reduced, and such a decision be left to the medical profession. In 1967, however, the Presidential Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, influenced in part by concerns about the impact of drugs on US soldiers in Vietnam, but more by increasing evidence of drug addiction and associated crimes domestically, once again recommended harsher penalties, reflecting a belief to be expressed the following year by President Nixon, when he blamed drugs for increases in street crimes.

The first US 'war on drugs' was declared by President Nixon in 1972, and global drug production and trafficking were highlighted as domestic political issues. The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), was created in 1973 to augment the

---

already existing 32 federal agencies co-operating in the field, with the task of eliminating drugs as close as possible to their source, and disrupting supply.73 While the United States was by no means inactive in seeking, unsuccessfully, to depress internal demand for drugs, it appears nonetheless to have believed that the key was supply. The logic was that the less each source country produced the less would be exported to the USA. While, clearly, if none were produced anywhere in the world there would be none to be exported,74 history has shown that even major variations in production, for example reductions in Pakistan and Turkey or increases in Afghanistan and Myanmar, have little impact on levels of export to the United States. In international commerce between first and third world countries the balance of the market is determined by the former. It follows that in this instance the determining factor is demand. The greater the demand, the greater will be the supply; the less the demand, the less will be the supply. Commenting on the demand for drugs in the USA, the Colombian President Belisario Bentancuo said:

In the world war against narcotics, we need the commitment of the consumer nations to attack the demand with the same vigour we have shown. We can make all sacrifices possible, but if there is enormous demand, production will never be completely eradicated.75

Since 1973, however, direct US intervention in foreign countries has been predicated on controlling narcotic supply. This first happened in Mexico, when President Carter ordered the DEA to eradicate opium there. Successive US administrations have not been unaware of the importance of drugs, particularly during the Reagan presidency, when Vice President Bush, as a former CIA head, particularly knew its importance. During the Reagan era, the US and Pakistan were very close, and huge amounts of US dollars came to Pakistan in the name of drug control, accompanied, of course, by DEA agents, yet both production and consumption took quantum leaps. I return later to this political aspect of narcotics production.

In 1986 President Reagan declared a second ‘war on drugs’ and CIA and DEA planned enforcement occurred in Gadoon Amazai area, where 26 farmers were killed in a battle over crop destruction. The US not only defrayed the cost of this

73 M.D. Lyman and G.W. Potter, op.cit. p.297.
75 The Los Angeles Times (Los Angeles: December 1, 1985)
killing but also offered to help establish an industrial estate to offer alternative resources to opium growers. Still, this did not reduce opium production, as the tribal areas and Afghanistan were there to compensate the reduction in supply under CIA patronage during this intense period of the Afghan war, during which President Bush declared yet a third war on drugs in 1991.

All these wars have two aspects, namely, demand reduction inside America and supply reduction in the producer countries. America has not succeeded in reducing domestic demand; rather, it is on the increase, but the supply side has also not been affected, except for changes in production locations. The United States too, it should not be forgotten, is a drug producing country which meets around a quarter of the demands of its own soft drug market. But the concentration of supply reduction in countries outside America means that this has, in spite of periodic initiatives which lead to local raids, been left largely untouched.

Arguments for and against Legalisation

Anti-criminalization voices had been heard in the United States at least as far back as the 1940s, when it was suggested that a medical model, then not entirely accurately termed ‘the British model’ be adopted, as it was considered to have been successful in eradicating heroin addiction there. In 1961 a joint report by the American Medical Association and the American Bar Association argued for the legal availability of drugs to addicts, pleading that if addiction could not be cured - and nothing thus far had been successful - perhaps the disease could be managed, much as the diabetic’s disease is managed, by maintenance doses of insulin. Debates about legalisation and decriminalisation were especially lively in the early 1960s, and in 1964, as we shall see later, experts started looking at the economics of legalisation.

The more recent campaign started within America when, in April 1988, Baltimore’s Mayor Kurt Schmoke publicly urged law makers to consider the legalisation of illicit substances. In 1993, the US Surgeon General also called for legalisation, and since then, many politicians, including former Secretary of State George Shultz,

---

76 M.D. Lyman and G.W. Potter, op.cit. p. 145
77 Ibid. p. 15.
prominent economists and law enforcement officers including Ralph Salerno (an expert on organised crime) and former New York City Police Commissioner Patrick Murphy have all called for a change in policy.

The legalisation debate appears, therefore, to be gaining momentum. Objections to legalisation are not mainly geared to defending the status quo, and some opponents of legalisation have been very blunt as to the nature of present problems: it is less in their analysis of the present than in their proposals for reform that they differ from the legalisation lobby. For example, among the opponents of legalisation, Aker agrees that prohibition has a number of negative impacts, including the creation of a "crime tariff" whereby a profitable black market for drugs is promoted which in turn supports criminal organisations.79

The main objections have to do with:

- fears of broader social damage being created by decriminalisation (a social fear),80
- the belief that legalisation would constitute an unacceptable surrender to criminals (a moral fear)
- anxiety that such a surrender would have a domino effect elsewhere, so leading to other similar issues being raised (a practical fear)
- the belief that legalisation would increase the rate of addiction further.

Of these objections, the last in particular certainly cannot be dismissed lightly. In support of it opponents of legalisation can point to the high proportion of current crimes committed under the influence of (legal) alcohol, as well as to road accidents and other associated health and medical costs. Certainly it is possible that the legal status of alcohol means that insufficient attention is addressed to alcohol, whereas the illegal status of heroin means that there is exaggerated awareness of the dangers associated with it, an awareness which is desirable, but which might be lost with the moral and social, as well as legal approval implicit in legalisation.

The impact of legalisation on health economics is inevitably speculative: while savings would be likely to accrue in areas such as dealing with the effects of adulterated substances and needles, any expansion in usage might impact negatively on the health budget and insurance premiums. Certainly these social costs suggest

---

80 R.L.Aker, op.cit.p154-5.
strongly to opponents of legalisation that the issue is far more complex than a matter of private choice: in a complex society the conduct of one person affects others in many ways.

The main arguments advanced by the legalisation lobby are:

- current policies are doomed to failure because they are repeating the mistakes associated with alcohol prohibition in 1917 and are therefore counterproductive. In particular, just as the huge profits to be realised from prohibition generated powerful and wealthy criminal organisations, which had diminished in influence by 1933 when alcohol was legalised, so will legalisation today undermine the corruption prevalent in the drug world;

- legalisation will improve public safety by reducing the numbers of violent and property crimes committed in order to obtain drugs;

- legalisation will save the exchequer the huge sum currently spent on law enforcement, as well as increasing revenue by the creation of legitimate drug duty;

- there would be certain medical benefits. While legalisation might not reduce the problem of drug abuse, and some addicts would continue to lead chaotic lives, cheaper and more available drugs would reduce the pressure to commit crimes to obtain them. They would be better integrated into their families and society at large, more likely to be employed and more amenable to treatment. All this would help them restore their health, lost due to adulterated street drugs;

- legalisation would lead to quality control of drugs which are currently adulterated, so reducing some of the health risks associated with consumption;

- while drug addiction and abuse are already on the increase, there is little reason to believe that legalisation would create an epidemic. In fact the end of Prohibition saw reductions in alcohol related organised crime, while production and consumption fell by 60%;

- a victimless crime such as drug use does not warrant application of the coercive power of the state to suppress freedom of choice, as long as this freedom does not

---

81 R. Stevenson, op.cit. p.52.
82 Ibid. p.53- 82.
83 Ibid.p.82.
impinge upon the freedom of others. In a democratic society it is not the responsibility of government to make all decisions for the people;

• legalisation would eliminate the personal stigma and social consequences experienced by otherwise law abiding citizens who have been criminalised as a result of drug use alone and who therefore experience the social exclusion (and the secondary deviance this can spawn) associated with a criminal record.\(^{84}\) One of the philosophies of the Dutch system is that labelling and embarrassing an abuser is more dangerous than being an addict.\(^{85}\)

• the unintended consequences of prohibition are unpredictable, and unmanageable by Government. For example, recent research shows that tighter policing of marijuana imports has stimulated domestic production by raising potency from 1% to 18%, increasing supply, encouraging the introduction of new dangerous drugs to the market and prompting the creation of marijuana syndicates in place of the small, disorganised growers which had dominated the market before the eradication campaign.\(^{86}\)

Addiction and Control in Pakistan

When, prior to the Hudood Ordinance of 1979, there was abundant opium production in Pakistan, there was almost no addiction problem, with some 315,000 opium abusers\(^{87}\) out of a population of 100 million - 0.31%. When opium was banned and production reduced, however, heroin took its place in such an alarming way that in less than twenty years, two million people became addicted to it. I will discuss later some of the background to this. Here, I discuss the way in which what seems to have been intended to be a classic moral panic about opium production and heroin addiction was created to serve vested interests. In the early 1980s, when heroin was introduced in Pakistan, most people did not know about it. The state-controlled print and electronic media played a very important role in creating a

---


moral panic about opium and heroin, but not other drugs, including cannabis, and alcohol, the latter especially being the preferred intoxicant of the upper class, and a product manufactured in Pakistan in spite of religious prohibitions. But the more intense the movement against opiates became, the more addiction spread. This was a moral panic on the pattern of alcohol prohibition in the United States in the second decade of this century, and was an imported model of creating such a panic but lacking some of its indicators.

The actors in this panic were the print and electronic media, officials of the Narcotics Control Board, politicians, and government and foreign funded NGOs. The media exaggerated and distorted the facts, created stereotypes, and sensationalised and dramatised events. Local newspapers over-reported minor domestic problems, attributing them to heroin addiction. Violence against women, a common characteristic of Pakistani society, was reported in many cases as the result of drug craving and the desire for money to satisfy it; and thefts and burglaries were increasingly attributed to the same motivation.

Opium crops and poppy capsules were pictured as ‘cobras’ and ‘snakes’ devouring youths. Well to do people were dramatised as the victims of opiates, their families destroyed. Heroin seized from addicts was reported as being meant for international trafficking and addicts were lumped with the international drug Mafia. The value of seized drugs was glamorised and reported in millions of pounds and dollars in the international markets, their value in Pakistani currency seldom being reported. This created an impression of smuggling for vast profits, and certainly Pakistani traffickers were arrested in many foreign countries and even executed on drugs charges in some so-called Islamic countries.

