The Treatment of Moral and Intellectual Education
in
Radical and Denominational British Periodicals, 1824-1875

being a Thesis submitted for the Degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

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by

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PREFACE

It is a truism to state that treatment of moral and intellectual education in the nineteenth century periodical takes place against a background of religious, economic, social and political upheaval. It is the purpose of this preface to provide a succinct account of such change while emphasizing, where appropriate, the legislative dimension - particularly with reference to education.

The bond between religion and education was that of a family, with all its concomitant assumptions, strains, stresses and disputes over power. The few who insisted on a divorce between religion and education were often accused of destroying the value-systems which were the basis of social cohesion. Might it not be argued that religion and education held together a society whose potential for chaos lay in the contrasts between wealth and grinding poverty, privilege and pauperism, landed estate and industrial slum?

To the majority of commentators, arguing as they did for the maintenance of the relationship between education and religion, the state itself was often seen as the agent which might sever this most vital of ties. The antipathy felt by most of the political nation towards state involvement in such matters was reflected in the lack of administrative machinery which the early Victorian state possessed for purposes of social engineering. Indeed, it was not until 1833 that the first government grant was made towards elementary education: significantly, this followed hard upon the increase in the franchise created by the 1832 Reform Act. Education was, after all, the main method whereby the
perceived dangers implicit within enfranchisement could be offset by an appropriate input of deference to one's social superior. Under the 1833 Act, a grant of £20,000 was to be paid towards the school-building costs of the two denominational organisations which operated the existing voluntary schools offering elementary education to the poorer classes: The National Society for the Education of the Poor (Church of England) and the less wealthy undenominational British and Foreign Schools Society.

In place of government machinery to promote education stood the conscience of the individual. It was a religious duty for those with money to provide schooling for those without: small wonder, then, that the schooling offered to the labouring classes should be seen to be cheap. The monitorial system, where one master controlled over a hundred children, had that virtue of cheapness. Tuition by pupil monitors under a rigid system of learning by rote had few other virtues.

And so, elementary education served the needs of two masters: religion and politics. When the two fell out, they fought over their mutual servant. The repeal of the Test and Corporations Acts in 1828 and the Catholic Emancipation Act of 1829, added to the suppression of ten Irish bishoprics in 1833, might be interpreted as government hostility to the Established Church. When the Tractarians so interpreted these measures, they were not slow to reassert the right of the Church of England to control education. Such apparent sacerdotalism was seemingly confirmed both by the 1845 secessions to Rome of J.H. Newman, W.G. Ward et al., and by the re-establishment of the Roman Catholic hierarchy in 1850. Some
Nonconformists felt that it was a lesser evil to see the state set up schools outside Anglican control than to surrender a generation to the overweening ambitions of prelates and priests. To what extent schooling of this type should be secular was a matter of vigorous debate and violent disagreement, fuelled by the demands for "useful knowledge" from the Utilitarian corner. Secular education, political liberalism: the close identity of the two was seen by Roman Catholics and some High-church Anglicans as a manifestation of the dangerous intellectual malaise which had fathered the French Revolution and which was corrupting theology, philosophy and political life. Calls for greater state involvement in education were therefore interpreted as steps on the road leading towards infidelity. Signposts on that road ranged from incidents such as the Gorham judgement in 1850 to the publication of Essays and Reviews by important members of the Church of England in 1860. The former, in which the judicial committee of the Privy Council effectively intervened in a doctrinal dispute between the Tractarian Bishop of Exeter and the Evangelical Gorham, confirmed in the minds of some Anglicans their fears that their church was Erastian at heart. Further secessions to Rome duly followed. The Essays and Reviews writers sought to encourage the Church of England to accept the value of the methods and techniques of contemporary intellectualism, including biblical criticism, Darwinianism and free debate: the very tendencies which many churchmen identified as intrinsically inimical to spiritual life.

It is clear that state involvement in education could proceed only slowly against a background of opposition. In 1839, the Committee of
Council on Education, under its secretary Dr James Kay, was empowered, not only to administer the increased government grant, but also to demand rights of school inspection as a condition of award. Pressure from the various denominations meant that the government inspectors had to work alongside Anglican, Nonconformist or Roman Catholic inspectors in the course of their duties.

In 1856, the Newcastle Commission - with one eye on the public purse - was appointed to survey the condition of elementary education. The proposals of the Commission included the establishment of local boards of education, empowered to levy a local rate. Amount of grant to a school depended upon the examination results as assessed by inspectorial teams. No attempt was made at this stage, of course, to counteract the denominational monopoly of elementary education. This concept of Payment by Results reappeared in the presentation to Parliament of the Revised Code of 1861 by Robert Lowe, Vice President of the new Education Department (the former Committee of Council). As a result, a government grant was made available to schools, based upon pupil attendance and the attainment of certain standards in reading, writing, arithmetic and plain needlework for girls. But this system could not assuage anxieties over the ability of the workforce to respond, not only to increasing international competition, but also to the new political opportunities afforded by the major increase in the franchise following the 1867 Reform Act. Awareness of the superiorities of the Scottish Parochial system, the supposed advantages of the Irish non-denominational National system and investigations into the state of popular education on the continent of Europe increased the pressure for reform. The Birmingham
Education League demanded free, compulsory and non-sectarian education - but its ideas could not go unchallenged: hence the creation of the pro-denominational National Education Union. Not surprisingly, the 1870 Education Act is one of history's compromises. Gaps in the voluntary system were to be filled by the provision of schools built by locally-elected school boards, with funding from a local rate. The Cowper-Temple clause sought to answer religious objections by permitting board schools to teach religious instruction as long as it was free from specific doctrinal formularies. In addition, voluntary schools in receipt of government monies were to adopt the so-called "conscience clause", whereby children of other denominations were to be allowed to withdraw from lessons containing specific religious instruction. The question of compulsory education was also subject to compromise. A school board could, if it so wished, enforce attendance. But compromises often have the effect of enforcing proximity on enemies: and the explosion of school-building among the voluntary agencies reflected the bitterness and antagonism felt by those who saw the new board schools as anti-Christian. Similarly, secularists accused the voluntary schools of sidestepping the conscience clause.

The demand for the reform of secondary education - virtually the preserve of the middle and upper classes - stemmed from the same pressures as did the reform of elementary education. The earnestness and emphasis on the moulding of the Christian Gentleman associated with the work of Thomas Arnold at Rugby School (1828-42) was itself a response to middle-class complaints about the uselessness of the traditional, Classics-dominated public school education. Arnold's reforms might have
amounted to a rejection of such criticisms, since Classics remained the foundation of his system, but the value attached to individual competition through athletics, the prefect system and examinations encouraged the growth of qualities which were not irrelevant to the needs of an increasingly complex and entrepreneurial society. Attempts to reform the endowed secondary and proprietary schools took into account the problems caused by the narrow ambitions of parents to exploit the perceived economic advantages of education through directly vocational study. The Taunton Commission of 1864 hoped to subject such schools to local control via a system of school boards, local rating, the construction of new schools and inspection. But the recommendations floundered in the face of bitter opposition from the very middle-classes who saw themselves as the chief providers of British wealth, progress and prosperity; achievements which they inevitably associated with freedom from state interference.

The Clarendon Commission of 1861 was established in response to widespread criticism of the most prestigious public schools on the grounds of inefficiency, financial irregularity and failure to match up to continental schools of a similar type. The resultant Public Schools Act of 1869 made some changes in finance and administration of the schools, but left untouched the curriculum issue. More significantly, the arbitrary selection of a number of schools comparable to Eton for purposes of inspection led to this élite status being given the force of law through that very act. In short, the legislation of the 1850s, 60s and 70s preserved, and in the case of the Public Schools Act rigidified, class distinction in education.
The universities of Oxford and Cambridge in the first half of the nineteenth century were where the Anglican upper classes received an education which tradition considered an appropriate one for either Anglican priesthood or for the life of a polished gentleman. If one became a scholar, then this was either a happy chance or a misfortune depending on the view of the parents who paid the fees. The University of Oxford required subscription to the Thirty-nine articles for matriculation: Cambridge required the same subscription for scholarships, degrees and fellowships. Criticism focused on cost, curriculum and religious exclusivity rather than on restricted access in terms of social status. In 1827, University College, London was founded as the higher-education flagship of the "useful knowledge" party. And, in inevitable opposition, the Church of England party founded King's College, London in 1829 and the University of Durham in 1832. The activities of the Oxford Movement and the loss to Rome of many of its most influential controversialists did little to assist those conservatives who wished to maintain Oxford and Cambridge as the preserve of the Anglican Church. By 1850, Royal Commissions into the state of the two major universities were appointed. Resistance notwithstanding, the Commissions' recommendations were adopted in the Oxford University Act of 1854 and its Cambridge equivalent in 1856. Non-Anglicans were permitted to become members of colleges, to take first degrees (other than in theology) but not to become Fellows. It was 1871 before all religious tests were finally abolished at Cambridge, Oxford and Durham. But educational discrimination based upon social class was scarcely affected by this. It was alive and well, and living in Oxford,
in Cambridge, at Rugby, at the Private commercial school, in board school and in Church school.
INTRODUCTION

Searching for a phrase to describe the Spirit of the Age, the mid-Victorian writer might choose the "Age of Education", or perhaps the "Age of Transition"; but Wilkie Collins chose the "Age of the Periodical". The high-status periodical, and education itself, were seen by many contemporary commentators as motive forces, determining, shaping, announcing and ushering in the Age of Transition: an age in which rapid social change had to be understood, tamed and channelled if society were to progress. Education - in all senses of the word - was widely seen as the means, not only whereby that progress was to be achieved, but also whereby the potential for self-destruction, latent within the tremendous vigour of the age, was mastered and controlled. As the Dublin Review put it:

"Education is felt by men of all religious and political parties to be the great question of the day, which is to determine not merely the well-being, but the very existence of society in the next generation."

A more laconic testimony to the importance attached to education comes from the Autobiography of J.S. Mill:

"education, and its improvement, are the subject of more, if not of profounder study than at any former period of English history."

To choose to study the treatment of education in the periodical press needs little justification. The continuing publication of the invaluable Wellesley Index to Victorian Periodicals is a token of the academic recognition, not only of the value of research into periodicals as a vital tool to understanding important aspects of literate nineteenth-century society, but also of the vast amount of work which remains to be done in the field. The present writer found little published work to
assist him. The few studies of specific periodicals, such as those by Everett° and Nesbitt°, are either dated, limited in scope, or both. More recent research is similarly thin on the ground. It has been possible to make only very limited use of the theses of Wessel Walker° and Holland°, which are restricted both in terms of the range of periodicals discussed and also by the perceived need to provide considerable - and rather well-known - background information.

Pecuniary considerations apart, the Review writer used his or her periodical as the most effective tool to argue, to convince, to encourage or to find supporters; in short, to gain or to retain an audience among the articulate and educated classes which formed the political nation. The reader most probably sought edification. The Age of Transition was frequently an age of disturbing challenge to established certainties, and, as frequently, an age of the re-imposition of traditional values and beliefs. Where else could the reader look for guidance, but to his periodical? He could, if he so desired, have his biases confirmed, while buttressing his assumptions with the latest arguments. Or, he could enter into the exhilaration of the free play of mind in a periodical claiming to offer genuine debate - and have his biases confirmed in this way too. One supposed advantage of the Review was that it provided pre-digested scholarly discussion served up in an appealing manner for those who lacked the time, education and inclination to read the actual writings of the scholars. Gissing's novel New Grub Street provides us with a perceptive account of the value of the periodical to reasonably intelligent people, such as his Amy Reardon.
"The solid periodicals attracted her, and especially those articles which dealt with themes of social science...She read a good deal of that kind of literature which may be defined as specialism popularised; writing which addresses itself to educated, but not strictly studious, persons...Thus, for instance, though she could not undertake the volumes of Herbert Spencer, she was intelligently acquainted with the tenor of their contents...."  

The periodicals chosen for the purpose of this thesis may indeed be considered to be of the "solid" variety, though whether great concession was made in those Reviews to indolence and incompetence is another matter. Certainly, James Martineau, a contributor to several of the Reviews under discussion, found writing articles of value to himself as a scholar, seeing them as "conducive to vigilance and exactitude in study...."

The educative rôle of the Review is attested to by the remarks of Bagehot in the National Review:--

"'It is indeed a peculiarity of our times, that we (the periodicals) must instruct so many persons. On politics, on religion, on all less important topics still more, every one thinks himself competent to think, - in some casual matter does think, - to the best of our means must be taught to think - rightly.'"

This is not, perhaps, the best example of Bagehot's generally clear and coherent style, but he does imply one further theme which should inform our understanding of the Reviews: the reviewer as a member of an intellectual elite - a "clerisy", to use Coleridge's term - whose use of the periodical to further political and social progress would be particularly deliberate and well thought-out. Of course, it could be argued that we are simply accepting the value of the Review as defined by those with a vested interest in stressing its influence and educative potential - the reviewers themselves. We could hardly expect evidence from consumers to be so readily available, but the account in Harriet
Martineau's * Autobiography* of the eager reception in her educated, middle-class household of the minor periodical *The Monthly Repository* is at least suggestive of such appeal.

Writing in the 1840s, the publisher Charles Knight commented that the supply of periodical literature was far too great

"for such careful thrashing and winnowing as may be advantageously bestowed.....in any attempt to trace the characteristics of the age."  

While this thesis seeks to focus on the treatment of education, rather than the tracing of such characteristics, Knight provides a timely warning. The sheer multiplicity of periodicals renders chimerical any attempt to discuss the treatment of education in the Victorian periodical as a whole. Reviews have therefore been selected because they may meaningfully be seen as representative of significant groupings within the educated classes in the nineteenth century. Given the importance attached to religion by those classes - and to religion in the educational debate *per se* - it is vital to consider the treatment of education in Reviews representing Roman Catholic, Protestant and secular schools of thought. But, of course, no one periodical could be selected as representative of any one school, due to the diversity of viewpoint within that school. The Roman Catholic Reviews chosen therefore encapsulate the bitter debate between the so-called liberal Catholics and the Ultramontanes: between those who saw the development of liberalism and science as weapons of great value to a dynamic Church, and those who saw contemporary society as intrinsically inimical to a Church which should, as ever, rest upon the primacy of the Pope. These opposing parties are represented by *The Rambler* and its short-lived...
successor The Home and Foreign Review for the liberal Catholics and by the Dublin Review for the Ultramontanes. The non-Roman Catholic Reviews were chosen as representative of the three major parties within Protestantism: The Anglo-Catholics, for whom the Oxford Movement was at once their high point and the seed of their discomfiture; the so-called "Broad Church" Anglicans, for whom Nonconformity and liberalism were fellow-travellers on the road to progress; and finally, the Nonconformists themselves, represented by the Unitarians, whose anti-Trinitarianism made them, in the eyes of most other sects, distinctively non-Christian. The Reviews are:

1) The Christian Remembrancer. This Review was the organ of the High-Church Anglicans, was sympathetic to the Tractarian movement and pointedly regarded the Church of England as "Catholic".

2) The Prospective Review. This Review was widely regarded as Unitarian, although its editors did not always care for a specific sectarian label.

3) The Contemporary Review. The Contemporary started out life as an anti-Ritualist organ of the liberal wing of the Church of England, but increasingly adopted a policy akin to that of the secular Fortnightly Review in deliberately opening its columns to opposing viewpoints. It retained, however, a religious tone. The secular Reviews discussed are The Westminster Review and The Fortnightly Review. The former was of radical persuasion, and openly Benthamite in its early years. The Fortnightly represents, like the Contemporary, the "new wave" of periodicals starting life in the 1860s. Its most influential editor, John Morley, explicitly compared the Review to the Encyclopaedia of Diderot, arguing that both were vehicles for free-flowing debate. In his Recollections, Morley explains:
"It was to be expected that the gospel of free intellectual and social expansion, now exciting minds capable of seeing how far it went, should seek a fresh organ of independent thought."

We see behind Morley's assumptions the views of his mentor J.S. Mill, who saw, in free debate, the solution to opposing philosophies.

There are a number of reasons for the choice of the period 1824-75. Between these years were some of the most important intellectual, political and social developments of any century: developments to which the periodical writer was obliged to respond in the interests of those he wished to guide. In addition, the starting point in 1824 permits the examination of the changing nature of the Westminster Review from the days of its foundation as a Benthamite journal through stages towards a growing sophistication. Similarly, the time-span allows us to examine the impact of new editors or contributors to the tone of a Review, and to identify the personal development of an important writer. The Dublin Review under W.G. Ward is a much more aggressive animal than was the fading periodical languishing under his predecessors. And J.M. Capes, Catholic editor of the Rambler in the 1840s, is very different to the J.M. Capes who criticizes Catholicism from the point of view of an outsider in the Contemporary Review of the 1860s. As suggested earlier, the 1860s also witnessed the birth of the "new wave" of periodicals, responding to the demand for new approaches to new problems in an atmosphere of increasing uncertainty and fear that progress might flounder: when Disraeli's "Leap in the Dark" called for writers who could offer advice, not only to those who had the opportunity to leap, but also to those whose self-appointed task was to catch the ones who fell.
If we are to consider the treatment of education in the periodicals, then it is essential to establish precisely which aspects of education are to be discussed. Introductions to each chapter provide detailed justifications of structure, but a basic outline is as follows. Chapter I examines the philosophy of knowledge which lies behind and underpins many an article of educational import. Such a philosophy may or may not be carefully thought out: it may reflect a distrust of the intellect unsupervised by dogma, or of dogma unsupervised by intellect. It may reflect the full gamut of views on the relationship— or lack of it— between religious, moral and intellectual education. It will reflect the vigorous contemporary debate over the nature, value and purpose of human knowledge in general and of human reason in particular. This debate will surface, not only in educational articles per se, but also in articles on past or contemporary philosophy and philosophers; on turning points in history; on historiography or on the nature of the historical discipline. Without an understanding of a Review's philosophy of knowledge, we fail to appreciate its attitude towards, say, the teaching of religion in elementary schools.

Chapter 2 deals with such formal education. The original intention of the present writer was to consider separately the issues of moral and intellectual education. This division was familiar from a wide variety of nineteenth century sources: writers as different as Lant Carpenter and Herbert Spencer found it useful in their writings on education. However, analysis of the Reviews revealed that writers frequently felt that their treatment of formal education was ill-served by maintaining what many saw as a merely terminological distinction. However, all
Reviews readily split up formal education into its higher and secondary/elementary categories, and Chapter 2 will therefore follow that pattern. This will also enable comparisons to be made on the subject of the relative importance attached to elementary and higher education.

Chapter 3 responds to the importance attached by several of the Reviews to the educational rôle of literature, and concentrates upon the novel. Indeed, it would take a brave or misguided reviewer to slight the potentially educative rôle of such fiction. As a fellow-worker teaching fellow-feeling; as an insidious adversary, enticing the political nation of past or present into dilettantism, metaphysics or otiose and unthinking slumber; above all, as a potential rival, fiction could not be ignored. For instance, for those who could not stomach the pre-digested teaching of the periodical, fiction might further sugar the pill. This would explain the success of such ventures as Harriet Martineau's Illustrations of Political Economy, where Adam Smith's jaw-cracking theories reappeared in story form as tasty and wholesome morsels. And, of course, there were those who bestowed upon fiction a much grander rôle: the Romantic image of the artist as Seer; or the vision of the artist as high-priest of the emotions, manipulating his readers' feelings to lay the foundation for a sound philosophy. As George Eliot put it:

"every great artist is a teacher... giving us his higher sensibility as a medium."  

It is not without significance that it is through the medium of the Review that Eliot chose to expand upon her views.
PHILOSOPHY OF KNOWLEDGE

INTRODUCTION TO CHAPTER ONE

An issue of this complexity cannot be examined in toto. It is therefore necessary to identify categories of articles with common themes. Conveniently, reviews may be divided into two categories. In the first, reviewers discuss the nature of mind and reason. The central issue here is the way in which ideas are formed in the mind. A Review with a desire to influence the influential could not afford to leave the topic in the spotless hands of the dilettante or dilatory contributor, nor in the inkier hands of the Grub St. hack who could drub up something indifferent but unexceptionable on a vaguely educational theme. For the derivation of ideas is a theme with implications: implications for education, yes, but implications for philosophy, implications for the study of man in society - and implications for God. If ideas are derived a posteriori, then it could be argued that God is distant, limited by His own laws, or non-existant. If ideas are derived a priori, then it could be argued that God has implanted those ideas, that they are awoken by Revelation - or, indeed, that they exist through nature alone, with God distant once more. This is why the issue of the nature of mind and reason is so frequently discussed by the Reviews, and also why that discussion frequently takes place in articles discussing philosophy, theology and the history of the churches.

In the second category of articles, reviewers discuss the value, limitations and use of reason - often in terms of the relationship between reason, science and faith and the virtues and vices of free debate.
How does the mind form ideas? The Rambler frequently focuses its discussion of the nature of mind and reason on this theme. The central issue is the extent to which ideas are derived a priori, or independent of experience.

The first point to make is that the reviewers are by no means consistent. Articles in the first series are generally antagonistic to the theory of innate ideas, whereas later numbers in the second series in general adopt and adapt such theories. Accounting for the change in attitude is less easy than the identification of it. One factor is certainly The Rambler's willingness to engage in the major controversies of the mid-nineteenth century. The attitude of the reviewers to the concept of innate ideas can be seen as reflecting their identification of the enemy to be combatted. When the enemy is seen as Pantheism, then the innate ideas theory congenial to that philosophy is attacked. When the enemy is Comte, then the theory that man has no ideas independent of experience is attacked. And yet, following changes in contributors, there is less readiness to dismiss as valueless whole schools of philosophy. Bridges are built, insights recognized. Most obvious becomes the gulf between the attitude of Capes in his article "The Scandal of Goodness" and that of Acton in "The Catholic Press." In the former, Capes dismisses Protestantism: its proponents do not speak the same philosophical language as Catholics, and no neutral ground exists. In the latter, Acton discusses the positive way in which learned infidelity improves contemporary Catholic learning. The educational implications of such stances are enormous. And the contributions of
Charles Meynell and Richard Simpson in particular reveal a readiness to accept the value of non-Catholic philosophies. This acceptance implies that contact with such ideas, and the proponents of such ideas, is no longer to be shunned at all cost. Again, the educational implications are considerable.

The problem here, of course, lies in attempting to separate an examination of the innate ideas theme from general attitudes towards schools of philosophy. Nevertheless, the importance of the theme is such that the attempt is necessary.

In the third volume of The Rambler, the article "The Ideas of the Deaf and Dumb" discusses theories of innate ideas, and concludes by emphatically rejecting such theories. The writer starts by dismissing the notion that reason, as a divine gift, germinates the seeds of truths which are implanted in the mind. How can this be, he asks, when we know that a person raised utterly in isolation from society possesses no intellectual or moral ideas? The author can understand why many religious people feel the need of such concepts as a defence against the Materialism and infidelity of the school of Locke. But this is to forget that Pantheism, and not Materialism, is the enemy of the hour. In any case, French, German and Irish experience reveals that the uninstructed deaf and dumb possess no moral or intellectual ideas. Making the isolated ego of man the bedrock of philosophy, or of education, is therefore not only psychologically unsound, but also displays a disastrous ignorance of the vital rôle of Revelation.

What, then, is the rôle of Revelation in the formation of ideas? The Review as a whole provides limited analysis on this theme. An article by
Capes on Newman's Lectures on the Position of Catholics in England suggests that Grace is 'the means whereby the mind is able to resist its own tendencies to ignore intellectual proofs of Catholic doctrines: tendencies perhaps born of Original Sin.'

"The intellectual proofs of the Catholic religion are abundantly cogent, when the mind is so affected by divine grace as to have lost (even in a slight degree) its original moral antipathies to the doctrines it proclaims." 5

Harriet Thompson's article in The Rambler vol. 11 ("Protestantism and Socialism") also discusses a link between Revelation and the mind. Authoritative natural laws impose themselves on the mind through the senses. But the supernatural order cannot use the senses in this way. However, Revelation brings down a moral certainty to the mind which is no less authoritative than the natural laws. The Protestant's obsession with natural reason blocks the effects of Revelation, and a dreadful and inexorable decline results as Thompson's adversaries march to the toll of doom: Naturalism, Scepticism, Materialism, Communism and revolution. It is more than significant that Thompson sees education as the agent of this descent, as unfettered reason sweeps across all issues and classes, showing deference to neither spiritual nor political authority.

For an informative contrast with Capes and Thompson, we need look no further than Meynell's article "Prospects of Catholic Philosophy". Meynell asserts that :-

"The principles of our knowledge are a priori, they lie in germ within the womb of intelligence..." 6

Meynell is optimistic that the relationship between sensation and knowledge will be demonstrated in time to be ontological, rather than psychological. The human mind cannot create ideas at the moment of
perception unless it has received them as innate from God. So, God provides the innate reason; sensation is the trigger. A later article by Meynell, "The Philosophy of the Absolute", insists that Catholics are champions of reason, since they accept that God has provided the mind with the wherewithal to decide transcendental questions. The sceptic demands demonstrative proof; to Meynell, our mind holds an universal and necessary truth which has an "objective reality wholly independent of the mind which considers it...".

It is Richard Simpson whose detailed articles reveal most clearly a well-thought out philosophy of knowledge based on an acceptance of a priori ideas. In "The Forms of Intuition", Simpson's basic thesis is that we see things only as our own faculties present them to us. This is no materialist approach, but a recognition that knowledge depends on two factors; the object perceived and the perceptive subject. So far, Simpson agrees with Kant, but points to the contribution of Aquinas on just this point. Simpson adopts an interpretation of the cognitive process which assumes an interplay between internal and external sources. Aquinas's insight he claims to have found useful: that knowledge may come from within as principles or innate ideas, and from the phenomena which are external, but which embody principles. Simpson stresses the point that "all necessary knowledge is formal, and derives its necessity from our minds, not from external experience ....". By "formal", he means "of forms". Indeed, he accepts Kant's Space and Time as forms of mind, making it clear that these are intuitions, not conceptions; but they must also be supplemented by the intuitions Simpson calls Force, Knowledge and Will. Space and Time are passive, the
others, active. Simpson sees inner knowledge, which he calls the
Understanding, as the supplier, to the objects, of the spiritual forms
of Force, Knowledge and Will. In other words, the mind, having
passively received impressions from the phenomena of Space and Time,
by a creative act invests them with meaning. So, God is compelling the
mind from within. Pure knowledge is possible only to God, but we limited
beings proceed by this creative act. A philosophy of knowledge of this
type informs Simpson's approach to all manifestations of the human mind.
It lies behind his articles on reason and faith, on science and
religion, and on poetry and novels. It also accounts for his readiness
to set freedom of inquiry as partner, not servant, to the essential
inner core of dogma.

While a detailed examination of The Rambler's views on metaphysical
subjects is not of direct relevance to us, it is important to establish
the attitude of the Review to schools of philosophy and theory. As was
suggested earlier, there are a number of important educational
implications. Protestantism may again be taken as a case in point. If
the reviewer regards Protestantism as worthless and dangerous, then
clearly this will lead to the rejection of any form of inquiry, or
formal education, in partnership with Protestantism in any guise.
Certainly it is Protestantism which receives the most severe criticism;
nor is that savaging restricted to earlier numbers. The Acton article
referred to above is atypical. Protestantism is accused of:

(1) sapping the foundations of belief through the idolatrous
worship of untrammeled private judgement, which is in turn
irreconcilable with doctrines of Revelation;
(ii) severing the connection between religion and everyday life, and between religion and science. Evangelicals and High-Church Anglicans thrust enthusiasm on the one hand, and empty formalism on the other, between faith and reason;

(iii) fathering Rationalism, which ends in discarding religion or in deifying the emotions;

(iv) leaving the soul a prey to doubt, by short-circuiting the relationship between reason and religion. Doubt occurs in the rational facet of the soul; it can only be conquered there. Doubt is no welcome friend: no positive clarifier of thoughts; no spur to the lazy intellect; it is dark, deadly and to be feared;

(v) oscillating between what Capes calls "viewiness", or dilettantism in metaphysics, and straight Scepticism.

Aubrey de Vere's article "The Counter Theory; or, the Latest Development of Puseyism" adds a further dimension to the attack.

Reason must be subservient to faith. Alone, it will never arrive at the Divine Truth. A movement which calls for the rejection of Church authority as a matter of principle, and demands and seeks separate proofs for each and every doctrine, is intrinsically lacking in faith. Baconian induction has, according to Capes, rendered communication between Catholics and Protestants impossible. Protestants are incapable of looking for fundamental axioms, granting postulates and employing reason from that point onwards.

The Rambler's general hostility to induction brings us to the question of the Review's attitude to metaphysical schools. Simpson's "Reason and Faith" attacks all metaphysical theories based on induction—like
that of Comte, whose hierarchy of sciences is not felt worthy of mention in articles touching on his Positive philosophy. Simpson accuses the bulk of contemporary philosophies of effectively restricting the power of the mind by rendering it passive towards experience. This attack would, presumably, include the necessarian/associationist theories. In an earlier article on Newman's style and method of argument, he says "ideas must be created as intuitions, before they can be defined."13.

Simpson is, in fact, an energetic opponent of any philosophy which either fails to recognize Revelation or the value of reason thereafter. A wide range of articles therefore widely condemns:

(i) Humboldt (irrational communion with nature);
(ii) Comte (ignores Revelation and reason in his view that minds cannot penetrate the substance of things);
(iii) Bunsen (ludicrous concept of man's perfectibility based on the triumph of manner over reason);
(iv) W.G. Ward (dishonours human reason);
(v) Comtists in general (under-educated physical science fanatics);
(vi) Bentham (denies a priori ideas, intuition, self-consciousness).

Of all The Rambler reviewers, Meynell14 is most ready to accept the contributions made by Locke, Hume and Kant. Eclecticism - the spirit of modern philosophy, as he sees it - has considerable value: to dismiss such men as lunatics is unworthy and mistaken. Interestingly, Meynell considers that such writers - Kant in particular - can illustrate scholastic arguments. Mention has already been made of Simpson's willingness to compare Kant and Aquinas, and to use Kant's ideas as a starting point. Indeed, if one school of philosophy receives more
general praise than others in The Rambler, it is that of the Scholastics. It is probably Capes' who makes the most forthright statement on the matter, commenting that religious thinkers and teachers must base their ideas either on St. Thomas Aquinas or on Voltaire and Hume. Modern philosophy is nothing more than a high road of unbelief.

But even Capes tempers his praise of the Schoolmen. The latter were wildly inaccurate when basing their work on personal speculation - their credulous raving on mathematical and physical science being a case in point. Capes's article "Pantheism, Communism, and Christianity" attacks the Scholastics for failing to use induction on natural phenomena. This left a gap which Luther attempted to fill with that spurious intellectualism called justification by faith. Meynell saw Scholasticism as containing much truth, but hampered by a different zeitgeist, obtuse terminology and inconsistency. The unidentified reviewer on "The Ideas of the Deaf and Dumb" is least sparing in his comments on the Scholastics:

"we are of opinion that the sooner certain remains of the cumbrous language and exploded notions of the schools are discarded from our philosophical language, the better."

Why did The Rambler refuse to disregard the Scholastics? Certainly, Scholasticism was held in high regard by the Catholic Church in general. But, for The Rambler, the Scholastics helped provide insight into two central themes of the nature of the mind; the existence of a priori ideas and the importance of Revelation.
The Rambler never rejects, but frequently upholds, the value of reason in intellectual inquiry. If this seems hardly surprising, it does not do to forget that the journal is a religious one, and a proponent of a way of life which gives greater importance to the achieving of a future existence than the climbing of intellectual peaks on earth. And not all Catholic Reviews or reviewers attached importance to intellectual inquiry, or saw it as a profitable and safe employment for human reason. The Acton-Simpson correspondence froths mightily on the obscurantism of W.G. Ward, whose views are represented to be that devotion must come before philosophy, and that reason without a thorough spirituality was dangerous. Acton condemns such views forthrightly. In one letter, he writes to Simpson:

"The task of raising the level of thought and learning amongst English Catholics is arduous enough to employ us for all our lives." 

Arduous enough, and vital enough. In another letter to Simpson, Acton lauds the German Catholic experience, where learning and intellect spurred theology. He continues:

"I am not disposed to accept the paradox about the necessity of ignorance in England, and I think any man...inclined to despair and give up the contest is better out of the Rambler."

In any case, Acton felt that the laity could be attracted - or converted - only through weapons familiar to them. Devotion might attract women, but men require intellect. The Review did not wait for the controlling influence of Acton and Simpson to challenge the assumption that Catholicism was antagonistic to intellect. In the very first number, the reviewer dismisses the notion that education is secular, and therefore
temporary. There will be intellect in Heaven:

"the more we elevate ourselves and our fellow-men ... and teach them to think, to reason ... the more worthily are they living of the natural end for which they were created."3

This does not mean that intellect is an essential prerequisite for Heaven. This point is echoed in a sorrowful and gentle review of Hare's edition of Sterling's *Essays and Tales*2. Sterling was indeed an intellectual benefactor to his species; but he did not prepare souls for Heaven. Indeed, Sterling represents what happens when the intellect is developed beyond its normal limits, and is at this point subjected to the Protestant axiom and right of private judgement taken to its logical conclusion. This review makes an interesting contrast to Carlyle's *Life of Sterling*3, where Sterling is seen as a bright, loveable being, spurred by headlong enthusiasms, but essentially unintellectual. The Sterling review reveals an important theme in *The Rambler*'s treatment of the value and limitations of reason. Simply, independence of mind - intellectual freedom - is an unmitigated good, but this does not imply a Protestant-style egocentric and arrogant rejection of authority. Such atomistic intellectual questing is seen as antagonistic to reason itself.

In "The Church and the People", Capes feels that freedom of thought is a consequence of political freedom. The Church must welcome this independence of mind, and, since Protestantism is no longer widely regarded as uniquely true, the Church is faced with a challenge and an opportunity. Show that Catholicism cannot handle reason, imagination and biblical criticism, and all is lost. And yet, Catholicism and reason are
not in opposition, but in essential partnership:

"Our intellect follows the laws of reason in trusting to an inspired authority as independently as when it is convinced that two and two make four."\(^{24}\)

Do we, Capes continues, fall into intellectual captivity when we accept Euclid? This argument is further pursued by Capes in his "Four Years' Experience of the Catholic Religion"\(^{25}\). The same format is employed. Rejected is the notion that a man of sense violates his intellect in accepting Catholicism; substituted is the view that the claims of Rome are based upon probability, as is human science. Once this is accepted, then reason shows how clear and comprehensible are the doctrines of the Church, which possess a clarity and intelligibility greater than any science save pure mathematics. The judgement is unfettered on matters outside faith, and questions of faith are accepted in any case just as one accepts that the three angles of a triangle add up to two right angles. The Church feeds the intellect, and the intellect feeds the Church. A review of Clough's poems makes a similar point. Clough is criticized for ignoring the possibility that there may be

"a divine fabric of both moral and supernatural truth, requiring the implicit submission of intellect and will ..."\(^{26}\).

Submission in questions of faith is not seen as irrational - quite the reverse. Simpson's article "Religion and Modern Philosophy"\(^{27}\) suggests that the rational solution for doubt lies in the authority of the Church. Doubt is not the necessary and welcomed harbinger of intellectual activity, but a sadness, a misfortune, a peril to the soul. Reason, in fact, is the only means of overcoming doubt. Dogma is also the bulwark against the slide into atheism. Capes's amusing article "A Lecture at - College, Ireland"\(^{28}\) provides the reader with an inaugural lecture at what is obviously intended to be one of the Queen's Colleges.
The lecture is attended by a Catholic, a High Church Anglican, a Jew, a Methodist, an infidel, an atheist and a Socinian. It ends in uproar, when the Catholic student realizes that the logical conclusion of excluding dogma is atheism. Dogma is not a matter for private opinion. Capes elsewhere (in "Civil and Religious Liberty") puts a limit on such rights of private judgement. When did God give man the right to deny His existence? Whether Capes is prepared to give intellectual life the same importance as does Acton is open to question. Certainly the intellect alone will not convert a nation. In his article "The Conversion of England", Capes sees conviction and affection being spurred by the sanctity of the Church. Elsewhere, he sees Rationalism as resulting from any attempt to make the individual intellect sovereign by freeing that intellect from the rules and restraints imposed by religious society.

In fact, the Church can no more grant total freedom of intellect than it can accept total freedom of behaviour. Simpson himself discusses this point in language which at first sight is rather surprising. Discussing and defending the condemnation of Galileo, he points out that the Church was right to consider and protect the interests of her simpler and more ignorant children, whose trust might be upset by sudden, drastic changes which seemed to impinge on doctrine. Simpson says:

"The Church and the world are in opposition not only in theories of political and social progress, but also in the march of intellectual development." 

This extraordinary condemnation of intellectual development, astonishing in that it comes from the pen of Simpson, is not what it seems. Simpson is actually referring to reckless philosophical Scepticism which knows
no bounds and takes no prisoners. Such Scepticism is

"the great characteristic of the present day .."33.

When faced with a denial of the worth of intellect, Simpson hastens to its defence. We have already had cause to comment on the attitude to W.G. Ward displayed in the Acton-Simpson correspondence. Simpson's review of Ward's On Nature and Grace is almost splenetic. Ward is attacked for failing to recognize genuine difficulties, unfairness to opponents, assertive verbiage and, in the end, dishonouring human reason. Ward's terror of the intellect is irrational. False is his link between mathematics and infidelity. False is his link between intellect and pride. And false is his view that intellectual pleasure without reference to moral duty is the foundation-stone of unbelief. Simpson is clearly out to hurt when he claims that Ward's views encourage infidelity, since they suggest that religious people hate the intellect, and would espouse

"galling police regulations with which they would always fetter the exercise of the mind."34

Indeed, Thomas Arnold, writing on Mill35, sees compulsion enforced on the intellect as acceptable in an uncivilised country in the same way as the child's mind is subject to compulsion. But Western Europe has outgrown coercion as an educational instrument. This is not to deny the value of ecclesiastical censure: this remains, and will ever remain, essential. Arnold does not, regrettably, sketch in the boundaries: presumably because such would be the function and prerogative of the Church. Mill, he feels, overstates the value of unbridled thought and discussion through a false view of the link between human improvement and the reasoning powers. Reason is not the only agency of improvement: the mind is enlarged also by the emotions, the contemplative will and
Perhaps the most sophisticated and detailed analysis of the value and limitations of reason appears in Simpson's articles "Reason and Faith". He restates his central view of the nature of mind and reason, emphasizing how there can be no contradiction between science and faith providing each keeps to its own sphere. In terms of science, this of course means the phenomena of time and space. He says that the Christian is able to

"hold fast to the faith, while all else is in a state of confusion and transition, because the dogmas of the faith are addressed to those powers of the intellect which transcend the sphere of phenomena in time and space, to which science is confined."

Science is restricted to knowledge, but Christian understanding is intuitive, reaching deeper into reality. Narrow-mindedness is a hindrance to both science and faith. Now, the problem here is to establish the exact rôle of reason. Reason is not synonymous with science, but, like science, it cannot by itself answer the great questions of the soul. Once you accept that the basis of faith rests on Revelation, communicating a feeling that God exists, then, and only then, does the reason go to work on the testimonies; then, the understanding submits. Whatever we might say of the theological implications of such a theory, Simpson is most definitely circumscribing both the power and the rôle of the intellect, however freely it might range over the phenomena of Space and Time. He asserts in the "Reason and Faith" articles that the truly religious mind is not suited to creative and philosophical investigation, even though every pursuit may be followed in the spirit of religion. A similar example of this ambivalence towards reason is revealed in a Capes article "Are the
Interests of Science opposed to the Interests of Religion?”. How can truth harm Christianity? says Capes. But—and the but is significant—intellectual culture is open to abuse, even if one cannot therefore deny that such culture should take place. Capes then touches on a very interesting point:

"We may use reason to place us on such an elevation that we may discern more than simple reason could teach us."

What a pity he does not expand upon this further.

Certainly it is Acton who, of all The Rambler reviewers, heralds the power and freedom of the unalloyed intellect. His article "The Catholic Press" suggests no compromise, no fearful regard for the ignorant faithful. Every type of knowledge, pursued for its own sake, will vindicate religion. Impartial inquiry into history, with no reference to religious dogma, has improved Catholic learning: even learned infidelity has improved us. Be patient: since science will in the end accept the actual limits of human knowledge, it is vital for the Catholic that the debate is encouraged, not smothered. And herein lies the function of The Rambler, which cannot avoid any of the intellectual or social problems which occupy the world, save those of straight theology. It is the proud duty of the Review to uphold the principle of independent inquiry, within the bounds of faith. Indeed, in his review of Döllinger's History of Christianity, Acton expressly favours the German approach to intellectual inquiry as against its British counterpart: enquiry for its own sake is preferred to enquiry for the sake of some practical, political or moral end. Only through the German method will actual advance take place. Why, implies Acton, should the Church fear it? Why should the Church fear a Protestant—or a Catholic
- who treats his faith not as an apologist, but as a man of science?

Reading Acton in his John Morley vein certainly provides an insight into the considerable variety of approach to the philosophy of knowledge in the short and troubled history of The Rambler. The attacks on Pantheism, Protestantism and private judgement stand uneasily in his company.

These discussions on the Nature of Mind and the Reason and on the Value, Use and Limitations of Reason have suggested a common Rambler theme of freedom of enquiry as partner to a central dogmatic inner core. The favouring of a priori philosophy, of Simpson's view of cognition, and of the role of Revelation all point to this theme. But differences lie in the varying views on the exact standing of the partnership. To most reviewers, the dogmatic inner core is the dominant partner. To Acton, the core may be the founder of the firm, but it seems sometimes to be slightly sleepy, if not actually sleeping. Small wonder, perhaps, that the English Roman Catholic hierarchy awoke to the implications of such a philosophy of knowledge.
To ask, and to attempt to answer, the question of how ideas are formed in the mind is no idle speculation of an idle moment. For asking and answering carries the Dublin reviewer into areas of vital import, not only in terms of his ideas on education - and the rôle of his Review - but also in terms of the theology which is the expression and foundation of the faith he seeks to propagate and uphold. Is education, for example, a matter of releasing innate ideas placed within the mind by God? If so, what is the rôle of reason? Or is the mind a blank sheet, upon which education must indelibly imprint God's instructions? How does the mind resolve contradictory impressions? The overweening importance of such inquiry is stated with admirable economy by Hedley in New Series Vol. 16:

"The doctrine of ideas, or how we get what we know, lies at the root of Faith itself."

Therefore, our most appropriate starting point is an examination of the Dublin Review's attitude towards the concept of innate ideas. While it would seem that the doctrine of innate ideas is a necessary road which the Dublin must follow, traverse or seek to undermine, it would also seem that it is a road which earlier reviewers encountered largely unawares, or pursued without looking at what lay beneath their feet. We await the era of W.G. Ward before the road is well and truly surveyed, but then Ward also drives a bulldozer.

And so, references to innate ideas are few and far between in the first two decades of the Dublin Review. Such references simply do not permit us to identify a clear set of attitudes. When James Burton
Robertson reviews Wiseman's Lectures on the Connexion between Science and Revealed Religion, he follows the author in attacking Rationalism for failing to answer the deepest yearnings of the heart and mind. Whether or not such yearnings are an expression of innate ideas is not discussed. And an article on Euclid by A. De Morgan in Vol.11 suggests that Euclid shows the young mind the raw material of its own conceptions and then forces from the mind an intuitive assent. Comments of this sort posit some form of link between intuition, reason and, possibly, innate ideas. Intuition seems to operate as the motive force in an acceptance of ideas which originate in the mind. But it is important to note that such an interpretation is nothing more than an attempt to overcome the total lack of explanation in the article. Robertson provides us with another fleeting glance at an important theme in an article for Vol.35 ("Modern Deism"). Here, he suggests that the Deists have found a weapon in a new form of natural religion - the so-called promptings of the conscience. Robertson argues that such promptings have been indistinct ever since the Fall, but leaves similarly indistinct any analysis of the relationship between conscience and its potential rôle as a vehicle for innate ideas.

The first meaningful discussion of the issue of innate ideas comes in a review by D.B. Dunne of Ward's Philosophical Introduction to On Nature and Grace (Vol.48). Dunne accepts that Ward effectively disposes of Mill's denial of a priori knowledge in asserting that there exist intuitive judgements which carry with them their own evidence of truth, which Ward distinguishes from the judgements of consciousness; the latter being based solely upon the mind's reflections on experience. It is very important to understand that Ward's theory is distinct from
an acceptance of ideas being in some sense present in the mind from
birth - which in itself need not imply or require any rôle for a Deity.

Dunne sums up :-

"In this we are, as all Catholic Philosophers must be, agreed.
Namely: that there is a large body of truths intimately affecting
and regulating our conduct, and which are therefore styled Moral
Truths, which come home to the minds of all men with as much, or
rather greater, clearness and irresistible necessity, as do the
axioms of Mathematics."

Mill's experiential view of the mind is also attacked in an article in
New Series Vol. 8 by R.E. Guy on M'Cosh's Intuitions of the Mind and
Examination of Mill's Philosophy. Guy clearly has no time for any
associationist definition of the formation of the mind, and feels that
M'Cosh is right to reject as alchemical any attempt to extract, from
sensations, such concepts as necessity or universality. M'Cosh is also
praised for satisfactorily disposing of the so-called "shuttlecock"
theory of Bain, where knowledge is supposed to arise from the cognizance
of difference and agreement. It is important to note that the reviewer
applauds Ward's definition of genuine intuitions as those which carry
with them their own evidence as truth. Clearly there is a link here with
Dunne's necessary moral truths. And, of course, Ward himself discusses
in exemplary depth, if not always with exemplary clarity, his own ideas
on this theme. In his article "Mr. Mill on the Foundation of Morality",
Ward accepts the existence of certain moral axioms which are intuitively
known. The vital phrase once again is "necessary", meaning that the mind
is obliged to recognize them as authoritative. In Ward's terminology,
these are self-evident, necessary truths, and are cognized by what is
often known as the moral faculty. It is evident that such moral truths
do not by-pass the faculty of reason:

"By the phrase 'moral faculty' we mean neither more nor less..... than the power, which resides in man's intellect, of cognizing moral axioms with self-evident certitude."\(^{46}\)

So, if a moral judgement is the cognition of a truth, it is not an inference from experience. It is intuitive only in the sense that it is a truth which is known by its very nature: it is therefore untrue that the savage has no sense of right or wrong, though it will differ from that of civilised man. Ward feels that all mankind has in common the capacity to hold, as self-evident, such truths as justice, fidelity, beneficence, veracity and fortitude. Certainly this moral faculty may be improved with cultivation. Prayer will lead to an increase in the number of cognizable moral axioms, and enable us to differentiate between such axioms and those which are the product of the intellect alone. What, then, is the relationship between these moral axioms, the capacity of the mind to recognize them and the intentions of Divine Providence? Ward describes his moral axioms as an integral part of Divine Revelation, which presumably denies any sense in which they are a type of inviolable mechanism implanted in the human mind at conception. In his article in New Series Vol.8 ("Science, Prayer, Free Will and Miracles")\(^{47}\), Ward comments on the Duke of Argyll's The Reign of Law. Ward denies that there can be any unalterable and irrefragable rule of Law over all, since this would imply that the mind could not be changed by Divine Agency. Needless to say, Ward rejects any argument against free-will which posits the operation in the mind of an unalterable sequence of phenomena. Ward provides us with further insight into his position on innate ideas in his article for New Series Vol.22: "Mr. Mill's Philosophical Position"\(^{48}\). In a footnote, Ward includes a lengthy
quotation from F. Kleutgen, in which that writer on Scholasticism examines the view that the acceptance of a doctrine of necessary moral axioms implies a similar acceptance of the innate nature of those ideas. Not so, says Kleutgen: the existence of the faculty of reason is in itself sufficient for the recognition of such axioms. Similarly, W.F. Barry, in an article on Aquinas, rejects the notion that we have within us an inborn, pure idea. If we had, we should not need to use the laborious methods of sensible operations which are now the sole means of reaching to knowledge."

The Dublin is therefore not prepared to accept the extremes of either a priori or a posteriori theories of the mind. God Himself would be limited or excluded in any theory positing the existence of an immutable Law. Innate ideas and associationist psychology impose restrictions on the Creator's freedom, and may call into question His very existence. Ward himself is singularly assertive in his dismissal of the phenomenalist position. In the article on Mill's philosophy, he uses the concept of "moral good" to challenge the view that the mind contains no ideas save those copied by the senses in various combinations. No idea, he says, is more instantly recognizable to the mind than Moral Good; no idea has more special characteristics:"

"while most certainly it is no copy, or combination of copies, of anything experienced by the senses."

It would seem that Ward regards his axiomatic views themselves as self-evident moral truths.
It is very important to establish the *Dublin Review*’s attitude towards movements of thought and schools of philosophy. It does not do to forget that the Reformation had created a society which the reviewers saw as antagonistic towards most things they held dear. It does not do to forget the standard charge that Catholics were themselves antagonistic towards intellect and education alike. It does not do to forget that reviews were written with the influential political nation in mind. In fact, our logical starting point is an examination of the Review’s attitude towards Protestantism and the Reformation.

The Review is consistent in its attitude towards the genesis and nature of Protestantism. Articles range from the invective of Talbot of Shrewsbury in Volume 14 to the more measured antagonism of W.F. Barry in New Series Vol. 25. Robertson’s "Modern Deism" article presents us with the theme of the link between Protestantism and infidelity. Protestantism is on the verge of collapse, since it always contained within itself the seeds of its own dissolution, which are now manifesting themselves as Rationalism and Pantheism. According to the article "Tendencies of Modern Logic" in Vol. 36, Protestants now uphold Rationalism as a fit subject for worship. This is simply Protestantism taken to its logical and inevitable conclusion, and stems from its initial and catastrophic error - the denial of the primacy of the authority of the Church. Luther and Melancthon may well have recognized the threat posed by Rationalism, but were prepared to allow human reason to sit in judgement over Divine Truth, while denying its validity over philosophy and natural truth. But setting human authority over the Bible was the first step down a dreadful road. It is therefore hardly surprising when an article in Vol. 39 sharply dismisses
Döllinger's contention that Luther genuinely felt and deplored the real abuses of the sixteenth-century Church.

It is important to note that the passage of time does not soften the antagonism and assertiveness of the Review when faced with the issue of the intellectual significance of Protestantism. New Series Vol. 19 comments on the "gross immorality and the profound irreligion" of the Reformation, and explicitly links the movement with the French Revolution, where the privileged classes were misguidedely generous in offering freedom, progress and the emancipation of reason to their inferiors. This article, entitled "Unsectarian and Scientific Secularism", demonstrates clearly the way in which attitudes towards movements of thought are linked specifically to attitudes towards movements of education through a philosophy of knowledge. Having discussed the pernicious influence of Reformation and Revolution, the reviewer draws a parallel between those events and the obsession of his contemporaries with ensuring the dominance of physical science and secularism over education. The reviewer adds a further dimension by placing at Luther's door the responsibility for the sense of intellectual crisis in the nineteenth century. Luther's principle of free inquiry implies the supremacy of human reason, and has thus produced monsters in the form of the ideas of Spencer, Darwin and Strauss.

All in all, the reader looks in vain for precise analysis of the exact relationship between Protestantism and knowledge. Emotion leads to assertion, and distaste to dismissiveness. What is surprising
is a general failure meaningfully to explore actual links between Protestantism and influential schools of philosophy which also arouse the reviewers' wrath.

In fact, all the modern schools of philosophy arouse wrath in the varying degrees between dislike and disgust. Sometimes these attitudes preclude discussion, sometimes they permit explanation. The review of Wiseman's lectures on science and religion in Vol.287 simply condemns the thought of Locke as materialist and degrading, while the basically materialist doctrine of Utilitarianism is seen as ludicrous in Vol.49, and in Vol.1259 as inimical to any understanding of the psychological laws which underpin aesthetics. We get considerably more by way of explanation when Jennings, in Vol.35, tackles Whately, Hamilton and J.S. Mill in "Tendencies of Modern Logic"50. Bacon is accused of creating a prejudice against any mental labour which fails to provide an immediate material benefit, which in turn could be verified by experience. Logic - the noblest employment of a reasoning being - was therefore and thereafter shunned as unworthy of attention. The reviewer goes on to make a very interesting point on a central problem in the theory of induction. He feels that there is a need to establish in some quantifiable way how many induced facts are required before a general law can be deduced from observed phenomena. It is a pity that Jennings then breaks off discussion to accuse Whately of Socinianism. Significantly, Hamilton is praised for his knowledge of Scholasticism, but abused for his fondness for the intellectual chase, and for his love of the heedless and reckless mount he chooses to ride.

In Vol.38, Jennings extends the scope of his attack on modern
philosophy. In "Des Cartes, the Sensationalists, and Kant", Descartes is seen as the great author of the erroneous view that the individual reason has an absolute and inalienable sovereignty; a view which inevitably and disastrously divorces theology from metaphysics, and thereby excludes the authority of the Church from philosophy. At first sight, it is surprising to see the reviewer couple together Kant and Locke as disciples of Descartes, but he does tend to try to combine essentially distinct systems when he perceives them to be in opposition to Catholicism. This is why he draws an apparently wild analogy between modern philosophy and Julian the Apostate. It is therefore less of a surprise to see that most combative of champions of Catholic philosophy, W.G. Ward, adopt an identical attitude towards Descartes in his article for New Series Vol.13 on the authority of Scholastic philosophy.

And so, we are now in a position to examine the attitude of the Dublin Review towards Scholasticism itself, which was, we recall, the philosophical system long identified with the Catholic Church, and often assailed by opponents of the Church as proof of her enmity towards the March of Mind. Scholasticism receives its warmest advocacy and most detailed treatment in the Review from the 1860s onwards. The first real discussion of Scholasticism comes in Vol.30 with George Crolly's article "The Monks and Schoolmen of the Middle Ages". Crolly is keen to defend the Schoolmen against Hallam and other nineteenth-century worshippers at the feet of Mammon. Aquinas is seen as the exponent of a theology which pre-eminently demands the use of reason. Crolly explicitly challenges the received Protestant opinion of Scholasticism through using the terminology he associates with Protestantism. He asserts that the
thirteenth-century Scholastics were

"standard-bearers in the onward progress of mind...."63

Crolly is prepared to grapple with most of the standard and unthinking objections to Scholasticism. He denies that the Schoolmen were engaged in febrile futility through their energetic pursuit of the nature of angels. This is interpreted as a valuable and harmless intellectual exercise - and infinitely preferable, he adds, to devouring obscene novels. An odd comparison, one might think.

In Vol.31 nestles a most important article by T.W. Allies on the Catholic University. It is important, not only because it considers a Catholic philosopher linked with Scholasticism; not only because it comments on the dangers of Protestant philosophy; but also because it discusses with admirable clarity the implications of these movements of thought for everyday education. Given the involvement of Allies in the Catholic Poor-Schools Committee, this interest is hardly surprising. The article starts by considering the assumption by Lord John Russell that Catholicism confines the intellect and enslaves the soul. Allies responds to the charge by discussing the meaning and value of knowledge itself. He therefore attempts to establish a classification of knowledge, and in so doing utilizes Bonaventure's nomenclature and division of human knowledge. It is deeply significant that Allies should choose Bonaventure, for the Franciscan did not share Aquinas's wide interest in all aspects of human intellectual endeavour, but insisted that all knowledge without faith and for purely secular ends was intrinsically worthless and ineffectual. In other words, God's help is necessary lest the intellect errs. Allies describes in detail
his interpretation of Bonaventure's system. God provides illumination for the human sciences. This illumination is divided into "Lights" which make up the various aspects of human understanding and knowledge. The "inferior light", for example, enables perception through the five senses, but the "superior light" descends by inspiration, rather than through observation or discovery. This is the light of Grace and the Scriptures, and is higher than reason. By means of further subdivision through identifying the differences between these lights, we can set forth the essential classes of human knowledge. These are:

1. THE LIGHT OF SENSITIVE KNOWLEDGE
2. THE LIGHT OF MECHANICAL ARTS
3. THE LIGHT OF RATIONAL PHILOSOPHY
4. THE LIGHT OF NATURAL PHILOSOPHY
5. THE LIGHT OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY
6. THE LIGHT OF GRACE AND HOLY SCRIPTURE.

The first five lights are directed towards the last and greatest of them, which contains them all. Allies uses this classification to attack the philosophical systems of the previous 300 years. These systems have ignored metaphysics and the superior light in their obsession with utility. And it is the superior light which "has for its object the supernatural and the super-intelligible." 64

Herein lies Allies's criticism of the creatures and creations of Protestantism. To replace Scholasticism, which placed the correct value on authority because it saw in that authority a reflection, not only of God's Will, but also that Will as manifested in the nature of the human mind, Protestantism offered a fraudulent emancipation of the individual from authority. In fact, Bacon's philosophy is simply the secular equivalent of Luther's theology; his inductive method proceeds from the particular to the universal, in the same way as Luther proceeds from the individual to God. Descartes completed the work of both, since his
"Cogito, ergo sum" founds the universe on the self-same individual. And the conclusion to end all conclusions is that temple of Materialism called the Great Exhibition, the shadow of which is cast over Allies as he writes. Here indeed is the fitting climax to centuries of material progress and spiritual decline, where ignorance of theology - the true master science - has had such a catastrophic effect.

Allies proceeds to draw important educational implications from his analysis of contrasting philosophies of knowledge. Luther and Bacon, having encouraged experimental science and the mechanical arts to invade areas of knowledge outside their rightful orbit, have turned millions from their trust in the Church, and in this way have deprived them of the certain truth that

"Faith leads them to knowledge." 66

Certain in its theological uncertainty, Protestantism combines with its sceptical offspring to deny the possibility and necessity of a moral and religious education. And so, the state is to teach nothing save secular subjects, ignoring the true purpose of education, which is to enable man to take up his true relationship with God. "Mixed" or multi-denominational education is therefore an abomination, for it roots itself in Materialism, and produces the self-same fruit. Faith, then, is the true root of education: fix the moral nature, and no Scepticism will ever issue forth from the study of physical science.

It is rare for a reviewer to spell out so precisely the educational implications of a philosophy of knowledge. The proponents of Scholasticism within the Review nevertheless share assumptions with Allies. Ward, in particular, sees Scholasticism as the one true system
of philosophy, offering to Catholicism a sure protection against the
wild and unhallowed speculation which is the product of Materialism. In
his article for New Series Vol.13 ("Authority of the Scholastic
Philosophy")\textsuperscript{66}, Ward warmly welcomes the work of F. Kleutgen, who, while
propounding the fundamental infallibility of Scholasticism, admits that
it stands in need of adaptation and correction to suit modern times.
J.C. Hedley makes similar points in his review of the first volume of F.
Bede Vaughan's \textit{The Life and Labours of S. Thomas of Aquin}\textsuperscript{67}. Hedley sees
Scholasticism as the temple of Catholic philosophy. S. Thomas created a
system which contains every known science and all supernatural truth: a
system which is unique in allowing the philosopher to cross the
boundaries between nature and super-nature. Hedley provides us with a
theme of great significance: the link between the support offered to
Scholasticism and the special theory of innate ideas espoused by Ward
himself. S. Thomas is seen to reject the Platonic doctrine that ideas
are necessarily \textit{a priori} in origin in favour of the Aristotelian view
that knowledge begins in sense, and is therefore not inborn. The link
between innate ideas and Scholasticism is further explored by J.B.
Dalgairns in his article "The Relation of Scholastic to Modern
Philosophy" for New Series Vol.20. Dalgairns also intends to explore a
link of his own: between the insight of James Martineau on innate
ideas and intuition and that of Kleutgen, the exponent of Aquinas. The
ground for agreement between the two is the existence of intuition
within the intellect. All knowledge, says Kleutgen,

"...implies intuition...that is, immediate knowledge of first
principles."\textsuperscript{68}

This is surely nothing other than Ward's concept of self-evident,
necessary truth, and is suggestive of the extent to which Ward's
thought is based upon his understanding of Aquinas. Ward's theory of the
self-evident idea echoes Aquinas's rejection of the crude theories of
innate ideas. W.F. Barry discusses this point in New Series Vol.25,
commenting that :-

"...S. Thomas does not say that the first concepts are innate...
on the contrary, he lays down that they are all due to abstraction,
and are produced by the action of mind upon objects represented in
the sense."

While the Dublin Review therefore maintains a generally antagonistic
attitude towards all post-Reformation schools of philosophy and a firm
advocacy of the essential value of Scholasticism, some reviewers discern
a value in the former which effectively increases the contemporary
relevance of the latter. Hedley\textsuperscript{79}, for example, thinks that there are
good things in the Mill and Bain school which could be used to help
rewrite the superseded parts of Aquinas's \textit{Summa}. And Dalgairns\textsuperscript{77} points
out that both systems may be wrongly used, as Kant and Occam proved all
too abundantly. Granted, he says, that we prefer the ontological
Scholasticism to the psychological and inductive modern philosophy.
However, we must accept that Scholasticism could not, and did not,
contemplate modern issues. Nor must we expect compliments to the chef if
we force such an unfamiliar dish down unprepared throats.
The Value, Use and Limitations of Reason

What is the relationship between reason and authority? Is reason capable of judging aright in all areas of speculation? To what extent is freedom of inquiry a duty, a danger or a possibility? What is the relationship between reason and faith? The issue of the application of reason is dominated by such questions, and the writers of the *Dublin Review* approach unanimity of opinion on the matter.

One central theme is the comparative weakness of the unaided faculty of reason. James Burton Robertson reviews Balmes's *Catholicism and Protestantism Considered in respect to Civilization* for Volume 24. Robertson quotes Balmes approvingly on his discussion of the weakness of human intelligence, which God does not offset as such, but at least allows for by implanting in the mind:

"...a certain inclination to defer to authority - the instinct of faith...."

Freedom of thought - that most arrogant and vaunted of freedoms - is chimerical, and is essentially a mere echo of others' thoughts. The truths of science rest on greater truths, which require a delicacy of observation granted to very few. In an earlier article, Robertson makes abundantly clear, not only the relatively minor rôle reason and free thought are to play in the great questions concerning mankind, but also the extent to which they are both subservient to Catholic dogma; dogma which has settled once and for all the fundamental questions in philosophy itself. Catholicism thereupon

"...abandons to free investigation a multitude of secondary and incidental points...."
The terminology is significantly dismissive; no great importance can be attached to any approach which deals with the abandoned and the incidental.

Further reviews offer us a more detailed analysis of the link between faith and reason. Robertson again, in his "Modern Deism" in Vol. 357a, describes in detail the thought of the French writer, Droz. Reason, asserts Droz, is simply inadequate on its own; for reason lacks the strength to command our assent and so move us to act. God provides the motive force through the gift of faith, which reason can recognize and accept. The precise nature of the link between the teaching of the Church and faith is assumed rather than explored, but the reviewer is adamant that, whenever philosophers deny the Church's authority over the fruits of reason, the followers of such philosophers will reap the most terrible harvest. And Descartes is subjected to Jennings's onslaught in Volume 3876 as the first great enemy of the Church who demanded her exclusion from philosophy in the name of the sovereignty of reason.

We can, of course, rely upon W.G. Ward for the most combative and trenchant statement of the authority of the Church over all forms of philosophy. We can also rely on Ward to criticize fellow-Catholics who deny the right of the Church to exercise such authority over supposedly secular speculation. Some Catholics - and, of course, all Protestants - argue that the Church cannot impose its teaching on philosophy, since philosophy relies exclusively on reason, which lies outside the remit of the Church. But Ward will have none of this. In his article "Authority of the Scholastic Philosophy"75, Ward asserts that, if the Church opposes a particular theory, it is because that theory is
irrational. Now, we need to be very clear on what Ward is claiming here. In his article "Science, Prayer, Free Will, and Miracles"77, Ward argues that the time has come to set out the Church's authority over secular science, and proceeds so to do: wherever secular thought touches, directly or indirectly, a truth of religion, then that absolute authority comes into play. Ward uses the image of Church doctrine as the axis around which turns all human knowledge. This concept of Church authority would seem to be virtually all-embracing. However, in his article for New Series Vol.18 on J. S. Mill78, Ward appears to accept that reason alone is the judge of specific questions, and gives slavery as an example. Indeed, it would seem that reason is capable of operating on the various social and psychological data to come up with an informed judgement and solution, although moral axioms have their own part to play in the process. Doubtless Ward would argue that the bedrock of faith, and acceptance of the Church's right to decide on the general principles, would be the prerequisite before reason could be employed on the specific issue.

How can we sum up Ward's attitude towards the intellect, as expressed in the pages of the Dublin Review? Critics of Ward were wont to accuse him of being afraid of reason, and in one sense they were right. When the human intellect left the region of pure mathematics, Ward felt that it could not be trusted alone. The word "felt" is used advisedly, because Ward's philosophy should never be divorced from the deep emotion and gratitude he felt towards the Church of his adoption: the Church which had given him the spirituality he craved; whose spirituality he valued above intellect, and whose spirituality he saw as the guide to the intellect in an age of cataclysmic upheaval. D.B. Dunne, reviewing
Ward's Philosophical Introduction to *On Nature and Grace* in Volume 4879, identifies this crucial element within Ward's thought, and agrees whole-heartedly with it. Ward, he says, is right to castigate those Protestants who suppose that leaning on the authority of the Church in matters of philosophy is to place one's intellect in fetters. Not so; for the very health of the intellect is placed in jeopardy if it is deprived of the opportunity to compare its own conclusions to those of an absolute standard.

