Assessing Democratic Quality and Performance in Legislatures

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Summary

This thesis looks into the possibility of assessing legislative performance and democratic quality using performance management frameworks and methods used for organisational development and change and whether measurement of this kind is beneficial to improving democratic quality and the legitimation of the political system in general. Political institutions and in particular legislatures are often immune from the adverse effects of poor performance due to large budget allocations regardless of efficacy. Furthermore a rise in efficiency is often seen as a threat to the institution's accountability. The literature on legislative performance is mainly confined to legislative policy making output which is not necessarily a sign of good performance. Neither is performance only about the consideration of the costs and resource utilisation or the behaviour of actors and individuals in the policy making process as dependent variables. As mentioned such considerations seem rather irrelevant to the performance of legislative outcomes since legislatures usually do not have budgetary or spending concerns as in the private sector.

This study has taken an open systems approach to legislative institutions. Any organisational model of this kind will doubtlessly consider the continual growth and improvement of performance as a major theme. Although expressions such as optimal growth cannot be used for legislatures, unlike other production systems, it is acknowledged that demands going into the legislative system from its environment will never cease and so the legislative organisation must be able to help the legislature adapt to the changes while at the same time, maintain or improve the quality of its work and seek better performance. This study investigates the methods and
frameworks already in use by developed legislative institutions and public sector organisations to assess whether these methods could be adapted to enhance legislative performance and democratic quality in the political system.

It is clear that not all countries respond to legislative capacity building programmes in the same way. It is often assumed that developed democracies culturally characterised through efficacy, meaningful and engaging work are associated with higher performance and that strong mission-based cultures perform better than those without or with a weak sense of mission. This study seeks to investigate this assumption and see whether it may be backed theoretically and proven scientifically. A cusp catastrophe model of democratic development and change is devised to show that below the certain threshold slight changes in the indicators for democratic development and growth may lead to large changes behavioural changes which are quite unpredictable using linear models of political development and change. A statistical analysis follows to show that the credibility of the model followed by tests and comparisons with other popular democracy indices to indicate its validity.

The cusp catastrophe model strengthens the idea that not all countries are suitable for performance measurement application. Only political systems that have passed a certain threshold for consolidated democracies may effectively benefit from performance measurement. Furthermore it is not really possible to compare the performance of a legislature on one side of this threshold with a legislature from the other side using the same measurement framework and methods. Thus only developed democracies, characterised as being ‘active’ could take advantage of performance measurement to avert problems relating to the legitimacy of the political system in the
eyes of its citizens. This work examines the problem of falling legitimacy from the literature to assess whether a crisis of democracy is in the making which could lead to problems such as the erosion of the authority of politicians; the steady reduction of electoral loyalty and stability of voters; the decline of public trust in political processes; and even an increase in law evasion. The literature suggests that developed democracies are not facing an eminent crisis of democracy but are faced with a challenge in which they must continuously improve the performance of their political institutions by improving responsiveness in order to maintain and improve on political legitimacy.

The Case studies in this work is an attempt to show how the implementation of performance measurement frameworks could potentially manage performance and continuously improve responsiveness to maintain and improve democratic quality and the legitimacy of the political system. The first study is of the British Parliament’s House Services’ use of the Balanced Scorecard framework to improve the performance of administrative services, services to MPs and the public. The study is also comparative and assesses the utility of different performance measurement systems and frameworks by comparing performance measurement in Westminster with other developed legislatures such as such as the Swedish Rikstag and Irish Houses of Oireachtas before evaluating on the success of such performance management in Parliament. The second case study examines the performance of the House of Commons in general and in particular evaluates the effectiveness of the modernisation agenda since 1997. This study is a self-evaluation and is narrowed down to include the performance of the Modernisation and Liaison Committees of the House of Commons based on the literature and documents available. This study finds
that the pace of reform has improved greatly with the adoption of the performance management mindset and the application of performance measurement methods and tools. Finally the third study is an example of how ineffective it is to apply performance measurement to legislative institutions below the consolidation threshold. This study investigated the implementation of the balanced scorecard to the performance of the Iranian Majles Research Centre and has documented the results.

The concluding chapter sets out the parameters of a performance measurement framework for developed legislatures and explains how some of the parameters in legislative performance measurement could contrast which could be avoidable. This chapter also provides a suggested framework for legislative performance based on the Balanced Scorecard and improvement in responsiveness to enhance legitimation and the quality of democracy in the political system. This thesis believes that a balanced approach, of the kind suggested here would no doubt contribute to knowledge and scholarship in legislative studies as well as to enhance democratic quality in consolidated democracies.

Key words: Performance Measurement, Legislatures, Democracy, Cusp Catastrophe, Consolidation, Responsiveness, Legitimation, Balanced Scorecard, House of Commons, Modernisation, House Services
Chapter one: Introduction

1-1. Introduction

This research is an investigation into the use of performance measurement in legislatures and whether measurement of this kind is beneficial to improving democratic quality and the legitimation of the political system. Performance is seemingly a concern and obsession in all governance systems around the world. As Frederickson and Smith (2003: 208) point out, ‘Accountability for conducting the public’s business is increasingly about performance rather than discharging a specific policy goal within the confines of the law’. Performance measurement as a public management tool is generally concerned with adapting the structures and processes of public sector organisations so as to ensure good performance (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004) and have been used vigorously by legislatures in the assessment of accountability and efficiency of government policy and output, especially in the past two decades. This research looks into the possibilities of adapting these tools to assess legislative performance in democracies.

Measuring performance and developing performance measurement systems, and especially commitment to it is subject to influence from technical, cultural and political conditions and is therefore contingent (Boyle, 1989, Bouckaert and Halligan 2008: 12). But whatever the contingencies, there is no doubt that the focus on performance is expanding and has become more intense. Almost all services in post-industrial societies use some kind of performance measurement system with the more developed societies placing more emphasis on achieving performance goals and targets. Managing performance has become the core of
public management and has had a spill over effect on legislative and judicial institutions too.

1-2. The Importance of Performance Measurement in Legislative Research

Performance measurement in legislatures is a topic that is often neglected in political circles perhaps because performance measurement aims at long-term goals whereas politicians are usually seeking to find quick fixes and short-term solutions to social and political problems. In other words as Jackson states ‘the length of a politician’s life is not long enough to wait for long run improvements in performance’ (Jackson 1990: 21). However, this reason alone cannot account for why this topic has been overlooked in legislative studies literature despite its popular appeal in institutional studies.

As discussed in chapter two, the main body of literature in legislative studies is based on reductionism and is causal only to the extent that a certain process is linked to a certain output or behaviour. Whereas from the perspective of performance management, performance is a holistic process and the relationship between the processes and outcome must be assessed not only through the lens of the legislature as a whole but also the impact of the legislature on the political system in general. The latter perspective adds complexity to research which is usually less favoured to the straightforward reductionist methodology that warrants conclusive results but at the price of leaving unanswerable questions and gaps in the literature. This study intends to fill some of these gaps by
looking at legislative performance from the perspective of performance management and to serve as a bridge between the studies of legislatures and organisations. Performance management in organisations has become more of a necessity than a trend and this study intends to realise this in the study of legislatures.

Legislative performance management has become a topic of interest among international organisations and agencies dealing with development and democracy appraisal. The implementation of parliamentary strengthening programmes such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) run project *Assisting Legislatures* is an example of such programmes which are usually misinterpreted in developing countries as performance management programmes rather than the legislative capacity building programmes that they really are. These kinds of programmes are usually based on historical approaches which tend to be less judgemental and relativistic. They also emphasise training and sharing of technical expertise in improving parliamentary functions by offering a broad range of options and frameworks for countries wishing to develop their legislatures.

There is no doubt that such tailor-made programmes are advantageous for developing legislatures as they are helped and supported to improve their internal technical capacity; strengthen their institutional functions such as representation and oversight; and improve executive-legislative relationships and build a
stronger relationship with civil society. And as this thesis argues legislative strengthening programmes of this kind can help build the foundations necessary for successful performance measurement and implementation but not the other way around. In other words performance management programmes can only be meaningful once the legislature has developed the capacity for performance measurement based on democratic foundations.

Legislative performance is not about strengthening legislative capacities and as David Arter points out (2006a) the relative strength or capacity of legislatures does not indicate their performance. The power of a legislature to influence policy or work independently of the executive does not have an impact on its organisational performance. What needs to be considered in performance is how well the legislature can carry out the powers appointed to it by the institution to maximum benefit of the system. Legislative performance does not improve under conditions of rigid institutional rules and processes since these rules operate in equilibrium and equilibrium equals a closed system. Whereas developed legislatures operate in open systems where there is not a fixed equilibrium, but rather a stable equilibrium state.


2 There are other potential problems arising from capacity building programmes such as this. Firstly progress is partial (usually ends when funding runs out) and relatively costly. Hence the programmes may become a burden to donor states who may decide to pull out of their financial commitments in reaction to slow progress and the lack of substantial development. Secondly due to the UN's political nature which is aimed at maintaining good diplomatic relations and avoiding animosity with regimes As a result, these programmes sometimes rely on the legislatures' own assessments. As a result, financial aid may be spent in ways which were initially unintended. Thus, such programmes may end up only indicating areas of weaknesses in a particular legislative system and offer limited advice by showing past experience in other similar institutions in managing a similar problem. Moreover, the methods used by international organisations and aid agencies, which are designed to bring issues of legislative development to focus, such as conferences and summits, can be too expensive and not as productive as initially expected (as productivity depends on political support and willingness from all participants). In the end it will be up to the national legislatures to choose whether it would like to follow the guidelines implicated and these programmes may end by spending lots and gaining little.
1-3. Legislative Performance from an Organisational Perspective:

Performance is not a unitary concept. The term performance means different things depending on the discipline that is used to describe it. Organisational theorists, Pollitt and Bouckeart, suggest that equating performance with a simple assertion as ‘to run better’ may be problematic as this could mean different things to different individuals and groups and improving performance on one dimension or against one objective may lead (intentionally or unintentionally) to a lower performance in other dimensions (Pollitt and Bouckeart 2004: 18). Thus performance must be viewed as a set of information about achievements of varying significance to different stakeholders (Bovaird 1996: 147). Talbot (2005) outlines the different dimensions of performance in the public sector as accountability; user choice customer service; efficiency; results and effectiveness; results and resource allocation; and creating public value. Performance is also used as prefatory to other activities such as auditing and budgeting and more diffusely to improvement, orientation and trajectories (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004: 341).

A legislature may be interpreted as a social system existing and functioning on the one hand in accordance with its own order, and on the other hand depending on the conditions of the environment in a complex and changing society. Legislatures and the public sector share this common fact that they cannot perform outside society. Thus legislative performance becomes part of societal performance and is ultimately linked to the performance of the governance system as a whole. So in addition to seeking evidence about substantive
performance improvement, legislative performance measurement systems need to pay attention to the legitimation aspects of performance management reforms.

Legislative performance in this work is broadly defined as: ‘The nature and consequences of service provision by legislative institutions’. The improvement of performance in legislatures would be an attempt to stimulate greater efficiency, effectiveness or higher quality or the mixture of all three at one time. The above definition also takes into consideration the ‘chain of delegation’ in contemporary democracies from voters and civil society to those responsible for the implementation and oversight of public policy’ (Strøm 2000: 266, Lupia and McCubbins 2000). Thus the study of legislative performance would seem to be nested in causal relationships within the structures of delegation and accountability rather than the hierarchical relationships between public management and control which would constrain straightforward linear modelling, most commonly used in performance measurement of public sector organisations.

Such an investigation requires a change in perspective on legislative performance from the rigid focus on legislative institutions, and binding rules that constrain legislative behaviour and output, to a focus on the legislative organisation itself and how ‘outcomes’ or the results from outputs, would effect legislative performance and ultimately improve the democratic outcomes in governance systems. As the review of literature on legislative performance in chapter two of this work shows studies in this area are limited and mainly seem
to concentrate on the internal processes leading to outputs rather than the outcomes of legislative performance itself.

Despite conventional wisdom that studies of performance should consider outcomes rather than outputs, most empirical studies of legislative performance still link processes to a certain 'policy output' and mainly take into consideration the cost and resource utilisation or the behaviour of actors and individuals in the policy making process as dependent variables. However such considerations may seem rather irrelevant to performance of legislative outcomes since legislatures usually do not have a budgetary or spending concern as in the private sector. Furthermore the behaviour of individuals and parties are usually summed up in game theoretic style (win-lose situations) rather than greater consensus building on the most important criteria of performance in the legislature itself.

The argument made repeatedly throughout this research is a reaffirmation that legislative performance or organisational performance is complex and multidimensional. The complexity relates not only to the number of different dimensions of legislative performance, but also the number of different stakeholders which makes consensus building all the more difficult. The multidimensionality of legislative performance relates not only to output quality and quantity, but also equity, efficiency, effectiveness, accountability, probity and the democratic impact on the legitimacy of the political system in general.

Organisational performance involves causal relationships that may only be properly understood in the context of a system which is interdependent and
holistic (and nested). Robert Jervis (1997: 6) defines a ‘system effect’ as a set of units or interconnected elements where the changes in some elements produce changes in other parts of the system and the entire system would exhibit properties and behaviours that are different from those of the parts. This does not mean that any attempt to consider a particular element in the system without examining the surrounding causal factors is bound to become reductionalist. But as Williams points out what is important is that the level of theory in social sciences becomes ‘human-sized’, meaning that the untrained intuition must see it as a whole, or a ‘single gestalt’ (Williams, 1973: 533). Hence holism does not mean that everything must be considered in the system, but the important aspects of the interaction must not be reduced or left out.

By studying legislatures in the context of open systems, common features may be indicated and frameworks may be devised where efficiency can be assessed and strengths and weaknesses indicated. These features could provide a useful framework for the comparative study of legislatures. The aim is to help legislatures indicate areas where institutional norms could be modified so that interaction with the environment can become more efficient and the output of legislative performance may improve by improving outcomes which naturally extends from better outputs.

Any organisational model based on a systems approach, including this study, will unavoidably consider continual growth and the improvement of performance. Moreover, it should be noted that unlike production systems, expressions such as ‘optimal growth’ cannot be used for legislatures. The
demands going into the legislative system from its environment will never cease and so the legislative organisation must be able to help the legislature adapt to the changes while at the same time, maintain or improve the quality of its work and seek better performance.

1-4. The Organisation of this Research

From the start of this work, two main research questions were designed with the aim of keeping the investigation within a framework of performance measurement:

- What approaches should be adopted to measure performance in legislatures?
- What aspects of performance management influence the performance of legislatures?

The second chapter of this work is a review of the existing literature on comparative legislative performance. As the literature analysis shows, there is a general tendency to equate legislative output capacity with performance and legislative performance has mainly been defined using studies of output and behaviour as part of the policy making process leading to legislation. This chapter attempts to bring together concisely the different approaches of output and behaviour to show how these studies have shaped studies of (comparative) legislatures. Most of these studies cover areas of policy making (executive-
legislative relationships) representativeness, responsiveness and the budgetary process and oversight.

As mentioned before, this research adopts a systemic view to organisational performance. The implications of this view are that in order to judge success of an organisation in terms of performance, it is not possible to proceed by assessing the success of one of the component parts. Neither is it possible to assess the success of each part and then aggregate the data for results on the performance of the whole. But what is necessary is to consider the merits of the system as a whole and to see how it performs to changing political tides and societal preferences. In this thesis performance is taken as the responsiveness of the institution to such changes. Yet any attempt to assess an individual system on the basis of such criteria will inevitably encounter problems including measurement and judgement, not least in relation to a comparative scale of legislative systems. Thus to be successful the performance measurement system needs to be narrowed down to include only those legislatures that can benefit from it.

Chapter three provides a conception of legislative performance using not only insights from political science but also organisational theory which regard legislative systems as organised wholes of various simple institutions. It is the organisation of institutional structures that binds legislatures as they are and helps them perform as they do. Using an organisational approach, the functions, behaviour and the performance of a legislature can be measured and assessed using measurement systems which would be very difficult to do if legislatures
are considered merely in institutional terms and values alone. This chapter also provides an analysis of performance measurement systems and frameworks used in political institutions, public sector organisations and legislatures.

From early on into the research (and from the author’s personal experience of working on legislative strengthening projects in Iran) it was realised that not all legislatures can benefit from legislative performance information and measurement in the same way and there is a difference in legislative strengthening programmes aimed at capacity building and legislative performance measurement aimed at improving the efficiency and effectiveness of legislatures within the framework of their capacity to perform. Thus a theory had to be established to show the necessary link between legislative organisations and performance which could preferably be backed up empirically.

Chapter four in this thesis investigated the hypothesis that developed democracies culturally characterised through efficacy, meaningful and engaging work are associated with higher performance and that strong mission-based cultures perform better than those without or with a weak sense of mission (Putnam 1993, 2000; Brewer 2005). This chapter differs from the current generation of comparative research in a distinct way. Instead of adding to the abundance of empirical case studies, the study provided attempts to theorise the dynamics involved in democratic development and democracy and then back up the theory by statistical analysis and empirical research.
The application of the cusp catastrophe model to democratic development and growth provides the central idea of this chapter: ‘In order to take advantage of performance measurement systems, political systems must first pass a certain threshold (for consolidated democracies). It is not really possible to compare countries below this threshold with countries above it using the same measurement indicators and techniques’.

Political systems above the consolidation threshold face two distinct performance related problems. The first problem is a fiscal one and is widely believed that political systems need to reduce or at least moderate the amount of resources consumed by the government and legal systems. The second problem relates to the legitimacy of the political system in the eyes of the citizenry. Chapter five accumulates some evidence of the latter problem or the falling ‘legitimacy rating’ of the political system using the literature available to assess whether a crisis of democracy is in the making.

If proven true then a fall of legitimacy may create various difficulties such as the erosion of the authority of politicians; the steady reduction of electoral loyalty and stability of voters; the decline of public trust in political processes; and even an increase in law evasion. These two problems call not only for a strategic response from the leaders of the political system, but also an improvement in the performance and responsiveness of the political institutions including the legislature. The evidence from the published works on this topic suggests that developed democracies above the consolidation threshold are not facing an eminent crisis of democracy which would be very plausible in countries below
the consolidation threshold. However developed democracies are faced with a challenge in which they must continuously improve the performance of their political institutions in order to maintain and improve on political legitimacy.

Chapter six presents three case studies where performance management techniques for continuous improvement of institutional performance are put to the test in instances of legislatures above the consolidation threshold and below it. The first study is of the British Parliament’s House Services’ use of the Balanced Scorecard framework to improve the performance of administrative services, services to MPs and the public. According to Ingraham, ‘Administrative reform …is a subset of all policy performance, not a separable set of technical efforts’ (Ingraham, 1997: 326, original emphasis). This case study provides a comparative perspective and a definitive indication of how this reform is rolling out in other developed legislatures. It compares and contrasts the utility of different performance measurement systems and frameworks not just in the House Services in Westminster but in other developed legislatures such as the Swedish Rikstag and Irish Houses of Oireachtas. The study evaluates the success of such measures in the performance of Parliament from interviews with key actors involved in the process and publications and documents from Westminster and the legislatures mentioned in the study.

The second case study looks at the performance of the House of Commons in general and evaluates the effectiveness of the modernisation agenda since 1997. This study is mainly restricted to the performance of the Modernisation and Liaison Committees of the House of Commons and provides a self-evaluation of
parliamentary reform based on the literature and documents available. Reform in the House of Commons has followed a pattern of cautious evolution by steadily improving the tools that enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of its functions paving the way for meaningful performance measurement. The process of reform has been slower than some would like, due to formal and informal restrictions and has at times suffered an imbalance between parliamentary accountability and efficiency due to the nature of executive-legislative relations in Westminster. However the pace of reform has improved greatly with the adoption of the performance management mindset and the application of performance measurement methods and tools. With such reforms in place there is no doubt that the pace of continuous improvements in legislative performance will enhance democratic quality in the political system and the balance between accountability and efficacy will be maintained to assist both performance and democratic quality.

The third case study looks into the application of performance measurement tools in developing legislatures that are below the threshold of democratic consolidation. This study presents the results of an attempt to design and implement the Balanced Scorecard to a developing legislature below the consolidation threshold in the model presented in chapter four of this work. The study was carried out on the Iranian Majlis Research Centre over a period of one year (2007-8) and scopes the problems involved in using performance measurement in a legislature that has not yet built the democratic capacity for performance measurement systems to develop and strengthens the hypothesis in this research that: "Developed legislatures with more management capacities
have the ability to perform better than legislatures with less developed management capacity and thus their assessment using performance measurement techniques further enhances the quality of democracy rather than reduces it.'

The final chapter in this research concludes this work by setting out the parameters of a performance measurement framework for developed legislatures. The chapter explains how some of the parameters in legislative performance measurement may contrast and create tensions at the performance management phase and how the parameters can be set out to avoid such a problem. Further difficulties include the measurement dimension of performance, in other words what to measure and how to measure it. Performance measurement systems must also be able to overcome the relativity of outcomes before indicating what measures legislatures could take to reduce these difficulties.

This chapter also provides a suggested Balanced Scorecard framework for performance measurement based on responsiveness to improve legitimation and the quality of democracy in the political system. This framework is informative and not prescriptive and does not seek to promote the Balanced Scorecard as the means to measure legislative performance. This study seeks rather to advocate a ‘balanced approach’ to performance measurement in legislatures which would require legislative institutions to assume corporate identities in their structures and behaviour so that they can look at the threats and risks to their performance, such as political disengagement, in a holistic way.
This thesis believes that a balanced approach, of the kind suggested in chapter seven, to performance improvement and measurement in legislatures would no doubt contribute to knowledge and scholarship in legislative studies as well as to enhance democratic quality in political systems above the threshold for consolidated democracies as mentioned in chapter four. Moreover, a comparative balanced framework of performance improvement designed to enhance legislative responsiveness which as suggested could lead to the maintenance and continuous growth of democratic quality and legitimation could innovate and change the study of performance in political institutions, not only legislatures.

The Balanced Scorecard or BSC is one of many performance management frameworks which this study finds to be the most preferable to other performance measurement frameworks used in organisational design and management. Whether the BSC will become the basis of a comparative performance measurement framework will depend on the political readiness and will to improve legislative performance. As argued here, the organisational readiness already exists in developed democracies but is yet to be achieved in developing legislatures below consolidation. Speculating on the political will for legislative performance measurement on such a scale of development is not the subject of this study and remains yet to be seen.
2-1 Introduction: The Analysis of Output and Behaviour as Legislative Performance

The study of legislative performance has long been associated with the study of legislative output and behaviour as part of the policy making process and the act of legislation. Judging by the number of academic publications, a performance based legislative research design centring on legislative output or behaviour is less popular than any other area of legislative research since interpretations of legislative performance as well as what would constitute legislative outputs, are not as straightforward and without consequence as the study of output would be in other areas of political and social studies. One major problem according to Walke et al, (1962: 25) is the lack of ‘conceptualisation of legislative output’ by which they mean specifying the dimensions and dependent variables of legislative output that are related to the different consequences of that output, not the study of output as a consequence of performance.

Whether output relates to the production of laws and the processes involved in the act of legislation and is affected by divided or undivided governments; the behaviour and role of individuals and groups within the legislature; the expectations of individuals and groups from outside the legislature; the strengthening of democratic values and smooth running of governance systems; the quality or quantity of legislation passed through the chambers, the increase of political oversight; or changes that are external to the legislature itself but have potential to create swings and volatility in the economy and public mood are
only some of the various dimensions that influence legislative output and have consequences for the performance of political systems as a result. However, it would be difficult to pinpoint a specific area of legislative output which would lead to higher performance of the system as a whole since legislative roles and relationships are often more complicated than a linear model would suggest.

This chapter is an attempt at bringing together the various perspectives (or at least the most important ones) into the study of legislative output and behaviour and show the picture so far as to how these studies have shaped comparative legislatures in general and the study of legislative performance in particular. Due to language barriers, the literature is restricted to scholarly work written in the English language. It is also evident from the literature that the majority of scholarly work dealing specifically on legislative output has been conducted on the United States Congress, and to lesser extent parliaments of Western Europe. The bulk of publications on legislative output thus relates to presidential systems. In an attempt towards balance, this study has chosen to focus less on presidential style legislatures and instead emphasise more on the legislative output of parliamentary systems. This exercise may also help define the scope of analysis in within the framework of this research. Moreover this study does not intend to include every single dimensions of legislative output in an effort not to base any assumptions on a particular political system.

The legislature is considered as a multifunctional institution and a utility maximising body which performs by balancing the behavioural aspirations of utility maximising individuals and groups from within the institution as well as
various tiers from the environment. According to Mayhew (1974: 5) the scrutiny of purposive behaviour is the best route to understanding legislative outputs. This suggests that in order to understand legislative behaviour, not only does the behaviour of legislators and political actors within the institution as well as constituents, groups and institutions from outside matter, but also the design and management structure of the institution.

From a public choice perspective, the performance of democratic legislatures depends on two important factors, namely their governance structure and their representativeness. These two factors are linked very closely to each other and it may be difficult to distinguish them at times. Both factors must be considered in any assessment of democratic quality of political systems, although governance structures and control emphasises government stability while the second tends to be more relevant in assessing fairness and equal rights. This chapter attempts to separate the literature surrounding these two dimensions but inevitably cannot avoid some degree of concomitance as not all analyse of legislative output have treated the dimensions as discrete features of legislative performance. This analysis begins by a review of literature linking policy output and performance and its affects on legislative performance and will be followed by the analysis of literature on the impact of representative output on performance.
The impacts of legislative policy making output on performance:

At the policy-making stage, legislatures maximise policy choice in accordance with institutional rules which matter greatly to the outcome and viability of the political system (Krehbiel 1991: 81). In other words, legislative output at the micro-policy level, is directly linked to governance at the macro-institutional level and improving legislative performance by maximising policy outcomes which as a result strengthens the democratic system. Understanding how well the legislature carries out these responsibilities will be critical to understanding what conditions enable it to act most effectively and efficiently.

At the micro-institutional level, the structures, procedures and rules become central in understanding the output of the legislature or any governance structure. These structures, procedures and rules are utilised by individuals or legislators who are the agents and representatives of the population or constituents at large. Legislators typically accept a set of rules that create a set of authority structures that are beneficial for producing outputs, reducing costs and improving governance. Although, as rational actors, legislators also understand that they must please those who have got them where they are, in order to stay (Shepsle and Boncheck 1997: 12), hence the accountability of their behaviour and preferences become a measure of their output or performance.

Moreover, as rational actors seeking to maximise their output, legislators must be able to cooperate with others on matters that will increase their outputs. According to Polsby (1968), the more institutionalised a legislature, the more it
is able to separate such efforts, become professionalised and specialised (informative committees) and the more efficiently it will be able to serve the constituents. So the level of institutionalisation taken as the degree of autonomy from other institutions, complexity in its structures and functions and universalism in overall behaviour (ibid) is enough to show the performance of any democratic legislature. Huntington has argued that any assessment of institutional performance would require two further dimensions of coherence and adaptability on top of the three measures mentioned above and that the measurement of these five dimensions would give insight into the evolution of the institution and its outputs (Huntington 1968). These two measures reflect the *Doctrine of Responsible Parties* (Shattschneider 1942) in which political parties as the instruments of cohesion and unity are pivotal for government effectiveness and links into the argument that parties are the engine of legislative performance\(^1\). In this view elections would also become an effective way of predicting performance and a future legislature’s output.

Moreover, if increased institutionalisation is equated with increased output then what is considered important in institutional performance will inevitably include measuring the increased speed of delivery of legislation due to increased professionalism. However, as Ferejohn and Baron (1989) have argued institutionalisation increases professionalisation and helps maintain a lower turnover rate of legislators which may retard the legislative output process and

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\(^1\) A more recent account of the affect of responsible parties on legislative performance can be found in: Sundquist, J. (1988) Another similar model is the Conditional Party Government Model in which the ability of law making is critically linked to the majority party and their homogeneity of preferences. The performance of the majority party is linked to legislative output and performance. See Aldrich, J (1995) in bibliography.
bring about delay as professionalised legislators are more likely to be re-elected in subsequent legislative sessions. Gilligan and Krehbiel (1987, 1990) have also shown that the ability of a committee to inform decision making diminishes due to the fact that the preferences of the informed committee and uninformed backbenches diverge more frequently and an institutionalised legislature reduces the speed of decision making while increasing the number of decisions that are not sensitive to majority preferences and as a result reduce output (ibid).

A further problem relating to institutionalised legislatures, most particularly in Congress, is that the institution is designed in a way that obstacles such as gridlock and stalemate become unavoidable. More institutionalisation does not necessarily reduce gridlock and hence improve performance since the legislature’s performance has broadly been evaluated in terms of the frequency with which it can reach agreement with the president on major matters of public concern (Binders 2005, 2003: 533).

Research has been carried out to better understand and predict policy change in cases where the status quo policies become extreme relative to the preferences of the legislators (Brady and Volden 1998, Krehbiel 1998)\(^2\) in order to predict policy change and its effect on legislative output when the key pivots are clearly in disagreement. Keith Krehbiel argues in *Pivotal Politics* (1988) that the supermajoritarian nature of Congress makes gridlock equally likely under both unified and divided governments and that there cannot be much expectation of

\(^2\) See Brady, D and Volden, C (1988) *Revolving Gridlock* and Krehbiel, K (1998) *Pivotal Politics: A theory of US Lawmaking*. The pivot may be referred to as a veto player since they are the ones that can overturn or uphold a veto in presidential systems when the president disagrees with the legislature. See Tsebelis, G (1995) in bibliography
policy change unless the equilibrium of the status quo is so extreme and far away from the median preferences of the incoming government. Although Krehbiel has based his model on institutional factors that concern party government (such as party control or the strength of the majority party in the legislature), these factors alone cannot be responsible for the passage of legislation. Instead it is the pivotal voters' locations, which varies with the decision rule and the organisation of preferences for the median voter is what usually shapes policy output and determines performance (ibid).

Other studies examine the relationship between the political behaviour of legislators and policy output in the United States Congress. For example Poole and Rosenthal (1977: 55) found that policy issue content, or the substance of legislation, does not lead to different induced preferences among legislators. However a critical test on the effects of legislative policy output and divided control of the Congress was carried out by David Mayhew (1991). In his book *Divided We Govern*, Mayhew has devised a method of identifying and measuring the most important laws enacted by Congress over the second part of the twentieth century to see whether at times of divided government the numbers of these laws reduced (and gridlock increased). His finding have concluded that in fact unified control of the Congress and the President has at times failed to boost legislative productivity and performance (in terms of law-making output) and legislative output is not specifically influenced by whether the government and majority in Congress are the same or whether there is a division. In order to do find the more important laws, Mayhew has got help from special raters (which were reporters from the *New York Times* and *Washington Post* along with
specialists in Washington with inside knowledge) and compared the different gridlock scores over the years to create a yardstick to measure and assess Congress’s legislative performance.

In Mayhew’s view the performance of Congress is regarded as an output in policy making, and the political behaviour of individuals has little effect on the overall production of the most significant legislation (and may only affect the passing of less significant legislation). In this case the institution performs well regardless of which political party is in charge of the legislature and who controls the agenda. What this model and Krehbiel’s pivotal politics model both tend to have in common is that increased institutionalisation does not necessarily lead to increased performance of policy output in the legislature. In other words, the measure of institutionalisation does shape the political behaviour of legislators but more institutionalisation does not necessarily produce more output and improved performance.

Studies carried out on Parliamentary democracies show that legislative output in terms of law production is dependant on the institutional rules and norms, especially the rules in relation to agenda control. Döring (1995) argues that since procedural control of the agenda substantially lowers the marginal costs of conflictual bills, it is plausible that a monopoly government aiming at electoral

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3 Sarah Binder has questioned this approach and has argued that measuring output without respect to the underlying policy agenda risks misstating the true frequency of gridlock (Binder 2003: 35). She has also questioned the use of raters as a precise way of measuring policy output (ibid: 36).

self-interest and triggered by institutional rules, will produce more general, significant and conflictual bills even though the total number of bills in general may be reduced (Döring 1995: 45-46). In this case it may also be possible to measure legislative output of parliamentary systems by measuring agenda control by the government and not only the number of significant bills passed (Döring 1995: 225). The amount of agenda setting power and how it is distributed within the legislature is determined by the institutional rules, making legislative performance predictable, if internal behaviour and policy making output is to be considered.

However, since the method above only seems to take the more important laws into account and leaves out the less significant laws that are usually more constituency oriented, then performance as perceived by the constituents would probably not measure so well by solely relying on policy output (discussed later in this chapter). It is also important to note that both studies by Krehbiel and Mayhew are conducted with a view to Congress, not parliamentary systems. Furthermore, the studies seem to ignore the bicameralism of Congress and only regard policy making for the first chamber.