Governors and Chief Ministers who spoke against drugs were given heavy media coverage. NGOs were specially created against drugs and were heavily funded. These in turn exaggerated the situation, not least for their own ends, and organised street corner meetings to which they invited the parents of addicts who used to weep and cry before the audience about the plights of their children and wards. These parents were presented everywhere at the expense of different NGOs. The Pakistan Narcotics Control Board organised seminars and symposia in five star hotels like the Taj Mahal Karachi, and invited foreign speakers. But when they
were asked about the production statistics, officials put off the questioners or became rude.

The fact, however, is that in Pakistan 60% of heroin addicts were literate, and a similar percentage was employed at the time of initiation of drug use. So why was this moral panic created? Experts have identified three types of moral panics - the "grass-roots model", the "elite-engineered Model", and the "interest group model". In Pakistan the panic about drugs was an 'elite-engineered model'. In this model, the panic is normally created by people in power or authority. It is explained thus:

An elite group deliberately and consciously undertake a campaign to generate and sustain concern, fear, and panic on the part of the public over an issue... Typically this campaign is intended to divert attention away from the real problems in the society, where solution would threaten or undermine the interest of the elites.... Elites have immense powers over the other members of the society -- they dominate the media, determine the content of legislation and the direction of law enforcement, and control much of the resources on which action groups and social movements depend.

This was a period in Pakistan in which more serious internal and external problems than drugs existed. The Army had taken over the Government; the civilian political leadership was disorganised and under ground; civil rights were ignored and the constitution suspended; under the "Theory of Necessity" the Supreme Court had justified the imposition of Martial law; elective aspects of Islam which could strengthen the rulers were projected; an elected Prime Minister was executed; the link between the public and the ruler was missing; extremists were engaged in terrorist atrocities; corruption was promoted, even among student activists, to buy their loyalty; new and inexperienced politicians were promoted and corruption

---

88 In July 1985, in a seminar organised by the Pakistan Narcotics Control Board, Mr Taha Qureshi, a high official of PNCB, presented very high figures of addiction. When the present author drew his attention to the number of addicts and the quantity of opium produced in the country, and asked from where did the rest of opium come into Pakistan to satisfy the needs of heroin addicts, Qureshi's answer was "Don't be defensive on the part of NWFP".


91 Ibid. p.135.
permitted; state institutions were in disarray; elections on a non-party basis had further fuelled corruption, every member parliament having been given development funds of not less than five million rupees each a year which they embezzled easily; to weaken the hold of some well organised religio-political parties which might be a threat to the ruling junta, new parties, such as MQM in urban Sind 92 were created and patronised on an ethnic basis.

The Afghan problem was gaining momentum, and many people had already fled to Pakistan. As a result of this situation, sabotage activities in the country had started. Bomb blasts were a daily occurrence in bazaars and other public places. The situation in Iran was changing rapidly and anti-Shah demonstrations were culminating in bloody clashes between law enforcers and the people. Many Iranians had also come to Pakistan and more were coming as refugees. In these conditions the economy was depressed, as foreign aid had been stopped by the donor countries due to the suspension of democracy in the country. The attitude of the Carter Administration toward the rulers was very cold if not negative, and in this situation American support was the only bail-out for the rulers. They were trying to do anything which could please them and change their attitude. Pakistanis and Americans, were both mindful of the Iranian and Afghan situation and the 'bogeyman' danger of communism in the region. Islamabad needed US support in any shape, while the United States needed Pakistani land as a front line against Russian designs. This political nexus ultimately brought them closer in common cause against communism, though the US offer to Pakistan an did of US$400 million was termed 'peanuts' by General Zia 93 in the start of a bargaining process which Pakistan ultimately won. But:

_the aim of US foreign aid, despite predictable protests to the contrary, has never been to eliminate poverty or to expand democracy. The dismal record in these two areas is glaring. US foreign aid -- whether economic, developmental or military-- has always served the dual purpose of politically rewarding our perceived friends and forcing US capital into foreign markets_94.

---

Since 1970, drug control has often been the dominant issue in US-Pakistan relationships but in 1979 the so called 'war on drugs' was extended to Pakistan. Soon after this, the Reagan administration was generous in its aid to Pakistan, and the person in charge of the anti-narcotics task force, Vice President George Bush, as a former CIA head, was well aware of the importance of narcotics in furthering US interests in the area.

So a panic was created officially, but it lacked many of the indicators of a moral panic, identified by Goode and Ben-Yahuda as important, including concern, hostility, consensus, volatility, and disproportionality. To take one example, the first indicator, concern, can probably best be measured by the availability and success of treatment facilities throughout the country. There were and are no rehabilitation services for the addicts at all. Supply of the drugs, particularly heroin, was under the patronage of the law enforcement agencies, particularly the police and customs. The national airline PIA (Pakistan International Airline) helped a lot in the drug business overseas, and food trolleys were used for smuggling heroin. Officials in jails openly sold drugs like heroin and cannabis, and those who reported them to higher authorities were brutalised. Members of Parliament have been involved in drug trafficking and some of them are under trial in the courts with no results for the last many years. The latest list of drug traffickers reported by the press includes the name of God-like politicians and officials and some uniformed officials.

Society showed little or no concern about these panics of drugs and drug addiction. When people were told about the dangers, some replied:

1. Drugs are no problem, leave these poor people alone, they haven't caused any harm.

---

98 'Customs Patronising Drug-trafficking' The Frontier Post (Peshawar, 11 March 1997)
137 "Heroin was smuggled in Zia's aircraft", The Frontier Post (Lahore: May 7, 1997).
2. Didn’t you know people have been smoking these drugs, what is new about it? Are you a foreigner?

3. We manufacture and process drugs primarily for export because people abroad need these drugs. Have the people of the west closed down their breweries and pharmaceutical factories?

4. How many are the addicts? What percentage of the population? How many thousands? You don’t have a significant number of people addicted to drugs. These responses reflect the traditional attitude of indifference prevalent among the majority of the population. It is not without reason. People have known opiates for ages. Their belief is that drug use is still fairly moderate, and prevalent among only a relatively small sub-group.

Religion and religious leaders have a very deep influence in Pakistan in general and the tribal areas in particular. The government functionaries and the international experts on narcotics knew this fact. They tried to win them over and use them to speak against opium. But most of the religious scholars had an indifferent attitude towards opium production. Recently, the United Nations tried to get a commitment from the Taliban Government in Afghanistan against opium production but to their dismay the Taliban’s verdict, after fifteen months, was that opium production is not un-Islamic or against Islam; drug production (heroin manufacture) on the other hand, is against Islam. Most of these religious leaders in Pakistan who speak on every day to day matter of the country, did not speak out against opium. Some politico-religious leaders close to the government officials, in other words in the good books of the government, were invited to such meetings to speak against drugs of addiction. They definitely spoke against intoxicants, but very few against opium production.

Nor there is hostility towards addicts or addiction or drugs of addiction. Addicts may be despised and pitied, but are not the subject of enmity. Accurately or not, they are not seen as being heavily associated with crime, and certainly most chronic

---

141 The Times (London: August 11,1997).
142 “Taliban say poppy cultivation is not against Islam” in The Frontier Post (Peshawar: November 11, 1998)
addicts satisfy their need through begging. Smugglers and drug pushers are seen as members of high class elites, whom ordinary people cannot criticise, or respectable people above the law and above criticism, as in the case of many Members of Parliament.

There is, in Pakistan, little or no consensus or trust between the people and state officials, state and society being far apart. What officials say is disbelieved; even the addiction figures are subjects of political controversy between independent analysts and Government departments. The state institutions also negate the state law, and the customs and police department in particular patronise the drugs business.

The Case for Controlled Legalisation in Pakistan

Drug addiction, then, is a relatively new problem in Pakistan, and it is not too late for the country to adapt to the new situation. Unfortunately Pakistan has had no indigenous drug policy since independence, initially adopting the former colonial policy of 1858 and 1868, with the major change that she produced her own opium instead of importing from India. But otherwise the system of licensing opium consumption (opium being the only significant drug available at that time) continued, largely unchanged and operating in a broadly satisfactory way, until the introduction of the Hudood Ordinance in 1979.

It was at this time that the addiction problem surfaced. It remains unclear why this suppressive law was adopted at this time, given that the problem of opium addiction was at this time so small. The prohibition on production meant Pakistan as a country lost a source of her internal revenue, while thousands of her people lost a source of livelihood. Still it is not too late, however, for the country to formulate a new and balanced drug policy which suits her internal interests, such as is being pursued by India. What is wrong with the production of opium? Why was its production and sale, once licit, suddenly pronounced illicit? If something was wrong it was not opium production but in-built corruption in government and institutional inefficiency. With regard to opium production, the Ordinance meant that Pakistan left the door open for India, and today, partly in consequence, India is the world's largest licit opium producer.
It is not possible to separate drugs from the society in which they are used and the problems faced by that society. Drugs perform a social function, and drug problems are often symptoms of deeper and more complex human problems\textsuperscript{143}. Drugs were not a serious problem, but propaganda and exaggeration made them one. By exaggeration and overstating the case, Pakistanis have made the truth more difficult to grasp. Their shouts and screams for the last two decades eventually have stopped other nations listening to them. The country needs to come out of this situation. Politically motivated donations and assistance in the name of eliminating opium and opium farmers will not serve the long term national interest. If tomorrow the US drug policy and priorities were to change, where would Pakistan stand?

There is much to be said for creating a balanced and controlled policy of drug production, involving medicalisation and decriminalisation, in a way which integrates the European model with Pakistan’s traditional model prior to 1979. Controlled legalisation, involving licensing or regulating opium production, of the kind which has been practised in the Indo-Pak sub-continent for more than one and half centuries, combined with the medicalization of its derivatives, is the only means of reducing the real risks posed by hard drugs, particularly heroin. Pakistan should therefore go back to her pre1979 policy on opium production, with her own heroin available for supply to addicts through the medical profession, but bolster this with renewed attempts at rehabilitation.