In fact, the tone of Ward's thought on the value, use and limitations of reason sets the model for the Review as a whole. A characteristic example is a very interesting article by Harriet Thompson: "The Principles of '89". (New Series Vol. 3) Thompson presents an imaginary conversation between a young, liberal Catholic Marquis, a rationalist German professor, a sound Catholic priest who is prepared to accommodate the principles of the Revolution to his teaching, and a thorough-going Jesuit ("the Padre") who is prepared to accommodate nothing. The Jesuit is the hero, and comments in a manner not unfamiliar to us that reason is not capable of judging faith, but that faith can teach nothing contrary to reason. It is interesting to note that the reviewer is keen to dismiss the Professor's argument that, since man's intellect has reached a state of maturity, it is unnecessary to try to control reason in leading-strings. Independent thinking, says the Padre, has no connection whatsoever with the chance crumbs of truth which were scattered in the French Revolution. Nor were the independent thinkers of Classical times able to conceive of the Christian principle of man's natural equality. And this very principle cannot be expressed without a Christian education in a Christian moral atmosphere. It may not be
without significance that the Professor's argument had been used by Thomas Arnold in a review for *The Rambler* in 1859. It certainly suggests the distance between the two Catholic Reviews on this most vital of topics. This distance did not, however, prevent Thompson from contributing to the *Rambler* as well.

Two major themes have emerged in the treatment of the value, use and limitations of reason in the *Dublin Review*. The first is the inability of unaided reason to achieve any meaningful goal. The second is the denial that science - in any sense of the term - may be separated from faith. Nor may reason be used as the dividing line. Linked with this second point is the Review's inveterate detestation of any philosophy which attempted to identify a region of the unknowable in order to ignore it. This makes metaphysics, and God Himself, inaccessible to the faculty of reason - that very faculty which is to receive His guidance.

There is a virtual unanimity of views on the value of doubt to the intellect. The unanimity is one of silence. One of the very few references to this topic, which exercised greatly the writers of the radical Reviews, occurs in an article for *New Series* Vol.13: "Mill on Liberty". Doubt is denial: no more, no less. So to doubt God's existence is to deny it. Doubt inevitably excludes worship.

What, then, are the educational implications of the philosophy of knowledge held with such consistency by the writers of the *Dublin Review*? Certainly the Review would find it difficult to contemplate acceptable educational contacts with Protestants at any level. This in turn would make any state rôle in Catholic schools a cause for concern. Perhaps it is Allies who makes the important point most clearly. He
describes the restoration of Catholic schools as:

"..the Church's great work of construction in the latter half of the nineteenth century..."\(^3\)

and goes on to add that all subjects may be taught providing faith is implanted as

"..the spring, not only of the moral, but the intellectual being..."\(^4\)
The short but stormy career of the *Home and Foreign* gave it little opportunity to discuss the nature of mind and reason, but plenty of time to discuss its value, use and limitations. Indeed, the discussion of these issues largely accounts, not only for the storms, but also for the brevity of the Review's existence. The forthright comments made by the later *Rambler* on the necessity for freedom of enquiry on subjects not covered by Catholic dogma are developed by the *Home and Foreign* in a series of articles which present a closely-argued and aggressive challenge to the Ultramontane school. Indeed, one article in Vol.3 seeks to undermine the Ultramontane by simultaneously consigning him to the dustbin of history and by re-defining him out of existence.

The major themes of the *Home and Foreign* can be established by examining Acton's comments on the Papal Brief to the Archbishop of Munich in 1863.

"In a word, therefore, the Brief affirms that the common opinions and explanations of Catholic divines ought not to yield to the progress of secular science, and that the course of theological knowledge ought to be controlled by the decrees of the Index." The real meaning of this, continues Acton, is to breach the walls between revealed dogma and personal opinion, and to imply a distinction between religious truth and scientific enquiry in seeking to demand the entire obedience of scientists to the supreme authority of Rome. Since the purpose of the Review had been to extend the walls and to demonstrate that unfettered scientific progress would, in itself, contribute to the good of the Church, Acton can see no alternative but to cease publication.

The theme of the necessity for intellectual freedom in scientific
enquiry is established in the very first volume of the Review. However, we must not assume that the editors' attitude towards free thought is identical to that of the Westminster or Fortnightly Reviews. Acton, Simpson and Wetherel's article "Cardinal Wiseman and the Home and Foreign Review" argues that a true religion seeks and accepts truth wherever it may be found, even if faith may initially be shaken. However, the Church may certainly control the dispensing of that knowledge - an important circumscribing of the freedom of thought. A scientific discovery may upset prevailing theology, and therefore care must be taken in disseminating that knowledge, even though the process by which it is attained may not be blocked. The implication of this is that the Review is likely to take a much less dismissive attitude towards Protestantism than did The Rambler. The "Wiseman" article makes it clear that truth is to be accepted and recognized whether it comes from a Catholic or Protestant source. And Roscher's communicated article for Vol.2 on the political economy of Pépin significantly objects to the latter's crude anti-Protestant bias, which leads him into the assumption that Protestants are Christian only so far as they coincide with Catholicism. Similarly, Acton's article "The Munich Congress" in Vol.4 clearly supports the approach of Catholic scholars who are prepared to benefit from the strengths and weaknesses of their Protestant colleagues. Acton and Simpson, in their article "Ultramontanism", are also prepared to cite Döllinger as an example of a scholar who is ready to accept that the Reformation had its nobler aspect, and should not be condemned outright. Significantly, the Review is unwilling to follow the papal and ultramontane line in upholding the unique value of scholastic theology and philosophy. The "Ultramontanism"
article argues that the Döllinger school, unlike Scholasticism, uses the valuable historic method, with its study of sources and scientific spirit, to further the advance of religious truth. Acton's "The Munich Congress" places those who rely entirely on scholastic theology alongside those who also rely on the Index.

What the Home and Foreign finds congenial is the view that man cannot be content with faith alone. His understanding "requires to be satisfied just as much as the religious feelings of man." The article on Ultramontanism outlines Baader's argument that faith is the basis of true knowledge, but that knowledge itself complements it: in so doing, it provides a safeguard against the dangers which flourish through the imposition of external authority upon the understanding. Acton and Simpson comment:

"When a man... has worked out the problem of science or politics, on purely scientific and political principles, and then controlled this process by the doctrine of the Church, and found its results to coincide with that doctrine, then he is an Ultramontane in the real meaning of the term - a Catholic in the highest sense of Catholicism."

This is a very interesting passage, and reveals, not only the limitations attached to the use of human reason, but also its value. The intellectual freedom to pursue non-doctrinal investigation is absolute, but is to be subjected - and, implicitly, validated - by reference to doctrine. It is also noteworthy that it would seem to be the individual himself who deals with the reference to, and comparison of, doctrine and discovery. We might think that the whole procedure is replete with potential problems. What does the phrase referring to control of the process actually mean? And what are the precise limits and terms of reference of church doctrine? In his article "Medieval Fables of the
Popes'94, Acton argues that the Church may have an infallible defence against false doctrines, but She has most definitely fallen victim to factual and historical errors, which find their way into missals, breviaries, tests of theological opinions and papal bulls. This may strike the reader as rather a comprehensive list, arguably impinging upon areas which many would consider distinctly doctrinal. Acton makes the further point that it is spiritually necessary to know the truth about the Saints—assuming that you are an educated Catholic. Truth, it seems, is less important to the spirituality of the less educated.

The Review, like The Rambler, bears in mind the need to attract Protestants to the church. But the Ultramontanes of the De Maistre school effectively repel them by their view that ecclesiastical authority should be the only guide to knowledge, even in matters foreign to itself. The impact of this school on the discipline of history is particularly unfortunate, and has led to the twisting of historical facts, evasion and wilful inaccuracy, such as claiming that Calvin died blaspheming. In fact, Acton's most forthright statement on the issue appears in the last volume of the Home and Foreign, where he deprecates the dishonour done to the contemporary Church through the conflict with literature and science undertaken in her name: conflict which has led to the suspicion that the Church

"represses that intellectual freedom which is essential to the progress of truth...."95
The Radical Reviews: The Westminster and Fortnightly Reviews

The Westminster Review started its life in 1824; the Fortnightly Review saw the light of day in 1865. Nevertheless, the expectation is that there will be strong similarities in the approach of the two Reviews to the philosophy of knowledge. Neither Review supported - or was interested in supporting - the aims of any religious denomination.

Both Reviews had a strong sense of their own importance as formers of opinion. Neither Review was supported by - or was interested in supporting - a political party in the manner of the Edinburgh or Quarterly Reviews. Both Reviews wrote for the intelligentsia. And the same names appear in both Reviews as contributors: Herbert Spencer; John Stuart Mill; James Martineau; G.H. Lewes; George Eliot; T.H. Huxley; Walter Pater; James Sully; and, by no means abashed by such august company, HM Inspector of Schools J.G. Fitch.

The apparent links between the Reviews would seem to be best exemplified in the commanding influence of John Stuart Mill. Mill was effectively the editor of The London and Westminster Review and a frequent contributor to the Westminster in general. He reappeared in the Fortnightly as a contributor and then, after his death, in the guise of his avatar, John Morley. Morley, indeed, uses Mill as the shining example of how the mind should be used. What Everett quotes as the essence of Morley's Rationalism is in fact taken from that writer's review of Mill's Autobiography, and is intended as a description of Mill.

"... here is the genuine seal of intellectual mastery and the true stamp of a perfect rationality."

However, if the Westminster and Fortnightly Reviews were horses
from the same rationalist stable, then their riders frequently differed, not only on the way in which they should be ridden, but also on the direction they should take. The early Benthamite years of the Westminster might seem to impose on the riders a uniform style and sense of direction; but the later Westminster was a beast more susceptible to the riders' varying interpretations of the art of horsemanship. And the Fortnightly Review was in theory an altogether different animal. It was designed to lurch about in various directions, and put itself through its paces before bounding off at unmatched pace to its goal. In his Recollections, editor Morley says that he tried to:

"do justice to truths presented... by men in various schools, with whom in important and even in vital respects I could not in the least bring myself to agree."**

Anthony Trollope, one of the founders of the Fortnightly, commented:—

"we would let any man who had a thing to say, and knew how to say it, speak freely."**

Trollope also felt that such eclecticism failed as it was bound to do; free-thinking duly carried the day, because free-thinking had its own exclusivity.

And so, in discussing the two Reviews, it will be vital to bear in mind, not only the differences between them, but also the diversity of viewpoint within each.
The Westminster Review

The Nature of Mind and Reason

The questions looming large in the minds of the Review writers are:

How does the mind form ideas? Are such ideas innate? Are they God-given? Are they derived a posteriori? The relevance of this discussion to the philosophy of knowledge and educational practice itself is made very clear by John Stuart Mill in his Autobiography.

"...the difference between these two schools of philosophy, that of Intuition, and that of Experience and Association, is not a mere matter of abstract speculation; it is full of practical consequences, and lies at the foundation of all the greatest differences of practical opinion in an age of progress."

For, in Mill's opinion, the practical reformer, when faced by strongly-felt opposition to necessary change, must account for those feelings before he can overcome them. And so, the intuitional school, treating such feelings as ultimately and essentially inexplicable, is

"one of the chief hindrances to the rational treatment of great social questions, and one of the greatest stumbling blocks to human improvement."

The early Westminster Review, with Bentham's head on its title-page, Bentham's views in its pages and Bentham's works in review, is hardly likely to favour a priori ideas. Rarely do the earlier volumes condescend to discuss the range of views on the nature of mind. Bentham's felicific calculus and entire philosophy are intrinsically mechanistic and associationist, since they rely upon the manipulation of experiences to influence the mind. These early reviewers often describe the acquisition of knowledge as a mere storage process.

The article "Present System of Education" in Vol.4 is a case in point.

"If Education means any thing... it is the process by which the mind of man, possessed of powers, but unfurnished with ideas, is stored with knowledge...."
Linked with the idea of the mind as a receptacle is one frequently employed image - the "treasury of knowledge" as the distillation of great ideas communicated through the ages.

Alexander Bain provides a clear demonstration of the link between Benthamism and the Laws of Association in his article "On Toys". Intellectual operations are said to depend upon the cohesion of contiguous ideas; the sight of an object is associated with the sound of the word, and when either is met with in a new context, the transferring of the idea provides pleasure. Also, J.S. Mill's article on Coleridge in Vol.33 points out how Coleridge's attack on Locke had the effect of reminding people of the important link between Hartley's associationist psychology and Locke's use of the a posteriori approach in his philosophy. Indeed, Mill's stance on a priori ideas is well known, and clearly communicated in several articles. Two examples will suffice. Firstly, he attacks Whewell for attempting to prop up existing doctrine with a flavouring of Germanic a priori morality; secondly, he uses a discussion of Comte's three stages of human society to label the whole area of a priori thought as appropriate only to the metaphysical stage.

Mill is, of course, not alone in his condemnation of a priori ideas. A review in New Series Vol.22 of Morell's An Introduction to Mental Philosophy, on the Inductive Method concurs with Morell's main thesis - that there is no a priori element working for any form of absolute; that so-called innate ideas are phenomenologically formed; and that supposed instinctive reactions are the result of pre-conscious mental activity, rather than the promptings of conscience or divine will.
Morality is seen as nothing more than the action of circumstances on the human spirit. The reviewer, H.B. Wilson, applauds Norell's argument that moral ideas are not formed from an a priori notion of absolute good. It is not difficult to find other examples in the pages of the Westminster of reviewers keen to stress their antagonism to non-experiential theories of the mind. Sheldon Amos, for example, criticizes Locke for insufficient attention to the Laws of Association. But it is dangerous to assume that the Westminster is a consistent and unflinching advocate of a posteriori theories. Indeed, it is possible to argue that the Westminster is frequently sceptical of such theories, and as frequently doubtful of the relevance of inductive, experiential theories to vital areas of the mind itself. For example, in New Series Vol.5, James Martineau sees the existence of conscience as independently valid and inappropriate to the workings of induction; faith is irrelevant if induction is universally applicable. Similar points are made by other writers in the articles "Theism" and "The Religious Heresies of the Working Classes". The former argues that we cannot apply induction to God: our intuitive consciousness of faith is the "ultimate fact of our consciousness..."

The latter argues that we need a philosophical Christianity able to hear God speak through the conscience. Froude's article on Spinoza also posits conscience as the seat of final judgement, and Necessarianism as, at bottom, an excuse for evil. We genuinely have some measure of free will. An Englishman's commonsense tells him to accept the plain instincts of right or wrong. On the other hand, a review by James Sully energetically damns the free-will doctrine as a Platonic-style
projection of the supposed indeterminacy of voluntary actions. H.B.
Wilson, reviewing the book Rational Godliness\textsuperscript{14}, appears to accept the
author's view that conscience, as well as truth, imposes a check on the
spirit of inquiry. The same reviewer, in commenting on Fortlage's
System der Psychologie\textsuperscript{15}, says that psychologists are too fond of
thinking that we simply need to photograph the mind to see how it works.
In New Series Vol.10, Wilson discusses Necessarianism in Solly's The
Will, Divine and Human. Wilson has no criticism to make of what he
identifies as Solly's argument, which posits the existence of
"... an innate sense of right and wrong, which enters as a force
-infinitesimal it may be, - but still a force, in all particular
determinations of the will..."\textsuperscript{16}
So, the mind forms its ideas and decisions using circumstance and
this force. Reviewing works on Materialism by Frauenstädt and Fichte\textsuperscript{17},
Wilson feels that we cannot prove that consciousness is attributable to
matter sui generis. One important theme in Wilson's reviews is that
human knowledge, as created in the mind, has both a priori and a
posteriori elements. His later review of Whewell's On the Philosophy of
Discovery\textsuperscript{18} makes this point, but Wilson clearly does not care for
Whewell's view that God-given truths are generated through the mind, so
that man increasingly sees as God sees. This alleged correspondence,
says Wilson, cannot be established as objective truth. Finally, an
article on the metaphysics of Lewes\textsuperscript{19} criticizes him for assuming that
science embraces all experience; there is a personal inner life which
is outside the laws of cause and effect.

An examination of the way in which the Westminster refers to schools
of philosophy reveals that the experiential school is by no means
uniformly supported. A quotation from Locke may be used on the
Westminster title pages, but the Idealists are not without their defenders. There may be attacks on Carlyle and Spinoza, Kant, Hegel and Whewell: but there are also attacks, albeit fewer in number, on induction and the implications of Materialism. These attacks are often from a religious standpoint. First, the anti-Idealists. John Sterling\textsuperscript{120} criticizes Carlyle for denying the value of systematic logical thinking in the examination of premises. Lewes\textsuperscript{121} criticizes Spinoza and Descartes for using \textit{a priori} premises as the basis of their thought. Lewes takes care to praise Bacon for establishing a method rather than a system of seeking truth via \textit{a posteriori} reasoning. Similarly, a review of Mill’s \textit{A System of Logic}\textsuperscript{122} praises the valuable moral lesson drawn from the use of evidence. Mill himself is less enthusiastic about Bacon as a practitioner of the latter’s own technique. In New Series Vol.2\textsuperscript{123}, he criticizes both Bentham and Bacon for trying to work out moral science from insufficient data. Mill is not, of course, denying that the inductive method is the correct one to employ on such questions.

We need to examine carefully the attitude of the Review to the philosophy of Auguste Comte. The relevance to the Positive philosophy to the philosophy of knowledge is considerable, since

(1) it claims to have established a precise hierarchy of sciences which leads to the fullest possible understanding of man in society;

(2) it provides a methodology, based on the methods of induction in the natural sciences, to establish the laws of society;

(3) it provides a vision of a positivist future in which a form of clerisy is able to secure progress through a combination of intellectual training and manipulation of moral emotion;
it is prepared to discard areas of inquiry which are "metaphysical", since such inquiry is profitless and takes place in a state of human progress soon to be transcended as the positivist era dawns.

Once again, the Westminster opens its pages to opposing views. Predictably, James Martineau prefers the feeblest interpreter of St. Paul to Comtean Materialism. G.H. Lewes is unhappy with Comte placing religion as intrinsic to man, and thus blurring the necessary distinction between religion and morality. John Chapman - perhaps rather out of his depth here - likes the hierarchy of sciences, but feels that progress depends less on systematic than on individual progress. J.S. Mill feels that Comte's three stages of human progress are meaningful, and that Comte is right in regarding intellect as the only progressive element - but the whole system does not amount to a genuine science of society.

On the other hand, thorough-going Comtists are given column-space. E.S. Beesly attacks Kingsley's inaugural lecture as Professor of Modern History: Kingsley is wrong to deny the necessity or possibility of establishing laws in history to be used for the benefit of society. Comte's three-stage development is the key. We should use Comte's model, together with other (unspecified) information on uniformities in nature, to give meaning to the facts of history and thus to facilitate progress. Frederic Harrison deals with another Professor of Modern History - Goldwin Smith of Oxford. There is little overt Comtist doctrine in the article, but Harrison makes a similar point to that of Beesly; you can form a valid induction by using history in conjunction
with the known laws of human nature to produce a science of society.

While the preponderance of argument generally sways in favour of the Materialists, it would seem that the Westminster does not require from its reviewers a rigid adherence to that school of philosophy. An avowal of support for the Idealist school may be acceptable - but what of the philosophy of the contemporary Roman Catholic hierarchy? Scholasticism? In fact, it is Scholasticism which comes in for the most widespread criticism in the Review. Scholasticism is given a pejorative definition in New Series Vol. 45 in the article "The Development of Psychology". It is accused of raising mere observed uniformities into self-acting entities. "The Philosophy of Roger Bacon" is the only article with anything resembling a good word for the Schoolmen: they might have blunted and wasted their powerful minds on the chimera of absolutes, but at least they vindicated the right of free enquiry.

If Scholasticism is given such short shrift, it is not surprising that Catholicism itself is axiomatically regarded as inimical to knowledge and the intellect. The word "axiomatically" is used advisedly, since the point is generally seen as so self-evident as to require no explanation. James Mill splutters

"The aversion of the Romish church to the progress of mind needs no illustration." Mary Shelley makes a similar comment in Vol. 11, and Vol. 22 brings up the usual charges against the Church for its persecution of Galileo. A further charge is added when the ogre of Ultramontanism looms. The Ultramontane principle

"would not only subject all intellects to the Roman creed, but all national power to the dominion of the Papal Court ..."
What is the significance of the Reformation to the progress of the mind? What is surprising is that there is little unquestioning assumption that the Reformation represented a giant leap forward for the intellect and for Rationalism. Samuel Brown's "The Atomic Theory" sees the Reformation in some ill-defined way as the effect, but not the cause, of the science and technique of observation. The reviewer in "The Emancipation of the Jews" in Vol. 19 doubts that the Reformation genuinely ended the thraldom of the intellect: and James Martineau, in an article significantly entitled "Protestant and Catholic Popery", denied that the Reformation freed the intellect:

"The Reformation has simply made over the infallibility of the Pope to each individual Protestant." Unalloyed praise is therefore rarely given to the Reformation. W.E. Hickson, in his "Dutch and German Schools", says that the Reformation principle was none other than the right of private judgement in religion, which led inexorably to the advanced state of popular education in Germany. And in Vol. 22, Germany's status as Europe's intellectual giant is traceable directly to the contribution of Luther in opening the intellectual eyes of millions. On the other hand, the later article "Dr. Newman: The Difficulties of Protestantism" makes what is at first sight a surprising avowal. If God had come to earth to found a religious system, then it could scarcely be other than that of the Church of Rome. The implication is, however, that He did not: for Protestantism, dismissed it would seem as a creed, is at least the cornerstone for the only true temple - that of free thought.

At best, then, the religious contribution to the philosophy of knowledge has been to act as a stage a progressive progress. Knowledge has rushed
on, and the foundations are forgotten below ground. Not surprisingly, perhaps, the Review is overwhelmingly antagonistic to the involvement of creed in educational thought, and of religious denomination in education itself.
The Westminster generally accords to the faculty of reason the utmost importance. It is not simply that reason is the key to intellectual progress - though this is true. It is not simply that reason is the key to destroying the dogmatic and irrelevant obfuscation which blocks the path to progress - though this is also true. Rather, there are crucial articles in which reason is given the central rôle in both intellectual and moral progress.

Various justifications are given for according reason a moral rôle. The Review prints the Spencer Royal Institution lecture of 1855, "What Knowledge is of most Worth?". Spencer defines *morality* as the independent use of reason. Science most demands that reason, and is therefore the most moral subject. Again, John Chapman, in an article on Christian Revivals, suggests that the intellect and feelings need freedom for self-examination. The intellect thereby leads morality to improve until morality becomes virtually instinctive. And a review of Essays on Religion and Literature condemns W.G. Ward for emphasizing the primacy of the moral and spiritual nature of man, as opposed to the intellectual, in the search for human perfection.

James Martineau's article "Protestant and Catholic Popery" complains that theological argument - by implication, argument without a rational basis - is in essence destructive. Science, however, genuinely seeks both physical and moral truths, and the search for "something more certain than the deductions of reason, some assurance that shall relieve the mind from dependence on its own faculties...is one of the standing superstitions of the half-cultivated intellect...".

Indeed, we recall that it is through scientific thinking that the next
Reformation will come; and its coming will

"illustrate the morality of inquiry..." (Martineau's stress)146.

It would seem that the faculty of reason is not only of first importance in the progress of man, but also that it is able to function on all aspects of human knowledge. However, not all Westminster reviewers would accept this view. An article on German philosophy by R.H. Whitelocke147 - unusually, a signed article - takes a most atypical viewpoint. The key to truth lies in religion, and not in the cold, scientific, analytical reason, which is unable to penetrate mysteries. God's omnipotent thought can, and does, elude the gropings of our reason; we are doomed to the fate of Icarus if we overestimate the capabilities of that faculty. The later article "Reason and Faith"148 dismisses the idea that faith is dependent on reason. A more detailed example of the same view lies in another James Martineau article149, which effectively warns us that his acceptance of the omnipotence of reason in "Protestant and Catholic Popery" is more apparent than real. Hope for the future, he feels, lies in the free intercommunion of Christianity and philosophy. But you slam the door shut on faith if you believe that Baconian induction is universally valid. A reconciliation between the two is the great task of the future - but it will not be a victory of one over the other. Similar points emerge when Martineau reviews The Restoration of Belief. Martineau will not accept that what he calls the "sciences of reflection and self-knowledge"150 are simply fancies. The author of the work under review overstresses the opposition of mathematical thinking and natural philosophy to any form of reason which is prepared to accept the probable. Do you not proceed in Euclid by granting premises?
In fact, a number of articles suggest that human progress is best served by a combination of reason, scientific methodology and some kind of religious feeling: the shorthand form often used is a combination of heart and mind working together in some sort of symbiotic relationship. A case in point is George Eliot's article on Mackay's *The Progress of the Intellect, as Exemplified in the Religious Development of the Greeks and Hebrews*. Eliot grants the Comtean view that metaphysical and theological speculation is worn out and outmoded. The intellect is vital for progress, for we need to establish and then use our sense of an "undeviating law in the material and moral world - of that invariability of sequence which is acknowledged to be the basis of physical science ... (and) which can alone give value to experience and render education in the true sense possible."

But this intellect cannot work unaided: we need empathy, tolerance, flexibility. But faith, too often regarded as a synonym for religion, must be probed by reason to weed out credulity. This, of course, is in direct opposition to the "Reason and Faith" and "English Religion" articles. Nor would H.B. Wilson agree with Eliot. In a review for New Series Vol. 8, he accepts the author's comments that the spirit of inquiry should proceed hand in hand with reverence, providing

"no other checks be imposed upon it than such as come of conscience and truth."

Again, the article "Theism" warns us against applying induction to God.

While generalizations have proved difficult, the *Westminster* is usually in favour of doubt - in every application of the term - and dogmatically opposes the use of dogma. Article after article castigates dogma as irrational and immoral. It has not been possible to identify a
meaningful defence of dogma in the Review. Even religious doubt is an
unmixed blessing. Doubt, of course, is seen as the force which breaks
down the walls of dogma. J. S. Mill's opinion is typical. Surveying
Aphorisms in Vol. 26, he singles out for mention a particular
favourite:－

"The unfortunate Ladurlad did not desire the sleep that
for ever fled his weary eyelids with more earnestness than
most people seek the deep slumber of a decided opinion."
(reviewer's stress). 154

James Martineau is habitually prepared to accept that doubt is essential
to every development of intellect: particularly the destruction of
creeds. Geraldine Jewsbury 156 attacks The Nemesis of Faith for its
treatment of doubt as misery, and George Eliot 157 is disgusted by Dr.
Cumming's negative and hostile attitude to honest doubters. Baden
Powell 158 even manages to turn the torments of Blanco White into an
object lesson in the need for the free expression of doubt—providing
it is expressed in a becoming manner!

So, doubt is not destructive. W. M. W. Call 159 sees doubt as the tool to
extract from the old that which is true, and to lay the foundations for
building afresh. This theme is echoed in the appreciative review of
Essays and Reviews 160: religion is to be allowed to work with natural
science. Eliot's Mackay article 161 makes the clearest statement of the
view that science and non-dogmatic religion should not be separated:
once more, heart and head work in necessary alliance. The Comtist
Beesly 162 adds that the heart must rule; it is the function of the
intellect to solve problems raised by the heart.
The Fortnightly Review

The Nature of Mind and Reason

Given that the Fortnightly is supposed to be a forum for contrasting opinions, we might expect to witness the clash of knowledgeable armies in the daylight of debate on philosophies of intuition and experience. Such expectations are disappointed. The preponderance of argument is most distinctly in favour of the experiential/associationist school. J. Scot Henderson, in New Series Vol. 18\(^{18}\), comes closest to a criticism of that philosophy in discussing the thought of Lewes. He interprets Lewes as saying that there is an \textit{a priori} element within the human mind - not in the sense of Kant's Forms, but as transmitted experience from one age to another, which gives the appearance of intuition. But Henderson feels that Lewes has not successfully accounted for some intuitions. Take, he says, the intuitive sense of the veracity of mathematical axioms. This sense is not traceable to any intuition verified by experience: it is abstraction, dependent on thought alone. So, indeed, is the assumption of self-identity, which is not explicable by sensory experience. Also, Mivart, in "The Assumptions of Agnostics"\(^{19}\), attacks Mill, Bain and Spencer for suggesting - through inaccurate verbiage - that we have no consciousness, hence implying that we have no faculty outside the sensory faculties. But, says Mivart, we must not, and cannot, dismiss our sense of mysteries \textit{beyond} consciousness.

We need to consider why the defence of the \textit{a priori} systems should be so scanty. Perhaps the very constitution of the Fortnightly, and certainly its development under the influence of John Morley, made contributions by those holding strong intuitive views unlikely. After
all, the implication is that free thought is of particular value, and
that it cannot be restricted in its operation or its efficiency by a
denial to it of whole areas of the philosophy of knowledge. The attacks
on intuition take a number of forms. A review of the Duke of Argyll's
The Reign of Law attacks the Duke for his single remaining
metaphysical idea - that there is purpose in the universe. Sir Alexander
Grant attacks the concept of intuitive moral ideas - such as Kant's
Categorical Imperative - by describing them as, in essence, the impulse
for self-preservation, which the desire for pleasure may convert into
the willingness to sacrifice one's life to attain the keenest
satisfaction. Indeed, the Fortnightly constantly reminds its readers of
the dangers of separating any form of mental activity from its
physiological basis. This is the theme of the review in New Series
Vol.9 of Dr. Maudsley's Gulstonian Lectures. It is also the theme
of Morley's article "Mr. Mill's Autobiography". Significantly, Morley
quotes the very passage from the Autobiography referred to earlier, and
remarks that Mill's attitude constitutes

"a true positivism ... by establishing at the bottom of men's
minds the habit of seeking explanations of all phenomena in
experience..."

In "On Compromise", Morley refers to morality itself as

"registered generalisations from experience..."

In a later article ("Mr. Mill's Three Essays on Religion") from New
Series Vol.17, Morley clearly but gently disagrees with certain
tendencies in his over-sympathetic mentor. Morley refuses to countenance
any suggestion that the bodily organisms do not cause mental operations.
Again, in his article "Mr. Flint's Philosophy of History", Morley
rejects completely the a priori method as valueless in extracting
laws from social facts. Morley is prepared to admit that there are
certain matters which experience and observation find inaccessible.
His "Diderot" article in New Series Vol.18 has a simple solution to
such problems:-- ignore them.

Needless to say, antagonism to a priori thought is not restricted to the
articles of Morley. Mill himself, in "Berkeley's Life and Writings", objects to Berkeley's view that God provides for us independent objects
of perception which are detached from the mind which perceives them.
This, says Mill, is pure assertion. Elsewhere, Mill remarks:--
"All we can know of Matter is the sensations which it gives us, and
the order of occurrence of those sensations."

James Sully, writing on the subject of the basis of musical
sensations, is similarly scathing on any suggestion that there exist
impressions or perceptions beyond consciousness. The appreciation of
tones and harmony comes purely from the accumulated effect of experience
and association. The Laws of Association simply translate or transfer
phenomena into new instances. The same point is made by W. Stanley
Jevons in "The Philosophy of Inductive Inference". Jevons discusses
the process of translation in greater detail. Experience provides us
with the raw material of knowledge, induction digests it and reason
adapts it into general propositions. However, Jevons does see induction
as a kind of inverse deduction: we can only work out such laws if we
have the power to envisage the result. Nothing in the article suggests
that this process is a priori in origin.

The positivist Frederic Harrison chooses a singular line of attack on
innate ideas. In his article "The Subjective Synthesis", he suggests
that, if one cultivated man fails to detect intuition at work, or feel
any interest in detecting it, then intuition existeth not. The cultivated man in question is doubtless one F. Harrison. W.T.Thornton’s article “Anti-Utilitarianism” makes a similar point. Children show no intuitive sense of right or wrong. Many articles relevant to this theme come from the pen of Morley, and many of these articles focus upon the eighteenth-century Rationalists, with particular emphasis on the Encyclopaedists. Morley’s interest in this field is not simply a reflection of his Rationalism. In his Recollections, Morley explicitly compares the Fortnightly to the Encyclopaedia; both offer

"the best observation of fresh flowing currents of thought, interest, and debate."  

So, his articles discussing Diderot make it clear that the eighteenth century is valued as an era of advance in knowledge and morality. The Encyclopaedia’s encouragement of physical science and the practical arts

"is the sign and exemplification of two elements of the great modern transition."  

The Encyclopaedists, as he comments in the conclusion to articles on Condorcet, correctly saw how natural laws could be discovered by observation. Their use of reason was positive and truly spiritual. In his article on Turgot, Morley praises him for being more positive and constructive than some other precursors of the French Revolution, who were all too content simply to free the mind from the restraints of the Church and encourage the enlargement of reason. Now, this comment on Turgot leads us into an appreciation of Morley’s criticism of the Encyclopaedists and the other Rationalists.
In Morley's article on Carlyle, Voltaire is praised for his
"burning passion for justice, his indefatigable humanity, his
splendid energy in intellectual production..."163

But elsewhere, Morley complains that Voltaire was overpowered by pure
Rationalism. He should rather have concentrated on using a scientific
methodology objectively. This failure explains the shallowness of
Voltaire's attack on the Church.164 Nevertheless, the hearts and minds
of the Philosophes, and the Encyclopaedists in particular, were in the
right places. Most importantly, they had the correct attitude towards
the construction of philosophical systems. One should avoid an obsession
with system-building. In particular, the aim should be to allow the
unfettered mind to range as widely as possible in a search for an
organic, rather than artificial, synthesis.165

Nevertheless, such criticism notwithstanding, Morley has little patience
with opposing schools of thought. His article "Mr. Flint's Philosophy of
History"166 dismisses Hegel's stance on history as that of an a priori
alchemist. His Carlyle article167 rejects the use of emotion in
questions on the nature of the mind; this simply leads to a lack of
concern for truth and an indulgence in untruth. Rousseau is at fault for
precisely the same reason. Indeed, Morley's article "Rousseau's
Influence on European Thought"168 writes off Rousseau as a passive
recipient of others' opinions, although he did succeed in creating a new
temper or atmosphere of sentiment. His gravest fault was a failure to
treat morality and politics scientifically; no combination of the two
is possible without this methodology.

Assaults on schools antagonistic to the Empiricists are not restricted
to Morley. Leslie Stephen's article on De Quincey is a case in point.
The whole piece is anti-Romantic, and objects strongly to De Quincey's dislike of the eighteenth-century Rationalists. De Quincey is sneered at as a "John Bull, as far as a man can be, who is of weakly, nervous temperament, and believes in Kant."¹⁹³

What is missing is genuine opposition from the Idealist point of view. Debate of a more genuine nature centres upon the significance of Comte and Positive Philosophy. The Review gives the Comtist Congreve an opportunity to attack T.H. Huxley's view of Positivism¹⁹⁰; and Huxley is given the right to reply¹⁹¹, singling out Comte's hierarchy of sciences for bitterest criticism. And, J.E. Cairnes is able to defend that classification - and the Comtean method - as an achievement on the scale of Bacon's (New Series Vol.7: "M. Comte and Political Economy"¹⁹²). Indeed, the Fortnightly was felt by some to be overtly Comtist. This was denied by Morley, whose own views were not dissimilar to those of Mill: Comtism had its values - particularly in attempting to use scientific methodology on man in society, and in recognizing the need for progress in morality as in intellect. But its great defect was to attempt to construct an overweening and all-encompassing philosophical system.

The attitude of the Fortnightly towards Scholasticism is, if anything, even more dismissive than that of the Westminster. In his article "Voltaire at Berlin"¹⁹³, Morley paints a picture of Voltaire refusing to waste his time in talking with adherents to an irrelevant system. This refusal is justified, though the Schoolmen had made a contribution to the development of the intellect in their day. Harrison utterly rejects Scholasticism. The very title of his article gives the clue to his
Catholicism as such is uniformly treated as inimical to progress. Criticism is levelled at the supposed restrictions of Catholic dogma upon the intellect, but the assumption is that there is a moral implication in denying access to the methodology of truth. Morley's articles on Joseph De Maistre stem only in part from his Mill-like concern to extract the genuinely valuable elements from a given philosophy. Morley's main motive is to anatomize Ultramontanism as a contribution towards defeating it in its contemporary, Irish manifestation: humanity's continued elevation depends on that defeat. His concluding article states that Catholicism may offer spiritual consolation, but it is

"the sworn enemy of mental freedom and growth."195

Leslie Stephen makes a similar point in his article "Are we Christian?" Ultramontanism, in hanging on boldly to ancient creeds, is destroying

"all genuine love of speculative truth."196

The most virulent attack comes from F.W. Newman197. Jesuits, he claims, are fanatical, nuns cannot escape from their prisons and the Church is the enemy of the human race: its demands for devotion prostrate the intellect.

Before we examine the attitude of the Fortnightly towards the impact of the Reformation and Protestantism in general, it is important to make abundantly clear the Review's attitude to free thought. While this will be discussed in detail under the heading of the value, limitations and use of reason, we must appreciate that adherence to creeds was anathema
to the Review: such adherence was morally and intellectually enervating. And so, for the writer of "Romanism, Anglicanism, and Evangelicalism Logically Identical"¹⁹⁹, all such creeds oppose free inquiry: and yet it is that very free inquiry which is making a newer and deeper Reformation. Luther's contribution was to advance the conscience and affections, not the intellect itself. There are one or two examples of articles which unreservedly praise the Reformation for its contribution to thought, but James Cotter Morison's view is more typical. Freedom of thought may be the logical result of Protestantism, but both Protestant and Catholic hate it¹⁹⁹.
In his *Free Minds, John Morley and his Friends*, Knickerbocker claims that Morley's *Fortnightly* did for nineteenth-century England what Diderot's *Encyclopædia* did for eighteenth-century France. He suggests that Morley moulded the mind of Young England. Quite what Knickerbocker means by Young England it is difficult to say. If we ignore fatuous comment and hyperbole, we are at least reminded of the link Morley made between the French Rationalists and the aims of his Review: a link which is nothing less than a commitment to free thought. The implication behind this doctrine of free thought must be that man's reason is to be unfettered, and that it is to be of itself the agent for progress. Any discussion of the *Fortnightly* does involve consideration of the elitist element within such doctrine. For the doctrine does not imply that all men have the same capacity for free thought, either innately or through circumstance. The Review itself offers the opportunity for the intellectual élite to manipulate influential public opinion in the necessary direction. And, as Knights suggests in *The Idea of the Clerisy in the Nineteenth Century*, the élite is likely to be a group whose knowledge transcends specialisms, and a group whose interest in history reflects the need to exert an intellectual control over the Age of Transition. Analysis of *Fortnightly* articles would support this claim. In "Mr. Pater's Essays", Morley shows himself to be wary of the dangers of over-specialization; and the Review's concern over the dangers of false theories of history has already been discussed.

The Review overtly refers on a number of occasions to the need to lead...
the influential. Lewes's "Causeries" in Vol. 3 specifically mentions the rôle of the Review in leading the intellectual élite in the treatment of philosophy, and the same writer, in his "The Principles of Success in Literature", remarks that

"Philosophy is meant for students, not for idle readers."

In New Series Vol. 1, the article "The Church of England As a Religious Body" is written with the distinctive aura of Coleridgean Clerisy. The reviewer suggests that universities should provide an opportunity for scholars to lead the intellect and civilisation of the country, and train National Priests - who may or may not have theological beliefs - for that rôle on a provincial level.

A comment in the Public Affairs section in New Series Vol. 2 is revealing. The writer objects to the bigoted attacks on Mill in the House of Commons: philosophers should be cherished. T.H. Huxley, in his address and article "Administrative Nihilism", presses for the government to promote intellectual development to facilitate the identification of the intellectual élite. Allowing free play of mind permits intellectual, moral and social progress. Huxley argues that straightforward advancement of the intellect in-turn advances morality and refinement, since the very use of reason teaches self-discipline. The precise relationship between self-discipline and morality remains unexplored.

Morley's "Voltaire at Berlin" similarly describes social advance as the result of free intelligence and open-mindedness, but the relationship between the consummation and the means is less direct than Huxley would have us believe. Intellectual advance leads us to the awareness that we
need fellow-feeling, but it does not actually secure it; that task is achieved through a "just culture of the impulses and affections...". Morley makes a similar point in his review "Mr. Pater's Essays." He praises the essays for their minute, laborious and rational scholarship: here is no fatuous linking of inspiration and genius; here is no metaphysical wallowing; here is a broad doctrine - Art for Art's sake - which allows free intellectual play: -

"and it is this ... that we require, before the social changes craved by so many can fully ripen." Morley does, however, speak on other occasions as if the intellectual strivings of reason, using the techniques of physical science, will alone improve morality. His set of articles "On Compromise", we recall, defined morality simply as registered generalizations from experience. This consistent theme of progress through the methodology of physical science appears to place little limitation on the faculty of reason. This in turn leads to extraordinary articles, such as Francis Galton's advocacy of statistical analysis as an effective method of establishing the efficacy of prayer. We should, however, recall the position adopted by some reviewers - particularly the Comtists. There are areas of speculation where reason should never be permitted to venture. Yes, reason craves its wings; reason wants to soar, to climb higher and higher to prospects ever more remote, to see all from a point so far above the world that the beauty is all-sufficient, perfect in itself, for itself, by itself. And this is Metaphysics, in all its tempting, enticing glory. But reason soars there at its peril. Reason will not be able to guide itself. All it can see lacks detail, clarity: the air is too rarified, and reason will fail. Free Will, the
Immortality of the Soul, Creation - so enticing, but so irrelevant, and so unknowable. The Comtist Harrison and the eclectic Stephen unite in warning - avoid such speculation at all costs.

Virtually the only voice raised against the *Fortnightly*'s paean of praise to free play of mind is that of the Rev. Wynne. He accepts that freedom of debate is a good thing, and that the priest must bring his beliefs into line with modern science and philosophy. But love of liberty of mind too often shuns impartiality and honesty: Rationalism is too keen to condemn all dogma as vicious and worthless. Wynne sets a limit to reason, though he fails to explain the nature of that limit.

"We wish to show our appreciation of the due use of reason, within those limits which we sincerely believe the evidence of Revelation imposes..." 

Wynne also points out that doubts do rack the soul: he would not find it easy to herald them with joy as the harbingers of intellectual emancipation. In fact, the *Fortnightly* seems much less interested in doubt as such than is the *Westminster*; perhaps because doubt has theological connotations. Theology is, to the vast majority of *Fortnightly* reviewers, at best uninteresting.

It is clear that the *Westminster* and *Fortnightly* reviewers - who are often the self-same individuals - maintain a common approach to the philosophy of knowledge. Dissenting voices are more audible in the *Westminster*, despite the *Fortnightly*'s genuine, if naïve, desire to open its columns to opposing viewpoints. We recall that both Reviews adopt a generally experiential view of the way in which the mind is formed and operates, although the concept of innate ideas is upheld by a substantial minority of *Westminster* reviewers. With this general support
of associationist approaches to the mind comes the correlative support of induction and the application of the methodology of physical science to most areas of human thought and conduct. Not surprisingly, the Idealist philosophers receive scant praise from the *Fortnightly*, though rather more praise from that *Westminster* minority.

Human reason is seen in both Reviews as the foundation of social improvement; permit the intrusion of dogma - particularly religious dogma - and the foundation is fatally flawed. This accounts for the tone of bitterness - fuelled by genuine anxiety - which characterises the comments of Stephen, Morley and others when faced by the renewed vigour of clerical opponents. Reason alone can impose on the Age of Transition the form which will most benefit civilisation. For that is the purpose of a philosophy of knowledge.
In the article "The Church Cause and the Church Party" for New Series Vol. 39\textsuperscript{212}, the \textbf{Christian Remembrancer} describes, not only its own genesis as a Quarterly magazine, but also its perception of its rôle in the service of a great cause. As the successor to the defunct \textbf{British Critic}, the magazine was to spearhead the High Church opposition to Latitudinarianism inside and outside the Church of England. And, as our discussion of the Catholic Reviews has revealed, it is very much in the interests of a theological Review to consider the issue of the philosophy of knowledge.

In discussing the derivation of ideas, the \textbf{Christian Remembrancer} consistently dismisses the views of the sensationalist school. The pattern is set in New Series Vol. 1 with an article on Whewell—"History and Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences"\textsuperscript{213}—which does not hesitate to equate straightforward Sensationalism with even more straightforward wickedness. This article contains lengthy extracts from Whewell, who argues that true philosophy requires a combination of external phenomena and ideas. Whewell's definition of an idea is an act of the mind itself, imposing on our perceptions certain relationships which are distinct from anything our senses directly present to us. We therefore subordinate our sensations to fundamental ideas such as Time, Space, Cause, Resemblance. These fundamental ideas in turn give rise to ideal conceptions. An example is given. Take the fundamental idea of \textit{Cause}. This duly gives rise to conceptions such as pressure, attraction, repulsion and so on. Knowledge, therefore, is in essence \textit{subjective}. However perfect the induction, we cannot escape the
fact that the mind has its own contribution to make to the idea at that very moment of combination. Any theory which attempts to derive general axioms from pre-cognized phenomena lacks validity.

The link made between a rejection of any form of a priori knowledge and sin is a constant theme throughout the Review. As late as 1863, a review of W.G. Ward’s On Nature and Grace\textsuperscript{214} complains that religious sceptics are naturally drawn towards the experiential school of thought. Of course, an attack on the a posteriori school can take many forms. The concepts of innate ideas, intuition, Revelation, necessary truths and the like are certainly employed by the various reviewers, though haphazard use of such concepts can involve inconsistency. Indeed, the concept of innate ideas can be in essence mechanistic and godless. There are, in fact, few occasions where reviewers choose to uphold innate ideas as the basis of cognition. In New Series Vol.8, an article on Fouqué\textsuperscript{215} discusses how the imagination of children might be cultivated. It is argued that reason should be given room to work, with the result that real and fully-formed ideas will arise. Even here, the imprecise phrasing makes it difficult to be certain that the writer is advocating the existence of innate ideas. The reviewers seem generally happier with the theory that certain ideas have been implanted by God. In New Series Vol.17, the writer of the article "Wilberforce on the Incarnation"\textsuperscript{216} discusses the way in which ideas such as holiness, justice and mercy have been implanted; the implication is that these should be seen as internal evidences of Revelation.

One of the most detailed discussions of the nature of ideas appears in a review of Hickok’s Rational Psychology in New Series Vol.26.
Hickok maintains a firmly a priori approach, which the reviewer clearly finds congenial. Much space is given to a straightforward description of Hickok's theories, followed by a modest admission on the part of the reviewer that Hickok makes an impressive prima facie case, but that it would require the unparalleled expertise of William Hamilton to give the final verdict. Hickok's ideas, it seems, amount to an attack on the Sensationalists. Observation, for instance, is not a mere recording agency. This is because sensible perception is not simply transmitted to the blank tape of a mind; instead, that perception requires an intellectual agency to distinguish between the various sensations. Since the intellect is not only able to move beyond sensation in forming conceptions without further contact with material impressions, but can also anticipate sensations through determining the conditions under which sensations are perceived, pure Materialism can be dismissed. In fact, according to Hickok, intellectual operations alone can form sensations.

The reviewer sees Hickok's science of mind as underpinning a sound system of Christian metaphysics. Indeed, philosophy without a recognition of the rôle played by Revelation is psychologically unsound, since we must recognize those things which God has made known to the soul. It is folly to ignore Revelation:—

"the truer wisdom is to endeavour to ascertain its meaning, to see what conclusions legitimately follow from it, and to govern and check all our other knowledge by what we thus learn."217

In fact, it would seem that the reviewer regards Revelation, less as a once-and-for-all implanter of ideas in the mind, but more as a continuously active agent of influence, alongside such agents as angels and their fallen counterparts. Clearly it would be deeply
presumptuous of philosophy to claim the right to judge Revelation, when Revelation itself provides the basis of the faculty of judgement.

The Christian Remembrancer discusses the link between Revelation and intuition in an important article for New Series Vol.18 entitled "Rationalism". Morell's The Philosophy of Religion and F.W.Newman's The Soul are under review. Both works are seen as rationalist, but the reviewer does like the distinction Morell draws between logical and intuitional consciousness. The form of things may indeed be communicated by the senses, but a knowledge of their matter is apprehended intuitively. What is crucial is that intuitive judgements are verified by their general acceptance by mankind. As Morell says, we do feel that there exist certain intuitions which we perceive to be unshakeable, come what may - such as mathematical axioms. But we feel less certain of moral and religious truths, and therefore seek corroboration from our fellows. In the reviewer's opinion, what Morell has failed to do is to locate the source of that common intuition in the impress of God on our minds. Morell is sound enough in his definition of Revelation -

"a process of the intuitional consciousness, gazing upon eternal verities..."

but attributes to Christ nothing more than an application of a greater stimulus to pre-existing moral intuition. This ignores both the function of Grace and the power thereof. This power provides the higher intuitions and informs the judgement of the Universal Church. The article "Ward on Nature and Grace" is keen to place Revelation above both intuition and induction: neither can adequately account for its existence.

The relative values of intuition and induction are also discussed in
New Series Vol.27, where an article on Maurice's theological essays defends, not only a theory of intuition, but also the thought of Butler. The reviewer feels that Maurice completely misunderstands Butler's purpose in the latter's *Analogy*, and cites as evidence Maurice's contention that Butler relies on analogy and induction for his views on conscience and human nature. Not so; since Butler expressly states that he is employing analogy and induction simply to press home his arguments to those who refuse to accept any other premises. And Butler also maintains that moral obligations are most definitely identified by intuition, though moral principles are ascertainable by reason, deployed upon probability. The foundation of Butler's argument for the truth of religion is not induction, but

"an appeal to our consciousness of a certain moral nature within us in the first place."^{220}

Had Professor Maurice taken the trouble to think about it, he would have realized that Butler's view of the fundamental distinction between good and evil in human actions militates against any inductive basis for his religious views. Induction, after all, cannot identify facts which are moral in essence. And it is Maurice himself who in effect throws doubt and uncertainty over the trustworthiness of conscience by attributing sovereignty, not to conscience *per se*, but to a form of "regenerate" conscience which lacks definition and credibility.

Given the general antagonism expressed towards the sensationalist or empiricist school, it is hardly surprising that J.S. Mill's view of the experiential basis of ideas is attacked on similar grounds in several articles. An article in New Series Vol.32, "Arago's Astronomy and
Herschel's Outlines", sees Newton's second Law of Motion as an example of an a priori truth, and, in so doing, identifies what it sees as a fallacy at the very heart of Mill's view that the principles of mathematical science are achieved through induction: -

"Such an opinion we do not wish to contravert, otherwise than by the remark that it falls to the ground by its own weight, inasmuch as our persuasion of their truth manifestly is unalterable by any amount of alleged experience."221

The same point is made in a lengthy article on Mansel's Bampton Lectures222, where Butler's reasoning by analogy is again defended - partly, no doubt, because the reviewer uses that method throughout. Mill's inductivism is swept aside with the assertion that both mathematical and moral truths are a priori; the conviction such truths arouse in the mind is absolute, not partial. Noticeably, this review concludes with stern criticism of the lack of attention paid to Mansel's lectures by most other periodicals, reflecting their lack of competence in handling such material. The Rambler and Christian Observer are singled out for blame. The former makes the wild claim that Mansel's ideas are plagiarised from J.H. Newman, while the latter's incompetence is entire. Lastly, the article "The Will, Divine and Human"223 deals with a work of that title by Solly, whose criticism of Mill from the a priori viewpoint is eagerly echoed. In fact, the reviewer goes further than Solly in denying that the testimony of experience might be accorded even a confirmatory rôle in terms of a priori truths. The writer follows Solly in claiming that the idea of causality itself is in some sense a priori because it cannot be derived from experience alone. The mind is no tabula rasa; it can be compared to a cabinet containing secret compartments replete with a priori conceptions which are God's precious gift to the soul at the
very moment of its creation. However, the drawers do not spring open automatically; they need to be located, their mechanisms understood. And our senses are obviously needed in this most vital of enquiries.

However, it is not fair to say that antagonism towards Mill's thought is unrelieved throughout. A review of Mill's *A System of Logic* is largely appreciative in tone. The writer comments that we are generally rather too inclined to claim, as "intuitive", truths which are established purely by human reason. The reviewer does not axiomatically support the *a priori* ideas of Whewell against the experientialist Mill. He questions Whewell's definition of certain experimentally-derived truths as "necessary" - a definition based upon the view that the negation of such ideas is inconceivable. But Whewell later discusses the views of Galileo's opponents, who regarded the negation of their ideas as inconceivable. The reviewer follows Mill in pointing out that Whewell is sabotaging his own case: what one mind regards as inconceivable is not so regarded by all.

The *Christian Remembrancer* represents a theological school whose basic assumptions posit a continuity of Catholic tradition and philosophy, as maintained by the best traditions of Anglican thought, from the time of the primitive church. It is therefore to be expected that the Review's attitudes towards schools of philosophy will reflect the extent to which, in the perception of the Review, such schools harmonize with the claims of Catholic theology. The term "Catholic", it should be noted, is used by the periodical in a sense largely independent of Roman Catholicism. There are a number of issues here. The first is that the Review is likely to oppose any philosophy which enables its proponents
to ignore or deny the rôle of God in the human mind. We have already
noted the antagonism of the Christian Remembrancer towards
Sensationalists, and are correct in anticipating a similar enmity
towards the broadly materialist school when the Review considers
philosophy as such. The second theme is the threat posed by any system
of thought implying or advocating Pantheism. However, it would be wise
to examine first of all the precise attitude of writers towards the
Reformation, towards Protestantism, and towards Roman Catholicism and
its scholastic theology, since these themes much exercise the reviewers,
and are often the starting point for discussions of philosophy in
general.

The most common attitude towards the Reformation itself is to attempt to
distance the Church of England from it. In New Series Vol.7, the article
"The American Church" comments that, of all the churches which
renounced papal supremacy, only the Church of England has retained an
apostolic form, discipline and doctrine. The Church must make up its
mind whether it intends to be Protestant, or truly Catholic. Also, in
the "Notices of Books" section for New Series Vol.5, a distinction is
implied between the Continental Reformation and its English counterpart.
Criticizing Spencer's Observations on the School Return for the Diocese
of Bath and Wells, the reviewer complains that the author, in objecting
to the separation of the rôles of priest and layman, is following a
Calvinist or Scots line, rather than that of the English Reformation.
And, by way of contrast, an article on the teaching of history in New
Series Vol.9 suggests that we ought to remember that the Reformation
was a movement in which the Latin Church participated.
Luther himself is treated with some degree of ambivalence. In the "Progress of Anglo-Catholicism" article, it is accepted that Luther's attack on indulgences was religious in inspiration, but his subsequent steps were treacherous. However, an article on Carlyle for New Series Vol.6 accepts that Luther did preserve truly Catholic elements in his doctrine, even though the violent and unchristian vulgarity in his anti-papal attacks disqualify him from the rôle of Carlylean Hero-Priest.

There are two major conclusions to be drawn from the treatment of the Reformation in the Christian Remembrancer. The first is that the Reformation in its Calvinist form is strongly to be deplored. Moreover, in the article "Life and Writings of Fouqué", the Church of Laud is set against Calvinist and Lutheran movements; the two latter may, in the most favourable circumstances, draw down God's Grace, but are fatally flawed by the absence of the hand of bishop or priest. In fact, as an article on the Anglican Bishopric of Jerusalem suggests, the true Protestant hates episcopal power, which blunts his absolute freedom of thought. The second major conclusion concerns the longer-term implications of the Reformation and Protestantism itself. The "Pantheistic Tendencies" article equates Protestantism with Rationalism and the denial of the inspiration of Scripture. A later article does not scruple to condemn Calvinism as intrinsically necessitarian. However, Rationalism is also seen as less of a threat than Pantheism. The latter is much more polite towards Christianity, is willing to be charmed by Christian ideals and is condescending enough to accept certain Christian facts. In this, Pantheism is even a sort of Catholicism, though of course its growth cannot be traced to Catholic thought, but to Rationalism. This does not prevent the ultra-rationalist
from abhorring the pseudo-mysticism of Pantheism.

The treatment of Roman Catholicism in the Christian Remembrancer lacks the virulent antipathy bestowed upon Calvinist Protestantism. It is generally felt that Rome is best criticized by those whose Catholicism enables a fair assessment to be made: in other words, those who espouse the via media, providing that via is suitably innovative, and traversed by people of high principle. One reviewer, in the New Series Vol. 7 article "Plain-Tune"\(^{235}\), worries that the via media might indeed hinder the development of a truly Catholic theory of the Anglican system. A similar point is, indeed, made by Gresley, whose "Anglo-Catholicism"\(^{236}\) is praised in the same volume for stressing the need for an awareness of the radical nature of the true road. There are moments, admittedly, when Rome receives undiluted praise. In New Series Vol. 9, a notice of several German theological works concludes with the comment that Germany must either fall victim to overt infidelity, or unconditionally surrender herself to Rome; only then can she "regain the treasure which she has wilfully cast away from her."\(^{237}\)

However, the Review has little but contempt for the intellectual standing of Roman Catholicism. A review of Allies's Journal in France\(^{238}\) complains that the continental Catholic Church has shown itself to be unable to handle those who have benefited from an improved intellectual life, in which there is nothing evil per se. The article "Vard on Nature and Grace"\(^{239}\) is particularly scathing. Contemporary Roman Catholicism is viewed as an intellectual desert, leaving athirst the educated convert from Anglicanism. The failure of the Catholic University of Ireland, and the failure of Catholic schools to prepare students for
competitive examinations, are both symptomatic of this intellectual malaise. And yet, this malaise does not affect the vital area in which Anglicanism and Roman Catholicism agree—in their basic system of philosophy. Indeed, instruction in the elements of the true Catholic faith is the one safeguard against philosophical error.

Given this view of the essential identity of elements of faith, it is perhaps to be expected that the Christian Remembrancer should maintain an allegiance to the scholastic system of philosophy similar to that held by the Church of Rome. Examples testifying to this allegiance are not difficult to find. The "Pantheistic Tendencies" article, for example, associates Scholasticism with just authority, and comments:

"The chair which is forcibly vacated by the scholastic, will be filled by the Pantheistic, philosophy." 240

It is therefore understandable that the Review resents the criticism in Mr Wilson Evan's Scripture Biography 241 of the Schoolmen, since their works rest secure among the Church's most treasured possessions.

Reviewers often claim a detailed acquaintance with Aquinas in particular—as in New Series Vol.18 242, where the writer backs up his own theory of intuition by reference to a similar tenet of the Angelic Doctor.

Nevertheless, there are a number of examples of what is, at best, a qualified approval of the contribution and relevance of the Schoolmen to modern philosophy. This tone is particularly prevalent from the 1860s onwards. In New Series Vol.39, an article on Bacon and the Inductive Philosophy 243 accepts that Bacon overstated the scope of induction, but is keen to assure the readers that the reviewer has no desire to see a
return to the opposite extreme of Scholasticism. Indeed, the previous volume's review of Wiseman's Recollections of the Last Four Popes explicitly links Scholasticism with intellectual stagnation in Rome itself. And in New Series Vol. 55, Ward's intellectual preparation for his attack on William Hamilton is derided as

*dressing up in the frills and buckram of philosophical phraseology some of the crudest notions of mediaeval schoolmen."

When dealing with contemporary philosophy or its antecedents, the Christian Remembrancer generally seeks to apply a convenient label to indicate opposition to the Review's conception of the nature of mind and man's relationship with God. Rationalism and Pantheism appear in this form most frequently, and appropriate philosophers are grouped accordingly. Locke appears as a Rationalist, and is credited as the great degrader of philosophy. According to the article "History and Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences", Condillac, Helvetius and D'Alembert are tarred with the same brush. Hegel and/or Spinoza are often seen as the fountainheads of modern Pantheism, although one article - "Saisset on Pantheism" presents Hegel as both pantheistic and atheistic. One problem, of course, with the label approach is that it is sometimes difficult to attach labels to certain thinkers.

Coleridge, for example, is seen as nothing more than a modifier of Pantheism in New Series Vol. 11 (as a follower of Schelling, who inspired Hegel, etc. etc.) but also as preparer of the ground for the Catholic faith in England through his use of Kant's distinction between Reason and Understanding (New Series Vol. 7). In fact, this article, "Signs of Hope", presents an idea unusual for the Christian Remembrancer: that German philosophy - through the medium of the poetry
of Coleridge — was a contributory factor in demands for a Catholic Church in England. Much more typical is the link made between Protestantism, the invidious effects of Hegel, and the general impact of most of the philosophers already mentioned: that is, the creation of an ever-increasing and shifting quicksand of thought. This latter point is made in the "Recent Metaphysics" article in New Series Vol.26²⁵⁰. It would seem that the Review sees little common ground between Catholicism and the major schools of contemporary philosophy.

What is the attitude of the Review to the philosophy of induction?

By and large, the Remembrancer is not inclined to denigrate the work of Bacon himself. The article "Lord Bacon and the Inductive Philosophy" in New Series Vol.39²⁵¹ discusses a number of possible objections to the Baconian system. It is significant that the reviewer refuses to countenance any suggestion that induction itself has no meaningful existence. De Maistre's argument that induction is simply a form of deduction is dismissed. Moreover, Bacon was a great reformer, although it is true to say that he overestimated the value of induction. Modern scientific methods are considerably different from those advocated by Bacon, and the great discoveries arise from the scientist imagining in his mind the operations of phenomena, rather than working from accumulated data. The reviewer does feel that induction may lend itself to Mammon, utility and love of success — if the inquirer is sufficiently fallible. Certainly a science like theology lies outside induction, since it operates by deductions from first principles established by Revelation. But then, Bacon never claimed authority for induction over theology. Grant induction its rightful place, and it has a great contribution to make to knowledge. The article
"Recent Latitudinarian Theology" in New Series Vol. 38 complains that Baden Powell's obsession with induction leads him to misapply it, in that he claims an exaggerated level of certainty for inductive data to make a case for an absolute uniformity of nature.

It is the article "Lord Verulam's Novum Organum" in New Series Vol. 16 which provides us with the clearest attempt to put Bacon firmly in his place, and to indicate his importance when compared to Scholasticism. The writer grants that it is a misinterpretation of Bacon which leads inductivists to infidelity. But it is hardly surprising that some of his followers should apply induction to theology, and there are occasions where Bacon steps outside his brief. Bacon's arrogant assumption that he had found the key to the workings of the universe is a case in point. Are we sure that he was right to reject the scholastic doctrine of formal cause, and to deny the existence of any substance save matter? In this, he unwittingly contributed to the spread of Materialism. The article duly concludes with the following ringing statement:

"And so it may chance to turn out in the end, that the forms and essences of the Schoolmen, rightly understood, may long survive the husks and membranes in which they are enveloped... they may declare the glory of God, and be the means of showing His handywork more perfectly to His regenerate people, when the subject-matter of the Baconian philosophy...shall be no more."
The Value, Use and Limitations of Reason

The Christian Remembrancer generally sees reason as a precious gift from God. But gifts may be misused, or abused. They may also be misinterpreted, and worshipped. This is what has happened in Protestant Germany. According to the article "Hermesianism" in New Series Vol. 9, learned men worship reason exclusively - with the result that the masses are served up warm as a tasty morsel for Materialism and Indifferentism to devour. This is not to deny that reason is a vital tool in many religious matters, as the Schoolmen have abundantly proved. But reason cannot logically and coherently be used to demonstrate revealed truths. Belief must come first, to stimulate and to guide the search for knowledge. Hermes sought to find faith through reason, and thus tried to found faith upon rationalist premises which are intrinsically opposed to it.

"Rationalism and faith are necessarily irreconcilable...faith in the common acceptation of the term, is, as described by Hermes, deference to the authority of a superior intelligence; while rationalism, on the contrary, is the holding a thing to be true or false upon the decision or the conviction of our own unaided reason."

In the end, the result of Protestantism is that everyone uses reason to fashion his own creed.

In New Series Vol. 10, the autobiography of Blanco White is reviewed. As always, attitudes towards White reflect the Victorian reviewer's position on the value and limitations of reason. According to the Christian Remembrancer, White was a soul tormented by his rampaging and unchastened intellect. White, it seems, believed that human reason was above sin. However, this idea is unlikely to appeal to a theological
journal which constantly stresses the fact, significance and impact of the Fall. Since mankind is fallen, the search for truth is in essence flawed and selfish - the pleasure of the intellectual chase. Truth can and will penetrate a true Christian, but remains impenetrable to the pokings and gropings of reason. Indeed, a number of articles point to the inability of reasoned argument to settle the hash of mistaken ideas.

In New Series Vol.31 is a review of William Lee's *The Inspiration of Holy Scripture: its Nature and Proof*. Lee employs reason and induction as the simple test of the authority of Scripture. But the Scriptures are bound to contain the sort of contradictions which would lead to their condemnation by this kind of test, since men must use words, and words are imprecise. The Remembrancer's treatment of the Latitudinarian Essays and Reviews also points out the futility of arguing with such a diverse rag-bag of vagaries and the occasional, inadvertent lapse into truth.

