THE UNIVERSITY OF HULL

THE "RURALIZATION" OF THE CITY

WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO BAGHDAD

BEING A THESIS SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF HULL

BY

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1993
TO

A PIECE OF EDEN, MY HOMELAND

IRAQ
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to take this opportunity to acknowledge with gratitude the help and encouragement I received from a number of people throughout this study.

First and foremost thanks are due to Dr Norman O'Neill, my academic supervisor, who gave me a vital part of his valuable time. The easy access he granted me and his prompt attention at all times were extremely encouraging. His generosity and scientific spirit opened new horizons to me in my work and his support during and after the Gulf crisis renewed my intention to carry on my study with confidence and strength of purpose.

Thanks go to all the members of staff of the Department of Sociology and Social Anthropology in the University of Hull, for their support and help.

I would like also to thank Dr D. Booth, my sub-supervisor for his great kindness and help.

My colleagues, A. Al-Nassar and A. Mustafa, who opened their houses and their hearts to me deserve special thanks.

I would also like to thank Mrs Kathryn Spry for carefully proof-reading the thesis.

Finally, no words could acknowledge sufficiently the patience of my wife, Nidhal and my children Sinan and Sally.
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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION
1.1 **THE PROBLEM**

This study is an investigation of the influence of traditional values on urban life in Iraq, with special reference to Baghdad, the capital of Iraq. Very much has been said about the function of the city as a social form exerting an independent causal effect on other forms of social organisation and on behaviour. The classical urban sociologists believed that city dwelling was likely to eliminate traditional family construction, kinship system and conventional behaviour. The present study attempts to test these assumptions - through a comparative analysis of three different groups of household heads: urban natives [city born], migrants and villagers [control group]- and to recognize the diffusion of traditional values, norms and customs in urban dwellers' behaviour and attitudes, as reacted in the contacts and social relationships among them.

Baghdad has a long urban history, dating back more than a thousand years, although it has declined and been devastated several times during its history. After 1258 A.D, successive invasions by Persian and Ottoman armies destroyed the city and compelled most of its inhabitants to flee, either to other agglomerate centres or to small towns and villages. As a result, Baghdad in the eighteenth century and the first half of the nineteenth century was no more than a collection of small hamlets.

However, the city faced new era of increase and urbanization after the First World War, due to two main factors:

A) the rapid and vast increase, in migration from rural to urban areas since the end of second world war;
The process of urbanization in Iraq, particularly Baghdad, has developed even more rapidly in the last four decades, mainly because of successive waves of rural migrants, especially from the southern regions: Mysan, Wasit, Thi-Qar, Muthana and Qadisya. Migrants predominate demographically and socially in the city, and most of the city's inhabitants have a deep-rooted rural background. In moving to the city, they have taken with them the attitudes, values, norms and beliefs of their villages, so that the cities have become, in effect, huge villages. In other words, in Iraqi cities, especially Baghdad, the process of urbanization has not necessarily been accompanied by "urbanism" as a way of life. Thus, in the major cities in Iraq, particularly Baghdad which has more migrants than any other, traditional values are sharply reflected in the social behaviour, and in most aspects of lifestyle.

Thus the thesis is concerned with the similarities and differences between the three sets of household heads; it dwells on their rural or urban origins, their education, age, sex, occupation, income and their attitude toward many aspects of social organization.

To test the diffusion of traditional characteristics among the indigenous of Baghdad city, in relation to the factors outlined above, the thesis accords priority to four salient issues:

A) family organization, including the family structure, power, and authority, women's roles, and patterns of marriage;

B) kinship networks in city social life, among those in both rural and urban categories; kinship control over marriage, loyalty and nepotism, mutual aid and obligations.

C) attitudes to neighbours and neighbourhood participation and relationships, including the role of neighbours as a source of social control;
D) attitude to social time, with reference to differences in social activities, such as work, leisure, punctuality, keeping appointments, and general outlook on the dimension of time.

These issues might shed light on our assumption that Baghdad city is deeply exposed to what has been called "the ruralization of the city".

1.2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

A. RURAL–URBAN CHARACTERISTICS

Large numbers of sociologists and anthropologists have been concerned with both poles of society, the rural and urban communities. Some of them defined "community" in organic terms, for example H. Spencer, who stressed the spontaneous competition and mutual interdependencies that emerge from living together\(^1\). A. Comte regarded "community" as a psychic phenomenon, stressing the shared sentiments underlying social consensus and collective action\(^2\). H. Main compared earlier forms of Greek, Roman and east Indian society with later forms. In his terms, peasant society represents a balance between familial and territorial society. It is a compromise adjustment between a society of status and society of contract\(^3\). In Durkheim, peasant society forms a special type of relatively stable compromise between the social segment and the social organ. In its adjustment of local culture to the civilization of cities, the solidarity of the tribe is preserved in conjunction with the market and within the nation\(^4\).

As F Tonnies put it, the peasant group is a form of society in which neither Gesellschaft nor Gemeinschaft is strongly present at the expense of the other; both are to be observed in a condition of equilibrium. Tonnies had already expressed the idea that Gemeinschaft
phases of society are based upon maternal love, the sex instinct and blood kinship. These direct bonds, when strong, tend to regulate the other activities of life, in so far as these other activities do not through force of circumstance, destroy the original social bond. Gesellschaft phases of society are based upon contractual economic relationship of a material sort. In the Gemeinschaft the social organization is paramount and in the Gesellschaft the economic gain is of greater significance\(^{(5)}\). As he pointed out:

Gemeinschaft is old; Gesellschaft is new as a name as well as a phenomenon. All praise of rural life has pointed out that the Gemeinschaft among people is stronger there and more alive; it is the lasting and genuine form of living together. In contrast to Gemeinschaft, Gesellschaft is transitory and superficial. Accordingly, Gemeinschaft should be understood as a living organism, Gesellschaft as a mechanical aggregate and artifact\(^{(6)}\).

The distinction he draws between the two forms of human association, Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft, has become the basis for a succession of typologies, and the departure point of the more recent academic sociologists such as Redfield and Wirth. H. Becker accepted the separation of sacred society and secular society, but he saw that systems articulated to each other by social interaction which he termed more specifically "sacred-secular continuum"\(^{(7)}\).

Max Weber in his study of the historical development of cities, developed various concepts of the city in terms of its economic activity, its relationship to agriculture and its administrative status. He reviewed the city in socio-economic rather than demographical or ecological terms. He wrote:
We wish to speak of a "city" only in cases where the local inhabitants satisfy an economically substantial part of their daily wants in the local market, and to an essential extent by products which the local population and that of the immediate hinterland produced for sale in the market or acquired in other ways. In the meaning employed here the "city" is a marketplace.

Accordingly, Weber's theory, based on useful economy, expressed the occurrence of complex sets of social interaction. In this regard, he described the city as rational, as opposed to the irrational rural community.

In his essay entitled "Community within Communities", R. Redfield described the "community "as rural or folk society, composed of people all related to one another. It is made up of several matrilinear, extended families, each embracing several nuclear families. The people of the community occasionally combine into co-operation parties and the community also provides wives and children. Most marriages are made within the community; a man may find a wife in another community, but this occurs very rarely because of the distance between communities, the disposition of the men of the community to keep their women to themselves and the rule of matrilocal residence which would compel a man if he married a women from another community to move away from home.

In his well-known deductive theoretical essay, "The Folk Society and the Culture", Redfield regarded the peasant, like the tribesman, as living in terms of common understandings which are rooted in tradition and which have come to form an organization. The sanctions that control conduct are likely to be prevailingly sacred. The familial organization is strong. There is little disorganization and
little crime\(^{(11)}\). Elsewhere in his work, he described folk society in more detail. He pointed out:

The population of any one group is homogeneous in that in race and costume any individual is much like any other. The group is isolated from others. The technology is simple. The community approaches economic self-sufficiency. The division of labour is simple, activities appropriate to the sexes are sharply distinguished, but activities carried on by any one member of a sex-and-age group are much the same as those carried on by others of that group. There is little or no use of writing, or if writing is used it is a mere adjunct to oral tradition and, like the latter, serves to conserve the local heritage. The habits of members of the society tend to correspond with customs. The society is relatively integrated in that the component groups are closely interdependent and the ways of life are correspondingly interrelated and consistent with one another. Change in the society is slow. The prevailing forms of control are informal and traditional, and control to the members of the society appears in large degree spontaneous. The intimate and primary institutions, such as the family and the local group, play relatively large parts in that organization of the groups and institutions which make up the society. Many objects, conceptions, and forms of control partake of those qualities of unquestionable power and prestige which we denote as "sacred"\(^{(12)}\).

Briefly stated, Redfield's scheme defined an ideal-type, the "folk society" which is the polar opposite of urban society, the folk-type of society is characterized as follows:

Such a society is small, isolated, nonliterate, and homogeneous, with a strong sense of group solidarity. The ways of living are conventionalized into that coherent system which we call "A culture". Behaviour is traditional, spontaneous, uncritical, and personal. There is no legislation or habit of experiment and reflection for intellectual ends. Kinships, its relationships and institutions, are the type categories of experience and
the familial group is the unit of action. The sacred prevails over the secular; the economy is one of status rather than of the market (13).

For L. Wirth, "Community" emerged as natural, unplanned symbiotic ties developed. People initially lived together on the basis of close spacial proximity, kinship ties, and both competitive and common interaction. Out of these sprang a division of labour and organic or "ecological" interdependence. Wirth used the concept "community" to designate this "natural "interdependence (14).

Since then many sociologists have defined "community" as a major pole in society, e.g. MaCiver and Page (1949) (15), Long (1958) (16), Stein (1960) (17), Webber (1964) (18).

In contrast, many sociologists and anthropologists have used the term "urban" to refer to the contractual pole of the society. L Wirth, for instance, uses the term "society" to refer to the:

willed and contractual relationship between men which,... are less directly affected than their organic relationships by their distribution in space. (19)

On the other hand, Wirth like other classical European social theorists such as F. Tonnies and E. Durkheim, believed that the overwhelming trend in the modern world consisted in a world-wide evolution from community to society-like social relationship; from status-based to contractual relations; from homogeneous aggregates tied together by "mechanical solidarity" to heterogeneous units based on complex division of labour; from primary to secondary group affiliations; and from folk to urban culture (20). Moreover, he believed that such indifference to others made people more cynical,
sophisticated, secular and normless, as the bonds of kinship, of
neighbourliness, and the sentiments arising out of living together for
generations under a common folk tradition are likely to be absent, or
at best, relatively weak in an aggregate the members of which have
such diverse origins and backgrounds\(^{21}\). Thus, the transitory,
superficial and secondary nature of most human interaction replaces
the primary social ties of family, kinship and neighbourhood, that
once securely anchored the personality in a structure of stable socio-
economic control.

Wirth did not believe that size alone determined the nature of a
society as urban or folk; he argued, "The characterization of a
community as urban on the basis of size alone is obviously
arbitrary"\(^{22}\). He felt that the community as urban could best be
understood when viewed in the light of a number of sociological
propositions concerning the relationship between a) size of population
b) density of settlement c) heterogeneity of inhabitants and group
life which can be formulated on the basis of observation and
research\(^{23}\).

In Wirth's view, the ecological and demographic structure of
city life, particularly the large size, high population density and
heterogeneous population mix resulting from urbanization, produced
numerous social and social-psychological consequences which, taken
together, constituted a new pattern of culture, "a way of life" that
he termed "urbanism"\(^{24}\).

In "Urbanism as a way of Life", Wirth attempted to define the
city as a permanent settlement characterised by three key structural
features; large size, high density, and social heterogeneity. Each of
these structural characteristics is treated as a distinct, independent
ecological variable. Wirth recognized that the three tended to be interconnected in the real world, for instance, large numbers living in a restricted area produce a high density of settlement. Nonetheless, he believed that it was fruitful to treat each variable separately. Having posited size, density and heterogeneity as three irreducible components of a city, the rest of Wirth's classical article attempted to derive a set of hypotheses about the relationship between urban social organization, personality, and behaviour from his basic definition of the city\(^{(25)}\). It is useful to consider Wirth's own summary of the basic proposition advanced in his deductive theory. He states:

Large numbers account for individual variability, the relative absence of intimate personal acquaintanceship, the segmentalization of human relations which are largely anonymous, superficial and transitory, and associated characteristics. Density involves diversification and specialization, the coincidence of close physical contact and distant social relations, glaring contrasts, a complex pattern of segregation, the predominance of formal social control, and accentuated friction, among other phenomena. Heterogeneity tends to break down rigid social structure and to produce increased mobility, instability and insecurity, and the affiliation of the individuals with a variety of intersecting and tangential social groups with a high rate of membership turnover. The pecuniary nexus tend to displace personal relations, and institutions tend to cater to mass rather than individual requirements. The individual thus becomes effective only as he acts through organized groups. \(^{(26)}\)

Shortly before, Simmel had put forward much the same deductive method, but Simmel used social rather than ecological characteristics. Some of his conclusions were incorporated by Wirth. For instance, Simmel held that compared with rural society, urban
society demanded greater punctuality and exactness from urban residents in order for them to meet their obligations in the tightly interconnected web of urban functions. This requirement, in turn, forced the individual to be more rational and precise and less impulsive, if he was to survive in the city realm. Moreover, the city sets up a deep contrast with small towns and rural life; in the metropolis the rhythm of life and sensory mental imagery flows more quickly, there is more hierarchy and less familiarity. Precisely, the sophisticated character of metropolitan psychic life rests less and less upon deep felt and emotional relationships such as widely permeate in rural and semi-rural milieu(27).

The city, finally, is something more than congeries of individual men, and of social conveniences, streets, buildings, electric lights, tramways and telephone etc; something more also than a mere constellation of institutions and administrative devices; courts, hospitals, schools, police, and so on:

The city is rather, a state of mind, a body of customs and traditions, of organized attitudes and sentiments that inhere in these customs and are transmitted with this traditions. The city is not in other words, merely a physical mechanism and an artificial construction. It is involved in the vital processes of the people who compose it; it is a product of nature and particularly of human nature(28).

Moreover "urbanism as a way of life"; is not confined to the cities and towns, although it emerges from the great metropolitan centres. It is a way of behaving, and that means one can be very urban in his thinking and conduct, although living in a village; on
the other hand, a very non-urbanized person may live in a most urbanized section of a city\(^{(29)}\)

Later, a large number of sociologists and anthropologists argued the ideal-types of rural and urban social systems, depending on the basic contrary hypotheses of Redfield-Wirth, for instance, Haer (1952)\(^{(30)}\), Martindal (1958)\(^{(31)}\), Dewey (1960)\(^{(32)}\), Greer (1962)\(^{(33)}\), Fuguitt (1963)\(^{(34)}\), Mann (1965)\(^{(35)}\), Fischer(1971)\(^{(36)}\).

Mann [1965], believed that urbanism can still be usefully understood by using rural-urban contrast\(^{(37)}\) Low and Peek [1974] concluded that rural-urban differences still exist, furthermore urbanism and rurality are real.\(^{(38)}\) Lewis [1965] who strongly objected to the Redfield continuum suggested that there was a need to redefine the terms, folk, rural and urban "if we are to establish meaningful, causal relationships among them"\(^{(39)}\). Pahl [1968] warned that the notion of rural-urban continuum which, arose in reaction against the polar-type dichotomies, carried with it the danger of over-readily accepting a false continuity.\(^{(40)}\) Fuguitt asserted that throughout history, the city and countryside have been interdependent, and that interdependence has recently highly increased\(^{(41)}\). Hauser (1965) attacked both Wirth and Redfield's ideal type constructs. He asserted that both parts of these dichotomies (folk-urban continuum and rural-urban dichotomy) represented complex systems of variables which have yet to be unscrambled. "The dichotomizations perhaps represent all too hasty efforts to synthesize and integrate what little knowledge has been acquired in empirical research"\(^{(42)}\). Miner (1952), citing much of the criticism raised against the Redfield continuum, claimed that he disagreed with a remarkable number of these viewpoints, because they constituted as
he wrote: "a criticism of Redfield rather than the continuum". Even so, he rejected the continuum ideal-type and implicitly tended to favour the rural-urban dichotomy. (43) Duncan (1963), in his discussion of rural-urban continuum, warned that students should take a careful look at the continuum hypothesis before admitting it to the professional argot. He asserted that such a hypothesis does not withstand careful examination. His analysis of census data provided fundamental evidence in favour of a rural-urban dichotomy rather than a continuum. He concluded that careful inductive classifications of communities are of "greater scientific value than hypothetical constructs like the rural-urban continuum" (44).

Haer, in contrast, favoured the concept of rural-urban continuum rather than the conventional rural-urban dichotomy. He stressed that the continuum concept may be useful in making more precise the meaning of the attributes usually subsumed under the rubrics "rural and urban" (45). Mitchell (1969) strongly supported the continuum. He thought that the continuum typology is more tangible, especially among the traditional societies. He stated:

Between the tribal and urban extremes there are many intermediate types; the rural, semi-industrial societies lie well between the two extremes. (46)

Dewey, after reviewing eighteen books and articles on this subject, counted a total of forty elements mentioned in the definitions of urbanism. These elements were:

1) Heterogeneity 2) impersonality 3) division of labour 4) anonymity 5) mobility 6) segmental roles 7) class differences 8) predatory relations 9) emphasis on time 10) new family role 11)
employment pattern 12) multiple dwelling units 13) more female employment 14) secularism 15) non-agricultural life 16) cosmopolitanism 17) tenancy 18) complexity 19) tolerance 20) superficiality 21) low fertility 22) sophistication 23) commercialisation 24) liberalism 25) automation 26) literacy 27) creativity 28) blase attitude 29) stereotyping 30) critical attitude 31) utilitarianism 32) formal controls 33) interdependency 34) subjective outlook 35) intense occupational space 36) social participation 37) transiency 38) individualism 39) objectivity 40) practicality. (47)

He found it was unclear which were specifically urban characteristics and which were not. Only one characteristic, "heterogeneity", was mentioned by the majority (as many as eleven of eighteen authors). The other characteristics were less popular.

However, the present researcher believes that these theories have not taken into account the diffusion of rural characteristics over the city, which is reflected in the rurality [as a way of life] of the city, in contrast to the usual presumption that it is the city which changes the out-skirts and the countryside. Thus we need to examine the other viewpoint.

B. A CONTRASTING VIEW: THIRD WORLD CITIES

Since Wirth called attention to the city phenomenon in his famous essay, "Urbanism as a Way of life" (1938), sociologists and anthropologists have paid more attention to studying the city. Thus, a large number of studies appeared afterwards either to test Wirth's theory or to create a new direction to study the city.

Obviously, Wirth's theory is not adequate to interpret urban life in the Third World; indeed, it seems inadequate to interpret
urban life in the United States itself. Buttel and Flinn (1975) asserted that the American population changed from 95% rural in 1795 to 74% urban in 1970. Despite this change, they pointed out the common expression "You can take the boy out of the country, but you can't take the country out of the boy". Moreover there were prevailing American beliefs that rural life was natural for man, while city life was artificial and evil. Their assumption that agrarian values were widespread in the general population of the United States, was borne out empirically. Most of the sample respondents tended to agree with agrarian statements, with little difference between the rural and the urban subsample. (48)

M. Axelord (1956) found interaction with relatives as manifested in friendship networks and mutual aid to be important in all age and socio-economic status groups. (49) Greer (1956) reported a similar finding in his study of Los Angeles. He indicated that 73% of the high urban families and 76% of the low urban families were part of family networks. (50) Similarly Sussman (1953) studied 154 maintained mutual assistance patterns among relatives of middle class in Newhaven. (51) O'Neill (1982) empirically found that kinship network among dockland communities (North Humberside-England) represents close contacts between relatives such as aunts, uncles cousins and grandparents at home or in the neighbourhood which might frequently occur. (52) He concluded:

Work-based communities like Dockland are more likely to be close-knit because relatives see a great deal more of one another than if they commute either out of, or into, the neighbourhood. (53)
Bell and Boat (1957), using interviews with men in four neighbourhoods in San Francisco, found that informal relationships within the neighbourhood are fairly frequent and likely to be personal, close and intimate. The frequency and the nature of informal participation vary with the economic and family characteristics of the neighbourhoods. Kin are generally more important in each neighbourhood (54).

Recent research (1988) on the urban community in the United State reports that 49% of the respondents get together with relatives at least once a week and another 13% reported that they get together with relatives a few times a month. Further 44% of the respondents visited most frequently with relatives (55). Strauss (1969) demonstrated empirically from a purposive sample of 448 married women in Minnesota, that ruralness and working-class status are associated with greater kinship interaction, compared with urbanness and middle-class status. He concluded:

...the kin network is often a deterrent to the rapid adoption of modern psycho-social characteristics, it does not follow that interaction with the extended kin can or should be eliminated even in societies desperately needing to modernize (56).

Suttles (1972) strongly opposed Wirth's dichotomy. He assumed that informal social control, for instance, is inadequate to cope with the heterogeneity, thus the city might be divided into several communities (villagelike) basis on primary relations as a main resource for social control (57).

In England (the cradle of modern urbanization in the World) some kinship ties remain. Young and Willmott (1960) in their study of
a middle-class London suburb, showed that 25% of parents in their seventies lived with married children and the percentage increased to 41% for those aged 80 and over. Childless couples also turned to the extended family in old age. Pahl (1970) emphasized that people who moved only a short distance would be able to maintain kinship linkages with parents and siblings. Similarly, where people from a similar area move into a nearby town, they are able to provide each other with social and economic support. He states:

For Irish immigrants coming from a similar part of Ireland and settling together in a quarter of an English town, or for local migrants from nearby villages, the social control and cultural patterns of the previous milieu may be maintained.

If Wirth's theory is not entirely applicable in a Western metropolis, it is still less so in the Third World cities.

In the major cities in Asia, Africa and Latin America, one can clearly observe extensive kinship networks, deep family ties, close relationship with neighbours and friends; in brief, one can see primary relationships dominating in the city realm. Studies such as those by Abu-Lughod (1962), Aldous (1968), Mangin (1970), Magnarella (1974), Gutkind (1974), Levine and Levine (1979), Pons (1980), Brunn and Williams (1983), Pons (1980), Brunn and Williams (1983), and Lowder (1986), well represent this. Some of them empirically tested Wirth's hypothesis, and found that cities in the Third World are lacking the urban ingredients described by Wirth [segmentalization, anonymity, superficiality, transience, formal social control, heterogeneity, etc.]. The city and town have maintained the folk community characteristics; primary relationships and deep ties. Contrary to Wirth's view, the
family does not lose its function and its importance. Its core values are incorporated into the beliefs and behaviour of city dwellers.

Roberts (1978) argued that internal migration in Latin America, had played a fundamental role in the urbanization process. He asserted that "urban populations are floating populations". In Peru, for instance, about 60% of the inhabitants of its major cities were born outside the city. He concluded:

The contribution of migration to urban growth is, however, a cumulative one; children of migrants born in towns or cities are counted as part of the natural increase of urban places. Consequently even in those countries in which net migration contributes a minor fraction of urban population growth, the migration experience may still be an important one in the urban social structure (69).

Abu-Lughod (1971) found that metropolitan Cairo maintained both the old and the new orders, which existed and flourished side by side. She emphasized that "Cairo combines the passing traditionalism and agrarianism of an Egypt that has existed for centuries with industrial modernism of an Egypt yet-to-be" (70).

Lloyd (1973) asserted that the term "urban" is not valid to use in the African context. The urbanization process usually involves the sudden movement of rural tribesmen into modern cities, shaping their social structure (71). Similarly, Gilbert (1982) emphasized that the so-called modern cities of Africa, Asia and Latin America, developed as result of the colonial system, who used them as trade and administrative centres. Into these cities, large numbers of rural migrants moved, eventually in massive waves. Thus, cities recognized today as being of the Third World, first emerged with extremely
different urbanization characteristics, those of the Western countries\(^{72}\).

Disputing the assumption that Western urbanization meant the end of traditional kinship systems, Flanagan (1990) emphasized that kinship systems in Third World cities remain powerful. He gave many examples of the effectiveness of kinship systems in Brazilian, Peruvian and African cities, but he viewed kinship in economic rather than cultural terms: "The key variable in understanding the operation of kinship in urbanization is economic, not cultural"\(^{73}\).

Aldous, from his experience in West Africa, concluded that status in the city was an achieved and not an ascribed status based on family membership. He found that the extended family in African cities is indeed functional\(^{74}\). Magnarella, in his study of some principal cities in Turkey, found that most people in Turkey consulted their fathers when making important decisions; only 5.5 % of his study sample claimed not to consult their fathers\(^{75}\). Similarly, one can easily observe the mutual aid among relatives in Tehran as Brunn and Williams mentioned\(^{76}\). Kin networks are also widespread in Delhi's population particularly among the migrants who formed more than 70 % of the entire population of the city\(^{77}\).

Mitchell (1987) directed questions to 1,392 informants of various education levels in Rhodesia, asking each to indicate whether he considered himself to be very definitely a townsman, mainly a townsman, partly a townsman and partly a countryman, mainly a countryman, or very definitely a countryman). He found that the majority, 56%, regarded themselves as partly townsman and partly countrymen. Only 9.6% of them claimed that they were very definitely townsman and 11.1% said they were mainly townsman, while 15.% said
they were mainly countrymen and 8% saw themselves as very definitely countrymen. The results confirm that rural characteristics prevailing in the city and influence all aspects of life; in other words the city is exposed to what may be called "ruralization"(78). In the same context, Abu-Lughod (1969) asserted that urban economic structure alongside rural to urban migration helps to sustain traditionalism and bring new ruralism within Cairo. She emphasized that an unknown but sizeable proportion of the city inhabitants were not true townsmen, but rather countrymen; living in but not of the city(79). Petersen (1971) tested Abu-Lughod’s hypothesis. Her empirical findings, supported the hypothesis as a generalization based on direct evidence about the rurality of Cairo(80).

In Latin America, as in most TWCs, the basic unit of social organization is the family. In Mexico city, for instance, family ties appear to remain very strong(81). Dotson (1978) claimed that large and medium cities in the less developed world with special reference to Mexico City, remain villages in their residential function to quite an astonishing degree. He assumed that movement from an rural to an urban environment does not necessarily mean a change of occupation; it may mean nothing more than rural-dwelling agriculturalists becoming urban-dwelling agriculturalists. Thus ruralism still very much prevails by occupation as well as psycho-social identity(82). He concluded that "the urban dwelling farmer is real"(83). A similar result was found in Peru, where the family remains the strong unit in the city as well as in the village. This might be due to the massive influx of rural migrants, and the nature of settlement in scattered or slum areas.(84)
Thus, Wirth's hypothesis, and even Redfield's continuum, which is regarded as more rational than Wirth's dichotomy, seem to be inappropriate in the Third World. Rural migrants in many underdeveloped countries came directly to the large cities and the capitals. There was widespread mutual assistance and obligation among relatives, neighbours and friends. This means, of course, that there is a high level of primary relationship. For instance, the inhabitants of central Lagos were found to be like their rural counterparts, continuing to regard the needs of their relatives as their first responsibility. They supported aged relatives as well as parents, and it was customary to present their elderly relatives with gifts in cash or kind when visiting them. They often contributed to the wedding costs of their younger brothers, the up-bringing of their nephews and nieces, and helped married sisters. Such aid was coupled with open-handed hospitality and gifts to relatives. Marris concluded that:

All Nigerians..... are very loyal to their family group, they regard their membership in it with pride and affection, and derive a deep sense of emotional security from it. (86)

Similar traits can easily be seen in other TWCs, particularly in the Middle East, as we shall see in the next chapter.

1.3 THE PRESENT STUDY

There has been the remarkable assertion that the city may be viewed as a firm, fusing all the population to cope with its style of life, to create what Ledermann called the "urban entity". Racial or ethnic groups, rural migrants or any other kind of aggregations would be apart from the city system and urban atmosphere. Although
some of these ethnic or religious groups might maintain their traditions, in general they became absorbed into the city atmosphere [the way of life]. This implies increased effectiveness of the individual, formal control, and the abolition of the family role in controlling and arranging individuals' activities and relationships.

However, we have seen that this may be only partially true for western cities, and still less so in TWCS. The researcher in this study advocates the view that the family is the main unit in the TWCs, bringing many obligations and commitments: close ties, vital kinship relations, extended family, patriarchal authority, endogamy, cooperation with neighbours and little concern for time. These may be described as characteristics of a rural community.

In this context, the researcher aimed to examine the following features:

A. The nature and the composition of the family in the city, its status, pattern of its members' relationships and authority;
B. The power of kinship ties, and obligations to relatives;
C. The nature of neighbours and neighbourhood and their participation in social control;
D. How the city dwellers view time as a criterion of social activities and life rhythm.

Meanwhile the following two main questions are raised:

1. To what extent have city dwellers acquired rural traits, values, norms and manners, and to what extent have they maintained hypothesized urban traits?

2. Is there any sort of double standard of personality, or dualism, in which modern and traditional ways live and flourish side by side in the city?
1.4 THE AREA AND THE POPULATION OF THE STUDY

The major part of this study was carried out in four districts on both side of Baghdad [two districts in Al-Karkh, on the left bank of the Tigris river and two districts in Al-Russafa, on the right bank of the Tigris]. The other part [the control group] was conducted in Sakran Village which is established about 115 km south of Baghdad.

The main reasons for having chosen Baghdad as the area of this study are:

a. It is a large urban centre in Iraq and one of the largest capitals in the Middle East.

b. It has about one-third of all the Iraqi population.

c. It is the main destination of migrants in Iraq, as well as having the most concentrated urban population.

All these reasons are very important for this study. In contrast, Sakran village, from which the control group came, is a homogeneous village where everybody knows everyone else, because all the village dwellers are blood relatives. Moreover the ecology of the village is very simple; the village consists of three streets, each comprising about 35 households. All the village inhabitants work in agriculture. The fact that the researcher knows everybody in the village, its distance from Baghdad, and its purely rural characteristics, as described in the literature, were other reasons for the selection of this village.
SIMPLE MAP OF BAGHDAD CITY ILLUSTRATE
THE MAIN DIVISIONS AND SUB-DIVISIONS
AND THE SAMPLE AREAS

- AL-RUSAFA AREA
- AL-ADHIAMIYA AREA
- AL-THOWRA AREA
- BAGHDAD AL-JADEEDA AREA
- AL-KARADA AL-SHARQIAH AREA
- AL-KARKII AREA
- AL-MANSOR AREA
- AL-DURA AREA
- AL-KADHIMIYA AREA
- THE SAMPLE AREAS
THE RURAL SAMPLE

SAKRAK VILLAGE
1.5 THE RESEARCH METHODS AND FIELDWORK

The methods of this research depended primarily on interview guided by a preset questionnaire, which was handed to the heads of families in Baghdad and Sakran village, during the period from October 1990 and January 1991.

The great problem confronting the researcher was the Gulf crisis which led to the closure of Iraqi borders and prevented the researcher from returning as intended, to obtain the data himself. The researcher was therefore forced to send the questionnaire to his colleagues in the sociology department and psychology department of the University of Baghdad. A. Yassin Mustafa who recently obtained his Ph.D from the sociology department in Hull University in September 1990, held with him the Arabic formula of the questionnaire, and obtained the data in association with Salih, K. Hussien, assistant professor in psychology University of Baghdad and Amin, M. Abdilal, assistant professor in statistics, University of Al-Mustansirya. I am very grateful to them.

The researcher had hoped that after the crisis, he would be able to return and re-collect the data, not because it is inadequate but to ensure that all the work was under his own control.

Unfortunately the duration of the crisis has so far made this impossible. Thus it is necessary to depend on the data collected by the colleagues mentioned above, who have considerable experience in this field.

It must be acknowledged that the study was done under unique and difficult circumstances: the fear of the confrontation with America and its Allies, following upon the hard experience of eight years of
war with Iran. The researcher made every effort to control the steps of the study and had the benefit of valuable collaborators; nevertheless, the findings may to some degree reflect the circumstances of that year, and of Iraqi society during a period of many years war of strife.

1.6 THE PILOT STUDY AND THE REFEREES

The pilot study was designed to reveal the significant variables for the construction of the questionnaire and to test the meaningfulness of every item. The sample included 20 respondents, most of them post-graduate students in Hull University, about 80 percent of them have lived in Baghdad city; 50 percent have lived there all their life, and 30 percent have spent more than five years there. The interview with each individual lasted about half an hour, each interview being followed by informal discussion.

The respondents in this group were divided into two sets: 18 males and 2 females; all of them were over 30 years of age, and only four of them were single, so they recognised the responsibility of the family; most of them asserted that the extended family is the main unit in Iraqi society, and is reflected here or in their permanent home, characteristic remarks included the following:

- When I was in Baghdad, I used to live with my parents, brothers and sisters and their wives and children under one roof.

- I have bought about three thousand pounds worth of goods for my extended family and relatives as gifts.

- I am studying hard to save my face when my family and relatives receive me.

- My original family support me morally and materially even though I now have family of my own.
I exchange visits with our Iraqi colleagues and friends here and share many things; we are a part of Baghdad community.

- We are urban dwellers but we have to maintain our original values and obligations.

The respondents viewed favourably most of the questionnaire items except for a few terms, which were changed in accordance with their suggestions. Meanwhile the researcher, under his supervisor's consultation, showed the first draft of the questionnaire to a committee in the Department of Sociology and Social Anthropology in this University. The committee consisted of:

1. Mr. C. Creighton
2. Dr. D. Booth
3. Mr. Ray Francis
4. Mr. L. Hill

They discussed and asked about every item in the questionnaire and provided some very useful advice, with regard to which the construction of the questionnaire was modified. The researcher then returned the revised draft for checking.

1.7 CONSTRUCTION OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE

The main device used in this study was a standardized questionnaire, which could provide data to describe the rural aspects of urban life in Baghdad city. The questionnaire was designed to collect data which included social characteristics of family structure, its interactions and activities in an urban centre in Iraq.

The questionnaire was designed having regard to a review of the literature in the field of urban sociology, and particularly studies in
Asia and the Middle East, with special reference to the urban characteristics in Iraq.

The questionnaire was formulated in English and afterwards translated into Arabic. To check the validity of the translation, the researcher sent three copies of the questionnaire in both English and Arabic, to three referees selected from his colleague in the Department of Sociology in the University of Baghdad. The respondents were asked for their help and told: "This information will be used only for scientific purposes, so we do not need your name and address. For that reason we need your cooperation to fill in the questionnaire truthfully, not just what you have believe, but also what do you actually do and how you behave"

Following the pre-test [pilot study] and the committee's advice the questionnaire was revised; some questions were modified and some were refined to make them easier to answer for persons with limited education. As modified, the questionnaire provided space for both males and females to respond.

The questionnaire in its final formulation consisted of five general sections each of which included a number of questions, plus general information as follows:

A. **GENERAL INFORMATION**: including, sex, age, education, occupation, place of birth, marital status, family income, age at marriage, number of children and family composition.[see appendix 1]

B. **THE URBAN FAMILY:**

1. Power structure of the family.
2. Family planning.
3. Women's position and status.
C. KINSHIP NETWORK AND

1. Kinship control over marriage.
2. Loyalty and nepotism.
3. Mutual obligations.
4. People attitudes toward each other as "kin".

D. NEIGHBOURS AND NEIGHBOURHOOD.

1. Neighbours relationships.
2. Mutual obligations.
3. Neighbourhood and social control.

E. SOCIAL TIME

1. Time perception: lateness and punctuality.
2. Time budget.
3. Rhythm of life.
4. Temporal orientation.

In the last section, the researcher adopted a Likert's scale to measure the attitudes of the respondents toward social time [social activities]. This scale was used because it is practical, relatively simple and inexpensive, and does not (like the Thurston scale) assume that the judges can determine a scale value independent of their own attitudes. (89)

The scale consisted of 12 items, covering four areas of social time [see chapter eight]. To avoid any margin of error or any tendency to stereotyped response, statements were worded in both positive and negative forms; six of the items were stated positively, so that strong agreement with them reflected a positive attitude,
while the other items were reflected a negative attitude. Both were clearly differentiated at the ends of the continuum.

Values on a five-point continuum were assigned to indicate a positive and negative attitude towards time as a criterion of social activity rhythm.

All the 20 Iraqi students employed in the pilot study were asked to react to the formulation of the statements to increase the face validity of the items. Split-half method was used to evaluate the internal consistency of the scale. The reliability coefficient according to Pearson's correlation was (0.86) for the 12 item scale.

1.8 THE SAMPLE:

After the preparation of the questionnaire, the researcher selected a sample of 300 heads of families, two hundred from Baghdad city and one hundred as a control group, from Sakran village, south of Baghdad. The sample was divided into three categories according to the nature of resident; natives [city born], migrants and pure rural.

According to the last general census in 1987, Baghdad within the boundaries of Amant Alassima [the capital province] comprises nine major residential areas, five on the right bank of the Tigris river, namely, Al-Russafa, Al-Adhamiya, Al-Thowra, Baghdad Al-Jadeeda and Al-Karada Al-Sharquah, and four on the left bank: Al-Karkh, Al-Kadhemiya, Al-Mansour, and Al-Dura. These are divided into 76 sub-sectors and the latter are divided into a further 360 districts.

The researcher recognized that a comprehensive survey of so many districts would be almost impossible, and would require more time and money than were available. Thus, the researcher selected at
random four districts: two from the right bank of the Tigris river and two from the left bank. The selection operation regarded two factors:

1. The concentration of the natives [city born] and the migrants.
2. The variety of the sample areas in the city.

In the first stage of the sample selection, the following districts were chosen: [Al-Safina] neighbourhood [district] in Al-Adhamiya area\(^{(90)}\) which is one of the oldest residential areas in the right bank of Tigris river, where most of its population are natives,\(^{(91)}\) Al-Chewader Neighbourhood in Al-Thowra area,\(^{(92)}\) where most of the population are migrants; Al-Mutanaby Neighbourhood in Al-Mansour area,\(^{(93)}\) where most of the population are natives, and Al-Noor Neighbourhood in Al-Shaala\(^{(94)}\) sub-division of Al-Kademiya area.

These areas were randomly chosen according to Weisberg and Bowen's note:

If a town fell into your sample, for example, you would randomly choose the neighbourhoods to be interviewed maybe one area in the northeast corner, another on the near south side, and a third in a western suburb. At the next stage, a sample of blocks would be chosen in each Neighbourhood, and at the next stage, a sample of houses would be chosen on each block\(^{(95)}\).

After the general division, further division was made, in the second stage each of these selected areas was divided into blocks and a random sample of blocks was selected.
The final stage was for all residential units in each selected block to be listed and a random sample of 2, 4, 6,... residents from each block selected, to give a total of 50 from each sampled district.

The total of 200 respondents of the sample was confined to heads of the family, because the study focused on family ties and the family's activities in an urban centre.

The second part of the sample, which consisted of 100 respondents from a rural area, were selected as a control group. This part of the fieldwork was easier because all of the dwelling units were systematically selected, as a case study. Sakran Village comprises 103 households which were covered by a comprehensive survey. Afterwards the researcher discarded two uncompleted copies and one for statistical reasons, bringing the total number of the sample 300 heads of family.

1.9 METHOD OF DATA ANALYSIS

Following the operation of transferring the crude data of the questionnaire into the computer, the researcher used the statistics package for social sciences program (SPSSX) which has been utilized in data processing, cross-tabulation and analysis. It was also found that chi-square was very useful for measuring the significant differences between the groups of the sample.

The technique of comparative analysis has been used. To execute this comparison, the researcher has used frequency and percentages. This method has great value because it shows the diffusion of the traditional values into urban dweller's behaviour that the researcher assumed to be real part of the urban inhabitants' manners and attitudes. In the same context the researcher was anxious to test the impact of some independent variables such as sex,
age, education and occupation on family ties, kinship obligations, neighbours and neighbourhood to ascertain the differences and similarities between the two main groups [urban and rural]. He therefore undertook to merge both natives and migrants groups, regarding them as an urban unit, and compared them with the control group [pure rural]. This necessitated cross-tabulation and some statistical measurements such as chi square and Pearson correlation coefficient, which had already been used.

For the attitudes of the respondents towards social time, one-way analysis of variance was adopted.


9. Ibid, P. 53


12. Ibid, pp 737


25. Ibid, PP. 12-13


37. Mann, P. H., Op. Cit, p. 71


70. Ibid, PP. 105-106


83. Ibid, P. 708.


86. Ibid, P. 124.

87. See for example, Greer, Scolt., The Emerging City, Op. Cit, P. 9


90. Al-Adhamiya is an administration unit (qatha) in the right bank of Tigris river.

91. A native is one who was born and lived all his life in the city.

92. Al-Thowra is the largest shanty-town on the right bank of the Tigris.

93. Al-Mansour is one of the high-class residential area on the left bank.

94. Al-shaala is one of the largest shanty-towns in Al-Kadhemiya area (qatha) on the left bank.


96. Sakran village is the birth place of the researcher.
CHAPTER TWO

URBANIZATION IN ASIA
AND THE MIDDLE EAST
2.1 INTRODUCTION

Urbanization in the Middle East as in most Asian countries, first occurred to a significant extent during and after the first World War, but it accelerated after the second World War. It has been a remarkable phenomenon, with the urban areas more than doubling their population in less than three decades, as we shall see.

The key factors behind this phenomenon have been the huge rural migration, together with the natural increase, which reflects improvement in the economic situation, health, education, and communication, leading to decreased mortality, and to increased fertility. In other words there have been more births than deaths.

Although this phenomenon has been very important for the progress of these countries, it has left pathological effects in social life such as over-urbanization, rurality, slum areas and so on.

In fact, the social features of the city seems to be similar to those of the rural counterpart: norms, values and habits are the commonplace of the two settings. The traditional family still stands firm against the winds of change, maintaining its old role over its members, for instance, "the new family is not recognized as a separate and independent entity. The son continues to be under the direct authority of his father or parents"(1). Kinship and neighbourhood have a great effecting on the social interaction, forming the invisible structure of the city.

In this chapter the researcher will attempt to define the features of urbanization in Asia with particular reference to the
Middle Eastern countries, because they have shared similar cultural characteristics, closely related with the purpose of the present study.

2.2 URBANIZATION IN ASIA

A considerable number of studies have discussed the process of urbanization in Asia. These have investigated many aspects of urban life, especially the rapid and vast growth of cities and its causes, in an often specialized way, appropriate to the purposes of this thesis. This urbanization process is quite different from that occurring in western countries today. Therefore, most of these studies now agree that the theory of demographic transition, as developed on the basis of the experience of western countries, is inadequate in the Asian context. It does not adequately explain, for instance, the pattern of fertility, family size and close relationships in the cities as well as in the villages throughout the "Third World"(2) which reflect the traditions in both types of settlement; these did not persist in western urban communities. These studies are well represented by K. Davis (1954,1961,1965,1975)(3), P. Hauser (1957)(4), D. Bogue and K. Zachariah (1961)(5), T. Wilkinson (1961, 1963)(6), the U.N- ECAFE Secretariat (1964)(7), R. Murphey (1966)(8), T. McGee (1971)(9), O. Lynch (1974)(10), Gilbert and Gugler (1982)(11), and J. Gugler (1988)(12).

The main feature of these studies was the explanation of urban growth or urban revolution in McGee's terms (13), according to two main factors:

1) The flow of migration from rural to urban areas, reflecting economic growth and consequent "pull" of the city's attractions, as compared with poor conditions on the land;
2) The natural increase (through an excess of birth over deaths) K. Davis indicates that the second component of urban increase was of high significance, as he states:

If Asia's urbanization is distinguished neither by its level nor by its speed, what is it distinguished by? One way in which it differs from past history is in the ingredients or components of urbanization. For instance, its city population is growing more rapidly than city populations grew in the past, and its rural population is doing the same. Furthermore, the source of city population growth is different; rural-urban migration plays a lesser role, natural increase a greater one.\(^{(14)}\)

Although, Davis did not give priority to the rural rural-urban migration factor in Asian urban growth, he did not neglect it. However, this factor should not be taken for granted, but should be examined by turning to other relevant researches. D.J. Bogue and K.C. Zachariah supposed that:

Rural-urban migration is by far the major component of urbanization and is the chief mechanism by which all of the world's great urbanization trends have been accomplished. This being the case, there is great potential profit in focusing on rural-to-urban migration as a way of deepening one's understanding of the urbanization process.\(^{(15)}\)

Similarly, R. Murphey pointed out:

In Asia the very large and continuing role is played by rural-urban migration. Almost every large Asian city has apparently owed half or more of its recent rapid growth to migration, but even so general a statement must be qualified since the nature of migration makes accurate counting difficult and since in most Asian cities it is clear that many if not most migrants continue to maintain
close ties with their rural origins and periodically return there\textsuperscript{(16)}.

With this phase of urban growth in Asia, it is very important to recognize that more than half of the inhabitants of most cities were born outside the city. For example, more than 70% of the population of Bombay city appears to have been born outside the city. This means that it is always a minority which feels "at home" in the city, the majority are "strangers". Similarly, it was found that in Djakarta about three-quarters of the city's population was born outside that city\textsuperscript{(17)}.

In communist China, the growth of the urban population was rapidly increased after 1949, obtaining an annual average rate of increase over four times that of the total population. From 1949 to 1960, aggregate urban population more than doubled; 60% of all the increase in national population was accounted for by the urban increase. This rapid increase was mainly attributed to rural-urban migration\textsuperscript{(18)}. As Kirkby (1985) stated:

\textit{Indeed, the impact of migration on urban population growth increased greatly through the first decade of the people's republic. Before 1953, net migration accounted for over 70 per cent of total urban growth}\textsuperscript{(19)}.

Dwyer (1971) regarded both natural increase and migration as the only factors responsible for the rapid rates of urban population increase in Hong Kong. He asserted that such phenomenon is in common with other parts of Asia and the non-Western countries\textsuperscript{(20)}.

Ramachandrant (1989) attributed the rapid pace of urbanization in India to rural-urban migration. In less than two decades, urban
population increased nearly three times, from 62 million in 1951 to 159 million in 1981. The proportion of urban population to total population increased at a slower pace, from 17.6% to 23.7% for the same period. The slower pace of increase is attributed to the high fertility of both rural and urban population, which diminish the differentiation between the two sets (21).

Goldstein (1971) ascribed the rapid pace of urbanization in Thailand to heavy rural migration, which more than trebled the population of Bangkok in about two decades (22).

In Iran, migration to the major cities, especially Tehran, is of a remarkable proportion. The city of Tehran grew at the rate of 5.9% per year during the years 1956-1966, of which 4% is attributed to rural to urban migration. These figures do not reflect the large amount of temporary migration which accounts for a sizeable proportion of Tehran population. Thus migration certainly responsible for the size of the major cities in Iran (23).

The growth of many, if not most of Asia's cities, including the main cities, was the result of the following factors:

a) the low land-population ratio arising from rapid population growth in relation to agricultural resources; people left rural areas, in brief, because there was no way, in the existing social land-tenure and technological conditions, of procuring a livelihood on already over-populated land or by technically obsolescent handicrafts.

b) the disruption and disorganization produced by the Second World War and the political change which followed as result of which many of the cities of Asia became choked with refugees who in
seeking occupation and advancement have swelled the urban population.

c) The lure of urban existence to which large parts of the peasant population were exposed as the result of military service, as well as migratory refugee flows.

d) Seasonality of employment in agriculture which creates migratory flows, bringing many people in contact with the attractions of city life.

e) The great cities which already exist create the tendency further to centralize industrial, commercial, and service development in them. Such a tendency may detract from the growth potential of other cities and may produce further concentration in the primate or great cities at the expense of the rest of the national economy. (24)

According to this theoretical approach, we have an inductive view, that the urban growth in Asia has been exceptionally rapid, not only because of unusually rapid increase in the urban proportion of the population due to rural-urban migration, but also because of the rapid increase in the total population to which this proportion is applied.