In the field of drug treatment, opiates are used as a substitute. After all, what is Methadone? Is raw opium not used for heroin addiction treatment in Pakistan? Why should the use of one opiate be legal while another is not? Why cannot sale through pharmacies and hospitals, instead of the vend system already known in the country, be adopted? Opium has many legitimate uses, for example as a cough suppressant and pain killer. Raw opium has been used for these purposes in the sub-continent for more than two millennia and still there is a very large and apparently controlled legal production of opium in countries including India and France.\textsuperscript{144} In India, opium is a traditional folk medicine, a raw material for export, and a basis for semi-synthetic and synthetic medical products inside the country. In Pakistan the same model could be revived for its pharmaceutical industry and even for export. But for this to happen the government would have to allow production.

\textsuperscript{144} P. Reuter, 1985, \textit{op.cit}. p.82.
Pakistan is a poor country which has from the first depended on foreign loans and assistance, and at present it has an international debt of US$40bn. Opium production is some 70% more profitable than the next crop\textsuperscript{145} and local people are dependent on the poppy economy in lieu of any other source of livelihood. When opium cultivation was banned, the state deprived its own people of a legitimate source of livelihood and added to their already severe economic burdens. Controlled legalisation would allow these communities to earn their livelihood as they did before the ban. The major role for the government would be to procure opium according to the market price, in order to eliminate competition from the illicit market.

The Government is trying a foreign donation-oriented crop-substitution programme in the drug producing areas, but it should be aware that such programmes do not offer solutions and are often a waste of resources. If national and international donations and support are meant for the programme, the policy has failed, since much of them has been diverted into private bank accounts. For example, the Senate Committee on Interior and Drugs has pointed out such embezzlement in the developmental funds for crop substitution and alternative development in the drug producing areas\textsuperscript{146} and pursuing a failed policy is of advantage only to embezzlers.

Similar programmes have been tried for almost three decades in some South American countries, notably Bolivia and the Andean nations, and have deprived many farmers of their livelihood. Recently, however, the Andean governments have chosen non-coercive programmes\textsuperscript{147}. In Pakistan, when the crop-substitution programme failed (and evidence on the effectiveness of crop-substitution programmes, though slender, is, sadly, discouraging)\textsuperscript{148} the Government switched back to coercion, and this process has since continued with ever more resources being allocated to it, including turning the military on their own people.

Such a policy as that here proposed would help the national exchequer in another way. In Pakistan the bureaucracy is already oversized and there has been a demand from international organisations like the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank for Pakistan to downsize the service sector, in order to reduce her need

\textsuperscript{145} Government of Pakistan, \textit{Buner Agriculture Development Project: The Buner Model}, op. cit. p.25.
\textsuperscript{146} \textit{Daily Jang} (London: April 29, 1999).
\textsuperscript{147} P. Reuter, 1992, \textit{op.cit.} p.158.
\textsuperscript{148} \textit{Ibid.}
for more and more loans. Legalisation would free up for other uses the resources currently devoted to the unsuccessful and counterproductive enforcement policy, so opening the door for serious developments in the therapeutic aspects of demand side reduction strategies. Treatment facilities, as we have repeatedly shown, have hitherto been scandalously neglected.

According to Reuter’s ‘Risk and Price’ approach, all enforcement efforts thus far, including eradication, refinery destruction and increased policing, have added to the risk experienced by the pushers, and hence led to an increase in drug prices.\textsuperscript{149} At present, some western countries give assistance to retain the enforcement agencies like the Anti Narcotic Force (ANF) in addition to the already existing police, narcotics police, and many others, but there is every likelihood that after some time, when the international donations dry up, maintaining these forces will be difficult for the Government.

Black money is a big problem in Pakistan, leading to many other economic problems. At present its volume is said to be 1,500 to 2,000 billion\textsuperscript{150} rupees. Out of this amount, 96 billion rupees are made by the drug traffickers within the country’s drug business\textsuperscript{151}. Drugs bring immense profits, which in turn bring high levels of susceptibility to corruption. With medicalization there would be no more profits for drug pushers, so enabling the Government to overcome one major source of corruption and black money. Americans who have experienced drugs related crimes say that:

\textit{If you take the profit out of drug trafficking, you won’t have young children selling drugs on behalf of pushers for $100 a night or wearing beepers to school because it makes more sense to run drugs for someone than to take some of the jobs that are available. I don’t know any kid who is making money by running booz\textsuperscript{152}.}

In Pakistan, heroin would no longer be so disproportionately profitable, and hence there would be less chance of uncontrolled drug availability. All the Government efforts against drugs should concentrate on suppression of illicit drug trafficking from and to the country.

\textsuperscript{149} \textit{Ibid.} pp.153-4
\textsuperscript{150} I. Dar (Pakistan Finance Minister) reported in \textit{Daily Jang} (London: May 28, 1999), p.1 and Editorial.
\textsuperscript{151} \textit{Daily Jang} (London: June 28, 1999).
\textsuperscript{152} M.D. Lyman and G.W. Potter \textit{op.cit.} p.369.
Legalising and/or regulating drugs would also mean they would be made available to addicts at cheaper prices and through legal means. The public health system should be given the leading role in preventing and treating substance abuse. In this way, the supply of such substances would be from the government to its institutions, and the government, not the criminals, would control price, distribution, purity and access to addictive substances. From a pharmacological viewpoint, unadulterated heroin causes little physical damage to the human body. It is said that it is the uncontrolled nature of street heroin that causes poisoning and leads to overdosing. Addicts should no longer be termed criminals but 'sick people' with a need for drugs. Currently addicts are at the mercy of traffickers and smugglers, who charge them high prices for their sickness. Legitimate provision would lessen the cost of purchase and hence reduce the need for the commission of crime to satisfy their need. Experiments along these lines have been successful in the Netherlands, where the number of addicts has fallen dramatically. In a city of a population of 700,000 some 0.4% are heroin addicts. This situation would earn some revenue for the country from drugs production, which could be spent on other aspects of drug related problems. It would not mean that drug addiction would totally come to an end, of course, and no doubt the problem of addiction will continue to exist as it has done throughout human civilisation. But it can be said that it would be controlled, and at least the number of addicts would be known to the state and medical profession, in contrast to the current unclear statistics of addiction. The fact has also to be faced that it is possible that drug addiction and production would increase temporarily, but the expectation is that it would subside after some time, much as some, at least, of the problems associated with prohibition did in the United States of the 1930s.

The more the enforcement, the higher the price of the drugs, and, in consequence, the more the addicts will have to pay. According to the US Surgeon-General, the cost of prohibition includes violence between drug traffickers, crime caused by addicts having to pay for inflated prices for their habit, overdosing and poisoning from contaminated illegal drugs and the spread of HIV and other infections through contaminated needles.

153 Ibid. p. 373.
155 The Economist op.cit. 22 January 1994.
Four main types of drug related crimes are committed, but such are the limitations of both criminal and health statistics in Pakistan that it is impossible here to mount even a 'guesstimate' of the numbers involved:

1 **Drug trafficking**, which involves mostly the intelligence agencies of the big countries: US Intelligence services, Britain's MI5, France's SDEC, Germany's Gehlen Organisation, Italy's SIFFARS\(^{156}\) and India's RAW, Israel's MOSAD and their clients elsewhere, has not been effectively controlled for ninety years. At present a huge amount of drug money is used by smugglers, narco-politicians and narco-guerrillas, not only to produce more and more illegal drugs but for non-monetary but seditious purposes. In Pakistan, ethnic violence in the southern part of the country and the sectarian violence which takes a heavy toll of lives every year, particularly in Punjab, are said by some western intelligence reports to be financed by drugs trafficking. Legalisation could end this source of terrorist money.

2 **Crimes committed to obtain drugs or money to pay for them.** The number of crimes committed to obtain drugs represents neither a significant threat to public order nor a significant proportion of crimes in the western world.\(^{157}\) In Pakistan, crimes to obtain drugs are surprisingly low given that an addict spends on average 2,000 rupees annually on drugs,\(^{158}\) while, as we have seen, 60% of addicts are educated and employed at the time of initiating drugs.\(^{159}\) This does not mean that drug abusers do not commit crimes but the intensity is not like that in the USA and other countries. The main crime committed by addicts is begging, which is prohibited under the 1958 Vagrancy Ordinance, but no practical step by the state to implement the law and to help the beggars not to beg has been taken so far. But addicts who are deserted and cast out by their family members have a miserable life. They live on or near garbage dumps, waiting rooms of the railway stations and bus terminals, in the shades of shops and other unhygienic places, and ultimately catch various infectious diseases and die in miserable conditions, their bodies frequently devoured by dogs and other animals. In the face of such circumstances we might enquire which is more humane: leaving addicts to the mercy of their addiction or meeting their needs at a low price? Drug takers inevitably commit crimes to secure or finance their supply, but how many crimes would occur if drugs were

\(^{156}\) C. Lausane. *op.cit.* p.117.


\(^{158}\) *Daily Jang* (London: June 28,1999)

\(^{159}\) South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) Workshop, *op.cit.* p.1.
legitimately available? This would also eliminate the trend of addicts to become suppliers and peddlers, mixing with, and becoming, smugglers, to satisfy their need.

3 *Crime committed under the influence of drugs* (alcohol) because judgement is impaired. Such crime may be violent, even fatal.

4 *Corruption* is a problem in Pakistan, and drugs have heavy potential to corrupt. If drugs were regulated and legalised, the trend of corruption would decrease. No drugs would be sold under the patronage of police stations and other law enforcers, since to do so would no longer be as profitable. In order to break the power of corruption, legalisation is the only solution as the forces of corruption are stronger in Pakistan than the anti-narcotic force.

The Hudood Ordinance of February 1979 was almost certainly primarily a response to successful US diplomatic pressure. The drug addiction problem is related to this ban on opium and other intoxicants. Inside Pakistan there is public resentment at US interference in domestic affairs, but the ruler’s compulsion helps to perpetuate such interference. The ban on opium, which is driving the nation into a heroin disaster, is a clear evidence of US made policies in Pakistan. If the Government adopted its own model of drug management, or at least the system which was in use in the sub-continent for more than a century, it could switch back the addicts to opium and a regulated supply, with heroin of known purity distributed through the medical system. This would give the public a sense of independence, get rid of US pressures and dictates, and lead to psychological liberation inside the country. Apparently, US pressure seems to be the major problem in adopting a pro-legalisation stance in Pakistan, as there is a saying that “Three As rule Pakistan: America, Allah and the Army”. But the country will have to come out of this political trap before US asks – or, in effect, permits - Pakistan to give up its anti-drug policies, and how this is to be done, with a debt the size of the current one, is a matter beyond the scope of this thesis.

