TAKing The war To scOTlAnd And France: The supPlY And trAnSPortAtion Of English Armies By sea, 1320-60

Being a Thesis SubmiTTed For The degRee of Doctor of philosophy

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Abbreviations

Anonimalle The Anonimalle Chronicle, 1333-81, ed. V.H. Galbraith (Manchester, 1927)
Bain Calendar of documents relating to Scotland 3 1307-1357 (Edinburgh, 1881-1888)
BIHR Bulletin of The Institute Of Historical Research
BPR Register of Edward The Black Prince
CCHR Calendar of Charter Rolls,
CCR Calendar of Close Rolls
CFR Calendar of Fine Rolls
Cal. Inq. Misc. Calendar of Inquisitions Miscellaneous
Chapters T.F. Tout, Chapters in the administrative history of England (Manchester, 1920-33)
CPR Calendar of Patent Rolls
ECHR Economic History Review
EHR English Historical Review
Foedera Foedera, ed. T. Rymer, revised edn, 4 vols in 7 parts (Record Comm., 1816-69)
Froissart Oeuvres de Froissart, ed. K. de Lettenhove, 28 vols (Brussels, 1867-77)
JBS Journal of British Studies
JMH Journal of Military History
JMMH Journal of Medieval Military History, eds., B.S. Bachrach, C.J. Rogers, K. DeVries
Lanercot Chronicon de Lanercost, MCCI-MCCCXLVI, ed. J. Stevenson (Edinburgh, 1839)
Le Bel Chronique de Jean le Bel, ed. J. Viard and E. Dépréz, 2 vols (Paris, 1904-5)
Melsa Chronicon Monasterii de Melsa, ed. E.A. Bond, 3 vols, Rolls Ser. (London, 1889)
MM Mariners Mirror
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INTRODUCTION

'In a very short time the wind had filled the sail and blown us out of sight of the land of our birth. And I tell you now that anyone who sets out on such a dangerous course is foolhardy. For at night you fall asleep without knowing whether you will find yourself the next morning at the bottom of the sea.'

'Let me tell you of the great peril that befell a Catholic king in the presence of the Old Pilgrim. This king was crossing the sea between Cyprus and Syria in company with other ships and galleys. The weather was fine. Suddenly a squall sprang up which did not last long but can be extremely dangerous if it strikes a ship with all sail spread. An old sailor said that it would be wise to lower the sail. But the captain paid no heed. Hit by another squall in such wise and with such violence that the ship went over on her beams-ends and was half under water. The great sail and topmast were in the sea.'

The above two passages suggests that maritime travel during the middle ages was a dangerous affair, and indeed it could be, as Edward III's return journey in 1343 from his campaign in Brittany amply shows; sea journeys could be perilous. Nevertheless, by the time Edward III crossed the Channel on 28 October 1359 English forces had already achieved many successful crossings to launch campaigns in France. If the numerous flotillas of the diplomatic embassies, 'micro-fleets' and trading vessels were added to these major expeditions, one could safely say that the English had, by this period, developed a safe and secure system of cross Channel communication and transportation. Nor is the maritime contribution to the Scottish wars of this period to be underestimated. Indeed, without ships supplying garrisons and armies, blockading enemy ports and providing the surprise element inherent in amphibious landings,

1 Jean de Joinville on sailing to the seventh crusade, from N. Ohler, The medieval traveller, trans. C. Hillier (Boydell, 1998), p. 45.
3 Anonimalle, pp. 17-18; Knighton, p. 47; Melsa, III, pp. 51-52; Murimuth, p. 135.
4 Foedera, III, i, p. 452.
5 St. Sardos 1324-5; the Low Countries campaigns of 1338-40, which account for two crossings; Brittany 1342-3; 1345; Crécy/Calais 1346-7; 1350 (the battle of Winchelsea) in addition to Edward's crossing to Calais; 1355; 1359. It needs to be borne in mind that some of these crossings involved more than one flotilla of ships.
pursuit of Edwardian ambitions in Scotland would have been almost impossible. Despite the importance of this facet of Edwardian military capabilities, and the fact that it usually involved the mobilisation of more manpower and money than its land equivalent, the maritime dimension of King Edward’s wars has received little attention over the years from scholars. The fleet that transported the king to Brittany in October 1342 numbered 487 ships and was manned by 8,796 mariners, while the land army it was transporting consisted of some 4,500 land based soldiers. Historians have yet to explore the implications of figures such as these.

This thesis will examine the maritime resources available to Edward II and Edward III. As the majority of the ships utilised by the kings of this period were requisitioned merchant vessels, the inner process of this operation of raising a fleet needs to be studied more closely. In addition, because the supply system that the land based troops relied on was largely conducted at sea, an assessment needs to be made of the nature and effectiveness of the maritime contribution to logistical support. Perhaps, therefore, the main focus of the thesis is to assess quantitatively the contribution made by maritime communities to the supply and transportation of troops during the period 1320-1360. The period covered by this research arguably witnessed the greatest change in England’s military community, and to her role as a major power

6 M. Stanford Reid, ‘Sea-power in the Anglo-Scottish war, 1296-1328’, MM 46 (1960), pp. 7-23, makes some valuable comments on the maritime war of the period.
8 C. Lambert, ‘An army transport fleet of Edward III’s reign: the maritime dimension of the Brittany campaign, 1342-3’ (Unpublished MA thesis, University of Hull, 2005), p. 85, although this present research has slightly up-dated the authors previous study. The number of land-based personnel includes an estimation of the non-combatant element; the actual numbers of paid soldiers was 1,800 men-at-arms and 1,800 mounted archers. See A. Ayton, Knights and warhorses: the English aristocracy under Edward III (Boydell, 1999), pp. 14, 259.
in continental Europe to have occurred during the middle ages. These changes, which have been characterised as a 'military revolution', have deservedly attracted much attention and debate over the last ten years. Nevertheless, the research carried out so far has, understandably, centred on the role of land-based personnel and the life and contribution of the gentry and aristocracy to military and public life. Central to this new direction was the work of the pioneers of fourteenth century military studies carried out by J. E. Morris, T. F. Tout, A. E. Prince, H. J. Hewitt and N. B. Lewis, whose research laid the foundation for further study. Indeed, our understanding of the fourteenth century military community, although not complete, has gathered much pace in recent years, as new structural and methodological approaches have been adopted. The most influential historians of this new approach are Michael Prestwich, Philip Morgan and Andrew Ayton. Prestwich has increased our knowledge of the structure of the military community, its financial underpinnings and the role of its personnel and some of the earlier major developments. Philip Morgan's important

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study on the military community of Cheshire increased our understanding of the relationships that existed between the men serving in the wars of the period. Andrew Ayton’s work has fully introduced the available source material pertinent to the Edwardian military community, while his most recent contributions have centred on what can be termed ‘network relational studies’, an aspect of military service prosopography, in which the relationships that existed between the captains and their men are fully analysed, as is the composition of Edwardian armies. These works have led to a greater understanding of the reasons for English success in the French war under Edward III.

Given the fact that the main focus of this thesis is the maritime resources available to Edward II and Edward III, what this brief survey of publications on the land-based personnel helps to show is how far the emphasis of research has favoured the knights, esquires and their mounts, rather than the mariners of the period. Indeed, no researcher has yet attempted the formidable task of a ‘network study’ on shipowners, masters, and the familial relationships between the mariners and masters of the port communities. This would surely bear some fruit as even a quick glance at the records on these mariners reveals within the communities a strong family tradition of serving at sea and inter-locking service in both trade and war. But, in many ways, research on the maritime aspect of England’s wars in the fourteenth century has failed to keep pace with the studies on the land campaigns and the land-based military

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the application of new methodologies and areas of study.

This is not to suggest that the maritime arm of medieval England has been completely ignored; in fact, quite the contrary is the case. Studies of late medieval naval history have been written since the early nineteenth century and a keen interest was taken in the subject during the early twentieth century. Sir Nicholas Harris Nicolas undertook the pioneering work in this field in the mid nineteenth century. He utilized valuable record sources, such as pay accounts, before The Public Record Office existed. But his work could be greatly extended, and for example, his research was followed with studies on the navy by C. D. Younge, W. Clowes, M. Oppenheim and later F. W. Brooks. More recent research on the maritime arm of this period can essentially be placed into four distinct categories: studies which concentrate on the ports of the ships; those which discuss the process of organising and operating a medieval fleet and the tactics it would adopt; those which concentrate on the ships themselves, how they were built and how they were used; and, finally, the research that has examined the mariners themselves.

The studies whose research centres on a particular port and its wealth in medieval period are numerous. The confederacy of the Cinque Ports in particular has deservedly attracted much attention. In addition there is a wealth of information on

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17 W. Clowes, *The royal navy: a history from the earliest times to the present* (London, 1897-1903).
20 For example M. Burrows, *Cinque ports* (London, 1888); F. W. Brooks, 'The Cinque Ports', *MM* 15 (1929), pp. 142-191 (this piece includes full transcriptions of the charters of 1206); *idem*, 'The Cinque ports feud with Great Yarmouth in the thirteenth century', *MM* 19 (1933); K. M. E. Murray,
other important port towns of England, such as Southampton, Portsmouth, Bristol, Exeter, Great Yarmouth, Hull, and King's Lynn. The maritime history of the Channel Islands is another area that has been researched. These few studies are in effect only the tip of the iceberg of works that centre on individual ports.

The second category of research is perhaps the one that has attracted by far the largest interest, the organisation and tactical use of fleets has generated many books and articles. An understanding of how a fleet was raised and administered can be gleaned from the studies by T. J. Runyan and S. Rose. The tactical use of fleets and ships during this period has also been widely studied, both with reference to specific battles and to the operational deployment of fleets. Of particular interest in this field is the work of N. A. M. Rodger, J. Sherborne and I Friel and many others. The

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24 For example, *Local markets and regional trade in medieval Exeter* (Cambridge, 1995).
25 For example, A. Saul, 'Great Yarmouth and the Hundred Years War in the fourteenth century', *BIHR* 52 (1979), pp. 105-115.
26 For example, W. R. Childs, *The trade and shipping of Hull 1300-1500* (Hull, 1990).
strategic use of ships during this period, although well researched, generally paints a less than positive picture of the understanding that governments had of naval strategies and tactics during the Hundred Years War.\textsuperscript{36} This present thesis seeks to illuminate, and show the complexities of the bureaucratic procedures involved in raising a fleet and the administrative achievements gained through doing so, as well as to show that the Edwardian kings and their advisors had a firm grasp of the advantages to be gained through the deployment of fleets.

Research on the ships themselves has also gathered much pace recently and this has been helped in many ways by improved archaeological and preservation techniques. The studies that concentrate on the ships are both wide-ranging and large. For example there have been numerous works on the ships of the Vikings\textsuperscript{37} and those of the Mediterranean city-states.\textsuperscript{38} However, the most common type of ship in the English context during the period researched here was the Cog. This was a vessel with a large cargo capacity and a high freeboard, which ideally suited it to the northern seas. It generally had a single square sail, a stern rudder and a flat bottom, and was clinker built. Other types of ships did make an appearance during this period, such as galleys, but they were never suited to long periods of service at sea in the rough tidal waters of the English Channel, Irish Sea and North Sea. Again, the development of

Kepler, 'The effects of the battle of Sluys upon the administration of naval impressment', \textit{Speculum} 48 (1973), pp. 70-77.
\textsuperscript{35} See, for example, Susan Rose, \textit{The medieval sea} (London, 2007), chapter 5, which concentrates on the war at sea during the hundred years war.
\textsuperscript{36} For example J. Sumption, \textit{Trial by battle} (London, 1990-99), who is less than positive about the capabilities of the fleets and administration of this period. A more positive appraisal of the maritime contribution can be found in C. Richmond, 'The war at sea', \textit{The hundred years war}, ed. K. Fowler (London, 1971), pp. 96-121.
\textsuperscript{38} For example, L. Mott, \textit{Sea power in the medieval Mediterranean: the Catalan and Aragonese fleet in the war of the Sicilian vespers} (Florida, 2003).
these ships can be charted through numerous books and articles. The final category of research has concentrated on the mariners themselves. But although there are accessible works on this subject, the mariners have usually been dealt with in short articles, and the detailed sources that would allow a study of some ship masters on similar lines to those used for the landed gentry has not yet been investigated. One of the aims of this current research is to bring out into the light some of the sources and the masters of the ships so as to provide a foundation for further research on individual members of the maritime community.

As was mentioned above a central aspect of this dissertation is to examine the role and contribution played by the maritime communities of England during 1320-60 in supplying troops in both Scotland and France. The issue of victual supply has been dealt with in the past, but it has mainly concentrated on the system of purveyance, the victualling of garrisons and the supply of armies from an over land point of view.

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41 There has recently been a study on the business relationships and financial workings of the medieval seamen, the merchants of the period and their lives at sea by R. McGregor-Ward, 'The mystery of the medieval shipmaster: the shipmaster in law, in business, and at sea, between the mid-fourteenth and mid-fifteenth centuries' (Unpublished PhD thesis, London, 2000).

There has been a little research on sea borne supply but this has tended to concentrate solely on the French war and brings out only general points. Yet the regular system of supply in both of these theatres of war relied heavily on waterborne transport. The Scottish campaigns in particular were dependant on victuals transported by sea. The garrisons of Scotland, such as Berwick, Edinburgh and Perth could not have existed without regular and sufficient supplies carried largely by ships. Supply fleets in the French wars were less regular and in some cases less important. Firstly, those armies serving in Gascony, such as Henry of Grosmont’s in 1345-46 and the Black Prince’s in 1355-56, essentially campaigned in a block of territory controlled by Edward III as duke of Aquitaine. Therefore supplies could be obtained through local communities. Nevertheless, as we shall see, English armies crossing to Gascony were usually careful to take at least some victuals with them. But English armies campaigning in northern France had to be supplied with help from regional allies (as in 1338-40) or they had to bring enough supplies to last several weeks. Of course, an army could


44 C. Candy, ‘The Scottish wars of Edward III’ (Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Durham, 2004), chapter 10 details the role that ships played in the supply operations as well as a general discussion on the participation of the navy during the wars in Scotland.

45 Transportation by sea was favoured because freighting victuals by this method usually cost the crown much less in monetary output, with waterborne transportation being anywhere up to eight times
always try to live off the countryside it traversed; but this form of supply could not be
guaranteed and a careful commander would always make sure his men had ample
food for at least a few weeks at the start of a campaign. Seen in this light the logistical
capabilities of the English merchant marine were paramount to any successful
campaign operation in enemy territory.

In order fully to assess and understand the contribution made to the wars of
Edward II and Edward III by England’s merchant marine this thesis will focus on four
areas that the ports were most heavily involved with. The first part of the study will
focus on the procedural and administrative capabilities of the crown during this period,
paying particular attention to the sources that allow the historian to examine such
areas. Following on from this, will be an analysis of how the English government
requisitioned sufficient numbers of ships to serve in both supply and transport fleets,
bringing to light new theories which highlight the complexity of the system utilised
by the Edwardian kings. The second section of the thesis will examine the role that
ships played in the supply of armies and garrisons within both Scotland and France, as
well as their military participation in the expeditions of the period. The English royal
campaigns in Scotland between 1322 and 1360 will be investigated. Each campaign
will be analysed individually and an assessment of the contribution of the maritime
communities will be discussed in relation to the type and amount of victuals
transported and the number of ports, ships and mariners involved.46 The period from
1346-60 will be dealt with separately because after Neville’s Cross - apart from the
Burnt Candlemas - this period was free from major royal invasions, though the supply

46 The thesis has been structured in this way because the Exchequer evidence alone lacks significant
details about the maritime involvement in many expeditions. Consequently a lot of comparative data
between the various administrative departments has been included so that the findings are more clearly
understood.
of the many English garrisons had to be continued. The military naval contribution to the king’s wars of the period, specifically in Scotland, will also be assessed because this helps us to understand just how burdensome the demands of the crown on the merchant marine were in this period; and also allows us to discover the overall involvement of individual ships and their crews in the wars of the two Edward’s. Failure to examine this dimension of the maritime communities’ participation in the wars would leave an incomplete picture as to their involvement.47

The third area of examination that this thesis will concentrate on is the composition of the many transport fleets of the period. The aim is to discover how many ports, ships and mariners were involved in each royal transport fleet of the period, the geographical spread of the ports contributing ships to the fleets, and how many land based men and horses they were required to transport. In addition the composition of what can be termed ‘micro fleets’ will be assessed. These are the many small fleets of ships, which transported the king’s lieutenants and his diplomatic embassies to France. The fourth and final section of the present research will focus on several issues that have been raised throughout the previous chapters. Of importance are the problems relating to an absence of payrolls for several major royal transport fleets of the period, an increasing tendency for the crown to partly privatise large sections of the supply and transportation systems from 1337, and the effects the Black Death had on the availability of shipping. Furthermore, it will be shown that by examining the maritime participation, alongside the land based operations, in campaigns such as the siege of Calais in 1347 new interpretations can be put forward as to the scale, scope and timing of such expeditions, which have usually been ignored due to the lack of source material from a land army point of view. Moreover, the

47 The lack of research and focus on the military role of ships had been noted by W. Stanford Reid,
careers of several masters and mariners, assessing their involvement in the supply and transport fleets, will be put forward with the aim of showing that the masters of the ships were an integral part of the Edwardian military machine, with a collective expertise that was vital to the English war effort. By focusing on such issues this research will be able to form a greater understanding of the size and distribution of the merchant marine of this period. This will be undertaken by comparing all of the individual ships and masters who participated in each separate campaign. It should be possible to locate and record every individual ship involved in campaigns during this period. Each campaign will be compared to the next to see how many unique ships and masters can be seen. This will allow an estimate to be put forward as to the number of individual ships in use from 1320-1360.
CHAPTER TWO

SOURCES, PROCEDURES AND RAISING A FLEET

2.1 SOURCES

The sources, which this present study will utilize, are diverse in nature, but can nonetheless be grouped into three categories. The first and most important are the Exchequer accounts; the second category includes the Chancery enrolments; and the last, the contemporary chronicle accounts. The Exchequer and Chancery categories contain distinct sub-classes within them. The Exchequer records, for example, come in at least three separate forms. Perhaps the most important are the accounts of particulars compiled for production and audit at the Exchequer (E101). The second group of Exchequer related sources are the pipe rolls, which are the Exchequer's own records of various accounts processed by it. The pipe rolls summarise the contents of the particulars. The 'accounts various',¹ are usually much more detailed, providing a breakdown of the expenses recorded on them. The third class of Exchequer source is made up of the accounts recorded through the Wardrobe (a division of the royal household). They were often written up in book form prior to submission to the Exchequer for audit. The Chancery enrolments also contain many sub-classes of rolls. The most important of these for our purposes are the Treaty Rolls (C76) and Gascon Rolls (C61). Other Chancery rolls, such as the Close and Patent, are also valuable for the historian of naval affairs and are particularly accessible because they exist in calendared and published formats. The National Archive source collection known as Chancery Miscellanea (C47) is an artificial grouping created by modern archivists at Chancery Lane and contains governmental records from several departments. Our third category of source material, the chronicles of the period, are varied in content,
authorial viewpoint and reliability. Some are more valuable for this research project than others. For example, the numbers of ships involved in the Brittany expedition of 1342-3 as recorded by Adam Murimuth are surprisingly close to those supplied by the administrative records of the three fleets.²

Perhaps the most important sources for this study, and the ones which will consequently provide the bulk of the evidence, are the Exchequer particulars and Wardrobe books. The Wardrobe accounts from the years 1320 to 1360 are the ideal place to begin any research on medieval ships.³ The importance of the Wardrobe to this study stems from the fact that during the reign of Edward I it underwent a dramatic development in its function. This evolution occurred around the time of the Welsh and Scottish wars of the 1280s and 1290s.⁴ Because the Wardrobe was an itinerant financial centre, always present with the king, it allowed greater freedom of action for the king in terms of military expenditure. The Wardrobe could issue debentures immediately to soldiers allowing the king to increase the size of his force without having to rely on the slow bureaucracy of the fixed Exchequer. In addition the king could also take out loans with foreign or domestic lenders through the existing Wardrobe system. As a consequence the Wardrobe provided the greater freedom, flexibility and independence that the Edwardian kings sought to develop in relation to the payment of army and navy wages. And so when the king personally led or assembled an army its wages as well as those of the shipmasters and crews were recorded and paid through the Wardrobe.

¹ These are categorised in The National Archive under E101.
³ BL, Stowe MS 553; BL, Cotton MSS, Nero C.VIII; Norwell; E36/204; Farley's 1359-60 accounts, which are E101/27/22; E101/27/23; E101/27/24; E101/27/25; E101/27/31; E101/27/36; E101/27/37.
The wage details recorded in the Wardrobe books are usually to be found in the last few sections of the final accounts submitted to the Exchequer. The payments made to the land-based retinues are recorded under the heading *vadia guerre* and those made to the shipmasters under the section *vadia marinariorum* or *nautourum*. These accounts, like the Exchequer particulars, allow the historian to view the transport and naval contributions of the period (including supply fleets) at the level of individual ships and masters grouped according to particular ports. Thus, in the left hand margin of the Wardrobe books the individual ports that provided the ships are listed. Bracketed under each port are the ships and masters that received payment from the crown for a specified period of service. For example, in William Edington’s Wardrobe accounts (1341-44), one sub-heading says ‘*naves de Faversham*’, and incorporated into the brackets which form this sub-section is a list of all the ships from this particular port. The format for each of the ship entries is standardised with the master’s name, ship’s name, number of mariners and dates of service being provided. So the first entry is recorded as follows; ‘Peter Seaman, master of *La Katerine*; wages for himself, one constable and twenty-six mariners for twenty-one days at a total cost of £7 17s 6d’.

The sub-class of Exchequer particulars will also feature heavily throughout this thesis. In fact, in relation to the study of victual supply they are by far the most important source. Clerks who were given specific logistical tasks compiled these accounts. Within are recorded the expenses incurred by them during their missions and, more importantly, the type, amount and cost of the victuals they had purchased and shipped to a royal army or garrison. These accounts were often compiled

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5 E36/204, p. 223.
6 With the possible exception of the 1322 campaign, because the Wardrobe accounts for that expedition contain a section on victuals: see BL, Stowe MS 553, fols 40r - 54v.
concurrently with those of the Wardrobe. However, sometimes these particulars could be linked to the Wardrobe, an example being the issues of the paymasters of the infantry in Wales during 1287, which although having the appearance of a separate accounting procedure, were written up under the direction of the Wardrobe. Another particular account that was linked directly to the Wardrobe was the payroll of mariners’ wages from ports north of the Thames that transported the king to the Low Countries in July 1338. This records the wages paid to 122 ships, manned by 4,045 masters and mariners, yet all these ships, except two, are to be found in the accounts of William Norwell. Moreover the order in which these ships are listed in the particular is the same as that in the Wardrobe accounts, suggesting that the Wardrobe compiled its records from the particular (or a commonly used document) at the end of the campaign. At other times the particulars could be compiled during a royal campaign yet remain totally independent of the Wardrobe accounts. A good example of this is the account listing the payments to shipmasters who were to transport the earls of Gloucester and Pembroke to Brittany in 1342. Although this account was compiled concurrently with the Wardrobe accounts, it is nonetheless entirely separate from the work of William Edington and was not included in the final wage section of his records.

This independence of the particulars from the umbrella of the Wardrobe is underlined by the separate recording of particulars of accounts on the pipe rolls. As already noted, included among these accounts are those containing detailed

8 Ibid., p. 19.
9 E101/21/10, mm. 2-5.
10 The Millane of 70 tons, mastered by John Pache junior; the Katerine of 40 tons, mastered by Richard Albion. 1 constable, 18 mariners and 2 pages, manned Pache’s ship; 1 constable, 32 mariners and 4 pages manned Albion’s ship.
11 Norwell, pp. 363-386.
12 E101/23/22.
information on the collection and supply of victuals. For example, it is possible to 
quantify the types and amounts of victuals sent from Ireland to Scotland for the 1322 
campaign of Edward II.\footnote{E101/15/36; E101/16/6; E101/16/7; E101/16/8; E101/16/20; E101/16/21.} So, for instance, the first of these particulars records the 
amount of wine and salt available for shipment to Scotland. Twenty-one people 
provided the victuals at a cost of £120 10s. Following this is a record of the ships that 
transported these victuals to Skinburness in Cumbria. Similarly in another account are 
recorded the particulars of John Rathfodam and Jordan Gretnah for the victuals 
shipped from Drogheda to Skinburness.\footnote{E101/16/21.} The amount of wheat and oats freighted is 
recorded, as are the names of the individual vessels that were involved.\footnote{E101/16/21,m.8.} The 
evidence thus contained reveals that 808 quarters 8 bushels and 11 parts of corn were 
provided by sixty-six people and transported in six ships.

In addition to the information contained in the particulars relating to victual 
supply, these records also provide valuable data on ships. They record the arresting of 
ships and also the payment of shipmasters and owners. For example, one such account 
contains the names of thirty-three ships and their masters arrested for service in the 
ports of the southwest for service in the 1327 Weardale campaign.\footnote{E101/17/35.} As with the vadia 
marinariorum section of the Wardrobe books, these separate Exchequer particulars 
allow the historian to investigate transport fleets at the level of individual ports, ships 
and masters. In fact when analysing the ‘micro-fleets’ of Edward’s lieutenants in 
France and those ships which transported diplomatic embassies to the continent these 
particulars become the most important source of information.\footnote{For example E101/25/9, which lists the 148 ships that transported Henry of Grosmont to Gascony in 1345. A good example of a diplomatic embassy is that recorded on E101/23/5. This relates the costs incurred while transporting Gawain Corder to Brittany. His mission ran for seventy days from 22 August 1341 and he was transported by one ship and one barge mastered by William Bacoun and an overall crew of 135 mariners, at a total cost £35 5s 9d. Royal administrators also required passage to}
Occasionally an account was accompanied to the Exchequer by supporting documents, including indentures. These usually take the form of agreements between king’s clerks and merchants, burgesses or ship owners by which the latter were to provide a specified number of ships for service. For instance, in 1335 Philip Clancow, clerk of the king, concluded five indentures with nine ship owners and burgesses from Welsh ports to provide ships and ships’ equipment for the 1335 Scottish campaign.\(^{18}\) The names of these nine owners and burgesses are recorded, as are the ship names and who mastered them. The indentures even record the size of the ships, crew numbers and what types of alterations have been made to the ships to make them suitable for service. For example, the *Trinite* of Tenby of 200 tons, described as ‘*magna navis*’, was crewed by 1 master, 1 constable and 100 mariners. In addition, it had been adapted for wartime service by having a forecastle and topcastle fitted as well as being supplied with crossbows at a cost of £124, including the wages of the crew and a carpenter.\(^{19}\) Similarly, sets of indentures are attached to a document that relates to the Saint Sardos campaign of 1324-5.\(^{20}\) These indentures were compiled by Richard de la Pole of Hull, collector of the king’s customs and an important figure in both Edward II’s and Edward III’s campaigns.\(^{21}\) They deal with the supply of arms for the forthcoming campaign and take the form of agreements between Pole and local castle custodians and sheriffs who were to supply specified numbers of springalds, quarrels, *clascibus*\(^{22}\) and horseshoes. For instance Thomas Deynill, custodian of Conisborough and from the Channel Islands. For example, in the 1330s William de la Rue was sent to the Islands. He had to wait eighteen days at Portsmouth before he could sail, and in the following year he waited fifteen days, although his passage was cheap, only costing him 2s 1d on one occasion in 1332. See E. W. Stevenson, ‘*The middle ages*’, p. 29.

\(^{18}\) E101/19/14, mm. 2-6.  
\(^{19}\) E101/19/14, m. 7.  
\(^{20}\) E101/16/34, nos. 1-17.  
\(^{21}\) For Richard’s importance to the campaigns of the two Edwards, see E. B. Fryde, *William de la Pole, merchant and king’s banker (1366)* (London, 1988), chapters 2 and 3.  
\(^{22}\) Exactly what a *clascibus* was is hard to determine. However, it seems probable that it was an early form of gunpowder weapon or a type of ingredient for gunpowder. It is known that in this period many
castle near Doncaster, agreed to provide 100 springalds and 1,000 quarrels from Lincoln, 1,000 quarrels from Nottingham and 1,000 grapples from the castle of Conisborough. This was agreed at Nottingham on 18 December 1324. With regard to the naval contribution, the last indenture provides the names of the masters and ships that transported the collected arms to Gascony and which ports they were from.24

The evidence entered on the pipe rolls can be used to supplement the two previously discussed subclasses of Exchequer accounts. In some cases the original particulars of an account have not survived. Therefore, the information taken from them and summarised on the pipe roll becomes important. For example, in 1342 the fleet of ships that transported the earl of Northampton to Brittany is listed in the Wardrobe book as being sixteen ships in total. This is because many of the ships that transported the earl failed to return to England for the king and were later punished by having pay forfeited or deducted. Consequently they were not enrolled on any final payroll. Yet we can better understand the actual size of the earl’s fleet by examining the pipe roll evidence, which records the wages paid to 145 ships’ crews prior to the campaign to prevent them from leaving port.25 However, when the original particulars do survive because they are much more detailed, they are always to be preferred over the pipe roll entries.

names were given to gunpowder weapons and so it is difficult to be precise about what they are: see R. E. Latham, Revised medieval Latin word-list from British sources (London, 1965), p. 90. On gunpowder weapons and the many names for both weapons and powder, see K. DeVries, Medieval military technology (Peterborough, 1992), pp. 143-163 and idem, ‘Gunpowder and early gunpowder weapons’, Gunpowder: the history of an international technology, ed. B. J. Buchanan, (Bath, 1996), pp. 121-37. Also, see T. F. Tout, Firearms in England in the fourteenth century (London, 1968); R. D. Smith, ‘Artillery and the hundred years war: myth and interpretation’, Arms, armies and fortifications in the hundred years war, eds, A. Curry and M. Hughes (Boydell, 1999), pp. 151-160, especially pp. 151, 153 which suggests that the earliest known reference to gunpowder was in Florence in 1326. Although he does acknowledge that gunpowder must have been in use earlier than 1326 and that the terminology surrounding it is sometimes difficult to interpret.

23 E101/16/34, no. 3.
24 Ibid., no. 17.
The Exchequer sources provide unrivalled detail with regard to supply by sea and the supply and transport of troops. Nevertheless, care has to be taken when using them as they can sometimes give the impression of providing all the relevant information about a particular campaign, when in reality they are only showing a fraction of what actually occurred. For example, a Wardrobe book, however detailed, is unlikely to include all the information pertinent to the naval contingent of a particular campaign. Indeed, the results that are gained by using only a Wardrobe book can often be misleading. This point is well illustrated by examining William Edington’s accounts of the Brittany campaign of 1342-3. As noted above, the transport fleet of the earl of Northampton, which left in August 1342, is recorded as being only sixteen vessels. This small number of ships is not the real size of the earl’s fleet. He had 1,100 men under his command and probably close to 3,000 horses to transport. Evidence for the other ships are to be found in other sources, notably charters of pardons given to ship-owners/masters and their crews for free service in transporting this army to Brittany. Similarly, a further thirty-one vessels in the Northampton fleet were ‘struck out’ of Edington’s final accounts for failing to return to England to transport the king’s army. The simplicity and neatness of the final accounts of the Wardrobe have been questioned before and it is clear in relation to the make-up of naval entries that over reliance on them can lead to inaccurate results.

Wardrobe accounts and books can also appear in a variety of formats. As a consequence, some provide more detail than others. For example, the Wardrobe accounts of both William Norwell (1338-40) and William Farley (1359-60) record the

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25 For example E372/187, m. 42 records the payment of 45 ships not recorded in any other source.
26 E36/204, p. 238.
27 SCI/39, nos. 39, 157; SCI/40, nos. 10-20; SCI/41, no. 66.
29 See A. Ayton, _Knights and warhorses_, chapter 5, especially pp. 138-156.
payments made to army captains to cover the cost of the re-passage of their horses back to England.\textsuperscript{30} Yet the records of William Edington covering the Brittany campaign of 1342-43 do not. Similarly, the later Wardrobe books of Edward III’s reign are more uniform than the earlier ones, such as Richard Ferriby’s accounts relating to the Scottish expeditions in the 1330s.\textsuperscript{31} Again a comparison of the 1334-35 \textit{vadia nautourum} from Ferriby’s accounts with those of Norwell’s or Edington’s shows immediate differences.\textsuperscript{32} The format of Ferriby’s account is much more jumbled than the later books. In Ferriby, the ships and masters are listed in no particular order, the sub-sections being a mixture of ships from different ports.\textsuperscript{33} This being said, the accounts themselves are undoubtedly unrivalled for the detail they contain. The accounts of Nicholas Huggate that deal with the Saint Sardos campaign of 1324-25 are not Wardrobe records. However, their format is exactly the same with a separate pay section for the maritime transport fleet divided into separate sections by port.\textsuperscript{34}

The sources that were produced within the Chancery are more varied than the Exchequer accounts. The Chancery had developed in a similar way to the Exchequer. Originally it was an itinerant personal department of the king, but increasing so much in size and scope that it eventually became a sedentary department, with its own courts at Westminster.\textsuperscript{35} The Chancery operated as both a secretariat, controlling the great seal, and as a department of administration. The Chancellor as head of this department had certain freedoms and he could perform duties ‘without special

\textsuperscript{30} Norwell, pp. 386-391. On Farley, see A. Ayton, \textit{Knights and warhorses}, p. 268.
\textsuperscript{31} BL, Cotton MSS, Nero C.VIII.
\textsuperscript{32} BL, Cotton MSS, Nero C.VIII, fols 264r-266v. Norwell, pp. 363-386.
\textsuperscript{33} BL, Stowe MS 553, fols 76r-77v has a similar jumbled \textit{nautourum} section. Apart from the section recording the king’s ships, the rest of the vessels, which served during the campaign are recorded together under the heading of ‘\textit{naute de flota costiere maris occidentalis}’ ibid., fol. 76v.
\textsuperscript{34} BL, Add MS 7967, fols 94r to 99v.
\textsuperscript{35} See B. Wilkinson, \textit{The Chancery under Edward III} (Manchester, 1929), chapter 1.
authorisation direct or indirect from the crown'. The Chancery, in effect, managed the issue of royal orders and reproduced these in the form of letters patent or close, as well as recording any form of grant or payment made under the great seal and noting certain parliamentary activities and the letters pertaining to the king's foreign possessions. The printed or calendared Chancery documents come in a variety of formats. These sources are easily the most accessible and they are not to be undervalued. Orders for the purveyance of victuals, the arrest of ships and the issue of protections to ship masters are just some of the important entries of relevance to this thesis that are recorded in these documents. They also provide much evidence on the service of ships. For example, during the 1342-43 Brittany campaign, 230 ships are recorded on the Close Rolls as deserting the king outside the ports of Brest and Vannes. Yet when these 230 ships are compared to the Wardrobe accounts, eighty-eight vessels from the rolls are not included in the final accounts of William Edington, a sizeable number of ships that otherwise would not be noticed. The other calendared and printed documents, such as Patent and Fine Rolls, also contain valuable information on the service of ships. For example, issues of protections listed in the Patent Rolls can supplement our knowledge of the 1327 Weardale campaign, which apart from two small Exchequer accounts lacks detail. In May to July 1327 fifteen protections are recorded for ships from various ports taking victuals to the king. Similarly, the Fine Rolls also note that in 1342 the county of Essex was required to pay the wages of the crews and the fitting out of ships from its ports until the

36 Ibid., p. 26, the king did however control the great seal personally and he could call on the chancellor to surrender it to whom ever he wished. The Chancery was usually involved with most of the officials of state both domestic and foreign.


38 CCR, 1343-46, pp. 128-32.

assembled vessels reached the port of embarkation.\textsuperscript{40} The *Charter Rolls* contain similar information about ship service. For instance, they record in detail the agreement between Edward III and the burgesses of Clifton, Dartmouth and Hardenesse in which the latter promised to supply two ships of war both to be manned *dupplici eskipamento* for forty days at their own costs.\textsuperscript{41} In return the burgesses were free of tolls, 'pavage, murage, payage, *cuueragio*, stallage, passage, anchorage, culage, pontage, barbicanage, quayage, stondage, sedage, wharfage, plankage, lastage, levage, and all other customs of all their goods and merchandise throughout the king's realm and power'. They were also given the right to elect their own mayor. These were clearly broad grants and show the value the king placed on raising sufficient numbers of ships for his campaigns.

The most important of the other Chancery enrolments (available in print) that contain detailed information on both victuals and ships are the *Rotuli Scotiae*: the Scottish rolls. The entries recorded on these rolls include detailed orders for specified victuals and for the arrest of ships for the Scottish campaigns. Thus, in July 1336 we can see that the king ordered two ships from Bristol to supply forty tuns of wine, sixty quarters of oats, twenty-four bacons and 2,000 horseshoes to his forces serving in Scotland.\textsuperscript{42} In many cases the orders for victuals recorded on the *Rotuli Scotiae* allow a glimpse into the organisation of the supply system, from the main supply depots of Carlisle and Berwick, to the garrisons further north. So, in March 1339 we find orders issued for the collection and distribution of victuals to English garrisons in Scotland.\textsuperscript{43} In addition direct orders to specific counties for the purveyance of certain foodstuffs are also contained in these sources. For example, in 1333 eighteen counties in

\textsuperscript{40} CFR, 1337-47, p. 307.
\textsuperscript{41} CCHR, 5, 1341-1417, p. 3.
\textsuperscript{42} Rot. Scot. I, p. 436.
\textsuperscript{43} Ibid., p. 562.
England were ordered to supply a total of 13,100 quarters and three bushels of wheat, 15,660 quarters and fifty bushels of oats, 5,500 quarters of beans and peas, 1,600 bacons, 1,200 quarters of salt and 200 tuns of cider. This huge amount of supplies was required by Edward’s large army camped outside Berwick in the summer of that year.

The Rotuli Scotiae also contains information on the raising and organisation of ships. For example, in the 1333 campaign, which witnessed Edward’s crushing defeat of the Scots at Halidon Hill, the rolls record that twenty-four ports from north of the Thames and thirty from the south were asked to arrest ships for the king’s use in this expedition. Moreover, orders sent out to individual ports to provide a specified number of ships are also recorded. In 1333 Newcastle and Great Yarmouth were asked to supply one ship of war for the king’s use and in 1334 John Crabbe and James Kingston were issued orders to arrest ten ships of war from eight east coast ports.

Printed editions exist for only selected rolls from the remaining two classes of Chancery enrolments: the Treaty Rolls and Gascon Rolls. The former records information pertinent to ships serving in the French wars of the period, while the latter contain a collection of varied documents, in relation to the government of Aquitaine. The evidence on the Treaty Rolls can be valuable especially when used in conjunction with the Exchequer evidence. This is because the rolls provide information on the arrest orders of ships, what date these were issued and when and where the fleet was expected to gather. Details on specific ships are also recorded on them as is information regarding the ‘election’ of mariners. For example, the fleet that transported Sir Walter de Mauny to Brest in March 1342 is recorded in detail on the

44 Ibid., p. 229-30 see also Bain, no. 259 for a writ, which orders specific counties to directly supply garrisons in Scotland.
46 Ibid., pp. 223-32, 317.
Treaty Rolls. 47 We learn who was assigned the task of arresting the ships and how many were to be selected. For example, we are told that John de Watenhull, sergeant-at-arms, was ordered to arrest sixty ships over forty tons from the ports south and west of the Thames. 48 But the roll also tells us that at some point prior to Mauny sailing for Brest he was ordered to provide one ship out of his fleet to Hugh de Neville who was arranging victuals for the forthcoming campaign of the earl of Northampton in Brittany. 49 This is important because the payrolls show us that thirty-six ships were paid to transport Mauny, while the Treaty roll records that in fact at some point he had forty-four vessels under his command. In this we can see some of the to-ing and fro-ing involved in fleet requisition. 50 Furthermore, the Treaty Rolls also contain valuable information on the preparations needed to raise a fleet. For example, on 1 March 1345 orders were issued to royal clerks to requisition ships for the forthcoming campaign of Henry of Grosmont in Gascony, and by 9 May 1345 the Cinque Ports had to be ready with their full quota of ships for the king’s passage to France. 51 In addition the Treaty Rolls also record details specific to individual ships and masters. For example, in October 1338 they record the number of mariners arrested by Hugh de Reppes to serve on board nine vessels. This shows us that a total of 570 mariners served in these ships with the Cog Thomas mastered by Richard Fille accounting for 120 of them. 52 Royal writs concerning the gathering of supplies are also enrolled on the Treaty rolls. For instance, during the siege of Calais the sheriffs of several counties were ordered to

47 C76/17, mm. 43, 44
48 Ibid., m. 43.
49 Ibid., m. 43.
50 See, for example, C76/16, mm. 3, 4, 7d, 8d.
51 C76/20, mm. 33, 34; C76/20, m. 31.
prepare 100 barrels of flour, 100 beef carcases, 500 bacons, 1,000 muttons and hay for
the horses. 53

The National Archive class of documents known as the *Chancery Miscellanea*
(C47) are also an important source of information for fleets and ships. The range of
materials offered by the *Chancery Miscellanea* is large and varied and consists of
documents related to a wide range of governmental agencies, including the Chancery
and the Exchequer. For example, it contains ship lists pertaining to several transport
fleets of the period. 54 It also includes information on the supplying of ships’ crews
with victuals, such as the fifty-seven individual indentures between Geoffrey de Say,
admiral, and merchants who agreed to provide certain foodstuffs to the fleet. 55 They
also record details of the arrest of vessels, 56 agreements between ship owners and the
crown to supply ships 57 and lists of vessels on active service. 58 For example, one
document in the series appears in a file with twenty-two individual membranes.
Recorded on these are the names of the ships, the masters and their crews. Membrane
nine in the document tells us that the ship *Seintemariecog* was mastered by Adam
Moll and was manned by fifty-one mariners. It then lists a second ship called the
*Cogg Johan* of Cardigan mastered by John Ampton and manned by thirty-two
mariners. In both these cases the full crew is listed by name. Membrane ten takes the
form of an indenture between Thomas de Garegrene, clerk of the king, and John de la
More, mariner of Liverpool. Included are the town bailiffs, William de Cholale and
William Grenole. The indenture stipulates that they will provide the ship *Nicholas* of
Liverpool, well armed, victualled and manned for the king’s service under the admiral

53 C76/23, mm. 7, 8, 18.
54 See below for a detailed discussion of these ship lists, pp. 31-47.
55 C47/2/27.
56 For example, C47/2/42, which contains a list of 145 ships arrested for the king’s service by Thomas
Dautre in 1358.
57 C47/2/25, nos, 9-13.
of the west. Membrane fifteen in this file is also important with regards to how the administration requisitioned and recorded a fleet. This lists 126 ships from eighteen ports all located north of the Thames. The evidence from this along with other documents will be used below in the sub-section on raising a fleet and will help to explain the process of arrest, muster and review of ships used in royal naval service during this period. A similar document survives from the Brittany campaign of 1342-43. This again comes in the form of a ship list but with no pay details. It also throws light on the process of raising vessels and the subsequent checks made on those ships requisitioned (to be discussed more fully below). In general the *Chancery Miscelleanea* is a valuable source collection and provides evidence on all aspects of naval service and individual ships. Much like the Exchequer particulars of account they can be used to supplement the evidence from the Wardrobe books. Indeed, some *Chancery Miscellanea* material may well be Exchequer related. In addition they also show us ships, masters and mariners that would otherwise be invisible.

In short, all the orders and demands from the crown regarding victuals and shipping are recorded on the Chancery rolls, in addition to further evidence relating to the arrest and service of ships throughout the period. These, of course, have to be used in conjunction with those Exchequer particulars of account and sections of Wardrobe books that relate to purveyance and mariners wages, as the issue of an order does not necessarily mean that the exact amounts asked for were collected. The Exchequer accounts and the Chancery enrolments are, therefore, both separate governmental documents and yet at the same time interrelated. By utilising the Chancery rolls and calendars first it is possible to understand the time scale of a campaign and the numbers of supplies and ships that the crown wished to be made available for it.

58 C47/2/25, no. 15.
These orders can then be correlated with the Exchequer evidence. By doing this an accurate picture can be created of the amounts of supplies collected and from where; the size of the fleets or naval contributions; which ports supplied these ships and what dates they served from and to. The Chancery Miscellanea as a category of source material containing both Exchequer and Chancery records, as well as other governmental produced documentation may contain evidence at any of these stages of research.

The third and final category of sources that this dissertation will use are the chronicles. These narrative sources are numerous and their scope, focus and reliability variable. In most cases the chronicles can add flesh to the bones of the record sources. For example, Edward II's 1322 Scottish campaign would seem to have been supplied reasonably well, or at least this is what the Exchequer evidence suggests. The rich availability of surviving particulars for this expedition shows that large amounts of foodstuffs had been purchased and transported to Carlisle and Newcastle. Yet the evidence provided by the chroniclers teaches us to be cautious. They are almost unanimous in the verdict that the reason for the failure of this expedition was the lack of victuals. Thus without their testimony the campaign would not be fully understood. The real logistical failure seems to have been the breakdown of the system of victual distribution at the two depots of Carlisle and Newcastle.

The testimony of John le Bel on his experiences during the 1327 Weardale campaign also adds greatly to our understanding not only of supply issues but also of

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59 C47/2/25, nos, 9, 10, 15.
60 C47/2/35.
62 Flores, III, p. 210; Scalacronica, p. 89; Brut, p. 225; Anonimalle, p. 111; Melsa, III, p. 345; Bridlington, p. 79; Murimuth, p. 3; Polychronicon, VIII, p. 317.
the tactics of the Scots, and the English counter actions. \textsuperscript{63} Again the records of this campaign show planning in the arrangement of victuals: \textsuperscript{64} although the records of the Exchequer and Chancery for this expedition are not comprehensive, the orders for such supplies certainly went out in earnest. Therefore, although we learn that the army consisted of 'all the chivalry of England,' \textsuperscript{65} without Jean le Bel’s testimony we would have no idea that one of the reasons for the failure of this campaign was that the English, in attempting to keep pace with the Scots, could not alter their system of supply sufficiently to keep themselves fed. This problem subsequently left morale low and Edward III in tears.

Chronicle evidence plays a similar role with regard to the campaign led by the 'Disinherited' in 1332. Because this expedition was conducted against the public wishes of Edward III, although not his private, \textsuperscript{66} in addition to being a private enterprise venture between Edward Balliol and the Disinherited, it has left no trace in the central government records. Therefore, without the testimony of the chroniclers we would be totally in the dark as to the people involved, how many there were and what a remarkable achievement they accomplished. More important, for this dissertation, is the fact that this expedition was a seaborne enterprise. As such the chroniclers tell us that Balliol and Henry Beaumont, with some 400-500 men-at-arms, boarded eighty ships in the Humber and sailed to Kinghorn in Fife. \textsuperscript{67}

\begin{footnotes}
\item[63] Jean le Bel, \textit{Chronique de Jean le Bel}, eds, Jules Viard and Eugène Déprez, 2 vols (Paris: Société de l’histoire de France, 1904), I, pp. 51-72. This important passage has now been reproduced in, \textit{The wars of Edward III: sources and interpretations}, ed. C. J. Rogers (Boydell, 1999), pp. 4-19.
\item[65] Scalacronica, p. 79.
\item[66] For Edward's public proclamation to the sheriffs, see Foedera, II, ii, p. 833; for his private support in terms of money grants, see CPR, 1330-34, p. 270
\item[67] Bridlington, p. 104; Melsa, II, p. 362; Scalacronica, p. 109; Brut, p. 275. See also R. Nicholson, \textit{Edward III and the Scots} (London, 1965), and C. J. Rogers, \textit{War cruel and sharp}, p. 35. Bridlington, p. 104 uses the words 'octo navibus' when discussing the numbers of ships the Disinherited utilised in 1332.
\end{footnotes}
So far, then, we have concentrated on the positive contribution of the chronicles to any study concerned with military expeditions and supply. But there are also many questions regarding their accuracy and therefore the extent to which they can be relied upon for factual information. This is particularly so concerning the numbers of ships they attribute to particular campaigns. By examining some of their estimates we can gain some insight into their reliability. When we turn to the evidence the chroniclers provide in relation to maritime affairs we are not met with a great deal of information. For example, although the discussion of the Crécy fleet in some chronicles is apparently precise with regard to the numbers of ships that were used for transportation, it is, nonetheless, simply a number. We are not told, for instance, which ports supplied the ships, how many mariners served on board or how the fleet was raised. The accuracy of the estimates for some transport fleets can be gauged by direct comparison with surviving government sources. For example, Murimuth states that the Crécy fleet numbered some 750 vessels. This number is surprisingly accurate when compared to the surviving abstracts of Wetwang’s Wardrobe accounts. Yet because the chroniclers provide only numbers their value is reduced to that of a supporting role with regard to maritime affairs. The chronicles will never yield evidence for a quantitative survey of a transport fleet or supply fleet. They do not record individual masters and mariners in the same detail as the government


69 *Murimuth*, p. 198.

70 See chapter 4.6 below for the Crécy transport fleet. A list of the 1346 sources can be found in A. R. Wagner, *A catalogue of English medieval rolls of arms* (Oxford, 1950), pp. 158-60. But also, see D. B.
sources and they provide little or no information on the ports save the embarkation points. With this in mind this thesis will therefore generally confine itself to the evidence contained in the pay rolls of the period, Chancery enrolments and various other central governmental records, as these will allow the sort systematic survey that the maritime contribution to the Scottish and French wars deserves.

2.2 RAISING A FLEET

Raising a fleet of ships for either transportation of troops or delivery of victuals was a complex operation. Although in the past the procedure for assembling a fleet of requisitioned merchantmen has been described as 'simple enough',71 a more detailed examination of the process provides evidence of an underlying sophistication. Not only was a large team of clerks required but also sergeants-at-arms, bailiffs, sheriffs and shipmasters. These groups would work separately or together in order to supply the required numbers of ships demanded by the crown. Yet the inner workings of this procedure and the sheer scale of the task is little understood. We do have an outline of the careers of some of the clerks and we know something of the methods they employed to raise an armada in the fourteenth century.72 But the system of arrest, muster and review that the clerks had to undertake in order to untangle all the information generated by the process of requisitioning large numbers of ships, from hundreds of ports, into payrolls with exact dates of service is yet to be fully appreciated. Therefore, the aim of this chapter is to analyze in detail the process of

Tyson, Notes and queries 49 (December, 2002), pp. 443-444, who discusses the new acquisition of BL, MS Add 71001 and its relation to the other rolls.
71 C. Allmand, The hundred years war, p. 88.
72 For example, T. J. Runyan, 'The English navy in the reign of Edward III', chapter 4, which deals with Thomas Snetesham and William Clewer; idem, 'A fourteenth century cordage account for the king's ships', MM 60 (1974), pp. 311-328, which details the career of Matthew de Torkeseye; The navy of the Lancastrian kings, ed. S. Rose, pp. 6-27, which charts the career of William Soper.
raising a fleet from the original arrest of the ships in their home ports to their final appearance on a payroll.

In the fourteenth century the king had seven sources from which he could build a fleet for his use. The first source was the king’s own ships. These were vessels owned by the king and used personally by him for his transportation and supply needs. However, there were never large numbers of these ships and they would only be able to provide for the king’s requirements and possibly those of his immediate circle of advisors and clerks. For example, in the Scottish campaign of 1322 Edward II had access to ten of his ships. Yet even with such numbers of vessels for his own use he still found it necessary to employ William le Prest, master of the Michel of Hull, to carry his victuals. Indeed, the king himself felt it necessary to board a non-royal vessel at Hull to take him back to London on 23 June 1323. It seems Edward found this necessary as his own ships had completed their service by April and so were unavailable for his voyage back to the centre of power. Edward III in his Roxburgh campaign of 1334-35 had even fewer of his ships at his disposal, with only two vessels serving, but this could be due to the fact that this expedition was conducted during the winter months, when the weather systems in the northern seas prevented extended naval service. Yet even when we look forward to the great

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73 The historiography to date stresses that the king only had three methods of collecting ships for his use. See, for example, BND, p. 33; T. J. Runyan, ‘Naval logistics’, pp. 79-81; D. Hannay, A short history of the royal navy 1217-1688 (London, 1912), pp. 9-11; A. T. Hall, ‘The employment of naval forces’, chapter 3; C. Candy, ‘The Scottish wars of Edward III’, pp. 240-3. However, it must be stated that J. Sherborne, ‘Shipping and manpower’, p. 166, notes four ways in which a king could raise a fleet by including the hiring of ships from foreign kingdoms in his assessment.
74 BL, Stowe MS 553, fol. 76r-76v.
75 Ibid., fol. 76v.
76 Ibid., fol. 77r. The ship was the Cog Saluatozis of Dartmouth mastered by Gilbert Coleman.
77 Ibid., fol. 76v. The last ship of the king’s to complete its service was the James of Westminster mastered by John Lutle and crewed by forty-eight mariners: they served until 6 April 1323.
78 BL, Cotton MSS, Nero C.VIII, fol. 264r. These were the Welfare and an unnamed barge, mastered by John Pettot and Thomas Springet.
offensive of 1335 Edward still had only two of his own ships on active service. 79 This small number of available royal ships probably reflects the fact that Edward had thrown off the yoke of Mortimer and Isabella only five years before this campaign, and for three of these years Edward had not been at war; consequently he had no need of a large royal fleet. 80 Edward’s continental ambitions soon altered this situation and by October 1342 he had ten royal ships serving in the Brittany campaign. 81 In short, the king’s own vessels only provided a small core of ships around which to build a larger fleet.

The second way in which the king could raise a fleet was to call upon the service owed to the crown by the Cinque Ports. The Ports, according to their charters, were to provide fifty-seven ships, each manned by twenty-one mariners, for fifteen days. 82 This could be commuted so that a smaller number of ships were provided but for a longer period. The history of this service has attracted much attention, particularly the origin of such obligations; 83 but the issue that concerns us here is how many ships they provided during the period covered by this study. In the 1322 campaign Edward II did call on the obligatory service of the Ports 84 and none of the Ports’ ships are included in the Vadia Nautarum Wardrobe account, which suggests they were serving for no pay. Yet this evidence of obligatory service is contradicted elsewhere because other sources make it clear that the full fifty-seven ships were not ordered, and instead the Ports were ordered to contribute twenty-seven ships. 85 This trend was to continue at speed during the fourteenth century and by the time of

79 Ibid., Thomas Springet this time master of the Cegedware and Hugh de Reppes, master of the Rodecogge.
80 Foedera II, ii, p. 698; SC1/42, no. 59. In March 1327 Edward had actually sold some of the ships remaining from his father’s reign.
81 E36/204, p. 221; E101/20/39, nos. 12, 41, 45.
82 CCHR, 1300-1326, p. 32; F. W. Brooks, English naval forces, p. 84.
83 For example, see F. W. Brooks, English naval forces, chapter 6 and A. T. Hall, ‘The employment of naval forces’, pp. 41-51. Both of these update the account of M. Burrows.
84 CCR, 1318-23, p. 533.
Edward III's Scottish and French campaigns the Ports' obligations to provide ships in return for local freedoms had ceased. In the majority of the expeditions they were paid their full wages for their service that usually went beyond fifteen days. For example, in 1342 Thomas Symond master of the Nicholas of Sandwich and sixteen mariners were paid £4 14s 6d for twenty-one days service and the rest of the Cinque Ports ships which served during this campaign received pay commensurate with their days of service. Nevertheless, the Cinque Ports continued to play an important role as advisors to the crown in naval affairs, they still provided large numbers of ships for expeditions and their ports were regularly used as embarkation points for continental campaigns.

Another method that the crown employed to raise ships involved making non-financial contractual agreements with ship owners and port burgesses. Such contracts were drawn up so that the specified parties would provide a set number of ships. Thus, in 1335 Thomas Gargrene, clerk, formed an agreement with John de la More, William Grenole and William Cholale, all from Liverpool. This indenture stated that they would provide the ship Nicholas well armed and victualled for the king when required. Similarly the burgesses of Dartmouth agreed to supply two ships of 120 tons burthen, dupplici eskippamentum, to 'follow the king whenever he calls upon

85 CCR, 1318-23, p. 708.
86 It needs to be recognised that the service owed by the Cinque Ports would only be called upon when a feudal summons was issued. As such, there is only the 1327 campaign in the reign of Edward III when such an order was issued. Indeed, the service of the Ports was called upon in 1327 and it was described as servitium debitum. In addition, if the ports supplied less than their quota of vessels then the reduced number of ships would be compensated for by double crews.
88 E36/204, p. 222.
90 C47/2/25, no. 10.
other ships of the realm to set forth, and to remain with him for forty days'. In return the providers of these ships would usually be granted freedom from local tolls and other taxes. From Edward’s point of view agreements such as these could bolster the numbers in his paid fleets and also save on the work of his clerks, as ships supplied in this way did not require payment and were therefore absent from payrolls.

The fourth way for the crown to raise ships was to hire vessels from private persons or make arrangements with certain countries, territories or city-states. For example, in 1359 the king hired eight ships from the Low Countries to transport troops to Calais for the forthcoming expedition. Although this method of acquiring ships never contributed large numbers, the king did employ envoys to organise the hiring of such ships. The most famous of these was Nicholinus de Flisco (Fieschi), sometimes called the cardinal of Genoa. He was employed in 1336 to obtain vessels for Edward to transport English horses ‘for the king’s service’. In fact Fieschi was to be a close envoy and diplomatic ambassador for Edward III for quite some time. But in this period the hiring of ships was not an important factor in the raising of military or transport fleets.

A fifth way in which the king could assemble ships for his fleet was to use those vessels which were taken in acts of piracy or as prizes of war. For example, in 1338 William Montagu, then admiral of the fleet to the south and west of the Thames, sent the four ships, Hulk of Brugges, Cristofre, Shavenecogge and Godesburgh, all taken in war, to Scotland loaded with men for the campaign which centred around

91 CCHR, 1341-1417, p. 3; and, see also M. Jones, ‘Two Exeter ship agreements of 1303 and 1310’, MM 52 (1967), pp. 315-19, which draws attention to two similar agreements made between the crown and local port dignitaries.
92 Foedera, III, i, p. 444.
Dunbar castle.\(^{94}\) In addition, the king could also offer pardons to ship-owners/masters, as well as to full crews, in return for providing both their ships and their own persons free of wages. For example, in 1342 Edward was able to add seven vessels in this way to his fleet. The ship owners/masters and crew were expected to serve ‘\textit{pur deux mois de aler sur meer en notre compaigne en le dit voyage par la temps avantdit}’ and their ships were to be provided ‘\textit{bien aparaille}’ with ‘\textit{gentz armees}’.\(^{95}\) Similarly, the king could lift the threat of confiscation of a ship provided that the owner/master served the crown in some capacity during a campaign.\(^{96}\) In these ways the king could usually add quite large numbers of ships to a fleet and save money.\(^{97}\)

The final, and most important, method employed by the king for raising a fleet was to requisition merchant vessels. This prerogative right of the crown had its origins in Anglo-Saxon times.\(^{98}\) But the Edwardian kings stretched the meaning of this prerogative to the limit. The call on merchant ships to provide military service was originally only to defend England from attack, yet all three Edwards requisitioned fleets for the offensive purpose of transporting invading armies to various countries. Of course, these offensive fleets were justified by the king because technically he was defending his Scottish and continental possessions and rights. This process, however, did lead to criticism. For example, when Edward I was requisitioning a fleet in 1297, he assured the ports that the service he was asking from them in no way would be taken as a precedent and he mainly relied ‘on his usual mixture of appeals to patriotism and threats to persuade the seaports to comply with the request’.\(^{99}\) In fact,

\(^{95}\) SCI/39, nos, 15, 39, 81, 157; SCI/40, nos, 10-20; SCI/41, no. 66.
\(^{96}\) \textit{CCR, 1341-43}, pp. 687, 689-90, provides evidence of ships and masters that could escape punishment for aiding the king in the Brittany campaign.
\(^{97}\) In addition to the seven ships, a further thirty-three served for pardons in the Brittany transport fleets of 1342. See C. Lambert, ‘An army transport fleet’, p. 33.
\(^{99}\) M. Prestwich, \textit{War, politics and finance}, p. 142.
the continental ambitions of Edward I and Edward II were not as grand as those of Edward III, and the latter’s great achievement was his ability to call on the service of merchant vessels year on year in large numbers with little opposition. Fleets of requisitioned ships were, however, by far the largest component of any fleet that put to sea during this period. For instance, in the Low Countries campaigns of 1338-40 Edward III enjoyed the services of 370 ships, of which the majority were merchant vessels, and in 1342 out of 675 individual ships serving as transports during the Brittany campaign, 665 were supplied by the merchant marine. As the numbers suggest the merchant contribution was of paramount importance. Yet the inner workings of the process used to gather such large numbers of ships is little understood.

The general outline of the requisitioning process is easy to reconstruct. Before a campaign was due to begin an order to arrest shipping would be sent out from the king. After these initial orders, teams of clerks, usually accompanied by sergeants-at-arms, would go to selected ports and arrest merchant vessels. Normally, each team would be given a prescribed geographical area to cover. For example, in the 1335 Scottish campaign John de Briggewater was appointed to arrest ships in Dartmouth, while John de Percebrigg operated in the area west of the Thames. By examining Percebrigg’s account we can see that he spent from 6 January to 4 March

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100 Edward III did however face problems during the Brittany campaign of 1342. His frustration was not in raising a fleet but in trying to get the ships raised to comply with his demands for long and repeated periods of service. Although he ordered the ships that transported the earl of Northampton to Brest in August to return for his forces, at least thirty-one failed to obey the order. In addition 230 ships deserted the king at Brest and Vannes in November 1342. On this, see C. Lambert, ‘An army transport fleet’, pp. 29-66 and 76-81.


102 See chapter 4.5 it has to be noted that twelve of these ships were foreign so the English merchant marine contributed 653 ships.

103 For example, CCR, 1333-37, p. 397-98, and Rot. Scot. I, pp. 505-6, 309, 311-12.

raising a fleet from requisitioned vessels involved three distinct stages. Firstly, the ships were arrested in their homeports and it was here that the first record of their names would have been taken. The second phase of the process occurred when the ships arrived at the port of embarkation. At this stage a second muster would take place involving ticking off from the first document the names of the masters who had appeared. This would have been necessary, as for a variety of reasons, not all the ships arrested in their homeports would have made the muster. For example, such a problem blighted Sir Walter de Mauny on two occasions. During the period 1337-40, 311 ships refused to go on the king's service under Walter, and later, during the preparations for the Brittany campaign, his passage was also delayed because some of the ships which were part of his transport fleet failed to appear at the port of embarkation. Similarly, another check would take place at the disembarkation point. It would have been at this stage that a new document would be compiled in the form of a list of ships that had honoured their arrest orders. The second phase would therefore provide the start and completion dates of a particular ship's service. The last phase of the procedure involved transferring the information gathered during the two previous stages, now conveniently in one long ship list, into the final payrolls with the service dates and pay details of the ships' crew. Only when the third stage was completed could the clerks submit the final stage documentation to the Exchequer. The task now is to chart this process, using surviving documents, thereby linking these three distinct phases together.

Before this process could be set in motion, however, the crown needed to have a rough idea of the number of ships it could count on to be available for the fleet. One-way of assessing the availability of vessels was to ask an influential ship-owner,

officials from the Cinque Ports or various other merchants and bailiffs involved with maritime affairs. Alternatively the king could order a sheriff whose bailiwick was in a maritime county to hold an inquisition as to the availability of ships for a forthcoming passage. Thus, in 1340 Robert de Causton, sheriff of Norfolk and Suffolk, provided the crown with a list of ship-owners from those counties and how many ships they could contribute to a fleet. The document contains the names of 155 ship-owners who between them could supply 177 vessels.\(^{111}\) By doing this the crown would gain a clearer idea as to how many land-based soldiers it would be able to transport overseas.

By examining an Exchequer account of unknown date we can see the first of the three requisition stages.\(^{112}\) The date of the document is problematic because the description of who compiled the account and when, which is usually recorded at the top of the account, is largely missing.\(^{113}\) Although an exact date is difficult to establish, that is less important than the fact that it corresponds well to the first of the three stages outlined above, because all the relevant information pertinent to this stage is to be found on it. We have the name of the port in which the arrest took place. We then have the name of the ship, and crucially, its tonnage. This last point is important

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\(^{110}\) C47/2/30, mm.1-2 and 1d, 2d. For the Brittany fleet, see C. L. Lambert, 'An army transport fleet', p. 52.

\(^{111}\) C47/2/32, mm. 1-4.

\(^{112}\) E101/17/35.

\(^{113}\) This being so the handwriting of the source suggests that it is from the latter part of the reign of Edward II or the early years of Edward III’s reign. In addition, when we compare the account to the 1322 Wardrobe payroll, none of the ships from the account appear in the *vadia nautorum*. Nor are they included in Richard Ferraby’s Wardrobe accounts of 1334-36. In addition, when they are compared to another account that consists of ships from the southwest ports (E101/19/26, mm. 3-4) none of the ships can be located in that document either. One of the ships, however, is listed in a payroll relating to the St. Sardos campaign. The ship and master appear in the particulars of Walter de Oterhampton, receiver of ships and victuals at Portsmouth (E101/17/3). The ship is the *Godyer* of Teignmouth, mastered by William Kayn (Ibid., m. 6d). In Oterhampton’s account the detail on the ship is of course more comprehensive and we are told that it had a crew of one constable, twenty-seven mariners and served for fifty-four days at a cost of £17 11s. But this is the only ship out of the undated document that is visible in any account relating to royal campaigns of the early 1320s. These comparisons suggest the list is connected with neither the 1322 campaign nor the St. Sardos expedition, and will it be taken to represent a list of arrested ships in the late 1327. One of the problems involved in placing it within the 1327 Weardale campaign is the lack of surviving Wardrobe accounts. On the reasons for the lack of evidence, see N. B. Lewis, ‘The summons of the English feudal levy: 5 April
because the initial order for arrests usually stipulated that ships of only forty tons burthen and above should be requisitioned. So, at this stage of the procedure the exact tonnage of a vessel was paramount. The master is also recorded, and importantly, the mainpernor, who was listed because he was guaranteeing that the ship would appear at the port of embarkation. This is another important feature of the document that points to it being part of the first phase of the process of requisition. It seems probable that at this stage the shipmaster was given the 'king's shilling'. This is similar to the way in which retinue captains received advance payments before their service.\textsuperscript{114} Having received such a payment the master could issue himself and his crew their first instalment of wages, thus increasing the chances that they would honour their arrest orders and appear at the port of embarkation. But, just in case, a mainpernor was recorded who was in effect guaranteeing that the ships would turn up at the muster port. This had a twofold purpose. Firstly, the mainpernor would be a locally influential person whose authority the shipmasters would not wish to question; perhaps they were ship owners. Secondly, if the ship failed to show up at the next stage of the process the crown could redeem its initial payment from the mainpernor.

The document, therefore, fills all the criteria for the first stage of the requisition process: port name, ship name, tonnage, master's name and a mainpernor who was guaranteeing their service because they had received their first instalment of

\textsuperscript{114} See A. Ayton, Knights and warhorses, pp. 141-2. This 'prest' payment would usually be the first quarter payment. Indeed, in June 1336 the ships arrested for service in North Wales refused to set out until they had been prepaid their wages and the king ordered the earl of Arundel to pay the ships' crews a reward. See Foedera, II, ii, p. 941. In addition, Bartholomew Garlek, mariner, was placed under arrest in July 1339 for taking his wages but failing to turn up at the port of embarkation, and as a punishment he was released to work in the Tower of London (CCR, 1339-41, p. 246). Furthermore, certain mariners operating ships of Bayonne were paid their wages prior to the Crécy campaign, and again there were problems as some of them failed to appear at the embarkation point (CPR, 1345-48, p. 109). The arrangements for the St. Sardos campaign involved the royal clerks producing a note of the ships' names, home ports and crew sizes so as to receive their first quarter wages: see R. A. Kaner,
pay. The format of the individual lines in the document is: ‘navis que dictus Godyer de C dolia un magister William Kayn per manus Henry Cornwall’. In another Chancery Miscellanea document, it is possible to see the process of money recovery from ship-owners and mainpernors who had guaranteed that vessels would appear at the port of embarkation. It contains the names of 311 individual ships, which refused to go on service with Walter Mauny during the Low Countries campaigns of 1337-40.\textsuperscript{115} With some of the ships the name of the owner of the vessel, as well as that of the master, is recorded and in other cases the name of the mainpernor is listed with the ship and master. For example, one ship from Whitby, simply described as Une Nief and mastered by William Page, also has the name of the mainpernor, Thomas Complin, listed next to him. Under the port of Hull, the ship Mighel is described as being mastered by William de Wende but being owned (seignior) by Michael Tinnok.\textsuperscript{116} This list of defaulters was probably drawn up on Mauny’s authority to facilitate the recovery of prepaid wages from the owners and mainpernors of these vessels. It also provides a definitive list of the masters, who would no doubt be apprehended on their return to port.

These original arrest lists played an important part in the second phase of the requisition process. They would be taken to the embarkation port and the ships would be ‘ticked off’ by the clerks.\textsuperscript{117} Those ships from the stage one ship list that turned up

\textsuperscript{115} C47/2/30, mm. 1-2, 1d-2d. Although Mauny was not admiral during these years he seems to have been placed in charge of a commission that was to investigate the failure of a large number of vessels that did not appear at the muster ports.

\textsuperscript{116} Ibid., m 1.

\textsuperscript{117} In fact the requisition of ships in this period would have generated a mass of supporting documentary evidence, which would have been discarded after the final payrolls had been compiled because they no longer served a purpose. However, these documents could prove to be useful in cases where there was a failure by shipmasters to turn up at embarkation or after they had deserted during a campaign. These early lists could therefore be used as identification markers to facilitate the punishment of offenders. It was from such early documentation within the requisition process that Walter Mauny would have identified the hundreds of ships that failed to appear between 1337 and 1340;
would then be written up on another much longer roll. It would be longer because this second stage ship list would include all the vessels arrested from every port. This list would therefore combine the details of hundreds of individual arrest lists compiled at the start of the requisition process (such as the documents discussed above) into one more manageable roll. The simplest way to compile such documentation would be to expect that on arrival each master would appear before the clerks and state his name and that of his ship. He would then be located on the first list and ticked off so as to be recorded on the second. This verification process would also provide the start date for the crew’s service. This procedure would be repeated at the port of disembarkation, thus providing a finish date for the ship’s service. A third stage ship list would then be written up.