Returning to Davis's emphasis on natural population increase, this arose, evidently because there are no outstanding differences between rural and urban growth; the traits of urban life are something like those in the rural areas, or in Roberts's terms "it is a city of peasants". (25) However, we need now to ask, did the processes of urbanization create "urbanism" as a way of life in urban Asia's milieu? While no clear-cut answer will be found, we shall try to
investigate some relevant studies to provide broad overviews of urbanization in the provinces or primate cities, by T.O. Wilkinson (1961, 1963)(26) O. Lynch (1974)(27), D. Pocock (1974)(28) and M. Rao (1974)(29). All of these writers agree that there are no essential differences between the rural and urban milieu in most Asian countries. As Pocock states:

Where it is recognized that city and village are elements of the same civilization, how does the question of their continuity arise? Is it not because the sociologist has assumed (almost unconsciously) a division which his later observations would lead him to mend?. If we have posited the village from the outset we have automatically opposed it in our minds to the city. When we come to knit up what we have broken, we can only do it by way of description of the relationships between the two entities.....it would appear impossible to recognize the "orthogenetic" character of India's cities and villages and at the same time to think of comparing them separately with their "equivalents" elsewhere. (30)

In Japan the tenacity of the traditional agrarian way of life, even in present day highly industrial Japan, has been supported by both governmental policies and economic factors "Against this background the presence of agriculturalists or at least an agrarian way of life within Japan's urban population becomes understandable" (31). Despite all the changes, in the major cities, the main residential areas in modern Japan still maintain many characteristics of the old traditional city. Although the new men take up residence as big businessmen, chairmen of industry, military leaders and government officials, they inherit and carry on many of the old traditions and values, drawing upon the same heritage as a source of prestige. (32)
In his careful and profound study, M. A. Qadeer [1974] assumed that urbanism might bring smaller and nuclear families, lower mortality and fertility rates and higher proportion of females to males, but substantially he found little differences between rural and urban areas in three countries in south Asia: India, Pakistan and Bangla Desh. Using household size, he observed a slightly smaller household in Indian urban areas, while similar households in Pakistan and Bangla Desh were a bit larger.

Table 2-1 Size of Household

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Areas/Countries</th>
<th>India</th>
<th>Pakistan</th>
<th>Bangla Desh</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Qadeer, Op.Cit P. 269

He concluded that the household size in both rural and urban areas indicates that family structure has not undergone the kind of change normally associated with urbanization. The consanguine family in these countries continues to be a very cohesive unit. Blood loyalties are strong and kinship ties are continually reinforced by religious institutions and economic considerations. He asserted that "Urbanization is not affecting these ties to any appreciable degree".

In this context King (1980) emphasised that urbanization does not modernize social structures in Asian cities. The less tangible sphere of changes is in values, attitudes and forms of social
relationships. He concluded that the commonplace in most Asian's cities is the pervasiveness of rural forms of social organization values (35).

One of the most important facets of the traditional values is that of the right authority in the family, which is confined to the oldest married male. Lazar (1979) assumed that "because men were held to have appropriate moral qualifications, family authority was limited to older married men" (36).

In Korea, despite large scale urbanization, industrialization and modernization, the family still plays many vital roles in shaping the society. Using Chang's words:

The family and later the clan have provided its members with an identity. The clan gave status to each member so that his position would be identified and clarified, thus establishing a channel of command. The family regulated the sex drive and reproduction. Through elaborate rules which specified a child's relations to others, the birth order, sex, and generation pyramid usually predetermined his activities throughout his life (37).

The extended family and kinship system seems to be very active in many other Asian societies regardless of residential areas. In Tibetan society, for instance, the kinship system encompasses multiple meanings, describing people sharing common agnatic descent from recognized ancestors; patrilineal descent (38). A similar system is found in Nepal, where the patrilineal system, clans, lineage, and joint family have remained more or less unaltered in Western Nepalese society (39).
In Indonesia Krausse [1979] observed that due to massive migration from rural areas, traditional values have been shaping the urban culture. He pointed out:

It is quite conceivable that such a large population equipped with rural values and life style, is as much involved in shaping the culture of the city as it is adjusting to it.\(^{(40)}\)

It is now commonplace that the rural and traditional forms of social organization, values, norms, attitudes, and social order persist in many cities in East and West Asia and the Middle East, which indicate that it is false to presuppose a dichotomy between rural and urban social structure. Thus, city life as Versluys has asserted is not necessarily as atomized as it has been emphasized to be, but often, on the contrary, shows a certain cohesiveness which would help the rural migrant to adapt himself relatively easily to the city life, which in Asian cities particularly does not fundamentally differ with that in the village\(^{(41)}\)

2.3 URBANIZATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Most countries in the Middle East experienced an urban explosion, almost at the same time, after the second World War. In addition, most of these countries are "over-urbanized"\(^{(42)}\) because the cities faced a heavy, rapid, and apparently continuous migration from rural areas. These cities were unprepared for the influx because of their degree of economic development. It is not quite clear how this greater quantity affects the urban process, but for urban theory it might well mean only that these countries were pushed more quickly into urbanization.
According to I.M. Lapidus, most of the city dwellers in the Middle East were born outside the city. He assumed that a sizeable portion of the people who lived in Middle Eastern cities were born in villages. Indirect but massive evidence of this exists in the fact that the population of most Middle Eastern cities is increasing at a higher rate than that of the countries in which they are located. For instance, Baghdad whose population was about 1,100,000 in 1965, had increased almost 800 per cent since 1904, when it had approximately 140,000 people. Similarly, Turkey's urban population distributed among its six largest cities, more than doubled in less than thirty years. Aleppo in Syria has doubled, rising from 218,289 in 1930 to 465,960.

Generally speaking, most of the Middle East cities at least doubled in size over one or two decades; Cairo in 1947 had a population three times the size of what it had been forty years previously and more than one-third of these people had not been born there. J. Abu-Lughod, thought that "migration from rural areas has been chiefly responsible for Egypt's soaring rate of urbanization." In the same context, A. Abou-Zeid, supposed that the rapid pace of urbanization cannot be explained by rapid natural increase in the urban centres, particularly in Cairo "It must be the result of a powerful multitudinous drift of migrants from countryside to the towns and cities."

Consequentially, there are three main reasons for the vast and rapid urban growth in the Middle Eastern cities:

a) the flow of migrants from rural areas to cities, particularly to the primate cities, which was the main source of urbanization;
b) the natural increase (the excess of birth over death) which in the urban areas is still as high as in the rural, accounting for half the annual rate of urban growth(51);

c) the administrative division, which has increased the city population; that means some hamlets and villages around the primate cities have been reclassified as part of those cities, according to the administration distribution of the population(52).

G. Baer asked, "What are the causes of this urbanization process which characterises much of the Arab East, and why has it become so much more rapid within the last generation?"(53). In his opinion some of the following factors should be considered:

a) the economic and social conditions which impel peasants and tribesmen to leave their agricultural areas. This factor operates in two main ways: In Egypt the peasants were driven to cities by a rapid natural increase in the population which outpaced the increase of farm land by its great density(54). In Iraq, the drift to the city had its roots in the system of land tenure(55);

b) the economic development of the towns and cities that attracted the rural population. It should be stressed that this economic development was due to: 1) discovery and exploitation of oil sources 2) emergence of the industrial cities 3) flow of capital from oil revenues(56);

c) political factors, which include the concentration of government institutions in the urban centres, and the considerable increase in the number of people employed in government departments.
Another political factor of importance which spurred the process of urbanization in the Middle East during the second World War, was the presence of the allied forces in the area, particularly in the towns and their immediate vicinity, which attracted thousand of villagers to the towns and cities\(^{(57)}\);

d) The social and cultural change, which brought about or speeded up urbanization, through closer links between agriculture and the market, in addition to the development of education\(^{(58)}\).

The strength of these "pull" and "push" factors varies from one region to another, and also changes over time, but over all Middle East countries, these factors were mainly responsible for urban growth, so the vast and rapid growth of the cities did not create an urban lifestyle, and did not solve their rural ills, as evidenced by the shanty and slum areas throughout the cities. For instance, Amman the capital of Jordan, grew from 12,000 in 1958 to 247,000 in 1961. A good part of it is slums, and urban amenities are lacking most of the time for most of the people. Greater Baghdad in 1960 had an estimated 850,000 people; its slums, like those in many underdeveloped countries, are in two zones: the central part of the city and the outlying areas. Here are the shanty "sarifa" areas, characterized by self-built reed huts; these areas account for about 45 per cent of housing in the entire city and are devoid of amenities, including even latrines\(^{(59)}\). These consequences of rapid urban growth have been as being in terms of the continual ruralization of the cities\(^{(60)}\).

In fact, the morphology of the city in the Middle Eastern countries is somewhat similar to that in the industrial countries: including motorways, traffic lights, paved streets, schools, police
stations, modern buildings etc. However, the similarity does not extend to the social relationships which reflect the rural style of life, because the majority of the urban populations are not only rural by birth, but also in culture, so the rural migrants bring their culture patterns with them to the city, and there are several ways in which their cultural patterns affect aspects of city culture. One of these ways is the contribution of rural migrants to the socio-cultural distinct quarters which are a feature of Middle Eastern cities. In this respect, Morroe Berger, noted that:

"the most striking aspect of the Arab city is its separation into "quarters" each with its homogeneous population, its law and its custom. The quarters were related to each other chiefly through a common subordination to the central regime and through commerce. In other respects, each quarter was until recently a city unto itself".

In Bab-Altibbani of Taripoli, Lebanon, there is a residential cluster of Alawites from Jabal Alnsariyya in Syria and in the Qubba section of the city there is a community of Maronites all from the same village. Physically, these two clusters are integral parts of the city itself. Their inhabitants maintain village ties and to some extent they operate their own shops, but in other ways they are parts of the city itself. Each cluster has a definite reputation for certain kinds of behaviour and for performing certain kinds of work. Obviously they contribute to the very essence of Tripoli's urban heterogeneity.

Similar behaviour has been reported from Turkey, P. Susuki (1966) describes the Anatolian peasants in Istanbul, showing how they
have retained aspects of their traditional lifestyle: they have maintained village endogamy, and established their own mutual fund covering funeral expenses and transportation fares to and from the home village\(^{64}\). He states:

I found village solidarity to be exceedingly strong for these migrants. Among the "Kiriniites", mutual aid, village endogamy, and its concomitants and parakinship system have been fostered in the city\(^{65}\).

Under the same stimulus Allan Schnaiberg (1970) noticed that the villagers in Ankara, had retained some traditional organization; extended family, patrilineality and patrilocality. They were established in a squatter area, composed of many other village groups clustered together\(^{66}\).

Finally, J.Ahu-Lughod assumed that as the villagers who were driven from the village by dearth of land and opportunity and attracted to the city had a low capacity for assimilation, they tended to build for themselves within the city, a replica of the culture they had left behind\(^{67}\).

Maintenance of village ties naturally implies communication, but more than this, it is maintained by a number of activities:

1) regular returns to the home village for weddings, funerals and other ceremonies;

2) regular exchanges of gift and visits;

3) commuting on a monthly, weekly or even daily basis\(^{68}\).

One of the possible consequences is that cities in the Middle East have two group of residents, natives and migrants, living and
flourishing side by side, creating a "dualism" by means of mutual adjustment.

Accordingly, this part of the thesis is concerned with studies of four aspects of urban life. The discussion begins with a brief review of studies concerning the study of family structure and marriage. It is followed by discussion of the kinship network and relationship with neighbours. Finally, we review studies of the use of "social time". Our study of rural aspect in the city is confined to those variables which are of particular importance in exploring the presence of the rural feature in urban life.

2.4 FAMILY STRUCTURE AND MARRIAGE

In general, there seems to be no real distinction made in studies between the family, marriage and kinship; all are interrelated, therefore, it is only possible to discriminate between them as regards methods.

Six structural properties have been identified as characterizing the Middle Eastern Islamic family system. These properties existing in rural and urban settings alike(69), are:

a) Extended family structure. According to R. Patai, the Muslim family is definitely extended. That is, under traditional circumstances prevailing in the majority of cases, the family constituting one household consists of an elderly man, his wife or wives, his unmarried daughters, his unmarried as well as married sons, and the wives and children of the latter(70). However, Goode dismisses this description as ideal rather than real. He believes that the principle of the extended family under one roof is
rarely practiced\(^{(71)}\). Elsewhere, Goode states that it is likely that many Arabs have at some time lived in an extended family, either as adolescents, or as adults keeping their married sons at home\(^{(72)}\). The ideal is of psychological importance, however, for it reveals wishes and values widely held, and it helps to inculcate notions of family loyalty, and solidarity in each new generation. Accordingly, E. Prothero and L. Diab pointed out:

Student of family structure have come to realize that family "types" are simply positions on a continuum. Though we speak of "extended" and "nuclear" families as qualitatively different, there are many individual and nuclear elements in "extended families" and many group and extended characteristics to be found in nuclear families\(^{(73)}\).

b) Patrilineal descent. The Arab Muslim family is patrilineal, which means that each man is regarded as belonging to the family to which his father belongs. Each individual derives his identity from the father and his paternal relatives\(^{(73)}\).

c) Patriarchal authority. This means that the father is master of his own conjugal family, and the eldest male is the head of the entire extended family grouping\(^{(75)}\). As C.S. Coon puts it:

The family is a large patriarchal household, with a considerable staff of domestics, and capable of handling most of the needs of its members in preparing food and clothing and in bringing up children\(^{(76)}\).

d) Polygamous marriage. Moslim law permits a man to have up to four wives at the same time, but only if he can treat them with equal justice and provide adequately for them. Although this tradition has been widespread in the past it is extremely rare
nowadays. For example, in Saudi Arabia, the king, the princes, and the rich still have sizeable harems; in Syria, Jordan, Iraq, Egypt, however, the example of the leading families is that of monogamy(77).

e) Endogamy. Another aspect of traditional behaviour that is undergoing change is the custom of endogamy, i.e., marriage within the same lineage, sect, community group, village or neighbourhood. Like others, this custom reflects the fact that the family rather than the individual constitutes the fundamental social unit. The advantages of endogamy lie not only in the convenience of lower bride-price and the retention of family wealth and property within the clan, but in the strengthening of kinship solidarity and avoidance of rupturing close relationships between the bride and her immediate kin(78).

In the context of the above, a large number of studies of family life in the Middle East have focused on the Arab preference for marrying relatives: R. Patai (1955)(79), J. Gulick (1968)(80), E. Prothero and L. Diab (1974)(81), and D. Eickelman (1981)(82). According to these studies the ideal wife for young man is the daughter of one of his father's brothers (bint aam). Thus a girl can not marry other than her father's brother's son without his consent. In the city endogamy, both parallel-cousin and cross-cousin marriage are still noticeable, but on the decline(83).

A number of studies by social scientists have investigated Muslim families in the Middle East(84). From these it can be determined that the average number of living children per nuclear family is between 5 and 7. J. Gulick has summarized recent studies of household size of Muslim families of Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan,
finding means ranging from 5.2 to 8.9. He argues that these numbers represent a large number of children born to one couple, rather than an extended family living under one roof(85).

Using fertility as an index of family size, A. Omran (1980) found that in Kuwait, Algeria, Libya and Jordan, fertility appears to be lower in rural areas while in Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Sudan, Syria and Iraq, it is slightly greater(86).

As regards age of marriage it seems to be generally agreed that the majority of Arab people marry at a young age. The Cairo 1970 census showed an average age at marriage of 19.7 years among females and 27.4 among males. In sum, the evidence strengthens the view that age at first marriage for females is relatively low in Arab countries(87).

2.5 KINSHIP STUDIES

Most sociologists and anthropologists who have studied kinship systems have defined kinship primarily in terms of genealogical criteria. For instance, E.E. Evans-Pritchard (1951) defined a man's kin as "those persons with whom he is genealogically connected through his father and mother "(88).

Although this approach is not valid in cross-culture studies as D. Eickelman determined(89), it is suitable to the study of Middle Eastern kinship, because the kinship system in the Middle East primarily depends on blood ties(90).

However, the term kinship in the Middle East is more complex, including a large groups with a social structure " that evolved to take care of legal and political problems that the extended family can not handle"(91). The large kin groupings are as follows: the tribe
(qabilah) while is usually subdivided into two or more sub-tribes (Ashirah). Each sub-tribe, in turn, is commonly divided into two or more subdivisions (firqah); the firqah comprises two or more further divisions (fakhdh); the fakhdh is divided into two or more complex families (hamulah) and finally the hamulah into two or more related extended families (92).

In his study W. Goode thought that kinship had declined in importance in urban Middle East. He pointed out:

In the city, these groupings are still based on family membership, but precisely because their main activities are taken over by the state or by other urban social agencies they weaken and lose their meaning (93).

Thus he suggested that it was possible to distinguish between urban Arab and folk (peasant and nomad) kin grouping (94). He wrote:

If one had visited Baghdad 200 years ago one might also have reported that the "hamulah" is disappearing, or tribal organization is no longer important (95).

While the nature of kinship has changed somewhat over time, it still provides a strong and highly valued basis for life in most towns and cities in the Middle East. People may work at a wide range of jobs and only a few relatives share housing, but extended families still have an important role in resolving conflicts, mutual aid, and support in crisis such as illness, marriage, death and so on. In Morocco, for instance, closeness in urban and rural communities:

...carries a contextual meaning which ranges imperceptibly from assertion of recognized ties of kinship to participation in faction alliances, ties of patronage and clientship and common bonds developed through neighbourliness; closeness is constituted by compelling
ties of obligations. Often closeness is expressed as "blood ties".

Similarly, J. Gulick (1968) mentioned that the important and binding kinship ties are not limited to the members of individual household; ideally, brothers are expected to support each other throughout life. There are stronger expectations of this sort among cousins and other relatives; in this respect he states:

The conventional expectations of Lebanese culture (and of Arab culture generally) are that adult brothers will remain in contact with each other, and be mutually loyal and helpful throughout life. Each man is normally the head of his nuclear family, but he also has obligations to his brothers and to his parents as long as they live.

J. Gulick considered this to be the result of the extended family which was separated into different households. He thought that the conventional expectations of the brother-sister relationship are a little more complex. As long as she is unmarried, a girl or young woman is thought of as being under the direct care of her parents, brothers and other sisters. When she is married, the sentiments involved in that care are not erased, but the woman also comes under the care of her husband and his brothers. However, if the marriage ends in separation, or if the woman is widowed and has no children to care for her, her brothers are still responsible for her.

Elsewhere J. Gulick wrote that all the variations of kinship occur in Middle Eastern villages and "that probably all of them including "tribal groups" occur in Middle Eastern cities". In the same sense A. Al-Wardi refers to the tribal alliances between city dwellers and
rural people\(^{(100)}\). In this respect, the view of J. Abu-Lughod is very important. She stated:

Middle Eastern culture places a high value on personal relationship, even at a sacrifice of privacy and internal development. This, combined with a system of relationship based on the extended kinship group, serves to increase the number of primary ties far beyond what western sociologists, reasoning from their own experience, dare to assume possible. This network of personal associations enmeshes not hundreds but thousands of individuals\(^{(101)}\).

Briefly, kinship ties are more expanded in Arab communities in both rural and urban milieu, and play a key role in social interaction and solidarity, which seems to be a common feature in Arab countries\(^{(102)}\). As J. Gulick (1989) summarized:

All indications are that Middle Eastern city environments sustain strong family life pattern, neighbourhood support systems, and communal religious activities, not only in the remaining preindustrial quarters but in the newer section as well\(^{(103)}\).

2.6 **NEIGHBOURS AND NEIGHBOURHOOD STUDIES**

Although there have been no independent studies of neighbours and neighbourhood in the Middle East, some related information may be found in social interaction or city planning studies. However, in traditional societies it is difficult to distinguish between kinship and neighbours, particularly in small communities such as hamlets, villages, small towns, or districts in large cities, because the local community is not merely a collection of people who happen to be settled and working in the same limited area; it is also a social unit.
with a large degree of internal organization through which its inhabitants cooperate in their economic activities, their ritual life and their leisure pursuits (104).

Neighbours in the Middle East play a significant role as an informal social control. As Gulick says: "A fear of the neighbour's gossip is very troublesome" (105). Elsewhere he referred to "a lively Neighbourhood life" (106) which, of course, implicitly reflects a positive view of the relationship of neighbours with each other. J. Abu-Lughod regarded the neighbourhood in Cairo city as the most important informal social institution — after the family — for migrants in the city. She regard that social life in the city is confined more and more to the immediate neighbourhood:

The cohesiveness of the neighbourhood is strengthened by the tendency of persons from the same village to settle together. Similar to the situation elsewhere, it is the women, children and very old persons who are the most active participants in neighborhood-centred social life (107).

Similarly, N. Al-Messiri thought that the neighbourhood in Cairo city is very important. In her empirical study, she emphasized that there was awareness of mutual rights and obligations between each other, particularly in the major life occasions such as birth, marriage, funerals and so on.

Al-Messiri's study is very interesting, because she places together so many important factors of the neighbourhood; the one to be dealt with first being the aspect of primary relationships and social control. The neighbourhood is seen as a grouping of people who have primary relationship with each other to such degree that a
real social control is exercised over their relationships; moreover, she
stresses that neighbourhood groups have a collective spirit\(^{108}\).

In Baghdad, neighbours affect each other under various circumstances, because they regard each other as being like relatives. Although neighbours in Baghdad may move or transfer from one quarter to another in time, they keep in touch\(^ {109}\), if not by exchange of visits, then by telephone, and they continue to share with each other on the main life occasions.

2.7 SOCIAL TIME

The literature on social time in the Middle East is very limited. E. Evans-Pritchard (1940) collected data from the Sudan on "Nuer". Although the data may now be outdated, it can be regarded as a basic study, more important than any similar study in the Middle East. Evans-Pritchard distinguished between two kinds of social time:

a) Oecological time, which reflect the relations between the people and their environment.

b) Structural time, which reflects the relations of people to one another in the social structure.

Both refer to successions of events which are of sufficient interest to the community for them to be noted and related to each other conceptually\(^ {110}\). He explains the dichotomies as follows:

The larger periods of time are almost entirely structural, because the events to which they are related are changes in the relationship of social groups. Moreover, time-reckoning based on changes in nature and man's response to them is limited to an annual cycle and
therefore cannot be used to differentiate longer periods than seasons. (111)

Nevertheless, he argued that structural time appears to an individual passing through the social system to be entirely progressive, while oecological time appears to be and is cyclical. (112)

Despite its early date, this study made a significant contribution in its field. Although rapid changes occurred in both rural and urban settings since date of the study, a number of traits in rural and urban milieu of the Middle East societies are still as Evans-Pritchard described them in "the Nuer". Similarly, A. Toffler (1970) discussed the collision between two different pacing systems in the Middle East, when German engineers in the pre-second World War period were helping to construct a railroad in Iran. Toffler stated:

Iranians and Middle Easterners generally take a far more relaxed attitude toward time than Americans or Western Europeans. When Iranian work crews consistently showed up for work ten minutes late, the Germans themselves super-punctual and always in a hurry, fired them in droves. Iranian engineers had a difficult time persuading them that by Middle Eastern standards the workers were being heroically punctual, and that if the firing continued there would soon be no one left to do the work (113).

In the same context, the present researcher found in a previous study (1981) that the rhythm of rural activities is more slower than that in the urban areas, so the widespread rural origin of the urban dwellers, had a large impact on the use of time in work and social contact (114).

Because most Middle Eastern urban dwellers have a rural background, they exhibit "dualism" or as J. Gulick explains it:
the man is not at all unusual who is equally at home in his modern city apartment and in the old stone house in the village of his father. This man partakes of two ways of life at the same time (115).

2.8 CONCLUSION

Most of the Middle Eastern countries are located in Asia, and like other Asian countries, experienced explosion of the urban population after the first world war.

Although the degree of urbanization has not been identical in all these countries, they share common characteristics as regards the pace and causes of urban growth. The rapid urban growth in Asia and the Middle East, occurred to a large extent mainly because of rural to urban migration, and created a kind of rurality in the city. In other words, the proportion of rural migrants in the city has been so great that the indigenous feel themselves to be in a minority, while the migrants who re-established their traditions in the city felt themselves to be a majority. Thus rural traditions flourish in the city. One can easily observe in the principal cities such as Cairo, Amman, Baghdad, Aleppo, Tehran, Ankara, etc, these active traditions which were transferred with the huge rural migration, and predominate in the social atmosphere of these cities. Such features include the family ties, kinship system, the close relationships with neighbours and the slow rhythm of social activities and other aspects of life, reflecting the effectiveness of the rural background in maintaining the former traditions. Therefore, no outstanding differences have been observed between the rural and urban milieu in social aspects; the difference appears to be only morphological. In other words, while there has been a process of urbanization, it is not
true to say that this has been accompanied by "urbanism" as a way of life, a point which Ralph Beals noted about forty years ago.
2.9 NOTES AND REFERENCES


20. Ramachandran, R., Urbanization and Urban System in India, Delhi, Oxford University Press, 1989, P. 69


34. Ibid, P. 270


46. Ibid. PP.108

47. Gulick, J., "Village and City" In Lapidus, I. M., (ed) *Middle Eastern Cities*, Op Cit., P.146


54. Ibid PP.624-625.


58. Ibid, PP. 627.


65. Ibid, P. 437.


70. Patai, Raphael., *Golden River To Golden Road, Society, Culture and Change In The Middle East*, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1967. PP. 84-85

71. In the researcher view Goode's view is the more acceptable. Certainly the custom is not widespread at the present time.


75. Ibid, P. 150.


90. The kinship terms for family of origin in colloquial Arabic are as follows: father (abb), mother (umm), father's brother (amm), father's sister (amma), mother's sister (khala), mother's brother (khal), brother (akh), sister (ukht), son (ibn), daughter (bint), father-in-law (nasib), grandson and granddaughter (hafid and hafida), grandfather and grandmother, (jadd and jadda), father's brother's son (ibn amm), father's sister's son (ibn amma), mother's sister's son (ibn khala), mother's brother's son (ibn khal). For further details see: Geertz, H. and others., Meaning and Order In Moroccan Society, Cambridge University Press, 1979. PP. 358-363.


94. This researcher would disagree with this idea, because: a) Goode wrote his book before the vast and rapid migration flow in most Middle Eastern Countries. b) The dominance of the large groupings has declined, particularly in its legal and political function in rural and urban community alike. c) The complex and extended family absorbed the role of tribe and subtribe in rural and urban settings. d) The importance of tribe and subtribe are confined to nominal loyalty, i.e. pride in name-holding; thus the tribe or subtribe organization has been undermined, but most of the behavioural elements are still active.
95. Ibid, P. 130.


98. Ibid, P. 131.


105. Ibid, P. 128.

106. Ibid, P. 209


111. Ibid, PP. 94-95.

112. Ibid, P. 95.


CHAPTER THREE

URBAN GROWTH IN IRAQ
3.1 INTRODUCTION

Iraq was the cradle of human culture. Urbanization occurred quite early in the third millenium B.C. in southern cities there, particularly between the two rivers, the Euphrates and the Tigris. Many city-states emerged, such as Babylon, Nineveh, Uruk and Assur. Among all of these cities, Babylon was the largest, covering 2,500 acres by the middle of the first millennium B.C. Next in size was Nineveh, with 1,850 acres. Openheim makes an interesting comparison with Athens, which at the time of Themistocles encompassed 550 acres and was considered unusually large and populous. Thus, Babylon and Nineveh were well-known as large urban agglomerations(1).

In the Islamic epoch there were many well-known cities, such as Baghdad, Basra, Kufa, and Sammera. The most renowned of all these cities was Baghdad, which grew up about 762 A.D., to be the capital of the Abbasid Empire. As Lapidus states:

Baghdad was the largest city in the Near East, one of the largest cities in the World, and a city with a heterogeneous and cosmopolitan population. The people of Baghdad included Arab and non-Arab migrants from Basra and other Iraqi towns, a local Nestorian community, merchants from all over Iran, administrators from eastern Iran, khurasanian-Arabs, central Asians, Turkish soldiers, workers from Syria and Egypt, and others. Baghdad was a microcosm of Near Eastern peoples"(2).

After the fall of Baghdad, and the end of the Abbasid epoch in 1258 A.D, Iraq's towns and cities declined gradually to became mere hamlets, or at best, small towns. Even Baghdad, which remained the capital of Iraq, lost its grandees. Nevertheless, the Iraqi towns and
cities arose again as modern cities during and after the British mandate, particularly after the First World War, as we shall see. These cities were, however, comparatively small and seem to have been "enclaves" surrounded by a "flood" of peasantry in McGee's terms\(^3\). The attraction of the city, together with other factors caused a wave of migrations towards the city. Now Iraq is one of the most highly urbanized countries in the Middle East and the Third World.

3-2 URBANIZATION PROCESS

In Iraq there has been no clear definition of urban and rural populations. The term "urban" is used in respect of any settlement which has been declared as a municipal area, regardless of size, density, type of economic activity and available services; all of these are administrative units\(^4\)

Thus, although a poor measurement, the administrative unit is the sole criterion by which to discriminate between the rural and urban milieu. Nevertheless, the vast and rapid growth of urban areas is deeply rooted in the circumstances of rural areas, as well as the natural increase.

Over the period 1867-1987 the urban population in Iraq increased from 24% to 70.2%, representing an increase of more than 45 times\(^5\) (see table 3.1).

The table shows also that the rate of urban population growth increased remarkably over the period, reaching a peak 8.7% in 1965. Despite of the continuation of waves of migrants after 1965, the rate of growth declined to become 8.5% in 1977, and only 5.0% in 1987, compared with the national rate growth, where the highest rate of
growth was 5.0% in 1977, and had declined again by the 1987 census. This might be explained in the light of the impact of the war on the number of marriages, the birth rate and the direct victims of the bombardment, both in the battle field and the population areas.

Table 3-1 Urban pop. 000 In Iraq 1867-1987

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Total pop per 000</th>
<th>Rate of growth</th>
<th>Urban pop 000</th>
<th>Rate of growth</th>
<th>Urban pop%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1867(1)</td>
<td>1280</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>510</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1890(1)</td>
<td>1826</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>430</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1905(1)</td>
<td>2250</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>533</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930(1)</td>
<td>3288</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>808</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947(2)</td>
<td>4826</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>1333</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>27.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957(2)</td>
<td>6299</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2192</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>34.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965(2)</td>
<td>8047</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>4112</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>51.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977(2)</td>
<td>1200</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>7646</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>63.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988(2)</td>
<td>16335</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>11468</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>70.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources:

The increase of urban population was gradual up to 1957, but then accelerated. This continued until 1975, table (3-2). According to the table, it is appears that the peak of urbanization was toward the end of the 1977. The recent upward trend in urban population has
been accompanied by a gradual shift towards the concentration of urban population in the major cities\(^{(6)}\) between 1965-1987. In contrast, the rural population dropped dramatically. From the base year of 1947 when it was 72.4%, to 29.8% in 1987. One can anticipate that the decline will continue under the unstable conditions in Iraq.

Table 3-2 Distribution of urban and rural population from 1947-1987

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Urban %</th>
<th>Rural %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>27.6</td>
<td>72.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>34.7</td>
<td>65.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>51.0</td>
<td>49.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>63.7</td>
<td>36.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>70.2</td>
<td>29.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: calculated from general census figures

The percentage of the urban population living in cities with more than 100,000 inhabitants rose from 16.6% in 1947 to 33.1% in 1957. In 1947, Baghdad was the only city with a population of more than half a million, housing 32% of Iraq's total urban population and this had increased to 43% by 1977 (Table 3-3). However, by 1987 the number of such cities increased to six. The increase in urban population between 1947 and 1957 represented 47.9 percent of the total increase during this period, but during 1957-1965 it reached 95.4 percent. Thus between 1947 and 1987 the urban population increased more than ten times from 1,635,000 in 1947 to 11,468,000 in 1987; a huge urban explosion in four decades.
Table (2-3) Mubafadah Urban Population for period 1947-1987

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mubafadah</th>
<th>1947 urban to total%</th>
<th>1957 urban to total%</th>
<th>1965 urban to total%</th>
<th>1977 urban to total%</th>
<th>1987 urban to total%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nineveh</td>
<td>32.8</td>
<td>35.9</td>
<td>46.2</td>
<td>54.1</td>
<td>67.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salahadeen</td>
<td>74130</td>
<td>135151</td>
<td>210159</td>
<td>347437</td>
<td>453285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ta’meem</td>
<td>32.8</td>
<td>39.3</td>
<td>49.0</td>
<td>70.1</td>
<td>75.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diala</td>
<td>30100</td>
<td>56431</td>
<td>116882</td>
<td>242054</td>
<td>443577</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baghdad</td>
<td>508093</td>
<td>64.1</td>
<td>1577591</td>
<td>2920072</td>
<td>3841268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anbar</td>
<td>32011</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>55697</td>
<td>255654</td>
<td>472463</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Babylon</td>
<td>57169</td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td>149751</td>
<td>288182</td>
<td>516489</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kerbela</td>
<td>92638</td>
<td>42.4</td>
<td>246097</td>
<td>170210</td>
<td>333397</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Najaf</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>153108</td>
<td>195619</td>
<td>315944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qadiislya</td>
<td>41598</td>
<td>24.8</td>
<td>99529</td>
<td>135694</td>
<td>231544</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mustana</td>
<td>92638</td>
<td>24.8</td>
<td>99529</td>
<td>135694</td>
<td>231544</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thi-Qar</td>
<td>41274</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>76857</td>
<td>247403</td>
<td>491264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wasit</td>
<td>33959</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>54511</td>
<td>88694</td>
<td>298084</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maysan</td>
<td>41668</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>60324</td>
<td>165782</td>
<td>300124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basra</td>
<td>127864</td>
<td>39.4</td>
<td>228081</td>
<td>800453</td>
<td>630673</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dhok</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>107404</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>218710</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arbil</td>
<td>34587</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>56632</td>
<td>288054</td>
<td>596118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sulaimania</td>
<td>39867</td>
<td>42.8</td>
<td>56218</td>
<td>325052</td>
<td>680857</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ministry of Planning, General Census Data, 1947-1987
3.3 SOURCES OF URBAN GROWTH

The main factors which contributed to the increase of urban population growth were:

A) the rate of natural increase, which reflects the excess of births over deaths;

B) the influx of migrants from rural to urban areas;

C) incorporation of pre-existing villages into the cities or reclassification of some village groups as urban areas(7)

A. NATURAL GROWTH

The rate of natural increase of urban population growth was high; 6.2% for the period 1960-1970, declining to 5.4% for the period 1970-1980(8). This suggests that the rapid growth of the urban population was the result not only of natural increase but also of large-scale internal migration from rural to urban areas.

The Census data reveal that a high fertility rate is characteristic of the rural population. Hilmi attributed the high rural fertility rate to illiteracy, social tradition and religious attitude. He stated:

The rural component of the nation's population has always shown a much higher fertility rate than the urban component. This is mainly due to the high illiteracy level and social traditions and religious beliefs in the rural population which are very strong in the tribal rural society in Iraq(9)
Doubtless the high fertility rate is characteristic of the rural population and since it predates migration, people have preserved this characteristic of rural population, which has been transferred in the process of their physical transfer. The table (3-4) reveals the natural increase of the urban population in Iraq.

Table 3-4 Crude birth and death and natural increase rates of rural and urban population 1973-1975

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rate</th>
<th>Urban</th>
<th>Rural</th>
<th>total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Crude birth rate</td>
<td>41.0</td>
<td>47.5</td>
<td>43.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crude death rate</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural increase</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>34.2</td>
<td>32.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The absolute size of the natural increase in urban population seems, from the table (3-4) above, so high, that we believe the extent of migration to urban areas has blurred the distinction between rural and urban populations. Moreover, with regard to fertility, it can be seen that there was no great difference in increase rate between rural and urban growth; 31.6 in urban areas versus 34.2 in rural areas (table 3-4).

Thus the rapid increase in urban population was largely due to rural-urban migration which, as shown in table (3-5), seems to be somewhat high. Despite the differentiation between the two sets, the higher rate of urban natural increase is mainly attributable to the great number of migrants in the city. During the years 1947-1987, the
Iraqi population trend has been characterized by a continuously high birth rate and declining death rate; for instance, between the years 1957 and 1968 the crude birth per thousand declined from 48.6 to 48.0, while the crude death rate per thousand declined from 21.0 to 16.2, for the same period. Thus the natural increase per thousand rises from 27.6 in 1957 to 31.8 in 1968. (table 3-6)

Table (3-5) The Natural increase of urban population in Iraq selected years from 1970 to 1987

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Urban population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Natural Increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>56.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>68.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>71.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>75.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 3-6 Crude birth and death and natural Increase rate of rural and urban pop in Iraq 1973-1975

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rates</th>
<th>Rural</th>
<th>Urban</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Years</td>
<td>1957</td>
<td>1968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crude birth rate</td>
<td>48.6</td>
<td>48.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crude death rate</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>16.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural increase rate</td>
<td>27.6</td>
<td>31.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ministry of Planning, Annual Abstract of statistics, 1974, Baghdad, 1975, P. 56
B. NET MIGRATION TO URBAN AREAS

Many writers have discussed the phenomenon of rural to urban migration in Iraq. Most of these have dealt with it as a demographic phenomenon, though others have studied its economic, social and political effects. Some official estimates used population data for this purpose, calculating the differences in population growth rates by region, other scholars used sample surveys. However, overall, scholars and researchers have made little attempt to investigate socio-economic problems or adjustment to city life, nor have they considered the existence of traditional values, attitudes, or behaviour in the city. The present study aims to redress the balance.

Migration from rural areas was extensive and rapid, particularly after the second World War, and more specifically, between 1957 and 1975. The migration factor might be primarily responsible for the urban growth\(^{(10)}\). Migration in Iraq can be viewed in terms of "pull" and "push" factors. In 1957 D. Phillips in his survey conducted in four sections of Baghdad city where migrants were living, found that the rural "push" factors in the migrant's decisions were clearly revealed. When migrants asked why they had left their place of birth, the common answers were, "We did not have enough to eat"; "Hunger"; "Oppression by the landlords"; "Dispute with the landlord over the size of our share"\(^{(11)}\). The result also reflected the insignificance of the job opportunities and the wage rate in the modern sector on the decision to migrate\(^{(12)}\).

M. V. George and R. Alsaadi used data available from the censuses of 1947, 1957, 1965, to measure and describe the volume, trends, stream and pattern of internal migration in Iraq in terms of
"pull" and "push" factors. They deduced that the chief migration influx, and the available evidence indicate that depressed conditions in rural areas and the better opportunities in the relatively industrialized Baghdad and Basra provinces contributed to the increasing mobility (13).

Table 3-7 Population movement from inside to outside Iraqi province

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>1947</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>1957</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>1965</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dahuk</td>
<td>4119</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>8106</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>18008</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nineveh</td>
<td>12163</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>22716</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>49481</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sulimany</td>
<td>2665</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>4098</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>7615</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arbil</td>
<td>1838</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>3233</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>7448</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karkuk</td>
<td>5321</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>7997</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>15389</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diala</td>
<td>17696</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>34396</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>54145</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anbar</td>
<td>12702</td>
<td>1.68</td>
<td>20621</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>87003</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wasit</td>
<td>14719</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>41340</td>
<td>3.15</td>
<td>60704</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Babil</td>
<td>14679</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>23758</td>
<td>1.81</td>
<td>33616</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karbala</td>
<td>7097</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>18109</td>
<td>1.38</td>
<td>30823</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qadisya</td>
<td>3932</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>11283</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>30764</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muthana</td>
<td>1238</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>4131</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>5310</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thiqar</td>
<td>4723</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>12319</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>30472</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maysan</td>
<td>53976</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>114708</td>
<td>8.74</td>
<td>132232</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basra</td>
<td>6603</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>86409</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>14382</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The population movement inside and outside the Iraqi province (muhafadah) indicated that the main push places were the Southern
province; mainly Maysan, Wasit and Quadisya. Maysan represented the main push province according to the figures of table 3-7. In 1959, for instance, there were about 190,000 persons living in Baghdad and born in the five southern provinces of Iraq. About 60% of them were born in Maysan. The main pull areas were Baghdad, Basra, Tammim and Kerbala. Baghdad attracted the highest level of migration because of the concentration of most social and economic development projects. Basra followed Baghdad, because it the only sea port and also is important for oil production and industry. Tammim attracted migrants as the main oil production centre and Kerbala as the main religious centre.

Many other researchers have studied rural to urban migration, among them M. Aziz (1968) A. Al-Jomard (1978) H. Al-Dulaimy (1981) A. Ali (1988) A. Al-Nassar (1990). In their results, the rapid growth of the urban population is due primarily to the volume of migration from rural to urban areas; even the high fertility in the city was viewed as a result of the high level of migration.

C. THE PACE OF MIGRATION

The migration from rural to urban areas began after the First World War, during the British mandate period (1917-1932) and accompanied the large scale economic activities which took place in the administrative centres of the primate cities. Electric power, water supply, telephone and postal systems, in addition to the improvement of transport facilities, created more employment opportunities and encouraged the movement of large numbers of rural dwellers to the urban centres. Moreover, in that period the local armies were established and reformed, mainly from the tribesmen and villagers.
Thus they tended to settle in Baghdad or in the primate cities with their families. After the Second World War, the national army was founded, resulting in an influx of hundreds of rural inhabitants to urban centres (21).

By the Second World War, the growth of primate cities in Iraq, particularly the capital, Baghdad, had stimulated the rural dwellers to move to the city. The landlords themselves had become increasingly involved in economic activities in urban centres and this had weakened their relationships with the peasants. The landlords (sheikhs) allocated agents (sirkals) to supervise the work on the land, but these agents misused their authority in order to maximise their profits, so that the peasants had to pay the agents as well as the landlords (22).

After the 1930's, industrial development was the important reason for migration, where the majority of the migrants were involved in industrial activities in urban centres. Accordingly, by the 1950's, about 57% of industrial employees were thought to be migrants (23). Between 1940 and 1950 the stream of migration increased remarkably due to the capital investment in oil and the industrial sector. This movement affected the annual increase rate of the urban population. During 1935-1947, the rate was 3.7% in the central region, as compared to 1.1% and 2.2% in the southern and northern regions respectively (24).

During the 1950's the exodus from the rural areas increased, due to the failure of 1952 and 1955 measures to deal with the land tenure system, and to the Tigris flood in 1954 which damaged all winter crops. Thus during 1957-1958, the migration continued on a
large scale and reached a level of more than five times that of 1955(25).

The modern era of 1957-1975 showed a continuous rise of rural-urban migration to an alarming scale of unprecedented dimensions. The rural population rate of annual growth declined to minus 0.5 % per annum in the 1957-1965 period, then to 0 % in the 1965-1977 period, while, the annual increase of the urban sector of the nation's population jumped from 4.1 % in the 1947-1957 period to 6.3 % in the 1957-1965 .(table 3.8). As a result the urban growth rate was about 9 % higher than the total national growth rate in 1957-1975.

Table 3.8 Annual increase of urban population and annual decrease of rural population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Total pop</th>
<th>rural pop</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Rate growth</th>
<th>urban pop</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Rate growth</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>4826</td>
<td>3493</td>
<td>72.3</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>1333</td>
<td>27.6</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>6299</td>
<td>4107</td>
<td>65.2</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2192</td>
<td>34.8</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>8047</td>
<td>3935</td>
<td>48.9</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>4112</td>
<td>51.1</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>12000</td>
<td>4354</td>
<td>36.2</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>7646</td>
<td>63.7</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>16335</td>
<td>4867</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>11468</td>
<td>70.2</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From statistical evidence regarding the volume of migration, it might be deduced that migration from rural to urban areas, took place in four stages\(^{(26)}\):

In the first stage from 1930 to 1947, there was a slow and gradual development in urban and rural populations alike; migrant pioneers began to arrive in the major cities but in small number and at a very slow rate. During this period, the annual rate of population growth was 2.2% for the northern region, while it was 3.7% in the centre and 1.1% in the south\(^{(27)}\)

The second stage, from 1947 to 1957, showed a more radical change in Iraq's population. City growth accelerated rapidly; Baghdad, for instance, more than trebled its population in less than three decades, from about 286,000 in 1930 to 793,000 in 1957. In this period the annual growth rate of rural population reflected the impact of the internal migration toward towns and cities which scored 2.4%, compared with 5.1% for urban centres and 2.7% for the nation as a whole. Many factors played a part in increasing rural influx to the cities; the Tigris flood of 1954 and oppression by feudal lords were among the major factors impelling the villagers to leave their lands, causing the dramatic change in the pattern of rural-urban migration\(^{(28)}\)

However the most dramatic change occurred in the third stage, 1957-1977, which experienced a much higher rate of migration despite the agrarian reform of 1970, which improved rural conditions somewhat. For example, the region of Diala lost 1870 inhabitants between the two Census years 1947 and 1957, as shown in A. Shallesh's study\(^{(29)}\). The 1977 Census revealed that out of 703,543 inhabitants still alive by 1977, at least 115,789 had left their birth
The figure for the loss in population was even higher for a region like Mysan, and the gain also much higher for the capital, Baghdad.

The fourth stage, from 1977 to the present, has shown a continued but more modest increase in urban population combined with a decrease in the rural population; the rural population decreased in 1987 to 29.8%, from 36.2% in 1977.

The long and bloody war with Iran, and then the American bombardment might have contributed to more recent migration waves.

3.4 URBAN GROWTH IN BAGHDAD

Like those of many other large cities in the Third World, particularly in the Middle East, Baghdad's population and area have expended enormously during the last three decades due to three major factors:

A) The natural increase (excess birth over death) which reflects the improvement of health services, economic and educational conditions rose from 48.6 to 48.0 per thousand, while the crude death rate per thousand declined from 21.0 to 16.2, for the same period compared with those of other towns and rural areas of the country.

B) The rural exodus to the city during the period 1955-1975, in an attempt to escape from poor conditions. Thus the population of the capital continued to grow at a much faster rate than that of the rest of the nation.

C) The influx of refugees from many boundary towns and cities and hundreds of villages exposed to direct danger in the Iraq-Iran
War (1980-1988), and more recently, as a result of the American bombardment.

Precise population figures for Baghdad from 1947 to 1987 (table 3-9) show that the growth of Baghdad in the last four decades has increased more rapidly than in any former period, and more so than the population of the nation as a whole. Although the country's population increased by less than four times over the 1947-1987 period, the country's urban population increased by more than six times, while the capital expanded nearly tenfold, from 535,000 in 1947 to 3,348,000 in the 1987. The population for 1988 has been estimated at 5,348,000(34).

Table 3-9 Baghdad's urban population for the period 1947-1988

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>years</th>
<th>Iraq's Total pop.ooo</th>
<th>Baghdad pop in 000</th>
<th>Iraq's urban pop</th>
<th>Baghdad% of Iraq urban pop</th>
<th>Baghdad % of total Iraq pop</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>4826</td>
<td>535</td>
<td>1635</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>6299</td>
<td>793</td>
<td>2455</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>8047</td>
<td>1631</td>
<td>4112</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>20.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>12000</td>
<td>3189</td>
<td>7086</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>26.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>16335</td>
<td>3841</td>
<td>11468</td>
<td>33.5</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988 *</td>
<td>17250</td>
<td>5348</td>
<td>12589</td>
<td>42.5</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Sources: 1947-1987 Census data.

* Annual abstract estimated 1988. PP. 43-44.

Although the region's population enumerated in the 1977-1987 Census probably included those seen elsewhere (e.g. those born in other regions), the 1947 and 1957 Census give relevant data which show that the percentage of non-local people in Baghdad increased from 21% in 1947 to 35% in 1957. So in the 1977 Census the total number of people who were born in Baghdad was 2,398,173, while the number of those living in Baghdad in the same period was 3,189,700. This means that about 24.8% of the total population of Baghdad was born outside the city. In the 1987 Census, the number of inhabitants born in Baghdad was 2,649,307, out of 3,841,387, (table 3-10), meaning that about 31% of Baghdad's population were born outside the city.

Table (3-10) Local and non-local population of Baghdad

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Baghdad total 000</th>
<th>Born in Baghdad</th>
<th>Born out Baghdad</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>3189</td>
<td>2398</td>
<td>0791</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>3841</td>
<td>2669</td>
<td>1192</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: General census 1977-1987

The most important deduction here, is that Baghdad has derived most of its population from the frequent waves of migration from rural areas during the last four decades. A survey conducted in
1972 on the migrants in Baghdad, found that the ratio of the migrants to the total of Baghdad population was, 1920-1939 = 16%, while it became 65.6% for the period 1940-1959(35).

Although there are no accurate figures about the refugee component of the population, it is reasonable to surmise that refugees from most cities and villages tended to move to the principal cities especially the capital Baghdad. The population of Basra, for instance, was 800,453 in the 1977 Census, three years before the War started, but according to the last census in 1987, had declined to only 630,673. This means that a large number of its inhabitants moved to other areas. It is expected that refugees from three provinces (more than ten towns and hundreds of villages) are distributed among Iraqi cities, including Baghdad. Some of these will have settled in these cities, either continuing their former jobs or obtaining new jobs, and will not seek to return to their place of origin. Thus, they will have increased the population of these cities, particularly Baghdad and we can regard economic activities as the "pull" factors.

The bombardment by America and its allies of Iraqi cities and villages, devastated most of the infrastructure, including amenities, electric power stations, water supply, sewage, oil refineries and most firms and factories. This massive bombardment, which lasted about six weeks during which more bombs were dropped than in the four and a half years of the Second World War, might have affected not only the rate of population growth, but also age and sex structure and distribution of the population over the Iraqi provinces. This might have been continued during the secession period and the uprising in the south and the north which completed the destruction of such vital institutions as the Americans left behind. Thus one can expect
that the movement toward Baghdad will rapidly increase for the following reasons:

1. Baghdad quickly regained its amenities and the food supply, to become not merely a main agglomeration centre, but in fact also the only one, which would have a pull effect in the short term.