Theoretical work on the impact of bicameralism on policy making has been carried out by George Tsebelis and Jeannette Money (1997). Their study shows

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5 In a cross-country analysis of 18 European parliamentary democracies, Döring has devised table (p.225) to show the degree of agenda control by the government by their authority to determine Plenary timetable. As the table shows, the parliaments of Ireland and the United Kingdom have the most powers to set the agenda Netherlands and Italy have the least powers in terms of government control. See Döring, H (1995) ‘Time as a Scarce Resource: Government Control of the Agenda’ in Parliaments and Majority Rule in Western Europe. In H. Döring, ed. Parliaments and Majority Rule in Western Europe. 223-24.
that policy outcomes in bicameral systems are shaped by the distribution of policies between the two legislative chambers and that both chambers are important in how policies are produced, while at the same time emphasising the importance of specific institutional features across legislatures, and their consequences for legislative performance. Taking the case of the French Legislature, Tsebelis and Money have shown that when the Senate’s uncertainty about the National Assembly’s discount factor is high, the length of navette between the two chambers increases (Tesbelis and Money 1997: 129-135). Policy output not only increases when cohesion between the two chambers increases and incongruence decreases, but also when cohesiveness is strong in the National Assembly as this signals a strong first chamber and the second chamber and thus compromise would result in a shorter navette (ibid: 134). It is certainly right to claim that institutional factors shape policy output and in order to understand the true output of bicameral institutions, the interaction between the two chambers must be considered. However, it is questionable whether less navette and delay signals better performance of the legislature as the very purpose of second chambers is to ‘Slow down the legislative process, render abrupt change difficult, force myopic legislatures to have second thoughts and thereby minimise arbitrariness and injustice in governmental action’ (Riker 1992: 101).

Veto Players according to Tsebelis are ‘individuals or collective actors whose agreement is required for any policy change’ (Tsebelis 1995: 301). They are significant actors in policy output because they have the potential (institutional or partisan) to defeat the status quo and change policy outcome. So it is natural
to assume that veto players raise negotiation costs and as veto players increase, legislative output (in the form of the number of laws made) is reduced (Tsebelis 2002). Tsebelis argues however, that if the transaction costs are significant and the policy change resulting from the cost is minor, then legislators will not seek a change in the status quo even if there is potential for change (Tsebelis 1995: 295). Therefore in terms of policy output, legislatures will perform better when legislators become more consensual in nature (individually or collectively as in the European parliamentary models) and reduce legislative costs by having more effective committees. Thus in the micro policy level, the degree of policy output and change can be regarded as a measure of legislative performance.

The importance of institutional processes leading to policy output is also reflected in studies of the political economy in which political processes are explained to determine economic policies which determine the conditions for economic growth and the development of markets (Alesina and Rosenthal 1995, Swank 2002, Persson and Tabellini 2004, Bernhard and Leblang 2006). These

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6 It is worth mentioning here that a major problem of Polsby’s study of the institutionalisation of legislatures (1971, 1978) is due to the limitation that his classification offers in comparative studies He has eliminated all ‘other’ legislatures which he considered as belonging to closed political systems and legislatures that he considers within an ‘open system’ but with an unspecialised government activity. Thus, only legislatures which he calls ‘open with specialised government activity’, are worthy of classification. Firstly it should be clear that no political system, not even the most undemocratic and isolated, is a closed system as all social and political systems must maintain some sort of interaction with its internal and external environment in order to survive (otherwise it could not be considered as a living system but merely a mechanical or dead system). Secondly, if as Polsby suggests, institutionalised legislatures can be applied only to countries with modernised legislatures that have accepted the cultural values of developed cultures and have approximated the operations of institutionalised legislatures, which in Polsby’s view is either the United States Congress or The British Parliament (Polsby, 1971), and that the degree to which all institutionalised legislatures perform, would be characterised by them having universalistic forms and complex structures and functions well bounded from their environment and how much it resembles one of these two types of institutions. Whereas open systems need to interact and are shaped by their environments and it can well be argued that no environment is a carbon copy of another but has evolved along its own needs and interests.
studies implicitly link economic performance to economic policy output, which are in turn affected by the internationalisation of markets (macro-level policy making). The focus on institutional performance, as embedded in the institutional structures and rules are intertwined with the behaviour of individuals and quality of representation inside those institutions. In such studies, the policy outcomes of legislatures are not only dependent on the party (or parties) that holds majority in the legislature but also on how strong parties act within the framework of institutional rules and processes. Thus the actual details leading to policy outcome, which are determined by the constitution and institutional rules, become if not the most important factor in studying output and future performance and may be predicted by assessing past policy making in the institution. Persson and Tabellini explicitly state that constitutional rules regarding the forms of government and electoral rules systematically shape both the micro and macro economic policies of a state (Persson and Tabellini 2004: 76).

According to the arguments made by political economists and new institutionalists, since legislatures foster distinct norms, values and behaviours that are so fundamental in the shaping of policy processes, it would be relatively easy to predict particular political outcomes, especially those affected by the market. Hence it may be possible, in theory at least, to measure the performance of legislatures (at least in terms of economic policy making) by measuring economic performance and vice versa. As a result it should also be possible to assess legislative performance in a comparative perspective by assessing how
different constitutional features affect economic performance of a political system over a time period or in comparison to other political systems.

However, in order to assess institutional performance by reducing the whole process to certain elements within the constitution and linking it to the larger economic performance there needs to be absolute certainty about economic events and that is made difficult as the impact of the environment must also be taken into consideration since the financial markets do not act on their own account but rely heavily on the environment in which they interact. Furthermore, within institutional constraints, the behaviour of individuals and groups cannot simply be reduced to the desire of retaining office as the next section of this chapter will elaborate. Political actors are more complicated to be predicted simply by forecasting the market and unpredictable legislative performance measured in terms of policy output will not necessarily lead to depressed economic performance. It is inconceivable that legislative gridlock in developed democracies would create volatility in and inefficiency in the markets even though they may be responsible for bigger budget deficits (Alensina and Tabellini 1990).

In a comparative study to link macro-institutional output of legislatures to democratic performance, Arend Lijphart compares and assesses democratic performance in thirty-six countries. Lijphart does not attempt to measure the actual performance of legislatures but rather emphasises on the policy output of the entire political process and assesses the overall democratic performance of political systems to give an evaluation of the degree of democratic quality among
countries with majoritarian and consensus style legislative systems. According to this study, consensus democracies are of a kinder and gentler kind to majoritarian models.

In chapter 16 of his book *Patterns of Democracy*, Lijphart examines several measures of the quality of democracy and democratic representation and concludes that consensus democracies score higher than majoritarian. He also argues that consensus democracies are more successful in macro-economic management because of independent central banks and lower budget deficits. Consensus style systems can control inflation, and appear to have less strikes, hence they are more efficient and effective at carrying out macro-economic policy (ibid: 263-270). Lijphart also argues that consensus democracies are also better at controlling violence which makes them better decision makers and policy makers. Consensus style democracies also have a higher level of democracy\(^7\) and score better on other factors leading to a rise in democratic quality, namely the representation of women, political equality, electoral participation, satisfaction with democracy and government-voter proximity and have more accountability and less corruption. Hence, consensus democracies perform better and raise the quality of democracy leading to better governance.

In order to show this, he uses Dahl’s *Polyarchy* scale\(^8\) and illustrates that consensus democracies have a good correlation with this rating of democratic

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\(^7\) According to Lijphart the degree of democracy in a country is the degree to which a country approximates ‘perfect democracy’ (Lijphart 1999: 276). Chapter 4 explains why perfect democracy does not exist.

\(^8\) The Polyarchy scale consists of 114 countries that are placed in 31 scale types from the highest type of democracy to the lowest type of non democracy as in 1964. See Dahl (1971: 231-45).
quality and the difference between the two models is more than three points (Lijphart 1999: 278). While it can be argued that Dahl’s definition of democracy is biased toward consensus democracies because it ranks multiparty countries better than two party systems, this research will show in later chapters why all countries grouped in his work as majoritarian democracies cannot be compared as they are at very different stages of democratic growth. Similarly consensus democratic systems cannot be grouped together as for example Switzerland (which Lijphart frequently uses in his examples of the consensus mode) has a very different political system from the other consensus models and cannot be boxed together with countries such as Spain, Germany, Italy and Japan (none of these countries function in the same way).

Apart from the ambiguity a far-reaching model of governance such as this produces, it seems striking that Lijphart had already decided on the results of his findings well before writing the book as he has selectively chosen the assessment framework. In such analysis results can be controlled depending on how one conducts correlation analysis, and the choice of regression analysis can be made to bring about certain results and to bring about a predetermined conclusion (which in this case is that consensus democracies perform best, bring about superior democratic quality and strengthen democratic governance as a result).

In his latest book *Thinking about Democracy*, Lijphart has added countries such as Afghanistan to the list of consensus democracies (Lijphart 2008). It would seem strange to suggest that political systems such as Afghanistan or even Iraq (also consensus democracy according to Lijphart’s characteristics) can produce
better policy outputs and outperform majoritarian systems such as the United States or the United Kingdom (the fourth chapter of this research will elaborate on this idea further). What Lijphart has done is to take the legislature’s law-making power as the measure for its performance and equate legislative strength with the institution’s overall efficiency and effectiveness which cannot be right.

It is obvious from different studies, some of which have been mentioned in this work, that differences exist between legislatures in terms of their capacity to affect the policy outcome. The difference is not only limited to the comparison of presidential and parliamentary style political systems but also within each of these categories of legislatures. Even though the relationship legislatures have in terms of constraining the government is basically the same, all legislatures differ in the extent to which they can actually constrain the government (Norton 1998: 3). Hence the strength and degree to which legislatures affect policy output will not be a suitable measure for assessing performance.

Furthermore, to link the strength of policy making with the quality of democracy and stereotyping legislative systems as Lijphart has done, cannot be as straightforward as he predicts. As this research intends to show in chapter four, democratic quality cannot be assessed using the same tools and indicators for developed and developing democracies. If it were possible to assess democratic performance as Lijphart suggests, then surely all countries could by applying certain institutional features, to their systems improve democracy. However experience suggests that it is certainly not as simple as the literature sounds
particularly for developing countries\textsuperscript{9}. Furthermore, if as Lijphart repeatedly mentions, proportional representation systems are superior in comparison to the majoritarian plurality and are linked to a higher degree of democratic quality, then why should a democracy such as Italy decide by referendum to abandon a system of pure proportional representation for a mixed electoral system which includes plurality votes for three quarters of seats in each House in 1993?\textsuperscript{10} Performance in legislatures has to be influenced by democratic outcomes rather than outputs.

\textbf{2-3 Legislative Output and Responsiveness}

The previous section touched on the relationship between policy output and economic performance and that the economy matters for legislative performance. Political institutions are designed to help the government manage the economy in order to avoid the social and political consequences of bad economic performance since the economy is one of the factors with which the public assess the performance of their political institutions in terms of responsibility and accountability. Thus citizen satisfaction with the government must be included in any form of legislative performance assessment of responsiveness (as output).

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{9} Referring to author's personal experience of working as a liaison officer for a UNDP project \textit{Strengthening legislatures} in Tehran 2000-2 and as a researcher in the Iranian Parliamentary Research Centre.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{10} In December 2005, the Italian Government changed back to an electoral system of proportional representation with a majority prize to the coalition that obtains majority rule. The change is mainly seen as an attempt by the governing party to improve its own gains and maximize its policy-making output. Though the change is recent and not much work has been published that assesses the performance of the Italian legislature, but it has generally not been regarded as a success in terms of democratic performance. See Ortona, G, Ottone, S and Ponzano, F (2008).}
and as legislatures are regarded as representative institutions, satisfaction with the performance of the representatives will reflect on the institutional performance rating. Hence understanding legislative roles becomes central to understanding its performance.

Within the neo-institutional framework, legislative roles are derived from a set of behaviours, norms, functions and motivations of the institutions (Searing 1991, 1994) as well as the rational choice tradition in the form of legislator preferences. In this context, the legislative roles become routines that are driven by reasons or preferences and at the same time constrained by institutional rules (Strøm 1997: 158). So in theory, the more institutionalised the legislature, the better the performance of legislative roles and inevitably the higher the perception of legislative performance among the citizens.

Linking the role of individual legislators and parties to their preferences as rational actors seeking their own goals was suggested by Anthony Downs in 1957 before the rational choice tradition and game theoretic models deriving from it became as popular as it has become today. In *An Economic Theory of Democracy*, Downs argues that political parties are entirely selfish meaning that they seek the rewards of office but in order to do so, they need to first achieve office and maintain it by bidding for favour before the public (Downs 1957: 18). In his view legislative representatives appear only as modest ‘intermediaries’ for their parties and the roles of those on the governing party would be to gather information on grassroots preferences and relay it to the government and then try
to persuade constituents back home that the government is doing a worthy job (ibid: 88-90).

The above description of the role of legislators as solely and tirelessly advocating their relevant parties’ positions is probably too crude even for many parliamentary democracies, as legislators are usually regarded to be in pursuit of their own re-election than anything else whether that would mean occasionally crossing the party line in pursuit of their own preferences and appealing to voters. Even legislators operating in parliamentary systems with highly disciplined parties such as Germany, are increasingly seeking to spend more time with their constituents and regularly representing local interests. This is despite the fact that members of the Bundestag enjoy a low turnover rate and high degree of professionalisation as a consequence of the traditional belief system which makes higher performance and strong governance structure to be a result of strong disciplined parties and the fact that their electoral system will afford to get them re-elected despite leaving the core of constituency service to the members of the Landtag (Patzelt 2003, 2007, Saalfeld 2002). Performance in terms of representational output will be increased with rising institutionalisation and specialisation within the German legislature not only because of the type of institution (including electoral rules) but also due to cultural norms as German citizenry clearly dislike an enduring lack of parliamentary party discipline (Patzelt 2003: 111). Even though professionalism is a consequence of partisanship and party discipline within the Bundestag which is in effect shaped by the institution, but as Patzelt argues it could become a dependant variable for measuring legislative performance since German legislators see themselves
firstly as ‘advocates of public interest’ followed by ‘representing people’s interests’ and then consider themselves as voting in the interests of their parties (Patzelt 1997: 36).

However, as Hibbing notes, the popular desire in many countries, including the United States is for a more citizen-based and less institutionalised legislature (Hibbing 2002, 39) if institutionalisation is to be equated with more professionalisation and increasing partisanship as Polsby (1968) and others have suggested. Charles Mahtesian (1997: 18-20) studying the relationship between professionalisation and higher performance of legislatures has compared the democratic performance of highly professionalised and nonprofessionalised state legislatures in the United States and has concluded that increased professionalisation may produce damaging consequences for the quality of democratic governance such as the lack of comity, extreme partisanship, the unwillingness to compromise and ineffectiveness. This argument that increased partisanship in a legislature is a worrying consequence of professionalism has also been noted too by Fiorina (1994).

In pluralist legislative systems, the behaviour of legislators become more individualistic and the relationship with the citizens are significantly higher as legislators aim for re-election. The role of policy advocacy becomes more conditional, as legislators will tend to chose and pick the policies that will affect their incumbency. According to Mayhew, Congressmen are likely to go about building and sustaining legislative institutions and making policy when there are appealing goals for them to do so. Since the most important goal for legislators is
re-election which they are ‘single mindedly’ in pursuit of (Mayhew 1974: 5) and
the spotlight is on the individual rather than parties, the thought of re-election is
what establishes an accountability relationship with the electorate (ibid). Mayhew prefers to use the term ‘Representative Assembly’ rather than a
legislature when looking at performance in regards to this relationship between
the institution and voters (ibid: 7).

Taken from this perspective, it would also seem fair to characterise developed
legislatures, and in particular Congress as an assembly of professional politicians
spinning out political careers. The job of a representative would offer good pay,
high prestige and there is no want of applications for them as long as they can
successfully get re-elected (ibid: 15). In this regard, legislators need to find a
way to secure their incumbency even if it involves separating themselves from
the party at times when policy making is weak or the economy is doing badly. In
Congress such separation is more frequent than in Parliamentary systems. In
1975, Richard Fenno questioned why Congress did so badly in the public view
while the Congressmen were regarded as performing well? According to him the
answer was in the fact that ‘representatives run for Congress by running against
Congress!’ (Fenno 1975: 277-287)

In The Personal Vote, Cain, Ferijohn, and Fiorina (1987: 2) have defined
representation as the ‘general policy response of representatives articulating the
policy position or ideologies of the constituents’. They distinguish three types of
responsiveness which taken together will determine the representativeness of a
legislator. The first type is Policy responsiveness or symbolic responsiveness
which reveals to constituent how faithfully the representative responds to the public’s wishes in words and deeds. Allocation responsiveness shows whether the representative is working to ensure that his or her district gets a fair share of government projects programmes and expenditures. The third type is Service responsiveness which assesses how assiduous the representative is in responding to individual and groups request for assistance in dealing with the government bureaucracy (ibid: 78-80). The authors argue that service allocation has increasingly become one of the most important components of the representational relationship and is changing the nature of representation since it is a way of earning personalised support and reward from the constituent for doing a good job. Votes become less dependant on party but more on the individual. Service allocation is one way of ensuring the incumbent keeps his or her seat even at hard economic times when the government gets the blame.

In such systems, because of the electoral rules, each individual voter becomes a judge of performance. The surveys published by Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina show that people generally rate an incumbent Congressman’s performance as very good while they rate Congress’s performance as very bad (ibid: 200). The same surveys show that while in the United Kingdom, Parliament as a whole performs reasonably well compared to Congress, but the MP’s individual performance is nearly three times more favourable than the performance of Parliament, whereas this ratio is fifteen to one for Congress. The authors of this study give the main reasons for this discrepancy in single member plurality systems as the independence of legislators to take policy positions that may be different to the overall position of the institution, legislators not having to share a
partisan label with the majority, and the constituent’s ability to apply different standards to assess performance of the individual and institution (ibid). Thus measuring the performance of representative output for individual legislators cannot be taken for the representational output of the institution as a whole.

Thus far it has been established that the institutional design of legislatures (along with the political structure, culture and history) determines how different systems view incumbency which will define how the responsibility relationship (in terms of accountability) between the voters and the legislators vary. Institutional factors also determine the level of professionalism necessary for the job of representation. The institution of legislatures has evolved over the years to accommodate further the representational role of legislators in regards to the external relationships with the environment and has facilitated institutional and behavioural change in order to increase representativeness (Searing 1994, Norton 1997). Legislators increasingly aspire to play the role of policy advocates, influencing policy and providing service to their constituencies than they were in the past (ibid).

The institutional changes made to facilitate the evolution of legislative roles and behaviour occurs at different levels and strengths in countries around the world and will be dependent on the internal structures and features of the institution as well as outside pressures. For instance accountability, as an outcome of representation, is stronger in majoritarian democracies than consensual systems because it is generally easier to see who is responsible for policy. It is also stronger in countries with a distinct separation of powers than in parliamentary
systems where the separation of powers is weak, as the framework of checks and balances will improve accountability and motivate legislators towards good behaviour. Taken in this light it would seem that presidential democracies would in theory be more responsible and accountable to the public than parliamentary models resulting in legislators becoming more constituency oriented and specialised within the organisation of such legislatures, which is different to becoming professionalised within the institution.

For instance while politicians in Congress may not be interested in taking advantage of minimum coalitions like parliamentary democracies as they would not have any interest in votes that they cannot claim personal benefit for, they will work hard to maintain the organisation and prestige of the legislature hoping to spend long careers. As a result professionalising within the organisation of the legislature becomes an individual aspiration as well a collective good. In this context of the organisation of Congress, legislators are 'responsive to those who control their future careers' and this relationship determines their behavioural output to a big way (Moncrief 2002: 65). Legislative organisation according to Krehbiel, is 'the allocation of resources and assignment of parliamentary rights to individual legislators or groups of legislators' (Krehbiel 1991: 2). So in order for legislators to perform well, they must professionalise within the structure of their organisation which is not the same as professionalism in the context of institutionalisation.

Within Parliamentary systems, the Parliaments of the United Kingdom and Ireland have the highest accountability while consensual governments such as,
Italy, Portugal and even hybrid systems like France are less accountable (Norton 2002:180-187). One of the most obvious reasons behind this difference in institutional features relates to the nature of their electoral systems as constituency-based electoral systems which inevitably increase the contact level between legislators and their constituents and as a result raise standards and demands made by the constituent, whereas list-based systems lower the need of such contact and decrease expectations and standards as a result (ibid: 11-12). In Portugal and Italy for example due to the absence of the constituency activity on the part of legislators who have been chosen from party lists, people’s perception of parliamentary performance or individual member performance will not be affected as it would in strong constituency-based systems Thus it would be problematic to base a performance measurement system on this relationship and attribute measurement to the perceptions for the voters.

Another reason for this variation among countries in legislative accountability and constituency work that also stems from the institutional features is the fact that constituency work and voter expectations from their MPs are usually much higher in unitary systems than in Federal systems. For example Germany is able to maintain high accountability even though members of the Bundestag consider themselves less case workers than executive watchdogs since members of the Landtag spend more time following up grievances and making contact with the constituents (Saalfeld 2002). However as Norton notes, this rule does not hold even when developed democracies only are considered as countries like Portugal do not have any tradition of constituency service (Norton 2002: 181).
Hence this measure would also be problematic in a comparative study of legislative performance.

The measure of the personal vote as discussed above is considerably lower in parliamentary democracies than presidential systems. The electoral benefit of the personal vote in Parliamentary systems is arguably not much more than 500. (Norton 2002: 12). Philip Norton argues that, contrary to the conventional belief that personal voting would be more significant in marginal constituencies, there does not seem to be a significant link between marginality and constituency work and the correlations are not exact (ibid: 182). Furthermore, in the event of large swing voting, the effect of the personal vote will count as nought (ibid: 12).

However constituency service seems to help legislative performance as legislators are helping to strengthen the link between the institution with the citizens and restore confidence in representational behaviour of the system and their own representational behaviour as part of it. The consequence of this increase in representation for the legislator is increased legislative specialisation and professionalisation as mentioned before in the case of presidential democracies. In order to strengthen these link legislators would have to rely more on the effective organisation and the efficient information flow to and from the system. This increases the need to improve legislative organisations, not only political organisations like parties. Within these frameworks, legislators realise that for them to succeed and attain their goals, it is an impediment for legislative organisations to perform well.
As parliamentarism or representative democracies in the broader term implies collective delegation, and this delegation has to be controlled within the framework of parties in order to contain agency problems, this group of legislatures require strong parties. It is the performance of such parties, through their cohesion that would be a determinant of the performance or representational output of the legislature, rather than the performance of individuals (Strøm et al, 2003). Party cohesion and redistributive goals are reinforced through partisanship, but increased partisanship is a danger to policy outcome and performance as is seen through the eyes of the electorate in representative democracies (Lupia 2003: 35-35 Strøm 2000: 262). However increases in party professionalisation and institutionalisation seem to suggest that political parties are becoming less stable and reliable instruments of popular control and may be the reason why voters have become increasingly less loyal and committed in their support for a single party, to a varying extent, in parliamentarian systems (Strøm et al, 2003: 657-658).

As a result, finding the right balance between delegation and performance in terms of policy output becomes central to any assessment of legislative performance which considers representational behaviour as a dependent variable of legislative output, not just an increase in delegation. And it is obvious that this balance will be different across countries as principals and agents have different perceptions of what a desirable output would contribute despite sharing similar patterns of delegation. The following section will also look at delegation, this time from a different angle of legislative-executive relationships and the implications it has legislative output.
2-4 Legislative-Executive Relationships:

Although aspects of the executive and legislative relationship focusing specifically on legislative output in regards to the policy making process was touched upon previously in this chapter, this section will focus only on the specific relationship between the two branches through the literature and the implications of this relationship in assessing policy outcomes and performance.

As mentioned the existing legislature is mostly centred on developed legislatures in Western Europe and the United States. Although the nature of legislative-executive relationships are quite similar, there are significant differences among different legislative institutions and their dealings with their executives not just in terms of institutional arrangements and activities but also in how much capacity they have to influence or affect the policy making process.

In parliamentary democracies, as mentioned above, voters delegate their elected representatives to represent them in parliament and delegate policies in their interests to unelected executive agencies (Strøm 2000, Strøm et al, 2003). Government accountability, in addition to legislator accountability, becomes the measure which voters use to assess the performance of the representative legislatures. However in all parliamentary systems, with differences in degrees of action, a government majority in Parliament (not necessarily reflective of public majority) will get its way and there is little scope for the legislative institution to stop the majority from achieving its goals (Norton 1998). As a result, legislative output in representative democracies as judged by voters will suffer due to this accountability problem, even though much of the
accountability, actually stems from factors external to the legislative institution such as the constitutional and executive structure, executive decision-making level, electoral systems and constituency opinion, rather than the internal organisation of the legislature itself or its policy attributes (Olsen and Mezey, 1991: 19, Norton 1998).

Thus in comparative legislative studies of legislative-executive output, the most significant problem will be finding significant indicators that will be conducive to legislative output in cross country analyses since different legislative systems require indicators relevant to their individual relationship. Furthermore in studying the relationship between the legislative and the executive branch, as when studying the relationship between legislatures and their constituents, it becomes apparent that there are many different levels to the relationship and different forms as a consequence. There is no one single straightforward framework to assess. Anthony King (1976) has proposed in studying the legislative-executive relationship of any political system, whether parliamentary or presidential, a number of specific relationships should be investigated instead of just one general relationship between the two branches. The number and nature of these relationships will differ not just among countries (as King has shown by comparing three countries, the United Kingdom, France and Germany), but also within the way each system is structured and functions. The basic patterns of relationships within the legislatures can be summarised as between parties (whether in coalition form or as between government and the opposition), within parties (to what extent the government or opposition has control over its party and how much influence it has), the strength of opposition
parties (and how they can affect legislative behaviour) and the extent of cross-party activity (by which he refers to the development of specialised committee systems). Each of these relationships and the subsequent relationships they produce would be differently structured not only according to internal and controllable features of the institution, but also the external features that are not controllable (or less controllable). Thus the assessment of legislative accountability would require incorporating a number of relationships which will be defined by the institutional features of the legislature and government in each case.

Jean Blondel and associates (1970) have argued that in order to assess legislature’s behaviour comparatively, an indication of the structures involved in law-making is more important than the indication of individual law maker’s attitudes. To assess the legislature’s role in the process of law-making, they introduce the concept of ‘Viscosity’ as a measure of the capacity of legislatures to resist or withstand government pressures. According to this measure, where legislatures are very compliant, bills pass very quickly with very little time spent on debate, but as the legislature become freer from government constraint, then the time spent on bills increases and amendments are discussed before the passage of legislation (Blondel et al, ibid: 200).

The effect that viscosity has on legislative-executive relationship is that it raises government accountability leading to better policy making output. Constraint, as far as viscosity is concerned, is not a veto and does not prevent the government from policy making, but only has influence on the effect of the output.
Constraints involve subtle effects that allow amendments to pass with government consent (ibid: 201). In parliamentary democracies where the opposition knows that they are unlikely to defeat government incentives, viscosity has the effect of making the executive defend its proposals. Michael Mezey suggests that by forcing governments to take responsibility of their actions, the opposition not only fixes accountability for the government’s actions, but also puts itself in a better position to assess the political cost for government actions at the next general election (Mezey 1998: 784).

Thus the number, nature, fate and debate time spent on amendments become indicative of the viscosity of the policy-making process. Viscosity will inevitably be lower in consensual parliamentary systems than plurality systems and very low in authoritarian legislative systems. External features, as well as internal features of the institution determine the level of viscosity which will vary in degree across legislatures as institutions try to adapt a balance of viscosity that will strengthen their governance in the system. For instance it has been argued that government controlled committees through disciplined parties will reduce viscosity in parliamentary systems. Though as Thomas Saalfeld explains in the case of Germany, this problem is overcome as parliamentary parties have specialised working groups parallel to the committee structure with overlapping memberships which allows committee deliberations to feedback directly into intra-party discussions making it less likely to reflect the preferences unrepresentative of all parliamentary parties and floor majorities (Saalfeld 2000: 367). Developed legislatures do seem to have adapted different ways of ensuring committees increase viscosity rather than reduce it.
However, there is no perfect balance for viscosity and naturally parliaments must find the measure of viscosity that works for them. Moreover, there is no indication how amendments alone will account for improving policy making output. Even Blondel argues that there is no evidence that more amendments in the short-term account to greater influence of the legislature any more than does the persistent nagging of government in debate (Blondel et al, 1970: 203). He also admits that cross-national index of legislative viscosity would be too complex an accomplishment due to the many indicators and the different weights they are given by individual legislators.

Where viscosity does help in comparative legislative studies is its emphasis and focus on the mechanisms that are available to parliaments with regard to legislative-executive relationships and how each mechanism may be used and improved to influence the actions of governments which will lead to policy output in terms of accountability. For example, while it has already been said that committees reduce viscosity, there is a lot of evidence in country studies of legislatures to suggest that specialised committees actually improve policy output and increase viscosity (Norton 1998: 9). However, there is still little cross-country research that focuses on the aspect of improved accountability as an incentive for representatives to increase viscosity or reduce it as interest will depend not only on who holds power in the legislature at any single time and whether the individual or party holds executive or opposition roles, but also features that are external to the institution (ibid).
In order to determine a legislature’s strength with regards to policy making, Philip Norton’s classification (1984, 1990: 178) is very helpful. Norton puts legislatures into three distinct groups, based on their policy making capacity. A **Policy-making legislature** has the power to formulate and influence policy proposed by the government. A **Policy-influencing legislature** can only modify or reject measures put forward by the government, and legislatures with *little or no policy impact* are neither able to modify, reject nor generate policy. Although countries in each classification will vary in their capacity, and many legislatures (which include parliamentary types) are of the policy-influencing kind, studies of Western European parliaments show that legislatures with more specialised and professionalised committees have more influence on the government measures leading to policy output\(^\text{11}\). Naturally committees are the most specialised in policy-making legislatures and the least specialised in legislatures with little or no policy impact.

Some research has based the policy-making strength of legislatures on the power and performance of their committees. According to Jewell and Paterson (1973: 219) the two most important functions that committees perform are ‘the making of decisions with regard to legislation and the authorization of oversight of administrative actions’. The difference in legislatures would be in the degree that committees are able to implement these functions and this will depend on factors, as mentioned before, both internal and external to the institution. The prerequisite for implementing these functions is first and foremost the autonomy

and discretion of the committees with regards to the government and access to specialised information (from the government or independent of it) in order to carry out adequate oversight. Strong committees improve committee functions by reducing the imbalance in policy expertise between the government as agents and the legislators as principals (Saalfeld 2000: 367). The reduction of information asymmetry between parliament and the government improves the parliament’s autonomy and its ability to hold government accountable for its actions and to foresee potential problems with government policy.

Certain characteristics of committees strengthen their functions which according to Norton include permanence, agenda setting power, evidence taking power, jurisdictions parallel to government departments, extensive resources and small and informed membership (Norton 1998: 7-12). As these characteristics institutionalise, viscosity is strengthened, the legislature exercises and improves its oversight function and the policy output is improved and the legislature is better able to monitor the government. Whether building capacity in committees is tantamount to performance is another matter which shall be discussed later. West and Cooper (1989) have argued effective oversight by the legislature is beneficial for the political system for two basic reasons. First of all oversight will contribute to the eventual improvement in the quality of government policies and programmes. Secondly as the policies are ratified by the legislature, the executive actions will acquire legitimacy. Legislative oversight is probably considered most important when it comes to the budget process and controlling government fiscal spending which will be considered below.
The role of the legislature’s budgetary oversight in most countries is to scrutinise and authorise revenues and expenditures and to make sure that the national budget has been properly spent and is a means of expanding democratic legitimacy in any political system. Although part of the policy making cycle, legislative oversight has its own dynamics that is not solely derived from other variables in the policy process. The patterns of budgetary oversight cannot be simplified and reduced or grouped into say, consensus and majoritarian democracies (Lijphart 1999) as variations within these grouping are too large to ignore (for instance the difference in budgeting process and in terms of budgeting strength between Congress and Westminster is too great to consider in one group).

Legislative oversight in general and budgetary oversight in particular, is seen to occur in different stages of the legislative-executive relationship within different political systems. Legislative oversight is said to be *Ex-ante* when it is performed before the government becomes engaged in policy making, while it is *Ex-post* when oversight is performed after policy has been properly implemented (Saalfeld 2000, Stapenhurst et al, 2008). Legislatures differ in the type of oversight that they use and the tools which they apply. However, an Inter-Parliamentary study into the oversight of legislatures, shows that legislatures are relatively uninvolved during the preparation of the Budget and legislative oversight occurs towards the end of the policy making process during the implementations stage of laws. The study claims that presidential systems are
just as uninvolved as parliamentary systems since there is a direct link between legitimacy and outcomes. It seems that the greater legitimacy accorded to the institution, the more disposed the legislatures (legislators) to accept the outcomes of policy as authoritative\textsuperscript{12}.

Budgetary oversight can be performed by employing a variety of tools depending on whether the oversight occurs before or after the implementation of the budget. Erik Damgaard (2000: 8) notes these tools as ombudsmen, committees of inquiry, auditing institutions, specialised parliamentary committees, public hearings and interpellations. Other tools may be added as oral and written questions and requests for documentation. Parliamentary systems tend to have a bigger variety of oversight tools which could be taken as more oversight potential. However, the effectiveness of these oversight tools is another matter and it cannot be said that a parliament performs more effectively simply by having more oversight tools at their disposal. Although a study by Pelizzo and Stapenhurst (2004) show that a clear relationship exists between the number of oversight tools and the state of development in a given country. Legislatures which were defined as low-income countries had on average five and a half oversight tools whereas middle-income to high-income countries had on average six and a quarter oversight tools. High-income countries used interpellations far more than middle income and low-income countries, while the use of ombudsmen and committees of inquiry are more in middle-income countries compared to legislatures of countries with a high-income and low-income (ibid).