The question to be answered at this point is can we find a document that links the first phase of the requisition process into the second? Careful scrutiny of surviving ship lists reveals two good candidates. Both are to be found in the Chancery Miscellanea bundles. One of them is a list of ships that were to receive payment of wages for transporting the king and Walter de Mauny to Brittany in October 1342. This document records the names of 330 ships and masters. The ships are grouped in ports but the port names are not used as subheadings; they simply follow the names of the ship and master. The document records no pay details at all, which may appear

and presumably William Edington also used such early documentation in 1342 to identify and punish the deserters during the 1342 Brittany campaign. See C47/2/30; CCR, 1343-46, pp. 128-32. In effect what we are seeing in the surviving sources is only a fraction of what was compiled when ships were requisitioned for service. See M. T. Clanchy, From memory to written record (London, 1979), chapter 2, which gives a lucid description of the proliferation of records that could result from just one order issued from the centre of government. Although at first glance this procedure seems open to fraud it is in fact quite the opposite. For if a master was to appear at the embarkation billet and claim he was about to transport troops over to the continent, with the avowed purpose of claiming wages for doing nothing, he would also have to be ticked off at the disembarkation point, which means that he would have to sail to France anyway. The task of unloading the men, horses and supplies at the point of disembarkation was likely to have been an ordered process with the ships unloading in small groups throughout the day. This would, therefore, make the task of recording the ships and masters’ names much easier.
curious, because it was William Edington, treasurer of the Wardrobe, who compiled the roll. The explanation is however quite straightforward. This second stage ship roll had been compiled from the original first stage requisition lists, and the records taken of the ships at the point of disembarkation that had completed their required service. This second stage ship list has kept the original ports and the vessels from them grouped together because it has been compiled from the original arrest lists, which record ships according to ports. But there are no dates of service or pay details recorded because these are only included in the final payroll, compiled from the second phase ship list. Indeed, if we compare the second stage ship roll to Edington's final *vadia marinariorum* accounts the order of the ports and ships is more or less the same. In addition, the same anomalies appear in both the second stage list and the final Wardrobe book. For example, Henry Goldeneye, master of the *Godyer of Rye*, is repeated twice in both documents. This suggests that the second stage ship roll and the Wardrobe accounts are related to each other with one being used to compile the other. Alternatively, there are also differences between them. Eighteen ships from Dover in the *vadia marinariorum* are listed as coming from Sandwich on the *Chancery Miscellanea* roll. However, this difference can be explained by re-examining the document from the first phase of the arrest process. For instance, under the port heading of Teignmouth, two ships are recorded which are not from that port.

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120 C47/2/25, no. 15; C47/2/35.
121 The Chancery Miscellanea list was certainly compiled before the Wardrobe accounts were drawn up. A comparison between the two documents shows this. For example, when the Chancery list is compared to the Wardrobe accounts forty-eight ships are absent from the Chancery roll. When these are compared to the 230 ships that deserted the king outside of Brest and Vannes we find that only six are listed as deserter ships, which means that the majority of the ships cannot have been docked pay as a result of their actions. The fact that there are forty-eight more ships in the Wardrobe accounts means that these vessels must have been added to the final accounts after the Chancery roll had been written up.
122 E36/204, p. 229; C47/2/35, m. 2.
One is from Drogheda and the other from Lyme Regis. These ships would seem to have been arrested whilst trading at Teignmouth. This could create confusion when this first phase document was used as the template for the second and third phases. Thus, those eighteen ships from Dover had probably been arrested at Sandwich and recorded as such on the first stage roll. Because the second stage ship list is formed by ticking off from the first stage roll, the mistake had made its way into every stage of the process, except the final payroll, which had to be sent to the Exchequer for audit and would usually be accompanied by supporting documentation compiled throughout the requisition process. It is likely that at some point this supporting documentation had illuminated errors in the original first stage ship lists, which were then rectified on the final payroll. Similarly, tonnage figures of ships could make their way into the final accounts simply because they were recorded at every stage of the process. So for example, the payroll of the ships that transported the Black Prince to Gascony in the 1360s has a record of each individual ship’s tonnage.

The final stage of the process was for the clerks to compile the payroll, which would then be submitted to the Exchequer for audit. By using the first stage ship lists as the basis for the second stage roll of ships that had actually embarked and disembarked the troops, they would have simplified their task of compiling the final pay accounts. By this stage the clerks would have a start date and an end date for each ships’ service as well as an accurate list of those ships that had completed their service. At the end of the second stage, the first stage lists of arrested vessels would be relegated to a secondary purpose and the clerks would retire to their offices to compile the payroll from the second stage ship lists. This is not to say that other documentation would not play its part. For example, the Brittany second stage roll

124 E101/17/35.
This chapter has aimed to explore the procedure and some of the bureaucratic workings involved in raising a fleet. This procedure had developed over several decades into an efficient system, which under Edward III was in continuous use for the greatest part of his reign. The historiography of the requisition process is right to suggest that individual teams of clerks were sent to ports to arrest ships of a certain size, which were then sent to the ports of embarkation and loaded with men, equipment and horses for transportation to a theatre of war. Yet the inner processes of this procedure and the clerks’ labour involved in recording the ships’ service through
three distinct phases have not been appreciated. Each phase would produce a ship list that would simplify the procedure and make compiling the final payroll much easier. Without such an efficient operation manned by experienced and capable clerks the king would not have been able to realise, or attempt to realise, his ambitions abroad.

The above analysis has outlined the procedure that the crown would employ to raise a fleet and how that resulted in the ships that were requisitioned being finally enrolled on a pay account. Yet there are many gaps in the payroll evidence, particularly with regard to fleets raised in the 1340’s and 1350’s. Most notable among these are the royal-led campaigns of 1345, 1355 and 1359. These fleets, which must have been of substantial size, are absent from the mariners’ payrolls for those years. How can we explain this apparent lacuna in the accounting procedures? One immediate obvious point of similarity between all these fleets is that they occurred when there are multiple armadas in preparation, including for other captains or lieutenants of the king who are also embarking for France. This was a strategy Edward repeatedly employed after the initial Low Country campaigns, as it stretched French forces and diluted their combat strength at any one point. From a cursory overview of the evidence, it seems that when the crown was organising a multi-front assault on France the fleets used directly by the king were subject to different payment procedures from those of the lieutenants sailing at the same time. For example, in 1345 while Edward crossed to the Low Countries, Henry of Grosmont sailed for Gascony. Henry’s fleet is fully recorded and paid for in the usual manner yet the king’s is not. 129 It was the same in 1355, when the king and Lancaster sailed to northern France, the Black Prince was waiting to leave for Gascony for his

128 C. Lloyd, The British seaman: a social survey, 1200-1860 (London, 1968), p. 16, states that there was no ‘continuity in medieval naval history, no administrative structure and no consistency in policy’.
129 Lancaster’s fleet is enrolled on E101/25/9.
forthcoming campaign. The Prince’s fleet payrolls are recorded on E101/26/36; E101/26/37; E101/26/38. The payments issues to mariners enrolled on the Issue Rolls (E403/377, mm. 18, 24) probably relate to the first instalments of wages given over to those seamen involved in transporting the troops raised through commissions of array that formed part of the king’s 1355 expedition. It has previously thought that there were three fleets, which all sailed in 1355 commanded by the king, the prince and Lancaster, however, C. J. Rogers, War cruel and sharp, p. 293, n. 38 has convincingly argued that Lancaster was actually part of the king’s flotilla of that year. So in 1355 there were two fleets and not three. See A. Ayton, Knights and warhorses, appendix 2, pp. 265-271.

132 On regard, see ibid., pp. 110-14. It is interesting to note that introduction of regard in 1345 coincides exactly with the new fleet raising procedure, which were adopted after the 1342 Brittany expedition. This is dealt with more thoroughly in chapter 5 below. For a more detailed account of the Brittany fleets and their problems, see C. Lambert, ‘An army transport fleet’, pp. 7-13.
these ports was relatively short and Edward had the luxury of having a safe harbour for disembarkation and land in which to reside throughout the duration of the campaign. Therefore, the Brittany expedition created different problems for Edward when it came to deploying a fleet, and seems to have been the starting point when Edward and his advisors decided to alter the requisition procedure they had used thus far for continental campaigns.

The maritime transport fleet for the Brittany campaign eventually sailed in three separate flotillas over an eight-month period throughout 1342. The first to take ship was the expedition force commanded by Walter de Mauny that landed in Brest in late March.\textsuperscript{134} The earl of Northampton followed this in August and finally the king sailed in October. The Brittany campaign is problematic because it is not known whether it was the original intention of the king to sail in one force or to spread the invasion out over three separate campaigns. However, it seems likely that the expedition unfolded as it did because several events conspired to affect the originally intended strategy. One of these was the incursion of the Scots into northern England while the campaign was being planned. This diverted the king away from his continental project. The other and more significant issues were the lack of available shipping to transport the army in one large fleet and the increasingly perilous situation in which the Montfortists found themselves by the spring of 1342. This required immediate support from England. Thus, Mauny was sent with as large a force as he could transport in the available ships. After Mauny’s truce had ended Charles de Blois again forced the Montfort supporters onto the defensive and it became necessary to send Northampton to their aid. Again, the fleet that Northampton sailed in had been under requisition for some time while the king waited for enough ships to arrive at the

\textsuperscript{134} C76/17, m. 44.
embarkation port to take a much larger force. Yet desperate needs meant desperate measures; so Northampton was sent on ahead in all the ships available at the time. These were supposed to return to transport the king yet the sources reveal that at least thirty-one did not.\(^{135}\) Therefore, the king’s fleet was further delayed for want of available shipping.\(^{136}\) In addition, the king’s personal campaign was disrupted when 230 ships failed to stay on active service throughout the campaign.\(^{137}\)

The Brittany campaign brought Edward and his advisors into contact with new problems when it came to fleet requisition. The headaches that Edward experienced during 1342 seem to have caused him to change the methods he employed for raising a transport fleet when multiple flotillas were needed.\(^{138}\) Thus, in 1345, 1355 and 1359 Edward opted for a system that required certain sections of the land-based retinues to arrange their own shipping. Those campaigns, such as Grosmont’s of 1345 and the Prince’s of 1355, which were small enough to requisition ships in the normal fashion, were raised by means of that procedure and paid through the Exchequer system. Finally, the capture of Calais also changed the options open to the king after 1347. Thus, in 1355 and 1359, the possession of Calais allowed the force under the king to disembark into a safe harbour and base. Consequently, the fleet that was to sail to Calais could be prepared at a more leisurely pace by means of private hire

\(^{135}\) CCR, 1341-43, pp. 621, 651-52, 664, 688, 697-98.

\(^{136}\) The king had ordered the arrest and the confiscation of these ships for failing to return. However, he later cancelled these orders because of his, ‘great need’. See CCR, 1341-43, pp. 629-30, 690.

\(^{137}\) CCR, 1343-46, pp. 128-32.

\(^{138}\) It is important to recognise that the earl of Pembroke and Gloucester were also awaiting transport at Plymouth, so there were multiple fleets in operation in 1342. The earl’s fleet was not paid through the wardrobe accounts. Indeed the St. Sardos campaign also sailed in three separate fleets. This view was also taken by J. S. Kepler, ‘The effects of the battle of Sluys’, pp. 70-77. It has to be noted that Kepler differs in the reasons he gives for the changes implemented after 1343 and he places more emphasis on the changes in the administration and management of officials. Although this is true in some respects Kepler fails to acknowledge that two large fleets (three if we include the 1337 flotilla of 150 ships requisitioned by Bartholomew Burghersh in 1337: see E101/19/39) were raised in 1338 and 1340 and several large armadas had been requisitioned and deployed in Scotland.
arrangements. The transportation for the larger sections of the army, usually under the command of the king, was paid for via private hire and not through the Exchequer, and so they did not generate enrolled particulars. This new organisational procedure explains the absence of payrolls relating to the king’s campaigns after the Brittany expedition of 1342 had highlighted the problems involved in using the normal requisition system.

2.3 THE RETURN PASSAGE

The shipping of soldiers from England’s ports to the continent was only half of the operation involved in any campaign. Once the army had completed its task and a victory or truce had resulted, the thousands of soldiers who had originally sailed to France had to be safely shipped back to England. As with the outward fleets of 1340, 1345, 1355 and 1359, evidence as to how this was achieved is often missing. Nevertheless, the Low Countries expedition of 1338-39 and the 1359-60 Reims campaign are illuminated with documentary evidence on the return fleets. In both cases the Wardrobe accounts show that re-passage payments were issued so that the retinue captains could transport their horses back to England after the cessation of hostilities. The implication is that the captains themselves also took passage on these ships. But these two campaigns had the advantage of being carried out through allied countries or friendly ports. So, for example, the Low Countries expeditions provided the English with free access to several large ports and the Reims campaign ended with the English army making its way back to the safe environs of Calais. How would an English army be transported back to safety after a campaign in another part

139 The king was still obliged to pay for the transportation of those arrayed troops who formed part of the force that sailed with him, which explains the advances on wages recorded to mariners enrolled on E403/377, mm. 18, 24.
140 These new operational changes will be discussed below.
of France that was not as firmly entrenched as an ally of the English government? Of course, only one campaign here springs to mind, that of the Brittany invasion of 1342.\textsuperscript{142}

The maritime transportation problems relating to the English intervention in Brittany have been discussed above. But the complex issue of the return passage to England raises more areas of confusion. We know from chronicle evidence that the voyage home was perilous with several knights losing their lives in the crossing.\textsuperscript{143} This provides proof that there had been some re-passage arrangements for the English and Welsh soldiers serving in the campaign. The king’s journey home can be traced with more certainty by following the entries recorded in the Wardrobe accounts. Edward’s return voyage took just under three weeks and he sailed via the island of Le Ragg (13 February), Le Blank Sabloini (14 February), Congueste (16 February), Port Crouidum (19 February), then back to Blank Sabloini (23 February). He was at sea on the last day of February before sailing into Melcombe Regis on 1 March 1342.\textsuperscript{144} The king, of course, always had transportation arrangements by utilising royal ships, but how did the rest of the force make it home?

There are several possibilities on how this was achieved, some with more credence than others. For instance, the return fleet could have been recorded on a now lost payroll. But this has to be doubtful. Since both Norwell and Farley recorded their re-passage payments through the Wardrobe system, it is likely that Edington would have done the same.\textsuperscript{145} The second possibility is that the return flotilla was made up

\textsuperscript{141} Norwell, pp. 386-387; A. Ayton, \textit{Knights and warhorses}, pp. 268-270.
\textsuperscript{142} Campaigns conducted within the bounds of Gascony operated within English controlled lands and English officials directly controlled the port of Bordeaux. The army of 1345 never campaigned directly on French soil and after the Crécy/Calais campaign of 1346-7 the English controlled Calais.
\textsuperscript{143} Anonamille, pp. 17-18; Knighton, p. 47; Melsa, III, pp. 51-52; Murimuth, p. 135.
\textsuperscript{144} E36/206, pp. 37-39; CCR, 1343-46, p. 97.
\textsuperscript{145} Norwell, pp. 386-92. On Farley’s accounts, see A. Ayton, \textit{Knights and warhorses}, pp. 286-70.
entirely of the defaulters from the previous year. But this seems unlikely because no new requisition orders to form such a large fleet were issued during the winter of 1342-3. It should be noted that some orders, contained in the *Close Rolls*, state that the 230 ships are to be arrested so that punishment can be issued to them. And there is evidence that some of the ships involved in the return passage were members of the deserter fleet from the previous October and November. In addition, other vessels were in the Brittany area on supply missions and they could also have been involved in the re-passage of sections of the English army. For example, the *Katerine* of Bayonne, mastered by Peter Bernardi de Tholoso, was allowed in January of 1343 to sell merchandise ‘for the maintenance of the men about to set out to the king in Brittany, in Peter’s galley, in going and returning’.

These scattered entries provide slight evidence of small numbers of ships that could have been involved in the transportation of troops back to England after the hostilities had ceased in early 1343. But the numbers of such vessels are inadequate for a satisfactory explanation as to how the English army returned home.

Perhaps the strongest possibility is that the return fleet was paid for out of the coffers of the ducal revenues. It is known that in April 1342 the Montfortists had agreed to supply Edward with £14,600 towards the cost of the English war effort. Moreover, the end of the campaign in 1343 placed the whole of the ducal income in the hands of the English and the duchess and her son were taken back to England for

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146 There were 230 ships that had disobeyed the king’s orders in 1342 and sailed back to England. Some of these were punished by having their pay deducted and it is possible that many of these were later sent back to Brittany as re-passage vessels.

147 *CCR, 1341-43*, p. 630. This shows that the *Nicholas*, mastered by John Galay was serving at his own costs for failing to appear at the previous transport fleet and he was to freight the earls of Huntingdon and Arundel to Brittany in January 1343. Yet these reinforcements were cancelled so it is possible that Galay still served but as part of the return fleet of that month. Similar orders were hanging over the head of William Asshendon of Dartmouth, see *CPR, 1340-43*, p. 568; *CCR, 1341-43*, p. 630.

148 *CCR, 1341-43*, p. 625.
safe keeping. In addition, many soldiers involved in the Brittany expedition did not return to England but accompanied Lancaster to the siege of Algeciras, thus greatly reducing the number of men who required passage. Another issue worth taking into account is that after an expedition the number of horses which required re-passage would be fewer than had initially crossed due to losses in the field while on campaign, again affecting the numbers of ships required. A further reduction of the troops who required transportation back to England would have occurred when the English installed garrisons in the towns that they now controlled across Brittany. Finally, after the truces had been agreed it would have been possible for some soldiers to cross overland to other areas where shipping was more plentiful. In short, of the 3,800 English troops that initially crossed over to Brittany during 1342 perhaps only half required re-passage back from the ports of Brittany. It seems likely that this would have been achieved over period of several weeks in a piece-meal fashion by ships serving for various reasons and paid for by differing accounting methods.

Walter Mauny’s expedition of 1342 is, however, fully recorded with a return fleet. Mauny embarked for Brittany at the end of March 1342 in thirty-six ships. Mauny’s land-based force served until early July 1342. In Edington’s Wardrobe book twenty-four of the thirty-six ships that originally transported this small force to Brittany were kept in service until 29 June with a further two vessels serving until 1 July. These twenty-six ships were obviously Mauny’s means of returning back to England. But why this fleet is recorded in the final accounts of the campaign, and the king’s return is not, can only remain in the realms of speculation. But the small size of

149 Foedera, II, ii, p. 1198; J. Sumption, Trial by battle, p. 390.
150 Knighton, p. 47. Knighton’s words suggest that the numbers of men who accompanied Lancaster to Spain were substantial, ‘et exinde multi Angligene et Francigene transferunt ad Spruciam ad bellum campestre’.
151 A. Ayton, Knights and warhorses, p. 263. For example Northampton’s retinue lost thirty-seven horses and Ralph Stafford’s forty-two.
Mauny’s fleet is the most obvious answer. By examining the orders issued by Edward at the outset of the campaign it is beyond doubt that the king wished all the vessels in his transport fleet to remain on active service until the expedition had ended. But the large number of ships that were ordered to remain under arrest meant that it was unlikely that such a fleet would stay in Brittany throughout the winter. And once significant numbers of vessels began to desert the king a domino effect seems to have taken place among those that had, initially, remained behind. Evidence relating to return passages is more complete in the later expeditions to France, and in the 1370s both outward and homeward passages were recorded in the payrolls. For example, John of Gaunt’s expedition to Normandy in 1369, which came to an overall cost of £74,934 6s 10d, did indeed include the payments for the re-passage of the horses and men back from Calais. This suggests that similar methods had been in place in earlier campaigns.152

This chapter has aimed to show the various sources that can be utilised to investigate the transport fleets, and quantify the amount of victuals supplied to campaigning armies during the period covered by this thesis. It has also detailed the procedures of requisition open to the English crown in the fourteenth century. The following discussion centred on how the ships that were requisitioned were recorded, from initial arrest to appearance on a final payroll. Furthermore, the issue of private hire has also been examined. The final section of the chapter analysed the problems relating to the return transport fleet after a campaign in France had ended. It was noted that the expedition that stood out from the others was that of the Brittany campaign of 1342-43. The campaigns before this such as St. Sardos (1342-25) and the Low Countries (1338-39) were conducted in English controlled areas or in the lands

152 J. Sherborne, ‘The cost of English warfare with France in the later fourteenth century’ BIHR 1
of English allies. And those invasions to northern France after 1347 had a safe
harbour at Calais. That the king did indeed provide shipping for both outward and
return voyages is beyond doubt. For example, the indenture sealed between Lancaster
and the king in 1345 stated that the earl was to have shipping both ‘in going and
coming at the cost of the king’.
This does not say that the king will provide
shipping just that he will pay for it. The implication here is that the outward voyage
was organised by the crown but in Bordeaux Lancaster arranged his own transport and
the crown reimbursed him on his return. In addition, the indenture that was sealed
between Edward and the Black Prince in 1355 explicitly states that the king will
‘provide sufficient shipping for the passage of the prince and all his men, as well as
planks, hurdles and all other things necessary for their shipment both going and
returning’. Unfortunately, the return wages paid to mariners seem to be mostly
absent from the Exchequer evidence, suggesting varying methods of payment were
used. It is unfortunate that the earlier return fleets, or payments issued for them, are
not recorded. However, the information contained in both Norwell’s and Farley’s
Wardrobe accounts seem to show that some form of re-passage was arranged and

(1977), pp. 135-150, p. 136. Lancaster also sailed to Gascony in 1370 and his re-passage payments
were paid for him and his soldiers during this campaign, ibid., p. 139.
153 K. Fowler, The king’s lieutenant, appendix 1, pp. 222-50.
154 BPR, IV, p. 144-45.
155 It is possible that the Exchequer clerks in England only recorded, and paid, the outward fleet simply
because this was easier for them to do in England than it was on the continent. And it is also probable
that the wages of war paid to commanders after the campaigns that they had been involved in had
ended did include money for the re-passage payments that they had arranged and paid for themselves.
Thus, the wages of war issued to retinue captains, including regard payments, were for the increased
costs of campaigning in France, which required the hiring of ships. Regard was not normally paid to
men serving in Scotland and the provision of regard and other bonuses really came to the fore during
the continental wars when sea-borne transportation was an added expense to the crown, which it did
not incur in the Scottish wars. On regard and its development, see A. Ayton, Knights and warhorses,
pp. 110-114. In the later part of Edward III’s reign certain accounts, compiled for the Exchequer, seem
to contain more detail about the return passages. For example, E101/29/18, mm. 1-2, record the
outward and return passage for the duke of Lancaster and the Black Prince from 1365 through to 1368
from England to Flanders and England to Gascony. Thirteen ships are recorded manned by 422
mariners and one sergeant-at-arms, two men-at-arms and two archers. Although such high ranking
nobles would no doubt be afforded more security in terms of return shipping than the soldiers under
their command.
perhaps we should treat Brittany as an anomaly. The 1338-39 expedition was conducted in allied territory where the busiest ports in northern Europe were situated and the 1359-60 campaign ended in an English controlled enclave, whereas although the English controlled parts of Brittany in 1343 they only had access to the two small ports of St. Mathieu and Brest. This essentially meant that the English soldiers returning to England probably did so in small numbers over a period of months from varying ports in northern France.
CHAPTER 3

THE SUPPLY OF ARMIES AND GARRISONS BY SEA 1320-1360

3.1 Logistics and Preparations for War, an overview of procedures

Logistical preparation was one of the most important and complicated aspects of any forthcoming campaign. Indeed, ensuring that an army would be fully supplied with foodstuffs has been described as one of the most difficult problems faced by any medieval government.¹ And once that army had made inroads and established garrisons, as the English did in Scotland, it was necessary also to make sure that those islands of occupation were fully supplied.² Without adequate provender the intended strategy of an invading force would collapse within weeks. Once food ran out and soldiers became hungry discipline would suffer and desertions increase. This was as obvious to a medieval commander as it is to modern strategists. Therefore, royal campaigns during the Edwardian period were usually preceded by months of meticulous planning and victual collection.³ This is not to say that in every campaign during this period everything went according to plan and the army remained consistently supplied with food. The 1322 and 1327 Scottish campaigns provide stark reminders that any medieval expedition, regardless of the preparations, could disintegrate due to lack of provender.⁴ And these two campaigns were a far cry away from the comment made by the Venetian envoy in 1497 who stated that, 'I have it on the best information that when war is raging most furiously, they (the English) will

³ See H. J. Hewitt, The organization of war, chapter. 3; M. Prestwich, War, politics and finance, chapter 5 and idem, Armies and warfare, chapter. 10. These three accounts provide detailed analysis of the preparations, which went into campaigns in terms of supplying armies with victuals.
seek for good eating, and all their comforts, without thinking of what harm might befall them. The following discussion will analyse the varying methods available to the government for supplying its forces.

During the forty years covered by this thesis the king had three major systems of supplying his armies: the crown could issue general purveyance orders, request that a sheriff from a particular county collect a specified amount of supplies, or involve private merchants in the operation. The procedures for the collection of victuals therefore varied according to which method the crown employed, although during the Edwardian period, all three methods usually operated concurrently. The most prominent of these, especially in the campaigns before Edward III’s French wars, was purveyance or the kings right to prise. This allowed the king to order that anyone who possessed foodstuffs, or other supplies, in specified counties were, on demand, to sell these to the royal purveyors. In many ways this system was the medieval government’s equivalent of a compulsory purchase order. The king could appoint his sergeants-at-arms, usually with royal clerks in attendance, to go into the chosen counties to collect, record and pay for the foodstuffs ordered by the crown.

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4 For 1322, see Flores, III, p. 210; Scalacronica, p. 89; Brut, p. 225; Anonimalle, p. 111; Melsa, III, p. 345; Bridlington, p. 79; Murimuth, p. 3; Polychronicon, VIII, p. 317. For 1327, see Le Bel in C. J. Rogers ed. The wars of Edward III, pp. 4-19.
6 J. Masschaele, ‘Transport costs’, pp. 266-7 suggests that the sheriff was the main agent in the arena of supply. However, this comment underestimates the role played by private merchants, particularly after 1336 in the supply system. Alternatively D. S. Bachrach, ‘Military logistics’, p. 429 argues that operating the two systems of purveyance and private supply by merchants direct to the army was not generally successful. However, these two systems worked effectively in the Scottish wars of Edward III and the merchants of King’s Lynn were instrumental in the supply operations from the late 1330s.
7 It has been suggested before that it is difficult to study the victual operations in the medieval period. See, for example, E. Amt, ‘Besieging Bedford: military logistics in 1224’, Journal of medieval military history 1 (Boydell, 2001), pp. 101-124, p. 101. However, the Scottish and French wars of Edward II and Edward III are well illuminated with documentary evidence, which throws light on most aspects of the supply systems employed by the crown during this period.
8 A good discussion of this procedure can be found in C. Given-Wilson, The royal household and the king’s affinity, pp. 41-48.
second method employed by the crown involved an order issued to the sheriff of a designated county to collect a specified quantity of supplies from his bailiwick and then forward them to the collection point or other expressed area. For example, in 1336 Robert de Causton, sheriff of Norfolk, collected 196 quarters 6 bushels of malt and 27 bacons and sent them to Ipswich and Great Yarmouth for the supply of the northern fleet. 10 Usually, though, for the royal campaigns, the sheriffs would be ordered to gather much larger amounts and forward them to the supply depots of Newcastle or Skinburness, if the campaign was to be in Scotland, or to King’s Lynn, Sandwich or Portsmouth if the destination was France. 11 The third process that the king could employ was to allocate the task of supplying armies or garrisons to a selected group of merchants. For instance, William de la Pole played an important role in supplying Edward’s army at the siege of Berwick in 1333. 12 But the two most significant merchants in this respect were Thomas and William Melcheburn of King’s Lynn. Thomas and William were influential East Anglian merchants and almost single-handedly supplied the Scottish garrisons during the 1340s. They were throughout their careers closely connected, to first, local and then national affairs, being custom collectors, royal advisors, envoys, king’s bankers, sub-admirals and ship-builders. 13

10 E101/20/7, mm. 1, 2.
11 E101/17/1 provides evidence that victuals for the St. Sardos campaign were to be shipped from King’s Lynn. E101/17/3 shows supplies at Portsmouth. The involvement of the sheriff within the purveyance system could lead to corruption. However, it has been pointed out that although this did occur, it was in many ways the lesser evil of the many corrupt practices performed by the sheriffs. Edward III tended to keep as tight a reign as possible over his officials and there was a marked increase in judicial reviews and oyer and terminer commissions during the period of Edward’s heightened campaigning years in the 1350s. On the corruption of sheriffs within the whole system, including purveyance, see R. Gorski, The fourteenth-century sheriff: English local administration in the late middle ages (Boydell, 2003), chapter 4, pp. 112-119.
13 See CPR, 1333-37, p. 58; CPR, 1340-43, pp. 87, 146, 212; CPR, 1345-48, p. 248; Foedera, III, i, pp. 7, 24; E101/19/31; M. Livingstone, M. Witzel, The road to Crécy: the English invasion of France, 1346 (Pearson, 2005), p. 95. These sources provide details of all their activities during this period. Of course, private merchants acting on their own could supply armies but generally only when the force it
The Melcheburns first appear as ship masters during the 1327 campaign, when Thomas was described as master of the Petre of King’s Lynn.\textsuperscript{14} By 1336 they had risen to become important victual suppliers of English armies and garrisons. For example, they supplied 2,078 quarters of wheat and 1,010 quarters of oats for the English forces in Scotland from 1336-1338 at a cost of £950.\textsuperscript{15} These foodstuffs were transported in ships to Berwick. For instance, in 1337 Walter Brekehened, master of the Godyer of King’s Lynn, freighted 180 quarters of wheat and 238 quarters of oats to Berwick.\textsuperscript{16} It seems that Edward III employed merchants, such as the Melcheburn brothers, as a consequence of his continental ambitions and these men could be left to their own devices to supply his forces in Scotland.

The magnates serving in any campaign could, and would, usually organise supplies for themselves and their retinues. For example, both Andrew Harcla and Aymer de Valance sent ships to supply their retinues in the 1322 campaign; William de Bohun, earl of Northampton employed two of his ships to supply him with provender during his campaigns in Scotland in 1336, and the earl of Lancaster was supplied by his own ship, the Cogge Thomas of Lancaster, at the siege of Calais in 1347.\textsuperscript{17} Whether or not magnates organised their own supplies on a regular basis is difficult to establish because evidence of them doing so would not normally find its way into the central records. This is of more than academic interest because it affects whether we can safely assume that the foodstuffs collected for the royal campaigns of this period were for the consumption of the royal household and the

\textsuperscript{14} CPR, 1327-30, p. 104.
\textsuperscript{15} E101/19/30.
\textsuperscript{16} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{17} CPR, 1321-24, pp. 90, 107, 204; Rot. Scot. I, p. 417; CPR, 1345-48, p. 350. One of Valence’s ships was called the Garland and de Bohun’s ships were called the Peter and the Katerine mastered by Nicholas ate Putte and Roger Broun.
general levies rather than the contingents brought by the magnates?\textsuperscript{18} It would seem reasonable to expect the magnates to supply themselves at the beginning of the campaign. This is because an individual lord would have access to resources from his own personal estates before he began his participation in an expedition. Furthermore, since the king would also expect monetary payments from those receiving the supplies he had collected by means of purveyance, a magnate could save himself large amounts of money by supplying himself, and his retinue, with foodstuffs he had sourced from his own demesne lands. Finally, due to the levels of comfort most magnates enjoyed through their wealth, it is unlikely that they would want to experience the privations of a campaign, as was usually felt by the ordinary soldier. Indeed, the promise of adequate supplies would be more likely to attract men to their service, which would be an important consideration for any lord who had an indenture with the crown to fulfil. Thus, during the Welsh wars of Edward I several magnates certainly took the precaution of supplying their retinues with foodstuffs in order to guarantee that men under their command would remain in their service and not desert due to lack of sufficient provender.\textsuperscript{19} In addition, evidence relating to the 1327 Weardale campaign suggests that magnates would supply themselves with victuals. For instance, in 1327 the Bishop of Ely employed three ships to supply himself and his retinue.\textsuperscript{20}

These three systems of supply were of course interrelated and purveyance was crucial to all but the third method. The history of this practice has been dealt with in other works, but in general it stemmed from the ancient right of kings to take goods for their households. Purveyance was probably the issue, arising as a direct

\textsuperscript{18} If the magnates did indeed supply themselves, and their retinues, then this would also increase the length of time the collected supplies, noted below, would last for.
\textsuperscript{19}D. S. Bachrach, 'Military logistics', p. 429, n. 30.
consequence of the increased militarization under the Edwardian kings, which amassed the most complaints. Parliament after parliament aired grievances on the problems related to its use, and although the system became less demanding in the 1340s and 1350s, and the nomenclature surrounding it changed, the government never really altered its core proceedings. 21

The extent of victual supply for the maintenance of mariners in royal service is difficult to establish. The main reason for this is that mariners usually served for much shorter periods than land-based armies. For example, the fleet that transported the king to Brittany in 1342 served on average for a forty-day period, and the majority of ships (63%) had completed their service by October 1342, whereas the land army campaigned into early 1343. 22 Furthermore, when orders to arrest ships were issued they usually specified that the ships should turn up well victualled and munitioned, or 'bien aparaille'. 23 Therefore, at the outset of a ship's period of service it usually carried enough victuals for the crew to sustain themselves for the relatively short period of service. Alternatively, mariners could be paid their wages in foodstuffs. For example, during the period 1337-49 Nicholas Pyk indented with 165 shipmasters to serve in various campaigns. 24 Some of the mariners in these contracts were given their wages in victuals instead of money, or in a mixture of the two. For example, the

20 CPR, 1327-30, p. 141. It is likely that the bishop did serve in this campaign, otherwise he would not have made such elaborate supply arrangements.


22 For the naval periods of service, see C. Lambert, 'An army transport fleet' p. 86; for the land-based soldiers, see A. Ayton, Knights and warhorses, appendix 2, pp. 258-262.

mariners under the command of Simon Springet, master of the Portejoye, were paid 2 tuns of flour and 7 quarters of wheat. In other indentures the mariners are paid the second way: through a mixture of foodstuffs and money. For example, those serving on the Cog Edward were paid, 'et en vitailles 9li. et pro salaires des marins. 11 li 6d'. Major problems could occur, however, with regard to the supply of ships. The most recurrent and serious of these was the fact that ships could remain under long periods of arrest before seeing active service. For instance, the fleet that transported the earl of Northampton to Brittany in August 1342 had in fact been under arrest from June of that year. Since the number of ships waiting at Portsmouth numbered 145 there must have been a constant demand for food supplies because the provender that the mariners had brought with them would have been exhausted by early July.

There are, however, a few documents, which illuminate the procedure employed by the crown for supplying fleets in long periods of service. The most informative of these is the account of William Dunstable concerning the money and victuals for the northern fleet from October 1336 to October 1338. By closely examining this document we can see that the process of arranging victuals for mariners, over a lengthy period, would have two distinct phases. Firstly, the supplies were collected and sent to the ports of King's Lynn, Great Yarmouth, Ipswich and Hull, usually by appointed sheriffs who had to purvey foodstuffs in their counties. For example, William Muchet, sheriff of Cambridge and Huntingdonshire, supplied King's Lynn and Yarmouth with a little under 200 quarters of provender and 65 bacons. Similarly Robert de Causton, sheriff of Norfolk, delivered 200 quarters of

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24 E101/20/39.
25 Ibid., no. 21.
26 Ibid., no. 3.
27 E372/187, mm. 42, 48.
28 E101/20/1; E101/20/7; C47/2/27.
29 E101/20/7, mm. 1-6.
victuals to Great Yarmouth.\textsuperscript{30} In addition, local merchants also contributed supplies to the process. For instance, in July 1337 Reginald Godwyn provided 1 quarter of wheat for 5s.\textsuperscript{31}

The second part of the process involved the preparation and distribution of the victuals to various mariners and others involved in the northern fleet. Usually some of the supplies, particularly wheat, was ground into flour at local windmills and then transported by river or cart to the granaries where it would be stored ready for distribution. For example, at Boston, from May to October 1337, 41 quarters of wheat, 25 quarters of fish and 20 quarters of malt, supplied by the sheriff of Lincoln, were taken in small ships to the granaries in the town. Similarly at King’s Lynn 30 quarters of wheat was ground into flour before being taken by cart to the port.\textsuperscript{32} Once at the port the victuals were transported to large ships by hiring smaller boats to carry this out. For instance, in September 1337, the \textit{Seinte Nicholas} and the \textit{Petre} freighted supplies from Great Yarmouth to Sandwich. Several small vessels were hired to take the victuals from the quay to the larger ships with the cost of \textit{wyndage} amounting to 5s 2d per tun.\textsuperscript{33} In addition, these vessels would also transport military supplies, as did the \textit{Petre} from Great Yarmouth, when it freighted springalds and 1,300 lime burners to Sandwich castle.

Once at these other ports the victuals would be distributed to various mariners, men-at-arms and archers who were serving in the northern fleet. For example, the master of the \textit{Portbilling} of Great Yarmouth received 2 quarters and 6 bushels of wheat for himself and his men; and from 8 July to 4 August, Reginald Godwyn

\textsuperscript{30} \textit{Ibid.}, m. 2.
\textsuperscript{31} J. Masschaele, ‘Transport costs’, p. 267 also describes the process of how a sheriff would collect victuals from villages and then use river transport to freight them to the storage points, usually a substantial port in the sheriff’s county, before shipment to the receivers at Berwick or Newcastle.
\textsuperscript{32} E101/20/7, m. 5.
\textsuperscript{33} \textit{Ibid.}
supplied eighty men-at-arms and 118 archers with 80 quarters of wheat. Similarly Dunstable dispensed 122 quarters 6 bushels and 11 parts of wheat to mariners at Hull in the same period. Moreover, although the admiral had the powers to purvey his own victuals Dunstable also supplied him for twenty-eight days in July 1337. In total the whole account shows that the men of the northern fleet, over the two year period, consumed 4,507 quarters 6 bushels of wheat, 54 tuns 6 barrels and 151 quarters of flour, all protected by 80 measures of canvas, 275 quarters 1 bushel of beans and peas, 2,578 quarters 3 bushels of malt, 329 bacons, 1,877 tuns of salt fish and middle fish and 20 tuns of wine. These victuals were transported to the various ports for the men of the northern fleet in five large ships, four barges and numerous small boats (naviculus).

The sheriff in whose county the port lay usually supplied ships that were held up in port waiting to transport troops to the campaign area, such as the earl of Northampton's fleet in 1342. This process is illuminated by another account. In June 1337 Robert Emeldon, clerk, was assigned to purvey victuals in Hampshire. The collected provisions were then to be distributed among the fleet of ships currently lying in Portsmouth harbour. Emeldon supplied a total of twelve vessels with wheat and wine. These twelve ships received a total of 56 quarters of wheat and 35 tuns of wine. The largest consumer was the Cristofre, mastered by Richard Fille, who had 10 quarters of wheat and 6 tuns of wine, while the Gracedieu of Great Yarmouth, which received 2 quarters of wheat and 2 tuns of wine, consumed the smallest amount of provender.

34 Ibid., m. 2; E372/184, m. 3d.
35 The ships were the Edmund of Great Yarmouth mastered by Nicholas Clyng; the Petre; the Nicholas; the Cristofre; and the Portbilling.
36 E101/20/1.
Alternatively the admiral of the fleet could organise the purchase and
distribution of victuals. This is what Geoffrey de Say, admiral of the king's fleet did in 1336. In his account he records separately by receipts the victuals he purchased and from whom. For example, he bought 20 quarters of wheat, 18 beef carcases, and 56 muttons for £4 19s 4d from Ralph le Wayte. Clearly, the scale of operations required to supply a medieval fleet should not be underestimated as it could involve enormous amounts of foodstuffs. A document survives which shows us exactly the food requirements of 4,050 mariners. This source is related to the provisioning of the northern fleet and appears in the form of a list of counties and their projected contributions to the victual requirements of the fleet. For instance, the county of Lincoln was expected to furnish 1,000 quarters of wheat, 1,700 quarters of barley, 800 quarters of beans and peas, 4,000 bacons, 6 lasts of herrings, 20,000 stockfish and 3,000 stones of cheese. In total the seventeen counties listed were to contribute 9,100 quarters of wheat, 9,350 quarters of barley, 2,200 quarters of beans and peas, 6,000 quarters of oats, 12,960 bacons, 3,900 stones of cheese, 45 lasts of herrings and 32,400 stockfish, 60 tuns of ale and 100 tuns of cider. Furthermore, private individuals could be allocated the task of supplying a fleet. For instance, during the preparations for the Crécy campaign, the abbot of Beaulieu delivered victuals to the king's ships. The account comes in the form of four individual receipts for the

37 C47/2/27, no. 12.
38 R. W. Unger 'The northern crusaders: the logistics of English and other northern crusaders', in Logistics of warfare in the age of the crusades: proceedings of a workshop held at the centre for medieval studies, university of Sydney, 30 September to 4 October, 2002, ed. J.H. Pryor (Aldershot, 2006), pp. 251-273, p. 262, estimates that a ship with a crew of forty mariners carrying forty horses would consume 2.2 tonnes of supplies per day.
39 C47/2/31. This is a difficult document and it comes in a file with nine individual membranes. Membranes 1-3 record the projected amounts of victuals that each county listed should provide, while membranes 4, 5, 7, 8, 9 list the names of important magnates, retinue captains and the size of their projected retinues. For an enlightened discussion of the document, see M. Prestwich, 'English armies in the early stages of the hundred years war', p. 108.
40 C47/2/31, no. 1.
supplied provender. Thus the abbot supplied Adam Coggere, master of the Galeye, with 1 pipe of cider and 2 quarters of wheat, and he sold to the master of the George 15 beef carcases and 6 conger eels, at a total cost of 88s. Evidence from a later period also shows the large amounts of supplies required by mariners in the king’s service. For example, in 1465 at the outset of the voyage, a ship manned by twenty-six men and a boy required forty-eight ‘breads’, four barrels of beer, rye, herring, saltfish, a cheese and a whole meat carcass. These victuals were increased when the ship called in at Walberswick when more bread, beer, beef, fish and salt was bought for the use of the crew. This clearly shows how much even a medium sized crew could consume while at sea.

Foodstuffs were not the only requirements for a medieval fleet. Many of the ships had to have alterations made to them so that they would be fit for war; and they needed supplies of sufficient weapons to defend them. For example, in 1339 Thomas de Snetesham supplied the king’s ship Phillipe, mastered by Thomas Springet, with 30 padded shirts, 21 pieces of plate armour, 30 hauberks, 38 crossbows, 40 sheaves of barbed arrows, 200 cords for the bows, 13 balistars, 200 quarrels and 8 banners. During a ten year period he supplied the king’s ships with enormous quantities of arms, such as: 599 cuirass, 856 bascinets, 878 pieces of armour, 2,072 sheaves of arrows, 10 pikes, 199 blasons (a type of incendiary device), 95 pousell (a type of armour), 553 aktions (a type of padded shirt), 256 crossbows, 300 darts, 750 bows and 3,843 windlass ropes in addition to many more such arms.

41 Ibid., roll nos, 1 and 2. This enormous amount of victuals was also probably intended as food supplies for the 2,000 men-at-arms (or armed men), 4,000 archers and 4,000 spearmen also noted in the document (ibid., no. 5) thus bringing the total of personnel to be fed to 14,050.
42 E101/24/12, nos, 1 and 2.
43 S. Rose, The medieval sea, p. 152.
44 E101/20/9, m. 5
45 Ibid., m. 2. The guide used to identify the weapons and armour were C. Blair, European armour circa 1066-1700 (London, 1958), chapter 2; D. C. Nicolle, Arms and armour of the crusading era 1050-1350 (New York, 1988) vols, 1 and 2.
The supplying of garrisons within Scotland was the responsibility of the keeper or receiver of victuals at Berwick or Newcastle. The task of this official increased dramatically during the large invasions of the 1330s, but when the king’s attention was drawn to the continent the scope of the operation was scaled down. This is not to suggest that his task became easier; in fact, now that it was his sole responsibility to forward supplies on to the garrisons, he could be held responsible if any of these castles fell to the enemy due to lack of sufficient provender. In addition, he would also be expected to make good the losses of victuals if there was no satisfactory reason for their loss.

By examining the accounts of Robert Tonge, who was keeper at Berwick between 1335 and 1338, we can gain a good understanding of the system of garrison supply. These show that after 1337 Robert relied for his supplies on merchants appointed by the king to send provender to Berwick. Once at Berwick Robert would allocate to the garrisons of Edinburgh, Stirling, Roxburgh and Perth a specified amount of these victuals. Thus, in March 1340 Thomas Melcheburn forwarded 1,000 quarters of wheat to Berwick at 7s 6d per quarter, and 1,000 quarters of oats at 4s. per quarter.

The following year Thomas and his brother William Melcheburn contributed a further 500 quarters of wheat, 500 quarters of malt, 10 tuns of wine, 100 quarters of salt and 7 quarters of oats. A further 200 quarters of salt and

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47 CPR, 1345-48, p. 543. In fact by September 1342 Robert Tonge was ‘praying for an allowance hi his account at the Exchequer of 72 tuns 1 pipe, 3 sexters and 2 pitchers of wine, lost through leakages out of a total of 1,047 tuns of wine at Perth and other places in Scotland sent by him. 220 quarters of oats freighted in a ship called the Lightfot of King’s Lynn, lost in the Tay. 129 quarters 5.5 bushels of oats and 17 qt 3 bushels of peas freighted in other ships and brought to those parts of Scotland which were lost by violence of the sea or rotted by long detention in the ships in the period he was keeper’. This passage is recorded in CCR, 1340-43, p. 555, and shows that the post of receiver carried with it added dangers, with any lost victuals in the account having to be repaid by the receiver himself.

48 Tonge occupied the office of receiver at Berwick, Newcastle and Bamburgh simultaneously and he accounted separately for each post at the Exchequer. See B. L. Atkinson, ‘Berwick Upon Tweed’, pp. 110-111.

49 E101/22/24
7 quarters of beans and peas were later sent by them. All these supplies were freighted in ships. In fact the Melchebun brothers played such a prominent role in the contribution of provender to garrisons in Scotland that in many ways they were the main buttresses of the system and they formed a close relationship with Tonge. Closer inspection of one of Tonge’s accounts shows the importance of his work. Between 30 September 1336 and 29 September 1337, Tonge had control of 3,115 quarters of wheat, 226 quarters of fish, 575 salmon, 2,746 quarters of oats, 886 tuns 21 pipes of wine, 418 quarters of malt, 455 tuns 4 pipes 8 quarters of flour, over 5,000 boards de escland, 2,028 horse shoes, 7,400 nails and various other iron implements. From Berwick, Tonge shipped these out to the garrisons at Edinburgh, Stirling, Bamburgh and Perth by sea. Thus, thirty-six ships freighted the victuals to the above towns. For example, Robert Deth, master of the Blithe of Newhithe, freighted 6 tuns of flour and 10 tuns of wine to Edinburgh, and John Hardarrage, master of the Holygost of Berwick, transported 100 quarters of oats, 9 tuns of flour and 100 iron pieces to Perth as well as 800 boards for Stirling. Further, Gilbert Stanpot, master of the Leonard of Hull, carried 7 tuns of flour, 12 tuns of wine and 8 quarters of salt to Bamburgh castle. In total these ships distributed 43 quarters of wheat, 493 quarters of malt, 360 tuns 1 quarter of flour, 743 quarters of oats, 196 quarters of salt, 507 tuns 3 pipes of wine, 4,806 boards de escland and 1,194 iron pieces and spikes.

The method employed for supplying armies that were serving on the continent is a more problematic than the systems of supply utilised by the crown in Scotland.

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50 E101/23/2, mm. 1, 5.
51 CCR 1341-43, p. 482.
52 E101/20/4, mm. 1-11.
53 Ibid., mm. 2, 3, 7, 8, 9. In fact there are 40 ships separately listed, but the Katerine of Berwick, mastered by Hugh Caldecotes, made three separate voyages as did the Holygost of Berwick, and the Katerine of Berwick mastered by John Bisshop carried out two voyages.
54 Ibid.
The latter methods have been more fully researched and are easier to understand, with the Scottish victual system of supply depots managed by the receivers. It has usually been suggested that armies campaigning in France during this period mainly lived off the land. This view is generally taken because it is argued that the quantities of provisions required by large armies, such as those of 1346 and 1359-60, could not have been transported over with the troops. Neither could the soldiers, when on active campaigns or chevauchées, have been burdened by slow and cumbersome baggage trains. Yet, many of the campaigns conducted by the English in France operated in the summer months when the autumn harvest would not be ripe. This last issue probably explains why, when in France, the English forces usually attacked towns. It was in the towns that the invaders would have expected to find large stores of foodstuffs. Indeed, an examination of the newsletters from the 1342 Brittany campaign and the accounts written during and after the 1346 Crécy campaign, show the importance the English commanders placed on taking towns while on the march.

Any town captured by force of arms would add valuable resources to the supplies the army brought with it, although attacking such towns usually came at a heavy cost in

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55 These ships came from thirteen ports all located on the northeast and east coasts, with the largest contribution coming from the ports of the Humber estuary, which supplied five ships, followed by King’s Lynn with three ships.


57 It has been calculated that a packhorse could carry four bushels of wheat, a bushel weighing 48 lbs., and travel up to twenty-nine miles per day. Therefore, an army’s progress need not be slowed down by the need for carts. See J. Masschaele, ‘Transport costs’, pp. 270, 277.

58 This could be of great importance. In 1812 when Napoleon invaded Russia some of his forces began feeding their horses un-ripened cereal crops, which resulted in thousands of horses dying of colic, as Dumoncau, one of Napoleon’s officers, noted ‘if the barley is fed to them and they drink water, the barley swells up and causes violent colics, which lead to death’. See P. B. Austin, *1812, Napoleon’s invasion of Russia* (London, 2000), p. 58. Thus great care for the horses’ victuals, at least, was required when campaigning on foreign soil during the summer months.

59 Avesbury, pp. 340-2, contains a newsletter written by the king to the council in England, which clearly shows that the English concentrated on taking towns. Also, see R. Barber ed. *The life and campaigns of the Black Prince* (Boydell, 1986), pp. 15-16, which records the letter written by Michael Northburgh detailing the early events of the Crécy campaign and which provides clear evidence that the English sacked several towns for the supplies that were stored there.
lives. Furthermore, taking a town did not guarantee that the supplies within it would be captured as unruly soldiers could sometimes destroy the stores through uncontrolled looting or burning. As a result, the view that armies relied on the lands they passed through for supplies have recently been challenged on two issues. Firstly, it has been suggested that the daily calorie intake of a soldier could be much less than has previously been thought. For example, M. Prestwich has calculated that seventy-four men would need 93 quarters of wheat for 176 days. A quarter being 384 lb., therefore, these men would consume 35,712 lb. of wheat in the allotted time that would have meant that each man roughly ate 2.7 lb. of bread per day, which amounts to around 5,000 calories per day for each man. Recently it has been suggested that this high dietary intake should be reduced to 3,250 calories per man per day. It has

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60 See, for example, A. Ayton, P. Preston, *The battle of Crécy*, pp. 66-67, which notes the problems that could ensue if discipline in the army disintegrated when a town was taken. Note particularly the sack of Carentan in which the English attack destroyed much of the stores.  
62 This calculation is also supported by several studies, which examine the supply requirements of foodstuffs for medieval households, and these show that a household servant employed by a lord was usually provided with roughly the same quantity of food M. Prestwich allocates to the garrison troops in the reign of Edward I: some two to three pounds of bread and a gallon of ale per day. See C. M. Woolgar, *The great household in late medieval England* (London, 1999), pp. 132-3. In addition, the bakers of the royal household were also expected to purchase a quarter of corn from which they were required to bake forty superior simnels, 140-150 salt simnels, and 260 bakers' loaves. A superior simnel would feed four men, the salt simnel would feed two and one loaf would be sufficient for one man. See C. Given-Wilson, *The royal household and the king's affinity*, p. 4. This suggests that a quarter of grain could feed up to 270 men. Indeed a bushel of wheat would normally provide thirty loaves and with nine bushels to a quarter then it can be inferred that one quarter of wheat could produce 270 loaves, see *idem*, 'Purveyance for the royal household, 1362-1413', *BIHR* 56 (1983), pp. 145-163, p. 152. Based on M. Prestwich's further calculations (*Armies and warfare*, p. 248) it is possible to suggest that 10,000 men would require roughly 5,000 quarters of cereals per week or 15,000 per month. However, it should be borne in mind that the inclusion of meat would reduce the demand for such heavy consumption of cereals. But with the inclusion of horses this could be further increased: it is estimated that 10,000 horses would require some 4,000 quarters per week. D. S. Bachrach, 'Military logistics', p. 430 makes the suggestion that a quarter was 504 modern pounds. If this latter figure is indeed true then the length of time the supplies, which had been collected and distributed, would last for as noted in this thesis should, perhaps be extended by anywhere up a month. Furthermore, if we accept that the magnates supplied themselves, at least initially, then the duration the provender would last should certainly be increased by a month.  
63 Y. N. Harari, 'Strategy and supply in fourteenth century western European invasion campaigns', *JMH* 64 (April, 2000), pp. 297-333, p. 303. A Venetian galley man's daily calorie intake has been estimated at 4,000 per-day, so in essence the daily calorie requirement of men on campaign should be seen as somewhere between 3,000-5,000 per-day. On the Venetian galley men diets, see F. C. Lane, 'Diet and wages of seamen in the early fourteenth century', *Venice and history: the collected papers of F. C. Lane* (Balitmore, 1966), pp. 263-268. What also needs to be noted, in addition to the above
also recently been argued that Edward III's campaigns in France did not rely on foraging for their supplies, and that the force of 1359-60, which numbered around 10,000 men, was fed for ten weeks solely from a large baggage train. It is calculated that 937 to 1,000 one-ton carts of cereals would last an army of 15,000 men fifty days.⁶⁴ These figures are entirely plausible and it is worth noting that when carts were transported by sea they were likely to have been dismantled, so as to take less space in the hold, and would have been relatively easy to re-construct at the disembarkation point. That English medieval armies did indeed bring supplies with them can also be deduced from the orders issued by Henry V in 1415 when he told the sheriff of Hampshire to proclaim that, 'every lord, knight, esquire, valet and all others going with the king', were to bring with them on the campaign enough victuals for three months.⁶⁵ And if we look further, the evidence of armies foraging for victuals in the Tudor campaigns in France as been described has 'scanty'. 'The enemy's territory never seems to have been the staple support of English armies at this period'.⁶⁶

Secondly, if account is taken of the livestock that was undoubtedly transported with the armies the length the supplies would last for can be further extended. For amounts of food, especially with regard to garrisons, is that not much is understood about the garrison troops themselves. For example, if the troops were of knightly stock, or from junior branches of knightly families or the gentry class, they are likely to have been accompanied by a servant. Therefore, the men-at-arms who appear on a garrison's muster roll would not be indicative of the actual number of men who required feeding from the food supplies. In fact the seventy-four men in Prestwich's calculations could have actually numbered over 100. Indeed, a garrison at Edinburgh in 1300 was manned by a total of 347 men of whom only 154 were fighting men, and the non-combatant staff at garrisons could number many individuals including brewers, cooks, bowyers, boys, glaziers, drapers, woodmongers, falconers, clerks, millers, washerwomen, chaplains, heralds, water carriers and bakers. See D. Cornell, 'English castle garrisons', who notes that 'in reality there was a much larger supporting cast whose purpose it was to support the garrison': pp. 3, 74-75.

⁶⁴ Y. N. Harari, 'Strategy and supply', p. 314. There are several views on what a medieval cart could carry but estimates vary between 1,000 pounds to half a ton. Wagons, it has been argued, could hold up to one ton. On carts and wagons, see A. C. Leighton, Transport and communication in early medieval Europe, 500-1100 (New York, 1972), p. 72; M. Girault, Atelages et charrons au moyen âge (Paris, 1992), p. 138; J. Masschaele, 'Transport costs', pp. 268-9; D. S. Bachrach, 'Military logistics', pp. 431-2.


example, if around 3,000 animals were freighted with the army the time it could remain in the field could be increased to sixty days or two months.\(^{67}\) And animals that were kept alive could be driven on the hoof so as not to slow down the army.\(^{68}\) Moreover, this number of animals and carts is not out of the question.\(^{69}\) For example, in 1294 Edward I transported 1,537 sheep, 430 cattle, 210 bacons, 4,565 stockfish, 807 salmon, 253 conger eels, 3,774 birds, 23,700 eggs, 2,686 quarters 75 bushels of oats, 1,207.85 quarters of flour, 805 one ton carts of horse fodder, 50 quarters of beans, 1,672 sacks and various other storage containers, to Gascony for his planned campaign there.\(^{70}\) Bearing in mind that the fleets raised by Edward III are likely to have been much larger than those of his grandfather, it would clearly have been possible for large amounts of foodstuffs to be transported to France in the 1340s and 50s. It should also be noted that not all of Edward III’s continental campaigns required large amounts of supplies to be transported over with the troops. For the first two campaigns Edward launched in the Low Countries he based himself in allied territory. His men could therefore buy victuals from Flemish merchants with their wages. Indeed, Edward’s stay in Flanders has been described as ‘an economic bonanza for the Low Countries, not only for the many Low Countries princes, but also for the bourgeois of the towns, for the church, and even for the common labourers, peasants, and the poor’, in total Edward’s own household expended £2,063 3s 5d on

\(^{67}\) It has been estimated that medieval livestock would have been forty to sixty percent smaller than modern farm breeds. It has been further argued that a medieval cow would yield 65 kilograms of meat, 31 kilos of edible offal and 25 kilos of fat; a sheep would produce 7.8 kilos of meat, 3.75 kilos of edible offal and 3 kilos of fat; a pig would produce 21.6 kilos of meat, 3.75 kilos of edible offal and 14.4 kilos of fat. See K. L. Pearson, ‘Nutrition and the early-medieval diet’, *Speculum* 72 (1997), pp. 1-32, p. 16.

\(^{68}\) Y. N. Harari, ‘Strategy and supply’, p. 314. It is unlikely that the animals transported from England would be alive, and those animals that could be driven on the hoof were probably collected from the local countryside of France during the campaign.

\(^{69}\) J. Masschaele, ‘Transport costs’, p. 269 notes that it was usually the case that a team of four horses would be required to pull a cart loaded with four quarters of wheat.

\(^{70}\) M. K. Vaughn, ‘Mount the warhorse, take your lance in your grip.....’ ‘logistical preparations for the Gascon campaign of 1294’, pp. 97-111, see pp. 99-111.
Furthermore, the 1342 Brittany campaign, much like the 1338-40 campaigns, was conducted with a relatively small number of English soldiers, in an area that was increasingly becoming under the control of the English administration that had direct access to several towns and ports. Thus the supply demands of such campaigns were not as great as those of the expeditions of 1346 and 1359-60.72

One further issue needs to be addressed with regard to the supply problem. It is now widely recognised by historians that Edward's campaigns in France sought the strategic outcome of a battle.73 So in order to achieve this goal it was vital for Edward to be able to keep his army in the field long enough to force this outcome, especially so when facing Philip VI, who consistently avoided battle and adopted a Vegetian approach. During the siege of Cambrai in 1339 Edward had witnessed how lack of adequate supplies could bring about an army's slow disintegration. Therefore, in order to keep his forces in good shape long enough to force Philip into action, Edward had to ensure that his soldiers in 1346 had enough supplies to see them through a two-month campaign. If he ignored such matters and relied on the local countryside in France to support his army, then the battle-seeking strategy together with all the preparations, such as raising a large fleet, would be wasted. It seems likely that Edward brought enough supplies over with his army to get them through the first eight weeks of a campaign, even if this involved reduced rations. And he could also replenish his supplies through the acquisition of towns while on the march.

72 For the size of the English contingents in the Low Countries, see A. Ayton, 'Edward III and the English aristocracy at the beginning of the hundred years war' p. 179 and p. 181 for Brittany. For a more detailed commentary on the Brittany campaign, see A. Ayton, Knights and warhorses, appendix 2. The number of men who participated in the Low Countries campaigns was 3,900 in 1338 and 4,500 in 1340. The Brittany army numbered roughly 3,800.
73 For example, C. J. Rogers, War cruel and sharp; A. Ayton and P. Preston, The battle of Crécy; S. Morillo, 'Battle seeking: the contexts and limits of Vegetian strategy', JMMH 1 (2001), eds, B.S. Bachrach, C. J. Rogers and K. DeVries, pp. 21-41. In this article Morillo weighs up the arguments for the battle seeking approach.
The discussion above has examined the methods available to the administrative officials of the period for collecting, storing, distributing and freighting supplies from the towns, villages and counties of England to the theatre of operations. We have also seen how these victuals were recorded and paid for, and we have scrutinised the work of the officials who were in charge of the system. The following analysis of the individual royal campaigns in Scotland and France seeks to establish just how much foodstuffs and other supplies were transported by sea. Each campaign will be dealt with individually and the amounts and types of victuals and supplies assessed. The role of ships in each campaign will be quantitatively researched: the number ships involved in each invasion; how many ports and their geographical location will be examined followed by an investigation into how many mariners served in each campaign. The main aim is to show by quantitative analysis the central role played by the maritime communities in transporting victuals and supplies in all of the royal campaigns. Within the context of each individual campaign a discussion of the 'military naval role' of shipping in the wars of Scotland will be assessed. The numbers of ships and mariners, the contributing ports and their dates of service will be established.  

3.2 THE SCOTTISH CAMPAIGN OF 1322

The Scottish campaign of 1322, Edward II’s last, was a disaster only rivalled by his defeat at Bannockburn in 1314. Indeed, one historian has labelled it ‘one of the worst failures of the reign’. Michael Prestwich has researched the supply element of this campaign, yet a little more can be added to our understanding of this expedition,
paying particular attention to the maritime dimension of the supply operation.\textsuperscript{76} Our investigation of the methods and procedures of supplying armies and mariners has shown that stockpiling large amounts of provender at the storage points of Newcastle and Skinburness required the mobilisation of many clerks, sheriffs and merchants, who in turn usually employed ships and mariners to freight the supplies to the victual points. For example, the 2,000 quarters of oats, 1,000 quarters of wheat, 200 hogs and the 40 tuns of wine, which were ordered from the counties of Cornwall and Kent in 1322, would all have to be transported by sea as the overland distance by cart to the north of England would be too great.\textsuperscript{77} Moreover, before the wheat was freighted the majority of it would be ground down into flour, thus making it more manageable and also less likely to be damaged by the sea journey. For instance, prior to the 1322 campaign, Thomas Lercedekne purveyed 62 quarters 7 bushels of wheat in Cornwall. This wheat was then milled into flour and placed in 9 empty tuns and 1 pipe. Lercedekne then hired a small boat to take the victuals by river to Falmouth before loading them onto a larger ship, the \textit{Seynte ys cogge}, mastered by Richard Rounam, which then freighted the supplies to Skinburness at a cost of 80 marks.\textsuperscript{78}

In his study on this particular expedition, Michael Prestwich assessed the total amount of victuals collected at Newcastle and Carlisle. He calculated that 6,700 quarters of wheat, 8,500 quarters of oats, 2,600 quarters of barley malt, 1,500 quarters of beans and peas and 2,100 bacons were requested from the English counties. An

\textsuperscript{76} M. Prestwich, ‘Miliatry logistics’. It is not the purpose of this thesis to provide a narrative of the events of the campaign, which can be found in various accounts. The most informative are, M. R. Powicke, ‘The English commons in Scotland in 1322 and the deposition of Edward II’, \textit{Speculum} 35 (October, 1960), pp. 556-562; C. McNamee, \textit{The war of the Bruces: Scotland, England and Ireland, 1306-1328} (Lothian, 1997), chapters 3 and 4; M. Brown, \textit{The wars of Scotland} (Edinburgh, 2004), chapter 10; R. McNair Scott, \textit{Robert the Bruce, king of Scots} (Edinburgh, 1993), pp. 200-205; A. A. M. Duncan, \textit{The war of the Scots, 1306-1323'}, \textit{TRHS} 2 (1992), pp. 125-151; M. Penham, \textit{The Scottish civil war: the Bruces and the Balliols and the war for control of Scotland} (Tempus, 2002), part 2 chapter 4. Further details can be obtained on this campaign in M. Prestwich, \textit{Armies and warfare} and A. Ayton, \textit{Knights and warhorses}.

\textsuperscript{77} CPR, 1321-24, pp. 93-94.
additional 6,000 quarters of wheat, 4000 quarters of oats, 2,000 quarters of beans and peas, 1,000 quarters of barley malt, 500 bacons, 500 tuns of wine and 500 quarters of salt were ordered from Ireland, while on 1 April, Gascony was also asked to collect 2,000 quarters of wheat and 1,000 tuns of wine. Prestwich found that out of these requested supplies some 3,788 quarters of wheat, 806 tuns of flour, 3,822 quarters of barley, 3,137 quarters of oats and 1,202 quarters of beans were in the possession of Henry de Shireoaks, keeper of victuals at Newcastle. While John de Louther, receiver of supplies at Carlisle, controlled 1,463 quarters of wheat, 201 tuns of flour, 1,079 quarters of beans, 420 quarters of barley 1,496 quarters of oats and 208 tuns of wine.79

How much of this total was transported by sea and how many ships were required for such an undertaking? First, a short discussion of the available sources that are specifically related to victual supply for this campaign is required. Most of the detail with regard to ships is to be found in the Wardrobe accounts and related particulars of accounts. The Wardrobe section headed _vadia nautourm_ lists the ships that transported the supplies to Newcastle and then to Leith.80 The particulars of account are useful when concerned with those victuals transported from Ireland. By examining the account of Robert de Basse we can see their importance. This Exchequer particular details the purchase of wine and salt from Waterford, which were then freighted to Skinburness in ships hired by Basse. We can see by surveying his account that twenty-one people supplied 83 tuns of wine and 60 quarters of salt at a cost of £119 22s. Four ships were then hired to deliver these supplies to the receiver at Skinburness.81

79 M. Prestwich, 'Military logistics', pp. 279-82.
80 BL, Stowe MS 553, fols 77r-77v.
81 E101/15/36, m. 2. The ships were the _Godale_ of Swynhumber, mastered by John Harry; The _Bonan_ of Teignmouth, mastered by Richard le White; The _Nicholas_ of Ilfracombe, mastered by John Cosyn and the _Cog St. Giles_ of Ilfracombe.
The above analysis details the amounts of victuals that were stored at the two supply depots and how they were collected and freighted there. If we now investigate the number of ships that sailed to Newcastle, we find that forty-one vessels were employed for this purpose. Of these, twenty-four ships are recorded in the Wardrobe book, and seventeen vessels are listed in other sources. Furthermore, there are an additional thirty-four ships recorded in the calendared documents, that participated in the search for victuals, in addition to a list of merchants who had taken the precaution of gaining enrolled protections for sending their vessels to Newcastle loaded with provender. For example, in June 1322 the Margrete, owned by John de Thornegge and John de Bamme, was sent to Norway to buy victuals and transport them to Newcastle. Unfortunately, in some cases we are not told the exact numbers of ships sent to locate and collect these supplies. For instance, in April 1322 Richard de Lincoln of Peterborough was given protection for ‘the men and the ships, whom he is sending southward to buy corn, victuals and other goods to bring to York and Newcastle’. In addition to Richard, this same entry lists a further forty-three merchants who had enrolled protections, and out of these twenty-three are specifically noted as going in ships. Therefore, the number of vessels involved in the supply operation was likely to have been higher than the seventy-five already noted.

When we examine all the ships involved in the transportation of supplies from Ireland, the numbers of vessels employed are much smaller, with only twenty-six ships being employed in this dimension of the operation. However, if we take into account that many of these ships actually carried out more than one crossing of the

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82 BL, Stowe MS 553, fols 77r-77v; CCR, 1318-23 pp. 660-1; Bain, no. 766, p. 142, which provides evidence that the king had his medicine transported by sea. In addition, three more ships were employed to freight victuals to the army but they were wrecked on their voyage to Scotland and so never delivered their cargoes, Cal. Inq. Misc., II, nos, 683 and 693, pp. 170-172.

83 CPR, 1321-24, pp. 14, 77, 86, 90, 107, 109-10, 114, 134, 204, 205, 207; CCR, 1318-23, pp. 463

84 CPR, 1321-24, p. 134.
Irish Sea, and we count journeys instead of vessels, the total then rises to thirty-two. For example, in the account of John de Rathfodan and Jordan Gretnagh, which records the victuals sent from Drogheda to Skinburness, five individual ships are listed. Yet these vessels actually made three separate crossings each to Skinburness. Therefore, because the clerks in Ireland presumably had a smaller number of ships at their disposal, they are employing them repeatedly, whereas their English counterparts had the luxury of a larger merchant marine to exploit.