2. the devastation of infrastructure has led to a lake of work opportunities in those cities that were severely damaged, their people may look to Baghdad as the only haven to live in.

3. in the long run, Baghdad might become not merely overcrowded, but the only centre of manpower in the country, unless the government takes this matter seriously and takes immediate action.

Thus even if the migration did not take place immediately after the war, it can be anticipated that huge numbers of migrants will move in, in the long run.

Table 3-9 Populations of some selected capital cities in the Middle East

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Pop 000</th>
<th>Ann Growth rate</th>
<th>Capital Pop %</th>
<th>Rural</th>
<th>Urban</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>1965</td>
<td>1626</td>
<td>8.3 (1957-65)</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>39.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>1966</td>
<td>323</td>
<td>6.1 (1961-66)</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>35.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>835</td>
<td>4.6 (1960-70)</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Arabia</td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>10.0 (1962-68)</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UN, Studies of Selected Development Problems in Various Countries in the Middle East, UN Publication, 1971, P.70.
MIGRANTS WAVES TO BAGHDAD CITY

1. D'HOK
2. NINEVEH
3. ARBIL
4. TAMEEM
5. SULAYMANIA
6. ANBAR
7. DIALA
8. SALAH-ALDEEN
9. BAGHDAD
10. KERBALA
11. BABIL
12. WASIT
13. NAJAF
14. QADISSYA
15. MUTHANA
16. MAYSAN
17. THI-QAR
18. BASRA

More than 80,000
40,001-80,000
10,000-40,000
Baghdad's population represents a higher proportion of the national population than that of many other capitals in the Middle East, as shown in table (3-9), where the urban population of Baghdad represents about twice that of Riyadh in Saudi Arabia and one and a half times that of Damascus in Syria.

3.8 CHARACTERISTICS OF URBAN POPULATION

The city in Iraq is not a pure urban population as one might assume, nor as might be the case in a similar metropolis in Europe or the United States of America. The population of Iraqi cities contains two different social systems, urban and rural, which have grown and flourished side by side. The reason, as we have already suggested, and as will be shown empirically, is that rural migrants to the city have continued the rural traditions, of their places of origin. George points out that "Urbanization generally takes place as a result of rural-urban migration" (36). Bear calls attention to the fact that the inhabitants of Baghdad are frequently grouped by tribes (37). If one accepts the view of some sociologists (38), that there are no great differences in the rate of natural increase between urban and rural communities, from which it is inferred that the increase in urban population is mostly attributable to migration into cities from rural areas, it seems that there are no obvious criteria to discriminate socially between rural and urban populations. Abu-Lughod found that more than 70% of people in Cairo lived a style of life which was neither "modern" nor supported by rural-model buffers (39). This may equally be true of Baghdad and other primate cities in Iraq.
J. Gulick notes that, in Baghdad in the sixties, three-quarters of the population of "Russafa", the old part of greater Baghdad on the east bank of the Tigris River, had distinctly tribal names. He states:

...As far as I could tell, they are no longer primarily inhabited by members of the tribes in question. They are located in what is now the midst of "downtown" Baghdad, which is gradually changing from an old-style Arab city of narrow, twisting alleys and covered "suqs" [markets] to a modern business and industrial district. (40)

These particular quarters, and some others in "Al-Karkh", on the opposite bank of the Tigris, are still primarily residential, but have been surrounded by cultural transformation. "One hundred years ago, these same quarters were on the outskirts of what was then the whole city of Baghdad, and they were inhabited by newly arrived tribal groups from rural areas" (41). The names may change in time, but the tribes have contributed to the character of the city. The same pattern was evident in the internal structure of the "saraif" (squatter settlements) which by 1960 had grown to massive proportions on the outskirts of Baghdad (42).

The population of the shanty towns (saraif) comprised eleven tribal groups, established as they had been in the villages they left behind, so that the members of each group were clustered together, and their "shaykhs" [tribal leaders] continued to exercise their authority by adjudicating disputes and maintaining guest houses. While tribal codes of conduct and indemnification were maintained, they were adapted somewhat to city conditions and problems (43).
Although urban and rural communities are by tradition mutually exclusive, hostile and contemptuous, there has, nevertheless, been continuous economic contact between the two sets. Most of the towns, indeed, contain what clearly were once tribal quarters.

Professor A. Alwardi insisted that nomad-urban conflict plays a key role in interpreting the nature of the Iraqi urban community. In his hypothesis about the Iraqi social personality, Alwardi admitted that he had been considerably influenced by the Arab philosopher, Ibn Khaldun who said a long time ago that there was always a conflict between the nomadic tribes and urban inhabitants; he presumed this was because the desert ecology needs strong men and brave knights, but the easy life in the city does not need such traits. Consequently, towns and cities were always in a position to be invaded by strong nomadic people who seized power. Gradually these nomadic people become urbanized and themselves become an easy target for other nomadic tribes, or in Ibn Khaldon's terms, "Urbanization is found to be a goal of the Bedouin." In this way civilization declines, and the cycle begins again.

Nowadays, the nomad population is on the decline, so Alwardi suggested a modification of the concepts of Ibn Khaldon to suit present conditions. Thus he assumed that the main traits of the Iraqi personality are derived from its nomad-urban composition. The recent transformation of the rural population from nomadic tribesmen to settled peasants and then to urban dwellers, or the desire to adopt a western way of life, are responsible for the dichotomy of the personality, or in Alwardi's terms the "double personality" or "dualism" in urban life. Therefore an individual appears urbanized and well adjusted, but in most social situations might soon show...
tribal values and rural-nomadic behaviour; similarly one might be westernized in clothes, but easily angered, sensitive in matters of honour, courageous before his enemies and generous to his friends. As Alwardi puts it, "He is Mr John on the outside, but pilgrim (hajji) Hasson on the inside." This means that one may appear like any western citizen, but at heart retain the characteristic of a tribesman. Moreover, the widespread existence of the extended family, the customs of generosity and hospitality, and the sexual behaviour among urban dwellers, including male superiority, are all seen as indications of "ruralism" among the urban people. This image seems to apply not only to Iraqi cities, but also to inhabitants of most Arab cities. In this context M. Berger states:

The Arab city has also been a conglomeration of enclaves whose inhabitants have felt themselves to be a part not of some great urban centre but only of the particular quarter they belonged to on the basis of occupation, religion, nationality, village of origin or family.

Moreover the pattern of local authority in the former epoch encouraged traditional values, norms and behaviour. In Longrigg's words: "The administration had established itself in tribal eyes as a thing to be placated and cajoled; the chiefs began to frequent the centres of administration and government." 

3.6 THE PROBLEMS OF RAPID URBAN GROWTH

Many problems have appeared as a result of rapid urban growth in Iraq; some of these have shown obvious problematic phases, and others pathological.

It may be useful to postulate some of these problems thus:
A) The persistence of rurality, which reflects the predominance of rural traditions and behaviour over all the social atmosphere of the city, by virtue of an influx of rural migration.

B) Dualism, or the "double personality"(53) of urban dwellers, who adhere simultaneously to two kinds of social order, modern and traditional, which live and flourish side by side in the city and have both been assimilated by the people.

C) Material problems, related to the housing crisis, population density and lack of general amenities in most areas of urban social life; for example, the expansion of the shanty-towns, ghettos and slum areas, which have been and are regarded as centres of delinquent and criminal behaviour. Al-Jumaily, for instance, wrote:

Migrants originally had moved to Baghdad in the hope of better conditions, but they were confronted with lack of jobs and opportunities, inadequate educational and vocational programs, and were forced into slum-type of living. Under such circumstances it was to be expected that deviancy and delinquent behaviour would develop in their new urban environment. People from outside "Medenat Al-Thowrah" hesitate to go there after sunset, because they are afraid of being attacked, robbed or may be injured(54)

Even now, most of the urban population, as we noted in the previous section, is concentrated in four or five large cities in Iraq, while other towns lack basic urban services and amenities.

Accordingly, the rural-urban migration in Iraq has created depressed conditions in rural areas, retarded the growth of subsidiary urban centres and rendered inadequate all major public
utilities of the exploding cities, as well as causing over-crowding, traffic jams, slum areas, unorganized and unplanned shanty towns, ghettos and squatter areas. Moreover, the rapid and vast migration to the city has had many dramatic effects on its social order and economy, as well as the work market, consumption goods, housing and wages\textsuperscript{(55)}.

The most striking feature of Iraq’s major cities, particularly Baghdad, is the separation into quarters, most of which have tribal names. Until recently one could observe tribal loyalty and related behaviour in the social interaction in these districts. Most of Baghdad’s population have rural roots and show the same order and social organization which they had in the villages.

Thus one of the main challenges confronting the local authorities in Baghdad and major cities in Iraq, is to maintain the social order in the face of social problems related to the difficulties of adjustment of rural migrants and other population groups during the period of transition. These are particularly great when there is a wide cultural gap influencing such features of urban living, e.g., employment patterns, housing, food consumption and nutrition, family structure and stability, informal social control, kinship ties and forms of social interaction. They are, thus, linked with what we can be describe as a negative side of the atmosphere of change and ferment created by the modern environment\textsuperscript{(56)}.

Similarly, Al-Adhami found that Baghdad’s municipal boundary has been extended three times during the last twenty years to accommodate additional people, most of whom are rural migrants\textsuperscript{(57)}, who maintain village ties inside the city and also maintain ties with
their home villages, by means of frequent communication. This involves, as J. Gulick mentioned:

a) regular returns to the home village for weddings, funerals and other ceremonies;

b) regular exchanges of gifts (such as home produced food from the village) and of visits;

c) commuting on a monthly, weekly or even daily basis(58).

This persistent contact might weaken the urban tendency(59).

In recent years, much attention has been directed to the difficulties attending rapid urban growth and the planners who were invited to study this problem have often wistfully believed that if only the size and growth of cities could in some way be limited, the backlog of demands piling up so visibly in the large cities, particularly Baghdad, could be dealt with(60).

According to this diagnosis and because of problems encountered with the squatters of the city, the main source of crime, the local authority of Baghdad attempted to limit, or in precise terms, to prevent the conflation of the capital's population by the influx of rural and small-town migrants. In 1984 it was decreed that anyone who had moved to Baghdad since the 1977 Census, could not buy a house there, but could only rent. There has also been a concentration of economic and political activities and general amenities.

As a result, Baghdad is surrounded by large scattered shanty towns such as; "Al-Karkh" on the right bank of the Tigris River and "Al-Russafa" on the left. According to Asis, "Al-Asima" was the largest and most over-crowded slum in Baghdad(61). However there
are others which he omitted to mention: "Al-Thaowrah City" which recently had its name changed to "Saddam City" on the left bank of the Tigris, and "Al-Shuala city", which together contain more than third of Baghdad's population, all of rural background, the majority of the migrants retaining various social characteristics associated with rural communities, e.g., high fertility rates, pattern of dwellings, family coherence, kinship solidarity and so on. Thus, they re-create their villages in the city milieu.

3.7 CONCLUSION

One of the most striking aspects of the city in Iraq today is the remarkable proportion of rural migrants, who continue the traditions of the villages they left behind. Therefore, the city is divided into many quarters, each with a specific name and forming in effect an autonomous sub-city. Most of these quarters, however, are slums.

Baghdad in particular, grew up vastly and rapidly, increasing tenfold in less than four decades, mainly as a result of rural to urban migration, but also because of natural increase and the influx of war refugees. Thus Iraqi citizens, especially in the capital, Baghdad, show two patterns of living: Firstly, the modern style which is closely modelled on Western culture, as reflected in style of buildings, technology, and some social interaction. Secondly, the traditional style, which dominant the social atmosphere of the city, as a result of frequent waves of rural migrants, who have retained customs such as family coherence, kinship solidarity, tribal loyalty, religious beliefs etc.
Doubtless, the migrants have adjusted to city life and in some respects behave like those indigenous to the city, but usually they maintain traditions and customs of their place of origin. In 1968, M. Asis, for instance, noted that "The men... started to use different types of clothes at work, but kept their rural type of clothes in the shanty towns" (62). This is true and [in the researcher's experience] it is true too for the natives, especially when on holiday, after work, on picnics, or while visiting with relatives and friends, when they wear the common rural dress or "Dishdasha".

It seems that the common rural features of urban life in Iraq are attributable to social ties, which connect the rural and urban milieu not economically or politically, but socially and culturally. For instance, both rural and urban communities, believe that a man should look after his parents as long as they live and it seems shameful to place an elderly parent in an institution. Similarly the members of the family give each other material and moral support, as a right of the blood tie. Thus, it appears that "dualism" flourishes in the city.
3.8 NOTES AND REFERENCES


9). Hilmi, W. A., Op Cit, P. 130


11. The landlords took between three-fifths and two-thirds of the crop if the land was flow-irrigated, and five-sevenths if it was pump-irrigated. For further details see, Warriner, Doreen., Land Reform and Development in the Middle East, London, 1957, PP. 137-139


23. Ibid P. 75.


26. Some researchers have divided the migration exodus into three stages. See: Hilmi, *Op. Cit*, pp. 141-142


30. Ibid, P.172


41. Ibid, P. 149.

42. Ibid, P. 149

43. Al-Hilali, A., Rural Migration to Towns in Iraq, Baghdad, 1958, PP. 62-71.(Arabic)


49. A lecture delivered in spring 1976 to the students of the College of Arts, University of Baghdad.


53. This phenomenon does not mean a pathological phase of the personality, or Schizophrenia as in psychological literature, but reflects the high capacity of adjustment to two or more conflicting situations or behaviour.


59. For this reason, it can be assumed that Baghdad and most principal cities in Iraq still have many rural traits, despite this modernity in material respects.


CHAPTER FOUR

SOCIO-ECONOMIC
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE
SAMPLE
4.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter is devoted to an investigation of the socio-economic characteristics of the sample. It deals with the similarities and differences among the three groups of the sample; peasants, migrants and natives. The main aim of this chapter is to display the social background of the sample groups which will be important in interpreting the responses to the study. Variables such as sex, Age, education, Occupation and Family composition, are expected to influence aspects of lifestyle, social activities and behaviour, distinguishing rural and urban life and illustrating the perceptions of these people toward what we have presumed are traditional values.

The researcher thinks that education, for instance, has a great impact on one's general outlook on life: values, norms and pattern of behaviour. However this impact may not be sufficient to counteract strong cultural orientation. In a country where the cultural context has been largely unchanged four thousands of years, people might act in the same way, despite differences in education, age, sex or occupation. The variables in the background of the sample are regarded in social research as fundamental to every study in this field, not only to distinguish the differences between the components of the different groups, but also to control the results. Each variable might play a role in determining the result, but this remains to be seen in the context of the actual responses received.

We shall therefore proceed to examine details of respondents' backgrounds as an introduction to the empirical study which will help later in interpreting significant or non-significant elements in the results.
4.2 **SEX AND AGE STRUCTURE.**

From the table (4-1) below, it can be seen that there is a high concentration of ages in the group 35-44 years, which forms about 31% of the total and a low concentration in the group less than 25 years, which is only about 3.6%. There are no significant differences among the three groups of the sample in most age ranges. By using the mean, the average age of the sample was 42 years.

Table (4-1) distribution of the Sample by Sex and Age.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age group</th>
<th>Rural%</th>
<th>Urban%</th>
<th>Total%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rural M*</td>
<td>Rural F*</td>
<td>Migrants M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 &lt;</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-34</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-44</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-54</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55 &gt;</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Average age of rural = 41  
Average age of migrant = 42  
Average age of urban = 43

Classifying the sample according to sex, we find a majority of males, of all the 300 respondents, only 13 females were interviewed, 4 from the rural group, 7 from the migrants and 2 from the urban. The main reason for the low participation of females in the sample is that it was a random sample focusing on heads of households. In a traditional society women are not normally heads of household. Even
if a woman lives independently with her children, her oldest son, even if he is not adult, may be considered the household head, or one of her extended family may be, such as her father, uncle or any adult male of her absent husband's family. From the researcher's experience, a large number of women widowed during the Iraq-Iran war returned to their original family with their children to be under male authority protection and to avoid social censure. Therefore the 13 women who submitted to the investigation were either old women or from the households where the male was absent for one reason or another.

4.3 EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND

About one quarter of the entire total of the sample were illiterate. Most of these were from the rural group or were migrants with a rural background. More than one fifth of the sample had completed university education. Most of these as table (4-2) shows, were urban natives, and only one individual from the rural group has had this level of education. The differences between the two groups can be explained by the lack of education facilities in Iraqi rural communities twenty years ago, in addition to the fact that peasants did not recognise the importance of school (1). To decrease the education gap between rural and urban communities a large number of primary and secondary school have been established(2), and a comprehensive campaign for the eradication of illiteracy was initiated in December 1978, reaching more than two million people(3). Between 1985 and 1988 there was an increase in the number of nurseries and schools of about 7.5%(4).
Table (4-2) Educational background of the sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education</th>
<th>rural%</th>
<th>Urban%</th>
<th>Total%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Migrants</td>
<td>Natives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illiterate</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Can read and Write</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elementary</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermediate</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University&gt;</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.4 MAIN OCCUPATION

Although occupation in Iraq depends primarily upon level of education, it reflects to some extent the social hierarchy and is associated with different standards of living and obligations. Table (4-3) shows five sorts of occupation which differ markedly in the three groups. In the rural group, about 95% are engaged in agriculture, the largest group of natives, 44% held official positions, while the overwhelming majority of the migrants, 65%, were engaged as labourers, so the sample shows priority in occupation mainly according to the education level. Type of occupation is very important in examining attitude towards social activities, and will help the researcher to identify the incorporation of what he has termed traditional values among the urban dwellers. The urban group are engaged in a variety of occupations, by nature of the city environment, but among the native city-
Table (4-3) distribution of the sample according to main occupation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Rural%</th>
<th>Urban%</th>
<th>Total%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Migrants</td>
<td>Natives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Official</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peasant</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worker</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-employed</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>House-keeper</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

dwellers, the main types of career are official and self-employment-occupation which rely upon either education or capital investment, while the migrants and peasants lack both these advantages and tend to be engaged either in agriculture or as labourers. Thus, occupation reflects the environment or background of the respondents.

4.5 FORMER OCCUPATION

Table (4-4) reflects changes in the pattern of occupation for the three groups, especially among the urban dwellers. By comparing this table with the previous one it can be seen that almost half the migrants had entered the urban labour force from a peasant background. This is likely to influence their acts, behaviour and attitudes toward life. The rural group have not changed at all, because of the limited scope of their environment. In principle, the city allows movement vertically, while such movement is unlikely to occur in the country. The native urban group shows a small change
in the balance of occupations: about 5% had left official positions, to
became self-employed

Table (4-4) Distribution of the sample according to the former
occupation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Former occupation</th>
<th>Rural%</th>
<th>Urban% Migrants</th>
<th>Urban% Natives</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Official</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>25.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peasant</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>41.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worker</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>19.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-employed</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>House-wife</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These result are consistent with Chicago School Theory and the
literature about the city which we have previously discussed, but
this does not undermine our expectation regarding social life, as one
cannot ignore the function of the city as explained by Wirth and his
colleagues.

4.6 FATHER'S OCCUPATION

The rural background of the migrants is revealed in table (4-5)
which shows that the overwhelming majority of migrants originated
from peasant families, as did 9% of the natives. While the natives
come from a variety of occupational backgrounds, the migrants who
were born in the city, and are regarded as urban dwellers did not
show the same variety. Father's occupation provides a good indication
of diffusion of traditional values, because more than half the city-
dwellers (migrants and natives together) share rural roots. They of course would have been influenced by their parents throughout the socialization process, especially among those who lived a traditional way of life. Thus rural traditions might permeate many areas of life. One cannot ignore the occupational variety among the natives, but this variety could nevertheless be infused with a traditional outlook.

**Table (4-5) distribution of the sample according to the father occupation.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Father occupation</th>
<th>Rural%</th>
<th>Urban%</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Migrants</td>
<td>Natives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Official</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peasant</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worker</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-employed</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**4.7 PLACE OF BIRTH**

Table (4-6) shows that about one quarter of the total urban group sample were born outside the city, which is consistent with studies opposed to the Chicago school, which we have already described in the literature (see chapter one). Even those who were born inside the urban centre and formed three-quarter of the total urban sample, live and interact with those who until very recently lived a more traditional life, and consequently are touched by conventional values. However, in spite of the significance of the place of birth in distinguishing people as urban or non-urban, this feature is inadequate to explain behaviour, because as we shall see, many of
them had rural roots through their parents' place of birth and their socialization. Similarly, Al-Nassar (5) found that 91.2% of 260 workers in Baghdad city come directly from rural areas.

4.8 FATHER'S PLACE OF BIRTH

The previous expectation is reinforced by the content of table (4-7) which illustrates the respondents' fathers' places of birth. The figures show that 54% of the urban sample group had fathers born outside the urban centre. Even those whose fathers were born in Baghdad still have to some extent rural roots. If we asked them about the origins of their grandparents (which we did not cover in the interview) we might find that most come from rural areas, because Baghdad's population in 1947 was only about 535000, while it is now about 5 million.

Table (4-6) Distribution of the sample according to place of birth.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place of Birth</th>
<th>Rural</th>
<th>Urban Migrants</th>
<th>Natives</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Village</td>
<td>100--</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>49.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Town</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Province</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baghdad</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>49.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table (4-7) Distribution of the sample according to father's place of birth.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Father's place of birth</th>
<th>Rural%</th>
<th>Urban%</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Migrants</td>
<td>Natives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Town</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Province</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baghdad</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.9 MOTHER'S PLACE OF BIRTH

The figures here are very similar to those concerning father's origins, table (4-8) shows that about 56% of the total urban sample group (both migrants and natives) had mothers born outside the city; 7.5% of those were from the native group. These figures again indicate that place of birth alone is inadequate to determine attitudes toward social life, because many of the "natives" have one or both parents holding traditional values by birth and would be in contact (through residence or work) with many others of a rural background.

Table (4-8) Distribution of the sample according to the mother's place of birth.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mother's place of birth</th>
<th>Rural%</th>
<th>Urban%</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Migrants</td>
<td>Natives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Town</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Province</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baghdad</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Nevertheless, the relative lack of variety of the place of birth seems to be important to explain the degree of concordance with the common values.

4.10 Marital Status

The marital status of the respondents is shown in table (4-9). From the table it appears that the overwhelming majority of the three groups were married; 87% of the rural group, compared with 85% of the migrants and 91% of the natives. 5% of each of the rural and migrant groups were single, compared with 3% of the native group. The figure also shows the rarity of divorce of none in the rural group, and only 1% for each of migrants and natives. These figures are consistent with Islamic and Arabic traditions. In the Islamic tradition, the lawful that God dislike is divorce." That means that divorce in Islam is allowed but undesirable. Since marriage is a matter of relationships between families and tribes not only individuals, divorce would undermine these relationships and fragment society. Thus the maintenance of marriage ties ensures good relationships with one's extended family and community. Any one who defies the family tradition and obtains a divorce, would be likely to face difficulties in remarrying. This applies to both males and females. The table also shows that 8% of the rural group were widowed, as were 9% of the migrants and 5% of the natives group. The relatively high rate of widows in the three groups might be result of the eight years war with Iran.

The figures shown in table (4-9) reveal the very high status of marriage reflecting, once again, the nature of the traditional society, which does not allow sexual relationships outside marriage. Moreover,
on marriage one acquires a new social status. The age at marriage shown in next table, might reinforce this notion.

Table (4-9) Distribution of the sample according to marital status.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Marital status</th>
<th>Rural%</th>
<th>Urban%</th>
<th>Total%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Migrants</td>
<td>Natives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divorce</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Widow</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.11 AGE AT MARRIAGE

From the results in table (4-10), it can be seen that more than half of the rural group got married at under 25 years, in contrast with 46% of the migrants and only 30% of the natives. Although in general the proportion of marriage at this early age is high, there are significant differences among the three groups. However, if we expand the range of inquiry to 34 years, we find the overwhelming majority of the entire sample, rural and urban alike were married by that age; only 5 out of 300 respondents or 1.7% got married over 34 years old; one rural respondent one migrant, and three of the native group. Because of the traditional taboo on outside marriage the early marriage is to be expected, because men and women alike have no other chance to fulfill their biological needs. Religion, which is a very strong influence on the social system, also encourages young people
to meet "half their religious obligation" by getting married, otherwise it is feared they might come under Satan's influence. Thus the interaction of religious and social tradition would enforce the process of social commitment.

Table (4-10) Distribution of the sample according to age at marriage

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age at marriage</th>
<th>Rural%</th>
<th>Urban%</th>
<th>Total%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Migrants</td>
<td>Natives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 &lt;</td>
<td>54.7</td>
<td>48.4</td>
<td>30.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-34</td>
<td>44.2</td>
<td>50.5</td>
<td>66.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-44</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45 &gt;</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In this context, the social system in Iraq provides a kind of social solidarity to encourage young poor people to get married. This takes such forms as "mutual gifts"; when someone gets married, all his relatives and friends collect money (usually) or other aid to help him to build up a new household. This operation is named in the rural communities, "shobash", and in the urban community "marriage gift".

4.12 NUMBER OF CHILDREN.

Obviously, the number of children is very important in revealing attitudes towards fertility.

Generally, Iraqi fertility seems to be very high as table (4-11) shows. In consequence families are relatively large. The 13 single
people obviously do not have children, but of the married individuals only four have no children. Childlessness in Iraqi tradition is a source of shame and distress. Under this pressure, marriage become unstable, and each of the couple has the legal right to seek a divorce. In this context Chinoy (1965) pointed out that among Moslems, childlessness is a legitimate reason for divorce. In 1959 the Shah of Iran divorced his wife, whom he claimed he loved, because she had not borne him children. The number of children is very important, not merely to stabilize the family life and strengthen the marriage, but also to give status to the family as we shall see in the next chapter. The information in table 4-10 shows a significant concentration of respondents in the category (4-6) children. By using the mean, the average number of children in the rural group was 5.02 compared with 5.04 for the migrants group and 4.57 for the natives. In combining the two groups of urban respondents and comparing with the rural group, we found a slight difference in the average number of children between the two groups (5.02 versus 4.79).

Table (4-11) distribution of the sample according to the number of children.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of children</th>
<th>Rural%</th>
<th>Urban%</th>
<th>Total%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Migrants</td>
<td>Natives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-3</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-6</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-&gt;</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4.13 FAMILY MEMBERS

One of the most important indicators of the rural influence on the city life is the structure of the family. Most urban sociologists and anthropologists believe that urbanization could lead to shift from extended and compound family to the conjugal or nuclear family as result of economic changes \(^{(7)}\). On the contrary, there is now a great deal of evidence of close social ties in cities of most underdeveloped countries, most important being family ties \(^{(8)}\), in other words the family role is still strong, even alongside urbanization. The content of table (4-12) might illustrate this point. From this table, it can be seen that no family in the sample has less than 3 members. Indeed we found that 44% of the rural group had families of nine or more members, as did 50% of the migrant group and 31% of the native group. The average number of the family in the rural area is \((8)\) persons while it is \((8.1)\) persons among the migrants and \((6.9)\) persons among the natives. The high average of the family members in both rural and urban groups might be attributed to the following reasons:

1) The high average in rural area might be a result of the diffusion of the joint and extended family as well as high fertility, especially after the improvement in health, education and communication in contemporary Iraqi rural communities.

2) In the city it might be attributed to the housing crisis, which impels young couples to live in their parents' households with their wives and children.
3) Some of the respondents may have counted their sons and daughters who were married and lived independently from them, still regarding them as their responsibility.

Table (4-12) Distribution of the sample according to number of family members.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Family members</th>
<th>Rural%</th>
<th>Urban% Migrants</th>
<th>Urban% Natives</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-&lt;</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-5</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>20.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-8</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>38.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-&gt;</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>41.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Average rural 8.02
Average migrant 8.05
Average native 6.9

This is suggested by the contents of table (4-12, 4-13) which shows the composition of the family

4.14 FAMILY COMPOSITION.

From the table (4-13) it can be observed that a high proportion of all the three groups of the sample had one or both parents living with them. 40% of the rural group claimed that one or both of their parents lived with them compared with 52% and 49% of the two urban groups (migrants and natives) respectively. 35% of the rural group claimed that one or more of their brothers or sisters lived
Table (4-13) Distribution of the sample according to family composition (paternal relatives)*.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Family Composition</th>
<th>Rural%</th>
<th>Urban% Migrants</th>
<th>Urban% Natives</th>
<th>Total%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Father/Mother</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>44.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brother/Sister</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>20.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand-child</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>30.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Respondents were allow to tick more than one choice

with them in the same residence, as opposed to 22% of the migrant group and 7% of the natives. 42% of the rural group replied that they had Grandchildren living, as did 25% of the migrants and 29% of the natives. Only one percent of the rural group replied that they had some other relative living with them, but the proportion increased remarkably to 10% in the migrant group and 3% of the natives.

This difference may be attributed to the concentration of high schools, economic and scientific institutions in the city which often draws the villagers to carry on their studies or to look for work. They often stay with their relatives in the cities, not as guests, but as a part of the family, due to blood ties or affinity.

From table(4-14), it appears that no maternal relatives lived with the rural group, who conformed to the tradition which does not permit maternal relatives to live alongside paternal relatives. For example it is shameful for the mother-in-law to live with other
paternal relatives. She would prefer to live alone rather than join her son- or brother-in-law. However under certain circumstances this might occur, e.g. if she has no patrilineal relative or there is a conflict between them. Thus we find some cases among the migrants and natives, because they are relatively less committed toward the traditions. Therefore, we found 7 urban respondents claimed that they have a father or mother-in-law in their household residence and 8 informants said they have a brother or sister-in-law living with them.

In discussing family composition we found a large proportion of all the sample, both rural and urban groups, had two types of family; the compound or joint family which includes brothers and sisters and other relatives in addition to the main members of the family and the extended family which consists of three generations or more (parents, sons, offsprings),

Table (4-14) Distribution of the sample according to residence with maternal relatives.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Maternal relatives</th>
<th>Rural</th>
<th>Urban Migrants</th>
<th>Natives</th>
<th>Total%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Father/Mother in law</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>46.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brother/Sister in law</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>53.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
these two types of family (compound and extended) represent ideal-types in the rural area. Although some studies (9) have referred to the nuclear family as the ideal-type in urban area, our own data shows that the three types live and flourish side by side in urban areas. This might be attributed to pressure of the housing crisis, many other complex reasons, such as religious and cultural pressures and local authority encouragement.

4.15 FAMILY INCOME.

Table (4-15) illustrates monthly family income. It shows that about three quarters of the rural group received between 150-250 Iraqi Dinars, while more than half the migrants and less than half of the natives received the same amount.

Table (4-15) Distribution of the sample according to the family income.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Monthly income ID</th>
<th>Rural%</th>
<th>Urban%</th>
<th>Total%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Migrants</td>
<td>Natives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>150 &lt;</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>150-199</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200-249</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>250-299</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>300 &gt;</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Average rural family income 201 ID
Average migrant family income 216 ID
Average native family income 225 ID
The result shows slight differences in the average income of the three groups. To be exact, 201 Iraqi Dinars is the average for the rural family, against 216 for the migrants and 225.5 of the natives.

The non-significant differences might indicate the gap in the standard of living between the rural and urban communities. The researcher believes that in recent years, Iraqi peasants have had good opportunity to improve their life style, because of the available facilities; paved roads, cars, tractors water-carriages and so forth, which diminish the difficulties of rural life and the gap with the cities.
4.16 REFERENCES


CHAPTER FIVE

THE URBAN FAMILY
5.1 INTRODUCTION:

Contrary to the ideas expressed by Wirth and numerous other sociologists, who assumed that family ties would lose significance in an urban setting, there is now much evidence of the strength of family ties in the city. Although there have been many studies discussing the rural influx to urban areas, most of these studies have concerned either the pathological effect of the huge number of people in slum areas and shanty-towns, or the phenomenon of the rural belt surrounding the outskirts of the city. Only a few studies have attempted to investigate the penetration of traditional values into the urban social structure. No adequate attempt has been made to deal independently with the impact of traditional values on urban life. In this and the coming chapters, the researcher will deal with the nature of social relationships in an urban setting.

In this chapter a number of hypotheses about the family structure and role will be tested:

1) The power structure in the urban family is still patriarchal, patrilineal, patrilocal, and the father has complete authority over all members of his family.

2) Although the family has to some extent lost its traditional extended structure, and divided into separate nuclear families, it has maintained its traditional function.

3) The urban family has clung to constraining traditions that are major obstacles to the practice of contraception and family budget management.
4) The role of women is traditionally determined and they still are subordinate to men's authority, despite large-scale urbanization.

5) Traditional marriage is still much practiced. In the city, as in the rural areas marriage is deemed a familial and even societal matter rather than one of individual desire.

Although the family in Iraqi urban communities has changed along the Western model in some respects, the traditional family patterns are maintained rather than discarded by urban dwellers, not only because of the penetration of the traditional values to the essential urban system, by virtue of the huge number of migrants, but also because of the encouragement by the local authority of traditional values.

5.2 THE POWER STRUCTURE OF THE URBAN FAMILY:

Recent literature has reflected two themes which seem contradictory: The most common, is that which identifies stress, anomie, frustration, misery, secularism, superficiality, formal control and weakness of primary social ties. The other, which is less often heard, emphasizes family continuity, cooperation, and community organizations. The first image is common in Western cities, the second is often found in those of the Third World. In Africa, for instance, the family function still plays an essential role in maintaining old traditions, in both urban and rural communities. In this context Piel and Sada (1984) emphasised that the African family tends to be very authoritarian and male elders expect that their decisions will be accepted without discussion (1). Accordingly, when urban and rural families are compared, it is found that the stereotypical images of the
extended rural family, contrasted with the nuclear urban family, do
not conform to the reality.

In the Arab World, the urban family is considered to be the
primary social unit and the cornerstone of social organization. It is
the focal point for religious training and practices, it provides
security and protection for its members and it is the focus for their
recreational and affectional life. The success or failure of an
individual member becomes, at least morally, that of the family as a
whole; every member is held responsible for the acts and behaviour
of every other member. The sexual misbehaviour of a girl, for
example, reflects not only upon herself but upon her father, her
brothers, her close relatives, her extended family as a whole. Thus
the "crime of honour" which still occurs in tightly related
communities, is an attempt to restore the family's honour and prestige
in the community\(^{(2)}\).

The mutual responsibility of family members requires
considerable self-denial, so every one needs to be totally committed
to the family itself. Family loyalty is one reason why many parents
still desire a large number of children. An extra child is seen, not as
another mouth to feed or another person to educate, but as an
extension of family power and prestige\(^{(3)}\).

This image is not confined to the Arab World. It appears in
many Third World communities. In India, for example, Gore (1968)
studied empirically the effects of industrialisation and urbanisation on
the organization of the joint family in and around Delhi, which is
considered as characteristic of Indian life. He found that his sample
as a whole still largely conformed to the pattern of joint family living
in behaviour, role perception and attitudes. All the members of these
families were subordinate to the head of the family, usually the father. The study found also that everybody in the family shared the family property. Even when the family was divided, it continued to serve as a group to which family members could turn for help. Giving and receiving among brothers whose families have separated is not only approved but encouraged. An agnatic relation of one's father generation is always a person to be consulted in all major decisions.

In Iraq, in the researcher's own experience, the eldest brother, even if he lives independently in the same city or in another city, influences the family strongly, being a person to whom all major decisions are referred. He is very influential in his sister's marriage and even in the choice of bride for others of his family, and in family disputes, his advice is always treated with respect. The brothers, father's brother and father's brother's son, therefore, are special categories of relation, exactly similar to what Gore found in India.

On this basis, the power structure in traditional cities is centralized upon the head of the household, who is usually the father, especially in the Arab World; the wife/wives join his kinship group (patrilocal) and the children hold his surname (patrilineal). The father expects respect and for his instructions to go without question. Such a father is known as (Raab Al-Ausra), the master of the family.

In every patrilineal society, the authority of the old man was respected, but each member of the family occupied a clearly defined rank in the socio-economic and political order. The bonds which held members of the family together were their strictly allocated duties,
reciprocity of mutual aid and support, responsibilities and reward, which gave each individual the satisfaction he sought and the knowledge that should dependency overtake him, he would not be cast out. (7)

While the Arab family is described as patriarchal, patrilineal, patrilocal, extended and endogenous, the oldest man, however, exercises greater authority. The absolute authority of the father has its roots in religion. Obedience of children (even when they are adult) to their parents is second only to the Muslim's primary obligation to God. Disobedience to parents might bring (khathab Raab Al-Alalamin) the anger of God, and is reckoned as a great sin which is harshly punished in the next world (8). Thus Muslim throughout the World, irrespective of class or location, believe implicitly that obedience to one's parents is a duty no less sacred than observance of the teachings of the Qur'an, and that all success in life depends upon this obedience and the degree of satisfaction which one gives one's parents by fulfilling one's obligations towards them (9).

Although, the mother has an important position in the family, its undisputed head is the father. He is treated with respect and deference, and even grown-up and married sons have to defer to his authority. The father has full responsibility for the well-being of his family and absolute right to make important decisions, but when the oldest son becomes mature and develops the qualities required for authority, he might delegate to him some of his authority. Thus the oldest son might be entrusted with the supervision of some family affairs and interests. Gradually the son too, will acquire a position of honour and influence in the family and in the community (10). In this context, the growing child, the adolescent boy, has to learn to submit
his wishes to those of his father and possibly to those of his elder brothers. He has to recognize that the interests of the family should come first and that he should govern his actions with the family viewpoint in mind\(^{(11)}\). The entire family, which may comprise several dozen members, resides together in the same household or clusters around a common district in the villages and towns, all under the male elder's authority\(^{(12)}\).

Generally speaking, the Arab family is stratified on the basis of sex and age. The young submit to the old, and female to male, in both rural and urban areas. As Ammar described, the family structure in Egypt deliberately spells out that the husband is the superior partner and enjoys the highest position in the family. The wife should tell her husband of the major events in the household. The husband is socially responsible for the acts and undertakings of his wife. He usually plans the work of his sons, while the wife does the same with the daughters; in this, the father is not expected to be involved. On the other hand the wife is supposed to be subordinate, devoted, and respectful to her husband. Sexual fidelity is the hallmark of a sustained marital relationship; infidelity will result at least in divorce, if not an attempt to kill the wife and her lover\(^{(13)}\).

Although the wife seems to be absolutely subordinate to her husband, she is almost the absolute manager of the house. Nevertheless, the power structure in the Arab World family is centralized upon the elder man and the father in particular. When he dies or is absent for any reason, the oldest son replaces him and acquires his status, including the absolute authority to deal with family affairs.
5.3 FATHER AUTHORITY AND FAMILY DECISION-MAKING

As we have already seen, the power structure of the Arab family is centralized on the father. The researcher's own recent data presented in table 5-1 below, show that the vast majority of informants both in the rural (control) group and the urban group are subordinate to the father's authority, both inside and outside the home.

More precisely, 92% of the rural group rely on the importance of the father's authority inside and outside the home, while 82% of the migrants (or those who have a rural background in the urban sample) and 77% of the natives, do so. The data show also slight differences between the control group (rural group) and the urban group, where 17% of the urban informants replied that the father's authority is important only inside the home, in contrast with 4% of the control group.

Table 5-1 The Father's Authority

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scope of Father authority</th>
<th>Rural%</th>
<th>Urban%</th>
<th>Total%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inside home</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outside home</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not important</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$X^2 = 11.9$  D.F 4
This difference might be explained by the different nature of their socio-economic activities; in the city often there was no father-son work association, such as existed in the rural community. The data, however, clearly illustrate the importance of the father's authority, both inside and outside the home. This result reflects the fact that the Arab family traditionally required the younger ones to obey their elders and live up to their expectations. Thus relationships between the young and the old in the Arab family tend to be vertical rather than horizontal. In such relationships, downward communication often takes the form of orders, instructions, warnings, threats, shaming and so forth. Upward communication, on the other hand, often takes the form of silence, pleas, appeals, apologies, explanation, inquiries and so on. Furthermore, it may be accompanied by crying, self-censorship, covering up, deception and depression(14).

The father's authority is demonstrated in daily life either directly toward the whole family members or indirectly through the mother, who sometimes acts as mediator. However, the real power of the father is manifested in the major life occasions which require firm decisions, e.g., marriage, work, whether to rent or buy a new house, spend money and so forth. The women (mother/wife) may play some part, but the final word rests with the father.

The data presented in tables 5-2, 5-3 and 5-4, show responses to questions as to: who mainly decides on spending the family income; who has the final word about whether to rent or buy a new house and who decides on the daughter's marriage?. Regarding spending family income table 5-2, the informants rejected all possibilities except the father and the oldest son. Two-thirds of the whole sample said
that the father is the proper person to decide how to spend the family income, while less than one-third assumed that the oldest son should do that. There was a slight difference between the control group (rural group) and the experimental group (urban group, in both divisions). 75% of the control group chose the father, against 67% of the migrants and 76% of the natives. On the other hand 25% of the control group chose the oldest son, compared with 33% of the migrants and 24% of the natives.

This result might not reflect the reality, as by nature some women are capable of wielding authority and may be able to manipulate or pressurise the men.

Table 5-2 Decision-making about Spending Family Income

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Who decides how to spend income</th>
<th>Rural%</th>
<th>Urban%</th>
<th>Total%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Migrants</td>
<td>Natives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Father</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mother</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oldest son</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[X^2 = 2.4\]  \[D.F = 2\]  \[N.S\]

However, such women should publicly pretend to be subordinate to their husbands. Even men who are less dominant in family affairs pretend publicly that they have full authority. This may be illustrated by an incident in the researcher's experience: On an evening in summer 1985, many people in the same residential block as
the researcher saw a proud self-employed man running out into the street pursued by his wife, who was beating him over the head. The researcher who was an eyewitness, intervened to end the fighting. A week later, the researcher discovered that the man used to give all his income to his wife day by day, but she did not trust him, and often searched his clothes. That evening she had found one Dinar hidden in a secret place in his jacket.

This case is one of many similar cases which might be unknown publicly. Behind locked doors, thousands of such cases are hidden, but outside the home, the men have to restore their status; they act and behave like any other superordinates. This might be the invisible side of patriarchal culture.

However, both men and women act conventionally to maintain the tradition of the society which confirms the male supremacy. Thus the result, even if it does not accurately portray reality, reflects the informants' general beliefs and the expectations of society as a whole.

Table 5-3 Decision-making on whether to buy or rent a new house

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Who decides to Buy or rent a new house</th>
<th>Rural%</th>
<th>Urban%</th>
<th>Total%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Migrants</td>
<td>Natives</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Father</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mother</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[X^2 = 20 \quad \text{DF}=6\]
When asked who has the final word about whether to buy or rent a new house, the data in table 5-3 show that the vast majority (76%) of the control group (rural group), replied that the father is the proper person to decide whether or not to buy or rent a new house. The proportion decreased to 71% among the migrants and 53% among the urban natives. On the other hand about half of the native group claimed that women (mother/wife) participate in such decisions compared with only 22% for the rural and migrant groups. By merging the two divisions of the urban group, we found that, the urban group reflected twice as much participation as the rural and migrant groups respectively. This can be explained by the high level of education among the natives compared with the rural and migrant informants. As a consequence, the natives might better appreciate the woman’s viewpoint and respect her role. However, these were less than half of the native informants. The rest might have the traditional viewpoint against the effective participation of women.

In a similar investigation in Lebanon, Prothero and Diab (1974) found that the husband in villages and in the city of Tripoli, usually, had sole authority to decide such issues, but among informants from Amman, Damascus and Beirut, the researchers found some variety according to class differences; most of the upper class informants claimed that they allowed their wives to participate in certain decisions. In Mosul city (northern Iraq) Mustafa (1990) found that most migrants (even long-term migrants) agreed that the husband/father has full authority whether to buy or rent a new house and how the housing is to be managed(16).

The question on who decides the daughter’s marriage might shed more light on family decision-making. The data available in table
5-4 shows that none of the respondents believed that the daughter can choose her groom by herself. In Islam the girl has the full right to choose her mate by herself as long as she makes a good choice, but if she errs in her choice and attempts to marry a person who is not of her status, then the father has the right of objection, because of the effect on the family and the future of the girl, who may be unaware, due to the immaturity of youth(17).

Table 5-4 Decision-making about daughter marriage.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Who decides on daughter's marriage?</th>
<th>Rural%</th>
<th>Urban%</th>
<th>Total%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Migrants</td>
<td>Natives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herself</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Father</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mother &amp; father</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brothers</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ X^2 = 5.6 \quad \text{DF}=6 \quad \text{N.S} \]

Culturally, the father seeks the agreement of his daughter before involving her in marriage, but socially (traditionally) that does not mean he will abide by her expressed wishes(18). The data available in table 5-4 emphasised this view, showing that more than three-quarters of all respondents from the three groups said that the father alone is the proper person to decide the daughter's marriage, while the proportion of those who chose joint parental decision-making increased gradually from the rural to native groups. 15%, 19%,
20% for the three group respectively. Brothers and other male relatives have some scope to influence the daughter's marriage. They might be consulted before the engagement, but would usually be expected to give their consent. In the researcher's experience, the father's brother and the father's brother's sons should be consulted before a marriage is arranged.

These findings provide a clear indication of the power structure and decision-making authority in the family. The control group (the rural group) are more patriarchal than the migrants and the latter are more patriarchal than the natives, but the differences are not highly significant, as one might anticipate from the Chicago school viewpoint.

This finding is confirmed by Alvirez and Bean (1976) who pointed out that the father/husband is seen as the absolute head of the family with full authority over all family members and all major decisions are his responsibility.

Thus, it can be seen that the patriarchal system is strongly upheld by the males, whatever their abilities or their qualifications, and places all the major decisions in their hands.

5.4 STATUS OF MALE SIBLINGS

Once again, in a patriarchal society such as the one under study, it is quite clear that the social position of the male is expected to be superior to that of the female. Preference for males and discrimination against females starts even before birth. The best blessing one can give, is to wish for another that God fill his home with boys. When the newly-wed couple are congratulated by friends
and relatives, they commonly say: "God bless you and fill your life with happiness and male children". To wish that anyone have a baby girl, even if he already has a number of sons, is interpreted as an insult. A woman considers her life a complete failure if she does not succeed in bearing a male child for her husband; women who find themselves unable to give their husbands a son spend tremendous amounts of money on doctors and sorcery and become very sensitive. The husband, in such a case, has the right to divorce his wife and marry another. Some wives in this position even encourage their husband to take a second wife, if only they will keep silence and do not seek divorce.

Boys receive greater attention in childhood than girls. Circumcision, for instance, is always a festive occasion celebrated by all relatives and friends. In many cases such celebrations are as elaborate and expensive as weddings. Such festivity is never bestowed on girls.

Table 5-5 Numbers of males and family status

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Does the number of males affect family status?</th>
<th>Rural%</th>
<th>Urban%</th>
<th>Total%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Migrants</td>
<td>Natives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To some extent</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\( X^2 = 18.8 \quad DF=4 \)

Accordingly, the data available in table 5-5 show that most of the informants agreed that the family which has many males has high
status. It is quite clear, as the figures illustrate, that there were no significant differences between the three groups toward this item; 89%, 91%, and 82% for rural, migrants and natives respectively.

The difference can only be seen in the disagreement option, which only natives chose; 9% of this group disagreed with the proposition. However, 9% does not represent a common attribute of the society; the majority of the urban informants held the traditional view. Meanwhile, the remarkable result in this table is that 11% of the rural group thought that a large number of males can, to some extent, give the family high status. This figure is 2% higher than that of the urban counterpart. This might be because the economic, political and social challenge of the city impel them to endorse fully the importance of many males rather than "to some extent".

The complete agreement on the status of the males, is revealed through the question: "If you have a son who gets married and lives independently, will you support him?". As table 5-6 shows, the unanimous response, for all groups, was "Yes".

Table 5-6 Family support for its sons

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Should family support its sons?</th>
<th>Rural%</th>
<th>Urban Migrants</th>
<th>Natives</th>
<th>Total%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This consensus might be an exaggeration of the reality, but informants responded conventionally. In the ideal-type of the patriarchal society, the son carries the patriarchal family name and
inheritance. He is a source of family pride, and regarded as a chain in the patrilineal descent.

In Iraq, as in the Arab World as a whole, one who get married and has a child is given a nickname, for example "Abu Ali" [the father of Ali] or "umm Ali" [the mother of Ali]. The nickname is derived from the name of the first child. Such is the case even if the first child is a female, but many people ignore the daughter's name, and substitute a male name for the nickname. Even those who are unmarried or have no children are often given such a nickname as a mark of respect, using some well-known name, such as Abu-jasim for muhammad or Abu-Hussain for Ali. Those who are married and have no children, are often nicknamed Abu-khib (the father of the absent).