What link does the Review posit between the God-implanted idea and reason? The article "Wilberforce on the Incarnation" considers just this point, and suggests that we should be able to work out for ourselves what God's purposes for us are. Reason, then, is competent to help us judge the internal evidence of Revelation. What the Review will not accept is the denial of any rôle for reason in matters of faith. The article "Dogmatic Theology" criticizes Bushnell for virtually denying that rôle; Bacon was right to see human reason, not only as valuable in apprehending God's mysteries, but also capable of inferring doctrines. This is not to say that reason can test the claims of a supposed revelation on its own. This point is emphasized in a review of Mansel's
Bampton Lectures. In fact, no one faculty is capable of ascertaining the truth or falsehood of a supposed revelation. The reviewer is not as clear as one would wish on this issue, but seems to be arguing that a judgement can be made given the concurrence of evidence of various types, including the internal character of the religion and a sense of its moral superiority. Mansel is suspicious of this kind of argument, and the reviewer feels he is wrong to be so. On the other hand, Francis Newman is equally wrong to argue that reason is competent to make an immediate moral and spiritual judgement on a professed revelation. Suspension of judgement is necessary. We do have an intuitive sense of a limit to our capacity to explore mysteries, providing we are not warped by pride of intellect. Even if human thought may reach a true conception of the divine attributes, we experience once again the barrier of inadequate powers of language.

It is not surprising that the Christian Remembrancer maintains the view that the relationship between religion and science should reflect:

1) the primacy of religion as Man's most important quest;
2) the acceptance of the limitations of reason and the inductive technique;
3) the status of the Review as a primarily religious journal.

The latter point is reflected in the limited coverage given to science per se - particularly physical science. Typical is the article "Styles of Preaching," where the reviewer confesses to lack of time to deal with the vexed question of the relationship between science and
religion, and contents himself with a statement of principle:—that one needs to take as the starting point of the discussion the first article of the creed, and accept that so-called natural theology will never prove a helpful support to religion: reasoning up to a deity from nature simply produces a rationalistic frame of mind. Revelation must not be brought within the sphere of science, of course: but it shows the correct approach to bring science within the scope of Revelation. The article "Wilberforce on the Incarnation" deprecates the attempt to link theology with the other sciences, which effectively binds it to a world it should transcend. As a review of Harriet Martineau's *Eastern Life... Present and Past* suggests, rarely does scientific thought actually make one more religious, and scientific illustrations of the facts and doctrines of Revelation are singularly unhelpful. And a notice in *New Series Vol. 17* of a work by Boyle prompts the reflection that science has been too often accompanied by

"moral and religious laxity..." 

Boyle has the right approach: he seeks to understand nature by relating it to what we know of the invisible world. Scientists are at liberty to pursue their researches without hindrance, but, as the article "Geology and Revelation" argues in *New Series Vol. 18*, relating the conclusions of science to theology is the job of theologians only. If science appears to contradict Revelation, then there are two possibilities, and two only: that Revelation has been misunderstood, or that the scientific theory is based upon an imperfect deduction.
It is significant that the Christian Remembrancer spends much more time discussing the issue of dogma and authority than it does discussing the relationship between science and faith. The basic attitude towards dogma is presented in the article "German Pantheism, and its Influence on Criticism". Faith requires from the intellect and human reason a straightforward submissiveness which testifies to the authority of Divine Revelation. In practical terms, this means that mankind needs a medium through which truth is communicated - the doctrines of the Church, as expressed by its theologians and priests. The article on Blanco White's Autobiography complains that White was looking for a way of finding truth without any medium save his own untrammelled Scepticism. Quite simply, it is the rôle of the Church to superintend intellect, and to remind us that the workings of the latter are not morally neutral; sin is present, and the Church must expose it. The article "Whewell on Morality" supplements this by pointing out that the University (of Oxford) is to impress a moral character on mere intellectual inquiry.

"It is the duty of authority, and especially of authority employed in education, to inculcate directly those moral truths on which its dominion is ultimately founded."

And, as the writer of the "Pantheistic Tendencies" article points out, the Church alone is at once the witness and custodian of Holy Writ; let its dogmas fail, and so will belief in the inspiration of Scripture. In this article, we see the link between dogmatic authority and scholastic theology; if this philosophy, with its patristic core and the contributions of its seventeenth-century English proponents, is not presented authoritatively, then will infidelity triumph. Dogmatic theology, indeed, is the bulwark against the many contemporary facets of
infidelity, ranging from the exaggerated principle of representative government in political thought through to supposed laws of development in history and psychology. And, since dogma is that bulwark, it is under attack.

Now, creed is an essential component of the barrier of dogma. In a review of Bunsen's *The Constitution of the Church of the Future*¹⁰, the writer objects to Bunsen dismissing creed as an obstacle to independent interpretation. The immediate result of Bunsen's stance would be a failure to agree on any principles of interpretation of God's will; and the longer-term result would, presumably, be catastrophic disunity amongst believers. In any case, suggests the reviewer of Maurice's *Theological Essays*²⁷¹, human society has a basic need for the order which subscription to dogma can offer in the form of a pledge of mutual understanding.

In the "Dogmatic Theology" article in New Series Vol.30, the reviewer challenges those who deny dogma from the point of view of the sufficiency of conscience as a guide.

"The necessity......for dogma depends upon this principle, that the living faith within man's heart must, if it is to be of any worth, rest upon something without, which is clear, definite, and true."²⁷²

In fact, subjective feelings require an objective reality. Dogma is the bones of religion; if the flesh be spiritual life, then that life must be given shape. Without dogma, religion cannot live. As a review of Miss Bremer's novels suggests²⁷³, the rejection of dogma leads to moral delinquency.

Some people reject dogma, not from the point of view of the power of
human reason, but from a view of its weakness. This argument is pursued in the New Series Vol.41 article "Dogma in relation to 'Essays and Reviews'". The sense of our ignorance ought to deepen our humility, but some use it to fan pride and unbelief. "I have no opinion" is a characteristic of the Essays and Reviews contributors; and they use this to assault the major tenets of our beliefs. But we know that many thousands say the Anglican creed with voice and understanding.

One thing is sure: the Christian Remembrancer can see nothing positive in doubt. Doubt is rationalistic and sceptical; it is not a path to belief. There is something inevitable in the occasional visit of doubt to the abode of the thinking man. Blanco White might bid it welcome, and beg it to stay; but the truly religious man will show it the door. The late article "The Relation of Calvinism to Modern Doubt" reflects with sadness on the fate of those

"whose spiritual life will be stunted through perplexing doubt." 276

Clearly, the Review would never invite its readers to taste the delights of free thought; nor does it care for the term. "Free handling" is the preferred phrase, and is usually used with sarcastic overtones in comments on Essays and Reviews and the work of Colenso - whose particular freedom allegedly horrifies the Maurice-style free-handlers themselves. Infidelity, Scepticism - these are, of course, the results of riding such wayward and ill-disciplined beasts.

Throughout the career of the Christian Remembrancer, a remarkable unanimity is observable in the treatment of the philosophy of knowledge. Each element within that philosophy - the nature of mind, the treatment of philosophical schools, the value of reason - forms a coherent whole
dominated by a sense of continuity and tradition which is asserted throughout. This sense of history, allied to the rôle of God in the development of the human mind, makes contemporary mechanistic theories of the mind and society particularly distasteful to the reviewers. They should, however, be credited with the preservation of a via media between firm opposition and outright vituperation.
The Prospective Review

Why "Prospective"? Victorian proprietors' and editors' choice of title for their periodical was not always felicitous, and some readers clearly thought that a Review which was "prospective" was liable to split in two in its effort to look backwards and forwards simultaneously. However, the Review was not named lightly. A preparatory note to the first number in February, 1845 suggests that the Prospective was to uphold a philosophy characterised by freedom from dogmatic and formulaic religion, by a sense of continuity between past and present and by, above all, a firm sense of hope for the future of Christian society. And yet, contemporaries were quick to provide the Review with a handy sectarian label. The Rambler referred to it as "the quarterly theological organ of the English Socinians, or, as they would probably term themselves, Unitarians."

The founders of the Prospective were indeed Unitarian ministers: James Martineau, J.J. Tayler, J.H. Thom and Charles Wicksteed. The name of James Martineau alone would suggest that the word "liberal" should be added to our label. But the four ministers themselves were unhappy with a sectarian label, though "liberal" might be least objectionable. Quite simply, the Review grew out of their desire to serve no one sect exclusively, but to uphold against the rigidity of sectarian dogma a vision of true progress through Christian union. That Unitarianism had within itself the potential to be the focus for such unity would not be denied. John Gordon's article "Unitarianism" in Vol.2 offers a clear expression of the link between Review and denomination. Gordon feels obliged to criticize those Unitarians who, in their obsession with reason, effectively block and limit the very feelings and emotion which
provide the basis for religion itself. Such Rationalism slides all too easily into Necessarianism. Nevertheless, Unitarianism, religion and progress are inextricably and uniquely linked:—

"We regard it (Unitarianism) with love. Our affection is strengthened by a firm conviction that the best and noblest interests of mankind are bound up with its welfare." 278

It is also significant that Martineau himself denies that the Prospective was in any meaningful or unmeaningful way the organ of the Unitarians. In his Biographical Memoranda, he comments that in one important sense the Review could be seen as anti-Unitarian, in that

"the great object of its conductors was to prevent the course of liberal theology from slipping into the rut of any Unitarian or other sect, and to treat its whole contents and all cognate topics with philosophical and historical impartiality..." 279

Such an approach makes sense of the proposals in 1853-4 to merge the Prospective with the Westminster Review. Martineau's avowed intentions do not, of course, affect the way in which his contemporaries perceived the Prospective. Perhaps his frustration with the reception accorded to the Review explains his willingness to contribute to the Westminster while the Prospective remained a going concern.

Although the Review contained many articles on religious topics, it would certainly resent being classed as a theological journal. The Gordon article was eager to stress the difference between theology - concerned with mere reason - and the true religious impulse. Moreover, its columns were open to a wide range of articles which had in common an interest in moral and intellectual progress. It is a philosophy of knowledge which enables the Prospective Review to search for ideas on human nature, ideas on the communicated relationship between God and Man, and on the uncommunicated derivation of ideas themselves.
The most convenient starting point is to examine the treatment of the themes of intuition and innate ideas in the Prospective Review, since these concepts act as foci for the discussion of the various and complex issues within the overall theme of the Nature of Mind and Reason.

Some articles provide us with little more than an insight into general attitudes, rather than with a cogent expression of meaning or a careful definition of terminology. There are several references to the workings of conscience, or to the activities of "inner perceptions", without meaningful attempts to relate these to the more general functions of the mind, or to establish areas of coterminity. Reviewers are, however, very keen to relate conscience and inner perceptions to assumptions about the workings of religion. We recall Gordon's comment that the essence and medium of religion is feeling. Some reviews posit a link between the feelings and ideas which are intuitions. The article "The Religious Bearings of Physical Science in Education" for Vol.11 makes a number of assertions about man feeling within his soul moral emotions which are the foundation of faith, and within his heart solemn moral facts which beckon him to duty. These latter are, it seems, perceived instinctively. The reviewer continues with an exhortation: - we are to believe with heart, soul, mind and strength, and to make sure that our teachings conform to the

"primary religious, moral, and natural intuitions of our nature."290

The reader is left puzzling at the multiplicity of organs of perception. Assertion, rather than definition, is also a characteristic of the article "Regeneration"291. Conscience is the theme here. Good and Evil are seen as innate, along with genius. After all, not every
outpouring of genius can be a direct inspiration from God. An article in Vol.10, "The Philosophy of Education, in its Relations to Religion", describes the existence of truths lying at the very roots of knowledge, "through which the secret spirit of truth seems to make its outcoming into the mind....".

This kind of image does not lend itself to analysis, but the writer confirms his acceptance of an intuitional theory of ideas when suggesting that God would not wish us to lose faith in our intuitions by providing revelations which would contradict them.

It is no surprise to learn that the Review takes a generally antagonistic stance towards Materialism in so far as that philosophy posits a purely experiential, a posteriori, theory of the derivation of ideas. Necessarianism in particular is given short shrift. Bagehot's review of Bailey's poem Festus admits that the doctrine of Free Will may have its problems, but the doctrine of necessity has its immorality. Significantly, Bagehot cites the evidence of conscience as proof of his contentions. The same writer makes an identical point in a review of J.S. Mill's Principles of Political Economy. Mill is criticized for his excessive use of induction, which allegedly displays a lack of awareness of the rôle of conscience. R.H. Hutton shares Bagehot's view. In an article for Vol.6, Hutton denies that Mill is correct in regarding experience and association as the only sources of knowledge. Hutton extends his attack to Spencer in his "Ethics of the Voluntary System" article for Vol.8. Hutton complains that one of Spencer's most radical errors is to ignore the presence of the positive authority of conscience within the mind. When the mind is assailed by a tumult of desires and wants, it is obliged to defer to that authority.
Not all Prospective reviewers are prepared to rely upon assertion to present a meaningful picture of the genesis of ideas within the mind. Indeed, we need look no further than Martineau and Tayler for a detailed examination of the mechanism of the mind - an issue so far unexplored. Tayler's review "The Philosophy of Religion" contains a criticism of Morell's failure to define intuitions or intuitional states of mind. Tayler refuses to accept the Idealist view that it is possible to construct the universe a priori

"by simple meditation on the laws of Mind; but neither do we think the ultimate truth attainable, by admitting the depositions of the senses as our only data...." 

Religious belief, he continues, is doubtless founded on an intuition, but this intuition is emphatically not an innate idea, fully formed in the new-born mind. Instead, the intuition is immediate; it depends upon an unfolded faculty of mind, and is defined as a perception, feeling and belief arising within us which reflects our very nature. Such intuitions determine the boundaries of truth; beyond the boundaries lies Scepticism. Indeed, this antipathy to the innate idea is echoed by the unknown writer of the article in Vol.10 "The Eclipse of Faith, and its Author's Defence thereof". A distinction is made between innate ideas and a priori notions. When one quite rightly argues that a mathematical idea is held a priori, one is not suggesting that the infant is born with Euclid imprinted on his brain. When discerned, such mathematical truths are self-evident. In a similar way, when F.W. Newman speaks of great principles of right and wrong, we should account for them as a priori notions, rather than as innate ideas. Similar comments are made by Tayler in his Morell article - comments which have a distinctly
Platonic ring. Tayler defines truth as

"an apprehension of the actual relations of things"\textsuperscript{299},

with these relations existing as images in the mind. Phenomena perceived through the senses are in themselves mere echoes of perfect truths - and perfect truths are known to the mind through intuition. The intellect acts as a trigger to volition in the sense that it awakens intuition, which then permits us to identify the relationship of the Will of God towards the data received through the senses. At first sight, Tayler appears to be identifying faith with intuition. However, faith is seen as a complement to knowledge. Knowledge lies in an appreciation of the relationships of external objects to ourselves; faith uses our intuitions to conceive of such things as they exist in God. It is very important to note Tayler's view of the partnership between intellect and intuition. As the powers of intellect and intuition unfold and work together, then the more we know of God, and the more we know of human psychology.

In his article "Christian Theology in its Relation to Modern Ideas and Modern Wants", Tayler is keen to provide us with a definition of the very link between religion and feeling which other reviewers had been content to assume and reluctant to explore. Tayler makes the usual point about the primary element of religion consisting of feeling, but is clearly unhappy with leaving it at that. In a footnote, he seeks to define feeling by using the German term "Gemüth": feeling is the seat of the affections. When the mind perceives the great agencies of the universe, then the affections are stimulated into feelings of awe, and demand, in an instinctive way, the acceptance of the existence of a great spiritual power. This in turn stimulates the workings of reason
itself, which is clearly not the agent which identifies that spiritual power. The foundation of the religious sense is therefore a "primal consciousness of spiritual truth in the human soul..." In practical terms, the educational implications of this kind of theory of the mind are enormous. A child's religious feelings depend on an appeal to the affections, and not to the intellect. So, the use of the Bible in schools must be based upon the acceptance of the principle that the study of Scripture through the reason will be unavailing; nor must we forget that the Bible is, in essence, a record of past religiosity, and not an automatic source of religiosity in the future.

Tayler's article "Harmony of the Intuitional and Logical Elements in the Ultimate Grounds of Religious Belief" justifies a close examination, as it brings together the various strands of his thought on the derivation of ideas. Tayler comments on what he sees as the predicament of the contemporary Rationalist, who finds that science and logic alone will not satisfy his aspirations and affections. We all feel that reason is inadequate to the task of answering the spiritual demands of the soul. Truth, says Tayler, will be achieved through the insights of an intuitional theory of the mind, but current confusion must not lead us to assume that intuition and logic are mutually exclusive. One major problem lies in terminology. When we use words like "reason" and "intellect", we tend to use them in the Lockean sense, which means that we are constantly expecting them to be capable of demonstrative proof. But Tayler contends that not all data supplied to the faculty of reason are furnished in the same way. Some data are indeed provided through logic and induction, but some come courtesy of intuition. The essential unity of this data is revealed in what Tayler calls the "Higher reason".
Data, after all, require interpretation: if we permit ourselves to turn aside from the world revealed by our senses and consider the world as revealed by our reflection, then we detect in our souls the God-given intuitions which enable us to interpret rightly. Tayler is happy to provide examples of these intuitions. We feel in our souls a sense of the limitations of our knowledge; of a guiding Mind concerned with the harmony of the world; of a dependence on a mysterious Will; of moral responsibility — and of a final retribution. It is significant that Tayler is not prepared to use the term "intuitional" without some attempt at a definition, although it is arguable that a more detailed definition would be helpful. He comments that beliefs are called intuitive because they are embraced by the soul immediately. Tayler also implies that the intuitions partake of the nature of the mind of God, since they are so strong in some people that we needs must confer the status of prophet on them, as men brought under the sway of the Parent Mind.

Perhaps the most detailed examination of the derivation of ideas comes from the pen of James Martineau. Indeed, a letter to Charles Wicksteed in 1877 reminds Wicksteed that the division of editorial labour in the Prospective left the reviewing of philosophical literature in Martineau's hands. Now, Martineau clearly agrees with Tayler that intuition is the mechanism through which the mind cognizes the highest truths. This theme occurs in a number of articles. In a review of Stanley's The Life and Correspondence of Thomas Arnold, D.D., Martineau likens the "first truths" of religion to those of morality and physical science. Such truths exist in their own right, and are directly and immediately recognized as certain by the intuition. Martineau
suggests that the operation of intuition in this way is not automatic, but depends on the mind reaching a particular stage of its development where certain unspecified "higher faculties" are called into play. What Martineau appears to be suggesting is that the way to become fully receptive to such truths is to allow the intellect to work alongside the conscience and affections. Neither intellect nor holy living alone will suffice. However, in his review of Parker's Discourse of Religion, holy living is shown to have a vital function. Duty is perceived only by the conscience, and the effective way to reach conscience is to present it with an example of holy life and beauty of mind. In other words, we need to see a religion lived before we can live it ourselves. Martineau concludes:

"And so we regard it as a rule in matters of devout faith, that it is reverence for persons which gives perception of truth in ideas."\(^{294}\)

At first sight, this is a surprising statement, since it appears to give primacy of place to reverence and conscience in the mind's acceptance of truth. However, we should draw attention to Martineau's reference "in matters of devout faith". It would seem that Martineau is not making a point about ideas in general; nor is he restricting truth to one solitary path. His immediate concern is with worship and faith. Indeed, he makes a similar point in "Mesmeric Atheism" (Vol. 7)\(^{295}\). The natural seat for the religious convictions is the conscience and affections. If that seat is overturned, then it is difficult indeed for a powerful but unaided intellect to establish a consistent theory.

Clearly Martineau welcomes as insightful an a priori approach to man's moral nature. In "Philosophical Christianity in France" (Vol. 4)\(^{296}\),

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Martineau is keen to criticize the a priori school for vagueness in terminology, extravagance in assumption and failure to appreciate that the mind itself is capable of invention in aesthetics and the mechanical arts. But in the moral nature itself, the mind lacks that power, and neither experience nor association can provide access to the higher moral conceptions. The direct influence of a Perfect Mind can provide, and does provide. In so doing, it also provides the necessary witness to its own existence. There are clear similarities here to Tayler's concept of the Parent Mind. In an article on Hamilton's philosophy, Martineau expands on necessary belief in ideal concepts. He likes Hamilton's concept of belief in Self and Not-Self given in the consciousness, but would add other ideal objects believed to be real, such as Substance and Cause, Soul and God. These, suggests Martineau, have as good a claim to be believed as the existence of the external world. Now, Martineau has no intention whatsoever of dismissing the insights of the a posteriori school of James Mill and the Associationists. He accepts the existence of involuntary elements in the mind - the truth lies in a creative synthesis of voluntary and involuntary elements. Only then can room be left for

"the joint presence of a human and a divine element in our spiritual life."

When confronted by what he sees as rampant Necessarianism, Martineau is unsparing in his criticism. The word "unsparing" is used advisedly, for Martineau takes no prisoners in his review of Letters on the Laws of Man's Nature and Development, in which his sister Harriet elicited the views of Henry Atkinson in tones of admiration. We recall Martineau's point that it was hard for the intellect alone to secure theistic convictions; impossible if the intellectual faculties are in
disarray. The writers of the Letters lack any real range of scientific knowledge, and are easy prey to pseudo-sciences like mesmerism and phrenology. Rolling delightedly in the jaws of Materialism, they thereby expose their vulnerability and incompetence. Martineau feels himself to be struggling against the odds in attempting to discern coherence in Atkinson's nightmare ramblings. Nevertheless, he feels fairly confident that Atkinson's central tenets are:

(i) that human knowledge is limited to the external perception of phenomena;

(ii) that it is not possible to rest psychology on the evidence of consciousness.

The implications? Simply - a philosophy which dismisses distinctions between right and wrong, and which would have us replace our systems of education, law and government with the moulding of human nature in gymnasium and hospital. Indeed, Atkinson's fundamental fallacy is to see mind as the product of, rather than the antecedent of, material conditions.

Having sniped at some aspects of the a posteriori school in his Atkinson review, Martineau demonstrates his full firing-power in the article "The Soul in Nature" (Vol.8). His target is Oersted, who is accused of using techniques appropriate to physical science in inappropriate areas, and of rationalizing faith and love into something which may appear serene, but which is essentially cold and detached. Oersted is emphatically not positing the usual materialist system, but conceives of human reason as essentially a priori, being evidence of the work of the Divine Mind. This must not be confused with Martineau's approach, which makes a similar identification with the moral faculty. Oersted further
posits that what we know a priori is revealed in the laws of nature; once we have clarified the position a priori, we may then identify natural phenomena a posteriori. However, Martineau responds that this is simply to imprison the workings of the Divine Will in an unalterable sequence of phenomena. Martineau also feels that Oersted makes the intellect alone partake of the Divine. And in failing to distinguish between reason and conscience, Oersted proceeds to fall into an ethical trap through his concept of the reason being triggered by the outer universe through some sort of process of sympathy. The problem here is that a trigger is, in essence, automatic, and Man is thereby deprived of freewill. Martineau's two major themes are here clearly identified: Oersted overlooks both volition and the workings of conscience. Conscience, in fact, is a source of ethical power in the same way as the understanding is a source of logical power.

It would seem to be Tayler and Martineau who provide both foundation and superstructure for the markedly consistent treatment of the Nature of Mind and Reason in the Prospective Review.

In considering systems of thought and philosophy, The Prospective maintains an antagonistic attitude towards Catholicism, but intersperses criticism with admiration. Several articles assume axiomatically that Catholicism is reactionary. Tayler reviews Thom's The Life of the Rev. Joseph Blanco White, and accepts that Blanco White's intellectual pilgrimage represented an escape from the thraldom of Catholicism. Antonio Gallenga contributes two articles to Vol.3. In "Monte Cassino", he complains that the persistence of monachism is a great evil, stemming as it does from a dark and priest-ridden age. In "Italy,
the Pope, and the Jesuits, the complaint is that the current form of Catholicism is incompatible with liberalism, though there may be hope if Pius IX really tries to bridge the gap between Catholicism and reason. Similarly, Martineau suggests that the march of progress has sidestepped Catholic countries for the previous 300 years. As a system, Catholicism may have extended its ground since the Reformation, but at the cost of losing its noblest elements and maintaining such charades as the confessional. And it is significant that a writer on the theme of popular education in Vol. feels it important to comment that the medieval Catholic church was opposed to the spread of education among the laity. Indeed, the very last volume of the Review contains a final attack on Catholicism, which sums up the assumptions of the previous ten volumes. By its very nature, the Roman Church is opposed to civil, religious and social progress.

Praise of Catholicism is comparatively rare. In the article "Bruno Bauer and the Universities of Prussia", Catholicism is seen as the most remarkable spiritual phenomenon of the age, producing the greatest number of moral and theological teachers. This praise, however, is used to serve an argument - that this kind of achievement stems from the Catholic clergy's single-mindedness, since they are not obliged to serve the two masters of church and state. In the same volume, a review of Lyra Innocentium offers a more open-handed praise in referring to the greatness of Catholicism in general, and the quality of its poetry in particular.

It might be expected that the Prospectiva would applaud the Reformation as a vital element in the varied facets of mankind's progress. The
Review, in fact, rarely suggests that the Reformation directly stimulated intellectual progress. It comes nearest to such a suggestion in an article on the French Reformation (Vol. 3), where stress is placed on the supposed contribution made by the Reformation in rolling away intellectual darkness and diffusing a thirst for knowledge. Even then, Luther himself never intended a reconciliation of reason and religion. However, we must not forget that the Review sees religion as primarily a matter for heart and conscience, rather than a concern of the intellect alone. No criticism is intended, therefore, when the Review prefers to stress the inadvertence of the undoubted contribution made by the Reformation to intellectual and political progress. For example, Martineau in "Europe since the Reformation", denies that the Reformation taught civil or religious liberty, the right of private judgement or democracy. Instead, it snatched political and intellectual control from the priest and rushed to offer it to the magistrate with an unctuous and relieved smile. But, since the movements spurred by the Reformation eschewed theological systems in favour of the pursuit of truth, the political and intellectual gain was as inevitable as it was unforeseen. It is Wicksteed who reminds us that it is a mistake to assume that Luther held dear the principle of freedom of inquiry, and an even greater mistake to assume that this principle lay at the heart of the Reformation. We must learn to distinguish results from principles. After all, Luther acted under the impetus of an entirely theological conception: justification by faith.

However, it is R.H. Hutton in Vol. 3 who makes the most detailed contribution to the discussion of the Reformation. In his article "State of Protestantism in Germany", Hutton considers that the vital
contribution made by Luther was not through a call for intellectual freedom, but through his assertion of freedom of conscience. Indeed, Hutton follows Brönner—whose work is under review—in suggesting that the desire for liberty of personal judgement itself effectively pre-dated Luther, and was a product of Italy. Now, Protestantism may well contain a tendency towards the abstract freedom of intellectual inquiry which is Rationalism itself. This tendency can be turned into service of Protestantism providing one remembers that moral aspiration must guide intellectual freedom. In Germany, once philosophy allowed scientific enquiry to triumph over and exclude the moral guidance offered by Protestantism, the bleakness of Rationalism was the result. Pursuing intellect for intellect's sake can lead to dilettantism or an eschewing of practical considerations which in turn leads to a caricaturing of the naturally subjective German mind, as the followers of Hegel prove all too abundantly. This point about the obligation of philosophy to take into account practical matters is echoed by Tayler. In his "Christian Theology in its Relation to Modern Ideas and Modern Wants", he accepts that the eighteenth-century rationalists are deserving of praise for sweeping away much rubbish, but deserving of censure for forgetting the practical and important way in which the feeling which informs religious life is powerfully stimulated by ancient forms and usages which appeal to the imagination. On a similar theme, Hutton points out that feeling requires an object to which it must attach itself. So many German thinkers lack a sense of reverence, and are therefore incapable of understanding that the purpose of a church is based upon the communal expression of reverence through worship. Hutton also points out that, even when philosophy tried to return to its moral
rôle, in the absence of any interest in the conscience or affections, the best it could achieve was the earnest, stern and forbidding morality of Kant.

We must recall that the Prospective Review's attitude towards schools of philosophy is coloured by the reviewers' belief that religious truth is not primarily discerned by the intellect, whereas philosophy is an intellectual pursuit, even though it must take into account the nature of man's mind and religious affections. It is hardly surprising that the Review should be generally antagonistic towards materialist philosophies, since these may lead to a denial of the objective existence of concepts such as will and conscience which are so central to the Prospective's view of the nature of mind. A review of Ruskin's Stones of Venice duly urges that Britain should free itself from a desolating Materialism; beauty and art have a vital rôle to play, since they stimulate the heart through appealing to the mind's innate tendencies of joy and tenderness. Indeed, it is Martineau who points to the central danger of the materialist philosophies. In a review of Kingsley's Alexandria and her Schools, he feels that Kingsley is right to complain of Locke and philosophers of similar mind who, in their insistence that we can know only phenomena, render the non-phenomenological God inapprehensible to the human mind. Tayler and Martineau are quite prepared to extend this kind of attack to the eighteenth-century Rationalists in general. Tayler, in a review of Harriet Martineau's Eastern Life: Present and Past, criticizes them for unadulterated blasphemy, and Martineau, coincidentally reviewing another work by his sister, complains of the flat and mean philosophies of Diderot and D'Alembert. Not that Martineau has any more time for what
he sees as dizzy speculation in the style of Spinoza. This, indeed, is
the crucial point: true philosophy must allow religion to breathe. Deny
the recourse of religious conviction to the conscience and affections,
and you will simply stifle it.

Time and time again, the Prospective attacks philosophies which rest on
a phenomenological or sensationalist view. We have earlier noted an
attack on J.S. Mill by Bagehot which criticized him for the excessive
use of induction and a lack of awareness of the role of conscience. This
review is very dismissive of Comte— an attitude prevalent throughout
the Prospective's pages, since Comte is seen as a rampant
sensationalist and a wild systematizer.

What the Prospective is not doing is denying the value of inductive
thinking altogether. Tayler saw Blanco White as escaping from the
thraldom of Catholicism using a Baconian approach. Whether White's
subsequent and temporary atheism was a result purely of Baconian
thinking is not made clear. Also in Vol. 1, Martineau's article "The
Elements of Morality, including Polity" accepts that moral laws
should be investigated through cautious induction.
The Value, Use and Limitations of Reason.

A theme which is clearly important to the reviewers is that of the relationship between reason and faith. Given the consistent attitude adopted by the Review to the existence within the mind of intuitions essentially separate from the reasoning faculty, it is not surprising that reviewers should uphold a division between faith, or religion, and the activities of human reason. There may be gradations of enthusiasm for reason itself, but this dichotomy is generally preserved, with primacy of place being given to religion. Our most convenient starting point to support this contention is Vol. 1 and the article by Newman on *Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation*.

Newman's opening gambit is to suggest that we cannot expect religion, which is based upon yearnings and sentiment, to affect positive proof for its insights. Newman is quite prepared to see the province of faith become more and more circumscribed as reason and its inductive technique increase our knowledge: but the bedrock of religion will always be the promptings of heart and conscience. Nor will reason ever have the right to forbid heart and conscience from finding God in the workings of the universe. Newman's evident enthusiasm for reason is not always echoed in the Review, although Wicksteed, in particular, makes some rather surprising statements which unfortunately lack clarification. In his review of Strauss's *Life of Jesus*, he comments that Unitarians are the only group willing to acknowledge human reason as the test of human belief. This proposition, taken literally, would certainly be challenged by other reviewers. An article on Benjamin
Constant, for example, sees reason as the

"weakest and least influential part of our nature. He who aims to
guide men by reason, usually fails, unless he has also the power to
move their passions, or arouse their better feelings."324

This reviewer does go on to make a familiar point - the need for a
fruitful and mutually beneficial partnership between religion and what
the Constant reviewer calls civilisation. Substitute the word "reason"
for "civilisation" and emphasize that reason is to be very much the
junior partner, and you have the kernel of the argument in Hutton's
article "State of Protestantism in Germany"325. Hutton, in placing his
emphasis on conscience as the fount of religiosity, points out that
faith surrenders the mind to beliefs which are confirmed by conscience.

Intellect can certainly check the logical consistency of these beliefs,
but its rôle is subordinate to that of conscience and the affections.
Indeed, it is wrong to see the affections as being roused by the
intellect, wrong to believe that faith is based on reason, and wrong to
deny the inevitable separation between religion and philosophy.
Religion, in fact, inhabits a different sphere: the affections are not
scientific, and therefore cannot be dealt with by philosophy. Philosophy
may analyse religious change, but it certainly cannot cause it.

The Martineau article "Mesmeric Atheism" also seeks to differentiate
between faith and reason. Taking the techniques of inductive science as
his starting point, Martineau argues that science and faith have
different theories of causation when contemplating the natural world.
Moreover, we must accept that the fundamental conclusions of science and
the fundamental tenets of religion are at variance, though recognizing
this should not circumscribe the dignity of either. Martineau believes
that religion classifies causes according to their "internal affinities of drift" - not one of his most elegant or accessible phrases. This would seem to mean that religion takes into account the moral implications as evidenced to intuition, and classifies accordingly. Inductive science, on the other hand, imposes order on the basis of resemblance and analogies of external appearance, which need not imply any accord with a classification by "affinities of drift". Such science can know nothing about fundamental cause: a higher philosophy altogether is needed to discuss whether our instinctive feelings about fundamental cause are right. If the limits of induction and the insights provided by our feelings are recognized, then may intellect be made rich; rich enough to look on nature with the eyes of a child - and rich enough to perceive therein "the hidden thought of God."

In fact, Martineau is perhaps more inclined to stress the dangers of a pretentious reason stepping outside its sphere than to applaud any partnership between intellect and faith. In his review of Kingsley's published lectures Alexandria and her Schools, he agrees with Kingsley that we need to remember at all times the difference between worship of the human intellect and reverence for Divine Truth. And in "The Soul in Nature", Martineau comments that we need to make sure that human knowledge progresses across a broad front; we cannot afford to leave progress to inductive science alone, since scientists have little insight to offer us in the field of religious conceptions.

Tayler similarly warns about the dangers of intellect crossing boundaries which separate it from faith, but is more concerned than
Martineau to stress the potential gains to be made through some form of relationship between reason and faith. He argues that the very first step would be to recognize those differences, and then to inform the two faculties with that awareness to prevent an unhealthy surfeit of intellectualism on the one hand and excessive religiosity on the other. This, indeed, is the argument in the article "Christian Theology in its Relation to Modern Ideas and Modern Wants". However, it is clear that Tayler feels that the affections and intuitions which lie behind religion have more to offer reason than can be offered in return. In his article "Harmony of the Intuitional and Logical Elements in the Ultimate Grounds of Religious Belief", it is clear that the melody line is carried by religion. Reason cannot work on the spiritual demands of the soul, but it is deeply enriching to bring religious feelings to intellectual study. On the other hand, the author of an article in Vol.10, "The Principles of Christian Union", would certainly not find the grafting of intellectual study on to religious feeling a deeply enriching experience; instead, it is productive of exclusivity and intolerance. On this point it is important to understand that the Review is worried about the impact of reason on the religious feelings: theology is a different matter. John Gordon's article "Unitarianism" makes this distinction clear. Theology is based on the understanding, where the action of reason is entirely appropriate. Gordon also makes the basic distinction between religion and morality; reason has the perfect right to decide on the latter, but its over-use in the former may well blunt feelings. Gordon also provides us with comments on the vital theme of reason and authority, creed and dogma. He comments that the binding force of the Unitarian movement lies in the
acceptance of the right of personal judgement without the shackles and dead-weight of a creed. Indeed, the Review is, in general, antagonistic towards the restraints imposed on inquiry by the stultifying effect of creed. Thom, in his article "Christian Churches, their Dangers, and their Constitution"334, urges that the great principles of freedom and progress, which require free and independent thought, must not be hampered, either by the demands of formalism, or by laws supposedly based on Revelation. And in his article "National Education"335, Thom asserts that the worst infidelity of all is to try to impose a creed out of fear of what free thought might bring. Now, it could be argued that Thom's enthusiasm carries him into a full-scale advocacy of free thought. However, we must bear in mind two points before we jump to an over-hasty conclusion. Firstly, Thom is really discussing creeds, which, being theological, are subject to the workings of unrestricted reason. Secondly, Thom does not discuss the full implications of a wide-ranging advocacy of unfettered thought in the detail which would alone permit us confidence on this point.

When other reviewers discuss the free-thought debate, they remain protective of that primacy of intuition which so characterises the Review. Tayler's article on Morell's Philosophy of Religion336 is a case in point. Tayler rejects absolute free thought: we must accept authority when it is the clear expression of our intuition. Fail to do this, and Scepticism will result - as inevitable as it is distasteful. Bagehot cites Faust337 as an example of what happens when the rampaging intellect rides roughshod over reverence and the affections.

A rather atypical view of the issue of religion and free thought is
taken by Milnes in his article on Hare's edition of Sterling's Essays and Tales. In the course of disagreeing with the Christian Remembrancer's view of Blanco White and the inevitable corruption of fallen man's intellect, Milnes argues that we need a German-style spiritual emancipation. But Milnes then proceeds to say that this hot-house intellectualism is suitable only for those of an adventurous spirit; better to leave undisturbed those whose nature inclines towards synthesis, tranquillity and a predominance of religious feeling. In fact, he allows Sterling to present a composite view which would, one feels, appeal to the majority of the Prospective reviewers far more than Milnes's dichotomy. Sterling's letter points out that progress of thought has made untenable any view of Christianity which does not rest on

"the higher and better demands of the conscience, and the sanctified reason..."339

And so to religious doubt. As we have seen, the dangers and attractions of doubt exercised many a nineteenth-century reviewer. Doubt, however, is not mentioned with any great regularity by the Prospective reviewers. Wicksteed339 considers it vulgar to see doubt as immoral, though it certainly can be used by some who wish to justify an immoral life. Martineau sees the central problem of doubt as one which could be solved by recalling the principles of the Prospective Review. In his article in Vol.2 on Theodore Parker340, he makes his position clear: the fear of doubt is simply a renunciation of faith. This attitude reflects Martineau's view of the nature of the mind, since the vicissitudes of the intellect cannot affect a faith which resides in the affections. His article on Thomas Arnold341, however, suggests that to treat doubt as a

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matter of the intellect alone is wrong: the cure lies in the cooperation of the intellect with the conscience and affections.

The most important conclusion we could reach on the philosophy of knowledge in the Prospective Review is that its nucleus of committed editors and its regular reviewers regarded the subject as vital to their view of man, God and progress. After all, the Review existed for the purpose of spreading that view. It is no coincidence that the phrase "Clerisy" is no stranger to the Prospective's pages. The Review bases its appeal on what it regards as the only true insight into the great questions of existence any sapient being must contemplate. The answers lie in, and through the operation of, intuitions and the affections. Small wonder, then, that the Prospective Review discusses and expounds the issues in such depth, and with such consistency.
The Contemporary Review

The Nature of Mind and Reason

In Vol. 23 of the Contemporary Review, William Knight wrote an article on the subject of prayer. His opening comment is highly significant:

"Although this Review is not intended to be an arena for debate between opposite schools of philosophical thought, I have been asked to reply to the criticism of a previous paper of mine... by the Duke of Argyll." 342

And, in the very same volume, Frederick Wynne is allowed the right of reply to an article by none other than J.M. Capes. In his "Motives to Righteousness from an Evangelical Point of View", Wynne also comments on the nature of the Contemporary.

"the pages of the CONTEMPORARY REVIEW have always been liberally open to representatives of every school of thought, provided their arguments were addressed to men's understandings rather than to their passions...." 343

In fact, there is truth in both these apparently contradictory views. Under the early editorship of Alford, the Review took the shape of a liberal Anglican/Broad church equivalent of the Fortnightly Review. As such, the Contemporary defended such works as Ecce Homo in the "Notices of Books" section of Vol. 3 344, spoke favourably of Colenso and offered a much more extensive treatment of art, music and science than one would expect in the usual theological journal. Nevertheless, there is no mistaking the Christian basis of the periodical; it is only with the editorship of Knowles from 1870 that the Contemporary begins to take on the character of a Review which extends to open debate the kind of welcome accorded by those who value free thought as the path to progress. A.W. Brown 345 sees the Contemporary as taking on the very hue of the Metaphysical Society, and a simple analysis of contributors
confirms this view. It is indeed a remarkable periodical which can give space to Ultramontanes like Manning and Dalgairns, space to lapsed Roman Catholics like Capes, space to Huxley and to Mivart, space to Hutton and to Spencer. Often, the rationale for publishing an article lies in its previous existence as a paper read to the Metaphysical Society. Such eclecticism therefore may render chimerical any search for a consistent theory of mind and reason in the period of Knowles's editorship. Nevertheless, it is more than interesting to look at the thought of writers whose work we associate with very different Reviews, and to compare, where possible, their contributions to the Contemporary with their contributions elsewhere.

It is, however, important to note that, when the Contemporary discusses the derivation of ideas, considerable consistency of viewpoint is evident despite the changes in editorial policy. The most constant theme is an antagonism towards Sensationalism and Materialism, and those contributors who might be expected to be less antagonistic towards this school rarely write on the topic. The pattern is set in the very first volume, where the unsigned article "The Philosophy of the Conditioned" discusses Mill's criticism of Hamilton. This article is in fact by Mansel, who argues that Mill has simply misunderstood Hamilton, and is wrong to insist on an experiential view of the derivation of mathematical axioms. Such Materialism, feels Mansel, will lead to atheism, perhaps by way of Pantheism. Nor will Mansel hesitate to attach the further label of Necessarian to Mill.

"the fatal charms of the goddess Necessity seem to have betrayed her champion into an unusual excess of polemical zeal, coupled, it must be added, with an unusual deficiency of philosophical knowledge."#
Similarly, in Vol. 2, the Notices of Books sections are keen to applaud books by Lowndes and Alexander attacking Mill and other Empiricists. The latter's *Mill and Carlyle* is praised for its dismissal of any necessarian attempt to reconcile itself with moral obligation. The same section in Vol. 3 contents itself with dismissing without argument Bray's *On Force* as yet another burst of blatant Necessarianism. And it is scarcely surprising that Mill is blamed for beguiling the Duke of Argyll, whose *The Reign of Law* seeks unsuccessfully to reconcile what we know of the actual operations of the mind with a particularly gentle and superficially attractive form of necessity. A review in Vol. 8 of Travis's *Free Will and Law in Perfect Harmony* comments that, although the mind is indeed subject to experience and causation, it nonetheless has the power to form the *final* will, which provides control over motives.

In Vol. 12 is an article by Alfred Barry: "The Battle of the Philosophies". Barry is not the most coherent of writers, but is clear enough when protesting at scholars who would seek to limit trustworthy experiences to those of external phenomena. There lies a grave danger in allowing physical science to invade the study of the mind in such a way as to attribute a physical cause to all mental activity. More closely reasoned is the article "The Science of Morals", which reviews a work by Alfred Barratt - a follower of Mill and Bain. Barratt is seen as the Materialist par excellence, and is treated with considerable sarcasm. He is a sort of physiological Utilitarian, fond not only of equating good and pleasure in the usual way, but also of making assertions without proof. Barratt, for instance, posits the existence of a universal primordial sensation and a physiological basis
for the power of comparison. The reviewer, Professor Calderwood, is keen to show the link between such theories and the nature of mind:

"we have no faith in a view of the moral faculty which describes it as a moral sense..."

Calderwood is deeply suspicious of any attempt to reduce moral philosophy to the status of a branch of physiology. Indeed, Calderwood later comments thankfully in Vol.16 that physical scientists are increasingly reluctant to rely upon Materialism in its crudest form. Huxley’s Lay Sermons are a case in point: they acknowledge that the relationship between brain and mind lies in the region of the unknown. And Mivart, in Vol.19, deplores any claim that thought is simply an aspect of sensation. Indeed, Arthur Russell, in his Metaphysical Society lecture "The Speculative Method" (Vol.23), comments that the very existence of the phenomenon known as the idea is itself evidence of the delusion of the extreme Empiricist, since his theory is itself an assumption which is not rooted in experience.

Any writer who dismisses Sensationalism is unlikely to accept a theory of the nature of the mind which perceives that mind as a tabula rasa, dependent on experience for its matter, and on Associationism for its cognitions. It is therefore no surprise to note that the Contemporary Review frequently upholds intuition as the major source of ideas—particularly moral ones. John Young's article on Huxley for Vol.11 demonstrates clearly the link between antagonism to the many types of Materialism and an acceptance of an intuitional theory. Young argues that Materialists are bound to accept as uniquely valid the evidence of phenomena and sense. In so doing, they forget that there exist, not only facts of mind as well as matter, and of consciousness as opposed to mere
observation, but also native intuitions in the mind. Scientists are all too ready to deny the existence of such intuitions - intellectual and moral - simply because they are unperceived by the senses. Of course, "intuition" is a term which lacks precision. Young is aware of this, and seeks definition by explaining what intuition is not. He rejects the concept of innate ideas in the sense of conceptions deposited in the mind at birth, but accepts that the mind does have a native tendency which predisposes it to form certain ideas, in the same way that a beaver obsessively builds. A review of Bain's Mental and Moral Science in the Notices of Books section of Vol.8 makes an identical point. Ideas such as God and justice are innate only in the sense that they exist in embryo in the new-born, to be developed by education and, crucially, by experience. The capacity for language is innate in exactly the same sense.

In an important article for Vol.12, "Mr. Lecky and the Utilitarians", Calderwood attacks the Fortnightly Review article "Mr. Lecky's First Chapter" from an intuitionalist point of view. Lecky's work History of European Morals, from Augustus to Charlemagne is critical of the utilitarian system of morals, and Calderwood feels that Morley's article misrepresents the Intuitionalists when he claims that their appeal to an instinctive sense of right and wrong is simply an attempt to impose on others their own moral standards. But Intuionalists, says Calderwood, aim to identify the workings of the moral faculty, not to establish a particular criterion of right or wrong. The argument goes like this. The Intuitionalist posits that the ultimate standards are to be found in self-evident, universal principles. It is therefore perfectly in order to cite the common consciousness of mankind as an argument against
It needs to be said that the treatment of intuition is not uniform throughout the *Contemporary Review*. There are articles whose acceptance of intuition is assertive and little else - a reflection, no doubt, of the attraction and danger of such *a priori* theories. The Manning article "The Relation of the Will to Thought" in Vol.16360 is a case in point. Manning sees will and thought as agents of the soul; their existence is confirmed by intuition. An instructive contrast lies in the Dalgairns article "On the Theory of the Human Soul", which not only appears in the same volume as the Archbishop's piece, but which also started life as a paper read to the Metaphysical Society. Dalgairns is not prepared to accept axiomatically the intuitionalist case, and starts his complex and thoughtful analysis with the proposition that each individual is, in essence, a spiritual substance called the soul, which *generates* the various faculties which manifest themselves as will, reason and intuition. These manifestations may be called the mind. Now, some theorists, like Mill, in describing the mind as a sort of luggage room patiently awaiting the arrival of phenomena as transmitted by the senses, must cope with the implication that the mind has no independent power whatsoever. The Phenomenalists must therefore struggle against hope to come up with any explanation of how the mind perceives the existence of a reality outside itself. Mill argues that such a perception might arise from an awareness of the different locations of sensations experienced by the body - totally unconvincing, says Dalgairns. Instead, Dalgairns offers us an analogy to explain his view of the nature of the mind. Imagine a living mirror, which has self-knowledge. Any image received by this mirror is thus partly passive,
partly creative. Thought is a judgement on a sensation, not a mere modification thereof. So, no thought can be the mechanical product of some organ of the body. Now, Dalgairns is certainly not suggesting a simple intuitive approach, and rejects, as did the other reviewers, the old-fashioned concept of the innate idea. The strict Intuitionalists are criticized for forgetting the fact that the mind enters into the very moment a sensation is received. This error leads thinkers like Hamilton into the further error of supposing the organism to act as a barrier between the mind and external reality, between soul and nature.

Dalgairns accepts that Mill has done good service in stressing the intimate connection between the body and the mind. All human knowledge stems from the joint operation of sense and consciousness. By this latter term, Dalgairns means the act of an agent which knows itself—the soul, in fact. The brain is thus the mere instrument of the soul "by which spirit externates to itself the dim thoughts formed in its depths." 33

In addition, the brain provides the symbolic language which allows the communication of these thoughts. Now, there is a genuine problem here in understanding exactly what Dalgairns means. His mirror analogy is suggestive rather than enlightening. We may feel that he is positing a modified form of intuition, but we needs must have recourse to Dalgairns's slightly later article for the Dublin Review in 1873 to confirm this impression. In his article, "The Relation of Scholastic to Modern Philosophy" 33, Dalgairns follows Kleutgen in asserting that knowledge itself implies intuition, in the sense of an immediate cognition of first principles. This kind of intuition falls far short of those Intuitionalists who argue that every human being has sort of mystical awareness of God's demands on the soul.
Indeed, Dalgairns's article "The Bearing of Infallibility on Religious Truth" for the *Contemporary Review* makes just this point. He is clearly aware that such theories of intuition are intensely individualistic and would deny dogmatic authority.

If Dalgairns sees value in both Sensationalism and a form of Intuitionalism, it is left to W.B. Carpenter to claim to have achieved a formal reconciliation between the two theories. Carpenter's article "What is Common Sense?" starts with an attack on simple Sensationalism. When we accept a visual impression, the trust we bestow in thus accepting it reflects a judgment which is based on more than mere experience. Carpenter expands upon this idea to posit the existence of a certain "Ideational consciousness", which is a form of blueprint imprinted upon the nervous mechanism allowing for generalization of separate cognitions *before* the intellect has developed sufficiently to cognize that generalization in the form of an idea. In this way, it becomes possible to judge self-evident truths by what is known as common sense, but which is actually that reconciliation of intuition and experience through an automatic co-ordination of experiences. A similar reconciliation is attempted by Hutton in the Metaphysical Society lecture published as "Mr. Herbert Spencer on Moral Intuitions and Moral Sentiments" in Vol. 17. Rather naively, perhaps, Hutton finds encouragement in what he takes to be Spencer's move away from straight Sensationalism. Hutton sees Spencer's use of the concept of the transmission of the accumulated past experiences of the race as evidence of willingness to accept valuable elements in the viewpoints of opponents. Where the Experientialists continue to fail is in their attempt to base on association or gregariousness the growth of a
regulatory moral principle. Nor are they successful in deriving necessary truths from universal human experience. Indeed, the concept of necessary truth does receive some treatment in the *Contemporary*, and shows once again the link between the Review and the Metaphysical Society. James Fitzjames Stephen gave a paper to the Society on March 10, 1874 with the title "Some Thought on Necessary Truth" which took a sternly experientialist line, and inevitably involved him in debate with W.G. Ward. Ward's response appeared in the *Dublin Review*, and Stephen chose the *Contemporary* for his reply. His article "Necessary Truth" in Vol.25 is a no-holds-barred attack on Ward's article, dismissing Ward's argument that the reception by the mind of mathematical axioms demonstrates something outside experience in our cognitions. Stephen sees Ward's speculations as

"simply an attempt to coin ignorance into a superior sort of knowledge by shaking up hard words in a bag."367

Ward is, of course, given the opportunity to respond in defence of his arguments in the self-same volume.368

The Stephen article serves to remind us that it is dangerous to impose an artificial unity of viewpoint on the *Contemporary Review*. Although the themes of intuition and Anti-Sensationalism do loom large, we should point to one article which in effect challenges most other *Contemporary* reviewers on the nature of mind. William Smith's article "Knowing and Feeling: A Contribution to Psychology" for Vol.14 takes an opposing view to that of Mivart on the psychological significance of evolutionary theories. Smith appears to hold a form of Sensationalism modified and rendered more attractive by the processes of evolution. His argument is that, if we hold up conscience - to take an example - as an original
intuition, then we forget that the ideas associated with it, such as fellow-feeling or the love of God, are themselves the result of evolutionary development. A similarly jaundiced view of intuition can be detected in an article by J. Llewelyn Davies: "Professor Grote on Utilitarianism". Davies is keen to sever links between Christians and Intuitionists, and claims that the will of God can be detected, not through intuition, but through an assessment of the evidence on whether the point at issue contributes to the progress and greater happiness of mankind. This open use of the felicific calculus is scarcely typical of the Contemporary Review.

The Contemporary Review lacks the interest shown by other Reviews either in the theory and value of induction or in Bacon himself. In one of the few articles on this theme, E.H. Plumptre discusses, in Vol.7, an inductivist approach to the phenomena of religion from the pen of Max Müller, whose attempts to systematize religious experience ignore both the influence of great men and the fact that it is impossible to gain a true induction from the few occasions when God has spoken directly to the prophets. Similarly, the "Battle of the Philosophies" article is prepared to grant that Baconian induction was useful in combating the excesses of Greek-style philosophy - where external reality was subservient to purely intellectual conceptions - but dangerous in encouraging us to use induction in inappropriate areas. To comprehend reason itself, we need a metaphysical approach.

It is therefore no surprise to note that the Review is in general suspicious of any philosophy which dismisses completely any *a priori* science of mind. Comtism is variously attacked for :-

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1) limiting philosophical inquiry to what the senses can cognize;
2) excluding all *a priori* assumptions;
3) creating a priestly caste through over-systematizing and intellectualizing religion.

Nevertheless, it is significant that the Review is prepared to open its pages to Brooke F. Westcott's article "Aspects of Positivism in Relation to Christianity". Westcott argues that it is possible to be both a Positivist in philosophy and a Christian in religion. He accepts that there is a problem in Comte leaving God behind in the metaphysical stage of society, but Comtism may be supplemented by Christianity in the same way as theology may complete the hierarchy of sciences by taking its rightful place above morals.

Indeed, Comte is fortunate in receiving reasonably frequent mention in the Review; lengthy articles specifically on philosophers themselves are conspicuous by their absence. What matters to the majority of the reviewers is the tendency of philosophy, rather than an elaborate disquisition on practitioners. This often leads to a rather dismissive attitude towards whole schools of philosophy, and a willingness to write off individual thinkers in a somewhat cavalier manner. With this in mind, it is hardly surprising that the *Contemporary* should spend much more time discussing variously the impact of the Reformation, of contemporary Catholicism and of Scholasticism. Two articles in particular look on the Reformation as an intellectual awakening. To Peter Bayne in his Vol.11 article "Christ's Church and Churches", the Reformation awoke man from his intellectual childhood. And Schwartz's "The Protestant Pulpit in Germany" (Vol.24) similarly presents the image of the Reformation, in its deification of
individualism, as a force demanding the effective use of reason. On the other hand, Maurice's review of Newman's Grammar of Assent for Vol.14\textsuperscript{379} rejects the idea that the Reformation was intended as some form of intellectual emancipation: it gave man freedom to believe, but not to think. It would seem that Tulloch, the author of the article "Rationalism" in Vol.13\textsuperscript{380}, would dispute Maurice's point. He argues that the Reformation, in generating intellectual doubt, also encouraged a feeling of terror by whipping up a sense of the Devil's presence at the same time as condemning as superstitious the semi-magical charms which Catholicism offered as protection against evil.

The most confident advocate of the importance of the Reformation is J.A. Dorner, though it must be said that he places greatest stress on the thought of Luther as the way forward. His article "Luther's Theology"\textsuperscript{391}, provides a detailed list of ways in which the Reformation has influenced civilisation.

1) By breaking down external authority, the Reformation increased confidence in personal faith, which in turn gave men confidence to use the intellect in scientific matters to strive for a similar certainty.

2) In the study of history, Protestantism encouraged the investigation of sources.

3) Philology received a boost from the stress placed upon ascertaining the meaning of the Scriptures.

4) Luther and Melancthon encouraged the growth of primary and secondary education.

5) The Lutheran theory of justification by faith created scientific theology, which in turn spurred attempts to systematize and classify
all sciences.

6) Morality was provided with a renovated system; family life was furthered by the emphasis placed on the priest-like rôle of the father.

7) Luther gave great impetus to the development of the idea of the state as a divine institution. Such a state will support neither despotism nor revolution.

The *Contemporary* certainly makes generally appreciative noises when faced with the question of the contribution of Protestantism to progress. The Roman Catholic writers for the Review do not engage in debate on the topic, contenting themselves with slighting references. Dalgairns, for instance, comments that not even the Reformation or Descartes sought to deny the centrality of Christ's Resurrection to the genesis of the concept of the division between spirit and matter. More typical of the review in general is the view of Tulloch, who, in his article on John Hales, comments that, even as the spiritual earnestness of the Reformation faded, Protestantism of its very nature enabled fresh springs of thought to draw forth ever deeper questions.

There is always an exception to the rule in the *Contemporary*, and that exception on the theme of Protestantism is provided by Farrar in Vol. 9. This article, "The Attitude of the Clergy towards Science", was originally a paper read at Sion College, where its reception may well have been mixed. Protestants, argues Farrar, have the tendency to thrust the Bible between man and God's progressive Revelation. So-called scriptural infallibility is pure fetichism when it is used to attack uncongenial discoveries in science. Luther himself was wont to rail
against Copernicus.

The Review's attitude towards Catholicism as maintained by its non-Roman Catholic writers has four main elements. The first is that Catholicism is innately inimical to freedom. This assertion may be found in Vol.2, where Lake, reviewing a work on monasticism, comments that love for freedom and love for Catholicism are mutually exclusive. And the article "The Roman Curia" in Vol.13 sympathizes with Mr. Ffoulkes, who has fallen foul of the Congregation of the Index:

"Mr. Ffoulkes has committed the great offence; he has thought for himself..."

The historical approach using the same assumptions can be seen in Vol.16, where the article "The Council of Trent in its Relation to the Present Time" sees that Council as representing the forcible subjection of the free German spirit to Romanism. The Council of Trent, and not Luther, deserves the blame for destroying the Church. The writer, Dr. Pichler, finds nineteenth-century analogies congenial, as his own books were indexed. Indeed, the Contemporary Review is keen to publish the views of those German Catholics of the Döllinger mould who were then engaged in controversy with Rome. Frohschammer, in particular, castigates Rome for failing to honour Christ by taking on board the methods of modern critical enquiry. The Review does frequently make the assumption that intellectual sterility is the mark of contemporary Catholicism. In Vol.9, Pasteur F.G. Wheatcroft's article "The Education of the French Protestant Clergy" comments that the Catholic seminary, by demanding isolation from the world, trains priests who can have little influence on the intellectual life of the country. Wheatcroft reappears in Vol.12 to bemoan continued superstition in the Catholic
Church - as evidenced by the supposedly miracle-working shrine of La Délievrande. Such goings on make the less hysterical French wonder whether

"there is not something absolutely incompatible between the Roman Church and modern society."^{330}

And John Hunt, in his article "Three Broad Church Catholics"^{391}, believes that the Jesuits, in their persecution of such men as Döllinger, "Janus" and Froschammer, are driving reason and modern civilisation outside the Church. The most forthright condemnation comes in a review of Le Curé d'Ars in Vol.6^{392}, where the system of Catholicism is presented as revolting to the Christian conscience.

While the Review gives the modern English champions of Ultramontanism a chance to respond to criticism, such writers are often more concerned to stress the important contribution of Scholasticism to the philosophy of knowledge and modern thought than to reply to the frequently antagonistic tone of the Contemporary towards Catholicism per se. Dalgairns's article "On the Theory of the Human Soul" in Vol.16^{393} confesses that one cannot reach the nineteenth-century mind by using scholastic terminology as such, but is adamant that the basic assumptions of Scholasticism - which include the Church's theory of the human soul - must be translated into modern language for the good of philosophy. Indeed, Dalgairns admits to having tried hard to see the value of modern philosophy, but now faces the conclusion that the Aristotle he learnt with Newman in their Oxford years has much more to say to modern man. A similar point is made by Nivart in "Contemporary Evolution (Part V)" in Vol.24. Nivart asserts that Hume, Berkeley, Kant, Locke et al lead inexorably to Scepticism and Nihilism;
Materialism and Idealism are simply signposts on the way. What is needed is a return to Aristotle and the Schoolmen. Does not evolutionary theory confirm what Aquinas taught - that

"a successively increasing purpose runs through the irrational creation up to man." 7394

The *Contemporary Review* permits Frohschammer to examine the Dalgairns article in particular in the course of his article "The Pope and the German Catholics on 'The Theory of the Soul'"395. Frohschammer objects to certain aspects of scholastic psychology within what he considers to be a well-written piece. Indeed, he argues that the scholastic reaction to the phenomena of mind is, at bottom, pure superstition. Scholasticism as a whole lacks the flexibility to allow for progress of knowledge - as is all too obvious from the doings of Pius IX and the Jesuits.

There is, however, little evidence of straightforward scoffing at Scholasticism. Farrar's article for Vol.9396 is perhaps the most dismissive, denying utterly the Schoolmen's knowledge of things divine. Perhaps we should conclude with Westcott's comments in Vol.5 as the perfect mid-way point between the enthusiasm and disregard we have witnessed. His article "Dionysius the Areopagite" remarks coolly :-

"we are tolerably familiar with the good and evil of scholasticism, and (are) not unwilling to acknowledge its permanent effects on modern habits of mind..."397
The Value, Use and Limitations of Reason

Many articles in the Contemporary Review have things to say on the value of reason, but that value is often implied rather than overtly discussed. This is why we see a great stress placed on the importance of freedom of thought and absence of intellectual constraint. More detailed analysis of the value of reason is left to a small number of articles, whose common theme is an interest in the relationship between reason and religion. However, it is only fair to say that these articles tend to offer some rather idiosyncratic definitions of reason.

Cheetham's article "Theodore Parker and American Unitarianism" comments rather unhelpfully that the object of religious consciousness is God, the knowledge of whose existence in this context depends not on reasoning, but on reason. Faced with this, we are rather keen to obtain Cheetham's definition of reason: a sort of self-evident truth which comes to man as naturally as his awareness of his own existence. Less neologistic and somewhat more comprehensible is the article "Moral Philosophy and Christianity" in Vol. 11. Reason, it seems, generates the moral affections. Clearly the writer is bent on separating reason from the intellectual faculty itself, since he holds that these affections are subsequently presented to the intellect. But the intellect needs the assistance of faith to attribute appropriate importance to them. Reason, then, is the first action of a process culminating in Christian morality. Faith may be the key to an affection becoming a part of man, but reason must be satisfied by the evidence on which faith rests; after all, faith is essentially a conviction. On the other hand, Bagehot's article and Metaphysical Society paper "On the Emotion of Conviction" (Vol. 17) grants reason a primacy of place in...
the search for truth; conviction is useful for fixing opinions in the
mind, but it should never control or override the intellect - as Newman
would have it do in his Grammar of Assent.

On a number of occasions, the Contemporary Review suggests that
intellectual freedom is axiomatically good. It is significant that it is
Henry Alford himself who says, in Vol 15\textsuperscript{1}, that the barriers of
exclusiveness and intolerance are crumbling: we must take courage, and
seek the progress which awaits us. And in Vol.18, Calderwood reviews
Dorner's History of Protestant Theology, emphasizing the latter's own
conception of the Contemporary Review as a force for philosophical
progress: the periodical represents a promising beginning in the
revival of the English spirit of inquiry. Calderwood's confidence is
apparent in his comment on the ultimate agreement of reason and faith:

"Reason does not dwell on one side of the mountain, and faith on the
other, each suspicious of the other...."

Indeed, in John Owen's article for Vol.14 on Rowland Williams\textsuperscript{403}, a
similar sense of confidence is reposed in the power of right reason,
which is seen as nothing less than a divine gift, to be sedulously
trained to avoid the purely destructive potential within itself. Love of
truth is a good so long as it is disinterested but open to sympathy -

hence the praise offered to Arnold's Essays in Criticism in the Notices
of Books section of Vol.10.\textsuperscript{404} A link can be drawn here with the
Review's attitude towards Catholicism. In the article "Christianity on
the Continent"\textsuperscript{405}, the Bishop of Argyll holds that free inquiry elevates
some countries and would depress others - such as those of the Roman
Catholic communion. The educational significance of free inquiry is
noted: nothing should be allowed to prevent the influx of knowledge.
And in Vol. 3, the writer of the article "M. Comte's Disciples on International Policy" looks forward to the time when national churches should break free from Rome

"in all of which free thought would be able to work with a power which has hitherto been unknown."406

Now, this writer certainly does not care for Comte's attacks on religion, but sees even such hostile criticism as useful; it spurs believers to a greater awareness of the meaning and value of the doctrines under assault.

It is to be expected that one of the Review's Catholic contributors should have a word to say on freedom of inquiry, and Dalgairns duly obliges in his article "The Bearing of Infallibility on Religious Truth" Froehschammer is criticized for his call for the right to unlimited speculation on the truths of supernatural religion. Such arguments would lead to the destruction of the very idea of Christian Revelation; their proponents argue that Revelation's only task is to stimulate reason, whence intellect itself, stimulated by faith, can rise to a sublime level of knowledge. Dalgairns comments:--

"Who does not see that the effect of this freedom is to deliver Christian truth, bound hand and foot, over to the mercies of the professor?"407

Given the enthusiasm of many of the reviewers for freedom of thought, we expect there to be a corresponding antagonism towards authoritatively imposed dogma or required subscription to creed. There is abundant evidence that this is the case. John Tulloch's enthusiastic review of Chillingworth's The Religion of Protestants comments that the author is right to reject all forms of simple adherence to any system or dogma. Once again, we note the tone of confidence: strip away dogmas,
allow free play of mind in a spirit of faith, and reason will harmonize with faith. Carpenter's "What is Common Sense?" article uses a dismissal of dogma and a constant encouragement to seek the truth as the basis for his attempted reconciliation of intuition and experience, where freedom of thought helps create a condition in which a sort of automatic, unconscious thinking provides the correct judgement, even though any immediate explanation of reasons for arriving at that judgement are bound to be inaccurate. Such reasons need not be articulated. And John Hunt's article "Speculative Theology and the Christianity of Christ" denounces any movement from doctrine to dogma as an unacceptable overriding of reason and conscience.