The entire amount of foodstuffs carried by all these ships was considerable. Those vessels that freighted supplies to Newcastle conducted a total of 3,779 quarters and 9 bushels of wheat, 94 tuns of flour, 40 quarters of beans and peas, 125 quarters of oats, 1,800 herrings and 1 barrel of sturgeon, plus 160 stockfish, 259 quarters of salt, 22 beef carcases, 510 bacons, 1,425 tuns, 47 pipes and 1 barrel of wine, 400 horseshoes and 20 pieces of large cloth, in addition to 90 lb. of the king's medicine. However, due to the ravages of the sea not all this provender made it safely to Newcastle, and 584 quarters 6 bushels of wheat, 60 bacons, 22 beef carcases and 26 pipes of wine sustained damage while being transported to the supply depots. Moreover, some of the foodstuffs destined for the Scottish campaigns were routinely apprehended en-route to the north by some of the king's officers. For example, the constable of Scarborough castle took 160 quarters of wheat from the Blithe of Dartmouth. When we take all this evidence together, and analyse the victuals

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86 E101/15/36, m. 2; E101/16/7, mm. 9, 10, 11; E101/16/8, mm. 2, 3; E101/16/21, mm. 8-10; Cal. Inq. Misc., II, no. 1088, p. 269.
87 E101/16/21. The ships were the Mariole of Wales, mastered by Richard de Fell; the Nova Navis of Chester, mastered by Simon de Hull; the Trinite of Liverpool, mastered by William Fitz Alan; the Mariole of Drogheda, mastered by John Haes and the Godyer of Birhale.
88 BL, Stowe MS 553, fols 76v, 77r-77v; CCR, 1318-23, pp. 591 640-1 660-1; Bain, no. 766, p. 142.
89 Cal. Inq. Misc., II nos, 685 and 693, pp. 170-72 records examples of ships that were lost at sea on their way to Scotland.
90 CCR, 1318-23, p. 591. Included in these totals are the twenty-one ships, which were used to forward some supplies from Newcastle to Leith recorded in BL, Stowe MS 553, fols 77r-77v.
freighted by sea to Skinburness, we find that a total of 1,420 quarters 6 bushels of wheat, 2,160 quarters 4 bushels of oats, 79 quarters of malt, 320 tuns of wine, 20 bacons, and 160 quarters of salt supplied by 966 individuals was shipped to the western supply depot prior to the campaign.\textsuperscript{91}

It is now possible to assess the size of the supply fleet (including the number of mariners) that shipped these victuals and was central to the whole supply system. In total we have 101 confirmed ships transporting the above victuals to the distribution points at Newcastle and Skinburness.\textsuperscript{92} The exact numbers of mariners involved in the victualling fleet is difficult to assess. This is because by contrast with the ships recorded in the Wardrobe accounts the majority of the vessels mentioned in the calendared sources are not accompanied by crew-size information. This is due in part to the method employed by Edward II, who seems to have raised the majority of the ships that participated in his supply fleet on a no pay basis, in addition to calling on the traditional service of the Cinque Ports.\textsuperscript{93} Furthermore, those ships, recorded in the particulars of account are not provided with crew details either because they were simply paid a freightage charge. The problem of establishing total mariner numbers can perhaps be addressed by calculating a mean average crew size for the ships for which we do have crew numbers for: namely those in the Wardrobe accounts. We can then extrapolate this average crew size on to the total of 101 ships. Although this is not a perfect solution to the problem, it still might provide a good idea of the numbers

\textsuperscript{91} E101/15/36, mm. 1,2; E101/16/1; E101/16/6, mm. 1-4; E101/16/7, mm. 1-11; E101/16/8, mm. 1-3; E101/16/20; E101/16/21, mm. 1-7; Cal. Inq. Misc., II, no. 1088, p. 269. It should be noted the amount of oats is larger than the corresponding figure in Prestwich’s article (‘Military logistics’ p. 282). This, however, probably reflects the fact that some of these victuals would have perished on the sea journey to Cumbria.

\textsuperscript{92} Forty-one ports contributed these vessels, with fourteen (34\%) of these ports situated in the northern admiralty and twenty-seven (65\%) ports located in the administrative sphere of the southern admiral (while three of the ports cannot be located with any accuracy). The port that contributed the largest number of ships was London with nine (8.9\%), followed by Great Yarmouth with six (5.9\%) while the majority of ports, twenty-four, contributed only one vessel.
of mariners that were likely to have been employed in the supply fleet of 1322. However, only three ships from the twenty-four supply vessels are accorded crew sizes.\textsuperscript{94} We can solve this further issue by averaging out the other twenty-seven ships' crews that were part of the 1322 campaign, as recorded elsewhere in the Wardrobe book. The total number of mariners operating these twenty-seven vessels was 1,135, which provides a mean average of forty-two mariners per ship. This allows a tentative suggestion that 4,000 mariners were probably employed in the supply dimension of the 1322 campaign.

\textbf{MILITARY NAVAL CONTRIBUTION IN 1322}

In the foregoing discussion it was calculated that forty-one ports contributed 101 ships in order to transport the victuals for the 1322 campaign. Yet these were not the only vessels that took part in this expedition. There were those that operated during the expedition solely as fighting ships. The problem with accurately assessing the numbers of such ships is that some of the vessels seem to have been contributed by their homeports for no pay. For example, in June 1322 the king thanked the bailiffs and the men of Ravenserodde 'for their grant of a ship with thirty armed men, victuals and other necessities to be sent to him and to stay in his service for six weeks'.\textsuperscript{95} Similar letters were issued to several other ports. Therefore, the total number of vessels outlined below should be taken as a low estimate of actual number that participated. Fortunately, we have the Wardrobe payroll and other related sources, which do provide a guide to the numbers of ships involved. Taking all this evidence

\textsuperscript{93} Foedera, II, i, p. 485; CCR, 1318-23, pp. 462, 463, 553, 540, 547; CPR, 1321-24, pp. 86, 102, 109-10.
\textsuperscript{94} BL, Stowe MS 553, fol. 77r. The Seintemaricog of Ipswich mastered by John Payn, with a compliment of 29 mariners; the Margrete of Yarmouth, mastered by John de Kirkele, with 28 mariners and the Petre of Yarmouth, mastered by Nicholas Coyt, with a crew of 19 mariners.
\textsuperscript{95} CCR, 1318-23, p. 559.
together it is possible to say that a further eighty-four ships, besides the 101 supply vessels, participated in this campaign. Furthermore, Edward had also specifically ordered the Cinque Ports to render their full service. This was due to the fact that the Flemings had entered the war as Scottish allies and had gathered a large fleet of ships to harass the English supply lines at sea. Consequently, if we take into consideration that the Cinque Ports did indeed contribute their full quota then a further fifty-seven ships can be added to the total. The Cinque Ports must have put some vessels to sea because the only recorded losses to the victual ships occurred through the ravages of the sea and not through attacks by the Flemings. In addition, twenty-two ports from the southwest were all asked to provide sufficient ships to transport the Irish contingents to Scotland. Whether these ports actually raised this fleet of transport ships is difficult to say. But there is one surviving Exchequer account, compiled by John de la Bacall, which records the wages paid to masters and mariners for the transportation of the earl of Louth’s retinue from Ireland to Scotland. This account lists the names of twenty ships, of which only eight are assigned to their home ports, and of these only three ports are located in the southwest. 316 mariners, including constables and masters, manned these ships and they transported the earl of Louth and his retinue of seventy-four men-at-arms, 189 hobelars and ninety-three foot

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96 BL, Stowe MS 553, fols 76r, 76v, 77r; CCR, 1318-23, pp. 463, 546, 559.
97 Foedera, II, i, p. 485; CCR 1318-23, p. 553.
98 Cf. E163/4/11, nos, 42, 73, which do suggest that the Flemings prevented some of the victual ships from reaching the supply depots. However, M. Prestwich has noted that the other letters in this series do not mention this problem (Armies and warfare, p. 367, n. 6) and the evidence does seem to suggest that many ships reached Newcastle and Carlisle, including the twenty-one which reached Leith, and that Flemish participation in the campaign was minimal.
99 CCR, 1318-23, p. 534.
100 E101/16/16, m. 6. The Godyer of Dartmouth; the Rodecog of Teignmouth, mastered by Richard Hobel, and the Godyer of Teignmouth, mastered by Richard le Wighe. It has to be noted that R. A. Kaner states that there were twenty-nine ships enrolled on this account. However, although there are twenty-nine individuals named, eight are repeated under the sub-heading of expenses for the ships at Drogheda, while one ship, the Nicholas of Pulle (Poole), has had a line drawn through its record and a cross placed next to the name, which suggests that this ship did not serve.
soldiers.\textsuperscript{101} Louth's retinue would have had roughly 500-700 horses including those transported to pull the baggage train.\textsuperscript{102} Therefore, each ship would have had to freight around forty horses and twenty men. However, it has to be noted that there could have been as many as 3,000 Irish troops participating in this expedition, which means that there must have been more than the twenty ships here.\textsuperscript{103} If we assume that there were about 300 men-at-arms, 500 hobelars and 2,000-foot soldiers that eventually did sail to Scotland, then this force would also have had in the region of 1,000 horses to transport. Therefore, it would seem likely that the twenty-two ports, which had been asked to supply transport ships for the Irish troops, did indeed provide at least one vessel each. With the inclusion of such ships the number of vessels participating in this expedition, solely in a transport or military role, could have been as high as 183.\textsuperscript{104}

These ships, employed as either military vessels or transport ships, were supplied by thirty-two ports.\textsuperscript{105} One of the most interesting aspects of this campaign is the method that Edward and his government chose to raise these vessels. Rather than sending out officers from the centre of power to the ports to requisition vessels his officials seem to have negotiated directly with some of the port towns. For example, nine ports and coastal towns, all located in Norfolk, were assessed in a novel way to provide ships. These communities were expected to contribute five vessels irrespective of the fact that they had already contributed two ships to the fleet.\textsuperscript{106} This

\textsuperscript{101} For details on the earl of Louth's retinue, see A. Ayton, \textit{Knights and warhorses}, pp. 92-3.
\textsuperscript{102} This is based on the earl having eight horses, the men-at-arms three each and the hobelars one each.
\textsuperscript{103} R. A. Kaner, 'The management and mobilisation of English forces', p. 69. The actual number of troops ordered was 6,000 foot, 1,000 hobelars and 300 men-at-arms. It is doubtful, however, that all of these turned up and perhaps only half eventually did so.
\textsuperscript{104} This includes the full Cinque Port quota, the twenty Irish ships, and the twenty-two ships from the ports asked to provide vessels for the campaign.
\textsuperscript{105} Of these, nineteen ports (59.3\%) were located on the east coast and in the northern admiralty, while thirteen ports (40.6\%) were situated in the southern admiralty.
\textsuperscript{106} \textit{CCR, 1318-23}, p. 463. The ports were: Snyterle; Wyveton; Cleye; Salthouse; Baudreseye; Covehithe; Guston; Waleton and Filthustowe.
process is reminiscent of the new obligations that Edward and his councillors had been developing with regard to the recruitment of the land-based troops. Just as some towns were required to provide a certain quota of armed men, it seems that various ports were assessed through a similar method, which required them to supply a specified number of ships, manned, armed and victualled. Sometimes, as in the case of the ports already mentioned, this meant several of them pooling their resources together to meet the demands of the crown.107

In order to calculate the number of mariners who participated in the military dimension of the 1322 campaign, a method similar to the one employed in the analysis of the victual ships’ crew sizes will be applied. This is because assessing the number of seamen that served on the military ships is problematic due to the method employed by the crown when it raised the majority of the fleet. Fortunately, as noted earlier, we have the Wardrobe payroll for this expedition, which does include crew sizes for some of the ships that operated in a transportation or military role. From these crew details we can calculate a mean average of forty-two mariners per-ship. By applying this average crew size to all the ships we know participated in the campaign it can be suggested that the number of sailors manning the fleet would be about 5,500. However, if we were to include the full Cinque Port quota, which is also quantifiable, this number would rise to 6,500.108

In conclusion, we have a confirmed total of 104 ships participating in this campaign as either transport or military vessels. However, this number rises to 183 if

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107 Ibid., p. 463. For example, the towns of Snyterle, Wyveton, Cleye and Salthouse were to find three ships. For a discussion on this type of military assessment, see B. C. Keeney, ‘Military service in England, 1272-1327’, Speculum 22 (October, 1947), pp. 534-549 especially pp. 540-1; M. Powicke, ‘Edward II and military obligation’, Speculum 31 (January, 1956), p. 92-119, see p. 98; M. Prestwich, Armies and warfare, pp. 78, 134.

108 By examining the homeports of the ships that operated in a military or transport capacity it can be shown that forty-one vessels manned by some 1,700 mariners were supplied from the area under the control of the northern admiral, while the ports south and west of the Thames contributed roughly
we include the Cinque Ports’ obligations, in addition to the twenty-two ships that were probably supplied by the ports from the southwest for the purpose of transporting the Irish contingents. By including these extra vessels in the analysis this would lead to a combined number of 284 ships (this number includes the 101 victual ships from the previous sub-chapter), which operated throughout the whole expedition in one of three ways, as supply, transport or military ships (the Cinque Ports had actually already contributed 6 ships to the victual fleet so they are counted as 51 here).

Turning to the ports that supplied these ships for the campaign, we find that a total of eighty ports were called upon to provide the crown with these 284 vessels (this includes the Cinque Ports and the twenty-two southwest ships which transported the Irish contingents). 109

It is now possible to draw some overall conclusions about the maritime involvement throughout the 1322 campaign. In total 284 ships participated, which in turn were provided by eighty ports, and overall it is likely that 10,000-11,000 mariners served on board these vessels. It has been noted previously that the main reason why this particular expedition failed lay with the supply operation of the campaign. 110 Yet we have seen that adequate food stocks were collected at Newcastle and Carlisle, and as Prestwich noted ‘in all, Shireoaks had impressive quantities of food stuffs available’. 111 And the fact remains that there were sufficient ships available for the transportation and protection of the collected supplies. Therefore, the real problem lay within the system of distribution from the depots to the army in the

5,000 sailors and ninety four vessels (this includes the Irish ships, both the twenty on the payroll and the twenty-two provided by the ports). The king provided eleven ships (6%).

109 Out of these eighty ports, forty-two (53%) were from north of the Thames and thirty-seven (46%) ports were located south and west of the Thames. The largest contributor to the southern fleet was London, with twenty-one ships (11.4 %, this includes the king’s and the vessels supplied by Greenwich), while the most burdened port from the north was Great Yarmouth, which provided twenty ships (10.9%).


111 Ibid., p. 281.
field. But, if anything, this was a communications and leadership failure. Edward II had not made his campaign intentions clear to the receivers and the exact itinerary of the army seems to have been largely misunderstood by them. Given the Scots' scorched earth strategy Edward should have had a large baggage train with him. In addition, although Edward did forward supplies to Leith on twenty-one ships, the types of foodstuffs sent in these vessels was unsuitable for a starving army. In total these vessels carried 1,432 quarters of various provender, 1,500 and 2 barrels of fish, 50 bacons, and most surprisingly 1,210 tuns 5 pipes and 1 barrel of wine. However, 60 bacons and 22 beef carcases that were also dispatched never made it to Leith as the ship transporting these victuals was wrecked. There are two issues to be raised about this. Firstly, the amount of wine, which was shipped to Leith, was enormous and considering the army was suffering from lack of food perhaps the cargo space should have been reserved for more suitable provender. Second, given that the army as described by Edward himself was, 'such as never been seen in our times, or in the time of our ancestors', why did he not utilize the 284 ships available to him more favourably, and why was his baggage train insufficient for such a large army? The only reasonable answer is that lack of organisation, leadership and the seeming failure to learn from his previous experiences of campaigning in Scotland all played a part in the failure of the expedition.

3.3 THE 1327 WEARDALE CAMPAIGN

The first campaign of Edward III ended in complete frustration, and ultimately, as far as Edward was concerned, failure. Whether or not we accept the argument that the Weardale campaign was a planned farce, a fake show of strength, in order to come to

112 BL, Stowe MS 553, fol. 67v.
a reasonable peace settlement with the Bruce, or that it was simply because the English had failed as yet to develop a more mobile method of conducting a campaign, the results are the same. The ensuing expedition has been dealt with thoroughly by historians and their work provides detailed analysis and narrative. Accordingly a brief description will suffice here. The campaign officially commenced on 15 July when the English army moved out of Durham although the preparations for the expedition had been ongoing since April. By this stage the Scottish army was already in Westmorland burning villages. What followed was a game of cat and mouse. The Scots had the advantage in mobility while the English had the upper hand in the size of their army. The English followed the smoke of the fires in order to locate the Scots, but in the end, it took the offer of a reward to the person who could discover the Scots' position, before the enemy was located. Previously, however, the English men-at-arms had tried to block the Scots' escape route. But this only resulted in depriving the English troops of their foodstuffs, which led to the situation that Jean le Bel describes with great detail. When the English army eventually located the Scots they had occupied so strong a position on a hill, with a river in front of it, that the English dared not attack them. For four days this stalemate went on until on the morning of the fourth day the English awoke to find the Scots had departed during the

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113 I. Mortimer, *The greatest traitor: the life of Roger Mortimer, first earl of March, ruler of England, 1327-30* (London, 2003), p. 178. Mortimer suggests that Roger had planned the campaign in this way as part of some pre-arranged deal with the Scots, whom he met while he was exiled in France prior to his successful invasion in 1326.

114 The best secondary accounts are A. E. Prince, 'The importance of the campaign of 1327', *EHR* 1 (1935), pp. 299-302; R. Nicholson, *Edward III and the Scots: the formative years of a military career 1327-1335* (Oxford, 1965) chapter 3 and *idem*, 'The last campaign of Robert Bruce', *EHR* 77 (1962), pp. 233-246; C.J. Rogers, *War cruel and sharp*, chapter 2; R. McNair Scott, *Robert the Bruce*, chapter 17; J. Sumption, *Trial by battle*, pp. 123-4, which analyses the impact of the failure of the campaign; M. Penhall, *The Scottish civil war*, which details the campaigns of Edward III and Edward Balliol; and much important information can be gained from the same authors excellent study *David II, 1329-71* (Tuckwell Press, 2005). These accounts have recently been updated by C. Candy, 'The Scottish wars of Edward III', which details all the campaigns of Edward III against the Scots up until 1336. The best primary source account of the campaign can be found in C. J. Rogers, *The wars of Edward III*, pp. 4-19, which translates Jean le Bel's eyewitness testimony of the occasion.

night. The Scots had relocated and had repositioned themselves on another hill and the same process as before repeated itself, this time for eighteen days, until the Scots packed up during the night and left.¹¹⁷

The issues, with which we are concerned here, are what preparations were made to supply the English army and what was the overall maritime contribution to this process? The major problem throughout the campaign was that the English army failed to keep itself sufficiently well supplied. The first time this occurred it was due to the English attempt to block off the Scottish forces’ way home, for which purpose they abandoned their baggage train. But on the following occasion it was when the army was stationed in front of the second hill, only a short while into the campaign.¹¹⁸ But it has to be noted that the majority of the army, if we include their stay at York, had been mustered for roughly two months at this point, which was a time span long enough for the supplies collected at the outset of the expedition to have been consumed.

The size of the English army on this expedition, and therefore the numbers of troops that required feeding, is difficult to establish.¹¹⁹ Jean le Bel states that the English had 37,000 men in the field of which 7,000 were men-at-arms.¹²⁰ This seems implausible, but a reasonable estimation of the foreign contingents can be made at between 500 and 780 Hainaulters, all men-at-arms,¹²¹ in addition to the contingent brought by the bishop of Ely that totalled 173 men-at-arms.¹²² If we accept le Bel’s estimate that the king’s division, which would have included Mortimer, totalled

¹¹⁹ The best analysis of the army can be found in N. B. Lewis, ‘English Feudal Levy’.
¹²⁰ Le Bel, in Rogers, p. 8.
around 600 men-at-arms\textsuperscript{123} we can suggest a total of roughly 1,500 men-at-arms. Indeed, the army could well have been larger as the majority of the other magnates, except the earl of Oxford, were present on this campaign and performed their feudal service.\textsuperscript{124} Considering that this was the first royal led campaign of the new reign it would be reasonable to expect that the size of the army was somewhere between those forces engaged on the 1322 and 1335 campaigns, so perhaps anywhere up to 10,000 men.

How much supplies were therefore ordered and collected and what role did the English merchant marine perform in this process? With regard to the availability of evidence, the ships involved in the victual operation suffer from the same source problems as the army: detailed Exchequer sources are lacking. There is some evidence with regard to supplies, but these are recorded in the Chancery rolls, which do not provide as much detail as the information enrolled through the Exchequer accounts. Orders for the collection of supplies were first issued on 20 April when merchants from all over the realm were requested to forward provender to Newcastle.\textsuperscript{125} This was followed on 22 April by further writs to eight royal clerks, who were to collect a specified amount of supplies from six counties. Thus, Edmund Grymsby and Richard Enderby were asked to collect 2,000 quarters of wheat, 1,000 quarters of oats, 400 quarters of beans and peas, 200 bacons, 200 quarters of salt and 2,000 horse shoes with 3,000 nails from the county of Lincolnshire.\textsuperscript{126} In total 6,500 quarters of wheat, 4,200 quarters of oats, 1,100 quarters of beans and peas, 1,200 quarters of barley, 700 quarters of salt, 440 bacons, 6,000 horse shoes and 3,600 nails, were demanded from Lincolnshire, Yorkshire, Nottinghamshire, Derbyshire, Norfolk and Suffolk.

\textsuperscript{123} Le Bel, in Rogers, p. 4.
\textsuperscript{124} N. B. Lewis, 'The English feudal levy', p. 247.
\textsuperscript{126} ibid., p. 207.
Whether or not these victuals were collected is uncertain because on 28 July the government had issued new orders for supplies to be found in Yorkshire, and in addition to the wheat previously requested this county was ordered to provide a further 1,000 quarters of barley. However, on 4 August the order changed yet again, this time asking for the same quantity of wheat as the first order; but now 500 carcases of beef and 60 bacons were added. Does this therefore mean that all the victuals demanded in the first order, except the wheat, had been collected? This is difficult to answer; but what we do know, using the evidence from the 1322 campaign, is that purveyors, in most cases, were quite successful in collecting supplies. In addition to the new demands issued to Yorkshire on 4 August fresh orders were also sent to Norfolk, Suffolk, Nottinghamshire, Derbyshire and Lincolnshire. These writs had also been changed so that now Norfolk and Suffolk had to find 1,500 quarters of wheat instead of 2,000. Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire had increased demands made upon them, and were now ordered to collect 5,000 horseshoes instead of 4,000; and Lincolnshire was now expected to contribute 20,000 stockfish. Furthermore, six new counties were also added to the same order; those of Surrey, Sussex, Lancashire, Cambridgeshire, Huntingdonshire and Leicestershire. Between them these counties were asked for a total of 3,500 quarters of wheat, 1,000 quarters of oats, 1,000 quarters of barley, 1,500 quarters of beans and peas, 600 quarters of salt, 500 bacons, 400 beef carcases, 9,000 horseshoes and 1,200 nails. Nevertheless, it has to be doubted if any of these supplies were in fact collected because by the time the counties would have received these orders the campaign would have been concluded.

127 Ibid., p. 215, 220.
128 Ibid., p. 221.
129 E101/18/3 shows that the sheriff of Norfolk and Suffolk did supply £89 worth of victuals. However, this is recorded in a mariners' wage section and could have been for the sustenance of the sailors.
Fortunately, there are some Exchequer accounts that have direct relevance to the expedition, and by examining them we can gauge how successful the crown was at organising its supplies. Utilizing these accounts, it is possible to say that a total of 4,688 quarters of wheat, 1,438 quarters of oats, 378 quarters of malt, 3,760 small salts, 728 bacons, 16 barrels of sturgeon, 4,000 horse shoes and 80,000 nails had been collected. This, apart from the horseshoes and nails, roughly corresponds to the initial order. These victuals were mainly gathered from the counties of Lincolnshire, Norfolk and Suffolk, but the nails and the horseshoes were sourced from Wales, and these were transported in at least six ships. Returning to the orders recorded in the printed Chancery documents, if we assume that the extra specified demands to the counties had actually been collected then we can add a further 500 quarters of wheat, 2,200 quarters of oats, 1,000 quarters of barley, 900 quarters of beans and peas, 100 quarters of salt, 140 bacons, 200 horse shoes and 300 nails. This seems reasonable because the Exchequer evidence does not include any victuals from the counties of Derbyshire or Nottinghamshire, and these counties, based on evidence from other campaigns, would have almost certainly provided some supplies.

The above supplies do not include those victuals that the merchants were ordered to forward to Newcastle. Again, Exchequer evidence is lacking, so we have to rely mainly on the details contained in the calendared records. In May protections were issued to twelve merchants and their ships for the purpose of transporting supplies to Newcastle. In addition, the bishop of Ely provided his retinue with

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130 E101/18/2; E101/18/8; E101/18/10.
131 E101/18/2, mm. 2-4; E101/18/8.
132 Ibid., Thomas Springet mastered one of the ships: the other five are not named. This account is badly damaged and over half the account is missing.
133 CPR, 1327-30, pp. 104, 108.
foodstuffs freighted in three ships. The quantity of provender carried by these ships is not recorded but these three vessels would have been able to carry enough supplies to keep 173 men-at-arms in the bishop's retinue well victualled. There was also more than one ship provided by Richard Gilian from the port of Ferriby, but unfortunately we are not given precise numbers. If we include the three vessels supplied by the bishop of Ely for his retinue, and the six from the Exchequer evidence, then the total number of visible ships is twenty-one, with the suggestion that the actual total could have been as high as thirty.

Already there is a stark difference between this campaign and the 1322 expedition: Mortimer and his advisors had produced a pitifully small number of vessels to convey the collected supplies. Even if we allow for a further twenty ships, which would have freighted the victuals from the counties in the initial orders, the total falls far short of adequate planning. Extrapolating from the other sources suggests that it should have been possible for the fifteen merchant ships (including the three used by Ely's retinue) to transport 3,500 quarters of foodstuffs, provided each vessel was capable of freighting 200 quarters of provender.

Taking all the above evidence together a theoretical assessment of the total collected supplies would be between 10,000-12,000 quarters of cereals, 900 bacons

134 Ibid., p. 141. The ships were the Torkesay, mastered by Robert de Stayburn; the Kele, mastered by William le Wayte, and the Flundres, mastered by Robert del Bate.
135 Of the twelve vessels, five were from Great Yarmouth (The Blithe, owned by Stephen de Catefeld; the Nicholas, owned by Thomas Sidher; the Rose owned by John de Fordele; the Edmund, owned by Robert de Drayton and a ship of Bartholomew de Thorp); London provided two ships (The Marie, mastered by Andrew Rosekyn, and the Seintemaribot, mastered by Adam Frenche); two were contributed by the town of Heacham (A ship of Simon Lambright and a ship of Geoffrey Gruggen). This port was recorded in the accounts as Hecham. However, it is likely that this was the town of Heacham, which is just south of King's Lynn. One ship came from Nottingham (Hugh Dammeson and William Amyas supplied the ship); one vessel was supplied by the port of King's Lynn (The Peter, mastered by Thomas de Melcheburn).
136 E101/18/19, m. 10, shows that two ships freighted 8.5 barrels of sturgeon and 1 pipe of wine from Newcastle to York, in early September 1328, the voyage was described as being 'on the king's business'. Whether these were some of the ships supplied previously by Richard Gilian is however doubtful, as they are recorded as coming from Roucliff and York. The ships were the Blithe of York, mastered by William Gregor, and a ship of John Bekeman.
and 4,000 small salts, these victuals being transported in thirty ships. If it were to be assumed that an army of 10,000 men would consume some 15,000 quarters of cereals per month, the amount of food estimated to have been collected in 1327 would have supplied an army of this size for roughly one to two months. But whether the evidence entirely supports le Bel's statement that the food ran out during the second confrontation with the Scots has to be reassessed. For instance, after the campaign was concluded John de Charleton, receiver of victuals at Newcastle, sold off various foodstuffs including wine, flour, oats and salt. This means there was a surplus of provender left after the expedition, which surely points to the fact that the main problem lay with the management of the distribution of victuals from Newcastle to the army. All of this suggests that the English had not yet come to terms with the problem of supplying highly mobile forces.

**MILITARY NAVAL**

It has been shown that the number of ships employed in the supply operation for the Weardale campaign was woefully inadequate. This section will aim to assess the maritime contribution to the military naval side of the expedition. The first order for the arrest of ships was issued to the Cinque Ports on 5 April 1327, with this order being repeated on 24 May. As the demand was issued to all the ports in the confederacy, and in the light of evidence from other sources, it would seem that the crown was demanding the full service of the Ports; namely fifty-seven ships. General arrest orders were issued on 6 May when nine ports were asked to contribute fourteen

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137 With the inclusion of fodder for horses the available victuals for the men would be decreased. But it is also worth bearing in mind that some magnates, such as the bishop of Ely, seem to have been supplying their own men.

138 E101/18/10, nos, 2-19. For example he sold 40 tuns of salt to John Scot fitz Rich, Nicholas de Cathale and Robert Haliwell (no. 2); and he sold one tun of flour to Robert Acton, ibid., no. 7.

ships over 60 tons well armed and manned *dupplici eskippamento*, to be ready within a week.\(^{140}\) The service expected of these vessels’ crews was described as *servitium debitum*, which suggests these ships were to serve at their homeports’ expense and would therefore be absent from any payroll.\(^{141}\) If we assume therefore that the Cinque Ports did provide their full quota and those nine ports contributed fourteen ships, then so far, the crown would have raised seventy-one vessels manned by roughly 1,500 mariners.

Further numbers of ships can add to the above by examining a payroll compiled by Nicholas Acton.\(^{142}\) In his account Acton pays the wages of thirty ships’ crews. Fourteen ports, all located on the east coast, provided these vessels. Indeed, its tempting to see these as the ships that were ordered to be arrested from the Thames to Great Yarmouth, as the majority of the ports listed are situated in Norfolk and Suffolk. The total number of paid mariners on these ships was 1,067, including the constables and masters, with a wage bill of £279 18s 6d.\(^{143}\) The one major problem with these vessels concerns their periods of service, which only ran from 3 June to 26 June. This was an incredibly short time and it would have meant that the ships would have completed their service before the land campaign began. Even if we include with these ships the king’s barge, the *Marie*, mastered by Andrew Roskeyn, which was put into service on 8 May and was employed to go against the Scots with sixty mariners, it is unlikely that this ship would still have been in service in August.\(^{144}\) If we also

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\(^{141}\) *Ibid.*, p. 210. In addition, more orders were issued on 7 May for forty ships of 60 tons or over to be requisitioned from the Thames to Great Yarmouth.  
\(^{142}\) E101/18/3.  
\(^{143}\) The port that supplied the largest contingent was Great Yarmouth with a contribution that amounted to ten ships manned by 330 seamen. Ipswich provided six ships, Gosford, Dunwich and Seaford each contributed two vessels, while a further eight ports contributed one vessel each. The largest single ship was the *Petre* of Great Yarmouth, mastered by Richard le Bower, and manned by forty-one mariners.  
\(^{144}\) *Rot. Scot.* I, p. 211.
assume that the other ports' served only for two weeks then it would seem that there was no naval involvement during the land campaign.

There is one final Exchequer account that could be of significance to the Weardale campaign. Unfortunately, a third of this account, including the description of who compiled it and on what dates, is missing. Nevertheless, some conclusions can be drawn from the document. It is a list of thirty-two ships arrested in the ports of Devonshire and, as discussed in chapter two, the handwriting suggests it can be dated to the latter part of Edward II’s reign or the early part of Edward III’s. An understanding of which expedition this account relates to can be gained by comparing it to other the sources, such as those which show the vessels that participated in the 1322 campaign. When this comparative exercise is carried out no one ship can be seen to appear in both documents and, furthermore, none of the vessels can be found in the sources relating to the early Scottish campaigns of Edward III. Another fleet that they could have been part of is that which was raised to repel the invasion of Mortimer and Isabella in 1326. Fortunately, we have a payroll of those vessels, which contains 124 ships provided by thirty ports, ten of which are situated in the southwest. Of these ten ports four appear in the Devonshire list, which when compared to the fleet raised to repel Mortimer and Isabella in 1326 shows that no one ship served in both fleets. Bearing this in mind, the possibility is that these ships were part of the Weardale campaign.

In conclusion, it would seem that we have 133 ships (including the full Cinque Port quota) provided by thirty-one ports. If we include the victualling ships in this

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145 E101/17/35.
146 E101/17/24.
147 Ibid., mm. 4, 4d.
148 Sixteen (51.6%) were located on the east coast and fifteen (48.3%) situated south of the Thames, while the king provided one ship. The port that provided the most vessels was Dartmouth, which
total then we can say that a possible 154 vessels took part in this campaign, supplied by thirty-six ports with the majority of these (52.7%) situated on the east coast. The number of mariners is difficult to establish with any accuracy, but if we use the average from the Acton account then there could have been as many as 2,000-2,500.\textsuperscript{149}

In light of this evidence it is tempting to follow Ian Mortimer's argument that Roger Mortimer and Isabella went into this campaign half hearted at best, their main objective being to put a façade of action over an expedition that had the ultimate aim of gaining an agreeable peace settlement. The evidence from the maritime arm of the expedition certainly lends credence to this. Although 150 ships in total was no small number, it remains doubtful if any of these served concurrently with the land contingents. Indeed, on payroll evidence alone, only thirty ships received wages for this expedition. The lack of victuals, although in part due to the abandonment of the baggage train early in the campaign, was purely down to lack of adequate planning and organisation. Moreover, the issuing of orders, although sent out in plenty of time, in no way compares to the volume of such writs issued by Edward II in 1322 and Edward III in 1333-35. Consequently, one is drawn to the conclusion that Mortimer and Isabella wanted the campaign concluded in as little time as possible, with the minimum amount of money spent. Perhaps domestic issues were their overriding priority during the summer of 1327.

contributed eleven ships (8.2%), followed by Plymouth with nine (6.7%). If we discount the Devonshire list then the largest contributor would be the port of Great Yarmouth with twelve ships.
3.4 THE SIEGE OF BERWICK AND THE BATTLE OF HALIDON HILL, 1333

In the analysis of Edward III’s Weardale campaign, one of the major stumbling blocks, to an accurate assessment of the issues of supplies and ships was the lack of surviving Exchequer evidence. Unfortunately, the 1333 expedition, which involved the siege of Berwick and the battle of Halidon Hill, is also lacking in extant payroll material. Nevertheless, there are a few surviving sources that relate to the supply of victuals that illuminate some of the types and quantities of foodstuffs amassed for the campaign. The next two subchapters will examine the evidence relating to the 1333 expedition in order to assess the maritime involvement in the supplying of troops and in the military operations around Berwick.\(^{150}\)

Orders were first issued on 20 March 1333 for the collection and transportation of victuals from seventeen counties.\(^{151}\) This was followed on 9 April with a more substantial request for foodstuffs from fifteen counties, the port of Great Yarmouth and Ireland.\(^{152}\) In June, when the siege was in full flow, six of these counties were still being asked for supplies. Yet these writs were for the same amounts of provender as the previous orders, which suggest that collection had been slow. In total, 13,100 quarters 3 bushels of wheat, 15,660 quarters 50 bushels of oats, 5,500 quarters of beans and peas, 1,600 bacons, 1,200 quarters of salt, 200 tuns of cider and 30 lasts of herrings were requested. Furthermore, the merchant Manentius Francis was requested to purvey 22,100 quarters of oats and 15,600 quarters of wheat,

\(^{149}\) This number of mariners is calculated from the crew sizes of ninety-three ships. In addition, because the Cinque Ports’ full quota is a known entity an additional 1,197 was added to the totals gained from the 93 ships.


\(^{151}\) *Foedera*, II, ii, p. 855.
4,000 quarters of beans and peas and 2,000 bacons. Whether the amount of victuals that Manentius was to collect was supposed to include those that the previous orders had requested is not clear, but on balance it is likely that these were separate requests. In addition to the supply orders, demands for the arrest of sufficient numbers of ships were issued at the same time and protections for mariners were enrolled.

What quantities of these supplies were actually collected? Bearing in mind that Edward Balliol had besieged Berwick as early as March 1333, and by 9 May Edward III had also arrived outside the town, and that there seems to have been no serious complaints of lack of victuals, the evidence suggests that significant quantities were collected. This is certainly borne out by the Exchequer sources, which show that although the totals recorded through the receiver fall short of the enormous quantities ordered at the outset of the siege, a significant store of supplies had been collected. For example, Gilbert de Halghton, receiver of victuals at Newcastle, records a total of 3,341 quarters 4 bushels of wheat, 2,221 quarters 6 bushels of oats, 365 quarters 9 bushels of beans and peas, 163 tuns of flour, 48 tuns of wine, 2,715 horse shoes and 25,200 nails, which were supplied by nine counties and Manentius Francis. Clearly, Manentius Francis had failed to collect the supplies he was asked for some months earlier. In addition, William de la Pole supplied the siege with £244 worth of supplies and 60 casks of flour, and his brother, Richard, forwarded 477 tuns of wine, with a further 7 tuns 14 parts and 1 pipe of wine being supplied by other merchants. Moreover, Robert de Wolsthorp and John de Melton contributed £340

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153 CPR, 1330-34, p. 409.
155 C. J. Rogers, War cruel and sharp, pp. 60-63.
156 E101/18/31, mm. 1-5.
157 BL, Add MS 35181, fols 3v, 10v.
12s 6d worth of provender from Lancashire and Gloucestershire. Allowing for the same price paid per quarter of wheat by Manentius Francis (5s 5d), the £584 12s 6d worth of supplies could have amounted to a further 2,000-2,500 quarters of wheat. Thus, the total amount of wheat collected and transported north for the siege was probably between 5,300 and 5,500 quarters, with the quantity of flour reaching 163 tuns and 60 casks. But it is also worth noting that the Scots, on this occasion, did not carry out a scorched earth policy, in fact English troops were able to sack the market at Haddington and take away large quantities of foodstuffs. Thus, supplies for the siege were also bolstered by raids on the surrounding area.

The role that ships played in the transport of these victuals was central to the success of the siege. However, the evidence is uneven in quality. In some cases, the numbers, and names, of the ships are not recorded with accuracy and only a payment for the costs of freightage has been entered on an account. For instance, included in the costs incurred by Wolsthorp and Melton, when purchasing their foodstuffs, are payments made out for *eskippag*, which means that the victuals they collected were transported by ship. And in another account, we are simply told that 200 quarters of wheat and 200 quarters of beans were transported in a *magnas navis* from the Humber, or that 173 quarters of beans and 200 quarters of wheat were freighted to Newcastle.

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158 E372/177, mm. 52, 52d; *Cal. Inq. Misc.*, II, p. 365, no. 1496. This probably includes the £44 3s 1d recorded in BL, Add MS 35181, fol. 3v.
159 E101/18/28, m. 1, lists the prices paid by Manentius Francis. The expenses of £13 16s he incurred while collecting these victuals is recorded on E101/18/28. On the first of his accounts (E101/18/28) he records the collection of 1,502 quarters of wheat, 1,022 quarters of oats and 406 quarters of beans and peas, which are probably the supplies recorded by Gilbert de Halghton in E101/18/31, m. 1, and which were freighted in eight ships by Manentius to Newcastle. The difference between the amount of beans and peas (41 quarters and 9 bushels) in the two accounts probably reflects the damage caused to some of the victuals while being transported by sea, therefore, Halghton only received 356 quarters and 9 bushels out of 465 quarters. The difficulty of reconciling these accounts was also noted by R. Nicholson, *Edward III and the Scots*, p. 114, n. 6.
161 J. Masschaele, ‘Transport costs’, pp. 267-8 also notes the problems of accurately assessing the amounts of victuals procured when the surviving Exchequer accounts only contain lump sum amounts as opposed to those particulars containing itemised expenses.
162 E372/177, m. 52d.
by more unnamed ships. But what all the accounts make clear is that the majority of the collected victuals were transported by sea and the role of the English merchant marine was therefore a crucial component of the campaign.

In some cases the available Exchequer accounts do illuminate some of the ships that were used by the purveyors to freight the supplies to Newcastle. For example, in one of the accounts we are provided with a list of vessels that Manentius Francis sent to the receiver of victuals. He hired eight ships, six of which came from the Humber, one from Boston, and one from King’s Lynn. Indeed, the account goes even further and breaks down the exact quantity of victuals each vessel carried. Thus, the *Godyer* of Swynhumber, mastered by Thomas Heynessone, transported 178 quarters of wheat and 60 quarters of oats to Newcastle. And the *Katerine* of Hull, mastered by John de Hildersonone, made several journeys, carrying first 200 quarters and 6 bushels of wheat, and then returning to Newcastle later with 98 quarters 6 bushels of wheat and 58 quarters 8 bushels of oats. Moreover, we are also told which ships freighted the supplies provided by certain counties. For instance, the *Rodeshipp* of Newcastle, mastered by William de Wynestowe, and the *Charite* of Wiggenhall from Norfolk, mastered by Roger Scot, were responsible for the freightage of the provender contributed by Northamptonshire. Finally, an account of William de la Pole discloses that he transported, in four ships, the supplies provided by him for the king, which were sailed direct to Berwick. In addition to the foodstuffs, Pole also provided the transportation for three siege engines and 691

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163 E101/18/28, m. 1.
164 E101/18/31, m. 1.
165 E101/18/28, m. 2; E101/18/31, m. 1.
166 *Ibid*.
167 E101/18/36. The *Lyghtfot*, mastered by Robert Berewald, and the *Mariole*, mastered by William Denwyk. The other two ships are listed below.
stones for ammunition. For this purpose he employed two of the ships that he had earlier freighted to Berwick with food, the Gracedieu, and the Nicholas, and a third vessel, the Jonette, which is not recorded on his earlier account. A further ship that also transported supplies to the siege was the Seintemarieshipp of Hartlepool but unfortunately we are not given details of what this vessel carried.

In total, thirty-four ships are recorded as participating in the supply operations during the 1333 campaign. But the Exchequer accounts also make it clear that the actual numbers of vessels involved could well have been double that figure. For instance, Thomas Melcheburn is recorded as having supplied victuals for the expedition and Thomas and his brother consistently used ships for all their supply operations. The surviving Exchequer particulars also show that a large quantity of provender came through Grimsby by ship. But how many of these thirty-four vessels recorded as transporting supplies were actually individual ships? This is uncertain. For example, 208 quarters of oats were freighted to Newcastle in the Mariole of Hull, mastered by John de Wolleflet, yet surely this is the same vessel that is recorded elsewhere as bringing 200 quarters of wheat and 100 quarters of beans.

Taking these problems into consideration it is possible to say that twenty-two out of the thirty-four ships were individual vessels. The total amounts of victuals transported by these ships came to 6,058 quarters of cereals, 385 quarters of beans and 168 E372/180, m. 47. By using E101/18/36 it is possible to say that the Gracedieu was mastered by John Rouland and the Nicholas was mastered by William de Ferriby. No master is recorded for the Jonette.

169 CPR, 1330-34, p. 410.
170 E101/18/28, m. 1.
171 E101/18/28, m. 2; E101/18/31, m. 1. This is because the first of these accounts is Manentius Francis’s own particulars, while the second is the receiver’s account. In Manentius’s particulars he records the names of some of the ships he used to transport his victuals. However, the receiver also noted the ships that were freighted as those Manentius, and many of these have the same names and can therefore be assumed to be the same ships recorded on different, but related particulars.
172 Thirteen ports contributed these vessels, with the ports of the east coast supplying the majority of ships (77%). The southwest ports contributed three ships (23%). These were the Welfare of Winchelsea, mastered by John Hubert; the Nicholas of Southampton, mastered by Edward Rous and the Alisot of Shoreham-by-Sea, mastered by Robert Londenaye).
peas, 163 tuns and 60 casks of flour, 484 tuns of wine, 2,715 horse shoes and 25,200 nails for those shoes. If we assume that Edward had 10,000-13,000 men, at one time or another operating at the siege, then the victuals recorded through the particulars could have lasted for roughly one month. If we include provender that would have been gained by raiding the local countryside, the victuals collected seem sufficient for the siege. But the lack of available source material for this campaign should be borne in mind, and it is likely, based on the future campaigns of Edward III, that many more supplies were collected. In short, the transportation of victuals by sea was crucial to the successful outcome of the siege of Berwick. Throughout the siege there is no mention by the chronicles of complaints of food shortages. Thus, the maritime supply operation allowed Edward to keep a large army in the field long enough to force a battle and capture the town, while keeping morale high because there was sufficient foodstuffs.

**MILITARY NAVAL**

The evidence for the numbers of ships that acted in an offensive role during the siege of Berwick is mainly available through the calendared sources. Nevertheless, there is enough detail contained in these records to provide a reliable impression of the size of the maritime contribution to the operation. The reason why there are no detailed payrolls for this campaign is intriguing. Perhaps it was because the government was still finding its feet, as it had been eleven years since the crown had used the Wardrobe [office] as the paymaster for a campaign. The first requests for shipping

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173 C. Candy, 'The Scottish wars of Edward III', p. 74 argues that although the army could have numbered 10,000 to 13,000 men by the day of the battle Edward’s forces probably only numbered some 8,000 troops due to the losses and desertions throughout the siege. That the army outside Berwick was large can be seen by the fact that by early June Edward III had already issued £6,000 for men, supplies, ships and siege engines, see A. G. Beam, 'The political ambitions and influences of the Balliol dynasty, c. 1210-1364' (Unpublished PhD thesis, Stirling 2006), p. 332.
were issued at the end of March 1333, when four ships of war were ordered from Hull and Ravenserodde to go against the Scots ‘at the king’s wages’.

The order to Hull was later changed to one ship, which probably reflects the fact that Hull had by then already supplied one vessel, the Trinite, through William de la Pole. On 29 March William de Ferriby was requested to ‘cause his ship which is reputed to be the best ship of Ravenserodde to come with the king against the Scots’. By 6 April these demands were increased and John de Perbroun was appointed captain and admiral of the fleet to go against the Scots. On the same day he was also requested to arrest five ships from Great Yarmouth and bring them to Newcastle by early May. On 26 April five further ports were ordered to contribute one ship each. On 26 June, when the siege was well underway, the Cinque Ports were instructed to provide ships, while a further sixty-two ports were told to arrest all available vessels. These instructions were reissued on 16 August, but this time the ships were to be employed for keeping the peace at sea, whereas the previous orders had described them as ‘navis de guerra’.

Taking all this evidence together, the orders issued throughout the spring of 1333 called for the requisitioning of 190 (this includes fifty-seven Cinque Ports ships) ships for the forthcoming campaign. But in what capacity were these ships used? It has been suggested that the Cinque Port’s fleet was probably used to keep an eye on the movements of the Flemings and the French in case any ships were sent by them to aid the Scots. This does indeed ring true and would be a commonsense strategy as

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174 CCR, 1333-37, p. 22.
175 Ibid., pp. 25, 99.
176 Ibid.
179 Ibid., pp. 248-49. It is unlikely, based on evidence relating to other ports’ shipping contributions that all the vessels in these ports would have been arrested, but it would seem reasonable to expect that each port supplied at least two ships. This present study, therefore, suggests that two ships from each port seems a reasonable assumption to make when assessing the numbers of ships that were eventually provided by these ports.
geographically and numerically the Cinque Ports were the natural choice for such a role. Furthermore, it is also likely that three Bristol ships led the attack on, and helped to capture, the Isle of Man. If we therefore exclude the above ships from the operations centred on the town of Berwick, it is possible that there could have been as many as 133 vessels serving throughout the duration of this campaign in the immediate vicinity of the siege. This number of ships could indeed have served, as the total amount paid in wages to soldiers and sailors during this campaign came to the large sum of £5,629. Furthermore, we know that the maritime contingent of the English army played a significant role during the siege. On 26 June the ships were used to attack the seaward side of Berwick; and, throughout the siege, the maritime forces were also employed to blockade the town so that Scotland's allies could not provide Berwick with any succour. It is doubtful that the Scots would have been able to muster enough ships to challenge Edward's grip over the town. Although, early on in the siege, ten French ships were reportedly sent to aid the Scots, unfavourable winds meant they never arrived. But, of course, had they weathered the storm they would still have had to successfully avoid the Cinque Ports fleet and break the English blockade of Berwick.

We could assume, therefore, that during the siege of Berwick the English put to sea 194 ships (this number includes a full Cinque Port quota) provided by sixty-two ports. The exact numbers of mariners is difficult to establish because of the lack of detailed payroll evidence. Nevertheless, a well-founded estimate, based on the mean average crew sizes of the ships from previous campaigns, would suggest that around

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181 Ibid., p. 123.
183 Melsa, II, p. 368; Bridlington, pp. 111-12.
184 C. J. Rogers, War cruel and sharp, p. 63.
5,000 served. If we include the victual ships in this total, it is conceivable that the English merchant marine contributed 228 vessels to the military operations in 1333.

In conclusion, the siege of Berwick in 1333 involved the mobilisation of large numbers of ships and mariners. These vessels were employed for a variety of purposes. As a preliminary to the campaign some twenty-two known ships helped stockpile victuals in Newcastle for the English land forces. In addition, the ships of the Cinque Ports were used as a deterrent against any foreign intervention and three ships from Bristol spearheaded the capture of the Isle of Man. If all the ports supplied their quotas of ships two vessels each, which seems likely, then around 138 vessels would have been actively involved in the operations against Berwick. Given that such a large mobilisation of England’s maritime resources was directly deployed against Berwick, it would have been almost impossible for Scottish forces to break the siege. As long as Edward kept his army well supplied the landward approach would have been cut-off from any substantial relief force, and with over 200 ships at sea Edward also made sure that no assistance could come from the seaward side. In all it was careful use of his available resources that brought success.

3.5 THE 1334-5 ROXBURGH CAMPAIGN

Unfortunately for Edward the success of the 1333 expedition could not be exploited the following year, and his winter campaign of 1334-5 was one of complete frustration. The expedition was originally planned for early October but did not get underway until over a month later. Owing to recruitment problems, Edward’s forces were small compared to the numbers of men that he had had under him at the siege of Berwick and the battle of Halidon Hill. Edward became increasingly angry and

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185 Twenty-four (38.7%) of these ports were located north of the Thames and thirty (48.3%) were
frustrated over this lack of commitment to his call to arms. Even the extra bonus of allowing each man, who appeared at the muster, the right to keep all the goods he could plunder did not help to raise sufficient numbers of troops. All told, Edward’s army probably numbered 4,000 men, but desertion was endemic and the county levies had fallen far short of their expected contributions.186

The late start of the expedition is mirrored by the stalled preparations for the collection of victuals.187 The first request for foodstuffs was issued on 11 November, when Lincolnshire was asked to supply 2,000 quarters of oats and 600 quarters of wheat. Four days later an order for 100 quarters of salt, 160 tuns of wine and 30 beef carcases was sent out.188 On 16 November William de la Pole was asked for a contribution of victuals from Hull and Robert de Sprotleye was to send 500 quarters of wheat to the same port.189 On 1 December Edward wrote to the community of London for 1,000 quarters of wheat and 4,000 saltfish to be sent to Roxburgh via Newcastle.190 Yet the real demands were not issued until 4 December when eighteen counties were ordered to collect 9,900 quarters of wheat, 7,100 quarters of oats, 2,400 quarters of beans and peas, 20 lasts of herrings, 6,000 stockfish and 200 bacons.191 By this time Edward’s forces had already been mustered for over a month. It is also doubtful whether any of these demands came close to being achieved, especially as Edward was asking his sheriffs to collect and ship these victuals in the middle of a particularly harsh winter.192 Throughout January and February Edward still expected twelve counties to contribute a further 7,900 quarters of wheat, 5,200 quarters of oats

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189 Ibid., p. 294.
190 Ibid., p. 296
191 Ibid., p. 297.
192 Bridlington, p. 120 provides a vivid description of the appalling weather during the campaign.
and 2,400 quarters of beans and peas. Most of these demands were sent to the same counties as before, suggesting that not much had been collected since the first orders issued in November.193

The Exchequer accounts relating to the victuals throw some light on the types and quantities collected for this campaign. By October 1334 Robert Tughale had 414 quarters of wheat, 8 tuns of flour, 52 tuns of wine, 14 tuns of cider and 2,278 horseshoes in his possession at Berwick.194 The receiver at Newcastle, Gilbert de Haughton, had even more provender under his supervision and his account shows that he had 1,957 quarters of wheat, 1,221 quarters of oats, 807 quarters of beans and peas, 64 tuns of flour, 9 tuns of wine and 532 horseshoes in his storehouses.195 These supplies were certainly distributed to Edward’s men. For example, Anthony de Lucy was given 60 quarters of wheat and 7 bushels of salt, and the constable of Jedworth (in the county of Roxburgh) was provided with 23 quarters of wheat, 5 quarters of salt and 1 tun of wine from Newcastle. In addition, a further £280 6s 9d worth of victuals were forwarded to Roxburgh on 22 October.196 In all 336 quarters 5 bushels of wheat, 9 tuns of flour, 204 quarters oats, 17 tuns of wine and various other foodstuffs were distributed among Edward’s men. By the end of November a further 400 quarters of wheat and 400 quarters of oats had been added to the already collected victuals.197

Therefore, in total Edward’s army had at its disposal 2,771 quarters of wheat, 1,621 quarters of oats, 807 quarters of beans and peas, 72 tuns of flour, 61 tuns of wine and 14 tuns of cider. This quantity of victuals would have kept an army of 4,000 in the field for roughly one to two months (the inclusion of horses would reduce this to

194 E101/18/32.
195 E101/18/34.
196 E101/18/33, nos, 14, 7-10; E101/18/35, m. 6d.
197 E101/19/1.
perhaps one month). Of course, the main problem during this particular campaign would have been the transportation of the foodstuffs to the area of Roxburgh during the harsh winter. However, as mentioned above, there is one account that provides direct evidence that some victuals were distributed among the men. It is likely that all these supplies were freighted in ships; but unfortunately, unlike the majority of campaigns, the contribution made by the merchant marine to the 1334-5 Roxburgh expedition is not well documented. We occasionally catch a glimpse of a ship involved in the supply operation, such as the Katerine of King’s Lynn, mastered by Richard Blackeneye, which freighted 180 quarters of wheat in the dying moments of the campaign in February 1335, and we also know that some vessels were sent direct to Henry Beaumont at Dundarg. But no concrete numbers of vessels can be gleaned from the available sources.

**MILITARY NAVAL**

Although the campaign of 1334-5 was conducted during a particularly harsh winter great efforts were made to provide the king with sufficient ships. In October 1334 protections were issued to mariners, and English ships were given permission to prey on Scottish vessels. Yet the real demands for maritime service were not issued until early December 1334. On 6 December John de Percebrig visited thirteen ports from Rye to Gillingham, while Richard de Wolyngham searched the east coats ports.

198 C. Candy, 'The Scottish wars of Edward III', p.93, states that Edward's army numbered 1,258 men-at-arms, 1,408 mounted archers, 1,117 foot archers, 100 armati, 25 miners, 879 Welsh foot, 27 vintenars, 108 horse troops of varying types, 108 myal servants, 55 masons, 35 carpenters, 3 smiths and 106 workmen. A further 491 men joined the army during the campaign.

199 E101/19/2, m. 4.


201 Rot. Scot., I, p. 286.

202 E372/179, m. 41; Rot. Scot., I, p. 305. Gillingham is somewhat inland and today lies some 8-10 miles west of Lowestoft. However, it is situated on the River Waveney. In addition, it was also possible in the early fourteenth-century to sail, by ship, as far inland as Norwich due to a rise in the sea-level over the previous 300 years. See S. Rose, *The medieval sea*, p. 8.
Thomas de Gairgrave was appointed to requisition vessels from the ports of the southwest and he subsequently visited twenty-three such ports. In early January, Edward sent a letter to the Cinque Ports, as well as sixty others, demanding that they provide ships. Finally, on 1 February, as the campaign was drawing to a close, John de Kingston and John Crabbe were ordered to collect ten ships from eight ports on the east coast and to send them north, while other officials raised a further six vessels from the southwest ports. The final request for ships was issued on 22 February when the Cinque Ports, along with fifty-eight others, were ordered to send all available ships over forty tons to Scotland, although this was probably for a fleet to maintain a blockade rather than to support the land campaign.

The Wardrobe accounts for the period between November 1334 and February 1335 show that wages were paid to the crews of nine ships manned by 372 mariners, including the masters and constables. Except two vessels that were owned by the king these ships were contributed by ports that were all located on the east coast of England. If we include the sixteen other ships requisitioned towards the end of the campaign, it would seem that the maritime contingent numbered twenty-five individual ships. This would have been a great disappointment to Edward because during the expedition he had ordered his clerks to search sixty-nine ports for available vessels (32 from the east coast, 35 from the south and west, 2 are difficult to locate). Apart from eight ships, two of which were the king's, the ports situated on the east coast provided all the vessels that served in this campaign. But this is not surprising because, as already noted, the winter weather was extremely harsh and it would have been difficult for many ships from the southwestern ports to negotiate the passage in

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203 E372/179, mm. 36, 41.
205 E372/180, mm. 43, 44; Rot. Scot. I, pp. 317, 320-1.
time. In fact, we must suspect that the orders for ships issued in December and January were actually for the intended blockade of Scotland during the spring and summer of 1335: that is, that the orders issued in the dying days of the Roxburgh campaign were in fact meant for the expedition that was to be launched in the summer of 1335.

3.6 THE 1335 ‘GREAT OFFENSIVE’

The campaign of 1335 was Edward III’s largest Scottish expedition. By the start of the invasion Edward had mustered between 13,000 and 13,500 soldiers.\(^{208}\) This ‘great offensive’ operated as two separate armies, one under Edward Balliol that took to the west coast, while a second force commanded by Edward III concentrated on the east coast. The idea seems to have been to form a pincer movement through the lowlands before both armies joined forces at Glasgow for a march of destruction northwards.\(^{209}\)

The purpose of this sub-chapter is to analyse in detail how well this army was supplied and what role the English merchant marine played in the expedition.

Orders were first issued on 31 March to sixteen counties to collect victuals at set prices.\(^{210}\) On 1 April the king requested that four mills be prepared at Newcastle, while three days later, he took the precaution of making sure his garrisons were well stocked by ordering Robert Tughale to forward 20 quarters of wheat, 4 tuns of wine and 4 quarters of salt to William de Pressen constable of Jedburgh castle.\(^{211}\) On the same day he also ordered the sheriff of Norfolk to deliver the supplies collected from

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\(^{207}\) BL, Cotton MSS. Nero C.VIII, fol. 264r.

\(^{208}\) R. Nicholson, *Edward III and the Scots*, p. 200. Nicholson points out that although 15,000 men probably served during the campaign this was not all at the same time, so he estimates that the optimum strength of the army was somewhere between 13,000-13,500 men.

\(^{209}\) The best discussions of the campaign are to be found in *ibid.*, chapter 14, and C. J. Rogers, *War cruel and sharp*, pp. 97-108.

\(^{210}\) *Rot. Scot.* I, p. 333: the prices were 5s for a quarter of wheat, 3s for a quarter of beans and peas and 2s per quarter of oats.

the counties of Lincolnshire, Northamptonshire, Cambridgeshire and Huntingdonshire that had been gathered at the port of King’s Lynn to Newcastle and Berwick. And on 20 April those vessels from Ireland, which were transporting men-at-arms to Scotland, were ordered to bring sufficient supplies with them. This order was later defined more clearly and on 12 May the chancellor of Ireland was asked for 200 bacons, 100 tuns of wine, 200 quarters of wheat, and 100 quarters of beans and peas. Two weeks later the supplies gathered from Gloucestershire were to be taken to Skinburness. Evidence shows that by early June these orders were being acted upon, as William Melcheburn loaded one of his vessels, the *Mauleleyn*, with victuals and sent it to Scotland. Nevertheless, even when the campaign was well underway demands for supplies were still being issued, and accordingly William de la Pole was to procure 60 tuns of wine and 600 quarters of salt and bring them to Berwick. Perhaps this large quantity of salt was required for the cattle lately collected by William Montagu from the local neighbourhood. During August the counties of Lincolnshire, Norfolk, Suffolk, Nottinghamshire, Surrey, Sussex, Essex, Dorset, Somerset, Cornwall, Devon, Gloucestershire, and Hampshire, were requested to supply foodstuffs and ship them to Berwick and Perth. In addition, the sheriff of Lincoln was to provide a further 40 tuns of salt and 300 quarters of oats and forward them to Berwick.

Fortunately, for this campaign we have a wealth of Exchequer evidence with direct relevance to the collection of food supplies. What this illuminates is the important role played by the English merchant marine in this process. For instance,

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216 *Rot. Scot.* 1, p. 370.
before the expedition began Eudonis de Stoke and John de Maner had managed to collect from the counties of Lincolnshire and Norfolk 4,114 quarters of wheat, 720 quarters of oats, 1,250 quarters of beans and peas, 20 lasts of herrings and 1,000 stockfish. These supplies were then transported to Berwick in twenty-one ships, which were in turn provided by ports located on the east coast. Stoke’s and Maner’s account also breaks down the totals freighted by individual ships. For example, the Nicholas of King’s Lynn, mastered by Adam de Muskele, transported 250 quarters of wheat to Berwick.\footnote{E101/19/2, mm. 1-4.} Furthermore, Robert Tonge, receiver of victuals at Berwick, accounted for 2,068 quarters of wheat, 5,078 quarters 10 bushels of oats, 652 tuns 36 quarters and 1 pipe of flour, 688 tuns of wine, 23 tuns 427 quarters of salt, 7,000 herrings, 1,955 salmons, 4 lasts of fish and 3,078 horse shoes with 8,000 nails. He also had control of 127 sheaves of barbed arrows that were transported in the Margrete from Swynhumber, and sent by the sheriff of Lincoln, and a further 24 sheaves supplied by Richard de Ferriby.\footnote{E101/19/3, mm. 1-4.} These food supplies and arms were freighted in a total of twenty-four ships.\footnote{E101/19/3, m. 8.} Of these vessels, nine went to Berwick, and Tonge himself forwarded fifteen to Perth. In addition, the account also allows us to examine each individual ships’ cargo. For example, the Jonette of Hull, mastered by John de la Beler, transported 50 tuns of flour and 2 tuns and 1 pipe of wine to Perth at a cost of 5s. Furthermore, two ships from Chester, the Seinte Anna and the Godyer, were hired by Thomas Crosse to take 400 boardnails, 50 spikings, 100 clenchnails and

\textsuperscript{118} E101/19/2, mm. 1-4.
\textsuperscript{119} E101/19/3, mm. 1-4. Some of these victuals could have been used for the Roxburgh campaign because Tonge’s account runs from 29 September 1334 to 29 September 1335. However, it is probable that most of the supplies on this account were collected during and after the 1334-5 winter campaign, with the majority of the victuals being consumed in the summer of 1335. What adds weight to this interpretation is that in 1334 the king complained that his forces were short of victuals. In fact, it was probably the weather that prevented victuals reaching the king in 1334-5.
\textsuperscript{120} E101/19/3, m. 8.
100 herrings to Skinburness. Both of these ships were each manned by eighty mariners and served until December.\textsuperscript{221}

By using this detailed Exchequer evidence we can gauge the quantities of victuals Edward's forces would have had at their disposal. Such calculations show that in 1335 Edward's forces had access to a total of 6,182 quarters of wheat, 5,798 quarters 10 bushels of oats, 1,250 quarters of beans and peas, 652 tuns 36 quarters and 1 pipe of flour, 23 tuns and 427 quarters of salt, 7,100 herrings, 1,000 stockfish, 1,955 salmon and a further 4 lasts of fish, 273 tuns and 6 pipes of wine. These victuals were transported in forty-six individual ships, with all but four contributed from ports located on the east coast.\textsuperscript{222}

This quantity of foodstuffs would have kept Edward's army well supplied for between one to two months. This, of course, entirely depends on whether the victuals could be forwarded to the front line, and as the capture of the count of Namur shows, even with a large army in the field small isolated detachments were still in danger. Thus, sea power and waterborne transportation were crucial, and Edward was quick to take this on board. The campaign of 1327 would never be repeated; or at least a process of meticulous planning would avoid a supply breakdown on that scale occurring in Edward III's future expeditions. This is why nearly two-thirds (62.5\%) of all the ships recorded on Tonge's account sailed to Perth, where the majority of Edward's forces were located, in order that plenty of supplies were forwarded directly to the English front line. Edward took similar precautions in 1336, when on 17 July,

\textsuperscript{221} E101/19/9; E101/19/25. One further vessel, the \textit{Rose} of King's Lynn, mastered by John de Baume, was also involved in the transport of victuals as a protection was issued to its master and crew in May, see CPR, 1334-38, p. 98

\textsuperscript{222} The largest supplier of ships were the ports located on Humber estuary, which contributed thirteen (28.2\%) of the vessels, followed by King's Lynn, which provided eleven (23.9\%). The smallest contributors were those ports such as Wiggenhall, Sandwich and Blackeneye, which provided one vessel each. It is likely that Wiggenhall is the modern town of Wiggenhall St. Mary the Virgin, which is located some six miles south of King's Lynn and situated on the Great Ouse. Although there is also
the receiver at Newcastle forwarded a ship loaded with 300 quarters of peas to rendezvous with the king at Aberdeen during his Lochindorb chevauchée. Indeed the importance Edward placed on a supply system based on maritime transportation can be seen in the account book of Robert Barton, receiver of victuals at Carlisle and Skinburness. Barton’s accounts reveal that between 1333 and the end of 1335 he spent over £8,500 on the purchase of victuals and their shipment from ports scattered all over England to his centre of operations in the northwest.

MILITARY NAVAL

In order to protect his supply ships, and also to provide his forces with the potential to attack coastal towns, throughout 1335 Edward raised a large fleet vessels to operate on the eastern sea coast of Scotland. Once the two parts of the English armies had met Edward’s campaign centred on Perth, which is why the majority of the supply vessels transported their victuals there during the month of August. As we shall see below, the service of the military naval arm of the fleet was designed to coincide with this.

Orders were first issued for ships to be arrested on 16 May 1335, when Edmund de Grymsby was told to requisition ships in the port of Bristol. On 20 May similar writs were sent to John de Percebrigg, in which he was ordered to gather ships from the Cinque Ports, Sussex and London. By 6 June two ships of Liverpool were at sea searching for a French vessel carrying arms and supplies to Dumbarton castle. Throughout June and July ships were ordered to be requisitioned from Newcastle, Hartlepool, Hull, Yorkshire, Lincolnshire, Norfolk, Suffolk, Essex,
Hampshire, Dorset, Devon, Cornwall, Somerset and the Cinque Ports. These vessels were to proceed north to Scotland. These demands did not cease, even when the campaign had begun, and writs were constantly being issued throughout late August and early September requesting that English ships attack a fleet of Scottish vessels operating off the western coast.

Owing to the survival of several Exchequer particulars, the details of the above orders can be expanded on and an analysis of the numbers of ships serving in this expedition can be attempted. By 16 May John de Grymsby had successfully arrested two ships from Bristol and fully manned them. On 10 July John de Briggewater had requisitioned two ships from Dartmouth, and twelve days later aided by Mathew de Crauthorn, he arrested several vessels in Melcombe Regis, Wareham, Poole, Hamele and Hamelhoke. By 29 July John de Wyndesore, along with Ambrose de Newburgh, and John de Tounsond visited the Cinque Ports to arrest all ships over forty tons. Requisitioning ships on the east coast was John de Hildesle, who for fourteen days in May searched for suitable vessels in the ports of Boston and Hull, while James de Kyngeston and John Crabbe arrested ships from all the ports between Great Yarmouth and Newcastle. The west coast ports were the preserve of Nicholas Acton and Philip Clanvow. Acton, with five archers and four men-at-arms, requisitioned ships in Chester, while Clanvow searched the ports of Wales where he arrested ships in four ports. The majority of these clerks were active during the months of June and July,

227 Ibid., p.414.
229 Ibid., pp. 374, 379.
230 E372/179, m. 43.
231 E372/179, m. 43; E101/19/15, m. 2. It is difficult to locate these two ports. However, the likelihood is that they are both situated in Hampshire.
232 E101/19/12.
233 E101/19/10.
234 E372/180, m. 44; CCR, 1333-37, p. 431.
235 E372/180, m. 44; E101/19/14, mm. 2-7d.
with the expectation that the ships would be in service by August, which is indeed reflected in the service records of the vessels.

The above evidence shows that the crown launched a concentrated effort in the early summer of 1335 to raise sufficient numbers of ships to aid the king's war in Scotland. But how successful were these clerks and how many ships did they manage to put to sea? The Wardrobe book of Richard Ferriby records the wages paid to the crews and masters of thirty-one ships that operated throughout the 1335 expedition in a military capacity, in three distinct 'types' of naval warfare. They attacked enemy ports, captured Scottish shipping and blockaded Scotland's more important towns and castles.236 We know that 895 sailors (including masters and constables) served; and making allowance for the fifteen ships that have no crew numbers allotted to them (and by averaging the crew sizes from the twenty-eight vessels that we have exact numbers for), we can deduce that there could have been as many as 1,327 mariners operating these thirty-one ships in 1335.237 The majority of these ships (28) served during June and August, while two royal ships extended their operations into September.238

In addition to the Exchequer accounts noted above there are also several further detailed payrolls that add to our understanding of the size of the fleet in 1335. Thomas Crosse, who organised the transport of the Irish contingents to Ayr, compiled one of these accounts. He records the wages paid to forty-nine masters, forty-nine constables and 788 mariners, who manned forty-nine ships from twenty-three ports.239

236 BL, Cotton MSS, Nero C.VIII, fols 264r-265v. Twenty-three (74%) of these ships were contributed by ports located in the northern admiralty and eight (9.6%) vessels were provided by the ports south and west of the Thames. Eight further ships had no port of origin recorded.

237 Based on these overall crew numbers, it is possible to estimate that 1,241 (93.5%) seamen served on board these ships from the ports situated on the east coast. The majority of these ships (28) served during June and August, while two royal ships extended their operations into September.

238 BL, Cotton MSS, Nero C.VIII, fol. 264v.

239 E101/19/16, mm. 3-4.
These vessels transported 2 earls, 14 bannerets, 472 men-at-arms, 291 hobelars and 815 foot soldiers, and the ships served from 26 July to 15 September at a cost of £492 9s 4d. This force probably had in the region of 1,000 horses including those pulling the train baggage.\textsuperscript{240} If we take the estimate of 1,000 horses then this would have meant that each ship had to carry roughly thirty-two men and twenty horses.\textsuperscript{241} We also have the expenses of the Cinque Ports which shows that they provided thirty ships, manned by thirty masters, thirty constables, 1,191 mariners and ninety-three boys at a cost of £468 6s 9d.\textsuperscript{242} The particulars of Alex Comyn, mariner of Liverpool, record the wages paid to two ships operated by two masters and thirty-one mariners that served from 27 July to 13 September at a cost of £21 8s 9d.\textsuperscript{243} The documents relating to Philip Clanvow's arrests of ships show that he indented with sixteen burgesses who agreed to provide nineteen vessels. All these indentures were compiled in early August.\textsuperscript{244} On this account only six ships are given crew sizes. The largest crew operated the \textit{Nicholas} of Swansea, which had one master, one constable and 110 mariners. The total number of sailors operating these six vessels was 447. The ports of Exeter, Plymouth, Teignmouth, Dartmouth, Great Yarmouth, Ipswich and Bristol contributed seven further ships that all served through June and July 1335.\textsuperscript{245} Adam

\textsuperscript{240} This is based on an estimate that each earl would have brought eight horses, a banneret 5, a man at arms 3-4, and the hobelars 2. On the numbers of horses per man, see A. Ayton, \textit{Knights and warhorses}, p. 58; Norwell, pp. 93, 386-92.

\textsuperscript{241} This number is entirely plausible. Using evidence from two other Exchequer accounts, which detail the exact number of horses transported to France by individual vessels, we can see the possible capabilities of ships of the period. One details the shipment of the earl of Cambridge's horses to Brittany in 1375 (E101/34/6), while the other concerns the transport of horses from Sandwich to Calais (E101/695/20). The first account records eleven ships, which transported 562 horses. The smallest number of horses transported by a single vessel was thirty-two, while the largest was seventy-two. The latter account lists twenty-three ships, which transported a total of 644 horses. The smallest number freighted by a single ship was eighteen the largest was forty.