In this tradition, the male has not only superiority or preference, but also has full family support, even if he is adult and lives independently, though in this case the support might be symbolic rather than material. Many siblings establish their own families and have steady jobs, so that they not need their original family support; even so, the original families (patriarchal families) may still look after them and give them such moral and financial support as they are able. By the same token, the siblings should do the same for their original family. Mutual aid is pervasive, the prevailing attitude being clearly reflected in the common sayings: "My heart is with my son" or, "I have still to look after my son as long as I live". In urban Iraq, in the researcher's experience, an unmarried son, or one who, though married, still lives in the same household, often gives his entire salary to his father. This is in line with prevailing customs in most Arab and Muslim families. As Abu-zahra (1976) pointed out:
If the eldest brother is earning money, he is responsible for contributing towards the upkeep of his father's household. He sometimes gives his father the whole of his salary. If the father is poor and the eldest son is earning enough money, he may be responsible for the education of the younger brothers. Sometimes a younger, wealthier brother may contribute to the education of the elder brother's son.

Accordingly, the data in table 5-7 show the sort of support which married sons who lived independently have presumably received. The vast majority of the rural and urban groups supported their sons both morally and materially.

Table 5-7 Types of Family Support

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of support</th>
<th>Rural%</th>
<th>Urban% Migrants</th>
<th>Urban% natives</th>
<th>Total%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Material</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moral</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>86.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$X^2 = 2.7$</td>
<td>DF=4</td>
<td>N.S</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The figures reveal no significant differences [$X^2 = 2.7$ DF= 4] between the control group and urban group (in both divisions); but indeed the figures are remarkably consistent, with 85% of the rural group asserting that they support their sons both morally and materially, while 86% of the migrants and 87% of the natives did so.

Traditionally and according to religious beliefs, fathers strongly desire sons. As Kiray (1976) stated:
After childhood, the father takes care to see that his sons find jobs or learn the family trade, that suitable girls be found for them, and that at the end of his active years the welfare of his family can be entrusted to them (23).

In this sense, the father in a traditional society, such as that under study, is eager to look after his sons, support them in finding jobs and help them to get married. Moreover he would help them to build a house, or pay a debt, and take their side in any dispute with others.

Thus, sons are socialized in the belief, that they might be unable to build up their lives without family support, and they act on this basis. This may partially explain why those sons are totally subordinate to their parents.

The question now arises, why the head of the household's (often the father) is committed to supporting his sons even when they are adults with all the ingredients to start their own life and build up a new family. The data of table 5-8 might shed some light on this.

The information shows that 63% of the rural group replied that they support their sons because they regard them as a part of themselves, while 59% of the migrant group and 56% of the native group shared this view. 31% of the rural group said that they will need their son when they get old, compared with 35% of the migrants and 43% of the natives. Only 6% of each of the rural and migrant groups said that they support their sons under the pressure of tradition, while only 1% of the natives held this view. The data shows non-significant difference between the three groups ($X^2 = 6.31$ DF=4). The high concentration in first category might be explained by the
patriarchal family nature of Arab and Muslim world. The considerable level of response toward the second category reflects the general orientation of society, reflected in the saying, "I save my son for my old age and for the dark days".

In conversation one often hears a speaker praise a youth by saying something like: "He carried his father on his back around the Kaba in Mecca." A young man might say, "On my back [with sign to his back] I carry my mother five miles to the hospital" (24). The audience often say "God bless you", whereupon the speaker will continue "This is my duty. God in the holy Quran orders us to look after our parents". The audience often say, "If you did that your sons will do so with you". The speaker pretends to think and modestly says "I hope so".

Table 5-8 Reasons for Support

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Why support sons?</th>
<th>Rural%</th>
<th>Urban%</th>
<th>Total%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Migrants</td>
<td>Natives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part of my self</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Need him in old age</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tradition's demand</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ X^2 = 6.31 \quad \text{DF} = 4 \quad \text{N.S} \]

Very few informants claimed to support their sons as result of traditional pressure. The figures might indicate the reality that support of sons is not a traditional demand, but is derived from
personal motives and reflects familial cohesion. However, sociologically the matter of support (mutual aid) is not only one of personal motivation, but reflects the nature of the family system and the prevailing culture. In Arab society and culture, the family is seen as the cornerstone of the society, both in the urban and non-urban milieu. Traditionally and religiously, the head of a Muslim family should direct his efforts towards the maintenance and continuation of the family. That, of course, requires voluntary assistance, not only in economic, but also in social and political terms: help in the case of dispute or attack, theft, insult and so forth.

On this basis, many household heads prefer and even insist that their married sons stay with them under the same roof. Similarly, a remarkable proportion of those sons, both rural and urban have a great desire to live as long as they can with their original family. Sterling (1976) in his study of two villages in Turkey, found that the joint household is pervasive in Turkey. It seemed that, whenever possible, married life began under the roof of the household's head; therefore, the household expanded by the birth of children, the marriage of sons and the birth of their offspring. There was a strong proscription against sons, married or unmarried, leaving the original family.

Although Sterling's description focuses on the rural family in Turkey, a similar situation is found in the cities, in the majority of Middle Eastern countries, where most of the urban dwellers have a rural background. In the Turkish town, Kiray (1976) asserted that in the patrilineal extended family, married sons lived in the same household as their fathers and under their authority. In an Islamic group of West African towns, Ellovich (1980) found that all
extended family members in Dioula lived in one household, though mobility and migration to other cities has affected to some degree the Dioula family (28). In urban Iraq, the situation is little different, as the extended and nuclear families flourish side by side, and the original family head still has absolute authority over his married and unmarried sons, whether they live in the same household or in a separate residence. Moreover most of the household heads have a great desire to keep their married sons under their own roof and supervision. The data of table 5-9 seem to enforce this view.

The table shows that three-quarter 75% of the rural household's heads prefer their married sons to stay with them under the same roof, compared with 63% of the migrant group and less than half (47%) of the native group. By merging the two divisions of the urban group, the proportion of urban respondents preferring their sons to remain at home is 55%. This shows that heads of households in Baghdad have a strong tendency to expect married sons to stay in the same household as the father. It reflects the desire of those respondents and at the same time reveals the continued existence of the extended family alongside nuclear families in urban life.

As we have already mentioned, this information reflects "desire". However, desire alone may not accurately reflect the actual prevalence of this sort of social composition.

The data in table 4-13 [previous chapter] might shed some light on this matter, and illustrate the relationship between desire and reality.
Table 5-9 Respondent desire to keep their married son with them in the same household

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Would you like your married son to stay with you?</th>
<th>Rural%</th>
<th>Urban%</th>
<th>Total%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>migrants</td>
<td>Natives</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>yes</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ X^2 = 16.7 \]  \[ \text{DF}=2 \]

Turning to the data, one can easily see the decrease of the curve gradually from the left hand side (rural) to the right hand side (urban), which may indicate that Third World cities contain traditions and modernity side by side. To complete the picture, we asked the respondents why their married son do not actually stay with them in the same household. As table 5-10 shows, that 56% of the control group (rural group) chose the answer, "To avoid the expected problems", while 44% felt it was better for the son to live independently, but none selected the second and the fourth categories, i.e. "To get ride of his responsibility" and "My house is too small". In the migrants group, 37.8% accepted the first category, 35.1% of them accepted the third category and 27% accepted the fourth, but no one accepted the second category, "to get rid his responsibility". 35.8% of the natives chose the first category, 56.6% chose the third and 7.5% the fourth, As with the other two groups, they rejected the second category.

Thus one can observe that many respondents do not keep their married son with them in the same household, not because he has reached adulthood and can manage on his own, but because of
impeding conditions: 56% of the rural group and 36% of the urban group thought that living with married sons might create some problems.

Table 5-10 Reasons for leaving Married Sons to Live Independently.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Why leave sons to live independently?</th>
<th>Rural%</th>
<th>Urban% Migrants</th>
<th>Urban% Natives</th>
<th>Total%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To avoid problems</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>37.8</td>
<td>35.8</td>
<td>40.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To get rid his responsibility</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Better for him to live independent</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>35.2</td>
<td>56.7</td>
<td>47.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My house so small</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>12.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$X^2 = 14.7$  DF=4

This is born out by the researcher's previous study (1988) about role differentiation between wives and husbands in Baghdad, which revealed that one of the most important obstacles against the marriage settlement of the conjugal family is the interference of close relatives. To be exact, more than one-third of the sample strongly complained of relatives' interference\(^{(29)}\). Benedict (1976) in a Turkish town indicated that friction soon developed between the wives of the brothers and other members of the household\(^{(30)}\). Abu-Zahra (1976) asserted that disputes between brothers' wives and between the wives and their mother-in-law, over authority in the household, when they live together, may contribute to the splitting up of households\(^{(31)}\).
In Iraq this phenomenon is also noticed. The relationship between the son's wife and her mother-in-law is always negative; people often say, "it is natural they hate each other".

Apart from those who readily accepted that their sons live separately, and who may be considered open-minded people, the other urban response was, "Yes, we would prefer our married sons to stay with us, we wish to look after their children, but our house is too small". The general impression gained from the above is that urban dwellers would prefer their married sons to live with them in the same household, but sometimes are unable to manage that under certain social and economic circumstances [the impact of urbanization]. However this does not mean the severance of the intimate contact, relationship and mutual aid and obligations.

5.5 FAMILY PLANNING

Under this title we have to discuss two main focal points:

1. birth control

2. the management of the family budget

Although these two have a different content, birth control being a demographic subject, while the budget is a matter of family economics, nevertheless, they share the same basis: ideally every family should plan its fertility in the light of its budget and vice versa. However, the analysis will focus on the effects of beliefs, norms and social tradition on the family's ability to plan its budget and fertility.
A. BIRTH CONTROL

As we have already seen, Arab culture gives high value to having children, especially male. The Quranic injunction, "Wealth and children are the ornament of this life" (33) has encouraged the high rate of fertility and inhibited the widespread use of contraception.

To refuse to have children for economic reasons is to show a lack of faith in God. Musallam (1983) asserted that Islamic law sanctioned the attempt to limit fertility by contraception, whether by the use of medicine, sex manual, or any kind of drugs, from the beginning of Islamic civilization (34).

In Iraq, as well as in many other Arab countries, over the period 1947-1987, the population grew at one of the highest rates in the World [discussed in chapter three], as a consequence of health, education and economic improvement, beside many other social and political factors. The lack of family planning is caused by religious beliefs, cultural illiteracy and the government encouragement of large families, in order to create the necessary labour pool to replace foreign workers.

The political factor is important in partially explaining the high birth-rate. In the mid 1970s the government declared its wish to accelerate the fertility level. This declaration was followed up by many practical procedures as follows:

1. Maternity leave, which had previously been confined to civil servants only, was extended to all women. Leave was six weeks after delivery, and included maternity benefit and other assistance (1974).
2. The child benefit scheme was extended to encompass more than two children (1976).

3. Maternity leave was extended to two months, one before and one after delivery (1977).

4. The child benefit was increased to cover up to 10 children, at the rate of two Dinars a month for the first, second and third children, four Dinars for the fourth child, increasing to sixteen Dinars for the tenth (1981).

5. Families with at least four children were given free house-building loans (1983).

6. All contraceptive devices were banned and abortion, in general and private hospitals and clinics, was made illegal (1986).

7. Women were allowed six months motherhood leave on full salary, which could be extended by a further six months on half-salary (1987).

These laws were enacted in the context of a social tradition, where sons are desired to strengthen the family position, socially, economically and politically. Sons are viewed as a source of support, not only in a parents' old age, but also in their maturity. Therefore, legislation is not the decisive factor determining the fertility rates; many urban women in Baghdad, for example, defied the legislation and broke the law by seeking abortion. Cultural factors seem to play a crucial role. In this respect, Goode spelled out several cultural factors which have kept the birth rate high in the Arab World: religious injunctions, the high rate of infant mortality, the economic
value of sons, high evaluation of sexual activity, early marriage and the high status of the mothers of sons (36).

Obviously in Iraq as in many other Arab countries, with such values and beliefs, fertility, in rural and urban setting alike, is not a matter of individual or even conjugal family decision, it is a large-scale familial and perhaps even societal issue. That may be what has impelled some researchers to consider the determinants of fertility as complex and difficult to analyse (37).

Although birth control has recently been practiced in some ways in urban life, especially among the well-educated, it is necessary to keep in mind the difficulty created by the lack of all contraceptive devices and the strict traditions. The data in table 5-11 shows the extent to which birth control is practiced by the respondents.

Table 5-11 Birth control

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Is birth control practiced?</th>
<th>Rural%</th>
<th>Urban%</th>
<th>Total%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\( X^2 = 14.6 \) \( DF = 2 \)

Firstly we asked the informants whether or not they were using any method of birth control. The informants responded in different ways. The rural and migrant group were relatively similar,
20% of the rural and 22% of the latter saying "Yes". However, of the natives, more than twice this number (42%) said "Yes".

Nevertheless, the proportion of those who said "No" is very high even among the natives; 58% of them said "No" compared with 80% of the rural group and 78% of the migrants. Despite government restrictions since 1985, and the strict tradition, the people have managed to obtain contraceptive facilities on the black market, at ten times the normal price or more. This finding is consistent with that of Al-Nassar (1990). He found 37.6% of the migrant workers from a rural background, and about twice this number, 71.9%, of native workers in Baghdad, had a favourable attitude towards the use of birth control devices. Even so, in his interviews, he recorded some individuals expressing strong views against birth control e.g. "Children are a gift from my God" or, "Why should we behave contrary to Allah's will?" (38). In Lebanon Prothero and Diab (1974) found great differences their study groups' attitudes toward birth control. As they stated:

In one group, more than 80% practice birth control. In another group of the same religion, living a few miles away, no one says she or her husband practices birth control (39).

Similarly, Yaukey (1962) found in both rural and urban milieu that fertility among Muslims was high compared with their Christian counterparts, and the rural - urban differences among Muslims were very small. These differences seem to shrink even further with socio-economic classes (40).

However in Mosul (northern Iraq), Mustafa (1990) found a significant difference between migrant women's fertility and that of
their urban counterparts; the average number of children was 3.3 for native women, compared with 4.9 for the migrants (41). Obviously, this evidence reinforces the view, so long and so much reported, that the large family with many sons is characteristic of the Arab value system.

A second question was directed to those who said "No" to the preceding question, that is "Why do you not accept the idea of using birth control?" As Table 5-12 shows, the majority of the three groups said, it is against their beliefs. The figures show no significant differences between the groups; 75% of the rural group, 78.2% of the migrants and 79.3% of the native informants chose this reply. A few respondents said, "It is against our tradition": 15% of the rural group, 12.8% of the migrants and 13.8% of the natives. A minority, 10% of the rural, 9% of the migrants and 6.9% of the natives said "More children make the marriage stronger". The last option might be particularly appropriate for women, since women with sons have higher status. As Goode put it:

It is not surprising that the young bride was rewarded if she produced many sons who stayed alive. The marriage tie was relatively fragile, but not so for a woman who had produced a living son. It has always been viewed as improper to divorce a woman with living children, unless there was a serious reason for doing so (42).

However, beliefs (religion) seems to be the main determinant of fertility in families which did not use any method of birth control. That is also what Prothero and Diab found in Lebanon, where the common explanation given by those who did not practice birth control
was, "It is contrary to religious teachings or contrary to God's will" (43)

Table 5-12 Reasons for not using birth control

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>If &quot;not&quot; why not?</th>
<th>Rural %</th>
<th>Urban Migrants</th>
<th>Urban Natives</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Against my beliefs</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>78.2</td>
<td>79.3</td>
<td>77.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Against my tradition</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>13.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Make marriage stronger</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$X^2 = 0.6 \quad \text{DF} = 4 \quad \text{N.S}

B. EDUCATION AND BIRTH CONTROL.

Although traditional values play a key role in preventing the use of contraception, education seems to be an important factor in breaking down these obstacles. In this context, Rufigual-Huda (1978) asserted that higher education leads to remarkable use of contraception and consequently, to lower fertility. Education provides a new outlook on life, freedom from tradition, willingness to analyse institutions, values and conventional patterns of behaviour (44). Similarly, Ritchey and Stokes (1971) found an inverse relationship between education (as an indication of socio-economic status) and fertility in developing countries (45). However the relationship between education and fertility is not always inverse; Germain (1947) reported
that some countries with a high level of education have a high fertility rate, perhaps as a result of wider knowledge of nutrition and health services available, as well as cultural pressure for larger families and the desire to have sons \(46\).

Table 5-13 The relationship between education and use of birth control

| Education level   | Practice of birth control | Urban Migrants | Natives | Total |
|-------------------|---------------------------|---------------|---------|
|                   | Rural | Yes | No | Urban | Migrants | Yes | No | Natives | Yes | No |        |
| Elementary level  | 7     | 62  | 5  | 42    | 1        | 10  | 130        |
| Intermediate level| 13    | 16  | 5  | 23    | 8        | 20  | 85         |
| High level        | --    | 2   | 12 | 13    | 33       | 28  | 68         |
| Total             | 20    | 80  | 22 | 78    | 42       | 58  | 300        |

The researcher's own data in table 5-13 show a slight relationship between education and fertility. As the education level increases, the desire to use birth control increases. However, this is to some extent related to urban orientation, as 33 out of 61 respondents of the native group with a high level of education, admitted using birth control, as did 12 out of 25 respondents of the migrants group, but none of the rural counterpart group used contraception. Nevertheless, the difference seems to be non-significant, as a broadly similar number of the highly educated of urban informants claimed that they did not use any method of birth control. Thus fertility in urban areas is still high. This result is consistent with the finding of Hiday (1978) in the Philippines, where
urban dwellers had the highest general fertility rate in spite of their highly level of education\(^{47}\).

C. OCCUPATION AND BIRTH CONTROL

It is quite clear in sociological literature that there is a dramatic decline in fertility rates under the stress of urbanization and industrialization. Recent survey research suggested that fertility declines were behavioural outcomes of changes in social process; women's participation in the labour market; individual decision-making which inevitably delayed marriage and increased family planning\(^{48}\). In her deliberate study on women's development, Yousif (1980) asserted that there is an adverse relationship between occupation and fertility:

The employment of women exercises a marked influence on family size and the practice of family planning\(^{49}\).

Table 5-14 Relationship between occupation and fertility

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Practice of birth control</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>Urban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes No</td>
<td>Migrants Yes No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Official</td>
<td>- 1</td>
<td>13 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmer</td>
<td>20 75</td>
<td>-- --</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worker</td>
<td>-- --</td>
<td>9 65 5 18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-employ</td>
<td>-- 1</td>
<td>-- 2 13 18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>House-keeper</td>
<td>-- 3</td>
<td>-- 6 -- 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>20 80</td>
<td>22 78 42 58</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
However, most sociologists have concerned themselves with fertility and family structure, focusing on the adverse relationship between fertility and women's involvement in non-agricultural labour. Our own data presented in table 5-14 confirm this view. None of the housewives in the sample practiced contraception, perhaps because they have no jobs outside the home. The proportion of those using birth control was considerably greater among those engaged in official work than among farmers and workers. However there were no significant differences between the migrants and the natives, for either males or females.

D. FAMILY BUDGET MANAGEMENT

Family budget management in the Arab world, as in many other patriarchal societies, depends primarily upon the household head (usually the father) who has overall authority in matters of family economics. Once again, religious beliefs play a major role in reinforcing and expanding the predominance of the patriarchal tendency. The Holy Quran, for instance, stated: "Men are in charge of women". This, of course, would include economic expenditure. The traditional values have always encouraged men's full economic responsibility for their families, and a man who allows his wife or daughter to share in his financial responsibility has low prestige(50). The family is seen as a socio-economic unit, where every member capable of contributing financially will do his best to maintain the family well-being, but control of these resources is always through the father. Often these resources are not commensurate with the
extent of family members' obligations\(^{(51)}\). The economic unity of the family is unconsciously recognized, and even those members who marry and live separately, share the economic burdens of their original family, or receive assistance from them if they are not self-sufficient. The numerous and extensive obligations of the traditional family toward its members inside or outside the original household, with relatives, friends and neighbours, might prevent the precise planning of family expenditure and demolish any budget made.

The data presented in table 5-15 reveal whether or not the household head is able to set a precise budget for the family's expenditure and financial obligations. The figures show that 15% of the rural group, 12% of the migrants and 22% of the natives have the ability to budget their families' expenses, but the majority of the sample can not do so. 83.7% of the whole sample could not plan their families' needs.

Table 5-15 The household's ability to budget for the family's needs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ability to manage the family budget</th>
<th>Rural</th>
<th>Urban Migrants</th>
<th>Natives</th>
<th>total%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>yes</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>16.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>83.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(X^2 = 3.8)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>N.S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DF=2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although the proportion of the natives who were able to plan their families' needs were noticeably higher than their rural
counterparts, where 78% failed to do so, the rural group seems to be in a better position to budget needs than the migrants, who have double obligations: to their urban environment and their rural relatives.

When we asked those who could not manage their family budget, why they failed to do so, with four given options [unexpected visitors, unexpected incidents, unexpected occasions, all of these factors] the majority, 82.4% of the rural, 58% of the migrants and 71.8% of the natives, said all these factors were involved. These results are shown in table 5-16. It is noticeable that the number of respondents choosing "unexpected visitors" and "unexpected occasions" is much higher among the migrants than among their rural and native counterparts. These answers reflect the expanded obligations of the migrants as a result of their expanded social and familial circle, comprising interactions in the urban milieu and continued obligations to their relatives in the country. It is common to hear such complaints as: "One needs a treasury to fulfil his obligations; every day there is a marriage, funeral or visitors", or, "What budget are you talking about? Every month some deficit could undermine any budget". Even native urban dwellers often fail to set a precise budget, because of obligations resulting from the expansion of the social interaction network. Thus the saying in the city is "Whenever your relationships expand, your problems will increase". However this experience does not impel urban people to change from intimate to more superficial, impersonal or transitory relationships.

The figures show slight differences between the three groups of the sample, which can be explained in the light of individual
differentiation, such as might be found even in a homogeneous society.

Table 5-16 Reasons for inability to budget the family's needs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>If not, why not?</th>
<th>Rural %</th>
<th>Urban% Migrants</th>
<th>Urban% Natives</th>
<th>Total%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unexpected visitor</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>12.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unexpected incidents</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unexpected occasions</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>12.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All of these factors</td>
<td>82.4</td>
<td>58.0</td>
<td>71.8</td>
<td>70.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

X² = 20  DF = 6

E. EDUCATION AND FAMILY BUDGET

In theory, one could anticipate that with increasing education, the opportunity and ability to plan the family budget might increase. However, this assumption or expectation was not born out by the facts. Table 5-17, shows that there was no significant difference between the illiterate and the more highly educated, in their ability to plan their families' budgets; only 17 out of 61 of the natives, and 3 out of 25 of the migrants, succeeded in planning their families' budgets. This suggests that in traditional societies, obligations toward family and kin groups encompass all levels of the society,
irrespective of urban or non-urban residence, or education. Thus the inability to budget seems to be a matter of cultural and societal context, rather than merely a lack of education. Individuals with a high level of education might have greater familial obligations, to maintain their prestige in the community, and as a consequence, find it more difficult to budget.

Table 5-17 The relationship between education and ability to manage the family budget.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Ability to manage the family budget</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rural Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low education</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle education</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High education</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chi²</td>
<td>$X^2 = 8.5$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The common complaint among officials, for instance, is that every month, at least two occasions, such as funeral, wedding, graduation, or new house, might arise among relatives and friends. All these occasions require visits and gifts, taking up a substantial portion of one's income. This is normal in Iraqi towns and cities, so the assumption that family budget planning increases with education can be discarded.
F. OCCUPATION AND FAMILY BUDGET

In a previous study, the present researcher asked urban and migrant workers the following question: "If you met a relative or friend by chance in the street, would you:

1- inevitably invite him to your house;
2- invite him to a nearby restaurant;
3- only greet him and go?

The overwhelming majority (90%) of them (natives and migrants alike) claimed that to invite him home is a moral duty(52).

Table 5-18 Relationship between occupation and ability to manage the family budget

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Ability to manage the family budget</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rural Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Official</td>
<td>-- 1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peasant</td>
<td>14 81</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worker</td>
<td>-- --</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-employed</td>
<td>-- 1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housekeeper</td>
<td>1 2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>15 85</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chi$^2$</td>
<td>X2= 1.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>D.F= 3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Person's R</td>
<td>-0.39</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Once again, the traditional value system seems to be more influential than one might expect, regardless of education level or occupation. As table 5-18 shows, there are no significant differences between those engaged in various careers, in urban and non-urban groups in terms of ability to manage the family budget. The figures show that the proportion of those who have the ability to set and adhere to a precise family budget is a small minority across the entire sample (urban and non-urban alike).

5.6. WOMEN'S POSITION AND STATUS.

As we have said, the man in the Arab World is given considerable power, not because of his intelligence, resources, property, or even his strength, but because of "a mistaken concept of biology"(53), which became over time, a cultural context. In contrast, the woman has to submit to her father's will as long as she remains unmarried, and then to her husband. A girl learns in early childhood to reconcile herself to the fact that a boy is much more important; he is a guardian. When she grows up, a girl should always take care of her brothers and should be obedient to their wishes and instructions, even if she is older than them; she has to make their beds, cook, prepare the bath, wash and iron their clothes and so forth. A good wife is seen as one who understands how to serve her husband(54).

In theory, the woman has no decision-making authority. This applies even for those who have a very strong position or have sole practical responsibility for managing the family's affairs. All the decisions should be declared by the men. A common saying one can
hear in coffee-houses, at work and in the public places is "Ask the woman for her opinion and then go against it". Civil law requires that the woman:

- be faithful
- obey
- bear and take care of children
- supervise the order and organization of the home
- defer to the father, mother and close relatives of her husband. (55)

The woman herself realizes her role, and to some degree, is satisfied; sometimes one can hear a woman say, "Such and such is a man's affair". Even a well-educated woman, when she has a decision to make, does not say, "Let me think about it", but, "Let me ask my father, brother or husband". For this reason Alwardi frequently said: "Our women are like Marilyn Monro on the outside and like grandmother on the inside" (56), in other words, Iraqi women, and those from other Arab countries, may wear fashionable Western-style dress and hair-style, drive a car, use Christian Dior make up and perfume, and even hold prestigious occupations, but essentially their status and authority is really little different from that of traditional, rural women. Well-educated women recognise that they are viewed in rather crude terms as child-bearers, and may sometimes worry about that, but they also realise that their inferior position is not their own fault or that of their husband, but is determined socially and culturally. Nevertheless, the majority have high self-esteem and don't see themselves as inferior to men. Deaver (1980) demonstrated this in his discussion of contemporary Saudi women. He stated:

Saudi women do not regard themselves as inferior to men. Part of their status is a function of that of their male
kinsmen. This is neither inferiority nor subordination since the male's status is dependent on the purity of the females. Seclusion is regarded by females as an avenue to purity, thereby maintaining the honour of the family which creates security. While several Westernized Saudi women have indicated to me they would like to modify the women's place in their society, when I examined their positions, they did not propose breaking down the public/private dichotomy. Rather, they proposed setting up schools for women who were poor and/or without kinsmen.

So far, women recognize that their fathers and brothers, are their protectors, who have ultimate authority over them, and to whom they are beholden until they marry. They recognize also that it is to these men they may turn for aid from offence. In this context, Mace (1959) emphasised the lack of independence of Arab women. He stated:

In childhood a female must be dependent on her father; in youth, on her husband; her lord being dead, on her sons. A woman must never seek independence.

Many Arab writers follow Mace's viewpoint in estimating women's status. Al-aqad (1969) and Kalid (1975), asserted that women are inferior by nature, by God's will; God said "men are superior to women", and made it the duty of men to strive, consequently Islam gave the male twice the share of the female.

However, women's subordination cannot be explained by one reason alone, but should be viewed in the context of the socio-cultural system. As Baracat (1985) suggested:

The prevailing general order and the nature of its division of labour, property ownership, degree and quality of involvement in social and economic activity, control over the production process and products, and the overall position in the social structure constitute the
basic factors contributing to the subordination of women \(^{(61)}\).

Although the subordination and inferiority of women tends to be taken for granted, the women have great status in the household, especially as wives and mothers. This status is confirmed by religion as well as tradition. The Prophet Muhammad said "Verily Allah forbade you to disobey the mother"\(^{(62)}\), "The woman is the queen of her house" and "Paradise lies under the feet of the mother"\(^{(63)}\). The Holy Quran says, "They have right like those of man against them, though men are a degree above them"\(^{(64)}\).

Traditionally, as sister and daughter, and more particularly as wife and mother, a woman is entitled to respect. Accordingly the best man is the kindest to the woman and never reviles her or her relatives\(^{(65)}\). On the other hand woman is still considered to be a source of evil, anarchy and deceit\(^{(66)}\).

However, woman's status is determined by her generation, age, marital position, fertility and her organizational role\(^{(67)}\). It is always conceded that the building up of a man is due to his wife; behind every successful man, there is a wise woman\(^{(68)}\). Moreover the position of the woman, especially the mother, as Lichtenstadter maintained, depends on her own abilities and qualities. In his words:

Some women seem to have no influence whatsoever and do not participate in their husband's and children's lives; others, though punctiliously conforming to the accepted pattern of segregation, are the centre of their home and are consulted and taken into confidence by their husband and their grown-up sons, while they have almost complete authority over the younger children. Such women acquire, in consequence a good standing in the wider family circle\(^{(69)}\).
A woman acquires full freedom when she becomes old, beyond childbearing age. Such women can be bawdy and vulgar in their talk before men without receiving condemnation; they may even talk back to men and, in the presence of younger men, have authority. Since they are the keepers of the home, they often gain an upper hand over the man of the house during his declining years(70). Such license is not given to the younger women.

Women's status in Iraq broadly conforms to the pattern described above. The data in tables (5-16) to (5-20) may illustrate the position and status of women in urban and rural settings.

According to the figures in table 5-19, the majority of the whole sample thought that the mother has less status than the father. This result is in line with the nature of Arab society described earlier, where the father enjoys full authority and power over his family. Thus it is not surprising to see the informants' responses centralized on the category that refers to the high status of the father compared with the mother, though a remarkable proportion of the informants said, "The mother has equal status with the father" as the table (5-19) shows: 41% of the control group, against 27% of the migrants and 37% of the natives. A small minority said, "The father has less status than the mother", which can be explained in the light of individual differentiation theory. A non-significant difference was found between the rural and the urban groups ($X^2 = 5,5$ DF= 4). The data confirm the view found in the literature, that the patriarchal authority is strongly evident in the Arab world and women are inferior to men. However, that does not demolish the idea that woman, especially the wife/mother, enjoys a reasonable status and has
absolute power over her family members, both male and female, except the head of household.

Other questions were asked to clarify some aspects of woman's position. Informants were asked their response to the statement: "Women plan and men execute the plan". The three groups' answers showed non-significant differences, \( \chi^2 = 3.0 \) DF = 4), most of the informants rejecting the content of this statement.

Table 5-19 Women's status

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Women's status</th>
<th>Rural %</th>
<th>Urban%</th>
<th>Total%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Migrants</td>
<td>Natives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less status than father</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equal status</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Father less status than mother</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ \chi^2 = 5.5 \]  D.F= 4  N.S

Table 5-20 shows that 70% of the rural group denied that the woman "plan" and man "execute" the plan, against 59% of the migrants and 66% of the native group. Although the proportion of those who agreed that women plan is not significant, such individuals would be regarded, in the patriarchal system, as making great mistakes. Arabs not only deny the dominance of the woman as "planner" but also regard this prospect as insulting to men. In practice, to the researcher's knowledge, women often play a significant role in decision-making behind the scenes, but there is a
dichotomy between public and private behaviour. A man must, traditionally, never show the effectiveness of his wife in front of any one else, while the wife exercises a constrained influence over decisions. In cases where the woman is obviously dominant, the husband loses his respect and honour in the eyes of his friends, relatives and even his own original family.(71)

Table 5-20 Woman's position as shown in her role in planning

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Women planning</th>
<th>Rural%</th>
<th>Urban%</th>
<th>Total%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Migrants</td>
<td>Natives</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To some extent</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$X^2 = 3.0$  D.F= 4  N.S

Those of our respondents who admitted the planning role of the women, might have done in recognition of their wives' great psychological influence, or they may have thought such an answer would impress the interviewer with a sense of the modern, broad-minded attitude.

Substantially, the woman is still subordinate to man which surely reduces her ability to plan or dominate. If she shares in the decision-making, or even succeeds in dominating it, she has to do so indirectly, hiding behind her husband/father/son, to follow convention.
More evidence about the inferiority of the woman is shown by table 5-21. When the question concerns "the final word about the number of children", one might anticipate that the mother/wife has the upper hand because it is, substantially a female concern, but this seems to be the case only among egalitarian societies. In the traditional world, where marriage and fertility are familial and even societal issues, the decision does not rest with the wife alone, but with the patriarchal household's members and their relatives.

Table 5-21 The position of the woman shown through the final word about the number of children

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Who has the final word?</th>
<th>Rural%</th>
<th>Urban%</th>
<th>Total%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Migrants</td>
<td>Natives</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Me</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My wife</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As we can see in table (5-21), a remarkable proportion of all informants claimed, they could themselves decide the number of children they wanted: 36% of the rural group, 33% of the migrants and 35% of the natives. At the same time the proportion of those who replied "both" (husband and mate) was also high; 31% of the rural, 28% of the migrants and 37% of the natives. However, the differences between the three groups seems to be non-significant ($X^2= 5.7$ $DF= 6$). Most of the informants who replied "other" claimed
that God alone is responsible for the number of children. Even those who said "me", are often heard saying: Bada Mashiat Allah "After God will, I will decide". As Lutfyya (1966) put it, "All children were born simply because God willed it" (72). This result is in keeping with Arab society and culture, which reflects the effectiveness of the traditional value system.

However, the question arises here: Is this view held to the same extent by all age groups and education levels?

A. AGE AND THE NUMBER OF CHILDREN

As the information in table 5-22 shows, the major concentration of the responses among the youth group (25-34), were in the category "both" in rural and urban groups alike: 13 out of 20 of rural informants said "both", compared with 18 out of 43 of the urban group [both migrants, and natives]. The oldest age group 55+ focused on the category "other"; 10 out of 11 rural respondents, and 25 out of 33 of urban respondents chose this answer. Although the result of this table shows some level of penetration of the urbanized and Westernized values among the younger group, many of whom have given up some of their patriarchal authority and permitted the woman to share the decision-making about the number of children, there is still a large proportion, particularly among the older men, who retain strongly conventional behaviour; the (35-54) age group strongly upheld the category "me". A small number of the total sample gave the priority or the initiative to the woman to decide; these were so few as to be treated as individual cases with no further significance.
As we have already said, the information seems to reflect some modernity, especially among the youth. However, though some of the youth proclaim modern urbanized views, in the researcher's experience, a "double standard" applies, in that much behaviour still reflects traditional rural attitudes to women. For instance, girls are expected to be virgins until marriage but there is no stipulation that men remain chaste. If a man has an intimate relationship with a woman, no harm or shame touches him, but if it is merely rumoured that a woman has such a relationship, the position is quite different. She and her paternal relatives are ashamed\(^{(73)}\).

Table 5-22 The relationship between age and number of children

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Rural</th>
<th>Urban</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M* W* B* O*</td>
<td>M W B O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25&lt;</td>
<td>1 -- 3 --</td>
<td>3 2 2 --</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-34</td>
<td>5 1 13 2</td>
<td>18 7 18 --</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-44</td>
<td>19 3 10 2</td>
<td>21 11 24 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-54</td>
<td>10 6 5 9</td>
<td>22 11 17 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55&gt;</td>
<td>1 -- -- 10</td>
<td>4 -- 4 25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>36 10 31 23</td>
<td>68 31 75 36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ \chi^2 = 56 \text{ DF}=12 \]

Pearson's R = 0.24

\[ \chi^2 = 53 \text{ DF}=12 \]

Pearson's R = 0.35

*B= Me

*W= my wife

*B= both

*O= other

B. EDUCATION AND NUMBER OF CHILDREN

Following on from the analysis of the previous table, educational levels may also be important in clarifying the position of
woman, as it might be thought education would modify traditional views. However, the data in table 5-23 show that there were significant differences between the informants who had a low level of education and those who had attained a higher level.

Nevertheless, the two groups have some conformity as regards the participation of woman in their decisions. Only a small minority, as in the previous table (age), gave the initiative to the woman. Even among urban respondents with university education, the number of those who share the decision-making was equalled by those who still feel that the priority and the initiative remains with the man (26 individuals to each). Thus, the traditional values which reinforce the superiority of man and inferiority of woman have a strong effect, not only on those who have a low level of education, but to some extent on those who have a high educational level.

Table 5-23 The relationship between education and number of children

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Rural</th>
<th>Urban</th>
<th>T*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M*</td>
<td>W*</td>
<td>B*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M</td>
<td>W</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illiterate</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Can read</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elementary</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermediate</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chi²</th>
<th>X² = 52</th>
<th>DF = 15</th>
<th>X² = 38</th>
<th>DF = 15</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>M*</td>
<td>= Me</td>
<td>W*</td>
<td>= My wife</td>
<td>O*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B*</td>
<td>= Both</td>
<td>O*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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C. MEN'S ASSISTANCE IN HOUSEHOLD TASKS

The preceding questions revealed that women's position is still inferior to men, despite urbanization and Westernization. This is further demonstrated in table 5-24 which reveals the extent of men's assistance in household tasks. The data show that the overwhelming majority of the rural group, 86%, replied that they never help their wives, as against 84% of the migrants and 59% of the natives.

Table 5-24 Men's assistance within their wives' household tasks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Helping Wives</th>
<th>Rural %</th>
<th>Urban% Migrants</th>
<th>Urban% Natives</th>
<th>Total%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Always</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sometimes</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>20.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>76.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$X^2 = 27.8$  DF=4

Rural and migrants' responses were very similar, but the natives showed significant differences, a remarkable proportion, 38% saying that they help their wives "sometimes", compared with 11% of the rural and 13% of the migrant group. The percentage of those who always help was the same in each group.

Although the native's participation in their wives' household tasks indicates some degree of urbanism (as a way of life), the majority of urban dwellers still do not help their wives. In the
researcher's experience, even women who work outside the home, bear all the domestic burden: cooking, cleaning, washing clothes and gardening. Women usually have no desire to see their husbands involved in what they regard as woman's tasks; for instance, they dislike a man helping in the kitchen, and say "Oh, no, you have to sit down and take your rest". This may be because the woman has no desire to see the man enter her kingdom and disturb her arrangements, or because the patriarchal authority of the man is often despotic, so that when the man interests himself in women's work, he may interfere. Thus a common expression in Iraqi society is, "When the man goes into the kitchen the woman does not do her work as well as normal".

To obtain a more complete picture of urban inhabitants' assistance in their wives' household tasks, table 5-25 shed light on the nature of that help.

Table 5-25 Type of assistance in household tasks*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of help</th>
<th>Rural</th>
<th>Urban Migrants</th>
<th>Urban Natives</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cleaning</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washing clothes</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cooking</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ironing</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washing dishes</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The informants were allowed to select more than one option
According to the information, the overwhelming majority of the natives were helping with tasks which were originally not women's duties: 37 respondents out of 45 of the native group claimed that they help in ironing, compared with 9 respondents out of 15 of the migrant group, and only 3 respondents out of 16 of the rural group. No one helped with cleaning and only one native with washing clothes. Only one native helped with cooking. The easiest task after ironing is "washing dishes", 7 informants of the urban group (both migrants and natives) said they did this task.

Basically, in a patriarchal authority, the husband regards any help as a concession, and often avoids any such "concession", based on the traditional argument that woman is greedy, and if one helps her, for example in cooking, she will begin to expect such help every day. Thus even now when a man intends to marry, he is told by his mother to "slay the cat", i.e. to be harsh from the beginning in front of his bride, in order to maintain his authority in the coming days; otherwise he will be dominated by his wife and bring shame to his family and relatives.

In this example we see women encouraging men to subordinate women. Thus it is not to be expected that a man will participate in what are conventionally regarded as feminine tasks. However, some kind of participation is emerging, attributable to large-scale urbanization and Westernization.

5.7. MARRIAGE

In patriarchal Arab society, marriage has been seen as a familial and societal tie rather than a matter of individual desire.
Functionally, it is perceived as a mechanism of sex fulfilment and economic cooperation (74); reproduction, human survival, reinforcement of family ties and interests, perpetuation of private property through inheritance, socialization and achievement of other goals that transcend the happiness of the individuals to guarantee community interests (75). Accordingly marriage for Muslims is normally arranged by the families of the principals, frequently without a prior meeting of the two principals. The major reasons for marriage are not companionship, romantic love or achievement of transitory individual happiness, but rather "fertility", permanence and the alliance of two family groups (76). Some individuals in towns and cities might marry spouses of their choosing, but they must first obtain their parents' consent. Without their assent the marriage will not take place. Even if the bridegroom insists and ignores his parents refusal, the bride's family will not accept him, because they recognize that marriage is not an individual affair, but a familial responsibility (77).

Generally speaking, marriage is compulsory and is completely in the hand of the parents. The parents are morally obliged to find a mate for their sons, and the sons are expected to accept and obey the parents' choice. Traditionally, the principals to be married did not see each other until before the wedding, but this custom is dying out (78). Where a young man's father is living, the father is expected to take a significant role in the negotiations, and the same is true for a young woman. Now, if questioned, men will assert that marriage negotiations are their concern alone. Substantially, women will take a very different view of the process, are involved and will, in fact, take quite an active role in the suggestion of marriage partner and
in preliminary negotiation (79). In this context the common expression is: "The master key to the father's consent is the mother".

Informal mediators are often used in the betrothal process. In Iraq, usually a group of women prepare the ground for the men's negotiations. They often discuss all the requirements and practical procedures, including the amount of the dowry (mahr) and the future residence of the couple, and when they reach agreement, the men need only talk in an amicable way before giving the formal endorsement. The men endorsement is needed just to give the women's agreements a social and legal acceptability, in conformity with the traditional values of the patriarchal society.

A. POLYGAMY

Marriage in the contemporary Arab World take two major forms: monogamy and polygyny. According to Islamic law, a man is permitted to take up to four wives, but this freedom is hedged by an important restriction, that a man should treat all of them equally, in terms of their economic and psychological well-being (80). The Holy Quran says:

"If ye fear that ye will not deal fairly with the orphans marry of the women who seem good to you, two or three or four and if you fear that ye can not do justice, then one (only), or that your right hand possess. Thus it is more likely that ye will not do injustice" (81).

Thus, the man has a right to have as many as four wives at the same time, only if he can act with perfect justice towards all of them. This may be possible to achieve in material terms, but it is unlikely emotionally. Thus the permission for polygyny is in reality quite restricted, and this restriction is widely observed in the Arab community, especially among urban inhabitants. However, polygyny
fulfilled several functions: to ensure a large number of children, to provide necessary manpower and satisfy other economic and social conditions\(^{(82)}\).

Although polygyny in Iraq was already on the decline, in 1977 the government decreed that any man who would like to take an additional wife, must first seek the permission of his first wife. This diminished the phenomenon to a minimal level.

The effects of this legislation on marriage forms in Iraq are clearly apparent in our own data, where only two informants among rural group had a second wife (table 5-26), while none in urban areas (both migrants and natives) claimed to have more than one wife. One of the most important reasons for the decline in polygyny in Iraq and many other Arab countries as well, is the diminishing of household work\(^{(83)}\), and the tremendous increases of the economic burden of the family, as well as large-scale urbanization (as a process, not as a way of life).

Table 5-26 Number of wives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of wives</th>
<th>Rural%</th>
<th>Urban% Migrants</th>
<th>Urban% Natives</th>
<th>Total%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Only one</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Four</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
B. CHOICE OF MATE

Ideally, marriage in the Arab World is not a personal choice, but is imposed on the individuals by the cultural system, through the family and close kin. The parents, especially the father, theoretically control the selection of a mate. Nowadays, the principals exercise considerable influence over the choice of mate particularly in urban centres. However, the final choice remains in the hands of the parents; the son might suggest a bride, but the final consent must be given by the parents. Their consent is often subject to two conditions: the reputation (honour) of the bride and her family, and her efficiency.

The choice of bride suggested, might be wide or narrow in terms of the kinship group (endogamy), but in almost every case the first name proposed is that of the Bint Al Amm (father's brother's daughter). First cousin marriage on either the mother's or the father's side is desirable, but mate selection from the father's side is preferred for many reasons: Firstly, the dowry (mahr) is often a symbolic one. Secondly, the property of the bride and her heritage remain in the family. Thirdly, the couple's mutual understanding might be better than that between strangers; it is believed that a wife of the same blood, might be more inclined to stand beside her husband in a crisis than would a stranger. Moreover, a paternal cousin feels that his Bint Amm is his responsibility, whether he marries her or not, so if he marries her, moral obligation and blood ties prevent divorce. This function is to maintain the coherence of the community and not "a sort of scandal" as Claude Levi-Strauss claimed.
Girls, in the choice of mate, are heavily influenced by local and kinship factors. They prefer, first and foremost, the conventional Muslim marriage to the first paternal cousin, because, substantially the first paternal cousin stands next to the brother as protector. This right is alluded to in a number of proverbs: "Her (the girl's) binding and her release are in the hands of her Ibn Amm" or "The girl who is desired by her Ibn Amm is forbidden to a stranger". On the girl's side, the common proverb is, "The feet of ibn Amm are better than the head of the stranger".

In Iraq as Patal pointed out:

First cousin marriage is the invariable rule. A girl belongs of right to the son of her father's brother (Ibn Amm) unless he expressly renounces his right to marry her. Even in this case she may not marry without his permission.

This tradition has remained to some extent active both in rural and in urban communities, but nowadays it is under attack, especially among the younger generation. Girls have begun to object if they do not like their Ibn Amm and their opinions are often respected. Consultation with the girl before the final decision, is required by religion and law, though the strict tradition in Iraq, as in most Arab and Muslim societies, gives priority to parents' supervision and consent. In our case, as Table 5-27 shows, we found the vast majority of the sample, both rural and urban, claimed that the father has the absolute authority to choose his son's bride.

The tendency for the choice of bride to be made by the father alone falls from rural to native respondents: 76%, 68%, and 53% for the three groups respectively. The role of the mother with the father's consent, however increases: 15% of the rural group, 25% of
the migrants and 41% of the native group. Only 5.3% of the entire sample said they chose their mates themselves.

Here, we have a clear-cut indication of the predominance of the patriarchal family in the social structure. In spite of the mother/wife's participation in such cases, the mother often plays only a lesser role; she might choose the bride and try to persuade her husband to accept her favourite choice, but the final words and the procedures (if he agrees) should be in the father's hands.

Table 5-27 Choice of mate

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Who chose/will choose your wife</th>
<th>Rural%</th>
<th>Urban%</th>
<th>Total%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Migrants</td>
<td>Natives</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>myself</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Father</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mother with father consent</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$X^2 = 20$  DF = 6

C. AGE AT MARRIAGE

Honour is one of the core values in Arab culture. Woman represents the honour of the family, thus she is secluded, prohibited from the man's realm in work and entertainment, and even from exchanging visits with friends and non-close relatives. All these restrictions are imposed in order to maintain the family honour. It is believed in the Arab World that women are weak in sexual matters,
and need constant supervision by an adult man or old woman. Male honour is closely linked to female purity; hence, a girl must remain a virgin till marriage. If she loses her chastity, it affects not only her own reputation but also that of her father, brothers and all her relatives(92), and she might expose herself to capital punishment by a member of her family. For that reason women are secluded and denied access to the work market. Thus only 5% of all adult women are employed in non-agricultural labour in most Islamic nations of the Middle East and North Africa(93)

In this cultural context, it is not surprising to see early marriage in Iraq for both males and females, but particularly female. Goode (1963) refers to the marriage of girls as young as nine or ten years of age. He argues that the system that permits marriage before puberty or in the earlier years of adolescence as "fits well with a system of high control by elders over mate choice"(94).

In fact, in a society which practices pervasive sexual segregation, emotional attachments can not be formed, and marriage is arranged early to prevent young people from undermining the traditional system. Thus it is in the interest of the elders who wish to maintain the traditional family system, to arrange marriage at as early an age as possible.(95).