An approach like that of Hunt inevitably makes the individual the judge of what constitutes dogma. Indeed, some articles argue that doctrinal unity as such is a bad thing. A case in point is John Jellett's "Is Doctrinal Unity desirable?" (Vol.6), where a parallel is drawn with the real gains produced by diversity of political thought. It is one of the glories of the Church of England that She is undogmatic:— that very fact shows that She loves truth.

Time and time again, the Contemporary Review denies the value and morality of a rigid system of creed and subscription. G. Vance Smith's article "On Creeds in Church and Chapel" suggests that dogma breeds sectarianism, curbs progress in thought and is productive of immorality in requiring a demeaning subscription to what may be a statement of belief based on an outmoded system of values. Any claim to infallibility is anathema to Smith—as it is to other writers, including the reviewer of Stanley's Essays on Church and State. This
article's paean of praise to the "new" theology concludes with the assertion that, whereas the old system simply reasoned down from an authoritative position, the new starts with facts, and reasons upwards. Certainly the Contemporary is keen to consider adherence to dogma and progress in theology itself as mutually exclusive. Farrar's article in Vol.9 holds that the dogmatic approach in effect usurps theology, and the Puseyites are criticized in Vol.1 for a retrogressive rigidity which has undoubtedly been the greatest obstacle to the formation of 'a new era in theology.'

However, John Tulloch offers a more cautious assessment of the value of dogma in his article "Dogmatic Extremes" for Vol.23. The age, he feels, suffers from extremes of opinions. This does not mean that liberty of discussion is not an advantageous development, but it can lead to unbelief which is itself dogmatic - if we forget that a strong intellect is itself inadequate without the moral qualities which are an intrinsic part of reason. The practical import of this is that religious creeds cannot be fixed, but should nonetheless be seen as the moulds into which the divine substance has run. As such, they have a rightful claim on our reverence. So: we must accept that rigid subscription to creed is wrong per se, but must also accept the need to examine creeds freely but in an appropriate and religious frame of mind. The purely intellectual zealot has done injury to civilisation, and in his arrogance fails to realize a limitation which is not only a reflection of religious truths which transcend the capacity of logic, but also an inevitable failure of language to express the inexpressible. Leslie Stephen of the Fortnightly Review is a sad example of what happens when unbelieving dogmatism takes hold. In its own way, such dogmatism is no better than the crude
dogmatism of some believers. And so:

"the Fortnightly Review echoes the hardened voice of the Record.""414

When the Contemporary Review enters into the debate on the relationship between reason, science and religion, a considerable variety of viewpoints emerges. In this most complex of issues, some reviewers fall into self-contradiction - sometimes because their view of the nature and value of reason does not always complement their assertions on the links between, and relative importance of, science and religion. Farrar's Sion College paper417 is a case in point. The opening assertion is that there can be no clash between religion and science, because they operate on different areas of human experience: religion on established facts on the relationship between God and Man, science on the laws of phenomena in the universe. However, Farrar holds that we can deduce facts on God both from His voice in the universe and from His voice in the heart. Since this process is the task of theology, science must have a voice within theology itself. The precise relationship between religion and theology is not clear, but we suspect that Farrar is in some danger of compromising his initial stance on the absolute distinction between religion and science.

The article by Farrar is also part of a rolling argument in the columns of the Contemporary on the contribution - or lack of it - made by the clergy towards science. The details need not detain us, save to point out the links between Farrar's denial of the validity of dogmatism, his antipathy towards Scholasticism, and his rejection of Hannah's contention in Vol.6418 that the clergy's contribution has been invaluable.
Of course, if you argue that religion can impose harmony over any conflict arising between religion and science, then you imply that religion possesses a basic primacy. This is the line pursued by Westcott’s article “Aspects of Positivism in Relation to Christianity”\(^\text{14}\). This point is echoed by Mivart from a very different direction, when arguing that the great Catholic teachers, possessing only rudimentary scientific knowledge, nevertheless provided

“fruitful principles by which the Church is prepared to assimilate and harmonize even the most advanced teachings of physical science.”\(^\text{12}\)

Dalgairns\(^\text{42}\) adopts a rather different approach. Physical science cannot and should not attempt to escape from the fact that it operates within a Christian world-view. Even then, theology and science each have their own methods and own rights: but, in areas of overlap, then theology must have the final word. Hold Darwinianism by all means, but it must not be applied to the soul. So says theology, and this is her right. On the other hand, Davies, in his article "The Debts of Theology to Secular Movements"\(^\text{42}\), argues that theology must sit and learn at the feet of physical science. We have matured: our powers of reason will not permit us to accept a theological system appropriate for the age of our childhood. Science, then, is to be the harmonizer.

The examination of the philosophy of knowledge of the Contemporary Review makes for a revealing contrast with that of the Fortnightly. Despite the aggressive demands for free play of mind and the joys of intellectual debate in the latter, it is in the Contemporary that we see what is perhaps a truer catholicity.
"Education is not instruction, any more than it is books, boards, or schoolrooms....Education is literally 'bringing up'....the whole - physical, intellectual, moral - the body, the intelligence, the spirit."'

So says Wyse in Vol.2 of the Dublin Review, and we would do well to follow the convenient distinction he draws between moral and intellectual education. Indeed, this distinction is entirely typical of nineteenth-century writers, who found it convenient when confronted by a topic, the scale of which was matched only by its importance. And the distinction became doubly convenient when writers tried either to emphasize the difference between, or to stress the interrelationship of, intelligence and spirit. Most Reviews, in fact, were keen to reject any attempt to split asunder the two, while accepting the conceptual dichotomy as a reflection of the nature of the mind.

While, therefore, all Reviews found it necessary to use the terms "moral" and "intellectual" education, the acceptance of a conceptual and terminological division need not imply a concomitant acceptance of a practical division between the two in terms of formal education. Some Reviews find it possible to discuss curriculum by distinguishing between subjects which are either moral or intellectual in content and outcome; others see properly-conducted intellectual education as moral per se, since it demands rigorous self-discipline and encourages the use of free thought. Other Reviews, wishing to see moral improvement as the primary goal of education, attribute to intellectual study a purely subsidiary rôle, either as a certain contributory agent towards moral improvement, or as a necessary enticement for parents to send pupils to a particular
school, where an appropriate moral education can take place. Clearly we would expect the religious Reviews to identify moral education with religious education and instruction, and the radical secular Reviews to deny the validity of any such identification. The implication, therefore, is that we cannot afford to impose on our discussion of formal education an artificial separation of moral and intellectual education. Of course, if we select the totality of formal education as our prey, its bulk makes it difficult to trap. Review writers attempted to corner certain aspects of it, and generally returned time and again to worry and then to anatomize. It is, however, possible to impose a structure on our analysis of a Review's treatment of formal education if we consider its views on:-

1) the purpose, value and limitations of formal moral and intellectual education;

2) the curriculum in educational establishments;

3) teaching techniques (where appropriate);

4) the organisation, structure, control and funding of formal intellectual education.

There remains a further division of formal education which positively demands our attention. Most Reviews consistently consider formal education as essentially divided in terms of social class. Higher education is assumed to be the prerogative of the "leisured" classes, and little or no attempt is made to consider the possibility of the "lower" classes crossing the gulf which separates their elementary education from the slopes of Academe. This educational dichotomy again reflects the assertion of some Reviews that St. Peter will not bar the gates of Heaven to those who cannot produce an examination certificate.
by way of passport.

It is therefore not feasible to treat moral and intellectual aspects separately in our examination of any level of education. Taking higher education as our first port of call, we see this problem particularly apparent in a Review like the Dublin, whose writers saw therein a vital weapon for the Church, and were therefore unwilling to discuss the purpose of higher education without giving priority to its moral and spiritual implications. Moreover, since a significant number of Dublin reviewers were themselves Oxford converts, they could reflect from their own experience how the atmosphere of a university contained the strongest pressures within, and outside, the formal teaching. While some would accept that they owed their conversion to Oxford, they were also well aware of the hazards to faith which arose from the anti-Catholic nature of the university, rendered doubly dangerous by its undeniable attractiveness in terms of social prestige. This question became of particular moment after Catholic Emancipation stirred the professional ambitions of the Catholic gentry, and the University Acts of the 1850s opened the door to membership of colleges and to first degrees.
In his article "The Theory of Denominational Education" for New Series Vol. 14, W.G. Ward sees the higher education of Catholics as the "most critical and anxious question of the day." If this seems to be hyperbole, we must recognize two points.

1) In a time of bitter challenge and unprecedented opportunity, the Church desperately needed defenders and proselytizers, able to meet adversaries or potential converts on their own ground.

2) Higher education had a clear relationship with political skill and influence in a time when Liberalism appeared to offer the greatest threat to the Church in its European context.

Clearly it would be advantageous to consider these two themes separately. H.R. Bagshawe sets the scene for us in Vol. 7 when he comments that only the well-off and well-educated have the privilege of theological debate. And a number of articles point out the necessity of securing first-rate education in ecclesiastical seminaries to arm the priests of the future for that debate. In Vol. 6, Kyan suggests that seminaries should be improved and extended to university standard to permit priests to study, and therefore counteract, modern physical science and its tendency to lend itself to the propagation of error.

A similar point is made by Formby in Vol. 25, where he suggests that the seminaries are not fully providing clergy of the quality needed to convert the country. The implication is that a Catholic university is needed. The notice of Education in Itself and in its Relation to Present Wants extends this point to demand for the leisured classes as a whole...
the best possible education, which, in allowing the Catholic upper-classes to match Protestants intellectually, would also give them the opportunity to bring the Protestants back into the fold.

It is W.G. Ward who makes the most detailed contributions to our theme. In his article "Principles of Catholic Higher Education" for New Series Vol.127, Ward stresses the need for the curriculum at Catholic institutions of higher education to match that of the Protestants, since conversion cannot be accomplished if the potential convert discerns - by his own standard - intellectual inferiority amongst Catholics of his own station. Wilfrid Ward provides us with further insight when he quotes his father's words.

"English Catholics don't know what education means...When a Catholic meets a Protestant in controversy, it is like a barbarian meeting a civilised man." 

Ward is therefore prepared to accept that Catholics must pursue physical science if opponents perceive it as being the sound basis for intellectual debate. But this is not to say that Ward is advocating some slavish imitation of the universities of Oxford, Cambridge or London. Higher education, after all, does not exist simply to impart mental power or dialectical prowess: even more importantly, it must impart speculative and practical truth. If "speculative truth" must reflect the authoritative pronouncements of the Church on matters of intellectual enquiry, then "practical truth" can be taken to mean the moral training which is so vital a part of higher education.

Indeed, in the self-same article on the principles of Catholic higher education, Ward stresses the fact that the absence of higher education places Catholics of the leisured classes at a moral as well as intellectual disadvantage at the very time when intelligence is reaching
its maturity and when ill-spent leisure is likely to be catastrophic. Perhaps Ward's most important article on this theme is his review of Newman's *The Idea of a University* for New Series Vol. 21, in which Ward suggests that higher education could do more evil than good if it ignores, or fails to grant sufficient importance to, the rôle of moral and religious education, which rests upon the code of the Church. Indeed, apparent inconsistencies or problems in any aspect of higher education can be resolved only by reference to the Church. Ward's philosophy of knowledge was earlier seen to reject the power of the unaided and untrammelled intellect to decide correctly on issues affecting human conduct. And the intellectual aspect of higher education is fatally inadequate to defend man against the abyss of liberalism and indifferentism which is the Spirit of the Age. Make no mistake, this is of vital importance to Ward, and explains in part the combative language and images of conflict and war which permeate many of his articles on the theme. In his Newman article, he says:

"The future of the world may probably enough depend on this simple issue, whether educated laymen do or do not work in profound sympathy with Holy Church... But by giving them increased intellectual culture, you do but open to them so many additional avenues, whereby the evil atmosphere around them may effect its entrance."

Now, this assumption explains Ward's objection to the tendency of Newman's *The Idea of a University*. Ward eschews his habitually aggressive tone, but the implication of his criticism is that Newman's concept of intellectual culture will leave the Catholic student open to all the influences Ward considers so pernicious. Newman fails to make it clear that the communication of higher education must be imbued with the truth:— education must take place in an atmosphere of ecclesiastical authority. Ward cannot accept Newman's point that
intellectual culture per se will promote spiritual welfare through offering the leisured classes a method of keeping the Devil at bay in the midst of their leisure. So will a novel, comments Ward. Idolatry of intellect, continues Ward, is one of the great evils of the present day and Newman is providing it with yet another weapon. Indeed, Wilfrid Ward describes some written comments made by V.G. Ward on education, in which the latter accuses the liberal Catholics in general of this self-same idolatry. In any case, intellectual culture gives power over men: it is therefore vital that it is used for good. In his article "The Infidelity of the Day. - The New Scheme of Catholic Higher Education", Ward demonstrates once again the sense of cataclysmic upheaval which characterised his view of the Spirit of the Age. Speaking of the atheism engendered by the misuse of inductive science, he cries:

"If ever there were an appalling crisis in the history of the Church, there is one at this moment."

Ward therefore sees the new 17-student Kensington College as having a crucial rôle in stemming the tide of unbelief. The vital point is that intellectualism alone is inadequate to combat atheism. Ward is adamant that the value of the new college lies in the rooting of intellectual ardour in Catholicism. It is this intellectual ardour which existing seminaries lack. Ward also makes it clear that he would prefer the customary intellectual somnolence of the Catholic gentry to the possibility of seeing them inspired by a purely secular ideal of intellectualism. Ward's attitude towards higher education clearly reflects his view of the nature of mind. He asserts that, after all, all men have within them a knowledge of God which depends on Grace rather than book-learning. The Kensington College, in fact, made quite an
auspicious start under Mgr. Capel. McClelland finds that it was, however, fatally compromised by the continuing competition of the seminaries and other colleges run by religious orders - particularly Stonyhurst.

Ward is not, of course, the only writer to stress the need to give predominance in higher education to appropriate moral training. The usual criticism of the University of Oxford concerns its failure to provide any meaningful moral guidance, spiritual life or direction for the conscience. Typical is Walford’s article in Vol.36 which denies that bad habits can be remedied by awakening a purely intellectual interest. In any case, the most important question to ask of such an institution is "What is its morality ?". Similar points are made by Allies, who contrasts the obsession with gentility at Oxford with the genuine spirituality and asceticism of S. Sulpice (taken from Allies’s own Journal in France).

We must not neglect to mention the further theme which emerges from the discussion of the purpose and value of higher education in the Dublin Review. In the very first volume, Pollock and Blount, in "The Irish and English Universities", are keen to present higher education from a specifically anti-Tory standpoint. Tories attempt to monopolise and manipulate knowledge, and use Oxford and Cambridge as training grounds for the enemies of the people. But this nefarious attempt nonetheless recognizes an important truth; that education should be used to form a good citizen with appropriate political skills. A similar point is made by Wyse in Vol.2, where he explicitly refers to universities as training schools for statesmen. And in a review of Montémont's
London\textsuperscript{17}, Stapleton comments on the value of effective higher education for the upper classes, from which society as a whole has benefited, and will, presumably, continue so to do. In fact, a review in the "Notices of Books" section in New Series Vol.17\textsuperscript{16} agrees with Sir Rowland Blennerhasset that higher education in general forms a sound public opinion, in contrast to the half-educated variety formed by the popular press.
CURRICULUM

Analysis of Dublin articles on the curriculum in higher education reveals that much time is spent discussing the value of the disciplines associated with Oxford and Cambridge: Classics and mathematics. This doubtless reflects the experience of the major reviewers of these topics, who generally accept the unique value of these disciplines, but earnestly stress once again the need to make Catholic teaching and moral guidance the bedrock of a system of higher education. And so, Ward, discussing imaginative literature in Vol. 2019, comments on the singular effectiveness of classical literature in eliciting a real appreciation of beauty - as long as care is taken that the absolute standard of beauty is the Christian one. To a man of intelligence and imagination, such literature provides remote and vicarious experience of conduct which allows true contrasts to be made, which in turn leads to a genuine appreciation of beauty. When Ward discusses J.S. Mill's inaugural lecture at St. Andrew's, he inevitably objects to Mill's praise of free inquiry at Oxford and Cambridge, but is more than happy to echo Mill's high view of the unique intellectual benefits attainable from classical study, although, like Mill, Ward would wish to see a reduction in its domination of the curriculum. On the subject of mathematics, Ward sees a

"curious resemblance between the invaluable intellectual discipline, obtained...from a study of mathematics, and on the other hand from a study of scientific theology in its largest extent." 20

Indeed, in his "Principles of Catholic Higher Education" for New Series Vol. 1221, Ward specifies both mathematics and Classics as the best subjects for laying a firm intellectual foundation. The point here is that we must stress foundation: in the next volume, Ward makes it clear that he regards the two as preparation for disciplines such as history
and philosophy²². This is why Ward complains that Newman’s *Idea of a University* puts too much emphasis on Classics and mathematics without considering the intellectual value of a

"certain not very scant admixture"²³

of physical science and other studies. Ward is not claiming for Classics in particular any moral value *per se*. Wilfrid Ward describes an episode from Mary Ward’s recollections which gives us greater insight on this point. It seems that Ward, after severing his teaching connection with St. Edmund’s, was distraught on hearing that students were no longer devoting spare time to the study of the New Testament, but to classical reading. Indeed, undirected reading of Classics is morally dangerous, since the power of the pagan writers is all too seductive. This explains Ward’s letter to Newman, where he complains :-

"If you agree with me on the extreme danger of classics.....why speak so little about that danger in your works, and give so little prominence to any plan for remedy ?"²⁴

In fact, Wilfrid Ward describes what he sees as the practical outcome of Ward’s views on classics as being the treatment of such literature as a

"mere instrument of rudimentary education in grammar, and general literature primarily as recreation."²⁵

Not all Dublin writers were prepared to dismiss the possibility of moral gain from classical study as such. In the "Notices of Books" section of Vol.46²⁶, a review of Newman’s *Lectures and Essays on University Subjects* upholds the absolute necessity of making a classical education the main part of an academic system which is to exercise a lasting influence on Christian society. And Wyse suggests in Vol.2²⁷ that Classics, next to Scripture, will ennoble the mind.

What a number of reviewers object to is an excess of subjects studied.
W.G. Ward criticizes London University for injuring intellectual training by teaching too many subjects, and a similar point is made by de Morgan in Vol.11, where he complains that London fails to use Euclid in the depth necessary to maximize its potential as an agent of the development of reason.

What attitudes do the Dublin reviewers hold towards the rôle, if any, of physical science in the curriculum? Perhaps the most important point to note is that physical science is nowhere dismissed as unsuitable or largely worthless. Our earlier identification of the importance attached by the Dublin to higher education as the means by which appropriate doctrinal and moral ideas were disseminated among the most influential classes is confirmed in the Review's habitual insistence upon the dangers of failing to subordinate the study of physical science to moral and religious truth. Allies's article "The Catholic University" is a case in point. Allies considers that the study of the physical sciences is a valuable intellectual experience, but one which must be illuminated by the predominating religious spirit, which in turn demands our adherence to the principle that metaphysical science represents the true use of the intellect. A similar point is made by Christie in his article "Paget.- Nature and Religion" for Vol.21. Specifically, Christie sees the study of physiology as a danger to faith unless theological knowledge is simultaneously increased. Ward himself has rather an ambivalent attitude towards the precise intellectual value of the study of physics. In his review of Mill's St. Andrew's Inaugural, he implies an acceptance of such value when he suggests that it is essential that the study is evidence-based; but, in "Principles of Catholic Higher Education", he is doubtful of
the intellectual gain to result from studying the science in detail.
Clearly we would expect science to have a place within the curriculum to
arm the Catholic intellectual élite for the fray with Protestants,
Pantheists and Sceptics. Kyan, we recall, insisted that natural
science be studied in seminaries to combat its use for the propagation
of error.
THE ORGANISATION OF HIGHER EDUCATION

While it is appropriate and necessary to consider the views of the Dublin writers on where, and under what circumstances, Catholic higher education should take place, the intention is to avoid a wide-ranging description of the variety of Catholic responses to such vexed questions as that of a Catholic Hall at Oxford, except in so far as they relate to an analysis of the Dublin's attitude towards topics previously discussed, such as the value of higher education.

Briefly, the issues can be identified as follows:

1) Should Catholics attend the Protestant Trinity College, Dublin, or non-denominational Queen's Colleges?

2) Should Catholics attend Oxford or Cambridge once it became possible to take a first degree in those universities?

3) Would it be necessary, practical or desirable to set up a Catholic Hall or full-scale College at Oxford?

4) Should a Catholic University be set up in Ireland?

The first point to make is that the Dublin Review could never be an open forum for debate on these issues. Although prepared to print correspondence disagreeing with its views on the subject, the very genesis of the Review, the predilections of its editors and its frequent use of ecclesiastics as writers led it to follow the decisions of the Church hierarchy whenever those were articulated. However, since such decisions were made generally as responses to situations, there was an opportunity at least for expression of opinion until an authoritative pronouncement was made. Of course, a readiness to accept such pronouncements reflected the Dublin's view of the sovereignty of the...
Church over human reason, and made its own pronouncements comparatively cautious until the Church had spoken. Nevertheless, we might expect a convert's nostalgia for the place of his conversion - which was so often Oxford - to colour attitudes towards that university, perhaps to the extent of hankering after some form of Catholic link with Oxford. McClelland's charts, for instance, persistent attempts to re-open the issue of a Catholic Hall at Oxford at an assembly of the English hierarchy in April, 1872, even though a decision had previously been made against that option. A concluding section from the report of the Assembly makes it clear that the constant raising of the issue reflected, not only the old attachments and memories of converts, but also desire on the part of some sections of the Catholic gentry to gratify social ambition.

Now, one might expect flurries of articles on these subjects to occur around three main controversial storms. The first is represented by the Papal rescript of 1847 which condemned the Queen's Colleges as institutions whose acceptance of a mix of denominations was injurious to faith, and which called for the establishment of a Catholic University in Ireland on the model of Louvain. This theme was echoed, of course, by the Synod of Thurles in 1850. The second flurry might be expected around the time of the abolition of religious tests for first degrees at Oxford in 1854 and at Cambridge in 1856. The third flurry should make its presence felt around the time of the University Tests Act of 1871. However, the majority of articles appear - mainly from the pen of W.G. Ward - in the 1860s, and reflect Ward's view of Catholic higher education as the first line of defence against the Britain of Essays and Reviews - a work which demonstrated once and for all that Scepticism lay
at the heart of Oxford University. And so, we see several articles from this time which insist that Oxford and Cambridge are to be shunned by Catholics at all cost. Manning's long article on the subject in New Series Vol.1 is careful to identify all possible arguments in favour of Catholics attending the two universities before systematically disposing of each to his own satisfaction, and thereby permitting himself the following exhortation:

"We earnestly hope that Catholics...will keep themselves from all contact with the traditions of anti-Catholic policy and education."36

Manning's great fear is that Catholics will not only fall into the worldly and rationalist stream, but will enjoy being carried along, calling to others to join them where the water was so lovely.

Ward's article "University Education for English Catholics" in New Series Vol.3 concentrates on the issue of establishing a Catholic Hall at Oxford. To Ward, the crucial point is this: can a Catholic College guarantee that Catholic truth will be granted its rightful supremacy over the whole body of thought? And the critical answer is - no! Reverence for the curriculum imposed by the examination system and the genuine attractiveness of intellectualism will sap faith and resistance to intellectual criticism of the Church. The encouragement of personal judgement in this atmosphere will prevent the unquestioning acceptance of moral phenomena. Ward's review concentrates on a letter to Newman by a Catholic layman advocating a Catholic College at Oxford, and turns upon the layman with the comment that, if he is trying to impress on the Catholic youth the principles of the thankfully defunct Home and Foreign Review, then success in the attempt would lead to one of the "heaviest calamities which can afflict the Church."37
Ward is very much in earnest. He mentions by way of stop-press a pamphlet by Oakeley which sees the spirituality of a Catholic college as adequate defence against the contagion of Protestantism. This, Ward rejects, and, in his haste so to do, rather inconsistently suggests that the calibre of secular education offered by Oxford has been overrated. Ward returns to the attack on the concept of a Catholic college at Oxford in *New Series* Vol. 4. He again stresses his sense of unprecedented crisis in the Church, which is menaced by the issue. Catholics going to Oxford would not be Catholics when they came out. And, being the intellectual leaders, their poison would spread in the most virulent manner. The Church's right to impose intellectual supervision would be resented by vulnerable young men whose natural antipathy to such restraint would have been fanned by their experience of Oxford life. The English Catholic gentry should consider sending their sons to the Catholic University in Ireland or should assist in the setting up of a Catholic Institution of Higher Education in England should numbers be insufficient for a full English university.

In his "Idea of a University" article as late as 1873, Ward continues to remind his readers that the old idea of a Catholic college at Oxford should not be revived: had not the Cardinal Prefect of Propaganda made it clear to the Irish bishops that it was next to impossible for a man to attend a non-Catholic university without sin?

However, it may be a mistake to assume that Ward cannot accept any form of compromise over Catholics attending a non-Catholic institution - providing the suggestion comes from the Church hierarchy. The article for *New Series* Vol. 14 on denominational education comments that the Irish Bishops were prepared to accept the prospect of a mixed Irish
University providing a separate Catholic college existed, with full rights of control over the examination system. The latter is seen as making the whole thing acceptable, though by no means as satisfactory as a full Catholic university. We may, however, be a little surprised by the comment that the reviewer would rather see an amiable but commonplace Catholic youth going to an existing Oxford college in preference to a Catholic college at the University. The point is that our amiable youth may not receive permanent or profound impressions from his stay, whereas a Catholic college there could lose an entire generation for the Church.

If the post-Essays and Reviews years produce this near-unanimity in antipathy towards the Catholic attending Oxford, the note of sorrowful regret is not submerged under the denunciations. The old Oxford of the Tractarians may have vanished into Indifferentism, but some writers will not bid farewell without a sense of loss and gratitude. The article "Oxford, as it is and as it was" is almost elegaic in its reminiscences of the former tutor and college system, which did provide some sort of moral education. And at least the Thirty-nine Articles had made some profession of belief a condition of education. Added to this, the teaching of the prevailing Aristotelian ethical system could permit an insight into the fundamentals of Catholic moral theology. The convert Dalgairns makes similar points in his article "The Relation of Scholastic to Modern Philosophy": Oxford philosophy of thirty years before had been, on the whole, true. Now, the Associationists carry all before them.

If most major articles on the organisation of higher education occur in
the 1860s, it would be a mistake to ignore earlier articles which are not always of similar mind. McMahon's article on Trinity College, Dublin for Vol.43 seeks to prove that all College honours, including scholarships and fellowships, were intended for Irishmen of any creed. There would seem to be little point in discussing the matter if the author felt that it was impossible for Catholics to attend such an institution. Perhaps the most surprising articles are those written by Walford for Vols.36 and 37: "Oxford, its Past and Present." Walford discusses the 1854 Oxford University Act, and hopes that:

"the final step will be taken before long, of repealing all religious oaths....and so giving every class of Her Majesty's subjects in an unmutilated form, the whole advantage of what, with all its faults, must for ever rank among the first of our national institutions."44

If we set aside abberations, then we see clearly how the value, curriculum and organisation of higher education interrelate in the minds of the writers in the Dublin Review. The preservation of the Catholic Church demanded a moral and intellectual élite which was to be provided by higher education. The correct intellectual content could not be achieved without the correct moral influence, which in turn could not be achieved without the correct type of institution and system.
The Rambler

The Purpose, Value and Limitations of Higher Education

For the Rambler, as for the Dublin Review, the successful implementation of a system of higher education was central to the progress and survival of the Roman Catholic Church in the British Empire. Provide the right education at this level, and you produce the right priest and the right layman. Provide the wrong education, and you produce a priest who cannot relate to the interests of those few Catholics influential in the life of the political nation. You also produce a layman for whom the eternal truths of the Church have little relevance or meaning. The Rambler also shares with the Dublin the assumption that higher education is itself the preserve of priest and gentry.

The tone of the Rambler's approach to higher education is set by Capes, who, indeed, contributes the bulk of the significant articles on this theme. In "The Catholic University for Ireland" for Vol. 8, Capes comments:

"Side by side with the question of education, every other question is just now comparatively unimportant."

It is essential to note the importance of the rôle of the laity in Capes's thought. In this article, he asserts that the preservation of the faith in Ireland depends upon the extent and intimacy of the connection between revealed truth and the cultivation of the intellect of the educated classes. Six years later, Capes is making similar points in the article "Ireland's Opportunity". Ireland's Catholic gentry are intellectually supine - unlike their English peers. This is worrying, since the needs and mores of modern society demand an
intelligent laity to work with the Church.

"It is through the laity chiefly that the Church has to hold her own in the world."  

The boorish and bucolic cannot advance the cause. Indeed, Capes cites as proof of his criticism the reputed apathy of the Irish gentry towards the Catholic University.

Now, while Capes is not one to claim that higher education is to concentrate on the intellectual life to the detriment of the moral, he is adamant that not even Grace will compensate for deficiencies in intellectual - or moral - education. In his "Catholic and Protestant Collegiate Education" for Vol.347, he comments that Catholic education is paralysed by a lack of college training of imagination, taste, judgement and reason - a comprehensive indictment indeed. The Wellesley Index editors49 are unsure whether the article "Catholic College Difficulties" in Vol.449 is from his pen, but the tone of criticism is vintage Capes. The Catholic gentry are roundly condemned for their apathetic and disastrous assumption that one can fully - or even partially - complete the education of a gentleman by the age of seventeen. Our supposition that Capes is the author is given greater weight by his article "The Queen's Government and the University" in 2nd. Series Vol.250, where stress is placed once more on the vital years post seventeen, when seminaries and schools will no longer suffice for young men soon to enter the world. A university is uniquely capable of gradually initiating a man into liberty.

The "Catholic College Difficulties" article51 also provides us with an important insight into the sense of conflict which permeates the Rambler's anxiety over higher education. Quite simply, the educated
Catholic must not enter into his social responsibilities, including contacts outside his own religion but within his own class, without being able to hold his own against his Protestant compatriots. Exactly the same point is made in the article by T.A. Paley, also for Vol. 4:

"Classical Studies as pursued in the English Universities." Catholics must be able to match their opponents, not only in controversy, but also in the cultural assumptions and background which those same opponents value. A classical education is the *sine qua non* here. And in Thomas Arnold's article "The Catholic University of Ireland," it is emphasized that any university worth the name must provide that which is valued by the world.
THE ORGANISATION OF HIGHER EDUCATION

The issue of the value of higher education cannot be arbitrarily separated from where that education is to take place, since the Review feels that intellectual training for its own sake in a non-Catholic environment is more likely to secure apostates than advocates.

The Rambler is therefore keen to tackle the vexed question of Catholic attendance at the Queen's Colleges or Oxford and Cambridge. This was a matter which the editors felt could, and should, be handled in a lay Review: were not Rambler contributors well qualified to comment on the issues, since many had experience of Oxford life? Moreover, the Review was the obvious forum for laymen whose voices and influence were unlikely to find a similar platform elsewhere in the Catholic Church. A relatively free discussion of the subject, and that of its related topic of clerical education, was not, of course, likely to appeal to those who saw such debate as trespassing on a vital clerical prerogative. W.G. Ward seeks to close an impassioned series of anonymous letters to the Rambler by attacking "XYZ" (Oxenham) for discussing and calling into question the fundamentals of ecclesiastical education in a lay periodical, and for influencing others with opinions which are:

"mistaken, pernicious, and anti-Catholic."44

And so, presumably, is the Rambler for opening its columns to such debate.

The Rambler is keen to discuss the organisation of university study and life in part because a number of writers are convinced of the inadequacy of existing seminary education for laymen. In the preface to Vol.35, and in the process of listing the problems facing the Church,
the writer comments that Catholic education, lay and ecclesiastical, is generally admitted to be in its infancy. We recall Capes's article "Catholic and Protestant Collegiate Education", which complains that Catholic education in general is in a grim state, due mainly to lack of teachers, lack of funds and excess of apathy amongst the laity. Small wonder, says Capes, that the seminaries have all but sunk under the difficulties. The young ecclesiastic, torn prematurely from his studies, is obliged to teach laymen what he scarcely knows himself. The result is that the young Catholic of the so-called educated classes is

"paralysed by the want of that early masterly training of the taste and judgment, of the imagination and the reasoning faculty, which can be acquired only under the guidance of a class of college professors... but rarely found amongst us."56

And, in "The Queen's Government and the University"57, Capes adds that the seminary is a place for boys, but not for men: its discipline and surveillance are no preparation for the young man of rank who will find his entrance into the world a violent transition, for which he is totally unprepared. Moreover, in Vol.12, Myles O'Reilly's article "Prospects of the Irish University"58 complains that seminaries cannot provide meaningful professional training outside the ecclesiastical vocation, and implies that they are too small in staff and resources ever to provide a focus for Catholic learning. They also fail to persuade the sons of the leisured classes to remain beyond sixteen or eighteen for further study, since the ecclesiastical discipline proves irksome.

The Correspondence sections of Vols.3, 4 and 5 of the 3rd. Series resound with a vigorous debate on the respective qualities of seminary and Protestant education. While letters as such do not necessarily
reflect the views of the Rambler itself, we should notice the letters of one "Derlax" who is none other than Richard Simpson, and who gives himself the opportunity of assuring W.G. Ward that the latter is both overestimating the value of current seminary education and grossly underestimating the quality of the Protestant public school equivalent. Simpson believes that the public schools, Catholic in origin, have retained that essential character. The French seminary, by way of contrast, produces decent men whose actual influence as such is negligible. There is a striking similarity between Simpson's view and that of Wheatcroft in the Contempora...
willingness to grant the superiority of the intellectual teaching in Protestant colleges in Vol.3&4, but such inconsistency at least speaks volumes on the depth of his antagonism.

The siren-like intentions of Protestant foundations are also discussed in Capes's "The Catholic University for Ireland". Trinity College, Dublin is a parlous danger, adept at enmeshing the unsuspecting and beguiled Catholic.

"Trinity College, Dublin, has done infinitely more to destroy the faith of Catholics than all the artillery that ever was fired from the batteries of the forty colleges of Oxford and Cambridge."

Thankfully, says Capes, Catholics are excluded from Oxford and virtually excluded from Cambridge. But Trinity offers its classes and its degrees to us, and is well aware of how to lull us into a false sense of security when our faith is - on the surface - treated with respect.

But the essential point is this: the non-Catholic teacher cannot avoid teaching what is anti-Christian. If you study man, you study religion, whether you name it or not. Nor is the baleful influence of Protestantism restricted to the lecture-hall or tutor's rooms.

Unrestricted intercourse between Catholic and Protestant students is fraught with peril to the souls of the former.

Oxford University is treated to a dose of Capes's fiction. In his story Passion, Love, and Rest: or the Autobiography of Basil Morley, Capes presents a picture of a Catholic who turns Protestant to attend Oxford. Only a Sceptic would make such a decision, and Capes duly provides for that apostate the most terrible of death-bed spiritual agonies. Indeed, the Protestant Morley temporarily sinks into Scepticism through the lack of religious supervision and dogmatic teaching in his university.
By the time of 2nd. Series Vol.267, Catholics have the opportunity to attend Oxford, courtesy of the Oxford University-Act of 1854. Capes is quick to respond. The Catholic must refuse this invitation to a university riddled with free-thinking. In 2nd. Series Vol.3, a review of Oxford Essays in the Short Notices section discusses Pattison's contention that higher education involves pupil and teacher working together in an atmosphere of shared insight: mind to mind, sympathy to sympathy. This is precisely why no Catholic should attend a Protestant university.

The unidentified writer of the article "Oxford and Cambridge" in Vol.269 attacks the universities from a very different standpoint. The problem is not the influence of the tutors, but the complete absence of any guidance or attempt to mould the intellectual or moral nature; the student is left to train himself, with potentially disastrous results.

What of the University of London? Existing Catholic colleges could, of course, prepare for the London exams—an attractive arrangement, in that students would not need to be resident at an institution which carefully excluded religion in its matriculation subjects. Capes, however, casts a distinctly jaundiced eye over the London system. The "Non-Religious Education" article in Vol.470 complains that any education which eschews religion is bound to lack vitality, influence and spirit: even in purely intellectual terms, it is a distinctly inferior article, and certainly no competition for Oxford and Cambridge.

And, in 2nd. Series Vol.271, Capes complains that no university is worthy of the name which exists as a mere examining body, separate from, and independent of, its teaching rôle. A university is a place of
education, and the degree itself is not the substance of that university. Capes makes it quite clear that the new Dublin university will be, unlike London, worthy of its name.

Clearly the Rambler is likely to welcome the prospect of a Catholic University of Ireland. Of course, that welcome might take a number of forms depending on the writer's view of the purpose and scope of the institution. Was it to be a straight rival to the Queen's Colleges for the Catholic Irish? Was it to be an Imperial University on the model of Oxford? Should it offer a professional or a full-scale liberal education? While most Rambler articles on the Catholic University present it as an institution for both Ireland and England, the Capes article "The Catholic University for Ireland" follows the assumption in his title: its raison d'etre lies in the conferring of

"that perfect training of the young mind of Ireland which the necessities of the day so loudly call for."

Indeed, much of the article is spent in delineating the threats peculiar to the young Irish Catholic which do not apply to the more segregated Catholic of England. However, by 1854, and no doubt in response to the dangers of de-segregation posed by the Oxford University Act, Capes is referring to the Catholic University as a source of influence over

"the Catholic youth of the United Kingdom..."

By 1857, Capes's article "The Catholic University: its Difficulties and Prospects" is referring to the criteria whereby the new institution could fulfil its duties as

"a really Catholic University for the British empire."

Capes is very specific. He sees the University as having the noble task of educating the young men of the Catholic upper classes of the United
Kingdom. He is adamant that the university must not be provincial, must not let any antagonism between Celt and Saxon distract it from what it was originally intended to be—a great national institution appealing to all English-speaking Catholics. If the University of Dublin becomes parochial, it will cut its own throat by forcing the English Catholic community to set up its own university, which will, being administered on national principles, appeal even to the Irish gentry who would naturally desire to see their sons find fellowship among equals irrespective of race, rather than suffer them to experience a grossly restricted environment.
Any reviewer discussing the higher education curriculum in the period 1824-75 would be obliged to consider the entrenched position of Classics, even if his intention were to launch a frontal assault on that position. In general, the Rambler makes no such assault. The most forthright advocacy of Classics per se comes in Paley's article "Classical Studies as pursued in the English Universities" for Vol.4. Indeed, Paley advocates the teaching of Classics to the maximum possible extent in the seminaries. The proviso is that the discipline must be taught correctly. A teaching technique based on pure reason seems to play a greater role in the development of the student's mind than the actual material itself. Paley is keen to emphasize, for instance, the value of the lecture system, which has the peculiar advantage of disciplining the mind through requiring of it the joint process of hearing and writing. Moreover, the demands of utter precision in oral translation exercises, which focus on the minutiae of grammar and semantics, are productive of a

"directly beneficial effect on the reasoning powers..."75

Paley is scathing on those whose translation method is to acquire a "general sense" of the passage. The writer gives a fictional and laudatory account of a rigorously grammatical and textual lecture which seems to put a premium as much on the lecturer's capacity for sarcasm as on the students' intellectual progress. This form of translation is also supposed to encourage a love of truth and an increased sense of personal respect. The process by which this consummation is to be achieved is not made clear. In addition, the exercise has a beneficial effect on the students' standard of English.
Paley is not one to decry the benefits of classical composition. The end is not the finished and finely-tuned poem, but the added refinement gained by those obliged to absorb through learning by heart and recitation. This process leads, it seems, to an empathetic response to the mind of the author, which in turn polishes the taste of the suitably-inspired student. Nor is Paley content with the gains so far described. The study of Classics is truly scientific, in that it demands an inductive approach in challenging received authorities and in removing corruptions from original texts. It also helps the understanding of modern scientific terminology. Clearly Paley is out to defend Classics - particularly the study of Greek - against those who argue that such study relies purely upon memory and a nimble wit, and produces students whose pedantry is matched only by their inutility. And, in the end, Paley argues that the sheer difficulty of the study is itself of value: the student is obliged to reflect on the relationship between determined effort and achievement.

In Vol.37, Capes sets the advantages of a liberal education against the narrowness of a merely professional education, which will turn out technological pedants. A sound liberal education must precede the professional to instil a largeness of view and a capacity to influence others. However, it is by no means certain that Capes is equating liberal education with classical study. On the grounds that Capes is, in all probability, the author of the "Catholic College Difficulties" article, it would seem - though the point is not clear - that he considers theology, history, philosophy and science to be the raw material of the best education and therefore the most effective route to the cultivation of reason and judgement. And the article "Non-Religious
Education again probably by Capes - complains that classical study turns out students of language only: what the Church needs is students of men, able to wage a Catholic campaign in the Battle of Life. We need officers who understand the laws of society, says Capes, not linguists who understand only the laws of oratorial practice and Greek metre. The study of history, moral and metaphysical philosophy, poetry, political economy and the laws of space and quantity are the means to understanding man, providing they are studied with religion as the guide. This point is echoed by Capes in his article "The Catholic University for Ireland", where he comments that it is dangerous to study history without a Christian commentary on its moral lessons and implications.

It is apparent that the most wholehearted support of Classics in the Rambler tends to be linked to an acceptance of the value of Protestant university and public school education as a model for Catholic higher education, be it lay or clerical. This is particularly apparent in the Paley article, where the Cambridge system of tuition in general and of private tutor in particular is held up as worthy of imitation. The tutor can offer individual tuition, and thus adapt his approach to the needs of each student - an invaluable practice, and one which the seminary should adopt. In any case, competition between tutors is most salutary, since it leads to increased efficiency.

"If we Catholics are wise, we shall be ready to profit by all that is really excellent in a system which has trained some of the most powerful intellects of our age."
It is significant that the bitter debate in the Correspondence columns of the 3rd. Series should focus on the links between the perceived value of the Protestant educational system for the educated classes and the value of Classics as part of the intellectual training of the priest. This is why Oakeley's letter criticizes Oxenham for praising the Anglican mode of educating a gentleman and then proceeds to dispute the value of a classical education. Oxenham's letter had argued that the rigid supervision of the seminary curbs imagination and stunts intellectual development, whereas the Anglican clergy benefit from the intermingling of laity and ecclesiastics, on which the clergy's future—and very real—moral influence depends. Oxenham had also argued that the Catholic priest should study Greek, which is seen as the most touching, expressive and emotive of languages. It is no coincidence that Greek has been the vehicle for the noblest geniuses of philosophy and poetry. It would, therefore, be a grave loss if the priest's education were restricted to theology. Oakeley responds by denying that moral influence, and feels that the priestly vocation is so precious that it would benefit from separate lay and clerical establishments and does benefit from rigorous surveillance and a prescriptive list of books at the very time when the students are most subject to temptation. As for the Classics themselves, Oakeley feels that a study of modern languages plus Latin would be equally productive of intellectual development, and would prove of greater practical value.

W. G Ward finds Oxenham's argument utterly unacceptable. In two trenchant letters, he complains that providing free access to literature in clerical training is to place things of the earth before things of Heaven. Imagination is more appropriately stimulated by studying the
Life of a Saint than by studying a pagan author. In fact, any in-depth study of Classics is impossible when a seminary education has to be complete by the age of 23. Grammatical mastery of the languages is all that could, or should, be sought. While letters as such cannot be taken as representative of the views of the Rambler itself, it is significant that the Review should be prepared to permit the debate to take place in its columns. It may also be significant that the Rambler does not leave the last word with Ward who, as we know, denied the right of a lay magazine to allow the debate to take place. Richard Simpson is permitted to reinforce once more the connection between the value of the model of Protestant public school education and the necessity to educate the priest in Classics.

It is, perhaps, appropriate to conclude with the words of Capes as a timely reminder of why higher education plays so prominent a part in the Rambler. His article "Catholic College Difficulties" emphasizes the vital importance of the right education for the politically and religiously influential amongst the Catholic community:

"Society is breaking up, and we alone can save it from going to pieces."
The short and troubled career of the *Home and Foreign* did not permit that Review the opportunity to explore in detail the issue of higher education, although evidence exists to show that Simpson and Acton maintained the *Rambler's* keen interest in the subject. The rationale of the *Home and Foreign* - the belief in progress and a desire to emphasize the distinction between the limited scope of dogma and the necessary rights of opinion - was bound to be productive of much thought on higher education. Indeed, Acton's letter of 27 August 1862 explicitly links the new Review's policy to issues of the rights of intellect and the education debate. He remarks to Simpson:—

"Newman's school, the future University (whether our own or at Oxford) and the whole interest of thought and science, are mixed up in our cause."

As for the *Home and Foreign* itself, it holds with the *Rambler* the view that higher education cannot be a mere intellectual process, but that the religious commitment of the teacher is an essential part of the moral training which true education encompasses. This point is made forcibly in Monsell's article "University Education in Ireland" for Vol. 2. Monsell objects to state control of education at any level, since it is powerless to mould the mind and heart. He stresses the English conviction that any state monopoly of education would be intellectually inferior to its free counterpart. The bulk of the article is an attack on Sir Robert Peel and his unwillingness to confer upon the Catholic University the right to grant degrees, together with his grossly unfair advocacy of the godless Queen's Colleges. No Catholic could send a child to such an institution without violating his
conscience. The writer concludes with the comment that he is familiar with the view that Catholicism dwarfs the intellect and enslaves the soul. If so, why are Protestants worried to see Catholics as rivals through the possession of the same educational choices and privileges which they themselves enjoy?
It is essential to appreciate that the Westminster Review does not engage in the frequent and detailed examination of the purposes of a university which Reviews like the Dublin or Rambler felt necessary to the preservation and furtherance of their cause. There are two major themes pursued by the Westminster in its comments on the issue:

1) The importance of a university in training the legislators and statesmen of the future.

2) The importance of a university in training the intellectual elite.

What is, perhaps, surprising is the lack of interest shown by the Review in any opening up of the university system to all social classes. The assumption is that it will remain the preserve of the upper classes.

On the theme of the political importance of appropriate university training, Bisset's article "Life of Pym" in Vol.19 comments that modern universities are simply not fitted to prepare men to become legislators and statesmen. The point is echoed in the article for Vol.27 by Grote and J.S. Mill on Taylor's The Statesman, where the reviewers complain that the English statesmen are totally indifferent to the value of the intellect and the training thereof. Vol.29 holds up Sir F.B. Head - the Governor of Upper Canada - as a distressing example of the typical politician, ignorant of how the past may furnish principles to help us understand the present. Bain's article "English University Education" in Vol.49 emphasizes the practical importance of such education by asserting that society must thereby produce men whose university background would enable them to operate effectively as legislators. The quality of life of their fellow-countrymen would
benefit as a direct result. Indeed, this theme of quality of life resurfaces in New Series Vol. 44, where the article "Catholicism and Philosophy"², prior to discussing the Catholic University, comments that the government promotes learning as a means of improving the comfort and safety of the subject.

In Vol. 25, J. S. Mill's important article "Civilization. Signs of the Times" comments extensively on the value of the university as essentially a training ground for an intellectual elite. Mill argues that the upper classes lack intellectual rigour at the very time when it is vital to influence the masses for their own good before such advice is ignored. Mill's definition of universities is significant: they are bodies whose duty was, and is:–

"to counteract the debilitating influence of the circumstances of the age upon individual character, and to send forth into society a succession of minds, not the creatures of their age, but capable of being its improvers and regenerators."³

After all, Mill regards it as axiomatic that changes in modes of thought are the prerequisite for improvements in the lot of mankind. He is also aware that education per se may foster the tyranny of public opinion—a theme stressed in On Liberty, where education is seen as a provider of common influences and of access to

"the general stock of facts and sentiments."⁴

The "Civilization" article⁵ is therefore keen to emphasize the rôle of the clerisy in providing literature which will carry the tone of authority. The university serves, not so much to pass on those ideas, but more to teach people how to discover truth for themselves. Mill indulges in a lucid panegyric on the virtues of allowing young minds access to a free interchange of ideas with the great minds of all ages.
CURRICULUM

Mill's "Civilization" article discusses the curriculum which he feels can give birth to the intellectual meritocracy which is the ultimate aim of university education. First of all, Mill is not prepared to see Classics and logic displaced by subjects which, superficially, have more relevance to the life of the times, such as physics or modern languages. This is because the aim is not to serve up convenience food to suit the palate of the worldly-wise, but to permit the development of a master of the intellectual cuisine, able to use whatever ingredients are available to create the most nourishing of dishes. In short, universities must teach moral and psychological science. Mill is reasonably specific on the implications of these objectives on the actual curriculum. In the first place, he accords a considerable importance to the study of ancient literature, since such study communicates the thoughts and actions of great minds and their strivings towards noble aspirations. Modern literature is no rival. This point is echoed in the Mill and Grote article where the writers confess to their surprise at the lack of recognition of the value of Classics in this calling. In the "Civilization" article, Mill feels that history has a similar value in that it records great achievements. In familiarising himself with great causes, studying the progression of mankind and accepting the manifold varieties of human nature, the student acquires a

"certain largeness of conception."

In fact, modern literature may be studied within the context of history. However, the latter discipline must not be approached with the puerile expectation of gleaning some political axiom or wisdom from it. The
student must also study logic — the means by which knowledge is cultivated — and the philosophy of mind. The latter is the root by which all sciences grow. Finally, Mill insists on the study, not only of mathematics, which builds up the powers of formal reasoning, but also of the more complex disciplines which involve observation and analysis of man in society: the philosophies of morality, government, law and political economy, which, together with poetry and art, enable man to think for himself. Teach religion by all means, providing you teach it in precisely the same way and with the same anti-sectarian end in mind.

How far do other Westminster reviewers consider Classics as a significant part of the university curriculum? Voices are certainly raised in defence, and voices are certainly raised in attack: and sometimes voices are muted in grudging acceptance or indifference. A review of Allen's *Doctrina Copularum Linguae Latinae* speaks in a tone of regret: Classics has been so poorly served at the universities that its revival is not to be expected. Were we to possess a few more scholars of Allen's calibre, then perhaps the republic of Letters might not be an object of forlorn hope. Nesbitt's article on the Queen's Colleges for New Series Vol.18*oo comments sadly that Ireland's lack of industrial development has led some to conclude that the higher education offered must be utilitarian and anti-Classical. But such education would, it seems, destroy the virtues of a liberal education, which no society can afford to reject: the cultivation of the intellect and the search for truth. Nesbitt justifies his rather assertive line of argument by commenting that those who lack a classical training are not entitled to dispute its value. This does not mean that Nesbitt's curriculum would eschew new subjects; these would be taught alongside
the old. By all means teach specific professional or vocational skills, but these may be dealt with in a truncated course, leaving liberal studies inviolate. Nesbitt attaches particular value to the issue in Ireland, which he, in common with many other commentators of his time, sees as a proving-ground for educational theories and innovations.

A more muted proponent of Classics is Amos, whose notice of Froude's inaugural address at St. Andrews follows Froude in criticizing Lowe in particular for an over-emphasis on doing rather than thinking in the desire to replace the traditional curriculum with modern languages, science and history. Amos feels that over-specialization is itself a danger - and would presumably include in this critique any curriculum dominated by Classics. The goal of the university is to foster a habit of cosmopolitan thought and observation, by means of teaching an interrelationship between the sciences, using logic as the vehicle. Logic, it is argued, is itself dependent on

"another class of sequences bound still more intimately with the nature of man."101

The reader may feel that definition is required here. He is, unfortunately, disappointed.

Classics is also discussed in Carpenter's "The Universities and Scientific Education"102. As the title suggests, Carpenter places by far the greatest importance on the systematic study of science, but is prepared to allow Classics some place within the universities of London, Oxford and Cambridge. However, he feels that Latin should be studied in preference to Greek. Neither the reasons for his choice nor the precise place of Latin within the curriculum is discussed.
Bain's article "English University Education" for Vol. 49 has distinct similarities to that of Carpenter. He, too, considers that science and the modern world in general must take over the larger part of the curriculum from Classics, and is unprepared to enter into a meaningful analysis of the residual status of that discipline. He comments that Classics should not be utterly discarded: it is pleasant to hear Homer in social conversation, and to compare the modern day with the past. We are not, however, to be treated to any further explanation for the consigning of Classics to the dinner-table, and must rest content with Bain's statement that he has
"no intention at present to enter into this particular controversy."

In New Series Vol. 45, the article "Moral Philosophy at Cambridge" effectively damns Classics with faint praise. The writer considers that Oxford-style study of Greek thought is better than nothing as a preparation for philosophy - it does at least create a willingness to engage in the philosophical activity - but that Classics as taught at Cambridge, in its emphasis on linguistic scholarship and accuracy, does not lead to profound thought.

Some articles dismiss completely the value of Classics with a similar paucity of explanation. An article on Brissot for Vol. 14 comments that Oxford and Cambridge remain woefully ignorant of the science of education thanks to an excess of Latin versifying. The Wellesley Index suggests that the author may be Bowring, and indeed the anti-Classics stance is typical of the man. The domination of the gentleman's education by Greek and Latin is condemned in the article "Progress of Art" for Vol. 41, where such domination is seen to lead to an utter
failure on the part of the universities to teach fine art beyond mere copying. Herbert Spencer makes a similar point in his article "Reform: The Dangers and Safeguards" in New Series Vol. 1709. However much university men know about Thucydides, they know proportionately less about social science. This is particularly dangerous, since the influential classes are thereby incapable of appreciating how inappropriate is working-class schooling to the wielding of political power. Indeed, the article "The Scotch Education Settlement of 1872" in New Series Vol. 4209 has no objection to discarding Greek and Latin from their positions as door-wardens to the universities themselves.

More positively, we need to examine what alternatives or supplements to Classics are suggested in the pages of the Westminster. We have already discussed J.S. Mill's admixture of Classics, history, logic and so on under the umbrella of moral and psychological science in his "Civilization" article. The second traditional aspect of the university curriculum - mathematics - receives some attention. In Vol. 1010, Cambridge mathematics is criticized for failing to promote the kind of intellect needed both for future professions and for a knowledge of life itself. Bain's "English University Education" article11, on the other hand, asserts that arithmetic, algebra and geometry are absolutely indispensable to the cultivation of reason. Nevertheless, most of the article is concerned to identify which "modern" subjects should dominate the curriculum. A tripos should be instituted in the physical sciences and in moral and political science. For the physical sciences, the subjects should be physics, chemistry, natural history, animal and vegetable physiology. For the moral sciences, Senate has fixed upon moral philosophy, political economy, history, jurisprudence and English
law. Bain feels that it is important that logic and psychology are included in moral philosophy, since logic already has a firmly established scientific rationale, and society as a whole desperately needs able proponents. The inclusion of history is seen as acceptable, provided that a fully scientific methodology can be developed.

The Carpenter article "The Universities and Scientific Education" predictably argues that science has been undervalued by the universities for far too long, and agrees with Huxley that science, as trained and organised commonsense, is essential for fitting the individual for the business of life. As such, it must be given primacy of place over literature.
Several reviewers discuss techniques of teaching in higher education, although it is fair to say that most stay only to denigrate existing practice. Symptomatic of the latter is T.J. Hogg's article on public libraries for Vol.8, which describes Oxford in the following terms:

"how little she teaches, and how much she prevents from being taught..."

Oxford is again the subject of complaint in Vol.10, where its teaching is supposed to promote display rather than learning. Students learn by their own efforts and ingenuity at penetrating one of the heavily-guarded shrines known as an Oxford library. Sarcasm is also a feature of the comments of Grant in the Miscellaneous Notices section of Vol.39. A Cambridge B.A. is attempting to delineate the faults of his alma mater: what a waste of time, says Grant. Our B.A. should have contented himself with the usual port-flavoured husk of learning which his university serves up. How could he think of indulging in

"the pestilent habit of making use of his own understanding."

For a more specific criticism, we must seek out the article in Vol.5 "Lardner's Differential and Integral Calculus". Analytical science is a vital tool of study; the student must be fully trained in its use. But Cambridge in particular provides far too much pre-digested material. In terms of sheer intellectual ability, Cambridge students of today lag behind their predecessors of fifteen years ago.

If the Westminster Review spends little time on meaningful analysis of teaching technique, the same criticism cannot be levelled at the frequency with which the Review discusses the issue of clerical
involvement in the universities and the demand for subscription to university tests. No writer is prepared to defend the validity of such tests. The nearest the Westminster gets to defending the interests of the Established Church is when T.J. Hogg, in Vol.15117, accepts that compulsory attendance at chapel is good for discipline. But clerical control is another matter. The only thing more mischievous than a spiritual court, says Hogg, is a spiritual university. On the other hand, Joyce's article "College Life at Cambridge" for Vol.35119 complains that the obligatory attendance at chapel in Oxford has an adverse religious effect.

Total opposition to subscription is expressed in an article for Vol.24 on German Universities119. The reviewer hopes for the appointment of a Minister of Public Instruction, whose rôle would include the elimination of "sectarian" tests. Harwood's article for Vol.38 - "Subscription. The Thirty-nine Articles"120 - takes a similar viewpoint. The removal of the test would lead to the improved moral and intellectual character of the Anglican Church. This is because the compulsory article system, of its very nature, saps moral rigour.

The dislike of subscription is linked in a number of major articles to the advantages of free inquiry. It is interesting to compare the Westminster's positive attitude towards the Queen's Colleges to the antagonism expressed by the Dublin Review and the Rambler. Indeed, assumptions and attitudes as evidenced by the Westminster may explain some of the antipathy of the Catholic Reviews. The Westminster sees the virtue of the Colleges as a reflection of their capacity to curb the obscurantism and clerical domination associated with the Roman Catholic
Church. The Colleges will, in fact, promote freedom of intellect. Indeed, an article for New Series Vol.44 - "Catholicism and Philosophy" - comments that if the Catholics wish to set up their own university, let them do so by all means. But they must not expect assistance from the public purse, which might be called upon only if the proposed institution were in keeping with the national will. The national will, however, dictates that a university cannot, by definition, teach religion.

It is Mill's "Civilization" article in Vol.25 which makes the clearest statement on the link between the need to discard dogmatism in higher education and a precise curriculum. Indeed, the efficacy of Mill's proposals rests on the preliminary rooting out of the domination of the curriculum by creed and its replacement by the teacher's willingness to know and state conflicting arguments. Mill's later article for New Series Vol.2 on Whewell makes his point very clearly:

"in the English universities no thought can find place, except that which can reconcile itself with orthodoxy. They are ecclesiastical institutions...Men will some day open their eyes, and perceive how fatal a thing it is that the instruction of those who are intended to be the guides and governors of mankind should be confided to a collection of persons thus pledged."

On the other hand, an article by Froude in the same volume on the 1852 report of the Commissioners on Oxford and Cambridge is more hopeful. Froude does see a movement developing in Oxford towards inclusion rather than exclusion, and against the theological basis of the educational system.

Several articles consider the administration of Oxford and Cambridge. The common theme is an antagonism towards the collegiate system, which is seen as anachronistic, inefficient and a bastion of social elitism.
The "German Universities" article for Vol. 241 would deprive colleges and professors, for that matter - of powers of patronage, would open collegiate libraries to all students and the public at large and make sure that university funding does not end up in college hands. The article "Cambridge University Reform" in New Series Vol. 7 insists that the collegiate system be brought firmly under the control of the university itself.
As with the Westminster Review, the Fortnightly does not consider the issue of higher education of sufficient moment to justify frequent discussion. This attitude is particularly apparent when we compare the brevity and infrequency of the treatment of this theme with the considerable attention given to education at school level.

Certainly the two radical Reviews share a common approach to most issues. Amberley's article for New Series Vol. 1 ("The Church of England as a Religious Body") posits a form of university-trained and based clerisy which is not dissimilar to the ideas of Mill, although the link made by the former between that clerisy and a National Church is a concept unlikely to meet with Mill's approval. The universities should therefore provide the opportunity, not only for training of national priests as such, but also for church officers in general to devote some time to the study of philosophy. This National Church, genuinely seeking and benefiting from diversity of opinion amongst its priests, is to aim at the instruction, improvement and civilising of the people. A religious sceptic would certainly not be debarred from this rôle, as Scepticism itself may well be the response of a religious spirit which accepts its responsibility to seek the truth. Unity of teaching is appropriate only when a definite body of facts has been established by reason and observation. Since some matters of physical science and many matters of philosophy, politics and theology lack this certainty, it is morally wrong to impose a set of beliefs herein.

In New Series Vol. 14, Emily Shirreff's article "Girton College" also
gives the university a central rôle in the civilising of the populace. University education is seen as spreading a leaven of nobility through society. Since women have the responsibility for influencing the young, it is essential that they too have the opportunity to be themselves influenced by university life and study.

The Fortnightly rarely discusses more specific aims for higher education. The article "Shall we continue to Teach Latin and Greek ?" in New Series Vol.3 is mainly interested in discussing the curriculum in schools, but does comment briefly that the purpose of higher education lies in teaching nascent philosophers to think. Philosophy is defined as the

"scientific study of man, society, and the conditions of knowledge..." 129

A more immediately practical purpose for the university is specified in New Series Vol.2. The "Public Affairs" section 130 argues that young men destined for the professions or commerce would benefit from some unspecified, but brief, acquaintance with Oxford or Cambridge, where the intellectual faculties could be honed. However, the most important result would be to equip such men for the task of guiding the mass electorate to come.
The lack of interest in the university per se is reflected in the absence of articles on the higher education curriculum. The article "Shall we continue to Teach Latin and Greek?" contains a rather brief discussion of the value of Classics at that level, but makes no reference to alternatives. Classics is vital in the study of philosophy, since the student may examine ancient philosophy without the problems of topicality and the partisanship thus awakened.

Not surprisingly, the *Fortnightly Review* shares with the *Westminster* a detestation of the religious test. The article "Religious Tests, and the Nationalising of the Universities" in New Series Vol.52 demands the removal of all tests on fellowships: there would be an immediate gain in the quality of intellectual life. In any case, adds Herbert Richards in New Series Vol.183, the manipulation of fellowships by the Church is innately immoral, since it may well put a candidate under the moral strain of subscription to a system of dogma he cannot accept.

The Review tends to equate subscription with bigotry, and Ireland with both. Max Cullinan's article for New Series Vol.8 on Trinity College, Dublin is severely critical of that institution, and demands a non-sectarian university to give a bigoted country the gift of freedom of thought. The *Fortnightly* gives J.P. Mahaffy the chance to deny all Cullinan's charges. The Review adopts a similar stance to that of the *Westminster* on the question of the Catholic university. The State should grant no monies or charter to such an establishment: what Ireland needs is a university on the model of London.
The Christian Remembrancer

The Purpose, Value and Limitations of Higher Education

The Christian Remembrancer regards the universities of Oxford and Cambridge as the foremost training grounds for the priests of the Church of England. This is the primary function of the two seats of learning, and the Church expects them to speak with its voice. The Review has little interest in discussing the universities outside this essential rôle. Indeed, the article "The English Universities" identifies them with the Remembrancer's own brand of Anglo-Catholicism:

"They are the scientific organs of the National Catholic Church." 1345

As places of learning, they are to root all disciplines in God Himself. In the article "Theological Education at Cambridge", that university is seen as the first line of defence against the looming danger of German Rationalism and Pantheism. The writer also discusses the respective rôles of the universities and the diocesan training colleges, like Wells. A precise delineation of functions and responsibilities is studiously avoided, but the reviewer is keen to remind the university of its practical responsibilities to train clergymen, lest that task be left entirely to the diocesan colleges. He adds:

"the university would strangely abandon her duty, and descend from her high station, if she should ever cease to offer the best possible theological instruction to the many who will always seek it from her." 1397

However, the author of the article "Education for Holy Orders" 1359, in his concern over the shortage of candidates for ordination, does not hesitate to criticize the universities. The argument is that they have lost sight of the need to form character in preparation for the ministerial vocation. The study of ecclesiastical history, divinity and
pastoral theology are all very well in their way, but they do not, of
themselves, cultivate self-sacrifice and the potential for holiness.
Ministering to one's flock bears little resemblance to the luxuries
which form a seemingly compulsory part of university life. There are
also dangers in a proposal to demand a further year's study from
candidates for Orders. Apart from that obligatory extra year of
pernicious extravagance, this system would drag back to the lecture hall
those who are keen to leave pupillage behind them. While the reviewer
wishes to be polite to the quality of training provided by the diocesan
colleges, he is reluctant to accord the same status to a minister
trained at such colleges as he would to a university man. He accepts
that the Church does need numbers of priests, and quickly: if they can
be obtained outside the universities, then so be it. Such non-university
clergy might prove useful for the lesser duties of the ministry.
However, the reviewer then proceeds to declare his belief in certain
advantages offered by diocesan-based training over and above that
offered by the university. The Bishop, for example, gains an intimate
knowledge of the personalities and abilities of his future ministers,
and is able to marry patronage with cleric. Diocesan colleges are
cheaper, provide an appropriate and ecclesiastical environment and allow
for the formation of fellowship amongst clerical brethren. Most
importantly, they form the character in a manner which the university
cannot rival. Doubtless the universities offer a good general education
in the Classics and the like, but the diocesan colleges are peculiarly
adept at providing professional training. The main point is that the
colleges are seen as complementary to the universities, rather than as
rivals. They will provide the professional training after the university
has provided the education of a gentleman. The reader is to be forgiven if he feels somewhat confused after perusing this article. On the one hand, the reviewer is adamant that the university need not feel threatened by the colleges, and, on the other, he comments that the universities of Oxford and Cambridge should see themselves as the diocesan training colleges for Oxford and Ely - having just explained how and why the university is not equipped to fulfil that function. The writer attempts to explain away this contradiction by suggesting that some sort of "voluntary" theological study might be offered by the university, and then involves himself in further contradiction by suggesting that a healthy rivalry might thus develop between the universities and the diocesan colleges.