\textsuperscript{242} E101/19/22, mm. 1-3, 6d. The ships served from 27 August to 13 September.

\textsuperscript{243} E101/19/11.

\textsuperscript{244} E101/19/14, mm. 2-8. The ports that supplied these vessels were Tenby, Haverford, Swansea and Carmarthen. The cost of the wages was £403 17s 33d. The cost of these ships was high because Philip had to fit many of them out for war. For example, the \textit{Cog George} had to have a topcastle and forecastle fitted.

\textsuperscript{245} E372/179, m. 43; E372/180, m. 44.
Brian, master of the *Trinite* of Southampton, was also sent to patrol the sea around Dumbarton castle and he did so from the 1 September to 14 November.\textsuperscript{246}

Taking all this evidence together it would seem that 143 individual ships served in the military naval campaign of 1335. These were manned by some 5,000 mariners.\textsuperscript{247} Indeed, there could have been as many as 6,000 mariners manning these ships, which would have cost the crown a calculable cost of just under £2,500.\textsuperscript{248} This raises new questions about the mobilisation of men for the campaign of 1335. For if we were to combine the mariners with the land-based troops, then it would seem that Edward’s administration managed to recruit, and put into action, roughly 20,000 men for this expedition. Moreover, a general grasp of maritime strategy was also in evidence throughout the expedition and this was actively pursued. This is nowhere better shown than in the constant blockading of the castle of Dumbarton, which was the hub of Scottish resistance.

### 3.7 THE 1336 CAMPAIGN

The 1336 expedition marked the end of sustained campaigning by Edward north of the border (Edward occasionally intervened in Scotland, for example, in 1337, 1341 and 1356). After he had concluded his dash up into the Highlands, known to posterity as the Lochindorb *chevauchée*, he returned to the south of the land in September,

\textsuperscript{246} *Ibid.*, m. 50. The ship was crewed by 1 constable, and 48 mariners at a cost of £33 16s. Brian’s particulars are detailed on E101/19/30; he arrived back at Bristol on 26 November.

\textsuperscript{247} The total known number of sailors comes to 3,917. However thirty-nine ships have no crew numbers enrolled, so the average crew size of twenty-eight has been allocated to these ships, thus bringing the total to roughly 5,000. The total number of ports was forty-three ports, of which twenty-six (60%) were located south and west of the Thames and sixteen (37%) were situated on the east coast, while one was the foreign port of Bayonne. Eight ships are not allocated a homeport. The ports located south and west of the Thames provided 118 (82.5%) ships, with the largest contributor being the port of Winchelsea with nine (6.2%) vessels, followed by Teignmouth with eight (5.5%) ships. Including the evidence from the previous discussion on the supply fleet, it is possible to say that 189 individual ships were mobilised for this campaign, with the ports from the south and west supplying nearly two thirds (61%) of all the ships and those maritime communities north of the Thames providing 35% of the vessels.
owing to the increasing problems with France over Scotland and Gascony, but later returned to Scotland for most of December. Already, by this stage, Edward had begun to place control of the war under high-ranking nobles such as Henry of Grosmont. The campaign in Scotland had reignited as soon as the truces agreed in 1335 had run their course. The Scots were first to take the initiative, but by early May a large English army was once again operating in Scotland, although Edward himself was not to intervene until the end of June.249

By this stage of Edward III’s expeditions in Scotland, largely because of the need to maintain garrisons, the issuing of victualling orders and the preparations and transportation of supplies was an ongoing operation. As such, requests to William Melcheburn for foodstuffs had been issued as early as 13 February 1336, when he was asked to supply Berwick with 1,000 quarters of wheat and 1,000 quarters of oats.250 In the same month the castle of Cupar was to receive 10 tuns of flour, 10 tuns of wine and 10 cauldrons of sea coal, with the added proviso that all the wheat was to be ground into flour before transportation.251 After this order no more demands for provender were issued until 12 July, the day Edward set out on his chevauchée, and this request was for only 40 tuns of wine, 60 quarters of oats, 24 bacons, and 2,000 horseshoes to be brought from Bristol in two ships.252 At the same time Ireland was to forward 200 quarters of wheat, 100 quarters of oats and 10 tuns of wine, also in two ships.253 By 13 August thirteen counties were requested to send available supplies to Stirling and Perth. These were obviously intended for the king and his men because

248 This is an estimate because the victual ships are not given crew numbers, and they are rarely recorded pay details.
249 The campaign is discussed by C. J. Rogers, War cruel and sharp, pp. 115-19. The newsletter from the Lochindorb chevauchée can be found printed in C. J. Rogers, The wars of Edward III, pp. 48-50, but also, see R. A. Kaner, 'The management of the mobilisation of English armies', chapter 6.
251 Ibid.
252 Ibid., p. 436.
253 Ibid., p. 437.
during August Edward remained in Perth. On 20 August 1,000 quarters of wheat and 1,000 quarters of oats were ordered from Robert Tonge and John de Thyngden, probably to feed the men at Perth, while the southern fleet, under Geoffrey de Say, was also to be provisioned in addition to the fleet of ships retained by the admiral of the north.254 After the king had returned to England demands for supplies were still being issued and on 2 October, London, along with ten counties, was asked to collect 11 tuns of arrows and 700 bows with extra strings.255 The final demand for provender was issued on 16 October when Thomas Melcheburn was to provide a further 2,000 quarters of wheat and 1,000 quarters of oats and freight them to Berwick.256 The repository of supplies at Carlisle had, by this period, been reduced to a centre of little significance. In fact, between 11 May 1336 and 6 April 1337, Richard de Tibay, custodian of victuals there, only had charge of 119 quarters 6 bushels of wheat, 7 tuns of flour and 119 tuns of wine.257

The above evidence relating to the 1336 expedition shows, therefore, that the demands for supplies were not of the same magnitude as those issued for previous campaigns, yet it is still possible to assess the quantities of foodstuffs collected and the role played by ships in this operation. By July Thomas Melcheburn had gathered and shipped 2,078 quarters of wheat at 7s per quarter, and 1,010 quarters of oats at 4s a quarter. He freighted 180 quarters of this wheat and 238 quarters of the oats to Berwick in the Godyer of King’s Lynn, mastered by Walter Brekeheved.258 After dispatching the above supplies Thomas’s brother, William, then transported in thirteen ships a further 900 quarters of wheat, 1,080 quarters of oats, 278 quarters of beans, 384 quarters of malt and 65 tuns of flour. These vessels were sent during the

254 Ibid., pp. 443-45; E372/184, m. 3d.
256 Ibid., p. 464.
257 E101/20/2.
months of May (4 ships), July (4 ships) and August (5 ships). In June, William transported a further 1,000 quarters of oats to Scotland, while a month later, he freighted another 1,000 quarters of various cereals to Berwick. These Exchequer accounts of the Melcheburn brothers show that they had met the original quantities of foodstuffs requested from them by the king prior to military action, namely, 3,000 quarters of wheat and 2,000 quarters of oats. By September 1336 the receiver at Newcastle had transported 1,280 quarters of wheat, 1,095 quarters of oats, 168 tuns of flour, 56 quarters of beans and peas and 137 tuns of salt to Berwick for the king’s forces. Furthermore, the receiver at Newcastle also forwarded 300 quarters of peas to Aberdeen on 17 July, in an obviously pre-arranged plan with the king to meet his forces in the vicinity of the town during his chevauchée around Aberdeen. In addition, 418 quarters 6 bushels of malt, 104 tuns of flour, 50 tuns of salt and 169 tuns of wine were also sent to Berwick in five ships. During the campaign the northern fleet was kept well supplied by William de Dunstaple and in his account he records that he provisioned the mariners and men of this admiralty with 1,016 quarters 6 bushels of cereals. In total Edward’s men had at their disposal 9,141 quarters of wheat, oats, beans and peas and malt, as well as 169 tuns of flour and 137 tuns of salt at Berwick and Newcastle. Given the size of Edward’s army at this time this amount of foodstuffs would have kept them supplied for the majority of the campaign. Yet at some point during the operation something must have failed because it was reported

258 E101/19/30.
259 E101/19/32.
260 E101/19/33; E101/19/34.
261 E101/19/16, mm. 2, 2d. This account, on examination, seems to have a membrane missing as the top of membrane two has empty stitch holes.
262 Ibid., m. 4. Edward actually arrived in the Aberdeen area around 21 July, so this ship if it was sent on 17 July could well have met the king on the coast. For the dates of the campaign, see C. J. Rogers, The wars of Edward III, pp. 48-50 especially p. 49.
263 E101/20/4, mm. 1-3, this account runs from 29 September 1336 to 29 September 1337. The ships came from King’s Lynn (3) and Hull (2).
264 E101/20/7, m. 1.
that soldiers were deserting due to the shortage of victuals.\textsuperscript{265} Bearing in mind the quantities of victuals collected during the year, this supply delivery problem, must have been caused by some form of failure of communication between the commanders in the field and the receivers at Carlisle, Newcastle and Berwick, or due to a lack of available shipping to transport the foodstuffs to the army. Do the sources cast any light on this issue?

By examining the surviving Exchequer accounts we can arrive at a good estimate of the numbers of ships involved in the 1336 campaign. For instance, William Melcheburn procured the services of thirteen ships, all from ports situated on the east coast, seven of which came from his hometown of King's Lynn.\textsuperscript{266} His brother, Thomas, employed the \textit{Godyer} of King's Lynn, mastered by Walter Brekehened, to freight 180 quarters of wheat and 238 quarters of oats.\textsuperscript{267} Unfortunately, the other two accounts of the Melcheburn's (E101/19/33 and 34) do not contain any information on the ships they employed to transport the victuals they had collected. Although given that these do record 2,000 quarters of various supplies it is safe to assume that roughly eight ships were used.\textsuperscript{268} In addition, the receiver at Newcastle utilised the services of six vessels, all provided by east coast ports, to forward a total of 126 quarters of oats and 186 tuns of flour to Berwick.\textsuperscript{269} During November a further five ships were sent to Berwick with victuals, three of which came from Hull, and two from King's Lynn.\textsuperscript{270} Included with these vessels should also be the \textit{Mariote} from the Isle of Wight, which during November transported

\textsuperscript{266} E101/19/32.
\textsuperscript{267} E101/19/30.
\textsuperscript{268} This estimate is based on E101/19/32, which shows that each ship employed by William Melcheburn carried around 250 quarters of foodstuffs.
\textsuperscript{269} E101/19/6, mm. 2-2d. The ships came from Newcastle (2), Hull (1), Boston (1), Hartlepool (1) and Swynfleet (1).
\textsuperscript{270} E101/20/4, mm. 2-3.
victuals to Scotland, in addition to the Rose of King’s Lynn, mastered by John Brancaster that in April freighted stockfish to the forces of Scotland, in addition to two further ships from Bristol and two vessels from Ireland.\textsuperscript{271}

In conclusion, thirty individual ships were involved in the freighting of supplies to Scotland during the 1336 campaign, with the possibility that a further eight were employed by the Melcheburn brothers to transport the victuals they had gathered.\textsuperscript{272} The amount of foodstuffs these ships transported were enough to keep Edward’s forces fully supplied, yet as noted above, this campaign was affected by desertion due of lack of foodstuffs. It is also true that during his chevauchée the king’s forces also suffered from lack of provisions, but this shortage was because Edward had decided to abandon his baggage train. The lack of supplies could have been because of Edward’s intermittent involvement in this campaign, for it seems that orders were not issued from the centre of command, to the receivers of victuals. Edward himself, anticipating that he would suffer from insufficient supplies on his dash to Aberdeen, took the precaution of arranging to rendezvous with a supply ship. The main victual operation was fed by the counties and through merchants such as the Melcheburns. The hubs of this system were the two receivers at Newcastle and Berwick, who were to forward supplies out to Edward’s scattered forces and garrisons. The evidence suggests that as long as Edward’s forces operated near the coast, and the weather was good, the supply system, under royal direction, was developed enough to keep armies well supplied. Of course, this system, based as it was on maritime transportation was in many respects reliant on the technology of the ships and their ability to sail in bad conditions, considering, if the weather broke down there was the


\textsuperscript{272} Twenty-five of these (86.6\%) ships came from ports located on the east coast, while four (13.4\%) were from ports situated south and west of the Thames. The largest contributor was the port of King’s
chance that the supply operation would also ground to a halt. However, by now Edward’s clerks, sheriffs and receivers had acquired a high level of experience, which would soon be put to the test supplying the French wars.

**MILITARY NAVAL**

The military campaign of Edward III in 1336 is dominated by his dramatic dash into the Highlands during July and August, with the intention of relieving the countess of Atholl who was being besieged by the Scots at the castle of Lochindorb. Edward’s personal involvement in the expedition was relatively short lived. By September the king had returned to England for a short while before travelling back to stay in Scotland until December. One of the more pressing problems during 1336 was the spectre of the large French fleet that had been re-located in the Channel from the Mediterranean after the cancellation of the intended French crusade. This, as we shall see below, diverted much of England’s sea power.

Orders were first issued for the arrest of ships on 8 February 1336 when James de Kingston was to requisition vessels over forty tons, all fully manned, victualled and armed, from Faversham to the north. On 20 February further demands for the collection of ships were sent to William Weredale and Ambrose de Newburgh, who were to visit ports north of the Thames, and Ralph Wylingham who was to search the ports south of the Thames. Furthermore, by 3 May William de Emeldon was requisitioning vessels in the ports of Newcastle, Hartlepool and Berwick. In the previous month of March a series of requests for ships had been sent directly to individuals such as Stephen de Padiham of Winchelsea, who was expected to

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Lynn, which supplied sixteen ships (55%) followed by Hull, which contributed three (10.3%) and Newcastle with two (6.8%).

273 *CCR, 1333-37*, p. 544.

contribute his ships, the *Cog Thomas* and *Cog Andreu*, for military service by Easter.\(^{276}\) During April four barges were ordered to patrol the sea around Dumbarton castle and these were to have on board carpenters from Great Yarmouth and King’s Lynn.\(^{277}\) An order, issued on 28 June, demanded that the ships of North Wales were to put to sea under the supervision of the earl of Arundel.\(^{278}\) In the months of August and September requests for more ships were constantly issued. For example, on 18 August the ships of Ireland were to go against the Scots, and six days later all the available vessels in Cornwall were to be put to sea and Roger Conduit, mayor of London, was to contribute three further ships fully manned, armed and supplied.\(^{279}\) Indeed, these three ships probably relate to the £86 10s given by London to provide ships for the king during the campaign.\(^{280}\) By 6 October a large flotilla of ships was ordered to be at Portsmouth and be ready to sail. No doubt this demand was issued because of the large French fleet at anchor in the ports of Normandy.\(^{281}\)

How many ships did these orders actually produce? The Wardrobe book of Richard Ferriby records the wages paid to the crews of twenty-one individual ships.\(^{282}\) Fourteen of these served throughout June, July and August, but three of these had been in active service from March.\(^{283}\) The service which these ships were to undertake

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\(^{275}\) *CCR*, 1333-37, p. 573.


\(^{280}\) Calendar of letter books of the city of London, letter book f, p. 5.

\(^{281}\) Rot. Scot. I, pp. 467-8. Three ports are difficult to locate. In total sixty-three ports received orders to contribute ships, of which twenty-nine were situated north of the Thames and thirty-one south and west of the Thames.

\(^{282}\) BL, Cotton MSS, Nero C.VIII, fols 265v, 266r, 266v. Four ships are not accorded any masters or crew but were sent by Robert Tonge with 42 men-at-arms and 99 archers: *The Holygost* of Berwick; the *Flemynge*; the *Mayln* of Grimsby and the *Cristiane* of Blackneye. No doubt the ship the *Holygost* was the same vessel that was recorded on Tonge’s victual account of 1336-7 (E101/20/4, m. 8) and mastered by John Hardarrage.

\(^{283}\) John Houlot, master of the *Ceale* of Hull; William Broun, master of the *Leonard* of Hull; Thomas Nesbit, master of the *Nicholas* of Hartlepool. Hugh Reppes, master of the king’s ship the *Rodecog* had served from May, although Reppes had been on almost continual service throughout 1334-36.
was described as an ‘expedition of war’ and all were to sail to Perth. The king’s vessels, the *Rodecog*, mastered by Hugh Reppes, and the *Seinte John*, also mastered by Reppes, had been in service from May. In addition, Thomas Roscelyn employed eight vessels to transport himself and the garrison force under his command from King’s Lynn to Dunnotar. The total number of mariners recorded through the Exchequer as receiving wages was 355, including masters and constables, although only seven ships are actually provided with full crew compliments. The evidence therefore seems to show that the naval contingent in 1336 was not as large as it had been over the previous campaigns; indeed it probably numbered only thirty-five ships. This was due in large part to Edward’s continental troubles, but he must also have, by now, begun to realise that Edward Balliol was incapable of pushing home the advantage that the victories of Dupplin Moor and Halidon Hill had provided him with. Consequently, as direct royal intervention on a grand scale drifted away from the Scottish theatre of operations so to did the resources of England.

### 3.8 VICTUALS, SHIPS AND SUPPLIES, 1337-1360

The last six sub-chapters have analysed the evidence relating to the supply of victuals by sea and the naval service of ships during a series of royal led campaigns. We turn now to the issue of supply during the years when direct royal intervention was lacking.

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284 Ten ports, with eight of these located north of the Thames, and two south and west of the Thames, supplied these vessels. The largest contributor was the port of Hull, which provided five (23.8%) vessels to the fleet, followed by Grimsby and Newcastle, which each supplied two (9.5%) ships. The *Rodecog* had a crew of 1 constable and 38 mariners and served until 31 October 1335 and then from 1 November 1335 for a further 120 days, before Reppes changed to the *St John*, see BL, Cotton MSS, Nero C.VIII, fols 264r, 265v. 285 The *Rodecog* had a crew of 1 constable and 38 mariners and served until 31 October 1335 and then from 1 November 1335 for a further 120 days, before Reppes changed to the *St John*, see BL, Cotton MSS, Nero C.VIII, fols 264r, 265v. 286 C. Candy, ‘The Scottish wars of Edward III’, p. 255. 287 BL, Cotton MSS, Nero C.VIII, fol. 266r. There is also a much more detailed and larger payroll of the ships that served in the western fleet, as recorded by John de Watenhul (E101/19/38, mm. 1-12) on behalf of Bartholomew Burghersh. This account runs from 3 October 1336 to 10 November 1337. However, all the ships in this account served only in 1337 and were no doubt involved in guarding the coast from the French fleet at anchor in Normandy and also in the preparations for the king’s intended passage to Flanders in that year. However, the largest single ship was the *Wehalchbot*, mastered by
(except 1341 and 1356 for short periods), and when the direction of the war in Scotland passed under the control of the king's lieutenants. These commanders indentured with the king to serve with a retinue alongside other forces provided by the crown in Scotland, or on the marches. This role had initially been undertaken in 1336 by Henry of Grosmont, earl of Derby, before Thomas Beauchamp, earl of Warwick, took over from him in 1337. But even these high-ranking nobles were gradually drawn to the more prestigious campaigns in France, and from 1338 and 1360 Scotland was usually left to the care of Henry Percy, Thomas Lucy and Edward Balliol. 288

Any examination of the *Rotuli Scotiae* throughout the period 1337 and 1360 reveals a dramatic decline in orders for large quantities of supplies, of a kind that were required for the expeditions between 1333 and 1336. True, the campaigns in 1337 and 1338 were accompanied by demands for large amounts of victuals, but generally, after 1338, the writs sent from the Chancery were concerned with the supply of garrisons. In 1337 orders were issued to Hull to fit out thirty ships capable of carrying victuals to the army under the command of the earl of Warwick. 289 But the main focus of 1337 and 1338 was the siege of Dunbar castle. The government placed great importance on this campaign, possibly because it involved the close friends of Edward III, and taking the castle became a matter of honour. On 17 February requests were issued to twelve counties to forward foodstuffs to Scotland and Robert de Tughale was told to supply the earls of Arundel and Salisbury with provender for their men during the siege. 290 During April the county of Lincolnshire was ordered to find 500 quarters of barley, 500 quarters of wheat, 500 quarters of oats, 102 quarters of salt and 32 tuns of wine.

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288 For a lucid discussion of the arrangements made with Grosmont and Warwick, see N. B. Lewis, "The recruitment and organisation of a contract army, May to November 1337", *BiHR* 37 (1964), pp. 1-19.


Adam Cogger, which was manned by 120 mariners and 1 constable and served from 24 August to 10 November and cost the crown £126 8s.
At the same time the sheriff of York was to collect 800 quarters of wheat, 1,000 quarters of oats, 1,000 quarters of barley and 40 tuns of wine for Berwick and the soldiers besieging Dunbar. By 3 April, Richard de la Pole had indeed freighted 77 tuns of wine to Berwick in the Berthelmeu of London, mastered by John atte Mede.\(^{291}\)

The requests issued to the previous eleven counties were later repeated on 22 May 1338, only this time Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire were added to the list and those two counties were to provide 300 quarters of wheat, 470 quarters of barley and 600 quarters of oats between them.\(^{292}\) Following these orders the receiver at Berwick was told to keep the garrisons of Perth, Cupar, Stirling, Roxburgh and Edinburgh well stocked and supplied with wheat, oats, barley, salt and wine.\(^{293}\) Of all the English garrisons in Scotland that of Perth demanded the most attention from the English government, and on 8 May five ships from King’s Lynn were loaded up with victuals and sent there.\(^{294}\)

The Exchequer accounts certainly reveal that victuals were issued in large quantities during 1337-8. For example, in 1337 Robert Tonge had under his control 3,115 quarters 1 bushel of wheat, 2,746 quarters of oats, 226 quarters of fish, 455 tuns 4 pipes 8 quarters of flour, and 210 tuns 21 pipes of wine.\(^{295}\) Robert employed the services of thirty-six ships to freight these victuals from Berwick to the outlying English garrisons. Of these, seventeen were dispatched to Edinburgh, ten to Perth and two to Bamburgh castle.\(^{296}\) On 19 February 1337 Tonge also employed one small boat to conduct foot soldiers from Berwick to Perth.\(^{297}\) Tonge’s account further reveals that

\(^{290}\) Ibid., pp. 522-23.  
\(^{291}\) Ibid.  
\(^{292}\) Ibid., pp. 533, 534.  
\(^{293}\) Ibid.  
\(^{294}\) Ibid., p. 530.  
\(^{295}\) E101/20/4.  
\(^{296}\) Ibid., mm. 7-9.  
\(^{297}\) Ibid., m. 10.
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291 *Ibid*.
293 *Ibid*.
295 E101/20/4.
these ships also freighted military equipment, such as the 800 boards *escland* to Edinburgh by John Hardarrage, master of the *Holygost* of Berwick. By October 1337 Robert had received a further 691 quarters 3 parts of wheat from the sheriff of Norfolk and Suffolk to add to his stores in Berwick.298 In addition to Tonge’s general stores, during the intervening months of April to July William de Dunstable was busy indenting with several sheriffs for a total of 201 quarters of wheat, in addition to a further ninety individuals who provided 270 quarters of malt, all of which found its way to Scotland.299

As noted above, the main military operation of the year 1338 was the siege of Dunbar castle, which was in full flow by early February, yet by May, it seemed as if the castle would never fall, which indeed it did not, and by this stage of the siege William Montagu had left and joined the king.300 Although this operation ended in failure detailed arrangements were made for the supply of the besieging army. One particular account is extremely informative on the supply arrangements for the siege and in this source are included seventy-three individual indentures and receipts.301 All the towns and individuals enrolled on this account are from the county of Lincolnshire. The supplies were collected and then taken to Boston for transportation to Dunbar castle. In total the receipts record that 153 quarters of malt were shipped direct to Dunbar castle in this way.302 In addition, a further 140 quarters of malt was sent to Perth,303 18 quarters to Berwick and 158 other quarters to various parts of Scotland.304

A siege engine was transported to Dunbar on 10 December 1337 in the *Coggeship* of

298 E101/20/10.
299 E101/20/13, nos, 2-8, 4d.
300 For the details of this army, see A. Ayton, *Knights and warhorses*, p. 172. But also, see J. Sumption, *Trial by battle*, pp. 236-7 and C. J. Rogers, *War cruel and sharp*, pp. 151-2. Both these accounts provide details of the actual events at the siege.
301 E101/21/24.
302 Ibid., nos, 7, 20, 21, 26-53.
303 Ibid., no. 54.
304 Ibid., nos, 6, 8-18, 55-58, 67-73.
Southampton this vessel was employed to freight a new engine to replace the one previously sent on board the *Katerine* of Middleburgh, which had been lost at sea.\(^{305}\)

Other Exchequer particulars reveal that the king ensured that the earls of Warwick, Salisbury and Arundel were well supplied with victuals throughout their involvement in the Scottish campaigns in 1337 and 1338. In the period from 29 September 1337 to 12 April 1338 they were supplied with a total of 2,908 quarters 6 bushels and 1 part of wheat, 1,533 quarters 2 bushels and 3 parts of oats and 172 quarters and 7 bushels of malt.\(^{306}\) A further 300 quarters of wheat, 470 quarters of malt and 600 quarters of oats was contributed by the counties of Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire for ‘the sustenance of the king’s friends in parts of Scotland’.\(^{307}\) In all forty-eight vessels are recorded as being involved in the transportation of victuals during 1337-38.\(^{308}\) All the ports that contributed these ships were located north of the Thames, except one, and the total number of mariners employed in operating these vessels could have been as many as 1,300-1,500. These victual ships were in turn protected by a fleet of eight ships from the ports of Newcastle and Ipswich that were crewed by 641 armed mariners, masters and constables in addition to a force of armed foot soldiers that was placed on each vessel.\(^{309}\) Furthermore, the ship *Gracedieu* of King’s Lynn, which served from 8 June to 29 August, was active searching for the pirate William de Hoth who had intercepted victuals off the coast of Scotland. This vessel had on board an impressive forty men-at-arms, forty archers and fifty mariners.\(^{310}\)

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\(^{305}\) *CPR, 1334-38*, p. 559. Sixty mariners manned this vessel. However, the king still issued a payment of £50 to the owner for compensation, see *CCR, 1341-43*, p. 186.

\(^{306}\) E101/20/32.

\(^{307}\) E101/20/28, m. 1. This account also contains three rolls, which list by name the mariners, archers and men-at-arms.

\(^{308}\) E101/20/4, mm. 7-9; *Rot. Scot. I*, p. 530; *CCR, 1337-39*, pp. 27, 46, 199, 209, 216, 251.

\(^{309}\) E101/20/34, mm. 1, 2. These ships served during November and December.
After the eventful years of 1337 and 1338 the victual arrangements for Scotland began to fall into a distinct pattern. Apart from an initial demand for 2,100 quarters of wheat, 600 quarters of oats and 250 stockfish, the main focus of 1339 was the on-going operations to keep the existing English garrisons well supplied. In particular, the English forces at Perth dominate these orders. In early 1339 requests for wine to be sent to Perth were issued to the receiver at Berwick; and on 9 March merchants were encouraged to forward supplies there by sea, while during April, York and Hull were told to freight 500 quarters of wheat, 300 quarters flour, 380 quarters of barley and 540 quarters of peas to the garrison. Throughout June and July the garrisons of Perth, Edinburgh and Stirling were to be provided with foodstuffs.

Yet in the case of Perth these orders made little difference as the garrison fell in August 1339. One of the principal weaknesses of the fourteenth century supply operations showed itself during this year: namely, that there could be long delays between an order being issued and acted upon. Such delays had serious consequences in 1339. Moreover, the capabilities of ships of the period meant that they were limited as to what they could achieve in a weather system liable to great degrees of change. And although an inquiry was ordered into the fall of Perth on 3 November 1339, Thomas Ughtred, the commander of the garrison, was later totally exonerated, which reflected the point that the fall of the garrison was related more to a failure in the supply system than to military incompetence.

The victualling activities during 1340 continued the now familiar pattern of ensuring that the garrisons were kept sufficiently supplied. Thus, in February 1340 safe conducts were issued to several merchants to take foodstuffs to Edinburgh and

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Berwick. In response to these requests two ships freighted 800 quarters of wheat, 1,000 quarters of barley, 200 quarters of beans and peas, 600 quarters of oats and 60 tuns of wine, for which Thomas Rokeby [at Edinburgh castle] was to take receipt.\textsuperscript{314} The duke of Cornwall also agreed to supply a further 1,250 quarters of barley, 600 quarters of beans and peas and 70 quarters of oats.\textsuperscript{315} By March, five ships of King's Lynn had been issued with protections to transport 270 tuns of wine to Berwick, while in April, four merchants were to forward 100 quarters of wheat, 1,500 quarters of barley, 1,000 quarters of beans and peas and 800 quarters of oats to Berwick, Edinburgh and Stirling.\textsuperscript{316} Some of these victuals certainly arrived at Berwick because between July 1340 and February 1341 Thomas Melcheburn had transported 2,000 quarters of wheat and 1,000 quarters of oats to the receiver, and he shipped a further 100 quarters of oats and 22 quarters of malt in April.\textsuperscript{317} So, essentially, the demands of that year had been met by private merchants operating a supply network for profit which, by now, had come to replace the enormous demands made directly on the counties and sheriffs.

In the following year, 1341, 2,500 quarters of wheat, 1,000 quarters of barley, 510 quarters of beans and peas, 100 bacons, 40 quarters of salt and 4,000 stockfish were ordered for Berwick and were to be shipped there from Newcastle and King's Lynn. Those in charge of supplying these victuals, Robert de Wardecop and Thomas Melcheburn, were given powers to arrest any available ships to take the supplies to the town.\textsuperscript{318} The year 1342 was even less onerous for those charged with keeping the

\textsuperscript{314} Rot. Scot. I, pp. 581, 582.
\textsuperscript{315} Ibid., p. 583.
\textsuperscript{316} Ibid., pp. 586, 589.
\textsuperscript{317} E101/22/24; E101/22/36.
garrisons of Scotland supplied, as no orders were issued at all in that year. Yet Thomas Melcheburn did supply Berwick with 2,000 quarters of wheat, 1,000 quarters of oats, 500 quarters of beans and peas, 498 quarters of malt, 241 quarters of salt and 60 tuns of flour. He distributed these victuals between November 1341 and January 1342. In addition to the supplies provided by Thomas the receiver of Berwick, Peter Gretheved also recorded a further 1,352 quarters of wheat, 535 quarters and 1 bushel of malt, 204 quarters of mixed cereals (mixcilion), 250 quarters of beans and peas, 64 tuns of flour, 20 beef carcases, 37 muttons, 5 bacons, 1 last of herrings, 420 fish, 32 quarters of salt, 40 coal cauldrons, 100 pieces of iron and eight one gallon containers, which he had in his store houses. During this period both the receiver at Berwick and Newcastle constantly forwarded victuals to Stirling and other garrisons. Furthermore, the official in charge of supplies at King’s Lynn, Robert de Wardecop, transported foodstuffs to Scotland from the surrounding counties totalling 635 quarters 1 bushel of wheat, 204 quarters of millet, 63 tuns of flour, 20 beef carcases, 38 muttons, 5 bacons, 32 salmon, 1 last of herrings, 257 quarters of beans and peas and 95 tuns 1 pipe and 1 hogshead of wine.

The years between 1343 and 1346 were altogether less demanding. Orders for victuals were now rarely issued, and when they were, they contained requests for only small amounts of supplies, such as the 300 quarters of wheat and the 100 tuns of wine to be sent to Scotland from Bristol in June 1343. Although merchants still

319 E101/23/2, m. 1. These victuals were intended for the campaign in Brittany, which had originally been planned for 1341. But after the cancellation of that campaign, for that year, the collected victuals were diverted to Scotland: see CCR, 1341-43, p. 315. But also, see M. Prestwich, ‘English armies in the hundred years war’, p. 104, who argues that the Brittany campaign was not the intended destination for the expedition of 1341 and that it was probably intended for another campaign in the Low Countries.
320 E101/23/9, mm. 1-3.
321 E101/23/15, mm. 2-3 shows the distribution of supplies and military equipment from Newcastle to Berwick and Stirling.
322 E101/23/26, mm. 1-3. These victuals were obviously included in the receivers account recorded in E101/23/9, as the amount of meat collected by Wardecop matches that recorded by Gretheved.
forwarded provender, the quantities of these supplies were now much reduced; for example, in 1343 only 459 quarters of wheat, 211 quarters of malt, 99 quarters of beans and 47 quarters of oats were freighted to Berwick and Stirling. This was partly due to the fact that from 1338 to 1346 the Scots regained the initiative and the English garrisons began to fall one by one. Even less emphasis was placed on the receiver of victuals at Carlisle, who from July 1338 to February 1339, could only account for 17 tuns of flour and 78 tuns of wine. And although his stores were later increased this was by the small amount of a further 40 quarters of wheat, 30 quarters of beans and peas and 200 quarters of oats.

The major change in Anglo-Scottish relations occurred following the capture of David II at Neville’s Cross in 1346. His subsequent imprisonment in England involved a shift from warfare to diplomatic alternatives. Victuals were still required for Edward’s forces in the marches and the remaining garrisons, but these were now mainly issued direct to Edward Balliol, Henry Percy, or others charged with protecting the borders. The only increase in demands for supplies came during the months between June 1355 and January 1356, when a total of 1,500 quarters of wheat was ordered from Hull, King’s Lynn and Grimsby, while a further eighteen ports on the east coats were to freight supplies to Scotland by January 1356. No doubt these were the supply preparations for the king’s intended intervention in Scotland, the purpose of which was to force an agreement on the Scots for the release of their king.

The numbers of ships involved in the transportation of victuals from 1337 to 1360 was not of the same magnitude as the earlier campaigns. Using the available evidence it is possible to suggest that sixty-four individual ships took part in the

324 E101/23/34.
325 E101/21/23.
326 E101/22/3.
327 See, for example, Rot. Scot. I, pp. 700, 715.
supply operations during these years, and that apart from one ship from London and
one from Bristol, the ports located on the eastern coast of England contributed all of
these vessels. Yet surely more ships were involved. For example, Walter de Mauny,
as admiral, was told to supply the forces in Scotland by sea. In addition, the sheriff of
Dorset was to forward foodstuffs by sea to Scotland and protections were constantly
issued to merchants throughout the period to supply the English forces. And
although Thomas Melcheburn's accounts do not list the names of ships he employed
in freighting victuals, we do know that he consistently did so, and he probably
contributed a further ten to twenty vessels during these years. The total amount of
victuals transported to Scotland from 1337 to 1360 would have been 13,420 quarters 8
bushels of wheat, 7,467 quarters 2 bushels of oats, 2,207 quarters of beans and peas,
2,283 quarters 8 bushels of malt, 3,750 quarters of barley, 1,444 quarters of mixed
cereals, 595 tuns 8 quarters of flour, 273 quarters of salt, 923 tuns 21 pipes and 1
hogshead of wine, plus numerous meat and fish products. Apart from major military
enterprises, such as the siege of Dunbar castle, these supplies were mainly destined
for the English garrisons in Scotland.

MILITARY NAVAL 1337-60

The military role of ships during this period was also much reduced, when compared
with the numbers of vessels that had been put into operations during the previous
years. This partly reflected Edward's change of strategic focus: his concentration on
continental campaigns that placed large demands England's shipping. This was
especially the case after the French had diverted their Mediterranean 'crusade' fleet to

328 Ibid., pp. 778, 785, 786.
329 E101/20/4, mm. 7-9; Rot. Scot. I, p. 530; CCR, 1337-39, pp. 27, 199, 216, 229; CCR.1341-43, pp.
186, 205; CCR, 1343-46, p. 407; CPR, 1345-48, p. 152; CPR, 1348-50, p. 452; CPR, 1358-61, p. 27.
the Norman ports, which now posed a direct threat to English shipping and the southern ports of Edward's realm. However, Scotland was not completely neglected, using all the available sources, it is possible to say that a total of thirty-two individual ships operated in a military role during the northern campaigns in the years from 1337 to 1360.  

The number of mariners that served on these vessels is difficult to establish and although some of the ships are provided with crew sizes these are quite high. But if we use the average of thirty mariners per ship then a rough estimate of the number of serving seamen would be in the region of 1,300 to 1,500.

Taking all this evidence together it is possible to say that in the period 1337 to 1360 ninety-six confirmed ships took part in supply and military operations relating to Scotland. The ports north of the Thames provided ninety-one percent of these vessels. The number of mariners involved in these operations would have been roughly 3,000-3,500. In general this assessment shows quite clearly that by this stage of Edward's reign his Scottish ambitions had been overtaken by his French campaigns. From the expedition of 1322, when 284 ships participated in Edward II's invasion of Scotland, with further peaks in 1333 and 1335, we eventually see evidence of a decline in the deployment of English sea power against Scotland, and from 1337 only ninety-four vessels served over a twenty-year period. But two points need to be stressed. First, the demands on England's maritime communities was not reduced; indeed if anything, they actually increased during the period 1337-60, as Edward III needed enormous fleets to transport his armies to new glories on the continent. Second, the commitment made by the English merchant marine, in terms of the numbers of ships and mariners, 

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331 E101/20/28; E101/20/34; E101/22/36; Rot. Scot. I, pp. 483, 485, 521; CCR, 1337-39, pp. 194, 197, 251; Foedera, II, ii, p. 1082; CPR, 1343-45, p. 555; CCR, 1346-49, pp. 132-3. Eighteen (56.2%) of these vessels came from ports located on the east coast, four (12.5%) were ships taken as prizes of war and re-used by the English, one was foreign, one was contributed by Southampton and eight (25%) are not specifically linked to any port of origin.
to the Scottish wars of Edward II and Edward III goes some way to address the idea that the Scots usually held the advantage in the maritime war during the period under consideration and that Edward III failed, or was not willing to commit, all his power to the wars in Scotland. 332 Although the latter point may well be valid for the period after 1336, the overwhelming numerical superiority in ship numbers employed by Edward II and Edward III surely favoured the Plantagenets rather than the Bruces in the naval war. It is true that the Scots preyed on English ships, but these were scattered examples of piracy against small numbers of supply vessels or trading ships making their way up the east coast. It must also be borne in mind that the English attacked Scottish shipping, in addition to devastating their port communities such as the burning of Aberdeen in 1336. 333 Furthermore, the point recently made by historians that Edward III deployed no major fleet with the aim of forcing a battle in Scotland is not supported by an examination of the sources. 334 The siege of Berwick in 1333 and the great offensive of 1335 saw large numbers of English vessels being deployed with the primary purpose of destroying any Scottish ships they confronted, while also burning several Scottish harbours in order to prevent retaliation by the Bruce party. Moreover, in 1333 a large English fleet was effectively deployed as part of the siege of Berwick, which did result in a battle.

It has also been suggested that the fleet south of the Thames was mainly deployed as a protection against possible French raids. 335 Although this was probably the case in some circumstances, it is unlikely to have been true during the periods of

333 For example, *CCR, 1337-39*, p. 172, which states 'order to deliver to William de Goseford, a ship called La Cogg of Flanders, which he took, and on which the bishop of Glasgow and other of the king's enemies were, certain being killed, as the king has given William that ship'. This was a great coup for Edward to catch such a prominent member of the Scottish nobility and shows that the English were also engaged in an aggressive maritime war.
334 C. Brown, *The second Scottish war of independence*, p. 48 makes this point.
the major expeditions of 1333 and 1335. Table 3.2 shows that of the majority of
vessels that operated in Scotland in the period, slightly more were provided by the
ports north of the Thames as compared with those south of that estuary. The French
did send ships to aid Scotland in the wars but only in small numbers against Edward
III and not until after 1336, when the break down of diplomatic relations between
France and England and the redeployment of Philip VI’s Mediterranean fleet to
northern France, did cause Edward to feel directly threatened, which in turn affected
the policy of English ship distribution.

Finally, by comparing the amounts of victuals that were ordered during the
preparations for a campaign with the amounts that were actually collected it can be
seen that, on average, only fifty percent was usually successfully gathered. For
example, in 1322 Edward II requested that a total amount of 34,300 quarters of wheat,
oats, barley and beans and peas was to be collected. Yet, the sources show that his
officers managed to gather only 16,615 quarters of these supplies. Edward III’s
administrative officials fared no better. In 1334 and 1335 the crown ordered that
39,000 quarters of various crops be collected, but the clerks in charge of this operation
only managed to gather 18,429 quarters. Yet, 1336 was a success with 9,141 quarters
of various cereals being collected when only 5,300 quarters had been ordered. The
evidence also points to the fact that after 1338 the system was left entirely to private
merchants, with no direct intervention from the government except in times when the
king, or his friends, was personally involved in an expedition. For example, in the
period 1338 to 1360 some 30,571 quarters of various crops were collected when only
14,990 quarters had been ordered from the royal administration. Clearly the new

336 The fact that the northern ports supplied more vessels partly reflects the 80 ships that sailed to
Scotland in 1322 and that after 1337 ninety percent of the serving ships generally sailed form east coast
ports.
victual operation involving private merchants was working quite successfully without government intervention. Indeed, one suspects that the enormous quantities of supplies that were ordered at the outset of a campaign was done so because the crown possibly only expected to collect half of what was requested and so the larger amounts of provender that were demanded then the greater the amount would be forthcoming. Thus, in reality Edward II would never have hoped to actually collect 34,300 quarters of cereals in 1322 but in asking for this amount he probably expected his officials to at least gather half that amount. In all, the victual operation in Scotland during the period covered by this thesis should be seen as a success. Even after direct government intervention ceased the whole system seems to have run relatively well in the hands of the receiver at Berwick and the merchants of King’s Lynn.

**TABLE 3.1**

**TOTAL QUANTITIES OF VICTUALS SHIPPED TO SCOTLAND, 1322-60**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPES OF VICTUALS</th>
<th>QUANTITIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WHEAT</td>
<td>40,190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OATS</td>
<td>27,468</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BEANS &amp; PEAS</td>
<td>8,144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MALT</td>
<td>3,463</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VARIOUS CEREALS</td>
<td>8,210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FLOUR</td>
<td>1,246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEAT</td>
<td>1,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FISH</td>
<td>13,372</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WINE</td>
<td>3,335</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

337 The quantities given for the cereals are in quarters while those for the flour, wine and fish are given in tuns, while the meat carcases include bacons, beef and muttons. The section various cereals include such things as barley, rye, malt and those victuals simply called millet in the accounts.
**TABLE 3.2**

**TOTAL NUMBER OF SHIPS OPERATING IN SCOTLAND, 1322-60**

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of ships</td>
<td>338</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Ports</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ships from South of Thames</td>
<td>513 (from 54 ports)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ships from North of Thames</td>
<td>628 (from 44 ports)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mariners</td>
<td>30,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.9 THE SUPPLY OF ENGLISH ARMIES IN FRANCE, 1338-1346

In the introduction to chapter three it was noted that the prevailing idea on how armies supplied themselves, when campaigning on the continent, was that they usually relied on the local countryside, or the sack of a town, to keep themselves fed while on the march. But it was also recognised that recently this view has begun to be eroded as a greater understanding of the scale and scope of the organisational abilities of the

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338 The numbers of ships that served in each campaign are slightly less than the number given in the table. This is because there are twelve ships from the southern admiralty that served between 1333 and 1335 and are recorded in Robert Barton's receipt book (E101/18/35) that cannot be located in any particular campaign between those years. Furthermore, the eighty ships that transported the Disinherited to Scotland in 1332 have been added to the northern ships because this fleet was raised in the Humber.

339 This is an estimate largely because the victual ships generally come with no crew sizes whatsoever, and in many cases the military naval ships are not given crew sizes either, especially those from the calendared sources, however an average crew size of thirty has been used to estimate the totals for the manpower of the fleet 1322-60.
Edwardian kings has been researched. This sub-chapter aims to analyse the campaigns in Gascony, the Low Countries, Brittany and Normandy during the period 1324 to 1346, in order to show that, in most cases, the forces serving abroad under Edward II and Edward III transported with them large quantities of foodstuffs, to such an extent, that living off the land became simply a means of revitalising what had already been freighted over with them.

The Saint Sardos expedition of 1324 is one of the best-documented campaigns of the period. Although the evidence relating to the issue of victual shipments does not rival the pay details of the army and navy, it does nevertheless allow a good assessment of the quantities of supplies that were transported to Gascony with the army. The collection of foodstuffs for this campaign began in earnest and by March 1324 Robert de Nottingham had already acquired supplies from the counties of Lincolnshire and Nottinghamshire. Later in the year, a further 1,470 quarters 5 bushels of wheat, 239 quarters of beans and peas, 21 quarters of oats, 88 beef carcases, 131 bacons and 104 tuns of flour were shipped to Bordeaux in twenty-six ships. In addition to these victuals each ship also carried seven tuns of water for the horses it transported. In October 1324 a further 1,050 quarters of wheat, 630 quarters of beans, 216 quarters of oats, 7 bacons and 27 quarters of flour was transported. The final fleet to leave England and travel to Gascony in the spring of 1325 also carried with it a further 375 tuns of flour, 585 quarters 1 pipe of flour, 40 quarters of wheat

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340 The excellent study by R. A. Kaner, 'The management and mobilisation of English armies', chapter 9, concludes with a positive assessment of the government's abilities to organise complex logistical operations and achieve a high measure of success.
341 E101/16/36. He claimed £18 4s for his expenses.
342 E101/16/35, mm. 1-2, 1d, 2d. A tun was 954 litres or 252 gallons as laid down by a statute of 1423. See G. Hutchinson, Medieval ships and shipping, p. 90 and B. Lavery, Ship: 5,000 years of maritime adventure (London Maritime Museum, 2004), p. 44. All of these vessels, except the Blithe from King's Lynn, mastered by Richard Erinyte, were from ports south and west of the Thames.
343 E101/17/4, mm. 1, 2, 2d.
and 20 quarters 3 bushels of beans and peas.\textsuperscript{344} As well as the collection of foodstuffs, the gathering of various types of arms was also underway and during the same period a total of 5,657 nails, 3,000 boards, 136 springals with 8,170 quarrels and 329 extra cords, 100 large spikes, 250 middle spikes and 250 \textit{plunche navit al oeps}, were freighted to the duchy in twelve ships contributed by ports situated on the east coast.\textsuperscript{345} Furthermore, enough wood for 20 bridges, 122 cords, 1,215 nails, 32 racks for horse fodder, 731 boards, 197 nets, and 182 \textit{canenasta} were transported to the duchy in twenty-six ships.\textsuperscript{346} Taken together a total of 2,560 quarters 5 bushels of wheat, 889 quarters 3 bushels of beans and peas, 237 quarters of oats, 479 tuns 612 quarters 1 pipe of flour, 88 beef carcases and 138 bacons were freighted to the duchy between 1324 and 1325. Even if we allow for the wastage of 1,000 quarters of the wheat there would still have been enough to keep 2,000 men supplied for close to two months.\textsuperscript{347}

Similar precautions were taken when supplying armies going to Gascony in the 1330s and 40s. For example, when John de Norwich served in the duchy in 1337 he brought with him sufficient supplies for himself and his retinue. Before Norwich had crossed, Stephen le Blount had collected 1,415 quarters 1 bushel of wheat, 2,034 quarters of flour, 21 quarters 6 bushels 3 parts of malt, 695 quarters of oats, 785 quarters of beans and peas, 28 beef carcases, 319 bacons, 589 muttons, 6,520 fish and

\textsuperscript{344} E101/16/40.  
\textsuperscript{345} E101/16/34, nos, 1-17.  
\textsuperscript{346} All the ships were from ports south and west of the Thames The term \textit{canenasta} is intriguing because this could be a form of early canon or some form of gunpowder weapon. If this is the case then it is one of the earliest forms of this type of weapon. See R. D Smith, 'Artillery and the hundred years war', pp. 151-160, p. 151, which notes that the earliest reference to such weapons in Europe dates to 1326. Alternatively the term could be derived from the Latin word, \textit{cannesta}, which is a type of head covering.  
\textsuperscript{347} There is evidence from a letter written by Ralph Basset, John Wisham and Adam Lymbergh to Edward II that some of the victuals sent to the duchy arrived rotten and this resulted in civil unrest. However, this letter was written in May 1325, so it must relate to the victuals sent for the force already in Gascony, because the earl of Surrey did not set sail for Bordeaux until 22 May 1325, see P. Chaplais, \textit{The war of Saint-Sardos} (London, 1954), p. 222.
80 conger eels.\textsuperscript{348} In the following year, Norwich was sent a further 1,955 quarters of wheat, bought from 246 people at a cost of £400 13s 10d.\textsuperscript{349} This large amount of foodstuffs was surely meant not only for Norwich’s small retinue but also for the Gascons who would also have served under him as Edward III’s representative in the duchy.\textsuperscript{350}

During the Gascon campaigns of 1345-9, initially led by Henry of Grosmont, the supply of the English forces in the duchy was a well-planned operation. At the outset of the expedition in 1345, Grosmont transported to the duchy 264 boards, 1,280 large beams, enough to construct 50 bridges, 20 springalds with 146 cords and 104 quarrels, 2,737 sheaves of arrows for bows, 1,000 caltrops, 1,000 sanalshapps and 45 carbons.\textsuperscript{351} In November of the following year, 800 quarters of wheat and an unquantified cargo of fish, along with other supplies, were taken to Bordeaux in five ships.\textsuperscript{352} In 1347, between May and June, a further 9,050 quarters of wheat, 200 quarters of rye and 400 quarters of beans and peas were freighted to the duchy in twenty-three ships.\textsuperscript{353} At the end of July, and throughout August and September, a further nine vessels from Hull and Newcastle transported 1,053 quarters of wheat.\textsuperscript{354} And in the summer of 1348 an additional 149 quarters of wheat, 40 quarters of oats and 50 quarters of beans and peas were shipped to Bordeaux.\textsuperscript{355} All the foodstuffs sent to Gascony in 1347 were sent to the duchy at the request of Grosmont who was by

\textsuperscript{348} E101/20/30.

\textsuperscript{349} E101/21/3.

\textsuperscript{350} Norwich’s force is known from enrolled protections (C81/17/50, m. 33) and from an Exchequer account (E101/166/11, m. 19). Using these it is difficult to get an accurate picture of the total size of his retinue; however, an estimate as to its size can be gleaned from the £1818 13s owed to him by the Exchequer (CCR, 1337-9, p. 323; CCR, 1339-41, pp. 40, 321). By spending 65s a day on wages his force was likely to have consisted of 30 men-at-arms and 100 mounted archers.

\textsuperscript{351} E101/24/6.

\textsuperscript{352} CPR, 1345-8, pp. 198, 204, 206, 215. One ship came from Winchelsea, one from London, and the other three were all foreign vessels from Spain.

\textsuperscript{353} Ibid., pp. 218-20. All the ships, except eight, were supplied by ports located on the east coast.

\textsuperscript{354} E101/25/20, nos, 10-15.

\textsuperscript{355} Ibid., nos, 5-9.
that time participating in the siege of Calais. This was because Henry had left his most trusted retinue leader, Sir Thomas Cok, in charge of the Anglo-Gascon forces and he obviously felt obliged to make sure that Cok and his allies were supplied with provender from England.\(^{356}\) Therefore, Cok's force and his Gascon allies had a total of 10,903 quarters of wheat, 400 quarters of beans and peas, 200 quarters of rye and unspecified quantities of fish at their disposal. This was enough victuals to keep an army of 4,000 men (although in reality Cok's army would have been much smaller than this, but the supplies may have also gone to local Gascons) continually supplied for perhaps four to six months. In addition to the supplies, which are recorded through the Exchequer, the English administration in the duchy also collected corn rents, which could also be utilised by soldiers campaigning in Gascony on behalf of the duke during this period.\(^{357}\)

The king's campaigns in the Low Countries during 1338-40 were also well supplied with foodstuffs from England. Initially the king had expected to cross over to Flanders in 1337 but this had been delayed. However, this cancellation did not stop the work of the purveyors and as one chronicler noted Edward's officers were extremely diligent in their business for this expedition.\(^{358}\) For example, Reginald de Donington, clerk, searched the county of Lincolnshire and the area around Lindsay for foodstuffs. He traversed through 537 towns, manors, vills and abbeys and in total he collected £809 12s 8d worth of victuals.\(^{359}\) By expending such a large amount of

\(^{356}\) Thomas Cok was retained as seneschal of Aquitaine from 1346-9: see K. Fowler, *The king's lieutenant: Henry of Grosmont first duke of Lancaster* (London, 1969), p. 301. However, Grosmont was back in Gascony at the end of 1349 and stayed in the duchy until 1351, so he could have used some of these supplies during his 1349 campaigns. See C. J. Rogers, *War cruel and sharp*, pp. 287, 294.


\(^{358}\) *Knighton*, p. 7.

\(^{359}\) E101/20/11, mm. 1-6.
money, Donington would have been able to raise roughly 5,000 quarters of wheat. Nevertheless, it was in the following two years that most of the activity for the collection of supplies occurred. From March to August 1338, William Dunstable, collected 347 quarters of wheat, 430 quarters of oats, 41 quarters 7 bushels of beans and peas, 9 quarters of malt, 92 quarters of salt, 110 muttons, 111 bacons, 1,287 horse shoes and 1,760 nails from the counties of Lincolnshire, Nottinghamshire, Derbyshire, Cambridgeshire, Huntingdonshire, Essex and Hertfordshire. All these victuals were taken to the ports of Great Yarmouth, Ipswich and King’s Lynn to be transported to Flanders. In a second, but related account, dated to the same period, Dunstable visited the same counties as above but this time he also gathered supplies from York, Bedfordshire, Buckinghamshire, Norfolk and Suffolk. He managed to collect a further 578 quarters of wheat, 138 beef carcases, 716 muttons, 204 bacons, 137 quarters of salt, 457 quarters of barley, 907 horse shoes, 7,900 nails for those shoes, in addition to a large numbers of springallds, quarrels and caltrops. He distributed these victuals to various people, including Walter de Mauny, Bartholomew Burghersh and the mariners who were stationed throughout the ports of Great Yarmouth, Sandwich and Orwell. Even before the fleet sailed for Flanders more victuals were still being added to the stores already collected, and days before the armada sailed a further 72 quarters 5 bushels of beans and peas was collected for the king’s army. Therefore, on his outward voyage to his first Low Countries expedition the king, and his men, transported with them 2,952 quarters of wheat, 430 quarters of oats, 103 quarters 12

360 E101/21/40. This is based on the £32 6s 1d paid for 265 quarters 6 bushels of wheat by William Wallyngford in 1339. However, it must be noted that the prices that were paid for wheat in the Scottish campaigns usually amounted to between 5s and 7s per quarter. Therefore, this amount of money could have bought only 3,200-3,500 quarters of wheat. But during years when demand was heavy for wheat the price per quarter could increase dramatically.
361 E101/21/1.
362 E101/21/4.
363 E101/21/5.
bushels of beans and peas, 9 quarters of malt, 475 quarters of barley, 826 muttons, 315 bacons, 138 beef carcases and 229 quarters of salt. This would have kept an army of 4,000 men in the field for roughly two months.\textsuperscript{364}

During Edward’s stay on the continent through 1339, and on his return in 1340, supplies were regularly collected for his men and shipped to the Low Countries. For example, from 14 February to 16 October 1339 William Wallingford raised 1,183 quarters 4 bushels of wheat, 1,183 quarters 3 bushels of beans and peas, 1,091 quarters 5 bushels of malt, 1,438 quarters 5 bushels of oats, 169 bacons, 136 beef carcases, 173 muttons and 60 horse shoes from twelve counties. These victuals were freighted to Antwerp in eight ships, which all sailed from ports situated on the east coast.\textsuperscript{365} William Dunstable also collected more supplies throughout 1339 when he accounted for foodstuffs purveyed from towns, manors and vills in Huntingdonshire and Oxfordshire. His account records a total of 1,091 quarters 9 bushels of wheat, 20 quarters 1 bushel of oats, 69 quarters malt and 1 bacon.\textsuperscript{366} Throughout 1340, a further 1,136 quarters of wheat, 101 quarters of oats, 22 quarters of malt, 304 beef carcases, 167 muttons, 384 bacons, 30 quarters 4 bushels 416 pipes and 280 parts of salt and gross salt, 200 quarters of flour, and 2,286 tuns of wine were transported to Flanders in thirty-six ships, which were provided by ports located on the east coast.\textsuperscript{367} While the land army was kept supplied so to were the ships of the fleet. During 1337-39 a galley of the king’s was furnished with 7 \textit{balistae}, 1 springald, 1,000 arrows, 30 \textit{aketons}, 30 \textit{hauberks}, 30 pieces of plate armour, 2 standards, 12 banners, 500 quarters of wheat, 168 quarters of beans and peas, 412 quarters of oats, and 500 quarters of

\textsuperscript{364} Indeed, if the supplies that were collected throughout 1337 were still available to be used then the amount of supplies taken to the continent would be double that noted here.
\textsuperscript{365} E101/21/40, mm. 1-7.
\textsuperscript{366} E101/21/38, rolls 1-3.
\textsuperscript{367} E101/22/25, mm. 1-5; E101/22/26, mm. 1-2; E101/22/27, mm. 1-3.
barley for the 100 mariners on board. If we analyse the total amounts of foodstuffs gathered throughout 1338-40, specifically for the Low Countries expeditions, then it would seem that the king freighted some 12,261 quarters 9 bushels of wheat, 1,989 quarters 6 bushels of oats, 1,225 quarters of beans and peas, 1,131 quarters 5 bushels of malt, 457 quarters of barley, 868 bacons, 578 beef carcases, 1,166 muttons and a large quantity of fish. This would have supplied an army of 12,000 men for roughly a two to three month period.

Of course, the horses of the army would also have required the use of some of the victuals and more of the supplies could also have been shared with his allies. But Edward’s newsletter on the 1339 expedition, makes the suggestion that Edward’s allies were supplying themselves: ‘quel jour nous avoions noz allies devaunt nous, qe nous monstrirent qe iours vitailles estoient pres des penduz et qe le yver estoit durement aprochaunt, qils ne poient demurrer, einz y covendroit retrere sou le marche a retcurnes, quant lor vitailles estoient pres despenduz, quant ior vitailles fusrent despenduz. Verraiment ils feusrent le plus briefment vitallez par cause qils entenderont qe nostre dit cosin nous eust done hastive bataille’. In short, Edward’s allies had not brought sufficient quantities of supplies because they had assumed that Philip VI would offer battle almost straight away. But what the letter also discloses is that Edward did have sufficient supplies and so it was not through his under preparation that the campaign was going to end. Indeed, the English king suggests in his letter that he had enough foodstuffs to offer his allies substantial quantities of victuals as long as they stayed and participated in the operation. Edward had taken the lessons he had learnt through campaigning in Scotland and applied them directly to

368 E101/20/37, mm. 1-3.
369 The total number of men Edward had under his command during 1338-40 numbered 8,400, although his allies’ contribution could have been an extra 7,000. See A. Ayton, ‘Edward III and the English aristocracy’. p. 179.
his continental expeditions. The English army at this stage, in terms of preparation and organisation, was streets ahead of its continental counterparts. This is not to say that all went well in these campaigns and some chronicles do record Edward’s frustration, particularly with the council in England, at their lacklustre performance in forwarding him supplies. 371 But this was probably more to do with the flow of money than the collection of foodstuffs. Nevertheless, it does seem that towards the end of the season in 1339 Edward’s forces did become short of supplies. 372 But again, this probably reflects the fact that he had kept a large army stationery at Cambrai for a lengthy period. 373 The siege of Tourai, however, does not seem to have affected Edward’s army in terms of lack of supplies and cattle, sheep, wine and other victuals were abundant. 374 In all, it would seem fairly conclusive that Edward’s campaigns in the Low Countries, in 1338 and 1340 were so well provisioned with foodstuffs that living off the land was relegated to a secondary role.

The Brittany campaign of 1342-3 was equally well planned and the collection of sufficient supplies was begun early so that the English forces would not have to subsist on the plunder of the localities they passed through. There was one main reason for this: namely, that Edward had intervened in Brittany as an ally of John de Montfort, so he would be determined to keep the goodwill of his Breton supporters by limiting the damage his army did as they passed through the lands of his allies. As the Brittany campaign had originally been planned for the summer of 1341, the collection of victuals had begun as early as May of that year. As was noted above, some of these supplies were eventually transferred to Scotland after the Brittany campaign was

370 Avesbury, p. 305 but also, see Knighton, p. 19.
371 Murimuth, p. 90.
372 Scalacronica, p. 129.
373 The difficulties of a siege and the amount of material it took to successfully bring one to conclusion are discussed in detail by E. Amt, ‘Besieging Bedford: military logistics in 1224’, pp. 105-119.
cancelled. However, some of the foodstuffs were still gathered, stored and prepared for carriage to Brest as soon as the English army was ready. For example, John atte Fenn and John de Fynch had been busy throughout 1341 and 1342 searching for victuals at London and King’s Lynn. By early 1342 they had collected, ready to be shipped to Brittany, 2,205 quarters of wheat, 1,000 quarters of malt and 525 quarters of beans and peas at a cost of £632 7s 3d.\textsuperscript{375} Later in the year a further 2,500 quarters of wheat, 1,500 quarters of barley, 500 quarters of beans and peas, 1 last of herrings, 32 quarters 100 pipes of salt, and 10 tuns of wine had been gathered.\textsuperscript{376} By 28 September 1342 John de Ampleford had collected more supplies in the counties of Surrey, Sussex, Somerset, Gloucestershire, Dorset and Hampshire. This added a further 600 quarters of wheat, 1,000 quarters of oats, 210 beef carcases and 1,200 muttons to the accumulated supplies.\textsuperscript{377} In addition, Thomas de Drayton loaded the ship, \textit{Flianoze} of Great Yarmouth, with a further 31 quarters 4 bushels of wheat, 36 bacons, 18 small bacons, 10 quarters of salt and 856 pipes of cider for the passage of the king.\textsuperscript{378} Therefore, a total of 4,848 quarters 4 bushels of wheat, 2,000 quarters of oats, 1,000 quarters of malt, 1,025 quarters of barley, 1,025 quarters of beans and peas, 10 quarters 100 pipes of salt, 210 beef carcases, 1,200 muttons, 54 bacons, 10 tuns of wine and 856 pipes of cider had been collected by Edward’s purveyors for shipment to Brittany. There were enough foodstuffs collected during 1341 and 1342 to supply Edward’s army for roughly two to three months. And although the Brittany intervention involved three separate expeditions it is likely that each campaign leader took with them enough provender out of this large pool of supplies to satisfy his needs.

\textsuperscript{375} E101/23/4, mm. 1-3.
\textsuperscript{376} E101/23/11, mm. 1-3. It has to be noted that out of these victuals Peter Gretheved, receiver at Berwick, was allocated the 32 quarters of salt, the last of herrings, 488 quarters of wheat and 475 quarters of barley.
\textsuperscript{377} E101/23/19.
\textsuperscript{378} E101/23/20.
Edward's most important campaign, and his largest in terms of troop numbers, was the Crécy expedition of 1346. The campaign officially began when his fleet arrived off the coast of Normandy on 12 July, but it should now come as no surprise to find that this followed on from months of stockpiling foodstuffs and supplies. The collection of victuals had in fact been an on-going operation from 1344. In April of that year Gilbert de Chishull had searched the counties of Essex, Kent and Hampshire. But the process was markedly increased in scope during 1345 when Edward was preparing for another expedition to Flanders. Thus, from 9 January 1345 Chishull was again appointed to collect provender for the king. He managed to gather 644 quarters 3 bushels of wheat, 443 quarters 4 bushels of beans and peas and 922 quarters of oats. These victuals were forwarded to Southampton before being transferred to a 'magna navis' and taken to Normandy. He then supplied the Wardrobe directly with a further 142 tuns of flour, 70 beef carcases, 643 bacons and 480 muttons, which were received by Walter Wetwang. Bearing in mind that Edward's business in Flanders during 1345 lasted from 11 June to 26 July, and that he had around 2,000 men with him, and that the account itself states that the victuals were taken to Normandy, it could be that some of these collected supplies were actually reallocated to the Crécy campaign in the following year. Although this might seem an excessive amount of time to store perishable goods, the quantities recorded on the first account match the amounts exactly that are enrolled on another Exchequer particular that is directly related to the Crécy campaign. Thus we are told that between January and September 1346, 922 quarters 6 bushels of oats, 443 quarters 4

379 CCR, 1343-46, p. 309.
380 Chishull used at least one ship, the Seintemaribot, mastered by John atte Crouch, to freight 254 quarters 4 bushels of beans and 151 quarters of oats of the collected supplies to Southampton.
381 E101/24/15.
bushels of beans and peas and 70 beef carcases were collected (the quantity of oats and beans and peas here is exactly the same as on the previous account). 384

In 1346 the purveyors were again busy organising and gathering enough supplies so that Edward could put his battle-seeking strategy into effect. From January to June 1346 William Kelleseye indented with the sheriff of Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire to the effect that the sheriff would provide a specified amount of victuals. By 1 June 1346 the sheriff had gathered 1,034 quarters of oats, 657 quarters of beans and peas, 300 tuns and 300 quarters of flour, 700 bacons, 60 beef carcases, 360 muttons and 50 tuns of salt. These were all forwarded to Hull and then shipped south in time for the king’s passage. 385 At the same time the county of Bedfordshire was assessed for a contribution of victuals. In total fifteen hundreds were searched and sixty-nine individuals provided 132 quarters of wheat. 386 At the beginning of the summer of 1346 William Kelleseye received a further 587 quarters 2 bushels of wheat, 1,059 quarters of oats, 223 quarters of beans and peas, 209 tuns and 524 quarters 7 bushels of flour, 755 bacons, 749 muttons, 46 beef carcases, 12 stones of cheese and 8 tuns 1 pipe of cider from the counties of Essex, Hertfordshire, Yorkshire, Nottinghamshire, Derbyshire, Northamptonshire, Rutland, Lancashire and Huntingdonshire. 387 The sheriffs of these counties took the foodstuffs they had collected to the ports closest to their bailiwick and shipped them to London to wait for the King’s passage. Throughout the summer more provender was constantly being collected by the sheriffs, and in Lindsey a further sixty-five individuals contributed

383 E101/25/11. Foodstuffs could be stored for long periods if they were kept in the right conditions. See K. L. Pearson, ‘Nutrition and the early-medieval diet’, pp. 3-5, 8.
384 E101/25/11, m. 1. The number of recorded bacons, 240, is actually less than that which appears on the previous account (E101/24/15), but this probably reflects the fact that 403 bacons had been consumed in the previous year.
385 E101/25/8, nos, 1-4.
386 E101/25/14, mm. 1, 2.
154 quarters of wheat,388 while the counties of Norfolk and Suffolk provided 20 lasts of herrings and 20,000 stockfish before the king sailed to Normandy.389

In addition to the food for human consumption the horses that served throughout the campaign were allocated 5,200 quarters of fodder.390 By the time the king sailed, a further 754 quarters 3 bushels of wheat, 443 quarters 4 bushels of beans and peas 922 quarters 6 bushels of oats, 143 tuns of flour, 70 beef carcases, 204 bacons and 304 quarters of millet had been added to the victuals already stored.391 By July, another 1,200 quarters of wheat had been gathered at Southampton from six counties and these were shipped to Normandy on 7 August.392 This is indeed intriguing because these victuals were dispatched to Normandy to re-supply the king during the campaign. This probably followed a prearranged plan that Edward had worked out and relayed to his victualling officers before he left for Normandy. The likelihood is that these supplies were taken to the river Orne, near Caen, where the earl of Huntingdon and others returned back to England. Although none of the campaign newsletters mention this event, one suspects that a small fleet of ships freighting wheat would not be the most important thing to record. Moreover, it is likely that Edward had certain clerks within the army who would record and dispense supplies, so the authors of the newsletters may not even have been aware that this operation was taking place. What this shows is that Edward and his council understood the value of keeping the army well fed. In fact one is instantly reminded of the ship that transported 300 quarters of provender to the king at Aberdeen in 1336 and it seems that Edward took these ‘on the march’ re-supply rendezvous seriously.

389 C76/22, m. 1.
391 E101/25/11, mm. 1-2.
392 Ibid., mm. 3, 4.
The evidence available to us suggests that by the time of Edward's departure in early July 1346 his forces had a pool of available resources amounting to 1,627 quarters 5 bushels of wheat, 3,085 quarters of oats, 1,341 quarters 4 bushels of beans and peas, 304 quarters of millet, 652 tuns and 824 quarters of flour, 1,455 bacons, 1,109 muttons, 106 beef carcases, 20 lasts of herrings, 20,000 stockfish, 50 quarters of salt and various other foodstuffs such as cheese and rye. In addition, a further 5,200 quarters of fodder had been gathered for the horses, while 1,200 quarters of cereals were shipped over in August. The role of ships in this process was central to its success. Every single Exchequer account makes it clear that at each stage ships were used for transporting these victuals. The first stage in the process required each sheriff to take the supplies he collected to the nearest port in his bailiwick, and from these county ports the victuals were then freighted by sea to the main collection points at London and Southampton, before finally being freighted over with the army in the transport fleet. The army that Edward took with him to France in 1346 numbered some 14,000 combatants, possibly as high as 16,000 if we include non-combatants. If we use the previous method that 10,000 men would consume roughly 15,000 quarters of foodstuffs per month then the quantity of provender summarised above would have kept Edward's army satisfied for roughly one month. But it is also worth noting that the sack of the towns of Barfleur, Valognes, Carentan and Caen during the campaign, and Hugh Despenser's raid on Le Crotoy, would have added greatly to the victuals brought over with the army. What this evidence suggests is that Edward was not willing to take the risk of campaigning in France, with the aim of seeking a decisive battle, without sufficient supplies to keep his army in the field long enough to

393 The overall size of the fighting force is analysed in detail by A. Ayton and P. Preston, *The battle of Crécy* chapter 5, but the totals for the army's strength are given on p. 189.
achieve his strategic aims. And as table 3.3 shows, the amount of supplies transported with six armies, campaigning in the French war, over twenty-two years, was similar to that consumed by Edward’s armies and garrisons operating in Scotland over a forty year period.