Early marriage is considered desirable and practiced not only in the Arab World, but in most Islamic countries. In Afghanistan, for instance, Hanifi (1979) reported that "a boy usually marries between the ages of sixteen and twenty-two, while girls ordinarily marry three to four years earlier(96). In 1960, in Amman and Beirut the averages range from 17 to nearly 22 years(97). In 1971 in Iran girls were often married before the age of fifteen years(98). In Iraq,
Mustafa (1990) found the averages in Mosul city (northern Iraq) to be from 18.2 to 21.1 years\(^{(99)}\). Alnassar (1990) revealed an average of from 18 to 25 years in Baghdad city\(^{(100)}\).

In our own data, as Table 5-28 shows, the preferred ages at marriage for men were in the 20-24 and 25-29 categories, with slight difference between the rural and urban groups. For women, it was younger in the categories 20< and 20-24 with significant differences between the rural and urban groups. More than half of the rural sample (61%) were concentrated in the category 20<, while more than three-quarters (78.5%) of the urban group were concentrated in the category (20-24). The mean of the male desirable age for marriage is 25.1 years, while the mean for female is 21 years. This result is consistent with Alnassar's result mentioned above.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age at marriage</th>
<th>Rural(%)</th>
<th>Urban(%)</th>
<th>Total(%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20&lt;</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-24</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-29</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30&gt;</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Total           | 100         | 100         | 100         | 100        | 100         | 100         | 100\

Mean of rural:  
Male = 24.1  
Female = 19.7

Mean of Urban:  
Male = 25.4  
Female = 21.6
D. RESIDENTIAL RULE

Arab society has been described as patriarchal, patrilineal, and patrilocal. All the power is concentrated in the hands of the males (father, spouse, grandfather... etc.), and as a result the residence was traditionally absolutely patriarchal; the bride left the natal household to join the household of her husband(101). Thus the typical household consists of the parents, their unmarried and married sons and their wives and children(102).

Although this rule has somewhat changed, with a move toward the individual household, the past custom is still widely upheld in rural and urban settings. In the past two decades, couples compulsorily joined the household of their parental extended family, because the father's household was considered the main source of livelihood. Property remained under his authority as long as he lived(103).

Accordingly, matrilocal residence is discouraged, regarded as shameful and breaking of tradition. A bridegroom who intends to live with his bride's family brings shame, not only to himself, but also to his original family and relatives. In Iraq public opinion is against such cases. The people often call a person who intends to do this (ga’dy), a perjorative word, which means in folk idiom a person who loses his authority and lives at others' expense, even if he has a job and supports his wife financially. Abu-Zahra asserted this fact when she stated:

If he goes to live in his wife's brother's house, his authority over his wife diminishes(104).
On this basis, people avoid matrilocal residence in order to maintain their prestige in the eyes of their original families, friends and the whole community. However, to every rule there are exceptions. Some individuals break with tradition and live with or near their wives families. Some are forced to do so, because either wife's family has no adult male to take care of the family, or the wife's family is very rich and forces them to do so. Attitudes toward residence are manifested in table 5-29, which shows that only 3% of the rural group, 8% of the migrants and 4% of the natives would "agree" to live with their wives' families. On the other hand the proportion of those who would "refuse" to join their wives' residence is very high: about 80% of the three groups, with slight differences between them.

Table 5-29 Residential rules

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Live with wives families</th>
<th>Rural%</th>
<th>Urban%</th>
<th>Total%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Migrants</td>
<td>Natives</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refuse</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persuade her</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[X^2 = 3.2\] \hspace{1cm} \text{DF= 4 N.S}

This result is consistent with Al-nassar's findings. He found that 2 respondents out of 260 migrants and none out of 140 natives...
in Baghdad city claimed to have positive attitudes toward matrilocal residence, and the overwhelming majority strongly rejected it. Some were reported as saying "If I live with my wife's parents, I will lose my power" and, "How could I live with my wife's parents?. It is a shame in my society"(105).

The result is also consistent with Prothero and Diab's findings; they found that the residential pattern, in which the newly married couple stayed with the husband's parents, was very strong among the villager and among the lower class of the city(106). From these results, it can be concluded that the patrilocal residence rule is still much in evidence in both rural and urban communities in Iraq. Again this reflects the continuation of female subordination, despite large-scale urbanization.

5.8 CONCLUSION

Arab society has been widely described as patriarchal, patrilineal, patrilocal, polygynous and characterised by the extended family. The family is considered the basic social unit and the cornerstone of social organisation in both urban and rural communities. It is the pivot of social, political, economic and religious training and practices; it provides security and protection for its members, and it is centre for their recreation and affective life. The predominance of the extended family system entails concentration of power in the hands of the older males (often the father or the eldest son), male superiority over females, and discouragement of family planning (both birth control and family budget arrangement).
In the first section of this chapter, the researcher investigated the range of the power structure of the family. As the data showed, the older man enjoys absolute authority over his wife/wives and his sons, whether unmarried or married in both rural and urban communities, with almost no-significant differences between them. The obedience of children to their parents, even when they become adults and get married, which is determined by religious and traditional values, is evident. On this basis the extended family still has a strong presence, not only in its traditional construction, but also in its function inside the nuclear family. This fact is manifested through the reciprocity of mutual aid, interdependence, wide participation in major life occasions and subordination of the young to the old and the females to males. Therefore, the father has full authority inside and outside the home, and has the absolute right to make decisions on behalf of his family members. Accordingly, the relationships inside the family are formed vertically rather than horizontally. In such relations, at the upper level, communication often takes the form of orders, instructions, warning, threats, shaming and so forth, whilst at the lower level it might take the form of crying, self-censorship, covering up and deception.

This absolute authority might transfer to the eldest son when the father dies, as a continuation of the patriarchal authority.

The status of the males was shown to be very high compared with that of females. This was clearly seen in the question as to whether the family which has a large number of males has a high status. The information received showed that the overwhelming majority agreed with this statement. This notion has several sources of reinforcement throughout socialisation; the male learns from early
childhood that he will be the "man of the family", responsible for his mother, sisters and younger brothers. The data demonstrated also a complete conformity between rural and urban informants as regards male status; 100% of the three groups said "Yes, if we have a son who gets married and lives independently, we will support him, morally and materially". This view is typical of traditional societies, where the family looks after its sons and helps them to find jobs, helps them financially to get married, to build a new house, to pay debts and takes side with them in any disputes. When we asked the informants "Why will you support him?" the vast majority said, "because he is a part of myself". Some said, "I need him when I get old". This also explains why they prefer to keep their married sons with them in the same household. This result is in keeping with the common impressions of the superiority of the males, and the effectiveness of the patriarchal family, in both rural and urban settings.

The third section tried to test the family's ability to plan its budget and fertility. It could be anticipated that the urban family would have greater likelihood of budgeting and using contraception, but the fact is quite the contrary. Family planning (birth control) faces strong obstacles: religious values which encourage high fertility, and traditions that regard a large number of children as the main reinforcement of the family's economic position and political prestige. Family budget management is undermined by extensive obligations: weddings, funerals, illness, expected and unexpected visitors. One commonly hears in Baghdad and other Iraqi cities complaints such as, "One needs a treasury to fulfil his obligations", or, "I plan my family budget, but every month I have shortfall, with
obligations extra to the budget". When we tried to measure the impact of education and occupation on the budget using \((X^2)\) we found no-significant differences between those who have high and low level education/occupation, in urban and rural populations alike.

The woman's position and status, discussed in the fourth section showed inferiority of women compared with men, though, her status increases if she gives birth to sons, while the restrictions are lifted when she becomes old. Although the majority of the informants claimed that the mother has less status than the father, a remarkable proportion of them said the mother has equal status to the father, and a minority said the father has less status than the mother. However, when the inquiry turned to responses to the statement "Women plan and men execute the plan" the majority strongly rejected it, and once again there were slight differences between rural and urban group responses. The only relatively active participation of woman was seen in the question about the number of children, where a remarkable proportion of the informants claimed that they share the decision with their wives, with non-significant differences between rural and urban groups. By crosstabulating age and education as independent variables, with decision-making about the number of children, we found greater impact of urbanization and Westernization on the younger groups and the well-educated than on others. However when the inquiry turned to the husband's assistance in his wife's domestic tasks, the vast majority said they never help, with slight differences between rural and urban informants. Even for those who admitted they help, the assistance that they offered was in tasks not normally regarded as women's tasks. Most helped with ironing, none helped with cleaning, and only one out of (300)
informants helped with washing clothes. These results reflect the dominance of the male, who still views the woman through the traditional values, as an inferior creature, physically and mentally.

The final section examined the nature of marriage: polygyny, choice of mate, age at marriage and residential rules. The information revealed some similarity between the rural and urban groups, as regards the decline of polygyny, where only 2 out of 300 informants had a second wife.

Because of the predominance of the traditional view of marriage, which regards it as a familial rather than individual matter, the family plays an essential role in mate selection, and the patriarchal authority emerges again as a decisive factor in determining the proper mate for both sons and daughters. Relatively early marriage is preferred, particularly for girls; there were slight differences between rural and urban groups, but the data showed that preferred age at marriage was less than 25 years for males and less than 21 years for females. This result is consistent with recent findings.

As concerns residential rules, the patriarchal authority entails patrilocal residence, and in a society dominated by strict tradition, it is not easy to accept matrilocal residence. If one breaks the value system, he is socially despised, mocked and vilified. People in Iraq usually regard him as "powerless". For these reasons the overwhelming majority of the informants claimed that they would not live with their wife's family, with conformity between the two sets.

In the light of these results we may conclude that the pervasiveness of traditional values in the urban context has
diminished the margin of differentiation between the rural and urban areas, and created to some extent, "ruralization of the city".
5.9 NOTES AND REFERENCES


3. Ibid, P. 27


24. Here there might be some exaggeration. One might hold his father for a hundred yards and say two miles. Such exaggeration is very common in Arab society. For instance, in the country someone giving directions might say, "The distance between this village and the next one is about the shot of stick", but, actually, it is more than ten miles. In urban areas, one might say, "When I was in the hospital complaining of a headache, they (medical staff) diagnosed thousands of diseases", but in fact, they found constipation and fever.


32. Holy Qura'n, Sura 18.
43. Prothero and Diab, Op. Cit, P. 100


64. Qura'n: 2-228.


73. Ibid, P. 148

74. Ibid, P. 151.


81. Qura’n, Sura 4, Verse 3.


85. Ibid, P. 57.

91. Ibid, P. 381.
95. Ibid, P. 105.
100 Al-Nassar, Op. Cit, P. 295
CHAPTER SIX
KINSHIP RELATIONSHIPS
6.1 INTRODUCTION

As we have said earlier in this thesis, the distinction between the family and kinship is unjustifiable in both structural and functional terms. The kinship system in the Arab World is based primarily upon the household unit or extended family and its expansion. Discrimination is only justifiable from a methodological viewpoint. However, whatever distinction is made, it is certain that the kinship system is large, complex and has considerable influence on both urban and rural dwellers.

The effectiveness of the kinship system can be seen, for instance, in the marital ties, and more generally in the prevalence of endogamy and exogamy which are regarded, as Parsons (1971) has said, as central to all kinship system\(^1\). It can also be seen in mutual obligations, loyalty, nepotism and many other facets.

Accordingly, this chapter seeks to underline the effectiveness of the kinship system in the urban milieu compared with that in its rural counterpart, to acknowledge the diffusion of the traditional values, which we have presumed might have a great impact on the components of urban life.

Traditionally, urban sociology has tended to underestimate the effectiveness of the kinship system in the city, where urbanization and modernization are expected to reinforce individuality, transience, and superficial relationships, rather than familism, kinship loyalty and nepotism. This view, however, is no longer tenable in view of much available evidence, particularly in traditional societies such as one
under study. Thus, the content of this chapter is mainly devoted to a consideration of four salient issues:

- Kinship control over marriage
- Mutual obligations
- Loyalty and nepotism
- People's attitudes toward each other as "kin"

These facets might reflect some features of the kinship system in an urban setting with reference to Baghdad city as a case study.

6.2 KINSHIP SYSTEM IN THE ARAB WORLD: GENERAL OUTLOOK

Undoubtedly, the Arab World today has undergone remarkable changes, not only in demographic or technological terms, but also socially and economically. These changes are reflected in every aspect of the social system.

In spite of these changes the kinship system has survived apparently free of damage, and one could anticipate that it will be alive as long as the patriarchal authority and family unit remain intact, not to mention the religion, which plays an essential role in maintaining active kinship ties. However, kinship is a broad concept, which begins with the conjugal family and covers large institutions: lineage, subtribe and tribe, which encompass hundreds of people, all connected genealogically and descended from one known or unknown, genuine or hypothetical ancestor. As Keesing (1975) reported, kinship is the network of relationships created and extended outward, by genealogical connection and social ties:

Genealogical connection between parents and child are extended outward to connect ego (the point of reference) to the parents of ego's parents and to the children; to
connect ego to her or his siblings (by their genealogical connection to the same parents); and outward through parents siblings to "collateral" relatives.(2).

In this sense the large kin groupings, in the Arab World, are social structures that aim to look after the legal, political, economic and social problems, that the family alone can not handle.(3). That is so, not only in the absence of centralized state authority, as Goode has asserted.(4). It seems to exist also where the grip of the state is strong. In Baghdad, for instance, kin groups are strongly functional; all the traditional obligations: cooperation, loans, mutual aids, protection and nepotism are applicable. Thus, urban social agencies do not weaken the role of kinship.

In spite of the atrophy of the large kin construction [subtribe and tribe] in the urban Arab community, the factual evidence of kinship group behaviour is considerable. The prevailing kinship network in the urban Arab community impelled Eickelman (1974) to ask the question: Is there an Islamic city?. After his brilliant analysis of a Moroccan urban setting, he concluded that there is not.(5). He found, instead, that the city was divided into quarters; each household in the quarter (darb) was considered to be bound together by multiple personal ties and by common interests. These complex ties are said to symbolize closeness in both urban and rural milieu. Thus he defined the quarter (darb) as the extension of the kinship group (qaraba).(6).

Beyond the individual's own extended family, which entails large-scale mutual obligations as we have described earlier [see chapter two], there are the wider dimensions of kinship: lineage, clan and tribe. The most important kin are those linked by patrilateral
descent, including the extended family together with married aunts, married sisters and the women of one's cousin's households, and matrilateral kin: one's mother's brother (khal), mother's sister (khala) and their siblings.(7) Patrilateral kin have higher status than matrilateral kin.(8) If the latter are of a different lineage, subtribe or tribe. This is reflected in the common proverb, "The Khal [mother's brother] is left out and the Amm [father's brother] is given authority". The Khal and the Amm are considered the nearest kin after one's own brothers and sisters. Those uncles [of both sides] have greater affection and responsibility for their nephews and nieces than for other, more remote relatives, and will give disinterested help when it is needed or after the parents' death. They may give their nephews or nieces a larger wedding gift than they would present to more distant cousins(9).

Mutual obligations at the lineage or tribe levels apparently occur among a remarkable proportion of urban dwellers in Arab communities, especially among the poor class, those of rural background and the old families in the cities. Gulick spelled out this notion in his analysis of the kinship system in Tripoli (Lebanon) by saying:

... less influential members want to maintain close relationship with their richer, more influential clansmen. When the latter have political ambitions, they can make good use of the loyalty of their poorer, remote relatives, as well, of course, as of the loyalty of those non-relatives for whom they can do favours. The political bosses (zu'ama) build their power party in this way, and those who seek to wrest their power from them try to do likewise(10).
Kinship ties in some contexts are assumed to be a guarantee of loyalty. This is the case not only in the monarchies in the region, but also in other structures. Loyalty seems to be pervasive everywhere in the Middle East, irrespective of the shape of the political authority. On this theme, Lutfyya has emphasized that all young men of the same lineage (hamula) or even the tribe (as characteristically used in Iraq) refer to each other as Ibn Amm (father's brother's son) and to all the young ladies as Bint Amm (father's brother's daughter). The older men are all regarded as Amamm (paternal uncles) and all the ladies are referred to as Ammat (paternal aunts).

This is not simply a matter of terminology. This sense of family ties entails a complex series of reciprocal favours and obligations: exchanged visits, assistance in major family events, such as birth, circumcisions, marriage, mourning, funerals and so forth. In Iraq it might be expanded more and more to cover promotion, move to a new house, new jobs, the purchase of a new car, and even the transition of the children from one class or stage to another in school, though large-scale urbanization has brought, inevitably, some increase in anonymity and drift towards individualism. The main obstacle to anonymity and individualism is religion. Relatives, according to the holy Qur'an, are accorded special respect. The Prophet Muhammad is reported to have said: "He who breaks off the ties of blood will not enter paradise". In this sense, Korson pointed out:

Individualism is a concept not in tune with the Muslim ethos, because individual ambitions and success are translated to mean improving the position of the whole family, whether in financial, social or prestige terms.
Definitely, religious commandments reverberate in all Muslim societies, despite cultural differentiation. Thus, religion might be a crucial factor in encouraging "nepotism", not only in socio-economic terms but in political terms as well. In the military overthrows which have occurred in the Arab World, the new governor has often charged the previous one with a high degree of corruption and nepotism. Nepotism, however, is a logical consequence of a society which is heavily infused with the ideology of the importance of kin ties(16).

6.3 KINSHIP CONTROL OVER MARRIAGE.

Kinship in the Arab World, as we have already seen, has a visible presence in the urban milieu. It is derived mainly from a strong tradition of intimate family ties, and encouraged by religion. This has led to complex mutual obligations, one facet of which is controlling marriage, which we will discuss in this section.

The ideal type of Arab and Muslim marriage is between first paternal cousins, with the next preferences being given to more distant paternal cousin, cousins on the maternal side, others of the lineage, and those from the same tribe, in that order(17). In spite of this strong tradition, the rule has some exceptions, recalling Sapir’s remark that "All grammars leak". Marriage may occur outside the realm of kinship and this is becoming more common among the urban indigenous today. The conventional marriage pattern may be broken by many urban individuals under the influence of Western culture through mass contact, subserved by the revolution in communications. Nevertheless, modernization and Westernization have not entirely caused kinship to lose its function, especially where marriage is
concerned. This situation seems to be similar to that reported from Africa and other Muslim countries in Asia, that the kinship network retains its meaning in both rural and urban areas\(^{18}\).

In a strong patrilineal system, parallel cousins are the preferred marriage partners, extended to other relatives. Exogamy may occur, but it is not the rule. As Gulick has reported:

This marriage system is a reflection of one of the most fundamental concepts in Arab culture. If the Arab in the street could fully verbalize this concept, he would say something like that: "The strongest tie which binds one person to another is the tie of blood, reckoned in the male line. The only people in this hard world in whom I can put my full trust are my relatives. Therefore, the best people in the world are my relatives--- my brother, my father, my father's brothers and their sons, and beyond them, every one in my father's lineage. When one marries, one chooses the best person one can find, and the best person is to be found among one's kinsmen--- the closer the better"\(^{19}\).

Accordingly, when an individual intends to marry, he normally thinks, first and foremost, of his close relatives, which Tannos thought might ensure the kin group's solidarity\(^{20}\). Moreover, the bride-price is highest if a man takes a bride from outside his kin groups\(^{21}\). However the decisive reason for maintaining the tradition of endogamy is to keep property within the kin group. Nevertheless, the general function of this pattern of marriage is to maintain the social relations of which it is the product. This might explain why kin groups have to control marriage.

Endogamy has been strongly criticised by Bourdieu (1972), who presumed that parallel cousin marriage is a matter of serving male interests. He stated that "the father ritually advises his son, 'Don't
listen to your wives, stay united amongst yourselves". He erroneously interpreted this as "naturally taken to mean 'marry your children to one another"(22), and viewed this kind of relationship as a type of scandal. In fact, endogamy and parallel cousin marriage are a cultural composition, which emerged and developed under certain socio-economic and ecological circumstances, like many other types of marriage in the world. Whatever the reason is, marriage is compulsory and completely under the parents' control. The children expect to accept and obey their parents' choice. Marriage is conceived as between two families, not two spouses(23).

So far, research has demonstrated that endogamy, particularly parallel cousin marriage, is still prevalent, even in large cities such as Cairo, Kabul and Tehran(24).

In Iraq, the pattern of marriage among relatives, particularly parallel cousins, is breaking down. Two or three decades ago, first cousin marriage was the invariable rule. A girl had to marry her ibn amm [father's brother son] unless he abandoned his right to marry her, but even then, she could not marry anyone else without his consent(25). This rule has now been broken down by the younger generation, especially urban inhabitants. However, a sizeable proportion of the urban residents still prefer the old style of marriage, among close relatives. The data available in table 6-1 might shed more light on this fact.

The information in the table shows that about one-third of the whole sample married relatives. Although there is a significant difference between the rural and urban group, a remarkable proportion of the urban residents still preferred to marry among their relatives. As the data shows, more than half of the natives or
54% claimed that they married relatives, compared with 68% of the migrants and 76% of the rural group.

Table 6-1 Marriage among relatives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Is your wife a relative?</th>
<th>Rural%</th>
<th>Urban%</th>
<th>Total%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Migrants</td>
<td>Natives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ X^2 = 11 \quad DF = 2 \]

Although there is no written law on the subject of marriage among relatives, tradition is sometimes more effective than written law; everybody knows by socialization in early childhood that a girl should marry her father's brother's son (ibn amm). Nowadays many urban residents are still concerned about the old style of marriage. For example, when one's brother has a new baby girl, he may say "We hoped for a boy, but it does not matter, she has a lot of father's brother's sons", or "She has come at the right time, she is for her ibn amm". This fact was noted by Granqvist, six decades ago, when he said that betrothal was normally arranged by the relatives at the birth of the girl(26). A letter received from the researcher's sister in law after the Gulf War, included the following passage:

Assel is now seven month old, she is drinking milk in spite of the shortages. She smiles and my father teases her saying "don't dance", but she dances, I have repeated that she will be, if God wills, the bride of Sinan

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"her sister's son" but her father angrily repeated that it will never happen, he would like to marry her to her ibn amm, ..Imagine!

This passage might have been a joke, or a way of indicating that life in Baghdad had returned to normal, but actually it reflects the attitude, not only of individuals but also of the social system as a whole, toward the early nominal binding of the children. It also reflects the strength of the emotional bond among the kin group.

Geertz (1979) indicated that marriage among relatives prevails among the urban residents in Morocco. He recorded the views of the people there and reported that "marriage among relatives over generations has produced a complex interwoven network of multiple consanguineal ties" (27). Such expressions are commonly heard everywhere in the Arab and Muslims countries.

To clarify the position, we asked the informants who replied "Yes" to the previous question, to indicate the degree of kinship with their wives. The responses in table 6-2, show that 32.9% of the rural sample had married cross-cousin relatives, while 57.4% of the migrants and 44.4% of the natives had done so. The figures indicate that parallel cousins no longer have preference. Cross-cousins have replaced the parallel-cousins; only 21.1% of the rural sample claimed that they were married to parallel cousins, compared with 17.6% of the migrants and 38.9% of the natives. Though the native group show no significant difference for either cross or parallel-cousin, nevertheless, the majority of the entire sample, both rural and urban informants had married a cross-cousin or parallel-cousin, while the rest (the minority) had married either from the lineage or from the tribe.
This result indicates that a sizeable proportion of urban informants still prefer marriage among relatives. The reason, as far as the researcher knows, is not only to maintain the family property, but because many people think that a wife chosen from among one's relatives might put up with the husband's wrong doings, slips and mistakes and stand with him in a personal crisis, more than could be expected of a non-relative wife. At the same time, the wife is quite secure in her marital life because it is unlikely that a man would abandon or divorce a blood-kin wife.

However, this kind of marriage is not confined to Arab and Muslim culture as Patai alleged; it is practiced among many other nations and ethnic groups. Spanish villagers, for instance, prefer marriage among kin groups and perceive a relationship between inheritance from the same grandfather and first cousin marriage. Among non-Muslim Indian people, marriage is endogamous; it occurs to maintain the caste.

Table 6-2 Degree of relationship with wife

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Degree of relationship with wife</th>
<th>Rural%</th>
<th>Urban%</th>
<th>Total%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Migrants</td>
<td>Natives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cross-cousin</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>57.4</td>
<td>44.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parallel-cousin</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>38.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From lineage</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From the tribe</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ X^2 = 25.9 \] \[ DF = 6 \]
In order to define their attitudes toward marriage among relatives [endogamy], we asked the respondents, whether or not they would prefer for themselves and for their sons to marry relatives. The answers, as table 6-3 shows, indicate similarities rather than differentiation among the three groups' attitudes, where 66% of the rural group favoured marriage among relatives, while 76% of them [back to table 6-1] had actually practiced this type of marriage. 60% of the migrants expressed this preference, while 68% of them actually practiced endogamy. 49% of the natives favoured it, while 54% already practiced it.

Although the data shows some regression from the left to the right [from rural to native], it indicates that the attitude toward marriage among relatives remains highly favourable, even among the pure urban residents. The differences between the three groups are not as high as one might anticipate. That means, of course, that the cultural system has a great influence over the whole society, irrespective of residential area.

Table 6-3 Attitudes toward marriage among relatives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attitudes toward marriage among relatives</th>
<th>Rural %</th>
<th>Urban %</th>
<th>Total %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To marry relative</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To marry non-relative</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$X^2 = 6.1$  
DF = 2
This result is consistent with what Cohen found twenty six years ago among the Palestinian hamolas [lineage] on the west bank, where the hamolas appears as a group of men who are mainly linked through their marriage to one another's sisters or daughters\(^{(31)}\). In a recent attempt to study a Moroccan city, Geertz (1979) found that the people of Sefrou city most commonly married among their own kinship groups\(^{(32)}\).

A. EDUCATION AND MARRIAGE AMONG KIN GROUP

The information of table 6-4 shows that contrary to expectation, a sizable proportion of those with a high level of education in all three groups, were married among their relatives. If we note the precise figures we will see, the two of the control group who have a high level of education claimed that they married among their relatives, compared with 11 out of 25 of the migrants and 26 out of 61 of the natives. 53 out of 69 of the rural group with a low level of education were married among their relatives, compared with 39 out of 47 migrants and 8 out of 11 natives.

The figures indicate that there is no contrast on either side of the curve, in other words, there is no significant relationship between level of education and marriage among relatives \( (X^2 = 9.8, 14.9, \text{ and } 9.5 \text{ respectively } DF=5) \). The only way to explain the relative similarity between them is through the cultural view, where both side submitted to and were affected by the traditional values. Therefore it seems that education does not substantially counter these traditional values.
Table 6-4 Education and marriage among relatives.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education and Marriage among relatives</th>
<th>Rural Y*</th>
<th>Rural N*</th>
<th>Urban Migrants Y</th>
<th>Urban Migrants N</th>
<th>Urban Natives Y</th>
<th>Urban Natives N</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low level edu</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle level edu</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High level edu</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Y* = Yes
- N* = NO

\[ X^2 = 9.8 \quad \text{DF} = 5 \quad \text{N.S} \]
\[ X^2 = 14.9 \]
\[ X^2 = 9.5 \]

B. OCCUPATION AND MARRIAGE AMONG KIN GROUP

If education level does not significantly alter attitudes toward intermarriage, it can be anticipated that the same will apply to occupation. This view is sustained by the information of table 6-5, which shows that the majority of the respondents in all occupations claimed that they prefer intermarriage, except for the officials who showed some indications of breaking with this pattern; only 19 out of 44 native official preferred intermarriage, and 13 out of 27 migrants.

The circumstances of the officials and the difficulties of urban life might impel them to look for suitable wives who can share the burden of the household expenses, for in the researcher experience, officials often marry after courting women working with them in the same office. This might explain the higher ratio of marriage to non-relatives. In such cases they should ask about their intended mate's reputation and tribal origin, to check "honour" of her family and find
out whether there are any relatives' objections. In many cases, the girl's kin group put a stop to any engagement with a non-relative, whatever the occupation or education level.

Table 6-5 Occupation and marriage among relatives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Rural%</th>
<th>Urban% Migrants</th>
<th>Urban% Natives</th>
<th>Total%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Official</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peasant</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worker</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-employed</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housewife</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$X^2=4.4$</td>
<td></td>
<td>$X^2=7.4$</td>
<td>$X^2=5.1$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DF=3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6.4 LOYALTY AND NEPOTISM

As a result of the prevailing patriarchal, patrilineal and patrilocal society and the high value of intermarriage, it can be said that most of the individual's activities are centralized on the kin group. The importance of kinship to the individual lies in its protective power; it is the body to which the individual may turn for assistance in times of crisis, insult or injury; it is of greater protective value to the people than lesser kin units since it possesses the largest numerical strength. Insult to a kin group member by non-kin or by a member of another kin group immediately
rallies all the kin group, especially close kin, together in common concern for a member of the common blood line\(^{(33)}\). However the importance of the kingroup is not only as a source of protection; it is a reference group, it provides economic support, and its members are united in religious participation. Thus the wide-spread loyalty to the group is not surprising. Familism one of the most common facets of rural and urban life alike. In fact, the entire culture of the Middle East is so permeated with family loyalty and influence that the terms familism and kinship have been properly been applied to it. The individual remain tied to his extended family beyond adulthood and into middle age. Subservience to family authority and reliance on the advice of elders remain characteristic traits of men in their thirties and forties\(^{(34)}\). Ingrained habits of family loyalty are strong in both formal and informal situations. It is extremely difficult for the individual to divest himself of a protective attitude toward his kinsmen, who expect him to render special services and favours to them\(^{(35)}\). In this sense Gulick pointed out that the majority of Arab city dwellers' loyalties are to their families and to their kin group in their home village, which may or may not be in a local minority. For that reason, as he said, "the Western observer often finds the Arab city so confusing and chaotic"\(^{(36)}\). He ascribed this chaos and ambiguity to the loyalties to multiple groups which remain intact in the city, while none of the inhabitants is directed to the city itself. Accordingly the majority of Middle Eastern city dwellers do not seem to develop the kind of individualism and the anomie which are frequently encountered among urban dwellers in the West, who have neither established satisfactory group identifications in the city nor retained strong identification with their families or home towns\(^{(37)}\).
Thus, the individual is highly dependent on his family and kin group for his short-term needs. Seeking assistance to cut through bureaucratic red tape is a well-known and widely accepted practice in Arab and Muslim culture. The individual begins his undertaking by seeking aid from relatives and through them, friends and friends of friends. The individual whose assistance is being sought may, indeed, be under obligation to the one seeking help or perhaps a member of the supplicant's family or from the kin group, lineage, tribe and so forth. Thus loyalty to the larger kin group is tangible not only in terms of mutual assistance, but also in "nepotism", which would occur when two or more individuals compete to seek the same goal.

A. TRIBAL SURNAME

The most important facet of the loyalty to a large kin group is nominal identity. In the Arab World, a person is often not seen as belonging to the city or the community as an individual, but as a member of his family and Ashira [tribe], so he takes as his surname not the name of the family, as in the West, but the tribal name, e.g. Alduleimy referring to the Duliem tribe. Al-zubaidy and Al-neaimy, are common tribal names in Iraq, while Rababaha, Al-Khal and Alkhori are found in Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. In Iraq it is common to see on shop fronts, tribal surnames sometimes without a first name, e.g. Al-Duliemy Company, Al-Jbouri Carpenter. On a smaller scale, sometimes people take the name of their city or district, for example Al-ileety, attributed to Ileet city or Al-Basri, attributed to Basra city or Al-Adami, attributed to the Al-Adamia district of Baghdad; however even this does not indicate loyalty to the city itself, so much as reference to some heterogeneous community descended from one original tribe.
Tribal surnames are also used in commercial advertisements and in politics, to play on tribal loyalty in seeking support. The latest form is quite similar to that prevailing in Africa: the kinship bonds are put to use in a highly selective way. In Mombasa, for instance, where about 90% of the trade union labour belongs to tribal units, the union leaders were able to use the appeal to tribalism in gaining union support(40).

Table 6-6 Tribal surname

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tribal surname</th>
<th>Rural%</th>
<th>Urban%</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Migrants</td>
<td>Natives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Important</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To some extent</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not important</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$X^2 = 12.5$  \text{ DF} = 4

The available data might shed more light on the use of the tribal surname as an indicator of kin group loyalty. Table 6-6 shows that the overwhelming majority of the entire sample regarded the tribal surname as important; precisely, 94% of the rural group, 87% of the migrants and 84% of the natives. On the other hand, none of the rural group said it is not important, while only 2% of the migrants and 8% of the natives.

This result calls to mind Gulick's remark that "the village and the city subcultures have many traits in common"(41). Tribal surname seems to be one of these "traits in common" in Iraq.
The question which arises here is, why is tribal surname so important? This question was put to the informants, and their responses, as table 6-7 shows, concentrated on two out of three choices. The two choices have approximately equal responses, especially among urban respondents [both migrants and natives], but there are significant differences between the control group [rural] and the urban group. 83% of the rural group claimed that tribal surname is important "because it indicates our original roots". The remaining 17% said, "because we need it socially". 49% of the migrants and 35.9% of the natives referred to original roots, while 51% of the migrants and 64.1% of the natives said the name is needed socially. No one, in any group, claimed it might be important for another reason.

Table 6-7 Why is the tribal surname so important?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Why important</th>
<th>Rural%</th>
<th>Urban%</th>
<th>Total%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Migrants</td>
<td>Natives</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reflect original roots</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>35.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Need it socially</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>64.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$X^2 = 46.7$  \hspace{1cm} DF = 2

So far the result is to some extent as anticipated, though one might ask in what way the name is needed socially. Even those who did not choose the reason "original roots" have not abandoned
tradition, as they appear to see tribal surname as a form of identity to cope with the common current values and to avoid inferiority in society based on the ground of tribalism and traditionalism. Thus, the replies to this question give no indication of urbanization, modernization or Westernization.

B. MEDIATION

Further evidence to confirm the concept of kinship loyalty and nepotism is the frequency of intercession and mediation, which seem to be common facets of a society highly respecting kinship ties. The advantage of favouring a relative over a non-relative in business is to obtain loyalty, trustworthiness and dependability; this may be considered more essential than obtaining the best talent available. For these reasons, many businessmen and governmental agencies fill positions from members of kin groups\(^{(42)}\). Gulick (1969) explained this phenomenon, stating:

Because most Middle Eastern villages are small, every resident knows every one else personally. To a considerable extent city dwellers (both migrants and native urbanites) tend to live in a similar, personalized environment. Nepotism in government and business is an aspect of this kind of interaction, as are the highly elaborated courtesies of wasta-- the use of intermediaries in adjudicating disputes or in seeking assistance from power figures\(^{(43)}\).

Thus the practice of looking for a relative to act as mediator to cut through bureaucratic red tape, is widespread. Even though contrary to government principles, it is even practiced among those who issued the legislation. Mediation is prevalent in Arab society, not
only to cut through bureaucracy, but in every other aspect of life, including marriage, looking for a job, or obtaining scarce goods.

Table 6-8 Intercession for relatives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Do you intercede for relatives?</th>
<th>Rural%</th>
<th>Urban% Migrants</th>
<th>Natives</th>
<th>Total%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not hesitate</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>91.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hesitate</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do not do</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ X^2 = 5.5 \quad \text{DF} = 4 \quad \text{N.S} \]

To examine this phenomenon, we asked the informants if they practice Intercession (mediation) in favour of their relatives. The overwhelming majority responded in favour, irrespective of their milieu. As table 6-8 shows, 94% of the rural group claimed that they do not hesitate to intercede in favour of their relatives, while 93% of the migrants and 87% of the natives agreed. On the other hand, only 2% of the rural group and 1% of the urban group responded negatively. 4% of the rural group said that they might hesitate before becoming involved in any mediation, compared with 6% of the migrants and 12% of the natives.

The figures confirm our claim, that mediation is widespread, and is a normal consequence of a society which highly values kinship ties.
6.5 MUTUAL OBLIGATION

As we have seen, the reciprocal obligations of the kinship system are not confined to members of the individual household, but extend to other relatives: parent-child, brother-sister, cousins and so on, extending to encompass lateral relatives: lineage, sub-tribe and tribe. In such relationships, kinship loyalty and mutual support are clearly conceived as virtues\(^\text{(44)}\). The major and most visible reciprocal obligation is among brothers and sisters, as Abu-Zahra (1976) pointed out:

When a man dies leaving unmarried daughters, it is his brother's responsibility to arrange these daughters' marriage. It is they who are asked for the girls' hands, and the eldest brother is responsible for signing the marriage contract. During the betrothal and wedding ceremonies the father's brother plays all the social roles which are usually the responsibility of the father. If there are no father's brothers, a father's brother's son may play this role\(^\text{(45)}\).

The bond between brothers and sisters, remains very close, even after marriage. A girl's brothers remain her protectors and a safe haven in case of need. Girls are aware that their original household is always kept open for them, no matter what happens. Thus there reigns in most homes a warm, cheerful atmosphere of love, harmony, mutual trust and respect which reflects this feeling of security\(^\text{(46)}\). Moreover, a married sister and her children may also receive financial support from her brothers if her husband is in need. Even if she is not in need, her brothers must visit her on each of the two big feasts to give her and her children gifts\(^\text{(47)}\), and pay her similar visits on certain occasions such as illness, circumcision,
marriage, funeral, mourning rites and so forth. If their sister’s son becomes involved in a dispute they are expected to support him (48).

It is obligatory, then, for brothers to assist each other in order to maintain the family unity, even if they are scattered in different towns and cities. If one of them setting up a new house, the other should help him financially or practically. Visits and meals are normally exchanged at least weekly, if not daily, especially when brothers are clustered in the same quarter of the city (49). Mutual obligations between brothers are the foci of a complex network of relationships, which also includes uncles and their sons [on both sides of the family]. In Iraq there are many ranks of relatives, and priority is often given to those up to the third rank (50); among those, the mutual obligations are unlimited, whereas they are confined to the main life occasions with others.

A. EXCHANGE VISITS

No one can exactly understand what Lerner (1958) called "empathy" among Arab people, unless he lives and carefully experiences this tangible fact. Lerner himself explained it as a result of extensive exposure to the mass media of communication (51). In fact, it is a cultural heritage which derives its roots from the patriarchal, patrilineal, patrilocal system and extended family, which endeavour to maintain the family unit over huge "mutual emotions" rather than "emotional despotism". Mutual emotions, protective feeling and interdependency, might contribute to reinforcing the continuity of strong ties. One of the most important facets of this continuity is frequently exchanged visits. Aswad (1974) considered that exchanged visits occupied a major portion of time among the elite women in the
small Turkish city of "Antakya". These visits are based on the principle of balanced reciprocity. Close relatives dominate the category visited more frequently, but most visiting between immediate relatives is done on a basis of generalized reciprocity.(52). She concluded that "The visiting patterns follow crucial intermarriages between the elite families"(53). Korson thought that kin ties are continually reinforced by almost daily visits. He found little differences in behaviour and attitude toward this form of leisure activity among different social classes. He recorded the experience of one professor as follows:

One university professor, in discussing the importance of kin ties, reported that he and his four brothers, all married, and all living in the same city, took turns visiting one another's home one evening per week on a regular basis. These visits included wives and children(54).

Despite the fact that members of families are scattered over the towns and cities, these people are not forgotten or truly isolated. There is always a great deal of travelling about and visiting one another. Even a trading trip, as Geertz said, "can be seen as a string of family visits"(55). Benedict (1974) mentioned that on certain days of the month a family has an open day [Kabul in Turkish, Istiqbal in Arabic] to receive relatives and friends. He defined these fixed days as a distinct form of visiting, and he alleged that such a phenomenon is known to have been prominent in most Middle Eastern countries from Morocco to Turkey, including Iraq(56). However, as far as the researcher knows, this phenomenon has not been practiced in the last two decades. Urban Iraqi households receive visitors, almost
every day. Most of those visitors are relatives. Daily visits among close relatives are quite common and even among laterals, reciprocal visits are considered an ethical obligation. The best leisure time is that spent in visiting relatives, neighbours and friends. Mustafa (1990) found that the majority of his informants (81%) in Mosul city [northern Iraq] preferred spending their free time in visiting relatives (57). A similar result was obtained by Al-Nassar (1990) in Baghdad, where more than 90% of his respondents said that they spend most of their leisure time in visiting relatives (58). Our own data, as shown in table (6-9) confirmed that exchanged visits with relatives are indeed a remarkable phenomenon. The overwhelming majority of the entire sample claimed that they exchange visits with relatives on occasions or otherwise. 93% of the rural group said "both on special occasions and otherwise", compared with 77% of the migrants and 78% of the natives. A small minority claimed that they exchange visits only on the main occasions: 5% of the rural, 21% of the migrants and 21% of the natives. The slight differences between the three groups do not reflect a sharp contrast between rural and urban behaviour. However, exchanging visits with relatives is not only an Arabic and Islamic phenomenon, it prevails among many other cultures and societies. Gargue (1965) in his study of kinship ties among French-Canadians of Montreal, found that the members of the broader kin group vary in their position in the formal and informal patterns and their closeness to ego's domestic family. These roles divide the total kin into a number of subgroups having special functions, but the whole kin group exchange visits on formal occasions (59). Similar findings were obtained by Gavrielides (1974) in Greece, where most of the relatives, friends and patrons visited each
other on formal and informal occasions, such as childbirth, wedding and funeral, but large-scale visits took place between close kin such as brothers and sisters outside these occasions\(^{(60)}\). In urban Africa, Southall (1961) describes the diffusion of the kin obligation to assist one another and exchange visits with occasion and without occasion to fulfil familial obligation\(^{(61)}\). Similar findings have been observed in Lima, Mexico and other Latin American cities\(^{(62)}\).

Table 6-9 Exchange visits with relatives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exchange visits with relatives</th>
<th>Rural%</th>
<th>Urban%</th>
<th>Total%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Migrants</td>
<td>Natives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On specific occasions</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From time to time</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[X^2 = 13.2, \text{ D.F} = 4\]

Although visiting patterns among relatives are well-known in most patriarchal cultures, their level depends on the intensity and expansion of traditional values and the level of industrialization. However, this phenomenon seems to be more visible in the Arabic and Islamic World than any other society. Accordingly, exchanged visits in urban Iraq as well as most of Arabic and Islamic societies should be taken for granted.

Another relevant point to be tested, is whether or not those visitors give prior notice to the hosts of their intention to pay a visit.
The data in table 6-10 show that the majority of the informants responded positively to the third category, which indicates that relatives should not need any appointment to visit each other. 72% of the rural group, compared with 70% of the migrants and 47% of the natives, held this view. However, a significant number prefer visits to be by arrangement: 27% of the rural, 29% of the migrants and 41% of the natives.

Table 6-10 Appointment to pay visit

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Appointment to visit</th>
<th>Rural%</th>
<th>Urban%</th>
<th>Total%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Migrants</td>
<td>Natives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Always</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sometimes</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$x^2 = 26.9$  D.F= 4

There were significant differences between the three groups, in that urban informants are more likely to make arrangements before visits. In the researcher's experience, households refer some warning when the visitors are not close relatives like brothers, nephews, nieces, uncles and aunts, but close relatives can visit any day at any time without giving notice of their visits.

Thus the making of appointments among relatives in Iraq is not popular, as one might anticipate. This is a normal consequence of a society deeply based on kinship ties accompanied with strong
emotion, and it will be so as long as the family unity is intact and functionally integrated.

Table 6-11 shows the extent to which the informants make appointments before knocking on the doors of the hosts. The data indicates that the majority did so "sometimes": 53% of the rural group, compared with 45% of the migrants and 52% of the natives. 45% of the rural, 45.5 of the migrants and 43.6 of the natives said that their relatives gave hints sometimes.

Table 6-11 Making appointments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Always or sometimes</th>
<th>Rural%</th>
<th>Urban%</th>
<th>Total%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Migrants</td>
<td>Natives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Always for me</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>12.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Always for them</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sometimes for me</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>52.7</td>
<td>43.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sometimes for them</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>45.5</td>
<td>43.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although there are slight differences between the rural and urban groups, these differences do not reflect a sharp contrast between them. However, this result strongly reflects the general social context, which confirms the tradition of close relations among relatives that would not entail any kind of formal consideration. In this context, if one visits a relative without appointment and says "I am sorry I have come without telling you first", they often reply "No no never mind, it's your home, you are one of our family, you can
come and go any time". Emotional blackmail is widely practiced. Hosts may be embarrassed when someone visits them without letting them know, but will still say "Don't worry, you are one of our family", and may insist on his accepting hospitality even if he is coming only to ask about something. When he goes, however, they may criticise him: "He is rough, uncivilized, he caught us unprepared". Gulick drew attention to the practice of emotional blackmail. The man may say "If you do not accept my hospitality, it means you do not love me, and I will, therefore, act accordingly"(63). This might well explain the family's concern with the guest rooms. When one undertakes to build a new house, much careful thought is given to the guest rooms. A perfect description of the guest rooms in Morocco has been given by Geertz. He stated:

Two of the largest rooms on the ground floor are more ornately decorated. The doorway of one is strung with varicoloured electric lights, like Christmas decorations, and the room is furnished with velvet-covered divans and bolsters, a large portrait of the king on the wall, and a picture of a young man of the family on another. These are the rooms used for entertaining important guests, for the long dinners and ceremonial serving of tea that are demanded by the Moroccan code of hospitality(64).

Fernea (1970) described the guest house (mudhil) in rural southern Iraq, as "a distinctive and characteristic feature of the region"(65). He explains its function as a centre of traditional tribal political life, and the setting for visitors from other tribes or even from the administrative centres of the near cities or the capital(66).

According to the deep rooted tradition of hospitality in the rural areas, urban dweller are always under attack from villagers,
who claim that urban natives are miserly and greedy. In their turn, urban dwellers who already have a guest room, go to great lengths to make it as large as possible, and to decorate it lavishly.

Table 6-12 shows that 99% of both rural and native groups have a separate guest room in their own homes, compared with 91% of the migrant group. The data demonstrates that there is no difference between the rural and the urban natives. The slight difference in the case of migrants can be explained in the light of the housing crisis and poverty, which prevails among the migrants who often live in shanty towns.

Table 6-12 Guest room

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Do you have a guest room?</th>
<th>Rural%</th>
<th>Urban%</th>
<th>Total%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Migrants</td>
<td>Natives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

X²= 12 D.F= 2

Accordingly the guest room seems to be very important. The people often say "The guest room is the face of the house, it reflects the status of the family". Thus the people strive to exhibit the best things they have, such as Chinese rugs, T.V and video, strings of coloured electric lights, a large portrait of the president, a picture of one or more of the males of the family, paintings and so forth.
B. OTHER PRACTICAL OBLIGATIONS

It is necessary to discriminate between genealogical and classifactory kin groups. Among the first, there are real mutual obligations, reciprocal assistance, participation in main life occasions, mutual protection and they act in many cases as a collective group. Among the second, the obligation does no exceed the minimum: mutual respect and at best, playing a mediating role to solve problems. The blood kin group itself is divided into close relatives, such as brothers, sisters, siblings, uncles, aunts and their sons, who share strong emotional ties, and lateral relatives who are theoretically bound by obligation, but in fact have no broad obligation on the practical level. However, priority in everything is given to close relatives; for instance, even when a son gets married and lives independently, his obligation to give his time to his father takes precedence over his obligations or enjoyment in the husband-wife relationship(67).

The attitude toward close kin is less calculating and impersonal. Those who are members of the nominal lineage, who trace their origin to the same ancestor or descendants of one grandfather, do continue to constitute a corporate group and many others cooperate economically. Many wealthy urbanites contribute heavily toward the education of their brother's sons, while others permit their father's brother's sons to look after some of their interests(68).

Obviously, kin obligations in the urban Arabic and Islamic World are based on both patrilineal descent and marriage. People are very aware of their relationship to kinsmen; they employ kinship terminology in daily life, and the kinship system is symbolized in all life crises, rites and ceremonies. Eickelman spelled out the practical
obligation in Morocco, through participation in the activities connected with births, circumcisions, weddings, funerals, graduation from school or memorization of the Qur'an and protection(69).

Accordingly, close kinsmen show great solidarity in situations that demand help and cooperation, in addition to the social and ethical obligations such as consulting one another in the marriage of their sons or daughters, contributing to blood money and even in showing respect for elders(70).

Table 6-13 Relatives' obligations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relatives' obligation</th>
<th>Rural%</th>
<th>Urban%</th>
<th>Total%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Believe and obey</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do not believe but obey</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do not believe and would not obey</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$X^2 = 9.2$  \hspace{1cm} D.F= 4

For our own data, it was suggested to informants that many people do not believe in relatives' obligation, but they obey under certain circumstances. Respondents were asked to clarify their own position. As table 6-13 shows, the majority claimed that they believe in relatives' obligation: 94% of the rural group, compared with 91% of the migrants and 83% of the natives. 15% of the natives said that they do not believe in relatives' obligation, but obey under certain circumstances, compared with 6% of the migrants and 4% of the rural.
On the other hand only 2% of the rural group, 3% of the migrants and 2% of the natives said that they do not believe and would not obey.