Politicians normally oppose legalisation or decriminalisation. In Pakistan, however, the most vocal politician, the Leader of Awami National Party (ANP), Khan Abdul Wali Khan, has clearly opposed Government moves to eradicate opium, suggesting that the Government should buy opium from the farmers, and terming opium

production the right of the growers. Not only he, but almost every political party in the opium growing areas, in particular, supports the growers. The political atmosphere is not against opium production and it would not be difficult for Government to revert to previous policies. In politics Pakistan style, Parliament is relatively powerless and Government always strong. Law making is by decree or Presidential Ordinance, with Parliament, elected members and experts never taken into the confidence of the executive. This is precisely what occurred with the Hudood Ordinance and its amendment. In such a context it is unlikely that there would - or could - be serious opposition to reversion.

Many opponents of legalisation put their case on a moral base. If this is the criterion of morality, a question arises, was America not moral before the prohibition of 1917? Did it then immediately become moral with the prohibition and then switch back to its pre-prohibition status? Was Pakistan not moral from 1947-1979, before the Hudood Ordinance? Did it become moral when it followed an imported model of drugs control and banned the production of opium and other intoxicants? Did it not return to pre-1979 status by permitting and licensing alcohol and wine manufacture and use? This aspect needs consideration in Pakistan.

The Hudood Ordinance was not directed only at opium (heroin was non-existent at that time). General Zia was, according to the general understanding in the country, against alcohol, and in fact during his reign many drinkers were arrested and whipped publicly to implement his brand of Islam. But what is the situation of alcohol in Pakistan today? Alcohol use, manufacture and transportation are still prohibited under the constitution. There was one alcoholic beverage factory in the country before 1979 which has developed into a big cartel with half a dozen branch factories in different cities of the country, and today two more companies are allowed to make wines, whisky, gin, brandy, vodka and beer. There are 25,000 licence holders in one province, Punjab, who are permitted to sell alcohol, and 15,000 licence holders in one city, Lahore, more than the number of public houses in a large city in Great Britain. Consequently it can be safely claimed that alcohol use is on the rise inside the country.

This change took place very silently. Initially the prohibition was relaxed for non-Muslims who, in the second phase, were, together with foreign missions, permitted to import wine. In this way many Muslims became permit holders, licensed to sell wine and other alcoholic drinks in the country. Smuggled wine is confiscated, but then auctioned to five star hotels and other influential places, often at nominal prices. The use of wine by parliamentarians is a known fact: in March 1997, for example, an employee of a MNA’s hostel in Islamabad alleged that many Members of Parliament had purchased wine from him but not paid him. He threatened that if they did not pay him the 500,000 rupees owed to him he would disclose their names.

The moral argument, in short, is selectively employed. It is hard to defend as moral the current state of affairs whereby a religiously forbidden drug, alcohol, though not legal is nonetheless available to its powerful and wealthy users, but a medicinal drug is prohibited.

Conclusion

In this chapter, after a brief review of the history and geography of drugs and the generally unsuccessful attempts to control them, I have shown how, in order to criminalise drugs in Pakistan, in 1979 a moral panic was created by the state controlled media. Politicians and officials spoke against drugs and drug abuse. This was a time when heroin like drugs were almost unknown, the main drugs of the day being opium and hashish. This situation glamorised heroin, in particular, which subsequently became a popular drug of choice in the country.

This was, in Goode and Ben-Yahuda’s formulation, close to an elite-engineered model of moral panic, deliberately created to meet certain political objectives, namely to divert public attention from the political issues facing the country at a time of Martial law and the suspension of civil governance, and to secure approval from the United States, Pakistan’s major donor country. But I have also shown that this panic lacked many of indicators identified by Goode and Ben-Yahuda, in particular public concern, public hostility towards drugs and drugs dealers, and consensus. The Government, as well as the international community, tried to obtain the support of the clergy in Pakistan in the drugs field but they failed, and to their
dismay, in Afghanistan the Taliban government declared that opium production was not against Islam.

Given, however, the concerted media campaign by a state controlled Press and the diversionary intent of the introduction of the panic, including the demonisation of the crop itself, there seems little doubt that this was a failed attempt at introducing an elite-engineered moral panic. But a two-fold theoretical lesson from this incident is, first, that the attempt, though unsuccessful in creating public support for the Ordinance in particular and the military government in general, actually was not necessary for the Ordinance to do its job. This suggests that the model of moral panic developed by these authors requires revision for it to have applicability in a country ruled by a military dictatorship.

Secondly, we learn from this that the campaign in fact had another, entirely different, consequence, in that it appears to have contributed to genuine changes in behaviour, but not that intended by the authors of the original panic. It is impossible to be confident that, without the campaign and the Ordinance, heroin would not anyway have gained in popularity; but there is no specific reason to believe it would. A twin effect appears, therefore, to have occurred: the criminalisation of a hitherto popular product fuelled demand for a related but new product, and a glamorisation effect resulted from misjudged propaganda: what was intended to be a threat was interpreted by its target audience as a challenge. Such an effect would be perfectly plausible, and undoubtedly recognisable to many drugs campaigners in the West.

Overall, the topic of drugs is very sensitive and immediately takes one into the dramatic world of crimes, smuggling, ripping and running, needles, HIV, junkies, burglars and so on. It is and has been a topic of high politics and propaganda. The scene is changing slowly, however, and attitudes towards drugs and drug addicts are also changing, as more people become aware of, and disenchanted with, repressive drug policies. The movement for liberalisation is gaining ground, and voices are increasingly heard saying that legalisation of dangerous drugs is the only way to tackle drugs and drug related problems. Proponents of this view include politicians, police and other law enforcement officers, medical professionals and legal experts.
The legalisation lobby bases its arguments on historical, economic, political and sociological experience of drug policies: prohibition has failed, the war has been lost, the fight is hopeless. Pursuing failed policies only causes more problems. Legalisation, on the other hand, would reduce the cost of prohibition, permitting the redeployment of resources allocated to harsher and repressive but failing policies to better ends, so reducing the burden on the national exchequer. It would lead to improvements in health for the addicted, reducing such drug-related harms as adulterated drugs and overdoses, the major causes of drug-related deaths. Present policies have created many social problems, particularly domestic violence and other crimes against property and persons, committed either to obtain drugs or under their influence. Prohibition has inflated prices, and if the users or abusers were provided with cheaper drugs, the crime rate would fall, leading to savings in, for example, drug related court cases and imprisonment. Legalisation would remove the label of criminality from drug addicted citizens, in turn reducing the number of criminals to the universal good.

On the other hand, opponents of legalisation believe that the existence of cheaply available drugs would increase still further the rate of addiction, and the abuse of hard drugs like heroin and cocaine. The answer to this objection given by the proponents is that drug addiction is already on the increase, and legalisation, of itself, would make no great difference. The major source of opposition, however, is moral, with legalisation a surrender to criminals and drug pushers which does not behave a civilised society. The proponents riposte that if this is the criterion, then what is their view about the prohibition and subsequent legalisation of alcohol?

Though the arguments are played out like a tennis match. the legalisation lobby appears to be gaining ground. Nevertheless, the gap between winning an argument and securing a radical change of policy in the face of strong opposition from both powerful Muslim interests and wealthy First World consumer countries with their own drug politics, and to whom massive debts are owed is vast. Legalisation would, however, have many advantages for Pakistan. Under diplomatic pressure from the United States it declared opium production unIslamic, and in order to pursue the edict deployed army and government forces to eliminate not only opium but opium producers as well. Opium has many medical and non-medical purposes for the growers, as does the coca bush in the Andean and some other South American countries. Legalisation would reduce the economic problems of opium growers as it
would reduce the burden on the national exchequer in various ways, including expenditure on the Anti-Narcotic Force, police, intelligence, jails, and hospitals. Above all, it would reduce corruption.
CHAPTER VIII: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

In this thesis I have explained at some length the geography, topography, politics, administration and economics of Pakistan, NWFP, and in particular the tribal areas (FATAs and PATAs). This information is not repeated here. In summary, however, I have drawn attention to the impoverished state of the tribal areas, their physical suitability for opium growing, their inaccessibility and hostility to Islamabad, and their distinct legal system. FATA laws, which are largely those of the former colonial administration, give power without accountability to bureaucrats and politicians. As a result, political corruption is rampant.

This thesis has addressed opium and heroin production in NWFP and the fact that addiction in Pakistan as a whole, particularly to home-made heroin, is spreading with alarming speed and damaging consequences. In fact, Pakistan contains 25% of the world’s heroin addicts in spite of the fact that heroin addiction was first reported (in Baluchistan Province) as recently as 1979, a year before the first cases surfaced in NWFP. Since then, however, addiction has spread like a contagious disease, with no cure and little or no care by the state. Today Pakistan has more than four million addicts, of whom 51% are addicted to heroin alone; and the number is increasing by an average of 100,000 annually.

Domestically I have shown the main political factors provoking heroin addiction to have been the Hudood Ordinance, the Iranian Revolution and the Soviet-Afghan War, in all three of which the United States was complicit. I have argued that domestically, heroin supply has driven demand much more strongly than demand has driven supply. The international drugs economy too is driven, like any economy, by the law of supply and demand, but internationally the relationship between them has been complex. While, internationally too, demand is strongly stimulated by easy availability, the recycling of the purchasing power of affluent consumer countries into the economies of impoverished provider countries stimulates supply, and where supply in one area is cut off it will, inevitably, begin somewhere else. This has led me to question the feasibility or desirability of any Pakistani policy of supply side control alone (such policies also often have ulterior

political motives), and to advocate regulation combined with rehabilitation. This would restrict the supply of the more physically damaging forms of heroin, reduce the damage to the livelihood of hill farmers, and generate official revenue which could be recycled into rehabilitation of domestic addicts rather than into the pockets of international criminals.