**TABLE 3.3**

**TOTAL QUANTITIES OF VICTUALS SHIPPED TO THE CONTINENT, 1324-1346**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPES OF VICTUALS</th>
<th>QUANTITIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WHEAT</td>
<td>37,253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OATS</td>
<td>6,398</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BEANS &amp; PEAS</td>
<td>4,881</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MALT</td>
<td>1,052</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VARIOUS CEREALS</td>
<td>3,687</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FLOUR</td>
<td>4,777</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEAT</td>
<td>7,908</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FISH</td>
<td>26,540</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WINE &amp; CIDER</td>
<td>3,152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SALT</td>
<td>785</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This section of the thesis has aimed to show that Edward II and III’s Scottish campaigns were well provided with foodstuffs. There were systems of supply already in place from the reign of Edward I, but under his son and grandson slight alterations were made to the administration of these systems, before Edward III increasingly began to place most of the operation under private control from the late 1330s.\(^{396}\) The

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394 Barber, ed. *The life and campaigns of the Black Prince*, p. 15, notes the letter written by Michael Northburgh, in which Northburgh describes the sacking of many towns. In the case of Carentan, Northburgh noted that ‘a lot of wine and food was found there’.

395 All the cereals are quantified in quarters, as is the salt and flour; the meat includes bacons, beef and muttons, the fish is in stockfish and the wine and cider is in tuns. The various cereals include rye, barley and those simply described as millet in the sources.

396 The move towards merchants handling the responsibility of supplying the King’s forces in Scotland in the late 1330s pre-empt the move by parliament in 1340 when the king, under pressure from the Estates, enrolled a statute concerning the supply of the military which essentially laid down that from now ‘military purveyance should henceforth be entrusted to merchants possessing no special commissions or warrants so that the people or any among them shall not be forced to sell anything against their desire or will’, see W. R. Jones, ‘Purveyance for war’, p. 314. Of course, the king still used purveyance throughout the French wars but he now called the purveyors ‘buyers’.


quantities which were freighted during the Scottish wars were enormous and although the armies of the period did suffer in certain campaigns from lack of provender this was a fault with the distribution of the supplies once they had been freighted to Newcastle, Berwick or Skinburness, rather than a failure to collect adequate victuals from the counties at the outset of a campaign. The continental expeditions of both Edward II and Edward III were also sufficiently supplied with foodstuffs from England. In all of the six continental campaigns analysed in this thesis, the quantities of provender transported over to the continent, with the army, were enough to sustain the English forces long enough for them remain in the field for an average of one to two months, which was the time span that most medieval expeditions were expected to last.

The above findings should come as no surprise because these expeditions took several months to plan and cost enormous amounts of money. Indeed, for an army to be able to maintain itself in the field for one month usually took three to six months of preparation. For Edward to throw away all this meticulous planning and finance on the gamble that his forces could live off the land in enemy territory makes no rational sense. In addition, the findings made here become more poignant when it is remembered that it is now widely accepted that Edward's ultimate aim was to force a hesitant Philip VI into a battle, which could only be fulfilled if the English king could keep his army on enemy soil long enough for honour to dictate that the French must attack. This strategy in turn relies upon how much provender the army freighted over with it. These foodstuffs were almost certainly taken with the forces on the large transport fleets and unloaded at the port of disembarkation. Indeed, the majority of the ships in these armadas were merchantmen and the crews of these vessels would have found this process almost instinctive. The role of the maritime communities in the
whole system, from collection to distribution, was crucial for the timing and success of the whole operation. Bearing this in mind and because we need to understand in detail how these supplies were freighted, and in how many ships, the following chapter will analyse in depth the size and structure of several transport fleets.
CHAPTER 4: THE TRANSPORTATION OF ENGLISH ARMIES TO FRANCE 1324-60

4.1 THE SAINT SARDOS WAR, 1324-5

The war of St. Sardos came at an unfortunate time for Edward II. Two years earlier he had crushed the rebellion of the earl of Lancaster but since that time his rule in England had rested on a foundation of fear rather than deference. The architects of this policy were Edward’s closest advisors, the two Despensers and Walter Stapeldon. The problem, which St. Sardos now brought forward, was how could these advisors allow Edward personally to campaign in France while they remained in England? If they stayed behind their political opponents were sure to make an attempt on their lives, but if they went France they also expected to face the full wrath of the French king who had a particular dislike of them because of their treatment of his sister, Edward’s wife. Thus a compromise was reached. Edward would send his half brother, the earl of Kent, and while he campaigned in Gascony, Edward would direct the expedition from afar. Bearing in mind Edward’s disastrous war leadership, at first sight, this method of directing the war seems to have offered some advantages. Unfortunately, the earl of Kent was no more a general than his half brother.

The chronology of the campaign is complicated but essentially it involved three separate expeditions. The earl of Kent’s force arrived in Bordeaux in May 1324; this was followed by a larger contingent that set sail in September 1324, while the final fleet sailed, from two ports in May and June of 1325, under the command of the earl of Surrey. The aim of this sub-chapter is to analyse these fleets in order to

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1 There are several studies that provide a detailed account of Edward’s reign, how the Despensers influenced him and the effect the War of St Sardos had on the political framework. The best are: T. F. Tout, The place of the reign of Edward II in English history (Manchester, 1914): chapter 4 and 6 deal with the Despenser’s and the problems of Gascony; N. Fryde, The tyranny and fall of Edward II. 1321-1326; M. Vale, The Angevin legacy, pp. 227-244; M. Buck, Politics, finance and the church in the reign of Edward II. Walter Stapeldon treasurer of England (Cambridge, 1983) chapters 7, 9 and 10; R. M. Haines, King Edward II: Edward of Caernarfon, his life, his reign, and its aftermath, 1284-1330 (London, 2003).
understand their size, structure, and how many men and horses they were required to transport. There are problems in attempting this, however, and the major stumbling block to a detailed analysis concerns the payroll evidence relating to the transport fleet of the earl of Kent. As Kent set sail in May 1324 any Exchequer account relating to his flotilla would be dated to the seventeenth year of Edward II's reign. Yet no such payroll exists. The earliest orders issued for the requisitioning of ships were dispensed on 10 May 1324. And although one of these orders stipulated that the arrested vessels were to be made ready within three days, and therefore could have transported the earl of Kent, that they would be requisitioned, manned, victualled and forwarded to the embarkation port in such a short space of time remains unlikely. Nevertheless, it is beyond doubt that Kent's army did sail in May 1324. We must conclude, therefore, that the transport fleet consisted of ships serving for no pay or that the payroll for this expedition has since been lost. But Kent's force was rather small, consisting of only a few hundred men, and the transport needs for such a force would not have been large. It is likely that his fleet consisted of no more than twenty ships.

Fortunately, the armada that set sail in September 1324 is fully recorded in the payrolls. As was noted above, the initial orders for the requisitioning of vessels were issued on 10 May 1324 and these were probably intended, in the main, for the fleet that was planned to sail in June. But how large was this fleet, how many ports contributed ships to the flotilla, how many mariners served on board these vessels and what were the numbers of men and horses these ships had to transport? The first

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2 *CCR, 1323-27,* pp. 182-84; *Foedera, II,* i, p. 552.
3 The June fleet was delayed until September before finally setting out from Plymouth in that month. See R. A. Kaner, 'The management of the mobilisation of English armies', p. 83, who details the organisation of the fleets and the delays they suffered.
orders for the arrest of ships were issued to eighty-eight ports. Over three days in May demands were issued for a specific number of ships from twenty-six of the eighty-eight ports already asked to contribute vessels to the fleet. In all, they were requested to provide sixty ships and send them to Plymouth. This gathering of ships was to coincide with the recruitment of the land-based forces that were to arrive at Plymouth on 8 July.

On 16 July efforts were increased to place the gathering fleets under central control when John de Crombwell was appointed admiral. In addition, on 22 and 25 July three of the king's own ships were placed into active service and their masters were given the right to choose mariners. By 4 August a further five royal ships were added to this contingent. Therefore, a total of sixty ships had been requested but given the fact that the crown issued orders to eighty-eight ports the evidence suggests that the king had greater ambitions than this. But can we arrive at a more accurate

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4 CCR, 1323-27, pp. 182-83, 187-88. There are five separate orders issued over the period of 10th, 20th, and 26th May. However, when the actual number of individual ports is untangled from these requests there are eighty-eight.

5 Ibid., p. 187.

6 R. A. Kaner 'The management of the mobilisation of English armies', p. 86, slightly differs in his interpretation of these orders. He suggests that a total of thirty-four ships were to be sent to Plymouth. However, there were two sets of orders issued; one on 10 May the other on 20 May (CCR, 1323-27, pp. 182-83 records the first two orders that were issued on 10 May, while CCR, 1323-27, pp. 186-87 notes the third order issued on 26 May). The first orders contained two quite separate lists of ports and the numbers of vessels they were expected to supply should, therefore, be added together (when this is done the demand was for sixty-eight ships). The confusion arises when on 26 May a third demand was issued for a specified number of ships to be arrested from a list of ports. However, all the ports listed in this last order had actually been recorded in the previous two demands. Four of the ports have their expected shipping contributions increased from one ship to two, while Southampton and Weymouth have their shipping contributions decreased from a total of sixteen vessels to eight. When these three orders are untangled the actual number of ships that these twenty-six ports were to contribute to the fleet numbered sixty.


8 CPR, 1324-27, p. 3; Foedera, II, i, p. 562.

9 CPR, 1324-27, p. 7. These were Richard Fille, master of the James, manned by 80 mariners; John Dyve, master of the Nicholas; Andrew Rosekyn, master of the Margrete.

10 CPR, 1324-27, pp. 7, 14. These were the Godyere, mastered by Thomas Fauxet and operated by 40 mariners; the Maudeyne, mastered by Theohald de Barton with 40 mariners; the Cog Seinte Piere, mastered by William Ede and 30 mariners; the Cog Notre Damme, mastered by William Lucas; and the Valence, mastered by John Petit.
estimate of the final numbers of ships that eventually appeared at Plymouth to transport the army?

There are several existing Exchequer accounts relating to the wages of mariners who served in the St. Sardos expedition; however, the majority of these payrolls cover the fleets that transported the earl of Surrey in 1325. The set of accounts drawn up by Nicholas Huggate reveal the transport fleet that freighted the September 1324 army. In all Huggate paid wages to eighty-eight ships' crews, which were contributed by forty-one ports. All of these ports, except nine, are included in the original requisition orders, issued on 10 May. But not all the eighty-eight vessels recorded by Huggate served in the September fleet. By closely examining these pay accounts we can see that forty-four ships, out of the eighty-eight, received pay for transporting the September contingents. The numbers of mariners who operated these ships was 1,182, including masters and constables (this rises to 1,372 if we include the mariners on board the king's eight ships). Out of the forty-four ships recorded by Huggate twenty-nine (65.9%) served from July to October, while twelve (27.2%) were paid for service between August and September, with only three (6.8%) starting their paid service at the last minute in September. This suggests that the majority of the ships were ready and waiting for the land-based retinues whose recruitment had begun in June. In addition to the forty-four ships paid by Huggate, a further three ships from London also joined the fleet, as did two extra vessels contributed by the port of Blackeney, which were provided at that port's own costs.

11 BL, Add MS 7967, fols 94r-99v.
12 These vessels were supplied by twenty-two ports, of which sixteen (72.7%) were located in the south and west and five (22.7%) north of the Thames, while a Spanish port contributed one ship, the Seintemary, mastered by Fernando de Fain. The largest single supplier of ships was Dartmouth, which provided seven vessels (15.9%) manned by 190 mariners (15.9%).
And eight ships of the king further bolstered the armada. This brought the overall size of the September transport fleet to fifty-seven individual ships.

One important question that remains to be considered is what was the size of the land-based army these ships had to transport and how many horses would these troops have brought with them? The St. Sardos *vadia guerre* is a difficult source, with many of the recorded retinues being small in size, while large numbers of foot soldiers served throughout the whole campaign. Nevertheless, by utilising these pay accounts, it is possible to suggest that eight bannerets, eighty-six knights, 369 esquires and 216 men-at-arms sailed on the September fleet. Accompanying these mounted troops were 1,700-foot soldiers. This would have meant that, on average, each ship would have had to carry forty-one individuals. Of course, this was not how the fleet was arranged, because some ships were specifically equipped to freight the army's horses. But this average of forty-one men per ship seems reasonable for the vessels of the period. The mounted contingents are likely to have brought with them roughly 1,500 horses. We know that 706 of these were valued before the steward of the household prior to the campaign but only the most expensive horses brought would be valued in such a way. Taking as our guide this estimate of 1,500 horses, each ship would have to carry on average twenty-six horses. This is indeed entirely plausible, based on the evidence from two exchequer accounts from later in the period.

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14 BL, Add MS 7967, fols 30r-53r; foot soldiers are enrolled on fols 75r-93v.
15 *Ibid.*, fols 8r, 8v. Throughout this thesis the average given for how many horses could be transported by each ship should be taken as a guide for what could have been carried out. However, it is almost certainly the case that only a section of the fleet would be fitted out for the transportation of horseflesh. Indeed, by examining E101/17/3, we can see that out of the Warrene fleet, sixteen ships were fitted out solely for use as horse transports; therefore, it is likely that between thirteen and fifteen percent of all the transport fleets analysed in this thesis were specially equipped for the transportation of horses alone.
16 E101/16/9, mm. 1, 2, 1d, 2d; E101/16/38, mm. 1, 1d, 2; E101/17/2, mm. 1, 1d, 2, 3, 3d, 4. I.e., one per man-at-arms providing that they were valued at 100s or more.
17 See above page 118 n. 241.
In conclusion, it seems that the fleet that set sail from Plymouth in September 1324 numbered fifty-seven ships. The fact that the initial orders specifically requested the ports to contribute sixty ships, and that a total of fifty-seven eventually appeared (albeit eight of them being the king's) shows that the raising of a fleet could be a precise operation.

4.2 THE EARL OF SURREY'S FLEET

John de Warenne, earl of Surrey, was dispatched to Gascony on 22 May 1325. Yet his departure followed months of delays. The original plan for his deployment had been 17 March, and commissions had been working toward this goal since the previous October. In the end, the transport ships sailed in two separate fleets from Portsmouth and Harwich. The flotilla that freighted the earl of Surrey's forces was the largest of the three armadas to depart for Bordeaux between May 1324 and June 1325. The payrolls relating to the maritime service for this particular fleet are spread throughout four separate manuscripts. Of these, only two contain the records for the ships involved in the actual transportation of Surrey's troops and horses, as the other accounts relate to ships, forwarded to Gascony later in the year, freighting extra victuals and arms.

These individual sources reveal the structure and size of each of the fleets that operated during the 1325 phase of the war. The most informative payroll for the earl

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18 The majority of the ships came from ports south and west of the Thames, which contributed fifty vessels (87.7%) and 1,239 mariners (90.3%), this includes the 190 mariners noted as serving on the king's ships. While those ports north of the Thames supplied six ships (10.5%) and 133 mariners (9.6%).
19 This is when the ship that transported him, the Cog de Touz Seintz, mastered by Roger atte Hurn of Southampton, began its paid service. See BL, Add MS 7967, fol. 98r.
20 C61/36, m. 21; R. A. Kaner, 'The management of the mobilisation of English armies', p. 97.
21 E101/16/35; E101/16/40; E101/17/3; BL, Add MS 7967, fols 98r-99v.
22 E101/17/3; BL, Add MS 7967.
of Surrey’s ships is the account of Walter de Otterhampton. He records the wages paid to eighty individual ships contributed by twenty-six ports. The numbers of masters, constables and mariners who served on this fleet was 1,907. The majority of these ships, fifty-seven (71%), began their paid service in March and served through until May. While twenty-three (28.7%) served from April to May. The cost of these eighty ships to the crown was £1,213 14s 6d, while an added expense of £38 2s 3d was paid to the sheriff of Hampshire for fitting out sixteen ships for ‘equus ad arma’.

Otterhampton’s payroll details the wages paid to eighty ships’ crews supplied by twenty-six ports. Yet the accounts of Nicholas de Huggate for this campaign, which include wage sections, also contain relevant entries on ships that served in the Warenne transport fleet. Thirty-four ships are recorded in Huggate’s accounts with dates of service that accord with the second fleet that set sail from Harwich. This conclusion is drawn by noting that out of these thirty-four ships only three started their service in May and completed it by June, while the rest of the vessels served from June to July. This second transport flotilla, relating to the earl of Surrey’s army was therefore not as large as the initial armada, which had set sail in May.

23 E101/17/3, mm. 1b, 2, 6b, 7, 9.
24 Of these ports twenty-three (88.4%) are located in the south and west while three (11.5%) are situated north of the Thames on the east coast. Those ports in the south and west supplied seventy-seven vessels (96%), while the ports on the east coast contributed three (3.7%).
25 1,843 (96.5%) of these men operated ships from the south and western ports, and sixty-four mariners (3.5%) manned the east coast vessels. The largest supplier of ships was the port of Teignmouth, which provided nine vessels (11.2%) operated by 154 mariners (8.4%). But the port that supplied the greatest number of seamen was Dartmouth, which contributed eight ships manned by 218 mariners (11.8%). This number of mariners includes three ships from Huggate’s accounts, which should be included in this fleet and were manned by seventy-five mariners.
26 BL, Add MS 7967, fol. 98r.
27 The thirty-one ships (three sailed in the first Warenne fleet) that formed this second fleet were supplied by eighteen ports. Only four (22.2%) of these were from ports situated south and west of the Thames while the rest were located on the east coast. The numbers of masters, constables and mariners that operated this flotilla was 731. The largest suppliers of ships were the ports of Brightlingsea and Ipswich, which both contributed five vessels each and 220 seamen. But the five ships from Ipswich provided 160 of these men, suggesting that that their vessels were somewhat larger than those of Brightlingsea.
In addition to the payrolls relating to the transport fleets of 1325 there is also a separate account which records the numbers of ships involved in freighting victuals and arms to Gascony for Warenne’s men.28 This lists the names of fifty-four ships from twenty-five ports. Unfortunately, the document does not record the crew sizes of these ships; but it is interesting in the sense that it is linked to two further Exchequer accounts.29 For example, in the early months of 1325 Richard de la Pole entered into several indentures with local sheriffs and castle custodians, in order to raise provisions of arms for Warenne’s forces. One of these indentures was sealed between Richard and Henry de Fauconberge, sheriff of Nottingham. Fauconberge agreed to supply springalds and quarrels for the campaign.30 This he must have achieved for in the Sturmy account he is recorded as freighting the Margrete of Ravenser, mastered by John Hardroneray, from the port of Hull.31 In all de la Pole and his suppliers freighted thirteen ships to Gascony, and of these, three appear in the expenses of John Sturmy. Furthermore, ten ships from Sturmy’s account are also enrolled in Huggate’s accounts.32 These are provided with dates of service, and apart from one vessel, all of these ten ships began their service in June, placing them in the second of the Warenne transport fleets.

Finally, included in any discussion of the maritime activity during the war of St. Sardos must be the service of the Cinque Ports. In mid-July 1325 they sent a fleet of twenty-one ships out to sea for twenty-eight days. This fleet’s purpose was to protect the southern coastline from predatory French ships.33 On board these vessels were 1,006 masters, constables and mariners. Yet only three of the Cinque Ports’

28 E101/16/40, rolls 1-4. This source records the expenses of John Sturmy, admiral of the northern fleet.
29 E101/16/34; BL, Add MS 7967.
30 E101/16/34, no. 7.
31 E101/16/40.
32 E101/16/40; BL, Add MS 7967, fols 98r-98v.
33 E101/17/10, mm. 1-3.
confederates supplied the ships: Winchelsea, Sandwich and Rye. Winchelsea was the largest contributor with fourteen ships and 672 seamen. But this fleet was not involved in any transport duties.

Therefore, there seems to have been 114 ships involved in the transportation of troops to Gascony in the spring and summer of 1325. If we include the ships used to freight supplies in 1325 the maritime contingent rises to 155 vessels (this is because thirteen of the ships recorded in the supply accounts were also recorded on the admirals account). But how many men and horses were transported in Warenne’s army and was this number of ships sufficient for the task? It has been calculated that the whole force of 1325 would have been 5,357 strong. Of these, 4,750 were foot soldiers and 607 were knights, esquires and men-at-arms. It is likely that these soldiers brought with them roughly 1,500 horses including baggage and pack animals. This would result in each ship in the fleet having to freight, on average, thirty-one men and thirteen horses.

In conclusion, this chapter has shown that 171 ships were involved in the transportation of troops to Gascony. If we include the supply ships and the twenty-one vessels provided by the Cinque Ports then 233 ships operated throughout the whole campaign, from May 1324 to August 1325. On board these ships there was probably 6,000 mariners. The 171 ships specifically involved in the transportation of troops had to freight 1,300 mounted men and 6,400-foot soldiers and possibly as many as

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34 The troop numbers are discussed in detail by R. A. Kaner, "The management of the mobilisation of English armies", pp. 98-99.
35 By examining E101/17/3 we can see that out of the Warenne fleet sixteen (14%) ships were fitted out solely for use as horse transports.
36 This is an estimate because forty-four ships are provided with no exact crew numbers. The ports to the south and west of the Thames contributed 178, including the king’s ships, (76%) ships to the operation, while those ports located on the east coast supplied fifty-four (23.1%) vessels, with one ship contributed by a port located in Spain.
3,000 horses, including baggage and pack animals. On average this would mean that each vessel would have had to carry forty-five men and eighteen horses in addition to supplies of food and arms. Again, based on the exchequer evidence of the carriage capabilities of ships from this period, this is entirely plausible. The cost of the maritime arm to Edward’s treasury was £2,969 4s 4d. In all, the organisation of the campaign appears to have performed reasonably well. Of course there were delays, but this dogged almost every campaign of the period, and the majority of the ships were requisitioned in time and in sufficient numbers for the land based troops to be able to board once they had been mustered. In addition, a fleet of ships was also raised to perform a coastal protection service during a delicate time in the negotiation of the peace treaty at the end of the campaign. In essence, the organisational capabilities of the English government in requisitioning transport fleets allowed Edward II to attempt an offensive campaign in continental Europe to safeguard his possessions. This experience, of raising a large transportation and supply fleet, would be utilised and developed further by Edward III, whose continental ambitions required armadas that could transport tens of thousands of men and animals and allow Edward III unprecedented access to the continent on a scale that Europe had never seen before. It is to these armadas that this study will now turn in order to assess the change in the structure and the size of Edward III’s transport fleets.

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37 That such numbers of horses were brought on campaign should not be doubted. In 1415 an earl was allowed to bring with him twenty-four horses on expeditions abroad. See J. Barker, *Agincourt*, p. 118.
38 E101/34/6 records a list of ships employed to transport horses. In this case one vessel freighted seventy-five horses.
According to the theory of war, which teaches that the best way to avoid the inconvenience of war is to pursue it away from your own country, it is more sensible for us to fight our notorious enemy in his own realm, with the joint powers of our allies, than it is to wait for him at our own doors.  

In order for Edward III to put into practice his theory of warfare and take the war to the enemy, his first priority was to raise a fleet of ships sufficient in number to transport the men, horses and supplies required for his first campaign in France. Much rested on Edward's 1338-40 campaigns. He had painstakingly built a large coalition of allies at the enormous cost of £382,000. Although Edward ultimately failed during these years to realise his goal of bringing the French to battle, the experiences gained by Edward's administration, in mobilising and organising two transport fleets, placed his bureaucratic staff in the ideal position to raise even larger armadas during the 1340s and 1350s. Nevertheless, as the previous chapter shows, Edward did have the framework of a system in place with which to construct a transport fleet that could be further developed to achieve better results.

The first campaign in the Low Countries began with much indecision and delay. Although Edward had developed close diplomatic relationships with the Low Countries princes, in June 1337, he seemed to be considering a change of strategy that would involve transporting his army to Gascony. But this idea was abandoned after a week or two and by July 1337 Edward was fully committed to the original campaign.
plan. Indeed, the process of raising a large fleet had begun in earnest under the management of Sir Bartholomew Burghersh. And by 25 July 1337 a fleet of sixty-one ships from ten south-western ports had been assembled. On 17 August a further thirty-two vessels, from thirteen south-western ports, were added to the gathering fleet, until on 29 August fifty-seven recently requisitioned ships joined the armada bringing its total size to 150 vessels.\(^{42}\) Unfortunately late in 1337 this large fleet was eventually allowed to disperse due to the cancellation of the whole campaign. Nevertheless, there were several naval expeditions in 1337 that allowed Edward to utilise some of the ships his clerks had raised over the summer. Prominent among these was Sir Walter Mauny's attack on 9 November on the French garrison based on the island of Cadzand.\(^{43}\) In addition, in December a second fleet of twenty-six ships also left England to take a consignment of wool that formed part of the wool scheme implemented in 1337.\(^{44}\) By this stage the king himself had already employed two galleys, mastered by John Dorye and Nicholas Blaunk, to search the sea for his enemies, in addition to purchasing the ship *Prucebergh* from Boston, which he then had fitted out for war with banners, streamers, standards, crossbows, bows, arrows and armour.\(^{45}\)

In February 1338 the requisitioning process was restarted to raise a large transport fleet that would eventually sail in July. But how large was the flotilla that was finally raised, which ports contributed the ships and how many men and horses did these vessels have to transport to the Low Countries? There are several payrolls, of relevance to the 1338 fleet, which provide us with the evidence to quantify the

\(^{41}\) *Foedera*, II, ii, p. 974. Gawain Corder was to arrest the vessels and have them ready at Portsmouth. The order was dated 12 June 1337.

\(^{42}\) E101/19/39.

\(^{43}\) For a detailed description of the action at Cadzand, see Froissart, *Oeuvres*, II, pp. 429-37; see also J. Sumption, *Trial by battle*, p. 216; C. J. Rogers, *War cruel and sharp*, p. 143.

\(^{44}\) E101/21/13, m. 3.
maritime contribution to the expeditions of July 1338, and, most of these particulars feed exactly into the Wardrobe system. As was noted in chapter two several ship lists would be written up during the build up to a campaign and they would then be used to formalise the final payroll contained in the Wardrobe accounts. However, closer inspection of the Exchequer particulars of accounts and their comparison with the Wardrobe book of William Norwell shows that, in some cases, several vessels were recorded in the particulars that never made it into Norwell’s final accounts. For example, John de Watenhul compiled one of the Exchequer particulars for the admiral of the southern fleet. In all, 130 ships are enrolled on this document. Yet when this payroll is compared with the final accounts in the Wardrobe book we find that thirty-two ships listed on the particular are not recorded in Norwell. On the other hand, 165 vessels in the Wardrobe book are not provided with exact dates of service, but their start and completion dates can be gained by using the Exchequer accounts, which do provide exact dates for the majority of the 165 ships. A similar payroll was also compiled by the admiral of the northern fleet for the vessels requisitioned under his orders. 124 individual ships arrested from nineteen ports and manned by 4,290 masters, constables and mariners are recorded on this account. Yet comparison with the Wardrobe book shows that one vessel that was recorded in the particular is absent from Norwell’s final accounts. A second payroll, which notes the wages paid to 122 ships’ crews also has two vessels that are absent from the Wardrobe book. Finally, a further ship that participated in the transport fleet of July 1338 can be found by examining a set of 165 indentures agreed between Nicholas Pyk and shipmasters. This

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45 *CCR, 1337-39*, pp. 29-30, 301.
46 E101/20/27; E101/20/39; E101/21/7; E101/21/8; E101/21/9; E101/21/10; E101/21/12; E101/22/38; *Norwell*.
47 E101/21/7.
48 E101/21/12.
49 E101/21/10.
ship, called the *Cog Touz Seintz*, is absent from the Wardrobe book, the reason for this probably being that this ship’s crew had their wages paid in the form of victuals and not money.\(^50\)

In addition to the vessels mentioned already that are not included in the final Wardrobe book, we need to take account of those crews who had forfeited their wages owing to an act of piracy after the army had been transported to the Low Countries.\(^51\)

Sixty-two ships from the ports of Great Yarmouth, Dunwich and Bauldseye committed this act of piracy. When these sixty-two ships are compared to the Wardrobe book it is found that twenty-eight are absent from Norwell’s final accounts. This absence of only twenty-eight ships, and not all the sixty-two, can be explained by the method of punishment imposed on them by the crown. In order to be forgiven for this act of plunder, these ships’ crews had to re-pay the owners of the attacked vessel £16,527 17s 1d as compensation for their losses. It seems likely that the twenty-eight ships struck out of the final payroll failed to honour this agreement. Yet caution needs to be shown when comparing these twenty-eight ships to the Wardrobe accounts because nine of these vessels are named not with their masters but with their owners’ names, as such these nine ships cannot be compared with the payrolls.\(^52\) Therefore, it is only possible, with any degree of certainty, to suggest that fifty-three of these ships actually participated in the 1338 transport fleet. Thirty-four of these are recorded in Norwell’s final accounts, while nineteen are absent from the Wardrobe book, and nine cannot be compared satisfactorily to any source because they are named only with an owner. In short, of the sixty-two ships that committed the act of piracy all but nineteen received pay, and are therefore recorded in Norwell’s final accounts. As such

\(^50\) E101/20/39, no. 30.
\(^51\) *CPR, 1338-40,* pp. 491-92. The order is dated to March 1340 so the ships must have been involved in the 1338 fleet because the king did not sail back to Flanders in 1340 until June.
these nineteen vessels that are ‘missing’ from the payroll sources should be included as participants in the transport fleet. Indeed, holding back the pay of crews that had committed certain offences was also initiated during the Brittany campaign when during the months of October and November 1342 230 ships left the king’s service without his permission. As a result eighty-eight of these forfeited their pay and were consequently not recorded in William de Edington’s final Wardrobe accounts.\(^{53}\)

Taking all the comparative evidence together it is therefore possible to suggest that a further fifty-five ships participated in the July transport fleet, which for a variety of reasons, have not been recorded in the Wardrobe book and should consequently be included in the analysis.

Bearing in mind that we already know that thirty-four ships that committed the act of piracy in 1338 were recorded in Norwell’s final accounts we now need to turn our attention to the overall numbers of ships, and mariners, that Norwell recorded as receiving pay for their involvement in the transportation of Edward’s army. In a recent article Bryce Lyon suggested that 370 vessels were requisitioned for the purpose of transports.\(^{54}\) Manning this fleet was 12,263 masters, mariners and other maritime personnel. Yet on closer inspection, the Wardrobe book contains the names of 340 individual ships in the transport fleet. Of these 340 ships 165 have been recorded with only the number of days they served and not exact dates of service, but as was pointed out previously, these details can be gleaned from the surviving Exchequer particulars.\(^{55}\) All these ships were in active service throughout June until

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\(^{52}\) Owners were not paid for the use of their ships and their names do not appear in the Wardrobe accounts.


\(^{54}\) B. Lyon, ‘Infrastructure and purpose’, p. 67. It has to be noted that in his introduction to Norwell’s Wardrobe book Lyon gives a different number: 361 ships. See Norwell, p. ciii.

\(^{55}\) E101/21/7; E101/21/10; E101/21/21.
early August 1338. In addition to the ships that participated in the transport fleet, Norwell's account includes nineteen further vessels that are recorded under the heading of individual magnates' names and other prominent personalities involved in the Low Countries expeditions, such as William de la Pole. Six of these ships were involved in the transportation of William Montagu and William de Bohun. Montagu owned four of these six ships and these presumably transported him along with his retinue to Flanders. This assumption is based on the names of the vessels, three of which incorporate Montagu's name. [For example, one of the ships was called the Cristofre Mountagu, while another was named the Magdaleyne Mountagu]. The two vessels recorded under the name of the earl of Northampton were both from the port of Ipswich, but their dates of service run for four months after the king had sailed. 420 masters, constables and mariners manned these six ships. The remainder of the thirteen vessels in this section of the Wardrobe book were involved in various aspects of the campaign. For example, the two ships owned by de la Pole were utilised for the freighting of the king's wool to Brabant, while the barge, the Spinnace and the magna navis under the command of Robert Camerario, were employed during the spring of 1340 to guard the sea.

In conclusion, if we include the fifty-five ships absent from Norwell and the vessels enrolled under the magnate's names, the number of vessels involved in the transportation of the king's army in 1338 rises to 401 ships. Manning these ships was 13,346 masters, constables, mariners, carpenters, clerks and pages. But how many

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56 See Norwell, p. ciii, for an investigation on the numbers of ships that served at particular periods.
57 Norwell, p. 384.
58 Ibid., Bohun's vessels began their service on 19 November 1338 and had completed it by 24 January 1339.
59 The ports situated south and west of the Thames supplied 204 (50.8%) ships operated by 7,105 (53.2%) maritime personnel. While the ports located north and east of the Thames contributed 197 (49.2%) vessels manned by 6,241 (46.7%) seamen. Yet by far the largest single supplier of ships was the port of Great Yarmouth, which provided sixty-one vessels (15.2%) operated by 2,574 (19.2%) sailors. Indeed, this port contributed more vessels to the fleet than were recorded through the
men and horses did these 401 ships have to transport to the Low Countries in 1338? It has been calculated that the contingents of men taken by Edward III to Antwerp in 1338 numbered 1,400 men-at-arms, 2,500 archers and an indeterminate number of Welsh infantry.\(^{60}\) These land-based contingents probably brought over with them anywhere up to 10,000 horses, including those specifically required for baggage and haulage.\(^{61}\) Therefore, each of the 401 individual vessels of the transport fleet of 1338 would have had to freight, on average, twelve men (this includes a rough estimate of 1,000 Welsh foot) and twenty-five horses. This is an entirely reasonable estimate that the ships of the period, especially when gathered in such large numbers, could have achieved.

In conclusion, the first transport fleet of the Hundred Years War sailing in 1338, numbered 401 individual ships, manned by 13,346 maritime personnel. The ports south and west of the Thames provided the majority of the ships and the manpower for the armada.\(^{62}\) The dates of service of these vessels also show that this fleet sailed as one large convoy to Antwerp so as to discourage any French aggression. These 401 ships transported roughly 5,000 land-based personnel. Which means that approximately three mariners were required to ship each land-based combatant (although the mariners' periods of service was much shorter, being on average only two months). In all, despite the vagaries of the communication network, the operation was most efficiently managed.

Exchequer because several ships were struck out of the final payroll as punishment for their involvement in the act of piracy discussed earlier.

\(^{60}\) A. Ayton, 'The English aristocracy', p. 179, Dr Ayton points out the difficulty of drawing firm conclusions about the service of the Welsh foot during the campaigns of 1339.

\(^{61}\) The amount of victuals transported over with the army in the Low Countries campaigns amounted to roughly 4,000 quarters of grain and various quantities of meat. If we suggest that it would take four horses to freight one cart loaded with four quarters of wheat, then it would have required some 1,000 horses for the baggage train. On the number of horses required for the transportation of grain, see J. Masschaele, 'Transport costs', p. 269. The principle seems to have been one horse per quarter.

\(^{62}\) The largest individual contributions to the operation were made by some of the ports situated on the east coast particularly Great Yarmouth and Hull.
4.4 THE 1340 FLEET AND THE BATTLE OF SLUYS

After Edward disembarked at Antwerp in July 1338 he began a frustrating stay in the Low Countries in which he had to cajole his allies into beginning the campaign. It was not until the following year that Edward’s large coalition moved into the field. Thus began a march of destruction with the intent of drawing Philip VI into battle but the campaign ended in an indecisive standoff. Nevertheless, on 24 June 1340 Edward did get the battle he so craved for, but not on land directly facing his enemy Philip VI, but at sea in the harbour of Sluys. The fleet that Edward took charge of, and which subsequently sailed to Sluys on 22 June, was the second of the Low Countries transport armadas. But the size of the fleet that Edward entered the battle with on the afternoon of 24 June has caused problems for historians owing to an absence of a complete set of payrolls for the naval contingent. There are, however, several important Exchequer accounts that detail the names of some of the ships and masters involved in the engagement. Most historians have generally relied on the estimates of chroniclers for the size of the Sluys fleet. Yet these chronicle estimates are far from consistent. C. J. Rogers, for example, follows the estimate of the Lanercost chronicle, which puts the fleet at somewhere between 120-147 vessels. However, the Meaux chronicle and Polychronicon suggest that the armada numbered 200 ships, while le Baker and Murimuth have much higher estimates totalling 260 ships. N. A. M. Rodger has suggested that the Sluys fleet could have numbered up to 320 ships; but he seems to have mistaken the 1338 transport fleet with that of 1340, as the source he cites is the Wardrobe accounts of Norwell. In fact the only vessels serving in 1340

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63 E101/21/31; E101/21/33; E101/22/25; E101/22/30; E101/22/31; E101/22/38; E101/389/8, m. 16.
64 For example T. J. Runyan, ‘Feeding Mars’, p. 98; H. S. Lucas, Low Countries and the hundred years war, 1326-1347 (Philadelphia, 1976), pp. 283, 398.
66 Melsa, III, p. 44; Polychronicon, p. 335; Baker, p. 68; Murimuth, p. 105.
that are recorded by Norwell remained in service throughout the year, these being the king’s ships and those that appear under the sub-headings of individual magnates names.\textsuperscript{67} Given the fact that Murimuth provides accurate information regarding the Brittany fleet, and bearing in mind the size of the land contingents Edward transported in June 1340, a fleet of 200 ships would seem to be of the right magnitude.

Do the administrative records allow us to arrive at a more precise measure of the size of the fleet? As was previously noted, there are several Exchequer accounts that provide evidence of ships that participated in the battle. The preparations for the fleet had begun in the spring of 1340. Avesbury states that the king had personally tried to gather a large fleet,\textsuperscript{68} but none of this activity is recorded on the Chancery rolls. Moreover, we know that Avesbury’s statement concerning the king’s personal involvement is not entirely true. In March 1340 the sheriffs and bailiffs of the maritime counties were paid 30s 6d for arresting ships from forty-three ports.\textsuperscript{69} Indeed, in 1340 Robert de Causton, sheriff of Suffolk, found that there were 155 individuals within his bailiwick who could contribute 163 ships to a fleet.\textsuperscript{70} Unfortunately, the document appears to have no more precise date attached to it than 1340, so it is difficult to know if it was compiled before or after the battle of Sluys.\textsuperscript{71} However, by utilising the several sources we can date to the battle of Sluys we can account for sixty-six individual ships, by name, which participated in the engagement. The first account records twenty-seven ships that were provided by the men of Great Yarmouth

\textsuperscript{67} N. A. M. Rodger, \textit{Safeguard of the sea}, pp. 492-497 and the section headed ‘sources’.
\textsuperscript{68} Avesbury, p. 311.
\textsuperscript{69} E101/389/8, m. 6. Thirteen of these ports were located on the east coast while the remainder were situated south and west of the Thames.
\textsuperscript{70} C47/2/32, mm. 1-4. Given that the king sailed from a Suffolk port it is tempting to link this document to the battle. However, it is simply a list of those who could supply ships and not a list of those that definitely did.
\textsuperscript{71} The document is dated 14 Edward III.
and which served from 19 May to 28 June 1340; operating these vessels was 1,335 masters, constables and mariners.\textsuperscript{72}

The second payroll records the wages paid to twenty-three ships. Eight were the king's personal vessels, including the \textit{Cog Thomas}, which Edward himself sailed in and a ship called the \textit{Cog Montagu} that was owned by the earl of Salisbury. Except for the \textit{Cog Thomas}, which served for ninety-seven days, all the other vessels' service was for a period of between nine days and twenty-six days from 24 June. Manning these ships was 1,011 masters, constables, clerks and mariners. Yet the largest crew compliment was that on board the \textit{Cog Montagu}, which with 124 mariners even outnumbered the crew on board the king's flagship.\textsuperscript{73}

The remainder of the evidence for the ships that can be known by name to have participated in the battle can be gleaned from five further Exchequer particulars and two chronicle accounts. One of the Exchequer accounts records the wages paid to the sailors of two ships provided by Thomas and William Melcheburn of King's Lynn. These were the \textit{Magdeleyne}, operated by eighty mariners, and the \textit{Seintemaricog}, which was manned by sixty seamen. They both served from 15 May to 28 July.\textsuperscript{74}

Further evidence comes from a pair indentures. The first of these was issued on behalf of Richard Fille, but he is known from the Sluys payroll (E101/389/8). However, the second indenture contains the names of eight further royal ships, one of which, the \textit{Barge de Abeville}, is not recorded on the Sluys payroll.\textsuperscript{75} In the indenture we are not given the crew size of this vessel, but fortunately, the same ship appears in another particular, and that does provide the exact crew details. We are told that John Giboun mastered the ship and that the crew numbered thirty mariners. A further vessel that

\textsuperscript{72} E101/22/25, mm. 1-4.  
\textsuperscript{73} E101/21/33.  
\textsuperscript{74} E101/22/25, mm. 1-4.  
\textsuperscript{75} E101/22/31. These indentures are repeated in E101/20/39, nos, 80, 113.
participated in the battle, but not enrolled in any other document, is also recorded on this same Exchequer account: the Margrete, mastered by Ralph Wiwynch, which was operated by six mariners.\textsuperscript{76} Another Exchequer document provides more than a glimpse of another ship that was at Sluys. The interesting point about this document is that enrolled with the ship's details is a full crew list. This vessel was called the Godbefor, mastered by John Halfknight, and manned by forty-six mariners including the constable Richard de Hilderburworthe.\textsuperscript{77}

The final piece of evidence concerning the ships known to have been involved in the June transport fleet comes from an account compiled by John de Watenhul on behalf of the earl of Warwick. The original plan was for Warwick to leave England with the earl of Oxford at the end of March. This equates with the requisition orders, which appear on the Sluys payroll. Yet the vessels that Warwick was to use as transportation were not arrested until the end of April. In addition, the evidence from the \textit{vadia guerre} account for the army suggests that Warwick was present at the battle of Sluys, and so we must conclude that the ships enrolled by Watenhul were those that transported Warwick with the June fleet.\textsuperscript{78} On the account there appear eight vessels with six being supplied by east coast ports.\textsuperscript{79}

Of these sixty-six ships that participated in the battle of Sluys, which we can name individually from payroll evidence, the ports north of the Thames supplied thirty-nine. The king's ships, including Montagu's, accounted for fourteen vessels (this is because four more of Montagu's ships appear in Norwell's Wardrobe book

\textsuperscript{76} E101/22/38, m. 1.
\textsuperscript{77} E101/22/30.
\textsuperscript{78} For a detailed analysis of Warwick's service dates at this time, see A. Ayton, 'Edward III and the English aristocracy', p. 176 n. 36.
\textsuperscript{79} E101/22/39. Manning these eight ships was a total of 297 masters, constables and mariners
with dates of service that suggest they participated in the battle). Manning these sixty-six ships was 3,120 maritime personnel, with 1,772 (56.7%) of these men being contributed by the ports north of the Thames, while the ports south and west of the Thames provided 1,348 (43%) mariners (including the king’s and Montagu’s ships). In addition to the payroll evidence, we can add a further five ships to the English fleet of June 1340, bringing the known number of ships to seventy-one.

It is beyond doubt that more vessels than this were present at the battle on the English side. We know, for example, that King’s Lynn supplied ships for the fleet but without comprehensive surviving payroll evidence we have to fall back on the chronicle estimates. We know too that Edward transported 1,300 men-at-arms and 1,000 archers in June 1340. Bearing in mind that the previous fleet of 1338 numbered 401 ships and had to transport 5,000 men, then a fair estimate for the size of the Sluys fleet would be along the lines of Murimuth’s and Baker’s testimony: that is in the region of 200-260 ships. This would place, on average, between eight and fifteen men on each ship for transportation purposes. Of course, we know from the accounts compiled after the war of St. Sardos that the ships in a transport flotilla would normally be separated into those specifically fitted out to carry horses and those for the freighting of the men. But this was not a normal transportation

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80 The ports south and west of the Thames can only be shown to have contributed three ships to the fleet. But thirteen of the vessels are not recorded with any port of origin.
81 The remaining 355 were operating the ships, which were accorded no port of origin.
82 Hemingburgh, II, p. 357, notes a galley of Hull being involved in the battle; French chronicle of London, p. 77, mentions a ship of London provided by William Hansard. However, Hansard actually contributed three ships to the Sluys fleet and these were the Jonette, the Cogge of All Hallows and the Scinteamaricog: see G. Milne, The port of medieval London (Gloucestershire, 2003) p. 116. There was also a ship of Sandwich involved in the engagement contributed by the prior of Christchurch, see H. S. Lucas, The Low Countries and the hundred years’ war, p. 400.
83 CCR, 1341-43, pp. 557-58.
85 If the list of 163 ships that Robert Causton could provide did indeed sail in the Sluys fleet then when these are added to the seventy-one known ships the overall number of vessels involved would come remarkably close to Murimuth’s and Baker’s testimony.
86 E101/17/3, m. 1b. This, for example, shows that sixteen vessels that made up the earl of Surrey’s transport fleet were specifically fitted out only to freight horses to Gsacony.
operation. Edward had seen the French fleet twenty-four hours before he engaged them.\textsuperscript{87} One suspects that Edward placed all of his men on a smaller number of ships, with which he could press forward the attack with vigour. This would ensure superior numbers of men-at-arms and archers would be brought to bear against the less specialised combatants likely to be manning the French ships.\textsuperscript{88} But precisely how many ships from the English fleet actually engaged the French remains a mystery. In addition, it is also known that at some point during the battle the Flemings also attacked the French vessels from their rear, thus adding more of ships to the English contingent during the engagement.\textsuperscript{89}

If we now take all the evidence together and calculate the numbers of individual ships that participated in both of the Low Countries campaigns, we find that a known 472 vessels were involved in the transportation of troops between June 1338 and June 1340.\textsuperscript{90} But the major obstacle to gaining a full understanding of the maritime contribution to the Low Countries campaigns is the lack of a full payroll for the 1340 ships. If we were to assume that this fleet did indeed number 260 ships, and only sixty-six of these can be identified, then there could have been as many as 630 individual vessels requisitioned for the use of transports during the two campaigns.\textsuperscript{91} But without a full set of payrolls to compare both fleets this can only remain a

\textsuperscript{87} French chronicle of London, p. 76.
\textsuperscript{88} T. J. Runyan, ‘The cog as a warship’, Cogs, caravels and Galleons, pp. 54-55 states that Edward ‘placed his most powerful ships in the van’. Although Runyan’s statement, following Froissart, that the English ships with the men-at-arms were in the centre flanked by vessels containing the archers has to be doubted. This seems to be following on from the argument of how English armies fought on the land, but this view has recently been challenged, see A. Ayton, P. Preston, The battle of Crécy, pp. 353-359 in which they suggest that archers were dispersed amongst the men-at-arms not on the wings of the army, although some naturally would find themselves in such a position.
\textsuperscript{89} C. J. Rogers, War cruel and sharp, p. 197.
\textsuperscript{90} The actual number of individual ships was 448 because by comparing all the payrolls, Exchequer accounts and Chancery evidence, we find that twenty-four ships serving in the 1338 fleet also participated in the Sluys fleet. The methodology on individual ships will be discussed more fully in chapter 5.2.
\textsuperscript{91} Although we know the name of three of William Hansard’s ships we do not know who mastered them, therefore it is impossible to compare them to other ships in the Low Countries campaigns to see if Hansard’s vessels had previously served in the 1338 London ships.
possibility. However, it is likely that only a minority of the Sluys fleet participated in 1338, perhaps only ten to twenty percent. The number of known maritime personnel involved in operating these 472 vessels in 1338 and 1340 was 16,566 men.\textsuperscript{92} Nevertheless, the following expedition in 1342 would bring new and more challenging problems to the surface. What were these problems and how did Edward and his council respond to them?

\textbf{4.5 THE BRITTANY TRANSPORT FLEET 1342-43}

The logistical problems faced by Edward III throughout his campaign in Brittany and the changes in fleet raising procedure that they prompted, make the first English intervention in the duchy perhaps one of the most influential expeditions launched by this king. The setbacks that Edward encountered during the campaign meant that his original intention of one massed invasion soon collapsed through 1342 and instead the resulting undertaking unfolded into three separate actions. The main issue was that in 1342 the English crown faced, for the first time, the problem of requisitioning more than one transport fleet simultaneously. In addition, a number of factors, both external and internal, changed the course of the English involvement within Brittany. Lack of sufficient ships, raids by the Scots and events in the Breton civil war itself forced the English king to transport his army in three stages.\textsuperscript{93} By examining the preparations in the summer of 1342 it can be seen that the evidence points to a shortage of ships during the preliminary stages of the organisation of the campaign. Firstly, the ships that made up the earl of Northampton's transport fleet were ordered to return for the

\textsuperscript{92} The ports north and east of the Thames contributed 237 (50\%) individual ships manned by 8,103(49.2\%) mariners, while those ports located to the south and west of the Thames provided 235 (49\%) individual ships operated by 8,453 (51\%) mariners.

\textsuperscript{93} For a discussion of the possible strategies of the Brittany campaign and how these were affected by the availability of sufficient numbers of ships, in addition to other factors involved in the build up to the expedition, see C. Lambert, 'An army transport fleet', pp. 1-13.
king and freight the forces under Edward’s command. Secondly, after the cancellation of the earls of Oxford and Pembroke’s expedition two of the ships from that fleet were seconded to the king’s. In addition, the fifty-seven ships that were waiting at Plymouth to transport the earls of Oxford and Pembroke to Brittany were insufficient to freight all the forces under their command. And after the king seconded two of the vessels to his fleet the remaining fifty-five ships could only transport the 800 Welsh foot. Indeed, it is doubtful that many of the Welsh eventually disembarked in Brittany as 600 were forced to take refuge on the Isles of Scilly, due to a storm, and the remaining 200 only served for twelve days until 19 November. These three issues show that the English administration was finding it difficult to requisition, and hold in port, sufficient ships for its intended strategy.

The evidence relating to the numbers of ships that participated in the Brittany transport fleet is also problematic with regard to both the earl of Northampton’s and the king’s fleets. For example, in the Wardrobe accounts of William Edington only sixteen ships are recorded as having received pay for the earl’s crossing. Considering that Northampton had in the region of 1,100 men under his command, this number of ships is too small for their transportation. Murimuth states that the earl’s transport fleet numbered some 260 vessels, which seems a more realistic indication of its true size. This apparent lacuna in Edington’s accounts can be compensated for by examining other, related source material, particularly the evidence recorded in the Chancery enrolments and calendared documents. The

94 CCR, 1341-43, p. 651; E101/23/22 records the fifty-seven ships waiting to transport the two earls. The two vessels which were transferred to the king’s fleet were the Blythe of Great Yarmouth, mastered by Thomas le Smyth, and the Seintemarie of Ipswich, mastered by Robert Asshe, see E36/204, pp. 224, 232, 234 for their service in the king’s fleet.
95 The two earls’ never sailed to Brittany; however, a small contingent of the foot under their command did attempt a crossing. It also seems that the Welsh foot made it no further than the Isles of Scilly. See CPR, 1343-45, p. 494; E101/23/22 m. 3 details the dates of service of the Welsh. But also, see A. Ayton, Knights and warhorses, p. 259 and table A, p. 263.
96 E36/204, p. 238.
Chancery documents, and related Exchequer accounts reveal the size and composition of the earl’s transport fleet. It will be remembered that those ships participating in the earl’s flotilla were required to return to England in order to form part of the king’s transport armada. However, at least thirty-one vessels failed to honour that demand and as a punishment they forfeited their pay and were thus struck out of Edington’s final accounts.98 A further problem encountered by the king and Northampton was that after the earl had disembarked in Brest, numerous vessels left Brittany and headed for Gascony to load up with wine. While some had been given permission to do this many had not. Again, the offending ships’ crews were penalised by forfeiting their wages.99

In addition to those ships that were struck off the payrolls as punishment for misdemeanours, a further forty vessels served in Northampton’s transport fleet in return for pardons. Thirty-two of these were involved in the ‘Taryte affair’. Evidence of this episode of piracy is scattered throughout the Chancery records.100 The warrants accompanying the offer of these pardons were all dated to 28 May 1342, so it must be assumed that these ships did serve in the August armada that transported the earl of Northampton. The orders state that any ships from Great Yarmouth and King’s Lynn who were involved in the incident are ‘to go to Orwell for the passage of the said earl of Northampton and other lieges to Brittany, with victuals and necessaries’.101 Yet there are interpretational difficulties with regard the thirty-two ships visible in the calendared sources. For example, the shipmaster/owner Nicholas Pyk was certainly serving with more than one vessel but, unfortunately, no precise details are provided

97 Murimuth, p. 126.
that show the number of ships that he served with.\textsuperscript{102} Similarly, in another warrant five masters from Ipswich are mentioned, all of whom plundered the \textit{Taryte}, but the names of their vessels are not recorded with them.\textsuperscript{103} This creates problems when the ship \textit{Katherine} from Ipswich, but not its master, is named elsewhere as being involved in the attack against the \textit{Taryte}.\textsuperscript{104} Is it to be assumed that this ship is one of the previous five transports? It is impossible to say, but for the purposes of this thesis it has been counted as a separate vessel. All the pardons relating to the Ipswich ships were dated 17 July 1342 and it must therefore be presumed that these vessels participated in the earl of Northampton's expedition. Furthermore, another eight ships are visible in the pardons recorded among the \textit{Ancient Correspondence}. These pardons were issued in varying formats: for example, seven went to individual captains, while one was issued to a full ships' crew.\textsuperscript{105} Thus, using the calendared and Chancery sources we can add forty ships to the sixteen recorded in the Wardrobe accounts.

The final piece to the puzzle of the earl of Northampton's transport fleet can be found in two Exchequer accounts dated to 1342. One is an account compiled by John Watenhul for his expenses in arresting 117 ships from the ports between Portsmouth and Bristol during April 1342.\textsuperscript{106} The second Exchequer source records a further 145 ships, which were enrolled on the pipe roll of 1342.\textsuperscript{107} These 145 ships received payments in July to keep them in port so that they would not leave before the army was ready to be transported. It is likely that these 145 vessels are included in the

\textsuperscript{102} Ibid., p. 529.
\textsuperscript{103} CPR, 1340-43, p. 477.
\textsuperscript{104} Ibid., p. 594.
\textsuperscript{105} SC1/39, nos, 93, 157; SC1/40, nos, 10-20; SC1/41, no. 66.
\textsuperscript{106} E101/22/39.
\textsuperscript{107} E372/187, mm. 42, 48.
117 arrested by Watenhull earlier in the year and that these would have formed the earl of Northampton's fleet.

The fact Northampton sailed ahead of the king can be put down to several reasons, the main one being that by August the position of the Montfortist Bretons had deteriorated seriously, and urgent reinforcements were required to bolster them. Added to this was the fact that all the ships currently under arrest in England were insufficient to transport both the earl and the king in one fleet. Indeed, it was feared that the ships under arrest would sail away from the embarkation port, due to the fact that they had been under arrest for several months. Thus the decision was made to send Northampton ahead of the main force, the intention being that the ships that transported him would return to form part of the king's transport fleet later in the year.

On closer inspection the evidence recorded in Edington's Wardrobe book relating to the kings transport fleet also appears less than wholly satisfactory. There we find 378 ships' crews receiving wages for the passage of the king and his army in October 1342. However, there are also 230 'deserter' vessels recorded on the Close Rolls to consider. These are the ships that left Brest and Vannes in October and November without permission from the king. As we have already seen, with the vessels of the earl of Northampton's transport fleet, ships' crews could forfeit some or all their pay as punishment for disobeying the wishes of the crown during an invasion. And when the 230 ships from the Chancery records are compared with the Wardrobe Book it can be seen that eighty-eight ships listed in the Close Rolls are absent from the final Wardrobe accounts. Indeed, when the pay details recorded in the Wardrobe book are examined more closely it is noticeable that 142 ships were docked pay, presumably as a punishment for deserting the king. For example, the Clement of

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108 E36/204, pp. 221-240.
London, mastered by John Blakeson, and operated by twelve mariners, received just over £5 in wages when the dates of service assigned to the ship show that the crew’s pay should have totalled £8 10s. Moreover, the eighty-eight ‘deserter’ vessels that are totally absent from the final Wardrobe book seem to have forfeited all their pay as a result of their actions.

Another important document relating to the king’s transport fleet can now be found among the Chancery Miscellanea records at the National Archives. This comes in the form of a ship list containing the names of 330 vessels, along with their masters, and grouped by their port of origin. The list records 144 ships from the ports located north of the Thames and 186 from those ports situated within the confines of the southern admiralty. The roll is a return by Edington for the wages of the ships’ crews that transported the king and Walter Mauny to Brittany in October 1342. However, it is not quite what it seems. Firstly, comparison with the Wardrobe book reveals that the roll lacks forty-eight ships that appear there. Second, five ships that are listed on the roll are not recorded in the Wardrobe book. Apart from these discrepancies, there are direct similarities between the two documents. The order of the ports listed on the Chancery roll, for example, is more or less the same as that recorded in the Wardrobe accounts. In addition, the same anomalies appear in both sources. For example, Henry Goldeneye, master of the Godyer of Rye, is repeated twice in both Edington’s accounts and the Chancery roll. But there are, however, slight differences between the two. One such difference is that in the Wardrobe accounts Edington records the homeport of eighteen ships as Dover whereas the

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110 E36/204, p. 221; CCR, 1343-46, p. 128.
111 C47/2/35, mm. 1-5.
112 Ibid., mm. 4-5.
113 E36/204, p. 229; C47/2/35, m. 2.
Chancery list enrols the same ships as hailing from Sandwich.¹¹⁴ In addition, when the forty-eight ships that are recorded in the Wardrobe accounts, but not the Chancery miscellanea roll, are compared to the 230 deserter ships that left service outside Brest and Vannes we find that only six out of these forty-eight vessels are noted as deserters, which means that their absence from the Chancery roll cannot have been because they were forfeited pay.

Another Exchequer account with relevance to the king's transport fleet is a compensation record of money paid to ship owners for the damage that their vessels incurred while on active service.¹¹⁵ This account consists of two files with the details of the payments issued. Only forty-five of these can be compared directly with the Wardrobe accounts, as the other names recorded in these files are of the ships' owners and not their masters. The former are not listed in Edington's accounts. Of these forty-five ships and masters, thirty-two are recorded in the Wardrobe book and all these vessels completed their service in October and November 1342, which placed them in the king's transport fleet. Again, the absence of thirteen ships from the final accounts is difficult to explain as none of these were among the deserter ships. Finally, evidence of one more ship that participated in the king's flotilla, though absent from the Wardrobe's final accounts, can be gained by examining a collection of accounts compiled by Thomas Snetesham.¹¹⁶ This set of documents includes receipts for supplies of food and wages issued to mariners who served on board royal ships. Included are several indentures that record prest payments issued to mariners during the Brittany campaign. Examination of these receipts, and comparisons with the Wardrobe book, reveals that Cok Gold, master of the Margret Spinnace, is not

¹¹⁴ Ibid., p. 225; ibid., m. 2.
¹¹⁵ E101/24/9 (b).
¹¹⁶ E101/22/38, no. 4.
included in Edington’s final accounts, although the indenture recorded by Snetesham shows that he did participate in the Brittany transport fleet.

Taken together, the evidence from various Exchequer and Chancery documents allows us to propose a more accurate picture of the size and composition of all three Brittany transport fleets. The first fleet to sail was Walter Mauny’s in the spring of 1342. The Wardrobe accounts for this particular flotilla are full and detailed. Mauny’s fleet consisted of thirty-six ships operated by 931 masters and mariners. Mauny had under his command 343 land-based soldiers, so over twice as many mariners were required to operate the ships that transported his force over to Brittany. Mauny’s small army consisted of one banneret, twenty-one knights, 111 esquires and 210 mounted archers. Taking this into consideration it is estimated that this force would have taken to Brittany roughly 630 horses; but if the horses of the non-combatants are included, this could have added a further 140 horses that required transportation. Therefore, each ship within the fleet would, on average, have had to transport twenty-one horses. The majority of the ships in this fleet (18) began their service in March with twenty-four vessels staying on active service until 29 June, and two further ships serving until 1 July. Five of the vessels would seem to have left service early and therefore were not likely to have transported Mauny back to England. Mauny’s fleet cost the crown £981 4s 8d, which was almost twice the amount paid out to the land-based forces whose service cost the crown £609.

117 The number of ports that contributed these thirty-six vessels numbered fourteen. Ten of these ports were situated south and west of the Thames, three were located north of the Thames and one was the port of Sluys in Flanders. The largest supplier of vessels was the port of Sandwich, which furnished six vessels manned by a compliment of 215 (23%) seamen, followed by Winchelsea, which provided four ships manned by 172 (18.4%) mariners. However, this particular port also supplied the largest single ship of the Mauny transport fleet, the Seintemariecog, mastered by Richard Passelewe, which had a crew compliment of fifty-two seamen.

118 The evidence relating to the non-combatants is gained from the indenture of the earl of Arundel dated 1387 that stipulated how many servants the earl would take with him on campaign. The earl was allowed twelve for himself and each man-at-arms were allowed one; see A. R. Bell, War and the soldier in the fourteenth century (Boydell, 2004), p. 51.
The earl of Northampton's transport flotilla was the second of the three fleets to leave England in 1342. Given that Northampton led a force that was over three times larger than Mauny's, his transport armada was inevitably a much larger affair. As was noted above, this fleet suffers from source material that is difficult to interpret, and this makes any analysis of the ports that supplied the ships and the numbers of mariners who served on board difficult. For example, although the document recording the arrest of ships recorded by John Watenhul tells us that he requisitioned these vessels from ports south and west of the Thames, we are not told which individual ports contributed which ships and how many. Nevertheless, it is possible to trace some of the ports involved in supplying ships for the earl of Northampton's transport fleet. For example, the pardons issued to several shipmasters do mention the vessels' homeports. There is also an order that was sent out to thirty-eight ports requesting that they furnish the earl with ships for his forthcoming campaign, and considering the final size of the earl's fleet, it would seem that the majority of these ports did supply ships. As with Mauny's transport flotilla the majority of these ports were situated south and west of the Thames. Of the seventeen that are recorded within the Chancery and Ancient Correspondence documents only seven are situated north of the Thames. The thirty-eight ports mentioned above contain no ports located in the northern admiralty, and as already noted, those 117 ships arrested by Watenhul were all requisitioned from ports between Portsmouth and Bristol. In total, fifty-one ports contributed ships to the earl of Northampton's transport fleet but only thirteen percent of these were located within the sphere of the northern admiralty.

These fifty-one ports supplied 204 ships. It is difficult to calculate the numbers of mariners who operated them owing to the nature of the evidence. For example, the

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Watenhul arrest document and the pipe roll entries give no indication of the numbers of mariners who operated these ships. However, the sixteen vessels recorded in the Wardrobe accounts are provided with full crew sizes. Averaging out the crew numbers from these seventeen ships (twenty-one mariners per-ship) and then extrapolating the results allows us to suggest a total for the whole fleet. Our rough estimate for the number of masters and mariners employed on the earl’s transport fleet would therefore be 5,000. Considering that the earl had 1,100 land based personnel under his command, it can be seen that the maritime arm of his expedition required the mobilisation of perhaps four or five times more men.\textsuperscript{120}

The land-based forces the above ships had to transport amounted to 1,100 men who would have taken approximately 2,200 horses with them, a figure that rises to 2,500 if we take into account the non-combatants. Considering the numbers of horses that would have required transportation each ship would have had to freight twelve horses. The cost in mariners’ wages to the crown was far less than would otherwise be expected from a fleet of this magnitude owing to the free service of the ‘pardon ships’, and of those vessels’ crews who had their pay forfeited. In all crown secured the services of these ships for just over £545.

The armada of the king was the last, and by far the largest, of the three to embark for Brittany in 1342. The king sailed out of Portsmouth on 16 October and arrived at St. Mathieu ten days later.\textsuperscript{121} Given the size of the fleet it should come as no surprise to find that the number of ports contributing ships to the fleet was also greater than that involved in the previous two transportation armadas. In total, eighty ports supplied vessels for the king’s fleet. However, as with the transport flotillas of Mauny

\textsuperscript{120} The earl of Northampton’s transport flotilla of 1342 consisted of 204 ships that were supplied by fifty-one ports the majority of these (87%) were located south and west of the Thames and an estimated 5,000 mariners operated these ships.
and the earl of Northampton the majority of the ports were situated in the southern admiralties jurisdiction.¹²²

These eighty ports supplied the king with 487 ships. 378 of these vessels were recorded in the Wardrobe accounts while a further 109 are listed within several other sources.¹²³ The number of maritime personnel that operated these ships is difficult to assess because 134 vessels have no crew sizes assigned to them. But we know that 8,796 masters and mariners served on 348 ships, which gives us an average crew size of twenty-five. Applying this figure to the remaining ships suggests that roughly 11,800 mariners manned the king’s transport fleet.¹²⁴

The king’s transport fleet of 487 vessels transported an army that consisted of 3,800 (4,350 including non-combatants) men, all of whom were mounted.¹²⁵ This force would have required the transportation of 5,100 horses, and on average each ship would therefore have had to freight ten horses to Brest in the autumn of 1342.

¹²¹ Edward seems to have waited at the Isle of Wight until the 25 October. He sailed into Brest harbour on the 27 October: see E36/204, pp. 31-32.
¹²² Forty-four ports were located between the River Thames and Bristol, while thirty were in the area controlled by the northern admiral, two ports are difficult to locate with any accuracy, three ports were foreign and the king’s own ships were counted as a separate category. The ports that are difficult to locate are Puchelseye and Hyam. The three foreign ports were Sluys, Bayonne and a Catalonian port. The largest single provider of ships was Great Yarmouth, which contributed thirty-two (6.5%) vessels manned by 902 mariners. London supplied twenty-seven (5.5%) ships crewed by 545 seamen. The Cinque Ports contributed a total of fifty-two ships (10.6%) operated by 1,347 mariners. Apart from Great Yarmouth the ports located within the remit of the northern admiral which furnished the largest number of vessels were Hull, which provided eighteen (3.7%) manned by 371 mariners, followed by Gosforth, which contributed fourteen (2.8%) and 368 mariners. The largest single ship in the transport fleet was one of the king’s own vessels, the George, which was operated by 166 mariners. The next largest vessel was the Edward of Sluys, which was manned by 124 mariners. The largest ship supplied by an English port, other than the king’s own ships, was the Berthelmeu of Great Yarmouth, mastered by Richard Bet, and crewed by sixty-three mariners. The smallest vessels had no more than ten mariners the Blithe of Dover, mastered by Peter Rede. See E36/204, pp. 221, 222, 226, 229, 234-36, 239, 240
¹²³ Eighty-eight ships from CCR, 1341-43, pp. 128-32; five from C47/2/35; thirteen from the compensation account, one vessel from the document compiled by Thomas Snetesham that records the payment made to the master Cok Gold, and two ships from CCHR, 5, p. 3.
¹²⁴ The ports from the Thames to Bristol contributed 7,051 (60%) of the total manpower numbers while the northern ports supplied 3,369 (28.5%) masters and mariners.
¹²⁵ A. Ayton, Knights and warhorses, pp. 14, 259.
None of the vessels, except the king's, served after 10 December 1342. Of those ships that we have accurate sailing dates for nearly two-thirds had completed their service in October, while a third ceased to be paid in November 1342. All the king's ships served into 1343.

In conclusion, if all the ships from the three fleets that participated in transportation duties were added together the overall number of vessels would be 727. However, what these figures represent is 'ship-voyages', not individual ships. Thus, for example, it is argued here that of the 204 ships in the earl of Northampton's fleet that set out in August 117 did return to transport the king. Taking such cases into account, it can be suggested that the number of actual ships involved in the transportation of English troops to Brittany in 1342 numbered 610. This number concerns the vessels specifically involved in transportation duties, but the maritime contribution to the campaign went beyond this. For example, five masters were issued with letters from the Chancery allowing them to prey on French vessels that were supplying the forces of Charles de Blois in Brittany. In addition, four further vessels were used to supply the king's forces with wine while he was in Brittany and John Montgomery, admiral of the western fleet, was on board the Edward of Winchelsea, which he used as a ship of war with a crew compliment including men-at-arms and archers. However, included in the final analysis of the maritime participation of the English merchant marine in 1342 must be the fifty-five ships that

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126 The last requisitioned merchant ship to leave service was the Trinite of London, mastered by William Clerbaud, which completed its service on 10 December 1342. See E36/204, p. 221.  
127 It is only possible to compare eighty-seven of the earl's transport ships to the other two fleets. However, the fact that only thirty-one were ordered to be arrested for failing to return must mean that the majority of the ships did so. None of the other vessels, the forty pardon ships and the sixteen visible in the Wardrobe accounts can be seen to have served in the king's fleet.  
128 CCR, 1341-43, p. 546.  
129 E101/23/18 records the wine ships; E101/21/36, mm. 2-4. The men on board were only paid half wages, presumably because they had no horses with them.
transported the Welsh foot to the Isles of Scilly.\textsuperscript{130} Indeed, by taking this extra dimension into consideration, the maritime arm of the invasion numbered some 675 ships. The cost to the crown for the king’s transport fleet came to £6,500 but if we include the costs incurred by the government for all three transport armadas then the cost came to £8,026 4s 8d.\textsuperscript{131}

Of the 675 vessels the southern admiralty contributed 444 ships while the ports north of the Thames provided 219 vessels with twelve ships being supplied by foreign ports. As we have seen, it is difficult to assess the numbers of mariners on board these ships, particularly those in the earl of Northampton’s transport flotilla. Nevertheless, a rough total of 12,000 maritime personnel would seem reasonable, particularly if we assume that many seamen served more than once during the campaign, when they returned to transport the king after the earl of Northampton had disembarked at Brest.

Therefore, it can be seen that the numbers of men required for the maritime dimension of the Brittany campaign far exceeded those employed as land-based troops. However, throughout this expedition Edward also encountered many problems, mostly caused by lack of ships or by shipmasters who were unwilling to obey orders. As we shall see below these issues forced Edward to adopt new methods when faced by the necessity of raising more than one fleet for transportation to the continent.

\textbf{4.6 THE CRÉCY TRANSPORT FLEET AND THE SIEGE OF CALAIS}

In the first week of July 1346 the largest English transport argosy organised and deployed during the reign of Edward III was ready to sail to France. The huge number

\textsuperscript{130} Kermond’s account only includes two northern ports (Great Yarmouth and Ipswich) and of the three ships these two ports provided, two were seconded to the king, see E101/23/22, m. 3. The fifty-five southern vessels were manned by 1,176 mariners while the one northern ship had a crew of seventeen.

\textsuperscript{131} This includes the compensation money from E101/24/9 (a) and E101/24/9 (b).
of ships that eventually sailed out of Portsmouth harbour had been dogged by bad weather, but finally, the moment had arrived for Edward formally to start what was to be the greatest military expedition of his reign.132 On 12 July 1346 this vast armada of transport ships finally arrived off the sands at St. Vaast-la-Hougue and the army was ready to disembark. The build up to the Crécy expedition and the campaign itself has generated much debate.133 This present sub-chapter will seek to address the problems faced by the crown during the process of requisitioning a sufficient number of ships for the armada, and to establish the overall size of the transport fleet that freighted the English army to Normandy and the scale of the maritime resources that were deployed throughout the siege of Calais.