\textsuperscript{12} IPU (2001)
Oversight tools are necessary for the efficiency of the budgetary process but not sufficient for effective oversight. Mark Shephard reviewing the improvement in oversight tools in the budgetary process of the Parliament of the United Kingdom, contends that despite important changes and successful reforms leading to the improvement in the efficiency of oversight, it has not ensured the effectiveness of procedures in terms of policy output (Shephard 2008). Effective oversight, in addition to oversight tools, would depend on additional conditions and features that are specific to the institution like whether the legislature has the ability to modify legislature (Lowenberg and Patterson 1979, Norton 1998) and whether legislatures (and legislators) have the power to acquire proper information (Jewell 1978, Krehbiel 1991), the role of the legislators, committee chairs and other kinds of institutional constraints such as term lengths\textsuperscript{13}.

Effective oversight is also dependent on features that are external to the legislature such as the organisation of parties, the role of the media and public opinion, and the role of the economy and markets. Even supranational organisations may have a constraining effect on the budget regardless of legislative oversight. For example in Europe, the scrutiny of national budgets are exercised by the European Commission, with a view of conforming to the Maastricht Treaty and imposes general limits on government deficits and debt (Lienert 2005: 13).

\textsuperscript{13} An example of term lengths would be Mexico's constitution that prohibits incumbency that is seen to limit professionalisation. Mexico does not have a dedicated budget committee which is seen as a barrier to the development of legislative budgeting expertise. Meyers, R 'Legislative Budgeting in Mexico: Aspirations and Choices' Conference Paper presented at Reform of the state: budget and public Spending. Mexico city (Jan 2000) available at http://userpages.umbc.edu/~meyers/mexico.pdf
Some authors have shown that the increase in the number of veto players in legislatures can increase the size of fiscal deficits and reduce the efficiency of budgetary oversight (Tsebelis 1995, Tsebelis and Money 1997, Heller 1997). In the case of second chambers with budgetary powers, Heller argues that it would force governments to include more spending in the budget than it would need to if the budget was passed in only one chamber making way for higher deficits (Heller 1997: 487).

In unicameral legislatures, the nature of veto players affects policy outputs and becomes subject to the power relationship among the political parties. Writing on the Portuguese Parliament’s budget process, Leston-Bandeira (1999) indicates that the amount of de facto, rather than de jure influence of the legislature is largely determined by political majorities. If the legislature is composed of several parties with weak disciplines, the executive will need to assemble a broad coalition of support for the budget increasing the potential influence of the legislature on the budget. However, if there is a strong and dominant party and strong discipline, the legislature’s influence on the budget is weak. The party composition in such parliaments is not the only force of influence and even informal caucuses, such as women’s groups may affect the budgeting process (ibid). Though it must also be stated here since the budget determines economic strength and prosperity, parties will not necessarily see it in their interest to use their veto power to decrease the legislature’s influence on the process. For example the Swedish Rikstag managed to turn its fiscal deficit into a surplus in the 1990s, despite the presence of political parties with considerable veto power (Leinert 2005).
It has arguably been said that the power of the legislature to amend the budget is the most important measure of performance and institutional strength which is fundamental to legislative-executive relationships and a determinant of the role of legislatures in public finance (Wehner 2006). Based on cross country analysis of legislative budgeting power in regards to the constitutional design of each country, Wehner has created an index of legislatures’ budgeting power based on a joint OECD and World Bank survey in 2003 of twenty-five developed countries, which measures variables of institutional structure and constitutional design of each consecutive country (OECD 2003, Wehner 2006). It would be questionable whether these results would indicate anything more than the relative influence of the legislatures on the budgetary process, not absolute legislative capacity, since as mentioned before, while there are some common basic institutional features and variables in the relationships between a legislature and its executive, there are also distinct features that characterise the relationship and features that are external to the institution and which cannot be controlled by it. An index is useful as far as it will show relative strengths and weaknesses (on what is generally perceived as strengths and weaknesses) not accurate and definitive measures of legislative budgetary capacity.

2-6. Conclusion: Performance and Output

The literature on legislatures shows that there is a general tendency to equate legislative output capacity with performance. Michael Mezey’s (1979)
classification of legislatures in terms of policy making strength has generally become the first point of reference for any work that wishes to study performance in terms of policy making output. Although Mezey’s classification of legislatures has credit for offering the systemic analysis (the first of its kind) of the comparative assessment of legislative outputs for a large group of countries, it was not until 2006, when *The Journal of Legislative Studies* had published a special edition on comparing and classifying legislatures by analysing legislative performance, that there has been much interest in separating policy capacity and performance and to construct conceptual frameworks for a common comparative research on legislatures. This neglect or shortcoming cannot be traced to a simple cause but as David Arter suggests ‘is basically that of legion’ (Arter 2006: 247).

As Arter has pointed out (2006a) legislative strength or the capacity of legislatures does not indicate legislative performance. The power of a legislature to influence policy or work independently of the executive has a very small impact, if not any impact at all, on its organisational performance, and indeed on the overall governance of society. Legislative performance would be the indication of how well the institution carries out the powers given to it to maximum benefit of the system not to dispute how much power of its output with regards to institutional rules and features.

Hence, a legislature with little or modest policy affect will not perform any worse than a legislature with strong policy power. Also the policy-related attitudes and behaviour of legislators will not affect legislative performance any
more than the policy-related attitudes of its citizens. So institutional rules effecting electoral rules will not be an indication of how well the legislature performs and how effectively and efficiently the legislature can deliver its functions (outputs) and produce favourable outcomes for the system as a whole.

As this chapter has also pointed out using the literature on organisational behaviour and output, representational quality and the behaviour of the legislature (and legislators) alone cannot be taken as an indication of performance and would present problems of evaluation. Saalfeld has noted (2002: 44) that all legislative systems simultaneously play a number of different roles within their representational responsibilities and represent various principles, each with their own preferences and expectations which would require certain behavioural output on part of the legislator. Furthermore, the asymmetrical information distribution among the principals and agents lead to considerable scope for agents to hide information on the true nature of preferences (ibid).

The literature on legislative oversight also shows that this tool cannot be taken as an indication of performance of the legislative system. As mentioned before, oversight affects policy making output only as far as to revise policy. Even though, the budgetary function is measurable and provides a tangible means of assessment for oversight, it does not mean that parliament's legislative performance is a subset of its oversight activities or even to equate the legislative function of parliaments to their oversight function and conclude performance based on its oversight capacity.
Rather than focusing on legislative institutions, and binding rules that constrain legislative behaviour and output, the focus of this research is the legislative organisation itself and how ‘outcomes’ or the results from outputs, would effect legislative performance and ultimately improve the democratic outcomes in governance systems. Keith Krehbiel has identified three stages that must first be met in order to assess performance in legislatures (Krehbiel: 1991: 261) which are as follows:

- Explicit performance criteria
- A theory that links legislative organisation with legislative performance
- Empirical support for such theory

The survey of literature in this chapter shows that there are no definitive performance criteria without constraints. The aim of this study is to find a performance criterion that could be explicit to democratic legislatures. The next chapter will look at performance from an organisational theory and whether theories of organisation may become applicable to legislatures and used to measure performance.
Chapter Three: The Concept of ‘Legislative Performance

3.1 Introduction: Legislative organisation and institutionalisation

In chapter two, legislative performance was looked upon from a comparative perspective of the existing pool of literature on legislative studies. Most of the literature indicates the popularity of quantitative assessments of legislative output reduced to measurable indicators of institutional structure, function or the behaviour of individuals and groups within the legislature. Evaluating institutional performance on policy output is quite common in comparative politics in which each regime type is considered as a distinct set of institutions combined into a whole according to whichever kind of institutional logic that makes sense (March and Olsen 1989). The main difference among institutional approaches is the amount of emphasis placed on institutional elements as independent or dependent variables.

In the case of rational choice institutional perspectives, the term ‘institution’ is without exception defined as rules that are looked upon as constraints within which actors may maximise their utility and self-interests. Under such circumstances, the individual’s strategic calculations are of central concern to legislative performance even though institutions may set the frameworks and parameters for them (North 1990). The shortcoming of this approach is probably this overemphasis on individual choice at the price of ignoring institutional preferences in interaction with the environment, thus undermining the important role of culture, society and organisational identity (Powell and DiMaggio 1991). Secondly, if rules are seen as constraints (as in rational choice), then actors may
wish to work around the rules in order to maximise their own preferences at the
cost of reducing the performance of the institution as a whole. Even if individual
actors, political parties and various interests interacting with the legislature could
be reduced to self-maximising rational choice actors, the institution of a
democratic parliament may not.

This study is more interested in historical institutionalism and its holistic
approach to institutional performance (Hall 1986, Skocpol 1979, 1987 and
March and Olsen 1989) in which rather than emphasising output, the outcome of
preferences is considered as a product of the interaction among various interests,
groups and institutional structures. Unlike rational choice, preferences are not
fixed but emerge and evolve within the institutional context which according to
March and Olsen (1989: 21) are the ‘rules of conduct in organisations, routines
and repertoire of procedure’. March and Olsen have defined political
institutions such as legislatures as:

‘Collections of interrelated rules and routines that define appropriate actions
in terms of relations between roles and situations. The process involves
determining what the situation is, what role is being fulfilled and what the
obligation of that role in that situation is’ (March and Olsen 1989: 160)

Since institutions shape behaviour, they are able to give legitimacy for their
conduct, thus allowing for performance to be assessed. This approach is based in
organisational theory and becomes very useful in the analysis of institutional
development and policy making in which the outcome becomes the main focus,
not the output. Although there is recognition of the role of individuals in shaping outcomes, this role is fairly bounded compared to rational studies of institutions.

However it must be stressed that social and political institutions do not act alone in formulating outcomes. Scott (1991: 147-8) argues organisational choice is influenced by cultural fields (or institutions) that define concepts such as fairness, equality, democracy and efficiency. These choices are reflected in the structures, functions and goals of the organisation as well as the rationality of individuals within it. So institutions cannot act alone in shaping outcomes but do so by interacting with systemic factors that are sometimes external to the institution. Furthermore, it must be recognised that outcomes are not one-dimensional but identify various macro aspects like public consumption, expenditure, level of welfare, democracy, political change and political growth. Unlike outputs which are relatively stable over time, outcomes tend to change.

This chapter, as the title suggests, intends to provide a conception of legislative performance as seen from a political science perspective. From a holistic point of view, legislatures as political institutions are 'wholes' that consist of simpler institutions which may be coupled into a system (Lane and Ersson 1999: 5). In other words, institutions are organised wholes of various simple institutions and it is the organisation of institutional structures that binds legislatures as they are

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1 In this work the terms Organisation and Institution are interchangeably used as formal organisations consist of institutions and large institutions are usually an organisation of simpler institutions. Institutions are usually either referred to as 'rules' or 'organisations'. This ambiguity can be seen in all analysis and discussions about institutions including theories about the design of institutions and constitutional engineering (Satori 1994). Political bodies such as a parliament, government or Supreme Court are usually referred to as institutions because behaviour in such bodies tends to be heavily institutionalised. However any established parliament is clearly an organisation that follows certain rules.
and helps them perform as they do. Organisational theorists such as Selznick (1949) and Meyer and Rowan (1977) have defined institutions as systems of meaning and that their behaviour and the behaviour of individuals within it depend on the meanings incorporated and the symbols manipulated from them or, in other words, their organisation. In this regard legislative performance may only be measured and assessed if taken from an organisational theoretical point of view. Organisational theory does not look towards distinguishing organisations from institutions, but rather works to reconcile these two terms. Moreover, when institutions are taken as an organisation, the meaning of the word is much wider and more flexible than when institutions stand as a norm or a rule. This allows for the macro analysis of performance in terms of outcomes.

The term ‘Institutionalisation’ is unavoidable in the process of political development and is generally regarded as:

‘The extent to which the entire polity is organised as a system of interacting relationships, first among the offices and agencies of government, and then among various groups and interests seeking to make demands upon the system, and finally in the relationships between officials and articulating citizens’ (Pye, 1973: 51).

Institutionalisation is frequently conceived as a subdivision of organisation theory. Patterson argues that organisations are the structural properties of institutions and that there can be no institution without an organisation, although the opposite is also quite possible in the case of informal organisations (Patterson
It is generally perceived that institutionalisation occurs when environmental factors move the organisation into a certain direction of greater complexity, boundedness and standardisation (Hibbing, 2002: 31). In order to institutionalise, there must be an organisation or a group of individuals bound by some common purpose to achieve objectives (North, 1990: 5) which then needs to be enriched with certain values and principles over time. Although the members become rationalised as these norms and values are incorporated into their behaviour, in the case of legislatures these norms and values are mainly established from the constitution without the need for an institutional build-up².

Traditional institutional theorists consider the process of institutionalisation as structural and linear whereby a political structure becomes more specialised within an organisation having a clear boundary from its environment, and becomes more operational in accordance with the rules and procedures (Polsby 1971), which in turn enables a more established, regularised and predictable pattern of behaviour in the institution. It is also considered as a process whereby organisations and procedures acquire value and stability (Huntington 1968: 12). Institutionalisation in this sense refers to the “development of norms and explicit, as well as implicit, codes of conduct or rules in the institution and signifies the routinisation of certain political procedures and the prevalence of certain principles over others” (Kamrava, 1993: 4).

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² The differences between institutions and organisations are considered so small, that organisational theorists such as Scott (1987, 1995) and institutional theorists such as Jepperson (1991) have preferred to ignore distinguishing between the two and referring to them as an interchangeable phenomena.
Taken in the above sense, firstly all constitutional systems must be in some stage of institutionalisation. As routines and norms become more established and gain greater meaning, the degree of institutionalism within these structures increase, thereby improving the performance of outputs. Secondly, the degree to which a system is institutionalised does not necessarily have to depend on the extent it corresponds to democratic rules and practices but to how much it manages to penetrate into the society and the degree of compliance it faces from the society, either voluntarily or by coercion and threat (Kamrava 1993: 2). Thus the Chinese National People’s Assembly, the Saudi Consultative Assembly and Zimbabwe’s Parliament cannot be considered as uninstitutionalised in a comparative perspective, though their degree of institutionalisation inevitably differs from developed institutions.

Since new institutionalists are more concerned with the behaviour of organisations within the framework of their institutions, stronger emphasis is placed on the norms of the institution as a way of understanding their function and how they determine or shape individual behaviour (Peters 1998: 19). In order to assess legislatures, not only internal factors, but also external factors influencing legislatures need to be considered along with the content and type of public policy issues (Norton and Olsen 1996). Hence the study of institutions becomes non-linear and systemic, whereby structures, properties, functions and the behaviour of the organisations are regarded in interaction with the environment.
The environment of a legislature is (in post-modern terms) a complex system itself, which is characterised as being unpredictable. So it must be assumed that any change in the environment must also affect the legislature it interacts with. Or, the legislature must at least adapt to its environment in order to survive (Parsons 1960, Almond and Powell 1966). This implies that legislatures would behave in unpredictable ways allowing them to de-institutionalise when necessary (Eisenstadt 1965, Hibbings 2002) and runs contrary to the reductionist concept of institutionalisation, which would require a stable, regularised and predictable system. Eisenstadt has used the context of bureaucratisation instead of institutionalisation and assumed it as a reversible process that changes with environmental patterns. This idea brings institutions and organisations closer in terms of functions and behaviour patterns and indicates that organisational solutions can be used to solve institutional problems.

Although this study seeks an alternative approach to the commonly accepted rational choice institutionalism, performance analysis of the organisation does not necessarily contradict institutional performance based on rational choice. Douglas North, a rational choice institutionalist, provides the distinction between institutions and organisations by comparing organisations to teams playing a game and institutions as 'the rules of the game' (North 1990: 4). According to this rational institutional view organisations are formed to participate within the institutional environment. This example could be used outside economic institutions and applied to political institutions such as a legislature to be an organisation within the broader institutional environment of the constitution and rules of the political system as a whole. Taken in this perspective, the functions,
behaviour and the performance of a legislature can be measured and assessed using organisational methods, whereas it would be very difficult to do the same by considering the institution as norms and values alone which cannot provide a distinct and clear measurement system.

Moreover, an empirical analysis of legislatures using only structural variables cannot provide adequate explanations of the institution as a whole. In an analysis of the institutionalisation of the legislative and judicial systems in America Schmidhauser, using Polsby’s and Huntington’s institutional maturation indices\(^3\), underwent a chronological comparison of these institutions and showed that legislatures are declining in strength (Schmidhauser 1973: 134-5) by indicating the negative correlation between the attributes of institutionalisation and growth. While this study may be a further indication that legislatures, as institutions, are changing towards becoming more like previously regarded political organisations, it may also point to the fact that nominal analyses of this kind cannot be used alone in the assessment of the institution as a whole.

It needs to be stressed that different approaches to institutions have all started off by looking at the structures in one way or the other. They differ in the way these structures are dealt with and incorporated with other elements of the institution. For instance March and Olsen (1984) have used a predominantly normative approach. Their emphasis is on the development and transmission of norms among the members of the institution or organisation as a unit of analysis.

\(^{3}\) The indices were taken from Polsby (1968) institutional maturation index and Huntington (1968) Political maturation indicators. Schmidhauser, J. 'An Exploratory Analysis of the Institutionalization of Legislatures and Judiciaries'. In Korenberg, A. ed. (1973) *Legislatures in comparative Perspective*. 66
to the extent that members’ interpretations of norms and how they perceive the rules may vary. Whereas behaviourists such as Giddens (1979) have argued that institutions inevitably shape the behaviour of individuals within them and as a system of meaning convey a sense of how members should behave. This approach is cognitive and deals with trying to explain the manner which members become habituated to accept the rules and norms of the organisation or institution (Peters 2002: 107) taking consideration of how structures affect behaviour within an institution.

In this case, the assessment of institutional structures, functions and behaviour could also be done in a similar ways to performance measurement in organisations. Like organisations, legislatures can be considered as open and adaptive systems in (direct and indirect) interaction with their environment. In this respect a model or framework may be able to assess the performance and quality of legislative outputs and outcomes. In order to devise such a model it would be necessary to analyse performance in the framework of legislative functions. Though, it must be noted that indicators used to evaluate performance will differ according to the nature of the organisation. For instance reducing the time and increasing the production of an output would be taken as an indication for higher performance in manufacturing organisations while it may not be necessarily so in the case of legislative institutions (in the case of an authoritarian legislature the legislative cycle is reduced considerably but the performance of the system in terms of outcome is not necessarily high). Thus indicators would need to be modified to suit the performance of a particular model of legislature, not merely a law-making institution.
Finally, it should be noted that constitutions as an institution of legislatures provide important opportunities for democratic growth in societies. It is the role of the legislative system to take advantage of these opportunities and as they do, alter the system within which they are a part of so as to facilitate the growth and demands of the interacting environment and provide the needs for a continuous interaction between systems. This is done via their symbiotic relationship between legislative institutionalisation, organisation and the feedback that they receive from their environment. Thus performance is a dynamic and constant product of ongoing cooperation and interaction among the environment and its institutions and organisations, within the context of the political system. The following section takes a closer look at conceptions surrounding performance in political science and institutional/organisational theory.

3-2 The Conception of Performance in Political Institutions

Simply put, performance is the purposive actions that institutions take in order to achieve their goals. The analysis of performance is a crucial step in the assessment of institution as a whole. To perform well, any institution would need to perform both effectively and efficiently. It is important to make the distinction between effectiveness and efficiency at this stage. Cameron and Whetter (1983: 17) have characterised effectiveness as ‘doing the right thing’ while efficiency is ‘doing things right’. An institution is judged as effective when it can provide minimal satisfaction to their external (and internal) constituencies.
The same institution will be judged as efficient if it is able to run with precision and minimal waste.

Buscher (1994: xi) has generally defined effectiveness as the ratio between the ‘outcome’ and the target, while efficiency is generally regarded as the ratio between the ‘output’ and the resources being used. In other words, the measure of effectiveness is an answer to whether an institution achieves the results (or values) it initially sets out to achieve whereas efficiency is an answer to whether the same institution is doing the right internal processes and is managing its goals in a cost-effective way. Efficiency has more to do with the allocation of the organisation’s resources (in terms of time and costs) and internal processes. Performance cannot be addressed by only regarding outputs, since efficiency and effectiveness are inadvertently linked. Moreover, outputs cannot be properly addressed without addressing outcomes which compels organisations to pay attention to factors from the environment before meaningful performance measurement can take place.

Conceptualising performance or performance measurement for political institutions, and legislatures in particular by means of literature is quite difficult. Firstly, there have not been as many studies allocated to political institutions in comparison to economic institutions and management agencies. Government performance is usually confined to evaluating and controlling the budget and oversight of government agencies as a way of promoting legitimacy and improving accountability and governance. Secondly, effectiveness and efficiency may not necessarily be linked so closely for all political systems and legislatures.
in particular despite the clear relationship between output and outcome in organisational theory. A legislature may be considered as efficient in terms of passing swift legislation but not considered to be effective by democratic standards. Equally significant, a legislature may be considered to be relatively effective by producing the right outcomes but at high costs (low efficiency). In this sense it would be a mistake to consider a political institution to be performing well only if one of the dimensions of performance is met.

In politics, legitimacy is usually perceived as a natural consequence of performance and is the ability to instil support for the system. Performance in a political perspective has generally been regarded as a dependent variable of legitimacy and is taken as the effectiveness of government actions leading to support for the political system as a whole. In Lipset’s *Political Man* first published in 1960, a definition of legitimacy has been provided which has become a commonly accepted concept of this term in political studies. According to Lipset (1981: 64) legitimacy is: ‘The capacity of a system to engender and maintain the belief that existing political institutions are the most appropriate ones for the society’. Huntington in *The Third Wave* (1992) has reiterated this belief and maintains that authoritarian systems, where there is less to no legitimacy, must rely heavily on performance and getting things right, whereas democratic systems, which are high up on legitimacy, become less dependent on performance legitimacy. In democratic countries where citizens’ allegiance for the political system is strong, failure in performance is blamed on the incumbents rather than the system and the ouster and replacement of the incumbent help to renew the system in terms of legitimacy (Huntington 1991;
18). In such circumstances performance outputs will be a matter of rational choice institutionalism and legitimacy will only suffer in sustained systematic failure in the long run which is highly unlikely.

Lipset's concept of legitimacy is based on the legality of the performance system in a representative democracy, in which the outputs of the performance system are in line with legitimacy. However if the legitimacy of a regime were to be based on the people's subjective acceptance of the rightfulness of the political order of a system rather than the system's capacity to engender and maintain support, then conceptualising legitimacy would not necessarily imply good performance or effective and efficient governance. Legitimacy may, in theory, coexist alongside an ineffective and inefficient governance system. This conception of legitimacy and performance is particularly prevalent in non-homogenous and decentralised societies (Gagnon and Erk 2004: 319-321).

In political science despite a certain amount of ambiguity regarding how performance is conceptualised with regards to legitimacy, the majority of texts see performance as a component of legitimacy. For instance in the context of the European Union, performance has been regarded as central in all of the narratives that have legitimised the European Projects from their inception (Bikerton 2007: 2). The requirement of performance legitimacy is that a 'value added' contribution be established in the relevant policy area which is focused on effectiveness and achieving results (ibid). In this sense, the concept of performance is all about reaching certain policy outputs, meeting expectations,
satisfying citizens, and therefore maintaining legitimacy. Performance is assessed through the success an institution has at reaching these outputs.

In political organisational studies, the idea of performance as a dependent variable for legitimacy has become quite acceptable. In comparative politics it is widely acknowledged that for development purposes, organisations should seek to emulate the successful performance of other organisations as a whole or in part. This practice has become institutionalised in many political institutions around the world and in the activities of international organisations involved in performance appraisal and institutional development. Hence the idea that performance may be measured, predicted, understood, and shaped becomes acceptable and bears some resemblance to some studies of organisational strategy building even though organisational performance may not be given primary focus as they are likely to in the study of organisations.

Some critics of governance performance measurement, including Moe (1984, 1990) and Shepsle (1986) argue that due to the different nature of politics, organisational theories do not and cannot have much influence beyond economics and sociology. Moe insists that public bureaucracy cannot bear much resemblance to rational organisations of the new economy as they are too bound up in politics and ‘are not intrinsically motivated by effectiveness, efficiency, coordination, management or any other design criteria that might limit the kind of bureaucracy they are willing to create’ (Moe 1990: 142). In this regard public bureaucracies cannot be understood as having a governance structure as unlike business firms, they are not motivated by certain criteria, such as reducing
transaction costs or improving production. Thus they are not able to implement their motives into their design, introduce rules, procedures, and monitor mechanisms and enforcement tools.

Though it is true that politicians, including legislators, are motivated by factors such as re-election which would influence their political decisions and behaviour, Moe’s argument that legislators in established democracies have ‘strong incentives to only do what interest groups want and in the absence of explicit demands, to take entrepreneurial action in representing group interest’ (Moe 1990: 139) cannot be generalised. Legislators must also have an interest in reducing their transaction costs and improving production (maybe not all committed to improving production in terms of outputs at the same time, but this cannot equally apply to outcome production). First of all, in civil societies with a high degree of public awareness and knowledge, demands coming from the environment, whether from the constituents or interest groups, do not necessarily coincide. Secondly the rationality of legislators in such societies would not simply imply that they act in their own best interests, but also to the interest of the whole institution. Even though maximising self-interests are among aspects of legislative work, it arguably cannot necessarily take precedence in democratic societies.

Whereas in economic organisations actors are inclined to think of maximising their utility and working toward increasing the output for their stakeholders, rationality may sometimes give priority to other internal goals such as the desire to stay on the organisational ladder regardless of the main intention of the
organisation. Economic actors may also be influenced by outside pressures and interests instead of their own customers and not present a result that is in the long-term economic interest of the organisation. Therefore, the dissimilarities between economic and political organisations may not be as much as it first seems. Political and economic institutions are both involved in the production of output and services to their respective fields. On top of that, they both need to be able to deal with their environments (internal as well as external) which are not always predictable, and include elements that do not always act rationally.

Another major aspect of understanding performance in institutions which one needs to take into account, most particularly when dealing with performance in legislatures, is not to confuse legislative capacity with legislative performance (Arter 2006b). Such confusion may lead to false conclusions of mistaking legislative strength or its potential power to produce output from its performance or systematic delivery of outcomes. Thus it is important to emphasise that policy power is not definitive of legislative performance (Arter 2006a). What is at stake is not whether the legislature has the power to make or influence political decisions but rather how it can optimise its already existing potentials and maximize outcomes through its performance and whether its outputs are contributing successfully in reaching the institution’s goals and improving the quality of democracy. This is considered to be the aim of all democratic political systems regardless of age, constitutional structure and institutional design.

It is important to note too that the key tenet of contingency theory in organisations is also applicable to established democratic systems in which the
organisation strives to maximise efficiency by adapting to the environment and achieving some kind of fit between the environment and its structure, functions and behaviour (Scott 1987, Meyer and Zucker 1989). In order to appear effective organisations are also required to legitimise their actions to their dominant constituencies which could come at the price of damaging efficiency. Thus, the main aim of a performance system is to maintain legitimacy and not lose out on effectiveness or efficiency. As institutional theories assume, the primary determinant of organisational structure is the pressure exerted by internal and external constituencies on the organisation to conform with a set of expectations and gain legitimacy, which will inevitably lead to the long-term survival and securing vital resources toward this aim.

Yet assessing institutional performance in political institutions usually takes a narrow form that is potentially very similar to institutional studies that assess the degree of institutionalisation and is basically internal in approach. Meyer and Zucker have argued that generally speaking, performance may be defined to the extent that 'elites dominate an organisation, a high degree of professionalism exists, and the organisation performs a technical function, outputs of which are measurable' (Meyer and Zuker 1989: 111). However, performance will be construed much more broadly, by contrast, to the extent that, 'the norm of participative democratic governance operates, sometimes in the formal structure of the rules of the organisation, the interests of multiple constituencies are given recognition, and the organisation’s function is non-technical and outputs elude measurement' (ibid).
Considering the above assumption from institutional theory, it is pertinent that performance in political democracies is institutionally defined and institutional factors, both internal and external, determine the interests being pursued by organisations aiming to gain legitimacy in continuous interaction with the environment. It is inevitable that performance will be dependent on factors such as institutional design, constitutional structure and the cultural differences of each political system. For instance a presidential system will not perform with the same variables as a parliamentary system, or a proportional representation electoral model will not bear the same outcomes as a first past the post voting system. In order to reduce the complications of any comparative performance framework, the model would first have to be slightly narrowed to consider only the main role of democratic legislatures in achieving good governance, system maintenance and gradual improvement (which will be examined in the next chapter of this work).

3-3 Performance Measurement in Institutions:

Measuring performance is one of the most problematic issues in the field of organisational theory (Zammuto, 1982). Even though there are a number of different approaches to assessing performance, as this chapter will point out, there is little consensus as to what constitutes a valid set of criteria. It is generally understood that when assessing internal processes to determine efficiency in an institution, it is more difficult to measure outputs as compared to inputs. This is especially the case in service providing organisations because the outputs tend to be more qualitative than quantitative. Taken from this
perspective, it would seem that legislatures do not need to be assessed the same way as other profit-making organisations since they will receive financial resources or a budget regardless of their performance. Perhaps this is one of the reasons there has not been the need for a programme to systematically assess performance in these bodies.

On the other hand, since effectiveness is more likely to be observed in the environment as the tip of the iceberg, it has usually been assessed and measured with regard to certain standards, norms and values that are external to the institution. In order to measure effectiveness an overall understanding of the institution’s functional responsibilities is first required. Organisational effectiveness shows the extent to which an organisation is able to fulfil its goal and complexity arises when an organisation is multi-functional and carries out a multiple of goals. In such a situation a consensus must be reached by those who are associated with the organisation’s performance and have more knowledge and experience in its functions and effects.

This section looks at the significance of performance measurement in institutional studies. Measurement has been a key operational management tool in indicating the success and failure of institutions. Garvin (1993: 78) writing in the Harvard Business Review has stated ‘if you can’t measure it, you can’t manage it’ and this sentence has been quoted frequently in organisational texts as an undeniable fact. However, the more traditional quality management experts, such as Edward Deming (1986) considered as the founder of the Japanese quality movement, are opposed to measurement and have declared performance
measurement as ‘the most inhibitor to quality and productivity in the western world’ (quoted in Gabor 1999: 43).

Performance measurement systems (especially from the late eighties up until today) have been recognised as playing an important role in the efficient and effective management of organisations. Every modern organisation has developed some form of performance measurement framework by either applying one of the available methodologies or tailor making a measurement system according to its own structure and culture. Andrew Neely and colleagues who have developed a performance measurement model called the Performance Prism (Neely et al. 2002) define a Performance Measurement system as a ‘set of metrics [or indicators] used to quantify both the efficiency and effectiveness of actions’ (Neely et al. 1995: 3). Neely and associates (Neely et al, 1996: 14) give five reasons for implementing any kind of performance measurement system:

- Monitor performance
- Identify the areas that need attention
- Enhance motivation
- Strengthen accountability
- Improve communication

Performance measurement must not be confused with performance measures when identifying organisational performance. According to Sinclair and Zairi (1995: 53) performance measurement is concerned with determining how successful organisations have been in attaining their objectives, whereas
performance measures are the numerical or quantitative indicators that show how well each objective is being met\(^4\). A performance measurement system is composed of various performance measures that are linked to performance management through the setting of goals, standards and targets for improving performance in the organisation (Buxon and Ward 1998: 2). In other words, measures are only a means to an end. In situations where multiples measures exist, meaningful measurement can only take place if the relative weight of each measure is known.

Although performance measures are partly constructed by changes in the balance of power or influence within the organisation (Hassard and Parker 1993), nothing can impact performance in organisations as much as the setting of clear goals which represent positive resources for the organisation around which to organise its activity and set priorities (Perrow 1970: 49). Organisational goals set out the framework that gives direction to organisational performance, motivate members and staff and build trust. An organisation cannot perform without first having a clear goal or set of goals. For evaluation purposes, quality techniques can be adopted more clearly, widely and successfully when goals are clearly defined (Berman and West 1995).

There is a positive relationship between goals and performance as organisations that have clear goals usually perform better. That is why it is important that measurements indicating performance should represent the real goals of the

organisation not short-term targets. It is also important that measures do not out­weigh one aspect of performance in comparison with others (Kaplan and Norton 1992). The goals of an organisation may be better defined through an examination of the behaviour of its various parts, in particular the environment or the society at large as organisations obtain resources from the society and seek to convert them in certain ways in order to obtain some sort of market for their output. So by observing the input-output process, one can establish the goal of the organisation or the needs that the organisation must satisfy in order to survive (Rice and Miller, 1967: 88-95).