Nevertheless, supply remains a crucial part of the equation, and the 'why' of availability - the processes which have led to opiate production in NWFP - drives the empirical study reported in Chapter V. This study was conducted in the opium and heroin producing tribal areas: the provincially administered tribal District of Dir, and the federally administered tribal agencies of Bajaur, Khyber and Muhmand, in North-West Frontier Province. It mainly answers the question why and how drugs are produced in Pakistan. To what extent and how are economic, political, historical and geographical factors responsible? In what ways are the political considerations national, regional or international? It is based on the hypothesis, which has the support of many experts in the field, 165 that economic and political uncertainties and instabilities have led the people of the area to produce these drugs as a part of their private economies and survival strategies, not as a deliberate criminal enterprise. For reasons discussed, I assumed indicators of poverty to include large family size, lack of opportunity structure, poor education, small land holdings, and (partly for cultural reasons) expenditure exceeding an income which was itself very uncertain.

History has had an important impact on the development of drugs and its culture in the tribal areas, and I have traced the history of opium in the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent in general and the area under study in particular. Although my study is not comparative, for reasons explained above, I have been able to demonstrate that the poor economic conditions of the area and the political insatiability in the region, as well as the poor administration in the country, are indeed associated with drug production.

In order to understand the economic conditions of the people in the opium producing areas, data were collected as mentioned earlier. The universe of the research was divided into two clusters: Peshawar Division in the west and Malakand Division in the north. From these clusters two areas each were selected

for data collection. In the first cluster the tribal Agencies of Muhmand and Khyber were selected, where, respectively, opium and heroin are produced. In the northern cluster, the District of Dir and Bajaur Agency, which have been very famous for this crop internationally, were selected. Sampling size was determined proportionally: the greater the area cultivated with opium the greater was its representation. Opium growing communities were sampled in all three areas, and personal contacts used to gain access. In the course of visits to the concerned communities, lists of opium cultivators were constructed as a sampling frame, from which respondents were randomly selected, no list of opium cultivators being available from administrative or developmental offices in the areas. Semi-structured interviews were then conducted, following Interview Schedule I.

Interview Schedule II was used to study heroin production in Khyber Agency. Some local educated people were interviewed about the historical development of heroin in the area, the economic conditions of the people, and the impact of the Afghan war on the local economy. Ordinary people, including transporters, market committee representatives and political activists were asked about the opportunity and the availability structure in the area, and their views about the involvement of administrators and politicians were discussed.

Before this study, in Pakistan, there existed no such information about the history of opium and heroin, the addiction situation in the country, the Government’s role in the development of the poor communities, the economic and political causes of opium and heroin production, and possible solutions to the addiction as well as opium production problem. These issues were therefore discussed, following Interview Schedule III, with intellectuals, including law enforcement officers, development economists, politicians, anthropologists, historians, psychiatrists and political scientists.

In order to find out the political causes of production of these drugs I discussed the various political systems operating in the drug producing areas, the regional impact of the Iranian revolution and the twelve year Soviet-Afghan war, the consequences of the involvement of a super power, the role of Pakistani political corruption and the political atmosphere in the opium producing areas. In the following sections I present the conclusions of the study.
Pakistan is an underdeveloped south Asian country. Mismanagement and political corruption since independence in 1947 have led directly to its current dependence on foreign loans and donations. External debt is currently US$43 billion, with foreign exchange reserves of only one billion\(^3\). Recent international reports put the average national *per capita* annual income at around US$420\(^4\) but the *per capita* income in NWFP in general and in the opium producing areas in particular is far less than this: my empirical data showed it to be around US$136 (see Table 5-6). This is in line with the figure of US$80-130\(^5\) calculated fifteen years ago. Even on the World Bank figures, however, the average income would be little more than 60 pence a day.

Politically, internally and externally Pakistan is weak and riddled with contradictions – between political ideology and political culture, and between the Constitution and the legal system. Constitutionally the country is an Islamic Republic, but its legal practices are often anti-Islamic and anti-democratic, many laws and practices of the colonial era which favour the rulers and politicians still being in force unchanged (for example the Police Acts of 1857, 1895 and 1935).

Politically, Pakistan has a federal system, with a concentration of power in a few hands, and consequent feelings of deprivation and helplessness among provinces other than Punjab. Administratively it is divided into four provinces - Baluchistan, Punjab, NWFP and Sind – the Federal Capital Territory (Islamabad District) and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATAs) and Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (PATAs) of NWFP, which have different political systems. The latter (comprising Malakand Division and parts of Hazara Division) have an amalgamation of Anglo-Muhammadan laws of 1857 which the Government considers Islamic Shariah, the Divisional Commissioner being the centre of power. Pakistan has been under martial law for half of its fifty years of independence, but the so-called elected democratic governments have proved worse than the military, having been notorious for corruption, embezzlement, cronyism and clientelism.

---

\(^3\) Lord MacIntosh (UK Minister of State for Finance) reported in *Daily News* (London: July 17, 1999)


\(^5\) G. Kruseman, *Socio-Economic Aspects of Poppy Cultivation: Selected Farm Profile of Eastern Dir Valleys and Dir Kohistan* (Peshawar: Special Development Unit, 1985), p.VIII.
Externally, Pakistan is weak due to factors largely stemming from economic vulnerability. As a result it can seldom withstand pressure from western powers, even regarding internal laws, as was seen in the Hudood Ordinance, which was contrary both to Islamic principles and the interests of Pakistan, but which met a number of American policy objectives.

In education, Pakistan cannot compete with many third world countries. The literacy ratio is officially over 39% but in fact it is not more than 26%⁶. Even today, more than 17 million children do not attend school. In health, conditions are even worse: the system and resources do not begin to meet demand. The drug producing tribal areas, particularly Dir District in PATA and Bajaur, Muhmand and Khyber Agencies in FATA, are the worst affected economically and politically, lacking any opportunities for honourable survival. The only resources are the physical labour of local people outside the province or their low quality small land holdings. Development is affected by inequity in Pakistan’s Five Year Development Plans, and areas which produce opium and heroin are virtually compelled to do so by a combination of internal socio-economic conditions and external geo-politics.

NWFP is the second most backward administrative part of the country. Despite fragmented attempts by successive provincial governments to establish industrial estates in opium growing parts of the province with foreign assistance, it has had no industrial base since independence. Most political and economic analysts see this as a deliberate ethnically based policy by a government dominated by urban Punjabis. Ethnically, the majority of the people of NWFP are Pukhtoon or Pushtoons. Pushto speaking people in general and the people of the tribal areas in particular migrated from Afghanistan in the 15th and 16th centuries. They still live a tribal life governed by the unwritten, customary laws of Pukhtoonwali, with its values of Melmastia (the honourable use of material possessions), Hujra (guest house, the centre of local political and social activities), Badal (the reciprocity of all good and bad conduct), Jarga (an assembly which resolves interpersonal and intertribal disputes), Tarboorwali (patrilineal descent to a common ancestor as the basis of property and political alliances), Toor and Peghor (stigma and jeering at someone for his or his family’s socially disapproved conduct).

Agriculture is subsistent and confined to the plain areas in Peshawar and surrounding districts. The only significant source of revenue is a royalty on hydroelectric power generation, which is, however, never fully paid by central government. Tobacco, cane sugar and wheat are the main crops of the plains, while wheat, barley, maize, mustard and onions are the crops of the hilly areas. The agronomic practice of opium cultivation is probably the oldest in the area.

The Opium Poppy and Opium: History

The origins of *papaver somniferum* or the poppy plant are as yet unknown, but probably lie in Mesopotamia, the eastern Mediterranean or Europe. No authentic history of the plant is available, and evidence about its origin and history is speculative, being largely based on archaeological or archaeobotanical descriptions of remnants found at different places throughout the world. Some say the plant was known in Mesopotamia in 6-5000 BC, others that it was known during the Neolithic or Mesolithic or Palaeolithic period. Botanists are as unsure about its progenitors as they are about its internal taxonomy. It is clear, however, that opium was being used by the Romans and Greeks as an analgesic and anaesthetic by 800 BC, and there is broad consensus that opium was the world's first medicine, being popular in the west in 500-400 BC, Hippocrates detailing its medicinal properties.

Opium and Opiates in the Indo-Pak Sub-Continent

The history of opium in the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent is also disputed. Within the sub-continent discussions have been affected by religious or nationalistic tensions between Muslims and Hindus, and more broadly between Muslims and western experts. The predominant western view is that 'Arabs' took the plant not only into the sub-continent but to the entire east, including China. This, however, may refer to Arabs of antiquity, since some experts mention that Arabs before Islam appreciated the value of opium and took it to the east. Indian scholars say that it

---

was Muslims who introduced opium into the area and that their sacred books do not mention the plant. On the other hand Muslims argue that the sacred *Vedas* mention of opium in 500 BC\(^\text{12}\) and make other historical claims which call the Hindu version of history into question. These disputes are not rehearsed here, however.

In the early sixteenth century, with the arrival of the Mughals, opium assumed the status of a political commodity, being taxed like other crops, so becoming a source of state revenue. But the Mughals did not give opium any special status as a drug crop or interfere with the choice of farmers as to how much of their land to cultivate with opium and how much with other crops. They were mainly concerned with self-sufficiency in food crops, the only source of their strength and richness being income from land.

With the advent of British rule in the 18th century, opium became a vital source of revenue for the British East India Company, which rapidly monopolised production and supply, quickly converting much of Bengal and some other parts of their domain into a poppy mono-culture, destroying other crops and penalising the farmers responsible. The British fought three opium wars to monopolise the business and its smuggling into China, and the weight of historical evidence suggests that it was their supervision of the trade rather than the legacy of the Mughals which spread the drug in India.

Historically, drug culture in Pakistan has revolved around *papaver somniferum* and *bhang* (cannabis). Opium was mainly used by lower class people to avoid fatigue and tiredness. Its negative aspects became known when its smoking started in the shape of *Chando* and *Madak*. *Chando* was the choice drug of rich people while *madak* was more used by the poor people, mainly for euphoric purposes. The recent history of opium began in 1953, when a UN Protocol allowing Pakistan to produce opium led to official efforts to produce opium for medical and non-medical purposes. But then, with no inking of addiction to opiates, policies changed, and the efforts formerly put into producing opium were devoted to prohibiting it, a policy change which was to be influential in the spread of heroin addiction in particular.