The process of raising a fleet of ships to transport the largest English army deployed by Edward III in his French war had actually begun in the previous year of 1345, when a transport flotilla had already been assembled and sailed to Flanders.134 After the murder of Edward's ally in Flanders, Jacques van Artrevelde, Edward returned to England and the 1345 campaign fizzled out. But although this expedition had come to nought, the crown immediately set about raising a fleet of ships for another intended attack against France. Even though the orders seem rather late in the year for a second campaign to take place it does, nonetheless, seem that Edward did intend to sail back to either France, or Flanders, for a military venture. The first orders that were issued for the requisitioning of ships, after the collapse of the 1345 Flanders intervention, came on 28 August, when the earl of Arundel, Robert Ufford, Reginald

132 Foedera, III, i, p. 71. The dates of the fleet actually sailing are problematic due to the delays caused by the weather. However, Edward had written a letter from the Isle of Wight on 7 July 1346 so he must have sailed from there to the Cotentin on or around 11 July 1346. See Ayton and Preston, The battle of Crécy, p. 17.
133 For a stimulating summary of the differing interpretations on the Crécy campaign, see Ayton and Preston, The battle of Crécy, pp. 41-72.
134 E101/390/12, fol 2r-3r. This records the payment of wages to mariners and arresting officials in addition to wages made over to the crews of the galleys of Bayonne amounting to £238 1s 6d, dated 23 April to 18 July 1345.
Donnington and Phillip Whitton were told to arrest all ships of thirty tons and over, from all the ports in England, and to make them ready at Portsmouth for a week after Michelmas.\(^{135}\) Although to contemplate raising a sizeable fleet of ships in such a short space of time would seem ambitious, requisitioning officials were dispatched immediately to ports all over the kingdom. During September the arresting process was intensified and clerks such as Robert St. Owen, along with five ships and their crews, were already receiving advances on wages.\(^{136}\) That further ships were raised, and their crews issued with advances on their wages is beyond doubt. Henry de Baa, William Redcliffe, John Montgomery and Griffin ap Cadwaldre were all paid expenses for arresting ships during the months of October and November 1345.\(^{137}\) Moreover, during the same period the earl of Arundel and Adam de Kilum expended a further £940 5s 8d on advances on mariners wages.\(^{138}\) This is a significant sum and shows that by November 1345 a fleet of ships must have been arrested and made ready for service. But the onset of winter meant that the second planned campaign of 1345 would have to be postponed. Consequently, the gathered fleet was given permission to break up and return to their homeports.

It is at this moment, after the cancellation of 1345 ventures, that Edward and his council must have been discussing and formulating the plan for the Crécy expedition. It has been convincingly argued, in a recent book, that the Crécy exploit was planned from the outset of the campaign and did not occur as the result of a last minute change of plan because of the direction of the prevailing winds.\(^{139}\) Indeed, the requisitioning of more ships in January 1346, in addition to those arrested in 1345

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\(^{135}\) *Foedera*, III, i. p. 57.

\(^{136}\) E101/390/12, fol. 3v.

\(^{137}\) *Ibid.*, fols 3v and 4v.

\(^{138}\) *Ibid*.

\(^{139}\) Ayton and Preston, *The battle of Crécy*, especially chapter 2 by Dr. Ayton on the ´Crécy Campaign´. This follows on from the work of C. J. Rogers in *War cruel and sharp*, chapter 10.
whose return to Portsmouth in 1346 had been guaranteed, began in earnest.\textsuperscript{140} Again, Portsmouth seemed to be the gathering point for all the vessels, and as such Gawain Corder was ordered to send the ships of Kent and Sussex to that port by 16 February.\textsuperscript{141} But during February problems began to surface in the arresting process and by the end of the month the ships of London had still not been forwarded to Portsmouth. Furthermore, a severe storm caused the break up of the waiting fleet, which led Edward once more to postpone his plans and to issue a new departure date for a fortnight after Easter.\textsuperscript{142} But, yet again, an over-optimistic sailing date had been set by the crown for the embarkation of the army, and during April requisitioning officers were still visiting ports. On 6 April Richard de Cotenhale and John Montgomery were searching the ports of the south and west coast for ships, and four days later, Walter Harewell was sent to the northern ports, while Robert de Barton was seconded to Montgomery as an extra member of the southwest team.\textsuperscript{143} By this stage Edward and his advisors were getting desperate for sufficient ships, and orders were issued giving permission to the officials to arrest any vessel, even those as little as ten tons burthen.\textsuperscript{144} This order reveals the scale of Edward's up and coming campaign. In raising previous transport fleets that had usually involved the transportation of anything up to 5,000 men, Edward had not been required to arrest such small vessels; clearly this expedition was to be of a different magnitude. By the end of April, however, the requisitioning clerks had already managed to gather a large flotilla of ships at Portsmouth and Sandwich and the officials in charge of this operation, John de Baddeby, Thomas Clerc, Reginald Donnington, John de Wathen, John Hotton, Henry Raleshale, Griffin ap Cadwalcdr and Robert de Holin, had issued

\textsuperscript{140} E101/390/12, fol. 5r.  
\textsuperscript{141} Foedera, III, i, p. 66.  
\textsuperscript{142} Foedera, III, i, pp. 70, 71.  
\textsuperscript{143} E101/390/12, fol. 5v; E403/336, m. 41.
advances on wages totalling £2,064 3s 9d for the mariners awaiting at the two ports. During May the already gathered fleet was still increasing in size as John Hotton sent the mariners of London to the embarkation points and issued them with £94 4s 9d in wages. Moreover, Peter Reninard, mariner of Bayonne, was provided with £34 2d for himself and seventy-eight mariners, while Robert Flambard continued the active requisitioning of more ships.

The evidence related above shows that by early to mid June 1346 Edward's officials had requisitioned and organised a large fleet of ships, at two ports, for the transportation of his army to Normandy. So far his clerks had issued a total of £2,192 8s 8d in advance wages to mariners. Due to the nature of these payments, it is difficult to create an accurate picture of the size of the transport fleet collected by the crown in the summer of 1346. Fortunately, we have recourse to several other sources, which allow a more detailed study of the size and composition of the Crécy transport fleet of 1346 to be undertaken.

The first point to be noted about the sources, both the original manuscripts and the published versions, is that all of them state that the fleet of ships they record include those vessels that served during the siege of Calais. Indeed, modern historians have generally taken up this idea. Yet it has to be doubted whether this is the

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144 C76/21, m. 5d.
145 E101/390/12, fols 6v, 7r; E403/336, mm. 42, 43, 44.
146 E403/336, mm. 42-44; E101/390/12, fol. 8r.
148 See, for example, A. T. Hall, 'The employment of naval forces', p. 156; T. J. Runyan, 'The English army in the reign of Edward III', p. 39, n. 2; N. A. M. Rodger, Safeguard of the sea, p. 492; J. S.
correct view to take of these manuscripts and published sources. The fact that over 700 ships and 16,000 mariners would be deployed solely during the siege of Calais is surely a questionable incorrect judgement on the evidence. It is argued here that what we are in fact looking at is the transport fleet of the Crécy army: the armada that sailed out from the Isle of Wight on 10 or 11 July 1346, not those vessels that served during the siege. This is suggested by the size of the fleet recorded by these sources when compared to the other transport flotillas of Edward III's reign, such as those of the Low Countries and Brittany expeditions; and, as we shall see below, there are other source materials that relate to the siege fleet that seem to have been compiled concurrently with the Wardrobe book.

The three surviving manuscripts, which can all be dated to the early modern period, take the form of a list of ports and the ships that each port provided. They appear to have been copied from the now lost *vadia marinariourm* section of Wetwang's final Wardrobe accounts that were submitted to the Exchequer after his term of office. All three follow the same format of listing each port individually with a record of the numbers of ships and mariners that the port contributed; and they all group the ports according to the southern and northern admiralties, with the contributions made by several foreign ports attached to the end of the lists. The end of each of the southern and northern admiralty sections, and of the list of foreign ships, is concluded by an overall total. But as was noted earlier comparison reveals differences between these three manuscripts. For example, the port named as Milford

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For example, on each manuscript the second entry is the port of London, which we are told contributed twenty-five ships manned 662 mariners.
in BL Harleian Ms 3968 is called Alysefond in BL Add Ms 38823. This suggests that these two documents may have been transcribed from an earlier copy (or copies), which is now lost. The complications continue when the numbers of ships and mariners assigned to particular ports are compared. For instance, Faversham is recorded as having supplied two ships manned by twenty-five mariners in Harleian Ms 3968, but two ships operated by fifty-three seamen in Add Ms 38823; and the port of Woodhouse, according to Harleian Ms 3968, furnished one ship crewed by twenty-two mariners, while Add Ms 38823 has one ship but only twelve seamen.\(^{151}\)

When the third manuscript is also compared against the other two further differences arise. The main problem that affects Harleian Mss 246 is what seems to be a major transcription error in the northern port list.\(^{152}\) The three manuscripts list the northern ports in the same order until the port of Dunwich. At this point Harleian Mss 246 misses out the ports of Gosford and Harwich. In addition, the transcriber of Harleian Mss 246 seems to have mistakenly recorded the total numbers of ships and mariners contributed by several ports. For example, the previous two manuscripts state that Gosford contributed thirteen ships operated by 303 mariners, while the transcriber of Harleian Mss 246 assigns these totals to the port of Orford.\(^{153}\) Since that scribe seems also to have confused the total numbers of ships and mariners provided

\(^{151}\) BL, Harleian MS 3968, fols 132r, 133r; BL, Add MS 38823, fols 65r, 66v. It is also worth noting that the compiler of Harleian MS 3968 originally recorded a total of 298 mariners for Faversham but crossed that total out and then wrote the new total of 25 alongside it.

\(^{152}\) Although this could have arisen because the compiler of BL, Harleian MSS 246 used a different copy of Wetwang’s accounts than the previous two transcribers. The northern ports in BL, Harleian MSS 246 are recorded on fol. 16v.

\(^{153}\) Gosford is recorded on BL, Harleian MS 3968, fol. 133r and BL, Add MS 38823, fol. 67r. It has been asserted before that Gosford did not actually exist and that what in fact the scribes were recording was simply an invention for a well known collection point of ships at the estuary of the River Crouch, see R. G. Marsden, ‘The mythical town of Orwell’, *EHR* 21 (1906), pp. 93-98, p.96.
by the port of Orford, with those contributed by Ipswich, the usefulness of Harleian MSS 246 should perhaps be questioned. 154

Naturally, inconsistencies in the information provided by these three manuscripts make it difficult to arrive at a reliable figure for the size of the transport fleet. Each manuscript provides overall totals for the ships and mariners involved in the armada, but these totals are slightly at odds with each other. For example, Harleian Ms 3968 records that the English ports supplied 700 ships, while the foreign ports contributed thirty-six. 155 The numbers of mariners operating the English ships was 14,521, while the foreign vessels required 805 seamen. 156 Yet Add Ms 38823 provides us with different totals: 710 English ships manned by 14,151 seamen, and thirty-seven foreign vessels operated by 805 mariners; and Harleian Mss 246 states that the actual number of English ships in the fleet was 700, which were operated by 14,451 sailors and thirty-seven foreign vessels crewed by 805 mariners. 157 Some of these discrepancies could be the result of transcription errors; but there is also the possibility that they might have individually consulted separate, and unique, ‘original’ copies of the Wetwang abstracts. What complicates matters still further is that the totals for individual ports do not add up to the overall totals supplied on the documents themselves. This suggests that the compilers of the three manuscripts copied their port lists from one or more earlier transcriptions, without themselves checking the accuracy of the totals they were recording. For instance, although Harleian Ms 3968 states that the overall strength of the southern fleet was 493 ships manned by 9,630 mariners, when each port entry is individually tallied we arrive at a

154 Ipswich contributed 12 ships manned by 239 mariners according to 3968 and 38823 while 246 gives the number of 3 ships operated by 62 mariners. On BL, Harleian MSS, 246 Ipswich is recorded on fol. 16v.
155 BL, Harleian MS 3968, fol. 133v.
156 Ibid.
157 BL, Add MS 38823, fol. 67r; BL, Harleian MSS 246, fol. 16v.
total of 492 ships operated by 9,597 seamen. The totals given for the northern fleets' ships are also inaccurate. For example, although BL Add Ms 38823 states that the northern ports provided 217 ships operated by 4,521 mariners, the actual totals were 213 vessels crewed by 5,345 maritime personnel.

But it is possible to compare the numbers given in the manuscripts with those provided by the published sources. There are six published works whose authors have looked in detail at the maritime involvement in the Crécy expedition. Three of these volumes include port lists that are similar to the ones recorded in the three manuscripts examined above, while the remaining three provide totals, without port lists, for the overall contribution of the maritime arm of the campaign. One of these six published sources would appear to be more accurate than the others: the work compiled by Robert Brady. Brady was an accomplished scholar who had direct access to the original Wardrobe accounts stored in the Tower of London. The Brut and the other secondary sources can be plausibly linked to the three surviving manuscripts, or to the now lost original copies of these manuscripts. For example, the port list that is recorded by Champollian is entirely consistent with BL, Harleian MS 3968. The totals

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158 The three sources that have included transcriptions of the ports lists similar to the ones contained in the three manuscripts, are: A collection of ordinances; R. Hakluyt, Principal navigations; Champollian-Figerac, Lettres des rois. It has to be noted that there are more versions of the Wetwang abstracts. For example, N. H. Nicolas, History of the royal navy, II, pp. 507-10 compared Cotton MS. Tins E. III, fol. 262 with BL, Harleian MSS, 246. He states that the fleet numbered 747 ships (History of the royal navy, p. 88, n. c). In addition, N. A. M. Rodger, Safeguard of the sea, pp. 492-97 tabulates the size of the fleet of 1346-7. Nevertheless, Rodger's estimate of the 1346-7 fleet only numbers 652 ships, which seems too small a fleet to transport the Crécy army. In addition, the sources he has consulted do not include the king's ships in their transcriptions. Finally, Wrottesley, Crécy and Calais, p. 204, puts the maritime contingent as 700 ships manned by 8,151 mariners with 38 foreign vessels crewed by 1,204 mariners. The crew numbers here are, again, far too small for the transport fleet of 1346 and therefore the accuracy of Wrottesley has to be doubted. This suggests that the three manuscripts this thesis has utilised, along with the work of R. Brady and R. Hakluyt, provide a more accurate guide as to the size of the 1346 transport fleet than those sighted by Rodger.

159 Brady was a strong supporter of the royalist cause in the later Stuart period and had close working links to Lawrence Halstead, the chief clerk of the Towers records. It is also recognised by historians that Brady was a meticulous scholar. For Brady's work as a scholar, see J. G. A. Pocock, 'Robert Brady, 1672-1700: a Cambridge historian of the restoration', Cambridge historical journal 10 (1951), pp. 186-204; J. Rose, 'Robert Brady's intellectual history and royalist antipopery in restoration England', EHR 122 (2007), pp. 1287-1317; Ayton and Preston, The battle of Crécy, p. 235.
given for each port are the same, even when the other two manuscripts provide different information on the ports' contributions. For instance, the port of Hope, in both Harleian Ms 3968 and Champollion, match one another exactly whereas manuscript Add Ms 38823 provides different numbers of ships and mariners. But perhaps the most convincing connection between Harleian 3968 and Champollion is the order in which the ports are recorded. Only in Champollion and Harleian Ms 3968 does the port of Exmouth appear between Faversham and Teignmouth. There are, nevertheless, slight differences between Harleian Ms 3968 and Champollion, particularly with regard the overall numbers of ships and mariners. But the similarities in the order of the ports, and in the individual port totals of ships and mariners suggest that Champollion did indeed consult Harleian Ms 3968 when he compiled his work.

The account known as *A Collection of Ordinances* can also be plausibly linked to one of the three surviving manuscripts (Add Ms 38823), or the earlier copy from which the three manuscripts are derived. Both *A Collection of Ordinances* and Add Ms 38823 are similar and even when differences occur this is likely to be a transcription error. For example, the port of Blackneye, according to *A Collection of Ordinances* supplied two ships manned by twenty-eight mariners while Add Ms 38823 has the same port contributing two ships operated by thirty-eight seamen. Similar differences affect nine ports, but the rest of the information contained in Add Ms 38823 and *A Collection of Ordinances* match precisely.

The published work of Richard Hakulyt can also be linked to one of the three surviving manuscripts, or to an earlier, now lost, original transcription of Wetwang's accounts. Hakulyt was closely linked to both the Tudor and Stuart courts, serving as a

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160 Champollion-Figerac, *Lettres des rois*, p. 87; BL, Harleian MS 3968, fol. 132r; BL, Add MSS 38823, fol. 65r.
161 Champollion-Figerac, *Lettres des rois*, p. 87; BL, Harleian MS 3968, fol. 132r.
162 *A collection of ordinances*, p. 7; BL, Add MS 38823, fol. 66v.
government official and an ambassador for five years, suggesting that he could have had access to the Tower of London’s records. Furthermore, his port list is similar to the one contained in Harleian Ms 3968. For example, the order of the ports south of the Thames is exactly the same as in Harleian Ms 3968. Even more convincing is the fact that only in Hakulyt and Harleian Ms 3968 does the port of Soford have attached to it an alternative spelling: ‘Soford also Seford’. In addition, only in Harleian Ms 3968 and Hakulyt are two figures given for the numbers mariners supplied by Great Yarmouth (1,075 or 1,950). This suggests that Hakulyt and Harleian Ms 3968 either shared a common source, or that Hakulyt used Harleian Ms 3968 himself while compiling his records. Indeed, both these sources were completed towards the end of the sixteenth century. That Hakulyt consulted Wetwang’s original Wardrobe book is to be doubted, for two reasons. Firstly, Hakulyt describes the keeper of the Wardrobe during the siege of Calais as William Norwell. This is clearly wrong and any person who directly consulted the original book of accounts would not make such a basic error. Second, the figure he supplies for the total amount of money expended on wages is far too high for the campaign and does not match the total wages of war recorded by the more accurate Brady in his published book.

J. Bree’s account of the fleet, written in the late eighteenth century, can be linked to manuscript Harleian Mss 246. In his account, Bree relates how the fleet numbered 700 ships that were manned by 14,451 mariners. He notes that he found this ‘expressed in one manuscript’, but does not state exactly that it was Harleian Mss 246. But this should not be doubted because of the three manuscripts this is the only one that provides the ship and mariner totals noted by Bree.

163 R. Hakluyt, *Principal navigations*, p. 298; BL, Harleian MS 3968, fol. 132v.
164 Ibid., fol. 133r; Ibid., p. 299.
165 R. Hakulyt, *Principal navigations*, p. 300.
The many chronicles of the period also contain information relating to the size of the transport fleet of 1346. However, most of the chronicle assessments of the fleet would appear to be overestimations. For example, Henry Knighton states that the fleet that sailed out of Portsmouth harbour numbered some 1,100 great ships and 500 smaller ships, a figure that the *Eulogium Historiarum* agrees with.\(^{167}\) This being said, Adam Murimuth, as we shall see below, was surprisingly accurate in his estimation of the Crécy transport fleet, which he numbered at 750 ships.\(^{168}\) Nevertheless, most of the chronicles that provide details of the size of this fleet suggest that it was anywhere between 1,000-1,500 ships.\(^{169}\) Not only is this number of ships improbable, it is also just a number, with no added details as to the ports that contributed these vessels or as the numbers of mariners on board these ships. Consequently, we have to turn away from the chronicle evidence on the Crécy transport fleet and utilize the much more accurate published and non-published books and manuscripts.

It has already been noted that the most accurate, and therefore the most reliable, aid to understanding the size of the Crécy transport fleet is to be found in Robert Brady’s work published in the late seventeenth century. We know that Brady directly consulted Wetwang’s Wardrobe accounts because he states that the information contained in his book was gained ‘from a roll in my possession’.\(^{170}\) Yet what also seems evident is that Brady rounded up his numbers for the fleet. He states that the armada numbered some 700 barges, ballingers and ships, which were manned

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166 R. Hakluyt, *Principal navigations*, p. 300 states that the total wages was 387,000 li 9s 4d. Whereas Brady has the more reasonable figure of 127,201 li 9s 6d.

167 *Knighton*, p. 54; *Eulogium*, III, p. 206 states the fleet was 1,500 ships.

168 *Murimuth*, p. 198. Unfortunately although Murimuth can be quite accurate at points the numbers of men he claims were involved in the land campaigns of 1346 (20,000 soldiers, p. 199) shows that caution still has to be shown when using such works.

169 *Avesbury*, p. 357, also says the fleet numbered some 1,000 ships.

170 R. Brady, II p. 86.
by 16,000 mariners.\textsuperscript{171} He therefore seems to have missed out the foreign vessels in addition to rounding up the total number of sailors employed in the fleet. The details on the fleet that are embedded in the Brut chronicle are perhaps the earliest of Wetwang's original accounts.\textsuperscript{172} Unfortunately, like Brady, the Brut neither provides no more than the number of ships and mariners involved in the expedition. It is worthy of note that Brady and the Brut use the same words to describe the fleet, which suggests that like Brady the author of the Brut consulted Wetwang's book of accounts.\textsuperscript{173}

This analysis allows us to arrive at several conclusions. First, all three surviving manuscripts are actually copies of an earlier transcription (or transcriptions) of Wetwang's accounts. Each time someone copied from this 'early transcript' small mistakes crept into their work, which explains some of the discrepancies in the order in which the ports appear and in the numbers of ships each contributed. Second, it is clear that these three surviving manuscripts were consulted by contemporary, or later, antiquaries and historians and included in their published works with added transcription errors and mistakes. Thirdly, it can be concluded that BL Harelian Ms 3968 is the most accurate surviving abstract from Wetwang's lost accounts. Not only does this manuscript compare well to the work of Hakulyt, but it is also the closest, in terms of ship and mariner numbers to those provided by Brady.\textsuperscript{174}

\textsuperscript{171} Ibid. That Brady did round up the fleet numbers is entirely plausible. For example, Brady presents the army's service as one continuous period from 4 June 1346 to 12 October 1347. Yet it is more likely that in Wetwang's accounts each retinue or contingent had several dates of service attached to it.

\textsuperscript{172} Brut, p. 541; Ayton, and Preston, \textit{The battle of Crecy}, p. 233.

\textsuperscript{173} Both Brady and the Brut use the words, 'barges, balyngers and vitteliers', to describe the types of ships used in the fleet. The original copy of Wetwang's foreign accounts must have contained this phraseology as in no other source consulted by this thesis do those descriptive words appear. Brut, p. 541; R. Brady, II, p. 86.

\textsuperscript{174} The information contained in of BL, Harelian MS 3968 has been commented on before and has supplied added details that the other manuscripts do not include. See Ayton and Preston, \textit{The battle of Crecy}, p. 233.
By utilizing the information contained in Harelian Ms 3968 we can create a picture of the Crécy transport fleet. In total eighty-nine ports supplied ships for the transport fleet.\textsuperscript{175} These eighty-nine ports contributed 747 ships manned by 15,917 mariners to the transport fleet of 1346.\textsuperscript{176} The ports from the southern admiralty supplied 493 (66\%) ships while the northern ports furnished 216 (28.9\%) vessels with the foreign contingent amounting to thirty-eight (5\%) ships.\textsuperscript{177} Unfortunately, the port list provided in this manuscript does not provide the names of the ships, or their masters, and so it is possible to name only a few of the king's ships along with their masters.\textsuperscript{178}

Therefore, in the summer of 1346 we have an English transport fleet numbering 747 ships that freighted the army to la Hougue on 12 July. The size of the force that these vessels were required to transport was indeed impressive, and in terms of the actual numbers of men deployed it was the largest army ever taken to France by Edward III. It is estimated that the retinues that made up the three divisions of the army numbered some 2,500-3,000 men-at-arms and 2,500-3,000 archers, the latter being mostly mounted. The arrayed troops, provided by the towns and shires of

\textsuperscript{175} Of these, the majority, fifty-one (57.3\%), were located in the southern admiralty while thirty-three (37\%) were situated north of the Thames and the remaining five (5.6\%) were foreign ports. \textsuperscript{176} The actual number recorded by the manuscript is 746 ships. However, it is known that the Prince of Wales' ship, the \textit{Thomas}, also participated in the fleet. See \textit{BPR}, III, p. 413. The evidence for this ship's service comes in the form of a plea for respite of debts owed to the Prince by one Thomas de Crue of Chester who stated that he and his brother were commanded to board the Prince's ship by his sergeants-at-arms at the Isle of Wight and that 'he received no wages for his labour at the battle of Crécy, and when his brother was wounded at the battle and he went with him to the hospital to succour him he received no reward'. As such Crue requested that the Prince wave the £10 he owed him. \textsuperscript{177} 9,597 (60\%) seamen operated the ships of the southern admiralty while the northern vessels required 5,151 (34.6\%) mariners to staff their contingent of ships, and 805 (5\%) were foreign mariners. The largest single supplier of ships to the fleet was the port of Great Yarmouth, which contributed forty-three (5.7\%) vessels operated by 1,950 (12.2\%) maritime personnel. The port from the southern fleet, which provided the most ships, was London whose contingent numbered twenty-five (3.3\%) vessels manned by 662 (4.1\%) mariners. The king himself supplied a sizeable proportion of the fleet and his own personal ships amounted to twenty-five (3.3\%) vessels operated by 419 (2.6\%) seamen, which almost matched the contribution made by the port of London. \textsuperscript{178} For example, \textit{CCR}, 1346-49, p. 95, shows that the \textit{George}, mastered by Robert Salmon, participated in the transport fleet of 1346. He was sent back from Caen to Winchelsea in 1346. The ship was subsequently left to fall into disrepair by Henry Finch, who failed to make adequate repairs to the vessel.
England and the Welsh lordships, added a further 8,000 men, most of whom, around 5,000, would have been archers. With the inclusion of the non-combatant element that accompanied every medieval army the number of men requiring transportation to Normandy in 1346 would have been at least 15,000. The number of horses requiring transportation would have been in the region of 17,000 (especially if we include those that would form the baggage train). This would mean that each ship, on average, would have had to freight twenty men and twenty-two horses to La Hougue; but given that some of the ships of the fleet would have had limited carrying capacity, the normal burden may well have rather more than this.

After Edward’s army had arrived and then disembarked at La Hougue, the 747 ships that had transported his force were no longer required, although Edward did retain a force of some 200 ships to harry, burn and destroy French shipping and ports along the coast. This policy was implemented to prevent any chance of French naval aggression during Edward’s campaign, but it also allowed the English sailors to settle some old scores. This fleet certainly did its work thoroughly, ‘burning and destroying all the seacoast from Barfleur to the foss of Colevill near Caen’; and, according to Edward himself, it sank over 100 French ships in the process. But on 26 July as Edward’s army moved deeper inland the fleet was no longer required, as such it was disbanded and sent home.

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It was to be another month before Edward finally met and defeated Philip VI at Crécy on 26 August. But this victory did not mark the end of the English expedition in France and, if anything, it actually began what was to become England’s largest

endeavor in the first phase of the Hundred Year War: the siege of Calais. By 3 September Edward had brought his army to the walls of Calais where he began a siege that would last until 4 August 1347 and involve some 30,000 English soldiers (although this number probably also includes those serving on the Crécy campaign in 1346).\(^{181}\) Within days of besieging Calais, Edward had already issued orders for the arrest of 180 ships, all to be manned *dupplici eskipammentum*, in addition to the ships of the Cinque Ports and London.\(^{182}\) It is possible that these ships were being prepared for, and did indeed sail with, John Montgomery in September 1346, carrying fresh troops under William Fraunk and Thomas de Haukeston.\(^{183}\) Throughout 1346 reinforcements were under constant preparation. On 10 October all ships of twenty tons and upwards were ordered to be arrested from London to Shoreham, those of forty tons and upwards from Shoreham to Lyme Regis, and those of sixty tons and more from King’s Lynn to Berwick were to be arrested. And on 15 October men were ordered to make their way to Sandwich, in order to sail to Calais. They were not to bring their warhorses.\(^{184}\) By 24 November, however, it seems that Edward was becoming concerned about the availability of sufficient ships, because on that day he requested that Thomas Drayton, William Redenhale and John Wolmere were to provide twenty fishing smacks and ten boats for the siege. Similar orders were issued to Thomas Spigurnel and Philip Whitton. It is likely that these were needed to block the small channels that made up the harbour of Calais.\(^{185}\)

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\(^{180}\) Nicolas, II, p. 92; Avesbury, pp. 359-60; R. Barber, ed. *The life and campaigns of the Black Prince*, p. 18, which records a letter written by Bartholomew Burghersh to the archbishop of Canterbury on 29 July and details some actions of the fleet around Caen.


\(^{183}\) G. Wrottesley, *Crécy and Calais*, p. 53; Foedera, III, i, p. 89.

\(^{184}\) C76/23, m. 14; R. A. Kaner ‘The management of the mobilisation of English armies’, p. 158.

\(^{185}\) Foedera, III, i, p. 94.
This frenzied activity of ship requisition and army recruitment continued during the early months of 1347. On 15 February both admirals were told to ready ships for the 'crossing of certain lords and others to the king', and on 23 February, two new admirals were appointed. John Montgomery was to become the admiral of the southern fleet, while John Howard was to administer the northern ship contingents. One wonders whether these new appointments were made because the lieutenant of the admiral of the southern fleet up to this point, Philip Whitton, had been unsuccessful in requisitioning sufficient vessels for the king: during the winter months he only paid out the relatively small sum of £17 13s 4d as advances on wages. During March 1347, Edward became concerned about the build up of French forces and therefore took the precaution of ordering an extra 7,200 archers as reinforcements, as well as calling on the services of the earls of Lancaster, Oxford, Gloucester, Pembroke, Hereford and Devon. These were all to be at Calais by 20 May without waiting for the transport of their forces.

Evidence concerning maritime participation in the siege of Calais is contained in three surviving financial accounts. Two of these provide details of the contributions made by the ports north of the Thames and by those ships from the southern admiralty, all of which seem to have been used solely for prosecuting the blockade of Calais. The third document provides evidence of what seems to be a separate ferry fleet, which operated throughout May to September 1347. Apart from the reinforcements that arrived with John Montgomery in September 1346 the maritime involvement, and thus the transportation of troops and the blockading of Calais, did not begin until

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187 E403/336, m. 46.
188 Foedera, III, i, p. 120; R. A. Kaner, 'The management of the mobilisation of English armies', p. 162. Due to the infirmity of Hereford and Devon it seems likely that what the king in fact wanted was for these two earls to raise men from their lands and send them to the siege. But their personal presence at Calais was probably not expected.
April 1347.\textsuperscript{190} The first fleet to arrive was that under the command of the admiral of the north, John Howard, in April 1347. Howard had earlier been ordered to find and deploy eighty ships of war, each crewed by sixty mariners and with twenty archers on board. To pay for such a fleet, Howard was authorized to use the subsidy that Edward had been granted by parliament.\textsuperscript{191} By April Howard had managed to collect, and sail to Calais, a fleet of forty-one ships, with a further five being added to this contingent by May.\textsuperscript{192} The majority of these vessels (26) served until 15 September.\textsuperscript{193} A total of fifteen ports supplied these ships all of which, except Bruges, were situated on the east coast. 996 masters, constables and mariners operated these forty-six ships.\textsuperscript{194} The crew sizes on board these ships were large: only two vessels had fewer than forty mariners, and the rest had crews of at least seventy-three. Clearly Howard had performed his task diligently.\textsuperscript{195} The crew sizes alone suggest that this fleet was involved in the military arm of the siege, rather than transportation duties, especially since some of the vessels were only forty tons burden, and would therefore not have required crew sizes of this magnitude. In addition to the fleet under Howard's command by 5 March 1347 four of the king's own ships were plying the waters

\textsuperscript{189} E101/21/36; E101/25/24; E101/390/12, fols 17r-21r.
\textsuperscript{190} This suggestion is reinforced by examination of Walter Wetwang's receipt book (E101/390/12, fols 10v -12v), which shows that no ships' crews were being paid in the winter of 1346-7.
\textsuperscript{191} E101/25/23. This contains hundreds of indentures between Howard, the collectors of the subsidies and individual ports. This account is directly linked to E101/25/24.
\textsuperscript{192} E101/25/24, nos, 1-46.
\textsuperscript{193} Eleven served up to 1 August and eight only served from April to June, while the James of Brugges has no dates of service attached to it.
\textsuperscript{194} Great Yarmouth contributed the most vessels to the fleet supplying fifteen (32.6\%) vessels manned by 1,156 (38.5\%) seamen. In addition to the crew sizes we are also told the tonnages of these ships. The largest ships were the Edmond, mastered by William Rondyng, of Great Yarmouth and the Berthelmeu, mastered by Richard Tynwhit (numbers 23 and 25), both of which were 180 tons, with the overall mean average size of the ships coming to eighty-nine tons.
\textsuperscript{195} The Floyne, mastered by William de Balyng of Great Yarmouth, which was crewed by 33 mariners and 1 constable and the Flouve, mastered by John Mose of Harwich, which was operated by 32 mariners and 1 constable were the ships with crew sizes smaller than forty, these are recorded on numbers 5 and 15.
around Calais. This brought the size of the English fleet, outside Calais, by April to forty-five ships and by early May this was increased to fifty vessels.

John Howard's blockade flotilla had only been in service for a few weeks when another armada of warships under the command of John Montgomery augmented it. We have already seen that Montgomery arrived at Calais in September 1346 carrying the reinforcements under William Fraunk. Unfortunately the details of this fleet are now missing; presumably they were recorded in the lost accounts of Walter Wetwang. Fortunately we have the pay details of the fleet he commanded during the second phase of the siege of Calais throughout May and June 1347. But this account, which was sent to the Exchequer for audit, comes with some interpretational difficulties attached to it. Montgomery had died shortly after the siege of Calais on 14 October 1347 and therefore the executor of his will, Andrew Peverel, compiled the account. There are 122 entries on the account, which on closer inspection can be reduced to forty-nine individual ships due to the repetition of some of the ships and their masters. What these payments record is the advance on the crews' wages. For example, thirty-eight mariners and one constable, manned the Rodecog of Hartlepool, mastered by Henry Whasselede, and this crew was paid £4 for seventeen days service. Their daily wages would have come to 126d or just over 10s, which would be more than the £4 they were paid according to the account. So what we seem to be seeing here is an advance on their wages and not the final sum due to them for a full seventeen days service.

196 E101/390/12, fol. 12v.
197 These five ships of the king's were later recorded amongst the forty-nine vessels under Montgomery, who seems to have taken control of the royal vessels during the siege.
198 E101/21/36.
200 E101/21/36, m. 4.
That these forty-nine ships served during the siege can be deduced from the source. It is true that Peverel states that some of the ships were employed on the king’s business, possibly diplomatic service, and that the account runs from 1340-1346. But these potential complications can be discounted. Firstly, the diplomatic fleets of the Edwardian era usually consisted of a flotilla of ships numbering between two to four vessels. Therefore, we may conclude that the forty-nine ships contained in this account, which served at the same time, cannot have been employed in diplomatic activities. Moreover, although Montgomery was admiral of the southern fleet in 1342, it is unlikely that these ships participated in that campaign because the wages paid to the crews of the ships in 1342 were processed through the Wardrobe accounts of William Edington. Only the particulars of John Kermond were audited separately from Edington’s accounts, and that was due to the nature of his appointment as the clerk in charge of sending the reinforcements to Brittany while the Wardrobe was with the king. In addition, the dates of service and the crew sizes in Peverel’s account point to the siege of Calais and a military operation.

All except four of the above forty-nine ships, under the command of Montgomery were supplied by ports south and west of the Thames. Nineteen of the ports were located in the southwest and 1,985 mariners manned the ships. Their dates of service ranged from seventeen days and twenty-five days through May 1347, although the king’s eight ships that participated in the siege served through June. This marked a clear increase in the maritime resources centered on the siege and matched the increase in land-based forces that were arriving in May owing to the threat of the French forces that were gathering under Philip VI.

An exception was the Bishop of Lincoln’s diplomatic flotilla in 1337, which was unusual because of its importance.

Kermond’s account is recorded on E101/23/22.

The northern ports that contributed ships were Great Yarmouth (2) and Hartlepool (2).
The third source that relates to the maritime involvement in the siege of Calais is the record of payments issued to mariners as preserved by Wetwang in his book of foreign receipts. A series of nine advances on wages were made by William Huggate (described as 'clerk of the ships'), to ships’ crews. The inclusion of these payments in Wetwang’s accounts suggests that Huggate was obviously operating under the umbrella of the keeper of the Wardrobe. There are only two possible reasons for Huggate to be issuing such large sums of money on nine separate occasions. Firstly, what we could be seeing here are nine individually raised fleets of transport ships that were disbanded after they had made just one crossing to Calais. This would mean, of course, that Edward’s army was only reinforced- and those troops who had fallen ill taken back to England- nine times throughout the siege. The second, and more likely, explanation is that these nine payments were issued to the same flotilla of vessels, which were used repeatedly over a four-month period. It is argued here that what in fact Huggate was issuing money for was a ferry system, constituted in June 1347 and stationed at Sandwich, for the sole use of the transportation of reinforcements to the siege. That this fleet was a sizeable entity can be seen by examining the total amounts issued by Huggate from June to September, which totaled £614 1s 4d. The likelihood is that these payments were only advances on wages and so the fleet must have contained over fifty vessels.

Therefore, the evidence seems to suggest that from April to September Edward had procured the services of at least ninety-five known ships for the

\[204\] Indeed, the implementation of a ferry system was not a new development. Henry II also operated such a system during his reign as a means of keeping in regular contact with his domains in France, see N. A. M. Rodger, ‘The naval service of the Cinque Ports’, pp. 641-42.

\[205\] Huggate issued his first payment of £140 on 27 June. He then paid another £58 16d in the first week of July, followed by three more payments in this month on the 9th, 10th and 28th. He made three similar payments throughout August before making his final payment in September.
prosecution of the siege of Calais that were operated by 4,981 seamen. In order to create a fleet of this size Edward relied on the contributions from thirty ports with a little over half (18) of these located in the southern admiralty.

It is now possible to propose some overall conclusions about the maritime participation throughout the campaigns of 1346 and 1347. In all ninety-two ports were involved in the contribution of sufficient ships for the king's campaigns in the fourteen months that the expeditions ran for. These ninety-two ports furnished a maritime contribution numbering 842 ships. 22,359 masters, constables and mariners manned these 842 ships. What these figures suggest is that the southern ports contributed about two-thirds of the ships to the 1346 and 1347 naval operation, but only half of the mariners indicating that on average the ships from the northern admiralty were larger. These figures speak for themselves in many respects. That the maritime contribution to the siege of Calais was of a great magnitude is borne out by the fleet sizes and numbers of mariners on board. But, the maritime involvement of the campaign did not match the land-based element, which employed 30,000 combatants over the fourteenth month period.

206 This number of ships should not be taken to be the overall maritime contribution to the siege. There were many vessels involved in the supply operation. For example, in early 1347 the sheriff of Essex sent seven ships from Colchester loaded with supplies to Edward's forces. These ships mainly freighted malt and oats and the wages of the mariners and the costs of the supplies came to £93 6s 8d, see E101/556/37. However, the supply operation during the siege is beyond the scope of the above analysis.

207 The northern ports supplied forty-nine (48%) individual vessels manned by 2,996 (60%) mariners, while the southern admiral controlled forty-five ships (52%) operated by 1,985 (40%) seamen.

208 Of these, fifty-three (57.6%) ports were located south and west of the Thames while thirty-three (35.8%) were east coast ports and six (6.5%) were foreign.

209 Owing to the nature of the evidence relating to the Crécy fleet, namely, that the manuscripts do not provide the masters' names or the names of the ships it is difficult to correlate the 1346 fleet with those serving through the siege. However the king's eight ships serving in 1347 would surely have been among of the twenty-five ships, which served in the transport fleet of 1346 so the number of individual ships should perhaps be 835. The ports south and west of the Thames provided 538 (64%) of these vessels while the east coast ports furnished 265 (31%) ships and the foreign element numbered thirty-nine (5%) ships. The king's ships have been added to the southern admiralty.

210 The ports north of the Thames supplied 10,332 (46%) of these maritime personnel and those vessels south and west of the Thames required 11,222 (50%) mariners to operate them while the foreign contingent of seamen numbered 805 (4%). The ship of Bruges has no crew size attached to it so the foreign contingent should perhaps be raised to 850 mariners.
4.7 THE REIMS FLEET, 1359

The campaign of 1359-60 was to be Edward’s last great mobilisation of men, under his personal command, to fight on French soil. The force that Edward led out of Calais in early November was the ‘best equipped army Edward had ever assembled’.\(^{211}\) The men under Edward’s command totalled 3,000 men-at-arms and 5,000 mounted archers.\(^{212}\) This, of course, meant that the number of ships required for the transportation of such a large, fully mounted force should have been of the same order of magnitude as that assembled for the Crècy campaign of 1346.\(^{213}\) We know, for example, that 10,861 horses, which were shipped back from France, were recorded through Farley’s accounts.\(^{214}\) Yet, throughout the summer and autumn of 1359 the actual number of transported horses must have been close to 30,000, if we include those in the large baggage train that supported the army.\(^{215}\) But the preparations for the campaign, particularly the requisitioning of sufficient ships, were troublesome for the king.\(^{216}\) This resulted in the army being transported in three, or four, separate crossings. The first to take passage was several contingents of the royal household followed by the duke of Lancaster, the earl of March and the king in October (there was also another possible small fleet that sailed between August and October).\(^{217}\)

Indeed, the retinue captains received payments from the crown to hire their own ships

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\(^{211}\) C. J. Rogers, *War cruel and sharp*, p. 396. We know that Lancaster’s force met Edward’s army a few days after it had disembarked at Calais on the 28 October.

\(^{212}\) A. Ayton, *Knights and warhorses*, p. 268.

\(^{213}\) Indeed, the *Chronicon anonymi Cantvariensis*, p. 50 says the fleet numbered a thousand ships in addition to numerous small boats. This comment is in line with the chronicle assessments of the size of the 1346 transport fleet.

\(^{214}\) A. Ayton, *Knights and warhorses*, p. 268.

\(^{215}\) On the baggage train and its possible size, see Jean le Bel, ii, pp. 312-13. Thomas Walsingham stated that the baggage train numbered ‘a thousand wagons and carts’, see R. Hakluyt, *Principal navigations*, p. 301, in which Hakluyt records a passage from Walsingham.

\(^{216}\) *Scalacronica*, p. 171.

\(^{217}\) Fifteen members of the royal household began receiving pay in August 1359. Sir William Grandson was the first to begin receiving pay on 3 August 1359, although he was not a member the household.
in order to achieve the final crossing with the king. The following sub-chapter will analyse the number of ships raised and assess the reasons for the dearth of shipping that afflicted this particular campaign.

The first orders for the arrest of ships were issued to Guy Brian, admiral of the west, on 16 December 1358. This writ requested that all available ships of 76 tons and below should be requisitioned for service. Two days later a similar request was sent to Robert Morley, admiral of the north. In addition to these orders a general requisition demand was sent to several towns and ports, which had been required to build barges for the crossing, and the admirals were sent a list of these ports. The admirals were ordered to report back by the end of January 1359 and to provide the crown with a list of the arrested ships, with their masters, their homeports and the names of the men who had provided security for the appearance of these vessels at the embarkation port. On 5 June these orders were repeated and the ships were to be ready at Sandwich by 8 July. By this stage eleven ships, from the east coast ports, had been allocated to the Black Prince’s officers for the supply needs of the assembled forces at Sandwich. On 7 June the king ordered the arrest of mariners to serve on seventeen ships, which were also to be ready for early July. Indeed, these ships and their masters did serve throughout the campaign in both a transportation

The first of the household to be paid wages was Simon Bisset on 16 August 1359, see E101/393/11, fols 81r, 82v, 83v, 84r, 85, 85v.

218 A. Ayton, Knights and warhorses, p. 270.
219 *Foedera*, III, i, p. 412. This order in itself is interesting because it looks as though the crown did not intend to arrest large vessels for this transport fleet. This is certainly borne out by the evidence on the exchequer accounts, which lists the tonnages of the arrested ships.

220 Ibid.


223 R. A. Kaner, ‘The management of the mobilisation of English armies’, p. 174. In addition nine ships where employed by the seneschal of Gascony for his transport needs. These came from Dartmouth (5), Fowey (2) and Plymouth (2). These were crewed by 241 mariners and carried forty men-at-arms and forty archers, see E101/27/19.

224 *Foedera*, III, i, p. 428.
role and as ships of war.\textsuperscript{225} The crown also secured the services of eight further ships from Gravelyng, Sluys and Dunkirk, which were procured throughout August.\textsuperscript{226}

It is clear, therefore, that the English government was attempting to raise a large transport fleet, which was to be ready at Sandwich by early July. But how does this compare with the muster for the land-based forces? The original intention was for the whole army to be mustered at Sandwich on 15 August. But this was eventually altered to 8 September owing to problems encountered in raising the required number of mounted men.\textsuperscript{227} In essence, the fleet had been raised to be ready and waiting for the army to board in August on its arrival. However, several exchequer accounts, which relate to the payment of mariners wages, show that a large section of the army must have been transported to Calais before the end of August 1359 even though all the land-based personnel had not yet arrived at the allocated muster point. There are four payrolls that record the wages paid to mariners for the transportation of the first section of the army. These accounts run from 27 June to 16 August 1359,\textsuperscript{228} while one further particular, compiled by Robert de Crull, records the wages paid to eight vessels, which participated in all three separate voyages and which served from 20 August to 4 November 1359.\textsuperscript{229} The first four payrolls must be the record of the wages paid to the mariners that transported members of the royal household, among other men-at-arms, who began their paid service in August. Considering the number of ships involved in this first fleet the household contingents must have been placed in charge of a sizeable force. Alternatively, this first flotilla could have been used to

\textsuperscript{225} See E101/27/31; E101/27/36; E101/27/37.

\textsuperscript{226} \textit{Foedera}, III, i, p. 444.

\textsuperscript{227} R. A. Kaner, 'The management of the mobilisation of English armies', pp. 177-8.

\textsuperscript{228} E101/27/22; E101/27/23; E101/27/24; E101/27/25.

\textsuperscript{229} E101/27/31. Furthermore, E101/27/16 records some purchases of equipment for three of the king's ships that formed this August fleet. They were the \textit{George}, mastered by John Gybon, which sailed on 12 August, the \textit{Godebye}, mastered by John Ruck, which sailed on 12 August and the \textit{Welfare}, mastered by Bartholomew Stygen, which sailed on the 28 August.
freight the horses and supplies for the army, with the members of the royal household sent across with such supplies.\textsuperscript{230}

However, within these particulars are embedded data for two separate fleets. Twenty-one vessels that sailed in the first flotilla in August also served again sometime after this date.\textsuperscript{231} On the first payroll (E101/27/22) they were in service for thirteen, fourteen or twenty days, while on the second particular (E101/27/25) all the ships received pay for either eight or six days. That we are seeing two different fleets is beyond doubt because the majority of these ships are recorded with different crew sizes on the two payrolls. For example, Simon Robyn from Cromer, master of the \textit{Eleyne}, served on board this ship with a crew of five mariners in the first crossing to Calais, while on his second voyage there were six operating the vessel.\textsuperscript{232} What seems to have occurred is that after the first fleet sailed in the summer twenty-one ships returned to England and transported another small contingent of men, sometime after August. It is possible that these twenty-one ships formed part a small flotilla of vessels that served alongside eight of the king’s ships (about-which, more below) during late August and early October: and that they either sailed back to England, after the members of the royal household had disembarked in Calais, to pick up a small contingent of men, or supplies, that could not be freighted in the first crossing, or participated in the freighting of the earl of March in October.

\textsuperscript{230} It is worth noting that the land-based contingents usually began their paid service on the day they reached the port of embarkation. Considering the fact that the ships’ crews began to receive their pay in June suggests that what the payrolls are recording are not just the wages for the actual transportation of the troops in August, but also the wages issued to keep the ships in port, until the land troops arrived. In short, the wages from 27 June to early August were dispensed to stop the fleet from disbanding. This is certainly what happened during the 1342 Brittany campaign when 145 vessels’ crews were paid wages to keep them port while the earl of Northampton waited for sufficient ships to transport his army, although on this occasion the pay issued to the mariners was enrolled on the Pipe Rolls. On the wages of the land-based forces, see A. Ayton, \textit{Knights and warhorses}, p. 146. On Brittany, see E372/187, mm. 42, 48.

\textsuperscript{231} These are found by comparing E101/27/22, mm. 3, 4 with E101/27/25, m. 2. The ships are all from ten ports located on the east coast.

\textsuperscript{232} E101/27/22, m. 3; E101/27/25, m. 2.
In all 472 ships are recorded as having received payment for transporting the first contingent, with a further eight vessels hired from the Low Countries ports.\textsuperscript{233} The exact numbers of mariners who manned these vessels is difficult to assess with any accuracy owing to the condition of some of the payrolls. For example, on one of the accounts that records the wages issued to mariners serving on east coast vessels, seventy-one ships' crews cannot be ascertained.\textsuperscript{234} But we can decipher the tonnages of thirty of these vessels. Averaging the tonnages of these thirty ships allows us to suggest a mean tonnage for forty-four others. Using the same account, and the tonnages of the ships where we can see the crew sizes, it can be speculated that these seventy-one ships were crewed by up to fourteen mariners each. A further account suffers from the same problems, but by applying the same method it is possible to average out the tonnages and therefore place an estimated number of mariners on the six ships' crews that are irretrievable from the account.\textsuperscript{235} In total, 6,149 mariners operated these ships (this does not include the 8 Low Countries ships).\textsuperscript{236} Eighty-seven ports provided the ships of which seventy-two were located north of the Thames.\textsuperscript{237}

Therefore, the above Exchequer particulars show that during July and August 480 ships operated by 6,149 mariners, contributed by eighty-seven ports, formed the first transport fleet of the Reims campaign. Given the number of ships involved in this

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{233} 402 (83.7\%) ships were contributed by ports north of the Thames and seventy (14.5\%) from ports located south and west of the Thames.
\item \textsuperscript{234} E101/27/22.
\item \textsuperscript{235} E101/27/24.
\item \textsuperscript{236} Of these, 4,788 (77.8\%) manned the ships from the ports north of the Thames, while 1,064 (17.3\%) operated those ships contributed from the ports south and west of the Thames. The remainder, 297, were the crews on board the king's ships.
\item \textsuperscript{237} The port that supplied the most ships was Great Yarmouth, which contributed forty-nine (10.2\%) vessels operated by 658 (10.7\%) mariners. This was followed by Hull with twenty (4.1\%) ships crewed by 372 (6\%) seaman. The largest provider of shipping from the ports south and west of the Thames was Dartmouth, which contributed nine (1.8\%) vessels. Unfortunately, the numbers of mariners from Dartmouth are difficult to calculate owing to the condition of the document. However, an average
first armada, and by comparing it to the transport fleets of the Low Countries and Brittany campaigns, it is probable that 3,000-4,000 men could have been transported in the first contingent.  

The second stage of the transportation operation involved the crossing of the large retinues serving under Lancaster and the earl of March. Thomas Gray stated that March embarked for Calais six days before the king and then made a chevauchée in the surrounding area. Given that the king sailed to Calais on 28 October the earl of March must have crossed on the 22nd of the same month. This fits rather neatly with the payroll evidence enrolled on a particular compiled by Robert de Crull. This records eight royal ships with dates of service indicating four separate crossings, ranging throughout the summer and autumn of 1359. For example, the Godebiet, mastered by John Ruck, and crewed by one constable and thirty-one mariners, sailed from London to Calais on 23 August. After this its service was extended, with the addition of a further nine mariners from 24 August to 30 September. On 1 October with the subtraction of one mariner, but the addition of one page, the same ship served until 14 October. Finally, from 15 October to 4 November the vessel sailed with a crew of one constable, forty mariners and one page. The disembarkation of March (and Lancaster) seems to fit in exactly with the periods of service of these eight ships.

Tonnage of 103 tons per ship can be gained from the payroll, which permits us to estimate that mariners that served on board these nine ships would be 300.

Of course we do not know the exact tonnages for the Brittany fleet. However, the majority of the Reims vessels seem to have been of a small size. Although because the Reims army was a fully mounted force the number of men shipped to Calais could be a little smaller than those transported in the earlier campaigns, which contained large numbers of foot soldiers.

Scala cronica, p. 171.

CCR, 1354-60, pp. 656-57.

E101/27/31.

Chronicon anonymi Cantvariensis, p. 52, says that March’s retinue consisted of 350 men-at-arms and 600 archers. Therefore, if eight ships performed four crossings it would be the equivalent of twenty-four vessels, which seems an adequate number of ships to transport March’s retinue.
Throughout their periods of service it is likely these royal vessels made several crossings to and from Calais during the course of which they transported Lancaster, March, and the king. We know that the king crossed the Channel on the *Philip*. This is likely to have been the same *Philip*, mastered by Bartholomew Stygan, and manned by fifty-six mariners, which is enrolled by Crull and completed its period of service on 30 October. This evidence fits in with what we know about the shipping arrangements for this campaign. We know that most of the retinue captains were required to hire their own transport vessels and that they were compensated for this by the crown. However, the Earl of March received no such payment from the crown for his outward voyage. This suggests that March along with his retinue embarked on the ships requisitioned and paid for by the crown.

The above analysis has shown that from July to mid-October 488 ships transported the first two contingents of the army to Calais. Comparisons with other transport fleets of the period would suggest that an estimated 2,000-3,000 men were freighted on these vessels. This, of course, would have left some 6,000 men in England still awaiting transportation to Calais. How was this passage achieved? It has already been noted that the majority of the captains serving in this campaign had to hire their own shipping for transportation. However, of the 400 or so companies known to have served on this expedition only twenty-five received passage payments from the crown. These twenty-five retinues consisted of 1,800 men-at-arms and 2,150 mounted archers. Moreover, in those cases were passage payments were

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243 Lancaster began receiving pay on 29 September 1359, while March began his paid service on 5 September, see E101/393/11, fol. 79v. In fact the *Eulogium*, p. 228 says that Lancaster crossed to Calais on 29 September, which coincides with the beginning of his paid service.

244 A. Ayton, *Knights and warhorses*, table A, p. 265. Although March died while on campaign, and this would not have required re-passage payments, he should still have received payment for his outward passage if he had hired his own ships.


246 E101/393/11, fols 83r-86v.
made, a comparison of the numbers of horses retinue captains shipped from England to Calais with those they brought back, usually shows that the July-August fleet transported some of the horses as well. For example, Farley’s payroll tells us that the Black Prince transported 1,369 horses to Calais but he brought back 2,114. Which seems to suggest that 745 of the horses were actually transported, ahead of his arrival, in the July-August fleet. It would seem, therefore, that the 480 ships involved in the July-August fleet not only transported many of the land-based contingents but also freighted large numbers of horses from those retinue captains who had to arrange shipping themselves. One can see why this was the case for it would make the work of the retinue captain, in hiring his own ships, much easier if that part of his ‘kit’ that required the most room aboard ship, as well as alterations being made to the vessels, had already been freighted over to Calais. With the horses a captain would send over a few pages who could look after the animals while they awaited the arrival of the main force.

The payroll evidence relating to the Reims campaign seems to suggest that the land-based contingents were transported over to Calais in three (or four if we include the small flotilla that sailed after the first fleet) separate stages. The first fleet involved the transportation of members of the royal household along with some of the horses belonging to the retinue captains who would follow later in the year. The second part of the process involved the passage of the duke of Lancaster and the earl of March, along with their horses. The third and final transport flotilla consisted entirely of vessels hired privately by the retinue captains with the costs incurred by them recompensed by the crown. As noted above, only twenty-five captains had to find

249 Alternatively the Prince could have acquired these extra horses in France. Although, see A. Ayton, *Knights and warhorses*, p. 268, who suggests that a shortage of horseflesh in England, which therefore meant that retinue captains sourced some of their mounts in Calais, only provides a partial explanation.
their own ships, but these did include very large retinues that consisted of nearly 4,000 men. To what extent did these retinue captains hire the same ships that freighted the first two portions of the army? This question poses some problems. Why did Edward simply not order the ships to return to Sandwich after they had transported the July-August section of the army and then extend their paid service? We know, for example that this is what happened in 1356 when Lancaster’s army was freighted in two separate journeys by the same ships.\textsuperscript{250} Perhaps Edward recalled the fiasco that had occurred during the Brittany campaign of 1342, when the disobedience of certain shipmasters meant that a large number of vessels failed to return to England and transport the king after they had disembarked the earl of Northampton at Brest.\textsuperscript{251} If we assume that there were 4,000 troops requiring transportation after the first two fleets had sailed a further 400-500 vessels would be required. The evidence suggests that, in order to secure the 800 or so ships that would be required to transport the whole army to Calais, the crown decided on three fleets, one of which was hired privately by the captains leading the retinues.

4.8 MICRO FLEETS

The above examination of the transport fleets of the Hundred Years War have, so far, concentrated on the armadas required by the major royal campaigns of the period. But throughout the war with France, the English crown frequently employed a multi-front strategy, which meant that, during a royal campaign, other flotillas would be simultaneously prepared, and deployed, to carry the king’s lieutenants to the other theatres of operations. Moreover, throughout the period fleets were needed to transport the many diplomatic embassies to the continent and the seneschals of

\textsuperscript{250} Avesbury, p. 462.
Gascony to Bordeaux. This sub-chapter will conduct an analysis of these ‘micro-fleets’, which were continuously raised throughout this period.

4.81 DIPLOMATIC AND SENESchal TRANSPORT FLEETS 1337-60

In addition to providing the fleets that transported armies to war, the English merchant marine was also employed to freight diplomatic embassies and seneschals to areas that the English were active in or to territories that they controlled.\textsuperscript{252} This sub-chapter will examine three diplomatic flotillas and two seneschal fleets. The diplomatic transports are: firstly, that which carried the bishop of Lincoln to the Low Countries in the summer of 1337, when he was Edward’s principal negotiator and one of the architects of the grand alliance strategy of the first campaigns there;\textsuperscript{253} secondly, those, under the nominal command of John Montgomery, and which sailed to Germany between 1338 and 1342 carrying ambassadors from England to the Holy Roman Emperor;\textsuperscript{254} and thirdly, that which transported Gawain Corder to Brittany in 1341, his mission being to negotiate the terms of the English intervention there.\textsuperscript{255} The fleets that transported the seneschals Oliver Ingham (Ingham was seneschal of Gascony in 1342, but was diverted to Brittany during his passage to Bordeaux) and William de Bohun to Brittany in 1345, and John de Cherelton to Gascony in 1359 will be analysed.\textsuperscript{256}

\textsuperscript{251} See C. Lambert, ‘An army transport fleet’, pp. 29-44.
\textsuperscript{252} The importance of diplomacy should not be underestimated and both Edward II and Edward III had extensive networks of communication stretching over northern Europe and the Mediterranean. These diplomatic connections were maintained by utilising existing shipping trade routes or by directly employing ships to transport ambassadors to foreign courts. The widespread nature of these networks are examined by W. R. Childs, ‘England in Europe in the reign of Edward II’, \textit{The reign of Edward II: new perspectives}, pp. 97-118.
\textsuperscript{253} E101/20/16.
\textsuperscript{254} E101/21/33.
\textsuperscript{255} E101/23/5.
\textsuperscript{256} E101/27/19, records the Cherelton fleet.
Henry Burghersh was employed by Edward III to head the negotiations that led to the forming of the grand alliance between Edward and the Low Countries princes during his first continental expeditions, a role that involved journeys to Flanders to meet with the potential allies. Burghersh’s first fleet of 1337 is fully recorded in an Exchequer account. As an important diplomat, as well as a member of the church, Burghersh required a substantial flotilla to transport him and his attendants to the Low Countries, both for his protection and for the upholding his dignity in front of the other nobles. Burghersh sailed in the summer of 1337 and the port of Great Yarmouth supplied all his ships, a total of twenty vessels. The numbers of mariners on board each ship show the importance of his mission. Each vessel carried a compliment of eighty mariners including the masters, giving a total of 1,600 mariners serving on the bishops transport fleet, such numbers of personnel offering the bishop protection, against interception by the French.

The diplomatic transport flotillas that were active in the period 1337-42 also covered two other areas of importance to the English crown, that of the Holy Roman Empire and Brittany. The former was an important ally in the Low Countries campaigns and the latter was an area that Edward invaded in support of one of the claimants to the duchy of Brittany in 1342. The embassies to the Holy Roman Empire were integral to the forming of Edward’s strategy throughout his first campaigns and they continued to play an important diplomatic role after the emperor’s direct involvement in the war against France had ceased in 1340. Four ships plied the waters

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257 Jean le Bel tells us that Edward formally requested that the bishop go to the Low Countries in January 1337. The bishop then returned to England before sailing back to the Low Countries and he was at Valenciennes by May 1337. He then proceeded to Brabant and Ghent. Throughout, two knights banneret and two legal specialists accompanied him. Unfortunately, there are no dates of service for the ships, and this means that this fleet could have been used twice. However, each ship was paid £8 4s (each vessel also had a constable on board drawing 6d per day in wages) in wages so their service would only have lasted for eight days. On the dates of Burghersh’s stay in the Low Countries, see *Chronique le Jean le Bel*, eds, Viard and Déprez, p. 121.
to the Holy Roman Empire in the years 1338-42; however, the account that records the pay details for these vessels is problematic. For example, although there were four embassies between 1338 and 1340, we learn the names of only two of the ships. But that there were four vessels employed in this role is beyond doubt, because from 4 July to 19 September 1340 four ships served at the same time. And although the names of these vessels are not recorded it seems likely that Thomas and William Melcheburn supplied two of these ships. There were four separate embassies sent to the emperor during the period. The first set sail on board the Maudeleyne of King’s Lynn on 7 March 1338. This vessel was operated by seventy-two mariners and did not complete its service until 4 July 1338, which meant the diplomatic talks lasted some four months. The second round of discussions between England and the Empire took place between March and July 1339. This time the ambassadors were transported in the two ships, the Maudeleyne and the Seintemariecog, both of King’s Lynn, but the Maudeleyne had one less mariner on board for this journey, while fifty-two seamen manned the Seintemariecog.258 The next round of discussions took place between May and September 1340. These were to be the last talks, which probably concentrated on the military alliance, as the campaign led by Edward was to come to an end later in the year.

The diplomatic embassies of 1340 actually occurred in two distinct phases. The first round of talks employed the same two ships, the Maudeleyne and the Seintemariecog, as the previous embassies had in 1338 and 1339 and they served from 15 May to 28 July 1340. Eighty-two seamen manned the Maudeleyne, while the Seintemariecog had on board a compliment of sixty-two mariners. The second round took place from the 4 July to 19 September 1340. But this time two further ships were

258 These two ships of the Melcheburn’s are likely to have been the same Seintemariecog and
involved in the transport fleet, from 4 July to 28 July. The names of these two added vessels are not recorded in the account; all we know is that each of them had seventy-four mariners on board. It would seem reasonable, therefore, to assume that two of these vessels were the *Maudeleyne* and *Seintemariecog*, while the two added ships were hired from the Melcheburns to accommodate an increasing number of diplomats.

The final diplomatic talks with the Empire occurred during the months of July and August 1342, and the same two ships were employed as transportation for the ambassadors, with 124 mariners on-board. In conclusion, we can see that a total of four ships were involved in the transportation of English ambassadors to the Holy Roman Empire during a four-year period. It is difficult to provide an accurate assessment of the numbers of mariners that served on these ships. Is it to be assumed that none of the seamen served on these ships more than once, for example? The largest crew size on board the *Maudeleyne* during these diplomatic visits was eighty-two, while the *Seintemariecog*’s largest known compliment was sixty-two. This gives us a maximum strength of 144 serving mariners. However, there were also two further ships, each with a crew size of seventy-four men, which adds a further 148 seamen; and thus we have a manpower minimum of 292 masters and mariners involved in these diplomatic missions. But if we assume that each time a ship sailed the crew consisted of different men, there could have been as many as 759 individual masters and mariners serving on board these ships over the four period.

The other area engaging the attention of the English crown during the early 1340s was the duchy of Brittany. After the death of Duke John III, on 30 April 1341, a civil war ensued for control of the duchy. Edward eventually decided to favour John de Montfort, half brother of the late duke, and he therefore sent an embassy to

*Maudeleyne* that had served in the battle of Sluys in 1340. The information relating to the fleets sent to
organise terms for the price of his backing. Edward chose Gawain Corder as the man
to head the mission. On 22 June 1341 Corder set sail for Brittany with Richard de
Swafham. He would stay there for seventy days. His means of transportation to the
duchy was one ship, mastered by William Bacoun of Dartmouth, and one barge.
Unfortunately, we are not told the name of the master of the barge although we do
know that, combined, these vessels were operated by 135 mariners and their wages
came to £39 5s 9d.\

4.82 SENESCHAL AND LIEUTENANT TRANSPORT FLEETS

In order to transport the king's officers to territories administered by the English
crown in France, a regular system of small fleets of ships was put into place. These
fleets were not permanent and they were raised on an ad hoc basis by ship requisition.
Yet there was some organisation employed throughout this procedure. Those officials
going to Gascony usually had their ships arrested from the ports of the southwest, and
Plymouth was the customary port of embarkation for most journeys to Bordeaux. This
sub-chapter will analyse three fleets of the period that transported seneschals to
Gascony and Brittany. The fleets that shipped the king's lieutenants Henry of
Grosmont in 1345 and the Black Prince's in 1355, will be analysed separately as they
are larger fleets and are illuminated by more detailed payrolls than the others.

The transport fleet of Oliver Ingham is in some ways problematic. He was
sailing for Gascony when his fleet was diverted towards Brittany. There are no
exchequer documents that relate directly to this fleet, and this is most likely because it
was constructed from the ships already requisitioned during 1342 in preparation for

the talks with the Empire are recorded on E101/21/33.
259 In the royal transport fleet of 1342 William Bacoun was to master another ship from Dartmouth
called the Trinite. He was also named as the joint owner with John Selinne of a second ship, the
George. See E101/24/9 (b), m.1.
the Brittany campaign of that year. However, owing to the problems encountered during the Brittany expedition, and the documentation arising from these complications, it is possible to gain an impression of the size of his fleet. During the Brittany campaign there were vessels that left the earl Northampton's charge and sailed to Gascony to collect the wine crop of that year. Northampton was already in Brittany when Ingham arrived with Hugh Despencer in August. On their arrival Despencer decided to stay and support the earl in his campaigns while Ingham continued to Gascony. It was during Ingham’s short interlude in Brittany that the ships that had transported him seem to have come under Northampton’s command, because, by November, Edward had issued numerous warrants for the arrest of the deserter ships and it seems that those vessels that had legitimately left with Ingham secured for themselves letters stating they had permission to sail on with Ingham. Fortunately, traces of these letters survive in the chancery documents allowing us to assess the size of the Ingham transport fleet. These letters suggest that a total of twelve ships transported Ingham to Gascony in 1342. Such numbers were necessary to afford protection of a sizeable treasure chest, which Ingham was taking to Bordeaux with him in order to pay the king’s soldiers and meet other expenses within the duchy.

The transport fleet that conveyed the earl of Northampton to Brittany in 1345 to Brittany is more clearly recorded than Ingham’s in the Exchequer records. The earl’s fleet is illuminated by an Exchequer account drawn up by Richard Houlak. Houlak records that the earl’s fleet was made up of twelve ships. No crew sizes are given but the account does record that it was the ports of Fowey and Plymouth that

261 CCR, 1341-43, pp. 455, 461; CPR, 1343-46, p. 568. Although the main threat had been somewhat neutralised by Northampton when he destroyed a large number of Genoese ships blockading Brest harbour on his arrival in August there would still have been enemy ships sailing the waters.
contributed these vessels. Another ship, which is absent from the payroll but which
certainly served in the earl's fleet, was the Trinite of Southampton mastered by
Thomas Warner.263 This vessel was loaded at Portsmouth with men-at-arms, archers
and horses. The twelve ships on the payroll served from 16 March to 26 April 1345.
They sailed from Plymouth directly to St. Matheu, a small port just down the coast
from Brest. This was a usual stopping point for English ships sailing to Brest: the
king's transport fleet of 1342 had anchored there for a day before moving onto Brest
for example.264

The last seneschal fleet to be examined is that which transported John de
Cherelston to Bordeaux in 1359. This fleet was raised and deployed in a year of
heightened ship requisition activity. There were four separate fleets raised this year:
Those that transported the royal household contingents, the duke of Lancaster's
flotilla, the earl of March, the king in October and the Cherelston flotilla. The wages
of the mariners employed to transport Cherelston are recorded on an Exchequer
account compiled by Walter de Harewell.265 Nine ships manned by 243 mariners
received payment for freighting Charleston and thirty-two men-at-arms and twenty-
four archers to Gascony.266 The mariners served for a total of forty-three days and
their wages came to £34 4s.

The above discussion has shown that size of the diplomatic transport fleets
reflected the importance of the embassy being transported. Thus, the bishop of
Lincoln's fleet in 1337 needed to be large to carry his retinue and fellow envoys.

262 E101/25/3.
263 CPR, 1343-45, p. 533.
264 E36/204, p. 31.
265 E101/27/19.
266 Three ports contributed these nine ships. Dartmouth supplied five vessels and Fowey and Plymouth
furnished two ships each. The port of Dartmouth was responsible for providing 147 (60.4%) seamen
and also supplied the largest single ship, the Cristiane, mastered by Richard de London, which was
crewed by thirty-eight mariners and four pages.
Those embassies sent to the Holy Roman Empire and Brittany were of a secondary importance and the talks were conducted by smaller numbers of diplomats. Finally, all the transport fleets that span the period between 1342 and 1359, are all of the same magnitude. They all seem to be fleets consisting of between nine and twelve ships (including Ralph Stafford’s of 1345 which numbered thirteen ships). The size of the earl of Northampton’s fleet in 1345 reflects the secondary nature that the theatre in Brittany had occupied after 1342-3.