An organisation cannot be considered as having a goal unless there is an ongoing consensus between members about the purpose of their interaction (Etzioni 1960). As organisations get more complex, the agents interacting within the organisation become more diverse and demanding. Diversity and demand from the environment generate a whole new set of behaviour with which the organisation must learn to adapt itself in order to evolve and survive. In other words, the organisational system is maintained by constantly adapting to new conditions around it and coevolving with the environment. Such behaviour would inevitably affect organisational short-term goals which may need constant re-evaluation and adjustment with the environment. A performance measurement system should also be able to detect such environmental changes and adapt with them in order to survive. Not surprisingly some organisational analysts (Jones 1996: 161) define organisational effectiveness as goal achievement.

5 Organisational goals were traditionally realised as static. Once a goal has been reached, it would cease to be the guiding image for the organisation and is assimilated to the organisation or its environment (Etzioni, 1964: 6). However, considering the dynamism of the environment, one can only assume organisational
According to Bititci and colleagues performance measurement systems provide a "closed loop model of organisational strategies" and a structured framework that allow 'relevant information to be fed back to the appropriate points in order to facilitate the process of decision making and control' (Bititchi et al. 1997: 524-5). The information fed back must correlate with the expectations from the system and the measures must be designed to improve the outputs and outcomes of organisations. Hence performance measurement emphasises strongly that the results from processes involved in output delivery should match the expectations of the system and also become a tool for controlling outcomes.

Traditionally, performance measurement was seen as a means for monitoring and controlling performance, checking progress and identifying areas that need attention (Neely et al, 2002). These methods set about only to identify key performance indicators or the key ratios. Such assessment which is usually referred to as 'benchmarking' (used in audits) compares the key indicators of performance in regards to a certain aspect (or the whole) of a business with a corresponding number of other similar units or with itself overtime. The major advantage of these methods of performance measurement is the transparency involved and the fact that performance indicators may be analysed and tested for validity using statistical methods.

Despite transparency and providing a structure for measurement which aids systematic improvement in performance, the problem with traditional types of measurement is that they are usually based on costs and benefits only and are goals to be flexible, requiring constant revision and alterations in order to meet with the demands from the environment.
driven solely by quantitative measures. Traditional performance measurement systems leave out qualitative measures in their assessment, as they are usually more difficult to implement. Moreover, traditional performance measurement systems do not consider the external environment and no future strategy is considered. Thus it is very difficult to derive at predictions about environmental change and its impact on the performance of the organisation as the empirical study of past performance does not provide any kind of clear and effective strategy for performance management.

Current measurement approaches to performance appraisal of public sector organisations and political institutions mainly use a combination of qualitative and quantitative indicators in their approach to assess governance structures. Quality methods have been used by organisations for defensive purposes to ensure the survival of the organisation in hostile and mainly unpredictable environments. They have also been used for tactical purposes, which are to ensure the satisfaction of customers and to ensure that the organisation can acquire the necessary capacities to develop suitably in the future as it is generally believed that improving performance in the organisation will lead to better performance in the environment and vice-versa. Since the interest of public sector organisations is in line with the common interest of the society,

6 For instance the Total Quality Management (TQM), a popular method used in governance performance measurement, is quite similar to traditional models in the sense that it also requires some kind of adherence to a standard similar to the certification schemes (such as the international standards organisation ISO certificate) with the added feature that organisational performance also takes the behavioural complexity of systems into account. Organisational results are almost always evaluated and analysed as intra-organisational performance. Often, comparable measures are used to find inter-organisational performance (such as the indexes used by developmental organisations such as the World Bank).
the study of performance has in the past used a positivist approach even in the overall evaluation of quality. However, positivist quality methods become quite difficult to assess in environments that are more complex, dynamic and fractious. This state is made more difficult when there is a fragmentation of interests inside as well as outside the organisation and there is an 'ambiguity of intention' from the environment (March and Olsen 1978: 250).

3-4 The Quality Movement and Public Institutions

Work to improve quality in organisations by introducing methods, techniques or values and standards has become very popular since the 1970s and has been gaining speed with the growth in international trade and globalisation. There has been a substantial legislative interest for performance measurement in the last fifteen years resulting in a growing focus on performance audits and evaluation. Quality and reputation have become more and more synonymous to the point that all organisations have tried to incorporate quality as part of their organisational culture. Although this trend was initiated in the private sector, public sector organisations have tried to follow and make organisational changes towards higher quality service and performance. For example in the United States most publications on the management of government organisations since the late 1980s include a section on the principles of quality management and their application in the public sector. In addition, the more broadly aimed management books on quality, such as Milakovich (1995) and Oakland (1989) have chapters on the public sector.
The current focus on performance measurement at all levels of government and non-profit organisations reflects citizen demand for evidence of programme effectiveness (Wholey and Newcomer 1997: 92). According to a survey by the United States Council for Excellence in Government in 1997, nearly three quarters of Americans believe performance in public sector organisations could be improved by bringing private sector values and practices into government. This indicates the growing understanding about the relationships between resources, goals and results.

It has generally become prestigious for public sector units to win a national quality award (Kettl 1997). The focus on performance in the public sector was given a statutory base in the Clinton administration with Congress passing the Government Performance and Reform Act and in 2001 the Bush administration promulgated a management agenda with 'Budget and Performance Integration' as one of the five central elements for government improvement. Following from that the US administration introduced a programme assessment tool in 2002.

The quality movement in public sector organisations which started in the United States about two decades ago has had a spill-over effect in Europe and the rest of the world. For instance in Britain, John Major writing in the Conservative Party

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7 This research was carried out by the American organisation 'Trust in Government'. The 1997 poll carried out on the public's perception of performance measurement in the public sector is available from their website at: www.trustingov.org/research/council_poll.htm

8 Featured in the 'Testimony of Patrica McGinnis, president of the council for excellence in government before the committee on government reform, House of Representatives' September 18, 2003
Manifesto of 1992, pointed to the ‘quality revolution’ taking place in British government that was ‘leading a drive for quality throughout our public services’ (Quoted in Tuckman, 1995: 77). The following New Labour government has since been emphasising quality in all aspects of the British public sector with the use of performance measurement especially noticeable in local councils, schools and the National Health Service (NHS)\(^9\) reflecting the general quality adage that local government should provide ‘value for people as well as value for money’ (Sanderson, 1992: 21). The Gershon report has been a key driver in turning public sector organisations in Britain toward performance management. The report identified twenty-one billion pounds of efficiency savings to be made in the public sector by 2007-2008 (Gershon 2004: iv). Quality in the public sector has taken a more open systems approach by arguing that quality should be measured in terms of ‘strategic direction’ rather than in terms of service delivery alone (Wilkinson, 1998: 94) and there has been a shift in focus from the service to the public who receive such service.

Most methods of performance evaluation in government focus on performance after-the fact (not before) and requires past performance to be compared to the present (or more recent past) performance with some kind of standard. Performance information has been used for audit and evaluation of government programmes and departments and helps the formation of the budget. Performance management of the government has been aided in this regard by a number of awards, frameworks, and software. An analysis of all these would

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\(^9\) The UK Government has been adapting and encouraging techniques from Total Quality Management (TQM), the International Standard Organisation (ISO) awards series, and more recently the European Foundation of Quality Management (EFQM) Excellence model into almost every area of the public sector.
require a whole chapter and will probably distort the nature of this research. Instead the most popular quality evaluation tools used in public sector organisations is briefly mentioned below.

The most popular evaluation benchmark for public sector organisations has been the ‘ISO 9000’ certification awards, presented by the International Standards Organisation (ISO). The ISO 9000 was a series of quality standards set by the European based International Standard Organisation. It gained significance as all firms wanting to do trade within the European Common Market were legally required to be ISO 9000 certified. Organisations were assessed according to a set of process standards as was stipulated in one of the standards that:

'[The] processes affecting quality must be monitored and controlled...objective evidence must be provided that the product received and delivered is inspected or otherwise verified'. (Gasko, 1992: 368)

A third party would evaluate the processes only once the organisation has announced its willingness to be evaluated using the standardised instruments used to determine the scoring of the evaluations. In other words the assessed party would know beforehand what level they are required to achieve. However, there is a disadvantage to having a fixed set of standards and measurement as it would imply that organisations will not see the need for continuous improvement.
and this allows them to exploit the system. An organisation can always go back to its previous ways after it receives the certificate\textsuperscript{10}.

The quest for an evaluation model to assess and reward excellence and continuous performance in organisations has led the European Foundation for Quality Management (EFQM) to present a nine-scale framework of quality assessment. This model has become very popular among organisations of all sizes as a relatively costless\textsuperscript{11} method of improving quality management and customer satisfaction. Like the total quality method (TQM), the excellence model focuses on the final product as well as the processes leading to the product.

The EFQM model has become as popular in the public sector as private organisations and EFQM has been giving out various awards and prizes to organisations (regardless of sector), which have managed to achieve the excellence model. The EFQM website offers a list of many organisations, public and private sector alike, across the world. Winning an award is seen not only as a sign of excellence but also prestige and recognition\textsuperscript{12}. Since 2004, EFQM has also set up a ‘local and regional government prize’ that it gives to local and regional governments which demonstrate outstanding contributions to pursuing excellence principally in design and implementation of e-government solutions.

\textsuperscript{10} The chairman of one quality consulting firm has even said ‘Currently 80-90 percent of the companies going through the ISO certification are just wasting their money’ (quoted in Fouhy et al. 1992: 42).
\textsuperscript{11} The EFQM is not costless in large organisations however since only managers need to be involved and not everybody working in the organisation (as is the case with TQM), then it is less of a time and cost constraint.
\textsuperscript{12} Full details of the award and processes leading performance growth is given on the EFQM website at www.efqm.org. The website features the names of many public sector organisations in its list of award winners. Local and regional governments have also adopted the excellence strategy as the EFQM has set up programmes to help these organisations improve performance using the techniques mentioned.
3-5 Performance Measurement in Legislative Institutions

There has been much debate surrounding the usefulness of a strict methodology for comparing effectiveness among political institutions. Arturo Israel (1987) on behalf of the World Bank Institute (WBI) argues that such comparison is neither necessary nor possible and all that is required is a ranking or an ordinal measurement system that can be defined in general terms (ranking has been the preferred method of WBI since). While it is very difficult to provide correct comparisons among institutions, WBI methodology cannot be considered flawless as it makes qualitative predictions of institutional effectiveness based on quantitative values.

However, the WBI methodology does take into consideration two significant factors in comparative analysis. Firstly, it is generally very difficult to improve the overall effectiveness and efficiency of any individual institution as it would often require changes to the internal culture (if not the structure) and such changes will not be easy to implement particularly in larger and older institutions. Secondly, in order to improve performance, it is necessary to compare institutions that are alike only (systems that can be assessed through similar measurement methodology).

As discussed before, it is very difficult to implement overall change especially to institutions such as legislatures that are multi-functional in nature, while it becomes relatively simple to implement change in single purpose organisations.
where a single factor (such as financial profit) dominates. In the private sector, the means and yardstick to measuring successful performance are more limited and more universally accepted. However, it becomes quite challenging when multiple measures which have a certain degree of value and controversy, are involved. In situations where multiple measures are considered as equally important and the priorities for assessing performance are not so clear, performance systems can appear complicated and the outcomes may become vague and even conflicting. The need to set practical limits on the functions of parliaments is very important to bear in mind when trying to find an effective model for performance in legislatures. Any feasible performance measurement system may be too costly, difficult to maintain, and inevitably lead to information overload if too many measures were to be assessed.

But is it possible to reduce legislatures to a single main function and then generalise performance for all institutions of the kind? Philip Norton argues that legislatures are multi-functional bodies with a range of political consequences for their respective political parties in which ‘law making’ is not necessarily the most important consequence of parliaments as some consider it to be, but instead the main function of these democratic and representative bodies is legitimising law making by assenting to binding measures of public policy (Norton 1990a: 1, 1990b:4, 2004). However, for measurement sake, if a performance framework were established to rank legislative performance solely by looking at their output capacity of assenting to measures from the executive, then probably less democratic parliaments with lower accountability would outperform the more democratic and transparent ones, as it could be argued that democracy is relative
and not absolute. Thus, performance models based on limited quantitative measures alone cannot be indicative of legislative performance and legitimacy of the whole institution.

Packenham (1970) who has devised a qualitative model for assessing functions in legislatures, uses the term 'consequence' instead of functions referring to outcomes and consequences that each function has for the political system at large. According to Packenham, different political systems do not share the same political consequences and this affects the relative importance of the functions in legislatures. In his view, when we characterise a certain function as the most important, it usually means that it is the process or a set of processes for which the legislature has the most consequences and the highest impact for the political system (Packenham 1970, 1990: 86). As a result, the political consequences of a certain piece of legislation do not have the same impact in parliamentary, presidential or hybrid style legislatures. In this respect, even if legislatures perform the same functions, they do not act in the same way and do not necessarily require the same consequences for their actions. Norton has also pointed this out in the introduction of *Legislatures* (1990a: 12):

> 'The realisation that legislatures are multi-functional bodies, and that those functions and the capacity to fulfil them vary over time and from country to country, has meant that it has been possible to think not in terms of a legislature, but in terms of different legislatures'
So in order to establish any kind of performance assessment model for different legislatures using one kind of measurement approach, one has to bear in mind that different purpose and values will require different types of measures. There is no single magical measure or a set of measures that will definitely serve all these purposes (Behn, 2003). If there is to be a performance measurement model for legislatures, it would either have to consider the identical (or near identical) purpose of legislatures or there would have to be an exclusive performance measurement model designed for each individual institution.

Another important factor to bear in mind when designing performance systems in political institutions such as legislatures is that whatever number of measures or values are chosen, there must be some kind of consensus on performance measures among the members of that institution on what constitutes performance in the first place. If the members of an institution or organisation do not agree or do not share the same view on performance, actions cannot be coordinated and resources may be wasted (Neely, 2002: 73).

Finally, it should be emphasised that no organisation likes to be evaluated in the first place. Evaluation becomes necessary only when different organisations of the same kind start competing for bigger budgets, more grants, better recognition and customer satisfaction. However, since parliaments receive an allocated budget regardless of their performance and in most cases, the common way of assessing performance of a legislator or a party has been through election results (which cannot by itself be a very effective method for assessment) as long as legislators are incumbent, they are not keen on being evaluated or ranked.
As discussed before the assumption that legislatures are political in nature may cause difficulties in performance assessment. Some researchers (Brunsson 1995) even question the use of the term decision in politics, which can lead to unpredictable consequences and political (as well as social) outcomes for the political system as a whole, compared to decisions of rational choice used in strategic management. For instance, the criticism of legislative oversight historically has been that it is not focused on the extent to which programs have achieved their objectives, but used to draw attention to politically sensitive or high-profile issues. Mc Cubbins and Schwartz (1984: 721) have argued that the Congress engages in 'fire alarm' oversight, where high profile issues get attention as opposed to 'police patrol' oversight where agencies or programs are looked at in detail in an effort to determine what works and what does not.

Moreover, there has not been much initiative from these institutions to provide a method of ranking or evaluating legislators in parliaments and the only instances are usually after initiatives have been set and from outside such as the media or the public\textsuperscript{13}. So for any performance measurement method to be

\textsuperscript{13} An example of such initiation is the website \url{http://www.theyworkforyou.com} that assesses legislators and their work. This website provides free and easily accessible records of democracy as they are practiced by the British Parliament and was set up in 2004 by a group of 'unpaid civic hackers' (as they quote themselves on their website). Users of this website can enter their own postcodes and they will immediately be linked to a record of all the contributions made by their MP in parliamentary debates. These records are provided using Hansard documents which are publicly available and easily downloadable. The ranking system uses indicators like the number of times an MP takes part in a debate, vote or written answers making use of the number of times their names appear on the Hansard documents. However, an article in The Times wrote of how MPs had become obsessed with 'gaming the system' by making short and unnecessary interventions in debates to have their names included in the count and tabling pointless questions for the sake of improving their ranking (‘The MPs who can’t stop talking’ The Times, 27th February 2007).

The website's organisers do admit that this method cannot be taken of a measure of a parliamentarian's actual performance and does not measure the quality of a Member's full contribution. Despite the fallbacks of this performance method, the website receives many hits every day. Some MPs have even started taking advantage of the system by point-scoring, that is intervening in debates as many times as possible to get a higher place in the ranking system. The fact that some MPs are going into the trouble of gaming the system to their advantage can only mean two things: Firstly MPs are becoming more aware of being watched by the public and of the need to improve performance (whether properly or by cheating the ranking system).
implemented within the system, it would have to appeal to the insiders (legislators) as well as those outside the institution. In the past (and even today in many cases) the introduction of such models would probably have resulted in it being sidestepped and/or not taken too seriously. However, as parliaments play the role of safety valves for public opinion (Norton 1993: 10) and as the public are becoming more demanding and aware of processes, they need to show that they are interested in performing better. Some of the methods which are already being used by legislatures, at the local and national level, to assess organisational performance include Reform Programmes, Audits, Corporate plans (using Total Quality Management method), the Balanced Scorecard (or scoreboard), EFQM (European Foundation of Quality Management) to name a few. These methods are briefly discussed below:

- 3-5.1 Audits and Benchmarking

Almost all legislatures have been using auditing techniques to various extent, to measure performance in parts of the political system, in particular the budgeting process. These assessments usually come in reports prepared and used by working groups, commissions and committees in parliaments (usually in
budgeting, reform and modernisation capacities). In theory the result of audits should feed into the formulation of the budget of the subsequent year but this method of audit usually appears with a significant time lag, because by the time the budget results or report has been made known for a fiscal year, the budget preparation phase may be underway for a fiscal year or two years after that (Joyce 2007: 59). Moreover, audits are strongly shaped by the internal institutional environment of the assessor (and the assessed). Reforms are usually slow, conservative and not very effective despite the strong rhetoric they generally offer.

The preferred method of audit reporting and performance measurement in governance structures has been the use of benchmarks. In this process, performance indicators are compared against each other, to established standards of performance set by the law or certain rules and norms or to themselves over an established period of time. The logic of benchmarking in organisations is to find the ‘best practice’ and then to see how well it is or can be applied elsewhere. The assumption is that gathering and reporting comparative information creates a powerful incentive for improvement and learning for others and assumes what works in a certain organisation can easily be transferred to another without any risk involved (Thomas 2006). This method is comparative in the sense that only successful efforts are considered and gives an inadequate account of the particular circumstances in different organisations. It does however bring managerial attention to important issues and ideas and helps improvement if only minor adjustments.
Auditing and benchmarking are very similar in application and are sometimes used interchangeably in the assessment of strengths and weaknesses of political institutions against specified democratic standards. Audits have been commonly used to assess legislatures in European and commonwealth countries and many countries have long established traditions of auditing executive organisations. In addition to the use of evaluation in a case specific mode, this method has also been used in comparative studies of governments and ranking systems of performance in development reports.

Audits and benchmarks are extensively and successfully used by legislatures to evaluate performance in various intuitions and programmes, but have seldom been used by others to evaluate legislatures. One example of using audits to assess performance in a legislature is study by John Uhr (2005). This study assesses the Australian Legislature using the four performance standards devised for the Australian Democratic Audit to rank the Australian Parliament along a scale of high, medium and low. These four standards derive from the contributions legislatures make to strengthening and promoting the following:

- Political equality (democratic citizenship)
- Popular control of government (public accountability)
- Civil liberties and human rights
- Public deliberations

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Measurement in this method is relative, not absolute. For each standard, Uhr offers a comparative assessment of what he considers to be high, medium and low performing legislatures. The assessment is comparative because the only way to consider high performance is to look at high performing legislatures and to do the same with others to get an idea of the other two levels (medium and low). Once the levels of these standards have been indicated, any legislature can be assessed, the level of performance can be decided upon and areas of improvement can be recommended.

In the audit of the Australian Parliament, it has been concluded that although the Australian Parliament does measure up to high standards in some instances, it falls short of the democratic potential in some other areas (i.e. the popular control of government). Once the weaknesses have been indicated, recommendations can then be made as to how to strengthen performance in those certain areas.

This sort of relative reporting is suitable for political institutions since it involves no kind of overall grading and an institution is likely to be as praised just as much as it is criticised (an institution can have as many practices at the high end of the audit as it does on the lower end). Another advantage of the audit method is that it does not necessarily have to take a holistic approach to performance. Audits can be carried out in the institution as a sub-entity or they can be carried out for each separate legislative chamber (in the case of bicameral structures) or any individual committee. Hence the use of audits allows for areas of strengths and weaknesses to be identified and worked on. The results of audits
are not intended to (and must not) be taken as the overall performance in the system as a whole.

One particular problem with this method is that audits are quite subjective and can be conducted in different ways depending from which angle one looks at the institution. An audit report written or commissioned by a ruling government may contain different results from a report undertaken by the opposition or non-government organisation. Also with regard to methodology, an audit can only take past data and observation into account. Thus it can only say how an institution has performed up to a certain point. It does not have an eye for the future and cannot be used to predict future performance (strategy formation), whereas performance models need to be predictive and dynamic. Uhr’s report of the Australian Parliament recognises that both formal powers and informal practices shape the performance of the institution but because formal powers cannot be altered, ‘any judgement of performance needs to be sensitive only to the conventional dimensions making prediction unwise’ (Uhr 2005: 4). However, it must be noted that no performance measurement system can claim to be successfully one-sided. Performance systems must include the leadership and management of the organisation in its assessment just as much as it involves others. Also it is important that performance models are able to formulate strategies and predict future directions for the organisation. Past performance data alone is not enough to make such predictions. Though to be fair, Uhr does mention in his paper that his method of assessment is not very scientific and has room for improvement.
A major problem with audits is that they only use output measures and thus are good at reporting on how much a product is produced or a service is delivered. Performance systems based on output measures only will not usually result in significant improvements in performance, as outputs are necessary for account giving and performance reporting but insufficient for performance improvement (Callahan 2007: 42). It is only when outcome measures are included that the quality of the service is revealed and improvements in performance can be realised. The following performance system, the Corporate System, is exclusively outcome based.

- 3-5.2 Corporate Plans

Some smaller (and more recent) legislatures in Western Europe and North America are building on the reputation of ‘working parliaments’ and are extensively looking at ways to run their institution like modern, service providing corporations. For instance the Scottish Parliament has devised its own corporate plan which is available on the Scottish Parliament website. This corporate plan gives details of the Parliament’s goals for the period 2007-2010 based on the four founding principles of the Scottish Parliament that include, access and participation, power sharing, accountability and equal opportunity.

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15 The Scottish Corporate Plan can be downloaded from the Scottish Parliament Website at: http://www.scottish.parliament.uk
The plan then gives details of the areas of performance measurement and the indicators required to meet its performance targets which include:

- Support the successful running and continuity of business in the Parliament including its committees
- Support the successful performance by members of their parliamentary and representative functions
- Increase awareness and understanding of the Parliament
- Widen opportunities for engagement and participation in parliamentary activities.

These aims have been measured using three main indicators:

- Parliamentary Business
- Parliamentary Support
- Engagement

The Scottish Parliament’s corporate plan is an eclectic approach to parliamentary performance management. It has taken from the Total Quality Management (TQM) approach in which quality is defined in terms of the needs of the customer, not necessarily excellence (crucial in EFQM) and balance (Balanced Scorecard). It has also put separate emphasis on two management techniques, ‘The Best Value Framework’ and the ‘Business Continuity Approach’, which are more internal in nature and to a certain extent deal with excellence in the system in regards to continuous improvements (as in TQM) within a defined timescale and budget. There is mention of performance measurement in the plan, which is
an inseparable part of all performance management techniques, using the indicators above. Performance is measured using benchmarks and published in annual reports. The results are quantitative and there is not a lot of transparency into how the measurements are applied and implemented into the corporate model.

One area in which the Scottish Parliament is keen to focus its performance programme is improved participation and outreach as a measure of improved performance of Parliament. The Scottish Parliament has set up a series of processes and procedures designed to encourage people’s participation and outreach, the most important of which is the Public Petition System\(^\text{17}\). Civil participation in the policy making process is supposed to be ensured through the role assigned to the Public Petition Committee of the Scottish Parliament, its powers and working methods. The Public Petition Committee sees itself as ‘The gateway for public involvement in the parliamentary process’\(^\text{18}\) or alternatively as the ‘principal avenue by which the people of Scotland can become involved with the work of the Parliament’\(^\text{19}\).

It is difficult to evaluate the success of the system in terms of outreach and enabling individuals. It is even more difficult to evaluate the successful performance of an institution based on benchmarks and indicators external to the

\(^{17}\) Other examples of services set up by the Scottish Parliament corporate plan to encourage participation include education services, the partner library network and the parliament website itself which is user-friendly and provides a great deal of information and links. The Scottish Parliament also co-organise events with civil society partners such as the Scottish Civic Forum aimed at opening up parliament and encouraging dialogue with civil society.

\(^{18}\) public petition committee, 1\(^{\text{st}}\) report 2002 ‘annual report of the public petitions committee for the parliamentary year 12 may 2001-11 may 2202, SP paper 633

\(^{19}\) PPC, 1\(^{\text{st}}\) report 2003, annual report of the PPC for parliamentary year 12 may 2002-11 my 2003, SP paper, 802
institution. Since the Scottish Parliament uses the TQM approach in its assessment of performance, customer satisfaction and customer behaviour is core to its performance. Even though the public petition committee has helped the overall performance of the Scottish Parliament in terms of encouraging participation, external benchmarks may not be so optimistic. For example the conclusion of the Carmen report (2006)\textsuperscript{20} while establishing that a majority of the petitions submitted to the Public Petition Committee were initiated by individual members of society, indicated concerns that the system was mostly used by those people who were already politically active and that therefore it had failed to connect with the people usually excluded from the democratic process. The emphasis of TQM to measure performance from the outside, at the price of ignoring internal attitudes to performance is fine for institutions that are exclusively service based such as hospitals and schools but probably less effective for democratic representative legislatures.

However the corporate management system of the Scottish Parliament is definitely working well and is suitably adapted for the institution and it is still too early to make judgements in terms of its performance (as the three-year corporate plan will end in 2010). In order to be effective, any type of performance plan must first indicate the core purposes and values of the organisation which are to be evaluated. The Scottish Parliament not only provides this through their website but also separates the purposes of Parliament from the purpose of its staff organisation. It also gives a list of the values it seeks to achieve and improve. It would be fruitless to try and evaluate any kind of

institution if it cannot provide definite goals and values. Moreover, no comparative performance measurement plan would be meaningful if the organisations involved did not share purposes and values of some kind. However, the problem with corporate planning for parliaments is that it stresses the financial aspects of performance measurement just as much, if not more, as the non financial ones. It may be a good idea to apply financial indicators and cost-benefit analysis to certain public sector organisations, but not to legislatures.

- 3-5.3 The Balanced Scorecard Approach

The Balanced Scorecard or the Balanced Scoreboard is a method in performance measurement created by Robert Kaplan and David Norton in the nineteen nineties (1992). The principle of this method is to give a holistic view of the organisation by simultaneously looking at four major performance areas: the stakeholders and finance; the customers; the internal processing; and innovation and continuous learning in the organisation. There is an emphasis on aligning long-term strategy with performance (Kaplan and Norton 1996). In order to assure long-term survival, there needs to be a balance between the four dimensions of performance.

Due to its flexibility and relative simplicity in producing performance data, implementing and updating the data, the method quickly became very popular with managers seeking improvement in the performance of their organisations. In 2000 between 40%-60% of large US firms had adopted the method (Neely 2002: 43). As with all performance management methods, the Balanced
Scorecard was quickly adopted by public sector organisations and adapted to suit multi-purpose systems as well, and to covered accountability issues as well as managerial techniques and has been used in state governance projects\textsuperscript{21}.

The underlying theme of the BSC that needs to be emphasized here is that no single measure can provide a clear performance target or focus and that a balanced presentation of all measures (financial and operational) are needed. These attributes and advantages of the method can be summarised as (Kaplan and Norton 1992, 1996, 2001):

- The BSC provides a mixture of financial and non-financial measures to assess performance

- The framework provides information on the four perspectives simultaneously, so as to combine the disparate elements of an organisation’s agenda in one report. These groups have been identified as: Financial, Customer, Internal Processes and Innovation and Learning\textsuperscript{22}.

\textsuperscript{21} For instance, the Bush administration has included a ‘management scorecard’ in its fiscal year 2005 budget and assigned federal agencies a green, yellow or red light based on how well they are implementing the new management agenda (Brewer 2006: 38). The US government has also adopted a ‘Government performance project’ (a joint project among the US government, Syracuse University and the Pew Charitable Trust) that has released a ‘report card’ based on the performance of individual states. Each state is graded in four areas: information, infrastructure, money and people. Each of these indicators are then assigned an overall grading of A to C (ibid: 37-38).

\textsuperscript{22} The original four perspectives mentioned by Kaplan and Norton in 1992 were changed in their later paper (1996) as: Financial, Customer, Internal Business Process and Learning and Growth. Though it seems that the previous perspectives are more fitting in the case of legislatures.
- The framework limits the number of measures so as to prevent information overload whilst concentrating on the few success factors\(^{23}\) only. The measures are chosen in relation to each goal with usually one measure for each goal (and each perspective not exceeding five goals).

- The framework guards against sub-optimism by forcing managers to consider all key operating measures together and how improvement in one area may be at the expense of another. It supports strategic communication and information flow.

- The framework is forward-looking. Unlike other methods which rely on past data, BSC looks at present data in order to make predictions about future performance.

- The framework necessitates the involvement of all operational managers facilitating cross-functional integration. It is consistent with team work and other initiatives of performance management such as continuous improvement.

- The method emphasises cause and effect relationships. It also puts strategy and not control at the centre of performance evaluation.

\(^{23}\) The measures in Kaplan and Norton's 1992 paper were around 15 and later (1996) increased to around 20 (about four measures for each perspective). Adding too many measures is seen as redundant.
The Balanced Scorecard is mission focused. In other words every perspective of the framework is focused on the main mission of the organisation. There should be a strong cause and effect linkage between the issues to show the relationship between the objectives and the activities leading to performance. As a result the relationship can be mapped out showing the activities of the lower sections of the BSC linked to the higher goals and objectives that inevitably lead to the mission. There is also a focus on the internal activities that are crucial to the better performance of the system as a whole. Most activities can be easily measured using targets based on actions and their goals.

The BSC is a very flexible and 'needs-led' approach to performance measurement (Bourne et al, 2000: 25). It is neither an audit-led, nor a model-led approach and can only be successful if there is internal consensus among the management within the organisation. As Kaplan and Norton propose (1996) in order to be able to create a business model using BSC, facilitators from outside the institution are required to lead and ensure consensus from within the organisation. These facilitators are necessary to keep the organisation focused on BSC vision and encourage managers in the implementation of their strategy by constantly asking about and maintaining consensus on the objectives to be achieved and how they intend to achieve it.

Chapter six will discuss this method in more depth and focus on how the balanced Scorecard has been established and adapted by legislatures to measure their performance. Since the application of this framework for political

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24 A model led approach uses mathematical models to prioritise objectives and measures in order of most important to least important. Hence the Analytical Hierarchical approach (Saaty 1980, 1988).
institutions is still in very early stages, there have been no practical conclusions about the effectiveness of this method. This chapter will instead look at how a project carried out by the Canadian Parliamentary Centre, in collaboration with the World Bank Institute (WBI) has used the Balanced Scorecard to assessed comparative performance of developing legislatures. The objective of this programme has been to ‘providing parliamentarians, parliamentary staff and others who study parliament with practical means to evaluate parliamentary performance general standards adapted to the circumstances of each country’.

The parliamentary report card has been designed to test performance in four key areas of activity namely:

- Legislation
- Budget
- Oversight
- Representation.

These four areas of legislative services have been evaluated using five performance tests:

- Level and range of activity
- Openness and transparency
- Participation
- Accountability
- Policy and programme impact

25 Quoted from the Canadian Parliamentary Centre website at www.parccnt.ca/indicators/index_e.php. In an attempt to find out more about the programme, I have tried to contact the head of the programme in various ways. However, I never got any response (the administrative staff did not respond to my emails either) I could not get more information on the programme apart from what they had presented on their website in 2005 (the website has not been updated since)
In order to evaluate each area of legislation using one of the performance tests in the form of a scorecard, indicators have been developed. The Canadian Parliamentary Centre and WBI developed these indicators using a written questionnaire which had a total of thirty-seven question (a question for each indicator). Each test sheet has been broken down to seven questions (with the exception of the second test titled ‘openness and transparency’ which has nine questions). These questions deal with a wide range of issues from parliamentary processes and internal performance to the interactions with the external environment, including government and non-government organisations, the media and the public or constituents.

The resulting scorecard questions have been specifically designed to test legislative performance in the budgetary process only. The scorecard has so far only been tried out on the Cambodian Legislature and only to the extent of analysing the results of the questionnaire (which at best only gives a general impression on the current level of performance in the budgetary performance of the Cambodian legislature). A total of six respondents have been chosen to represent the Cambodian legislature. They include two senators, three members of the national Assembly and one representative from the civil society. These respondents had to rank the Cambodian legislature using a five point scale. ‘Zero’ would indicate that a particular indicator was not present and ‘Five’ would show a strong presence of an indicator. The sum of averages taken from all indicators was then applied as the overall assessment of performance in each field of parliamentary performance.
According to this analysis, the average overall score for performance in the Cambodian legislative system is 1.7 which is below the score for an effective parliament (the score 2.5 has been considered to be average). This report then continues to give a holistic picture of performance in the relation between the legislature and the environment and making predictions for future development.