The medicinal value of opium has been known since pre-historic times and the advancement in biochemical science enhanced its importance even more during the early 19th century, particularly with the isolation of morphine, codeine and then its semi-synthetic derivative, diacetyl morphine or heroin. At present, some thirty other alkaloids of opium are known including narcerine, narcotine, laudanine, and papaverine, though morphine and heroin are the most widespread. Morphine was isolated from opium in 1805, is the most natural alkaloid, and has been in medical use ever since.

Heroin was synthesised accidentally in 1874 in London, but subjected to further experiments and found to be dangerous, so production was stopped. In 1890 in Germany, it was synthesised by a different method and considered a medicine, Bayer beginning commercial production in 1898. Its therapeutic properties caused it to obtain recognition from the Austrian and American Medical Associations in 1906, though by 1910-12 its addictive potential led to efforts to contain its use. By 1914 legislation was ready to control this drug, though politics more than medical factors were involved in the campaign against the drug which led to its outlawing in 1924 in USA. This was endorsed by the League of Nations, whose successive bans on manufacture, transportation and international trading led to production going underground and underworld. Since then the world has witnessed this outlawed drug being used to defame individuals and states for political purposes, as a weapon against enemies to undermine their power and might, to finance wars and terrorism, as a source of survival in producing countries, and as a source of affluence and might by politicians, criminals and even states.

In Pakistan, heroin was introduced in the late 1970s, and by the early 1980s Pakistan had become a fully fledged heroin exporter. Though a small amount of heroin had been processed in the tribal areas much earlier, little had come of it, and increased production was linked with the political and economic conditions of the area and the involvement of the United States in particular, which used heroin both as a source of financing the Afghan War and to undermine the Soviets. The superpowers are now no more in the field but their legacy is plaguing the country’s youth through addiction, with no cure at the state level.

---

Economics of Opium and Heroin Production

The war may have triggered the trade, but its perpetuation has mainly economic and political causes, as poor economic conditions are the main basis of opium and heroin production in the area. All the drug producing areas have common economic characteristics. They:

- are geographically inaccessible, having minimal communication sources
- lack economic opportunities, including private and public sector industry
- are characterised by large families
- have subsistence farming based on small and irregular land holdings, normally on top of mountains and hills, and without irrigation
- have surplus labour, due to the opportunity structure
- have widespread poverty of all kinds.

Consistent with this analysis, Dir is mostly mountainous, inaccessible, with no industry and nominal agriculture but a population as high as 1.6 million, an average family size of 13 people and an average family land holding of only 4.7 jreebs (less than 1 hectare). Its major source of public earning is off-season emigration to other parts of the country. Only 16% of the land is available for agriculture, it is terraced, and even it could be afforded mechanisation of production would be technically impossible. 80% of agricultural land is devoted to opium. Among poppy growers the average annual per capita income is as little as 6,000 rupees – much more than would otherwise be available.

Bajaur, another drug producing area, is mountainous, inaccessible, dry and rain dependent for agriculture of a single crop a year. The major source of livelihood is labour outside the agency area. No industry exists there. Socio-economic and political conditions have worsened due to the presence of some 200,000 Afghan refugees. Average family land holding is 13 jreebs and annual average per capita income is 3,960 rupees. Average family size is 18.

Muhmand, the most backward area, is mostly mountainous, but the mountains are barren and void of vegetation. Water is scarce even for drinking, so most people migrate in summer. Agriculture is very backward due to scarcity of land, and no improvement in the quantity of land is possible for geological reasons. Only 5.88% of the total land is available for agriculture, and land quality is poor. Per capita
annual income is 3,840 rupees, the average family size is 23.2, and the average family land holding of a rain dependent nature is 19.5 jreebs

Khyber is an inaccessible mountainous area with no agricultural activity worth mentioning due to shortages of land and water. The main economic resource, the trans-Afghan border trade, which had flourished for twenty years and brought some alleviation of poverty, was brought to a sudden halt by the Soviet interference in Afghanistan. This caused people to switch to a prompt and sure source of survival, the drugs trade. Per capita annual income is 5,682 rupees. Average family size is 23.8.

**Politics of Opium and Heroin**

Uncertain and weak political conditions, then, have contributed significantly to opium and heroin production. Domestic political factors include the various political systems in the drug producing areas since the colonial era and the in-built corruption in the political system of the country which makes politicians and power holders immune to any law. In addition, I have shown that the Hudood Ordinance was a precipitant of heroin addiction. External political factors include the history of the drug, particularly its development under colonialism, the supranational approach to control which began with the League of Nations and continued after the Second World War with the United Nations, US power politics and the geopolitical conditions in the region. Particularly significant were the Soviet-Afghan war and its aftermath, and the Islamic revolution in Iran.

History is important in shaping not only policies but also cultural values. The economic value of opium has probably been known since the Bronze Age when it was exported from Cyprus to Egypt as a commodity of revenue generation, and it is clear that economic prosperity and political stability are correlated, irrespective of time and place. In the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent the use of opium during the sixteenth century by the Muslim rulers became the basis of the later development of opium for more aggressive purposes during the Raj, when opium’s economic importance overrode humanitarian and political considerations, leading to the Opium Wars with China. Paradoxically, these wars became the basis of

---

supranational but unsuccessful and sometimes counterproductive control efforts for almost a century.

In good part Pakistan is still run on the basis of colonial laws which reflected the determination of foreign rulers to dominate an area which they could not incorporate into their administration, and not on the basis of respected indigenous legislation. Such conditions favoured the political misadventures and gamesmanship of politicians and bureaucrats after independence in 1947 which continue till this day in areas to which the state laws, other than those which help the politicians and political administrators, have not been extended. On the other hand, the existing drugs laws in the country do not apply equally to drug traffickers, poor traffickers being fined and imprisoned but big and influential traffickers never being brought to justice.

The political atmosphere in the drug producing areas also favours production. Unanimously and unhesitatingly all political parties and politicians support the opium cultivators, even in the presence of laws banning opium production, except when in power, when external political pressures lead them to attempt eradication. Moreover, the ‘poppy dollars’ donated by western nations are a source of wealth for many politicians in the federal as well as provincial government, and in order to attract more foreign donations the Government has been presenting exaggerated figures of addiction.

The Hudood Ordinance prohibited opium production and sale both to addicts, and for medicinal purposes. Though there seems no logical or religious basis for the Ordinance, two political purposes exist: internally, a desire to convince the people that General Zia’s Government was trying to implement Islam, and externally, to eliminate opium and heroin meant for the US market. It is now believed by many western experts that the latter was the real objective, the Ordinance being promulgated as a part of the US ‘war on drugs’, and coated in the name of Islam to ensure domestic compliance. After all, if the aim was to develop an Islamic legal system forbidding intoxication and intoxicants, why was opium targeted but not wine?

---

15 “Taliban say Opium Production is not UnIslamic” in Frontier Post (Peshawar: November 8, 1998)
The purpose could not have been to prevent addiction, as at that time there was little or no heroin problem and only a few thousand opium abusers. But when opium sales closed down, these addicts switched to heroin. Pakistani opium is now compensated by bulk Afghan opium and there seems likely to be no shortage in supply in the near future.

There is a widespread belief in Pakistan, then, that the Hudood Ordinance was enacted under US pressure, and was a symptom of political uncertainty, subservience and dependence. To justify it, an ‘Elite Engineered Model’ of panic was created in the state controlled media, with propaganda against heroin, the addicted and poppy crops reminiscent of that associated with American prohibition in the early quarter of this century. All these tactics brought in millions of dollars, but did nothing for the welfare of addicts or opium growers, not least because the revenue was mostly embezzled.16

Today’s drug addiction problem is therefore associated with American domestic policies and was further fuelled by the Afghan war. The repression of the opium farmers is part of the political culture of the country and the rulers have embarked on a path which gives them no alternative to force. Political corruption and the involvement of the ‘bigwigs’ who patronise drug trafficking is also strongly associated with drug production and addiction. This corruption is not on the level of ordinary state servants but involves the top echelon of politics including successive Presidents, Prime Ministers, Generals, Parliamentarians, ministers and high officials like the head of the Anti-Narcotic Force, proving that the forces of corruption are greater than the anti-narcotics forces in the country - another example of political weakness.

The external political factors associated with the drug boom in Pakistan are the Soviet-Afghan war and the Iranian revolution, which occurred close together. The Soviet-Afghan war is widely believed to have been financed by drug money under the patronage of the CIA, representing the US Government. The CIA, as previously in Vietnam, not only turned a blind eye to the activities of the Afghan leaders but actively participated in trafficking even after the withdrawal of Soviet forces. Today, many Pakistani leaders known to have benefited from drug money, are welcome visitors in the USA and remain immune from prosecution.

The Iranian revolution caused many Iranian traffickers to flee to Pakistan, establish heroin factories there and in Afghanistan, and use their contacts to introduce Pakistani traffickers to international Mafiosi. The revolution has also seen an increase in religious sectarian conflict in Pakistan. In Iran, mostly Shiaism, is practised, while followers of this sect inside Pakistan, where most Muslims are Sunnis, are in a minority. As a result of Iranian support for Shias in Pakistan this sect has become militant, and sectarian intolerance is now prevalent, with the Sunnis blaming the Shias and Iran for using narcotics to terrorise the non-Shias. This has led to further violence, which is still continuing.

The study contained quantitative as well as qualitative data. On the whole, however, the quantitative findings were inconclusive, mainly because of the very small sample sizes, though most trends were in the direction of supporting the hypotheses. Inconclusive chi-squares certainly give no reason to reject any of the hypotheses, and other qualitative attributes, like social and political conditions, at the very least establish a prima facie case for more substantial investigations in the future.

Towards Controlled Legalisation

In the preceding pages I have discussed the economic and political conditions of Pakistan and the drug producing areas in particular. This description shows a symbiosis of the economic and political conditions compelling the area and the country to linger on with the drugs problem. I began with the expectation that poor economies and weak politics are the prime causes of drugs production the world over but this study has brought to light considerably more in this regard: it is clear that political might and economic invincibility also promote production and trafficking. The case of the United States, one of the world’s biggest cannabis producers but a country powerful enough to define cannabis as falling outside the United Nations’ definition of a narcotic is the prime example. US patronage of drugs production and trafficking the world over is well known, and its ‘war on drugs’ is in good part a slogan and a tool to pressurise weaker, debtor, countries, and interfere with their domestic policies.