In the article "The Education of the Clergy: its Condition and Prospects" in New Series Vol. 29, the reviewer considers further the issue of the relationship between university and diocesan college. It is accepted that the former leaves incomplete the education for Holy Orders. Academic lectures do not true education make. Nor does compulsory attendance at some lectures constitute moral training. The charismatic professor might well prove to be an incompetent nursemaid for the future cleric. One possible improvement would be for the college tutor to be specifically entrusted with the training of character, but even then it would be advantageous to supplement the university years with the quieter, gentler but firmer discipline of the diocesan college. This article is, however, certainly not intended to play down the value of the university to the Church. Instead, the writer would free professors to handle the highest theological controversies, rather than leave the field to the Chevalier Bunsen. It is therefore hardly
surprising when the Review demonstrates an antipathy towards the possibility of replacing clerical with lay fellowships at the universities. The article "Clerical and Lay Fellowships" in New Series Vol.30 considers that any such move would maim the colleges and weaken the Church. On the other hand, the article "Father Félix and his Conferences at Notre-Dame" comments that current deficiencies in theological science are remedied, not so much by the universities, as by the diocesan colleges.

The sense of intellectual crisis does lead the *Christian Remembrancer* to see Oxford in particular as the last bastion holding Britain free from the descent into Latitudinarianism. The theological atmosphere of the universities represents the "last stronghold of old, genuine religious thought and feeling..." No wonder that the Review is deeply suspicious of reported government interference in theological appointments at Oxford, which it sees as the first step towards German-style state control.
The *Christian Remembrancer* upholds theology as the Queen of Sciences, and is keen to preserve intact the traditional university curriculum, with, in some instances, a judicious but by no means overpowering admixture of more "modern" subjects. In the article "The English Universities"¹⁴³, theology is considered to be the mother of art - literature, poetry and philosophy. According to the "Education for Holy Orders" article¹⁴⁴, her most important children are Classics, mathematics and philosophy. This view is echoed in the notice of a work by Laing¹⁴⁵, in which the reviewer accepts that, while it is necessary to supplement existing English university professorships with the sort of subjects - like geology and modern languages - which suit modern society, Classics and mathematics should ever remain the bedrock of the system. This is because they prevent the deluge of subjects which would overwhelm the student, at the same time as building up the mental powers. In short, they permit the acquisition of rapid learning techniques upon which the future career of the student will depend.

In New Series Vol. 40, the article "Oxford - its Constitutional and Educational Changes" maintains a firm acceptance of the primacy of Classics. However, Classics is here defined as a discipline which includes not only literature, but also history and philosophy. The writer does not hesitate to sing praises :-

"Training in Classics is the best training that can be had, and the classical models are the best models that can be had."¹⁴⁶

This is why we must guard against imposing modern views on classical authors. Grote, in his *History of Greece*, is seen as a prime perpetrator of this kind of anachronism. Of course, our reviewer is not
arguing that Classics should be taught in virtuous isolation. He feels that the current approach is best: let Classics lead out in the dance, but let other subjects at least carry her train. He approves of the compromise which would admit to the university the disciplines of mathematics, natural science, law and modern history. Hamilton's argument on the superiority of Classics to mathematics in intellectual training is accepted. Mathematics supposedly trains only a few of our faculties, and those in a partial manner. However, the article "Arago's Astronomy and Herschel's Outlines" in New Series Vol.32 is keen to point out the virtue of mathematics at university. Providing such education included algebra and geometry, the trained mathematician, used to analytical investigation, is actually far better equipped to take on mechanical theory from scratch than those whose experience is based upon the standard popular treatise.
The *Christian Remembrancer* does not value independent thought for its own sake. As an article on theology at Cambridge suggests, the university student should have a thoughtful but submissive cast of mind, which will keep him clear of the dangers of seeking scriptural justification for his own pet theories. It is part of the virtue of the English university that it speaks with authority. Better that than attempt to rival German universities merely on the basis of research and scholarship. The article "The New Divinity Statute" accepts the right of the English university to

"tell men what is true, and what is not."^149

The German university in effect creates its own truth, whereas Oxford and Cambridge receive the genuine article courtesy of tradition. This is why the article "Whewell on Morality" in New Series Vol.10 comments that it is important for authority to

"inculcate directly those moral truths on which its dominion is ultimately founded."^150

Having said this, it is unacceptable, according to an article on Allies's *Journal in France*^151, to remove completely the responsibility of the student himself for his own education. The excessive "drill" of the seminary of S.Sulpice is duly condemned. The lack of intellectual rigour at such institutions will reduce the influence of its graduates over the educated classes. This article may seek to criticize Roman Catholic intellectual life from a number of angles, but we should nonetheless remark on the similarity of approach to higher education when the *Remembrancer* is compared to, say, the *Dublin Review*. The importance attached to higher education as a weapon of authority is a characteristic of both Reviews.
While we might expect the Prospective to show little or no interest in the universities of Oxford and Cambridge - since many of its reviewers would be excluded from those institutions, and so would lack the interest based on personal experience and nostalgia - we might anticipate an interest, either in the University of London, or in the value of the ideal university. The correspondence of James Martineau, for one, demonstrates the ardour with which those connected with the Unitarian body debated the pros and cons of the transfer of Manchester New College to London and its prospective links with the university.  

Nor should we forget Martineau's own candidature for the Chair of Philosophy of Mind and Logic at University College. His Biographical Memoranda reveal the extent to which he saw his rejection as an issue of major principle. And yet, how infrequently does the Prospective Review discuss the value of a higher education which clearly exercised the minds of its editors outside the pages of their periodical.

Indeed, it is left to Walter Bagehot to discuss the 1852 Royal Commissioners' report on the University of Oxford and to comment on the purpose of a university. In Bagehot's view, a university is to train those of appropriate potential for the intellectual life. This is in turn defined as a training in sobriety and in the means whereby the arguments of the ill-educated may be exploded. Bagehot clearly feels ill-at-ease with the kind of claims put forward for the university by J.H. Newman, and is correspondingly dismissive of the latter.
The higher education curriculum receives scant attention from the Prospective Review. A review of Dewar's *German Protestantism, and the right of Private Judgement in the Interpretation of Holy Scripture* concludes with an attack on the universities of Oxford and Cambridge for their obsession with Classics and failure to match the German universities in the study of theology. Although it is not clearly stated, it is apparent that the reviewer sees a link between the university curriculum and one major purpose of university education: to combat errors derived from the extremes of an otherwise healthy spirit of Rationalism. The unfavourable comparison between Oxford and German theology is echoed in the article "Bruno Bauer and the Universities of Prussia" (Vol. 2), where Oxford theologians are described as sleek men, rewarded for a lifetime's refusal to think.

Tayler's article "Maury, on the Spiritual Legends of the Middle Ages" considers Classics in some detail. What he has to say is not restricted to the level of higher education as such, but the relevance is clear. Tayler is prepared to grant that Classics certainly played its part in releasing the human mind from intellectual bondage to scholastic subtleties and priestcraft, and prepared to grant that it has formed, and will continue to form, the general culture of Europe. He is not prepared to grant that it should maintain its present predominance in education: instead, it should

"henceforward leave ampler room for pursuits more nearly related to the present wants of society...."  

Tayler is keen to disassociate himself from the Utilitarian who would discard ancient literature from a liberal education simply because it is
ancient. Tayler argues instead that the more we become enmeshed in the concerns of practical science, the more we should recognize the need to recall the ways in which our own morality developed. This enables us to assess scientific developments. What this does not require is an obsessive grind through Latin language and literature - the past in its entirety must be the subject of analysis. We do indeed require the disciplining of our minds, but this need not be exclusively the task of Classics, and can be pursued through

"another medium of expression than that which is habitually employed by the student..."\textsuperscript{166}

Perhaps Tayler has in mind the expression of the \textit{Prospective Review}.

In Vol. 5, F.W. Newman's article "University Reform"\textsuperscript{167} prefers Oxford-style Classics to Cambridge mathematics as the basis of the curriculum, but complains that both systems are too exclusive. At least Cambridge is making the first tentative steps towards a vital expansion in its fields of study. More specifically, the problem with mathematics at Cambridge is that it is treated as the only gateway to Academe. The study of Classics too often includes minute study of worthless authors. At its best, providing it includes poetry, history and philosophy, Classics does exercise many powers of mind, and in this is certainly preferable to mathematics. But it fails to satisfy intellectually the most able, as there is much repetition of material, which may well have been covered in a decent Public School.
Once again, the Prospective conspires to disappoint our expectations. Apart from a rather off-hand and axiomatic dismissal of the university test in Bagehot's article in Vol. 8, only Newman's "University Reform" article makes anything resembling the onslaught one might expect on forms of subscription. He remarks that Dissenters, hastening to set up their own colleges, have neglected to point out the absolute evil of Tests, which have encouraged the desertions to Rome.

There is similarly an absence of discussion of different systems of education. No attempt is made to compare the Oxford College system with that of the University of London. Symptomatic of the Prospective's attitude is a review in Vol. 1 in the Notices of New Publications section which proves to be on German university education. We anticipate an informative review - particularly when we bear in mind the Prospective's views on the superiority of German theology over its English counterpart. But the notice is marked by such brevity and imprecise criticism that it is open to question whether the reviewer bothered to read the work at all.

One possible explanation for the scanty treatment of higher education in the Prospective is suggested by a comment in Newman's Vol. 5 article. Universities, he feels, cannot fundamentally change: their constitutions prevent it. And a tone of exasperation pervades Wicksteed's article "Dr. Tait's Oxford Sermons" in Vol. 2. He concludes:

"A good rough wind from Germany will do a world of benefit in the Halls and Colleges of Oxford..."
The Contemporary Review

The Purpose, Value and Limitations of Higher Education

The Contemporary Review devotes most interest to education below the higher level. Remarks on the purpose of higher education are no more than remarks: brief and generally assertive. Nor do they permit us to detect much by way of a common theme. In Vol. 1, for instance, the article "University Reform in Relation to Theological Study" is responding to the fall in candidates for ordination (a term the reviewer would clearly prefer to the Christian Remembrancer's "Holy Orders"). The writer, Reichel, finds this situation disturbing. It is the task of the clergy to lead the people, and for this purpose the clergy themselves must be highly educated to maintain their status in response to the increasing cultivation of their flocks. The lack of educated clerics has led to a failure to meet the challenge of works such as Essays and Reviews, or Colenso on the Pentateuch. It also explains the tone of the Christian Remembrancer, which seems unaware of the existence of the Eastern Church when discussing the so-called "Seamless Robe" of the Church. On the other hand, Gregory Smith, in his Vol. 9 article "Lowe and Huxley on the Classics", accepts without demur the idea that the distinctively religious character of the universities is increasingly outmoded.

The Gregory Smith article stresses that education at all levels is the vital tool for ensuring that the transfer of political power to the currently unfranchised is successfully achieved. The article "High Life Below Stairs" in Vol. 22 also considers the political implications of university education, but in so doing makes a suggestion conspicuous by
its absence from other Reviews: that some provision ought to be made for the working-class child to rise through the endowed school into the university itself. Money to pay for cramming should not be the sole key to university life. Similarly, some exhibition scholarships should be made available to the sons of the poorer gentry or professional classes who would not care for their children to associate with parish school children. This last point suggests that the writer, Littledale, is not dismissing class distinctions or advocating the university as a breeding ground for a simple intellectual meritocracy. Indeed, the main thrust of his argument stresses the need to extend the advantages of culture to all classes, rather than to eradicate class divisions through education.

An article by W.E. Jelf in Vol.3 - "Home and School Education" suggests rather an unusual social purpose for university education: to give the student sufficient self-confidence to eradicate self-doubt and thus enable him to take up any calling without worry over loss of caste. The assumption here is, of course, that the university remains the preserve of those classes who could lose caste.

What is absent from the Contemporary is any major criticism or questioning of the existing higher education system in terms of its purpose or value. The article "The Universities and the Nation" in Vol.26 is a case in point. This writer, Brodrick, would like to see university colleges foster more scientific training for the professions, but is keen to remind his readers of the great debt we owe to Oxford and Cambridge for services rendered. It is significant that he does not choose to include London within his encomium.
CURRICULUM

In keeping with the theological interests of the Review under Alford, early discussion of the curriculum in higher education centres on theology. In Reichel's article for Vol.170, the current standard of university teaching in theology is assailed as pathetic, brief and undemanding. The exact cause for complaint is not specified, but it seems that Classics is as much a victim as theology: indeed, the two are clearly linked through philology. The current Irish obsession with mathematics does not help matters. And in Vol.2, the article "University Education in Ireland" places the continued teaching of theology as a vital weapon in the fight against the ultra-liberals, whose free-thinking and desire to banish God from the university results in the sadness and despair which assails the man of feeling forced to rely on mere intellect. The writer sympathizes with those at Trinity College, Dublin and the Catholic University of Ireland who fight to maintain the place of religion and theology. It is significant that the writer accepts that the teaching at Trinity would subtly undermine the faith of the Catholic student - a mark, presumably, of the impact such study possesses.

In Vol.19, Littledale's article "The Secular Studies of the Clergy" takes a very practical stance on the necessary education for a parish priest. He needs a racy, idiomatic English style, produced by a detailed acquaintance, not with Latin tags, but with English literature. Some form of legal training would help him arbitrate in local quarrels, and political economy will both make him informed about his parishioners' interests and also warn him against the dangers of indiscriminate charity.
No mention of the curriculum is complete without consideration of the considerable space given to St. John Tyrwhitt's enthusiastic advocacy of the value of the fine arts. In Vol.3\textsuperscript{172}, Tyrwhitt argues for the establishment of a National School of Art, not only to provide a focal point for the training of the painter in his profession, but also to enable all society to gain some education in form and colour. More immediately relevant to higher education as such is the same writer's article "An Oxford Art-Scheme"\textsuperscript{174}, where he envisions a vital rôle for that university in the encouragement of art and the improvement of the status of the artist. Specifically, he would like to see the creation of a School of Historical Art and formal links established between this School and the Schools of Modern History to permit classmen in those Schools to take examinations in art. History, in particular, has intimate links with art, in that the historian must be aware, for example, of the historical value of the portrait. We must, however, stress that Tyrwhitt's vision of art education at the university is not exclusive or elitist: the aim is to use Oxford as a centre from which provincial initiatives to provide public art could draw their inspiration and personnel. The artisan's increased knowledge would have an impact both aesthetic and economic.

The \textit{Contemporary} is interested in the subject of Classics, but articles on this discipline concentrate mainly on the school curriculum. Conington's article "A Liberal Education" for Vol.7\textsuperscript{175} provides a reasoned defence of Classics without any reference to study beyond sixteen. We may assume that he would wish Classics to remain the bedrock of university study, but can offer no proof for our contention. Indeed, the one article which discusses the rôle of Classics wishes to place
modern literatures and history as an alternative and parallel course alongside the Cambridge Classical tripos and the final Classics examination at Oxford. Mozley's "Modern Literatures" in Vol. 1 argues that a combined modern literature and history course would demand a salutary width of knowledge and free play of mind greater than that demanded by Classics.

A full-scale advocacy of the merits of physical science as the mainstay of a university curriculum has to wait until Huxley's inaugural address as Lord Rector of Aberdeen is printed in Vol. 23. Huxley, of course, substitutes his word "science" for Mill's word "culture" as he quotes the latter's inaugural speech at St. Andrews:—

"'In cultivating, therefore, science as an essential ingredient in education, we are all the while laying an admirable foundation for ethical and philosophical culture.'"

It is, perhaps, difficult to imagine the Huxley article appearing under the editorship of Alford.
Discussion of the organisation of education at this level is limited. We can, however, detect a line antagonistic towards residual clerical control of the universities. This attitude is apparent in a notice of a work by Goldwin Smith, where the reviewer follows Smith in objecting to the visitatorial authority of ecclesiastics, whose competence or interest in the colleges under scrutiny must be open to question. The attitude of the reviewer to the imposition of religious tests is not easy to establish. He does, however, comment that the universities are first and foremost national institutions: the influence of the Church over them is legitimate only so far as it retains a hold on the conscience of the nation. Denominational higher education is attacked in the brief educational section of "Notes from Ireland" in Vol.1, where the writer opposes the setting-up of any Roman Catholic college at the Queen's University, since the mixed-education system is a good in itself, and must be defended.

There is certainly no sense in which the Contemporary Review objects violently to the status quo in higher education. Rather grudgingly, Markby's "University Extension" article for Vol.6 accepts that London University has indeed many excellences, but these are insufficient to suggest to us that the tried and tested ways of Oxford and Cambridge are to be deserted. There are no advantages to be found in making students independent of the traditional model of college life. In fact, the German system is criticized by its own practitioners for its laxity. We are to accept, in fact, that Cambridge in particular is as good as is possible.
The Dublin Review

The Purpose, Value and Limitations of Elementary and Secondary Education

The Dublin Review is never prepared to take for granted the value of formal intellectual education. If most articles on the subject are willing to accept and describe certain values therein, then some remain apprehensive of overestimating the importance of a fashionable shibboleth. Several articles reject utterly the axiom that purely intellectual education is moral per se. In Vol. 811, Steinmetz asserts that real progress depends on morality, which in turn depends on religion. A similar point is made by Formby in his article "Malou on the Indiscriminate Reading of the Bible" for Vol. 23. The argument is that the three "R"s are no panacea for the moral and mental maladies of the Age - they do not even amount to education. Formby quotes the Bishop of Limerick on the fundamental purpose of life: -

"'a man may go to heaven who does not know his alphabet.'"[102]

But is time spent learning the alphabet wasted or dangerous? Some writers are at least wary of the potential implication of the study of secular subjects, seeing in it a movement towards Scepticism. Discussing Mayhew's The Industry of the Poor,[93], Wiseman comments that the study of science can lead to arrogance and Scepticism. Moreover, it is fatuous to assume, not only that mechanics and labourers can cope with mathematics and chemistry after a day's hard labour, but also that formal education can overcome moral and physical degradation. Significantly, Wiseman holds up religious observance as the key to the chastity of illiterate Catholic coster-girls.
Similarly, a review of *Thorndale* in Vol. 44 comments that the author is dangerously wrong in seeing intellectual progress as the vehicle for the final subjugation of passion. Knowledge simply entices passion to seek gratification in more sophisticated and more deadly indulgence. More precise reference to elementary education occurs in the notice of *Education in Itself and in its Relation to Present*. The reviewer accepts that intellectual education has a value in training men to analyse their religious convictions, but disputes that such education could, or should, form a leading part of the education of the Catholic poor. A little learning is dangerous, because it has the tendency to inspire ignorant arrogance, which needs must sully the purity of faith. It is all too easy - and exhilarating - to sneer at Revelation with a garbled smattering of physical science. The reviewer does not see more education as the answer, but advocates a restriction of elementary education in the intellectual sense to the three "R"s, manual training and housewifery, and an expansion of such education in the field of moral training. Indeed, we recall Formby's reference to the words of the Bishop of Limerick, who prefaced his remarks on the alphabet with the view that teaching without training might prove useless and harmful. Further episcopal comments are a feature of Vaughan's article on Bruce's education bill, where the words of a Mr Fox, quoted approvingly by the Protestant Bishop of Tennessee, are given a further airing:—

"'Of what use is it to a commonwealth that its rogues should know how to read, write, and cipher? Those acquirements are only so many master keys...to break into the sanctuary of human society.'**19**

Why one should need to break in when possessing a key is not made clear.

In New Series Vol. 15, an article on Protestant London considers
further the potential political implications of granting intellectual education without religious training. Quite simply, it could lead to the development of a revolutionary class. On a similar theme, the consistent view of the Dublin Review is that education should not be used for social mobility, but to reflect and contribute towards a sense of station. The lower classes, says Wyse in Vol. 2193, must be taught to venerate the alphabet and the plough. And in Vol. 45, an article on industrial education190 is concerned that industrial schools do not equip girls for their station, but raise them too high, both intellectually and morally. The possibility of an excess of morality is surprising.

The Dublin's tone is generally apprehensive when faced with the prospect of a widening franchise. Wyse191, for one, is insistent that intellectual education should include some element of political training for the appropriate use of the vote. Of course, as Symons points out in Vol. 14192, the security and peace of society depend upon an education which is at once religious and general: such an education may also lead to an amelioration of the labourer's physical condition.

It is important to establish the Dublin's view of the interrelationship between moral and intellectual education. Not surprisingly, it is generally accepted that, whereas intellectual study can and does take place without moral advantage, moral improvement can and does take place without the involvement of the intellect at all. The review of Education in Itself and in its Relation to Present Wants provides convenient definitions of moral and intellectual education. The former is seen as the training of the soul to contemplate and love God, and, through Him,
to love one's fellow men. For the Catholic, this would also mean the practice and appropriate reception of the sacraments. Intellectual education, we recall, is training in the analysis of one's convictions. There are two significant points to be made here. Firstly, it is apparent that religion is to form the basis of both aspects of education. Secondly, there is no doubting that pride of place is granted to moral education. Purely intellectual men are often found wanting in morals, since their intellectualism may be no more than the capacity to apply knowledge to any subject. Moral training, in fact, may take place without any corresponding training of the intellect. This is not to deny that the intellect may serve the Church, on the assumption that

"moral education may be supreme over intellectual..."193

Clearly a link is to be noted here with the Review's fear of higher education taking place unless the intellect is held in check by an institution's Catholic atmosphere.

Article after article stresses both the relationship between progress and moral training and the necessary subservience of intellectual to moral advance. And moral advance is, of course, itself a product of the religious spirit. A review of Heinroth's On Education and Self-formation194 compliments the author for his correct view of the purpose of education, where religion is seen as the main spring of character. Virtually identical remarks are made in a similarly approving review of Boreau's Cours méthodique et complet d'Instruction in Vol.6195. And we can rely on W.G. Ward for a firm statement of this prime object of education. In his article on The Lamp of the Sanctuary, A Catholic Story, he comments on the paramount need to imbue

"the whole of man's nature with the religious principle!"196
But need this be done by formal education at all? In the same volume as
the Symons' article, which sees schools as the most important weapon
against moral degradation, the McMahon review of Laing's Travels
implicitly devalues such education in remarks which are taken from Laing
himself, and which are heartily endorsed by the reviewer. It is asserted
that more moral education can be communicated by one glance from a
mother than in an entire course of reading and writing—where,
presumably, the glances of teachers are peculiarly ineffectual.
This may, of course, despite its extreme tone, be taken as an example of
the familiar Dublin stance on intellectual education. But a further
comment stops the reader dead in his tracks. It seems that an experience
of the workings of the law will provide a course of intellectual and
moral education, in comparison with which all schools for the people and
national systems of education

"sink into insignificance..."

This must be seen as an idiosyncratic and atypical article, rather than
one which takes general Dublin attitudes to their logical conclusions.
James Burton Robertson's comment on the subject of French convents
may be taken as more genuinely representative of the Review's belief in
the importance of moral education conducted within an educational
institution. Robertson attributes to the domestic influence of convent-
educated women the saving of middle-class religious life in France.

Consistency is very much a feature of the Dublin Review. Its message is
straightforward: that religious education is the essence of morality,
and that morality is the essence of schooling. The intellect is to take
very much a secondary rôle. If formal education is indeed a vital tool
for progress, then the Review also feels called upon to remind us that
progress itself is limited by Original Sin. As Murphy puts it in his article on Channing for Vol. 25:

"Great, indeed, is man's capacity for improvement....But we know and believe that a primeval malediction has denounced woe upon the abodes wherein he dwells..."200

This element, together with the fear of Scepticism in philosophy, combine to bring the wrath of W.G. Ward down upon the heads of the liberal Catholics for failing to realize that intellectual culture needs

"concomitant moral training to prevent it from being a grave calamity."201
Since the educational interests of the *Dublin Review* lie in other areas, we do not expect to see a great deal of attention bestowed upon the elementary school's secular curriculum. Such is indeed the case. Moral and higher education predominate, and the *Dublin*’s philosophy of knowledge of course stresses the dominant rôle of authority and self-evident truths over mere intellect. It is also the case that the limited discussion of curriculum in elementary and secondary education is often given over to the debate on the value of Classics in schools for the upper and middling classes.

However, a number of articles do devote some attention to the theme of "useful knowledge". In Vol.10, Quin’s article on agricultural improvement in Ireland speaks of the great blessing of such knowledge, and M’Gauley in Vol.13 praises the study of chemistry, the general cultivation of which

"cannot but be attended with the best and the happiest results." Similarly, Johnson’s article on scientific farming for Vol.15 quotes with approval Paris’s *Life of Davy*, where criticism is levelled at the ignorance of useful science caused by the excessive classicism of the public schools. On the other hand, Ward is keen to point out in Vol.20 that useful knowledge is simple idolatry unless it is purely vocational.

The debate on useful knowledge spills over into the debate on the value of Classics. Wyse’s article in Vol.2 attacks the profitless Latin of Grammar schools and the lack of ethics in commercial schools. He stresses the need to make the curriculum relevant to the middle
classes, who will need to deal with the results of various mechanical, mineralogical and chemical operations. When the Review discusses the public schools as such, there is little or no desire to discard Classics altogether. In New Series Vol. 3, Coleridge discusses the debate between the Edinburgh and Quarterly Reviews on this issue. It is not easy to identify Coleridge's standpoint on the contest between Classics and modern knowledge. The prudest, it seems, recognize the value of Classics; but the wisest see that width is being purchased at the cost of depth. But the reviewer discards altogether the clamour in favour of utility, the sciences and modern languages as replacements for Classics. To give Classics a primacy of place in education is, of course, another matter. An article in New Series Vol. 5 attacks the way in which a public school produces a gentleman who lacks a religious sense. But the reviewer is quick to add:

"It is very far indeed from being our opinion that classical studies should form no part of Catholic education." 2

It should not surprise us that no discussion of the content of a religious education curriculum takes place in the pages of the Dublin Review. That curriculum may represent the very soul of the Catholic school, but it would also represent, in the Dublin's terms, an unforgiveable breach of episcopal prerogative to trespass on such subjects in a lay periodical.
The 

TEACHING TECHNIQUES

The Dublin Review does discuss occasionally the techniques of instruction. Wyse briefly praises the Pestalozzi approach and castigates rote-learning. A similar point is made in the article for New Series Vol.22 on the religious education of women. Natural indolence of teacher and pupil leads to a readiness to accept the merely mechanical style of teaching and learning, which substitutes copying for understanding and the book for the teacher's voice. Where there is no thinking, there is no education. However, reviews in the Notices of Books sections tend to be rather suspicious of books which appeal to imagination, rather than aim at providing a set of facts to commit to memory. In Vol.14, for instance, a review of a Christian Brothers' geography book accepts that it will stimulate curiosity, but feels inclined to prefer a straightforward catalogue of names and facts "such as a child might commit to memory".

Such reviews present a mechanistic idea of the mind which hardly squares with the typical Dublin view of the nature of mind and reason. In New Series Vol.5, for instance, is a suggestion for a history manual which would present historical facts in the style of a ladder. This is thought to provide a useful tool for historical analysis, even though the pupil is not involved in the process, other than providing a tabula rasa upon which the ladder should stand.
Our earlier discussion has revealed a general opposition in the pages of the *Dublin Review* towards systems of higher education not under the control of the Catholic Church. However, early volumes of the Review uphold the state as the prime agent in effective elementary education on a national model. Wyse complains of the lack of system in educational provision, which stems from a mistaken assumption that any government-run system represents an attack on the hallowed rights of the individual. Indeed, the Irish national system, with all its faults, is seen as the way forward. Wyse is very clear on this point.

"We must have a 'National System', by which every man in the country...shall be secured...a substantial, applicable, enduring education, physical, intellectual and religious."[413]

Wyse is not entirely alone. An article for Vol.3, "English Tourists in Ireland", praises the government for its attempts to reform the ills of Ireland through the national schools. Nor is objection raised to a non-denominational system, where

"no particular faith is inculcated, the system being founded on principles precisely the reverse of exclusive."[414]

This acceptance of mixed education does not last. Reflecting the experience of continental Catholicism faced with state encroachment, worried by links between national systems and Scepticism, and, most importantly, responding to growing papal opposition towards non-Catholic education at all levels, the *Dublin Review* adopts a stance which is increasingly antagonistic as the century progresses. The article by Symons in Vol.14 on the education of the working classes[216] may be taken to herald this change in attitude. Although much of this piece discusses
issues relevant to a national system of education - and explicitly advocates the view that qualifications should provide the gateway to the world of work as the *modus operandi* of such a system - the final paragraphs change tone. Symons argues that it is the Catholic Church which must provide the educational remedy for the lack of moral and general education for Catholics in the manufacturing districts.

What the *Dublin* is not claiming at this point is that non-denominational elementary education is necessarily a threat to the Catholic faith. Russell's article in Vol. 20 on the Protestant Claremont Institution for the deaf and dumb is helpful here. These children are, by virtue of their disability, peculiarly susceptible to Protestant influence, from which no freedom to practice their own religion would save them. However, Russell adds that he can see no practical objection to such a system in the case of ordinary children. It is interesting to place this piece alongside O'Hagan's article on Trinity College, Dublin just three volumes later. This writer comments that it is not only anti-Catholic instruction which is to be shunned, but also the absence of overtly Catholic teaching. This informative contrast is suggestive of the extent to which the Review sees higher education as playing the more vital rôle in the progress of Catholicism in an antipathetic age.

In his article for Vol. 35, Russell comments that the Review had avoided the subject of the rôle of the Irish Board of Education for some years - apparently to preserve some sort of common front. However, Archbishop Whately's attempt to impose a common book of religious instruction on the model schools impels Russell to enter the fray. What is most significant is not the detailed discussion of the trust confided
in the Board, but rather Russell's assumption that it is acceptable for common materials to be used in purely literary instruction.

By the early 1860s, the tone of the Review hardens against mixed education. In New Series Vol.1219, Manning explicitly condemns it in all its forms. Since the atmosphere and spirit of a school engender a moral response, it is essential that even secular instruction takes place in a separate school. Manning argues that poverty had obliged the Irish Catholic Church to submit to the mixed system. However, with papal guidance and sanction, the Church is currently striving to extricate itself from the Board's clutches.

Under Ward's editorship, there is no defence of mixed education. The topic finds its appropriate place within Ward's rather embattled worldview. In the Notices of Books section of New Series Vol.11220, Ward is not slow to link an acceptance of a separation of Church and State in education with liberal Catholics, and the twain with extreme centralization, bureaucracy and compulsory attendance. This represents a further link with the attempt of industrial societies to impose a positivist philosophical system in the place of religion on the grounds that the latter is more favourable to appropriate progress. What Ward is doing here is to place in its widest possible context the very concern over the implications of Bruce's Education Bill in general, and the conscience clause in particular, which Vaughan expresses in the same volume.221 Vaughan argues that a conscience clause will provide no protection for the children of careless parents, no protection for children against the tyranny of majority opinion and no real bulwark against the secularists. Vaughan suggests that opposition to the bill
should be focused through the Catholic Poor-School Committee. We ought, perhaps, to add that the workings of that Committee do not generally bring pens leaping to the hands of reviewers. Holland is right to point out that its associated publication, *The Catholic School*, is reviewed only once.

By way of contrast, Ward's article "Explicit and Implicit Thought" for *New Series* Vol.13 works downwards from a philosophical viewpoint, and in so doing reveals the connection between his philosophy of knowledge and his attitude towards formal elementary education. Ward is responding to an attack in the *Pall Mall Gazette* on denominational education as an intellectually sterile system, whose use of creed and catechism reveals that sterility. Ward argues that the *Gazette* fails to understand the link between explicit and implicit teaching, which occurs when the Catholic child learns, as a foundation for his spirituality, implicit truths through the atmosphere of the school. This consideration therefore explains:

"the intense dislike (we might almost say, horror) felt by all good Catholics, for mixed education in every shape."**

In *New Series* Vol.14, Ward discusses the theory of denominational education. He reiterates the view that no conceivable system of mixed education can deliver the Catholic spirit. On compulsory education, Ward has his fears. He feels it may lead to Socialism, but the Catholic must await direction from Rome on the issue, which has profound theological implications. It is also significant that Ward's article chooses to concentrate, not on elementary education, but on the implications of a mixed approach in higher education. Once again, his priorities are abundantly clear.
In the Notices of Books section of the same volume, it may be Ward who refers to Whately's Life to point out that the Archbishop had indeed intended to use supposedly non-denominational R.E. books to undermine Catholicism. The lesson to be learned on the dangers of mixed education is duly stressed. The Review cannot resist referring again to Whately's skullduggery later in the volume.

No wonder the author of "Secularism in Elementary Education" for New Series Vol. is deeply disturbed by the prospect of the extension of Forster's conscience clause to schools in receipt of any form of assistance from the state. How can busy parish clergy cope with rigidly timetabled religious instruction? Might such moves be the first step to a denial of the need for denominational education?
The Rambler

The Purpose, Value and Limitations of Elementary and Secondary Education

The Rambler is adamant that the poor must be educated. Since several articles take the trouble to discuss and demolish arguments that the formal intellectual education of the poor is spiritually irrelevant and indeed counter-productive, we must assume that some sections of the Catholic community were by no means convinced of the value of such education. In the article "The Destinies of the Intellect" (Vol.1), the writer lists the standard objections to increasing a poor man's knowledge, prior to dismissing them. If, for example, morality is the key to Heaven, why should we concern ourselves with the improvement of the intellect? Is it not in the affections where our nature feels its greatest spiritual response? The reviewer replies with his own question. Are we not then assuming that there will be no intellectual joys in Heaven? God has granted us our intellect, and all classes must seek to develop the gift as far as circumstances permit. Religion is, of course, the shepherd of the intellect, but to dismiss intellectual education as secular and therefore unimportant is to take the high-road to fanaticism. Man is not a purely spiritual being. The powers he trains through education, and uses in secular life, will not be discarded in Heaven, but honed and developed there alongside morality.

Very similar arguments are employed by Capes in Vol.6, though he is keen to stress the political implication of maximizing educational opportunity. Firstly, it is untrue that education will render the poor discontented and unsuited to their rôle: an educated man performs better whatever the task. Secondly, as the possibility of universal suffrage looms, we must educate the poor for the sake of society as a
whole. However, Capes fights shy of the issue of whether it is right for a man to use education for social mobility. He comments that he does not feel called upon to discuss the matter, while also making it clear that rich and poor are ordained by God and cannot expect to receive the same education.

The need for the Catholic Church to hold its own in intellectual debate was identified as a characteristic of the Rambler's coverage of the philosophy of knowledge and higher education. The same theme emerges in the Review's treatment of elementary education. The Capes article above demands effective intellectual education for the Catholic poor to fit them to hold their own in debate with their Protestant peers. Indeed, such contests offer the opportunity to prepare souls for conversion to Catholicism. But what happens if Catholics fail to provide decent intellectual education? Capes is adamant that, if Catholics fail, Satan will not - and the education provided outside their own schools will turn Catholic poor into unbelievers. In Vol. 10, he insists that such failure would not only enable the more effective Protestant schools to attract Catholics, but would also signal the end of Catholicism as a political force.

Now, although the Rambler stresses the importance of intellectual education, reviewers are not prepared to argue that it should be given primacy of place in formal education. In Vol. 1, "The Amusements of the Poor" article denies that intellectual drilling will strike an effective blow against vice: we would be better advised to teach the poor how to
enjoy themselves effectively.

"Education without amusement is almost as perilous an experiment as education without religion. It is not made for man..."231

And Wenham's article in 2nd. Series Vol.6232 denies that character can be formed by any form of instruction: we must teach by example until it becomes habitual. Wenham is keen to place greatest emphasis on this moral training. He argues that we possess three faculties - the moral, the physical and the intellectual, of which the first is the highest. The child must be taught to direct its free will, partly through forming habitual rules of conduct, and partly through the assimilation of appropriate principles. What is equally significant is Wenham's acceptance of the need to offer a good secular education to make sure that Catholic schools attract pupils. It matters not whether the secular wares on display have value in themselves, as long as the customers are enticed by their presence to absorb the more important moral principles.

It could be argued that there is nothing specifically religious about the moral training here discussed, but Wenham reminds us that, just as we must make sure that intellectual knowledge does not outstrip religious knowledge, so must we ensure that purity, devotion and charity are taught along with punctuality, cleanliness and order. Nevertheless, the lack of detailed discussion of the religious element within elementary schooling is suggestive of Wenham's overriding concern that Catholic schools should compete effectively with their Protestant rivals.

Wenham may seem to be setting religious and moral education alongside intellectual education, but other articles emphasize the importance of establishing the former before venturing upon the latter. In "The old
Priest's Parlour, Capes uses his familiar technique of a fictional setting to explore his theme. The priest in question argues that the teaching of doctrine, morality and duties — defined as a thorough religious education — must precede the preparation of the young mind for its secular calling through the cultivation of the various faculties. Similar points are made in a review of a work by Weise (probably by Capes and Simpson) in which the formation of character is seen as the essential precursor to intellectual education.

The Rambler is unlikely to take kindly to any view of the purpose of education which upholds simple utility as the goal. In 2nd. Series Vol.10, Simpson clearly has a rush of blood to the head on the subject of Utilitarianism. One article is an onslaught specifically directed against Bentham and the felicific calculus, while a second — on the subject of France — comments:

"The professional estimate of education, which values everything taught — grammar, history, poetry, or arithmetic — not by its influence on the mind, but by its capability of being used in life, and put to account in commerce, war, or administration, is the cause of another frightful evil."

In particular, if one studies with the sole aim of future utility to oneself, rather than for truth or beauty, then one ends up like the Belgian, whose artisan son, educated in Virgil, develops a distaste for his trade, and needs must be an office-worker or tutor. According to this definition of utilitarian intentions, one is not paying homage to utility in approving, as the Rambler does, of education as means to equip a man for his likely station on life. We have already noted Capes's unwillingness to enter into the debate over whether education may be used to scale the social ladder. In his "Literature for the
Catholic Poor” article, Capes comments that the mind of the mechanic is "alive with an almost unhealthy life" and so betrays a certain fear of the consequences of widespread intellectual improvement. This, in turn, leads him to grant to the literary classes what at first sight seems to be an extraordinary power, which we would have anticipated to be the preserve of the moral educator: namely, the capacity to “form the mind, to mould the eternal soul...”

No wonder he perceives the need for a good Catholic periodical to furnish the poor with intellectual recreation. An article by Capes on Catholic lending-libraries accepts that infidel and Protestant books can and do corrupt the mind. And Formby suggests that the educated poor, exposed to such literature, are actually in a more dangerous spiritual condition than the uneducated.

Perhaps we may best sum up by arguing that, while the Rambler indeed accepts that the Church has a great opportunity to use formal and moral education of the poor as a means to secure and expand its own rôle, the Review’s discussion of the issue frequently takes place in an atmosphere of warning and potential crisis. Priests and catechesis alone cannot equip the poor to hold their own against their adversaries. Parents are all too often unaware of the importance of schooling. That schooling must be attractive in secular terms, but it must also be rooted, not in intellectual attainment, but in moral and religious training. Indeed, the Review clearly assumes the identity of morality and religion, and seldom troubles to discuss its assumption. Even then, Catholics must beware of the dangers of non-Catholic literature, and meet the challenge by producing suitable books and periodicals.
The comparative absence of a Catholic middle-class no doubt explains the failure of the *Rambler* to interest itself in the purposes and value of middle-class education. As for the poor, we must accept that the treatment of the purposes of elementary education in the Review is less intensive — and less intense — than the corresponding treatment of higher education. Perhaps this reveals the *Rambler*'s perception of where the most important threat, and the most attractive opportunity, lay in terms of the defence and progress of the Catholic Church in England.
The *Rambler* displays little interest in curriculum issues. Symptomatic of this is the fact that the most detailed discussion occurs within Capes's fictional conversation in "The old Priest's Parlour"\textsuperscript{241}, where the close identity of that clerical gentleman's assertions with the views of Capes himself is probable, but not certain. The priest uncompromisingly rejects the value of teaching and studying physical and natural science. It is remote, factual and relies on cramming for assimilation. The Devil cannot be defeated by overloading the memory. The priest's friend and disputant, Edward York, objects that this will only leave Catholic education trailing in the Protestant wake. Not so, comments the priest. How can mere rote-learning be progressive? If you want to teach the poor something useful, teach them Latin - to help them follow the Mass - and teach them how to amuse themselves in innocence. Our priest does, in fact, recommend a specific curriculum. Reading and writing should come first, to be followed by arithmetic to book-keeping level. Algebra should also be taught, on the grounds that it is easier for children to handle abstractions than to deal with disciplines which presuppose experience they may well lack. Mathematics is felt to be unsurpassed as a method of strengthening the faculty of reason. Summary-style history is rejected: the chronology required is felt to be far too difficult. Better to limit history to Church stories, which at least have relevance to the lives of the children. Also included is simple geography, together with music and drawing for relaxation. Some consideration should be given to future secular duties, so girls should learn basic domestic skills, and boys, the basics of appropriate trades.
Teaching Latin in elementary schools is a prospect further pursued by Capes in an article on popular education for Vol. 1024. He feels that it would be more profitable for advanced classes in elementary schools to learn Latin in preference to the more fashionable "ologies". This kind of remark certainly supports the view that the old priest, rather than Edward York, is the mouthpiece of Capes. His article "Popular Music a part of Popular Education" follows the priest's recommendation of music as an innocent diversion: corrupt music has, of course, the opposite effect.

The first part of Capes's popular education article stresses the importance of not allowing the secular curriculum to detract from religious education. You can indeed provide knowledge without religion, but, in so doing, simply churn out Socialists. True religious education not only teaches doctrine, but also forms habits. The religious feelings must be developed first. It is vital to teach religious knowledge alongside secular knowledge, lest the pupil should see religion as below reason, instead of in its true place - above it.
TEACHING TECHNIQUES AND THE ORGANISATION OF FORMAL EDUCATION

We have already met the opposition of our parloured ecclesiastic towards cramming and rote-learning, and the Rambler objects on several further occasions to knowledge acquired by means of memory. It is significant to note that the Review feels it worthwhile to discuss in some detail school manual or text-books. In Vol.5, for instance, it is probably Capes who reviews Tate's work on algebra. The review praises Tate for getting pupils to reason and to apply knowledge, rather than to learn a set of rules, although the author may have gone too far in discarding altogether this latter aspect of Algebra. In 2nd. Series Vol.3, the review of Weise's German Letters on English Education accepts that a danger exists in the contemporary English habit of relying on easy-learning aids and cram. The most extensive treatment of school-books is by Stokes, whose article "Elementary School-Books" subjects to an expert and withering scrutiny certain books recommended by Her Majesty's Inspectors. Stokes sees them - the books and, presumably, the inspectors themselves - as obsessed with classification and unnecessary technical terminology.

When the Rambler discusses the issue of secular schools, it generally does so briefly and without argument, relying on the assertion that education without religion is no education at all. This is why proposals for non-religious schools are dismissed in Vol.5 as logically impossible: such schools would both teach Socinianism and be morally negligible. Capes expands upon this point in Vol.7, where his article "Dr. Murray on Miracles and on Education" argues that you cannot treat education as purely secular once you step beyond the
basics of reading, writing, mathematics and physical science to treat with man himself.

The issue of whether Catholic schools should permit government inspection - in the interests of obtaining grants - is referred to in a number of articles. The most detailed analysis of the issue is by Stokes in 2nd. Series Vol.11. Stokes is responding to the setting up of the Newcastle Commission in 1858, and the tone of the article is distinctly critical of the Catholic response to what was, after all, the first comprehensive enquiry into the state of popular education in England. Catholics should have pressed the claim for a Catholic commissioner, rather than bemoan the commission's intention to examine religious education. Such an examination would, in any case, be restricted to assessing the pupils' understanding of the various formularies, rather than presuming to comment on the formularies themselves. And if Catholics were to seek an exemption from the inspection of catechetical teaching, then we not only fail to demonstrate the centrality of religion to our educational system, but also provide the enemies of denominational education with ammunition for their onslaughts. Nor can Catholics afford to forego government grants. If we choose so to do, then we must be doubly sure to show ourselves to be at the forefront of education, lest our critics accuse us of fearing inspection. This point is made forcibly by the same writer in his "Elementary School-Books" article. The Christian Brothers refuse inspection and the opportunity to gain certificated teachers, but their schoolbooks are often inferior to those of their secular rivals. The
religious spirit of the Christian Brothers' schools ought to

"hallow and purify the highest intellectual attainments; they
form no excuse for slowness and mediocrity." 251

Stokes echoes the Review's habitual *apologia* for its involvement in the
educational debate *per se*. He argues that he is not trespassing on
clerical prerogative to speak on such matters: rather, he claims for
the *Rambler* the right to

"furnish materials for a judgment rather than to force a conclusion
of our own." 252

Certainly the opponents of the *Rambler* would see this argument as
disingenuous. Doubtless such opponents would grow to expect the *Home and
Foreign* to pursue the debate on education at this level even further. In
fact, that Review concentrated its efforts in the two years of its
existence on the debate over higher education.
The Westminster Review

The Purpose, Value and Limitations of Elementary and Secondary Education

The Westminster Review is generally an enthusiastic advocate of the importance of formal education. A constant theme in the first series is the value of education as a tool for ensuring appropriate political behaviour amongst those likely to benefit from an increased franchise. This, in turn, leads the Review to consider the relationship of education and the environment - an important topic for those reviewers upholding associationist psychology. But the Westminster writers are most exercised throughout the period 1824-75 by the relationship between formal education and morality. To what extent is intellectual education in itself of moral benefit? To what extent, if any, is moral education synonymous with religious education?

To advocate education as a means of increasing political awareness need not imply any more than the grudging acceptance of a regrettable necessity. In fact, the early Westminster sees education less as a response to changing society and more as a vehicle for change itself. In the very first volume, W.J. Fox comments that, since education and basic literacy have created intelligence, an extension of the franchise must follow in their wake. Indeed, trying to teach to the politically unaware poor a sense of duty and contentment has clearly backfired on the paternalists: no sooner had the poor been given the taste for reading, then they reached for Cobbett.

It is significant that the Review often includes an education section within its Miscellaneous Notices, and it is in this section of Vol.35 that the reviewer approves warmly of the educational content of a
work by the Chartists Lovett and Collins. He comments that, if the authors succeeded in organising the intellectual and moral improvement of the working classes, then enfranchisement would follow on its heels. Later volumes echo this view. In New Series vol. 3, the article "Educational Institutions in the United States" argues that Americans work on the correct principle — namely, that political representation depends upon the cultivation of intelligence in every class. The reviewer applauds the system of basing the suffrage on educational attainment, rather than on property.

It would, of course, be possible to present education as a grim necessity, justified by the need to avoid a cataclysmic disaster as the vote is reluctantly offered to the poor. If this tone is sometimes adopted by the Dublin for one, it is generally avoided by the Westminster. Only in New Series Vol. 4 is great play made of the political danger of an under-educated population, and even this must be placed within the context of an attack upon the shortcomings of the voluntaryists.

One unidentified writer in an early volume comments that

"Education, if intended for any thing, is intended to prepare subjects for the state."

This apparently means an education in duty and occupation, though the writer is more interested in expanding on the means whereby this is to be achieved than in precisely what the value and implications of such training might be. Nor can we be sure that the writer is simply using education to maintain existing class relationships. A review of Lytton's Pelham in Vol. 10 does venture upon the issue, though the comment that
education will lead to

"melioration, throughout the entire chain of dependence."\(^{11240}\)
can scarcely be taken as an encouragement to the storming of the social barriers. J.G. Fitch, in New Series Vol.43\(^{u}\), objects to the idea that education is to be used for the vulgar art of social climbing. Nevertheless, he does feel that the truly exceptional child of poor parents should have the opportunity to get to university. Of course, we must not expect the early Westminster, with its distinctly Benthamite leanings, to uphold education as a social escalator. The Bentham Papers\(^{22o}\) themselves make it quite clear that the felicific calculus, as applied to education, had no such function.

One constant political theme throughout the Review is the importance attached to formal education as a means of securing forceful and informed public opinion as a vehicle for change and progress. Bowring\(^{201}\) argues that our own experience shows us that an increase in education has led to improvements in legislation and government, and Thomas Love Peacock's review of Randolph's Memoirs, Correspondence and Private Papers of Thomas Jefferson\(^{262}\) approves, not only of Jefferson's interest in the diffusion of knowledge, but also of the notion that subsequent improvement in public opinion is vital, since such opinion acts as the guardian of morality. These are surprising views, perhaps, from the satirist of the "Steam Intellect Society". Not dissimilar views appear in Ellis's article "State of the Nation"\(^{263}\), where he argues that formal teaching is responsible for the formation of a sound public opinion. And, in Vol.7, W. Eyton Tooke sees the education of the peasantry as the means to create the kind of public opinion which would result in birth
control, so curbing what he describes as the

"fatal fruitfulness of the Irish..."264.

A number of articles place education as the mentor of industrial efficiency. Bowring265 feels that it would prevent the squandering of time and money which has accompanied Britain's undoubted rise in prosperity. By 1868, the Review is worrying over the threat posed to industry by foreign competition. Workers must be rendered intelligent for this threat to be repelled.266

In its early years, the Westminster Review's attitude to the role of education in serving the state reflects the Review's close links with Utilitarianism. If education is to help the individual in understanding the true nature of his self-interest, it thereby benefits the state, which is none other than an aggregate of those self-same individuals, appropriately enlightened in the pursuit of happiness. Southwood Smith's article on Bentham's Chrestomathia in Vol.1 offers a definition of the purpose of education, which is to

"teach what it is most useful to know, and what it is most conducive to happiness to do..."267

Bingham's article on Cowper for Vol.2268 establishes clearly the standard by which successful education is to be judged. This is none other than the test of utility, which is further defined as the extent to which the greatest happiness of the greatest number is promoted. Government should play its part by making sure that the pursuit of such education is suitably rewarded, thus highlighting further the importance of self-interest. Southwood Smith returns to the subject in his review of the congenial and associationist work of James Mill: Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind269. Mill labels as intellectual and moral
the two sources of gratification which reflect the nature of mind, and which should therefore be the guiding principles of education: The moral aspect is defined as an examination of mental phenomena in terms of the pleasure and pain principle. More practically, knowledge itself is defined by Mill as an awareness of what is most conducive to happiness, which, in turn, is none other than virtue itself. Smith is eager to accept the value of Mill's insights, and comments that the key to individual and national progress lies in enabling a man to perceive the nature of his self-interest. Education forges the key by providing both an understanding of mental science and a treasury of knowledge. This useful knowledge, examined by the disciplined faculties, feeds and is fed by that essential prerequisite to progress, self-control. An article by Symonds in a later volume also focuses on the theme of self-control, suggesting that it stems from physical control, which is itself guided by the intellect.

The Symonds article provides us with our first glimpse of a vital issue - the relationship between intellectual and moral education. Unfortunately, our glimpse is somewhat restricted by the writer's unhappy combination of assertiveness and obscurity. In dealing with moral education in formal schooling, he argues that it "would be the result of the intellectual education, as applied daily and hourly to the collection and formation of just opinions."

There are a number of articles in the Westminster Review which imply that intellectual education is itself advantageous to morality. Lalor's notice of a work on home education agrees with the author's view that the moral system is based upon a faculty of the intellect, which
grants the power to recall perceptions when the object is absent. This conceptive faculty is fed by the stimulation of the emotions through the study of such subjects as history and experimental science. Similarly, an article by Symons argues that, since the Welsh lack effective teaching in secular subjects, their standard of literature and language is poor and their morals correspondingly lax. And Ellis's article "State of the Nation" takes this kind of approach to a logical conclusion by providing lists of formal questions which supposedly lead to a satisfactory state of opinion and conduct. This article implies that the definition of moral behaviour is to be sought in the laws of political economy.

Twenty years after the Symons and Ellis articles, renewed pressure for franchise reform provokes Sheldon Amos to return to the question of the relationship between moral and intellectual education. Ignorance, comments Amos, is incompatible with generosity of sentiment, since the intellectually supine cannot empathise with others. Morality must be taught formally, and through appropriate secular subjects. It is interesting to compare Amos with the Westminster's early Utilitarian reviewers. The former complains that one of the threats to morality stems from the verbosity of the Sensationalists and Utilitarians. Nor does a keen sense of self-interest preclude either narrowness of thought or ignorance itself. On the other hand, it could be argued that Amos is placing greater trust on the moral influence of secular subjects than did Bentham himself, who confessed, in a letter to Simon Bolivar, that he had little experience of moral education, and had, therefore, been obliged to omit it from Chrstommathia. A review by Amos of one of Arnott's works on national education provides us with further insight.
into the former's views. He follows Arnott's argument that the study of a systematized body of science "involves the exercise of most moral as well as most intellectual qualities...".

Amos is not alone in the equating of moral and intellectual education. W.E. Hickson, as writer and editor, demonstrates through the 1840s a keen interest in education. Hickson might not have cared for the simplistic approach of Amos in establishing the relationship between moral and intellectual education, but his enthusiasm did carry him at times close to the latter's position. Hickson's article "Dutch and German Schools" accepts that it does not do to exaggerate the amount of good which can be achieved in the short term through schooling, but goes on to suggest that an education which turns out thinking, observing and reading men will, in so doing, produce:

"in a moral sense...objects of pursuit, and habits of conduct, favourable to their own happiness and to that of the community.".

Again, in his "Postscript" on the session of Parliament for Vol.40, Hickson attacks Anglican bishops for preventing the intellectual and moral training of thousands. It is significant that Hickson argues that this training takes place through knowledge.

However, in the Miscellaneous Notices section of Vol.35, Hickson reviews his own work on Dutch and German schools, and comments that those countries succeed better in moral education, not through communicating superior axioms, but through the indirect influence of the teachers themselves. In fact, a review of Mayhew's What to Teach and How to Teach It - in the period of Hickson's editorship - accepts with Mayhew that, while it is impossible to separate moral and intellectual
education, it is necessary to concentrate initially on the moral aspects, since intellect must serve morals.

Can formal education prevent crime? This issue interests a number of reviewers, though the conclusions reached are by no means consistent. In Vol.1822, for example, one reviewer feels that universal education is partly responsible for the absence of mobs in the United States, whereas another reviewer in the same volume, discussing French criminal statistics227, feels that the connection between lack of education and criminality is by no means as straightforward as might be thought. John Robertson's article on the London Statistical Society224 is at least sceptical of the simplistic statistics of one Mr. Porter, whose argument that reading and writing alone diminish crime is sarcastically rebuffed. This does not prevent a later article by Hickson from citing approvingly Porter's evidence225. And the writer of an article on popular colleges for Vol.48224 is content to point out that the police are well aware that educated disorderlies are few and far between.

The Westminster Review does discuss the issue of the relationship between religious and moral education, although most articles on the theme appear only from the 1850s onwards. That relationship is presented as distant at best. If moral education is not to be separated from intellectual culture, it can, and should, be separated from religious education, with which it has no connection. The Review may refer to a religious spirit in a positive tone of approbation, but its definition thereof is usually secular. Hickson's "Explanations on Education"227 is a case in point, where the religious spirit - which should inform all teaching - is described as the spirit of love, truth and reverential
enquiry. A similar view appears in John Chapman's enthusiastic but woolly article on Christian revivals, where man's religious nature is supposedly to be cultivated by the exertion of intellect and feeling in harmony. In this activity, the scientific intellect leads morality by the hand. In fact, the Westminster frequently suggests that religious improvement itself—however defined—is encouraged by intellectual advance. This point is made by Nesbitt in an article on the national education system of Ireland, where the enlarging of the minds of children through intellectual training provides an increased opportunity for the reception of religious truth. And Binns's article "The Religious Heresies of the Working Classes" comments that the desire for a free religion may be intuitive, but the intellect is to be appointed as guide. Indeed, an article in New Series Vol.48 on the religious education of children argues that doctrinal education actually curbs intellectual development. The value attached in this article to the sacred right of private judgement is, of course, a basic reflection of an important and familiar aspect of the Westminster's philosophy of knowledge.
That the formal school curriculum interested the Westminster Review is not open to doubt. There is a considerable number of articles on political economy as an educational subject, and a similar number on the rôle of Classics. The importance attached to the discussion of the value of this latter discipline reflects the Review's interest in educational issues relevant to the upper classes. By no means all articles on Classics are condemnatory - even in the openly Benthamite years. One might expect a radical Review to maintain a firm interest in science, but, while such is indeed the case, there is certainly no preponderance of laudatory articles on the theme. And one final indicator of the general value attached to curriculum issues is the intention, voiced in Vol. 37, of providing, for the Westminster readers, a regular digest of the best works available on educational matters. This praiseworthy policy is not, however, maintained.

Articles on political economy as a school subject preponderate in the first series, with J.S. Mill providing insight into the Review's approach. In an article with Ellis on the economic thought of M'Culloch, Mill remarks:

"If there is one sign of the times upon which more than any other we should be justified in resting our hopes of the future progression of the human race...that sign undoubtedly is, the demand which is now manifesting itself on the part of the public for instruction in the science of Political Economy."

A further article in the same volume assumes the status of political economy as a science. In "Present System of Education", the writer argues that progress will come from the sciences of politics, law, public economy, commerce, mathematics, astronomy, chemistry, mechanics and natural history. In addition, Thompson's review of a work by
Chalmers on political economy is particularly emphatic on the overriding importance of that discipline:—

"The proper business of every man and every hour, is to know as much as he can of political economy." 296

Of course, that man ought also to have studied applied physics, geography, double-entry book-keeping and arithmetic: but any slave could learn all these and yet remain a slave. Knowledge of political economy is a means towards living for oneself. And an article on the condition of the working class in Vol.18 296 suggests that a lack of knowledge of the sciences of political economy and legislation leaves the poor an easy prey to political nostrum-mongers. Whether this is to be remedied by elementary education as such is not made clear. One of the most detailed descriptions of the nature of political economy as a school subject is given in the Ellis article for Vol.52 297 — testimony to the Review's persisting interest in the issue. Ellis argues that the value and functions of money and credit, the laws of value and price, rent, wages, profit and taxation should be covered in a school curriculum. God Himself is brought in as a non-interventionist liberal economist by the George Combe article on secular education for New Series Vol.2 298. God's secular providence applies to believer and non-believer alike, and can be established through study of the laws which determine production and wealth. However, the very same volume contains an article by F.W. Newman, whose rather dismissive phraseology on the subject of political economy might be taken as an answer to Combe. The truths of political economy are doubtless very valuable, comments Newman:—

"as are all the calculations of the shop; but they are seldom elevating...." 299.
This may be taken as a harbinger of the fact that the enthusiasm of the Westminster for political economy is distinctly on the wane. There is certainly little evidence of further interest.

While there are a number of articles - particularly in the first five years of the Review - which describe the advantages of the study of science in an elementary education, there is no real evidence that the Review accords primacy of place to it. Since writers eschew precise definition, not only of the nature of scientific instruction, but also of the rôle and importance of the physical sciences, we may assume, if not a lack of interest, then at least an unwillingness to make physical science in particular the bedrock of formal education. The nearest we get to that bedrock is in Roe buck's article on the Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge, where he hopes that knowledge of physical science might be conveyed to the labouring population, since their welfare greatly depends on that knowledge. Even then, the context of the discussion suggests that Roe buck is thinking of adult education. And he is careful to suggest that the study of science takes place after the working class is rendered moral, obedient and relatively comfortable.

In Vol. 1 appears the important Southwood Smith review of Bentham's Chrestomathia. This review is generally very successful in conveying most of Bentham's ideas in manageable form without the latter's obsession with neologisms, but significantly fails to place the same emphasis on the value of scientific education as does Chrestomathia itself, which argues that only physical science can provide the mental strength to safeguard a man against the deadly foe of perverted
religion.

The author of the article "Scientific Education of Upper Classes" in Vol. 9 is one of the Review's most enthusiastic advocates for science, though that enthusiasm leads him into turgid and repetitive examples of the practical utility of the discipline. Utility is indeed his key-word. The clergy, he argues, should study the physical sciences as the most effective way to develop

"useful practical logic..."

When discussing the value of Classics, the Westminster Review clearly does not aim for consistency. Articles sceptical or dismissive of Classics appear alongside others which are favourable or even enthusiastic. Typical of the dismissive school is Ellis, whose article on charity for Vol. 2 attacks the ability to scan and compose classical-style poetry as symptomatic of a false view of what knowledge is. John Bowring is nothing if not robust, discarding as he does the study of Latin and Greek as a

"vicious and useless system"

in Vol. 7, and returning to the attack using similar weapons four volumes later in an article on Magyar poetry.

Nevertheless, thoroughgoing assaults on Classics are the exception, rather than the rule. Even the Ellis article referred to above could be seen as opposing versifying, rather than Latin and Greek per se.

A similar criticism is made in an article by Leeds which dismisses verse-making as barren. However, since Leeds is prepared to suggest the study of classical architecture as an alternative, the implication is that Classics as a whole is not lacking in worth.
Several articles are critical of existing practice in the teaching of Classics, and object to its domination of the curriculum. They do, however, fall short of rejecting altogether its value. The article "School Claims of Languages" is a case in point. The reviewer discusses a work by Pillans in which the teaching of Latin and Greek is strongly supported. This article is distinguished by its preference for thoughtful comment over blunt assertion. The reviewer argues that Classics rightly has an important place within a scheme of liberal education, but that it must not bestride the timetable like a Colossus. The defence of Classics rests upon the familiar view that language study is a wholesome discipline for the mind: less familiar is the writer's willingness to support his contention. The argument goes like this. Without words, thought is impossible. Therefore, the philosophical study of language must show the human mind at its most thoughtful. However, this view, as the writer admits, does not justify the teaching of Classics as opposed to modern languages; nor can gratitude for the contribution of Latin and Greek to the culture of the Renaissance justify the years of study normally bestowed on them. Nor do we gain much insight into the grammar and etymology of English from study of the Classics. And if we argue for the supremacy of classical literature above all other, do we not thereby devalue Shakespeare, Goethe and Dante? As for the view that Classics expands the memory, this is to misunderstand the elastic nature of memory, which obligingly stretches in response to the arousal of interest, rather than through the sheer weight of information deposited therein.

Having disposed of the standard arguments in favour of the monopolisation of the curriculum by Classics, the reviewer explicitly
deals with Pillans's argument that the best educational theory requires one subject as the common denominator for all others. Correctly identifying this argument with Jacotot, the reviewer rejects the argument on the grounds that common experience teaches that we can indeed learn several separate subjects, which may be aimed at the development of the several intellectual faculties. What the reviewer suggests is that the study of Classics should be left until the pupil is about thirteen. Even then, you must shun the drudgery of grammar and leave composition for higher education. After all, the younger mind is constituted to work best on external nature, rather than on abstract studies. Our reviewer also argues that French and German have distinct advantages over Latin and Greek. For the young, they are easier, and more suitable for oral work. For vocations, they are more relevant. For the higher stages, he seems prepared to grant that the mental drilling offered by Classics is uniquely valuable. Certainly neither physical science nor mathematics have the power possessed by language and literature in general to "develop and harmoniously combine the majority of our faculties of mind."

As early as Vol.11, we see similar attitudes: let Classics be properly taught, and it has a justified place as part of the curriculum, if not in a dominant rôle. The complaint - made in the course of a review of a translation of Herodotus - is over the amount of time spent on inefficient teaching. We cannot afford to ignore Classics altogether, since this would mean breaking our bonds with the past. Links should be made with other disciplines to make classical study live. And in Vol.38, the reviewer of a work by Mayhew accepts that Classics forms
a useful part of a liberal education, though it is by no means essential. A wide sympathy can better be cultivated through study of the modern languages.

Perhaps the most enthusiastic advocate of classical study is E.H. Barker, whose article on Greek Lexicons accepts readily that Latin and Greek should form the basis of what he calls our "public education". One assumes that he means middle-class education.

The Westminster Review is less interested in discussing the value of that partner to Classics in the traditional curriculum of the educated classes, mathematics. It is significant that the one article which discusses mathematics in terms of the highest approbation and in the greatest detail is on the subject of the Polytechnic schools of Paris, and was written by a continental reviewer.

Having examined the Review's treatment of aspects of the curriculum, we must not neglect those few articles which provide detailed suggestions for the whole curriculum. In his Vol.1 article, the Chrestomathic curriculum is of less interest to Southwood Smith than is the teaching technique. Given the complexity of that curriculum, his attitude is understandable. More informative is Symonds's article on national education for Vol.20, which uses as the basis for his curriculum the utilitarian and associationist concept of the need to enable man to control the conditions which affect personality. Since morality is nothing but the training of the moral and physical to the right use, great play is made of disciplines which enable speculative study to be physically applied. This mechanistic view of the educational process leads Symonds into some odd comments. He tries to
explain how the quality of presence of mind stems from physical attentiveness, which in turn springs from observation. Taste is nothing more than right judgement stemming from the possession of knowledge - with a judicious admixture of refinement. Where the latter is acquired is unclear.

It is significant that Symonds discusses first an appropriate curriculum for middle-class boys, and only then proceeds to suggest a watered-down version for the poor. The intellectual education for the middle-classes would consist of history with geography, elements of arts and sciences and languages. Physical training would include digging in a garden, gymnastics, dancing and carpentry. Moral education would, of course, follow from the intellectual and physical. The history taught to the poor would emphasize the causes of revolutions and the principles of good government, and in this way fulfil the criterion of usefulness. The physical training would be more vocational than that offered to the middle-class, and would make some contribution to the budget of the school.