The major problem with this scorecard approach (not a balanced scorecard) is that the measures and questions have not been decided on by consensus from those who are within the system but jointly decided on by experts in WBI and the Canadian Parliamentary Centre. There is no explanation about the scientific justification for choosing certain indicators and most importantly the choice of respondents to these sets of questions. There is no indication of what kind of issues were considered in choosing the participants and what the basis for their choice was.

Furthermore, there is no indication as to the choice of the individuals, or scorers, and what role they actually played in the management of parliamentary affairs. Whether they were chosen because they had in-depth knowledge of workings of the Cambodian National Assembly and the Senate (specially in the area of budgeting which this performance assessment is said to have emphasised) or because these legislators were more available (they had more time to spare, were keen to take part in the study or maybe had proficiency of English as the questionnaire were written in English). There is also the possibility that participants may respond subjectively on the basis of their partisanship. In
developing legislatures it is more obviously the case that a member of the ruling party would rank parliament better than a member of the opposition parties.

Another problem with the scorecard in this project was that a single questionnaire, indicative of institutional performance as a whole was sent to both members from within the legislature and representatives from the civil society (using the same measures). Performance measurement deals with the workings of the legislature as an organisation. A BSC model has to be assessed by people from within or people, considered as authorities on the subject, with a strong knowledge of the functions and activities of parliament (both formal and informal) whereas this project chose otherwise. In BSC, the management of the organisation should also be involved in performance assessments. Even though the public or the customers view on services is strongly considered as one of the four perspectives of performance, the question of how the public sees the institution should be put to the members of the organisation (as how they think that the public sees them). Furthermore, members of the civil society or certain interest groups are usually biased towards their own interests and will only see parliament performing well if it manages to act on the issues they want to see performed. Instead of using a representative from the civil society, this assessment would have done more justice to get help from the academia and specialists on the Cambodian Legislature with a moral obligation to stay scientific and unbiased.

Despite the issues raised here concerning the Canadian Parliamentary Centre’s flawed use of the Balanced Scorecard to assess developing legislatures in a
comparative perspective (the problem of comparative legislative performance will be elaborated further in the next chapter), the Balanced Scorecard remains the most appropriate and most quoted method in the field of performance measurement and management. The framework has been designed with an eye to help managers measure and improve organisational performances and unlike some other performance methods, the balanced scorecard does not give specific targets for performance levels. There also is no explicit method for successful implementation of performance measurement making the method highly flexible based on consensual approval from within the organisation itself on what works best in specific circumstances and measures for specific improvement areas can be assigned.

- 3-5.4 The EFQM Approach

The European Foundation for Quality Management or EFQM has been the European answer to the American Baldrige Awards26. Both of these two performance measurement systems aim at self-assessment in organisations and help organisations realise the gaps in the management of organisations and simulate solutions. The EFQM model takes a holistic approach to performance in the whole of the organisation which is unlike the scorecard method that is holistic but at the same time can be broken down to smaller parts of the whole and used to measure performance in one specific part only. As a result, the framework makes it possible for all the organisation and its environment to be

26 The American Baldrige awards or the Malcolm Baldrige National Quality Awards, are presented annually by the US National Institute of Standards and Technology. The website address of the NIST is http://www.nist.gov
included in the assessment. EFQM is also a non prescriptive method and leaves each organisation to find its own solutions for sustainable excellence using its own resources and the framework only as a guide.\(^{27}\)

The procedure starts off with verbal descriptions of the different criteria for performance management, which is then translated to numerical grades and then combined with the weighted averages (as the method is largely based on self assessment of a unit, the comparisons use the unit’s own performance figures). The chosen criteria are closely linked so that results are caused by enablers and enablers receive feedback from results to help improve the overall performance.\(^{28}\) In this method, there is a strong emphasis on continuous improvement and organisational learning. There is also a clear focus on customers (or the users of the system) and the environment. EFQM is a results-oriented method which clearly puts pressure on management to reach targets and produce results (in business organisations results mean keeping the stakeholders satisfied while in public organisations results are more to do with public satisfaction).

There has been a fascination with the idea of excellence and the EFQM, not only in Europe but all around the world. Not only are business firms and companies adapting the model and competing with each other for EFQM’s Excellence

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\(^{27}\) The model is based on a nine-criteria framework. The EFQM apportions a total of 100% among these nine graded factors: leadership (10%), policy and strategy (8%), people management (9%), processes (14%), resources (9%), people results (or satisfaction, 9%), customer results (customer satisfaction, 20%), impact on society results (6%) and business results (15%). Five of these criteria are called ‘enablers’ which deal with what the organisation does and four criteria are called ‘results’ which deal with the outcomes.

\(^{28}\) The EFQM model is basically made of nine criteria, five of which are called ‘Enablers’ and four are ‘Results’. Enablers cover what the organisation does to achieve its results.

http://www.efqm.org/default.aspx/tabid=55
awards (which is considered very prestigious in the business world) but also many public organisations, agencies and even schools and hospitals have been using the model. As an example, the EFQM has been used by the British Government’s ‘Modernising Government Agenda’ programme and it has been promoted by the public sector benchmarking project that is now better known as the ‘public sector excellence programme’ (Hansard 2000). EFQM has been used as another method of performance evaluation and oversight in Westminster as quoted from the documents of Hansard.

Despite the growing popularity of EFQM in some federal legislatures and use among local authorities and government organisations, the British Parliament has only stated interest so far as the performance of other organisations are involved, not the legislative system itself. The British National Audit Office, which scrutinises public spending on behalf of Parliament is also an advocate of the EFQM technique and encourages local authorities to use the model to improve performance. The British Cabinet Office also has a Performance and Innovation unit that is set up to help government and non-government departments, organisations and agencies adapt the EFQM model.

29 The Modernising Government Agenda is available from the Cabinet Office website at: http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/moderngov/prereview.htm
30 Part of a quote from Mr. Ian Mc Cartney in Hansard, 20 June 2000 (column 170W)
31 One quoted example in Hansard regarding the use of EFQM in all business units of the Rural Payment Agency (RPA) mentions: ‘Assess current enabler's ability to deliver required targets and outcomes agreeing change to Action Plans by 31 March 2003’. Quoted from the Hansard. 24 July 2004 (Column WA93)
32 For example Warwick local authorities have long been working towards receiving the EFQM public sector excellence awards. Full details of their programme carried out in 2002 and how well they scored is available from the Warwick local authority website at: http://warwickdc.gov.uk/NR/rdonlyres/B04
There has been a growing interest in EFQM especially among Northern European countries which according to OECD reports on public management reforms (PUMA) have a relatively bigger public sector as a proportion of their GDPs (OECD 2000). The framework has been very popular, especially in places that deal with the budget such as ministries of finance (or treasuries). The excellence model has also been used in assessing technological performance of the Parliament of Finland (Kaivo-Oja et al 2005: 36). But despite a clear commitment to creating a balanced performance measurement system to assess performance in all aspects of legislative work, not even the smaller, ‘working parliaments’ of Northern Europe have started to adapt an excellence performance measurement model to assess performance in their parliaments as a whole. It remains to be seen whether an excellence model will ever take off in such institutions.

Adapting the EFQM in legislatures may prove problematic for two main reasons. First of all, this method is very time consuming. Since all criteria leading to performance need to be assessed together for an indefinite period, a team of analysts need to gather frequently and discuss issues and solutions on a continuous basis. The bigger and more multifunctional the organisation, the more difficult and time consuming it becomes to implement the model. The second problem is that even though the method is a relatively low cost way to improve performance in profit making organisations, it is still considered as rather expensive for organisations feeding from the public purse. Especially

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since all changes are of a prescriptive nature and results are seen in the long term performance of the institution.

Some organisations see EFQM to be prescriptive as well as prescriptive. The Excellence award is quite like the ISO (International Standards Organisation) awards with the difference that updating ISO, has become more or less an essential requirement of organisations, whilst the EFQM is mainly seen as a prestigious status and frequent updating has not become a requirement. However, in the case of big corporations and organisations, the award would be seen as compulsory as in the case of not having one would mean banishment from the excellence community\(^\text{34}\).

With these problems it would seem that legislators don’t have the time or would feel it a waste of taxpayers money to have performance models to assess excellence in their institutions. Getting the excellence awards for a legislature would mean hard work, institutional changes and commitment to change not only from the management but also from all involved parties and groups. However, since many developed parliaments already have the facilities to conduct such long-term research in areas of their performance, it would seem appropriate if some of the techniques used in this method could be tailor made to suit certain legislatures with similar performance. Such research would definitely benefit comparative legislative performance research.

\(^{34}\) For instance IBM had estimated that in preparing the document that led to its Rochester plant winning the Malcolm Baldrige Award in 1990; it took many man-years of effort. Something that only few companies can afford (Brown 2006)
Conclusion: The Performance of Legislatures as Organic Institutions

In order to determine whether performance measurement is beneficial for legislatures and what type of methods could work better to assess quality in democratic institutions, it is necessary to understand the place of such institutions in relation to their ability to perform. Burns and Stalker (1961: 119-121) give a simple typology of organisations which is specifically relevant to auditing bodies. In their view organisations are either mechanistic or organic. In mechanistic (hierarchical) organisations, positions are specialised and differentiated according to the tasks with each functional role having a precise definition and a concentration of knowledge at the top of the pyramid. While in organic organisations there is a continual redefinition of the content of positions, and positions are designed according to special knowledge.

Accuracy in mechanistic organisations is important, not benchmarks. It is generally agreed that the right amount of input, and the right kind of processing, will lead to the precise output. Hence, output can be controlled from the start (Deming 1986). Performance measurement is not considered necessary as quality improvement in such organisations is about getting each individual part right from the start and by building trust, loyalty, good leadership and training but not to work toward targets and quotas as they only create adversarial relationships and cause low quality and productivity (ibid). Furthermore,

35 Mechanistic organisations are typical of traditional bureaucracies or production firms in a stable environment, whereas organic forms are typical of non-hierarchical organisations surviving under unstable environmental conditions. The mechanistic types of organisations are control-based and do not require input from the environment, except for controlled input that it is provided manually (Burns and Stalker 1961).
optimisation and improvement of some areas may come at the price of worsening performance in others (closed systems).

The problem with mechanical organisations is because environmental factors are ignored (or reduced) they cannot give a realistic outcome and so performance measurement systems such as TQM cannot be applied. According to Flood even when more parts are considered in mechanistic organisations, there is the danger that they are all viewed from the same perspective (Flood, 1993: 14). Also authority or the leadership at the top of the hierarchy cannot be the sole determiners of effectiveness in organisations as it tends to prefer measuring short-term effectiveness and targets at the price of long-term efficiency. Effectiveness needs to incorporate whether the will of the people (the environment) is satisfied and this is an expression of ‘well being’ (Beer 1981: 808).

The organic or horizontal approach to organisations portrays measurement as a crucial part of business solutions and argues measurement to be the only reasonable way of knowing what is happening in complex organisations. These organisations are more interactive and rely on improved cooperation and linkages between internal parts as well as external customers (as in the case of manufacturing and service providing) by encouraging systemic benchmarking to evaluate performance, the measures and methods used are conducted towards finding efficiency in the different parts of the organisation separately against external comparators or standards.
Organic organisations follow a less controlled and more flexible approach to organisational performance. Members and staff are given more individual freedom. The ability of the institution to enforce behaviour is more limited and employees see themselves as individuals first and then part of a group. There is also the sense that members are part of the environment and thus a consideration of environmental factors becomes more crucial than in mechanistic organisations. Members in organic institutions can even create their own work quotas (based on their own professionalism). Therefore, efficiency can only be reached if there is consensus among members of clear goals and a sense of responsibility toward the organisation is maintained. This, in addition to the individual pursuits of members, needs to be in line with the environment it serves.

Rather than placing legislatures into one distinct group of mechanistic and organic organisations or the other, it would be more accurate to see legislative institutions as being a continuum from one organisational form to the other. Where each individual legislative entity stands on this continuum would be related to different factors which are not the aim of this chapter. While it is right to claim that some legislatures have more features related to mechanistic organisations which would not see a need to performance measurement systems, the more established legislatures have moved toward the organic type of institutions in which performance measurement would be a sign of telling whether there is cohesion between the overall structure and whether the connections are firm enough to improve the overall legitimacy of the system in a changing environment. This idea will be elaborated further in the next chapter.
The general problem with the concept of performance is it being a social construct, indicating that most measures of performance will be subjective. Research on organisational performance has shown that this concept is also multifaceted. For instance Boyne (2002) has put organisational performance into five categories of outputs, efficiency, effectiveness, responsiveness and democratic outcomes. Even in the case of a single entity such as a legislature looked at from different angles by different individuals, it becomes obvious that each individual will define performance terms differently depending on the angle that they have used to look at the institution. An outsider would probably be looking at it using general indicators which will not have much to do with the actual workings of the organisation.

An insider, by contrast, will model performance based on variables from within and the final outcome of the analysis may be completely different from an external observer. It is important to note that the concept of performance as defined by the insiders of an organisation is more likely to have a unique, although many-faceted definition (Lebas and Euske, 2002: 73). If the members of a single organisation cannot share the same view on their organisation’s performance, they cannot coordinate their actions and any exercise of performance measurement will be a waste of time and resources. The advantage of (democratic) legislatures compared to other organisations is that since those inside the organisation represent the public, they are much more aware of the views from outside of the organisation.
So in order to perform well, an organisation needs to have a clear purpose (or set of goals) which should be generally agreed by all those who operate from within it. It is acceptable if there are slight differences over secondary purposes and actions but there must be total agreement on the sole purpose or the most important goals of the organisation. In the case of the legislature, all legislators (regardless of party) and those involved in the running of parliamentary affairs must in principle agree on the general purpose of the institution. The internal stakeholders or the legislators will obviously have different opinions on the indicators for realising the goals of the institution, but the general goals are the same and would be so in all democratically developed legislatures. The public need only judge on the outcomes that involve them. However, this does not take away the significance of the oversight power of the public and other external sources of information and research which are necessary for keeping the legislature on its toes and performing well in order to give the results that are being required from it.

The next step after consensus on the purpose and goals is to find performance indicators and targets which is the most challenging part and requires expertise from insiders and experts on legislatures. Individual measures should be able to

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36 External stakeholders may have differing views on the purposes and measures of performance (probably more similar to the financial-based indicators). As they can only judge legislatures from the outside and are not in a position (or have no interest) to judge the internal workings of the institution, the external stakeholders are only in a position to assess the final legislative outcomes or results (such as decisions or services) and the quality of the results.

37 Data collection in this step may be carried out using the three methods available: questionnaires, interviews and the study of secondary sources. However, as organisations vary in the extent to which performance targets can be precisely described and valid and objective performance indicators are available (Smith 1999), there is no guarantee that the results are valid and as objective as possible. For optimal results validity tests may be carried out using statistical analysis. But even so, there may not be much consensus among different results, however as the next chapter intends show, the similarities are quite significant among certain countries and thus there is the possibility of using performance measurement systems for their legislatures.
combine to assess the performance of the organisation as a whole (Neely 2002). They should be able to work with other measures in a framework that provides a balanced picture of the organisation as a whole. There is no point of working on the assessment of an individual measure if it does not contribute to the overall performance of the system. The Balanced Scorecard method is probably the best method designed so far, which can create a balance in the whole of the system while emphasising the parts that need improvement. This performance framework will be analysed further in chapter six along with case studies of legislative application of BSC.

In conclusion, the idea of using quality methods to measure performance in legislatures would create concern and criticisms similar to the concerns that have been raised for the use of quality methods in evaluating public sector organisations. Some of these concerns and measurements have been mentioned in this chapter and as Fredrickson (1993: 5) argues in the case of the American government, since policy decisions drive performance:

‘The real problems of American government have little to do with management or administration. Public administration is usually done rather well. The problems of government have mostly to do with the failure of political will, the power of interest groups and the weakness in conduct of statecraft by elected leaders’.

Although it is accepted here that legislatures are not production units, and that political will is the most important factor in the successful application of any
kind of legislative performance measurement, the next chapters will first focus on determining legislative systems that are more ready to take advantage of performance measurement and whether the application of such tools actually improves the quality of democracy and enhances the political will to be assessed.
Chapter Four: Environmental Conditions

4-1 Introduction:

This research uses a system-theoretic approach in the study of legislative performance, whereby maintaining and improving system legitimacy is of key importance to improving the democratic quality of the system. It is clear that in order to understand the performance of legislatures as a subsystem of the polity, parameters such as the system (regime) type and stability cannot be ignored. It is also clear that these types exist within a spectrum of political systems extending from developed democracies to non democracies (Beetham 1992, 1993) and that while some systems have already made the achievements necessary toward the higher ends of this spectrum, there are many countries that are still in the process of reforms. There are also countries that have struggled and failed to incorporate institutional changes to improve democratic performance in addition to some others that may not have much intent on improving their democratic performance as it stands.

The problem with this third group of countries is not to do with the structure of their democratic institutions, as many of them have well established institutions which often emulates one of the advanced types of legislative institutions in form (whether presidential, continental or Westminster style legislatures). However, instead of moving towards a functional and open democratic system, their legislatures behave merely as a rubber stamp of the
authoritarian establishment or are mired by the lack of organisation and control in the state. In such cases, democratic reform may not necessarily be a step towards improving performance in the legislature and the quality of democracy as a whole. In other words democratic growth and development are not aligned and in some instances may act as a destabilising force adding to system breakdown or anarchy rather than democratic transition.

This chapter has been divided into three parts. The first part is a literature analysis of the democratic development and behavioural changes of political systems in movements towards democracy and consolidation. This is an effort to understand why some legislatures have not managed to evolve as their democratic counterparts despite having seemingly similar structures and roles. In the second part a Cusp catastrophe model of democratic development and change will be presented based on the parameters of democratic development argued in this work. This model will be followed by a cross-country statistical analysis of the democratic development of political systems to establish the validity of the cusp and estimation of the democratic threshold based on indicators for the two parameters. In the third part, more statistical tests and regression analysis will be carried out in an effort to compare the new data with standard datasets used in political research.

The advantage of using non-linear systems, such as the cusp catastrophe, is in their dynamism and ability to show behavioural change, discontinuity and uncertainty that would not be detected, or be rather vague and difficult to determine under a linear system. Catastrophe models also provide for a
conceptualisation of a threshold (or singularity line) below which the relationship between variables are unstable and may lead to a dramatic change from one qualitative behavioural form to another (referred to as a 'bifurcation'). In order to gain stability, political systems must be able to pass this threshold. It is extremely difficult to pin point an exact threshold for each individual political system and what is attempted here is an approximation based on the literature analysis on democratic development and consolidation and the singularity point estimated in the statistical analysis of the Cusp Catastrophe model. To test the validity of this model a cross-country statistical analysis of the variables using measurements will be carried out with the idea of establishing a new index of democratic development aligned to the cusp catastrophe model. The credibility of this index is then further tested by correlation analysis and regression analysis with standard indices and datasets to strengthen the claim made in this chapter.

Up to now, no model has been provided to show how sudden changes in the behaviour of political systems may obstruct their gradual movements towards democracy and democratic consolidation (and the application of democratic values). Although studies have focused on the theories of development leading to democracy as a continuum from non-democracy to democracy, there are slight differences over whether democracy is an all or nothing affair (Lipset, 1959, Huntington 1968, Dahl 1971, Linz and Stepan 1996) or whether it is possible to have degrees of democracy (Przeworski and Limongi 1997, Sen 2001). These differences, as explained later, are mainly to do with differences over basic definitions of terms such as democracy and the location of a relevant threshold. Most of these studies tend to look specifically at the relationships between
development - usually defined by economic growth - and democracy by indicating the dimensions involved in the process and the requisites for linear transitions towards democracy. The following section is a brief analysis of the most influential research in this field.

4-2 Part One: Transitions to Democracy

Probably the first, most important and controversial research into economic development as the precondition of democracy was carried out by Seymour Martin Lipset (1959) who compared twenty-eight European and English speaking countries with twenty countries of Latin America. He divided the first group of countries into two groups of stable and unstable democracies (or dictatorships) and the second group of countries into unstable and stable dictatorships using his definition of democracy as:

'A political system that supplies regular constitutional opportunities for changing the governing officials. It is a social mechanism for the resolution of the problem of societal decision making among conflicting interest groups, which permits the largest possible part of the population to influence these decisions through their ability to chose among alternative contenders for political office' (Lipset 1959: 71)

This definition has served as a rough threshold for his analysis, indicating whether a country has the potential to be regarded as a democracy or not based
on factors such as its constitutional stability, social cleavages, democratic history and development. In order to compare democratic development, Lipset used a range of quantitative indicators based on economic development and the quality of life which included measures of wealth (GDP per capita), education and urbanisation. The averages of these indicators are then compared leading to results that claim to be subsumed under the conclusion that 'economic development carries the political correlation to democracy' (ibid: 80). Lipset has also argued that the 'more well to do a nation, the more likely it will sustain democracy' (ibid: 75). Although he does not go as far as stating that economic development causes democracy, which is the theme of modernisation theories (Lerner 1958), he establishes a correlation between the two which paves the way for a succession of later comparative studies of democracy and development (Cutright 1963, Huntington 1968, O’Donnell 1973, Lipset et al 1993, Przeworski and Limongi 1997, Przeworski et al 2000, Diamond 1992, 1999, Lane and Ersson 1994, Inglehart 1997, Inglehart and Welzel 2005).

Data from comparative studies linking economic development to democratic growth have provided strong support for economic development being the main driving factor for a rise in the quality of life and political emancipation at the mass societal level which leads to democracy. This theory naturally concludes that poorer authoritarian countries with lower GDP per capita have less prospects of democracy and so the exclusion of civil society (often seen as an impediment of growth) must be tolerated at the price of economic growth. As Lipset has argued economic development leads to the eventual rise in civil society by reducing social cleavages and will eventually bring about a favourable
circumstance for democracy to be embraced by the majority. So certain requisites must first function in a linear mode before democracy can flourish.

Lipset decided to exclude rich authoritarian countries (such as the Middle Eastern oil rich states) stating inadequate data as the main reason which limits the all-inclusiveness of his argument. Whereas O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986: 33) see it as highly unlikely that regimes which they call 'Sultanistic' will change towards democracy unless there is an armed insurrection from within a professionalised military. Huntington (1968, 1984) studying the transformations from authoritarian to democratic regimes suggests that it is perhaps easier for relatively stable authoritarian countries to evolve into democracies than countries that have regularly oscillated between despotism and democracy as the former have developed a broad consensus accepting authoritarian norms which can be displaced by a broad consensus on acceptance of democratic ones (Huntington 1984: 210). While Ulfelder and Lustik (2007) argue that development improves the prospects of democratisation in all states including authoritarian countries that have attempted democracy before.

In criticism of the mechanical, one-way flow of development leading to democracy, Rustow (1970) has pointed to the fact that positive correlations between economic growth and development must not be mistaken for causality. Causality at best provides 'clues to some sort of connection without indication of its direction' (ibid: 342). Rustow provides examples of America and Europe in the last century of states considered as democracies despite undergoing
economic growth. For him a process of democratisation can only start with ‘a deliberate decision on part of the political leaders to accept the existence of diversity and unity, and to that end, to institutionalise some crucial aspect of democratic procedures’ (ibid: 355). Thus establishing democracy is basically a process of learning and creating trust between parties and confidence in democratic institutions. In other words, the threshold for democracy cannot be limited to a range of economic development without other variables intervening and that economic growth may be very helpful towards this end, but cannot be considered as the main cause.

Much of the new research into the relationship between development and democracy tends to focus increasingly on finding any intervening variables that may be used to explain the varying significance and strength of the relationship. Diamond, Lipset and Linz (1995) believe that development enhances (not causes) democracy because it enhances certain crucial intervening variables which according to them are: ‘Capacities for independent organisation and action in civil society.... a more equitable class structure (with reduction of absolute poverty) and a less corrupt interventionist seeking state’ (ibid: 24). They believe that where economic development far outstrips the deeper structural and cultural changes, the level or the probability of democracy will be much lower than expected from a country’s level of economic development. But

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1 Dahl has added to the debate by pointing out that when Tocqueville had written about democracy in America in the 1830s, the country was not economically developed in terms of GDP (Dahl, 1971: 70).

2 The debate over economic development and growth has been very controversial issue. For instance Leftwhich (1996) argues that democracy is not conducive to development, as interpreted in economic growth and improvements in the quality of life. He argues there may even be a negative relationship between the democracy and growth and has supported his claims by referring to the developments in South East Asia.
in places where these intervening variables emerge through different historical processes and traditions, the level and probability of democracy will be much greater than what would be predicted merely from the countries GDP per capita (ibid). This argument seems to suggest that unlike Lipset's previous argument (1959) development and democracy cannot be considered as a straightforward and linear process for all countries.

Other scholars such as O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986) and Przeworski et al, (2000), Inglehart and Welzel (2005) also demonstrate that in addition to democratisation being a multidimensional process of human development, there is a positive, non-linear and a gradual relationship between development and democracy\(^3\). These scholars also believe that economic factors alone cannot be responsible for transitions to democracy but they act as facilitators once the conditions for such transitions are ripe. Przeworski has called this type of relationship 'Endogenous' (Przeworski 1991: 101). According to these scholars, other factors leading to human development should also be considered which will include, but are not dependent on, economic prosperity. In other words democracy should not be seen as the end but as a means towards human development\(^4\). Such views make way for models to predict transitions and the evolution into developing democratic systems, and to bring about the idea of a

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\(^3\) This study distinguishes between liberalisation and democratisation using O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986) definitions of the two terms. Accordingly, liberalisation marks the beginning of the democratic process. Liberalisation can exist without democratisation and democratisation must be preceded by liberalisation (ibid:10). These terms seem to suggest that democratisation is non linear even though liberalisation is a linear process. Furthermore, liberalisation is a reversible process whereas once established, a democracy becomes irreversible.

qualitative threshold that political systems need to pass before transforming into
democracy becomes a reality.

Behavioural scientists searching for the factors that underlie democratic
development have mainly been interested in the politics of transition and the
dynamics of authoritarian to democratic change and democratic breakdown.
Transition as it has been known to political scientists is usually considered as the
‘interval between one political regime to another’ (O'Donnell and Schmitter
1986: 6) and ‘centres around the establishment of the formal, minimal criteria of
a democratic regime’ (Plasse, Fritz and Ulram 1998: 8). Transitions are
considered to be complete once free elections, universal suffrage and basic rights
and liberties are formally respected and secured and an elected, unconstrained
government is in office or in other words Robert Dahl’s concept of ‘Polyarchy’
(Dahl 1971). However, this level of democracy does not imply that the
democracy is efficiently and effectively functioning and as O'Donnell (2001:
113-115) has argued studies of Latin American countries show that despite
having institutionalised elections and respecting basic freedoms and coming
under the umbrella of polyarchies, the distinct variations within the countries
(that are empirically and normatively evaluated) are likely to effect their
survival prospects. This argument hints at the reassignment of the commonly
perceived cut-off point or threshold for democracy that not only includes
polyarchies, but stable and consolidated democracies.

The tendency to focus on transitions as a process of regime change from non-
democratic to democratic forms within a specific amount of time (Huntington
1991: 15) or the breakdown from democratic to non democratic regimes, has caused scholars to ignore a substantially large number of transitions that take place and mainly consider only two factors, namely the prior regime type and the initiator of the transition (Linz and Stepan 1996) to be in place for the successful movements towards democracy. However, one example of transitions that are often ignored by scholars are political or military coups that present a substantial discontinuous change in the behaviour of a system though it may not affect the form of the regime type. A good example of a country facing such discontinuous transitions is Thailand which is generally regarded as a continuous democratic regime despite having a succession of eighteen military coups since the end of its absolute monarchy or authoritarian regime in 1932 (Economist 2006)⁵.

This study seeks a broader definition of transition and does not limit the term to regime change only but a general process of change. The Encarta Dictionary (2001: 1534) defines the term transition as 'A process or period in which something undergoes a change and passes from one state, stage, form or activity to another'. Transition in this study will signify a period or state of change in the behaviour of a system, regardless of a change in the regime. As the catastrophe model will show there will be a change from one equilibrium state to the other. This type of change is usually ignored in other studies and is regarded as continuous. For example Przeworski and Limongi (1997) do not differentiate between successive authoritarian regimes and have stated 'If president Videla or

even ayatollahs succeed a shah, we treat it as one continuous spell of dictatorship’ (ibid: 160, footnote 12).

The independent variable that is usually considered in studies of democratic transitions and development is the stability of the system or the persistence and durability of democratic regimes over time. Diamond, Linz and Lipset (1989: xviii) define a stable regime as ‘one that is deeply institutionalised and consolidated, making it likely therefore to enjoy a high level of political legitimacy’. In other words, these studies all indicate the existence of a certain threshold from which a democracy functions effectively and efficiently and contributes to the legitimacy and performance of the system of governance by maintaining stability. The bulk of these studies provide evidence and support to the contention that once democracy becomes consolidated, maintaining positive economic performance contributes to democratic stability and legitimacy. Thus

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5 The concept of ‘Consolidation’, like democracy, is contestable and there have been various definitions given. Linz and Stephan (1996:4) define consolidation to take place when democracy becomes the ‘only game in town’ behaviourally, attitudinally and constitutionally. That is when no significant political group seriously attempt to overthrow it; when even in the face of severe political and economic crisis the overwhelming majority of people believe that any further political change must emerge from within the parameters of democratic formulas; and constitutionally when all actors in the polity become habituated to the fact that political conflict will be resolved according to the established norms and that the violations of norms will be both ineffective and costly (ibid). Diamond (1994, 1995) equates consolidation exclusively with the attitudinal dimension by emphasising the creation of legitimacy and terms the behavioural aspect of Linz and Stephan as ‘Democratic Deepening’. Przeworski (1991) on the other hand builds his concept of consolidation using the behavioural aspect and the survival of the democracy. Schmitter (1988: 57) sees consolidation as a sum of partial regimes(such as parties, organised groups and civil society) which influence the quality of democracy. In order for democratic consolidation to be achieved, he believes that these partial regimes must have emerged, but not necessary completed. Di Palma (1990, 1991) equates consolidation with an agreement on the implementation of democracy, signal the end of democratic transition. Whitehead (1989) also views consolidation as a process following transition, even taking up a generation after the transition to complete. Valenzuela (1992) insists that consolidation only takes place once the formal procedural aspects of democracies change before negative consolidation takes over. Despite differences between concepts, one thing that the majority agree on is a period of stability following democracy. The length is not really an issue (though it is probably right to say that the longer the more consolidated) but the time should be enough for democracy to become institutionalised.
not only does economic development logically precede democratisation and shape democratic transitions as modernisation theory purports, but socio-economic development is also necessary for a system to pass a threshold toward democratic consolidation and stability. Once the threshold is passed, the probability of negative consolidation (Valenzuela 1992) becomes less likely as the effective democracy has been achieved and democratisation becomes irreversible.

Ulfeder and Lustik (2007: 353) have argued that cross-country comparative studies that group political systems by regime types are in effect an exercise to model the likelihood of states being required to cross a qualitative threshold representing the presence or absence of the minimal conditions necessary for democracy. A threshold usually refers to a minimum point or a starting point, and for a country to be considered a democracy, it has to achieve a certain minimum level of indicators that are accepted as the minimum criteria for democracy. Diamond (1999: 29) has estimated that at the start of the new millennium, sixty percent of the countries in the world were considered to have surpassed the threshold for 'procedural democracy', although the number of countries that have institutionalised democracy cannot be as large. According to Vanhanen (1997: 41) the reasonable minimum threshold for democracy with regards to competition and participation, would probably be around thirty percent competition and fifteen percent participation. Though he later argues that many countries that are just above this threshold are not really democracies and political systems just below the threshold are not much different democratically from those that are slightly above the threshold (ibid). These two different
thresholds represent the ambiguity and vagueness that exists in defining and measuring a threshold for democracy and the problem of finding a universally accepted threshold will be just as hard as finding a universal definition for democracy.

However, if a threshold for consolidated democracy could be found, then with the passage of this threshold, a political system's overall improvement of the quality of democracy becomes the key issue of its performance. Linz and Stepan (1996; 14-16) have addressed the issue of a consolidation threshold by arguing that toward the end of the twentieth century, a growing number of countries as well as developed democracies had completed their democratic transition and were now attempting to consolidate their democracies. Once consolidated, these democracies may be placed on a continuum from low quality to high quality democracies and the main task ahead would now be how they could attempt to improve their performance by means of moving up on this continuum. Thus it would seem that a consolidation threshold would not only sound more logical, but it may also be easier to locate a minimum criteria for consolidation that is more universally accepted. This idea will be discussed further later in the chapter.