The slight differences between the rural and the urban groups might be attributed to some extent to urbanization, and to individual differences. Though the data indicate there is widespread adherence to the tradition of mutual obligation among relatives, crosstabulation of those who do not believe and would not obey with education, reveals that education level has affected the attitude toward relatives' obligation, especially among the urban group; the two urban informants who rejected such obligation, as table 6-14 shows were of high educational level, and the three informants of the other urban subgroup (migrants) were of middle educational level, while the two rural respondents had little education.

Table 6-14 Relative obligation and education

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Relatives obligations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low level</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle level</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High level</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These figures not give a precise indication, as most of the rural group were illiterate while most of the urban group were of middle or high level of education. Nevertheless, the figures for the
respondents who rejected relatives' obligations are not statistically significant.

Responses to the further question, "Who do you mainly depend on, when you are in a financial crisis?", reinforced the result of the previous question, where about three-quarters of the rural group and more than half of the natives claimed, as table 6-15 shows, that they mainly depend on their relatives, while approximately equal numbers of the rest depended on either neighbours or friends. A remarkable difference between urban and rural responses is demonstrated in the third category, where the natives score more than twice the rural ratio (32% compared with 13%). This might be explained by the requirements of the urban milieu.

Table 6-15 Respondents' dependence in financial crisis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Who do you mainly depend on in financial crisis?</th>
<th>Rural%</th>
<th>Urban%</th>
<th>Total%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Migrants</td>
<td>Natives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relatives</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighbours</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friends</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$X^2 = 15.5$ \hspace{2cm} D.F = 4

In traditional societies, neighbours and friends are often relatives who are clustered in the same quarter of the city or in
near-by quarters. Gulick draw attention to this phenomenon as found in Tripoli (Lebanon):

It is not uncommon for brothers to wish to live near each other. This is, of course, the conventionally proper thing to say. If in fact the brothers in successive generations of a clan did live close to each other, the result would be residential cluster of clansmen\(^{(72)}\).

Actually, there is no salient evidence at the present time of such residential clusters. Formerly and in the old districts of Baghdad city, the residential areas were divided into tribal quarters [see chapter three of this thesis]. Now, although relatives do cluster to some extent in certain districts and combine in an overlapping network of relationships, this does not occur to the extent it did two decades ago; under economic pressures and the housing crisis, the convergence of relatives has diminished. However, relative divergence does not necessarily imply any breakdown in kinship structure.

6.6 PEOPLE'S ATTITUDE TOWARD EACH OTHER AS "KIN"

The attitudes of people toward each other as "kin" depend mainly on two factors:

- The degree of relationship; a positive attitude associated with deep emotion and mutual assistance is felt toward genealogical relatives.

- Economic and political status; when one's economic or political status improves, the number of following relatives increase. Lateral relatives soon become "cousins", even though some
followers may not have seen or be personally known to their more influential relative.

Accordingly, kinship terms are linguistic symbols of kinship status. Different status and the quite different interaction patterns between them, call for various types of behaviour or attitude on the part of any one individual. In Gulick's words:

The kinship system seems to revolve around this question: must there be a one-to-one correspondence between the patterns of "lumping" and of differentiation of certain relatives in any one kinship system, and the prevailing behavioural and attitudinal patterns concerning relatives in the culture which uses that system?(73)

In this regard, individuals are identified by kinship, usually by familial and tribal affiliation. Men and women always identify themselves as belonging to a certain family and tribe(74). In general, our respondents conformed to this traditional view; relatives are very important and highly valued. Nevertheless, there were some gestures of dissent. For instance, opposition to first cousin marriage arose among many people in both rural and urban groups(75), and many people are rethinking the behavioural rule that "You should side with your brother in any dispute, regardless of whether he is right or wrong". The question then arises, to what extent is public opinion revising the traditional norms and changing its attitude toward relatives? The data might shed more light on this point.

As shown in table 6-16, the informants were asked to reply to the statement, "I would side with my brother against my paternal cousin, and with my paternal cousin against any stranger". The majority of the whole sample agreed with the content of the
statement: 92% of the rural group, 91% of the migrants and 82% of the natives. The sample responses show non-significant differences between the three groups ($X^2 = 6.1$ D.F = 4). This conforms with the literature, where brothers, father's brothers and father's brothers' sons are strongly connected and give each other unique support. Only 2% of the whole sample disagreed with the statement.

Table 6-16 Attitudes toward brothers and paternal cousin

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>I would side with my brother...</th>
<th>Rural</th>
<th>Urban</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>To some extent</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To some extent</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$X^2 = 6.1$ D.F = 4 N.S

This result, indeed, indicates that the sample's attitude is consistent with the traditional norms of family ties and obligation, and this might be reflected to some extent in the whole social organization.

To check the reliability of this result, we asked the informants to respond to another statement expressing a negative attitude, "Relatives are scorpion-like". The result, as table 6-17 shows, again indicates conformity toward traditional norms among the majority; 72% of the rural group, 71% of the migrants and 67% of the natives disagreed with the statement, while 3% of the rural, 7% of the migrants and 9% of the natives agreed.
Table 6-17 Attitudes toward relatives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relatives are scorpion-like</th>
<th>Rural</th>
<th>Urban Migrants</th>
<th>Natives</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To some extent</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>23.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>70.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

X² = 3.3  D.F = 4  N.S

However a remarkable proportion of the three groups agreed "to some extent" with the proposition: 25% of the rural group compared with 22% of the migrants and 24% of the natives. This ambivalent attitude may be explain in terms of the conflict between two cultures (traditional and modern), so that many people have partly accepted the new culture while being still strongly held by the old, creating a dualism. Dualism is very common in the Arab World by virtue of continuation of the kinship system alongside urbanization, westernization and industrialization. On the other hand, as a consequence of residential clusters, many problems and quarrels might arise explaining the comment which is sometimes heard, "Do not approach your relatives, their scorpions will bite you"(76).

Turning to the data, the figures show no significant differences between the three groups (X² = 3.3  D.f = 4), which means that their similarity of view is greater than the differentiation between rural and urban informants.

To clarify the informants' attitude towards relative ties and obligation and to reinforce the two previous statements, the
researcher asked the informants to react to another statement, "A man's only relative, is his money".

Table 6-18 Attitude toward relatives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A man's only relative is his money</th>
<th>Rural</th>
<th>Urban</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To some extent</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>24.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>62.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$X^2 = 3.7$  
D.F = 4  
N.S

The result as shown by table 6-18, manifested some similarity with the responses to the previous question, which reflects the importance of the kinship system to both rural and urban dwellers. The majority in each group, with slight differences, responded that they "disagree". More precisely, 69% of the rural group, compared with 58% of the migrants and 61% of the natives had this view. On the other hand, 11% of the rural group, 13% of the migrants and 16% of the natives agreed. Once again, a sizeable proportion of the informants agreed "To some extent": 20% of the rural, 29% of the migrants and 23% of the natives. Indeed, economic status, even in traditional societies, is highly valued, even though the majority of the sample reflected social orientations based on the conventional attitude toward relatives. One hears everywhere in the Arab World, particularly in Iraq, that, "Money is not every thing; money comes
and goes, but relatives are the only permanent capital”, or "Money is the dirt of life, we do not live to collect money, but on the contrary we spend money to maintain our ties to serve each other", or "I would not exchange my relatives with all the earth’s treasures; they are my back-belt".

From these findings, people’s positive attitudes toward each other as "kin" seem to be highly prevalent in the urban setting in Iraq. It is not just an individual attitude, but a cultural construction, so the individual’s attributes and actions may only be understood in term of kin group membership, or in Rosen’s (1979) words:

In societies characterized by sharply delineated corporate groups, the attributes and actions of a particular individual may, to a great extent, be understood in terms of the conditions and consequences of group membership(77).

6.7 CONCLUSION

It might be thought that the traditional kinship system could not coexist with urbanization. It would be diminished to the minimum or die completely, especially outside the conjugal family. However this is not the case in the Third World, or even, to some degree in wealthy Far Eastern countries such as Japan and Korea.

In the Arab World, kin groups have remained alongside urbanization and industrialization, contrary to Wirth’s theory. Studies throughout the Middle East, have shown that the kinship system has remained healthy and is highly valued, not only in the rural, but also in the urban environment.
In this chapter the researcher has attempted to demonstrate the effectiveness of the kinship system in the urban milieu in Iraq. Firstly the data reveal that marriage among relatives is highly preferred in both rural and urban areas. There is, of course, no written law compelling one to marry among his relatives, but the conventional system has strong influence reinforcing intermarriage. According to the figures, about 54% of the natives have married among their relatives, about 30% of them married a parallel-cousin and 44% of them married a cross-cousin. The result indicates that parallel cousins are not so strongly preferred as was once the case, but the data demonstrate that a sizeable proportion of the informants still prefer intermarriage. The reason in the researcher's experience, is not only to maintain the family property or for a low bride-price as the literature has asserted, but also because people think a wife chosen from among relatives might show greater support and loyalty to her husband than a non-relative. Moreover, the woman is assured greater stability in her marriage, because no one would expect a husband (who is always regarded as the protector) to divorce his blood-kin wife.

As regards the impact of education and occupation on orientation toward intermarriage, the data reveal non-significant differences between those of high level and low level of education, and between rural and urban occupations.

Secondly, the investigation focused on loyalty and nepotism among kin groups through two facets, tribal surname and mediation. Regarding the first, the information revealed that tribal surname is very important, not only as a nominal identity, but also as a reflection of kin loyalty. The overwhelming majority of the urban
informants claimed that tribal surname is "important", while a small minority said it was "not important". In response to the question, "Why is tribal surname important?", the rural informants gave the priority to the first option, "It reflects our original roots", while the urban respondents gave priority to the second option, "We need it socially". The result indicates that urban dwellers accept the tribal surname as a form of identity to cope with the common values and to avoid inferiority in a society heavily based on tribalism and traditionalism.

Regarding the second aspect, the data reveal that mediation is widely practiced among relative groups to cut through the bureaucratic red tape of the governmental administration as well as in aspects of social life including, marriage, looking for jobs and so forth. According to the figures, 94% of the rural informants claimed that they do not hesitate to intercede for their relatives, compared with 90% of the urban respondents. (X^2) shows no significant differences between them. The results confirm the researcher's anticipation and at the same time represent a normal consequence of a society which highly values kinship ties.

Thirdly, the analysis was concerned with mutual obligation as reflected in exchange visits and other practical obligations. Although visiting patterns among relatives are well-known in many societies and cultures, the phenomenon is more visible among Arab and Muslim peoples; our own data show that the majority of the sample, both rural and urban informants, frequently exchange visits with their relatives, both on special occasions and otherwise. About two-thirds of them said that relatives do not need a preceding warning or appointment to visit each other; relatives, especially close relatives...
could knock on the door any day, at any time, and the hosts are often delighted because a large number of visitors reflects the high status of the hosts. This might explain the exaggerated concern given to the guest room, or "Mudif". Everyone, rural or urban, poor or rich, Muslim or non-Muslim, gives the guest room priority when building or furnishing a house. Thus the data show 99% of the rural and urban dwellers equally have a separate guest room.

Other practical obligations are widely seen among relatives: financial support, practical help, exchange of gifts, and many other kinds of mutual help. Thus one can depend on his relatives when he meets with some crisis. In our study, more than 60% of the urban respondents claimed that they mainly depend on their relatives in a financial crisis, while only 2.5% of all urban informants said they do not believe in relatives' obligations. Thus relatives' obligations seem to be highly valued and widely observed.

The fourth concern was how the informants express their attitudes towards each other as "kin". In practice, their attitudes towards each other depend mainly on the degree of relationship and on economic and political status; whenever the relatives are either close or of high economic and political status, positive attitudes seem to be more visible, as reflected in the proverbial statement, "I would side with my brother against my paternal cousin and with my paternal cousin against any stranger". The overwhelming majority of the sample, both rural and urban agreed, while they rejected the unfavourable statement "A relative is scorpion-like". In another unfavourable statement, "A man's only relative is his money", the result was approximately similar to the preceding one.
Finally, kinship ties in Iraq, as in all Arab countries, in rural and urban areas alike, remain intact, not only among the conjugal family, but also elaborated to encompass large aggregations: extended family, lineage, subtribe and tribe. Genuine obligations are practiced to maintain the blood ties which seem to be a normal consequence of a society characterized by corporate groups.
6.8 NOTES AND REFERENCES


4. Ibid, P. 130


6. Ibid, PP. 283-286


8.---------, Social Structure and Culture Change in a Lebanon Village, N.Y, Johnson Reprint Co. 1955, P. 114


12. Lutfyya, Baitan, Op. Cit, P. 144


33. Fuller, Burij, Op. Cit, P. 62

34. Patai, Golden River to Golden Road, Op. Cit, P. 96-100

35. Ibid, P. 96-97


37. Ibid, P. 171


44. Ibid, P. 125


46. Lichtenstadter, Op. Cit, P. 609

47. In Iraq, it is usual for a married girl and her sons to pay visits to her original family early in the morning of the two big feasts to greet them and to receive gifts (e'dhia) for herself and her sons from her parents, if they are alive, or from her brothers.


50. The first rank encompasses, parents, brothers and sisters; the second, nephews and nieces, the third, uncles and aunts, the fourth, uncles' and aunts' sons.

51. Lerner, D., The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East, Glencoe, 1958, 49-54

52. Aswad, B. C., "Visiting Pattern Among Women of the Elite in Small Turkish City", Anthropology Quarterly, Vol. 47, No. 1, 1974, PP. 8-24

53. Ibid, P.22


57. Mustafa, A., Op. Cit, P. 153


66. Ibid, P. 20


69. Eickelman, "Is There an Islamic City", Op. Cit, P. 286

70. Ibid, P. 286


73. ------, Social Structure and Culture Change, Op. Cit, P. 114

74. Sweet, I., Tell Toqaan: A Syrian Village, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan, 1960, P. 184

75. Patai, Golden River ..., Op. Cit, P. 173-174

76. Ibid, P. 175
CHAPTER SEVEN
NEIGHBOURS AND NEIGHBOURHOOD
7.1 INTRODUCTION

Sociologists and anthropologists are accustomed to describe the ideal type of individual contacts in cities as transitory, anonymous, segmental and impersonal, comparing with intimate and personal in rural areas. In the advanced world of surplus economy, with large and complex institutions such as clubs, associations, hobby and work groups, it is possible to live for many years in a certain neighbourhood without knowing even one’s next door neighbour. The house itself is used almost like a hotel, only for eating and sleeping. In such cases, local community communication might diminish to the minimum, or even ultimately disappear. In contrast, in the less developed world, local aggregations kinship, neighbourhood and friendship—often prevail. Cultural tradition, together with religious commandments play an essential role in keeping local community contact intact.

Thus, this chapter is devoted to an analysis of the following points:
- Neighbour relationships
- Mutual obligation
- Neighbours and social control
- Attitudes toward neighbours

The analysis focuses on the social rather than physical aspects of the neighbourhood, as modern trends in the latter do not always reflect people’s behaviour and attitudes. For example, many people in the Arab World live in modern houses of Western style, but they act and behave like villagers. Like the family and kinship, neighbourhood
is considered one of the most important elements in the structure of the local community. Thus, the picture of Arab urban life will be made more complete by looking at this component of the local community, as a theme of analysis, to test our main assumptions.

7.2 NEIGHBOURHOOD AS A SOCIAL COMPONENT

It might be quite difficult for someone who was born and lived all his life in an industrial culture to imagine the pattern of neighbourhood that prevails in less developed countries. Westerners often do not regard the neighbourhood as any more than a number of people living beside each other or near each other in one block or district. One may not know his next-door neighbour, and neighbours do not interfere in each other's lives. Thus neighbourhood, under such circumstances, does not mean more than a physical aggregation of individuals. As Anderson spelled out:

The neighbourhoods are now said to be "open" while the homes are more "closed" than formerly. The neighbourhoods still exist but the neighbourly lack of privacy has been replaced by more discrete relationships and restraint(1)

This description purported to depict the rural neighbourhood in Western culture. So the privacy, secrecy and strain would be even more effective in an urban milieu. Daily travel to work may break down the strong neighbourhood feeling. Mann (1965) compared the house's function with that of a hotel by saying:

The comparison with an hotel is, of course, too extreme to be real but the meaning is significant, that the young person uses the home as a centre from which he, or she,
will go out to a wide variety of interests, the home having the principle function of providing a place to sleep and eat\(^2\).

Two things tend to work against strong neighbourhood ties: high mobility and wives' continuing in work after marriage\(^3\).

If one considers the neighbourhood in physical terms, then it is viewed as a place covering a limited area, bounded by streets, railway line or parks separating off an area and its inhabitants, or where historical and social tradition make people view an area as a distinctive unit\(^4\). Indeed, the neighbourhood is more than an ecological form, it contains inhabitants having something in common. This, to some extent, gives them a collective character, which affects and reflects people's feeling about living there and the kind of relations they establish\(^5\).

Many sociologists have emphasised the importance of physical attributes\(^6\). However, the researcher has to take physical features for granted, and view the neighbourhood in the light of people's interaction, relationships and their general orientation toward each other.

The neighbourhood as a social rather than a physical environment is almost invisible in highly industrial cultures, since mass production, high technology, transportation and improved communications have led to privacy, alienation and fast mobility. Intimate relationships, face to face contacts with mutual rights and obligations prevail in the less developed world.

In Butler's terms, there are two types of neighbourhoods: neighbourhoods of primary relationship and neighbourhoods of secondary relationship\(^7\).
In an urban community with reference to Western culture, certain areas that might be called neighbourhoods do not have primary group character. Such areas may still be called neighbourhoods, but natives in new African towns have no other conception of community life than that of the primary contact neighbourhood of the village\(^8\).

As a consequence of highly urbanized societies and disappearance of strong neighbourhood feelings, both "alienation from society" and "alienation from self" are strong features of normal life, so that people cannot relate to the world around them\(^9\). This phenomenon is not evident in those parts of the world which maintain primary ties.

In the urban Arab World, as well as in most urban settings in the Third World, neighbours and close friends with whom one has no genealogical links can be referred to and treated as kin. Religious values might be one of the most important factors impelling people to maintain close relationships with neighbours. The Prophet Muhammad is reported to have said, "Repeatedly Gabriel advised me to do good to my neighbour till I thought he would make him heir [of my legacy]" and "He is not a believer who eats his fill while his neighbour goes without food"\(^10\). Cohen recorded Arab people's impressions of religious obligation towards neighbours:

Despite the increase in population and the expansion of housing, neighbourliness, apart from kinship ties, has its own values and norms in village culture. The villagers say that the prophet Muhammad ordained the good treatment of neighbours, as far as the seventh house from one's own\(^11\).
This view has also been confirmed in urban areas. Thus, selection of neighbourhood areas is a matter for care, because the house is the main focus of leisure and recreation, as there is little entertainment outside the home, or in Gulick's words "...relatively little social life out of their own [or friends' or relatives'] private homes"(12). Common proverbs which might shed more light on this point are:

- Ask about your neighbours before you build your house.
- Your neighbour is your refuge.
- Your next-door neighbour is better for you than your far-off brother.
- As long as your neighbour is prosperous you will be prosperous too.
- God and your neighbour are the only two who know your affairs best(12).

Accordingly, neighbours come next to one’s own immediate family and before more distant relatives. People frequently repeat "Your neighbour, your neighbour and your brother" referring to the importance of neighbours, who have priority over one’s brothers. In this regard, neighbours are to some extent an extension of the domestic circle, when it comes to needing help, or simply company. From this point of sentiment, neighbour relationships are strongly binding, involving exchanges of meals, gifts, visits, and many other obligations similar to those seen among close relatives. Saunders (1980) described such position:

In Mirria a neighbourhood is to some degree an extension of the domestic sphere of its residents. A wife who never goes to market may pay day-time visits to the compound next door, or sit at her own doorway to chat. Many activities, such as marriage, involve several households
but less than the entire community. Marriage decisions privately made within two households must be followed by public ceremonies which involve only a portion of the Mirria community, primarily neighbours and kinsmen of the newly-weds(13).

Such entertainments and participations of neighbours prevail everywhere in the Arab World. In Cairo, as Almessiri reported, neighbours enjoyed the collective spirit on several occasions; this is clearly seen in marriages and funerals: virtually every individual in the neighbourhood (Hitta) should participate in the newly-weds' celebrations; in funerals most of them follow the coffin to the mosque and complete all the relevant rituals, as well as giving moral and material support to the dead person's family. Both occasions are regarded as common occasions, which entail a sizeable number of supporters and followers from the neighbourhood residents(14).

In Mosul city [northern Iraq] Mustafa found that the urban neighbourhood plays a significant part in the life of its residents(15).

7.3 NEIGHBOURS RELATIONSHIPS

Despite the complexity of urban life, as a result of size of population and expansion of residential areas, neighbourhood remains one of the most important prevailing groups in Baghdad. Although many individuals complain of neighbours' intervention in their domestic affairs: lack of privacy, gossip and snobbery, many of them can not imagine life without neighbour interactions. One can often hear such expressions in Baghdad as, "Paradise without people is unbearable", or "Alienation is death without a coffin". Women have extensive contact with neighbours. They often spend many hours a day in gossiping. In the researcher's experience, informal
relationships among neighbours are very evident, even among the high class; one can easily go back and forth to one's neighbour's house any day, at any time. Neighbours help each other not only in emergency, but also in ordinary daily life.

The data of table 7-1 which concerns the quantity of neighbours' contact, demonstrate that daily contact is highly prevalent in the urban milieu. The figures reveal that the majority of all informants claimed that they have relationships with more than four households of their neighbours; precisely, 95% of the rural group, 73% of the migrants and 53% of the natives. The data reveal significant differences between the three groups ($X^2=47.7$ D.F= 6).

Table 7-1 Relationships with neighbours

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>How many Neighbours do you have relations with</th>
<th>Rural%</th>
<th>Urban% Migrants</th>
<th>Urban% Natives</th>
<th>Total%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only one</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>23.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4&gt;</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>73.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$X^2=47.7$ D.F= 6

The only way to explain these sharp differences is through the impact of urbanization. Urbanization, however, does not demolish or even diminish neighbourhood as a primary group, as more than half the natives and three-quarters of the migrants extended their
immediate contact to more than four of their neighbours, while most of the rest had relationships with 2-3 of their neighbours. Only one percent have no contact with neighbours at all.

The latter figure has no statistical significance. Thus the overwhelming majority of the sample had direct relations with more than one neighbour up to more than four, despite the differences between the three groups, which seem to disappear if we merge the third and fourth categories. However, the result demonstrates that direct contact with neighbours is pervasive in the rural and urban milieu alike. This result is consistent with that underlined by Cohen, who claimed that Arab people frequently repeat that the Prophet ordered them to respect their neighbours till the seventh house; and that entails daily informal contact between them(16). The common view is that the boundaries of the neighbourhood extend to encompass one's seventh neighbour and no more; beyond that, it becomes a district: Mahla, taraf, hara, Darb in local words.

To complete this picture we asked the informants, "What form of relationship would you prefer with neighbours?". The overwhelming majority of the entire sample, claimed that they prefer intimate relationships with neighbours, as table 7-2 shows: 93% of the rural group, compared with 91% of the migrants and 69% of the natives. The downward tendency of the three groups in attitude to intensity of relationships reflects a growing tendency among the natives to prefer superficial relationships, compared with the rural group: 30% of the natives, against only 7% of the rural and 9% of the migrants. This result revealed a significant difference between the three groups ($X^2 = 27.4$ D.f= 4), which can be explained in the light of urbanization which entails high motivation to mobility and privacy.
However, even this is a very small proportion, compared to the large number who prefer intimate relationships. Moreover, even those who replied that they prefer superficial relationships, in practice are not isolated or under strain, and they do not suffer alienation, because traditional values remain healthy and active, so if they do not have contact with neighbours, then they do with relatives and friends.

Table 7-2 Form of relationship with neighbours

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Form of relationship with neighbours</th>
<th>Rural%</th>
<th>Urban%</th>
<th>Total%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Migrants</td>
<td>Natives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Superficial</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intimate</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No relations</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$X^2 = 27.4$ D.F= 4

Activities and occasional participation with neighbours give rise to a number of more or less strong links among neighbours, which might account for significant differences, especially as the informants in general have no desire to cut off relationships with neighbours, except for one individual (0.4% of the sample) who is not statistically significant. In this context only four decades ago in the United State of America, Foley (1952) found that about three-quarters of middle class residents of Rochester, New York City, had at least chatting relationships with other people in the block, while two-fifths of the
informants said that such relationships extended to all the residents in the block-neighbourhood\(^{(17)}\).

So far, in terms of contact, urban neighbourhood in Iraq, is regarded as a strong, intimate and personal relationship, and there is a marked absence of privacy, strain, and alienation, as a result of traditional values prevailing. This image is quite similar to that found by Pons (1970) in Africa, where despite the diversity and increasing heterogeneity of the urban population, the fabric of social relations remained relatively uniform, and social cohesion continued to be predominantly communal rather than associational\(^{(18)}\).

7.4 MUTUAL OBLIGATIONS

On the individual level, political, financial and psychological crisis, in addition to collective emergencies: marriage, funeral, and illness, constitute the main occasions for neighbouring. These occasions entail mutual obligations, some of which are regarded as universal. For example, among the working class in a North German industrial suburb, participation in funerals is considered a universal obligation, help in sickness more or less universal, but joining in marriage or religious celebrations are more properly matters for the particular families involved\(^{(19)}\).

Obviously, neighbours are expected to help each other in times of need, help in emergency, exchange tools and equipment, visit informally, ask advice and chat\(^{(20)}\). In highly industrial Japan, Dore (1958) found that neighbours' informal relationships are carried on even in the capital, Tokyo, itself. Neighbours express complete trust
in each other, lend and borrow freely and act as guardians of each other's houses, health and reputations\(^{(21)}\).

A. NEIGHBOURHOOD RIGHTS

The ideal-type situation of neighbours is sufficiently compact to permit frequent and intimate association and a strong sense of self-consciousness, and is capable of influencing the behaviour of its several constituents. Thus there is an awareness of mutual rights and obligations between the group members if they are to be so influenced. This self-consciousness is backed up by the homogeneity of the neighbour community\(^{(22)}\).

To test this assumption in practice we asked the informants, whether or not they practice the norms that reinforce mutual rights. The data in table 7-3 are based on the question, "Do your neighbours respect neighbourhood rights?". The respondents reacted relatively similarly to the three given options: 67% of the rural group said that they "always" respect neighbourhood rights, compared with 63% of the migrants and 52% of the natives. 32% of the rural group said they do so "sometimes", compared with 36% of the migrants and 46% of the natives. Only 1% of the rural group, and 1.5% of the urban (both migrants and natives) said that they "rarely" did.

The result shows that the majority of the sample, with non-significant differences between rural and urban groups, thought that neighbours "always" respect each other rights. Such a response is quite expected in a traditional society such as the one under study, where everyone is aware of the importance of neighbourhood ties and local norms.
Table 7-3 Respect of neighbourhood right

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Neighbourhood rights</th>
<th>Rural%</th>
<th>Urban%</th>
<th>Total%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Migrants</td>
<td>Natives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Always</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sometimes</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rarely</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$X^2 = 5.2$  \( D.F = 4 \)  \( N.S. \)

Accordingly one should be very polite, respectable, and careful in one's behaviour with neighbours. Moreover it is a moral duty to ask about one's neighbours, if one has not seen them for several days; visit them in serious illness; help them whenever they need it; share with them in sorrow and happiness; protect and take side with them against any attack or dispute and even consult them in many other cases. This interdependency prevails in both the rural and urban milieu. These norms play a key role in community activities and are used as criteria by which people evaluate each other.

B. EXCHANGE VISITS

There was no precise information about how frequently neighbours are in contact with each other, so the researcher proposed to inquire into this, suggesting a range from weekly to yearly. Firstly, however, informants were asked whether or not they exchange visits with their neighbours. According to the responses shown in table 7-4 the overwhelming majority of the whole sample
replied in the affirmative. All of the rural and migrant respondents said they frequently exchange visits with their neighbours, as did 98% of the natives. Only 0.7% responded negatively. This non-significant proportion can be explained in the light of individual differentiation. However, the uniformity of the informants' responses reflects the tendency of the social organization.

Table 7-4 Exchange visits among neighbours

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exchange visits with neighbours</th>
<th>Rural%</th>
<th>Urban%</th>
<th>Total%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Migrants</td>
<td>Natives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

X² = 4  D.F = 2  N.S

To complete the picture an enquiry was directed toward the frequency of visits. The responses reflect considerable diversity. As Table 7-5 shows, the figures are sharply stepped downward from left to right: 93% of the rural group exchange visits once or more a week, compared with 68% of the migrants and 57% of the natives. Although the figures reflect significant differences between the three groups, as (x²) demonstrated, a remarkable proportion (72.7%) of the three groups said they exchange visits more than once a week. The rest (27.3%) visit a few times a month. None, however, chose the third category, "a few times a year", which would be regarded as a real criterion to indicate disordered relationships between neighbours. The result reveals the intense and intimate relations among neighbours.
Even the 2 individuals who rejected the idea of exchanged visits with neighbours in the previous table, changed and responded like the others, reflecting the effectiveness of traditional values.

Table 7-5 Frequency of exchange visits among neighbours

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency of visits</th>
<th>Rural%</th>
<th>Urban%</th>
<th>Total%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Migrants</td>
<td>Natives</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Once a week or more</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>72.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Few times a month</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Few times a year</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$X^2 = 34.2$  D.F= 2

According to Mustafa’s fieldwork in Mosul city (northern Iraq), the majority of his sample spend a good part of their free time in exchanging gossip with neighbours (23). A similar result was found in Africa by Parkin (1969) who claimed that the neighbourhood unit is more significant for women than for men as a field of contact. He stated:

Women in the town often admit to long leisure hours during the day and may gather at a water tap or in front of a neighbour’s house and gossip from early in the morning until shortly before the younger children come home from morning school. Much of the preparation for meals: the peeling of vegetable or plantain, or the brewing of tea, is done out of doors and provides additional contexts for the exchange of gossip (24).
Daily visiting between neighbours, relatives and friends is a normal result of a society heavily based on conventional values, especially in the shanty towns and to a lesser degree, among those who reside in more affluent areas.

C. EXCHANGE MEALS

The exchanging of meals is an aspect of the firm tradition of the Arab World particularly Iraq. The phenomenon is not confined to religious occasions such as the feast month (Ramadan), though it increases on such occasions, compared with other times. This kind of contact is very important in maintaining neighbourhood obligation, alongside urbanization and modernization, which have started to some degree to permeate the social structure, undermining some of the tradition. Nevertheless, such conventional acts remain intact, as our own data reveal.

According to the content of table 7-6, the majority of the rural group, 63%, claimed that they frequently exchange meals with neighbours, compared with 47% of the migrants and 34% of the natives. 36% of the rural group said they exchange meals with neighbours "sometimes", against 53% of the migrants and 64% of the natives. Only 1% of the rural group and 2% of the native said "rarely", while none of the migrants did so.

The significant differences between the rural and urban groups, do not negatively influence the result, in that 99% of the whole sample claimed that they exchange meals with neighbours either frequently or sometimes.
Table 7-6 Exchange meals between neighbours

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exchange meals</th>
<th>Rural%</th>
<th>Urban%</th>
<th>Total%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Migrants</td>
<td>Natives</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequently</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sometimes</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rarely</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$X^2 = 18.6$  $D.F = 4$

D. MUTUAL HELP

Despite the differentiation in quality and degree, help among neighbours seems to prevail not only in the Arabic and Islamic world, but also in many other societies, including highly urbanized societies.

Mann described neighbours' assistance in Britain, in serious illness and at other times. In his words: "Help in sickness and distress is often given in cases other than emergencies" (26).

Studies conducted over the last several decades show that this source of help is relatively unchanged in its dimensions; Froind et al (1981) summarized the importance of helping networks to individual health and well-being as follows:

Individual caregivers in an individual's personal network, made up of family, friends and neighbours, remain the primary reference point for those seeking and obtaining help. An individual's social network is a major factor in defining the nature of problems, providing help, influencing what sources of outside help will be obtained,
and aiding in adjustment to a wide range of acute and chronic problems (27).

Thus, Hallman (1984), considered the neighbourhood web of social relationships as a "treasure" in dealing with life's problems (28). Dennis (1963) recorded the experiences of some urbanized people of neighbourly help, particularly in emergency situations such as illness. He quoted the following:

Mrs X, Mrs Y and Mrs Z made the meals, cleaned the house, saw to the doctor's instructions, did the washing, looked after the children, did the shopping. No gifts, no payment, only "thank you" (29).

Sharing equipment, exchanging loans and shopping for each other are other facets of the informal relationship among neighbours. The data displayed in table 7-7 show whether respondents help their neighbours. The information reveals that all of the rural and migrant groups claimed that they do help their neighbours, as did 99% of the natives.

This result reflects a complete conformity between rural and urban respondents, which can be explained, once again, in the light of cultural unification.

It can be concluded that neighbours can never hesitate to do what is necessary to help each other. Traditionally help is regarded as a moral duty. Neighbours are often treated as family. Indeed, as Cohen claimed that most neighbours are relatives: "Splitting households tend to continue living in close proximity to each other" (30), but there are many others classified as non-relatives, who are viewed always according to the same norms.
Table 7-7 Do neighbours help each other?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Neighbours help</th>
<th>Rural%</th>
<th>Urban%</th>
<th>Total%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Migrants</td>
<td>Natives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When we asked about the form of help, the informants responded in different ways. As table 7-8 shows, the majority of the sample, with non-significant differences between the three groups, claimed that they help their neighbours in all the given items: "All these things"; precisely, 78% of the rural group, compared with 72% of migrants and 63% of the natives. Meanwhile, among the other items, "Using equipment" takes a remarkable proportion of the responses; 13% of the rural group, 19% of the migrants and 27% of the natives said they exchange and share equipment, while the other options (shopping, lend them money) received fewer responses. The result reveals that primary relationships among neighbours are very strong. In this regard Gulliver (1971) asserted that any neighbour who would like to render assistance and gain reciprocal rights should readily do so, and due to the conventional values all the members of the community could wish to commit themselves to the reciprocal obligation (31). In a study of neighbourhoods in the Detroit area conducted by Warren (1981), informants were asked about recent
concerns not requiring high expertise for solutions. Example were
deferring blue or tense, thinking about retiring, going back to school,
changing jobs and suspicious people in the neighbourhood. For help,
muched persons turned most frequently (82%) to their spouse: 42%
used co-workers as helpers. Other helpers were friends (41%),
relatives not living in the same household (37%), immediate
neighbours(27%) and less than 8% were a variety of professional
workers: police, doctor, teacher, counsellor. Except co-workers, most
of these helpers were within the neighbourhood. When the informants
asked if they had been helped by neighbours during a life crisis in
recent years, 56% said they had(32).

Table 7-8 Form of help among neighbours

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Form of help</th>
<th>Rural%</th>
<th>Urban%</th>
<th>Total%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Migrants</td>
<td>Natives</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shopping</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Using equipments</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lend them money</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All these things</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

X²= 9.2  D.F= 4  N.S

In many traditional societies, a wide range of cooperation and
mutual aid is given whenever it might be needed. Such assistance
often occurs voluntarily or spontaneously among close kin and
neighbours. Neighbourly relations are significant in terms of
exchanging equipment and services. In this regard, Holy (1974) has pointed out:

A women can ask any of her female neighbours for embers to light a fire, and she may borrow from her neighbour a pot or other needed item... A man living alone is not forced to do women's jobs such as cooking or preparing millet beer, thus exposing himself to ridicule, for he may fully rely upon help of his neighbours(33).

Accordingly, mutual assistance among neighbours is really a matter of daily life, not only in rural areas such as that described above, but everywhere in the Arab World. The people who help each other are mainly close neighbours or may be relatives. This view is reinforced by our own data as well as by the theoretical constructs of writers like Hallman (1984), who considered the neighbourhood community as:

a people possessing shared values, common interests and norms of conduct, engaging in social interaction and mutual aid, having their own groups, associations and institutions to help meet their basic needs(34).

E. PARTICIPATION

To go further, such types of interaction, including involvement in mutual assistance, interests, common values, reciprocal rights and obligations, are quite tangible in Iraqi urban areas. To clarify this point, we asked the informants, "Do you participate with your neighbours in the main life occasions, such as marriage, illness, funerals...?". The data in table 7-9 reveal that the overwhelming majority of the whole sample, with slight differences between rural
and urban groups, claimed that they "always" participate with their neighbours in main life occasions: precisely, 93% of the rural group compared with 90% of the migrants and 78% of the natives. On the other hand only one individual among the native group said "rarely". This exception can only be explained in the light of individual differentiation.

This result confirms the preceding findings which reveal the continuation and effectiveness of the primary relationships among neighbours in urban life, which reflect the influence of the traditional values, despite urbanization, modernization and Westernization.

Table 7-9 Participation with neighbours in the main life occasions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Do you participate with your neighbours?</th>
<th>Rural%</th>
<th>Urban%</th>
<th>Total%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Migrants</td>
<td>Natives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Always</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some times</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rarely</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X2= 12</td>
<td></td>
<td>D.F= 4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Further evidence was obtained by asking the informants, "Do you call on new neighbours?". The answers reveal significant differences between the three groups. Nevertheless, as table 7-10 shows, the vast majority said "yes": 97% of the rural group compared with 94% of the migrants and 78% of the natives. The highest proportion of those who replied negatively were among the natives;
22% compared with 3% of the rural and 6% of the natives. The only way to explain such an increase of negative responses among natives is either that they deal with new neighbours with some suspicion (as unknown), as a result of subordination to the requirement of urbanization, or they express their hospitality in other ways. However such a reaction is not found, or is very limited, among the rural and migrant groups, who regard a new neighbour as a new guest, who should not tire himself in cooking for three to seven days. All the neighbours will either invite him for dinner or cook for his family.

Although the majority of the natives follow the tradition of calling on new neighbours, in some of the most urbanized areas in Baghdad, in the researcher's experience, this tradition has been modified; two or three days after his arrival, the neighbours pay him a visit, bringing a suitable gift. This, like the traditional custom, helps to maintain neighbourhood ties and norms. Thus, the traditional virtues of neighbourhood relations are preserved, though the influence of urbanization and Westernization has led to some modification of customs and daily habits.

Table 7-10 Calling on new neighbours

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Do you call on new neighbours?</th>
<th>Rural%</th>
<th>Urban% Migrants</th>
<th>Urban% Natives</th>
<th>Total%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>89.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>10.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ \chi^2 = 22.5 \]  
D.F = 2
In this sense Patai pointed out:

The phenomenology of Westernization is sufficiently well attested, and it would be a relatively simple task to draw up a long list showing what traditional features in the Middle Eastern culture have been replaced in the course of the past 100 or 150 years by what new features introduced from the West. (35)

7.5 NEIGHBOURS AND SOCIAL CONTROL

Social control is a term used to designate social behaviour which influences individuals or groups toward conformity with established norms. It is exercised by groups, both formal and informal, and by institutions or other social agencies. Conformity is the favourable response to social control. Thus there are many forms and methods of control and different degrees of conformity. Much of this depends on the extent to which the ways of behaving of groups or society are repeated for generations and formulated into ritual, symbolized linguistically, or crystallized in social customs and habits (36). Informal social control prevails in traditional societies, including the one under study, hand in hand with formal control, but the informal type seems to be more visible and more effective. As Patai stated:

In traditional Middle Eastern society, social control and political organization are based on family ties, or at least are modeled after the structural pattern characterizing the family (37).
In such societies, the parallelism between familial and social order goes even further. Everyone has to exercise self-control to avert a clash with neighbourhood norms. Since the family is based on a community tradition, one's freedom is restricted whenever it conflicts with the freedom of others. Thus one should be careful in his behaviour and act in such a way as to maintain kinship, friendship and neighbourhood ties.

However, this is not only a matter for individuals, it is also a familial one. Both individuals and family have to act conventionally to maintain the family's reputation. The family, for instance, should suspend its own celebration, if there is any, when their neighbour is in mourning; or at least they should celebrate silently. People often make a distinction between rough and respectable neighbours. The respectable ones are home-centred, conventional and morally more consistent and controlled, while the rough are often disorganized and unconventional in manners and morals\(^{(38)}\). The latter are strongly criticised and may be exposed to social ostracism, and it is extremely difficult for such an individual or family to restore their harmony with neighbours, even if they desire to regain their position by adhering to norms of behaviour.

Although neighbourhood in traditional societies seems to be homogeneous, with cooperative interactions to cope with the informal social control, people are very sensitive toward each other as a consequence of curiosity, snobbery and intrusion. Thus one should be very careful in his behaviour to avoid the criticism of neighbours, who watch and may interfere in small and big issues. In this regard neighbours are considered an active social control device. To test
this attribute in practice, we asked the informants whether or not they take care of their behaviour to avert neighbours' criticism. The information of table 7-11 shows that the overwhelming majority of the whole sample, with non-significant differences between the three groups, claimed that they do their best to avoid neighbours' criticism: precisely 97% of the rural group compared with 95% of the migrants and 97% of the natives. No one said they "never" do so, and only 3% of the rural and the natives and 5% of the migrants claimed to do so only "sometimes".

This result reflects the tendency of the whole society, not only the sample, where everybody should direct his behaviour in conformity with the community norms.

In traditional society, jealousy and gossip are common as a consequence of direct contact between neighbours. This phenomenon might lead to conflicts and dispute, often created by women and children, who are more frequently in interaction with neighbours than men\(^{(39)}\). Thus one should do his best within the scope of the expected roles, to avert gossip. This phenomenon might play a latent role in exercising reciprocal social control, helping to sustain the common standards\(^{(40)}\). In this regard Keller pointed out:

\[ \text{Gossip, or the transmission of scandalous information, reaffirms the distinction between respectable and disreputable conduct and thus helps promote latent consensus on manners and morals}^{(41)} \].

Accordingly, close contact among neighbours is a general criterion for maintaining social standards of correct beliefs, helps reaffirm accepted standards and thus contributes to social
integration. Gossiping and spying upon each other may play an essential role as informal means of social control. Accordingly, ambivalent feelings may emerge, of caution and love, leading to anxiety.

Table 7-11 Avoidance of neighbours criticism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Avoidance of neighbours criticism</th>
<th>Rural%</th>
<th>Urban% Migrants</th>
<th>Urban% Natives</th>
<th>Total%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Always</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>96.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sometimes</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$X^2 = 0.7$</td>
<td></td>
<td>D.F = 2</td>
<td>N.S</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7.6 NEIGHBOURS' ATTITUDES TOWARD EACH OTHER

Despite the negative attributes which emerge as a consequence of direct daily contact, neighbours are still held in respect and affection by their local community. Religious instruction might play an essential role in maintaining neighbourly ties and keeping up the traditional values; in turn reflected in neighbours' attitudes toward each other.

However neighbours' attitudes in traditional societies are more than like and dislike; they are based on strong emotions and attachment, not only toward residents but also toward residence. In
Baghdad one hears people say, "I was born in this neighbourhood and I would like to die in it", or "This is my birth place and should be my grave". Thus when people select a residence, they are facing a big decision. Moving house is difficult because of the strong emotions of attachment to place. Nevertheless, they have to consider, as Hansen (1975) said, "many variables". Ideally they give priority to their neighbours: their reputation, behaviour, and relationships with others. Then they might think about the other ingredients such as accessibility to major roads, convenience for work, public transportation, shopping, parks, schools and so forth.

In this regard, neighbours' attitudes toward each other are often based on the feeling that human beings tend toward aggregation, sociability and contact rather than scattering, privacy and alienation; exchanged help and information rather than self-sufficiency and segmentation. Thus one should be friendly, helpful and tolerant with his neighbours to obtain internal peace and good will. Matthews (1966) recorded the impressions of a Tennessee Ridge community, who reckoned the great sin of omission was to fail to be helpful to members of their neighbourhood. Cohen and Shinar (1985), in an empirical study of the neighbourhood and friendship network in Jerusalem, found that in response to the question, "Who are your three best friends?", 35% of respondents named at least one friend in the neighbourhood. In another empirical study in Pittsburgh, the researchers discovered that about two-thirds of the 5,896 respondent; felt more loyalty to their neighbourhood than the city. Gulick noticed that many people who had moved from houses in the old city of Tripoli (Lebanon) to newer sections had mixed feelings about the move. Most of them, except those who moved
voluntarily, regretted leaving their former neighbourhood residence, claiming that they had lived in their neighbourhood for a long time, and their friends were there. Nevertheless they tended to form ties with their new neighbours, as a continuation of their positive attitudes toward neighbours\(^{(48)}\). In this regard, Almessiri noticed that residential mobility out of or into neighbourhood areas in Cairo is very limited, because of the phenomenon of residential emotion\(^{(49)}\). All these studies reveal that people almost everywhere, held positive attitudes toward neighbours, whom they regarded as family or friends.

In Iraq, people's attitudes toward their neighbours are not solely governed by residence, but are associated with deep emotions. In the case of movement from one area to another in the city, people do not forget or ignore their previous domestic relationships with their former neighbours. They often keep in touch with each other; if they do not exchange daily or weekly visits, then they inevitably ring each other and participate in the main events of life: marriage, illness and so on.

This does not mean that attitudes are always positive. Of course, there are some negative attitudes on the individual level. However, generally, attitudes are more positive than negative. The data in table 7-12 might shed more light on this point. The table is based on the question, "How do you regard your neighbours?". The first of the three options "like my family" obtained the majority of the responses; 82% of the rural group claimed that they regard their neighbours like their families, compared with 61% of the migrants and 56% of the natives.
Table 7-12 Attitudes toward Neighbours

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>How do you regard your neighbour?</th>
<th>Rural%</th>
<th>Urban% Migrants</th>
<th>Natives</th>
<th>Total%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Like my family</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>66.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Like my friends</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Like strangers</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(X^2 = 18.5 \quad D.F = 4\)

Despite the significant differences between the three groups \((X^2 = 18.5 \quad D.F = 4)\), the attitude toward neighbours was very positive. The responses, in fact, to some extent reflect the nature of residence. For those in rural areas, neighbours are often literally relatives, as families cluster together in one area. Thus the rural group responded more positively to the first option. In contrast, relatives in urban areas might be scattered in different districts in the city. Thus, the urban informants responded more positively to the second option compared with rural and migrant groups. Only one individual from the urban group responded negatively, "Like any other stranger". The result is consistent with the findings of many studies in Arabic and Islamic societies, where neighbours are reckoned to some degree an extension of the domestic sphere of its residents.

In Iraq, in the researcher's experience, people often regard their neighbours like family not only in conversation or exchanging help, but also in sharing secrets, visiting freely any time, and interdependence in daily life as well as in emergencies. The common
expression in this regard is, "What happens to your neighbour happens to you. If they get happiness, you get your share; if they get sadness, you have to get it as well". Another saying is, "Your neighbour is your brother, except he was not delivered by your mother". For this reason, Abu-lughod asserted that social life in the city (Cairo) is based more and more on the immediate neighbourhood group\(^\text{(50)}\). Almissiri recorded some people's attitudes toward neighbours and neighbourhood in Cairo. She reported that one said, "Living in a neighbourhood is like living in a private kingdom; censorship is very tight, and no stranger can look down on us, so I would not like to leave my neighbourhood". Another said, "Everybody in the neighbourhood knows each other; the children know each other as well as the parents; it is like a village"\(^\text{(51)}\).

To confirm the extent of positive attitudes toward neighbours we asked the informants to respond to the statement, "When a man wants to buy or rent a house, he should ask first about the neighbours". The responses, as table 7-13 shows, revealed significant differences between the three groups. Precisely, 77% of the rural group gave their agreement with the statement, compared with 66% of the each division of the urban group. The neutral category, "To some extent" received a remarkable proportion of the informants' responses: 12%, 28% and 33% from rural to native respectively, while the third category, "Disagree", received a small response: 11% rural, 6% migrants and 1% natives.

The question here is why the rural group gave more agreement compared with migrants and natives, when one might expect the opposite. This can be explained by the fact that rural residents are more conventional. Thus, as a principle, rural respondents have to be
more cautious in renting or buying a new house. On the other hand, rural residents often reside in areas where most of the population are kin, so they do not need to ask about neighbours, as everyone knows each other.

Table 7-13 Attitudes to neighbours revealed in buying or renting a new house

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Do you ask about neighbours when you buy or rent a new house?</th>
<th>Rural%</th>
<th>Urban%</th>
<th>Total%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To some extent</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[\chi^2 = 19.3\]  \ D.F= 6

However, the three groups showed great interest in the neighbourhood issue, when choosing a new house. That is, of course, because the house is not only for eating and sleeping, but is the focus of all the family entertainment, because of the seclusion of women and the lack of public amenities and entertainment. This might be why Gulick said that there is little social life outside the private home\(^{(52)}\).