While it is easy to criticize an ill thought-out article like that of Symonds, credit must be given for his willingness to be reasonably specific on curriculum matters. Most writers venturing on the subject adopt the approach of Southwood Smith in his article on the 1833 report of the Commissioners on the Employment of Children, where he comments that it is not his intention to go into detail over subjects to study at elementary level, and then lists a variety with little or no explanation of his reason for including them. Natural history, drawing, the outlines of botany and zoology, geometry, mental arithmetic, mechanics, geography
and history duly make their appearance. For a full-scale discussion of the curriculum and the rationale behind it, it would seem that the Westminster feels happier to import wholesale such familiar contributions to the debate as Spencer's "What Knowledge is of most Worth?" lecture to the Royal Institution, which is reprinted in New Series Vol.16316.
The monitorial system of instruction is rewarded with unstinted praise in the early volumes of the Westminster Review. Nowhere is that praise more readily bestowed than in Southwood Smith's article on Bentham's Chrestomathia. Fulsome is the word to describe Smith's introductory paean on Lancaster's system, which is felt to be as significant in educational terms as the invention of the alphabet. Smith assumes that an analogy between teaching and the workings of a machine is entirely appropriate, and therefore commends the monitorial system, not only for its power, but also for its similarity to the latest processes in the woollen industry. And Bentham's Chrestomathic concept is of particular value to the nation, since it extends that system beyond the elementary stage into secondary, middle-class education. Smith overcomes admirably the obscurities of Bentham's terminology, which had prompted Hazlitt to comment that he understood that Bentham's works had been translated into French:

"they ought to be translated into English." 

Thankfully, Smith sees little point in using a Bentham neologism such as "mathetic", which purports to help the reader understand his reference to exercises communicating the process of learning. What Smith also does is to explain the importance of Bentham's systematic and staged learning process, the validity of which supposedly enabled the monitorial system to function effectively in higher branches of learning, since the process followed the development of the intellect. Smith sensibly chooses to illustrate the cumulative process by describing two of its stages in the teaching of geography. He does, however, tend to oversimplify, and omits Bentham's interesting explanation of the way in
which stage one eschews abstractions and rests upon appeals to the senses and memory.

Smith echoes Bentham in assuming that the pupil-monitor would be intellectually and socially equipped to communicate the necessary information.

The communication of information indeed lies at the heart of the teaching techniques advocated by the Review in its earliest volumes. The pupil is a passive recipient of appropriate nuggets from the treasury of useful knowledge. A lengthy article on the Hamiltonian system in Vol. 10 is a case in point. The reviewer argues that Hamilton's system rests upon the teaching of small groups in a manner which avoids completely the possibility of any independent learning. Totally teacher-directed, the pupils must not be left to work things out for themselves.

"the business of the teacher...is, to communicate all he knows as clearly, as perfectly, and as rapidly, as possible; leaving nothing to the pupil excepting to comprehend the information he conveys."31

It does seem to occur to the reviewer - rather too late - that the teacher ought to try to cultivate the intellectual faculties of his pupils. This point is covered in a footnote, which seeks to explain that previous comments should be taken to refer only to the communication of knowledge. The reviewer's grasp of the issue is open to question where he argues that the Hamiltonian system might be adapted to suit the monitorial system, and thus ignores the importance attached by Hamilton to small numbers in class.

Symonds's article on national education for Vol. 20 also upholds the Lancastrian system, though one wonders how carefully the writer had examined the monitor in action. It makes little sense for Symonds either
to applaud the value of oral teaching or to place emphasis on the enthusiasm and personality of the teacher as a preliminary to recommending a system where

"the master should be called upon only in the last resort."\textsuperscript{320}

Increasing dissatisfaction with techniques placing emphasis on rote-learning is evident from the 1840s onwards. Hickson's discussion of methods of teaching singing leads him to make important comments on principles of general application. Educationists are, he says, dangerously prone to confuse effective education with the adoption of a specific method\textsuperscript{321}. Lancaster was an excellent teacher, and so his system worked for him; this does not mean it is per se an effective system. Primarily, we need good teachers, produced by offering decent wages, decent training in teacher-training establishments and the diffusion of well-thought-out methods through school inspectors and a central Board of Education. Also in Vol.37, the education section of Miscellaneous Notices comments on a number of schoolbooks. A review of Lady Callcott's \textit{Little Arthur's History of England}\textsuperscript{222} leads to an attack on the standard of many history and geography textbooks, which test memory only: they are simply boring, and lack the right approach to bring imagination into play. These notices consistently advocate the use of visual and tactile aids to learning, and condemn any system of teaching grammar which starts with the rote-learning of grammatical rules. The same section of Vol.43\textsuperscript{223} criticizes the gross inefficiency of the Eton Grammar as a book of rules which need to be learned by heart before the material can be understood. Grammars should be self-explanatory. Similar points are made in the previous volume\textsuperscript{324}, where an impressive discussion of the various textbooks produced by the Scottish
School-book Society leads to a number of complaints about excessive detail, complex terminology and the inadequacy of the catechetical style of teaching as a means of developing the intellect. On the other hand, William Ellis's "State of the Nation" article provides the kind of list of detailed questions and axioms for the teaching of social science which would probably produce catechetical-type answers. Nevertheless, the period of Hickson's editorship is generally marked by a preference for the encouragement of imagination and wonder over rote-learning. The Review shows less interest in the topic of teaching techniques following the departure of Hickson at the end of 1851.
THE ORGANISATION OF FORMAL EDUCATION

The major issues discussed by the Westminster reviewers are grouped around two main themes, both focussed on elementary education. The first is the necessity or otherwise for a national system of education, and the second the issue of whether or not teaching could, or should, be restricted to secular subjects. Some of the issues which so exercise Reviews like the Rambler or Dublin receive scant attention. The Westminster, for example, shows little interest in discussing mixed or multi-denominational education. William Nesbitt's article on Irish education stands out as the one piece prepared to devote space to the debate, though even he relies on assertion rather than argument. His view is that only the religious bigot denies that the Irish system has been successful. The English system, so dominated by doctrinal dispute, so great a failure in moulding the character, has much to learn from the Irish experience.

It is during the editorship of Hickson that we see the greatest concentration of articles advocating a national system of education. Most of these are penned by Hickson himself, and, of these, few indeed offer any form of definition of a national system. Hickson tends to refer to national education in rather an automatic manner as some sort of panacea for whatever ill he happens to be discussing. Examples include Hickson's comments on the Hand-Loom Inquiry Commission, where he argues that existing information will suffice to justify a national system. And his education column in the Critical and Miscellaneous Notices section of Vol. 38 stresses the pre-eminent importance attached by the Westminster to education, while attacking what he sees as clerical attempts to block any educational progress - including the
establishment of a national system - which lies outside church control. A later article by Hickson on parliamentary matters voices similar complaints in a tone of some bitterness. Would Pestalozzi himself have been allowed to teach in a church school, he wonders ironically. Hickson fears that clerical control of education is actually increasing, encouraged by the failure of the government to use grants to weaken the sectarian divide.

Hickson's antipathy towards voluntary control of educational provision is frequently voiced, and predictably reflects the attitude of the Westminster as a whole. The fullest explanation of Hickson's approach and attitude occurs in his article "Educational Movements," where he claims that results demonstrate the failure of voluntaryism. Hickson emphatically supports the National Public School Association in its demands for a national system based on taxation, rather than charity. The teaching of religious doctrine should take place at certain specified times, when the schools would close to allow ministers and unpaid teachers access to the children. Hickson's further article on the subject for Vol. 55 reminds us of the distinction he draws between the teaching of sectarian dogma and the necessity to inform all teaching with the spirit of love and truth, which is truly religious. This is contrasted with the kind of religious instruction provided by the voluntary schools, where the tired teacher, cane in hand, grinds through indigestible chunks of a catechism - which can touch neither heart nor understanding - or uses the Bible as a spelling book, which inexorably kills off any interest in the scriptures. Better to adopt the system used in the Dean of Hereford's schools, where R.E. is taught in a room set apart from the mainstream classrooms and where the teacher actually
converses with the pupils. An earlier article by the same writer, "Education of the People"\textsuperscript{332}, complains that charity education produces a painful sense of obligation and is, as a direct result, guilty of sapping self-reliance.

By the later 1860s, the Westminster's habitual and axiomatic acceptance of national education is on the wane. This may well reflect a growing concern in the Review's columns over the increase of bureaucracy. However, it is only fair to point out that even Hickson's obvious enthusiasms for national education were tempered by a feeling that full-scale government interference and direction of education would be unpopular and un-English; the rôle of government is to supply funds to local schools, appoint inspectors and supply institutions for teacher-training, rather than to indulge in blanket and prescriptive legislation. There is, however, a considerable difference between Hickson's attitude and that of the editorial note in New Series Vol.18, where Nesbitt's assumption that the state should provide funds for popular education is held to be

"at least questionable..."\textsuperscript{333}

By New Series 41, the Review clearly feels that the question has been settled. In the aftermath of the 1870 Act, the writer decides that

"The 'Review' has consistently protested that it is unwise for the State to interfere with the education of the people, and that it is unfair to tax the community for the purpose of establishing a system of instruction under Governmental control."\textsuperscript{334}

This distinctly partial account of the Westminster's career is followed by the suggestion that, since we must reluctantly accept the government's decision to interfere, the best must be made of it. But the reviewer proceeds to make the worst of it. There is little by way of
positive suggestion: the writer prefers to criticize the 1870 Act and its aftermath for permitting the use of ratepayers' money to teach dogmatic religion.

The article "Public and Private Schools" in New Series Vol. 44 provides us with a theoretical justification of the Review's increasing antipathy towards growing state involvement in formal education. The argument is that, since there is no generally accepted and systematic statement of educational principle extant, then the government has no right to interfere with the laws of supply and demand—particularly in terms of secondary education. In addition, any attempt to base state intervention on the alleged incapacity of a community to decide its own educational goals is nothing less than an assault on freedom.

The Westminster's attitude towards compulsory elementary education closely follows the pattern of its comments on national systems. Volumes in the first series take a generally favourable view of compulsion, whereas writers in the late 1860s and early 70s adopt either a less definite or an opposing stance. Perhaps the debate over the nature, implications and practice of the 1870 legislation helped to crystallize that opposition. The writer of the article "The Government and the Education Act" in New Series Vol. 41 may be taken as representative of the non-committal school, commenting that:

"This is not the place to discuss the difficult questions involved in the application of the compulsory principle to national elementary instruction."

The Westminster Review is, of course, just the sort of place where such discussion should take place. And a representative of the anti-compulsory school can be seen at work in the article "Religion as a
Subject of National Education" in New Series Vol.43. Here, the argument is that compulsory education is simply impossible, since only a despotic country would seriously think of sending in the policeman to prosecute for non-attendance.

Agreement and consistency do prevail when the Review discusses the issue of secular education. Hickson's comments on the distinction between the religious spirit - which can and should inform the secular school - and the dogmatic approach of the sectarian school has already been noted. In a postscript to Vol.55, he complains that government money should not be provided to educational establishments which are chapels, rather than schools. He singles out the Catholic Poor-School Committee: why should government money enable them to buy images of the Virgin Mary for their schools?

George Combe's article "Secular Education" also emphasizes a division between moral education and religious instruction. The secular school can teach morality effectively through stressing maxims for practical conduct. Religion should be taught in a separate establishment. Combe is not denying the value of religious dogmas as such, though his view that they may usefully give added efficacy to secular precepts assumes a largely subordinate role for catechesis. A slightly different angle is taken by Ebenezer Syme in the very next volume, where he quotes in an apparently approving manner from a work which argues that the separation of the secular from the religious shelters the latter from contamination. The argument in favour of two separate establishments is repeated in the article "Sects and Secular Education", with the addition of a typical piece of the Westminster philosophy of knowledge.
The tendency of dogmatic instructors to treat scripture as if it is infallible fails to prepare the child for the biblical criticism he will face on leaving school; either he will lose his faith entirely, or he will take refuge behind superstition. However, an article nearly forty volumes later proves to be an exception to the rule in denying that it is possible to keep religious and secular education separate even if the former were taught outside the school. How can history be taught without a religious content? Those who would restrict religious instruction to bible-study forget that there are numerous versions of that book: which one should be chosen? How do you prevent teachers from expounding upon the text? The recommended approach is to treat religion as a phenomenon, teaching its elements as factually as you would teach the elements of other subjects.

It ought to be noted that the Westminster Review does not entirely ignore the practical considerations of a forthright advocacy of secularism. In New Series Vol.33, the article on popular education accepts that secular education represents the way forward, but warns that aggressive secularism could well delay progress for a decade or more.
The Fortnightly Review

The Purpose, Value and Limitations of Elementary and Secondary Education

The Fortnightly Review rarely analyses the precise moral implications of formal education, preferring to accept an identity between intellectual progress and a desire for the discovery and triumph of truth. The pattern is set by one of Morley's "Causeries", where he comments that

"The object of education is twofold....first, to develop the greatest amount of intellectual power; and second, to develop the greatest and most unswerving devotion to truth." 344

Morley is not spelling out the relationship between his twofold objects, but the Review's philosophy of knowledge of course seeks to place the search for truth as a direct consequence of intellectual improvement and freedom. It is entirely consistent with this philosophy that the Fortnightly should insist on freedom from dogmatic authority as a prerequisite for effective formal education. Elementary education, suitably organised, should therefore contribute in some way to moral improvement. An article on the Revised Code in Vol. 5 argues that allowing the masses a few glimpses of truth will effectively rescue them from ignorance, and thus from crime. This view is echoed in Huxley's "Administrative Nihilism"346, where he asserts that the promotion of the intellect in turn promotes reason: and the functioning of the latter demands a self-discipline which is itself moral.

Not all articles on the moral impact of formal education make a specific reference to the link between intellect and morality. Some are content merely to assert that moral principles may be implanted through elementary education without making clear how this is to be achieved. A case in point is the article "Compulsory Primary Education" for New
Series Vol.3^a^7, which claims, as a result of compulsory education, an improvement in morality due to the atmosphere of the school. It is made clear that this may be achieved without formal religious education.

The Review's most detailed discussion of the issue of the value of formal education comes from the pen of Morley himself. The articles which form the basis for his book "The Struggle for National Education"^a^4^a^ are impressive and closely-argued; they provide an insight into the mind of one who accepts both the importance and the essential limitations of education. Although teaching as a whole will widen the horizons of the poor, and help them put some order into their affairs and lives, elementary education, however perfect it becomes, will be able to do little to amend the evils of crime and immorality without a much wider programme of remedial legislation. Morley adopts a bitter tone towards those - and he singles out church leaders - who argue that education is the one necessary and assured remedy. Such people are precisely those who use this argument to block, not only other types of reform, but also significant improvements in elementary education itself. Sectarians think only of their dogmas, when, through education, we can at least give the poor a chance to improve their self-respect, and to contribute to society in a positive manner. Is it wise, asks Morley, to leave our political masters in a state of ignorance, and trust to rude vigour to guide them to the right decisions? Is it wise to ignore the intellectual improvement of the very tradesmen on whom our prosperity depends?

While many of these arguments are familiar to us from the pens of a number of reviewers in a number of Reviews, Morley is unique in being
prepared to move beyond statements of general principle to indicate what level of education he considers appropriate to a child leaving an elementary school. The absolute minimum standard should demand the ability to read with fluency and expression; to write short themes or easy paraphrases; to handle proportions and fractions, vulgar and decimal. Morley's demand that the ablest of the poor should have the right to progress to the highest secondary level of education is unusual but not unique: we recall that the same call is made by J.G. Fitch, who further demands that the poor should have access to university.

The political value of elementary education is a theme echoed in a number of articles. This does not mean that the Review would wish to restrict the vote to those who could achieve a certain standard of literacy: an article on democracy in England in Vol.1 explicitly rejects that idea. On the other hand, the public affairs section for New Series Vol.1 argues that, had education been more widely diffused, there would be no current opposition to reform, and implies that this opposition is not to be dismissed, since the more intelligent members of the working class itself are by no means anxious for a sudden widening of the franchise.

Our examination of the philosophy of knowledge of the Fortnightly Review revealed a strong attachment on the part of that periodical to the idea of the intellectual guidance of the nation by some form of clerisy. It might, therefore, be anticipated that this theme would manifest itself in the Review's treatment of elementary education. Certainly there is the suggestion, in Morley's review of Mill's inaugural lecture at St. Andrew's, that it is through the guidance of advanced intellect -
even more than through changes in social conditions— that society in
general will progress. Morley's article "A Fragment on the Genesis of
Morals" discusses in an appropriately fragmentary way the improvement
of morals, and argues that such improvement is based to some extent upon
the capacity of a great moral reformer, strong in intellect and
behavioural science, to identify suitable institutions for the
advancement of the multitude. While a stationary intellect leads to a
stationary moral life, it is not actually the intellect which sparks off
a quickening of the moral perceptions: and here again the influence of
a great teacher or leader is necessary. This is not, unfortunately, one
of Morley's more cogent articles. It seems that the influence of this
leader works through the tapping of a kind of receptive quality—a
conscientious feeling—which is not intellectual as such. Indeed,
positive changes in social conditions, which affect the general
character, can expand this feeling throughout society. Perhaps the rôle
of the moral reformer is to facilitate an awareness of the need for such
changes. This article seems to reverse the relative importance attached
to the leader and to social improvement noted in the article on Mill's
lecture. Nevertheless, both agree that the leader has a significant part
to play. Elementary education alone will not suffice to make the people
as a whole as progressive and enlightened as the Fortnightly Review
would wish.
The *Fortnightly Review* shows little interest in the curriculum of the elementary school, and less in teaching techniques. Discussion of the curriculum is dominated by arguments for and against Classics, and therefore reveals the Review's greater interest in secondary schooling for the middle classes. The article "Shall we continue to Teach Latin and Greek?" in New Series Vol. 3 discusses the issue at both secondary and higher levels. In particular, the writer seeks to examine the familiar contention that classical study is the best mental discipline and aid to intellectual development. To do this, he seeks to identify the elements which contribute to that development. In stimulating powers of observation, Classics cannot compete with physical science. In improving memory, Classics has no particular advantage over other disciplines. Mathematics is far better for developing the power to handle abstract concepts. On the other hand, Classical poetry has an unique value in cultivating the imagination and taste and rescuing the mind from the taint of provinciality so feared by Matthew Arnold. The other elements—particularly reflection and conditional knowledge—are appropriate to higher education. The point is that Latin is not to be pursued at school by anyone leaving at fifteen: nor should verse-composition be attempted by anyone not intended for university.

A Royal Institution lecture by Farrar is printed in New Series Vol. 3. Farrar takes an apparently jaundiced view of the value of Classics. The mental discipline argument is here completely rejected, and the moral effect of studying Greek and Latin is considered to be frequently bad. The Classics grind leaves its victims with the spelling and
orthography of a Fred Vincy; with a reprehensible ignorance of English literature — and with a taste for sensational reading.

Rejecting, as it would seem, the domination of the curriculum by the Classics, the lecturer proposes as an alternative a range of languages, literatures and sciences. The school-leaver should, at the age of eighteen or nineteen, be able to:

1) read at sight any easy Greek or Latin author;
2) demonstrate a firm grounding in arithmetic, algebra and geometry;
3) comprehend French and German, and speak one of the two with fluency;
4) demonstrate a sound grasp of history and geography;
5) demonstrate a mastery of English, and a familiarity with the great literature in the language;
6) demonstrate a knowledge of the most important conclusions of science, together with a detailed and practical grasp of one scientific discipline.

However, when Farrar discusses the way in which this curriculum is to be developed, it becomes clear that Classics is by no means overthrown. The study of Latin is to commence at the age of 9, and Greek at 12: which makes Classics the “main serious study of the seven years between nine and sixteen.”

Nor is Classics dismissed in the article “Technical Education” for New Series Vol.4. Indeed, it is argued that the industrial party has seriously undervalued the dead languages when overestimating the immediate value of science. Classical study is certainly superior to the study of modern languages, in that it equips the student with the ability to express himself precisely, and therefore to think accurately. However, the author is keen to emphasize that natural science should
rank, as a philosophical study, fully the equal of mathematics and Classics. Literature may be the gateway to the study of man in society, but there is more to the world than the Greek and Roman writers ever suspected. It is therefore incumbent on the government to encourage the less effective, semi-classical and semi-commercial schools to recognize the value of science. On a similar theme, Oscar Browning warns that it is necessary to take a stand on the literary pre-eminence of the Classical authors. Browning suggests that archaeology be taught at school-level as a useful teaching-aid to the study of Classical literature.

The one uncompromising attack on the value of Classics comes in a brief notice of a work entitled *The Claims of Classical Studies, whether as Information or as Training*. Clearly the work under review is antagonistic towards Classics, and the reviewer comments:

"The pretensions of classics are sifted more and more carefully, and the residuum of independent worth, found to belong to them, is becoming beautifully less."

Other than printing Huxley's Lay Sermon *On the Advisableness of Improving Natural Knowledge*, the Review shows less interest in the teaching of physical science than it does in the teaching of Classics. Nor does the *Fortnightly Review* show a Westminster-style interest in education in political economy or social sciences. In the very first volume, the article "The Limits of Political Economy" argues that political economy is not an independent science, any more than the phenomena of society can be studied in isolation from intellectual and moral elements. Benthamite self-interest is therefore sheer perversity. This article accepts the validity of the positivist antipathy towards
Utilitarianism, which is charged with ignoring the fact that morality transcends self-interest.

The lack of attention bestowed upon curriculum matters is reflected in Morley's "The Struggle for National Education" where the writer is more concerned to explain what should not be taught - i.e. dogmatic religion - than to explain what subjects should form the curriculum of the school.
The Fortnightly Review consistently supports a secular system of elementary education. Denominational schools are given short shrift. The one article daring to defend such schools is treated with a dose of editorial tut-tutting, from which the Review as a whole is generally free. J.G. Fitch - the offender in this case - argues that sectarian schools suit the English way, and are by no means as riddled with dogma as opponents allege. He also rounds on those who would seek to destroy the denominational system by removing religious education from the elementary school. The editor comments that the Bishop of Manchester had found such a scheme both feasible and reasonable.

In fact, the Fortnightly does regard the possible demise of the denominational system as a consummation devoutly to be wished. Dogmatic instruction is a wrong in itself, and represents the antithesis of true education. In practical terms, the Review wishes to see religious education taught separately from secular subjects, and argues that such separation is possible. The article "The Conscience Clause" for Vol.3 asserts that the three "R"s, elementary geography and history are habitually taught without any impress of religious doctrine. The contrast here with the denominational reviews is particularly marked. The writer is not suggesting that religion should be excluded from schools, but that sectarian dogma should be replaced with simple reading of scripture and moral education. How, he adds, are children to understand dogma in any case? When the inevitable dogma is inevitably learned by rote, how can we avoid instilling unreasoning prejudice into our children? Similar attitudes prevail in an article in Vol.5 on
religious life in Scotland. Catechetical teaching is an incomprehensible burden to a child's mind, and gets in the way of the genuine spiritual enlightenment that stems from free enquiry. The reading of the Bible is to be permitted, but the child must be allowed to make up its own mind on doctrines and churches when it reaches maturity.

The acceptance of some form of religious instruction within the school is not typical of the Review. By the time of New Series Vol.1, the article "Prospects of the Session" advocates a national system of education teaching secular and moral education, whereas religious instruction must be left to the parents and clergymen out of school time. There is no provision allowed for separate, time-tabled religious instruction within the school, whether in a distinct classroom or not. The implication is that morality and religion are different in kind.

Morley's article "Mr. Mill's Three Essays on Religion" argues that morality is certainly not the essence of religion, which might or might not be moral. Picton's article "Moral Aspects of the Religious Difficulty" also deals with whether moral training can be separated from religious instruction. If religion is taken to mean dogma, then that separation is not only possible, but also - presumably - necessary. But if religion is taken to mean

"teaching imbued with reverence for the Divine Mystery that enshrouds us all..."

then one hopes for its omnipresence. We might, perhaps, wonder whether such a nebulous presence would be detectable. Picton is adamant that the Cowper-Temple clause permits the Board schools to teach a theology which is all too detectable. The schools teach an approach to biblical
infallibility which might please Protestants, but which also attaches
to itself the ghastly Old Testament prohibitions which cause conflict
for the pupils when, in later life, they are exposed to scientific
ideas which reveal the unreasoning nature of such doctrine.

Morley's "The Struggle for National Education" provides a detailed
examination of the relationship between religious and moral instruction,
set firmly in the context of contemporary debate and practice. A
considerable proportion of the work is given over to a sustained attack
on sectarianism, where the Anglican establishment receives the brunt of
the criticism. The clergy are presented as inveterate enemies to freedom
and light. The conscience clause does not safeguard Nonconformists from
having to pay towards Anglican schools in those rural areas where
education is compulsory. In a footnote, Morley supports the arguments of
those who suggest that such schools should be placed under local, and
presumably non-sectarian, management for secular instruction. If
religious education is to be provided, it must be at the cost of those
who control it, and at a specified time under a teacher employed for
that purpose and no other. Morley also complains that, since the
training colleges were left in sectarian hands, they have supplied, to
model non-sectarian schools, teachers who were trained in a manner
unsympathetic to the aims of the latter establishments. Moreover, the
worthlessness of the conscience clause is attested to by the avowed
intention of the Church of England to use its schools to communicate
Anglican dogma. Morley demands a national system of secular schooling,
with religious education available only as a supplementary course,
provided by the clergyman in a specific time-table slot and paid for by
willing parents. His tone is bitter as he condemns what he sees as the
tyranny of the Established Church in effectively making the
Nonconformist minority pay for the teaching of church doctrine in church
schools.

Perhaps it is a mark of Morley's confidence in the alleged gross
inefficiency of sectarian schools that he is prepared to play the
pragmatist and confess to a willingness to turn a blind eye to the
dogmatic instruction if only the schools were able to provide a decent
standard of intellectual education.

Morley is a firm advocate of the need to make elementary education
compulsory. This view is prevalent throughout the Fortnightly, and
contrasts significantly with the attitude of the Westminster Review
during the same period.
The Purposes, Value and Limitations of Elementary and Secondary Education

Discussion of the value of formal education is of limited interest to the Christian Remembrancer, since the issue revolves around basic assumptions which are never challenged, and which are shared by the Review's habitual readers. The first assumption is that education must be grounded in religion. The article "Recent English Works on Practical Education" in New Series Vol.3 makes it clear that the working classes are to be educated primarily to lead godly and Christian lives. The same writer continues his theme in the next volume with the following quotation from the Educational Magazine:-

"'The affections, the imagination, the understanding of a man, seem wasted and meant for nothing, till he finds that he is a CITIZEN; what it is to be a citizen he knows not till he finds that he is a WORSHIPPER.'"370

This consideration implies, of course, that formal education has a vital rôle to play as a means of christianizing the poor. The article "Dr. Hook and the Education Question"371 argues that a religious education in school is the only way to guarantee a religious upbringing for the children of the poor.

The possibility of education being a means to prevent crime - an issue much discussed in other Reviews - receives scant treatment, since a religious education is assumed to fulfil that function. Only an article for New Series Vol.43 on the Revised Code372 mentions the matter, and then merely in passing. It is asserted that criticism of the cost of education is misplaced, since the lack of education would result in increased - and expensive - pauperism and crime.

The second assumption is that religious education encompasses moral
education. Moreover, moral education is more important than its intellectual counterpart, since the latter cannot teach sentiments and habits unaided. The article on Hook reminds us, not only that education can be a force for evil as well as for good, but also that, while knowledge can be a tool to allow religion to flourish, it will not, of itself, purify the mind.

The Review does not entirely ignore the potential political impact of formal education. Elementary education is not to be used for social mobility, but the writer of an article on industrial training in New Series Vol. 41 is adamant that such training - at school level - does not leave the poor stranded above their station, but instead reminds them of the dignity of their calling. And in an article on middle-class education, the reviewer is anxious to point out the potential dangers if the class of small retailers, in possession of the vote, continue to be educated in their commercial schools to serve Mammon, and Mammon alone.
CURRICULUM

Absent from the *Christian Remembrancer* is a significant number of articles discussing the curriculum. Even the few which refer to the matter lack detail. "Notes on Industrial Training in National Schools" in *New Series Vol. 41* is a case in point. Religious education is, unsurprisingly, seen as one of the twin foundations of elementary education alongside the three "R"s, but the writer is not concerned to expand further his views beyond the remark that the child is to learn things appropriate to his class and calling. The "Recent English Works on Practical Education" articles are much more concerned with the organisation of education and teaching techniques than with any comparison of, say, the value of the various secular subjects. The nearest we get to a meaningful discussion of the issue is in the review of a work on middle-class education, where mathematics is presented as being particularly valuable in enlarging the mind.

However, in *New Series Vol. 9* is an article which provides a detailed examination of the value of the teaching of history in schools for the upper classes. Here, history is seen as the one secular subject which provides the gateway to politics, legislation, poetry, the fine arts and so on. History enlarges the mind through its call upon the chronological sense; it enables us to act wisely by showing us experience beyond our own, and thus reminds us of the interdependence of, and relationship between, events. Philosophy may teach us that absolute truth is unobtainable, but history enables us to get as close as possible. The Bible requires to be read with an historical sense. Since God's Revelation is expressed through history, it therefore requires an historical understanding to be rightly comprehended.
TEACHING TECHNIQUES

The *Christian Remembrancer* prides itself on offering practical suggestions to persons engaged in instruction. The article "Infant Schools" stresses the intention of the Review to offer useful comments on the various educational treatises which come under its scrutiny:

"...knowing, as we well do, that many of the clergy and other school-managers who peruse our pages especially desire minute and detailed suggestions for the daily working of their schools..."

The Review is true to its word - at least in the earlier volumes of the New Series. Practical suggestions range from the way to paint a blackboard-style wall to the problems of using the Bible as a spelling-book, or from recommendations of specific works to recommendations on the value of physical exercise.

On a more theoretical level, the Review is generally suspicious of techniques which place great demands on the pupil's memory. The "Recent English Works" article stresses the need for investigative thinking in preference to passivity and mere memory, and continues in New Series Vol.4 to castigate any questioning technique which probes the memory only. The problem of religious teaching in which rote-learning takes precedence over understanding is also discussed. Memorizing things is all very well providing the interest of the child has been aroused through the utilization of the understanding. How can a child gain anything morally if it does not understand? The Review reminds teachers of the need to use a variety of question techniques and to root the instruction in the child's own experience. On the other hand, the training of the intellect without an accompanying religious atmosphere is an evil greater than rote-learning would be under the same conditions. The system of Jacotot comes under rather unfair criticism in
an article on a Kay Shuttleworth lecture at Exeter Hall\textsuperscript{302}. The reviewer feels that Jacotot's system is merely dogmatic or teacher-directed, and objects to the lecturer calling it "analytical", or conducive towards learning through discovery. In fact, the reviewer's unfairness reflects his eagerness to criticize Kay Shuttleworth and his "whiggish" ways. Two Pestalozzi manuals are praised in the same volume\textsuperscript{304} for seeking to awaken the mind and follow its natural development. The master is encouraged to avoid dogmatic instruction through leading his pupils, not only to use skills of observation, but also to demonstrate their understanding.

The Review is not prepared to deny or forego the use of catechism in schools, and ignores the issue of whether such tuition could be seen as straight rote-learning. The "Infants Schools\textsuperscript{366}" article comments on the need to subordinate educational maxims to the baptismal formularies of the Church of England, and an article on the religious development of children\textsuperscript{366} stresses the primacy of the catechism. Furthermore, an article criticizing state interference with school trusts clearly fears and deprecates a growing antipathy towards catechesis.\textsuperscript{367}
THE ORGANISATION OF FORMAL EDUCATION

The *Christian Remembrancer* consistently assumes and asserts that formal elementary education must remain denominationally based and controlled. Indeed, according to the "Recent English Works" article in New Series Vol. 399, the truest principle is that all such schools should be run on the guidelines of the Church of England, which has the unique capacity to blend mercy and truth into the quality of justice, which should form the framework for school life. Only in this way can the true ends of education be attained. A further article in the same volume obligingly states those ends: the moulding of the will and affections of man

"in conformity with the relations in which he stands, as a spiritual creature, to God and to other men." 399

This outlook enables the Review to praise the Presbyterian schools of Scotland, where education is wedded to the church and thus produces moral and useful members of society. This does not, of course, imply any approval of Presbyterianism, which is described as a merely human institution. Were such a system to be adopted by the apostolic and Catholic Church of England, then its effectiveness and value would increase immeasurably. This article also reveals the importance attached by the reviewer to the middle classes, who are presented as worthy enough to merit the provision of diocesan schools to replace the materialist principles of commercial schooling with the religious principles of the Church.

The Review is, of course, keen to oppose any attempts to prise elementary education from the grasp of the Church. State control, mixed education and secular education are rejected totally. The article discussing a lecture by Arnold on the study of modern history391 denies
that the state should take upon itself the moral training of the young. The task of the state is first and foremost to keep citizens from harm, and to leave to the Church such training, which can only be seen in terms of the spiritual relations between man, society and God. The state can, and should, provide the material means whereby the Church educates. The most extensive attack on the state control of education is launched in the article "Dr. Hook and the Education Question". This reviewer assumes that placing schools in the hands of a Minister of Public Instruction is tantamount to giving them to a political party. The French and Prussian experience allegedly demonstrates that the outcry against interference with family life will prevent the implementation of any fully-centralized system. Dr. Hook, argues the reviewer, has fallen victim to the lure of dubious statistics, and fails to recognize the real virtues of some schools for which there are no figures available. In any case, what matters is not quantity, but effective discipline, which alone can instil desirable habits.

The article "Foreign State Education" is similarly suspicious of those wishing to import inappropriate foreign systems of secular and compulsory education into the country. This does not prevent the reviewer from using, whenever possible, convenient evidence from the reports of Matthew Arnold and James Fraser to point out the alleged failure of attempts to use the Bible as a common religious basis for non-sectarian education. This review is, however, prepared to see the grant of government assistance to the secularists to enable them to establish their own schools - providing this would not compromise the freedom of the religious bodies.
The article "State Interference with School Trusts" argues that secular education is impossible per se, since subjects other than religion have religious content and implications. And secular education is dismissed as un-English in New Series Vol. 33. The article on Hook reminds the reader that, since education is more than the simple communication of knowledge, it is essential to recognize that no true education would take place if religion were reduced by a time-table clause to the periphery of the system. Since meaningful religious education would not take place under such a system, it is fair to assume that an irreligious version would do so, with results as dangerous as they are undesirable.

The article "The Divine Drama of History" in New Series Vol. 30 demonstrates how the Review's attitude towards secular education is at one with, not only its philosophy of knowledge in particular, but also with its world-view in general. The writer comments:

"The whole theory of indifferentism in religion, antidenominationalism or secularism in education, and Erastianism in politics, is based upon the notion that all positive religion is a dream... and that the true human life is the aggregate of sensations..."
The discussion of the issue of formal education in the Prospective Review follows very closely the Review's philosophy of knowledge. The article "The Philosophy of Education, in its Relations to Religion" posits the existence of truth lying in germ within man. Education, in the sense of calling the whole person into full being, is one of these truths requiring germination. This article is lacking in practical suggestions, but may be supplemented by the article "The Religious Bearings of Physical Science in Education", where the writer accepts, not only that a true philosophy of religion leads directly to a true philosophy of education, but also that the former should guide our views on the purpose of education. This reviewer implies that intellectual advance alone is no guarantee of educational progress, which lies mainly under the control of the moral and religious sphere. In practice, it is necessary to add to the teaching of secular subjects those

"particular developments and modifications of the religious Idea which secular teaching does not naturally contain."

It may be possible, continues the writer, to leave this supplementing of formal instruction to parent or teacher in church: nevertheless, his concern over the limits of secular teaching is very real. It is the quickening of moral emotion which provides the key to true education. An article on Mary Carpenter's Reformatory Schools follows the author in demanding the use of formal education to direct human nature to spiritual progress. Strong faith, not intellectuality, is the bedrock of education. The basic assumption made by this reviewer of the worth and innate goodness of the human soul is typical of the Prospective Review: an assumption which informs its attitude towards formal education.
The Carpenter reviewer argues that society as a whole lacks this conception of the soul's capabilities, and adds that the educator may be the most effective communicator of man's potential. Moral and religious education may be of the greatest moment, but intellectual training is vital to permit the assimilation of useful knowledge, and also to enable everyone to enjoy the higher ends of life, rather than gravitate towards the debased ones. The reviewer sums up by stressing his conception of the true aims of education, which are to awaken in the heart our feelings towards moral and religious objects. Again, we note the way in which the educational discussion relates to the Review's philosophy of knowledge - in this case, to the importance of ideas latent within the mind.

It would seem, therefore, that the Prospective is not inclined to attach great importance to the power of unaided intellectual training to educate in a meaningful way. A review of Carpenter's book on Ragged Schools comments that the work shows the inadequacy of mere intellectual tuition. The Reformatory Schools review rejects utterly the notion that literacy and numeracy alone prevent crime. The article on juvenile delinquency in Vol.2 does accept that ignorance, alongside want, is one of the most important causes of crime, and that education can relieve that one contributory factor. However, the reviewer is not suggesting, either that intellectual education will accomplish that end, or that education will lead to economic improvement per se.

Absent from the Prospective Review is the interest shown by other
Reviews in formal education as a method of political control or advancement. The important article in Vol.8 on popular education mentions the issue only in passing, after once more stressing the importance of education in unfolding the religious sentiment latent within us. The author - perhaps Samuel Robinson - hopes for an educational system which would provide the kind of knowledge, not only suited to the recipient's social position, but which would also enable him to improve that position if circumstances permitted.
Practical curriculum matters do not interest the *Prospective Review*. The articles on education for the upper classes so typical of the other Reviews are not entirely absent, but are certainly limited in number. This factor may well reflect the educational background of the contributors. In Vol.4, an article on Eton accepts that the education there should be based on Classics, but wishes to widen the curriculum. The argument in favour of Classics is the familiar one - that the study of Latin and Greek is a fine preparation for intellectual toil of any type. The dead languages are inherently valuable through the richness and variety of their literature. Moreover, it is important to possess a *corpus* of study, in preference to a mere smattering. Nevertheless, the curriculum at Eton should include arithmetic, English reading, geography, history, modern languages and elementary mathematics. It is significant that the reviewer sees the more complex scientific exercises as suitable for study during the holidays: they can then be practised at school. Tayler's article "Maury, on the Spiritual Legends of the Middle Ages" is less ready to accept a prime position for Classics in the educational system. It has had its value in the past, but now must, at the very least, leave room for disciplines more appropriate to our present needs. Tayler is keen to discard a merely utilitarian approach: the obsession with the practical applications of science should be balanced with a study of the past as a whole to enrich the general mind. The traditional use of Euclid is defended in a review of a version of *Elements of Geometry* in Vol.3. The elements are heralded as the best introductory exercise for the development of the reasoning faculty. The practice of noticing school books is not widely prevalent in the Review,
though Vol. 3 does contain one further example: a review of a zoological textbook by Patterson\textsuperscript{400}, where the study of natural history in schools is welcomed.

It is therefore no surprise to see discussion of teaching techniques a very rare feature of the \textit{Prospective Review}, beyond the occasional exhortation to arouse the affections of the child through personal influence. The "National Education" article in Vol. 3\textsuperscript{401} castigates the monitorial system for effectively preventing the teacher from enlisting his ability to inspire veneration from his pupils.
The Review's attitude to the organisation of formal education reflects, not only the importance attached to religious education, but also its opposition to the imposition of dogma. This leads the writers to criticize the voluntary system on the grounds of restricting liberty of thought, but also into suspicion of the state establishing any secular system lacking a firm basis in religion. J.H. Thom is probably the author of an article on the Minutes of the Committee of Council on education^10, where he objects to the right of the state to prescribe any form of Christianity in schools. Doctrinal matters must be left to parents and religious instructors: religiousness must be left to the schools. The writer demands the provision of free schools in every poor neighbourhood, with Normal schools set up as model establishments by the government to provide teacher-training and scholarships for the best pupils from the ordinary schools. The voluntary system is felt to be inadequate to play its part in this national framework, and so a minister for public instruction is needed with real, well-defined powers. The article "National Education" in the same volume - which is certainly by Thom - also rounds on the voluntaryists in no uncertain terms. Cramming an incomprehensible creed into a child blunts his capacity for free inquiry, and blocks the development of a sound system of national education. It is possible - and essential - to teach veneration: to illustrate God's goodness: to communicate scriptural facts; and to put across the example of Christ and the need to imitate Him. All this, and literacy and numeracy, and good manners, can be taught in common. But Thom is not advocating the destruction of the voluntary system, despite his forceful criticism. Since man is innately
good, his efforts should not be discarded or legislated for.

"Where no Churchman, no Dissenter, no private Missionary of knowledge has yet come, there let the State, without rivalry, commence its work."

The earlier point about the state providing model schools is echoed in this article. So is the desire to make school teaching a reputable profession with a decent salary, and to grant that teacher a place in what Thom significantly refers to as the national clerisy. This phrase encapsulates the Review's belief in the essentially religious nature of effective education, intellectual or moral.

In Vol. 8, the article on popular education emphasizes the centrality of the religious sentiment among the faculties to be unfolded by education, and reminds us that this can be done without theological doctrine. This piece, however, suggests that local control can provide the answer to the various disputes of the secularists and voluntaryists—especially as both parties seem to be losing support. A more precise solution to the denominational problem is proposed by an article in Vol. 24 which sees little difficulty in Dr. Hook's idea of a separate classroom and timetable slot for doctrinal education. Thom may again be the author: Houghton is certainly of that opinion, and the forceful style is characteristic of the man.
The Contemporary Review

The Purpose, Value and Limitations of Elementary and Secondary Education

In Vol.9 of the Contemporary Review, I. Gregory Smith's article "Lowe and Huxley on the Classics" argues that education is to be seen as the greatest of the great questions of the day. Indeed, the Review as a whole does discuss the various educational issues with considerable frequency and some expertise. Trouble is taken in some articles openly to offer a summary of published material for the purposes of the interested but busy reader. The articles "Middle Schools Commission Report" by Lake and "A French Criticism of our Public Schools" by Fearon are cases in point. The latter confirms the Review's expertise, since Fearon was involved in the inspection of Scottish schools for the Taunton Commission. The topics chosen by Lake and Fearon also reveal the predilection of the Contemporary for the discussion of issues affecting the education of the upper classes. Popular education is generally fairly well served in terms of analyses of its value, but much less so when curriculum is examined. The Review does, however, refer to the education of women with a frequency unmatched even by the Westminster.

Smith's article makes the straightforward point that the successful transfer of political power depends upon the fitness of the currently unfranchised, and that fitness itself depends upon education.

Significantly, the reviewer then proceeds to discuss, not the means whereby this consummation is to be achieved, but the value of Classics to those who, presumably, already have the vote. Smith does make one point of general application: the mind should be trained before knowledge is provided - unless the aim is to produce a non-reasoning prig. Other reviewers extend this point to cast suspicion on any system
of education which provides mere intellectual fare, but fails to satisfy the moral feelings. Plumptre's paper "The Relative Functions of Church and State in National Education" argues that education should provide the citizen with training for both the temporal and spiritual kingdoms. And a review in the Notices of Books section of Vol.10 quotes with approval the words of a certain Dr. Moore, arguing that improving the logical faculties of man will not amend his natural will and passions. Christianity — and Christian education — will seek to influence the whole man, and enable him to take steps to earn his salvation. A similar point is made by Emily Shirreff, who sees education as the training of motives which will act upon the will: teaching must respect Christian standards and, in so doing, appeal to the conscience.

Throughout the 1870s, the Review continues to stress the necessary primacy of moral training in formal education, but increasingly fails to adhere to the view that morality need be taught within an overtly Christian framework. This may in turn reflect the change in editorship from Alford to Knowles in 1870. Dudley Campbell's article for Vol.22, for instance, complains that too little attention has been given to moral education per se: boys should be trained for self-improvement and selflessness, but are not. The article "Ethical Teaching versus Religious Teaching in the National Schools" in Vol.23 may be unhappy with the assumption that religion and morality are identical, but is adamant that the usual intellectual instruction in such schools will not, of itself, teach morality. The writer, Mackintosh, requires the teacher to provide an outline of a man's duty, to communicate the idea that freedom of development of thought and character is an essential and inalienable right, and to identify the common requirements of law and
order in the interests of the state. The decision of the editor to print an article by Huxley in advance of the election to the School Boards in 1871\textsuperscript{424} reflects the importance attached to Huxley's discussion of the purposes of education, which anticipates some of the points made by Mackintosh. Since mere intellectual drill will simply lead to specious and surface smartness, a child must receive the kind of religious education that is as truly religious as it is undogmatic, and that centres upon the stimulation of love for an ethical ideal.

The \textit{Contemporary Review} is prepared on occasion to assert that crime is reduced by formal education, though precise analysis of the evidence for and against the proposition is wanting. Plumptre\textsuperscript{426} accepts that it is the duty of the state to restrict personal freedom in seeking to curb crime through reducing ignorance, and a notice of the Bishop of St. David's Charge to his clergy\textsuperscript{426} suggests that a school can open the hearts of its pupils to moral truth, and thus cut the level of criminality. This notice also advances the familiar argument that the moral atmosphere of the school is more important than the secular teaching.

Should formal education be used for social mobility? The Review accepts that it can be so used, but rarely conceives of such mobility as a prime function of education. Absent is the notion that structured arrangements should be available for the very lowest classes to rise into the higher echelons. Lake, for example, argues that Latin may act as a social ladder, but not one which can be climbed by all classes. He accepts a
commissioner's view of Latin as

"'the cement of the social bridge which unites all classes of society
in England above the day-labourer.'"

The labourer, it seems, is not to be allowed access to the bridge. On
the other hand, J.M. Ludlow sees permitting access as an essentially
Christian action. All classes must be given a dynamic and progressive
education which ensures that no talent is buried, and that the
blasphemous concept of restricting an individual to his station is
attacked by affiliating all elementary schools for the poorer classes to
Working Men's colleges. By way of contrast, an examination of
Littledale's article "High Life Below Stairs" reveals, on the
one hand, a willingness to contemplate a man rising in social status
through education - or more specifically, through access to culture -
but on the other, a conviction that it is better to raise the culture of
a whole class, rather than to shed the rôle of artisan per se.
Littledale's practical suggestions do, however, seem more relevant to
the progress of individuals through the adaptation of the existing
formal education system rather than to the progress of an entire class.
The endowed schools, he argues, should award scholarships to affiliated
local elementary schools of proven quality.
CURRICULUM

It is in discussion of the curriculum that the *Contemporary Review*'s predilection for articles on educational issues relevant to the upper classes is most apparent. The teaching of Classics receives the greatest attention. Wessel Walker's analysis of the Review's treatment of the subject is marred by typographical error and inconsistency, but she rightly identifies how closely the comments on Classics reflect the attitude of the reviewers to prevailing philosophies of education. This can be seen clearly in Smith's article criticizing Lowe. The latter is accused of rejecting Classics for its alleged failure to communicate useful knowledge; a failure which prevented it from disciplining the mind. We recall that Smith saw the training of the mind as the first and most important intellectual task in education. Lowe is therefore castigated for reversing the true order of intellectual development. Smith further comments that the strenuous nature of Classical study demands an exactness of response from habits of concentration and memory, and therefore leads to a true discipline of the faculties. The student of Latin and Greek must reason inductively, or he will be unable to work out the necessary linguistic principles from the raw material. Verse composition may, admits Smith, have been over-emphasized, but at least it teaches precision in handling rules and draws out the ability to select and deploy information. The reviewer is indeed prepared to grant that Latin and Greek of themselves are of little use as equipment in the battle of life, but at least they provide, in an uniquely valuable way, the training for the fight.

The Review consistently upholds the value of Classics. Thomas Markby's articles on public schools for Vol. 42 fully endorse the primacy of
Classics, and demand that rigorous attention be devoted to oral work in grammatical exercises. Markby is keen to dismiss the value of English literature or physical science as a rival to Classics: science, in particular, allegedly has little to offer as a discipline of the intellect, since its principles are mere generalizations, which soon fade from the mind. Conington's article "A Liberal Education" makes points relevant to both school and higher education, and argues that, while the dominance of the curriculum by Classics may be overplayed, no subject can offer a rival combination of intellectual advantages, which include a steadying effect on the judgement and a recognition of the profound impact of studying an influential civilisation so remote from our own. Nor is Conington prepared to postpone the study of Greek until after the age of sixteen. This is because the younger boy, being more susceptible to compulsion, is easier to lead through the necessary grind of basic grammar. Verse-composition should also be retained, since it is suited to the abilities of the younger boys. Conington shares Markby's distaste for the idea of English literature and language replacing or taking time from Classics, but is prepared to accept the extension of the study of natural science, with two important provisos which imply a certain disapproval of any large-scale increase in such study. The first is that experience suggests that natural science can, and does, place difficulties in the way of religion. The second proviso is that literary men do not perceive any lessening of their mental powers due to their ignorance of science. On the other hand, Conington is happy to add the study of German to the early curriculum, since it is so vital a tool in modern learning.
Alfred Church's article "A Short Plea for Latin Verse" agrees that Latin and Greek should remain the basis of the curriculum, but would allow space for the teaching of science and English language and literature. Church is not, however, upholding verse-making as appropriate for boys under the age of 15: sufficient discipline is imposed on the mind by verse-translation. Conington is quoted (in his capacity as contributor to the report of the Public Schools Commission) as a firm advocate of composition, since the clever boy finds that poetry falls much more within his range than does prose. Church does not, however, point out the significance of Conington's restriction of the value of composition to the clever boy; nor does he query how appropriate composition might be to the less gifted. Less enthusiasm for verse-making is shown in the Notices of Books section in the same volume, where the reviewer of Thompson's Wayside Thoughts regards the activity as appropriate for some but not for others. This reviewer is willing to add more science and English to the curriculum, but is adamant that he has no intention of disparaging the value of Classics.
The *Contemporary Review* does not review school books or pedagogic manuals as a matter of policy, unlike periodicals such as the *Christian Remembrancer*. One result is that comments on teaching technique are few and far between. The attacks on rote-learning which frequently appear in other Reviews are correspondingly absent. Emily Shirreff's criticism of the cramming system as degrading and immoral is one of the few examples which can be cited. It is the like-minded Emily Davies who provides us with the one detailed analysis of teaching technique within the Review. Her article "The Training of the Imagination" recommends that teachers should keep the imaginative faculty constantly in mind. Imagination can help a pupil visualize an idea, and the teacher should aim to set exercises which train the imagination. Imagination lies behind effective reasoning, since the scientific hypothesis itself requires the power to envisage the relationship between complex mental pictures. To assist the pupil, the teacher should use concrete examples whenever possible. Davies suggests that the difficulty of providing concrete instances in grammar might be obviated by leaving mood, tense, gender and the like until the mind has developed sufficiently to cope with abstracts.
THE ORGANISATION OF FORMAL EDUCATION

In his advertising circular for the new *Contemporary Review*, editor Alford commented that the periodical would number among its contributors those who, while holding to a belief in the articles of Christianity, were by no means afraid of the challenges of modern thought. As a rival to the *Fortnightly Review*, the *Contemporary* had therefore to consider the issues which much exercised the former's contributors, who, as we know, displayed an axiomatic opposition to denominational education and the use of such education to inculcate dogma. The discussion surrounding the 1870 Education Act gave particular focus to these issues. In fact, the *Contemporary* is, in general, keen to retain the denominational schools, and therefore inclined to see the conscience clause provisions of the 1870 Act as workable. Nevertheless, a number of reviewers are equally keen to draw a distinction between dogmatic education, which is to be avoided, and religious education, which is not. And the Review's policy of granting a voice to opposing views means that it is usually possible to find an exception to our generalizations — particularly in the years of Knowles's editorship.

Plumptre's article in Vol. 9 argues that the Church (of England) has the right to educate, and may justifiably claim the assistance of the state when it fulfils the state's requirements in education. Her Majesty's Inspectorate may not interfere with the religious instruction in such schools, and any attempt to impose a national syllabus for religious education on any denominational school would be tyrannical, whether or not that syllabus were supposedly non-sectarian. Plumptre therefore sees a conscience clause as necessary and valuable. John Oakley's Sion College paper, printed in Vol. 14, looks at the conscience
clause as outlined in the 1870 Act, accepts the difficulties posed over interpretation, but grants that it provides the necessary freedom for religious instruction and the safeguard of withdrawal from such instruction for those who wish it. Oakley is adamant that it would be both unjust and impractical to establish state schools as rivals to existing denominational schools. He continues:-

"denominational schools must be retained, and must be aided from the rates; at all events, until experience furnishes reasons to the contrary, which a priori arguments have certainly not yet supplied."  

And Seebohm's 1872 article "The Education Difficulty" demands legislation, not to repeal the religious provisions of the 1870 Act, but to make sure its principles are fully promulgated. Now, the Review is prepared to give the Congregationalist leader and founding member of the National Education League R.W. Dale the opportunity to put the case for non-sectarian education. Dale argues that the conscience clause does not provide a solution to the religious difficulty. Given its generally anti-ritualist stance, the Review is presumably not displeased to see Dale criticize the ritualists in particular for their proselytizing in schools under their control in contravention of the spirit of the conscience clause. Dale presses urgently for the state provision of non-denominational education within the reach of every child. Dale's article is not alone in its attack on denominational education. The Huxley article in Vol.16 warns of the danger of the clerical members of school boards leading their schools into the teaching of distinctive religious formulae.

Since the Contemporary Review consistently rejects the imposed authority of dogma, it might be expected that the Review will as consistently echo
the stand of Huxley against the use of dogma in the elementary school. Opposition to such dogma need not, of course, imply rejection of religious instruction or the denominational school. The notice of the Bishop of St. David's Charge responds in a manner typical of the Review. The bishop's argument is extensively quoted. Children should not be taught theology, as they are simply unresponsive to it; nor are the theological hints in secular subjects beloved of some clergymen as effective as they would hope and expect. Moreover, a school which teaches purely secular subjects is not necessarily irreligious per se. John Oakley's paper adds that it is not possible to exclude all religious and moral considerations from the most secular of schools. The implication of these articles is that religion and dogma are two different things. Huxley himself argues that religion - in the sense of the engagement of the affections - is vital in inspiring love for an ethical ideal: this religion he values so greatly as to be prepared to accept nine-tenths of dogma mixed with one tenth of the genuine article. What Huxley is doing is defining religion in a way which Christians would find hard to accept. The Review as a whole does not care to define religion in this manner, and is content to leave it separate from dogma but undefined. The one article which attempts to distinguish between morality, ethics and religion flounders in a sea of confusion:

Mackintosh's "Ethical Teaching" piece for Vol.23. Mackintosh's argument appears to be that morality may indeed be separated from religion, and rests upon the theory of innate ideas and conscience. On the other hand, "the chief worth and office of religion may be to enforce morality and to bind it upon the soul; yet morality may be taught separately from it."

Presumably this separate teaching is somewhat compromised by the absence
of religion. Mackintosh does not concern himself with a meaningful distinction between morality and ethics, and does not convince us of his ability to answer a question on whether religion may be taught separately from morality. He argues that moral instruction is generally held to be comprehended by religious instruction. This enables him to suggest that attendance at the religious education classes at a church school would procure for the pupil a certificate which would be accepted as a "dispensation" from the ethical classes of the common schools: classes which would otherwise be compulsory. The problem here is that Makintosh's phrasing suggests on the one hand, common schools for all, with religious instruction provided elsewhere, and on the other, the retention of church schools as an alternative for those who wish to see morality and religion taught in conjunction. This latter option probably reflects his viewpoint. Secular education is his prime interest, and any remaining denominational schools would be very much on the periphery. Mackintosh would hope that the Church of England would take the lead in withdrawing at once from seeking to influence the existing common schools. He is, however, very clear in putting across his view that religion can, and should, be separated from dogma. He further suggests the provision of a common manual of elementary ethics. Since this manual is to put across, among other things, Mackintosh's view of the relationship between religion and morality, one's heart goes out to any pupil required to understand it.
THE EDUCATIVE VALUE OF FICTION

INTRODUCTION TO CHAPTER THREE

"No man accustomed to anything like a comprehensive survey of human nature, will deny the educational importance of Fiction, and its bearing on the intellectual development for good or for evil."'

So says a writer in New Series Vol.3 of the Christian Remembrancer, and from his words we may take the themes and structure of this chapter. His article concerns itself mainly with the novel, and the chapter will follow suit. We may not assume that all Reviews accept his assessment of the educational value of fiction, and we must therefore consider the following issues.

1) To what extent do reviewers perceive the novel as having value purely as amusement or distraction?

2) Does the novel have a moral or religious rôle? Is that rôle of singular or subsidiary value? What connections, if any, are made with other disciplines? After all, it could be argued that the acceptance or denial of an artistic theory - such as Romanticism - can never be philosophically, morally, politically or educationally neutral. What links exist between a Review's treatment of the novel and its philosophy of knowledge?

3) What method of teaching should fiction employ? Can it employ didactic techniques, or should instruction remain covert? What is the relationship between the various techniques of the novelist and the educational value of his work?
The Value of Fiction: The Novel

The Rambler

Few Rambler reviewers care to uphold the theory that the novel is of value purely as the momentary amusement of the easily amused, or as the idle recourse of the intellectually enervated. The majority of writers argue or assume that the novel possesses an important educative influence. It is a sign of that importance that a significant number fear the impact of the novel.

If it is unusual for a review of a novel to fail to discuss its significance in specifically educational terms, examples may still be found where no such discussion takes place. In Vol. 42, for example, Thackeray's Pendennis is praised for its characterisation and heartily recommended without further ado. A lengthy article on the novels of George Eliot by Oxenham also contains little or no explicit or implicit consideration of the value of the novel. And a review of Hard Times in 2nd. Series Vol. 24 castigates it as unamusing: Dickens should avoid trying to instruct his readers at all costs. This may be taken, of course, as a criticism of Dickens for stepping outside his supposed limited range, rather than as a denial of the instructive rôle of such fiction. Nevertheless, the reviewer feels obliged to comment that Dickens and his school, when they assume the office of instructors, get into as much of a muddle as the Hard Times character Stephen Blackpool.

We should note in this context an extraordinary short notice of Collins's Hide and Seek. The reviewer complains bitterly of the novelist's casual, sow-your-wild-oats approach to virtuous conduct, which is inevitably pernicious to the morals of the age: and yet, he
concludes:—

"As a novel we can recommend it highly."*

We can only assume that the moral impact of a novel is of little practical concern.

Indeed, some articles display an uncertainty about the precise influence of the novel. A review of the fiction of Talbot Gwynne makes the rather dismissive comparison of the novel to one's dessert after a good dinner: the dinner provides what nutriment the body really needs, whereas a novel may hope, at best, to aid digestion. The reviewer then proceeds to make the blunt statement:—

"It is true enough, that the proper aim of a novelist ought to be to amuse and not to instruct."*

Novels, by this argument, do not, and should not, shape opinions. But the reviewer is clearly ill at ease, and proceeds to modify his own assertions. After all, digestion is an aid to health. He accepts that the power to amuse implies the ability to influence and to instruct: novels provide the colouring for a man's outlook on life. As long as a novelist is charitable, truthful and pure, he can indeed be a "positive benefit on our age."*

But what if a novelist is not charitable, truthful or pure? The Rambler concerns itself more with the potentially dangerous moral teaching of the novel than it does with the concomitant value of the novel for powerful moral instruction. A review of *Dombey and Son* in Vol. 1° is a case in point. Dickens's immorality is identified in his portrayal of supposedly "good" characters who are totally devoid of meaningful religious belief or motivation—such as Florence Dombey. A later article by Capes on Catholic lending-libraries° argues that formal
education has created a market for fiction, and therefore has exposed these new readers to the pernicious influence of immoral trash. Each parish should have a library, from which the poor could obtain decent, wholesome amusement. Capes does not concern himself to identify a more precise value for such fiction. Similar points are made in the article in Vol.12 on Catholic literature for the poor. The newly-educated are in a situation which is potentially far more dangerous than that of the honest but ignorant and unimaginative youth. Catholic literature (not simply novels) must be provided, since the

"larger half (sic) is not only objectionable, but so simply bad, that its very existence is one of the evils against which we have to protect ourselves and our children." 

And the shrill tone in a notice of The Nemesis of Faith encapsulates this very real fear of the immoral influence of the novel. The author, says the reviewer, has been guilty of:

"a frightful deed, in thus making public his terrible thoughts..." 

"Pernicious" is a word much used by the Rambler reviewers to describe what they regard as unsavoury novels. Bulwer is criticized in this way in an article on Thackeray's The Newcomes in 2nd. Series Vol.4.

In Vol.6, a review of Mount St. Lawrence, which starts out by describing the pleasure to be gained by a rapid perusal of a work of fiction, develops into an examination of the importance of the Christian novel. The profoundest thinker will find a very necessary relaxation in such a work, and the theologian with gravitas may even find the occasional profitable hint. But the wrong sort of fiction read by the partly-educated and unwary is an invidious danger: the apparently harmless novel, or the novel with what appear to be religious overtones,
may nevertheless be so riddled with worldliness that it must be considered as one of the devil's most subtle instruments. The novel works through its power to make us identify with its characters: a power which few can effectively resist. This review does, however, move towards its conclusion with a distinctly positive message after so much fearful concern: the proper use of a novel may harness for the Catholic Church the potential vehicle for instructing the devout and even for converting the unbeliever. But the writer feels obliged to end on a note of warning: beware the worldliness of the Protestant novel.

In 2nd. Series Vol. 214, a review of certain Clifton Tracts - Catholic tales for the poor - suggests that they have a great value in showing their intended readers how Catholicism contributes to everyday life. Winifride Jones is applauded for demonstrating how a girl's sense of duty overcomes her ignorance. Moreover, such stories can help defeat the penumbral shades of religious doubt.

It is Capes who provides what might be described as the most cheerful analysis of the positive value of the novel. Writing on Trollope's Dr. Thorne and Eliot's Scenes of Clerical Life, he comments:—

"Are not novels one of the most delightful of the minor blessings of civilisation? May, are they not entitled to rank among its greater blessings?"

This is because a well-written, lively and comforting novel amuses, calms our worries and encourages us to enjoy the more the society of our fellow men.

It is disappointing to note the absence in the Rambler of major reviews of novelists by Richard Simpson. His work on George Eliot for the Home and Foreign and Jane Austen for the North British demonstrate the
incisive quality of his criticism and a readiness to grapple with the issue of the value of the novel. In the Rambler, we see Simpson devoting his literary interests to poetry, and making important comments on the relationship between the true poet— the "vates", or prophet—and man's need to express the ideas latent within him. Clearly this kind of concept is nothing other than a reflection of Simpson's philosophical position as applied to poetry: again, we must regret that he did not see fit to examine the novel within the context of his world-view. It is significant that he comments on novelists in a dismissive manner in an article on Longfellow: Hymen is the deity of the novelist, who will permit all sorts of crimes to be committed by her. With Capes, he comments rather casually that the Review is sometimes—the "sometimes" is not insignificant—asked to recommend some decent Catholic novels, suitable for inculcating good principles—he goes this far—but also as a little pleasant reading. The cynic might suggest that Simpson must have read some of the rather feeble fictional efforts which found their way into the Rambler's columns. Capes's Passion, Love, and Rest; or the Autobiography of Basil Morley will serve as an example: a kind of Loss and Gain without the style and humour, and with a series of deathbed scenes which Dickens at his most lachrymose would not wish to rival. On the other hand, the fact that the Review chose to print such tales suggests that some importance, at least, is attached to the educative rôle of the novel.

Despite—or because of—the fiction printed in its own pages, the Rambler is generally hostile to novels which preach, and to tales which set out to be controversial and theological. The Review is keen to stress that novels must avoid the adoption of the preaching tone when
addressing the young or the poor. In the Short Notices section of Vol.112\textsuperscript{1}, the Catholic novel *Lazarine, or, Duty once understood.* religiously fulfilled is praised for its dissimilarity to a sermon, and the Clifton Tract tale *Joe Baker* is perceived as successful because it does not talk down to the poor. The same section in Vol.9\textsuperscript{2} approves of *Josephine, a Tale for Young Ladies* for the same reasons: this time, the young are the intended readership. Indeed, the *Rambler* does not always avoid the Pardiggle trap of assuming that the poor and the young can benefit equally from the same books, since their tastes are allegedly identical. The story *The Old Tree* - reviewed in Vol.7\textsuperscript{3} - is supposedly suitable for both groups. Capes and Simpson should be given the last word on this issue, since their remarks on being asked to recommend suitable novels make it clear that suitability may include the inculcation of sound principles, but must also be characterised by the absence of

"that distinctive 'preaching' which is the vice of so much of the fiction of the present day."\textsuperscript{24}

Of course, what is one man's preaching may be another's method of inculcating principles. It seems that the Review adopts an axiomatic distaste for the theological and controversial novel except where the theology and controversy are congenial. In Vol.1, a notice of Newman's *Loss and Gain* opens with a statement on how much the reviewer detests theology and controversy in fiction as a rule, but concludes with a panegyric on a work which is described as

"one of the most entertaining, touching, instructive, and profound books we ever met with."\textsuperscript{25}

A distrust of theology masquerading as fiction is evident in the review of *Mount St. Lawrence*\textsuperscript{26}, where the reviewer complains of the religious
novels which render the literary framework subservient to a theological argument. The result is that the story and the theology both suffer. And a notice of Uncle Tom's Cabin考察 considers fiction as an unsuitable medium for religious or political propaganda. The argument is that documented evidence would be far more effective, since an opponent could simply harness fiction to respond in kind. It would seem that our reviewer is merely translating his distrust of the Beecher Stowe message into a specious literary theory. He remarks that the emancipation of slaves is as undesirable as it is impractical, and suggests that the authoress would have been better employed in delineating the duties of the slave-owner, rather than the rights of the slave. It does not seem to occur to him that such delineation would itself be religious and political didacticism. The review of Gwynne's novels考察 comments that influence is most effective when the didactic element is less than palpable. This does not prevent a notice of The Miner's Daughter: a Catholic Tale考察 from recommending the work as a good method of instructing children in the celebration of the Mass.
The Method of Teaching in the Novel

The *Rambler* reviewers are not concerned to discuss in detail the way in which the novel's influence or teaching is to be communicated. Nevertheless, two major themes may be detected in the Review's treatment of the issue. Firstly, a number of articles consider that the fancy or imagination should be seen as the appropriate vehicle of instruction. A review of various German Christmas books for children argues that, unlike their English counterparts, the German tales are less concerned to pass on useful knowledge, and more inclined to utilize fancy as the servant of religion and morality. Both approaches may lead to extremes, but it is better to err on the side of an excess of fancy, since it seems to be the more effective teacher of the two. And in Vol.2, a reviewer heartily welcomes a new edition of Fouqué's works as a counterbalance to the over-subjective contemporary fiction which, in concentrating only on the romantic and risible, leaves the greater part of a young man's mind unaffected. Better by far to tap the imagination through tales of fantasy, which can indeed have an ennobling impact. In this context, a review of *Lucy Ward* criticizes that *Clifton Tract* for an excess of mysticism, which might alienate the interested Protestant reader.