Despite differences in the distinction of the threshold, the idea of gradual movements toward democracy has been mentioned by scholars from different viewpoints. While some like Sartori (1987) see a distinct line between democratic and non-democratic states, others like Dahl have a more evolutionary view of democracy, which makes the distinction of a precise threshold fairly
difficult to achieve. In the transition to democracy, Dahl, along with Bollen and Jackman, have referred to a mid-area between democracy and non-democracy. They suggest that: ‘Many significant changes in regimes involve shifts within, into and out of this important area’ (Dahl et al., 1989: 615). Perhaps they are referring to a qualitative threshold with the mention of ‘shifts’ to and from this contested area.

It should be pointed out here that to pinpoint an exact line that transforms political states into two very different concepts of democracy and non-democracy is probably not doable and is undesirable. As Przeworski et al (2000) claim, placing regimes on one side or the other of a dichotomy distinguishing democracies from dictatorships can only result from bad rules or insufficient information. However, this does not rule out the existence of a threshold that marks the sustainable development of institutionalised or consolidated democracy. In Democracy and the Market, Przeworski (1991) has hinted that above a certain point of democratic development there can only be one equilibrium state, which is generated by a compliance between the institutional rules and behaviour or as he has assumed ‘the equilibrium of decentralised strategies of all the relevant forces’ (ibid: 71). The advantage of using a catastrophe model here is not just to offer help on locating a new threshold point, but due to the existence of two equilibrium space below singularity, to show and at best offer predictions on how premature attempts of democratisation can potentially end up if the necessary elements to sustainable democracy are not in place. In the following section a description of this model and its control factors will follow after a brief introduction of catastrophe theory and its uses.
In this part of this research a cusp catastrophe model will be used to show that democratic development may only be considered as linear once above the consolidation threshold. Below this threshold sudden movements and changes in some indicators or factors of democratic development may lead not only to discontinuous change but also stunt democratic growth towards consolidation. This theory has been used in this work to essentially justify the differences between legislative systems on either side of the consolidation threshold or singularity which allows this study to explain why measurement frameworks to assess performance in legislatures may be successfully implemented for some legislatures and not all.

Catastrophe theory offers a new non-linear approach to the analysis of behavioural change in movements toward democracy and is particularly useful at predicting discontinuous change in structural forms. Despite linear models proving to be a very useful in dealing with scientific empirical analysis, there has been a steady rise in deterministic non-linear and qualitative approaches in social scientific thinking and more specifically the use of Chaos and Catastrophe theories in addressing dynamic continuous behaviour and discontinuous change.\(^7\)

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\(^7\) Chaos and Catastrophe theories in particular are increasingly used to treat interactive political behaviour within diverse masses and conflict analysis. These two theories are joined together by the fact that they are both non-linear and deterministic and dynamic (as opposed to static) models. However, the two are also very different as a chaotic process is random and has an irregular cycle, whereas in catastrophetheory the change is controlled by the parameters and the transformation from one form to the other will only occur after a parameter value change. According to Courtney Brown (1995a: 69) Chaos and Catastrophe theories are both suitable in situations in which there is one case and many time points as for instance in changes or behaviour over time. However, Chaos theory cannot be used there are many cases but only one or a few time observations like a cross-country analysis over a definite time period. As the analysis
A catastrophe is described as ‘Any violent or sudden change representing a discontinuous response of a system to smooth changes in the external condition’ (Arnold 1984: 2). In a broad sense, a catastrophe is any discontinuous transition that occurs when a system can have more than one stable state, or can follow more than one stable pathway for change. In other words a catastrophe is a ‘jump’ from one state or pathway to another (Woodcock and Davis 1991: 42). The transition is considered to be discontinuous not because there is no other pathway or state, but because none of those states are stable.

A dramatic change from one qualitative behaviour to another is referred to as a Bifurcation which is central to catastrophe theory. A bifurcation is also described as an event that occurs in the evolution of a dynamic system in which the characteristic behaviour of the system is transformed (Brown 1995a) and occurs when an attractor\(^8\), or a specific point on the system, changes in response to change in the value of a parameter. Thus, the fundamental characteristic of a catastrophe is the sudden disappearance of one attractor, combined with the dominant emergence of another attractor. (Ibid: 53)

\(^8\) Another difference between chaos and elementary catastrophe theory is that the attractor in chaotic systems are dynamic and irregular, whereas the attractor in the catastrophe model is a static point (Brown 1995a)
Catastrophe theory was created in the late 1960s by French mathematician, Rene Thom and was viewed by some to be just as important as for instance the discovery of calculus by Newton (Kilmister 1973: 32). The idea of discontinuity and qualitative change is found in all fields of science such as chemistry, biology, psychology, linguistics, sociology and economics. The theory became very popular in the 1970s as a revolutionary approach to qualitative change and predictions. In sociology, it was famously applied to model institutional disturbances and prison riots (Zeeman, 1976). In political science, catastrophe theory was applied to predicting trends and changes in political behaviour and understanding political turmoil, revolutions, swings in public opinion and voting behaviour. For example Brown (1995b) has used the model to suggest that in the 1980 US presidential election voter feelings for the Democrats declined gradually and at some point voters rapidly abandoned support for Carter and changed their views on Reagan.

Catastrophe theory has been criticised for the difficulty it presents in quantifying the parameters used in its models which as a result limits its predictions and forecasts (Bird, 1997: 143). It has also been said to lack mathematical foundation and also that its statements about abrupt change just confirms general

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9 As Catastrophes are considered as extreme examples of non-linear phenomena, endless examples of such chance may be found in nature. A simple kind of catastrophe would be particles and grains of sand aggregating into a sand pile. As every grain of sand is added, the pile gets higher and higher and eventually they reach a critical point after which any additional particle is likely to produce, periodic avalanches (meaning catastrophes of sand down the side of the pile). The simple addition of sands to the pile may be considered linear but the avalanche cannot be linear process but a profound discontinuity in the aggregate behaviour of the pile (Bak, Chen and Creutz, 1989). The famous example of a cusp catastrophe model is the observable changes in a dog's behaviour from an attacking mode to a fleeing one by gradually increasing the levels of rage or fear in the animal (Zeeman, 1977).

10 This article was commissioned by the British Home Office and published in the British Journal of Mathematical and Statistical psychology, Volume 29, 1976, pp.66-80.
knowledge\(^9\) (Sussman and Zahler 1978). From the point of view of some observers, catastrophe theorists were loosely associating all phenomena that contain some element of rapid change to one kind of catastrophe model. To avoid this type of criticism this chapter will back up the argument made by using the relevant algebraic structures and statistical analysis to form the cusp using measurements and strengthen the claims made\(^{10}\). Even though measurements can be applied to indicate exact locations, the theory does not attempt to replace empirical, quantitative studies. Instead this theory intends to demonstrate the conditions under which a qualitative change may occur and to bring awareness about the probabilities of such predictive change\(^{11}\).

In catastrophe theory there are three states of equilibrium: stable, semi-stable and unstable. As in any open system, the stable equilibrium is in no way static but more resistant to change in comparison to the other two equilibriums (it is similar to a spinning gyroscope and or the concept of 'potential energy' in physics) Thus, a catastrophe occurs when there is a sudden shift in potential energy that causes an unstable equilibrium to transform into a stable state which is illustrated in figure 4-1.

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\(^9\) In fact, Thom wrote in a student magazine of the French Mathematical Institute in 1973 that although any phenomena could be explained by a suitable model from catastrophe theory, but 'a theory that explains everything was actually explaining nothing!' indicating that he was aware of the limited value of theoretical models compared to a quantitative law of physics on an experimental trial (Quoted in Woodcock and Davis, 1991: 39).

\(^{10}\) It must be stressed that catastrophe theory is in some ways similar to a map without a scale. In other words, while the theory can tell us about the locations but it cannot give the exact distances or the size. Hence the use of algebraic structures and measurements are important to prove statistical validity.

\(^{11}\) Thom believed that since quantitative methods are statistical, they could not satisfactorily explain complex processes. In his view the qualitative stability of a process is more important than its quantitative complexity as a clear-cut result can always be reached under considerable quantitative variation but the important fact is that the process should maintain its qualitative stability despite quantitative change. This process has long been used in science as 'homeostasis' meaning the ability to preserve (Waddington, 1972).
The illustration above is a simple transformation or catastrophe using five energy graphs. The application of energy to the first from the left, leads to a succession of change from a stable equilibrium (or unique minimum) towards a complete change in the state of equilibrium as seen in the final graph. These changes make way for the unavoidable change in potential energy leading the ball to jump to its new equilibrium state. The only way that can prevent the catastrophe is to prevent the formation of the second equilibrium point. In other words, the qualitative shape of the curves in the patterns is important and can change up to a certain point. However, once that certain point is reached by creating a new equilibrium, which in effect destroys the old equilibrium, the catastrophe is inevitable. The graphs can be reversed with a change in potential energy leading to a ‘Hysteric Cycle’ (Zeeman, 1977).

If the above graphs were in a three dimensional space, one could imagine a plate or a surface instead of the lines. In place of the curve, there would be a fold.

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12 This illustration has been taken from Zeeman (1977: 11). Zeeman’s version consists of seven graphs. However as the purpose of bringing these graphs is to explain the Cusp Catastrophe which does not require two local minima (as with some of the other models), only five of the original graphs sufficed.
(figure 4-2) which enables a catastrophic jump from one surface to the other surfaces and the concept of a dynamic equilibrium to be better understood. In this case any variation in the potential behaviour or \( v \) would depend on the combination of the two values \( x \) and \( z \). The two latter lines effect the elevation of the curve on the surface and as a result the nature of the fall. Thus the two variables \( x \) and \( z \) are considered as the ‘Control Variables’ and are essential for a Cusp Catastrophe model.¹³

\[ \text{Control Factor } x \]
\[ \text{Control Factor } z \]
\[ \text{Behaviour 'v'} \]

Figure 4-2: A Cusp Catastrophe Model (Zeeman 1977)

It must be emphasised that small changes in the parameters of the catastrophe system do not necessarily lead to catastrophes, but normally produce small changes in a trajectory’s or attractor’s dependent variable. Zeeman has referred to type of change as a Divergence (Zeeman 1977: 18). A catastrophe is a drastic

¹³ There are seven elementary catastrophe models: the fold, the cusp, the butterfly, the swallow tail, the hyperbolic, the elliptic and the parabolic. However as the last three are five to six dimensional, they are considered as ‘Umbilic catastrophic graphs’ and are seldom used.
form of behavioural change when an attractor reaches the *cusp* or the catastrophe point in the non-linear system resulting in an oscillation or transformation in behaviour that would not have been predictable in a linear system. As mentioned, there are many examples of the phenomena in different areas of social science, one of which (Zeeman 1977) is presented below and is a cusp catastrophe model to predict the behaviour of nations at time of war. The control variables in this example are costs and threat and the state variable represents the type of policy to be adopted by each nation and ranges between the aggressive or hawkish mode on one side and the appeasing or dovish mode on the other side of the scale.

![Figure 4-3: A Cusp Catastrophe model of political Decision-making (Zeeman 1977)](image)

13 This model was widely used at the time of the cold war in predicting the behaviour of cold war adversaries. More examples of models based on Catastrophe Theory, can be found in Zeeman (1977), Woodcock and Davis (1979, 1991) and Saunders (1980, 1995).
The first path in this figure represents a hawkish country, which initially judges the treat and cost of war to be low. It therefore has an aggressive policy (or if at war can afford to escalate it). However, if the threat remains the same but the costs increase beyond a certain point (represented by C) there would be catastrophic jump toward a less aggressive and more appeasing policy. The second path represents a country facing a high cost and low threat. The chosen policy would be to avoid military action even if the threat is increased. However if the threat gradually increases up to a certain point (represented by D), there would be a sudden jump in the behaviour toward aggression and war, regardless of high costs.

4-3.1 A Cusp Catastrophe Model of Democratic Development and Change

It is possible to use a cusp catastrophe model to explain behavioural changes of political systems in transitions to democracy and consolidation. The model consists of two control variables, resulting in three control spaces that determine the behaviour of the political systems used in the following analysis and to indicate whether the continuous changes affecting each attractor would lead to a catastrophe (discontinuous change in their equilibrium states).\(^{14}\) The behavioural variables (shown in figure 4-4) range from anarchic to authoritarian with

\(^{14}\) It should be noted that this model would show generally behavioural changes of the political system in the movement towards democracy not predicting legislative behaviour which would require a different model (a historic analysis of a single legislature is not the intention of this study, nor a cross country study of legislative systems). However, as legislatures are major institutions in any political system, any behavioural changes in the system would inevitably affect the legislature just as much.
democratic behaviour in the centre and above the fold\textsuperscript{15}. If the equilibrium state of an attractor is closer to the cusp or the edges of the fold, then its behaviour is more likely to represent one form of extreme non-democratic behaviour. In this model the various forms of authoritarian behaviour is to the right of the cusp (the right hand side of the surface $G$) and any form of anarchic behaviour will be to the left of the cusp (on the right hand side of $G$).

Authoritarian behaviour in this model is used to refer to all the different kinds of political systems ranging from various types and degrees of authoritarian behaviour. Authoritarian behaviour suggests a continuum and ranges from complete autocracy, despotism, personal dictatorships, totalitarian, military rule, theocracy, and single-party rule to milder levels of centralised bureaucracies (Linz 2000), hybrid and semi democracies (Diamond 2002), illiberal democracy (Zakaria 2003), competitive authoritarian (Levitsky and Lucan 2002) up towards majority rule and capitalism (market rule) in the space above the cusp\textsuperscript{16}.

The term ‘Anarchism’ usually denotes chaos and disorder, even though (like authoritarianism) it has many levels and degrees. In *The Politics of Individualism* Susan Brown (1993: 106) writes:

\textsuperscript{15} The area under the fold is technically a grey area involving uncertainty and stochastic processing. Thus this study has decided to avoid the complications of analysing this area and shall refer to it as inaccessible.

'While the popular understanding of anarchism is of a violent, anti-state movement, anarchism is a much more subtle and nuanced tradition than a simple opposition to government power. Anarchists oppose the idea that power and domination are necessary for society, and instead advocate more co-operative, anti-hierarchal forms of social, political and economic organisation'

Anarchism, like democracy, is an abstract term and, even though full anarchism can never be achieved, anarchic behaviour is quite apparent at higher levels of consolidated democracy. Similar to authoritarian behaviour, anarchic behaviour is also presented as a continuum of having different forms and strengths ranging from the worst 'rule of the jungle' to feudalism, tribalism and warlords, on to civil anarchism and liberal democracies as they move further up from singularity of the cusp model. In addition, the type of democratic behaviour a state has and the level of democracy it chooses to apply would determine its location from the edge of the fold and whether it is to the right or the left of the graph. One thing that experience has shown is that democracy cannot be taken merely as the rule of the people whose will is determined by representatives the majority elects. The reason being is that such rule can easily be manipulated and abused by non-democratic regimes and passive or drifting societies.

Figure 4-4 is an adaptation of a simple cusp catastrophe model for changes in democratic behaviour of a state. The two control factors in this model, $x$ represents the levels of Human Development in a country as (the arrow points

17 The types of democracy may include, 'radical democracy, social democracy, liberal democracy, guided democracy and consociational democracy'. These terms have all been taken from the book 'Democracy in the Third World' by Robert Pinkney (2003)
towards increased human development) and \( z \) shows the degree of the decentralization of political control signifying political freedom and the free flow of information as the second parameter for democratic governance (again arrow points to increase in democratic governance). \( D \) represents the *unique equilibrium* or total democracy\(^{18}\). According to the cusp catastrophe model, this point is seldom or never reached due to the flux in the control factor \( z \).

According to this model democratic states should fill the upper section of the graph close to \( D \) and the amount of democratic behaviour of each state will be indicated with the proximity to this point. In situations where the level of democratic development is quite low but there is a relatively high degree of political centralisation in a state, another kind of unique equilibrium will exist (to the right of the graph below singularity). This equilibrium would indicate some kind or non-democratic authoritarian rule. There would also be a unique equilibrium state if the first parameter remains low but the second parameter increases. This equilibrium state reflects a type of anarchic behaviour, which under the point of singularity could reflect uncontrolled violence or any other form of chaos. If the level of human development is low but it is in balance with the second control parameter, it is possible to have two types of equilibria. Below singularity, the political behaviour is volatile and can swing between two equilibrium states. *Figure 4-4* illustrates this situation on plate \( G \) which has been divided into two surfaces via a fold. The upper and lower sheets are projected by two threshold lines (indicated in the figure). These lines separate the two

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\(^{18}\)Total democracy is an abstract term as no practical system of government can ever be considered as completely democratic. According to Skar, every system is 'an Aristotelian mixture of democracy in terms of power to the people and oligarchy, or the rule of the few'. (Skar, 1996: 27-28)
equilibria. The width of the threshold depends on the level democratic development. In this model, the lower the level of human development, the more drastic the change would be from one type of equilibrium to another.

As shown in the last example, it is possible that all attractors *diverge* and pass the democratic threshold without necessarily going through a catastrophe. A catastrophe is the most drastic change that occurs only if the control factors do not rise or fall in accordance with the changes required. Moreover the observation of changes to levels of the control factors makes the prediction of catastrophes easier. In this model, if the two control factors increase smoothly, then usually an equilibrium state can transform continuously without the need for a catastrophic change. Paths *a* and *b* represent two equilibrium points (in two different environments) that transform to democratic states without any need to undergo a catastrophe. The control and splitting factors and the measurements used in this model, along with the reason for the choice of measurements, will be explained below.
Figure 4-4: a cusp catastrophe model of democratisation

4.3.2 Determining the Parameters of the Cusp Catastrophe Model

As mentioned a cusp catastrophe model requires two sets of control parameters one of which (the normal factor) represent a continuous range of potential values. The catastrophe results from a rapid or sudden change in the second control parameter forcing the trajectory to pass over the lip of the cusp and relocate to the upper or lower portion of the fold. The first control parameter in this model as mentioned is the level of democratic development is taken as the sum of socio-economic modernisation and the creation of a democratic culture that is most important bringing about effective democracy and strong governance. This research is of the opinion that the common denominator for
such socio-economic development towards consolidation is human development\textsuperscript{19}. The enhancement of human development is a universal goal for development and democracy, where democracy is not seen as the target for development but as a means for development, thus, raising the threshold of democracy from formal standards of democracy to consolidation and efficiency through democracy.\textsuperscript{20}

The Human Development Index (HDI) will be used as the comparative rankings of indicators used for measuring the degree of democratic development. This index is published annually in the Human Development Report (HDR) by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)\textsuperscript{21} and was developed in the 1990s by a group of prominent economists led by Mahbub Ul Haq. Although the theme of this index is development, it does not only rely solely on economic development and is based on four essential components of Equity, Sustainability,

\textsuperscript{19} The idea that the components of Human Development contributes to the rise of democracy is not new and has been promoted by socio-economic scholars of democracy and modernisation as mentioned before. Diamond, Lipset and Linz (1995: 24-25) summarised the overall relationship between development and growth as, ‘Development enhances the prospects of democracy because it enhances several crucial intervening variables...capacities for independent organisation and action in civil society...a more equitable class structure (with the reduction of absolute poverty) and a less corrupt interventionalist seeking state. Where economic growth far outstrips these deeper structural and cultural changes, the level or probability of democracy will be much lower than expected from a country’s level of economic development. But where these intervening variables have emerged through different historical processes, the level or probability of democracy will be much greater than that which would be predicted merely from a country’s per capita GDP’.

\textsuperscript{20} Amartya Sen has famously quoted that ‘A Country does not have to be fit for democracy; rather it has to become fit through democracy’ (Sen 2001: 4)

\textsuperscript{21} These reports can be accessed freely from the UNDP website at http://hdp.undp.org/global
Productivity and Empowerment (Mahbub ul Haq 1996: 16)\textsuperscript{22}. The Human Development Index is usually considered as the most original and best known composite index of human development. It is a summary measure of a country’s average achievement in attaining (HDR 2008: 2):

- A long healthy life (measured by life expectancy at birth)
- Access to knowledge (measured by two indicators of adult literacy rate and the combined gross enrolment ratio in primary, secondary and tertiary education)
- A decent standard of living (measured by per capita GDP) \textsuperscript{23}

However, the HDI is not faultless as like all other ranking systems. The UNDP admits to the difficulties in using statistical methods to measure cultural liberties and the fact that in some instances, the report relies on individual countries to provide some of the data (some countries may find it in their interests to hide and distort some figures). This problem has been addressed over the years as the UNDP now uses data from international organizations and agencies as well as

\textsuperscript{22} The first Human Development Report in 1995 worked out the concept of Human Development and its measurement. It explored the relationship between economic growth and Human Development showing that growth is necessary but not essential. The Basic arguments of the report were:
- Development must put people at the centre of its concerns
- The process of development is to encourage all human choices, not just income, so that the Human Development concept focuses on all society not just the economy
- Human Development is concerned with expanding and ensuring the full use of these capabilities (through enabling processes)
- The Human Development approach defines the ends of development and analyses the options for achieving them (Human Development Report 1995: 122)

\textsuperscript{23} The Report also take into account the state of a country’s health and nutrition, knowledge and literacy, security, human freedoms (political, cultural and economical) and participation. Thus, HDI can also be used to indicate the trend in governance in a country.
government sources, and governments have become more open to information and information techniques have improved considerably.

A second criticism of the HDI is the argument that the index is really not much different from a cross country measure of GDP per capita. Wolfers (2009) has claimed that since the correlation between HDI and GDP is 0.95 and a scatter plot of one against the other looks like a 45 degree line plus measurement error. The first problem with this claim is that it fails to acknowledge that any two indexes which measure democratic development and use a large number of samples (HDI has 179 sample countries) is bound to have a high correlation score as will be discussed later in this chapter. Diamond (1992: 100-2) has compared his Combined Index of Political Freedom with HDI and GDP and has found that the correlation between HDI and his index (0.71) is considerable higher than with GDP (0.51), hence concluding that 'the contribution of economic development to democracy is substantially mediated through improvements in physical quality of life' (ibid: 107). A similar argument to this claim has been made by Lane and Ersson (1994). A study of the correlations between HDI and GDI over a period of time from 1990 to 2006 shows a much lower correlation of 0.43 between the two indexes which seems to indicate that changes in health and education appears to be different to GDP.

Apart from the general acceptance of the Human Development Index being the best systematic source of information of the overall state of development in nations and the trend of democratic development, the fact that the index formulation and data collection are carried out by the United Nations also adds to its objectivity, credibility, and reliability. Hence the advantages of using HDI outweigh the disadvantages as a basis for comparative developmental studies.

However, the main reason for the choice of this index in this research is that country rankings cannot change considerably from one year to the next as two of its most important indicators, namely adult literacy and life expectancy, are slow to change. This means that even if a country is able to boost its GNP, politicians cannot use GDP alone to claim short-term political gains and need to build long-term structural policies with an eye for future development in the long term. This condition is perfect for the cusp catastrophe model since one of the control parameters, or the normal factor, must be relatively stable and unlike the second parameter, or the splitting factor, its indicators cannot make sudden changes. The HDI ranking is more or less stable and will not notice massive change in its rankings despite continual growth or decline in certain variables. Because of this stability there is no need to collect data (apart from some economic data) annually. The 2006 HDR has used the same data collected in 2004 HDR from certain indicators such as life expectation and the percentage of

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26 As stated indicators such as life expectancy at birth, adult literacy and gross enrolment for primary, secondary and tertiary education require long term planning and do not change in the short term. Although indicators such as gross enrolment and average incomes may vary from year to year, but when expressed as national averages, they still will not correlate much with policies that raise enrolment among illiterate communities or tackle income poverty among the most deprived. See Human Development report 2004. http://hdr.undp.org/global/2004
people in secondary and tertiary education. So despite some difficulties facing the HDI, its advantages outweigh the disadvantages as a basis for comparative developmental studies.

The splitting factor, or second control parameter of this model will consider the amount of political freedom and decentralisation of political power. In simple terms, decentralisation is the transfer of powers, resources and responsibility from higher to lower levels in a political system which entails various types of powers including political, fiscal and administrative. In order to decentralise politically, a democracy should be able to credibly guarantee the prerogatives of subunits, and must possess a strong media that can freely defend the rights of the subunits. The classical argument for decentralisation is that it increases the efficiency and responsiveness of government (Musgrave and Musgrave 1973: 80-81, Oats, 1972); reduces poverty; increases participation; delivers public services (Sen 1999, 2001, Fritz and Menocal 2006); and impacts directly on good governance (Hayek 1939, Mckinnon and Nechiyba 1997).

The United Nations Capital Development Fund (UNCDF) has stated in its 1999 evaluation report that ‘There is no simple one dimensional, quantifiable index of the degree of decentralisation in a given country’ (UNCDF 1999: 167). Since there is no consensus on the precise definition and the outcomes of decentralisation, it becomes very difficult to apply a comprehensive approach to

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27 With a view to the stability of this index, data from the 2004 HDI index will be used throughout this study (this data appears in appendix 1).
measuring the concept\textsuperscript{28}. However, since the type of decentralisation considered in this model is in the form of political power and the increase in political freedom (as the factor distinguishing democratic and non-democratic development) the existence of a free and independent media plays a pivotal role in the process of political decentralisation and strengthening democracy, good governance and human development. A catastrophe model is able to predict whether the balance between the degree of media freedom and the level of democratic development in a political system is at a healthy equilibrium or not. It would be highly unlikely that those systems which cannot maintain a healthy balance between these two control factors can make gradual changes in their behaviour towards a more sustainable democracy.

A free press contributes to human development by addressing the right of freedom of expression, strengthening responsiveness, transparency and accountability of governments and providing a plural platform and channel of political expression for different groups and interests that is essential for the rise

\textsuperscript{28} The complexities of assessing decentralisation can be seen in the case of China for instance, which is categorically centralised but may also develop forms of decentralised planning. On the other hand a federal state, like India, may carry out centralised policies. Another example can be seen in an OECD study that has shown a country like Denmark (where central government tightly regulates virtually every aspect of local government finance) as more decentralised than the United States (Joumand and Kongrud 2003). Thus the actual degree of decentralisation isn't central to democracy, but it is the appropriate balance between centralised and decentralised policy that is important to providing strong management to human development and in a transparent way. Another important factor to bear in mind in assessing decentralisation is that different types will involve different measures. All political systems, irrespective of their democratic credentials, have allowed for some degree of decentralisation in their economy, finance and administration. This has to a certain extent allowed them to maintain stability without the need to decentralise politically leading to the idea that development may not necessarily lead to democracy. Tiersman (2000) has even argued that while some types of decentralisation have improved governance, other forms have impaired it. So it is fair to say, that while some aspects of decentralisation are strongly related to democracy and human development, other aspects are not as strongly related and in the case of economic policy, a strong regulation of a central democratic power may even be more beneficial to the rise of human development.

Sen has argued that political freedom has a constructive relationship with human development since the former can help define the substantive content of the latter (ibid).

Norris claims that where the media has failed to act as a civic forum, democratic consolidation has been hindered and even reversed (2008: 190-191) and the quality of democracy remains limited in places where there is considerable control or state monopoly over media, effectively reducing accountability and responsiveness. In her book, Driving Democracy (2008) Norris has argued that the structure and independence of the mass media (which she, in common with other writers, calls the ‘fourth estate’) is one of the four fundamental building blocks and institutional features of consolidated democracies. In a case study, she compares Uzbekistan with Ukraine, which had shared common political

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29 The Declaration of Dakar (UNESCO 2005) marking World Press Freedom day has emphasised the contribution of a free press towards good governance by ensuring ‘Greater participation by citizens in democratic processes, the rule of law, the fight against corruption, respect for separation of powers and independence of judiciary, transparency, accountability, access to information, poverty reduction and human rights’ and notes that the respect of these principles among nations is crucial for increasing human development.

30 This argument has been backed empirically in two separate case studies on India. Burges and Besley (2001, 2002) have found that regions of India where the media are freer and active, are least likely to suffer from famines during droughts. This is because regions with a better media have a greater reach and are also areas where voters are more informed about their political choices. Political leaders in these areas know that their performance will be monitored and have a affect on their incumbency, so they become more accountable to voters.
histories under the Soviet Union and had attained roughly the same amount of human development (poverty, education and literacy) and shows there is a significant contrast in their press freedom rankings\(^{31}\), which is why Uzbekistan has failed to make a democratic transition whereas Ukraine has been relatively successful (Norris 2008: 198-204).

Thus the free press can safely be a control parameter of a catastrophe model of democratic development and the indicators of free press can be expected to improve the broader indicators of human development towards consolidation. Press freedom has been measured in different ways. For instance the World Bank uses indicators from the freedom of information laws and the Transparency Index (Islam 2003). But this research believes that although freedom of information laws and the mention of press freedom in constitutions is a significant measure of democratic culture, they are not significant as in many instances the rights and legislation are not implemented by authorities\(^{32}\). The two indicators that measure actual press freedom are the *Freedom House Index of Press Freedom* and the *Worldwide Press Freedom Index of Reporters without Borders*.

For the purpose of this study, the best index which can serve as the splitting factor for the cusp catastrophe model is the Worldwide Press Freedom Index

\(^{31}\) In 2007, Uzbekistan ranked 189 out of 195 nations by the Freedom House press freedom index and 158 out of 164 countries by Reporters Without Borders press freedom index. While in the same year, Ukraine was ranked 112 by Freedom House and 105 by Reporters without Borders (ibid: 202-204)

\(^{32}\) For example three of the articles in the Constitution of Iran are devoted extensively to freedom of the media and all forms of communication and information flows. Article 24 specifically states *'The media and press are free to express all and every kind of opinion unless regarded as a threat to Islam and civil rights'* . However, this constitutional right is very frequently ignored by the authorities. So whether free press has been mentioned by the constitution is not a very good indicator for actual political freedom.
(PFI) which is published annually by Reporters Without Borders. PFI has been inspired by article 19 of the 1948 Universal declaration of Human Rights that states ‘Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression and the right to seek, review and impart information regardless of frontiers’\textsuperscript{33}. This index not only shows the amount of democracy and freedom of expression in a state, but also how much influence the central government has on such liberties\textsuperscript{34}. And it is not limited to journalists and the media, but also researchers, academia, groups, free speech and censorship in general. It focuses on how TV, radio, print and the internet are controlled by the central power and whether opposition groups have access to such media. A strong media is generally regarded as a defender of decentralised subunits, making it one of the constituents of a sustainable democracy.

PFI has been criticised by some governments of partiality as Reporters without Borders receives a considerable amount of funding from western governments and organisations, which in turn are dealt with more sympathetically. This criticism could be made for all non-profit organisations which rely on donations for their research. However, PFI does imply a fair degree of justice and donor countries are not always high on the rankings (for example the United States has been falling in ranks since the state of the invasion of Iraq. In 2007, the country was ranked 53 which implies the degree of pressure and influence central power

\textsuperscript{33} The 1948 Declaration of Human Rights was adopted and proclaimed by the General Assembly Resolution 217, A (III) on 10\textsuperscript{th} December 1948. For more information go to: www.un.org/overview/rights.html.

\textsuperscript{34} For instance measures include account of countries such as Saudi Arabia, China and Syria and Iran where there is a monopoly of state government control on the media and the internet and actively enforce strong monitoring of information are considered in this index. Information on the compilation of the Press Freedom are provided on the RSF website at www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=19391. The questionnaire used to compile the measures involved is also available on the website at www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=19390.
has put on society even though the country is considered politically decentralised).

A second criticism of PFI is the fact that the rankings fluctuate with changes in political behaviour of the state and are viable to change, whereas the Freedom of the Press Index published by Freedom House or the World Bank governance indicators stay relatively constant. The Freedom House Index puts countries into three groups: free, not free and partly free. There are methodological problems with this type of grouping as the boundaries are fuzzy and not easily defined, leaving the researcher with limited freedom to work with as the thresholds have already been defined. Despite the methodological difference, there is a significant correlation of 0.75 between the Freedom House Index and PFI which reveals that the two indexes have more or less similar judgements about the concept of press freedom and democracy (Norris 2008: 193-194).

This study does not disregard the Freedom House Index, but prefers to use PFI as the indicators fit better with the cusp catastrophe model. The PFI is less subjective than Freedom house and provides a cleaner slate for the researcher to work with (only listing in order of their achieved press freedom ranks rather than a predetermined grouping). Unlike the Freedom House index, PFI does not put countries into groups or boxes, making it possible for rankings to fluctuate at times of political change. Furthermore, PFI fluctuations are necessary for the construction of the cusp catastrophe as this model should be able to show how

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certain changes in one control parameter can lead to a catastrophic change in the
behaviour of trajectories. It needs to be said that sudden changes in the splitting
factor would not necessarily lead to catastrophes in countries that have a high
HDI ranking and are above the singularity point. Only countries that are ranked
below the average in terms of HDI may observe a catastrophic jump to the other
side of the cusp. The abruptness of the jump would depend on the position of the
state from the cusp.