On this basis, in renting or buying a new house, one is often guided by friends or relatives who are located there and know the house and the neighbourhood. However, if the move is arranged by a
local agency, the purchaser or tenant can be advised by the agent, as to what action to take if the neighbours are not as described, and one might leave the neighbourhood if he find unsuitable neighbours. These attitudes are confirmed by the figures, which reveal that in such a position, traditional factors are more effective than modernization.

Further evidence was obtained by asking the informants, "Do you think it is possible to ignore neighbours?". The responses reveal significant differences between the three groups, but the majority of the three groups claimed that "it is impossible". 75% of the rural group compared with 57% of the migrants and 41% of the natives gave this response. On the other hand only one per cent of each of the rural and migrant groups said it is "possible", compared with 3% of the natives. However the "sometimes" category received a significant proportion of the informant's responses, especially among migrants and natives: 42% and 56% respectively. The statistical criterion reveals that the ability to ignore neighbours increases with urban characteristics. To explain this point, we need to remember what we mentioned before: rural areas often encompass kin groups; they share the same characteristics, interests, values, norms and other behavioural aspects. In brief, they live a homogeneous way of life, that is not always possible in the city, where one's kin might be scattered over large areas of the city, in different neighbourhoods, classes, associations and work groups, with different interests, norms and way of life. This variety in the city might impel its dwellers to react in different ways, according to their interests, despite the dominance of the traditional values, which seems to be common factor between them. In any case, the proportion of those who felt able to
ignore their neighbours, even among urban respondents is very small.

Table 7-14 The possibility of ignoring neighbours

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Can you ignore neighbours?</th>
<th>Rural%</th>
<th>Urban%</th>
<th>Total%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Migrants</td>
<td>Natives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Possible</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sometimes</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impossible</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ X^2 = 24 \quad \text{D.F}= 4 \]

7.7 CONCLUSION

It does not seem, from these results, that traditional values and behaviour are vanishing from the urban milieu. Our own investigation in this chapter demonstrates that such values are still firmly held in the city, and influence many dimensions of behaviour. Even in highly urbanized countries which have already replaced primary contact, with a secondary one, some features of these contacts are relatively tangible. In the Third World, especially in the Arab World, friends and neighbours who have no genealogical links can be referred to and treated as kin. One can easily observe and recognize the strong emotion accompanying the informal chat, mutual help, reciprocal rights and obligation and positive attitudes even in urban settings. Our case in Iraq emphasized that informal contacts and face to face
relationship remain the major focus of social interaction. The figures demonstrated that more than half of the urban informants have intimate relationships with more than four of their neighbours, while about three quarters of the urban informants claimed that they prefer deep relationships with their neighbours and they act accordingly. The result reflects the deep-rootedness of the traditional values, despite the atrophy of the population and expansion of residential areas, as a consequence of the urban explosion. Even the minority who said they prefer superficial relationships with neighbours, do not suffer loneliness or alienation, because intimate ties still stand, if not with immediate neighbours, then with close kin and friends.

Evidence of primary relationships between neighbours was found by discussing and analysing mutual obligations among neighbours. In conventional societies such as that under study, the parallelism between familial and social order may go further; everyone has to exercise self-control, not as a response to civil law, or formal institutions, but to avert a clash with the neighbourhood community. The family, for instance, has to suspend its celebrations when close neighbours (up to the seventh house) are in mourning, and they will offer support if one of their neighbours becomes seriously ill. Moreover, neighbours often behave toward each other politely, respectfully, and helpfully. They will side with each other against any outside attack.

These facets were discussed in relation to mutual rights, exchanged visits, meals and help. The information showed that more than 55% of the urban respondents claimed that their neighbours "always" respect neighbourhoods rights. 99% of the urban group
often exchange visits with their neighbours, while more than 60% of them do so once a week or more. More than 80% of the urban informants frequently or sometimes exchange meals with their close neighbours, 99.5% of them help their neighbours, by shopping, loaning equipment, lending money, or all these things, and more than 85% claimed that they "always" participate with their neighbours in the main life occasions. These results reflect once again the intensive and intimate relationships between neighbours, which are quite in conformity with those prevailing among their rural counterparts.

Evidence was also found of the role of neighbours as a social control device. The homogeneity of the neighbourhood community does create large-scale harmony, but at the same time leads to sensitivity as a consequence of face to face contact, curiosity, snobbery and intrusion. Thus people are very careful in their behaviour to avoid gossip and criticism, which are reckoned as active informal social control. Looking at the statistics, we found that about 96% of the urban informants said that they "always" review their behaviour to avoid neighbours' criticism and gossip.

Finally, we considered how neighbours saw and evaluated each other; in other words, what sort of attitudes prevail among them. Despite the negative attributes which might prevail as a consequence of daily direct interaction, positive attitudes seem to be more visible in urban neighbourhoods in Iraq. For instance, when moving to another section of the city or to another city, neighbours often keep in touch with each other, if not by exchanging visits from time to time, then, by telephone. The data revealed that more than 58% of the urban informants regarded their close neighbours like their families; 66% thought and asked about the neighbours before undertaking to
buy or rent a new house. To go further, the researcher asked the informants if it is possible to ignore neighbours. Only 2% of the urban informants said it is. The result reflects the widespread positive attitudes among neighbours toward each other, as a consequence of deeply rooted traditional norms which are maintained in urban as well as in rural life. The impact of modernization and Westernization seems to be very limited in the face of this extensive and strong tradition.
7.8 FOOTNOTES AND REFERENCES


5. Ibid, P. 90.


41. Ibid, P. 45.
CHAPTER EIGHT

SOCIAL TIME
8.1. INTRODUCTION

We have been concerned in the previous chapters, to show that traditional values prevail in urban life in Iraq. This chapter continues with this theme, looking at the use and abuse of social time.

In practical terms, time is of less importance in Iraq compared with the Western stereotype. The rhythm of life as a whole in the Middle Eastern countries is slow, because of the overlapping of rural and urban values, and the predominance of the agrarian values, which are maintained not only in family, kinship and neighbourhood patterns, but also in temporal behaviour. Despite urban expansion, the city often reflects the rural rhythm. For instance, when a rural individual would like to visit his relative or neighbour, he will often say, "I would like to visit you tomorrow". At best he might add, "In the after noon", while a city-dweller might add "When the weather is better". For the rural person, the appointment is open from midday to midnight, while for the urban one it refers to the time between four o'clock in the afternoon and nine or ten o'clock at night. That is, if they give notice at all; often people call on each other with out warning. In an official's apartments, friends and relatives commonly pay visits, spending on unlimited time—one, two, or three hours—taking cup after cup of coffee and tea, while the people outside wait for the private visit to end.

Accordingly, the concept, "time is money", widely held and adhered to in industrial culture, seems to be far away from the
attitude of traditional societies, not only in appointments, but also in general orientation toward past, present and future, as well as in work and leisure time.

These points will be tested in this chapter by reference to the informants' attitudes, under the following headings:

- Time perception: lateness and punctuality.
- Work and leisure time.
- Temporal orientation.
- Social time as a dependent variable.

However, it should be noted that the analysis focuses on social time as an aspect of social behaviour and not as an independent variable.

8.2. FROM SACRED TO SECULAR TIME

The concept of time as a criterion by which to study social behaviour is a relatively recent development in the social sciences\(^1\). Time, in the past, was closely connected with mythology. It has been conceived as "the medium of sacred history. Time was thought of, but more often celebrated, as a sequence of specific events that befall a chosen people"\(^2\). On this basis, one can not understand events by considering people and physical environment only; it is necessary to consider three interrelated components: people, place and time. In this context Werner (1988) pointed out:

Rituals and other sermonised and ritualized activities can readily be seen as transactional unities. They involve particular people in particular roles, with particular environmental features such as objects, places, settings and the like. In addition, rituals are explicitly temporal in that they involve a past and a likely future, as well as
the present enactment; they often occur with particular frequency and regularity, for particular lengths of time and so on.(3)

The Durkheimian school is regarded as the first group of sociologists to develop the sociology of time. They based their notions about time on the sacred and cyclical phenomena exhibited in traditional societies(4). Durkheim himself posed the question, "What is time?" and concluded that time without processes, divisions, measurement, succession of hours, days, months and years, seems to be inconceivable(5). Durkheim's linkage between time and social activities impelled his followers to continue the study he began in "Elementary forms of religious life", focusing on the qualitative nature of social time in religious rituals. Marcel Mauss emphasised that the representation of time in religion and magic rituals points to its social origin(6).

In brief, the Durkheimian school paved the way to the sociology of time and proposed a basic theoretical approach. From his departure point onwards, the concept of social time emerged. Time had a specifically social dimension; it was derived from social life(7).

Many pioneers, such as G. H. Mead, Sorokin, Gurvitch, Merton, Causer and others made extensive efforts to study social time, either in the micro or in the macro context. The common ground among them related to their theoretical approach: the dimension of time, the movement of social phenomena, temporal orientation and social change(8). Sorokin and Merton for instance, underlined duration and indication of time as a reflection of social activities or group achievement(9). Gurvitch (1964) defined social time thus:
Social time is the time of convergency and divergency of movements of the total social phenomena, whether the total social phenomena are global, group or micro-social and whether or not they are expressed in the social structure. The total social phenomena both produce and are products of social time. They give birth to social time, move and unfold in it ... social time thus can not be defined without defining the total social phenomenon(10).

Gradually, successive empirical studies moved towards building up a picture of secular time, the time of everyday life, by using monographs, questionnaires, interviews and participant observation(11). Pronovost summarizes social time themes which became the object of study as follows:

An increasing specialization in themes and perspectives can be observed along with the variety of work. Particular times have become the object of study, such as working or school time, cycles and constraints within family time, and leisure time. ...collective memory, time patterns according to one's place in the life cycle, the management of time and the diversity of presentations of the past, present and future. Age groups and social classes, men and women, worker, peasants and the unemployed, are among the many social actors whose time patterns are studied(12).

On this basis, the concept of social time has became more secular, as fieldwork has taken place and created a world-wide perspective.

8.3. SOCIAL TIME IN TRADITIONAL SOCIETIES

Most of the efforts of sociologists and anthropologists have been directed toward describing and understanding time dimensions
of non-Western cultures and societies\(^{(13)}\). Thus most social scientists who consider time in relation to culture saw it as an aspect of culture, not an independent variable\(^{(14)}\).

In fact, all human events and activities take place in time and time is always used as a criterion to control these activities, but people react to, refer to and use time in different ways, according to individual differentiation and cultural variety. In this regard Bock (1969) stated:

> Every culture provides a series of temporal categories and relationships in terms of which persons may orient themselves and coordinate their activities. And as with all things cultural, the categories of time found in one society are partly arbitrary, differing from those of other societies in significant ways\(^{(15)}\).

A long time ago, Malinowski studied time-reckoning in the Trobriands. He found that the people reckoned time in practical as well as sentimental ways; practically, time can be fixed by reference to some recurrent natural phenomenon which can be foreseen and defined; important and dramatic incidents, such as a year of famine, serious disputes within the community, a slave raid, or head-hunting expedition which can be remembered for a long time. It is viewed sentimentally, in relation to the solar movements or many other astronomical elements, such as the succession of seasons, the trade and monsoon winds, and so on\(^{(16)}\). In his study about time and social structure in the Ashanti culture, Fortes (1970) followed Malinowski, defining social time function through three dimensions: duration, continuity and growth process, which reflect people's activities.
according to natural events which have happened or might be expected(17).

Most traditional societies conceive time to some degree dependent on natural and sentimental phenomena rather than recognition. In a recent study about time in the black culture, Jones (1988) defined five dimensions of human experience: time, rhythm, improvisation, oral expression and spirituality. These dimensions reflect basic ways in which individuals and cultures orient themselves to living. In time and rhythm, he found significant differences between the Euro-American and Afro-American perspectives. The main difference is that while the Euro-American focuses on the present as a threshold to future goals, the Afro-American view present goals more and more in terms of the past as a source of reference(18).

Levine (1988) displayed a dramatic differences in pace of life between peoples from different cultures. He described the highly industrialized culture (North America and Northern European nations) as a prototypically fast culture(19). He depicted its tempo as follows:

The value of promptness, the sense that time is a commodity not to be wasted, and the need to make every minute count have been seen as particularly characteristic of people from the United States, Germany and Switzerland(20).

In contrast, cultures such as the Navajo Indians, traditional Mediterranean Arabs and Latin Americans are described as slow cultures, which are not concerned with exactness and do not feel the need to make every minute count(21). Hall (1977) termed American time as "monochronic". Overseas Americans suffer psychological stress when confronted by the polychronic time system prevailing in Latin
America and the Middle Eastern countries. In the markets of the Arab World, one is often surrounded by other customers vying for the attention of the clerk, with no order as to who is served next, and to the northern European or American, confusion and clamour abound(22).

One of the most important studies about social time in an Arab community was made by Bourdieu (1963). Although it is an old one, or even out of date, like the study of Evans-Pritchard about the Nuer in Sudan, it is considered a basic attempt which still makes a rich contribution to interpretation of temporal behaviour. On the other hand it reveals that social change which encompasses most aspects of social life, seems to have less effect on the value system. Bourdieu emphasized that the Kabyle community of Algeria lives at the rhythm of nature and the ritual calendar; submission to nature is inseparable from submission to the passage of time as seen in the rhythms of nature. The Kabyle submission to the passage of time is such that no one dreams of mastering, using up or saving time(23). Moreover most of their activities are not subordinated to the requirement of civilization promptness, exactness or punctuality. In his words:

All the acts of life are free from limitations of the time-table, even sleep, even work which ignores all obsession with productivity and yields(24).

As in Algeria and all Middle Eastern countries, Iraqis use time with little concern for its value; no one deals with time as being saved, spent, wasted, or lost, even among the highly educated. Sometimes, people and institutions schedule important activities and projects, but do not accomplish them on schedule, because they do not look to time as a value, as does the Westerner, who acts
unconsciously according to the rule that "time is money". In fact, the people claim to believe that time is gold, or that time is like the sword; if you do not cut it, it cuts you. However in practice, they act against such ideal-types, as we shall see.

8.4 TIME PERCEPTION: LATENESS AND PUNCTUALITY

Every society, whatever its state of development, has a perspective of time, not only as an independent variable, but also as a cultural theme, used to coordinate human activities, relationships and interactions. Despite cross-cultural differentiation toward time, human beings share such notions as before, after, during and so on. People often arrange themselves, their relationships, objects and aims accordingly in everyday life. Nevertheless, people's attitudes toward time differ markedly according to cultural variety. Some societies might see time as "gold", other as a "pastime" and others as "something mysterious, passing and everything goes older".

Table 8-1 reveals some features of Iraqi people's attitude toward social time as a criterion to coordinate their activities. The attitude of the majority of the whole sample toward lateness, was convergent. Precisely, 49% of the rural group responded positively to the statement, "It is no problem to be ten minutes late for an appointment with friends", compared with 63% of the migrants and 64% of the natives. If we look at responses in the "strongly agree" category, the rural group seems to be more liberal toward delay behaviour; 18% of them replied thus, compared with 14% of the migrants and only 4% of the natives. However, merging "strongly agree" with "agree", the result is remarkably reversed; the migrants and natives become more tolerant of delay than the rural group.
Various possible explanations may be made for this. It may be that the rural respondents like to appear well-urbanized and so claim to respect time, or perhaps they have no need for appointments because they are often closely related. On the other hand the urban respondents might often be delayed by transportation difficulties; sometimes the departure of the bus may be as much as an hour behind schedule.

Table 8-1 Delay behaviour in an appointment with friends.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>It is no problem to be ten minutes late</th>
<th>Rural%</th>
<th>Urban%</th>
<th>Total%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Migrants</td>
<td>Natives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Agree</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N. opinion</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. disagree</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[X^2 = 24\] \hspace{1cm} \text{D.F= 6}\n
In general, people whether in the rural or urban milieu, do not view appointments as something important. This result is consistent with Hall's view. He emphasized that Middle Eastern people often do not give appointments the same weight as is given by those from Europe or the United States\(^{(26)}\). Levine (1988) told a funny story about two Afghan brothers who had agreed to meet each other in
Kabul, but neglected to specify what year and what time. He concluded, that lack of concern with exactness in time is pervasive in traditional societies. Levine and West (1980) in a comparative study about time and punctuality in Brazil and the United States, found that Brazilians were more often late for appointments and social gatherings. Brazilians expressed less regret over being late. Americans had more negative attitudes toward a person who is frequently late, and rated punctuality as a more important trait in a colleague or friend than did Brazilians. He concluded:

Our original notion that Brazilians are less concerned with lateness and are more frequently late received empirical confirmation.

Table 8-2 Late for work

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>I have never seen my colleague late for work</th>
<th>Rural%</th>
<th>Urban%</th>
<th>Total%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S. Agree</td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>N Opinion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>Urban Migrants</td>
<td>Urban Natives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Agree</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N Opinion</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Disagree</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$X^2 = 11.5$  
D.F= 8  
N.S

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Similarly, when respondents were faced with the statement, "I have never seen my colleague late for work", the figures of table 8-2, shows that the highest concentration of the responses was located on the negative side of the continuum; 57% of the rural group, 52% of the migrants and 64% of the natives said they "disagree". This means that the majority of the respondents have actually seen their colleagues late for work. By merging the two negative categories, the ratio rises to three-quarters of the whole sample. Because the statement was not personally directed, attitudes were revealed frankly and clearly.

This result reflects the stereotype of traditional cultures, where time is not so important. In this respect, Levine and Wolff (1985) compared the time sense of 91 male and female students in Niteroi (Brazil) with that of 107 similar students of California State University in Fresno. They found that on average, Brazilian students defined lateness for lunch as 33.5 minutes after the scheduled time, compared with only 19 minutes for the American students. However, Brazilians allowed an average of 54 minutes before they considered someone early, against 24 minutes to the Fresno students. They concluded that Brazilians are more flexible in their concepts of time and punctuality(30).

In a field study in Baghdad (1981) the present researcher found that about 30% of his total sample used to delay a few minutes for work time. Most of them thought that a few minutes lateness does not affect the running of the work. Some of them claimed that they are sometimes forced to delay because of unforeseen circumstances beyond their control, such as difficulties of transportation, home problems, illness of children, meeting friends and so forth(31).
A. EXACTNESS AND APPROXIMATE TIME

Lateness and delay might give some indications about exactness, which requires that a high value be put on time in every day behaviour. Traditional culture often has a slow rhythm with less concern about time. Levine described the Brazilian people's lack of exactitude, in his anecdote about his first day's visit to Niteroi (Brazil). He wrote:

I asked someone the time. It was 9:05 a.m, which allowed me time to relax and look around the campus before my 10 o'clock lecture. After what I judged to be half an hour, I glanced at a clock I was passing. It said 10:20! In panic, I broke for the classroom, followed by gentle calls of "Tola, Professor" and "Tudo bem professor?", from unhurried students, many of whom, I later realized, were my own. I arrived breathless to find an empty room. Frantically, I asked a passer-by the time. "Nine forty-five" was the answer. No, that could not be. I asked someone else. "Nine fifty-five". Another said, "Exactly 9:43". The clock in a nearby office read 3:15. I had learned my first lesson about Brazilians: Their timepieces are consistently inaccurate. And nobody minds(32).

Levine's description of Brazilian inaccuracy, indeed, completely conforms to the situation prevailing in Arab World and in Iraq particularly. The available data might shed more light on this fact. The informants, as shown in table 8-3, were asked to respond to the statement, "The best way to meet one another is at an approximate time". The highest concentration of responses was in the positive categories; 58% of the rural respondents, 54% of the migrants and 57% of the natives agreed with the statement, i.e. a majority of 56.3% prefer "approximate time" instead of exactness. In the researcher's
experience, urban residents in Baghdad, even those who are highly educated, prefer to indicate approximate time when arranging to meet. Common expressions are, "I will see you between six and eight p.m", or, "Wait for me for an hour; if I don't come, you can be free". Accordingly, they seem to have little concern for accurate or exact time.

Table 8-3 Exactness and approximate time

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The best way to meet other is at an approximate time</th>
<th>Rural</th>
<th>Urban</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Migrants</td>
<td>Natives</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Agree</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N. Opinion</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Disagree</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[X^2 = 18.7\] \[D.F = 8\]

Further evidence is provided by responses to the statement, "One does not need a diary to arrange his activities". A diary is an indication of the need to control time in daily activities. In Iraq, people do not usually use a diary even professionals, officials and those who have had a Western education. As one said, "I do not need an extra mind, my memory is enough".
The data in table 8-4 shows a significant proportion of the informants agreed that a diary is not necessary; about 70% of the whole sample either have negative attitudes towards using a diary or have no opinion about it at all, with significant differences between the three groups ($X^2 = 59$ DF = 8).

The diary, however, reflects a clear relationship between general attitudes toward activities and time spent on them (33). Activities in the urban milieu are more varied than in rural areas. Thus the use of a diary to arrange those activities is more likely to occur in the city than in the village, especially in traditional cultures such as the one under study.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>One does not need a diary to arrange his activities</th>
<th>Rural%</th>
<th>Urban%</th>
<th>Total%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Agree</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N. Opinion</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Disagree</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Turning to the data, about half the native informants had positive attitudes towards using a diary. Although attitude to some degree reflects actual behaviour, expressed attitudes do not always
correspond with behaviour. In the researcher's experience, in a traditional society such as the one under study, it is important to discriminate between words and deeds, as many people, if not the majority, behave in ways quite different from those indicated by their words. In our case as in many others, verbally, respondents express the value of using a diary, but in practice, they do not do so. This interpretation might explain the remarkable proportion of positive attitudes towards using a diary, in both settings.

B. TIME-BUDGET

Time-budgeting first took place in the advanced World, starting in the USSR in the 1920s. The aim is to measure and describe, how time is actually used, usually on a daily basis (34). Accordingly the time-budget is a process for managing time by redistribution of all parts of social and individual time, to enable individuals, institutions and society as a whole to use time in a way suited to their needs and aspirations. The earliest time-budget studies were highly concerned with division of time for work and leisure (35).

As a consequence of industrial, technological, information and communication development, western culture has made extensive efforts to systemize time, whilst underdeveloped countries continue to use time in arbitrary ways, not only at the individual level, but at the societal also.

To test the attitude toward time-budget, we asked the respondents their reaction to the negative statement, "A time-table makes a man robot-like". The majority, as table 8-5 shows, responded positively to the statement, with significant differences between the three groups ($X^2 = 38$ D.F = 8), which means that they agree that a
A time-table makes a man like machine, reflecting a negative attitude toward time-tables.

The data, however, show unexpected attitudes among the rural group, whose rate of positive response, when the two categories "strongly agree and agree" were merged, was the same as the native response: 51%. However, there were fewer negative responses among rural respondents than natives: 30% versus 43%.

**Table 8-5 Time-budget**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A time-table makes a man robot-like</th>
<th>Rural</th>
<th>Urban Migrants</th>
<th>Natives</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S. Agree</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>17.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>39.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No opinion</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>28.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Disagree</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[X^2 = 38\] D.F = 8

The only way to explain the positive attitude of the rural is that they do not suffer from time-table stress, as they do not work compulsorily at set times. Their work schedule is determined by natural phenomena rather than the clock, e.g. they wake up at dawn, go to the farm with their livestock directly soon after first light, these might be considered a "set time", but not in the same sense.
the term might apply to urban people who experience time table stress, as work and leisure time are more rigidly set.

Further evidence might shed more light on this point. The result of the statement, "I always eat, sleep and wake up at a set time", confirms, to some degree, the findings of the previous one. According to the data in table 8-6, the native informants responded less positively than the rural informants: 58% versus 77% (by merging the strongly agree and agree categories), which indicates that rural informants were more favourable towards time-budget (set time) than the natives. On the other hand, negative responses among natives, were about twice those of their rural counterparts: 41% versus 23%.

Table 8-6 Set time

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>I always eat, sleep and wake up at a set time</th>
<th>Rural</th>
<th>Urban</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Migrants</td>
<td>Natives</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Agree</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>19.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>52.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No opinion</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>25.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Disagree</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[X^2 = 42\]  \[D.F = 8\]

It can be concluded from the data, that urban residents have no strong tendency toward "set time". In the researcher's experience, Iraqi people often do not systemize their daily habits. Whereas
English people, for instance, often have a set dinner time, tea time, shopping time, holiday time and so forth, such is not usually the case in Iraq. For example, dinner may be at 1 p.m, 3. p.m, or 5. p.m. Any time during the day or evening, could be tea time.

C. RHYTHM OF LIFE

Differences in pace of life attributed to cultural variety are often described as dramatic. Sociologists and anthropologists have distinguished between "fast" and "slow" cultures. Bohannan (1980), for instance, has described the greeting style among the Tiv, a primitive people in Nigeria, compared with their neighbours the Hausa. He described the Tiv as "fast" people; they spend little time in greeting rituals, while the Hausa people spend a long time in such rituals. Thus, they are described as "slow" people(36).

The tempo of life, however, is derived from the way in which people evaluate and use time. In Rezsohazy’s (1972) terms:

Time may be organized and mastered in varying degrees according to the value attributed to it(37).

In this regard, Europeans do not move the way Puerto Ricans, Mexicans, Arabs or Chines move. Each culture has its own evaluation, characteristic and use of time. As a consequence, the rhythm and tempo are locally constituted; every society has a specific style of locomotion, sitting, standing, walking, reclining and gesturing. Accordingly, it is very easy to identify several differences in walking behaviour. For example, Europeans often move in quick tempo, while Arabs usually move in slow(38). Adam (1988) suggested that Western
societies have departed from natural rhythms, while other societies organise their social existence according to them\(^{(39)}\). In this sense, Freedman and Edward (1988) described Western life as being subordinated to extreme time pressure, which is considered a major element producing stress. He stated:

Many of the complaints about the stress of modern life revolve around the lack of time, the pressure to move quickly, the too fast pace of life, and so on\(^{(40)}\).

In Iraq despite the large scale urbanization and a degree of industrialization, the rhythm of life in general remains "slow". The data in table 8-7 might shed more light on this point.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Speed is a devilish act</th>
<th>Rural</th>
<th>Urban Migrants</th>
<th>Natives</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S. Agree</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>50.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>38.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N. Opinion</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>9.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Disagree</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ \chi^2 = 48.9 \quad D.F= 6 \]

According to the table, the majority of the whole sample (50.3\%) responded positively to the content of the statement. Despite the significant differences between the three groups (\( \chi^2 = 48.9 \quad D.F= 6 \)),

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when we merge the two positive categories (Strongly Agree and Agree), we can see that the general attitudes of the sample strongly confirm the "slow" rhythm of life: 92% of the rural respondents, 94% of the migrants and 80% of the natives, either "Strongly Agree" or "Agree" that speed is devilish act, which reflects the traditional view, where everybody has to be slow, to maintain his prestige; in walking behaviour one should be quiet and slow, and spend as much time as possible in greeting behaviour. People might be surprised when they see someone in a hurry. They often say to him "Do not hurry; who is the father of tomorrow?". That means one cannot get more than his fate, whether he goes fast or slowly; thus none can ensure the future. Common sayings in this regard are:

- Better to walk a month than jump the river.
- Do not be speedy father, we are waiting for you.
- Do not be fast, death is faster.
- If you run like the beasts, you can't get more than God determined for you.

Another facet of the slow pace of life is displayed through the statement, "It is better to rely on your biological clock than a wrist-watch". This statement reveals the natural rhythm concomitant with the psychological aspects of traditional cultures, where the wall-clock or wrist-watch is not the only or the effective device to measure social activities and life rhythm. Natural rhythm is a commonplace of all beings: plants, animals and humans alike, because they are bound by external rhythm\(^{(41)}\). They respond either biologically, as in plants and animals or culturally and psychologically, as modified response in the case of humans. In this
case the natural rhythm coexists alongside the modified one. Thus people might depend on their biological clock (internal sentiments) rather than the artificial one, so the tempo of life as a consequence is spontaneous, inaccurate and slow.

The attitudes toward the biological clock as shown in table 8-8, reflect significant differences between the three groups \( (X^2 = 26 \ D.F= 8) \); 45% of the rural group either strongly agree or agree that they depend on their biological clock rather than a watch, compared with 37% of the migrants and only 30% of the natives. The majority of the natives (69%) responded against the biological clock, which is to be expected as urban activities are determined by the clock, while rural activities are more dependent on natural rhythm: day and night, succession of seasons, sun, moon, stars and wind movement, which prompt the biological clock and internal timings.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>It is better to depend on the biological clock than a wrist-watch</th>
<th>Rural</th>
<th>Urban Migrants</th>
<th>Urban Natives</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S. Agree</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>31.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No opinion</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>53.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Disagree</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\( X^2 = 26 \ \ D.F= 8 \)
Despite the significant differences between the rural and urban informants, a remarkable proportion of the natives claimed that they depend on internal timings, which reflects somewhat the penetration of rural traits in urban life.

8.5. WORK AND LEISURE TIME

There are many ways to understand social time as "social", but the most important one is that of looking to it as a "value". From this perspective, time is something that people can use, save or lose. However, the way in which people conceive of and use time is intimately related to the central values of the culture\(^{(42)}\).

With regard to the system of values, if any society has to develop its infrastructure, time should be assessed in economic terms. Economic values of time and its scarcity, as Rezsohazy emphasized, might impel humans to save it and make the most of it to do more, achieve more and earn more\(^{(43)}\). That is why Sharp (1981) raised the possibility of dividing time into only two categories; work time and non-work time. Time, in this context, is money gained from the marriage of work and leisure\(^{(44)}\).

In so far as people are the producers of their society, their conception of time and the way in which they evaluate and use time in work, as well as in leisure, is the crucial factor in development and progress, but as we have already said, the value of time depends primarily upon the core values of the culture. Thus time has quite different values according to cultural variety and the degree of cultural and technological progress. In this regard, Rezsohazy stated:
The value of time is expressed by the activities or pastimes given social preference. For example, one society will say that time is money, whereas another will say it is recreation and a third, contemplation (45).

In traditional societies such as the one under study, time is still treated in ineffective ways, despite the awareness of its importance to the nation and individuals alike.

The data in table 8-9 might shed more light on this fact. The informants were asked to respond to the statement, "Time is gold but no one appreciates it". The overwhelming majority of the three groups with non-significant differences between them, responded positively. 90% of the rural group, 93% of the migrants and 93% of the natives claimed to either agree or strongly agree with the proposition.

Table 8-9 Value of time.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time is gold but no one appreciates it</th>
<th>Rural</th>
<th>Urban Migrants</th>
<th>Natives</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S. Agree</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>47.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>44.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No opinion</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Disagree</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$X^2 = 8.5 \quad D.F. = 8 \quad N.S$
This result, confirms the views expressed in the literature mentioned above, and indicates that the informants recognize the value of time, but in practice can not cope with it, because of the obstacles of the traditions which encourage the slow rhythm, regarding it as a criterion of individual prestige, which reflects the prevalence of agrarian values.

Further evidence of the underestimation of the value of time was obtained by asking the respondents their reactions toward the statement, "Most leisure time is wasted with gossiping". The data in table 8-10 reveals that about three-quarters of the whole sample agreed that gossip is extensively used to fill leisure time. Precisely 72% of the rural group, compared with 85% of the migrants and 73% of the natives, either agreed or strongly agreed that leisure time is wasted with gossiping.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Rural</th>
<th>Urban</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Migrants</td>
<td>Natives</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Agree</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No opinion</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Disagree</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$X^2 = 27.9 \quad D.F = 8$
This phenomenon is not confined to Iraqi or Arab society, but seems to prevail in most traditional societies, and whenever people meet face to face, even in industrial societies. Recently, the magazine "Awake" (1991) presented three articles discussing various aspects of gossip, which all show that "gossip" is a global phenomenon or, as it stated, "gossip is universal". However, whereas gossip might be practiced for several minutes in the local community in industrial societies, it may last several hours or all day in traditional societies, as was found by Kimball in Brunei. Many Iraqi researchers have empirically found that leisure time is often passed or wasted in exchanging information, chatting and fuelling conversations encompassing many aspects of their neighbours and local community (see chapter seven of this thesis). Gossiping in traditional society is pervasive everywhere: neighbourhoods, offices and apartments, shops, parties, family and so forth. It flourishes at every level of the society; educated or non-educated, high or low class. Apart from the fact that it may be harmful and victimize others, which reveals a very dark side of human behaviour, it is a waste of time which could be used to engage in activities to benefit individual and society.

In the same context, and accompanied with the harmful gossip phenomenon, Arab people often use the rosary to pass time. Despite its religious use and psychological function, the main purpose of using the rosary is to pass tedious leisure time, and as a consequence it becomes a daily habit, used not only at certain times, but at any time, everywhere: in offices, school, home, the street, shops and so on.
To test the extent of the rosary usage, we asked the informants to react to the statement, "The rosary is often used to pass boring time". The overwhelming majority of the whole sample responded positively to the statement: 90% of the rural group, compared with 92% of the migrants and 93% of the natives either agreed or strongly agreed. This attitude is manifest in the daily behaviour of the people, thus it does not reflect only the informants' attitudes, but also their real behaviour. However, in the researcher's experience, the rosary is not only used to pass time, but it becomes an individual hobby; many people enjoy collecting valuable rosaries, while others holding different kinds of rosary to harmonise with their dress, and talk proudly about it.

In fact, with the lack of adequate public leisure facilities, the people create their own means of providing psychological stimulus and coping with their cultural context.

Table 8-11 Use of the rosary to pass time

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The rosary is often used to pass boring time</th>
<th>Rural</th>
<th>Urban Migrants</th>
<th>Natives</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S. Agree</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>45.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>46.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N. Opinion</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Disagree</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[X^2 = 28\] \hspace{1cm} D.F = 6
8.6. TEMPORAL ORIENTATION

It is quite right that cultures share some similar characteristics, but in fact, there are qualitative differences which give each culture its own characteristics. As a consequence of cultural variety, every culture has its own conception of social time, and every society relies upon its culture to orient its members temporally. The Western tradition views the flow of time as fundamentally linear, marked by a number of historical events which have been (and will be) of crucial importance to human salvation. The Asian civilization takes a much more cyclical view of history. Such temporal orientations reveal quite important information about human behaviour. Thus, and in the light of anthropological studies, there is remarkable differentiation between human cultures in their temporal orientation; in the advanced cultures, the people often act and behave according to the concept of "promptness", and exploit the past and present to designate and develop the future. Traditional cultures still associate the past with the present; the people often turn back to the strong inheritance of their ancestors' values, norms and achievements which seem to be a major obstacle that prevents people moving forward. Pronovost shed more light on this point. In his discussion of traditional cultures' temporal system, he stated:

The concept of the future, in so far as we can use this term, is a reproduction of the traditional way of life. There is no clear-cut line between the past and the future but only a sort of relative homogeneity in temporal horizons, a continuity from the past to the future.

F. Kluckhun (1961) discussed the time orientations of people in different societies and from different angles. She asserted that each
culture has developed its own distinctive emphasis upon either the past, present or future. She devised a questionnaire to examine the temporal orientation found in a number of social groups. She concluded from her empirical study of five subgroups in the American Southwest, that Texans and Mormons ascribed more value to the future, while Navaho, Zuni Indian and Spanish-American groups gave such value to the present. Navaho and Zuni Indians placed more value on the past than the future(52).

In the Arab World, many writers have drawn attention to the cultural heritage dilemma and ancestorism. II. Saab (1973) considered it a dilemma of mist which covers the human mind and prevents him from recognise the present facts and future views(53). However, ancestorism or orientation to the past seems to be quite tangible, represented not only in verbal behaviour, but also in some rituals, such as frequent visits to graveyards and shrines, and some types of magic and sorcery(54).

We asked the informants to express their attitude toward the past through the statement, "I remember the past with affection". As table 8-12 shows, the vast majority of the whole sample, with non-significant differences between the three groups, \(X^2= 7.1\) D.F= 8 responded positively. Precisely 76% of rural respondents and migrants, and 75% of the natives, either agreed or strongly agreed with the statement. This result reflects the informants' concern with the past, and at the same time indicates the attitude of the social organization as a whole, where most of the people, including the well-educated, set a high value on the past. In the researcher's experience, people often, when talking about the present or the future, refer to the virtue of the past. Thus we can conclude that
the sample gives the past a high value which is an indication of societal attitudes toward time.

Table 8-12 Temporal orientation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>I remember the past with affection</th>
<th>Rural</th>
<th>Urban</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Migrants</td>
<td>Natives</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Agree</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No opinion</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Disagree</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[X^2 = 7.1\]  \[D.F = 8\]

8.7. TIME AS A DEPENDENT VARIABLE

This section deals with social time crosstabulated with other variables as follows:

A. AGE AND SOCIAL TIME

Biological time runs out and everybody ages. Humans have to change their status in cyclical time, from birth to death: passing from childhood to puberty, unmarried to married, adulthood to old age. In this sense, time is recognized in different ways according to one's status and age.
In general, young people have more liberal attitudes toward all aspects of life, including recognition and usage of social time. Pronovost, in this regard, assumed that youth, in terms of movement, look forward to the future, more than other age groups. The present is striving toward the future that is made up of work and family(56). However, generally and at the practical level, human behaviour is formed culturally, and as a consequence every culture determines its members' behaviour and attitudes toward time with regard to the differentiations entailed by the age groups. The data in table 8-13 might test this assumption in practice. According to the mean, we can observe that there is complete conformity in rural respondents' attitude, regardless of age groups, except for a slight difference scored by the old age group (55>). The urban group reveals similarity among all age groups. The mean reveals close correspondence between rural and urban attitudes toward the use of time.

Table 8-13 One way analysis of variance of rural and urban attitudes toward the use of time according to age

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Rural Mean</th>
<th>S.D</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Urban Mean</th>
<th>S.D</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&lt;25-34</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>32.8</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-44</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>32.4</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55&gt;</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>34.8</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>32.1</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>33.1</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>32.4</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F= 0.56</td>
<td>D.F= 2</td>
<td>F= 2.0</td>
<td>D.F= 2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.S</td>
<td>N.S</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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This result reinforces our assumption, that cultural values might diminish the differences toward the use of time, regardless of age variable, in rural and urban groups alike.

B. EDUCATION AND SOCIAL TIME

As with age, it is possible that education level might play an important role in determining people's attitudes toward the use of social time, but once again, we can assume that education level may be less effective in some cultural contexts, so we have to see each education level and each social group as a microcosm of the whole society in Pronovost's terms (57).

According to the data in table 8-14, the mean does not show any indication of differences between those who have high or low level of education in either rural or urban group or between the two settings. If we look carefully at the figures, we see that the mean of the low education level of urban informants, 32.8, is almost the same as that of those who have a high level (32.1). This is reinforced by standard deviation, which records convergence rather than divergence. Slight differences can be seen between high and low education levels of the rural group, but F ratio records non-significant differences between them (F = 0.56 D.F = 2), F ratio also records non-significant differences between the high and low education level of the urban group.

This result confirms our assumption that education has no significant influence, in the predominant cultural perspective, but it conflicts with the finding of Robinson (1988), that the highly educated are likely to be able to accomplish more in the time
available, and they make greater gains than the less educated people in the least hurried activity. They described their life as being rushed, so they felt more under pressure of time than others, and as consequence used time more actively\(^{(58)}\).

Table 8-14 One way analysis of variance of rural and urban attitudes toward the use of social time according to education

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Rural</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Urban</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low edu</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle edu</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>32.8</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High edu</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>32.5</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>32.5</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ F = 0.11 \text{ D.F= 2} \quad F = 0.87 \text{ D.F= 2} \]

N.S \quad N.S

C. OCCUPATION AND SOCIAL TIME

The ways in which people use social time are strongly related to the nature of their socio-economic activities. Agricultural work, for instance, has its own characteristics, and leads to a pattern of activity not like that usually found in the city. The people work not by the clock, as in the city, but according to the environment's requirements\(^{(59)}\). Thus, attitudes and behaviour seems to be related to occupational variety. As Rezohazy emphasized, individuals learn to handle time in very different ways. Even in the same society, social
groups such as social classes, rural and urban, different generations, might have different attitudes toward time, e.g. making and keeping appointments and so forth\(^{(60)}\). In this regard, the nature of work engagement, which demands some differences in pace and rhythm, might influence individual attitudes, though, that is not the case, when the question concerns collective behaviour formed by cultural values. The data in table 8-15 might shed some light on the ambiguity surrounding this point. The mean shows slight differences between the different occupations among the rural informants, which appeared in standard deviation, but shows correspondence among the urban. In the average, the figures indicate non-significant differences between the different occupations in rural and urban groups alike (rural F ratio= 1.82    D.F=3) and (Urban F ratio= 0.22    D.F= 3).

Table 8-15 One way analysis of variance of rural and urban attitudes toward the use of time according to occupation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Rural (No)</th>
<th>Rural Mean</th>
<th>S.D</th>
<th>Urban (No)</th>
<th>Urban Mean</th>
<th>S.D</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Official</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>38.0</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>32.3</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peasant</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worker</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>32.6</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-employed</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>37.0</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>32.5</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housekeeper</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>31.3</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>31.7</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>33.1</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>32.4</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F= 1.82</td>
<td>D.F=3</td>
<td>F= 0.22</td>
<td>D.F= 3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.S</td>
<td></td>
<td>N.S</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

330
This result is consistent with the domination of traditional values in both rural and urban residence, irrespective of the nature of economic involvement.

D. FAMILY INCOME AND SOCIAL TIME

Family income is often used as a criterion of social class. It is indeed an important indication of the social hierarchy. Different classes might treat social time differently according to their income, property and style of life. More privileged families, for instance, might try early to inculcate in their children notions such as the value of time: they have to keep it, save it and not waste it. In fact, there is a clear classification of the concept of time in relation to social class(61). However, if that holds, it does so only in societies with clearly differentiated social classes. In the Arab World, there is no clear cut distinction between high, middle and low classes, so one can anticipate no sharp differences among them in their attitudes toward the use of social time.

The data in table 8-16 reveal slight differences between informants with high and low family income. The mean of low income respondents in the rural group is 31.1, compared with 33.6 of for those with high family income. In the urban group it is 31.9 for those with the low family income, compared with 32.5 for those with high family income. The information reveals non-significant differences between the two sets (Rural F: 2.3 D.F= 3) (Urban F= 0.22 D.F= 3). Income does not seem to have any important impact on attitude toward the use of time among respondents of low and high family income in either the rural or urban setting.
This result, confirms our own assumption, that the values of the culture as a whole might over-ride individual social components, especially in traditional society. It also indicates that hypotheses and theories applicable in an industrial culture do not necessarily apply in other cultures.

8.8. CONCLUSION

People learn to handle time in very different ways due to cultural variety. Failure to recognize the cultural concept of social time might lead, as Bock has said, to "a great danger of misunderstanding the behaviour of persons from other societies"(62). For that reason, it is not easy to understand a particular society without acknowledging its sense of time, or in Levine's terms "To understand society, you must learn its sense of time"(63). In this
regard, the discussion in this chapter focused on attitudes toward the use of social time, in order to complete the image of the traditional social life in an urban centre.

The data analysis reveals that lateness, delay and inaccuracy prevail among the majority of the urban informants. Delay in appointments with friends, as well as in work, which would be considered in European culture as intolerable and insulting behaviour, are considered normal in a traditional culture such as the one under study, as most of the respondents indicated in their responses. In the same context, the investigation demonstrated that informants placed little value on time, and preferred to arrange their activities, appointments and contact for an approximate, rather than exact time; for example, "I will see you between 6 and 7 P.M" or "I will visit you this evening", without specifying the time. The figures show that more than 60% of the urban informants tend to prefer approximate time rather than exactness, with slight differences between rural and urban respondents.

Similarly, the data reveal negative attitudes toward using a diary to arrange daily activities; about 70% of the whole sample either claimed that they do not need a dairy, or had no strong opinion on the subject.

The most important part of this chapter is that concerning time-budget. Respondents' attitudes toward time-tables were generally negative. Most denied being committed to a time-table, and agreed that time-tables make people like machines. They also claimed that they did not systemize their daily habits at certain times: eating, sleeping, shopping and so on.
The rhythm of life, which was reviewed also in cultural terms, was seen to be slow, not only in general outlook, but also in specific locomotion: walking, spending time in greeting, and so forth. In this regard more than one-third of the urban respondents expressed a negative attitude toward speed, and considered speed as a devilish act, not a way of saving time to accomplish something. However slow motion is considered in Arab culture, and in Iraq particularly, as a part of the individual's prestige. Thus one has, for instance, to eat or walk slowly to maintain his prestige. People express surprise if they see one pass in a hurry or spend less time in greeting behaviour. They often shout: "Do not be hurry, who can be sure of tomorrow?", meaning that no amount of hurry will give you more than fate intends for you.

In work and leisure, time is viewed as an economic value: "Time is money, time is gold" or "Time is like a sword, if you do not cut it, it might cut you". In practice, time is used in contemplation, dissipated, run out and wasted for nothing. The respondents therefore, expressed agreement with the statement, "Time is money, but no one appreciates it". More than one-third of the urban respondents either agreed or strongly agreed, reflecting a negative attitude toward the value of time. Not surprisingly then, the overwhelming majority of the respondents agreed or strongly agreed that they wasted time either in gossiping or in using the rosary, with non-significant differences between rural and urban groups.

Temporal orientation is another facet of this investigation. The data reveal that the informants gives the past a high value, perhaps more than the present and the future; about 70% of the whole sample remember the past with affection. In the researcher's experience,
people do not talking about their achievements in the present time or their plans for the future without reference to the virtues of the past.

To check that the attitude toward the use of time was not affected by independent variables such as age, education, occupation or family income, these variables were correlated with the sum of the twelve items (statements) of the scale by using one way analysis of variance. The findings reveal the following:

- There are no significant differences between the attitudes of young, adult and elderly groups; low, middle and high education level; low, middle and high family income; or between occupations.

- The data demonstrated conformity between rural and urban groups.

Finally, it can be concluded that the conventional values which cover all aspects of life have a great impact on urban residents' behaviour and attitudes. They to some degree diminish the differentiation between rural and urban settings. This, as we have said earlier in this thesis, is because of the pervasive penetration of agrarian values in urban life, which push the city toward "rurality".
8-9. NOTES AND REFERENCES


8. Ibid, P. 4-14.


20. Ibid, P. 44.


24. Ibid, P. 221.


29. Ibid, P. 549.


47. Ibid, P. 5.


57. Ibid, P. 71.


CHAPTER NINE

CONCLUSION
9.1- THEORETICAL INTRODUCTION

Although much has been said about the influence of the city on the countryside, and little about the reverse situation, traditional values in the city do not die under the stress of urbanization. They might be weakened or modified, but will stand as long as the human beings are influenced by religious values.

Even in highly industrial cultures, family, kinship and neighbourhood are still, to some degree, active, while in less developed cultures, they are extremely active.

This is not only an assumption counter to Wirth's theory or an overview contrast with that of the Chicago school, it is also a practical view derived from cross-cultural studies. Thus, it can be said: what has been experienced and written about a certain culture or society should not be taken for granted, or generalized to every society.

Because of the lack of comprehensive study, not only in Iraq, but throughout the Third World, of the impact of traditional values on urban life or "ruralization of the city", the researcher undertook this project to compare the main aspects of social life in the city with their rural counterparts.

The main assumption of this thesis is: Iraq's principal cities, including the capital, Baghdad, have grown several-fold in the last four decades, as a result of rural to urban migration. This changed their demography as well as their social characteristics, and caused what has been called "ruralization of the city".
To examine the above assumption, relevant studies have been pursued in a global perspective. We first discussed, as theoretical background, the findings of the Chicago school, concentrating on the views of Wirth and Redfield, who put forward clear characteristics of rural and urban life. It was considered extremely important to survey urban and rural attributes in order to underline the scope of our own study. However, urban and rural theories are not confined to the Chicago school, but also appear in the early works of the pioneers. The ideas of Durkheim, Tonnies, Weber and Simmel, which were discussed briefly, are regarded as forming the foundation of the classic school of sociology. They paved the way to the earlier sociologists such as Wirth and Redfield. The Chicago school, although it based its approach on the pioneers' findings, developed a new theoretical dimension, focusing on the nature of the city. The most important and problematic assumption was that of Wirth: "urbanism as a way of life", which gave rise to many questions and created controversy among sociologists. Wirth assumed that the city requires a way of life attributed to the socio-economic and ecological characteristics, which stand in strong contrast to the rural way of life.