4.83 THE TRANSPORT FLEET OF HENRY OF GROSMONT

Taken together the 1345-46 campaigns of Henry of Grosmont in Aquitaine were one of the most successful expeditions of the first phase of the French war. On landing in Bordeaux on 9 August 1345, Grosmont entered a much-reduced duchy of Aquitaine. From the territories ceded to Henry III in the Treaty of Paris English control in Gascony had shrunk to no more than a thin coastal strip of some fifty miles broad from the Bordeaux to Bayonne and reaching inland to Saint-Sever. By the time Grosmont ceased hostilities in 1346 he had widened the area of English influence almost to the traditional borders of Aquitaine. The campaign not only increased the martial reputation of Grosmont but it also tied down a large French force under the duke of Normandy outside Aiguillon in 1346, which weakened the French host Edward III faced at Crécy.

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267 E101/24/18, which details the fitting out of thirteen ships by Robert Gyon and Walter de Haukey on behalf of the earl of Arundel at Bristol for the passage of Ralph Stafford and his men going to Gascony in May 1345.

268 Henry de Grosmont was created the earl of Derby in 1337, he became the earl of Lancaster during his campaigns in Gascony in 1345 and he was later created the duke of Lancaster. He will be referred to as Grosmont here.

269 Froissart places the arrival of Grosmont much earlier than this (6 June): Froissart, Chronicles of England, France, Spain and the adjoining countries from the latter part of the reign of Edward II to the coronation of Henry IV, trans. T. Johnes (London, 1848), p. 127. However, K. Fowler and J. Sumption agree that his arrival actually occurred on 9 August 1345. See Fowler, King’s lieutenant, p. 53; J. Sumption, Trial by battle, p. 463.
The fleet that transported Grosmont is recorded in an Exchequer account, which also contains a retinue roll for his retinue. But his fleet was raised in a year of increased activity with regard to ship requisition. Four separate armadas set out from England in 1345, all sailing to the continent: a flotilla transported Ralph, Baron Stafford to Gascony in the spring, another took the earl of Northampton to Brittany; a third conveyed the king in the summer and Grosmont’s fleet sailed in July. These fleets were prepared simultaneously, with vessels being raised throughout the kingdom and seconded to the various magnates as and when they needed to sail. As discussed above, the king’s fleet of 1345 was an exception to the usual requisition process in that it was paid by means of private hire arrangements.

Preparations for the raising of sufficient ships had begun as early as 9 January 1345 when an order was issued to Robert Ufford, admiral of the northern fleet, to gather information relating to the numbers of ships, and their tonnages, within his admiralty capable of transporting men and horses across the sea. He was to present his findings to the king and the Chancery, and to take security from the owners of the vessels to ensure that they would be ready to take the king’s wages by 11 June. On 23 February 1345 the earl of Arundel was appointed admiral of the fleet south and west of the Thames. Two days later Ralph Stafford was formally appointed seneschal of Aquitaine and on 1 March Arundel was ordered to provide him with thirteen ships at Bristol for the transportation of himself and his men.

Henry of Grosmont set sail for Bordeaux at the end of July 1345. But how large was his fleet and how many men and horses was it required to transport? In all,

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270 E101/25/9.
271 *Foedera*, III, i, pp. 32, 34, 35.
272 *CCR*, 1343-46, p. 492.
273 *Foedera*, III, i, p. 31.
274 *Ibid.*, p. 32. Protections were issued to Stafford and thirty-four of his men.
thirty-six ports supplied the ships for Grosmont’s fleet.\(^{275}\) These thirty-six ports provided 148 ships, manned by 2,866 constables, masters, mariners and pages.\(^{276}\) It is certain that more ships were involved in this fleet as some men who served under Grosmont in 1345 sailed from Dover and not from the earl’s port of embarkation.\(^{277}\)

In total 148 known ships sailed with Grosmont to Bordeaux but how many men and horses did these ships have to transport? In his indenture with the king Grosmont had agreed to provide 500 men for the campaign in Gascony. The king agreed to furnish a further 1,500, and in order to secure these additional troops he made separate indentures with Laurence Hastings, James Audely, Ralph Stafford and Walter Mauny. 500 Welsh foot were also to be attached to Grosmont’s forces.\(^{278}\) Grosmont was therefore expecting to take a projected force of around 2,000 men. If we assume that all these soldiers were raised then they would have brought with them roughly 4,500 horses. However, given that some of the men bought their horses in Bordeaux and that Ralph Stafford had already arrived, it is likely that the number of horses transported was nearer 2,000 to 3,000. This would mean, on average, that each ship would have to carry twenty-seven horses and thirteen men.

4.84 THE 1355 BLACK PRINCE FLEET

\(^{275}\) Of these ports twenty-two (61\%) were situated south and west of the Thames while thirteen (36\%) were located north of the Thames, while one port (Bayonne) was foreign. These thirty-six ports provided 148 ships, of which 104 (70.2\%) vessels were provided by the ports south and west of the Thames, while thirty-nine (26.3\%) came from the ports north of the Thames and five (3.3\%) ships were contributed by the port of Bayonne.

\(^{276}\) The ports south and west provided 1,983 (69.1\%) seamen while the northern ports supplied 711 (24.8\%) maritime personnel and the five ships from Bayonne were operated by 172 (6\%) mariners.

\(^{277}\) Adam de Everingham was accompanied by Philip de Lymbury and they both required transport for their horses and equipment. Everingham is listed on the muster roll. Whether they sailed in a small flotilla from Dover with several others or on a single ship to Bordeaux is unknown, see CCR, 1343-46, p. 361.

\(^{278}\) K. Fowler, the king’s lieutenant, appendix 1, pp. 222, 250. Grosmont was to provide 250 men-at-arms and 250 mounted archers for his retinue. The king’s 1,500 men were to consist of 250 men-at-arms, 250 mounted archers, 500-foot archers and 500 Welsh foot. Hastings was to provide 80 men-at-arms and 80 mounted archers, although he arrived only with 56 men-at-arms at Southampton. Audley
Rather than merely a footnote in the history of the hundred years war, the fleet that transported the Black Prince to Aquitaine in 1355 deserves to be regarded as one of the most important of the period. The first order for the arrest of ships was issued on 10 March 1355, when the ports located between the Thames and the Cinque Ports were requested to provide ships for the passage of the earl of Warwick and others to Gascony. On 27 April 1355 more arrest orders were issued for the requisitioning of vessels for the passage of the Prince. All ships above twenty tons burden from the ports of the Thames to King’s Lynn, King’s Lynn to Berwick, London to Exeter and Exeter to Dunbergh, including Wales, were to be arrested. By 6 May the sheriff of Cornwall was asked to provide bridges to aid the transport of the Prince’s horses and on 27 May John de Hoggeshawe, lieutenant of John de Beauchamp, was ordered to accompany the Prince, taking charge of the maritime resources. The following day an order was sent to eight shipmasters to arrest 234 mariners to serve on board their ships. The last request for ships was delivered on 16 July when William Sturmy was to requisition all ships from Bayonne and the Channel Islands and to send them to Southampton for the Prince. However, it is doubtful if these ships made it to the embarkation port as none of the extant payrolls relating to the fleet of 1355 include any vessels from Bayonne or the Channel Islands.

was to bring with him 40 men-at-arms and 40 mounted archers, while both Stafford and Mauny were to supply 130 men-at-arms each.

279 Foedera, III, i, p. 297.
280 Ibid., pp. 298-99.
281 Ibid., pp. 299, 300, 302.
282 Sufficient time was allowed for the Bayonne and Channel Islands ships to join the flotilla assembling at Plymouth, as the Prince did not sail until the 9 September. Perhaps one of the reasons for their failure to appear was the frequent storms that lashed England and the Channel during the summer of 1355. The king’s fleet was seriously delayed for over a month in July due to the storms; see J. Sumption, Trial by fire (London, 1999), pp. 166-168, although Sumption confuses the fleets of 1355 by suggesting that the earl of Lancaster had a separate flotilla to the king, as does Hewitt (Black Prince’s expedition, p. 38). However, C. J. Rogers (War cruel and sharp, p. 293, n. 38) argues convincingly that Lancaster was in fact part of the king’s fleet and that therefore there were only two flotillas in 1355, not three.
The above orders were wide ranging: every possible port was to be searched for available shipping. But how many vessels were finally raised and which ports contributed these ships to the fleet? The eventual size of the Prince's transport fleet of 1355 can be established by examining three exchequer accounts. The first of these documents records the wages paid to the crews of forty-nine ships provided by the ports situated on the east coast. A decipherable masters, mariners and pages, manned these. The next Exchequer account records the ships contributed by the southern ports that had assembled at Southampton by 8 May. In total, fourteen ports provided thirty-nine ships manned by 872 seamen. The third account details more ships supplied by the ports situated on the east coast: twenty ports, which furnished ninety-one ships manned by 1,560 masters, mariners and pages.

Taking all this evidence together thirty-five ports supplied 179 ships for the Prince's fleet, though this number should be increased to 187 if we include the eight vessels recorded in Feodera. 2,937 mariners manned these 187 ships. Again the true numbers of seamen operating these vessels is difficult to determine exactly due to that damage on the first account. However, assuming that the ships in the fleet had an

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283 E101/26/36; E101/26/37; E101/26/38.
284 E101/26/36 is in appalling condition and has been marked as 'unfit' by TNA and it is disintegrated in many parts. However, by following the lines made by the clerk from the ship names to the record of the crews' wages it is possible to account for forty-nine ships.
285 E101/26/37. It is worth noting that the ships gathered at Southampton seem to have been solely for the transport of the earl's of Warwick and Suffolk, while the prince sailed from Plymouth, see D. Green, 'The household and military retinue of Edward the Black Prince' (Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Nottingham, 1998), vol. 1, p. 44.
286 The ports that supplied the largest number of ships were the ports of Hannelhoke, Shoreham and Dover (five ships each). Hannelhoke's ships were the largest and they therefore, contributed more mariners (124; one ship has no crew size).
287 H. J. Hewitt, Black Prince's expedition, pp. 40-42, pp.179-81 nos, 138-167 are the references he cites for the Prince's fleet. Hewitt only utilises one of the surviving accounts (E101/26/37)) and does not include E101/26/36 in his discussion of the preparations of the fleet. He notes E101/26/38, but he argues that this account does not make any mention of the mission the ships recorded on it were engaged in, so he does not include it among the ships that transported the Prince. However, because the account starts on 12 July 1355, it could not be related to the king's and Lancaster's transport fleet of that year because on 10 July they were already at sea having sailed from the Thames estuary. Therefore, the likelihood is that E101/26/38 does indeed record the wages paid to the mariners who had transported the Prince to Gascony.
average crew size of sixteen, the forty-three ships for which no crew sizes is known could be said to add a further 736 mariners to the fleet. It could therefore be tentatively suggested that the east coast ports supplied 140 ships (74.8%) ships operated by 2,296 (62.5%) mariners, thus making the east coast by far the largest contributor.\(^{289}\)

So far we know that the transport fleet of the Prince numbered 187 ships. But how many men were these vessels expected to carry? The actual size of the army under the Prince is difficult to establish because no muster rolls survive for this campaign.\(^{290}\) It is known that the Prince, as part of his indenture with the king, agreed to provide 433 men-at-arms and 700 archers, of which 400 were to be mounted and 300 on foot.\(^{291}\) In addition, the earls of Warwick, Oxford, Salisbury, and Suffolk brought retinues, as did Sir Reginald Cobham and Sir John Lisle. It has been suggested that their combined recruits numbered some 500 men-at-arms and 800 archers, giving an overall strength of 933 men-at-arms and 1,800 archers in the Prince’s army.\(^{292}\) This force would have brought with it approximately 6,500 horses.

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\(^{288}\) E101/26/36 is too badly damaged to see many ports although Grimsby, Barton and Swynflete can be made out. All these except Swynflete appear on E101/26/38.

\(^{289}\) The port, which provided the most ships, was Great Yarmouth, which contributed twenty (10.6%) ships crewed by 323 (8.7%) mariners. But the largest single ship was the Seintemaricog of 200 tons, mastered by John Wilydon, but owned by Henry Finch of Winchelsea, and manned by fifty mariners, see E101/26/37, m. 3. Finally, it is also known that the Prince himself sailed on one of the above vessels, the Cristofre, which is recorded on one of the Exchequer accounts. See E101/26/38; H. J. Hewitt, *The Black Prince’s expedition*, p. 40; D. Green, *The battle of Poitiers, 1356* (Tempus, 2002) p. 28. Three more ships were ordered to be prepared: the James, the Gilane and the Marget of the Tower. These were to be manned and made ready for service in the Prince’s fleet (C76/33, mm. 9, 12). However, it is difficult to say whether they actually sailed with the Prince.

\(^{290}\) The best guide to the size and composition of the Prince’s army can be found in H. J. Hewitt, *The Black Prince’s expedition*, pp. 14-26 and appendix C, which lists, as far as the sources will allow, the men that served under the Prince at Poitiers.

\(^{291}\) BPR, IV, pp. 143-44.

\(^{292}\) D. Green, *Poitiers*, p. 23, who differs slightly from earlier interpretations. For example, A. E. Prince, ‘The strength of English armies in the reign of Edward III’, *EHR* 46 (1931), pp. 351-71 estimates that Warwick brought 120 men-at-arms, Suffolk, 60; Salisbury, 55; Cobham, 30; Lisle, 60; Hewitt, *The organisation of war*, p. 35 states that Lisle’s retinue numbered 20 knights, 39 esquires and 40 mounted archers and Hewitt places the total strength of the Prince’s force at 2,600 men (*Black Prince’s expedition*, p. 21). However, given the size of the Prince’s transport fleet and by comparing it to those fleets were we know how many men were transported in it is likely that the force numbered some 1,500-2,000 men.
assuming that is that not too many serving personnel purchased their mounts in Bordeaux (which was permitted under the terms of the indenture). This would mean that, on average, each ship in the fleet transported fourteen men and thirty-four horses.

To conclude the analysis of the fleets that were concerned with the transport of the king’s diplomats, seneschals and lieutenants in the period 1337-1359: it is possible to say that 408 ships participated in the transportation of these ambassadors, officials and soldiers (this includes the thirteen vessels that transported Ralph Stafford to Bordeaux in 1345). Were it is possible to record the homeports of these vessels, it can be stated that 188 ships were contributed by ports north of the Thames and the ports situated south and west of the Thames supplied 215 ships, while five were foreign vessels. The total number of constables, masters, mariners and pages operating these 408 ships was 8,809. If we make allowances for the ‘invisible crews’ who served on board thirty-eight of these vessels, the overall number of active seamen could rise to as many as 9,500. These 408 ships and 8,809 mariners transported land-based armies and diplomats totalling some 5,000 men. It seems that the maritime arm of any Edwardian campaign or embassy would require the maritime component in terms of manpower to be twice that of the land-based elements, which it transported.

293 BPR, IV, p. 144.
TABLE 4.1

NUMBERS OF SHIPS INVOLVED IN TRANSPORT FLEETS, 1324-1360

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1324-1360</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total number of English Ships</td>
<td>3,052</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern fleet</td>
<td>1,688</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern fleet</td>
<td>1,364</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign ships</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of mariners</td>
<td>65,341</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern mariners</td>
<td>35,572</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern mariners</td>
<td>27,687</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The table includes all the ships that served, including those vessels, such as the twenty-one Cinque Port ships that served in 1325, regardless of the fact that these were not strictly transport ships. The king's own ships have been added to those of the southern fleet. The largest number of ports that were asked to supply ships was eighty-eight in 1324. However, on closer examination the largest number of ports that actually supplied ships to one fleet was the eighty-seven ports that contributed ships to the 1359 transport fleet. Although the table shows that both admiralties contributed roughly the same numbers of ships and mariners, the direct comparative evidence from the 1324-5, 1338-40, 1342 transport fleets and the Crécy ship list show that most transport fleets were composed of ships mainly provided by the south and western ports (for e.g. in 1342 the southern ports supplied 7,051 mariners compared to the 3,361 of the northern ports and 444 ships compared to the 219 of the northern ports) it must be taken onto account the lack of evidence relating to the southern admiralties participation in the major campaigns of 1345, the siege of Calais and the 1359 Reims campaign. If all the evidence material were available for these campaigns it would probably weight the contribution in favour of the south and western ports by 60% to 40%.

1,408 mariners operated foreign vessels. The total number of mariners includes the estimated 'invisible' mariners from various campaigns, whereas the individual admiralty numbers do not.
CHAPTER 5

MARITIME RESOURCES AND THE KINGS WAR

This thesis has set out to investigate the involvement, whether voluntary or unwillingly, of England’s maritime communities to the war effort of Edward II and Edward III. The origins of the participation of so many ports, and their resources, in the wars of the period can be traced back to the campaigns conducted under Edward I, especially those of the 1290s in Scotland and Flanders. The requisitioning of ships continued under his son, although Edward II’s Scottish campaigns were punctuated by long periods of truce. But by the time of Edward III’s campaigns, particularly those fought on the continent from 1338 onwards a dramatic change occurred in the organisation and logistics of war. An increase in the demands of the crown for the support of its wars altered the relationship between the king and his subjects. Edward I and Edward II had raised only four fleets for service abroad (the St Sardos fleet has been counted as two), but within four years from 1338 Edward III had already matched this.

Indeed, what this thesis has shown is that in terms of ship numbers the scale of the operations from the beginning of the French war increased dramatically. Edward II’s fleet of 284 ships serving in the campaign of 1322 looks rather small as compared to the 675 that Edward III deployed throughout 1342. Change also occurred in the organisation of the fleets. In the Scottish wars, ships could be requisitioned and put to sea in relatively small numbers over the course of perhaps a month, which in turn led to large numbers of vessels sailing the seas around Scotland. But there was no requirement for the ships to mass at one particular port and sail out in one large armada. In the preparations for the Scottish campaigns the orders issued for the arrest
of ships rarely mention a meeting or embarkation port. The victual ships' destinations were always set, because they had to go to either Skinburness or Newcastle. But the military arm of the fleet was usually given no such orders, being normally advised to 'go to sea and attack the king's enemies', or variants on such phrases. It seems that the military ships, having been placed under the admirals of the north and the south, would usually sail out of their ports and would group together in 'county' fleets. Thus, when raised, the ships of Great Yarmouth and King's Lynn would sail up the coast together for extra protection until the admiral gave them specific orders at a later date.

What the admirals were handling in the Scottish wars are groups of twenty to forty ships, assembled on an ad hoc basis over a month or two, which all told could add up to 200 or more vessels participating in victual, blockade and siege duties.

It can be seen, therefore, that the role played by the merchant marine had changed in two important respects between the Scottish wars of the 1320s and the beginning of the French campaigns in 1338. The numbers of ships deployed had risen dramatically and the organisation and management of these requisitioned fleets had also developed. What Edward III required from 1338 was an organisational structure that allowed his officials to requisition hundreds of ships and place them at one chosen embarkation port all at the same time. That this was achieved on a large scale in 1338, 1340, 1342, 1345, 1346, 1355 and 1359 is testament to the skill of his administrative officials. The drawback, however, was that, on occasion (as in 1342), this process meant that over a hundred ships could be locked in port for as long as two

1 A. R. Lewis, T. J. Runyan, *European naval and maritime history, 300-1500* (Indiana University Press, 1990), p. 123. Henry III had previously raised a fleet of 288 ships for foreign service and Edward I's 1297 Flanders flotilla numbered some 305 vessels. Such fleets, however, were not regular occurrences.

2 Edward II did operate a policy of blockade between campaigns from 1307-1314, and periodically thereafter. But during his campaigns a blockade policy was never attempted, and although he tried to organise combined operations by sea and land these were never successful. Many English shipmasters violated the blockades themselves. See W. Stanford Reid, 'Sea-power in the Anglo-Scottish war', pp. 14-18.
months awaiting the arrival of more and more vessels. But Edward III’s officials were generally successful in raising these large transport fleets, and while it is true that they were exploiting the skeleton of an efficient system already in place from the reigns of Edward I and Edward II, the frequency with which such armadas were raised in the 1330s and 1340s represents a radical departure from the reigns of the previous two kings. Indeed, the analysis provided in this thesis goes some way to addressing the argument that it was only after 1343 that Edward managed to formulate an effective technique for the raising of fleets: an argument that ignores the fact that he did so on two occasions before 1342 on a large scale. The question which therefore needs to be asked is how Edward III achieved this level of support and who benefited from the new organisational procedures that he introduced from 1338-1359?

In order to answer such questions, and assess the overall shipping contributions made to the wars by the English merchant marine this chapter will be divided into three sections. What immediately follows will be an analysis on the administration of the fleets, including a discussion on several issues that arise from the changes made to the organisation of war by Edward III. Chief among these was the increasing tendency to partly ‘privatise’ large sections of the war. Secondly, the chapter will examine the issues that have arisen in the above discussion on several transport fleets, such as Sluys in 1340 and Reims in 1359. More positive, however, will be the analysis of the siege of Calais, where it will be shown that when there is a lack of sources relating to the service of the land-based forces, the maritime evidence can be used to illuminate the scale and timetable of the siege. Finally, a detailed examination will be undertaken as to the numbers of individual ships that operated

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3 J. S. Kepler, The effects of the battle of Sluys’, p. 71, who argues that Edward’s fleet raising methods were ineffective until after the Brittany campaign. Indeed, what Kepler fails to take account of is that in addition to the 1338 and 1340 transport armadas in 1337 Bartholomew Burghersh had also raised a fleet of ships numbering 150 vessels, see E101/19/39.
throughout the wars. Included in this will be a discussion about the methodology that this thesis has employed in order to be as accurate as possible with regard individual ship service.

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From an organisational perspective, Edward III inherited a system of raising a fleet from his father, but he exploited his maritime resources more effectively than any of his predecessors. In chapter two it was argued that Edward III employed seven methods to gather ships for his fleets, whereas his father only utilised three. Although requisition was at the centre of both kings' policy the system they employed varied slightly depending on what the intended expedition's main aim was or how large a fleet was required to transport the awaiting army. For example, in 1342 general arrest orders were issued to the admirals to requisition the fleets needed for that year. They in turn sent officials out to visit ports under their authority. But, in 1346 the admiralties were sub-divided into smaller units with clerks sometimes being given particular ports or 'zones of requisition' in order to raise sufficient ships. There were still two admirals in 1346, but requisition zones did not respect the natural divisions between the admiralties at the River Thames. Because the fleet of 1346 was planned from the outset to be the largest of the reign so far, a more thorough way of exploiting the available maritime resources was required, and as a consequence individual clerks were ordered to concentrate their efforts on smaller geographical areas, although the admirals still held overall authority. By 1359 this administrative and organisational system had again changed. The capture of Calais meant that Edward III could now employ mixed fleets, raised partly in the traditional way by requisition and partly by means of private hire. There was one process that connects these changes: under
Edward III there was an increasing though partial tendency to privatise the English war effort.

This privatisation can be traced back to the Scottish campaigns of the mid 1330s. For Edward III, 1336 marked the end of several years of intense personal participation in the Scottish wars (he was involved in 1341 and 1356, but only for a short raids). From the latter part of 1336 he seems to have left the system of victual supply entirely in the hands of several men, but particularly the merchants of King’s Lynn such as Thomas and William Melcheburn. The Melcheburns accounted for what they supplied either directly through the Exchequer or through the receiver at Berwick. But it was the first method that was most important, as it seems to have been a recent development. In many ways a new system was brought into operation in which private merchants, such as the Melcheburns, could now work directly with the Exchequer, thus reducing the role of the receiver of Berwick, who sometimes had to source his own supplies independently of the government. No longer were general purveyance writs issued for campaigns in Scotland. By this stage of his war in Scotland, Edward III seems to have decided to hold on to what he had so far gained, through the employment of contract armies and garrisons, who in turn were supplied by merchants who could utilise their own private contacts in the markets. This ‘private’ system of supply has been regarded as unsuccessful, but this conclusion was based on evidence concerning Manentius Francis, a foreign merchant, who faced problems, but who probably did not have the ‘market contacts’ that the Melcheburns

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4 Requisition, Cinque Ports and on one occasion a direct agreement with port burgesses, the king’s ships are not included here because their numbers were only small. Edward II never issued pardons to ship masters or crews.

5 By 1338 the receiver generally worked directly with the merchants to supply his needs. The days of the receiver having to travel sometimes vast distances to source his own supplies had ceased. On the role of the receiver in the earlier period, see D. Cornell, ‘English castle garrisons’, pp. 65-66.
had developed throughout their long careers as shipmasters/owners and merchants. Indeed, during this period we do not find regular complaints by the Melcheburns about the lack of payment by the Exchequer. The main problem with supply was the distribution of the victuals from Newcastle and Berwick to the garrisons. On the other hand, the victual arrangements for royal armies (and the forces of Edward’s lieutenants who campaigned in France), which by 1338 were about to embark on continental campaigns still relied on purveyance. It was not, therefore, that this intrusive way of raising supplies did not cease to operate; it was just transferred to what Edward thought was the more important facet of his wars. The system was, however, modified in the sense that particular clerks, such as William Dunstaple, were usually placed at the head of purveyance teams, who worked in close cooperation with the sheriffs of the counties. They consequently tended to act more favourably towards the local population, which in turn lessened tensions between Edward III’s government and the political community, now voicing its opinion in parliament.

Privatisation of the victualling dimension of the war effort was taken to its next logical stage during the expedition of 1345 and those of the 1350s. The transport fleets for these royal campaigns were raised by means of private hire agreements between retinue captains and ship owners/masters. This had advantages for all parties involved in the wars. The king benefited because he and his administrative staff were now freed from the burdensome task of requisitioning large fleets and organising them to be at particular ports. They still did this for the king’s lieutenants serving in

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6 Citing the failures of Manenti Francis, C. Candy, ‘The Scottish wars of Edward III’, p. 259 states that ‘private supply was not successful’. In addition, D. S. Bachrach, (‘Military logistics’, pp. 429-30) notes that private supply could not work effectively in conjunction with general purveyance owing to one method depriving the other of available transportation: yet, the Melcheburns and the de la Poles of Hull supplied English armies with general purveyance concurrently and the clerks employed by the crown did not impede their work. However, these two sets of merchants usually relied on sea transportation rather than overland travel.

7 This new development in many ways mirrored the indenture system, which it has been noted freed the crown from burdensome financial and bureaucratic procedures. In short by shifting the onus of
Gascony and Brittany, but the task was made easier by only having to arrest ships from one particular admiralty and the flotillas were much smaller than those assembled for the royal fleets of 1338-1346. From 1345, when the king required multiple transport fleets for himself and his lieutenants, it is probable that one of the two admiralties was reserved for the retinue captains’ private arrangements. Thus, in 1345 the king’s transport fleet to Flanders is not recorded in any payroll, while the fleet that transported Lancaster to Gascony included only a small number of vessels from the northern admiralty. Furthermore, in 1355 and 1359 very few ships from the southern ports are recorded on the payrolls drawn up by royal administration. The retinue captains benefited from this system because they could now arrange their own transportation. What this meant to them was that they could reduce the time they spent waiting at the port of embarkation because they were able to agree first hand with the ship master the exact date of arrival and departure. For the crown this had the added bonus of reducing the supply needs of large numbers of men waiting at the ports. The ship owners/masters were also favoured by this new approach because they would not be forced to stay under arrest for lengthy periods in the port of embarkation. They would know exactly the intended length of their service and they would still be paid their wages up-front by the captain. Just how important this could be is indicated by the circumstances of 1342, when over 140 ships were held under arrest for over recruitment, and fleet raising, onto the captains the government saved itself valuable resources. On the suggestion that this eased bureaucratic pressure off the government, see M. Srtickland, R. Hardy, *The great warbow*, p. 199.

At first glance it should have been the other way round, i.e. that the king’s transport fleets would be raised by the traditional method because he had the bureaucratic apparatus with him in the form of the Wardrobe. However, what the crown seems to be aiming for is as little disruption as possible, and therefore fewer complaints through parliament, to the English merchant marine, and the rising merchant classes. Thus the largest section of the fleet was assembled mainly through private hire. Although the crown would still rely on the Wardrobe to organise the arrayed troops’ transport vessels, so in essence even the king’s transport fleet still consisted of requisitioned merchant ships.

Although advances were issued by Wetwang to mariners for their wages, these probably related to the forces raised by commissions of array and not to captains of retinues.
two months before sailing to Brittany while they waited for the army to gather. The advantage in laying some of the burden onto the magnates’ had been steadily recognised from the Scottish wars of 1334 and 1335, when it became the magnates’ responsibility to honour the contracts they had made with the crown: to find the number of men they had agreed to serve with, and to ensure that the men raised in this way were sufficiently equipped. This took away many burdensome recruitment tasks from the royal officers and the royal household. 11

It would seem, therefore, that all the participants involved in the privatisation of the royal transport fleets from 1345, when multiple fleets were requisitioned, gained from this development. There was an element of trust built into the system, in that the captains relied upon the crown to pay them for organising their own transport arrangements. However, it is probable that the regard payment, which in part was rendered to the retinue captains in advance of a campaign, was intended to cover the added costs that were incurred when they were obliged to make their own shipping arrangements. It is noteworthy that regard as a system of up-front payment was introduced in 1345, which coincides exactly with the year that also saw the introduction of the new method of raising a fleet. 12 It is therefore argued that in part the quarterly payment of 100 marks that each retinue captain received, for every thirty men-at-arms in his retinue, was to provide sufficient monetary means to enable him to arrange his men’s maritime transportation requirements. In the period covered by this thesis it was normal for a ship owner to charge 2s for transporting a horseman and 6d

10 This is why in Wetwang’s receipt book there are payments made over to ships’ crews in 1345 because these would the vessels employed by the crown to transport the county levies over with the army, the retinue captains being made to make their own arrangements, see E101/390/12, fols 2r-3r. 11 See C. Candy, ‘The Scottish wars of Edward III’, p. 154. 12 Regard was a flexible way of increasing payments to soldiers serving in expeditions without actually altering the daily wage rates. For example, in the 1370s regard was doubled so that the crown did not have to continue with horse compensation payments, which it has been already noted were administratively expensive to produce and imperfect, see A. Ayton, ‘English armies in the fourteenth century’, pp. 24-25.
for a footman; however, to hire a single boat would cost one mark for both outward and return voyage. But it was much more expensive to hire shipping for transporting horses and men to a theatre of war. For example, in 1343 Jack Faukes and his companion paid 20s to charter a vessel for a single journey, and then had to expend a further sum, at least half a mark, on hiring boats to take them out to the waiting ship at Dover, and another small boat at Wissant. Therefore, the issue to a retinue captain of 100 marks, for the transportation of thirty men-at-arms, seems to be a sum of money of the right magnitude for his transportation requirements. The connection between the payment of regard to retinue captains and the need to compensate them for the shipping of their horses is further indicated by the fact that regard was not generally paid for service in Scotland.

The capture of Calais in 1347 provided further impetus to the increasing reliance on privatised transport fleets, because by controlling Calais Edward III now had no longer to transport an army in one large fleet. His forces could now arrive at a continental port, safe in English hands, over a period of several weeks. Edward still paid directly for the county levies’ transport needs, and those of his lieutenants, but captains serving in the royal household division now organised their own transport arrangements. Another advantage of partly privatising the fleet raising system was that it seemed to promote a greater willingness on the part of ship owners to have their

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14 Ibid.
15 By using the information contained in the account of Faukes it is possible to suggest that it would cost 3 marks to transport each man-at-arms and his horses. Therefore, to transport thirty men-at-arms it would come to roughly ninety marks. Indeed, in the 1390s the future Henry IV paid 22s 4d to transport eleven horses from Dover to Calais, see S. Rose, The medieval sea, p. 98.
16 On the system of regard and the date it was introduced, see A. Aytton, Knights and warhorses, pp. 110-114. This introduction of regard also affected the practice of drafting the indentures of war, which generally became more precise in their language during the French war, see Private indentures for life service in peace and war, 1278-1476, Camden fifth series, 3, eds, M. Jones, S. Walker (London, 1994), pp. 21-22. It is also worth noting that captains serving in campaigns in Scotland, such as Richard II’s in 1385, did not usually receive regard payments. This was surely because the captains had no need to
vessels requisitioned, or now hired, for service. It has already been noted that Edward I and Edward II sometimes met with refusals from shipmasters to serve in their fleets. Indeed, this problem afflicted some of Edward III's expeditions, particularly between 1337-40, when hundreds of vessels failed to serve under Walter de Mauny, and during the 1342 Brittany invasion, when several ships failed to turn up at the port of embarkation and hundreds more deserted the king outside Brest and Vannes. This problem had wholly disappeared by the time of the 1345 campaign, which saw the development of the partial privatisation model of fleet building methods. This reduced the friction between the government and the port communities, which in turn, encouraged a more rapid response by ship owners in allowing their vessels to be requisitioned.

These developments should not be seen in isolation. From the inception of the indenture system potential was always there for the kings to partly privatise areas of their war effort. The emergence of the ‘mixed’ retinue, which came to dominate the organisation of English armies from the 1340s, should be seen in this light. In 1336 and 1337, Henry of Lancaster and the earl of Warwick led the Scottish war with armies raised by exploiting existing recruitment networks, paid for by the crown, and supplied by merchants using their own methods and contacts in the markets. In 1346 the English armies operating in Gascony and Normandy had large contingents that were raised through the exploitation of retinue captains’ and their military recruitment ties, and by this time the transport fleets had been added to the list of elements in the

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17 C47/2/30; C. Lambert, 'An army transport fleet', chapter 2.

18 C. J. Rogers, *War cruel and sharp*, p. 295 notes how the fleets of 1355 were raised quickly: two months from planning to sailing, although bad weather delayed the voyage for months.

19 The retinues are analysed by A. Ayton in, A. Ayton and P. Preston, *The battle of Crécy*, p. 171.
Edwardian military machine that could be raised through the private initiative of the king's companions in arms.20

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In order to understand how the kings utilised the maritime resources available to them it is important that we now turn our attention to certain issues relating to the transport fleets, and specifically to some of the problems encountered by the crown when it came to requisitioning transport armadas. The following analysis will focus on certain aspects of four of the royal transport fleets of the period: those of the war of St. Sardos, Sluys in 1340, the siege of Calais in 1347 and the Reims campaign of 1359. During our systematic examination of the fleets of the period several issues have appeared: the problems and time scales involved in arresting and organising the fleets; the election of mariners to serve on board the vessels; gaps in the payroll evidence; and how the capture of Calais affected the organisation of the transport fleets.

Consistently, the kings of the period experienced time management problems when attempting to assemble transport flotillas. In some cases this timetable was disrupted as a result of objections raised by the ports themselves. Preparations for the St. Sardos transpon fleet, including the election of mariners, highlight some of these difficulties. Throughout the preparations to this expedition, Edward's government met with direct refusals by shipmasters to serve in the fleet; it struggled to meet the timetable of the campaign and also to raise sufficient numbers of mariners to serve in the flotilla.

Delays encountered during the requisition process clearly are indicated in the sources. We already know that the armada, which sailed in September 1324, was originally to leave in June of that year. One reason for this delay was the refusal, in

20 By the 1340s Edward III's wars had acquired popular support within the nobility, see A. Ayton, 'War
June, of shipmasters from Devon, Somerset and Dorset to allow their vessels to be requisitioned. The Cinque Ports also caused delays. The Ports had objected to service over long periods and their complaints resulted in the king requesting that the bishop of Bath search through any documents relating to Edward I's Gascony campaign for evidence of Cinque Ports' service. Edward I had certainly received the service of twelve ships from the Ports for his Gascon expedition in 1301, but doubts remain as to whether these ships' crews were paid. It is likely, however, that the Ports had raised concerns over the issue of payment of wages, because the increasing tendency throughout this period was for the Ports’ crews to be paid wages, and it is certain that in 1342 all the ships provided by them were indeed paid wages commensurate with their service.

Edward II faced similar problems with regard to mariner recruitment. Although some of the ships were at the port of embarkation from June onwards, their crews were engaged piecemeal from mid-July to October. For example, Gilbert Saundre, master of the Godyer of Dartmouth, was paid wages for himself one constable and twenty-eight mariners from 12 July to 11 October 1324, while a further six mariners only served from 1 August to 11 October, and eight took wages for no more than thirteen days in October. Furthermore, Walter atte Lane, master of the Richgayne of Weymouth, was paid wages for himself and twenty-eight mariners for ninety-two days; yet from 31 August to 11 October 1324, seven further mariners were admitted to the crew ‘pro dupplici eskipammento’. This last phrase that is included in Nicholas Huggate’s accounts is intriguing. Recent commentators have suggested

21 CCR, 1323-27, p. 194.
22 SCI/16, no. 37; N. A. M. Rodger, ‘Naval service of the Cinque ports’, p. 645.
23 E36/204, p. 229 provides evidence that the Ports’ crews received wages in 1342, but also, see N. A. M. Rodger, ‘Naval service of the Cinque Ports’, p. 645
24 BL, Add MS 7967, fols 94r-98r.
that this term was employed when a ship had its normal crew size doubled to enable it to perform a troop transport or military service role. But the evidence in Huggate's accounts suggests that the term was used in a far less meaningful manner: that a crew such as that on the *Richegayne*, which here was increased by a quarter, could also have the term applied to it. It seems that while the ships waited at the embarkation port for the land-based personnel to arrive a constant flow of extra seamen were admitted to the ships. This also means that the mariners who joined the waiting ships were not recruited from the vessels' homeport. Indeed, because admirals sometimes worked alongside commissioners of array it is likely that some of the manpower utilised on board the ships was raised from counties with no coastline. But due to the sometimes-limited manpower resources of the maritime ports only two thirds (65%) of the ships were sufficiently well manned to enable them to go on active service by July 1324.

There is also some intriguing evidence that exemplifies the way in which Edward II occasionally organised his resources and procured ships for his fleets. In preparing for the 1322 campaign, Edward and his advisors seem to have negotiated directly with some of the port towns, rather than sending out officers (from the centre of government) to requisition vessels in the normal fashion. For example, nine ports from Norfolk were assessed in a slightly different way to contribute ships for the campaign in Scotland. The ports were expected to furnish five ships, irrespective of

25 N. A. M Rodger, 'Naval service of the Cinque Ports', p. 637; T. J. Runyan, 'Naval logistics', p. 89. Indeed, increasing the size of a ship's crew for transportation purposes would mean that less land-based forces could be freighted to the area of operations. The transport fleets of the period were large enough to counteract any French aggression simply by virtue of the fact that they numbered many hundreds of vessels.

26 On the admirals working alongside the commissions of array, see R. M. Hedley, 'The administration of the navy', pp. 20-33. It was not an urgent requirement that all the men on board a ship should be experienced seamen. As long as there was a master who could navigate and a few other experienced mariners, the rest of the crew were there simply for the muscle power needed to operate a ship. A vessel with only a single mast would require only a small number of experienced men to direct the others on how to operate it.
the fact that these communities had already contributed two to the fleet. This process is reminiscent of the new obligations that Edward and his councillors had been developing with regard to the recruitment of land-based troops. Just as towns were required to provide a certain quota of armed men, ports were assessed to contribute a specified number of ships, manned, armed and victualled. Sometimes, as in the case of some of the towns already mentioned, this meant several ports pooling their resources to meet the demands of the crown. Although this kind of ship-raising procedure was not entirely novel, assessing towns or groups of towns certainly seems to have been a new development.

Edward III resorted to novel methods when it came to raising the crews for his fleets. As well as the employment of mariners by the traditional methods of election or impressments Edward III also resorted to issuing pardons to ship owners/masters, and to full crews, in order bolster the numbers of vessels in his transport armadas. A detailed set of pardons relating to the Brittany campaigns of 1342-3 have survived, now preserved among Ancient Correspondence that allow an unparalleled glimpse into the forms these pardons took. It seems that three distinct types were issued. One type was granted to individual masters and mariners to serve themselves in person. A second category was issued to ship owners/masters to

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27 CCR, 1318-23, p. 463. The ports were, Snyterle; Wyveton; Cleye; Salthouse; Baudreseye; Covehithe; Guston; Walston and Filtustowe.
28 Ibid., p. 463. For example the ports of Snyterle, Wyveton, Cleye and Salthouse were to find three ships between them. For a discussion of the recruitment of the land forces by means of this assessment, see B. C. Keeney, 'Military service in England, 1272-1327'; Speculum 22 (October, 1947), pp. 534-549, especially, pp. 540-1; M. Powicke, 'Edward II and military obligation', Speculum 31 (January, 1956), pp. 91-119, see p. 98; M. Prestwich, Armies and warfare, pp. 78, 134.
29 Individual ports had certainly been approached to provide ships before this time, yet this usually involved negotiations with the port burgesses and they usually acquired favours from the king for providing ships in such a way. On earlier example of ports providing ships, see M. Jones, 'Two Exeter ship agreements of 1303 and 1310', MM 52 (1967), pp. 315-19.
provide ships for two months, while the third type of pardons were given to full ships' crews for their two months of free service.\textsuperscript{30}

Seven pardons included in the *Ancient Correspondence* collection that relate to the Brittany campaign were issued to individuals.\textsuperscript{31} These seven men were to serve, 'par deux mois de aler sur meer en notre compaigne en le dit voyage par la temps aravant', for the, 'defense du royalme'. Seven ships were contributed to the Brittany transport fleet of 1342 by ship owners/masters who were the beneficiaries of the second category of pardons. The vessels these men supplied were to come to the port of embarkation 'bien appaireille', and with 'gentz armees' on board.\textsuperscript{32} This category of pardon, because it names the ships' masters can be compared directly with the Wardrobe accounts and other payrolls relating to the Brittany campaign. This reveals that none of the masters named in these seven pardons are recorded as having received pay for this campaign: their service was given for free in return for a pardon against their crimes. The third type of pardon was issued to a full crew who served on board the *Margrete*, which was one of the two ships provided by John Perman, and it records the names of thirty-four mariners.\textsuperscript{33} This pardon evidence shows that Edward

\textsuperscript{30} H. Lacy, 'The politics of mercy: the use of the royal pardon in fourteenth-century England,' (Unpublished PhD thesis, University of York, 2005), pp. 20-21, 49-51, 61-62 and appendices 2 and 4, notes that there are three types of pardon: individual pardons, general pardons or group pardons. The ones issued to the mariners in 1342 seem to equate with individual pardons. Although Lacy suggests that military service was usually linked to the general pardon, that many of the ship masters/owners, and indeed full crew compliments, are named individually suggests that these were individual pardons. Edward seemed to favour this approach throughout the campaign in 1342 as he awarded twenty-six persons such pardons outside Vannes in 1342. Some of the maritime pardons make no mention of service at own costs (for example SC1/40 no. 18). However, the presumption must be that free service was required and although it has been noted that pardons were usually issued on the premise that some men could still draw wages (Lacy, p. 22) and the issuing of pardons was used as a means to bolster numbers at the muster points, the likelihood is that many recipients did serve for no pay. In addition, the fact that none of the pardoned masters appear in any of the related payrolls suggests that they were serving for two months at their own costs. In many ways these sets of pardons are anomalies because Lacy does not mention them in her thesis and she makes the suggestion that only on two occasions were pardons not recorded through the Patent Rolls in the Chancery (Lacy, p. 50). However, Lacy seems to be mistaken on this last point. See, for example, A. Ayton, *Knights and warhorses*, pp. 144-45 who notes that pardons were recorded on the Treaty Rolls, privy seal warrants and the Scottish rolls.

\textsuperscript{31} SC1/40, nos, 14-18.

\textsuperscript{32} SC1/39, nos, 15, 81; SC1/40, nos, 10, 12, 19; SC1/41, no. 66. SC1/40 no. 12 accounts for two ships.

\textsuperscript{33} SC1/40, no. 10.
III cast his net widely when it came to ship requisition. Every possible facet of his maritime resources was exploited in order to raise sufficient numbers of ships and mariners for his needs.

The crown also exploited the available shipping resources in order to give in the expeditions of the period a proactive maritime dimension. When the king had successfully transported an army to the continent, a fleet of ships was usually put into operation to perform coastguard duties along the coast of England or to operate along the coastlines of France, raiding and destroying ports. Moreover, when Edward was campaigning on the continent, ships contributed in one of the most important ways: that of maintaining communications between Edward and his home government. It is necessary only to look at the Low Countries campaigns, during which Edward was away from England for long periods, to see how important this function was. When Edward's army disembarked in Antwerp during July 1338, the French put to sea a fleet that threatened to disrupt his supply and communication links with England. Consequently, on 27 September 1338, an order was issued to Peter Bard, admiral of the southern fleet, to raise a flotilla of ships to go against the French and attack the Norman ports. Similar writs were sent to Thomas de Drayton, admiral of the north. 34 On the same day Edward's home government increased these efforts to raise a fleet and issued direct instructions to ninety ports, and the Cinque Ports, to raise a sufficient number of ships. These requests seem to have been met in part because Thomas de Drayton expended £400 on mariners' and archers' wages, and John Crabbe was issued with a further £52 20d for the payment of wages made to the mariners of the north from 4 April to 12 June 1339. 35 Moreover, during April 1339 off the coast of Flanders Robert Morley attacked a squadron of Genoese galleys that were

escorting French supply ships. The next few months were quiet as far as the mobilisation of England’s maritime resources was concerned, as Edward pressed on with his land campaign. However, on 6 November 1339 William Trussell was ordered to provide two ships, the Blakecog and the Warenne, from Poole, which would enable thirty men-at-arms and forty archers, under William de Warenne, Ralph de Wylyngton and John Seinte Piere, to go against the kings enemies. Four days later, Robert de Artois was to be given control over the ship Seinte Jak of Bayonne, mastered by Donnyngton Bydard, currently anchored in the port of Sandwich. On 15 November Hugh le Despencer set out with two vessels, the Seintemariecog and the Cogg de Clyve, mastered by William le Ridere and Goscelinde de Clyve, on the king’s service. Other ships were also pressed into service to freight victuals. Thus the Nicholas of Great Yarmouth and the Nicholas of Hadelegh carried wine and cheese to the king in the months of June and September.

One maritime resource that was always available to the king and which he could deploy with relative ease were his own ships. These played a vital role in all the campaigns of the period, but their contribution to the king’s communication network was paramount when he was campaigning on the continent. Throughout Edward III’s stay in the Low Countries, the communication artery, which these vessels provided, aided the war effort and they were almost always on active service. For example, three of the king’s ships were anchored in the port of Sluys (the George, Margrete and the Messenger), from 25 January until 15 February, when they sailed for England. Similarly Richard Fille, master of the Cog Thomas, left Sluys to England in early

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35 E101/21/31; E101/22/8.
36 N. A. M. Rodger, Safeguard of the sea, p. 97. Before this, in January, certain ships of the Cinque Ports burnt the French town of Boulogne, see Murimuth, p. 103.
37 CCR, 1339-41, p. 302. Trussell’s expenses are enrolled on E101/22/18.
38 Foedera, II, ii, p. 1095.
39 CCR, 1339-41, p. 290.
1340 only to return to the Low Countries on the 19 April and stay in Flanders until the
7 May. He then sailed back to England before eventually returning to Flanders to
participate in the battle of Sluys in June. Hugh Cad, master of the Hokebot, was in
London in early September before leaving for Sluys on the 18th of the same month.
The evidence relating to the service of the king’s ships throughout the Low Countries
expeditions illuminates the fact that the king’s ships were employed as crucial agents
in the communication network between Edward and his home government.41

Until the battle of Sluys weakened French naval power, these frequent
voyages by the king’s mariners were fraught with danger. The French fleet, before
June 1340, was large and sailed the Channel with impunity. Indeed, one can see that
the French concentrated all their naval power in Sluys during 1340 not only to prevent
Edward returning to the Low Countries but also to disrupt the king’s communications
with his allies and the English forces serving in Flanders. This again provides further
evidence to contradict the recent suggestion that Edward III never fully appreciated
the effects of sea power,42 an argument that, in any case, fails to take into account the
fact that Edward fought two sea battles and utilised his own ships for his
communication needs while on campaign.

* * *

In chapter four it was noted that the Sluys transport fleet is puzzling in terms of how it
was raised and paid for, and why there is a gap in the payroll evidence. The fact that
an estimated 150 ships are absent from the relevant payroll is an intriguing mystery.
Of several possible explanations perhaps the most likely relates to the way in which
the mariners were eventually paid for this campaign. In 1340 Edward had struggled to
requisition a fleet of sufficient size and it is possible that ad hoc arrangements and

40 Ibid., pp. 143, 207.
guarantees were made to ship owners with regard to the payments that would be made
to the crews of the participating vessels.\textsuperscript{43} We also know that the king claimed to have
captured 190 ships from the French fleet during the engagement at Sluys.\textsuperscript{44} The prize
money from such a large number of ships would certainly have brought in a
considerable sum. This could have been used in various ways. For example, the ships’
crews could have taken their share of the booty and this could have been given in lieu
of their wages or, indeed, could have replaced their wages altogether, thus removing
the need to include these ships in the usual payrolls. The mariners of a ship that had
captured a prize at sea were entitled to one-quarter share of the booty. The king could
claim one quarter and the owners of the vessel another quarter. The admiral of the
fleet had the right to a proportion of the booty, usually amounting to two captors’
shares if he participated in the engagement and one if he did not.\textsuperscript{45} In fact the whole
system of dividing the prizes taken during a maritime engagement was still very much
in flux during this period. For example, in 1319 Edward II allowed the east coast
vessels serving in his fleet to retain all the booty they captured from Scottish shipping.
Similarly, in 1336 the king again granted to his sailors all that they could capture at
sea, and during the fifteenth century it was usually the practice to allow private ships
to keep the gains made through attacking enemy vessels.\textsuperscript{46} Of course, the mariners
should still have received their wages, as the right to prize was an additional bonus
and would not normally have covered their wages. However, it should be borne in
mind that the capture of enemy ships, and the divisions of the spoils resulting from

\textsuperscript{41} Thomas Snetesham compiled the account, which is recorded on E101/22/38.
\textsuperscript{42} P. Reid, \textit{By fire and sword}, p. 74.
\textsuperscript{43} J. S. Kepler, ‘The effects of Sluys on naval impressment’, pp. 73-4.
\textsuperscript{44} N. H. Nicolas, \textit{History of the royal navy}, II, p. 61, which prints a letter written by Edward to his son
after the battle in which the king claims to have captured 190 ships; M. Prestwich, \textit{Armies and warfare},
p. 278.
such gains, was in many ways a grey area. Moreover, the king had prerogatives he could enforce in order to gain more than the quarter he would normally take. Indeed, it should be recalled that during this campaign Edward was desperately short of funds and he may well have used the captured ships as a means of meeting some of his debts. It is likely that Edward would have sold these captured ships to his allies, the Flemings, and set the money he gained through doing so against his mounting debts. That there is no evidence in the records of the sale of these ships should come as no surprise, because the king’s gains through ransoms rarely left a mark in the administrative accounts. What is striking, however, is that two years after the battle several ships’ crews that participated in the encounter had still not received their wages. This shows that there was a chronic shortage of funds during 1340.

How can the absence of the Sluys fleet from the records be explained? One possibility could be that the mariners were paid in the form of consignments of wool. We know that after the collapse of the wool scheme the king took control of what had been deposited in the staple. He could have used this wool as a means of payment in lieu of wages to both soldiers and mariners. Yet it is more likely that this wool was used to set against his debts that had accumulated over the two years he had spent on the continent, an interpretation that is reinforced by the lack of evidence in the Chancery rolls of wool payments to the mariners. Perhaps the most intriguing of the

47 B. E. R. Formoy, ‘A maritime indenture of 1212’, *EHR* 41 (1926), pp. 556-559. But see also N. H. Nicolas, *History of the royal navy*, I, p. 140, who states that, ‘ships and goods captured from the enemy became part of the property of the king; but prize money seems to have been as ancient as the English navy itself, though the amount depended entirely on the sovereign’s bounty’.
48 For an enlightening discussion on ransoms gained from prisoners of war and the difficulty in calculating the returns gained by the king in such agreements, see C. Given-Wilson, ‘Edward III’s prisoners of war: the battle of Poitiers and its context’, *EHR* 116 (2001), pp. 802-833. Given-Wilson notes that although what Edward paid the person who had captured one of the enemy is sometimes recorded on the Issue Rolls he also observes that ‘it is no easy task to discover the amounts for which Edward III eventually ransomed the prisoners whom he had acquired’, p. 817.
possible explanations of the missing Sluys fleet relates to the absence of a surviving Wardrobe book. It is known that after Norwell had completed his term of office William Cusance replaced him as keeper.\textsuperscript{50} There is no indication that Cusance summarised his transactions as keeper into a Wardrobe book that was then forwarded to the Exchequer for audit. Indeed, one piece of related evidence suggests that a set of Wardrobe accounts from Cusance’s term of office was not audited. This is the surviving household journal roll for the Sluys campaign.\textsuperscript{51} Such rolls do not always exist for other keepers, such as William Edington, suggesting that they were discarded when a full set of accounts were sent to the Exchequer. It is therefore possible that there was a separate journal roll for the Sluys campaign, including a section on mariners’ wages that has since been lost. It is noteworthy that on the surviving journal roll there is a membrane that records the wages paid to the sheriffs, bailiffs and other officers of the maritime counties for arresting ships for the transport fleet.\textsuperscript{52} It is beyond doubt that these officials would have arrested ships for the armada and these vessels must have been recorded elsewhere. It is possible that the royal ships that are enrolled on the journal roll were accounted for separately and that is why they appear in that pay account.\textsuperscript{53} This would not be unusual because the royal vessels that fought at Sluys are also visible on the account compiled by Thomas Snetesham.\textsuperscript{54}

A final possibility regarding the missing payroll evidence is hinted at by one of the many chronicles that provide a narrative of events during the battle. This notes that the ship carrying the king’s Wardrobe was attacked, captured and all the crew

\textsuperscript{49}The crews manning the ships of King’s Lynn at the battle were still waiting for their wages in April 1342, see \textit{CCR, 1342-43}, pp. 556-57.  
\textsuperscript{50} Tout, \textit{Chapters}, vi, p. 27.  
\textsuperscript{51} E101/389/8.  
\textsuperscript{52} \textit{Ibid.}, m. 6  
\textsuperscript{53} \textit{Ibid.}, m. 16.  
\textsuperscript{54} E101/22/38.
except one woman and two men put to death. On board this ship could have been documents that related to the first phases of the fleet raising procedure, such as the ship lists mentioned in Chapter Two. Once the French had captured or destroyed these lists, the Wardrobe would have had no means of accurately recording all the vessels involved in the engagement. The payments owing to the mariners for their wages would therefore have been made in a much less formal and fully recorded way than normal. The survival of the journal roll for this campaign could well be linked to this incident. Once most of the related documents had been captured, the journal roll became more important as a record of the expenditure of the campaign for scrutiny at the Exchequer.

* * *

The maritime resources of the kingdom of England were at their greatest stretch and made their largest contribution to Edward III's wars during the Crécy/Calais expeditions of 1346-47. It has been suggested that the English merchant marine could not produce fleets of such size, but as the evidence in tables 4.1 and 5.1 show, Edward had large reserves of maritime manpower and ships to call upon. The main issue was not so much the absolute number of ships available as the capacity to requisition and

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55 Hemingburgh, II, p. 357.
56 J. Sumption, Trial by battle, p. 492, states that 'to transport in one crossing the enlarged army that was now envisaged would have at least required 1,500 ships, which was probably more than the entire English merchant marine could furnish'. Also, see J. S. Kepler, 'The effects of the battle of Sluys', p. 77, who stated that the Crécy fleet would 'denude the entire country of shipping'. In fact Kepler seriously underestimates the size of the English merchant marine and he also argues that acts of piracy committed by a handful of vessels could hamper the crown when it was raising a fleet because these vessels were at sea and not in their homeports awaiting requisition (Ibid., p. 73). This statement is based on the assumption that if sixty or so vessels were at sea Edward would struggle to locate more ships. These two accounts greatly underestimate the English merchant marine. For example in addition to holding in port fleets numbering over 400 ships the crown still managed to find access to vessels to transport the hurdles, clays and other materials of war from the counties of England. See E101/557/10, m. 1a-1c, which shows that during the 1359 campaign although there were 488 vessels waiting at Sandwich to transport Edward's army to Calais the sheriff of Essex still managed to find enough ships and barges to freight 500 clays (hurdles) to the embarkation port. This operation involved the transport of the clays by cart to Maldon. At Maldon they were transferred from land to waiting ships by barge before being freighted by five ships to Harwich and then to Sandwich. Once at Sandwich they were stored in a warehouse until they were required.
forward them, in good order, to an embarkation port with sufficient speed so as not to disrupt the timetable for the planned campaign. This managerial and organisational problem dogged Edward’s preparations in the build-up to the 1346 expedition. He raised his largest ever transport fleet over a period of several months between the autumn of 1345 and the spring of 1346, a period during which storms lashed the English coast and further altered his plans. Nevertheless, his officials, now experts in ship requisition, managed to make ready a substantial fleet by June 1346.

The Crécy transport fleet marks a dramatic departure in terms of the numbers of ships employed when it is compared to the previous continental ventures of Edward III. Although the 1346 transport armada was only 100 or so ships larger than the Brittany fleet of 1342-3 there was a major organisational difference between the two expeditions, in that in 1346 a single fleet was stationed at one port ready to transport the largest army of the reign. The Brittany campaign occurred over a year and involved three quite separate transport flotillas. The earlier expeditions to the Low Countries in 1338-40 were also formed into two fleets. This meant that the officials in charge of organising these armadas were only requisitioning fleets of up to 400 ships at a time. By comparison in 1346 a further 350 vessels were arrested, and all were required to be at a single place at the same time. The degree of extra organisational management can be appreciated immediately. That the admirals and their staff achieved this shows how ship requisition had evolved under Edward III into an effective system.

The receipt book of Walter Wetwang shows clearly how the admirals and their staff went about the work of raising the largest single transport fleet of the fourteenth century. The whole coast of England was divided into small units. There were still two admiralties but these were further sub-divided and formed into distinct areas.
Although the admirals still held overall authority within their administrative areas, the sub-divisions within the admiralties allowed the clerks to be more efficient when it came to finding and requisitioning ships. Thus, the new zones of requisition did not respect the normal divide between those ports north of the Thames and those south of the Thames. The coast seems to have been divided into three geographical areas to begin with. One zone was to cover the ports between London and Lyme Regis; the next sub-division was all the ports between King’s Lynn and Berwick, and the third involved the ports of London, Kent and Sussex. Ships from these last three places would normally be requisitioned among the vessels prepared by the southern admiral and although he seems to have retained overall administrative authority he was freed from searching these three areas so that he could concentrate on the section of coastline between Sussex and Lyme Regis.\(^57\) This allowed the admirals to have overall control, but at the same time their roles were made easier because there were more clerks available for requisition duties, and, importantly, the clerks in turn had smaller areas to cover. Thus, they could gather more ships than for previous transport expeditions because they could spend more time in one area exploiting its resources to the full.

The flexibility of the English administration operating under the guidance of the Wardrobe is illuminated by an examination of the siege of Calais. In the above discussion on the siege this thesis has shown that by consulting the maritime sources alongside the land-based evidence it is possible to see four separate fleets operating throughout the operation. By examining these armadas we can see the periods of the greatest military intensity throughout the siege. The first of these fleets arrived in September, carrying the reinforcements under William Fraunk and Sir Thomas

\(^{57}\) C76/23, mm. 20-21; *Foedera*, III, i, p. 66; E101/390/12, fols 3r, 3v, 7r, 7v,8r; E403/366, mm. 42-44.
Haukeston.\textsuperscript{58} This fleet, as was noted above, is difficult to assess and was probably recorded through the lost accounts of the Wardrobe. But it would have transported substantial reinforcements, because Haukeston’s retinue alone numbered 161 men-at-arms, 313 mounted archers and 241-foot archers.\textsuperscript{59} Once these reinforcements had arrived it would appear that some men, who had previously served during the march to Crécy took the same ships and returned to England.

That the English army was smaller throughout the winter of 1346 than the force that landed at St. Vaast is indeed likely. For example, on 14 May 1347 the king ordered the earl of Oxford and thirty other bannerets, including some members of the royal household who had been purchasing new horses and renewing their equipment in England, to come to him at Calais. This order suggests that these men had left the siege at some point between September 1346 and May 1347. Indeed, other important members of the original army had returned to England earlier in the campaign, among these was the earl of Huntingdon who had returned to England from Caen.\textsuperscript{60} These men had contributed substantial forces to the English army. If we calculate the size of their retinues, we can arrive at an estimate as to how much the army declined in size throughout the winter of 1346.\textsuperscript{61} It is possible to estimate the size of seven major retinues (in addition to several minor ones) that men ordered to return in the summer of 1347 had served with either during the Crécy march, or would bring with them after May 1347 to the siege of Calais.\textsuperscript{62} We should also include the retinues

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{58} Wrottesley, \textit{Crecy and Calais}, p. 53. William Fraunk had been appointed constable of the army, \textit{Foedera}, III, i, p. 89.
\item \textsuperscript{59} A. Ayton and P. Preston, \textit{The battle of Crécy}, pp. 239-240.
\item \textsuperscript{60} Huntingdon was requested to return on 5 April 1347. See \textit{Foedera}, III, i, pp. 106, 115; Wrottesley, \textit{Crecy and Calais}, pp. 55 n. 1, 121; C76/24, mm 10, 12, 14. These show that orders were issued for the provision of ships for the earl of Pembroke, John ‘the king’s son’ and John Darcy. These orders were dated 28 April to 15 May.
\item \textsuperscript{61} This is reliant on the suggestion that not only did these magnates return to England but also their retinues.
\item \textsuperscript{62} Hugh Despencer, John de Vere, John Darcy Senior, Reginald Cobham, Thomas Ughtred, Robert Ferrars and Giles Beauchamp were the captains of the major retinues.
\end{itemize}
contributed by Henry Grosmont and Laurence Hastings, because these men were in Gascony during the preliminary stages of the siege and they did not join the action until June 1347. By examining the evidence relating to the retinues of those ordered to return to Calais, we can see that the king’s army at the siege was indeed reduced by a minimum of 1000-2,000 men (including the earls, bannerets, knights, esquires, mounted archers and foot archers). If we include the reinforcements that joined in June under Lancaster and Pembroke, and possibly Walter Mauny, then in the summer of 1347 the siege army was augmented by a further 1,088 men-at-arms, 753 mounted archers and forty-six hobelars and thirty-two foot archers. We know that the men returning to England were replaced by the reinforcements of Fraunk and Haukeston in September, but if we take into account the desertions that seem to have plagued the army, as well as the fatalities and withdrawals due to camp sickness we can see that Edward’s force probably only numbered 5,000 to 6,000 men over the winter of 1346-7. This represents a slight adjustment on the army numbers given by Dr Rogers who suggests that the Calais army was 10,000-11,000 strong. That a force of such size was operating at the siege for most of its duration must be questioned, because the

63 Wrottesley, Crecy and Calais, p. 55. Lancaster led a chevauchée from the siege camp on 18 July.
64 Wrottesely, pp. 55 n.1, 121 and Foedera, III, i, p. 120 records the captains ordered to return to Calais, while Wrottesley, pp. 193-201 lists the size of some of the retinues brought by the men who were ordered to return to the siege. For example, Hugh Despencer is asked to return and he served at Calais with a retinue of 2 bannerets, 40 knights, 86 esquires and 105 archers (Wrottesley, p. 194; Ayton, Preston, The battle of Crécy, p. 251); the earl of Oxford served at Crécy and Calais with a retinue numbering 131 men (Ayton, Preston, p. 246; Wrottesley, p. 194); Walter Mauny came to Calais with 326 men, although he had not been in the Crécy; Roger Beauchamp served at Crécy with a retinue of 17 men (Ayton, Preston, p. 243); Hugh Hastings served at Calais with a retinue numbering 73 men and John Lisle brought 41 men. John Grey of Ruthin was asked to return but his retinue at Crécy or Calais is not recorded in the Wetwarg abstracts (Ayton, Preston, p. 249); Reginald Cobham brought 112 men to Calais. It is worth noting that the retinue sizes that are taken from Wetwarg are commencement totals for the campaign. The likelihood is that during the Crécy expedition and the siege of Calais the retinues that were originally brought by the captains would have been drastically reduced.
65 The orders that were issued for these men to return to the army certainly contain evidence that they were expected to bring their retinues. The order issued to Hugh Audley states that he come to Calais because of the, 'fealty, affection, and allegiance which he owed the king, and in consideration of the king's urgent necessity, to assemble as many men-at-arms and archers as was befitting his status'. See Wrotesley, Crecy and Calais, p. 121; on desertions, see ibid., p. 102.
66 C. J. Rogers, War cruel and sharp, p. 423 n. 3
overall total of wages of war given in Robert Brady’s summary of Wetwang’s accounts (£127,201 2s 9.5d) includes the wages of the mariners and the payments issued to retinue captains for regard and restauro equorum. This has led the most recent commentator on the English army at Crécy and Calais to suggest that Rogers’ estimate of the army size at Calais (10,000-11,000 men) should be scaled down by a fifth.\(^\text{67}\) Indeed, scaling down the army down by a fifth would take account of Lancastre’s, Pembroke’s and Mauny’s retinues that did not arrive until June 1347. Consequently, that the army was only 5,000-6,000 strong during the winter of 1346 is entirely plausible.

The argument that the English forces actually diminished in size through the winter stage of the siege of Calais should not be taken as indicative of a lack of planning by Edward III. Indeed, some of the reasons for the declining numbers during the winter were beyond the king’s control. It is well known, for example, that the outbreak of dysentery in the siege camp during the winter had the effect of decimating the English army.\(^\text{68}\) And it has been noted before that ‘an enormous effort had to be made to raise a new army to maintain the siege’.\(^\text{69}\) In any case the French were in no position to interfere with Edward’s operation as they had lost at least 1,500 men-at-arms during the battle of Crécy, including important members of the nobility, such as the king’s brother Charles Count of Alençon.\(^\text{70}\) These men were Philip’s recruiting agents in France and vital for raising an army. Their removal severely damaged the recruitment network, as the personal military ties they had built up over years, or

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\(^{68}\) B. Emerson, *The Black Prince* (London, 1976), p. 54. For the urgent requests for reinforcements to serve under the Prince at the siege, see *BPR, II*, p. 49. This request was dated to 6 March 1347. These orders were issued in sufficient time for the men raised to be sent to Sandwich by June so they could be transported on the ferry system fleet.

\(^{69}\) Ibid.

generations, were broken. As such Philip's ability to recruit an army would have been seriously weakened. Matters were made worse by the fact that the duke of Normandy had disbanded his army soon after his campaign against Lancaster in Gascony had ended; and then, shortly after arriving at his father's court, John immediately fell out with Philip and removed himself from the king's presence for several months. Furthermore, the marshal of France, Charles de Montmorency, was dismissed in disgrace and enquiries into both the military and financial operations before the battle of Crécy were also instigated. In short, the French were in the midst of a severe political crisis at the highest levels. Although Philip VI had some forces that were led into Flanders to survey the English encampment during September and October, the English had 'the field to themselves' and by November the French had resigned themselves to allowing the English to carry on the siege.

It was only during the months between March and September 1347 that the English began to increase their efforts to take Calais. From September 1346 to March 1347 the maritime involvement in the siege had been limited. Apart from the supply operation, the naval dimension of the siege was insubstantial during these months. The reasons for this are clear. The threat from the French was negligible after Philip had disbanded his army on 31 October 1346. Moreover, earlier in the expedition the

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71 It is also important to recognise that many of the 1,500 men-at-arms killed during the engagement were of junior branches of the nobility; as such these men would have brought sub-retinues with them to the muster. Thus, such large numbers of deaths would weaken every link in the retaining chain.

72 D. Simpkin, The English aristocracy at war: from the Welsh wars of Edward I to the battle of Bannockburn (Boydell, 2008), pp. 65-67 notes the devastating effect that the deaths of so many of the English nobility at Bannockburn could have on military recruitment, in particular the deaths of the earl of Gloucester and Payn de Tibetot. In addition, see also D. Green, 'The household and military retinue of the Black Prince', chapter 8, which details the links that existed within military retinues and the regional, family and economic ties that bound such contingents together. The death of the leader or 'hub' of such retinues could therefore fracture the whole recruiting potential of that force. It is also worth noting that the French army would have consisted of large numbers of troops recruited through contracts. Indeed, the likelihood is that this number was in the thousands, therefore, the large-scale mortality suffered by the French nobility in 1346 would have affected these 'contractual networks'. On the French army at Crécy, see B. Schnerb, 'Vassals, allies and mercenaries: the French army before and after 1346' Ayton and Preston, The battle of Crécy, pp. 265-272, p. 267.
English fleet had destroyed most of the available French ships capable of offering any resistance.\textsuperscript{74} The lack of a full English blockade by sea is also indicated by the arrival of supplies into Calais during the winter of 1346.\textsuperscript{75} That the English failed between September and March to put into operation a full and continuous blockade should come as no surprise. Medieval ships were difficult to operate during these months and the requisitioning of a sufficient number of vessels would take time, a process that was also made difficult in the winter. Moreover, Edward was organising what was in effect a fresh expedition against France while he was still actually on French soil. This meant that the raising of a sufficient number of vessels for maritime operations, to effect a naval blockade, delayed for several months until his administrative staff in England had arrested and organised a fleet of ships large enough to transport men and supplies to the siege camp.\textsuperscript{76} So it was not until March and April 1347 that the two admirals arrived outside the town with two large fleets. In addition to this, Edward ordered the sinking of English ships in the harbour of Calais, presumably in another effort to stop French aid reaching the town.\textsuperscript{77} As such it was no coincidence when in April the English attacked and captured the Rysbank, a slender stretch of land between the town and the sea, on which they built a fortified camp, garrisoned by

\textsuperscript{73} J. Sumption, \textit{Trial by battle}, pp. 539, 554, 555; on the political crisis, see A. Ayton, P. Preston, \textit{The battle of Crécy}, pp. 277-286.

\textsuperscript{74} This was an important operation because between 1342 and 1346 Philip had at his disposal twenty-two ships, four galleys and twenty barges of his own. If we include those available to through the hiring arrangements he had with the Genoese, Catalans and Navarre the French king could draw upon large resources of shipping until the English fleet destroyed most of the ships available to him in 1346. On the size of the French fleet, see C. DuFourmantelle, \textit{La marine militaire en France au commencement de la guerre de cent ans} (Paris, 1878), pp. 11-12.

\textsuperscript{75} J. Sumption, \textit{Trial by battle}, p. 557.

\textsuperscript{76} By examining the timetable involved in previous armadas it can be seen that, on average, four to six months was required to raise a fleet of ships. In 1324, for example, the first arrest order was issued in May but the fleet did not sail until September. And this fleet was relatively small when compared to those flotillas of 1338, 1340, 1345, 1346 and 1347.