In Pakistan, American pressure has led to efforts to eliminate poppies from areas where opium has been cultivated for at least one and a half centuries. As a result
opium production is surely reduced, but the supply from Afghanistan, which has accordingly emerged as the biggest opium producer in the world, has not been controlled, and this has led to a massive expansion of heroin manufacture in Pakistan. This follows the pattern the world over: variations in drugs production in particular countries have little or no impact on world drug abuse.

Drug addiction in Pakistan is now said to be increasing at the rate of 7% annually,\(^{17}\) faster than the population growth rate. Statistics are contradictory and in many instances politicised, but if we were to take this statistic at face value and to assume few improvements in rehabilitation, it would only be a matter of time before most of the population was addicted.

So what can be done? When Pakistan had a controlled system of drugs production and sale there were only 315,000 opium users,\(^{18}\) but when addicts were left high and dry they switched over to a more potent opiate, heroin, and Pakistan's population of 100 million now includes three million heroin addicts. The reintroduction of a version of the pre-Hudood system of control, combined with even modest improvements in rehabilitation, would bring many benefits normally associated with regulation, and would certainly be less harmful than the present system of repression. As I have shown throughout, the best regional, national, international and supranational control efforts have not only been ineffective but have made a bad situation worse. Controlled legalisation would offer a middle ground between the present war on drugs and complete legalisation, within the boundaries of an international prohibitive approach.

Drug treatment is a long process requiring not only resources but patience and planning at state level. At present there is a lack of medical resources for addicts, and on average an addict is kept under treatment for not more than twelve days - a waste of resources, since the first thing a discharged addict does is 'score' from a dealer, who may indeed be waiting for him outside the rehabilitation centre. The alternatives to improved medical and social care involve, at an individual level, continuing the present combination of criminalisation and neglect, and, at social and political levels, accepting the damaging consequences described here.

---

\(^{17}\) *Daily Jang* (London: June 28, 1999).

Legalisation would not mean the harmful physical effects of drugs use being ignored: in fact health would be of prime concern. But a gradual process of controlled integration of drugs in society would both accept the reality of the situation and teach its members to cope better with it. Addiction would continue to exist, but it could be reduced from being a major social problem to an individual one. Integrating drugs and addicts would not mean acceptance, but discouraging usage need not entail criminalising users. Regulation would put opiates on a par with tobacco and alcohol, where policies can be adjusted according to developing scientific evidence of harm and changing public attitudes. It would also mean that:

- product quality could be assured and drug related deaths diminished. Pure heroin is less dangerous than heroin adulterated by substances which include quinine, talcum powder, white chalk and gluten in brown heroin, many of which are more dangerous to inhale than the original heroin;

- criminal involvement would be reduced. When a commodity is prohibited, black marketing (which is growing hugely in Pakistan) is the natural partner of prohibition and in the case of drugs the consequences are seen by the world. Addicts often finance consumption by selling their own and other’s possessions or by dealing on behalf of drug syndicates. Legalisation might not prevent them remaining addicts, but it would reduce the side effects of hustling, damage to properties and organised criminal involvement;

- because drugs would be brought within the fiscal system, new resources would be created which could be recycled into rehabilitation and health education. Similarly, legalisation would save money spent on enforcement — police, prisons, courts, military — by reducing drugs related crimes committed by addicts and the criminal underworld.

Drugs should not be a problem of policing and prohibition but a problem of general welfare and health, the proper aim being to return to addicts the respect and honour which are at present denied them. Internationally most prohibition attempts have failed, and prohibition has often been primarily an instrument of coercion. Any move towards controlled legalisation by Pakistan would cause international controversy and hostility, and the consequences of doing so would clearly require detailed and difficult negotiations in international fora. But at present the UN lacks the authority as well as the ability to control the drugs trade, and those who plead
strict control and penalties for addicts and drugs production should accept that some will always take drugs, some need drugs, and in Pakistan at least there is a need for Government to recognise this.\textsuperscript{19} History shows that societies that have been too strict about drugs are often the worst affected, and their politics have in fact been instrumental in the protection of production and trafficking, reduce the black market (the volume of which is increasing day by day.

Pakistan has lost much in a foreign war on drugs fought on its own land against its own people: the economic resource of a large population, the health of its people, a source of state revenue and political sovereignty. It gained in return poppy dollars (largely embezzled), increased political corruption, a loss of confidence among the people, and wholesale drug smuggling.\textsuperscript{20}

Creating panic through the state controlled media and exaggerating addiction statistics to attract foreign aid will not work in the long run, and is not in the interests of the country. To curtail corruption and black money it is necessary to regulate drugs. This would mean Pakistan would need to produce its own opium. This of itself would help solve the problems of communities dependent on opium production, whose means of survival have been removed by the Hudood Ordinance. It is not a good, but a less bad, solution, as even if addicts switch back to opium, they will be better off thus than being known as junki


BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books


Official and Project Reports


**Dir District Development Project: Consultant Report/Draft Project Document**


**Dir District Development Project: Project Document**. Peshawar: Drug Control Programme, 1994


237


Journals


Newspapers and Magazines (Specific References)


The Friday Times Lahore, 26 March 1992


The Times 9 March, 2 June and 11 August 1997.

United Nations Publications


240


---


*The Illicit Drugs Problem in South West Asia: Briefing Note*. Islamabad: Drug Control Programme, June and November 1996.


**Encyclopaedias**


**Theses**


**Published Papers**


Stevenson, R. “Winning the War on Drugs: To Legalize or Not” London: Institute of Economics 1994

**Conference Proceedings**


**Newspapers Consulted (Non-Specific)**

*Christian Science Monitor.*

*The Independent.*

*Daily Jang* (Urdu).

*Daily Kasooti* (Urdu).

*Daily Khabrain* (Urdu).

*Daily Mashriq.*(Urdu).

*Daily Pakistan* (Urdu).

*Daily Telegraph.*

*International Herald Tribune.*

*Los Angeles Times*

*New York Times.*
The Dawn.
The Frontier Post.
The News.
The Sunday Times.
The Times.
The Washington Post.
METHODOLOGICAL APPENDIX

Interviews

Afridi, K.H. Assistant Director: Social Welfare Department, Peshawar, NWFP.
Afridi, K. I. M. Drug Demand Reduction Officer, D.A.P.R.C., Islamabad.
Akhunzada G.W. Political Tehsilda Khat, Bajaur Agency.
Elahi, K. Retired Professor and Ex-Dean Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Peshawar.
Khan G.A. Farmer, Pai Khan, Muhmand Agency.
Khan, I. M. Deputy Superintendent Police/Group Leader Anti-Narcotics Force, Kohat NWFP.
Khan J. Director Social Welfare: UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Peshawar.
Khan, K. Sharbatai, Bajaur Agency, NWFP.
Khan, M.F Medical Social Officer: Lady Reading Hospital, Peshawar.
Khan, S. Farmer, Manai/Berarhai, Karo Dara, Dir, NWFP.
Khan, S. Landlord, Tangi, Charsadda, NWFP.
Shinwari, G.R. Political Activist, Khyber Agency.
Shinwari, K.K. Foreign auto-parts dealer, Landikotal Bazaar.
Zahid, H.S.S Retired Deputy Director: Pakistan Narcotics Control Board, Peshawar.
ANNEXURE: INTERVIEW SCHEDULES

Interview Schedule 1

Opium Cultivators

C.NO.__________ Date______

Name of the village__________ Tehsil______ Distr./Agency______

Name of the respondent.-__________ Age__________yrs.

Q.1. Relationship with head of the household:

1. Self
2. Brother
3. Elder son
4. Son

Q.2. Size of the household (person):

□ □

Q.3. How many are:

1. Males.
   □ □
2. Females;
   □ □

Q.4. No. of educated people in the family:

0. No education./
   □ □
1. Primary education.
   □ □
2. BA/BSc
   □ □
3. MA/MSc
   □ □
4. Inter/Matric
   □ □
Q.5. No. of family members having regular earnings: 

Q.6. What is the nature of their jobs? 
1. Govt. Service. 
2. Private job. 
3. Self employed. 
4. Agriculture 

Q.7. How was the govt. service position obtained? 
1. Bribed the high officials 
2 Bribed the local MP/politician, 
3. Recommended by some person 
4. Relatives in govt. service helped in getting the job. 
5. Any other 

Q.8. Total monthly income of the family: 
Q.9 Total monthly expenditures of the family: 

Q.10. Total land of the family: (acres) 

Q.11. Nature of the land: (Jreebs) 
1. How much irrigated 
2. How much rain dependent 
3. How much uncultivable 

Q.12. What is your land possession status? 
1. Owner cultivator 
2. Tenant
Q.13. How many harvests do you get a year?

- One
- Two
- Three
- More

Q.14. What are your harvests in:

**Summer/Spring.**

- (a) Wheat
- (b) Barley
- (c) Mustard.
- (d) Vegetables
- (e) Others

**Winter/autumn.**

- (a) Maize
- (b) Rice
- (c) Vegetables
- (d) Others

Q.15. Is your food produce sufficient for your needs?

**a. In summer**

- Yes
- No

**b. In winter**

- (qn.16)
Q.16. If no, how do you manage then? ___________________________

Q.17. Do you cultivate the following cash crops?

1. Sugar Cane
   - Yes
   - No

2. Sugar Beet
   - Yes
   - No

3. Onions
   - Yes
   - No

4. Vegetables
   - Yes
   - No

Q.18. If no, why ___________________________

Q.19. Do you cultivate opium?

Yes

No

Q.20. Why do you cultivate opium?

1. Land suits this crop
   -

2. It gives more money
   -

3. Other reason(s)(Explain.)
   -

Q.21. What is the opium used for?

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

248
Q.22. Do you know heroin?

Yes ________

No ________ (next qn)

Q.23. (if yes) what is it made of? _______________

Q.24. What are the main effects of taking heroin?

______________________________

______________________________

Q.25. How much money did you make out of opium last year?