4-3.3 A Statistical Analysis of the Cusp Catastrophe model of Democratic
Development

As mentioned, the data used in this model for the splitting factor have been taken
from PFI (2006) and the data used for the control factor is HDI (2004). Table 1
(appendix 1) shows the original data of these two indices for 150 countries. The
third column denotes the country category and is used only to facilitate locating
countries on the cusp diagram. This column is not included in any of the indices
mentioned and has been created here purely to help spot patterns in country
types along the cusp instead of writing each individual country (obviously not
doable since it is not possible to clearly write all 150 countries in one small
diagram) and does not have scientific significance outside this context. The
countries have been put into four regime categories with the help of existing
According to this categorisation, thirty-four countries were agreed as established democracies and put into the first group. The second group of thirty-five countries were considered as developing democracies which are going through the consolidation of democracy or very close to it. The third and fourth groups are the developing democracies with less or the least amount of democratisation (i.e in the initial stages of democratising or below). These countries are either undergoing some kind of autocratic regime or are faced with some form of anarchy, disorder (or even some form of chaos). In the case of autocratic behaviour, countries are put into the third group and the countries with some form of anarchic behaviour, are put into the fourth category. It is emphasised again that these groups are not accurate and do not serve any other purpose outside of this research.

To better understand the parameters involved, analyse the indicators and establish relationships among the four groups a series of six histograms are produced using Minitab and the results are illustrated in figure 4-5 (histograms...
It is hoped that this analysis may provide information about the threshold (singularity) in the model.

Histogram 1

Histogram 2

Histogram 3

Histogram 4

Histogram 5

Histogram 6
The first histogram corresponds with information taken from indicators relating to PFI. As indicated, the distribution of these indicators ranges from 0.5 and 98.5. The box plot under the histogram shows some indicators with ‘*’. This refers to the outlier indicators which represent countries that have a PFI of over 75. These countries have a bad ranking of press freedom and do not follow the natural trend.

The statistical mean in the histogram for the measure of press freedom is 25.67, but this number still shows a large degree of variance among countries. Instead of using this figure, the median (18.15) is used which is a better representation of the mean value of press freedom among countries. In this histogram the confidence intervals for the mean and median are estimated at 95% in this distribution.

To indicate the type of distribution among the parameters the Anderson-Darling statistic is used. This statistic is used to measure the goodness of fit test. The Weibull distribution (histogram 2) is fitted to the data on press freedom (the shape of the parameters is estimated at 1.147 and the scale is estimated at 26.96). This figure fits closely with the median of press freedom, which was estimated at 18.15.
Weibull Distribution:

\[ f(x) = \frac{\beta}{\alpha^\gamma} (x)^{\gamma-1} e^{-\left(\frac{x}{\alpha}\right)^\gamma}; \quad x > 0 \]

\(\alpha\) = the scale parameter, \(\beta\) = the shape parameter.

The third histogram shows descriptive statistics relating to the data on HDI. One can observe that this parameter ranges from 0.311 to 0.965. Unlike the press freedom index, no outlier data is observed in HDI. The average HDI in the world is considered at 0.7076 and the variation of data for the parameters is relatively good. But the histogram shows that there is no one-fit-all distribution that can be considered to cover for all the data. Instead, there seems to be three separate patterns representing the distribution of HDI. The first pattern represents countries with a HDI of over 0.9 and is generally considered that of developed countries. The second pattern covers all countries with a HDI of between 0.6 and 0.9 that are generally regarded as medium range developing countries. Finally, all countries with a HDI of below 0.6 are generally regarded as least developed and low level (low income) developing nations.

The last three histograms show the probability distributions fitted to three proposed groups of HDI. Histogram 4 shows the probability distribution for countries with a HDI of less than 0.6. A total of 44 countries are grouped in this distribution and correspond to a Weibull scale of 0.488 and shape of 7.828. Histogram 5 shows the probability distribution for countries with a HDI between 0.6 and 0.9. There are 79 countries in this group that are considered to have a medium range HDI. These countries follow a Weibull distribution function of three parameters that are: shape (5.638), scale (0.3443) and threshold (0.4495).
Finally, histogram 6 is a representative of the distribution of developed countries with a HDI of over 0.9. There are 27 countries in this group which again follow a Weibull distribution function of three parameters. It should be noted here that the \textit{P-Values} related to the credibility of the goodness of fit test in the histograms are all above 0.3. In other words, all of the distributions fit well with the existing data.

3-parameter Weibull
\[ f(x) = \frac{\beta}{\alpha^\beta} (x - \lambda)^{\beta-1} \exp\left(\frac{x - \lambda}{\alpha}\right) ; \quad x > \lambda \]
\(\alpha\) = the scale parameter, \(\beta\) = the shape parameter, and \(\lambda\) = the threshold parameter

Using the results from the histograms above, the data from the two indices can be normalised\textsuperscript{37}. Although it is not necessary to normalize the data in this instance, it is preferable since the mean of the new variable is equal to zero, and the distribution of the measures along the coordinates are homogenous and equal to an individual unit, (\text{Var}(z)=1). Using the mean and standard deviation from

\textsuperscript{37} The two main reasons for normalising data include, making the measurements scale-less and helping the range so that measures are not scattered too far from the mean. Minitab has been used to normalise the data which facilitates the algebraic process in which basically the original data for each indicator is subtracted from the mean and then divided by its standard deviation as shown below:

\[
\bar{X} = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{n} X_i}{n}
\]

Then:

\[
S^2 = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{n} (X_i - \bar{X})^2}{n-1}
\]

Finally:

\[
Z_i = \frac{X_i - \bar{X}}{S}
\]
the histograms, the normalized coordinates are calculated as below. The list of
the normalized measures can be seen in Table 2 (appendix 2).

\[ PF_z = \frac{PF - 25.673}{22.487} \quad \quad HDI_z = \frac{HDI - 0.70762}{0.18355} \]

Before writing the standard cusp equation, the data from the four categories are
further analysed to test their appropriateness in relation to the normalised data
using Analysis of Variance test (ANOVA)\textsuperscript{38}. The results from the analysis of
variance for PFI of the four country categories can be seen in Table 4-1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>DF</th>
<th>SS</th>
<th>MS</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>P</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Category</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>41151</td>
<td>13717</td>
<td>58.57</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Error</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>34194</td>
<td>234</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>75345</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ S = 15.30 \quad R-Sq = 54.62\% \quad R-Sq(adj) = 53.68\% \]

Individual 95% CIs For Mean Based on
Pooled StDev

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>StDev</th>
<th>Pooled StDev</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>6.13</td>
<td>5.30</td>
<td>(-**-*)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>18.74</td>
<td>10.93</td>
<td>(-**-*)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>50.55</td>
<td>23.46</td>
<td>(-**-*)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>22.14</td>
<td>13.23</td>
<td>(-**-*)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ Pooled \text{ StDev} = 15.30 \]

\textsuperscript{38} ANOVA is a one-way variance measurement technique used to test for differences among
three or more independent groups.
In this table, *p*-value=0.00. This shows that the four categories of countries have different levels of press freedom. The four levels shown at the bottom of this table indicate the mean and standard deviation for each category of countries which has been calculated with a confidence level of 95% based on a pooled standard deviation. These figures show that the most deviation belongs to the third category of countries and the least standard deviation is observed in the first group of countries. In other words, the degree of press freedom among the first category of countries is more homogenous. Moreover, the study of press freedom among the four groups of countries, recognised here clearly shows that the first group has the highest amount of press freedom and interestingly enough the third group, not the fourth group, has the least press freedom in the world. The second and third groups of countries have a more or less homogenous degree of press freedom (less standard deviation is observed in these groups).

A similar claim can be made in the analysis of the HDI among the four country categories. *Table 4-2* below uses ANOVA to measure the means and standard deviation of the four groups. In observing the four groups, one can clearly see the difference in HDI among the categories. The best HDI belongs to the first group and followed by the second, third and fourth groups (there is a smooth descending pattern from one to four). Like the previous analysis, the same confidence level of 95% has been considered for the means based on a pooled standard deviation of 0.1119. However, unlike the previous analysis for press freedom, this table shows that the standard deviations for the third and fourth
group are significantly higher than those of groups one and two. This indicates the significant fall of HDI in developing and under developed countries compared to the more developed countries.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>DF</th>
<th>SS</th>
<th>MS</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>P</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Category</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3.1921</td>
<td>1.0640</td>
<td>85.00</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Error</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>1.8277</td>
<td>0.0125</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>5.0198</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

S = 0.1119  R-Sq = 63.59%  R-Sq (adj) = 62.84%

Individual 95% CIs for Mean Based on Pooled St Dev

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>St Dev</th>
<th>Individual 95% CIs for Mean Based on Pooled St Dev</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>0.9154</td>
<td>0.0634</td>
<td>(+--*--)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>0.7853</td>
<td>0.0509</td>
<td>(+--*--)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>0.6486</td>
<td>0.1532</td>
<td>(+--*--)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>0.5204</td>
<td>0.1302</td>
<td>(+--*--)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Pooled St Dev = 0.1119

Table 4-2 Analysis of HDI among the Categories

Figure 4-6 shows the distribution of all the normalized distribution of parameters for each country on a coordination axis. The horizontal axis represents press freedom and the vertical axis indicates the range of HDI among nations. Each small number represents a normalized country indicator (appendix 2); and each country is given a grade from one to four as mentioned before. The four numbers in bold font represent the areas where there tends to be a densest distribution of each group of countries. The broken lines in this diagram form the primary cusp. These two broken lines have been drawn using the countries highlighted in the
country data in the appendices\textsuperscript{39}. Each highlighted country marks the classification line separating the different groups of countries. In other words, they are furthers away from their median.

\textbf{Figure 4-6: Normalised Distribution of HDI and PFI on Cusp Diagram}

However, as the figure shows, this cusp does not represent a standard cusp as was illustrated in the cusp catastrophe examples for two reasons. Firstly the two parameters of HDI and PFI are not independent variables as there is a coefficient correlation of 0.31 between the two. Secondly the indicators for these parameters are not accurate enough to form a perfect cusp. Neither can HDI, PFI, nor any other set of indicators claim to be the perfect indicators for democratic development (even though they are probably the best indicators suited to this model). To create a standard cusp, the data needs to be rotated.

\textsuperscript{39}These countries have been marked with star sign * to their right. Countries belonging to group four (Kyrgyzstan, Nepal and Srilanka) are marked with three stars and countries belonging to group three are (Morocco, Angola, Mongolia and Niger) are marked with three stars.
The only way to create a standard cusp is to rotate the data and transfer the new measures on to new coordinates. Before any rotation can take place, the angle or amount of rotation needs to be measured using the following equations:

\[
\begin{align*}
    x_{new} &= x_i \cos(\theta) - y_i \sin(\theta) \\
    y_{new} &= x_i \sin(\theta) + y_i \cos(\theta)
\end{align*}
\]

\(\theta\) represents the necessary angle to rotate the coordinates into a standard cusp. In this model, the best amount for \(\theta\) is such that can act as a mean for the first two categories of countries in the new coordinates on the \(y\) axis. After measuring \(\theta\) the two curves representing a standard cusp need to be identified (these curves should be placed so that groups three and four are separated along with a separate area where groups three and four are at its densest). This was done by identifying three parameters namely, the cusp equation coefficient \((k)\), and the new coordinates \((a\) and \(b\)). Using the Least Squares method, these three parameters can be estimated in a way that the function below can keep to a minimum:

\[
\sum_{i=1}^{n} e_i^2 = \sum_{i=1}^{n} (y_{new} - \hat{y}_{new})^2 = \sum_{i=1}^{n} [(x_i \sin(\theta) + y_i \cos(\theta) + b)^2 - k(x_i \cos(\theta) - y_i \sin(\theta) + a)^{2/3}]^2
\]

In this function \(i\) represents countries that are considered on the separation line. To minimise error any optimisation software can be used. The optimisation process will inevitably lead to the Standard Cusp Equation: \(y = kx^{2/3}\)

Coming back to the cusp model, using the least square method, the best optimised measure for the rotation angle \(\theta\) is -0.655 (radian) and the new origin
coordinates for $a$ and $b$ are estimated as 0.026134 and -0.63525 consecutively.

By placing the optimised values in the formula below, the standard measures for PFI and HDI parameters (HDIz and PFIz) are obtained as follows:

\[
PFIz = 0.8365PFIz + 0.5479HDIz + 0.026
\]
\[
HDIz = 0.8365HDIz - 0.5479PFIz - 0.635
\]

---

Figure 4-7: Standard cusp catastrophe model of Democratic Development

Using the rotated data new indicators are formed in table 3 (appendix 3) and a new cusp catastrophe model can be drawn which resemble a standard cusp as can be seen in figure 4-7. This model confirms:

\[
HDIz = -1.5 (PFIz)^{2/3}
\]
Countries close to the cusp are in an unstable position and may oscillate of the behavioural types with the slightest change to the splitting factor. The countries further from the cusp are in more stable equilibrium states, which can only mean that they will be more or less subject to the one dominant type of behaviour depending on the type of regime. These countries can either move toward the cusp (thus face a catastrophic jump), or they may diverge by liberalising and pulling away from the cusp toward singularity (democratic threshold). However, in order to do so a country must strengthen the foundations necessary for such a passage. Any attempt to democratise before this point is reached would probably not succeed⁴⁰.

It should be noted that the origin of the cusp equation fits with the mean for countries in the second category. This indicates that the threshold for democratic consolidation is roughly about 0.7853 of HDI (2004). This threshold is higher than Vanhanen’s threshold (5.0) in his *Index of Democracy* which he states is roughly at a HDI of 0.3 in 1990 (Vanhanen 1997: 78-9)⁴¹. The threshold estimated here is also higher than Przerowski et al (2000) $6500 per capita GDP, which they recognised as the minimum for democratic survival and is more

----

⁴⁰ What this model shows is partly, a confirmation of modernisation and neo-liberal views of democracy and development. However this model intends to go a step further by claiming that the spread of democracy cannot happen over night; an autocratic regime will not transform into democracy despite economic development and more importantly, unless the factors contributing to democratic growth are ripe, no effort to bring democracy to a state will succeed. This model also implies strongly that democracy cannot be imposed from outside either by military invention of liberal intervention. Democratisation requires the gradual growth in factors controlling democracy, which in this model are human development and freedom of the media. Just as human development cannot be improved over night, nor can we consider that any country can reach democracy in a short space even if the economy grows rapidly and efficiently.

⁴¹ For instance in according to Vanhanen’s Index of Democracy, Yemen passed the threshold in 1993 and became a democracy. However, following the civil war of 1994, Yemen stopped being a democracy (the process of democracy stopped) (Vanhanen 1997: 124-5). Vanhanen’s threshold is rather ambiguous as democracy is not like a button that can be switched on and off!
representative of a consolidated democracy which has been argued to be a point where democracy cannot be stopped or reversed (Diamond 1999). To test the new threshold, the new indicators of democratic development HDIz will be compared with other standard datasets in the following section.

4-4 Part Three: Testing the Validity of the Cusp Catastrophe Model

Many datasets and indexes have been constructed to measure democracy out of which three datasets, namely Polity, Poliarchy (or Vanhanen’s Democracy Index) and Freedom of the World Index (Freedom House) appear more frequently in academic studies. These three studies claim to have a high correlation of between 0.85 and 0.92 among themselves (Casper and Tufis 2003) which suggest that they have used identical data and/or have generally coded countries in very similar ways. Political scientists have usually tested their models and validated their findings by finding correlations with either of these measures (although correlation with the Polity dataset has been the most favourable). In this section, the results from the cusp catastrophe model of democratic development, HDIz will be tested against the Polity IV dataset. A good correlation between the two sets of country scores will strengthen the validity of the cusp catastrophe model, as there already is a high correlation

---


43 However, it must be emphasised that any correlation does not necessarily imply interchangeability, as different measures lead to different results. Correlation is merely a sign that the new model is valid and should not be rejected at face value.
among the various democracy databases mentioned above and would imply that stability is a characteristic of the threshold in this model. The two terms democratic threshold and singularity will be used interchangeably as they indicate the same point.

A disadvantage of the Polity score is that its lack of emphasis on democratic participation. Hence, this study will also compare the results from the catastrophe model with the Participation Enhanced Polity Score datasets (PEPS\textsubscript{1}, PEPS\textsubscript{2}) developed by Bruce Moon and colleagues (2006) at Lehigh University. The PEPS datasets have been designed to enhance the role of participation on democratic development and to add more significance to the measures used by the Polity datasets. Hence a correlation between the results from the cusp catastrophe model with PEPS\textsubscript{1} and PEPS\textsubscript{2} would strengthen the validity of the model even more. However, as shall be discussed later, the PEPS\textsubscript{1} and PEPS\textsubscript{2} datasets are not without flaws and the very reasons that the authors of PEPS\textsubscript{1} and PEPS\textsubscript{2} bring to advocate their model may be used against it and further stress the fact that countries above the democratic threshold and those below it need to be assessed differently. In order to test the threshold in the cusp model, two sets of regression analysis between HDI\textsubscript{z} and PEPS\textsubscript{1,2} are carried out. The first set among countries below singularity in the cusp model and the second for countries above this point. The results from the correlations reveal distinct behavioural patterns between the two areas which are significant.

\footnote{Though as it will be discussed later, the type of stability used in the Polity studies cannot be necessarily applied to countries with the same strength. Stability in the form of the strength of political institutions is not an adequate measure of democracy for countries around the point of singularity and below it.}
Finally to show the direct relationship between government performance, political stability and the democratic consolidation, correlations will be made between two of the World Bank’s Governance Indicators (government effectiveness and political stability indicators) and HDIz. Since only 35 countries have been used in the correlations, which are mainly countries above the cusp, this is not a thorough investigation of the parameters linked to democratic development in the world. Due to the insufficiency of valid data from all countries, some extent of subjectivity will be inevitable in claims made of countries below singularity. However the limited study of 35 countries does reveal interesting results for consolidated democracies which further strengthens the arguments in this chapter.

The advantage of the cusp catastrophe model of democratic development compared to Polity and almost all other democracy measurement systems is its capacity to account for discontinuity in democratic behaviour and group countries accordingly, whereas the Polity Index, along with Vanhanen Index and Freedom House database and PEPS only see countries in a continuum from authoritarian to democracy. This study will try to point out the inaccuracy of the latter type of classification for countries below singularity by bringing examples from developing countries and as a result strengthening the main argument that growth and development are not aligned in countries below singularity and disagreeing with the assumption made by most democracy datasets that if a country shows signs of democratic growth, it can be placed among functional and developed democracies.
4.4.1 Comparing HDIz with Polity IV

The Polity Project has become the most widely used measure of democracy, which according to Jaggers and Gurr (1995: 471) is based on:

'...three essential and independent elements of democracy as conceived of in Western liberal philosophy. The first is the presence of institutions and procedures through which citizens can express effective preferences about alternative political policies and leaders... [A second is] the existence of institutional constraints on the executive power... [and finally] The guarantee of civil liberties to all citizens in their daily lives and in acts of political participation'

The Polity dataset originated from a study of political system persistence and change (Gurr 1974) and has had measures of institutionalised characteristics gradually added as the dataset developed (Jaggers and Gurr 1995). The idea was initially to study the authority patterns of a social unit (a political system) and measures indicating the degree of executive constraints, competitiveness of executive recruitment, trade regulations or openness and competitiveness in participation have been among the variables used to construct an eleven point index of institutionalised democracy and an eleven point index of autocracy.

This study is particularly interested in one of the indices that Polity has used to indicate the sum of each consecutive regime type. This index is the result of subtracting each country’s autocracy score from its democracy score and has
been called the democracy minus autocracy score. This score has been used as a general index of democracy and is a continuum of twenty-one points (-10 to +10) going from full autocracy (-10) to full democracy (+10) in any given state. These data are consistent not just with the state of democracy, but also the regime type. Depending on their score, countries are divided into full democracies, democracies, partial democracies, autocracies and full autocracies. Although the data are purely institutionally based, and do not directly give measures for political liberties or human rights, they claim to be consistent with other measures and indices of governance, political liberties and human rights practices (Bates et al, 2005).

Table 4 (Appendix 4) provides the measures from this dataset together with the two sets of indicators from the cusp catastrophe model45 HDIz and PFIz. A comparison of these measures has been carried out for each country. As the results show, there is no significant correlation between PFIz (the rotated measures from Press Freedom Index) with any of the Polity scores. This indicates that the press freedom indicators in the cusp model do not have much significance in the democratic state of a country. This is expected since unlike the cusp catastrophe model, Polity distinguishes regime types, not behavioural types (in terms of anarchic and authoritarian). In the cusp catastrophe model, PFIz is regarded as a splitting factor and only decides the relative place of the trajectory with regards to its anarchic and authoritarian behaviour (there is no

45 Polity IV has a total of 192 countries but only 141 countries will be compared as the Polity scores do not include all the 150 countries used in the catastrophe model as countries such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Bosnia and the United States are not included in the Polity dataset.
homogeneity among the countries below singularity in press freedom as illustrated in table 4-1). This factor is not recognised in Polity.

HDIz, on the other hand, has a rather significant correlation with the Polity's democracy - autocracy score (0.55) and DEMOC or Polity's democracy score (0.65). The second correlation in particular indicates a significant relationship between the two datasets and would have been greater if a smaller sample of homogenous countries (as in table 4-2) were examined, or a number of exceptional and irregular countries in the cusp model were taken away\(^{46}\). The correlation between HDIz and DEMOC is even higher (0.69) if countries with HDIz below -0.6 (mainly countries in the fourth category) are excluded. There is a negative correlation between the Autocracy score (AUTOC) and HDIz (-0.35). This indicates the fact that there is no significant relationship between autocracy and democratic development.

However, it must be noted that the measures used in the Polity dataset suffer from limitations, the most important of which is that it places too much emphasis on institutional arrangements and civil liberties at the cost of recognizing the importance of citizen participation, which is one of the main features of an active democracy. For example South Africa had a Polity score of

\[^{46}\text{As with all models, there are small exceptions observed. The first is India, which had been grouped alongside other established democracies in the first category. However because of a lower Human Development ranking, the model has placed India in the area below singularity (in the area mainly dominated by states with anarchic behaviour). Also, three countries that definitely belong to group three due to their autocratic nature, namely Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, are seen in the area above singularity. These countries are all very rich in natural resources, mainly oil, and enjoy a high GDP from oil, investments and low population levels despite lacking the democratic values shared among countries above singularity. However, according to this model, these three exceptions are in a better position to democratise smoothly than the other resource-rich states below singularity. Though that would still depend on whether the conditions (internal and external) for transition are ripe which is out of the scope of this research.}\]
+4 (democracy 7, autocracy -3) from 1910 to 1989 despite the fact that 90% of the population did not have voting power (the black population of South Africa could not participate in political decisions). Polity does include 'competitiveness of political participation' as a measure of democracy, but according to Paxton (2000) and Moon et al (2006), the threshold to identify restricted participation is too low.

The second problem with this measure is that it only sees countries in terms of democracy and autocracy regardless of democratic development. For example countries such as Kenya or Lesotho both have a democracy score of 8 (democracy 8, autocracy 0) which is the same as the democracy score of Argentina and only one point below France. According to Polity, these countries are seen as functioning democracies and do not suffer from electoral chaos or instability. Colombia and Haiti despite instability (and chaos) both have a democracy score of 7 and autocracy score of 0 on the polity scale. It is difficult to imagine these two countries on an equal level of democracy as Turkey, Russia and Ukraine, which also score 7 on the polity scale.

The case of Kenya in the event of its presidential elections on 2007 is a clear example of the problem with Polity. Kenya is considered by Polity as a model

47 It is difficult to regard these countries or countries such as Botswana (Polity 9), Bangladesh (polity 6) and Sierra Leone (polity 5) as functioning democracies despite having low human developments and political freedoms and to consider them at the same level of democratic development as countries above singularity on account of their stability or electoral laws but disregarding factors such as tribal loyalties and heavy reliance on intervention from outside to help settle disputes.

48 According to Michael Holden reporting for Open Democracy 'Kenya's much vaunted presidential election on 27 December 2007 has turned from what could have been a trailblazing exercise in democracy into a catastrophe' Holden M 'Kenya: chaos and Responsibility' (3rd Jan,
for democratic stability and tolerance in Africa and a pattern for democratic development and change in the region. However, the aftermath of the Kenyan elections in December 2007 was a stark contradiction to this image and has provided an example of how democratic behaviour under singularity and around the cusp may bring about unpredictable results. Within two weeks after the contested election results Kenya's Red Cross Society reported that around 575 people were killed and more than a quarter of a million people were displaced (Associated Press 2008). The death toll rose dramatically with widespread ethnic cleansing, amounting to final reports of killings of at least twelve-hundred people and over three hundred people displaced by the end of February 2008 (The Economist 2008). These results have prompted some analysts to write that western-style democratic theory is not suited to Africa and is the root for such disasters (Associated Press 2008).

The conflict started after 'democratic' presidential elections were held with claims from the opposition of vote rigging and electoral fraud from the incumbent president's supporters. President Kibaki belongs to Kenya's largest ethnic group the Kikuyu while the leader of the opposition, Raila Odinga belongs to the Luo which is the second biggest tribe in the country. The violence started with ethnic clashes and soon scaled up towards ethnic killings, looting, and economic unrest. However to say that tribal loyalties and corruption were the sole elements in the crisis is to miss a vital element in democratic development which is present in the Kenya Human Development Index and Press Freedom

2008), Open Democracy at:
(www.opendemocracy.net/article/where_does_responsibility_for_kenyas_chaos_lie)
49 'Chinese Writer: Democracy Hurts Africa' (Jan 14 2008), Associated Press
50 'Looking More Closely at the Killings', The Economist, (May 15th 2008)
levels. Kenya’s Press Freedom was at 30.2 and its HDI was at -0.91 in 2005 (appendix 1) which is too low compared to any developed democracy. Its rise in GDP was not parallel with the wide gap between the rich and poor in the society and the majority of Kenyans were living below the poverty line.

Using the cusp catastrophe model, the Kenyan crisis may be explained as follows: Unlike Polity’s score (Democracy 8, Autocracy 0), Kenya has been put into group three in the categorisation phase of the cusp catastrophe model for democratic development. Countries in this group are all considered to be below singularity and have some form of authoritarian rule (be it central authority from the government, centralised planning and autocratic rule). Kenya is thus placed somewhere on the right of the cusp. Since independence, Kenya has had only three presidents. Kenya’s first president, Jomo Kenyatta was an authoritarian ruler in favour of his own tribe the Kikuyu. Kenya’s second president, Daniel Arap Moi, who according the BBC, was the last remaining big man in Africa’ (Phombeah 2002)\(^5\), and ruled Kenya for 24 years. However, his powers started to recede from the 1990s as he came under pressure from the United States and the international community to hold multi-party elections (Barkin 2004)\(^5\). The Kenyan African National Union or KANU could no longer legislate as Moi pleased and new alliances were shaping in defiance of the president (ibid). Despite mismanagement of the economy and widespread corruption, Moi’s

\(^5\) Phombeah, Gary ‘Moi’s legacy to Kenya’, BBC website, (Monday 5\(^{th}\) August 2002). Moi’s authoritarian methods were similar to all autocratic leaders, demanding absolute loyalty and repressing signs of dissent and criticism. He would reward members of the legislature with ministerial positions or big sums of money in return for their acquiescence and like many repressive autocracies, the legislature was a rubber stamp.

\(^5\) Barkan Joel D ‘Kenya After Moi’ Foreign Affairs, Jan/Feb 2004
weakened rule still managed to keep the country and its tribes united (Kenya remained firmly in group three).

In December 2002, Mwai Kibaki (who was from the Kikuyu tribe, a minister in Kenyatta’s government and vice-president to Moi) took office. Kenya’s place on the cusp diagram has now moved leftwards, though still on the right of the cusp. Kibaki’s method of governing was a contrast to Moi’s micromanagement. He decentralised power to his ministers and encouraged them to pursue their own agendas resulting in further mismanagement, corruption and confusion. Kibaki’s leadership style, in addition to his support for his own tribe (at the expense of whole population), helped push Kenya closer toward the cusp. Unequal economic growth with the average annual income per person at one dollar a day (Phombeah 2002) and inadequate civil society made way for the catastrophe to happen at the 2007 elections and Kenya to jump towards anarchy and chaos. In the cusp catastrophe model, the only way that Kenya can move from anarchy would be to resume some form of authoritarian rule or a jump back to its previous form. In earnest, Kenya could not have been a functioning democracy as the Polity project and other similar studies had pictured it in the first place, and it is strange to think that any scientific database would ignore such vivid facts.

53 According to Japsen and Wallis, during this period Kibaki was an ‘absentee leader’ who was famous for his ‘sleepy and laid back style and his fondness for Nairobi’s Muthaiga golf club!’

4-4.2 Comparing HDIz and the Participation Enhanced Polity Score (PEPS)

Democratic participation enhances the moral legitimacy of a democratic system and is paramount to any index of democratic quality. Since Polity does not give enough emphasis to participation as it does to other institutional factors for democracy, Bruce Moon and colleagues at Lehigh University, Pennsylvania, have incorporated participation into the Polity results to create the ‘Participation Enhanced Polity Score’ or PEPS which measures the breadth of political participation by studying the voting records and the creation of a variable called ‘Voter Turnout Scalar’ or VTS. This variable is measured by multiplying the number of votes (in a certain country over a certain period) by the total of the adult population. A good correlation between the results of the cusp catastrophe model and this index will further strengthen the cusp model.

Naturally no democratic country has a 100 percent VTS apart from a few exceptions of assisted electoral turnout as recorded by the International Institute for Development and electoral Assistance (IDEA). Moon et al have included these exceptions in their study and believe that compulsory voting legislation in some countries, such as small fines, is relatively light and should be considered as incentives rather than a requirement (Moon et al 2006: 10). However, countries with no voting record or one-party states with a notorious authoritarian

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54 Countries that have been identified by an IDEA study to have compulsory voting such penalties and possible imprisonment (only Fiji is cited as including imprisonment) have been eliminated from the PEPS dataset. (Source: International Institute for Development and Electoral Assistance IDEA (2003) http://www.idea.int/vt/index.cfm

55 Their studies show that countries with strongly enforced voting have an average of 1.1 percent lower voting rates whereas those with weak enforcement laws averaged around 11 percent higher rates (Moon et al 2006: 11).
behaviour are coded as missing data or void. Zero turnout implies that their PEPS score is not much different from their Polity score. Thus, no truly democratic state and certainly none of the thirty-one countries, which have a Polity score of +10 (appendix 4) can score 10 (no country can have 100 percent turnout). As Table 5 (appendix 5) shows, a country such as the United States with a turnout of 49 percent in 2003, will have a PEPS score of 4.93 despite having a Polity score of 10. So even though the PEPS₁ score is a modification of the Polity score, it gives prominence to electoral participation as a requisite for effective democratic institutions. PEPS₁ is calculated as below:

\[
\text{PEPS}_{1t} = (VTS_{i,t} \times \text{Polity Democracy Score}_{i,t}) - \text{Polity Autocracy Score}_{i,t}
\]

Since PEPS₁ does not carry any weight when the polity data is missing or the VTS score is zero, the score has very little impact on overall levels of democratic behaviour at low levels of democracy. As mentioned, in such cases the measures do not differ from polity in a certain number of countries. In order to make the measures fairer without harshly prejudging the character of participation in autocratic countries, the authors have computed the PEPS₂ index. In PEPS₂, the VTS 0-100 score has been scaled down to match Polity’s -10 to +10 score thus providing a more equal weighting and allow for more differentiation among countries with low levels of democracy (not high levels of democracy) than PEPS₁ (Moon et al 2006: 14):

\[
\text{PEPS}_{2t} = (((VTS_{i,t}/.05)-10) + \text{Polity}_{i,t})/2
\]

---

56 The letter i denotes a certain country and t denotes a certain time or period (Source Moon et al, 2006:12)
Table 5 (appendix 5) lists VTS, PEPS₁ and PEPS₂ of all countries in 2005 along with the Polity score of the same year and HDIz in the column to the right. Countries with zero turnout or those without VTS scores (also given zero) only have a PEPS₂ score. Pearson correlations between PEPS₁, PEPS₂ and HDI’x for all countries in this table are not very significant. Between PEPS₁ and HDI’x the correlation is 0.54 and the correlation between PEPS₂ and HDI’x is lower at 0.45 (while the correlation between PEPS₁ and PEPS₂ is 0.94). Figures 4-8 and 4-9 illustrate the distribution of the countries in regards to their HDIz and PEPS₁ and HDI’x and PEPS₂ respectively. As the figures and the regression analysis show, there cannot be a perfect line to link all (or most) points. The regression equation for HDIz and PEPS₁ (figure 4-8) out of the 125 cases used is: 

$$\text{HDIz} = -0.838 + 0.112 \times \text{PEPS}_1$$

57 In Moon et al (2006) the table identifies VTS, Polity, PEPS1 and PEPS2 for 153 countries. Since some of the countries covered in the last chapter are missing in this list and vice versa, only 144 countries will be used in this analysis. PF’x scores have not been included as previously stated.

58 Only 135 countries could be used in the comparison since not all had comparable data. Out of the 135 countries used in the analysis, 9 had missing values and had to be deleted.