The second theme adopted by the Review is that of the vital contribution which realism can offer towards effective teaching in the novel. The *Mount St. Lawrence* reviewer argues for the realistic portrayal of plot and character, lest, in the Catholic novel, the devout characters appear unrealistically triumphant in every venture, and so devout that the concerns of the secular world are not accorded their natural and rightful importance. Other articles stress the need for the novelist to
demonstrate a knowledge of, and ability to portray, human nature. Bulwer (Lytton) is not the Rambler's favourite author, and is attacked in an article on The Newcomes for his irremediably false portrayal of human life and motivation. Stothert's view of the necessity to show how the Catholic faith bears upon human nature rests upon the novelist's ability to portray effectively that nature in its manifold moods and phases. Packing off broken-hearted people to the convenient religious community therefore not only offends Stothert's view of human motivation, but also panders to the Protestant view of the inmates of such institutions.

In the Gwynne article, the reviewer argues that the influence of the great novelist lies in his knowledge of human nature and powers of characterisation: the ideas such a novelist chooses to present formally have little impact over his readers. Indeed, we recall the several instances of the Rambler's fear of the novelist's power. That power would stem from his ability to draw in the reader by his meaningful portrayal of recognizable characters.
The Value of Fiction: the Novel

The Dublin Review

In his article "Our Ministry of Public Instruction" for Vol. 35, Wiseman remarks upon the great reading public

"which loves to take up its opinions with the least possible trouble, to suck in theology through a novel, and imbibe its morality from a tale..."

Clearly, Wiseman disapproves; and the sarcastic title of his article makes his disapproval plain: the "Ministry of Public Instruction" is run by the novelist and the gentlemen of the Press. Nevertheless, the potential use of the novel - and the periodical, for that matter - in terms of morality and religion is recognized, albeit with apparent reluctance. But we must not forget the involvement of Wiseman in the periodical press, nor that he chose to write a novel himself: Fabiola, which was widely reviewed. Just two volumes later appears the Dublin's own notice of Fabiola. The reviewer, C.W. Russell, is predictably enthusiastic, but does stress the difficulties facing religious fiction in handling sacred themes - in this case, the Church of the Catacombs - with the necessary awareness of the interest felt by ordinary readers in everyday details. Nor is it easy to avoid turning the novel into a treatise on early Christian evidences, which would short-circuit its potential for utilizing the fact that the experience of conversion stems, less from intellectual gratification, but more from the moral instincts and sense. However, Fabiola avoids these various traps, and is therefore a pleasing medium for communicating, not only the spirit of consolation, but also an account of the development of the inner life of the Christian.
The same rather reluctant acceptance of the novel's religious rôle appears in Vol.45, where the reviewer comments that a crusade against novels is futile. Since many will only read novels, then the Church must take such souls into account, since it will not and cannot ignore any soul, however weak. This assumes, of course, that the soul of the habitual novel-reader is likely to be weak.

"Nothing that rouses even one such mind to a sense of a reality of life should be thrown away."33

And yet, continues the reviewer, Catholic novels are generally trash: silly stories, lacking vigour and an awareness of the trials and sorrows of life. Manzoni's I Promessi Sposi is praised by way of comparison as a tale which can elevate the heart, and where the novelist's great influence can be turned to good. On the other hand, the Notices of Books sections of the Review are often prone to comment on the Burns and Lambert Popular Library series in particular as offering delightful tales, touching to the Catholic heart and so on. The general view of the Review seems to be that there is a need for effective Catholic tales to counteract the influence of the less salubrious variety: hearts can be won while the fancy is being amused. This argument appears in the Notices of Books section of Vol.25, and the same section in Vol.38 comments favourably on the Rambler's suggestion that Catholic Lending Libraries be formed for the distribution of such works.

How far are novels to contain direct instruction? The Review generally argues that instruction should be kept in the background. C.W. Russell - a frequent contributor to the Notices of Books sections - regards novels as an auxiliary to the work of education. It is probably Russell who
discusses the taste for universal light reading in Vol. 24, where he opposes the use of novels to provide any form of instruction which would, in the normal course of events, be gained through studious exertion. However, he does accept that the light-weight mind would blanch at the thought of studying learned works on high and solemn matters. Such a mind can be offered the assistance of fiction – as in the Tales Explanatory of the Sacraments. Internal evidence suggests that a notice of Ethel: or, the Double Error in Vol. 38 is the work of Russell: the comment that the novelist should avoid the gloom of tragedy, eschew teaching as a primary object and treat subjects with a lightness of touch bears all the hallmarks of his chief concerns. Russell's most detailed exploration of the value of the novel appears in his article "Novel-Morality". He denies that the issue of the value of the novel is of purely ephemeral interest, since such fiction is an important medium for

"the diffusion, or at least the maintenance, of sound and healthy views of moral and religious responsibility."44

It is characteristic of Russell to back away from a full avowal of the positive rôle of novels, while objecting that the writer who merely seeks to excite or amuse may well inspire in his readers a frivolous and purposeless outlook on life. More dangerous are those works which conceal their message within the trappings of a tale. Candide, it is alleged, did more to sap French faith and morality than the Encyclopaedia itself. This is not to say that a good novel is one which directly strives to inculcate religion. With scarcely an exception, the novel of doctrine is as tiresome as it is ineffective. Nevertheless, the novelist must anchor his work on Christian principles, and avoid the
trap of upholding the pagan standard of virtue which is seen as a
dangerous feature of both Pelham and Vivian Grey.

What the Review does like is the work of Frederika Bremer. In Vol. 17,
her domestic scenes are praised with something close to enthusiasm as
being capable of drawing tears from the most blasé novel-reader. But
even now, the reviewer is wary of granting to a novel a major impact on
the lives of its readers. He says:

"there are few of us who might not rise from the perusal of this
charming book (Home) with softened, and, perhaps, improved
hearts."48

The "perhaps" speaks volumes. It is interesting to compare with the
rather brief and uncritical response of the Dublin to that of the
Christian Remembrancer, which is far readier to question the theological
stance and religious impact of the Bremer novels. The Dublin rarely,
if ever, seeks to place a novelist within a wider context of ideas and
philosophy.
The Method of Teaching in the Novel

It is hardly surprising to note that the Review provides virtually no meaningful analysis of the method by which the novel educates. Imagination is often assumed to be both a necessary attribute of the effective author and also the faculty which should be tapped by fiction. Only in a review of The Lamp of the Sanctuary: a Catholic Story in Vol. 207 do we get a discussion of the value of imagination. The reviewer - W.G. Ward - is not particularly interested in using his view of the intimate and unique connection between imagination and religion as the starting point of an examination of the novelist's art. He argues that literature must treat imagination as a specifically religious faculty in the most effective manner possible. This would involve eschewing allegory or romance in favour of the direct introduction of the world invisible. Ward then hastens away to discuss liberal education in general, leaving the reader interested but unsatisfied.
The Value of Fiction: The Novel

The Home and Foreign Review

The Home and Foreign Review might have been short-lived, but its notable career witnesses the blossoming of Richard Simpson into a critic of the novel whose accomplishment is as rare as his ability to identify the mental world of the author. On another occasion, the present writer found Simpson's work on George Eliot of considerable help in establishing the relationship between that novelist and contemporary philosophy. And yet, we noted that Simpson's contribution to such criticism in The Rambler was negligible by comparison. The influence of Acton is crucial here, since it was Acton's suggestion that led Simpson to saturate himself in the work of Eliot. Equally significant is Acton's stated reason for suggesting Eliot as a suitable subject for Simpson's attentions:

"there is doctrine as well as art in her."

Simpson maintains, in his article on Eliot, his distaste for didactic novels. His style is a reflection of his personality: at once incisive and subtle. He criticizes sharply and eloquently the novel with a purpose:

"They are generally religious; and their chief characteristic is the ludicrous contrast between their pretension and their power. Didactic novels are generally written by persons who cannot teach, and have no story to tell."

This is strong language. But Simpson then proceeds to modify his opposition to such novels by arguing that all great works have a purpose. He then seeks to identify that purpose in Eliot through an analysis of the mechanics of her plot-creation and characterisation. However, Simpson is well aware of the difficulty of so doing without a
preliminary discussion of Eliot's world-view and philosophy. He proceeds to trace the influence of Lewes and Comte on the novelist, and makes perceptive comments on the extent of Eliot's Positivism. Simpson argues cogently that Eliot will not accept the rigid and overweening systematizing which characterises Comte's philosophy. She feels that the foundation of the new order would depend much more upon the truths latent within Christianity than the founder of Positivism was prepared to admit. Simpson identifies these truths as, in Eliot's terms, "the pure emanation of the feelings," and, in so doing, shows his understanding of the debt owed by Eliot to the thought of Feuerbach. According to Simpson, Eliot felt that obsession with system or maxim would be a hindrance to the expression and development of these feelings.

What is absent from Simpson is the vituperative language which some reviewers would use - on religious grounds - once they had achieved an insight into the nature of Eliot's thought. It is not as if Simpson is seeking to deny that the novels themselves are as much a reflection of Eliot's mind as her articles for the Westminster Review. On the contrary, he examines Silas Marner in considerable detail to demonstrate to his own satisfaction how the purpose of the novel was essentially anti-Christian. Discussing the plot of the novel, he points out how the series of coincidences which spur the development of Marner's character - the casting of the lots, the loss of his gold, the discovery of Eppie and the like - are akin to the particularly feeble and fatuous operations of "Providence" which are used by the weakest of religious novelists as an anchor for their tales. But, says Simpson, Eliot is well aware of the feebleness of such providence as a plot device: indeed,
she uses it deliberately. By implicitly ridiculing those who would have
providence dealing with man in such a way, she provides the reader with
an alternative view, in which Marner's self-development is attributed to
the workings of human love. Feuerbach, not Christ, provides the
framework for a story which is indubitably and commonly perceived as
moral.

"There is great ingenuity in this method of planting opinions which
one wishes to eradicate, and of hiding a subtle argument for error
under a specious defence of the truth."62

Nor does Simpson care for Eliot's characterisation of Savonarola in
Romola. This, he sees as reflecting the essential immorality at the
heart of Positivism, which considers that insincere religion is
acceptable providing it is used as a force for progress through its
undenied value in arousing the imagination and emotions. Savonarola is
the embodiment of positivist principle, which strives to justify
imposture as the cost of mankind's moral advance.

A further aspect of Eliot's teaching is scrutinised. The author's
interest in physiology leads her into studies such as Baldassarre in
Romola, and into authorial comments which take the form of maxims - such
as her reflections on Adam Bede's intense absorption in the sound and
sight of the clock in the midst of his agony over Hetty. Simpson,
indeed, does not object to this almost medical dissection of
characters. As long as the reader cannot see the surgeon's knife,
there is no reason why he should not learn something about surgery.

When Simpson sums up on the purpose of Eliot's novels, he discusses the
influence of Goethe on Eliot and Lewes. Simpson demonstrates that he has
read with great care Lewes's The Life of Goethe, and identifies the
German's teachings which he sees echoed in Lewes's approbation and in Eliot's fiction. Quoting from Book seven of the biography, Simpson identifies as characteristic of Eliot and Lewes the statement that Goethe was a man of

"deep religious sentiments, with complete scepticism on most religious doctrines"53

He might also have added Lewes's later words:--

"Goethe's moral system was intimately connected with... (his) Theosophy. His worship was Nature worship, his moral system an idealisation of Humanity... we must learn to limit ourselves to the Possible; in this... lies the germ of self-sacrifice...."54

Simpson fully appreciates the importance of renunciation to Eliot. In this, she speaks with a Christian, even a Catholic, voice. But she will reject dogmas, since these come not from the feelings, but are seen by her to be evanescent. Needless to say, Simpson identifies such anti-dogmatic Humanitarianism with the eventual enervation and denial of morality itself. However, it is absolutely crucial to our understanding of Simpson's view of the potential moral impact of the novel to observe that he does not think that Eliot's fiction will have an adverse effect, despite her bad philosophy and unacceptable theology. For her cleverness, and her skill in concealing the implications of her world-view, are self-defeating: few will be able to perceive her hidden meaning, so adroitly woven is it within her plot and characterisation. More positively, her sensible ethical code

"outweighs the negative evil of her atheistic theology..."55

This comment implies a meaningful divorce between an ethical system and religion which sounds strange from the pen of a former Rambler reviewer, where that divorce was castigated as an impossibility—particularly in terms of formal education. But the comment does reflect the general
willingness of the *Home and Foreign Review* to accept truth from whatever source it may be found, even if that truth be surrounded by error. Moreover, it would seem that the make-up of Simpson's mind permitted him to handle new material and research new areas without allowing his world-view to distort ideas at the moment of comprehension. Nevertheless, Simpson's dislike of materialist philosophy, and acceptance of a philosophy of knowledge which posits an understanding which is God's mechanism for investing phenomena with meaning, lead him to disapprove of literature which dislocates the external world from the emotions. An excess of romantic susceptibility is, to Simpson, philosophically unsound, and is therefore unsound as literature. A case in point is the review of Hugo's *Les Misérables* which Carroll wrongly attributes to The Rambler, but which in fact appears in the first volume of the *Home and Foreign*. In this article, Simpson complains of the way in which Hugo's rampant individualism and anti-Rationalism portray, not only a world without rules, but also a religion without any authority save that of a man's conscience. The review follows Simpson's usual pattern of placing the author in his cultural and philosophical context before consideration takes place of the particular work itself. Hugo, argues Simpson, clearly saw *Les Misérables* as a parable providing instruction. But his ethical teaching is harmful in the extreme, in that it portrays exceptional characters as the harbingers of a new morality, in the service of which Hugo's plot permits bad actions to be offered up with necessity as the specious excuse. The book rests upon Hugo's Socialism, but is a failure as a political treatise: indeed, all Hugo's philosophical arguments are mistaken and ineffective. But, as with Eliot, this does not mean that
the book's teaching is an unmitigated failure. On the contrary: the
reader prizes the work for its many insights, its details and the
universal quality of its author's sympathies. Its formal argument may be
ignored, but the material itself cannot, and should not, be so
dismissed.

In Vol. 4, Simpson turns his attention to Thackeray, and criticizes that
writer for the same philosophical shortcomings identified in Hugo.
For Thackeray is a great disparager of reason. The novelist's
lectures, criticisms and fiction all aim at baring the soul. To do this,
the distinctions of the class system and political life are all equated
with the falsity of the snob: and the soul is heralded as a thing
separate from reason. The soul is the essence of emotion, and reason, at
best presented as a protection to the soul, is more often than not an
agent of wrongful concealment. Men of reason and genius are Thackeray's
villains: reason is enemy to simplicity, and the simple are the heroes.
The effect of Thackeray's philosophy is to discourage an individual's
attempt at moral improvement. Baring the soul is all: attempted
improvement must, by definition, predate a change in the soul, and is
therefore yet another pretence. Certainly reason cannot be expected to
assist. Simpson also seems to suggest that the novelist's view is that
the soul cannot, in any case, change in any meaningful way.

Thackeray's disparagement of reason is reflected, argues Simpson, in his
"proverbial" cast of mind. A proverb is the antithesis of cautious
reason and logic: it is pell-mell shrewdness rushing heedlessly to the
cause of the heart against the head. It is a desire to flee the virtuous
mean for the extremes, and to desert the synthesis for the
contradiction. Order is undermined in the same way as reason is undermined: by the dominance of feeling.

"He divided his soul from his reason, and his reason against itself."50

Are we then to say that the novels of Thackeray are, in Simpson's opinion, full of dangerous teaching? As with Eliot, Simpson prefers to conclude with a positive judgement after the ruthless dissection of his prey's philosophy. Thackeray's lessons — due to the purity of his heart and ethical sense — are perceived to be on the side of virtue. We may feel that Simpson has eloquently established evidence which would convict Thackeray of teaching inimical to morals: perhaps Simpson feels that no jury could establish such a case for themselves in reading the novels. Or perhaps the influence of novels is so limited that a mild caution should be the only penalty imposed.
The Method of Teaching in the Novel

The *Home and Foreign*’s discussion of the issue of the method of teaching in the novel is restricted to the pen of Simpson, and further restricted to his article on George Eliot. Initially, he seeks to establish the basic principles of the novelist’s art before discussing the particular example. He identifies the elements of a novel as three: plot, characterisation, and development by description and dialogue. The best novels achieve a balance of these elements, but much that is valuable may be achieved even if one element preponderates. There are, however, certain basic rules which the effective novelist must obey. The novel in which characterisation predominates must not make use of improbable incident, nor allow circumstance to dictate the development of that character. Eliot generally writes the novel of character, but does, on occasion, fall into the trap of failing to allow that characterisation to guide the plot. The death of Maggie and Tom in *The Mill on the Floss* is therefore incongruous, and their lamentable end appropriate only to a novel of intrigue and incident. Strangely, Simpson feels that a comic dénouement would be more to the purpose.

Simpson’s attitude towards Eliot’s realism is interesting. He argues that Eliot has an essentially pictorial mind, to the extent of using language to enable the reader to apprehend, rather than to judge: the former allowing more readily for the formation of a picture in the mind’s eye. This is why she chooses to use ungrammatical language at times when seeking to communicate a scene. One example given by Simpson is from *Adam Bede*:

"'An upper room in a dull Stoniton street with two beds in it - one laid on the floor.'"*59
We might feel, perhaps, that Simpson is basing rather too much on the omission of a verb. He is, however, unrepentant, arguing that the celebrated scene in the "Rainbow" in *Silas Marner* may owe much to the contemplation of a canvas by Teniers. Nevertheless, while Simpson may be questioning certain aspects of Eliot's beloved realism, he emphatically does not deny that writer's ability to delineate character. In her characterisation of Tito (*Romola*), Arthur Donnithorne (*Adam Bede*) and Godfrey Cass (*Silas Marner*), Eliot shows the reader his own heart, and makes him feel his weakness, irresolution and capacity for self-deception. Here indeed is a method of teaching which gives the novel enormous educational potential. Simpson comments:

"novels which paint character truly lead, through self-examination, to self-knowledge."

Not that Eliot is always an accurate portrayer of character. Simpson charges Eliot with identifying woman with passion, and man with duty. Simpson accepts that Eliot - "averse from ideals", as he puts it - does not portray men unalloyed by the feminine qualities. However, it seems that Eliot ignores her aversion when portraying women, who approximate to a Comtean ideal. But Simpson sees this portrayal as ultimately degrading. The author has lost touch with the life of ordinary women, and replaces domesticity, honour and delicacy with the supremacy of woman as Passion.
The Value of Fiction: The Novel

The Westminster Review

"In sober and utilitarian sadness, we should be extremely glad to be informed, how the universal pursuit of literature and poetry...is to conduce towards cotton-spinning; or abolishing the poor-laws."  

So says a reviewer in Vol.4. Uncompromising in an apparent rejection of the value of fiction, a review such as this is grist to the mill of those who see the early Benthamite years of the Westminster as a time in which the felicific calculus can find little place for works of imagination. Nesbitt—a sarcastic rather than objective student of these early years—concludes:

"The impression now long prevalent that the Utilitarians were hostile to literature is in general correct."

Our reviewer in Vol.4 is, however, grossly atypical. And even then, it may be that he objects simply to the "universal" pursuit of things literary, rather than literature per se. The closest the Review gets to similar dismissal of the value of fiction is Fox's article on Coleridge and poetry, where he comments that he will leave the arena to what

"many may deem more appropriate and more important topics."

And an article in Vol.25 ("English Literature of 1835") does suggest that literature becomes more of a mere accomplishment as society progresses.

Now, whilst such dismissive reviews are very much in the minority, reviewers in the earlier volumes are keen to point out a specific limitation in the novel's influence. According to a review in Vol.10 of the novel The Anglo-Irish of the Nineteenth Century, it seems that such
spirited fictions may

"now and then infuse a few correct notions into heads that would
never acquire them in a more formal way."  

The phrasing suggests, of course, that the influence is occasional, and
perhaps even inadvertent. This hesitant, unwilling acceptance of the
moral influence of the novel is echoed in a review of *The Dutchman's
Fireside* in Vol. 15. Paulding's reviewer is particularly nonchalant,
remarking as he reaches for the next tome that the novel did contain
some moral and social remarks

"which deserve, at least, to be pointed out."  

As the Westminster enters the second and third decades of its existence,
warmer comments on the moral value of novels become apparent. Thomas
Carlyle, for example, commenting on Lockhart's *Life of Scott*,
criticizes Scott for providing amusement for the indolent, but
instruction for none. Literature has far higher aims; it should edify,
reprove, elevate and heal. In an article for Vol. 29 on French
Literature, Margaret Mary Busk links the high level of middle-class
morality with the pervading habit of novel-reading. The clearest
statement of the new importance attached to the novelist's rôle comes in
a review of Galt's *The Entail*, which is praised for inculcating a moral
and political lesson.

"It is not sufficient that a novel should amuse for an hour. The
writer must have an answer for the question, cui bono?"  

This is no mean task to ask of the novelist: to pose the right
questions, and then to provide the solutions. To ascribe this kind of
influence to the novelist is to grant him a power for good or evil.
Precisely this point is made in an article in Vol. 41 on the progress of
art; novels have created a new literature which is read with avidity
by every class, and which affects every mind with its moral or immoral tendencies.

Now, the implication of articles such as the one above is that the novelist has an influence which is in some way without rival. This is clearly stated in a review of R.W. Griswold's anthology of Prose Writers of America:

"In politics, in morals, in religion, the insinuating lessons of the lighter literature are often more effectual than any other teaching..."71

But this is a reluctant avowal. The reviewer accords the novel a lowly rank in the world of letters. Taking jewels from philosophy and poetry may be necessary to raise one novelist's status above that of the common scribbler, but it does not make him any the less a creature in borrowed plumage. But his cry is so regrettably heart-piercing; ignore it we cannot. A similar point is made in a review of Baron von Eötvös's *The Village Notary*72, but the note of regret is missing. The reviewer comments that it is often assumed that the novelist ranks below the historian, and that the latter seeks truth where the former seeks mere amusement. But truth alone - historical fact - is without value until some profitable inference may be deduced from it. The novelist can invent imaginary incidents and characters for the sake of embodying and exhibiting such inferences where they will not admit of a cold and ratiocinative delineation. Maxims of wisdom which are as practical as they are profound may be drawn from a novelist's pages. This practical influence is stressed in a considerable number of reviews. W.E. Hickson73 praises Dickens for his desire to improve the charities of life. The same sort of overt teaching in *Out of the Depths, the Story of a Woman's Life*74 is seen as morally beneficial if only it
could be placed in the hands of those it most concerns - which would seem to imply prostitutes. Not all reviews offer praise, of course, but the assumptions about the moral value of novels remain the same. Wilkie Collins, for example, is criticized for wallowing in descriptions of sin: he must fulfil the high mission of the artist and choose subjects "such as may benefit rather than deteriorate his readers."76

As soon as we start contemplating views of the novelist as a uniquely effective teacher, then the mighty figure of George Eliot hoves into sight. As reviewer and as novelist under review, her ideas on fiction provide and stimulate greater definition of the novelist’s rôle. Crucial here is her article in New Series 10: "The Natural History of German Life". Her point is not a complex one, but the implication is immense: mankind cannot better the common or uncommon lot without the ability to empathise. And only the artist can stimulate that sense of fellow-feeling.

"The greatest benefit we owe to the artist, whether painter, poet, or novelist, is the extension of our sympathies. Appeals founded on generalisations and statistics require a sympathy ready-made....but a picture of human life such as a great artist can give, surprises even the trivial and the selfish into that attention to what is apart from themselves, which may be called the raw material of moral sentiment."76

In particular, this links the higher with the lower classes much more effectively than can any sermon or work of philosophy. We need to feel for the unlovely, the boorish, the ignorant. Economic science makes us feel that social progress is somehow outside ourselves in the domain of number and chart. What we really need is to get to know the subjects of our calculations, homilies and patronage.

Reviews of Eliot’s novels in the later volumes generally show similar
attitudes at least to the value of her novels. A review of *Silas Marner* in *New Series 20* enthuses on Eliot's power of sympathetic insight in a manner which smacks of dictation from Marner's creator. It is difficult, opines the reviewer, for the cultivated intellect to empathise with the ignorant:—

"and the most comprehensive inductions are but tools and helps in such a task."**77**

John Chapman can similarly be relied upon to make the right noises in a review of *Adam Bede*, though his phrasing hardly suggests any untoward analysis. Remarking first of all that most people in such a high-pressure age read fiction for recreation rather than instruction, he suggests that the real artist is able to teach while amusing, but not overtly. He lamely suggests that

"The truth is, we are all moralists when we see the facts in their right light."**78**

Even J.R. Wise**79** — not one, as we shall see, to stress the value of fiction — comments that Eliot has raised the status of the novel from the solace of the idle to the solace and guide of the scholar. And in a later review, Wise can barely restrain himself in his enthusiasm for *Middlemarch* **80**: but then, rather curiously, asks a question to which he never provides the answer:— how far is *Middlemarch* to be seen as a contribution to social ethics?

Now, the educational value of the novel is not seen by *Westminster* reviewers as necessarily restricted to "elevation" of the moral senses (a favourite, if vague, phrase). Nor is it restricted — if restricted is the word — to Eliot's basically Romantic concept of the artist. Admittedly, earlier volumes do not trouble themselves to comment much on the value of novels in this sense, and again we are getting into the
1830s before any meaningful points are made, though even these betray no common theme and respond simply to the novel in question. Seafaring novels are seen by the reviewer in Vol. 16 as calling up high feelings in descriptions of frigate actions. Bisset, in Vol. 22, comments that aristocratic novels at least have the effect of stripping the veil from nasty aristocratic habits — albeit involuntarily. And in Vol. 23, Bisset sees the novel Plantagenet as having an educational theory to teach which at least points the way for others to follow.

However, Harriet Martineau's article on the works of Miss Sedgwick in Vol. 28 establishes a theme which subsequent reviewers echo: — fiction and the novel as a mirror of the mind of a nation. Martineau suggests that, if fiction succeeds in presenting to a nation, not only its zeitgeist, but also a fresh and original mind, that nation may be led into personal and political conduct which is no longer weakly derivative. A similar point is made in Vol. 40, where the reviewer reflects that it seems curious that fiction should provide a better medium for truth than simple fact — curious, but undeniable. Specifically, a novel provides unique insight into the character of a people.

Now, several reviews see the novel as a medium for studying human nature. An article in Vol. 35 attacks Lytton for ceasing to aim at that particular target, whereas an article in New Series Vol. 27, strenuously keeping up with the same author's latest name change, comments that a novel may be helpful in giving us insight into human affairs through accurate observation of character. However, this article is most significant for its denial that the novel as such can convey any
deeper form of knowledge beyond that achievable through observation. Lytton is simply pretentious when he speaks of the novel, and art in general, as the mirror of the age. Nothing of the sort, scoffs the reviewer. The novelist is to be discouraged at all costs from attempting to philosophise. Philosophers require a width of view and a tenacity — in debate, presumably — which would be fatal to literature. The reviewer is conveniently explicit, and comments:—

"We have implied that a novel ceases to be a novel when it aims at philosophical teaching. It is not the vehicle for conveying knowledge. Its business is to amuse..."

In fact, the novelist must emphatically not set out to instruct.

"His duty is by no means to teach. He may make us happier, and perhaps better in being so, but he will never make us wiser."

All in all, the article on Lytton reads as if the reviewer cannot decide whether the novelist has a meaningful educational rôle. Indeed, this ambivalence is a characteristic of a number of Westminster writers in the 1860s. Justin McCarthy is a case in point. His article for New Series Vol. 26 is entitled "Novels with a Purpose", and we are left unsure of the purpose, not only of novels, but of his review. McCarthy thinks that the novel should at least "delight", which in itself "elevates". The novelist is certainly the most influential of writers, but it seems that we are not in a position as yet to decide whether novels with a set purpose are indeed works of art. Dickens fails whenever he has a set moral, and Meredith is advised not to let philosophy interfere with his fiction. The Contemporary Literature section of New Series Vol. 19 is much more forthright, and much more dismissive. It contains a surprisingly lengthy review of Lady Scott's The Skeleton in the Cupboard, and concludes with the comment that the
titled authoress presents scenes and characters which

"interest a not too critical reader, which after all is one of the
chief merits to which a novelist should aspire." \( ^{90} \)

And yet, it would seem that some Westminster reviewers of this period are prepared to forego decent characterisation and plot and to accept overt philosophising if the message is congenial. New Series Vol. 33\(^{91}\) contains an enthusiastic piece on the novel The Pilgrim and the Shrine, which would seem to be an early version of Robert Elsmere in its description of the noble soul suffering the death-pangs of traditional belief whilst simultaneously discovering the link between the devout nature and social action.

Now, we should consider further the attitude of reviewers towards the novel which teaches didactically and overtly. Certainly the balance of Westminster reviews is antagonistic towards such didacticism throughout the period under scrutiny. The review of Tremaine in Vol. 4\(^{92}\) complains that novels are not sermons, and should not be treated as instruments of devotion. George Eliot\(^{93}\) objects to Miss Jewsbury's misuse of the novel as homily. Use the novel to put across a message by all means, but a rampant, all-consuming and simplistic moral leads us to criticize the moral and ignore the work of art. A similar point is made in a review of Brontë's Villette and Gaskell's Ruth\(^{94}\): we do not want a tract masquerading as a novel. A review of Kingsley's Two Years Ago\(^{95}\) remarks that Kingsley's overwhelming sense of purpose leads, not only to unreal characterisation, as in the case of Elsley Vavasour, but also towards a lack of sympathy felt by the author towards his own creation. Vavasour is formed to epitomize what happens when a person seeks glory without God. We share our author's attitude towards his character. A similar
point is made in New Series Vol.1796 where, in Farrar's Julian Home, overt moralising and excessive authorial presence not only spoil the characterisation, but also lead us to judge the author, rather than his novel. And so, when J.R. Wise finds a novel with a moral which he actually likes (Terence M'Cowan, the Irish Peasant), he feels constrained to award the novel an accolade which surprises the dedicated Westminster reader as much as himself:

"one of the few novels with a moral which we can recommend." 97

Perhaps it is appropriate to let John Chapman have the last word on this theme. Reviewing Adam Bede98, he simply states that it is a canon of criticism that overt moralising in novels is - bad. But, in a fashion which is becoming increasingly familiar to us, he then compromises by remarking that a work of genius can confute any such canon.

The general Westminster antipathy towards the didactic novel is not restricted to works which set out to moralise. The novel is not the appropriate medium for the treatment of social and political questions. This criticism is made in an article in New Series Vol.199 on contemporary German novels where, in Das Pfarrhaus zu Hallungen, the plot is twisted to fit the discussion - an inevitable result of a misguided aim. J.R. Wise is clearly one to be irritated by the novelist who discusses the great social questions of the day. His review of Colston in New Series Vol.36100 complains that the author would be better advised to write essays, as he is simply sacrificing his plot to pontification. Wise is, it seems, disgusted with critics who praised the novel Lord Bantam. In New Series Vol.41101, he advises the author of that work to put his views on university reform into a treatise by all means, but never into a novel. Wise does not concern himself with a
detailed explanation of his antipathy to the didactic novel, and is quite prepared to churn out the same axioms in review after review in virtually identical words.

Now, George Meredith is not content with dismissing overt didacticism: in two important reviews in consecutive volumes, he rejects absolutely any novel of "purpose". This term he never defines, and we are left with the rather uncomfortable but unavoidable conclusion that a major novelist denies to his fellow artists whole areas of human concern and interest. In his review of Miss Hume's *The Wedding Guests*, he confesses to a sense of weariness when faced, not only with a novel of "purpose", but also with a writer whose subject-matter is downright unpleasant; it is the novelist's rôle, at the very least, to soften such unseemly material. Meredith also reviews for *New Series Vol. 12* the novel *Below the Surface*, and comments dismissively:

"Here is another novel of 'purpose,' well intended, well written, but failing in both ways - the fiction is burdened by the fact, and the fact rendered dubious and weak by the fiction."

However, it would be an exaggeration to state that the *Westminster* uniformly rejects the didactic novel. There are isolated instances of such works receiving varying measures of praise. In *Vol. 52*, for instance, *Excitement: a Tale of our Own Times* is seen as an effective warning against gambling. In *New Series Vol. 2*, an article on contemporary American Literature cites Beecher Stowe's *Uncle Tom's Cabin* as being far more effective in its cause than any newspaper report. And when Maitland, the author of *The Pilgrim and The Shrine*, steps outside his usual moral and philosophical orbit to handle the "women's question", then his comments - doubtless congenial - receive
unalloyed praise. Nevertheless, these instances are generally well concealed under the Westminster's blanket of condemnation.
Overt didacticism may be deprecated, but the Westminster, in generally accepting a vital rôle for fiction in the education of the political nation, might be expected to provide its readers with guidance on the manner in which such education should take place. Analysis of reviews on the methodology of fiction suggests that the theme of realism is seen as a major factor in effective communication. Having said that, it is also true to say that there is little interest shown in analysing method in novels in the first decade of the Review's career. Such comments that are made are restricted to vague exhortations, like that of the reviewer in Vol. 14 who comments that all novelists should be instructed in a few principles of political and economic science, and that novelists writing on morals should be moralists, historical novelists should be historians and so on.

Several reviews maintain the theme of the obligatory preparation which should be undergone by the novelist before he can effectively communicate with his readers. G.H. Lewes, in Vol. 45, goes to the lengths of identifying different types of novel and the preliminary study required of the novelist. For the roman intime, the writer should have an understanding of the methods of mental analysis and passion; for the historical novel, a genuine historical grounding, together with the capacity for empathetic expression. Similarly, a review of Heartsease, or the Brother's Wife complains that the novel lacks insight into the human psyche and that the novelist lacks intellectual strength.

The assumption behind such advice on the novelist's necessary
preparation is that he must communicate reality. But what, we must ask, is meant by reality, or realism? Quite simply, definition is not always forthcoming. When a reviewer in Vol. 39 complains that Lytton slights the Real for the Ideal, his comment that one may select appropriate realities to achieve the Ideal is less than enlightening. The clearest avowal of what might be called a near-photographic realism comes in H. Sutherland Edward's article on Balzac, where he comments that Romanticism has abolished the conventional novel, and has led to an exact imitation of nature, using real and natural models. Realism correctly imposes an unwillingness to use either Love as the central dramatic agent or an avenging Nemesis as the inevitable solution to evil. Nor will the reviewer accept that realism necessarily implies Materialism.

Jane Sinnett combines the theme of the artist's vital intellectual preparation with the theme of the necessity for naturalistic realism. In a review of German novels for Vol. 48, she comments that the poetic sense has been obliged to descend from lofty heights to deal with the dustier pathways of everyday life to discover the sources of social evils. On the other hand, she seems to suggest that straight realism is appropriate to the early stages of the writer's career: thereafter, he may use imagination—presumably disciplined by his study of realism—to create works of fancy.

Linked with the general advocacy of realism is a deprecatory attitude towards the use of passion in the novelist's technique. In a review of Bulwer and Dickens, W.E. Hickson agrees with Ruskin that, where passion simply overwhelms, it is unfit for high art. In Bain's article
on wit and humour in Vol.48, he is suspicious of passion where it blocks the functioning of the intellect. Reflecting his view of the physiological basis of the mind, Bain argues that the artist must recognize, through his technique, that passion must be accompanied by intellect, and intellect by passion. Similarly, an article in New Series Vol.7 on Victor Hugo comments that his greatest work may stem from the impulse of violent emotion, but the MORAL EFFECT is hampered by the consequent loss of realism. Schiller is quoted approvingly:

"However great be the storm in the poet's breast, sunny clearness must float about his brow." 16

By the time the Westminster arrives at its fifth decade, we witness a suspicion in the minds of a number of critics of the value of untrammelled and photographic realism. In New Series Vol.18, for example, two reviewers consider the relationship between the art and value of the novel and realism itself. John Chapman, discussing The Mill on the Floss, concentrates on the attraction between Maggie Tulliver and Stephen Guest. Such mutual attraction may be true to life, says Chapman, but verisimilitude is not enough. To preserve what he sees as a necessary distinction between life and art, the reviewer insists that we are given reasons for the attraction—reasons which he has admitted do not appear in life.

"On this point we think that George Eliot has sacrificed too much to her beloved realism." 16

Also, we are led to believe that the reader's feelings rise against the nobler characters when their failings become apparent. The picture of an effective novel thus presented is distinctly anodyne, and suggests that, not only has Chapman failed to understand the Eliot technique of moral teaching, but also that the reader should feel a sense of relief that
Chapman was a publisher rather than a novelist by profession. The other review in this volume on the same theme is by F.T. Palgrave, and has a significant title: "Thackeray as Novelist and Photographer". Palgrave's argument is that art needs imitation, but not imitation alone and as an end in itself. Art has one basic rule: it must distinguish itself from photography, lest the creativity of the human mind seem absent. Thackeray is a great artist only when he really sets himself the goal of presenting the souls of his creations—and when, presumably, the hand of the master is in some way detectable. The necessity to extrapolate on this kind of review is, perhaps, a reflection of a lack of clarity in the reviewer's conception and explanation thereof.

Expressions of discontent with straight realism are by no means restricted to New Series Vol. 18. A review of Janet's Home in New Series Vol. 25 complains that the reader is oppressed by the excessive realism which makes him almost a part of the treadmill monotony of the heroine's life. And in New Series Vol. 26, Justin McCarthy dislikes the realistically melancholy ending of Meredith's The Ordeal of Richard Feverel. We recall in this context Meredith's own comments on the necessity of a novelist "softening" the more unpleasant elements in his subject-matter! McCarthy's point, however, is a different one. Meredith may be engaging the intellect, but his work lacks:

"The fusing heat of emotion which melts the substances of a novel into one harmonious and fluent whole..."

We would now like McCarthy to provide us with an exact definition of "fusing heat of emotion", the manner of fusion and, in particular, the agents of fusion. What we actually get is a set of further
conditions for the effective novel which in themselves require
definition: eloquent writing; humour; depth of feeling; ability
to express feeling and so on. But pride of place is given to the
CONSTRUCTION OF A GOOD PLOT. It is only fair to say that the Westminster
spends much less time than most of its rival periodicals in obsessive
pursuit of the chimera of the Good Plot. There are few examples where
the reviewer simply uses the plot as the sole criterion for judging a
novel.

However, the most explicit, the most carefully thought-out, and the
most genuinely felt, words on the method of teaching to be employed
by the novelist come from the pen of George Eliot. Having accepted
the novel's moral rôle, Eliot provides meaningful dicta for the
novelist's technique. The technique, based upon an acceptance of the
Artist's sense of responsibility, is essentially Romantic. The novelist
is to attain a status which is both intellectually and morally profound.
He must have the power to identify the way in which all mental phenomena
conform to sequences in Nature, and to develop a higher sensitivity to
his fellow-man. The implication of this in terms of the writer's
technique is most clearly discussed in her article in New Series
Vol.10: "The Natural History of German Life". Realism is essential,
but it could be argued that this is as much a pre-condition for
effective writing as a technique. The danger is that a novelist will
invest the characters outside his own social class with his own thoughts
and sentiments. German novelists write themselves into the peasants they
claim to portray, and in this way destroy any true basis for fellow-
feeling, since one is asked to empathise with a virtual projection
of the novelist in the peasant's clogs. The novelist must strive to

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amplify the experience of his readers, and he can do this justly by making his characters true to life. It is at least arguable that Eliot’s reviews themselves fail to make it clear how the artist is able to awaken fellow-feeling for characters so alien to the thought-processes of the majority of readers. Perhaps she succeeds in this only in her novels. Certainly the reviewer of Silas Marner in New Series Vol. 2012 thinks she does. We are, says the reviewer, educated by the sheer reality of the novel, which is achieved through the correlation between effective plot and psychological study of character. One feels that Eliot would agree.
The Value of Fiction: The Novel

The Fortnightly Review

We have high expectations of the Fortnightly's readiness to undertake a comprehensive and thoughtful treatment of the issue of the value of the novel. With Anthony Trollope as a founder, George Eliot's consort as Editor and novels serialized in its pages, we anticipate much, and are correspondingly disappointed. The tone, set by Lewes and echoed by Morley, is by no means dismissive of the value of the novel - or of poetry, for that matter - but it reflects an attachment to the concept of the intellectual elite as interpreters of true meaning in literature and a concomitant tendency to deal in lofty generalities rather than to discuss specific works. Literature is, indeed, often treated as a whole, as in Lewes's series of articles "The Principles of Success in Literature". Anyone wishing to read the articles for practical guidance on writing effective literature would be, perhaps, disappointed by the lack of examples employed, and not unduly enlightened by the reflections on the value of literature. Lewes argues that:

"The object of Literature is to instruct, to animate, or to amuse."\(^22\)

His use of the word "or" is somewhat surprising, since it implies that amusement is an alternative to, rather than a partner of, edification and excitation. Discussing the principle of Vision\(^23\), Lewes opines that it is possible to add to the common stock of knowledge providing the artist truly relies upon personal experience to empathise. The writer must aim to kindle emotions. The same theme reappears in Lewes's late article for New Series Vol.11 on Dickens, where he asserts that art can secure influence only through stirring the emotions. Dickens, he feels,
has genuinely inspired the growth of healthy and genuine emotions in those who would not normally be reached by literature. This securing of influence Lewes specifically calls teaching, but he is keen to remind readers that

"The main purpose of Art is delight."  

Lewes also reviews Hugo's Toilers of the Sea for Vol. 5, and, in commenting on the author's extraordinary inventive power, reveals that he is disappointed in failing to achieve for himself the anticipated benefit from a work of art - an enlarged faculty of vision. What this means, or how far such vision might be enlarged, is not clear.

There are instances in the Review where writers discuss literature in a manner which implies that the benefit from its teaching may be restricted to the intellectual élite. Morley's article "Mr Pater's Essays" argues that it is essential to aim, not for size of audience, but for the quality thereof. It is in this context that Morley finds the doctrine of "Art for Art's sake" of value, since it is anything but restrictive and narrowing: it permits and encourages the use of free intellectual play, and is in this way a contribution towards preparing the intellectual ground for social change. Indeed, such broadening of the mind is necessary to counterbalance the over-specialism endemic in physical science. Morley makes few references to specific authors, but the suggestion is that he is thinking of poets and essayists rather than novelists: he cites Ruskin, Swinburne, Morris and Pater. Edward Dowden's article on the prose works of Wordsworth adds that only the elect can be expected to detect and be affected by a writer of genius.
Since the Review is keen to place literature within an intellectual and political context, it is important to reviewers to establish whether or not a particular work reflects the spirit of the age. Dowden does argue that it needs a special gift to overcome the fact that Wordsworth has lost contact with contemporary intellect. Lionel Tollemache's article "Mr Tennyson's Social Philosophy" comments approvingly that the poet had imbibed something of that spirit, and is generally positive in regard to it, unlike George Eliot, who has the temerity to end her masterpieces on a depressing note. This kind of comment reveals less about the Fortnightly's optimism on the subject of inevitable progress than an almost morbid fear of forces counter to that progress. That Tollemache should want to deprecate Tennyson's attachment to reverence as opposed to modern enquiry is significant.

Given the attachment of the Fortnightly to the virtue of free thought, it is to be expected that the didactic novel will incur strong disapproval. The novel aiming to communicate religious doctrine is completely ignored, but reviewers do take the trouble to express their antipathy towards didactic fiction per se. Robert Buchanan's article "Immorality in Authorship" for Vol.6 may be unclear on several points, but its dislike of such novels reflects his view that the chief aim of fiction is to please. Scott, it seems, never stooped to didacticism. H. Buxton Forman's article on Samuel Richardson for New Series Vol.6 rejects overt moralising, though he feels that we can forgive a great writer for such mistakes providing his moral is also communicated through the very fabric of his work. On a similar theme, it is interesting to compare the laudatory notice of The Pilgrim and the
Shrine in the *Westminster Review* with the distinctly cool tone adopted towards Maitland's book by the *Fortnightly*. The reviewer doubts the artistic propriety of presenting an individual's spiritual doubts in a novel. The main problem seems to be that the construction of the work is badly affected, though this may also be a reflection of the novelist's incoherent premises. The reviewer comments, in a tone of some superiority, that the book's speculations are scarcely satisfactory to those used to reading similar topics in the more appropriate and formal environment of a treatise. Nor is the author likely to find a readership among those the author seeks to attack and convert. Unlike the *Westminster*, the *Fortnightly* at least shows some awareness of the novel's plot, which is, as the Review points out, full of incident.

When we further examine the Review's attitude towards the novel as a teacher of morality, two points emerge. The first is that there is no consistent line over the period under discussion, and the second that some of the articles addressed to the theme lack clarity and coherence. Later articles do reject the notion that morality is an important feature, or definition, of a work of art. Edith Simcox's notice of Reade's *A Simpleton: A Story of the Day* agrees enthusiastically with the novelist's view that giving pleasure should be the main aim, and congratulates Reade for the breathless haste of his plot. Simcox's tone, however, is best described as glee interspersed with mockery. Perhaps one should beware of her praise. More direct and strident is George Saintsbury's comment in discussing Baudelaire - a comment which, presumably, applies as much to novels as to poetry:

"It is sufficient for me, that the introduction of morality is... a blunder and a confusion of the stupidest kind."
This blunder is no doubt made by Buchanan, whose article in Vol.6 is addressed to the issue, and upholds the notion that the moral effect of reading literature of the right type can be great. To the mind of the present writer, Buchanan's gravest blunder is when he decides to try to define what he means by a moral or an immoral work. Taking up and agreeing with Lewes's view that sincerity of vision is the key to morality, he then proceeds to argue that nature can adapt sincere immorality in a way which regulates that immorality. In fact, nature can convert the immoral subject, treated sincerely, to something which gives pleasure. Buchanan then brings in the concept of genius, which he fain would associate with sincerity. Any immorality which shows itself — albeit in a work by our sincere genius — will be revealed sufficiently plainly

"to impress purely, without paining."

Unfortunately for his own consistency, Buchanan proceeds to argue that, if Tennyson were to write something immoral, it might be difficult to detect thanks to the musicality of his verse: but he would not write immorally in this way, by simple virtue of his genius. Passion, if treated with sincerity, is Art: treated insincerely, it is dangerous. How, then, do we detect insincerity? This, it seems, is peculiarly the function of what the reviewer calls the "wise". Such people — who would presumably include our reviewer — would therefore be able to identify when George Sand's illicit passion is moral or immoral. But the half-formed mind is in danger from works which are insincere. In particular, some women are supposedly ruined by Braddon's false picture of men. Buchanan is not alone in pointing to the danger of novels. Lewes's article "Criticism in Relation to Novels" in Vol.3 is a case in
point, though he appears to be less concerned with the moral peril than the deleterious effect of the bad novel on public culture. In particular, he objects to the way in which critics unworthy of the name trot out clichés about "purity of moral tone" and the like. There is, in fact, one gushing notice in the Fortnightly itself which would serve as a good example of criticism of this type. Surprisingly enough, the reviewer is Morley. He greets with praise the novel The Village on the Cliff for its exquisite power of awakening sympathy:—

"this stirring is the beginning of the highest of lives — the life beneficent." 137

Lewes continues by remarking that a great novelist's fame is only slightly less than that of the poet. Significantly, he shows no sign of wishing to challenge that order of merit. He does, however, accept that the first-rate novel has a considerable influence, which he rather obliquely refers to as

"both extensive and subtle..." 138

J. Herbert Stack's article "Some Recent English Novels" in New Series Vol.9 also considers that some stories might have an unfortunate influence over the inexperienced mind, and that vivid descriptions of triumphant sin would be dangerous to some extent. He uses the phrase "a certain peril" 139 which does not convey the impression that Stack is losing much sleep over the matter. The value he attaches to novels is real, though essentially limited to providing greater illumination in dark corners:— they can brighten homes, refresh great minds, lift lowly minds out of ruts and soothe wearisome hours.

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Apart from the occasional aside and murmur, the silence from the Fortnightly Review on this issue is deafening. There are objections made by Lewes to mere effective plotting as the criterion for a good novel. In "Criticism in Relation to Novels"¹⁴⁰, he argues that a decent novel should be a picture made up from the sequences of nature - an interesting comment, which reflects the closeness of his viewpoint to that of George Eliot in her Westminster articles, even if the Fortnightly lacks its rival's interest in detailed analysis of the technique of the novelist.
The Value of Fiction: The Novel

The Christian Remembrancer

The fact that the Christian Remembrancer is avowedly a theological journal does not prevent it from examining the educational rôle of fiction, which could, of course, have religious implications in various ways. This examination takes place, not only in reviews of specific works, but also in articles which address the question of the purpose of the novel. The Review does not maintain a uniform attitude towards that purpose. On some occasions, writers adopt the tone of the Dublin Review in accepting that the novel provides a useful method of teaching Church formularies or doctrine: on others, writers are doubtful of the value of such fiction as religious instruction in any form. Those advocating the use of the novel as an aid to the teaching of doctrine include the writer of the article on Harriet Martineau's tales in New Series Vol. 2." Miss Martineau, having supposedly sated the adult market with her thinly-disguised political stories, has now entered the children's market with her series The Playfellow. But she shares with Miss Edgeworth the propensity to make her characters virtuous through the pressures of secular society, rather than through an awareness of the demands of Christianity. The reviewer argues that children cannot be allowed to read works which so ignore the ordinances of the Church. Safety lies in the perusal of the works of Gresley, and the tales published in the Burns's juvenile series: what need have churchmen to consult a Unitarian like Martineau? In the next volume is the important article "Didactic Fiction", which approves of Gresley's tales for the stand taken on the Reformation—namely, that the Anglican church predated that event. In the second part of the article, Paget's Tales...
of the Village are considered to be effective in settling the presumptions of Romanists, dissenters and infidels in turn. In the first tale, for example, the papist heroine is converted by a High-Church parson who judiciously maintains a firm sense of the differences between the Church of England and that of Rome, while accepting the apostolic nature of the former. Surprisingly, the same reviewer objects that a tale written for amusement should not contain doctrinal instruction. Instead, children's books should present characters who act according to their religious convictions. It would seem that a certain Catholic tone will allow the child's imagination to lead him into the appropriate response without overt didacticism. This kind of comment certainly seems at odds with the remarks passed on the Paget book, which, presumably, offered readers some form of amusement. Perhaps the reviewer's strong distaste for what is seen as sickly Protestant-style sentiment in Swiss Family Robinson spurs his reflections on the necessity for that Catholic tone. The same book, however, is suggested as a suitably appealing reader for elementary schools in an article on the Revised Code for New Series Vol.43. In New Series Vol.4, Gresley's Bernard Leslie: or, a Tale of the Last Ten Years is extensively reviewed in an article entitled "The Progress of Anglo-Catholicism". The question of whether fiction is or is not an appropriate method of religious instruction is, according to the writer, settled in favour of the proposition by the success of Gresley. That novelist is seen as usefully putting across the correct and consistently Catholic view of such matters as the Hampden affair: indeed,

"No one book - we speak advisedly - has done so much general good, as his Portrait of an English Churchman..."

On the other hand, the reviewer feels it incumbent upon him to point out
that the Portrait is as much a plain narrative of a clergyman's life as it is a work of fiction. However, no proviso is attached to the Rev. Neale's Shapperton Manor. The notice in New Series Vol.9'47 points out that Neale's plot is simply an excuse for a discussion of Anglican theology - nevertheless, the tone and spirit cannot but do good. Similarly, no major objection is raised to Lady Georgiana Fullerton's Ellen Middleton', where the moral is distinctly theological: the need for auricular confession. Nor is the use of fiction to illustrate the sacrament of Communion objected to in the Notices section of New Series Vol.19'49. The same section of New Series Vol.12'60 accepts that the novel Laneton Parsonage, unlike others of similar pretension, is an effective vehicle for illustrating the Catechism.

A lengthy review of Ivors, and other Tales seeks to draw a distinction between an overtly moral tale and the novel. The authoress of Ivors intends each tale to illustrate some truth, and has duly created a sequence of truths which are mutually illuminating. The reviewer feels that young people who would not otherwise care to read moral works will gain good counsel. For such tales, amusement is a secondary objective. Nevertheless, in the novel, amusement must predominate. No novel worth its name would subject its readers to overt didacticism and the consideration of grave matters. This is not to deny the moral value of the novel:

"The good such works may do - and it is often infinite untold good - is not, in the strict sense of the word, designed." 181

Oddly enough, the reviewer does not object to the way in which one novel shows the practical impact of parts of the Catechism in action. A further value is that novels have an excellent opportunity to inculcate
appropriate views on love and marriage. The novel which solely aims to
amuse may have a baleful influence in its treatment of this topic.
Ivors, for instance, is criticized for eschewing higher views in favour
of a disturbing picture of the seething tumult of emotions inside woman.
The impression given by this particular review is a willingness on the
part of the writer to accept overt teaching in a novel providing it fits
in with his viewpoints: a not unfamiliar attitude.

It is not difficult to find examples within the Christian Remembrancer
of articles which doubt whether the novel is a legitimate source of
religious instruction. In the article "Low-Church Novels, and
Tendencies" in New Series Vol.61^n2, the writer takes exception to
evangelical novelists purloining High-Church plots, and proceeds to muse
on whether fiction is a suitable weapon in the armoury of the Church. It
is certainly effective, but its explosion showers all sides. The
reviewer admits that he has been tardy in expressing such reservations,
but has found the issue forced into prominence by the perusal of the
novel The Rector in search of a Curate, which reveals all too well the
power of fiction in the wrong hands. It is not easy to follow his
precise objections here. On the one hand, he is keen to assert the
dangers of the novel, and, on the other, claims that religious fiction
is nothing more than an exhausted mine. If so, wherein lies the danger?
His next point is that such works fail as religion and as literature:
did not readers take up the Martineau tales of political economy with
the firm intention of ignoring the teaching? He clearly feels that his
rhetorical question on whether the missal should appear as a story-book
settles the matter once and for all. It seems that the High-Church party
is being advised to keep clear of religious fiction per se. The same
volume contains a notice of Paget's The Pageant: or Pleasure and its Price. A Tale for the Upper Ranks of Society. The reviewer rounds on the followers of the Gresley/Paget school for attempting to use the novel to communicate high religious truths, but it appears that the real objection is to the novel as an agent of controversy. The problem is that the novelist can stack cards against opponents in a way which is foreign to the age-old methods of the Church in handling such disputes. Controversy should take place in an earnest and forceful manner, minus the trumpery of sugared didacticism favoured by Edgeworth and Martineau. However, this review stops short of completely rejecting didactic fiction, since the main concern is over the involvement of novelists in debate. The article "Recent Novels" echoes the points made in the Paget criticism, complaining that opponents are often unfairly savaged. The best religious fiction eschews abuse, and may be edifying: hence the appeal of Geraldine and Margaret Percival. The teaching, it seems, must not be too overt. Readers get bored with the good advice - Harriet Martineau is again criticized with this in mind - but are prepared to assimilate it when it is displayed as in real life. We might hope for more religion in Dickens, but we are grateful for his ability to display the charities of human life. A novel should not be a treatise, though it can, and should, treat of morality.

"We do not ask now with what appellation a book comes to us, but whether it informs the mind or corrects the heart, whether it teaches us to rise above selfishness, to cultivate the kindly affections, to feel the earnestness of life..."

The most helpful treatment of the issue of religious teaching comes in the article "The Moral Character of Story Books" for New Series Vol. 40. It is asserted that all supernatural fiction has its moral: the
religious story is no exception, and the well-written piece of this type has a moral which is detected by intuition. In fact, the reviewer uses the word "intuition" when "conscience" would be more appropriate. The young have a sense of justice which is fed by the fairy-tale when the evil get their come-uppance and the good their reward. But the overt moral is a different matter. The reviewer cites what sounds like an apocryphal case of the girl who was bombarded with moral stories showing the virtuous child who invariably died, and as invariably went to Heaven. Our youthful reader did not care to die, and so deliberately did wrong to avoid that fate. The discussion becomes less dramatic as the reviewer pursues his argument into the theological novel, where the young follow the plot with interest, and skip the doctrine. The religious novel which eschews doctrine has much to commend it — not least its capacity to teach great truths of faith through characterisation and tone, rather than through indigestible chunks of doctrine. The work of Sewell and Yonge therefore has a

"far more beneficial and far more practical effect on mind and heart than all the preaching and teaching in the world." 

This would give to fiction an enormous value: perhaps we might judiciously make allowances for hyperbole. It is in keeping with the tone of our reviewer that he comments on the great contribution made by novels to the Catholic movement of the day. Gresley would be read where a treatise would not, and a healthy development of mind and thought would ensue. Having said this, two short notices of religious novels in the same volume seem at first sight somewhat inconsistent with the general antipathy to doctrinal matters in fiction. Corroda Abbey treats of the topic of conversion to Rome and re-conversion to Anglicanism, and is generally approved. However, this reviewer does cite
the benefit to be derived by children from the feeling and sentiments of
the book, and is less interested in the element of theological
controversy. Similarly, Trevenan Court is praised for inculcating
elevated thoughts and feelings — with the addition of sound religious
principles. But in the second "Didactic Fiction" article in New Series
Vol.3', the idea that the reader skips doctrine and concentrates only
on the goodness is dismissed. The young and the untaught must be
provided with accurate doctrine in a novel. Accurate doctrine is, of
course, defined as that congenial to the Christian Remembrancer — such
as appropriate stress being placed on the apostolic nature of the
ministry of the Church.

However, it is significant that the Christian Remembrancer is sometimes
prepared to accept as valuable those novels which clearly contain views
which the Review itself finds distasteful. The article on Kingsley's
novels for New Series Vol.34 finds much to criticize. Kingsley's social
reforming interests are doubtless commendable, but the reviewer objects
to the author making support for such measures the sole criterion of
salvation. The reviewer also questions the wisdom of Kingsley's alleged
devoting of two novels to the issue of sewage. Kingsley is also
castigated for his attacks on the acceptance of dogmatic authority and
asceticism. But the tone of the criticism is not vitriolic: indeed, the
reviewer affects a kind of casual condescension:—

"Now, really, if the Clergy are to teach, they must teach what they
believe themselves; and if they are members of the Church, they
must teach what she teaches."'

Kingsley, it seems, lacks a sense of reverence. His irresponsible
speculation is to be deprecated and its influence feared. Nevertheless,
the reviewer is determined to conclude with an appreciation of the
author's good intentions, his attractive style and his genial tone. Also of interest here is a review of Eliot's *Felix Holt, the Radical* in New Series Vol.52'so. This is an impressive notice, in which the reviewer perceptively draws attention to the way in which Felix speaks of his interest in the transmission of progress through the generations. Such comments remind one of Richard Simpson, although the Remembrancer reviewer lacks Simpson's ability firmly to place the novelist in her intellectual environment. Surprisingly, the Anglican writer praises Eliot for giving the reader the opportunity for moral improvement beyond that offered by any religious novel. Both *Romola* and *Felix Holt* enlist the conscience in a depth of sympathy and a hatred of injustice which can only benefit the thoughtful reader. Such teaching is altogether preferable to the predictable sin/repentance/conversion model beloved of the professed religious novelist, who is all too inclined to provide a personal confession of faith and a formal enunciation of dogma. Indeed, it is argued that Eliot's novels will have a positive effect on public opinion itself. The reviewer is well aware that the Eliot novels do not provide us with any picture of hope in a future life, but clearly does not see the absence of this as a fatal flaw. Eliot's novels would seem to be a safer bet than the novels of Wiseman and J.H. Newman as reviewed in New Series Vol.33'so. Neither *Fabiola* nor *Callista* should be read by young people lacking an awareness of the boundary which divides fact from unjustified assumption.

A review of the novels of Bremer in New Series Vol.17 follows the pattern of disapproving of her religious stance, but of accepting at least some positive value in her work. Miss Bremer, argues the reviewer, is no Christian. Her deity is reason itself, which is ever her criterion
for deciding on truth. Christ is never allowed to take captive any one thought or imaginative notion. The Swedish church is partly to blame for this, since it built into itself the rights of an individual to decide his or her own creed. This, the review sees, not only as anti-Christian, but also as invidious in a moral sense. There is no fear of God in the Swedish Lutheran church, and no fear of God in Bremer. In her novels, mankind has an undimmed potential. The theme of the Fall often informs articles in The Christian Remembrancer; but the Fall has no place within the Bremer world-view. Nevertheless, the reviewer grants that much may be learned from the author. On social life, on intimacy between fellow creatures, on the qualities of kindness, forbearance, simplicity, truth and unworldliness, Bremer is an effective teacher. Her lessons:

"we can imagine to have real weight and influence with young people..." 162

However, the real evil of the books should lead us to distrust her. Within the course of this review, the writer also comments on the necessary limitations of a work of fiction. Simply, the novelist must lack the kind of detachment and capacity for sustained and calm thought which the philosopher or moralist requires. Steady and deep abstract reasoning is emphatically not the province of the novelist, whose powers of characterisation, of analysis of motives and of humorous and pathetic expression, preclude the entering upon forbidden and foreign regions. Should the novelist trespass there, he will find, as Bremer does, that his real powers suffer. A novelist must step outside himself to write effectively, and the skill of sympathetic characterisation tends to attribute excessive power to the individual, which not only makes it difficult to bestow the appropriate level of hatred upon error, but also diminishes the control of external dogmatic authority over
that self-same and keenly-realized individual. A woman, argues the reviewer, is particularly ill-equipped to enter upon questions of theology or morality. If she chooses to do so as a novelist, then profanity, absurdity and blasphemy on the Bremer model duly follow. This supposed inability of women to handle questions of metaphysics is also a feature of comments on Edgeworth’s fiction in New Series Vol.3163.

Given the comments on Bremer, we might expect the Review to maintain a generally antagonistic attitude towards the so-called “philosophical” novel. It is therefore surprising to note that Gresley’s Charles Lever is seen (in New Series Vol.1)164 as being peculiarly calculated to spur thought itself. In the Notices of Books section of New Series Vol.2168, a reviewer comments that some novels aim to inform the mind, and therefore place less emphasis than most on amusement. De Clifford: or, The Constant Man is seen as an example of such novels. Nor does it fail, in that the mere novel-reader does unintentionally pick up wholesome instruction. However, the true philosopher is less likely to gain philosophically: nevertheless, he will find relaxation and refreshment in such works. More forthright and dismissive is the article “M. Eugene Sue - French Infidel Novel-writing” in New Series Vol.1166. It seems that this reviewer considers that novels – and newspapers – enervate the mind. This is because they effectively discourage thought. Indeed, a writer like Sue portrays vice in such a way as to mesmerize our sense of right conduct and to stimulate vicious habits. Nor is this reviewer alone in warning of the potential moral dangers of novel-reading. In New Series Vol.3167, a notice of Harrison Ainsworth's Old St. Paul's accuses the author of gross violations of propriety capable of corrupting the female mind. The article “Social Creeds among our
Novelists' ranges wider in its criticism of novels leading readers astray. Their worldly social creed revolves around status and wealth, and even the avowedly religious lady novelists equate rank with piety. When such a novelist takes it upon herself to provide the upper classes with a timely word of warning, she falls into error and extravagance. Mrs. Craik's John Halifax, Gentleman simply replaces aristocratic pride - which is often tempered by courtesy - with the insufferable variety practised by the eponymous hero. Similar complaints are made in the article "Youth as depicted in Modern Fiction" in New Series Vol. 52. Too many novels teach that money is the basis of happiness, and reinforce the message by making the obligatory moral passages as trite as possible. The hard-working and dutiful are dismissed as uninteresting. Braddon's heroines implicitly cheapen just ambition and promote rôle-models of women as pampered slaves to wealth and luxury. The reviewer comments:

"It is impossible but that much reading of this sort must be injurious to young people, as tending to lower their ideas at once of the poetry, the dignity, and the purpose of life."'69

The article "Our Female Sensation Novelists" in New Series Vol. 46 sees the sensation novel as symptomatic of the times: a reflection of an impatience with the old ways and a desire for change whatever the cost. And so it is that the sensation novelist makes crime attractive, despite the formal disclaimers offered to the reader. The young reader is especially vulnerable to the attractions and allurements of a fundamentally false view of life, which of itself stimulates vulgar curiosity for the unusual and exceptional and weakens established notions of correct conduct. However, it is important to note that the article concludes by reminding readers that the potential value of the
novel is considerable, in that

"Every true and honest observer of human nature adds something to the common experience..."\textsuperscript{70}

This positive note reminds us that the \textit{Christian Remembrancer} frequently argues in favour of the moral value of the novel. A review of \textit{Jane Eyre} reveals, not only the Review's acceptance of what it sees as the dominant position of the novel, but also its awareness of the power of the novelist.