\textsuperscript{77} \textit{CPR}, 1345-48, p. 260; \textit{BPR}, I, p. 84. There is a slight discrepancy between these two sources. The \textit{Patent Roll} states that the ship sunk was owned by Peter Faulk of Winchelsea and that he was granted the \textit{Michel} of Fowey as compensation for this action by the king. But the Prince's register records that the owner was a Peter of Fowey and he was awarded the \textit{Michel} as compensation. Presumably Peter Faulk and Peter Fowey were one and the same person.
forty men-at-arms and 200 archers. The strategy of the two admirals at this stage of the siege was to cut off Calais from any possible succour and to guard against any French threat against the arrival of English reinforcements. Nevertheless, the maritime threat from the French could never be wholly discounted. Individual English supply ships were occasionally picked off as they sailed towards the siege.

The final aspect of the maritime involvement of the siege of Calais was the ferry system, which the English crown implemented through June to September in order to freight reinforcements to the siege, as well as to take the sick and those who had completed their service back to England. This operation was the perfect organisational solution to the problems that presented themselves during a continuous operation on foreign soil. Instead of arresting transport ships ad hoc as reinforcements were raised it was decided to keep a permanent fleet in service throughout the period of the siege during which Philip was most likely to attack the besiegers. The ships raised for this ferry system were used solely for the transportation of soldiers to and from Calais and would not be used for the military operations that the two admirals were undertaking at the same time. The ferry system demonstrates the flexibility of the English administration managed by the Wardrobe.

To allow the siege to be prosecuted, and the arrival of new recruits to be organised efficiently, the whole venture was divided into separate operational and administrative units. The admirals conducted the naval side of the siege, accounting directly with the Exchequer back in England, while William Huggate organised and managed the ferry system and accounted through the Wardrobe. It seems that Wetwang himself

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79 CCR, 1346-49, p. 223 records the capture of the James from Sandwich on 3 June 1347, which was freighting wine and other victuals to the English army.
80 An order enrolled on C76/24, m. 16 dated to May suggests that the ferry system was in place by this stage because the ships that were to transport the earl of Huntingdon were to 'return for the other magnates'.
concentrated on the land-based element, by recording the wages owed to the new arrivals and ceasing the pay of those returning to England, knowing that his trusted associate could organise their transportation and pay the wages of the ships’ crews. By prosecuting the siege in this way the massive organisational task was made more manageable. That the ferry system was put in place at this time was in direct response to the French invasion of Flanders in April and their slow progress towards Calais itself in July, thereby posing a direct threat to the English position.

An intriguing question remains however: namely, where the English disembarked their men and horses so as to get them to the siege as quickly as possible. The most likely answer is connected with the April operations around the harbour, organised by the two admirals. In part these were to capture and secure an area capable of allowing the English ships to embark and disembark soldiers and supplies safely. Moreover, although supplies did come over land from Flanders, stretched and vulnerable supply lines like these could not be relied upon to keep an army, several thousand strong, in the field for long. In addition, other accessible ports along the French coast, such as Wissant, had been destroyed and the French occupied Boulogne, which would have created difficulties if Wissant had been used as the disembarkation port for English reinforcements. This is why in April, before the arrival of the reinforcements, the admirals captured and garrisoned the Rysbank. This stretch of land was perfectly placed on the seaward approach to Calais, allowing English ships

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81 During William Edington’s keepership of the Wardrobe from 1342-44, Huggate was employed as a clerk of the Marshalsea within the Wardrobe office, and during the same period Wetwang was clerk of the pantry and buttery (a subsidiary department of the Wardrobe). The evidence suggests that these two men had worked closely together for at least four years prior to the campaigns of 1346-7. It is worthy of note that Huggate is a village situated close to Wetwang in East Yorkshire suggesting, that these two men may have known each other for some time. On Huggate’s career, see Tout, Chapters, IV, p. 110.

82 C. J. Rogers, War cruel and sharp, p. 278.

83 J. Sumption, Trial by battle, p. 532; C. J. Rogers, War cruel and sharp, p. 275.
an ideal place to unload their cargoes of men and supplies. The garrison of forty men-at-arms and 200 archers that were placed on the Rysbank were clearly a force whose job it was to protect the process of un-loading. This process could be achieved quickly providing that the right type of vessel was deployed. Philippe de Mézières noted that he had seen ships utilised called taforesse, which had a design that allowed the men to ‘mount their horses inside the ship, helmet on head and lance in hand. Then, without fuss, in an instant they ride out and without warning rush against the enemy’. What is interesting about this comment is that Philippe states that the innovation that allowed the men on board the ship to do this was the insertion a door in the stern of the ship. It is well known that the English employed such a door in order to load the horses on board at the port of embarkation and that charging horses directly off a ship was a tactic familiar to western European soldiers.

It should be noted at this point that the arguments put forward in this thesis on the siege of Calais are at odds with the interpretation of Dr. Rogers, who states that the reason for prosecuting the siege of Calais was to force Philip VI into another battle. This thesis has proposed that the capture of Calais was the priority for Edward, not a battle. If his actions had resulted in another battle, Edward would surely have been content; but his primary aim was to take a town capable of providing

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84 Medieval ships were usually equipped with their own lifting gear that allowed them to unload cargo on beaches or onto waiting lighters alongside them while in the open shallow waters. See R. McGregor-Ward, 'The mystery of the medieval shipmaster', p. 104.
85 See J. Sumption, Trail by battle p. 568 for a map of the harbour. Indeed, the fortress constructed on the Rysbank continued to play an important role in the defence of Calais well in to the reign of Henry VI, see CPR, 1422-29, p. 532; CPR, 1436-41, p. 367.
86 G. W. Coopland, 'A glimpse of late fourteenth-century ships and seamen', p. 190.
88 C. J. Rogers, War cruel and sharp, chapter 12.
89 C. Richmond had noted the importance of Calais both as an entry and exit port and as a strategic garrison sandwiched between Normandy and Picardy on one side and the Low Countries on the other, see 'The war at sea', p. 100. But also, see S. Rose, Calais: an English town in France, 1347-1558 (Boydell, 2008), pp. 9-10. Rose points out that the location and relative poor wealth of Calais made it an odd choice for a siege, unless it was the port facilities that Edward was interested in controlling.
a safe and permanent entry and exit point into France for future English armies.\textsuperscript{90} Granted, it is difficult to know exactly when the decision to take Calais was made; but considering the fact that such an operation would require a large maritime supply operation, in order to move both men and victuals, it is clear that the decision must have been taken early in the expedition of 1346.\textsuperscript{91} Edward's need to take Calais was reinforced by his three previous campaigns in France, all of which had suffered because viable entry and exit ports could not be relied upon and his allies operated in a volatile climate composed of several competing factions. His experience in Brittany proved above all that although expeditions could be launched in these areas, as an extension of the war, his war aims could not be achieved in such places. What Edward needed was a Bordeaux in the north, an English controlled town which could be defended against enemy forces, with a harbour that could accommodate sizeable fleets of transport ships and which would provide Edward with an entry point directly into the economical and political heartlands of his enemy. As Alfred H. Burne pointed out: 'if France was to be conquered, Calais would have to be captured sooner or later'.\textsuperscript{92}

In conclusion, when the maritime sources are consulted alongside those relating to the land-based element of the siege, a picture emerges that is different from that gained when only the latter set of records is consulted. During the winter of 1346 the English army seems to have become smaller in size. The town was only choked off from any outside help between the months of April and September 1347. Thus, although the siege lasted a year, the town fell because of the achievement of a total

\textsuperscript{90} Indeed, if Edward's aim were to force another battle then perhaps it would have been best to besiege Rouen, or another major town, which could be supplied by sea and river from England.

\textsuperscript{91} It is more than likely that Edward made the decision to take Calais after he had defeated the French at Crécy. However, that he probably had it in mind at the outset is surely a certainty. Although whether or not he would be able to take the town depended entirely on the outcome of the planned engagement with the French. It has been suggested that Calais was a last minute change of plan, see, for example, D. Green, \textit{Edward the Black Prince: power in medieval Europe} (Longman, 2007), p. 47

\textsuperscript{92} A. H. Burne, \textit{The Crécy war} (Wordsworth, 1999), p. 204. Burne slightly confuses his account after stating this when he says that the English should really have attacked Paris, pp. 206-7.
blockade by the English during the last six months. That the town was the objective is suggested by looking at the siege from a logistical viewpoint. Edward had an eye on future campaigns in France. One of the lessons he must have learnt from Dupplin Moor and Halidon Hill was that one battle could not win a war and that in order to achieve complete success he must keep up the pressure on Philip, which might involve further invasions and fighting more battles. What Edward could not have foreseen was that the arrival of the Black Death in 1348 would mean that a campaign in that year was out of the question; otherwise Edward would have undoubtedly invaded France again to push home the victories achieved in 1346-7. It has been noted by Dr. Rogers that Edward himself declared his intention was to fight a second battle. But Edward had previously exploited the chivalrous nature of warfare, and knew the advantage, in terms of positive propaganda, that he could gain through the use of big statements and grand gestures. That is what made Edward not just a great field commander but also a master politician. Throughout his reign he used propaganda to tap into the martial ethos of his countrymen. Thus by talking of battles and glory he fostered support for his campaigns; but his advisors would have also known that in order to fight battles it is necessary to be able to gain entry to and exit from of France; and to win the war this had to be done over a lengthy period of time. In this respect Calais offered the perfect solution and it is interesting to note that after it was captured Edward never personally sailed to any other destination in France in order to launch his campaigns.

94 A. Ayton, ‘War and the English gentry under Edward III', p. 39 notes that a man would take up arms for a variety of reasons but underlying all of those reasons was, ‘a mentality shaped by the deep-seated attitudes of a traditional warrior class'. This is the side of his countrymen to which Edward appealed to foster support for his wars.
The Reims campaign of 1359-60 involved another transport fleet that poses problems to an historian assessing how the kingdom’s maritime resources were utilised during the king’s war. It is also important in a number of respects. Because this was only the second major campaign in the north of France after the capture of Calais, it highlights the way in which the control of that port affected the organisation of transport fleets (it has already been noted in chapter two that, after the Brittany campaign of 1342-3, subtle changes were made in the way transport fleets were paid for when there was more than one fleet being organised in the same year). And the Reims campaign is important too because it involved a major army led by the king for which we have Wardrobe accounts and related Exchequer evidence. Lastly, given that it occurred in the post-Black Death period, it provides an excellent opportunity to examine how the maritime resources of the king were affected by this calamitous event.

Two possible explanations spring to mind when trying to understand the complexities of this campaign. Firstly, after the English capture of Calais in 1347, its availability as a campaign disembarkation point dramatically changed Edward’s options with regard to transportation. Secondly, the arrival of the Black Death in 1348, and its impact on the maritime communities, probably resulted in a drastic reduction in available shipping. But the capture of Calais now allowed Edward to prepare his forces differently. For example, during the preparations for the Brittany campaign of 1342 the transport fleet of the earl of Northampton was held under requisition for over two months while Edward tried to raise sufficient numbers of ships to freight a much larger force to Brest than eventually sailed. However, with the capture of Calais came the option to transport armies in separate stages, with the knowledge that each

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part of the army could safely lodge in Calais and await the arrival of the complete force (of course, this would only be true for those campaigns that were to be launched through this port. Expeditions such as those of Crécy or Agincourt, which required a landing in hostile territory, would still have to be transported in one large armada). In these circumstances, allowing retinue captains to secure their own transportation had a number of advantages. These would be a decline in complaints lodged in parliament by the mercantile class concerning the injuries caused by ship requisition. When planning a campaign in northern France, there was no need for Edward to keep huge fleets holed up in port for long periods of time while awaiting the arrival of either the land army or more ships. This would also save the crown valuable revenue. While the ships were under requisition, crews needed wages and supplies, and this was consequently a drain on the resources of the king. Another major advantage was that the government was now freed from the heavy burden, and expense, of raising a large fleet through the services of sergeants-at-arms and requisition clerks. This also meant that there would be less antagonism directed towards these officers. It is clear, therefore, that any major campaign channelled through Calais freed the crown from major obligations and transferred more of the burden to those serving in the army. Indeed, Edward’s martial reputation at this stage allowed him such an option, as many men were more than willing to fight under his banner. There was a wave of popular support for the French war that began after the successes of Henry of Grosmont’s expeditions in Aquitaine in 1345-6, and was greatly augmented by victories by Edward III at Crécy and the Black Prince at Poitiers. This, coupled with the lure of potential booty and fame, meant that retinue captains were willing to take on extra responsibilities when it came to campaigning. Of course, as this analysis has shown, Edward did not entirely neglect his side of the bargain: he provided a large fleet that
transported a section of the land army and large numbers of horses from the retinues awaiting passage to Calais in 1359.

The other factor that could have affected Edward's fleet preparations was the impact of mortality due to the Black Death of 1348, which left severe shortages of manpower in all sectors of society. Port towns were the first to feel the effects of this disease. Cramped conditions and the on-board presence of rats usually meant ships' companies became infected before spreading the illness into the ports. Most of the research centred on the Black Death has tended to concentrate on villages and urban populations in general rather than the maritime communities in particular. Nevertheless, most studies seem to suggest that anywhere between twenty-five and fifty percent of the population suffered death during 1348-9. However, these estimates varied greatly between communities, with some towns suffering high mortality rates, while others escaped relatively unscathed. In addition, research has also shown that, in most cases, the survivors of the disease were in their early twenties or thirties, which aided a swift recovery. For instance, in the village of Halesowen, eighty-two percent of the plague-vacated houses were re-populated within a year, and the southern counties of Hampshire and Wiltshire had started to recover by the end of 1349. If similar patterns were followed within the maritime towns then this evidence also points to a possible quick recovery.

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One way of establishing how the plague affected the raising of a fleet is to calculate, where the evidence permits, the pre-Black Death mean tonnage and crew sizes of transport fleets and to compare them to those fleets requisitioned after the plague, to see if there is any significant fall in the size of both ships and crews. Of the 446 ships involved in transport operations pre 1348, for which we have both tonnage and crew sizes, we can calculate a total tonnage of 41,347. This gives us a mean of 92.7 tons for each vessel. The total number of mariners serving on these ships was 16,294 (102 of the ships only come with the masters name so an average of 29 has been applied to these which is calculated from the crew numbers we do know) giving an average crew size of 36.5.\footnote{G. H. Martin, ‘The borough and the merchant community of Ipswich, 1317-1422’ (Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Oxford, 1955), p. 181 notes that in Ipswich the Black Death did not ‘sweep away all the rulers of the town’.
} Tonnage figures are more frequently available after 1348 and we can therefore utilise a greater number of ships with which to draw comparisons with pre-plague conditions. When the same methodology is applied to post 1348 fleets out of 659 vessels with tonnages we find a total tonnage of 34,696, which averages out at 53 tons per ship, with the average crew size being sixteen.\footnote{E101/17/35; E101/19/14; E101/19/22; E101/19/39; E101/21/7; E101/21/10; E101/21/12; E101/25/24; BL, Add MS 7967.} Although there seems to have been a dramatic fall in the size of the vessels these averages belie the true nature of the evidence. For example, the post Black Death tonnage figures are heavily reliant on the 1359 Reims campaign sources, which account for 405 ships and this transport fleet is unusual for the period. The ships that participated in this transport armada were smaller in tonnage than would normally be expected. Of the 411 ships in the payrolls that tonnages can be seen, 186 (45%) were between 10 and 20 tons, while 117 (28%) were between 20 and 40 tons, and 69 (17%) ships between 40 and 100. Only thirty-nine (9%) were of more than 100 tons. Indeed,
if we look at the post Black Death tonnage figures in general, 202 (31%) ships were between 10 and 20 tons, 205 (31.1%) between 20 and 40 tons, 151 (23%) fell in the 40 to 100 ton category and 101 (15%) were over 100 tons. When we examine the tonnage figures for the pre-Black Death ships then we find different results. There were 167 (37%) ships of more than 100 tons, while 189 (42.3%) of the 446 ships from before 1348 were between 40 and 100 tons. 86 (19.2%) fell between 20 and 40 tons while only four were less than 20 tons.

Therefore, although it seems, on the surface, that the ships were becoming smaller in the middle of the fourteenth century, closer examination reveals that it is the unusually small tonnages of the vessels engaged in the Reims transport fleet that bring the mean tonnage figure down. For example, the ships that transported the Black Prince to Gascony in 1355 were, on average, 60 tons burden (not all the ships that transported the prince have tonnages recorded in the payrolls, so this average is taken from 145 of the vessels for which we have tonnages for). If we examine the 125 ships that participated in the 1338 fleet that we have tonnage figures for, we arrive at a mean of 28 tons.102 The crew sizes certainly seem to have decreased during the post Black Death period; however, the overall mean is also affected by the unusually small crew attachments that served in the Reims transport fleet. And although there had been a reduction in the volume of trade that exceeded that of the population after the Black Death, it seems that, if anything, the same ships were being operated but by

101 E101/26/37; E101/26/38; E101/27/22; E101/27/23; E101/27/24; E101/27/25; E101/27/36; E101/29/1.
102 Although the ships from this fleet are recorded in the Wardrobe book of William Norwell there are some Exchequer particulars that are linked into the Wardrobe system for this fleet, which do provide tonnage figures, see E101/21/7; E101/21/10; E101/21/12. In addition, a reduction in the population would not automatically lead to smaller ships. Building and paying for a vessel required a considerable outlay of valuable capital and it is more likely that a ship owner would continue to use the ships he currently possessed but allow smaller crews to operate them. For example, in 1422 the barge Marie Bretton was sold to John Tendryng for £40, a significant sum, and it is likely that this ship would have cost considerably more to build from new. See W. J. Carpenter Turner, "The building of the GraceDieu, Valentine and Falconer", p. 70.
smaller crews.  

Perhaps the simplest explanation lies in the fact that after the capture of Calais in 1347 any expedition using the port as a disembarkation point did not require large ships because of the narrow sea crossing between southern England and Calais.  

It was also cheaper for the crown to requisition and employ smaller vessels, with smaller crews, on a ‘ferry system’ basis, whereby the ships would make more than one crossing.  

The Black Death does not seem to have had any adverse effects on the transport fleets sailing in the 1370s, for which the English merchant marine was still providing large vessels this can be seen by examining the flotilla that transported the duke of Lancaster from Sandwich to France between April and September 1373, a fleet that averaged 77 tons per ship.  

Although far from perfect, the evidence suggests that perhaps the only significance of the Black Death was to reduce the size of crews.

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103 R. W. Unger, *The ship in the medieval economy, 600-1600* (London, 1980), p. 163; W. R. Childs, *The trade and shipping of Hull*, p. 23. Unger notes that the average tonnage of ships did not fall dramatically during the fourteenth century. He points out that 81% of ships in the Anglo-Gascon wine trade were of less than 100 tons but 16% were between 150 and 200 tons; and he states that by the fifteenth century the average was probably 100 tons, so the sizes of the ships did not change considerably after the Black Death. Hull was certainly re-engaging ships of over 100 tons in its wine trade with Bordeaux in the later fourteenth century: in 1385 nine ships from Hull were sent to Bordeaux with a total tonnage of 1,261. This was roughly the same tonnage figure as we find in the early fifteenth century. However, the evidence does seem to suggest that the need for large ships subsided somewhat in the middle decades of the fourteenth century due to the mortalities and the drop in the volume of trade because of the Black Death.

104 It must also be noted that tonnage figures are notoriously difficult to interpret. For example, it is known that there are six different methods of measuring tonnage: gross registered tonnage; net registered tonnage; displacement tonnage; deadweight tonnage; measurement freight tonnage and old registered tonnage. Consequently, a sailing ship with two decks would have tonnages in the following: gross registered tonnage, 100 tons; net registered, 96 tons; displacement, 150 tons; deadweight, 150 tons; freight, 187.5 tons; old registered, 90-120 tons. On tonnage figures and methods of calculation, see F. C. Lane, ‘Tonnage, medieval and modern’, *EcHR* 17 (1964), pp. 213-33, pp. 216-218.

105 Indeed, the value of such a ‘ferry system’ would have been reinforced due to the success of that which had operated during the 1347 siege of Calais.

106 BL, Add MS 37494, fols 17v-24d. Although this account contains the names of more ships, only 112 have their tonnages recorded with them. The total tonnage from these 112 vessels was 8,643.

107 The custom accounts rarely provide the size of individual ships and generally only give an indication as to what they carried. For example, E122/56/24 records thirty-seven ships from London which freighted a total of 286 tuns and 92 pipes of wine; and E122/57/10 details 191 ships which freighted 743 sacks of wool and 456 tuns, 12 pipes of wine out of Hull in one year. As such it is difficult to calculate the sizes of ships from the majority of the custom accounts.
5.1 METHODOLOGIES AND THE SERVICE OF SHIPMASTERS

So far throughout this thesis we have analysed, and assessed, the contributions made by the merchant marine to the wars of Edward II and Edward III between 1320 and 1360. However, in order to fully understand the totality of the service provided by the merchant marine it is necessary to calculate how many of the ships that served in the forty years covered by this study were individual vessels. Table 5.1 shows how many ships served throughout the Scottish and French wars, but this table does not take account of those ships that served more than once. Indeed, there are many ships, mastered by the same men, and from the same port that served in more than one fleet. These should, therefore, only be counted once when trying to assess the true overall shipping contribution made by the English merchant marine to naval operations between 1320 and 1360.
Table 5.1

TOTAL NUMBER OF SHIPS IN OPERATION 1322-60\textsuperscript{108}

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total number of ships</td>
<td>4,258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ships from south</td>
<td>2,201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ships from North</td>
<td>1,992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of mariners</td>
<td>95,341</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mariners from south</td>
<td>38,688</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mariners from north</td>
<td>35,824</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of Ports</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{108} The difference between numbers of mariners from the two admiralties and the overall total is because only the known number of mariners has been included. What affects the overall total is the 30,000 mariners that are estimated to have served in the Scottish campaigns, but where it is possible we can say that 8,138 mariners operated ships from the northern ports, while 6,116 manned vessels from the southern ports during the Scottish wars. The main issue with the Scottish ships lies with the 1333 expedition, and the victual ships, which are rarely given crew sizes. Therefore only the crew sizes, which the sources provide, are listed in the two mariners sections of the table, while the overall number includes the estimation of the missing crews. There are sixty-five foreign ships that served from 1320 to 1360. The table includes the data from the 1346 fleet, even though these cannot be compared with any source. The inclusion of these ‘un-comparable ships’ aims to show what the maximum number of ships was that could have served in both Scotland and France. There are more ships that can than be placed into a specific admiralty that cannot have the three identifiers applied to them. For example, some ships that served in the 1333 Scottish campaign have one identifier missing but can nonetheless be placed into an admiralty; these have been included in the table. The discussion below on the methodology utilised by this thesis will show that perhaps anywhere between twenty and thirty percent should be taken as a margin of error.
As noted above, Table 5.1 records the overall number of vessels that served throughout the Scottish and French wars. Whereas table 5.2 records the number of individual ships that actually served between 1320 and 1360 in naval operations. But there are slight problems with this figure. For example, the 747 ships that served as transport vessels in 1346 have been included even though we cannot compare these to any other ships because they are recorded in the sources without the names of the masters that operated them. In addition, there are other ships that cannot be compared using the following methodology, such as the thirteen that transported Ralph Stafford to Gascony in 1345. Nevertheless, it is important to include these ‘un-comparable’ ships because to exclude them completely would certainly lead to a gross underestimation of the contribution to the maritime war made by the merchant marine. Considering these latter points more fully there are methodological ways of taking into account such problems, and when these are applied a percentage of error can be

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**TABLE 5.2**

**TOTAL NUMBER OF INDIVIDUAL ENGLISH SHIPS IN OPERATION.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1322-1360</th>
<th>4018</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Known individual ships</td>
<td>2112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern vessels</td>
<td>1906</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

109 In total 188 masters served more than once in the service of the crown. Of these 188 men, forty-four served more than twice. In total these men accounted for 478 separate voyages from 1322 to 1359. However, only 303 individual ships were used for these 478 voyages because 175 of the ships were used on more than one occasion. For example, a particular master might have participated in five expeditions, but only operated three different ships over these five campaigns. Thus although in table 5.1 these vessels would be counted five times in table 5.2 they are only counted three times. Therefore, the table has deducted these ‘double-counted’ vessels from the previous figures given in table 5.1. As such there are 175 ships (or rather voyages) in table 5.1 that have not been included in 5.2. Eighty-nine of these extra voyages were carried out by ships from the southern admiralty. But the table still includes those ships that are ‘un-comparable’, such as the 1346 Crécy fleet.
suggested. The next section of the thesis will outline these methods and show its strengths and weaknesses.

The methodology that has been used to calculate the individual ships in table 5.2 was achieved by matching three 'identifiers' of information regarding ships that the sources consistently provide. Thus, if a particular ship name from a certain port appears, with the same master in the records of more than one expedition it is counted once. As such table 5.2 takes account of those ships and masters that we know served on more than one occasion, and allowances have been made. But because this method can still give rise to both over and under estimation of vessel numbers participating in supply and military operations covered by this study, and some manner of conflation and double counting could affect the overall totals given in the tables, we can analyse the repetition of ship names from certain ports. Those ships sailing in the same fleet with the same name would provide a minimum number of ships with that name sailing from that port. Finally, we can also assess the repetition of service amongst the shipmasters. A large number of masters serving repeatedly would suggest that the merchant marine was small, whereas a small number of repeat servers would argue for a large pool of shipmasters, and thus a larger merchant marine. This methodology in its simplest form would be as follows: Robert Tynwit, a shipmaster from Great Yarmouth, operated the same ship, the *Nicholas*, on three separate occasions. This, of course, could be three individual ships, all with the same name, which would mean the individual ship numbers in table 5.2 would be an underestimation of the numbers of vessels involved in the campaigns of the period. But Tynwit also mastered a ship called the *Bartholomew* in 1347, and thus following the methodology applied in this
thesis although he made four separate voyages he did so in two ships. Alternatively, John Shipman of Hythe mastered the *Nicholas* in 1336 and 1337, while in 1335 he operated the *Cog Johan*, so although he served three times he did so in only two vessels.

Although the above method is liable to a margin of error it does nonetheless seem to offer the most accurate means of assessing the contribution of England’s maritime resources to the king’s wars between 1320 and 1360. Linking the ship name to a master’s name and the port of origin also lessens the chance of over calculation when each port is individually assessed. Of the 4,018 individual ships in operation throughout 1320-1360, it is possible to know the names of 2,714 vessels. 1,304 do not appear with their name in the sources or they are absent from the records. Of these ships’ names there are six that appear with the greatest frequency, and out of the 2,714 ships we can name 248 were called the *Nicholas*, 180 were called the *Johan*.

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110 Robert Tynwhit served as master of the *Nicholas* to the first time in the 1338 transport fleet, he fought at the battle of Sluys in 1340 as master of the *Nicholas*, and he captained the *Nicholas* in 1342 when he transported the king to Brittany. He was master of the *Bartholomew* during the siege of Calais. See E101/21/10, m. 5; E101/22/25, m. 1; E36/204, p. 235; E101/25/24, no. 23.

111 E101/19/22, m. 3v; E101/19/38, m. 7; E101/19/39, m. 3.

112 The 747 Crecy ships cannot be named neither can 117 from the Brittany campaign; some ships serving in 1333 cannot be named. There are forty-nine vessels from the Black Prince’s fleet of 1355 that have no known names due to the damage of one of the documents. There are other ships that served in various campaigns in Scotland and in the French war that are also not named in the sources, including the eighty ships that transported Balliol’s army of 1332, the Cinque Port ships that possibly served in 1322, 1327 and 1333, the thirteen ships that transported Ralph Stafford to Gascony, and some of the vessels employed to transport Oliver Ingham in 1342. See E101/15/9; E101/16/6, m. 6; E101/18/36, m. 9; BL, Stowe MS 553, fols 76r, 76v; BL, Cotton MSS, Nero CV.III, fols 246v, 255v; E372/179, mm. 43, 44; E372/187, mm. 43, 44; E101/21/33; E101/26/36; E101/26/38; E101/27/22, m. 1; E101/27/23, m. 1; C47/2/25, nos, 12, 13; E36/204, p. 240; CCR, 1318-23, p. 660; CCR, 1333-37, pp. 367; CCR, 1337-39, p. 46; CCR 1343-46, pp. 128-32; CPR, 1327-30, p. 104; CPR, 1334-38, p. 98; CPR 1338-40, pp. 85, 366. Rot. Scot., I, pp. 226, 232, 233, 234, 248-9, 255. The chance that a ship would have its named changed at some point in its life should also be considered. However, it is unlikely that this occurred on a large-scale and therefore would not alter the margin of error greatly. Note also that sixty-five ships out of the 2,725 were foreign.

113 It is also worth noting that thirteen ships called the *Nicholas* used in the above analysis were recorded on a document that records the names of 311 vessels who failed to appear for service after they had been arrested between 1337-40 (C47/2/30, mm. 1, 1d, 2), and therefore were not part of the transport fleets but have been included to show that the numbers of ships with the same name is a reasonably small proportion compared to the whole merchant marine.
Seintemariecog, 125 were named the Blithe, 130 the James, sixty-one the Rodecog and forty-seven were named the Margarete. 114

Yet if we take this down to the level of individual campaigns we can see that repetition of particular names does not appear to be significant. To take Nicholas as an example: sixty-nine ports supplied all the 248 ships called the Nicholas over the forty years covered by this thesis. The port contributing the largest number was Great Yarmouth (34); indeed, it supplied a ship called the Nicholas to every campaign in the period from 1322 to 1359. When this port’s ships, called the Nicholas are examined more closely we can see that only two masters served on board a ship with this name more than once over the forty years. 115 Taken further, it is possible to say that in the Flanders transport armadas of 1338 and 1340, out of the whole fleet of 448 individual ships, only twenty-eight were named the Nicholas. 116 During the Brittany campaign of 1342, only thirty-three vessels that formed the transport armada were named the Seintemariecog, and these were supplied by as many as twenty-five ports, with London contributing three and Exeter two. The 1338 and 1340 Flanders transport fleets contained only twelve ships called the Seintemariecog. When this is applied to

114 BL, Add MS 7967, fols 94v, 95r, 95v, 97v, 98v, 99r, 99v; BL, Cotton MSS, Nero CV.III, fols 264r, 265r, 266r; BL, Stowe MS 553, fols 76v, 77r; E101/15/36; E101/16/6, m. 2; E101/16/34 E101/16/40; E101/17/3, mm.1b, 6b, 7, 8; E101/17/4, m. 2; E101/17/10, mm. 1, 2; E101/17/24, mm. 4, 4d; E101/17/25, m. 4d; E101/17/35; E101/18/3; E101/18/9; E101/18/28, m. 2; E101/18/31, m. 1; E101/18/36, m. 2; Norwell, pp. 363-86; E36/204, pp. 221-40; E101/19/2, m. 4; E101/19/3, m. 8; E101/19/6, mm. 2, 3, 4; E101/19/11; E101/19/14; E101/19/16, mm. 2, 2d, 3, 4; E101/19/22, mm. 1, 2v, 3v, 6d; E101/19/28, mm. 3, 4, 7; E101/19/32; E101/19/38, mm. 3, 4, 7; E101/19/39, E101/20/1 mm. 2, 3; E101/20/4, m. 7, 8; E101/20/6; E101/20/16; E101/20/34, m. 1; E101/21/4, m. 7; E101/21/7, mm. 2, 3; E101/21/10, mm. 3, 4, 5; E101/21/13, m. 3; E101/21/15; E101/21/33; E101/22/25, mm. 1, 2, 3, 4; E101/23/22; E101/25/9; E101/25/20, nos. 6, 13, 15, 30, 31, 35; E101/25/24, nos. 2, 17, 21, 24, 25, 26, 29, 31, 34, 43, 47, 49; E101/26/36; E101/26/38, m. 2; E101/27/19; E101/27/24, mm. 1, 2; E101/27/25, m. 2; E101/389/8, m. 16; E101/556/37; C47/2/25, nos. 9, 10, 15; C47/2/30, mm. 1, 1d, 2, 2d; CCR, 1318-23, pp. 453, 591; CPR, 1321-24, pp. 14, 77, 288; CPR, 1327-30, pp. 27, 104; CCR, 1333-37, pp. 290, 348; CPR, 1334-38, pp. 536; CPR, 1338-40, pp. 491-92; CCR, 1339-41, pp. 143, 207 CCR, 1343-46, pp. 128-32; Rot. Scot. I, p. 530.

115 They were Robert Tynwit who served in the 1338 Flanders fleet, the battle of Sluys and the 1342 Brittany fleet. He served in other fleets such as the 1347 Calais flotilla but he mastered a different ship on those occasions; and John Norman who served in 1338 and 1342. For Norman’s service, see E101/21/10, m. 5; E101/21/13, m. 3; E36/204, p. 234.

116 Twenty-four ships from the 1338 fleet went on to serve at the battle of Sluys.
individual ports, we can see that of all the 347 ships supplied by Great Yarmouth from 1320-60 only two were called the Seintemariecog, thirty-four were called the Nicholas and twenty-three were named the James. London supplied eighty ships to the campaigns of the period and only five of these were called the Seintemariecog. And of the masters from London only William Churchgate can be seen to have mastered the same ship, the Katerine, twice. Other masters from London, such as William Clerbaud, certainly served in more than one expedition but in more than one ship. For instance, Clerbaud sailed in the Messanger in 1338 and the Trinite in 1342. Again linking a port name, a ship name and a master's name together reduces the risk of conflation or double counting in the overall totals.

It is, nevertheless, still probable that the same ship from a particular port had different masters from one campaign to the next. What we can examine, however, is how many ships with the same name served at the same time; this would provide us with the minimum number of ships with that name, from that chosen port. Such an analysis of several ports from both admiralties shows that anywhere between a twenty and thirty percent margin of error could be applied to the individual ships numbers in table 5.2. For example, the port of Newcastle contributed 117 ships to campaigns in Scotland and in France between 1322 and 1360. If we analyse in detail the individual ship names we can determine how many appear with regularity throughout the period, and this will provide some indication of the possible extent of the double counting problem. In all there are fifty different ship names for the port of Newcastle and the

117 CPR, 1327-30, p. 104; E101/16/40, m. 1; Norwell, pp. 379-382; CPR, 1338-40, p. 492; E101/20/4 m. 8; E101/20/16; E101/21/10, m. 5; E36/204, pp. 234, 235; E101/22/25, mm. 1-4; C47/2/25 no. 15; E101/25/9; E101/25/22; E101/25/24; E101/26/38; E101/27/22, m. 3; E101/27/25, m. 2.
118 BL, Cotton MSS, Nero C.V111, fols 265r, 266v; BL, Add MS 7967, fol. 99r; CCR, 1318-23 pp. 660-1; E101/16/40, main roll; E101/18/35 p. 5d; Rot. Scot., p. 523; E101/19/3, m. 8; Norwell, pp. 363-365; E36/204, pp. 221-222; E101/20/39 nos, 37, 38, 46; E101/25/9.
119 E36/204, p. 221; E101/25/9.
120 Norwell, p. 365; E36/204, p. 221.
most popular names being; *Trinite, Seintemaribot, Blithe, Nicholas* and *Godyer*. For example, there were seven ships called the *Seintemaribot*, which served in 1334, 1335, 1336, 1337 and 1339. Only one master, Robert Trym, served on board a ship called the *Seintemaribot* more than once (he served in three victual operations between 1334 and 1339 in Scotland).121 Different captains mastered all five ships called the *Nicholas* that served between 1337 and 1359,122 and the same applies to the ten ships called the *Trinite*, which served in five campaigns between 1337 and 1359. Of course, those ships called the *Trinite* that served in 1337 could be the same vessels that served in 1359, but even if this were so only one ship called the *Trinite* served from this port in 1359, and so the possible margin of error through double counting is small. In total three ships called the *Trinite* sailed in the Scottish campaigns of 1335 and 1337 and a further three more served in the Brittany fleet of 1342, these could therefore be the same ships mastered by different captains. So theoretically the ten ships called the *Trinite* from Newcastle could be reduced to the three ships that served at the same time in 1337 and 1342.123 Indeed, if we were to say that only those ships that served at the same time, with the same name were individual vessels Newcastle’s maritime contribution could be reduced by thirty-two percent.124

When we apply the same methodology to other ports we find similar results. For example, between 1333 and 1355 eight ships called the *Nicholas* sailed from the port of Hull (Hull’s total ship provision was 158). But only a maximum of two vessels sailed in the same fleet, therefore, these eight ships could actually be the same two

121 BL, Cotton MSS, Nero C.VIII, fols 265r, 266r; E101/19/6, mm. 2, 2d; E101/21/4, m. 7; C47/2/30, m. 1d.
122 C47/2/30, mm. 1, 1d; E101/26/38; E101/27/22, m. 1.
123 BL, Cotton MSS, Nero C.VIII fol. 264v; E101/20/34, m. 1; C47/2/30, m. 1, 1d; E101/26/38; E101/27/22, m. 1.
124 The six most popular ship names from each port were analysed first. The popularity of ship names varied between ports. However, the ‘sample’ was extended further to include all the names of ships from a particular port that served more than once. The findings show that the percentage of error that
vessels repeatedly arrested but with different masters. Similarly, there were eleven ships called the *Godyer* that served between 1324 and 1345, but only a maximum of two ships served in any one expedition of the period. There were four ships called the *Blithe* and these served in four separate campaigns all with different masters. And of the seven ships called the *Leonard* a maximum of two served in any one campaign mastered by different men.\(^{125}\) Taking all the names of the vessels that served more than once and if we say that only those ships with the same name that served at the same time are individual vessels, Hull’s overall contribution could be reduced by twenty-seven percent.\(^{126}\)

A similar examination of three ports from the southern admiralty provides similar results. For example, following the same methodology that has been applied to the northern ports Winchelsea’s overall ship provision of 129 individual vessels could be reduced by fourteen percent over the six most popular names, and by twenty-two percent using all the ship names. Sandwich’s (Sandwich contributed 81 ships) overall contribution would be decreased by twenty percent, and London’s (London supplied 80 ships including Greenwich) shipping contribution could have an eighteen percent could be applied by using the six most popular names is between fourteen to nineteen, while the inclusion of all the ships that sailed more than once raises this to twenty-five to thirty percent.\(^{125}\) BL, Add MS 7967, fol. 99v; BL, Cotton MSS, Nero C.VIII, fol. 266v; *Foedera*, II, ii, p. 912; E101/16/40, roll 1; E101/18/28, m. 2; E101/18/31, m. 1; E101/19/3, m. 8; E101/19/6, m. 1; E101/21/4, m. 7; C47/2/30, m. 1; C47/2/35; *CCR*, 1343-46 pp. 126-32; E101/25/9; E101/25/20 no. 13; E101/25/24, nos. 41, 42.; E101/26/38, m. 2.

\(^{126}\) Following the same methodology Boston’s contribution could be reduced by forty-seven percent; King’s Lynn would be decreased by twenty-six percent; Great Yarmouth’s contribution would be reduced by nineteen percent using the six most popular names and thirty-two percent if we included all the ships that served more than once at the same time and with the same name; Ipswich’s overall shipping contribution could be reduced by twenty-seven percent, and Colchester’s by twenty-one percent. See *CPR*, 1321-24 p. 205; *CCR*, 1333-37 p. 348; C47/2/3; E101/16/40; E101/18/3; E101/18/31; E101/19/16, mm. 1, 2, 2d, 3; E101/19/32; E101/20/1; E101/20/34, m. 1; E101/21/7, m. 2; E101/21/10, m. 3; E101/21/12, m. 2; E101/25/9; E101/25/24, no. 35; E101/25/24, nos. 1, 6-10; E101/26/38, m. 2; E101/27/22, mm, 3, 4; E101/27/23; E101/27/24; E101/27/25, m. 2; BL, Stowe MS 553, fol. 77r; BL, Add MS 7967, fols 98v, 99r; *Norwell*, pp. 378, 382-3; E36/204, pp. 232-33; E372/179, m. 44; C47/2/30, mm.1, 1d, 2, 2d; *CCR*, 1343-46, p. 132.
Although these percentages show that up to a third of the vessels in table 5.2 could be double counted it is worth noting that repeat service between transport fleets was usually only on a small scale. For example, by applying the three identifier methodology to the 1,320 ships that sailed as transport vessels in 1338, 1340, 1342 and 1345 only ninety-two, or seven percent of these ships served in more than one of these armadas. Indeed, other studies of a more local nature have shown that in some cases a port, such as Hull, Great Yarmouth and Exeter, could have up to several hundred vessels visiting its environs in any one year. Furthermore, there is also the fact that we are missing the evidence from the major royal fleets of 1340, 1345, 1355 and 1359, which means that there are possibly as many as 1,000 ships unaccounted for in this evidence. Following the above findings it could be

127 BL, Add MS 7967, fols 97v, 98v 99r, 99v; E101/16/40, main roll; BL, Cotton MSS, Nero C.VIII, fols 264r, 265r; CPR, 1327-30 pp. 10, 104; CCR, 1339-41 p. 143; E101/17/10, mm. 1, 2; E101/17/24, m. 4d; E101/18/3; E101/19/2, m. 4; E101/19/32; E101/19/38, m. 2; E101/19/39, m. 3; E101/20/4, m. 8; E101/20/16; E101/20/34, m. 1; E101/21/10, mm. 2, 4, 5; E101/21/33; E101/22/25, mm. 1, 2, 3, 4; CCR, 1343-46 pp. 128-32; E101/25/20, nos, 15, 16; E101/26/38; E101/27/22, m. 3; E101/27/25, m. 2; C47/2/25, no.15; E101/27/24 m. 3

128 W. R. Childs, The trade and shipping of Hull, p. 22; M. Kowaleski, Local markets and regional trade in medieval Exeter, pp. 222-249 and idem, 'The expansion of the south-western fisheries in late medieval England', EHR 53 (2000), pp. 429-454, tables 1 and 2, pp. 431, 432. Between them these two ports had access to a possible 506 English vessels. For example, between 1383 and 1384 110 ships docked in Exeter, and by 1492 to 1493 this had risen to 803 ships, although some of these vessels were from Great Yarmouth. See Kowaleski, Local markets, pp. 432, 433. It is not known whether the 234 ships (A. Saul, 'Great Yarmouth', p. 110, n. 60) that Great Yarmouth had under arrest at some point during this period were all individual vessels, however, the likelihood is that the majority of them were. The three east coast ports of Hull, King's Lynn and Great Yarmouth contributed seventeen percent of the entire number of individual ships. This should not be seen as too remarkable because in the 1204 subsidy Hull contributed a total sum of £344 14s 4d, making it the most important port in the north-east, see B. Waite, 'The medieval ports and trade of north-east Yorkshire', MM 63 (1977), pp. 137-149, p. 139. While the counties of Norfolk and Suffolk contained some of the richest tax vills in the kingdom and, along with the counties on the Welsh borders, had the greatest concentration of markets, thus making East Anglia a major centre for trade. As such there was a need for large numbers of trading vessel. See B. M. S. Campbell and K. Bartley, England on the eve of the Black Death: an atlas of lay lordship, land and wealth, 1300-49 (Manchester, 2006), pp. 302, 306, 310-12, 324-35, 343. Finally, the east coast ports were also the dominant trading centres for the majority of England's wool and cloth trade during the fourteenth century. They continued to be the main centres of export and import for these commodities until the rise of London in the fifteenth century. See M. Bonney, 'The english medieval wool and cloth trade: new approaches for the local historian', The local historian, 22 (February, 1992), pp. 18-40, pp. 27-35.

129 In addition, the fleet that engaged with the Spanish vessels off Winchelsea is absent from the sources as is the fleet that transported Edward to Calais in 1350. Furthermore, there are several documents that have not been used by this thesis as they are outside the parameters of the research topic (for example, E101/27/5 that lists fifty-one ships that have not been included). Moreover, there
said that the average percentage of error is twenty-seven. It is, therefore, suggested by this thesis that the margin of error for the number of individual ships recorded in table 5.2 is perhaps twenty-five to thirty percent.

A further methodological complication, related to the problems of double counting and conflation arises from the difficulty of estimating the life-span of medieval ships. But by following the service records of some of the king’s vessels it is possible to estimate the life-span of a ship and from this suggest that a medieval vessels could remain in service for at least two decades. The king’s vessels provide the perfect case study on this because they usually served in every expedition. For example, the *Cog Thomas*, *Cog Edward* and *Rodecog* served for over twenty years. The *Rodecog* began its service in 1335 during the Scottish campaign of that year and continued to operate in 1336, 1338 (Flanders and Gascony). It was still in operation in 1354 before being involved for the last time in the Reims campaign of 1359. Apart from its last outing, the ship was mastered by Hugh Reppes on every occasion. The *Cog Edward* began its service in 1336 and was still operational in 1354 after participating in four expeditions mastered by Thomas Springet. The *Cog Thomas* also served over a twenty-year period. It began operations in 1338 before serving through 1339-40, taking part in the battle of Sluys before participating in the 1342 Brittany campaign. A gap appears in its service record before it is listed in the Crécy fleet of 1346. It was also present at the battle Les Espagnols Sur Mer in 1350, before

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are numerous payrolls, such as E101/26/5, mm. 1-4, which records the wages paid to thirteen ships’ crews for the freighting of wool in royal ships.

130 BL, Cotton MSS, Nero C.V111, fol. 246r; CPR, 1333-37, p. 692; Norwell, p. 364; E101/20/39, nos, 2, 4, 25, 26, 29; H. J. Hewitt, *The organisation of war*, p. 79; E101/27/15, mm. 2. Reppes appears as the master of the same ship on E101/27/5, which has been dated to 1356.

131 Norwell, p. 363; CCR, 1333-37, p. 692; CPR 1334-38, p. 387; E101/19/3, mm. 8; E101/20/39, no.3; H. J. Hewitt, *The organisation of war*, p. 79.
finally appearing in 1359. Throughout its long career it had three masters, Robert Salmon, Richard Fille and John Willie.\textsuperscript{132}

What this short discussion of the king’s ships illuminates is that medieval vessels could remain on active service for decades.\textsuperscript{133} Indeed, given the nature of the service that the king’s ships were engaged in, which included two fiercely fought battles, it is possible that vessels operating in a much safer environment could provide a longer life of service for their owners. Consequently, although the method used throughout this thesis is in danger of both overestimating and underestimating the numbers of individual ships that sailed in the wars, the use of the three identifiers coupled with the fact that there is not much repetition of ship names in separate campaigns, should lessen its impact on the accuracy of the tabulated information, and that conflation and double counting will probably account for no more than thirty percent of the totals.\textsuperscript{134}

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The overall total of the 95,341 mariners involved in the operations of the period is obviously an overestimation.\textsuperscript{135} Unfortunately, the sources make it impossible to offer a more accurate figure. For example, Great Yarmouth contributed 347 ships to the king’s wars in this period and 8,851 mariners manned these vessels. This total, which

\textsuperscript{132} Norwell, p. 363; E101/389/8, m. 16; E101/20/39, nos, 4, 9, 10; D. Hannay, \textit{A short history of the royal navy}, p. 24; E101/27/15, m. 2.

\textsuperscript{133} R. Malcomson, ‘The longevity of wooden warships: the Great Lakes example’, \textit{MM} 89 (2003), pp. 425-436, pp. 426, 472, 433 notes that even wooden ships that were laid up throughout harsh winters in areas where there was no dry docks, no sufficient dockyards, no store houses or work shops and in which warfare was common place could survive for thirty-one years, with the majority of vessels between 1750 and 1830 serving between ten and twenty years.

\textsuperscript{134} It is also worth noting that to some extent, conflation and double counting will cancel each other out. This is especially so when the numbers involved are large.

\textsuperscript{135} The total numbers of mariners recorded in table 5.1 are calculated by adding together all the ships’ crews for which data exists. Included are estimations of mariner numbers for the campaigns where we have no such information: for example 1333, for which we have no accurate crew sizes.
is more than twice the pre- Black Death population of the town, must conceal a great deal of repeat service. However, what is surprising is that in the same fleet in 1342 Great Yarmouth supplied thirty-three ships manned by 924 mariners, which means that in one expedition, at the same point in time, a quarter of all Great Yarmouth’s population appears to have sailed on board the town’s ships. This is an interesting point, suggesting that either that the town’s population was totally wedded to service at sea, or that manpower for the fleets was raised not just from the town but also from the outlying villages and surrounding areas. More likely, however, is that during the preparations for a campaign mariners were arrested through commissions of array alongside the general levies and in the areas of the coast designated ‘maritime lands’ by the crown. This would not have impeded a ship’s progress at sea because not all men on board a vessel would have to be expert seamen. A ship with a single mast only required a small group of skilled mariners who could direct the other crew members to do the work. Indeed, what the commissions of array provided is the brute force needed to handle the tackle on board a ship.

It is beyond doubt, therefore, that there is a high proportion of repeat service among the mariner group. Taking this into account perhaps only half the numbers of mariners recorded in table 5.1 were in fact individual seamen. But again, it is worth bearing in mind that there are probably as many as 1,000 ships missing from the extant source evidence. We can, however, be more precise in our conclusions.

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136 A. Saul, ‘Great Yarmouth and the hundred years war’, p. 105 estimates the population before the plague to be 4,500.
137 E36/204, pp. 234, 235, 240; C47/2/35; CCR, 1343-46, pp. 128-32.
138 M. Hughes, ‘The fourteenth century French raids on Hampshire and the Isle of Wight’ Arms, armies and fortifications in the hundred years war, eds A. Curry, M. Hughes, pp. 121-143, p. 140 states that the ‘maritime land’ extended six leagues from the shore.
139 Alternatively the mariners for the ships could be gathered from the surrounding area of the embarkation port, such as seems to be happening during the weeks leading up to the St Sardos campaign. It is known that admirals did sometimes work alongside commissioners of array during the preparations of a campaign and so it is possible that men were arrested for service during the general
concerning the masters. Many of the 3,049 masters we know by name served on more than one occasion. Many of the 3,049 masters we know by name served on more than one occasion. What this seems to suggest is that the merchant marine in the fourteenth century was a significant size, for otherwise we would expect to find much more repeat service within the master group.

Fortunately, we are on firmer ground when we examine the careers of some individual masters. For example, Walter atte Lane from Weymouth served on six separate occasions between 1322 and 1338. He operated the Richgayne in 1322, when that ship was part of the supply fleet for the Scottish campaign of that year, before mastering the same ship in the transport flotilla that conveyed the earl of Surrey to Gascony in 1325. He was employed as master of the Richegayne for the last time when that ship was part of the armada that was raised to protect the coast from the round up of county levies. On the admirals working alongside commissioners of array, see R. M. Hedley, 'The administration of the navy', pp. 20-33.

This number is calculated from table 51. The apparent discrepancy between the total number of masters here and the overall total of ships given in table 5.2 is because there are many occasions when a master might appear with a particular named ship, but where the name of the port is not provided by the source. For example, the 747 masters that sailed in the 1346 cannot be named, neither can 117 from 1342 there are further 356 ships were the master’s name is not recorded.

This is calculated by matching the three identifiers discussed earlier. Although these masters served more than once this does not necessarily mean they operated different ships, indeed, many mastered the same vessel on more than one occasion. For example, Peter Seaman mastered the Katerine on four separate occasions in 1336, 1337, 1338 and 1342. See E101/19/38, m. 3; Norwell, p. 368; E36/204, p. 233. That many masters are unidentifiable is due to the Crécy fleet sources, the absences from the fleet that transported the earl of Northampton to Brittany in 1342, and those ships that are named in the Scottish wars with no master. In addition, there are other payrolls, such as the Black Prince's 1355 transport fleet, which are damaged: CPR, 1343-38, pp. 98; CPR, 1334-38, pp. 128-32; BL, Add MS 7976, fols 94r-99v; BL, Stowe MS 553, fols 76v, 77v; BL, Add MS 7967, fols 98r, 99v; BL, Cotton MSS, Nero C VIII, fols 262v 264r, 265v 266r, 266v E101/15/36; E101/16/7, m. 11; E101/16/16, m. 6; E101/16/34, no. 17; E101/16/40, roll I, main roll; E101/17/3, mm. 2, 6, 7, 8; E101/17/10, m. 1; E101/17/24, m. 4, 4d; E101/17/35; E101/18/3; E101/18/28, m. 2; E101/18/31, m. 1; E101/18/35; E101/18/36; E101/19/3, m. 8; E101/19/4, mm. 4, 5, 7; E101/19/6, m. 1-4, 2d; E101/19/22, mm. 2, 2d; E101/19/32; E101/19/38, mm. 2, 3, 7; E101/19/39, m. 3; Rot Scot. I, pp. 523, 586; C47/2/25, no.15; C47/2/30, mm. 1d, 2d; C47/2/35; E101/19/28, m. 3; E101/19/39; E101/20/4, m. 7; E101/20/6; E101/21/7, m. 3; E101/21/10, mm. 2, 3; E101/21/13, m. 3; E101/23/22; E101/25/9; E101/25/24, no. 32; E101/26/38; E101/27/15, m. 2; E101/27/22, mm. 2, 3, 4; E101/27/24; E101/27/25, m. 2.

Indeed this small number of repeat servers from one expedition to another was in many ways mirrored by the service records of the men-at-arms, for example, a recent examination of the Falkirk campaign of 1298 showed that at the time of that campaign many were ‘relative novices in war’ and that, on average, it was only usual for knights to participate in royal led expeditions only 4.79 times in their whole career in arms, see D. Simpkin, The English aristocracy at war, tables 3.1-3.4, pp. 84-90.
threatened invasion of Roger Mortimer and Queen Isabella in 1326. He then escaped service for ten years before reappearing as the master of the Cristiane in 1337. His final period of service came in 1338 when he again mastered the Cristiane.\textsuperscript{143} Similarly, John le Longe of King’s Lynn served through four campaigns as master of three different ships.\textsuperscript{144} He began his service in the king’s wars during Edward III’s siege of Berwick in 1333 and his ship was requisitioned two years later to participate in the great offensive of 1335. He made his final appearance as master of a ship of war during the siege of Calais.\textsuperscript{145} The mariner William Fille of Great Yarmouth served five times in the wars of the period. He first appears as a master sailing a vessel in the diplomatic flotilla that transported the bishop of Lincoln to Dortrecht in 1337, before serving as master of a transport ship in the 1338 Low Countries fleet. He fought at the battle of Sluys in 1340 and then went on to master a ship that transported the king’s army to Brittany in 1342. His final period of service at the siege of Calais.\textsuperscript{146}

Beyond the careers of individual shipmasters we are able to perceive familial groups within the port communities contributing their expertise to the Edwardian wars. For example, William and Alan Littlebod of Canterbury, father and son, sailed their two ships, the Mighel and the Peter, to Scotland in 1322 to deliver victuals to Edward II’s army.\textsuperscript{147} Roger Hammond, from Romney, and his son, Roger Hammond junior, both sailed in the Brittany transport fleet of 1342.\textsuperscript{148} Members of the Box family of Great Yarmouth were active in 1338, 1342, 1347 and 1359. Henry Box served in all

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{143} CPR, 1321-24, p. 114; E101/17/3, m. 3; E101/17/24, m. 4; E101/19/38, m. 3; E101/19/39, m. 3.
\textsuperscript{144} He mastered the Mariole in 1333, the Petre in 1335 and the Seintemarieship in 1347, and it was as master of this last vessel in which he failed to appear before Walter de Mauny in 1337.
\textsuperscript{145} E101/18/28, m. 2; E101/18/31, m. 1; E101/19/3, m. 8; E101/25/24, no. 32.
\textsuperscript{146} E101/20/16; E101/21/10, m. 4; E101/22/25, m. 3; E36/204, p. 234; E101/25/24, no. 21. In 1337 he mastered the Margrete he captained this same vessel in 1340, but in 1338 he operated a different ship, the Cog Johan. In 1342 he was in charge of the Beton before finally serving as master of the James at the siege of Calais.
\textsuperscript{147} CPR, 1321-24, p. 109.
\end{footnotes}
but the last of these years, his son taking over in 1359 (when Henry retired after the siege of Calais). Another family active in the campaigns of the period were the Loveriks of Sandwich. John and William both served in 1325 and 1337. But an Exchequer account from 1340 is perhaps the most intriguing document that highlights familial relationships at sea. The source lists the full crew compliment on board the Godbefor of King’s Lynn and shows that, at least on board this vessel, the crew were closely connected. For example, the master of the vessel was John Halfknight but there was also a Thomas, William and Richard Halfknight on board, furthermore, John and Roger Reppes were also crew members as were Geoffrey Hormynglowe senior and John Hormynglowe junior. These are surely members of the same families and it shows that the master of the ship had three members of his family on board, in addition to a further two more family groups. This tantalising look at a full crew lists shows that mariners operating the ships of the period could have close relationships that would undoubtedly create an atmosphere of camaraderie aboard. This familiarity between members of the crew could be important particularly when we consider that the crew on board the Godbefor fought at Sluys. Overall it is possible to see twenty-nine familial groupings in the sources of the period, and that is undoubtedly as minimum figure because it has been arrived at by counting only those who match all three identifiers explained above. However, it is likely that many

148 E36/204, p. 230.
149 Norwell, p. 380; E36/204, p. 234; E101/25/24, no. 27; E101/27/22, m. 3.
150 E101/17/10, m. 2; E101/19/39, m. 3.
151 E101/22/30, mm. 2, 2d record the names of the forty-five crewmembers.
152 Reppes was located in East Anglia, so it was in the same geographical area as King’s Lynn.
153 The twenty-nine includes the seven family groups noted above in addition to the Saundre family Dartmouth; the Richard family from Brunham; the Bryan family from Southampton; the Swete family from Dartmouth; the le Bakers from Dartmouth; The Waynflete family from Great Yarmouth; the Nesbete family from Hartlepool; the Shipman family from Winchelsea; The Finch family from Winchelsea; the Scots from King’s Lynn; the Sauger family from Sidmouth; the Godale family from Hook; the Goldyngs from Hastings; the Passelewe family from Winchelsea; the Folk family from Winchelsea; the Swan family from Winchelsea; the Baitille family from Winchelsea; the Hammond family from Romney, which was larger than just the two Rogers with also a John and Richard; the
shipmasters operated out of several ports during their careers. This makes record linkage difficult to determine with any accuracy. Richard Priour, for example, operated out of no fewer than three east coast ports during this period. He mastered the *Magdelene* in 1338 and the *Gaynepay* of Ipswich in 1359. But he also sailed from the ports of Whitlowenes and Withernsea.\(^{154}\) It seems that many families in port towns gravitated towards a life at sea, no doubt learning their skills from their fathers, brothers, cousins or uncles and putting their accumulated maritime knowledge to good use in the king's wars. However, the dangers of an occupation that involved regular service at sea should not be underestimated and there was not only the risk of suffering injury or death at sea, but the home towns of the mariners could suffer devastating raids by the French.\(^{155}\) That this invaluable service was sometimes not recognised by contemporaries should not lessen the importance of the shipmasters in the wars. Indeed, many medieval writers did display a discourteous view towards mariners because their occupation could lead them to the horror of dying without confession and a decent Christian burial.\(^{156}\)

There was also considerable overlap between tradesmen, burgesses and shipmasters. For example, many town burgesses from Ipswich mastered ships in the

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\(^{154}\) Norwell, p. 378; E36/204, p. 232; *CCR*, 1343-46, p. 132; E101/27/25, m. 2.

\(^{155}\) For example, Robert Finch, shipmaster and member of the influential Finch family from Winchelsea, was killed by the French during a raid in 1360 on the port of Winchelsea. Robert had previously served as the master of the *Cog Thomas* in 1338 and as the master of the *Seintemariecog* in 1342. See E101/21/7, m. 2; E36/204, p. 229. For his death, see *Chronicon anonymi Cantvarensis*, p. 61.

\(^{156}\) M. Evans, *The death of kings: royal deaths in medieval England* (London, 2003), pp. 96-97, shows the negative ways in which medieval writers could portray the image of the medieval mariner; G. W. Coopland, 'A glimpse of late fourteenth-century ships and seamen', p. 189 describes a more positive
wars of the period, in addition to running trading enterprises and being involved in the
sphere of local government. For example, John Irp, a prominent resident of Ipswich,
occupied the office of town bailiff nine times from 1324 until his death due to the
Plague in 1348. But in 1324 he mastered the ship, Godyer, when he participated in
the victual operation for the war of St Sardos. The Whatfields were another Ipswich
family who served as shipmasters and town officials. In 1324 John Whatfield
participated in the supply fleet sailing to Gascony, and during the same decade his
brother was a member of the town's government, when in 1328 he occupied the office
of bailiff. In addition, men who appear as masters of a particular vessel in one
document can be viewed as the owner of another ship in a separate source. For
example, John Giboun mastered the Seintemariecog in the Flanders expedition of
1338 and then operated the Clement during the Brittany transport fleet of 1342. But he
is also named as the owner of the Alisen, a ship mastered by John Dame, which
participated in the Black Prince's transport flotilla in 1355. There does appear to have
been only one person here called John Giboun, because on all the occasions his name
appears it is in connection with the port of Sandwich. Clearly Giboun was an
important maritime figure in that port. Another ship owner with a similar career
was William Bacoun of Dartmouth. In 1341 Bacoun mastered a barge that transported
Gawain Corder to Brittany, but he was name elsewhere as the owner of the George, a
ship that was mastered by John Seiline from Dartmouth in 1342. The world of the

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medieval portraiture of a seamen. Indeed, Chaucer's shipman was also described as a 'gentil maryneer', see The works of Geoffrey Chaucer, 2nd edn. ed. F. N. Robinson (Oxford, 1957), p. 160.
158 E101/16/40, main roll. His vessel freighted 18 tuns of flour.
159 G. H. Martin, 'The borough and the merchant community of Ipswich', p. 180, appendix III, pp. 214-215; E101/16/40, main roll; BL, Add MS 7967, fol. 99r.
160 E101/21/7, m. 2; E36/204, p. 222; E101/26/37, m. 3. Indeed it is likely that John Giboun had
become a royal mariner by 1356 as he appears on a royal ships list dated to that year as the master of
the Robynet (E101/27/5).
161 E101/23/5; E101/24/9 (b).
medieval mariner was obviously complex in the fact that they could be ship owners yet not master that vessel when it was requisitioned, preferring instead to employ another man for that role. William Gamelyn from Hooke exemplifies the complexity of a life at sea during a period of intense warfare. In 1336 he mastered the Welfare as part of a defence armada against a possible French attack, and he can be seen mastering the same ship in 1337 and 1338. But in 1347 we catch a glimpse of him in his civilian role when he appears mastering the same ship as a trader in Chichester. A short sketch drawing on the service records of medieval seamen shows that they and their ships were arrested for a variety of purposes and roles, and that on the whole they were a versatile part of the Edwardian military machine. These men could be masters of victual ships on one campaign and by the next they could be in the thick of a major sea battle such as Sluys.

* * *

Chapter five of this thesis has analysed several major issues relevant to the maritime dimension of the wars conducted by Edward II and Edward III. It has discussed the increasing 'privatisation' of the organisation of war from 1336 in Scotland and 1345 in France. In addition, the varying methods employed by both kings to raise fleets and arrest mariners were also analysed. Central to the chapter was the analysis on the expeditions of 1340, 1347 and 1359. It was found that although there is an absence of source material for the fleet that engaged the French armada at Sluys it is impossible, with any certainty, to point to one reason why such a lacuna in the documentary evidence exists. But perhaps the loss of the Wardrobe documents during the engagement is the most important reason for the lack of information. On a more positive note, however, was the analysis on the siege of Calais. The main point

162 E101/19/38, m. 3; E101/19/39, m. 3; E101/21/7, m. 2; E122/190/5, Gamelyn's ship on this occasion
brought out through the discussion of the siege was that where there is a lack of source documents detailing the service patterns of the land-based forces, the payrolls relating to the service of the maritime contingents can help to reconstruct the events of 1347. But perhaps the principal issue was the discussion on the overall number of individual ships that served between 1320 and 1360, and the resulting methodology. This illuminated the vast resources that were contributed to the wars by England's merchant marine.
CONCLUSION

This study has traced the maritime involvement in the wars conducted by Edward II and Edward III between 1320 and 1360, a forty year period that certainly witnessed England's greatest military endeavours of the middle ages.\(^1\) The kings of England were, for much of this time, engaged in two inter-related wars against two other kingdoms. The militarisation of sections of England's population had been gathering pace since the wars initiated by Edward I in the 1280s.\(^2\) This study has aimed to show that it was not only the English landed community that felt the impact of these wars, but also the maritime sections of society. Indeed, to analyse properly the effects of the wars on England's society and economy one needs to take account of all aspects of the war effort. For example, Edward III did not assemble 14,000 men for the Crécy expedition; he actually recruited 30,000, as he also raised 16,000 mariners to serve on board the ships that transported his army. This point is pertinent to every campaign of the period and obliges us radically to revise our estimates of recruitment and indeed demands on the population.\(^3\)

The thesis began by examining the hidden bureaucratic procedures that underpinned the raising of a fleet in the fourteenth century. It showed that behind what, on the surface, looks like a simple procedure was in fact a complex operation organised by a skilled administrative staff who were capable of organising large numbers of men and ships and employing them, at the same point in time, into

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\(^{1}\) Cf., J. Sherborne, 'The cost of English warfare with France', which demonstrates that the warfare between 1369 and 1380 was both intensive and costly.

\(^{2}\) This process is amply dealt with by D. Simpkin, *The English aristocracy at war*, particularly chapter 1.

\(^{3}\) This is an important point to note. For example, K. B. McFarlane, 'War, the economy and social change: England and the hundred years war', *past and present* 22 (July, 1962), pp. 3-18 makes no mention of the maritime element of the campaigns or the manpower, and money, required to put it into operation when he discusses the effects of the war on England, even though he includes a detailed analysis of the land-based armies in his account and what effect raising such numbers of men had on society. However, M. M. Postan, 'The cost of the Hundred Years War' did include the maritime manpower in his assessment.
functioning fleets. This process should not be underestimated: as in 1346 747
individual vessels, manned by 16,000 men were assembled over several months. The
thesis also examined the maritime contribution to the logistical operation and showed
that its support in this process was perhaps the most important part of any campaign,
deriving the land-based campaigns in the period. Indeed the process of collecting
and distributing the victuals by sea was as complex as the methods employed when
raising a fleet. The campaigns in Scotland, regardless of whether they were successful
or not, were proven to be supported by meticulous planning of supply provision. In
addition to the arrangements made for invading armies, it was also shown that the
survival of English garrisons within Scotland relied on provisioning by sea. With
regard to continental wars it was argued that English armies, far from living off the
land when campaigning in France, were well supplied with foodstuffs and military
equipment. Indeed, if the Reims campaign were included in the overall totals recorded
in table 3.3, the supply of victuals for continental campaigns would far outstrip those
quantities shipped to the wars in Scotland.

In the analysis on the transport fleets of the period we discovered that in terms
of numbers of ships the English merchant marine was more than capable of meeting
the increasing demands of the crown. Particularly so when it is remembered that the
section above on the methodology adopted by this thesis shows that the overall the
number of individual ships recorded in table 5.2 could be in error by thirty percent,
which would still mean that relatively large numbers of vessels operated in this period.
The study has, therefore, illuminated the vital role played by England’s maritime
communities in the wars of Edward II and Edward III. Their commitment to the
expeditions of these two kings in terms of manpower and money was equal to that of
the land based elements of the campaigns. The organisational structures were
inherited from the reign and wars of Edward I were developed further, particularly by Edward III, who increased the size of the fleets raised for his wars, especially for French campaigns, through a process that required a skilled bureaucratic staff. Furthermore, the reign of Edward III witnessed a series of administrative experiments designed to simplify the fleet raising procedures. These new developments also had the advantage of decreasing the complaints from the merchant class and parliament. In short, the sophisticated administrative systems developed by Edward III un-locked and tapped into the resources that the crown required in order to prosecute a largely successful continental war after 1340.4

The numbers of ships that participated throughout the campaigns in Scotland and France was immense and it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that a large section of England’s merchant marine was deployed in the war effort. If we couple this to the demands for supplies, and the system that ensured their collection, as well as taking into account the land-based forces that also operated concurrently with these two facets of the war effort, it can be stated fairly conclusively that England’s population felt the effects of total war. From 1322 to 1360 there was not a single manor, vill, town or port that did not supply foodstuffs, military supplies, manpower, ships or the other materiel of war. Every section of the population from the peasant to the king was involved in the wars of the period. The peasants worked the land which supplied the food; the merchants and clerks arranged for this to be collected, stored and distributed it to the armies; the merchant marine provided the instruments to freight provender, horses and men to the theatres of war; the landed gentry supplied the brute force required for the chevauchées and battles of the wars; and the clergy prayed for

4 The experimentation and changes in the fleet raising procedure by Edward III should not be seen in isolation because these developments were mirrored by similar experiments in the organisation of certain aspects of the land-based section of the army, see A. Ayton, Knights and warhorses, pp. 96-120.
success in the expeditions whilst issuing propaganda for the kings.\textsuperscript{5} By 1360 England’s maritime communities had supplied thousands of ships and tens of thousands of men for service in the campaigns. Indeed, comparisons between the quotations at the beginning of this thesis and the findings of the study concerning the numbers of ships and men and their crucial involvement in the wars of the period, prompts the conclusion that rather than a barrier, a dangerous obstacle that was best crossed infrequently, the sea and the people who worked on it, were the main artery in England’s wars, trade and communication with the other kingdoms of Europe. This achievement by England’s medieval maritime communities was not forgotten. Nearly five hundred years later, when England faced another threat from the continent, in the guise of Napoleon, the British looked back to the maritime achievements of Edward III to provide them with the inspiration and the courage to face the threat by taking stock of the past victories and successes when the merchant marine of fourteenth century England was called upon to take the war to the enemy for its kings.\textsuperscript{6}

\textsuperscript{5} For the level of gentry support, see A. Ayton, ‘Edward III and the English aristocracy’ but also, see A. Ayton and P. Preston, \textit{The battle of Crécy}, chapter 5 in which Dr. Ayton assess the English army including a discussion on the non-aristocratic element in a major Edwardian army. The wide ranging affects on the general population of the Scottish and French wars had been noted by W. R. Jones, ‘The English church and royal propaganda during the hundred years war’, \textit{JBS} 19 (1979), pp. 18-30, p. 18.

\textsuperscript{6} In 1803 an opera was performed at Covent Garden to an important audience by a well-known and famous cast to provide inspiration for the coming naval war against Napoleon. It was entitled \textit{The Fleet of 1342} and was composed by John Braham and Thomas Dibdin and was received with rapturous applause. It can now be found in the rare collections in the Maritime History Museum at Greenwich, PBE 6737.
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