At the same time, Redfield developed a new direction. He claimed that there is no dichotomy, no contrast, but a continuum. Many sociologists regarded Redfield's approach as more reasonable, but both constructions are problematic. As there has been no clear answer as to the applicability of these two approaches, our investigation looked for the alternative view: the city in the Third World. After presenting a number of studies, we found that the Wirth-Redfield constructions (dichotomy-continuum) are not adequate,
because of the spread of rural characteristics in the city, which is attributed to large-scale internal migration. In Asia, Africa and Latin America, the villagers have a dominant influence on the city demographically, socially and culturally.

The researcher went on to discuss theoretically, the process of urbanization in Asia and the Middle East, with particular reference to Iraq, before presenting the empirical study. A large number of studies were discussed, which had as a common theme the vast growth of cities as a consequence of the rural to urban migration, reflecting economic growth and the resulting "pull" of the city's attractions compared with the deteriorating conditions in the rural areas, together with natural increase. Many studies found that there were no essential differences between the rural and urban milieu in most Asian cities; they considered that city and village are elements of the same civilization. Qadeer, for instance, asserted that in India, Pakistan and Bangla Desh, household size which indicates the family structure, has not undergone the kind of change normally associated with urbanization; the consanguine family in these countries continues to be a very cohesive unit. Blood loyalties, and kinship ties, which are continually reinforced by religious values and economic considerations, extended family and kinship system seems to be very active in the city as well as in the village. In brief, the traditional values have been shaping the city culture. Following Krausse:

It is quite conceivable that such a large population equipped with rural values and life style, is as much involved in shaping the culture of the city as it is adjusting to it. (See chapter one P. 47)
In the Middle East, additional factors accelerated the pace of migration: discovery and exploitation of oil, emergence of the industrial cities and concentration of government institutions and amenities in urban centres. Thus the influx of a huge number of migrants destroyed the urban style of life and replaced it with a rural one. Focusing on four aspects of urban life: family construction, kinship system, neighbourhood and social time, which are relevant to our own study, we found that the urban family is still extended, patrilineal, patriarchal, polygamous and endogamous, like its rural counterpart. The kinship system, which is based on genealogical descent, seems to be extremely strong, important and playing a key role in social interaction and solidarity. Intimate neighbourhood ties are quite tangible and play a significant role as an informal social control. Studies of social time as a theme of culture, not an independent variable, showed a lack of information about how people in the Middle East used and abused time. Nevertheless, the small number of available studies, reveals that slow rhythm, low valuation of time and lateness are a normal elements of Middle Eastern culture.

In Iraq, the picture is quite similar to that of the Middle East in general, because the countries of the region share the same cultural components: language, religious and historical heritage. However Iraq was the cradle of human culture, urbanization occurred quite early in the third millenium B.C. Many city-states emerged between the two rivers (Mesopotamia). In the Islamic epoch, large cities such as Baghdad, Basra, Kufa and Samarra flourished and Baghdad became one of the largest cities in the world. Iraqi cities declined gradually after the fall of the Abbasid empire in 1258 A.D, and rose again after the First World War. The attraction of the city,
discovery of oil and the dearth of land caused waves of migrants, and as a consequence Iraq become one of the most highly urbanized countries in the Middle East. Three factors played an essential role in urban growth: the rate of natural increase, the influx of migrants from rural areas and incorporation of pre-existing villages into the city or reclassification of some village groups as urban areas.

The rate of natural increase of urban population growth was high: 6.2% for the period 1960-1970, and 5.4% for the period 1970-1980. The high fertility rate was attributable to the high rate of rural migration which shaped the city culture. Thus the main and decisive factor behind the rapid growth of urban population was rural migration. The large-scale migration started after the Second World War, due to the capital investment in oil revenue and industrial sector. During 1957-1975, migration reached an alarming scale. As a result, the urban growth rate was about 9% higher than the total national growth rate. Baghdad took the lion's share; it increased more than tenfold in the last four decades, compared with a six-fold increase for the population of the country as a whole.

The eight years war with Iran, affected the trend of migration. Many people from the southern regions moved to the capital to avoid the danger of the war and to look for jobs.

The bombardment by America and its allies of Iraqi cities and villages, which devastated most of the infrastructure, might have affected not only the rate of population growth, but also the age and sex distribution and caused movement of the population over the Iraqi provinces. Thus one can expect that movement toward Baghdad will rapidly increase in both the short and long term.
On the basis of the above, the urban population is a rural-urban mixture, the two groups living and flourishing side by side, with agrarian values predominating. The collision between traditional values and modern ways that some people have adopted, is responsible for the dichotomy of the personality or "dualism". As evidence of this dualism, the individual appears extremely urbanized and well adjusted, but in most social situations might soon show traditional values; one might be westernized in his clothes but easily angered, and sensitive in matters of honour. As professor Al-Wardi (Iraqi scholar), put it "Ile is Mr John on the outside, but pilgrim Hasson on the inside"(See chapter three). Moreover, the wide-spread existence of the extended family, kinship system, neighbourhood, loyalty and nepotism, hospitality, male superiority, and failure to view time in economic terms, may be considered as "ruralism" among the urban population. The local authorities established in successive epoches, encouraged traditional values, norms and behaviour, to maintain their authority and to be conform with the traditional way of life. As a consequence, many problems appeared and deeply affected urban life.

To provide empirical evidence to reinforce the theoretical research, the researcher designed a standardized questionnaire covering four salient aspects of social life: the family, kinship, neighbourhood and social time.

Because of the Gulf Crisis, and the accompanying difficulties, it was not possible for the researcher to return to Iraq to collect the data. For that reason, arrangements were made to send the Arabic formula of the questionnaire with a colleague, who had recently obtained his Ph.D degree from the Sociology Department, University
of Hull and was returning to Iraq. The aid was enlisted of two assistant professors from Baghdad and Al-Mustansirya Universities.

These three collected the data according to the researcher's instructions. The researcher monitored and directed progress by weekly telephone calls. The filed survey, as described in chapter one, included four neighbourhoods in Baghdad city and a rural community as a control group, with a sample of 300 household heads, 200 informants from Baghdad city and 100 informants from a village, about 115 k.m, south of Baghdad.

The results of this part of the study can be summarized as follows:

9.2 SOCIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SAMPLE

By way of introduction to the applied study, information was obtained on the respondents' backgrounds: sex, age, occupation, marital status, family components and income. This was done, not only to show the differences between the components of the three groups, but also to control the results. The sample revealed considerable variety, necessary to the validity of the study.

9.3 THE URBAN FAMILY

This part of the study explored several assumptions, relating to vital aspects of urban family in Iraq: power structure, family planning, women's position and marriage.

A. POWER STRUCTURE

The Arab family is described as patriarchal, patrilineal, patrilocal, extended, polygynous and endogamous. The oldest man
exercises great authority over his family members. The absolute authority of the father, derived from cultural traditions, is also supported by religious values, which seem to be very effective in the rural and urban milieu alike. Children learn in early childhood to obey their parents, to fulfil one of the most important obligations toward God.

Although the mother has an important role in the family, the undisputed authority rests with the father. He is treated with respect and deference, and even grown-up and married sons have to submit their wishes to those of their father, and possibly their elder brothers. Thus the power structure of the family is centralized on the father. The investigation confirmed this view, demonstrating that the undisputed authority of the father is commonplace among rural and urban groups alike.

The father's authority is manifested in daily life, either directly toward the whole family members or indirectly through the mother. The real power of the father is seen on the major life occasions, which require firm decisions. In this context, the data showed that two-thirds of the whole sample claimed that the father is the proper person to decide on issues such as, how to spend the family income, sons' marriage and whether to rent or buy a new house. However, the respondents thought that women have an effective but hidden role. Some women are able to exercise power and may be able to manipulate or pressurize the men, but even those who have superiority inside the family, in public should pretend to be subordinate to their husbands. Those men who are less dominant in their families affairs, often pretend publicly that they have full authority, so the lack of recognition of women's role in the responses
of the informants may be explained in a cultural context, which confirm the male supremacy; the respondents have to cope with the expectation of roles of both males and females.

One of the most striking evidences of male authority over females was displayed in the study through the status of male siblings. The investigation reveals that the status of the male is considered highly superior to that of the female. Preferences for males and discrimination against females start even before birth; to wish that someone should have a baby girl, even if he already has a dozen male children, is interpreted as an insult. A woman considers her life a complete failure if she does not succeed in delivering a boy child to her husband. The husband, in such cases, has the right to divorce his wife and remarry. Accordingly, the family who has a large number of males has a high status.

All our rural and urban respondents, agreed that if they have a son who gets married and lives independently, they will support him both morally and materially. The common expression, in this sense, is "I have still to look after my sons as long as I live". To explain this, the vast majority said either that their sons are a part of themselves or that they need them when they reach old age. Support for sons reflects familial cohesion. In the Arab World, the family is seen as the cornerstone of society. Traditionally, the head of the family should direct his efforts towards the maintenance and continuation of the family. That, of course, requires spontaneous assistance, not only economic, but also social and political. On this basis most household heads prefer their married sons to stay with them under the same roof. Even those who claimed that they would not prefer this, reject ideas such as "To get rid of their
responsibility". Most of them said they live separately from their sons, either because their houses are too small or to avoid problems. Thus they think that to live separately is better for both, and might preserve good relation between them.

The data, however, reflects either non-significant differences or slight differences between rural and urban respondents, which indicate the effectiveness of the traditional values in both settings.

B. FAMILY PLANNING

Under this title, the analysis pursued two main focal themes: birth control and management of the family budget. In the first theme, birth control is quite limited because of the religious injunction, which encourages a high rate of fertility and sanctions the attempt to control birth by contraception; and cultural tradition, which plays essential role to in supporting large numbers of children, who are regarded as fundamental to strengthen the family position.

Although birth control has recently been practiced in urban life, it is largely still viewed as defined by strict tradition. Fertility seems to be not a matter of individual choice, but a familial concern, extending even to relatives and friends. The investigation reveals that a minority of all respondents were using some method of birth control. Because of the government restriction since 1985, and the obstacles of tradition, people have difficulty in obtaining contraceptive facilities, and get them on black market at ten times the normal price. Nonetheless, the majority are still against using any method of birth control, because either they regard it as against God's will (religion), or because they accept the strict tradition. In
testing the impact of education and occupation on practicing birth control, the study demonstrated only a slight relationship between education, occupation and fertility. This result reflects the strength of tradition over education and occupation.

In the second theme, family budget management seems to be intimately related to the household head's responsibility. Traditional values strongly support the father's full economic control over his family. The economic unity of the family is unconsciously recognized. Even those members who marry and live independently, share the economic burdens of their original families. Despite this economic unity, the extensive obligations toward its members inside or outside the original household, with relatives, neighbours and friends, often prevent the precise planning of family expenditure and demolish any budget that is made. The data showed that family budgeting is almost impossible. Less than a quarter of the urban respondents, claimed that they can manage the family budget, compared with less than one-fifth of the rural informants. The majority can not manage, because of unexpected visitors, unexpected occasions and unexpected incidents. It is common to hear complaints such as "One needs a treasury to fulfil his obligations, every day there is a marriage, funeral or visitors". Or every month a deficit could undermine any budget. Among the highly educated informants, only 20 out of 86 succeeded in arranging their families' budgets according to plan. This number reflects the inability of education to affect people's attitudes and make them more rational and more urbanized. Thus the inability to budget seems to be a matter of cultural and societal context rather than merely a lack of education. Individuals with a high level of education might find themselves involved in more familial obligation to
maintain their prestige in the community, and as a consequence, find it more difficult to plan their family budget effectively. Similarly, occupational involvement had little impact on the traditional ways which make budgeting difficult.

C. WOMEN'S POSITION

Because of the supremacy accorded to men, a woman has to submit to her father's will as long as she remains unmarried, and then to her husband. She learns in early childhood to reconcile herself to the fact that the man is much more important.

Theoretically, women have no decision-making authority. This applies even for those who have a very strong position in the family, and for those who are well-educated. All the decisions should declared by the men. A common proverb, heard in Iraq is: "Ask the woman for her opinion and then go against it". The woman herself realizes her position and to some degree is satisfied with it. Even a well educated woman, when she has a decision to make, she does not say "Let me think about it", but "Let me ask my father, brother or husband". Although Iraqi women may wear fashionable western-style dress, drive cars and use Christian Dior make up, substantially their status and authority is really little different from that of traditional rural women. Well educated women recognize that they are viewed in rather crude terms as child-bearers and are sometimes anxious about that, but they realize that their inferior position is not their own fault or that of their husband, but it determined socially and culturally, so they to some extent accept it.
Although the inferiority of women tends to be taken for granted, women have great status in the household, especially as wives and mothers. This status is confirmed by religion as well as tradition. When a woman becomes old, she acquires full freedom, she may talk back to men and may gain the upper hand over her husband during his declining years. Such freedom is not given to younger women. According to the data, more than 60% of the urban informants admitted that the mother has less status than the father. In response to a provocative statement, "Woman plan and man execute the plan" only less than 10% agreed. The minority who admitted the planning role of the woman, may have done so in recognition of their wives' psychological influence; they may thought that such an answer would impress the interviewer with a sense of their modern broad-minded attitude, or they may really have more liberal attitudes. Further empirical evidence confirming the inferiority of women, was obtained in response to a question about who decides the number of children. In this case one might anticipate the mother/wife has the upper hand to decide, as pregnancy and childbirth are female concerns, but this seems to be the case only among egalitarian societies. In the traditional world, decisions on marriage and fertility does not rest with the wife or a couple alone, but with the patriarchal household members and their relatives. Thus responses were divided almost equally between the husband alone or both with others, while only small proportion of respondents said that the woman alone decided. Attitudes were the same for age groups and educational levels.

The investigation also asked respondents whether they help their wives in household tasks. The overwhelming majority replied
negatively, while only 3% of the whole sample replied positively. When we asked those who replied positively about the type of assistance they offer, the majority seem to help with tasks which were originally not women's duties, such as ironing. Only one individual admitted that he helps with cooking and no one said cleaning or washing clothes. Basically, the husband regards any help as a concession, and often avoids any such concession, based on the traditional argument that woman is greedy, and if one helps her, she will demand more and more. Thus even now when a man intends to marry, his mother advises him to "Slay the cat", i.e., to be harsh from the beginning in front of his bride, if he wishes to maintain his authority, otherwise he may be dominated by his wife and bring shame to himself and his original family.

D. MARRIAGE.

Marriage has been seen as a familial and societal rather than an individual desire. The major reasons for marriage are not romantic love or achievement of transitory individual happiness, but rather fertility, permanence and alliance of two family groups. Some individuals in towns and cities might marry spouses of their choosing, but they must first obtain their parents' consent. Often the parents are morally obliged to find a mate for their sons, and the sons are expected to accept and obey the parents' choice.

According to Islamic tradition, a man is permitted to take up to four wives, but this freedom is hedged by the restriction, that a man should treat all of them equally. However, polygyny in Iraq is on the decline, because of the economic pressures of modern social life, in
addition to the legislation of 1977, which decreed that a man who would like to remarry must seek the permission of his first wife. The effect of these factors on polygyny appear clearly in the present investigation, where only two out of 300 respondents had a second wife, and those were not among the urban sample.

Theoretically, the parents, especially the father, control the selection of mate, but nowadays, the principals exercise considerable influence over the choice of mate, particularly in urban centres. Nevertheless, the final decision remains in the hands of the parents; the son might suggest a bride, but the final endorsement must given by the parents.

The choice of bride suggested might be wide or narrow in terms of the kinship group (endogamy), but generally, first cousin marriage is preferred. This tradition remains to some degree active, but recently has come under attack, especially among the younger generation. Nevertheless, parental supervision and consent, remain fundamental to fulfil marriage requirements. In our case, the vast majority (more than 90%) of all respondents claimed that either the father alone or the parents together have the absolute authority to choose their son's bride, with non-significant differences between rural and urban respondents.

Taking into consideration, the restrictions imposed on women entering the man's realm, the seclusion and deliberate sexual segregation, in this context, it is not surprising to see early marriage in Iraq for both males and females. The data revealed that the mean of males desirable age for marriage is 25.1 years, while the mean for females is 21 years.
The investigation went on to discuss the residential rule. In fact, patrilocal residence is one of the main characteristics of Arab societies, while, matrilocal residence is discouraged, regarded as a shameful and a breaking of tradition. The bridegroom who intend to live with his bride's family brings shame, not only to himself, but also to his original family and relatives. Public opinion in Iraq calls a person who intend to do this "ga'dy", which means in folk idiom, a person who has lost his authority and lives at another's expense. Therefore, people avoid matrilocal residence in order to maintain their prestige in the eyes of their original families, friends and the whole community. The data showed that more than 90% of the whole sample, with non-significant differences between rural and urban respondents, rejected matrilocal residence. Some were reported as saying, "If I live with my wife's family, I will lose my power". The result is quite consistent with the findings of many writers and researchers. Hence, it can be concluded that the pervasiveness of traditional values in the urban context has diminished the margin of social differentiation between the rural and urban areas, creating to some degree, "ruralization of the city".

9.4 KINSHIP RELATIONSHIP.

Traditional urban sociology underestimated the effectiveness of the kinship system in the city, where urbanization and modernization were expected to encourage individuality, transitory and superficial, rather than intimate relationships, loyalty or nepotism. This view, however is no longer tenable in view of much available evidence. This part of the study pursued this evidence in relation to: kinship
control over marriage, mutual obligation, loyalty and nepotism and people's attitudes toward each other as "Kin".

A. KINSHIP CONTROL OVER MARRIAGE

The kinship system in the whole Arab world, has a tangible presence in the urban milieu. It is derived mainly from strong family ties and encouraged by religious values. Controlling marriage is one facet of kinship obligation. In fact, endogamy is quite common as a cultural heritage, and not a type of scandal as Bourdieu has claimed. It maintains ties and keeps property within the kin group. Whatever the reason, marriage is quite early, compulsory and completely under the control of family and close kin.

So far, research about Arabic and Islamic marriage has demonstrated that endogamy, particularly parallel cousin marriage, is still preferred, even in large cities.

In Iraq, the pattern of marriage among relatives is still prevalent in both rural and urban alike. Although parallel cousin marriage is to some degree declining, endogamy is still shaping the culture. The data showed that more than 60% of urban respondents emphasized that their wives were chosen from their relatives.

Although there is no written law on the subject of intermarriage, tradition is sometimes more vital than written law; everybody is aware that a girl should marry a relative, if not specifically her "Ibn amm". The data demonstrated that more than 80% of those married either a parallel or cross-cousin relative. Respondents who got married a long time ago, might now have changed their mind about intermarriage. With this in mind, we asked them, whether or not they still prefer for themselves and for their
sons to marry relatives. The responses confirmed the traditional attitudes rather than the modern.

It is quite true to say, that some of the younger generation are attempting to break down the social order and marry non-relatives, but they are the exceptions to the rule; the rule remains firmly against change. Measuring the impact of some independent variables, the data revealed non-significant differences between high and low level of education, as well as rural and urban occupations.

B. LOYALTY AND NEPOTISM

The importance of the kinship system is derived from its function. It is the body to which the individual turns for assistance; it is a reference group, provides economic support and religious unity. Thus widespread loyalty to the group is not surprising. Familism is one of the most important facets of rural and urban residents alike. The individual with his family beyond adulthood and into middle age. Ingrained habits of family and kin loyalty are strong in both formal and informal situation. It is really difficult for a person to divest himself of this protective attitude, shown in seeking assistance, cutting through bureaucratic red tape and helping in daily life.

Loyalty to a large kin group is revealed in the sense of nominal identity; an urban person is often not seen as belonging to the city as an individual, but as a member of tribe, "Ashira", so he takes the tribal name as his surname, not the name of the family, as in the West, e.g., Al-Duliemi, attributed to Duliem tribe, Al-Zubaidy, attributed to Zubaid tribe. Such tribal names are quite common in Iraq and all the Arab culture. Sometimes people take the name of
their cities or district; Al-Heety attributed to Heet city, Al-Basri, to Basra city or Al-Adhami attributed to the Al-Adhamia district of Baghdad. Even those do not indicate loyalty to the city itself, but tend to refer to some heterogeneous community descended often from one original tribe.

In view of the above, tribal surname seems to be extremely important, not only as a nominal identity, but also as an indication of a social unit. The data demonstrated that the overwhelming majority of urban informants regarded tribal surname as important, either because it reflects their original roots or because they need it socially.

Further evidence was obtained to confirm the concept of kinship loyalty and nepotism, revealed in intercession and mediation. Looking for a relative as mediator to cut through bureaucratic red tape, is widespread. Although it is contrary to government principles, it is even practiced among those who issued the legislation. Moreover, mediation is not confined to cutting through bureaucracy, but is prevalent in every other aspect of life, including marriage, disputes, looking for jobs or obtaining scarce goods. The empirical investigation demonstrated that the majority of the sample were involved in intercession in favour of their relatives, irrespective of their milieu.

C. MUTUAL OBLIGATION

Reciprocal obligations among kinship groups are not confined to members of the household, but are extended to lateral relatives: lineage, sub-tribe and tribe. While the obligation toward lateral
relatives is often nominal and confined to certain occasions, toward close relatives it is unlimited. It is common for those to exchange visits and meals, share equipment, and give many kinds of assistance.

Exchanging visits is an expression of intimate relationship and mutual obligation among relatives. The urban household in Iraq receives visitors almost every day; such visits are considered a moral obligation.

The best leisure time is that spent in visiting relatives. Empirical studies have shown that exchanging visits with relatives occupies a major portion of leisure time. In our case, the investigation revealed that more than three-quarters of the urban informants used to exchange visits with relatives, both on special occasions and otherwise. Another relevant point has been tested, that is whether or not those visitors gave prior notice to the hosts. The figures showed that the majority of the urban informants claimed that relatives do not need any appointment to visit each other. This result reflects the general social context, which confirms the tradition of intimate relationships among relatives, which do not entail any kind of formal consideration.

In line with the extensive obligations of hospitality, people are highly concerned about the guest rooms. Compared with the tradition of hospitality in rural areas, urban residents often come under attack. They are accused of being miserly and greedy; in turn, urban residents try to demonstrate the reverse, so they give more attention to the guest room, of the best possible size, decoration and furnishing. Almost all the informants said that they have a guest room. The 3.7%, who did not, can be explained in the light of the housing crisis and poverty.
Many other practical obligations prevail among relatives forming a backbone of cohesion and solidarity. Obligations such as consulting one another in marriage of their sons, contributing to blood money and even showing respect for elders, are considered as a matter of concern. To clarify this point it was put the informants that many people do not believe in relative obligation, but obey under certain circumstances. The vast majority of the whole sample, with slight differences between rural and urban respondents, claimed that they believe in relative obligation, while only 2.4% said they do not believe. This proportion, however, is not statistically significant. Thus relatives' obligations seem to be quite important in a society deeply based on traditional values.

D. PEOPLE'S ATTITUDE TOWARD EACH OTHER AS "KIN"

People's attitude toward each other as "kin" depend mainly on two factors: the degree of relationship and economic-political status. Kinship terms are linguistic symbols of kinship status. Different status and interaction patterns between them, call for various types of attitudes and behaviour on the part of any one individual; close relatives, such as parents-sons, brothers or cousins, do not hesitate to help and protect each other under any circumstances. To determine to what extent public opinion reflects the traditional norms toward relatives, the informants were asked to reply to the statement: "I would side with my brother against my paternal cousin, and with my paternal cousin against any stranger". The overwhelming majority of the sample with non-significant differences between rural and urban respondents, agreed with the statement. Almost all disagreed
with the statement: "Relatives are scorpion-like". To reinforce this point, respondents were asked to react to another negative statement, "A man 's only relative, is his money", and most rejected it. Accordingly, people's attitudes toward each other as "kin" seem to be quite positive in the urban as well as in the rural milieu, which reinforces the main assumption of the study.

9.5 Neighbours and Neighbourhood

In this part, the investigation focused on neighbours and neighbourhood in social rather than physical terms. These included, neighbours' relationship, mutual obligation, neighbours and social control and attitude toward neighbours.

In fact, neighbourhood is considered one of the most important elements in the structure of the local community, in both rural and urban areas.

Neighbourhood as a social rather than physical entity, is almost invisible in highly industrial cultures, since mass production, high technology, communication and improved transportation have led to privacy, alienation and distinction, while face to face relationship, mutual rights and obligation are still maintained in less developed countries. Religious values also encourage people to maintain traditional ties.

A. Neighbours Relationships

Although some individuals complain about neighbours' intervention in their domestic affairs, many others can not imagine life without neighbours' interactions. One can often hear in Baghdad such expressions as "Paradise without people would be unbearable".
Thus one can easily go back and forth to one's neighbour's house at any time, any day. Neighbours help each other, not only in emergency but also in ordinary life. The investigation into the quality of neighbours' contact, revealed that daily contact is highly prevalent in urban areas. The figures reveal that the majority of all respondents have relationships with more than four households of their neighbours. For further clarification, the investigation extended to encompass the form of relationship which informants preferred with their neighbours. More than three-quarters of the urban informants preferred intimate relationship, while less than 20% preferred superficial relationships; only one individual preferred no relations at all.

As a consequence, the urban neighbourhood, in terms of contact, seems to be quite strong, with intimate and personal relations and a marked absence of privacy, strain and alienation, as a result of agrarian values prevailing.

B. MUTUAL OBLIGATION

Ideally, neighbours in Iraq are expected to help each other in times of need, exchange tools and equipment, visit, ask advice and chat. These expectations are fulfilled in practice. They are aware, for instance, of mutual rights and responsibilities, and act accordingly. The investigation on this subject showed that the majority of the sample, with non-significant differences between rural and urban informants, thought that neighbours always respect each other's rights, help, share sorrow and happiness, protect and take sides with them in disputes and consult them in several cases. Other aspects of the relationship which were tested included exchange visits, meals,
help and participation on the main life occasions. It was found that 99% of the urban informants exchanged visits with their neighbours; more than 60% of them do so once a week or more, while the others do so a few times a month.

Exchange of meals is regarded as an aspect of the firm tradition of the Arab World, particularly Iraq. The investigation demonstrated that almost all the informants engage in such contact either frequently or sometimes. A similar result was found with regard to mutual help. The result reflected a complete conformity between rural and urban respondents. Involvement in mutual assistance and participation on main life occasions confirm the preceding findings; we found evidence of the continuation and effectiveness of primary relationships among neighbours in urban life, which reflect the influence of the traditional values, despite urban expansion.

C. NEIGHBOURS AND SOCIAL CONTROL

In the developed world a neighbourhood may mean no more than a number of people living near each other in one block, and one may not even know one's next door neighbour. Neighbourhood in such position, does not mean more than a physical aggregation of individuals, and social control is often formal in style. Informal social control is characteristic of traditional societies, based mainly on family, kinship and neighbourhood ties.

Although neighbourhood in traditional societies, particularly in Iraq, seems to be homogeneous, with cooperative interaction to provide informal social control, people are very sensitive toward each other as a consequence of curiosity, snobbery and intrusion. Thus
one should be careful in his behaviour to avert the gossip and criticism of his neighbours, who watch and may interfere in small and big issues. In this regard, neighbours are considered an active social control device. To test this attribute, the investigation asked the informants whether or not they modify their behaviour to avoid neighbours’ criticism. The result showed that the overwhelming majority of the whole sample, with non-significant difference, between rural and urban respondents, claimed that they do their best to avoid neighbour’s criticism.

D. NEIGHBOURS’ ATTITUDES TOWARD EACH OTHER

Taking into account, the attribute described above, the attitude seems to be more than one of like and dislike; it is based on strong emotions and attachment, not only toward neighbours, but also toward residence. In Baghdad, one often hears people say, "I was born in this neighbourhood and I would like to die in it", or "This is my birth place and should be my grave". Thus, movement from one area to another is regarded as a big decision because of the strong emotions of attachment to people and place. However, priority has to be given to neighbours their reputation, behaviour and relationships with others. Then one might think about other factors such as accessibility to major roads, shops, parks, schools and so on. This does not mean that attitudes are always positive, of course, there are some negative attitudes on the individual level, but generally, attitudes are more positive than negative. In this regard in response to the question "How do you regard your neighbour?", the majority of the urban respondents responded that their neighbours are like their families. The others claimed that they are like their friends.
Only one individual said "like strangers". The respondents, confirmed their positive attitude toward their neighbours, when the majority agreed that they should ask first about the neighbours, when they want to buy or rent a new house. Similarly in response to the question, "Do you think it is possible to ignore neighbours?", only 2% of urban respondents thought it was.

The results once again confirm our own assumption that traditional values deeply rooted in urban life help to preserve community norms intact, and urbanization has non-significant influences.

9-6 SOCIAL TIME

The final part of the empirical research focused on social time as a criterion to study social behaviour. The investigation encompassed four salient aspects: perception of time, work and leisure time, temporal orientation and social time as a dependent variable.

A. PERCEPTION OF TIME

Human events and activities take place in time and time is always used as a criterion to control these activities, but people react to and use time in different ways according to individual differentiation and cultural variety. Some societies might see time as "money", others as "pastime" and still others as "something mysterious". In all Middle Eastern countries, particularly in the one under study, people often use time with little concern for its value, and rarely deal with time as being saved, spent or wasted, even
among those who are highly educated. In fact, most people in our culture claim to believe that time is money and repeat some political slogans such as "Waste one minute of the work time, waste an opportunity to progress" or "Time is like the sword, if you do not cut it, it cuts you", but in practice, they behave against this ideal-type. This view was born out by the investigation. When the respondents were asked whether or not it matters to be ten minutes late in an appointment with friends, the majority were either agreed or strongly agreed, that ten minutes lateness is acceptable. They do not view an appointment as something important. This matter has its counterparts in most traditional societies. Levine, for instance, found that Brazilians were more often late for appointments and showed less regret over being late, than those from the USA. (see chapter eight P. 306).

Exactness in matter of time requires a high value to be placed on time in every day life. However, traditional cultures do not give time the value given by highly industrialised cultures. Thus people prefer approximate time rather than exactness. The investigation revealed that the respondents preferred approximation in those matters of time. A remarkable proportion of urban respondents do not like to use a diary to arrange their daily activities. Some have no strong opinion about it, others asserted that "they do not need an extra mind". In fact, they responded culturally.

To measure and describe how time is actually used in daily life, the investigation asked about time budget, which involves redistribution of all parts of social and individual time, to enable individuals and society as a whole to use time in a way suited to their needs. Despite the effective use of time budget in the advanced
world, underdeveloped countries continue to use time in arbitrary ways. The data revealed that urban respondents were strongly against time-tables, which they regarded as inimical to humanity, by making people like machines. Similarly they rejected the statement, "I always eat, sleep, and wake up at a set-time".

Lateness and punctuality reflect the general rhythm of life. According to cultural variety, it is possible to identify several differences in the tempo of locomotion, sitting, walking and gesturing. Arab people, for instance, usually move slowly, while Westerners move in quick tempo. The data in this matter, showed, that informants' attitude toward speed is extremely negative. The majority of the informants also said that they usually depend on natural timing rather than a watch or clock.

B. WORK AND LEISURE TIME

People in the West evaluate time in economic terms: it can be saved or wasted, one can make the most of it to do more, achieve more and earn more. However, the way in which people evaluate and use time is intimately related to the core values of their culture. In traditional cultures such the one studied here, time is still treated in ineffective ways, despite the recognition of its importance to the individuals as well as to the nation's progress. To assess their attitude toward the value of time, the informants were asked to react to the statement "Time is gold but no one appreciates it". The vast majority of the whole sample, with non-significant differences between rural and urban respondents, either agreed or strongly agreed. In response to the statement, "Most leisure time is wasted with gossiping", about three-quarters of the urban respondents agreed.
The data showed a similar attitude toward passing leisure time by using the rosary. These responses are related to the core values of the culture, which is striving to maintain the traditional legacy.

C. TEMPORAL ORIENTATION

The conception of time dimensions -past, present and future- is a common trait among cultures, but different cultures may give more value to one or other of these dimensions. In Arab culture, for instance, the past is often given more respect, while such respect is given, in industrial cultures, to the present and future. The informants were asked to express their attitude toward the past through the statement "I remember the past with affection", the statement received a tremendous positive response, confirming the assumption that traditional culture often gives the past more value. This result is consistent with the researcher's experience, that people in Iraq often, when they talk about their plans or projects in the present or future refer in their speech to the virtue of the past.

D. TIME AS A DEPENDENT VARIABLE

To give more validity to the impression obtained from the respondent's reactions, one way analysis of variance was used, crosstabulating social time with other independent variables, such as age, education, occupation and income. Urban informants revealed similarity among all age groups. The mean and standard deviation, showed relative correspondence between rural and urban attitude toward the use of time. A similar result was found with respect to different levels of education, occupation and income.
Taking into account all these findings, it can be concluded that urbanization has not changed the deep-rooted tradition. It might have been expected that the changes of the demography of Iraq from predominantly rural to predominantly urban in less than four decades, would influence social as well as morphological aspects of urban and rural life alike, but in fact, the effect is more tangible in morphological than social aspects. It is quite easy for people to change their residence style, adopting one more comfortable, but it is extremely difficult to depart from their norms, values customs, and daily habits, especially when the ingredients of radical change are not available. Strong family ties associated with enormous emotional power are accompanied by cohesive religious values and a rigid political power structure. All these factors combine to maintain the traditional values intact. Not only are agrarian values seen as a great heritage per se, but they represent a means by which people can protect themselves in the face of political, social and economic uncertainty. In the weakness of formal social control it is natural that individuals turn to other ways of preserving their safety and interests against the aggression and nepotism of others.

In fact, a society divided into categories, anharmonic parties and unstable superstructure creates deep contrasts in social organization. Many years ago, the researcher was one of many academics who believed that social integrity had nearly demolished the individual and group differentiation, but the American bombardment and its aftermath, have demonstrated the fragility social structure. "Ruralization", is not only the result of rural migration, although this seems to be the most tangible element. The city itself,
even before the demographic transformation, was a focal centre of tribalism and kinshipism. The question is: what has changed throughout these decades of urban accumulation? In broad sociological terms, nothing; absolutely nothing. Familism, tribalism and nepotism remain active, despite extensive demographical, morphological and technological change. Briefly, there is "ruralization of the city", mainly because no alternative social institutions have crystallized.

Generally speaking, Baghdad city has no distinctively urban way of life or "urbanism" in Wirth's terms, and has not eliminated the diffusion of traditional social organization and values. However, misunderstanding might have occurred because of the long history of the city, which presumably provided a special urban flavour.

Anyone who has visited Baghdad in recent years, has found a highly organized city: modern buildings, motorways, highways, traffic-lights, schools, parks, police stations, supermarkets and so on. However, the problem is not the morphological side of the city; it is socio-cultural structure and individual behaviour. It is quite evident that many inhabitants are practicing modernity in their residential environment, in their dresses and even in their thinking; they use all kinds of technology in their homes, and have reacted positively to changing manners and styles in line with the Western way of life. Nonetheless, they are not Westerners in actual manner. Despite the modernized form which makes both men and women appear like many Europeans, they often act and behave very much like their ancestors; they talk, for example, about normal attachment between men and women, but they are easily angered and respond sensitively if they hear that their own sisters or daughters have attachments with others; they will reject the groom if they discover he has entered
into a pre-marital relationship with the bride. They can not permit a woman to challenge their superiority, they act in favour of their families and kinship groups and they are intolerant of breakdown in the patrilocal residence rules.

The real problem is that the people are living two different ways simultaneously, in socio-political terms, "hypocrisy" or "dualism". They are fascinated by the European style of life, but they have been brought up in a different cultural system. The people of Iraq, particularly in the rural communities, who are mainly responsible for the rapid urban growth of Baghdad city, were in early childhood inculcated with the values: "I would side with my brother, whether he is right or wrong, victim or offender" and "The son and his property belong to his father". Such socialization has resulted in characteristics sharply contrasting with the nature of the city as described by classical sociologists.

The dilemma is made more complex by the education system, in that the general process of socialization and formal education are separated. This separation brings about cultural conflict inside the personality; the conflict is most likely to be stronger, where the socialization which mainly takes place in the homes of people and is associated with inculcation of deep traditional values, requires close relationships, deep emotional attachment and mutual obligation, whereas formal education in schools presents curricula and course content derived from foreign cultures, emphasizing different values.

The question is how can we explain the fact that a city, though having a long history, is described as traditional and ruralized, rather than modern? In fact, it is not a case of a transitional period, which is responsible for this chaos of conflicting values, as one might
assume. There are very complicated factors overlapping to create the character of traditional Baghdad, which can not easily be discussed in terms of empirical investigation. Some of these factors are invisible, and some can give even specialists contradictory impressions. Let us explain the clinging of the people to their kin groups, which Wirth and his colleagues assumed would be eliminated by city dwelling. Under certain circumstances, such as hunger or poverty, the only way to survive is to create a solidarity system: to help each other, exchange meals and equipment, protect each other, starting with close relatives, expanding to the nuclear family, extended family, lineage, clan and ultimately tribe, the system can meet basic social needs, for example by aiding the poorest people, helping those who would, unaided, be unable to afford to marry, by giving them gifts in cash and kind. In a prosperous social economy, the system might be modified and eliminated gradually. Indeed Wirth's assumptions appear to have been developed in the context of the prosperous economy of the heyday of industrialization, socio-political stability ( democracy ), and social security. These components do not exist, to some extent, in Iraq, or in most other Third World countries, partly because of the colonial system which left many serious problems behind: religious, ethnic and economic rival groups, which, in the scramble for power, conflicted among themselves, weakening the social structure and allowing scope for the world superpowers to achieve their objectives and maintain their strategic interests.

Thus, the colonial legacy is partially responsible for the unstable superstructure in the Third World in general and in Iraq in particular. The absence of constitutional institutions formed a real threat to individuals, who looked for security, insurance and
protection to other social organization: the family, kinship, neighbourhood and friendship, firmly supported by religious values. On the other hand, the cultural challenge represented by the secular cultural invasion or arrival of foreign values through the media, and the direct interference of the superpowers in the internal affairs of the Third World countries, preventing them from developing their societies in the way they desire, might also be partially responsible for what are called "Cultural challenge reactions", impelling the people to consolidate their position by "fundamentalism", "traditionalism" and "ancestorism", which all reflections of the stress caused by uncertainty, ambiguity and insecurity.

Moreover, Baghdad city in its long history as an urban agglomeration was deliberately ruined several times and reduced to group of small hamlets. Those natives who did not flee the city were left in enclaves, surrounded by huge numbers of rural migrants. Under the circumstances described above, the indigenous inhabitants were forced, after the mass influx of migrants after the First World War, when Baghdad rose again as the administration and political capital of the State of Iraq, to partially give up their urban way of life and adopt the way of life of the arrivals, which provided more effective socio-economic security and protection. It was also in keeping with the values supported by those in political power, who have mainly come from rural backgrounds, and have encouraged the traditions of rural people.

So, "ruralization" is mainly and obviously, a direct consequence of massive rural influx, accompanied by an unstable socio-political system, uncrystallized constitutional institutions, cultural challenge,
and powerful religious influence. All these factors have combined to vitalize the traditional values in Baghdad City.
APPENDIX
1.1 SEX

a. Male...... b. Female........

1.2 AGE

a. less than 25.... b. 25-34........

c. 35-44...........d. 45-54........

e. 55 and above

1.3 EDUCATION

a. Illiterate....b. Can read and write..

c. Elementary.......d. Intermediate ...

e. Secondary.. f. University and above.

1.4 OCCUPATION.

a. What is your main occupation ?.....

b. What was your former occupation ?..

1.5 FATHER'S OCCUPATION

a. What is your father's occupation ?...

1.6 PLACE OF BIRTH
1.7 **FATHER'S PLACE OF BIRTH**

a. Village ......... b. Town .......

c. City (province) ..... d. The Capital.....

1.8 **MOTHER'S PLACE OF BIRTH**

a. Village ........... b. Town..............

c. City (province) ..... d. The Capital..........

1.9 **MARITAL STATUS**

a. Single ....... b. Married ......

c. Divorced ...... d. Widowed ......

1.10 **AGE AT MARIIAGE**

a. Less than 24 .... b. 25-34.........

c. 35-44 .......... d. 45 and above....

1.11 **NUMBER OF CHILDREN**

a. None .... b. 1-3 ..... 

c. 4-6 ..... d. 7-and above .

1.12 **THE INCOME OF THE FAMILY**

a. Less than 150 I.D ..... b. 150-199 I.D.....
c. 200-249 ............... d. 250-299 ...........
e. 300-and above ...........

1.13 NUMBER OF FAMILY MEMBERS

a. Less than 3 ..... b. 3-5 ..... 
c. 6-8 ..... d. 9-and above ..... 

1.14 FAMILY COMPOSITION

Are there any of the following presently living with you in the same home?

A. PATERNAL

a. Father/ Mother ..... b. Brothers/ Sisters ..... 
c. Grandchild........... d. Other Relative............

B. MATERNAL

a. Father/Mother-In-Law... b. Brother/Sister-In-Law. c. Other Relative.............

2 FAMILY CHARACTERISTICS

Now I would like to ask you about family life and marriage, if you are not married and have not started your family I would like to know your opinion.

2.1 What do you think about the father's authority?
a. Its very important inside the home ....
b. Its very important outside the home ....
c. Its very important both inside and outside the home
d. Its not important in either situation ......

2.2 Who decides to spend a family income ?

a. Father.......b. Mother.......c. Oldest Son....d. Household head (if not spouse)..e. Other...........

2.3 Who has the final word about buy or rent a new house?

a. Father...............b. Mother...............c. Both...............d. Other...............e. Other..........

2.4 Who choice your Wife/ husband ?

a. Myself...........b. Father..............c. Mother with father consent....d. Other....

2.5 Who decides the daughter marriage ?

a. Herself........b. Father.............c. Mother with father consent....d. Brothers...e. Other.......
"A family which has a large number of males has a high status"
   a. Agree ........... b. To some context......
   c. Disagree ..........

2.7 If you have a son who gets married and lives independently will you support him?
   a. Yes.........b. No.......... 

2.8 If "yes" what kind of support will you give
   a. Material ...   b. Moral ....
   c. Both ....

2.9 Why do you support him?
   a. Because he is apart of myself ...
   b. Because I will need him when I got old ...
   c. Because tradition demands it ...

2.10 Would you prefer your married son and his family to stay with you?
   a Yes ........... b. No ..........

2.11 If "not" why?
   a. To avoid the expected problems ....
   b. To get rid his responsibility......
c. Better for him to live independently....
d. My house so small......

2.12 Are you able to budget your family needs ?

a. Yes..........b. No............

2.13 If "not" why ?

a. Because of unexpected visitors ...  
b. Because of unexpected incidents ...

c. Because of unexpected occasion, such as birth, wedding,  
funeral ..etc.....

d. Because of all these factors

2.14 What do you think about this statement ?

"Males have the right to choose their marriage partners but females  
have not"

a. Agree ..... b. To some extent...

c. Disagree ..... 

2.15 Do you use any method of birth control ?

a. Yes.........b. No.........

2.16 If"not" why ?

a. Because it is against my beliefs
b. Because it is against our traditions

c. Because more children make a marriage stronger

2.17 Do you help your wife with household tasks, such as, cooking, cleaning, washing?

a. Always...... b. some time ....

c. Rarely..................

2.18 If "always or some time" what sort of participation do you offer?

a. Cleaning..........b. Washing clothes...

c. Cooking..........d. Ironing........

e. Washing dishes....f. Some thing else....

2.19 What do you think about this statement?

"My son's son is my son, but my daughter's son is not"

a. Agree ..... b. To some extent........

c. Disagree ......

2.20 Suppose, when you got married, your bride/groom requested you to live with her/his family, what would you do?

a. I would refuse ..... b. I would try to persuade her otherwise ..... c. I would agree .....
2.21 Who has the final word about the number of children?

   a. Me ....   b. My wife/husband ..... 
   c. Both ..... d. Other factors ....

2.22 What do you think about the following ?

   a. Mother has less status than father .... 
   b. Mother has equal status to the father ...
   c. Father has less status than mother ...

2.23 How many wives have you had...........

   a. Only one .......... b. Two ....
   c. Three ............ d. Four ....

2.24 What do you think about this statement ?

"Women plan and men execute the plans"

   a. Agree ..... b. To some extent.........
   c. Disagree ....

2.25 What do you think is the best age to marriage for:

   A. Male

   a. Less than 20......b. 20-24.........
   c. 25-29............d. 30 and above....

   B. Female

   a. Less than 20......b. 20-24.........
3. KINSHIP NETWORK

3.1 Is your wife among your relatives?
   a. Yes  ......  b. No  ...........

3.2 If "yes" indicate the degree of relation
   a. Cross-Cousin ....  b. Parallel-Cousin ....  
      c. From the lineage ....  d. from the tribe ....

3.3 What do You think about the tribal surname?
   a. Important ....  b. To some extent.........
      c. Non-important ..........

3.4 If "important" why?
   a. Because it indicates the original roots.....
      b. Because we need it socially .......
      c. Some thing else mentioned .......

3.5 Do you think that the relatives need to have appointment to Visit each other?
   a. Always..........  b. Some times.........
      c. Never......

3.6 If" always" or "some times" did you and they do that?
a. Always for me .....  
b. Always for them .....  
c. Some times for me.....d. Some times for them.....

3.7 Have you a separate guestroom ?

a Yes .. .....  b. No .....  

3.8 If a relative needed you to intercede for him in a legal issue would you:

a. Not hesitate to do so .....  b. Hesitate .......

c. Not do any thing.....

3.9 what do you think about this statement:

"Relatives are scorpion-like"

a Agree.....  b. To some extent.....

c. Disagree.....

3.10 Many people do not believe in relatives obligations, but they obey under some circumstances, what about your self?

a. I believe in relative obligations......

b. I do n't believe, but obey under some circumstances
c. I do n't believe and would not obey......

3.11 When do you exchange visit with relatives ?
3.12 Who do you mainly depend on, when you are in a financial crisis?

a. Relatives....
   b. Neighbours...
   c. Friends...
   d. Any other (please specify)

3.13 What do you think about this statement:
"A man's only relative is his money"

a. Agree......
   b. To some extent....
   c. Disagree....

3.14 What do you prefer for you or your sons:

a. To marry a relative.....
   b. To marry a non-relative......

3.15 What do you think about this statement:
"I (would side) with my brother against my paternal cousin and with my paternal cousin against (any) stranger"

a. Agree ..... b. To some extent.....
   c. Disagree.....

4. Neighbours and Neighbourhood

4.1 Do you or your family member exchange visits with your neighbours?
4.2 If "Yes" how many times do you or your wife/husband do so?

   a. About once a week or more....
   b. A few times a month.......
   c. A few times a year.......

4.3 Do you participate with your neighbours in the main life occasion, such as, death, marriage...etc?

   a. Always.....
   b. Sometimes.....
   c. Rarely.....

4.4 How do you regard your neighbours?

   a. Like my family.....
   b. Like my friends.....
   c. Like any other strangers.....

4.5 What do you think about this statement?

   "When a man wants to buy or rent a house, he should ask first about the neighbours"

   a. Agree ...........
   b. To some extent........
   c. Disagree.........

4.6 How many neighbours are you related to?

   a. None.....
   b. Only one ........
4.7 Do your neighbours respect the neighbourhood rights?

a. Always....

b. Sometimes....

c. Rarely.....

4.8 Do you or your family exchange meals with your neighbours?

a. Frequently......

b. Sometimes.....

c. Rarely.......  

4.9 Do you or your family call on new neighbours?

a. Yes..........  

b. No.........

4.10 Do you think that you or your family should be careful in your behaviour to avoid criticism from neighbours?

a. Always........  

b. Sometimes........

c. Rarely......

4.11 What form of relations would you prefer with your neighbour?

a. Superficial ties....

b. Deep relationships.....

c. No relationship at all.....
4.12 Do you think it is possible to ignore the neighbours?

a possible ............ b. sometimes....... 
c. Impossible............

4.13 Do you help your neighbours ?

a Yes................... b. No..........

4.14 If "Yes" what sort of help do you offer ?

a Shopping.... b. Use of equipment.....
c. Lend them money...... d. All these things......

5. SOCIAL TIME (ACTIVITIES)

The following symbols ( SA, A, NO, DA, SD ) denote respectively, (strongly agree, agree, no opinion, disagree, strongly disagree,).

5.1 It is not a problem to delay

just ten minutes in an appointment

with a friends SA A N DA SD

5.2 Most leisure time is wasted

with gossiping SA A N DA SD

5.3 One does not need a diary

to arrange his activities SA A N DA SD

5.4 I always eat, sleep and

wake up at a set time SA A N DA SD
5.5 Time-table make the man robot-like

5.6 Speed is a devilish act

5.7 The rosary is often used to pass boring time

5.8 Time is gold but no one appreciates it

5.9 I remember the past with affection

5.10 I have never seen my colleagues arrive late for work

5.11 The best way to meet another person is at approximate time, such as 6-7 p.m

5.12 dependent on biological clock is better than wrist-watch
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