Rs ________

Q.26. Will you continue to cultivate opium?

Yes ________

No ________

Q.27. Is there any ban on its cultivation?

Yes ________

No ________

Q.28. If yes, why do you confront the law? _______________

______________________________

(if no to qn.19)

Q.29. Have you ever cultivated opium?

Yes ________

No ________

Q.30. If yes, why did you stop its cultivation?
1. Govt. ban on its cultivation
2. You think it is a bad thing
3. Religious reasons
4. Your economic conditions have improved (next qn.)
5. Any other reason (Pl. explain).

Q. 31. How did your economic conditions improve?

1. Changed cropping pattern
2. Someone in the family got a job
3. Sent someone to Middle East.
4. Any other reason (explain pl.)

Q. 32. Do you know about any development projects in the area?

Yes
No

Q. 33. If yes, is the project of any help to the opium cultivators?

Yes
No

Q. 34. If yes, how? __________________________________________

Q. 35. What are/were the advantages of opium cultivation?

___________________________________________________________

Q. 36. What are/were the disadvantages of opium cultivation?

___________________________________________________________
Interview Schedule 2

Opinion Leaders of Khyber Agency

C.NO.______________ Date______________

Name of Village______________ Khel _____________

Q.1. Name of the respondent ________________ Age______ yrs.

Q.2. Occupation/status______________________________________

Q.3. Size of the family: (persons)
   a. 1 ____ 10
   b. 11 ____ 20
   c. 21 ____ 30
   d. 30____ above

Q.4. How many are:
   1. Males
   2. Females

Q.5 No. of educated people in the family:
   a. MA/ M.Sc.
   b. BA/BSc
   c. Inter/Matric

Q.6. Total monthly income of the family __________ (Rupees)

Q.7, Total monthly expenditures of the family __________ (Rupees):
Q.8. No. of individuals in the family having regular jobs:  

Q.9. What is the nature of their jobs?  
   a. Govt. service  
   b. Small business. (specify pl)  
   c. Business in Bara Market. (go to qn.13.)  
   d. Transport.  
   e. Agriculture. (go to qn. 17)  
   f. Any other. (specify pl)  

Q.10. If govt. service, how did you succeed in getting it?  
   1. Your Khel quota.  
   2. Bribed some high up.  
   3. Through local MP.  
   4. Merit basis  
   5. Some other relative in govt. service helped  
   6. Any other source  

Q.11. If business in Bara Market, in which merchandise do you deal?  
   1. Foreign Electronics  
   2. Foreign Cloth  
   3. Foreign Luxury items  
   4. Others (specify)  

Q.12. For how long you have been in the business__________yrs.
Q.13. When did you start this business here?_________yr.

Q.14. Has the Afghan war had any effect on your business?

Yes

No

Q.15. If yes, was the effect;

a. Very hard. 

b. Hard

c. Not very hard.

Q.16. If very hard, what was the effect? (specify)

__________________________________________

(If agriculture, qn. 9)

Q.17 Size of the family land: (acres)

a. 1____20

b. 21____40

c. 41____60

d. 61____above

Q.18 Nature of the land (acres):

a. Cultivable.

b. Rain dependent.

c. Uncultivable.

Q.19. How many harvests a year do you get?
Q.20. What is your harvest in:-

a. Summer:
   a. Wheat.
   b. Barley.
   c. Mustard
   d. Vegetables
   e. Others

In winter/autumn.

a. Rice
b. Maize
   c. Vegetables
d. Others

Q.21. Is your food produce sufficient for your needs?

a. In summer :
   Yes
   No (go to next qn.)

b. In winter :
   Yes
   No (go to next qn)
Q. 22. (If no) how do you manage? (pl. explain) ____________________________

Q. 23. Do you cultivate opium?

Yes

No (go to qn. 29)

Q. 24. If yes, for how long have you cultivated it? __________ yrs.

Q. 25. Why do you cultivate it? (reason(s) please)

Q. 26. Is there any ban on its production in this area?

Yes (next qn.)

No

Q. 27. If there is a ban, will you continue its production?

Yes (next qn.)

No

Q. 28. If you continue, will it not be illegal / defiance of law?

Q. 29. (if no. to qn. 23) Have you ever cultivated opium?

Yes (go to next qn.)

No

Q. 30. If yes, why did they / you stop its cultivation?

1. Strict Government control
2. Nagha (ban by tribe/khel)
3. It was no longer economic
4. It is a bad thing.
5. Other business.
6. Your economic conditions changed.
7. Any other reason

Q.31. How much did you earn from opium sales last yr./last time you cultivated (Rupees)?

Q.32. What is the opium used for?

Q.33. Do you know heroin powder?
   Yes
   No

Q.34. How long ago, as far as you know, was heroin introduced here?_____Yrs.

Q.35. How did you know about it for the first time?

Q.36. Is it produced in this Agency area?
   Yes
   No

Q.37. If no, from where does it come?

Q.38. Who introduced it into the area?
Q.39. Why did they introduce it here?

Q. 40. Do you think the heroin business has improved/changed the economy of the area?

Yes

No

Q.41. How can you explain the change?

Q.42. Do you favour narcotics cultivation/production here?

Yes

No

Q.43. Have the govt. resolved on any operation in your area?

Yes

No

Q.44. If yes, when and why?

Q.45. Do you think the govt. was justified in carrying out that operation?

Yes

No

Q.46. If no, why?
Q.47. Are you aware of heroin business being carried on in this area?

Yes

No

( go to qn. 50)

Q.48. If yes, why is that?

Q.49. Why does it persist despite the government stance on heroin and its addiction?

Q.50. (If no to qn.47) Why do heroin addicts from all over the country come to Jamrud/Baramarket?

Q.51. Who is doing this business?

1. Tribals of Khyber agency.

2. Outsiders

( next qn)

Q.52. If outsiders, how can they do it without the local tribals support?

Q.53. Do you think the heroin business can be eliminated from the area?

Yes

( next qn.)

No

Q.54. How can it be eliminated?

Q.55. If no, why?
Interview Schedule 3

Intellectuals

C.NO____________ DATE____________

Name of the respondent__________________________

Field/Occupation of the respondent_________ Age_________ yrs.

Q.1. Do you know for how long opium has been cultivated in this country? ___________ yrs.

Q.2. Do you think drugs are a problem now?

   Yes
   No

Q.3. Which drug is mostly abused?

   a. Heroin
   B. Charas
   c. Tablets
   d. Other

   Q.4. For how long have you known about heroin here? ____ yrs.

Q.5. Do you agree with the official statistics on addiction?

   (approximately 1,20,000. persons a year)

   Yes _______ (next qn.)
   No _______ (go to q. 7)

Q. 6. If yes, is that not a very high level of drug addiction?
Q.5. If no, who introduced it into this country?

Yes

No

Q.7. If no, why not?

Q.8. Do you think people in some parts of the province produce heroin powder?

Yes

No

Q.9. If yes, in which areas?

1. Settled.

2. Tribal. (qn no. 12)

Q.10. Do you think that heroin manufacture is a local technology/innovation?

Yes

No (go to next qn)

Q.11. If no, who introduced it into this country?

Q.12. Why do only tribal people produce heroin/opium?

1. Economic reasons (go to qn.13.)

2. Political reasons (go to qn. 23)

3. Cultural reasons

4. Any other

(If economic reasons, how you see them in terms of; )
Q.13. Agriculture in the tribal / opium growing area:

1. No agriculture;  
2. Subsistence agriculture  
3. Good agriculture  
4. Surplus agriculture

Q.14. If no agriculture/subsistence agriculture, what are its reasons?

1. Scarcity of land;  
2. Structure of the land;  
3. Irrigation problems;  
4. Poor agricultural methods  
5. Any other reason(s)

Q.15. Could the agriculture be improved in these areas?

Yes  
No

Q.16. If yes, why is this not done?

_________________________________________________________

_________________________________________________________

Q.17. Is there any industrialisation in the area?

Yes  
No

Q.18. If no, why?

_________________________________________________________
Q.19. Govt. employment in the area in comparison with other areas in the province/country:

1. Available
2. Available but scarce
3. Not available

Q.20. Do the people have equal access to such jobs?

Yes
No

Q.21. If no, why? (can you explain this situation pl.)

__________________________

Q.22. Do you think with improvement in economic conditions poppy cultivation will cease automatically?

Yes
No

Q.23. Do you think the political reasons for drug/opium production are:

1. National
2. International
3. Both (q.24and25)

Q.24. What are the national political reasons for narcotics production;

1. Inter/intra- province economic disparity
2. Political instability in the country.
3. Political parties encourage its cultivation
4. Politicians involvement in narco-business
5. Economic instability of the country

6. Anti-opium laws of the state

7. Loss of public faith in the state/govt

9. Any other political reason(s) (pl. explain) _______________________

______________________________

Q.25. If international politics, are they;

1. Regional; __________________________ (next qn.)

2. Global. __________________________ (qn.29)

Q.26. If regional, do you mean;

1. Afghanistan war. __________________________ (next qn)

2. Iranian revolution; __________________________ (qn.28)

3. National political instability

Q.27. If the Afghan war, can you explain how it affected the narcotics business here? ________________________

______________________________

Q.28. If the Iranian revolution, what is the relationship between narcotics here and revolution there? ________________________

______________________________

Q.29. If global politics, who is responsible and how did it happen?

______________________________

______________________________

Q.30. There have been reports that the American CIA was involved in this drug business/ introduction into the area. Do you agree with such reports?
Q.31. If yes, why did they do this?

Q.32. Do you think opium should be totally eradicated?

Yes

No

Q.33. If yes, India has the world's largest production of licit opium (about 800 m/tons), why is it cultivated there?

Q.34. If no, why does the govt. want its total eradication?

(with reference to the armed clashes between government and tribals in Dir, Buner, Gadoon, Bajaur etc.)

Q.35. Why did govt. resolve on stern action against the farmers?

Q.36. Do we need opium for our growing Pharmaceutical industry?

Yes

No

Q.37. Do you think the development projects in opium growing areas are successful in their efforts?

Yes

No

(Next qn)
Q.38. If no why?

Q.39. Can the country overcome the drug problem?

Yes

No

Q.40. If yes, how?