"The Novelist is now completely lord of the domain of Fiction. Whatever good or evil is to be done in the present day through that medium, must be done by him."\textsuperscript{71}

This consideration therefore places a great responsibility on the shoulders of the novelist. Currer Bell has the power to serve her society, but she needs to put more trust in human goodness. A novelist must present a world-view in which Christ's presence can be detected. Reviews of the novels of D'Azeglio suggest that this writer, at least, succeeded in achieving an entirely Christian impact. The review of \textit{Ettore Fieramosca} in \textit{New Series Vol.20}\textsuperscript{72} comments in passing on the lack of intensity of purpose in Jane Austen - with the result that she is not a great moral teacher. Contemporary religious writers might be earnest, but they overdo the religious element, and become embroiled with the controversies of party. D'Azeglio is also praised some four volumes earlier\textsuperscript{73}, where his \textit{Niccolo de Lapi} is seen, in conjunction with his other stories, as effective in teaching self-sacrifice.
The Method of Teaching in the Novel

There are three major themes within the Christian Remembrancer's treatment of the method of teaching in fiction. The need for imagination, careful plotting and realistic characterisation receive frequent mention, but it is characterisation which receives greatest attention.

The article "Recent Novels" in New Series Vol.14 sets the tone. The reviewer argues that the novel of character secures the strongest hold on the mind. Richardson's novels are early examples of such works. A novel devoid of character and incident is liable to be condemned as dull and insipid - the fate of Walter Blake in the Notices section of New Series Vol.16. The review of D'Azeglio's Ettore Fieramosca in New Series Vol.20 comments that the highest achievement in fiction is to produce, as D'Azeglio has done, the novel of character. Works of imagination and adventure are all very well in their way, but we rarely return to make their further acquaintance. The point is that creations of the fantasy will not teach us to observe and to feel. And the reaction against the excesses of imagination, in the form of the analytical novel, is equally unreal in its minute dissection of feelings and motives. In the article "New Novels by Lady G. Fullerton and Currer Bell", the reviewer is keen to point out the problem arising when fancy directs the reason. The impact on characterisation is unfortunate, since characters are bent to fit circumstance, and the writer's subsequent novels simply repeat the characters of earlier works. Nor should characterisation be twisted to suit a message. In New Series Vol.24, Uncle Tom's Cabin is criticized for holding up before the reader personages who are not typical representatives of their social
class, but extreme examples which seriously damage the characterisation.

A review of Miss Yonge's novels pursues further the theme of realistic characterisation. Jane Austen is seen as the inspiration for the novel of character, and her influence is felt to be paramount. But once again comes the warning: it is dangerous to allow sharpness of observation to foster a morbid introspection, which may in turn lead to mere sentimentality. Miss Yonge is praised for avoiding the temptation to draw characters to fit some philosophical theory: instead, her creations impress us with their reality, and thereby teach deep lessons. Symptomatic of this positive attitude towards characterisation is the article "Youth as depicted in Modern Fiction". The reviewer comments:

"Every study of a character, working out fair natural aims in a wholesome state of society, if done with care and love of the work, is, in its degree, of real value to literature."

Similarly, the article "Our Female Novelists" comments that all novelists should commit themselves to some sort of moral purpose, but that

"the mere truthful exhibition of human nature may furnish this."

That imagination is a novelist's virtue few reviewers would deny. The article "Didactic Fiction", in emphasizing the educational importance of fiction, asserts that such works must recognize the importance of the imagination: deny or ignore it, and it will turn upon you and wreak its revenge. No scientific pursuit can rival imaginative fiction in its capacity for moral and intellectual improvement. More specifically, imagination can stimulate hope, cheerfulness and energy. And it is imagination which is the writer's tool for getting the young to perceive the existence of conceptions beyond and deeper than the
self. Similar points are made some thirty volumes later in the article "Ivors, and other tales, by the Author of 'Amy Herbert'". The plot of a novel should be based upon the pleasant and optimistic flights of imagination, and a novelist needs an abundance of such fancies to avoid repetition and the dangers of a limited, and perhaps unfortunate, experience. The authoress in question sees the world as stern and forbidding, and her fancy is too limited to help her overcome her experience. She is all too aware of the harshness of class distinctions, and yet her fancy rarely rises above the delights of park and mansion. The result is that the reader is perplexed by the inconsistency between her unworldly teaching and her worldly points of reference. When some tales are dominated by her fancy, they create further perplexity by presenting characters which have lost touch with reality. The central character in Amy Herbert has the unnatural habit of expressing all her thoughts. What child, muses the reviewer, would behave in this way without some motive? What child lacks the sense of honour which would prevent such inconvenient and obtrusive behaviour? And so, Amy Herbert has found no imitators, though the novel as a whole has doubtless done some good. This reviewer stops short of formulating a theory of imaginative characterisation, but would seem to hold the view that the effective drawing of character requires a blend of common experience and a willingness to let the imagination dwell on the sanguine possibilities suggested by that experience. Mere realism is not enough, and may indeed be deeply disturbing. The fear of insanity which pervades The Earl's Daughter may be too close to the reader's experience for comfort.

The Amy Herbert reviewer also discusses the requirements of an effective plot. The problem of the overtly moral novel is that the plot and
characters are designed to illustrate the development of some truth.
Causation is therefore made dependent on the moral, with every action being given its appropriate reward. The implication is that both plot and character will lack reality. A credible plot must be peopled with those whose responses are spontaneous. If men and women were really imprisoned by the dreadful consequences of each action, they would never act at all. The article "Christian Socialism" comments that Kingsley falls victim to the usual fault of the didactic novelist: the incidents of the story are twisted unnaturally. A great novelist would put across all Kingsley's points in a far more subtle manner. The reviewer of Paget's The Warden of Berkingholt considers that argument—in this case, the moral superiority of charity over Utilitarianism—should not be allowed to drag down the plot, but also adds that the plot should not drag down the argument. A plot, it seems, can be made too interesting.
The Value of Fiction: The Novel

The Prospective Review

Given the importance attached by the Prospective to a philosophy of knowledge and an educational system in which the requirements of heart and conscience are met, it is no surprise to see the reviews of novels and novelists consistently point to the moral value of such literature. The article "Recent Works of Fiction" in Vol.9, reviewing Mrs. Gaskell's Ruth, argues that fiction has attained a vast influence. Indeed, fiction must not be seen as a mere mirror of the age: it has become one of the most important instruments of change. The mission of fiction is high and holy: in providing an idealization of actual experience, it can, and should, drag readers away from their own selfish interests and propel them towards a genuine sympathy. This reviewer meets head-on the issue of whether or not the novelist should play the moralist. The answer is emphatically in the affirmative: since life is moral—an expression of the divine Will—then the novel has no choice but to be moral. Sin cannot be trifled with: it must be presented as nothing less than treason against God. This means that the twin canons of the art must be the call of conscience and the demands of beauty.

A very similar approach to the novel appears in the important article "Polemical Fiction" in Vol.7, possibly written by John Sibree. Significantly, George Eliot mentioned the article in a letter to Sarah Hennell: it may well be that she found the views therein congenial. The central argument of the piece is that literature must not ignore the higher interests of man: any attempt to "sugar the pill" in fiction was unworthy of such an object and opportunity. Indeed, the writer
identifies God as the literary critic who would most object to the absence of morality in literature. Moreover, any attempt to ignore morality would be psychologically unsound, as it would presuppose a division in the mind which does not exist. To imply such a division would be morally reprehensible, since it would be, in the end, injurious to social behaviour. In particular, artists must not be permitted to portray men without consciences: what would we think of a painter who drew portraits without heads? The reference to conscience makes explicit the link with the Review's habitual philosophy of knowledge, and the article further clarifies that link in its comments on Kingsley's Yeast. The anti-dogmatic stance of the novelist is appealing, but it is his willingness to stir up the moral sense which is so valuable.

"Convinced as we are, that all mental fermentation leads to truth, and that the earnest purpose to act out acknowledged principles, will lead to something even better than speculative truth, we are not dissatisfied with these characteristics of the age, and would hail the additional impulse which such works as 'Yeast' supply."

Indeed, fiction has in this a distinct advantage over the essay, which is restricted to abstractions and logic: the novelist can appeal to all aspects of the human personality. It is therefore understandable that this reviewer should use strong language about those who choose to write for amusement only: they must search out their readers in the confines of nursery, sick-room or mad-house.

Tayler's article on Mary Barton for Vol. 5 places the novel as a genre firmly in the forefront of intellectual life as

"one of the marked intellectual features of our time."
In its excellence, its use of grave moral themes, its ability to handle the development and narrative of character and capacity to arouse and manipulate human sentiment, the novel has outstripped the older forms of poetry. Of course, as society advances, the older forms of novel—the "silver fork" variety—become wearisome. From a novel like *Mary Barton*, we take a deeper sense of interest in our fellows; we learn to trust more in the ultimate and glorious destiny of the poorer classes, and to work for them as they progress.

Of course, the novel has the potential to be misused, and may therein have a dangerous moral effect. F.W. Newman's article "Froude's Philosophical Novels" warns against pouring out one's soul in a novel without caring to consider any moral framework or effect. If the writer's soul is in harmony with God, then such outpourings will inevitably be moral if the reader is prepared to look for such implicit teaching. If it is not in harmony, then we have the right to expect the novel which aims beyond mere amusement to enable us to draw some truth from itself more directly. Froude's *The Nemesis of Faith* fails on both counts. The core of Necessarianism therein reveals that the writer is not in harmony with God; nor does Froude follow the alternative path and make his views plain. Newman praises Froude's literary ability, insight into morality and freedom from dogmatic authority, but demands that the author should, in future, write with the definite moral purpose to kindle hearts. The review of *David Copperfield* and *Pendennis* in Vol. 7 argues that

"A work of fiction may seldom succeed in teaching a false doctrine, but it often inspires a false strain of feeling."
The writer makes commendable attempts to be specific. He accepts that the effect on the feelings is indirect, but can be detected in the general tone of social conversation. Take Dickens and Thackeray, whose sentiments are unconsciously assimilated by the public. Thackeray's subtle anatomizing of psychological states entangles us in a web of moral contradiction and obscurity which dims a clear sense of morality, and an obsession with self-analysis detracts from action; it seemingly justifies a reluctance to obey and respond to the demands of conscience. This is a weighty charge from a Review like the Prospective. This reviewer is prepared to accept that an artist need not moralise—a surprising comment, perhaps—but is adamant that Thackeray's sneering and contempt can do nothing but harm.

The Prospective Review therefore appears to hold the view that teaching in the novel should be indirect, but precise and clear. This seems a difficult balancing act for the novelist to perform. An article in Vol.11, "Fictions for Children"¹, provides some help here. It seems that the teaching should be of the type to encourage action. This reviewer sees nothing wrong in providing the young with a direct moral, forcibly expressed: the more clear the sermon, the better it suits a child's needs. It does not do to excite the imagination without providing an outlet for aroused affections. That the novel should stimulate both act and feeling is a theme referred to in the article "Puseyite Novels" in Vol.6—a article which probably comes from the pen of R.H. Hutton. The reviewer feels that fiction has an unique capacity for displaying the relationship between the external influences on, and the internal needs of, the individual mind. Avowedly religious
novels may very well prove effective in this line. Indeed, the popular antipathy towards religious novels may be misdirected: their value is considerable - providing they are firmly based on the kind of philosophy of the mind upheld by the Prospective: on, in other words, the acceptance of the demands of conscience and the "inward principle". What the Review is not advocating is the doctrinal novel: indeed, that class of fiction is scarcely felt worthy of mention. Much more in keeping with the Review's predilections are the works referred to in a discussion in Vol.6 featuring the tales Hearts in Mortmain, and Cornelia. The discussion starts with the rather patronizing comment that ladies have generally taken over the field of fiction, and provided works which have refreshed the spirit after a hard day's work. However, the reviewer then changes gear and stresses the vital importance of novels which contain the spirit - but not, presumably, the doctrine - of true Christianity: a spirit which is a more effective opponent of doubt and Scepticism than any overt appeal or subtle reasoning. Very similar points are made in a review of Ruth, which, at first sight, seems to be accepting the right of the novelist to deal in a polemical manner with moral, social, religious and political questions. However, the novelist is not to be a preacher, but to teach unobtrusively, to use a healthy and positive moral tone to transmute a mere principle into a form which would appeal to the conscience: -

"we are well aware that in actual experience the indirect teachings of example come home to the heart with far greater power than those delivered in the tone of direct exhortation..."

Indeed, Ruth seems to fit the criteria mentioned by F.W. Newman for effective, implicit teaching: the reviewer comments that Mrs. Gaskell has left the reader with a work for his thoughtful perusal, and without
authorial comment. Where authorial comment occurs in profusion to serve a didactic purpose, the Review is less happy. As always, reviews of Uncle Tom's Cabin ably encapsulate the attitude of a periodical to such teaching. Charles Beard's notice of the book in Vol. 8197 argues that its open purpose renders it flawed as a work of art. Beard concludes that there will be much more effective attacks on slavery than that of Mrs. Stowe: nevertheless, the novel has, at least, stimulated his own thoughts on the subject.
The Method of Teaching in the Novel

Given the considerable interest displayed by the Prospective Review in the purpose of the novel, it is perhaps surprising to note the lack of interest shown in how that purpose is to be achieved. Most Reviews discuss, with greater or lesser detail, the issue of characterisation: the Prospective shows a modicum of interest at best. The most detailed discussion of the issue occurs in the article on Charlotte Yonge in Vol.10**. Miss Yonge is criticized for failing to allow her cardboard cut-out characters to move with the plot. The conduct of characters must be used to illuminate their personalities, and this means that they must be shown in conflict with life, rather than merely passive in the face of adversity. Simple realism is not enough, since what matters is to draw the essence of a character. An individual author's experience alone is inadequate to draw such types; he must use imagination upon experience to strip away anything which stands in the way of painting the more striking features of strong and powerful characters. Similar points are made in the Ruth review in Vol.9**, where the writer speaks of two types of reality: the low, repulsive, descriptive type, and the high, generous type, which gives voice to the ennobling aspects of the spirit of the age. Only in this way can the artist hope to lead us to a nobler life.
The Value of Fiction: The Novel

The Contemporary Review

The Review is more than willing to attribute to the novel an important educative rôle, but is keener to warn of the unacceptability of the didactic novel than to discuss regularly and in detail the precise implications of that rôle. Where reviewers consider the issue of the moral value of the novel, they are frequently careful to remind the reader of their dislike of direct teaching. A.H. Japp's article "The Morality of Literary Art" for Vol.5 - written under the pseudonym of Page - refuses to accept the view that literature in general has no relationship to morality, but significantly objects to any attempt to inculcate a moral in a direct manner. Japp attempts to establish a relationship between the regrettable desire to introduce autobiographical elements into a work of fiction and a concomitant desire to teach an overt moral. Art requires the power of synthesis, the exercise of imagination and the communication of feelings: in this way, the sympathy of the reader is aroused.

"An artist is a teacher, indeed, simply because he has more power than others of thus abandoning the individual sphere,....enabling him by appeal to the emotions to exalt and purify others." 240

Japp specifically objects to the treatment of the character Mrs. Transome in George Eliot's Felix Holt, the Radical on the grounds that the author makes her a vehicle for preaching, and in so doing offends against true art. The novel and the poem may be considered artistic when, and only when, the power of sympathy is called forth. A good man can rise above himself to sympathize with others, and it takes a good artist to enable him to do it through art. The implication here, of course, is that the artist must be morally good to be able to separate
himself from his creation.

In Vol.7, Mrs. Transome resurfaces in an unsigned notice of the novel Golden Fetters: we suspect a further contribution from the pen of Japp. The treatise or autobiographical work is again condemned, since it would inevitably fail to harmonize the reader's intellectual, moral and emotional feelings. The novelist must not take sides in an argument, and must eschew a set purpose in his work. The precise objection to Mrs. Transome is that Eliot has successfully aroused our sympathy for the character, but brings our intellect into collision with our sympathy by suddenly revealing the woman's sin. This revelation of adultery presumably destroys the very harmony which constitutes the goal and medium of fiction. Earlier reviews in the same volume echo, in slightly different terms, the theme of harmony. The novel A Hero's Work provokes the comment that the novelist must seek to satisfy our hearts, conscience and judgment. This does not mean that the plot is precluded from venturing upon the discussion of social problems, but it must not be sacrificed on the altar of the author's didacticism. In other words, any discussion must meet the triple criteria of heart, conscience and judgement. This is why Grace's Fortune is praised, not only for the strength of its moral suggestion, but also for its lack of preaching.

In an article on children's fiction for Vol.11, Japp repeats his antipathy towards preaching in the novel, and makes some sensible comments on the need for such fiction to provide the child with the opportunity to adjust new ideas to existing experience.

Japp is not alone in objecting to overt moralising and preaching. Juliet Pollock takes the opportunity of discussing Uncle Tom's Cabin in
Vol. 22 to comment that no fiction will achieve a permanent place in
high literature when the author's special passion permeates the work.
The Minister's Wooing is preferred to Uncle Tom's Cabin on the grounds
that it contains no paramount moral theorizing. George Stott's article
"Charles Dickens" considers the issue of whether Dickens is to be
seen as an artist and a moralist. All artists, feels Stott, are to a
certain extent moralists, but must not lose sight of the true goal of
art, which is the creation of beauty. Conscious moralising is a mistake.
One should aim for artistic truthfulness, and content oneself with
whatever moral influence is thereby communicated. George Eliot is an
example of a writer whose works are life-like: instruction may be
derived if the reader so chooses.

George Eliot is treated to a substantial review by Edward Dowden in
Vol. 20, where the reviewer argues that her work is not to be seen as
a treatise, but as a work of art which communicates definite moral laws
through enlisting the sympathies of the reader: though the power of the
author is such that she bears down upon our consciences. Dowden makes
perceptive comments on the ubiquitous nature of the Eliot sympathy,
which he rightly sees as extending to Hetty in Adam Bede. To subtract
her wisdom and wit from her work would be a mistake, since, like
Shakespeare, she is to be understood and appreciated through enjoyment.
Dowden comments that the best critic is he who communicates the delight
he has found in an author, while resisting the temptation to record his
intellectual response. Unfortunately, this reviewer's attempt at
communicating delight reads rather like a peculiar and enervating
pastiche of Swinburne. And yet, Dowden shows a real appreciation of
Eliot's teaching when he comments on the importance attached by Eliot to
the ties binding man to his past.

It is left to V.B. Rands to make what is perhaps the most dismissive comment on overt moral teaching in the novel. Reviewing The Portent, he enthuses:

"It is a very thrilling piece of work, with a true unity of its own, and, thank Heaven! no moral." 208

In most Reviews, it is possible to locate exceptions to the general rule: but a search for writers in the Contemporary Review who approve of the didactic novel is particularly unrewarding. The nearest we get is a notice of Tottenham's Terence McGowan, the Irish Tenant in Vol.14, in which the reviewer makes remarks whose import and meaning are obscure:

"If we believed at all in the possibility of making fiction serve any useful purpose, in reference to the settlement of difficult and keenly-disputed questions, we should say this was a really good story." 209

The reviewer continues by remarking - more plainly, it would seem - that it is unwise to press the imagination into the service of a specifically political cause: but then admits that the novelist has succeeded in maintaining a fairness of approach which is compromised only by certain comments in the appendix.

In general, the Review is not concerned to offer dire warnings of the depravity of novels it considers immoral. The only real exceptions are articles by Haweis and Murray. In Vol.16210, Haweis argues that the purpose of art is to provide pleasure and promote morality, but that some art may give aesthetic satisfaction and yet be morally dangerous. Crime may be presented in such a way as to make us forget its essential criminality. Crime should be presented with a judicious admixture of good and evil to enable us to identify a wrong action for what it is.
Adam Bede and Lytton's Alice treat the same crime, but only the former handles it in a moral way. More strident is the Murray review of Ouida's novels in Vol.22. The novelist is accused of encouraging the reader to seek enjoyment at all costs, and earns and inspires Murray's vigorous condemnation and pious hope that no art so-called "more despicable than her novels represent can henceforth be produced."
The Method of Teaching in the Novel

The *Contemporary Review* demonstrates a very limited interest in the manner in which the novel fulfils its educational rôle. The one theme touched upon by a number of reviewers is that of the importance of characterisation. The phrase "touched upon" is used advisedly, since little is offered by way of analysis. Alford's review of *Felix Holt*\(^2\&\) is full of enthusiasm for Eliot's characterisation, but he restricts his explanation to the assertion that the effectiveness of the portrayal of Esther Lyon stems from the fact that her personality is based upon a compound of her environment and circumstances. Similarly, a notice of Gaskell's *Wives and Daughters* in Vol.2\(^2\&\) praises the novel for refreshing the reader's heart through the reality of the characters, who are not one-dimensional. On the other hand, the review of Lemon's *Golden Fetters* in Vol.7\(^2\&\) requires the novelist to draw characters which are essential types to facilitate the achievement of intellectual, moral and emotional harmony. No further definition is offered. Only the Stott article on Dickens\(^2\&\) takes the trouble to expand upon the issue in detail. Stott, like a number of reviewers in other periodicals, is concerned to distinguish between the "realist" and "idealist" authors. A "realist" will attempt to demonstrate his knowledge of how a personality is shaped by environment. Of course, adds Stott, all art idealizes, since a mere copy of nature would seem unnatural, as the writer would be forced to limit the detail of his study. Nevertheless, the realist will dwell on the visual, rather than the imaginary. This consideration accounts for the love-scenes in Trollope, which are realistic. However, the idealist forms a conception of a character which he then elucidates by means of incident and situation. This will therefore lead to a less
realistic portrayal of those situations. The best artist will unite the
two methods, and George Eliot is pre-eminently successful in this
venture. The purest of realists cannot rival her effectiveness.
Thackeray may be taken as that supreme master of realist art, but we
fail to see inside his characters. By way of contrast, the idealist
Dickens is hampered in his idealism by a lack of true imagination and
insight into human nature. It is acceptable to hold up a one-dimensional
character - to concentrate on one aspect of personality - providing you
give evidence that other aspects exist. This, the standard Dickens
grotesque fails to do.
CONCLUSION

This thesis has revealed the danger of separating the educational thought of the Victorian intelligentsia from its intellectual milieu. Too often, education is treated as if it can be detached from values, assumptions and overt speculation on the nature and purpose of human society. The chapter on the philosophy of knowledge identified themes which consistently informed the responses of reviewers to all aspects of education. Clearly the mind of the Reviewer is no tabula rasa: when an idea enters that mind, it does not simply slot into a treasury of knowledge, unaffected as it crosses the threshold; instead, it is categorised according to the filing system imposed by the reviewer's philosophy of knowledge. In this way, attitudes towards higher education, towards secular schooling, towards the rôle of the novelist, are dependent upon that philosophical system. Where, for example, clerical domination or involvement in elementary education is seen as a reflection of an outmoded but dangerous attempt to bind freedom of thought - the only true source of progress - then clerical influence on school boards is categorised accordingly and condemned appropriately. In turn, a specific viewpoint on an educational matter reveals the nature of the filing system. This is why the willingness of the Rambler to open its columns to a discussion of clerical and higher education without reference to ecclesiastical authority was meaningfully interpreted by the Dublin Review as implying a philosophy of knowledge which, in the end, was distressingly similar to the anti-authoritarian assumptions which were the product of the Reformation. These ideas were to be expected - if deplored - in such Reviews as the Westminster and Fortnightly, but were doubly dangerous in an avowedly Roman Catholic
periodical. Tracing the links between the Rambler’s educational ideas and its philosophy of knowledge has suggested that the Ultramontanes were right, in their terms, to show concern over the implications of the Review’s stance – particularly when the Rambler nestled under the wing of Acton, and showed a greater willingness to accept as valuable some of the contributions of post-Reformation philosophy and Protestant scholarship. In this context, the Home and Foreign Review is very much the Rambler writ large.

We should not, however, exaggerate the distance between the Dublin and the liberal Catholic Reviews. If the Rambler, the Home and Foreign and the Dublin did not entirely agree on the use of reason, their view of the nature of mind was similar. Mechanistic interpretations were as alien to them as were unsophisticated theories of innate ideas, since both might imply the distance – or absence – of a deity from human affairs. Such theories as Ward’s “necessary truth” or Simpson’s view of intuition imply a detachment from most philosophy from the eighteenth century onwards, and in turn reflect an unequal, but real, acceptance of the value of scholastic thought.

Clear links have been drawn between a periodical’s attitude to religious thought and its philosophy of knowledge. The Review most antagonistic towards established religion and its influence on society is also the organ which is keenest to espouse theories of the mind which deny the existence of intuition, of a guiding conscience and of necessary truth. The Fortnightly Review under Morley is prepared to allow a voice to
those who disliked associationist theories, but the tone of the Review followed its editor in distrusting such ideas as essentially limiting and demeaning to the sovereignty of reason. The simple Necessarianism of the Westminster Review in its early years is increasingly tempered by writers in the mould of James Martineau: writers who were unwilling to abandon conscience and free-will to the less than tender mercies of undeviating phenomena and the inductivist approach. The common ground shared by the Martineau school with some Catholic reviewers—such as Dalgairns—did not go unnoticed by the latter, but the eclecticism of the Contemporary did not lead to a meeting of minds. Catholicism remained, to the non-Roman Catholic, a foe to progress, and the varieties of Protestantism remained, to the Roman Catholic, nothing more than alternative routes leading inexorably towards the same destination: Pantheism, Scepticism and Infidelity. The position of the Christian Remembrancer is interesting here, since it approached the Dublin in its condemnation of the effects of the untrammelled freedom of thought stemming from the Reformation. Scholasticism, we recall, is treated somewhat warily, but is seen by the Remembrancer as a system likely to prove much more valuable than Baconian induction and its fellow-travellers. Emphasizing the elements in common between the Anglo-Catholic Review and its Roman counterparts must not blind us to the former's frequent and axiomatic criticism of Roman Catholicism as the enemy of intellect.

James Martineau represents just one of the several reviewers who contributed to more than one of the periodicals featured in this thesis. Nor do such writers appear to modify their approaches to suit the house-
style of the periodical in question. The Martineau of the _Prospective_ - a Review which achieves great consistency among its tightly-knit contributors - is no different from the Martineau of the _Westminster_ or of the _Contemporary Review_. The willingness of some writers to engage in the laborious task of contributing to a periodical whose aims were uncongenial is an ample testimony to the power which the periodical press was assumed to possess. Dalgairns, Ward and Manning could not expect their articles for the _Contemporary_ to be received in a similar spirit to their articles for the _Dublin_, and yet they were ready to see their words transplanted into soil which was likely to prove barren.

This thesis has argued that a philosophy of knowledge, placing man's intellectual and moral nature within the context of the purpose of his life, may be expected to demand appropriate formal education. Where a Review sees man's supernatural fate as the most important factor of his earthly existence, then we expect ideas on the organisation and curriculum of formal education, together with perceptions of the relationship between religious, moral and intellectual education, to reflect such a goal. Intellectual education for its own sake is rejected by the Roman Catholic Reviews and the _Christian Remembrancer_. Where some writers for the _Westminster_ and _Fortnightly_ Reviews would see the exercise of reason as intrinsically moral, the denominational periodicals would regard it as a useful tool in the service of faith, always providing that the bedrock of education rested, not only upon the formularies and authority of the Church, but also upon the overtly religious atmosphere of its schools. The call for secular and/or mixed education is unacceptable to both _Rambler_ and _Dublin_. Such education is
rejected as unworthy of its name, and the demand for it labelled as the covert beckoning of Scepticism.

The discussion of formal education revealed that the three Roman Catholic periodicals devoted their greatest attention to higher education. The defence and expansion of the Catholic Church in England was seen to depend, in large measure, on the ability of the educated classes, not only to withstand the increasing allurements of Protestant institutions, but also to meet and defeat their Protestant peers in controversy. Where the Reviews differ is over the value of the model provided by Protestant universities and public schools. The Christian Remembrancer shares with the Catholic Reviews the expectation that a university should speak with an authoritative voice, drowning the demands of independent thought. Where it differs from all the other Reviews is in upholding the universities of Oxford and Cambridge as rightfully and primarily the voices and training schools of the (Catholic) Church of England. Higher education is treated with less interest by the non-Catholic Reviews, who tend to attach greater importance to the subject of elementary education. The Prospective, in particular, shows little desire to examine higher education, and the Contemporary seems reluctant to discuss change at the universities. The radical Reviews, as might be expected, occasionally seek to uphold the university as the focus for a national clerisy, but fail to consider the possibility of the working class using the university as a means to participate in the intellectual guidance of the nation. Indeed, we might argue that the radical and Catholic Reviews are at least agreed on the
function of the university as a guiding mechanism for the intellectual and moral life of society.

The Westminster, Fortnightly and Contemporary Reviews share an antipathy towards clerical domination of the older universities. To demand subscription to a test is condemned as both immoral in itself and productive of immorality. The link with the Reviews' belief in the value of free debate is very plain. What is, perhaps, surprising is not so much the antagonism of the Roman Catholic periodicals towards London University as the comparative lack of interest shown by the radical Reviews in that institution. Nor is the traditional curriculum under the kind of sustained assault one might expect. Apart from some Benthamite fulminating in the earlier years, the Westminster is as ready to be generous on the value of Classics as it is to propose a greater rôle for science in the curriculum. The discussion of Classics by the Roman Catholic Reviews is pervaded by a sense of the pre-eminent value of such study as an intellectual discipline, but this recognition coexists uneasily with the fear - particularly strong in the case of the Dublin - that Classics might entice the young away from the central ethos of Christian dogma which should permeate all teaching. The reviewers, therefore, tread an awkward path in wishing to emphasize the intellectual vigour of Catholicism through supplying the kind of knowledge valued by a potential Protestant convert, while, at the same time, fearing the impact of methods of study and systems of tuition which, arguably, were based upon a Protestant system of values.
The limited treatment in the Roman Catholic Reviews of elementary education for the poor is characterised by an insistence on the need to root such education in doctrinal religion. Together with the Christian Remembrancer, they assume and assert the identity of moral and dogmatic religious training. However, the Rambler places more emphasis than does the Dublin on the need to secure an effective intellectual education to rival that of Protestant schools, lest the latter should entice Catholic parents to seek, for their children, a better academic training in schools which would fatally compromise the spirituality of the coming generation of Catholic poor. By way of contrast, the Contemporary and Prospective Reviews require schools to communicate religiosity, but deny the effectiveness and morality of attempting to communicate doctrinal formulae. Indeed, the Prospective makes the clearest of links here with its view of the nature of mind. Formal education must enable the voice of conscience to be heard: it cannot be restricted to the intellect alone. The Westminster and Fortnightly Reviews, arguing in general that intellectual development promotes morality in its quest for truth, resent any attempt to fetter that quest through denominational education and concomitant religious dogma. Here is the clear rejection of any link between formal religious instruction of the catechetical variety and morality.

Detailed discussion of school curricula is not a feature of most Reviews. The Westminster and Fortnightly Reviews make the greatest effort, but are by no means reluctant to concentrate on issues of greatest relevance to their readership, such as the traditional curriculum of the middle-class school. The Christian Remembrancer.
demonstrates the highest level of interest in teaching techniques, and is clearly making an effort to keep the clerical school-managers among its readership up to date with the latest textbooks.

The nineteenth century is often assumed to be the age of the novel, but the Reviews approach the question of the educative rôle of fiction in very different ways. The first point to make is that all Reviews recognized the necessity to consider that rôle, and were disinclined to adopt the view of some Nonconformists that the novel was sinful per se. The Roman Catholic Reviews and the *Christian Remembrancer* are most concerned about the immoral impact of many novels, and less ready to accept a positive value therein than are the *Westminster* and *Prospective*. Indeed, the *Dublin* in particular gives the impression of being reluctantly forced to consider the impact of the novel, which possesses an unfortunate power over the lighter mind. We noted that Richard Simpson dominated the treatment of the novel in the *Home and Foreign Review*, and must also applaud his virtually unrivalled ability to place a novelist within his or her intellectual milieu. Morley makes the greatest effort to do something similar, but is more interested in the political and social context than the intellectual, and more interested in poetry than in the novel. And yet, Simpson was keen not to overestimate the power of the novelist to inculcate subtle ideas, however pernicious. The *Fortnightly*'s approach to the novel reflects very closely the elitism of its philosophy of knowledge, since the Review chooses to emphasize the need for the intelligentsia to undertake the interpretation of such works. By way of contrast, the *Prospective* argues that the novelist is uniquely capable of exploiting the two-fold
nature of mankind through appealing to all aspects of the human personality, including the very heart and conscience which were so important a part of the Review's concept of the human mind.

It is the Westminster which explores most fully the issue of the educative rôle of fiction, and its analysis is dominated by the contribution of George Eliot. Her concept of the novelist as teacher is not dissimilar to that held by other reviewers, but her ability as a theorist of the novelist's art is unrivalled. The objections to didacticism which appear in all Reviews are given clarity and precision by Eliot, and by Eliot alone. Her concept of realism in artistic portrayal is a refreshing change from the unconsidered assertions which are a feature of the musings of most writers on the subject of the novelist's technique.

Finally, it should be said that the study of the many thousands of words written by the reviewers is, in the end, something of a chastening experience. The polymathic abilities, sincerity and width of knowledge displayed by some reviewers would shame many a twentieth-century academic, marooned within a single specialism. This thesis has sought to cross boundaries between purely educational thought, literary criticism and philosophy because the reviewers did so, and assumed that it was necessary so to do.
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THE CHRISTIAN REMEMBRANCER. New Series Vols 1-55, (1841-1868)
The New Series of this periodical marks its transformation into a major quarterly Review. It sought to take over the mantle of the recently-defunct High Church British Critic. Its readership, some 2000 in 1860, had halved by 1868, at which date it ceased publication.

THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW Vols 1-26, (1866-1875)
The Contemporary was founded by publisher Alexander Strahan - who already had several popular religious magazines to his credit, and who wished to secure the services of an editor who moved in the best circles. He chose Henry Alford, Dean of Canterbury, who epitomized the new Review's scholarly Christian tone. Ill health and pressure of other work brought about Alford's retirement from his duties in 1870. For the remainder of our period, the editor was James Knowles. Knowles's connection with the Metaphysical Society explains in part why so many of the papers read to that Society found their way into the Contemporary.
This Review owes much to the desire of Nicholas Wiseman, then Rector of the English College at Rome, to found a Roman Catholic periodical which would reach the educated Catholic and the potential Anglican convert in the years of optimism following Catholic Emancipation and the Tractarian movement. Wiseman and C.W. Russell were largely responsible for editorial policy, despite the nominal editorship of H.R. Bagshawe (from 1837 to 1863). But Wiseman was obliged to leave more and more work to Bagshawe following the former’s elevation as Cardinal Bishop of the restored Roman Catholic Hierarchy in 1850. Bagshawe failed to give the Review a clear goal, but his successor, W.G. Ward, did not. Under Ward’s control, the Dublin adopted the Ultramontane position and defended it against all manifestations of liberalism.

The Fortnightly, as befitted an avowedly radical journal, took the virtually unprecedented step of eschewing the standard principle of anonymous articles. The first editor, G.H. Lewes, succeeded in attracting valuable contributions from respected writers, which justified the high price of the periodical. The title remained, but the unusual fortnightly publication did not: the Review became a monthly in November 1866. Lewes’s resignation from ill health in December of the same year was followed by a surprising but wise choice: the largely unknown John Morley, who boosted the circulation from 1,400 per month to 2,500 by 1872.
Whereas The Rambler was for most of its career published monthly, the Home and Foreign Review was published quarterly. This gave the editor and proprietor, Sir John Acton, the opportunity to provide the more weighty and erudite articles which suited his taste. The Review achieved an excellent reputation for its distinguished "Contemporary Literature" section as much as for its major articles. Even its adversaries - such as W.G. Ward - were prepared to admit its quality; hence Ward's evident relief when Acton decided to cease publication following the papal brief to the Archbishop of Munich in 1863 which condemned the very liberal Catholicism which the Home and Foreign sought to promulgate.

This periodical was founded by the Unitarian ministers James Martineau, John Hamilton Thom, J.J. Tayler and Charles Wicksteed. It was no more rigidly theological than it was rigidly Unitarian. What the periodical could not do was afford to pay its contributors. It managed to arouse the suspicions, not only of potential readers who were wont to regard it "merely" as a Unitarian publication, but also those Unitarians who worried about its breadth of tone. Since the editors were largely the major contributors as well, the Prospective was inevitably endangered by their increasing commitments in several fields. However, by 1852 some new blood had been brought into the editorial panel. In particular, R.H. Hutton, Walter Bagehot and Martineau himself began to consider wider objectives. There was a move in 1854 for the Prospective editors to buy out John Chapman's Westminster Review, but the attempt was blocked by Harriet Martineau - possibly because she objected to her estranged
brother's treatment of her *Letters on the Laws of Man's Nature and Development* in the pages of the *Prospective*. That the *Prospective* was no longer considered an adequate forum for its editors' energies and views is revealed by its demise in 1855.

**THE RAMBLER**

Vols 1-12, (1848-1853)
2nd Series Vols 1-11, (1854-1859)
3rd Series Vols 1-6, (1859-1862)

The *Rambler* was founded largely by J.M. Capes, a recent convert to Roman Catholicism from the Anglican Church. Capes and his fellow contributors - generally also converts - shared a need to channel their education and abilities to the service of a Church which found it difficult to identify a rôle for them. The apparent independence from ecclesiastical scrutiny which the *Rambler* chose to exhibit brought the periodical into conflict with Wiseman and the so-called "old Catholics" who were not pleased by the tone of superiority the newcomers seemed to adopt.

Growing conflict had its effect on Capes's health. He duly resigned his editorship in 1857. Richard Simpson and Acton joined Frederick Capes as proprietors. Simpson was de facto editor from October 1856 to February 1859. The increasingly aggressive tone of the Review under Simpson led to moves on the part of Wiseman and other bishops to insist on Simpson's replacement. J.H. Newman himself was persuaded to take over the editorship on a temporary basis, but was obliged to resign when his own contributions aroused similar concern. Acton's editorship did not improve matters from the hierarchy's point of view, and the *Rambler* was in danger of ecclesiastical censure when Acton and Simpson ceased publication with the *Home and Foreign* in mind.
The Westminster Review was intended as a radical-liberal periodical to rival the two great political Reviews - the Whig Edinburgh Review and the Tory Quarterly Review. It was inspired and funded by Jeremy Bentham. Quarrels between various Benthamite factions led by James Mill and the first co-editor John Bowring did not improve its increasingly-parlous financial state. The journal was rescued by T.P. Thomeon, who acted as co-editor with Bowring as well as co-proprietor with the ageing Bentham. The Mills (father and son) had withdrawn in umbrage at the continuing presence of Bowring, but their own periodical, the London Review, merged with the Westminster and left J.S. Mill as de facto editor. Mill's philosophical development away from narrow Utilitarianism is increasingly mirrored in the new Review's pages, but the lack of any meaningful parliamentary foothold for the radical interest in the late 1830s made Mill only too willing to see W.E. Hickson and Henry Cole take over the ownership of the periodical. The rather strident reformist tone of Hickson's first four years (from 1840) was somewhat tempered by the time he came to sell out to the publisher John Chapman, whose own lack of real intellectual credentials as editor was offset by the temporary assistance of Marian Evans, his own enthusiasm, the longevity of his editorship and his good fortune in attracting able contributors. Despite its frequent financial crises under Chapman, the Review had achieved the aim of its original founders: it was a genuine and respected rival to its great opponents. In fact, it was great itself.
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referred to, all articles will be listed in order of publication rather
than alphabetically by author. Where there is an element of uncertainty
in the attribution, the name of the likely contributor is followed by
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LWR - London and Westminster Review
WFQR - Westminster and Foreign Quarterly Review.

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*The Religion of Humanity*  
*The Impact of Comtean Positivism on Victorian Britain*  
APPENDIX

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES ON MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS

ACTON, John D. (1834-1902)
Educated at Oscott, studied under Dällinger at Munich.
Part-proprietor of The Rambler, 1858. Editor from September 1859 to May 1862.
Editor of the Home and Foreign, July 1862 to April 1864 : co-proprietor with Richard Simpson, July-Dec. 1862, sole proprietor until 1864.
MP for Bridgnorth, 1865-6.
Created Baron Acton by Gladstone, 1869.
Regius Professor of Modern History at Cambridge, 1895.

ALFORD, Henry. (1810-71)
Dean of Canterbury from 1857. His edition of the Greek Testament, published between 1849 and 1861, was a testimony to the debt he owed to the German biblical critics. Interested in ecumenical matters, particularly in the establishment of common ground with the Nonconformist churches.
Editor of the Contemporary, 1866-79.

ALLIES, Thomas W. b.1813.
Educated Eton and Wadham College, Oxford.
Ordained in Church of England. Examining chaplain to the Bishop of Lincoln : received living at Launton, Oxfordshire in 1842.
Resigned on becoming a Roman Catholic in 1850.
AMOS, Sheldon. (1835-86)

Educated Clare College, Cambridge. Chair of Jurisprudence at University College, London, 1869. Influenced by the thought of Comte, but remained a practising member of the Church of England.

ARNOLD, Thomas. (1823-1900)


BAGEHOT, Walter. (1826-77)

Received gold medal in Intellectual and Moral Philosophy and Political Economy from University College, London, 1848. Editor of National Review from 1855. Editor of the Economist from 1860 until his death. Published his The English Constitution, 1867.

BAIN, Alexander. (1818-1903)

Utilitarian. Asst. Secretary to the General Board of Health, 1848-50. Professor of Logic and English at Aberdeen University, 1860. Lord Rector there, 1881.
BARRY, Alfred. b.1826.
Fellow of Trinity, Cambridge. Ordained, 1850. Principal of
Cheltenham College, 1862. Principal of King's College, London,
1868. Bishop of Sydney, 1883.

BEARD, Charles. (1827-88)
Graduated London University, 1847. Entered Unitarian ministry,

BEESLY, Edward S. (1831-1915)
Educated Wadham College, Oxford. Assistant Master, Marlborough
College, 1854. Professor of History at University

BINGHAM, Peregrine. (1788-1864)
Educated Winchester and Magdalen College, Oxford.
Barrister and essayist.

BINNS, William.
Unitarian minister. Published his Lecture on Theodore Parker,
1860. Published Scripture Readings for Young Children, 1877.

BISSET, Andrew. b.1803.
Educated Magdalen College and Trinity College, Cambridge.
Barrister. Wrote legal works and parliamentary histories.
BOWRING, John. (1792-1872)

BUCHANAN, Robert W. (1841-1901)
Educated Glasgow University. Dramatist and poet. His attack on Swinburne and Rossetti - "The Fleshly School of Poetry" - was published in the Contemporary under the pseudonym of Thomas Maitland.

CAIRNES, J.E. (1823-75)
Economist. MA Trinity College, Dublin, 1854.
Professor of Political Economy and Jurisprudence at Queen's College, Galway, 1859.
Professor of Political Economy, University College, London, 1866.

CALDERWOOD, Henry. (1830-97)
Presbyterian minister in Glasgow, 1856.
Chair of Moral Philosophy in Edinburgh University, 1868.
First chairman of the Edinburgh School Board, 1873-7.

CALL, W.M.V. (1817-90)
MA St. John's, Cambridge, 1846. Ordained Anglican priest in 1844. Withdrawn from his ministry. Influenced by the thought of Comte.
CAPES, John M. (1812-89)

MA Balliol College, Oxford, 1840. Involved in the Tractarian movement, convert to Rome in 1845. Founding editor and proprietor of The Rambler in 1848. Returned to the Anglican communion over the issue of freedom from clerical supervision of intellectual inquiry. According to daughter Florence, was reconciled to Roman Catholic Church in 1886.

CARLYLE, Thomas. (1795-1881)

Son of a stonemason. Educated at Edinburgh University. By 1817, had abandoned his intended future career in the ministry of the Calvinist sect to which his family belonged. Married Jane Welsh when modestly established in the Edinburgh literary world, 1826. His interest in German metaphysics and skills in translation were welcome to Jeffrey, editor of the Edinburgh Review. His Sartor Resartus was published in Fraser's Magazine, 1833: decided to settle in London. Publication of The French Revolution (1837) established his literary reputation and put him on the road to his near-prophetic status in the 1840s.

CARPENTER, William B. (1813-85)

Unitarian. Medical training at University College, London and Edinburgh Medical School: main interest, physiology. FRS 1844. Later, Professor of Forensic Medicine at University College. Registrar of London University, 1856. Sought to reconcile the theory of natural selection with evidence of creation through design.
CHAPMAN, John. (1821-94)


COMBE, George. (1788-1858)

Educated University of Edinburgh, 1802-4. Founder of the Phrenological Society, 1820. Author of numerous works on phrenology and education. An indefatigable lecturer on these subjects.

CONGREVE, Richard. (1818-99)


DALE, Robert W. (1829-95)


DALGARNS, John B. (1818-76)

DAVIES, (S). Emily. (1830-1921)


De MORGAN, Augustus. (1806-71)


De Vere, Aubrey T. (1814-1902)

Educated Trinity College, Dublin. Received into Roman Catholic Church, 1851. Poet, critic and writer on Irish affairs.

Dowden, Edward. (1843-1913)

Educated at Trinity College, Dublin. Professor of English Literature there, 1867. Respected Shakespearean scholar. Wrote, inter alia, biographies of Shelley, Southey and Browning.

Ellis, W. (1800-81)

Chief Manager of a marine insurance company, 1827. Joined J.S. Mill's short-lived Utilitarian Society. A staunch advocate of the need to teach political economy to schoolchildren. Founded the first Birkbeck school, 1848.
ELIOT, George (Mary Ann, later Marian, Evans). (1819-80)


FARRAR, Frederick W. (1831-1903)

Influenced by F.D. Maurice when at King’s College, London. Won a scholarship at Trinity College, Cambridge, 1852. Master at Marlborough College at the same time as E.S. Beesly. Fellow of Trinity College, 1856. Farrar managed to combine popular fiction with scholarly and popular theology. His work as a philologist earned him the friendship of Charles Darwin. Headmaster of Marlborough, 1871. Canon of Westminster, 1875, then Archdeacon in 1883. Dean of Canterbury, 1895.

FEARON, Daniel R. b.1835.

FITCH, Joshua G. (1824-1903)

Schoolmaster, later Principal of Borough Road Training College. Inspector of Schools, 1863-94. Worked with Fearon on a parliamentary investigation into the state of elementary schooling in Liverpool, Manchester, Leeds and Birmingham in the years before the 1870 Education Act. Assistant Commissioner, Taunton Commission. Published his Lectures on Teaching, 1881. Chief Inspector of Schools for the eastern division, 1883. Interested in higher education for women: helped found Hitchin College (1867), later transferred to Cambridge as Girton College. Knighted, 1896.

FORMBY, Henry. (1816-84)

Educated Charterhouse and Brasenose College, Oxford. Tractarian and Anglican priest. Received into Roman Catholic Church at Oscott in 1846. Subsequently took Holy Orders in the church of his adoption. Published a work on the Irish National system of education: State Rationalism in Education, 1854.

FOX, W.J. (1786-1864)

Unitarian minister. Editor of the Monthly Repository, 1833-6. A leading orator of the Anti-Corn Law League. MP for Oldham at various times.
FROUDE, J. A. (1818-94)

Educated at Oriel College, Oxford. Contributed to J. H. Newman's Lives of the English Saints, but found such work a strain on his faith. Subsequent religious agonies led to the publication of his novel The Nemesis of Faith (1849). Resigned his fellowship at Exeter College, worked for various periodicals, edited Fraser's Magazine, 1860-74. Friend of Carlyle, Clough and Charles Kingsley. His historical works were influenced by Ranke's techniques of source-criticism. He was a controversial appointment to the Regius Chair of modern history at Oxford, 1892.

GALLENGA, A. C. N. (1810-95)

Author and journalist. Born in Parma. Italian nationalist. Professor of Italian Language and Literature at University College, London, 1848-59.

GALTON, Francis. (1822-1911)

Educated at King Edward's School, Birmingham. Started medical studies in London, but abandoned medicine when his father's death left him ample means. After several missions as an explorer, worked on meteorology. FRS, 1856. His interest in laws of heredity and acceptance of his cousin Charles Darwin's views on evolution led him to consider the possibility of selective human breeding - hence his term "eugenics".
GRANT, Alexander. (1826-84)

HARRISON, Frederic. (1831-1923)
Educated King's College school and Wadham College, Oxford: Fellow of Wadham, 1854. Attracted to Comtism through the influence of Congreve, but did not follow Congreve's break from Laffitte. President of the English Positivist Committee, 1880 to 1905 and founder of the Positivist Review, 1893. Professor of Jurisprudence, Constitutional and International Law for the Inns of Court's Council of Legal Education. Author of many historical, political and legal works. Taught at the Great Ormond St. Working Men's College alongside F.D. Maurice. His attack on the man of culture stimulated Matthew Arnold's defence in Culture and Anarchy.

HAWEIS, Hugh R. (1838-1901)
Delicate health as a child prevented systematic education. However, had gained BA Trinity College, Cambridge, 1859. Reading Essays and Reviews made him decide to seek Holy Orders. Ordained 1862. Fashionable preacher and lecturer. Promoted the Sunday opening of museums. Wide variety of literary work - especially on music. Contributed a preface to Mrs. Humphry Ward's novel Robert Elsmere, the eponymous hero doubtless appealing to a man of Haweis's sympathies.
HICKSON, William E. (1803-70)

Partner in father's firm of boot and shoe manufacturers.
Retired to devote himself to philanthropy and letters, 1840.
Specific interests:—national education, popular musical
culture. On Royal Commission into state of the unemployed
hand-loom weavers, 1837. Tour of Holland, Belgium and N.
Germany in 1839 led to his pamphlet Dutch and German Schools.

HUNT, John. b.1827.

Educated University of St. Andrews. Took Anglican Holy Orders,
1855. Influenced by F.D. Maurice. Contributor to a number of
Reviews, published poetry and theology. Major work,
Religious Thought in England, from the Reformation to the End
of the Last Century (1870-3).

HUTTON, Richard H. (1826-97)

Educated at University College, London. Also studied in
Heidelberg and Berlin. Prepared for Unitarian ministry at
Manchester New College under James Martineau and J.J. Tayler.
Lacking skill as a preacher, he never practised his profession.
Editor of Unitarian weekly The Inquirer, 1851-3. Joint editor
with Walter Bagehot of National Review, 1855-64. Joint editor of
the Spectator, 1861-97. One of the original members of the
Metaphysical Society, 1869. Champion of Christianity against
Agnosticism and Rationalism.
HUXLEY, Thomas H. (1825-95)
Medical graduate from London University with the gold medal for anatomy and physiology, 1845. Assistant surgeon on HMS Battersnake; as a result of his naturalist work on the Great Barrier Reef, elected FRS in 1851. Professor of Natural History at Royal School of Mines, 1854. Hunterian Professor of Comparative Anatomy, 1863-9. Admired lecturer (often to working class audiences) on natural history, the educational value of scientific study, natural evolution. Member of the Metaphysical Society. "Agnostic" is a word of his coining.

JAPP, Alexander H. (1839-1905)

JELF, William E. (1811-75)

JELLETT, John H. (1817-88)
Educated at Trinity College, Dublin. Professor of Natural Philosophy there, 1847-70. Sat on the Commission of Irish National Education, 1868.

JENNINGS, William. (1825-62)
Professor of Mental and Moral Philosophy, Maynooth College, 1852 to death.
JEVONS, William S. (1835-82)

JEWSBURY, Geraldine E. (1812-80)
Novelist, reviewer and literary socialite. Novels include Zœ (1845) and The Half Sisters (1848).

LAKE, W.C. (1817-97)

LEVES, George H. (1817-78)
Essayist, novelist, biographer, Review editor and naturalist. Works include an analysis of Comte, a popular history of philosophy, Seaside Studies (1858), in which he responded effectively to T.H. Huxley's attack on him as a mere "book scientist". His biography of Goethe (1855) remains valuable today. Editor of the Fortnightly Review, 1865-6. His liaison with George Eliot - whom he could not marry because he was unable to divorce his wife - dated from 1854. His influence over Eliot and his encouragement were instrumental in turning her to novel-writing.

LITTLEDALE, Richard F. (1833-90)
Anglican controversialist. Educated at Trinity College, Dublin. A High Church ritualist of the Pusey mould.
MANNING, Henry E. (1808-92)


MANSEL, Henry L. (1820-71)


MARKBY, Thomas. (1824-70)


MARTINEAU, Harriet. (1802-76)

Unitarian upbringing. Literary and social success came with the publication of Illustrations of Political Economy between 1832 and 1834: largely Benthamite discussions dressed up in fictional garb. Wrote children's stories - some highly regarded by George Eliot - and novels. Published her translation of Comte's seminal writing on the philosophy of Positivism, 1853. Her enthusiastic repudiation of religious faith created a rift with James Martineau, her brother.
MARTINEAU, James. (1805-1900)

Educated at Lant Carpenter's school in Bristol. Manchester New College, 1822-7. Ordained in Unitarian ministry, 1828. Professor of Moral Philosophy at Manchester New College, 1840. College removed to London (University Hall), where he was Principal, 1869-85. One of the four joint editors of the Prospective Review. Member of the Metaphysical Society.

MAURICE, (J.) Frederick D. (1805-72)

Child of Unitarian minister. Educated Trinity Hall, Cambridge. Joined Church of England in 1830, ordained, 1834. Professor of English literature and history at King's College, London, 1840. Also Professor of Theology, 1846. Dismissed from both chairs following the publication of his unorthodox views on eternal punishment in his Theological Essays, 1853. Founded and became Principal of London Working Men's College, 1854. Leader of Christian Socialist movement. Knightsbridge Professor of Moral Philosophy, Cambridge, 1866.

McCARthy, Justin. (1830-1912)

Irish politician, historian and novelist. Reporter with London Morning Star, 1859. Editor, 1864-8. As a contributor to the Westminster Review, formed friendship with J.S. Mill. After a spell in America, returned as leader writer on the Daily News. Irish MP. McCarthy was used by Gladstone to persuade Parnell to resign in the divorce case of 1890. Novels included Dear Lady Disdain (1875) and Miss Misanthrope (1878).
MEREDITH, George. (1828-1909)

Irregular and unusual formal schooling, including a spell at a Moravian establishment in Germany. Solicitor in London, early and largely unsuccessful literary career was as a poet. First major novel was *The Ordeal of Richard Feverel*; a financial failure, but one which earned him the friendship of Carlyle and the Pre-Raphaelites, 1859. Contributor to many periodicals. Slowly increasing reputation as novelist, though he saw himself as a poet first and foremost. President of Royal Society of Authors.

MEYNELL, Charles. (1828-82)

Educated at St. Mary's Seminary, Oscott and the English College, Rome. Professor of Philosophy at Oscott, 1856; also Professor of Theology, 1860-70.

MILL, James. (1773-1836)

MILL, John Stuart. (1806-73)

Product of his father's relentless tuition. Early Utilitarianism was modified following an acute mental crisis in 1836. Came to argue for the value of identifying common areas in contrasting philosophies, advocating the importance of free play of mind. A major influence on John Morley, and a writer whose views on logic, individual liberty, political economy and the position of women were extremely influential on those of like mind and could not be ignored by those who profoundly disagreed. Editor of the London and Westminster Review, 1838-40. Independent MP for Westminster, 1865-8. Rector of the University of St. Andrews, 1867.

MILNES, Richard M. (1809-85)

Educated at Trinity College, Cambridge: one of the "Apostles" group which included Hallam and Tennyson. MP for Pontefract, 1837. Worked for a variety of reforms, including the establishment of Mechanics' Institutes. Refused a Lordship of the Treasury from Palmerston, but was created Baron Houghton in 1863. Major work, Life and Letters of Keats (1848). Champion also of Swinburne. FRS, trustee of the British Museum and a collector of the works of the Marquis de Sade.
MIVART, St. George S. (1827-1900)

Educated King's College, London. Converted to Catholicism, 1844. Continued education at Oscott. Member of Royal Institution, 1849. Fellow of Zoological Society, 1858. Lecturer on Comparative Anatomy in St. Mary's Hospital, London, 1862-84. FRS, 1869. Found Darwinianism stimulating, but insisted upon an essential disparity between the faculty of reason in humans and the mental processes of brutes. Professor of Biology at the Catholic college at Kensington, 1874. Member of the Metaphysical Society from 1874. Review articles for the Nineteenth Century in particular led to some being placed on the Index, 1893. Excommunicated, 1900.

MORISON, James Cotter (1832-88)

MORLEY, John. (1838-1923)
Educated Cheltenham College and Lincoln College, Oxford. His father had intended him for the religious vocation: Morley refused, and left Oxford with a pass degree only. Ill-paid hack journalism in London until noticed by the Saturday Review. One of his essays for that magazine brought him the acquaintance and friendship of J.S. Mill. Became editor of the Fortnightly in 1867—a post he held for 15 years. Liberal MP, 1883-1908, Chief Secretary for Ireland under Gladstone: Secretary of State for India, 1905-10. Arguably his most important biography was that of Gladstone himself (1903). Created Viscount, 1908.

NEWMAN, Francis W. (1805-97)
Fellow of Balliol after achieving a double first in Classics and Mathematics, 1826. Unable to take MA due to his unwillingness to subscribe to the Thirty-nine articles, he resigned in 1830. Missionary work in India followed by Classical Literature professorship at Manchester New College. Chair of Latin, University College, London, 1846. Published Phases of Faith, a controversial account of his religious changes, 1850. Brother of J.H. Newman.
NORTHCOTE, J. Spencer. (1821-1907)


OAKELEY, Frederick. (1802-80)

Fellow of Balliol College, Oxford, 1827. Public examiner to the University, 1835. Declared his adhesion to Tract 90, 1845. Received into the Roman Catholic Church, 1845. Theological student at St. Edmund’s Seminary, Ware, 1846-8. Ordained priest, 1848. Canon of Westminster, 1852 to death.

OXENHAM, Henry N. (1829-88)

Educated Harrow and Balliol College, Oxford. Anglican priest, 1854-7. Received into Roman Catholic Church by Manning, 1857. Was not convinced of the invalidity of his Anglican orders. Acquainted with Dollinger. Taught at St. Edmund’s, Ware and the Oratory School, Edgbaston.
PLUMPTRE, Edward H. (1821-91)


POWELL, Baden. (1796-1860)

MA Oriel College, Oxford, 1820. FRS, 1824. Savilian Professor of Geometry, 1827 to death. Member of the Oxford University Commission of 1851. Contributor to Essays and Reviews, 1860.

RANDS, William B. (1823-82)


ROBERTSON, James Burton. (1800-77)

Educated St. Edmund's, Ware. Barrister. Accepted J.H. Newman's invitation to the Chair of Geography and Modern History at the Catholic University of Ireland, 1854. Also took the Chair of English Literature at the same institution. Granted a pension at Gladstone's request for long service to literature, 1869.
RUSSELL, Charles W. (1812-80)
Professor of Humanity at Maynooth, 1835-42. Chair of
Ecclesiastical History, 1845-57. President, 1857 to death.
Vicar Apostolic of Ceylon, 1842-5. Member of the Historical
Manuscripts Commission, 1869. With Wiseman, a major force
behind the Dublin Review in the years of Bagshawe's editorship.

SEEBOHM, Frederic. (1833-1912)
Historian. Educated at Bootham School, York. Barrister by
profession. Supported his friend Forster in the campaign for
popular education immediately prior to the 1870 Education Act.
As an historian, interested in demographic and economic
history. Published The English Village Community (1883),
Tribal system of Wales (1895).

SHIRREFF, Emily. (1814-97)
With sister Maria, a tireless propagandist for women's
education and suffrage. Helped to establish Girton College,
Cambridge. Published novel Passion and Principle (1842),
treatise Thoughts on Self-Culture (1850). Mistress at Girton
College, Cambridge from 1870. Co-founder of the Froebel
Society, 1875.
SIMPSON, Richard. (1820-76)

Educated at Merchant Taylor's and Oriel College, Oxford.
Influenced by Keble, Pusey and, in particular, J.H. Newman.
Graduated 1843, ordained as Anglican priest in 1844, taking the family living of Mitcham. Resigned, converted to Roman Catholicism in 1846. As a married man of independent means, he found it difficult to fit into a rôle within his new church until The Rambler gave him the opportunity for the display of his learning and rather acerbic prose style. Editor of The Rambler, 1858-9, when his taste for controversy aroused much opposition within the English Roman Catholic hierarchy. Co-proprietor of the Home and Foreign, 1862-4.
Member of the committee of the New Shakespeare Society, 1874.

SMITH, Thomas Southwood. (1788-1861)

Studied medicine at Edinburgh University. MD, 1816. Unitarian minister. Fellow of LRCP, 1847. Member of the General Board of Health.

SMITH, William H. (1808-72)

Educated Glasgow University. Barrister. Wrote poetry and tragedies. His Athelwold was performed by Macready in 1843. The novel Thorndale (1857) was a vehicle for his radical philosophical and psychological ideas.
SPENCER, Herbert. (1820-1903)

Largely self-taught. Civil engineer for the London and Birmingham Railway Company up to 1841. Sub-editor of *Economist*, 1848. Cultivated Lewes, John Chapman, Marian Evans, T.H. Huxley among others. In a series of treatises, Spencer discussed education, sociology and psychology within the context of an acceptance of evolutionary theory. His collection of articles on education - *Education Intellectual, Moral, and Physical* - was published in 1861. His *The Study of Sociology* was published in 1873.

STEPHEN, James Fitzjames. (1829-94)

Educated Eton, King's College, London and Trinity College, Cambridge. Barrister - defended Rowland Williams in the appeal against his deprivation following the publication of *Essays and Reviews*. Chief writer for the *Pall Mall Gazette*. Member of the *Metaphysical Society*.

STEPHEN, Leslie. (1832-1904)

STERLING, John. (1806-44)

Educated at Trinity College and Trinity Hall, Cambridge. Leading member of the "Apostles". Associated with F.D. Maurice in the founding of the Athenaeum, 1828. Sterling's short life was, perhaps, more notable for the friendships he inspired than for his own literary productions. The "Sterling Club" - meetings of his literary friends - included Carlyle, Hare, J.S. Mill and Tennyson.

STOKES, Scott Nasmyth. (1821-91)

Educated at Trinity College, Cambridge. Barrister, Converted to Roman Catholicism. Secretary to Catholic Poor School Committee, 1848-53. Inspector of Schools, 1853 : Senior Inspector, 1871 to death.

SULLY, James. b.1842

Awarded London degree, 1866. LLD. Contributor to several Reviews. Publications include The Teacher's Hand-Book of Psychology, (1886).

SYMONS, Jelinger Cookson. (1809-60)

TAYLER, John J. (1797-1869)
Educated Glasgow University. Unitarian minister in Manchester, 1820. Professor of Ecclesiastical History, Manchester New College, 1840-53, also Professor of Theology, 1852-3: Principal of University Hall, London from 1853 to death. Joint editor of Prospective Review from 1845 to 1854.

THOM, John H. (1808-94)
Educated Belfast Academical Institute. Unitarian minister in Liverpool, 1829. Editor of the Unitarian Christian Teacher from 1838. Joint editor of Prospective Review.

THOMPSON, Harriet D. (1811-96)
Convert to Roman Catholicism. Apart from periodical writings, also produced works of fiction, including Mount St. Lawrence and Winefride Jones.

THOMPSON, Thomas P. (1783-1869)

TULLOCH, John. (1823-86)
Chaplain to Queen from 1859. Moderator of the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland, 1878.
TYRWHITT, Richard St. John. (1827-95)


WARD, William G. (1812-82)

Fellow of Balliol College, Oxford, 1834-5. The most combative of the Tractarians. The publication of The Ideal of a Christian Church in 1844 led to the deprivation of his degrees at a special meeting of Convocation. Became a Roman Catholic in 1845. Professor of Dogmatic Theology at St. Edmund's College, Ware, 1852-8. Ultramontane editor of the Dublin Review, 1863-78. Member of the Metaphysical Society.

WESTCOTT, Brooke F. (1825-1901)

Educated at Trinity College, Cambridge, where he was conspicuously unimpressed by the Tractarians. Ordained, 1852. Taught at Harrow. Canon of Peterborough, 1869. Regius Professor of Divinity at Cambridge, 1870. Canon of Westminster, 1883. Bishop of Durham, 1890.

WICKSTEED, Charles. (1810-85)

WISE, John R. (1831-90)

Educated Grantham Grammar School, matriculated from Lincoln College, Oxford, 1849. War correspondent in the Franco-Prussian war of 1870. Published various poetic works, lectures on Shakespeare, and a history of the New Forest.

WISEMAN, Nicholas P. S. (1802-65)


WYSE, Thomas. (1791-1862)