59 Regression equation: HDIz = -0.838 + 0.112 × PEPS₁, the means for PEPS₁ = 1.8941, PEPS₁₂ = 2.7040 and HDIz = -0.65734
In *figure 4-8* there are a number of outliers (a total of nine countries have been identified as having the largest standard residuals in this observation). These countries are as follows: Kuwait (28), Qatar (40), UAE (42), Bangladesh (108), Lesotho (117), Senegal (124), Mozambique (135), Sierra Leone (143) and Niger (144). *Table 4-3* below gives the details of these countries along with their residuals and standard residuals (these countries all have large standard residuals, which distance them with other countries in the diagram). In this table, the countries are represented with a number which is the same as in *table 5* (appendix 5). As observed all these countries have a large difference between their HDIz and PEPS1. Qatar, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates have a relatively good HDIz (due to their oil wealth) compared to their Polity (-10) and participation rates, whereas Bangladesh, Lesotho, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Niger have large standard residuals.

*Regression equation: HDIz = -0.882 + 0.0956 PEPS1*
Mozambique and Niger have good ratings of PEPS1 (as they did in Polity) but low democratic consolidation.61

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>PEPS1</th>
<th>HDIz</th>
<th>Fit</th>
<th>SE Fit</th>
<th>Residual</th>
<th>St Residual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>-7.0</td>
<td>0.3210</td>
<td>-1.6224</td>
<td>0.1565</td>
<td>1.9434</td>
<td>2.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>-10.0</td>
<td>0.1730</td>
<td>-1.9585</td>
<td>0.1960</td>
<td>2.1315</td>
<td>2.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>-8.0</td>
<td>0.1630</td>
<td>-1.7344</td>
<td>0.1694</td>
<td>1.8974</td>
<td>2.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>108</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>-2.6240</td>
<td>-0.3318</td>
<td>0.0897</td>
<td>-2.2922</td>
<td>-2.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>117</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>-2.3080</td>
<td>-0.2993</td>
<td>0.0916</td>
<td>-2.0087</td>
<td>-2.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>124</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>-3.5410</td>
<td>-0.4696</td>
<td>0.0836</td>
<td>-3.0714</td>
<td>-3.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>135</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>-2.4540</td>
<td>-0.4382</td>
<td>0.0847</td>
<td>-2.0158</td>
<td>-2.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>143</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>-2.4140</td>
<td>-0.3407</td>
<td>0.0892</td>
<td>-2.0733</td>
<td>-2.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>144</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>-2.3590</td>
<td>-0.4068</td>
<td>0.0860</td>
<td>-1.9522</td>
<td>-2.08</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4-3: Unusual Observations from Regression analysis in figure 4-8

In an attempt to improve the correlation between the PEPS1, PEPS2 and HDI', the six Arab members (Middle East and North African) of the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries or OPEC62 have been taken out of the correlation analysis. These six countries (not including Iran and Iraq) all have relatively high GDP scores and low population levels. They include: Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, United Arab Emirates (UAE), Algeria, and Libya. In the standard cusp model, three of these countries, Qatar, Kuwait and the UAE, could be observed above the cusp, alongside countries belonging to group one.61

---

61 These results show that PEPS1 and Polity datasets have more in common than suggested and this is due to taking the same political considerations in addition to the use of similar measurements. Hence, the example of Kenya’s Polity result would also apply to PEPS1 and PEPS2.

62 OPEC consists of twelve members: Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Venezuela (5 establishing members), Algeria, Angola, Indonesia, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, United Arab Emirates (7 joining members)
and two\textsuperscript{63}. As explained before, these countries have an irregular rise in their HDIz figures due to high economic growth even though their levels of press freedom are far from good. It may be argued that high GDP rates, will eventually allow these countries to democratise more smoothly compared to countries with the same level of authority but lower growth, though that does not diminish their status as non-democratic (Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE have Polity scores of -7, -10 and -8 respectively).

The PEPS\textsubscript{i} and PESP\textsubscript{2} scores given for these countries are also negative as can be seen in table 4-9. Once these OPEC countries have been deducted from the list of 141 countries, the correlations between HDIz and PEPS\textsubscript{i} and HDIz, PESP\textsubscript{2} improve significantly (though the correlation between PEPS\textsubscript{i} and PESP\textsubscript{2} remain the same). Using Minitab, the results of Pearson correlations (excluding OPEC members) between HDIz and PEPS\textsubscript{i} is 0.618 and PESP\textsubscript{2} and HDIz is 0.54 which is an improvement on previous attempt (0.54 and 0.45 respectively). The correlation between PEPS\textsubscript{1,2} have stayed the same as before (0.94).

A further analysis of PEPS\textsubscript{i}, PES\textsubscript{2} and HDIz reveals more interesting findings. First an analysis of the correlations with the exception of all countries with PEPS\textsubscript{i} scores below zero was made\textsuperscript{64}. There is again an increase in the correlations between PEPS\textsubscript{i}>0 and HDIz (0.65) and PESP\textsubscript{2}>0 and HDI (0.6)

\textsuperscript{63} These countries have been noted as part of the exceptions in footnote 43. Despite belonging to the third category of countries (authoritarian developing countries) they appear above the cusp alongside countries belonging to categories one and two.

\textsuperscript{64} Although countries with a PEPS\textsubscript{i} score of over zero do not exactly correlate with the countries above the singularity line, they do include all of those countries in addition to some countries around the point of singularity.
while the correlation between PEPS\textsubscript{1} and PEPS\textsubscript{2} stays about the same (0.90). However, the same correlations between the three indexes give very different results when only PEPS\textsubscript{1} below zero (roughly all countries in the cusp model that are located around and below the singularity line) are considered. As predicted the correlation between PEPS\textsubscript{1}<0 and HDI\textsubscript{z} (-0.19) is far too low to be considered significant and the correlation between PEPS\textsubscript{2}<0 and HDI\textsubscript{z} is even less significant. The correlation between PEPS\textsubscript{1}<0 and PEPS\textsubscript{2}<0 is lower than previous correlations, but remains significantly high (0.83) which again shows that similar data has been used for both indexes. This finding further strengthens the chapter's claim that below singularity, the voter scalier index cannot be a significant indicator of democratic development as suggested by the authors of PEPS\textsubscript{1} and PEPS\textsubscript{2}.

These results strengthen the main argument in this chapter that in order to democratise, countries must pass a certain democratic threshold and that it is not really possible to compare countries below this threshold with countries above it using the same measures and measurement techniques. Even if the measurements used to make the HDI\textsubscript{z} index are not adequate in the measure of democracy, they are sufficient to show that countries must reach a certain degree of democratic activeness before the quality of democracy can be assessed through the performance of their democratic institutions. The results from the correlations above also indicate problems in the PEPS model in addition to having the problem relating to subjectivity (mentioned for the Polity score in relation to some countries) since PEPS\textsubscript{1} is really a take on the Polity score. The
next section of this work will look at another major problem with the PEPS index.

**4-4.3 The Problem with PEPS₁ and PEPS₂**

Despite its claim to be different from Polity due to its emphasis on voter turnout and participation, the PESP indexes are in many ways similar to Polity as the same data and measures (with the exception of the VTS) have been used. Thus the measurement problems of Polity (regarding countries such as Kenya) would also apply to PEPS₁ and PEPS₂. However, the PEPS indicators have another problem which has become apparent in the regression analysis of correlations for PEPS₁, PEPS₂ and HDI’x. *Figure 4-10*, is the regression analysis for HDI’x and PEPS₁>0\(^{64}\). The diagram shows the distribution of the countries around the regression equation:

\[
\text{HDI’x} = -2.13 + 0.345 \text{PEPS₁}
\]

*Figure 4-10: Regression Analysis for PEPS₁>0 and HDI’x*

\(^{64}\) The reason for using PEPS₁>0 instead of PEPS₁ (to cover all countries) is to reduce the number of countries or points in the regression diagram and to make them easier to distinguish.
Using Minitab 9 countries may be identified as ‘outliers’ or ‘unusual observations’ which are as follows: Tanzania (130), Malaysia (48), Estonia (34), Senegal (124), Switzerland (11), Sierra Leone (143), Bangladesh (108), Lesotho (117) and Mongolia (91). The data from these countries may be observed in table 4-5.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>PEPS</th>
<th>HDI'x</th>
<th>Fit</th>
<th>SE Fit</th>
<th>Residual</th>
<th>St Residual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>-1.4180</td>
<td>-1.9241</td>
<td>0.2386</td>
<td>0.5061</td>
<td>0.61 X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>-0.1090</td>
<td>-1.7896</td>
<td>0.2223</td>
<td>1.6806</td>
<td>2.01R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>2.32</td>
<td>0.6270</td>
<td>-1.3276</td>
<td>0.1686</td>
<td>1.9546</td>
<td>2.30R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>124</td>
<td>3.29</td>
<td>-3.5410</td>
<td>-0.9931</td>
<td>0.1336</td>
<td>-2.5479</td>
<td>-2.98R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>3.75</td>
<td>1.0200</td>
<td>-0.8345</td>
<td>0.1191</td>
<td>1.8545</td>
<td>2.16R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>143</td>
<td>4.44</td>
<td>-2.4140</td>
<td>-0.5966</td>
<td>0.1017</td>
<td>-1.8174</td>
<td>-2.11R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>108</td>
<td>4.52</td>
<td>-2.6240</td>
<td>-0.5690</td>
<td>0.1001</td>
<td>-2.0550</td>
<td>-2.39R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>117</td>
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<td>-2.3080</td>
<td>-0.4690</td>
<td>0.0953</td>
<td>-1.8390</td>
<td>-2.14R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91</td>
<td>9.70</td>
<td>-0.5600</td>
<td>1.2170</td>
<td>0.2135</td>
<td>-1.7770</td>
<td>-2.12R</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4-5: Unusual observations from Regression Analysis PEPS$>_0$ and HDI'x

Similar results can be observed in the analysis of correlations between PEPS$>_0$ and HDIz. Again the diagram showing the distribution of countries around the regression equation ‘HDlz = -2.10 + 0.312 PEPS2’ in figure 4-11 below:

---

65 R denotes an observation with a large standardized residual. X denotes an observation whose X value gives it large influence.
Figure 4-11: Regression Analysis for PEPS₂>0 and HDIₙ

Minitab has again identified nine outliers or unusual observations as it did with PEPS₁ which are illustrated below. These countries again show the biggest inconsistencies between HDIₙ and PEPS₂. Despite slight differences with the previous observation, there are quite a number of repetitions which shows the similarities between PEPS₁ and PEPS₂. These outliers are as follows: Haiti (122), Comoros (103), Estonia (34), Senegal (124), Switzerland (11), Bangladesh (108), Niger (144), Sierra Leone (143) and Malawi (134).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>PEPS₂</th>
<th>HDI'x</th>
<th>Fit</th>
<th>SE Fit</th>
<th>Residual</th>
<th>St Residual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>122</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>-2.3670</td>
<td>-2.0891</td>
<td>0.2381</td>
<td>-0.2779</td>
<td>-0.31X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>103</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>2.3590</td>
<td>-2.0205</td>
<td>0.2298</td>
<td>-0.3385</td>
<td>-0.38X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>2.74</td>
<td>0.6270</td>
<td>-1.2502</td>
<td>0.1429</td>
<td>1.8772</td>
<td>2.04R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>124</td>
<td>3.12</td>
<td>-3.5410</td>
<td>-1.1317</td>
<td>0.1314</td>
<td>-2.4093</td>
<td>-2.62R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>3.75</td>
<td>1.0200</td>
<td>-0.9353</td>
<td>0.1144</td>
<td>1.9553</td>
<td>2.12R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>108</td>
<td>5.53</td>
<td>-2.6240</td>
<td>-0.3801</td>
<td>0.0921</td>
<td>-2.2439</td>
<td>-2.43R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>143</td>
<td>6.38</td>
<td>-2.4140</td>
<td>-0.1151</td>
<td>0.1002</td>
<td>-2.2989</td>
<td>-2.49R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>144</td>
<td>6.62</td>
<td>-2.3590</td>
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</tr>
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<td>134</td>
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<td>0.3902</td>
<td>0.1404</td>
<td>-2.1282</td>
<td>-2.32R</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4-6: Unusual Observations for Regression Analysis PEPS₂>0 and HDIₙ
In the first regression analysis (using data in appendix 5) Mongolia is seen as having the highest Participation Enhanced Polity Score (9.70) out of all 144 countries involved in the PEPS$_1$ analysis, despite having a negative score on HDI$_z$ index (-0.56). Moreover the results from both the regressions analysis, show Switzerland as an outlier due to the inconsistencies that exists between HDI$_z$ with PEPS$_1$ and PEPS$_2$. In the first analysis, Switzerland has a PEPS$_1$ score of 3.75 despite scoring very high on the HDI$_z$ index. The regression analysis of PEPS$_2$ also reveals very strange results. Switzerland is observed among the outlier countries and its democracy score has been placed behind countries such as Bangladesh, Sierra Leone, Niger, and Malawi. These four countries precede Switzerland’s democracy score in PEPS$_2$ despite all having negative HDI$_z$ scores. Either there is a problem with Swiss democracy or with PEPS. The authors of the PEPS have pointed the finger at Switzerland’s poor turnout rate. Switzerland’s voter turnout rate used in the calculations of PEPS, which have been based on the 2003 report from the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance$^{66}$, is estimated at 38 percent (Moon et al, 2006). The reason for this low turnout, according to the authors of PEPS is due the institutional structure of its collective executive which:

‘Diminishes voter motivation by minimising the significance of election outcomes.... surely such a system is regarded as less democratic than one in which most citizen’s participate in elections and actually make a difference in leadership and policies’

(Moon et al 2006: 7)

$^{66}$ The 2003 figures are available from the International Institute for Electoral Assistance (IDEA) website at: http://www.idea.int/vt/index.cfm
The authors of PEPS seem to have ignored the fact that the political system in Switzerland is quite different to any other system in the world. The above statement would have been true had there been a Westminster style or representative government functioning instead of the system of direct democracy that Switzerland is. In a direct democracy people (by referendum or initiative) vote directly on a large number political issues effecting them and their surroundings. Switzerland may not have direct executive elections and its seven-member Executive Council is not directly chosen by the people (but by the legislature). However, as Wolf Linder notes, for more than thirty years, the council has been composed of a successful coalition between the same four parties which represent 70 percent of the electorate (Linder 1998: 4). So in addition to outstanding political stability, voter satisfaction is quite high.\(^{67}\)

Voter turnout in federal elections have declined over the years, though that does not reflect a passive public. Voter turnout has been high on issues that have been important to the public. For instance on the referendum for membership of the European Union in 1992, the turnout was 78.3 percent and in 1989, 68.6 percent of the population turned out to vote on whether the Swiss army should be abolished. Kris Kobach put the decrease in turnout at referendums down to voter exhaustion rather than passivism (Kobach 1993: 79). A decrease in voter turnout may also be due to the fact that Swiss voters know that their votes will not have

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\(^{67}\) In Switzerland all constitutional amendments, popular initiatives, and some international treaties have to be approved by popular vote. The Swiss people have the final word on parliamentary decisions and so the legitimacy of the institutions comes from the people. Even though the people have little impact on elections, they have a great deal of influence on constitutional policies and their government actions. This kind of civil authority is not seen in other democratic system. For instance the Swiss government could not have invaded Iraq as easily as other democracies did in 2003.
any direct effect at the national level on the composition of the executive. The reduction in turnout can also reflect that voters are generally happy and satisfied with the status quo and do not need to make their voices heard. Thus it is a mistake to presume low voter turnout in Switzerland points to lower democracy levels.

It is not intended here to assess the merits of direct democracy in Switzerland or how well the Swiss system is living up to its standards. What is important is to identify the flaws in the PEPS indices in relation to Switzerland having been the most obvious example here. One can also point to other strange observations such as Mongolia which has the highest PEPS score (9.70) of all countries with a turnout of 97 percent followed by Uruguay (9.47) with a turnout of 95 percent. Assuming the turnout rates are without flaw, could these two countries be considered more democratic than the rest? Or, as the cusp model and the correlations between PEPS and HDI (for countries above and below singularity) have shown, countries above, around and below the point of singularity cannot be assessed in the same way using the existing democracy indexes such as Polity and PEPS. In order to explain this point better, a final correlation analysis will be

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68 As the executive council decides on the composition of the executive using a so called 'magic formula' (Linder 1998). The representative at the national level, in turn does not have much say on policies at the local level (Switzerland being one of the most devolved democracies in the world).

69 Feld and Kirchgassner (2000) argue that in a direct democracy such as Switzerland, citizen's are more informed about public policy than other democratic systems, since they need to collect information and awareness before the discussion process preceding a vote. Secondly, citizens are also able to control and sanction their legislators and the government which in effect reduces inefficiency of the system and improves voter relationships with their representatives. Thirdly the open and strong discourse between citizens and their representatives, leads to constant evaluation of policies and government performance on issues of self interest and common interest alike. This inevitably improves satisfaction.
made using Government Effectiveness Index, Government Stability Index and HDIx.

4-4.4 Comparing Government Effectiveness, Political Stability and HDIz

The comparisons have so far shown a significant (positive) relationship between participation and democratic development HDIz in consolidated democracies (above singularity). The purpose here is to see whether there is also a positive link between HDIz and government effectiveness and political stability among countries above the democratic threshold. Due to the lack of data, this section can only consider the countries of the European Union, plus OECD states (35 countries)\(^70\) whose data are more or less uniform.

The two indicators used to show political stability and government effectiveness has been taken from the World Bank’s Governance Indicators 2006 (Kaufmann et al 2007). The World Bank Governance Indicators is an aggregated dataset that ranks countries on six criteria\(^71\) by combining data from twenty-five different credible data sources (8 public sector data providers; 9 multilateral non-governmental institutions; and 8 commercial business providers). These data are

\(^{70}\) The list of countries studied here is not an accurate picture of countries above the singularity but it does preset a fairly good picture for the purpose of correlation making. For countries below the threshold, the same problems and limitations mentioned before (and below) would be apparent plus the fact that not enough consistent data exists to carry out comparisons.

\(^{71}\) The six criteria are: voice and accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption (Kaufmann et al, 2007). Like all other datasets and indexes, there will inevitably be substantial amounts of subjectivity used in devising the scores and thus, correlations between these indicators and other scores (for example Freedom House’s Freedom of the World indicators) will be significantly high.
recalculated every two years and are also based on opinion from experts, citizen surveys and credible research (and such as Freedom House, the Economist Intelligence Unit and the Global Competitiveness Report).

The authors of the Governance Report admit that limitations will exist, but limitations are universal as over sixty percent of all cross-country comparisons result in highly-significant differences in their indicators (Kaufmann et al, 2007: 24). However due to the aggregation of data from different sources, errors are less likely to be systematic and are likely to raise the quality of the work. The aggregation of several datasets to reduce the problems of poor quality (at the expense of conceptual precision), has been the strategy used for measuring global governance at World Bank.

'Datasets appear to be unreliable individually, although the various subjective ratings of quality of governance obtained from different sources tend to rank countries similarly, the discrepancies are large enough that we cannot make confident conclusions'

(Knack and Manning 2000: 11)

On the plus side, the Governance Indicators give a generally good coverage of all countries and the Governance Project has been gathering data for more than a

Moreover, the number and types of sources on which these scores are based may differ among countries. For example the government effectiveness indicator may measure slightly different things in different countries and so there may be discrepancies in what the data actually stands for. Therefore it may not be very reliable to use the data alone in cross-country comparative research, other than to give a general comparative view of how well a government is functioning in relation to the rest, which is what is necessary for correlation purposes.
decade which makes it a reliable source in development studies, especially as it is done by a reputable international institution. The data are very transparent and the data procedures, quality assessments and the data are very easily accessible (Van de Walle 2006). For the purpose of this research, the World Bank provides a good and well balanced set of indicators for government effectiveness and stability for countries above the threshold. The problems mentioned about the precision, subjectivity and reliability of the collected data would mainly apply to countries below singularity.

Government Effectiveness is a measure of the quality of public services, the quality of civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formation and implementation and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies (Kaufmann et al 2007:4). While political stability and government effectiveness are in a way related, the political stability indicator of the World Bank, adds the measure of the likelihood that a government will be destabilised or overthrown (ibid). It is obvious that these indicators cannot escape subjectivity and rely heavily on perceptions and opinions (however impartial and professional they may be). The aggregation of systematic data is in fact an advantage only projects such as the World Bank can afford. However, since the methods of data collection are disputable for countries below singularity, those countries will be taken out in an effort to eliminate outliers in the regression analysis.

Table 6 (appendix 6) includes the data using the World Bank’s Government Effectiveness and Government Stability indicators for all EU and OECD
countries in 2006 (35 countries). The World Bank scores range from -2.5 (the lowest) to +2.5 (the highest) in each category. Since only developed countries are brought here, negative scores are very rare (only government stability scores for Turkey and Mexico). The column on the right is for HDIz. If there is significant correlation among the scores in the three groups, then there is evidence that there is a positive relationship between the rise of active society, government effectiveness and political stability for countries above the consolidation threshold.

The Pearson correlation between political stability and HDIz is very significant at 0.813. This stresses the fact that there is definitely a positive relationship between political stability and HDIz for countries above the threshold. There is also a significant relationship between government effectiveness and HDIz for the thirty-five countries in this analysis (0.715). This too stresses the positive link between the rise in the quality of government functions and democratic development of consolidated democracies. Since the definition of government effectiveness as given by the World Bank implies government efficiency (quality includes efficiency and effectiveness), and since effectiveness and efficiency together implies performance (chapter 2), so it can be concluded that there is a positive link between government performance and the rise in HDIz\textsuperscript{73}.

\textsuperscript{73} The correlations between political stability and government effectiveness are not as significant as the correlations between PEPS and Polity indexes and PEPS\textsubscript{1} and PEPS\textsubscript{2}. The reason may be that the World Bank has not used the same datasets for measuring political stability and government effectiveness which is a plus side for the World Bank Governance Indicators. This is not to say that a good correlation between political stability and government effectiveness does not exist. In fact, there is a significant relationship between the two, indicating that a rise in political stability in countries above the singularity line leads to a rise in government performance. Though, the link is not strong as was the case in the above mentioned indices.
4.5 Conclusion:

This chapter partly reaffirms Lipset's classical argument (1959, 1960) on development and growth and the position of modernisation theories regarding causal dynamics involved in the rise and consolidation of democracy. Debate into development and democracy has triggered the vast literature in comparative studies of political systems using empirical methods and quantitative analysis while efforts of theorising democratic development has been mainly left out. This chapter differs from the current generation of comparative research in distinct ways. Instead of adding to the abundance of empirical case studies, this study has made an attempt to theorise the dynamics involved in democratic development and democracy and then back up the theory by statistical analysis and empirical research.

Unlike Lipset's argument on the linearity and continuity of the causal relationships between development and growth, catastrophe is a non-linear model and the cusp catastrophe model of democratic growth is a non-linear model which in addition to showing continuity, also shows discontinuous behavioural changes in transitions to democracy. The threshold for democracy is not at a minimum requirement for transitions to democracy, but the minimum for democratic consolidation (where democracy becomes institutionalised providing the minimum for effective and efficient democracy). And finally, the parameters of democratic growth are human development and democratic
freedoms, not economic growth (although human development will not rise without economic growth).

Democracy is a consequence of various developmental factors. The empirical classifications and analysis of the cusp catastrophe model has been based on the most important of these factors, namely, human development, political freedoms that lead to stability and efficiency, effectiveness and a rise in democratic quality. The analysis is confirmation of the basic argument in this study that countries below and above the democratic threshold cannot be assessed for democratic performance in the same methods and measures\textsuperscript{74} and neither should their legislatures. Only consolidated democracies are suitable for performance measurement. Countries below must focus on building and strengthening the institutions that are detrimental to their passing singularity. The singularity or consolidation threshold has been estimated although it must be emphasised that this is an estimation based on the quantitative assessment and is not an accurate or definitive figure.

\textsuperscript{74} Part three of this chapter not only strengthens the cusp catastrophe model but also the fact that different indicators must be used in assessing democracy in countries above and below singularity. Moreover, democratic reforms without development in the active society is not possible and an active society cannot be achieved without economic development. This idea is illustrated in the example of three democratic revolutions (so called by the media): the Velvet revolution of Czech Republic (above singularity); the Rose revolution of Georgia or orange revolution of Ukraine (close to singularity); and the Saffron revolution of Burma or green revolution in Iran (below singularity). In Burma, since the foundations for the active society were not present nor was the conditions for development ripe, any attempt to change the authoritarian regime would produce a catastrophic jump into anarchy which can only be stable again under authoritarian rule. In Georgia, despite lots of foreign aid and financial investment, the rose revolution has been very fragile with frequent unrest and police crackdown. Only the Czech revolution can be truly referred to as democratic, with a smooth transition and rise in the quality of democracy due to the existence of an active society at the time of transition.
What is the relevance of these findings to the study of comparative legislatures? The findings in this chapter combined with Abraham Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs, produces a simple model called the 'Legislative Performance Pyramid' from which legislative performance measurement may evolve. If a legislature is to perform well, it must have first managed to maintain the environmental conditions and benchmarks of democratic governance. These benchmarks are the 'foundation' of any system of democracy regardless of cultural or historical differences. A consolidated system cannot be built without the proper foundations and capacities in place (sometimes referred to as the failure of democratic transitions). Figure 4-12 is a simple legislative performance pyramid model influenced by Maslow's work and the argument put forth in this chapter.

Figure 4-12: Legislative Performance Pyramid with Focus on Continuous Maintenance and Improvement

Maslow's 'Hierarchy of Needs' has been widely used in psychology, education and management. According to this model, the human being as an entity has a set of physiological, safety, belonging and esteem needs which he must satisfy before reaching self-actualisation. Not all humans are able to reach this final stage of human development; but those who do, have first managed to fulfil all the lower needs before moving toward the final goal of 'self actualisation' (Maslow 1998: 10-19) The claim made by Maslow's model is interestingly similar to claims made in systems theory which states that in order to create change in any system, there needs to be a change in all elements or organisations leading toward that change. More significantly, Maslow's model focuses on the idea that 'the prerequisite to full realisation of achievement is that nothing higher can happen before the lower needs get satisfied' (Maslow, 1998: 39). In other words, in order for a system to be able to reach its full potential and performance, it must first make sure that the requisites for such performance are satisfied.
The pyramidal framework also takes into account one of the fundamental factors of any organisational performance model, 'the focus on maintenance and continuous improvement' which has been adapted from the Japanese Kaizen model of quality control (Imai, 1986). This framework assumes above all that democratic performance cannot be assessed properly unless there is an organisation to perform the functions required by the institution. In other words before a system can perform satisfactorily, all of the requirements (or at least most of the requirements) of the organisation must be met. But perhaps what is most important in this framework is the fact that an organisation that does not have the proper foundations built in place, cannot be expected to perform adequately as its organisation has not been established to meet the needs of a performance system. In the case of legislatures or any other democratic institution, no performance model can adequately assess the democratic performance of the organisation unless the foundations for such organisations are in place. In other words, before any democratic performance measurement model can be properly established, the foundations for democratic development must be present and institutionalised. Naturally, as with any other form of stable structure, foundations cannot be built overnight. Nor should one assume that an organisation that has first been built without the proper foundations can perform in the same way as a faultless structure.76

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76 This model can be interpreted in another way to show that if a legislative system has established the structures necessary for organisational performance, but the foundations of that system are not necessarily those required to build a democratic legislative system, then organisational behaviour would persist and functions could still be analysed although the results are not on a comparative level as legislative systems above singularity. But as long as legislative institutions below singularity aim towards system maintenance and gradual improvement then the measurement of performance can be conducted, and there may be improvements to institutional performance though not necessarily democratic performance since the democratic foundations are non-existent or too weak. In this case, the mission, vision and values of such an institution would be significantly different from that of their counterparts in democratic societies.
Since the main aim of legislatures is to promote and enhance democracy, a democratic performance measurement system can only include democratic legislatures occupying the space above singularity in the cusp catastrophe model, which are more or less homogenous. For other legislatures, as the cusp catastrophe model of democratic development shows, becoming democratic is a gradual process and requires a state to pass a certain threshold first. Legislatures that have not yet developed the foundations for democracy and democratic performance require capacity building measures to strengthen their foundations. It would be futile to assess the quality of democracy in non-democratic institutions. The pyramid model does not require all legislatures above singularity to replicate structures or functions before being considered in a comparative performance framework (just as there are bound to be differences in organisational structure and culture among all well performing institutions). It would be significant if legislatures manage to meet most requirements but they must all have the foundations of consolidation and the organisational capacity required to perform above the democratic threshold.

Focusing on organisational theories in the study of legislative institutions, will allow us to account for the interdependencies between the institutional and environmental factors together with the organisational structures that affect the legitimacy of a political system as well as its governability, representativeness and rationality of the whole system under study (Olsen 1983:9). In this way, it becomes easy to see how any model that plans to assess performance in

Even though non-democratic institutions may also function as organisations, their functions and behaviour would be different from democratic organisations and so the performance should be assessed using different indicators and methods.
legislatures should bear similarities with organisational models first. Organisational theory also takes into account the constant interaction between the organisation and its environment in an effort to remain an equilibrium state. A performance model should allow an organisation to be flexible and dynamic to pick and choose those factors that are strongly related to the maintenance and improvement of the system that is in constant interaction with the environment. The following chapter will focus on the external legislative environment and how its interaction affects the performance of the legislature.
Chapter 5: Assessment by Citizens

5-1 Introduction:

Following on from the previous discussion on democracy and development, this chapter will consider only political systems that are above the threshold for consolidated democracy\(^1\) (or singularity in the Cusp Catastrophe model of chapter four). One of the advantages of considering this group of countries is that there is often more (time series) credible data available on them which has frequently been analysed in peer reviewed research. The research carried out on these countries mainly show that these countries share more common core democratic features and functions than the ones below the threshold for consolidated democracies. Political systems belonging to the first group of countries have successfully managed to meet the requirements of active democracies (which is to say not all of them necessarily are) and their differences lie mainly in the balance achieved between active citizens and political institutions, within the structural and cultural boundaries of each nation.

A political system may be considered as a pattern of feedback relations regardless of having any type of supra-unit centripetal mechanism (Etzioni 1968: \(205\))

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\(^1\) As mentioned, the purpose of this research is not to investigate democratic prerequisites of consolidated democracy. Such work would require a large project with involving many researchers and man hours which cannot be done in the scale of this research. The intention is to extend the idea of democratic threshold to reveal the (broad) difference in democratic performance different countries on either side, and to show democracy is a gradual process and democratisation forms a continuum requiring gradual and continual development. This continuum does not determine any kind of benchmark or standard to point to a 'good' or 'bad' democracy. It has a beginning but not an end.
Stable consolidated democracies are in a steady state of equilibrium due to a continuous process of feedback relating to inputs from the citizens, outputs of governors, and the response that citizens make to government outputs (Easton 1965). To maintain the state of equilibrium, the political system must become responsive to the feedback it receives. Some definitions of democracy identify responsiveness as a fundamental feature of the system. For instance Michael Saward defines democracy as the ‘Necessary correspondence between acts of governance and equally weighted interests of citizens with respect to those acts’ (Saward 1998, 51). In this definition, responsiveness of the central political power system to the interests of the people is of central importance for maintaining stability in the system and is a top-down reaction to the bottom-up concerns of active citizens. Responsiveness serves by not only empowering citizens and acting as a qualitative transformation of different forms of subjectivity, but also by quantitatively increasing the strength and capacity of governance (Dean 1999). The issue of legitimacy becomes pivotal for the survival of the system and its performance. If the system operates without reflecting the interests of the people, then it risks losing the confidence and trust it needs to work democratically.

Non-democratic countries may also be responsive and usually respond very quickly to any form of expression from the subunits (sometimes violently) if they do not manage to block dissent before it surfaces. However, they do not seem to be flexible like democracies and cannot afford not to use coercive power to rule. In order to achieve activeness, along with modernisation, these societies must reach consolidation by becoming more representative, reducing state control (less police control and more civil rights) and allowing for consensus formation within its political groups. Etzioni believes that if these countries manage to make such reforms, their transitions to democracy are more smoothly achieved once other conditions are ripe (Etzioni 1968: 520-524). There are many examples to support this claim as in South-East Asia and Eastern European countries in recent history.
The legitimacy of the political system is a direct reflection of support for its institutions which according to David Easton (1965) and Michael Mezey (1979) lend certain predictability to policy making strength and political stability within the democratic system. Mezey defines support as ‘Attitudes that look to legislatures as a valued and popular institution’ (Mezey 1979, 1990: 156). Both Mezey and Easton believe that conceptual attitudes and values are an important, if not the most important, source of legitimacy of the regime and regime support. Hence legitimacy derives from:

'the conviction on the part of the member that it is right and proper for him to accept and obey the authorities and to abide by the requirements of the regime....[legitimacy] is not contingent on specific inducements or rewards of any kind, except in the very long run...if there is a strong inner conviction of the moral validity of the authorities or regime, support may persist even in the face of repeated deprivations attributed to the outputs of the authorities or their failure to do so'  

(Easton 1965: 278)

This type of ‘diffuse support’ or ultimate support allows a system to ‘weather the many storms when outputs cannot be balanced off against the inputs of demand’ (Easton 1965: 273). For Easton (1975: 448) legitimacy and trust are

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4 Diffused Support according to Easton’s definition ‘is a kind of support that a system does not have to buy with more or less direct benefits for the obligations and responsibilities the member incurs...the outputs here may be considered psychic or symbolic and in this sense, they may offer the individual immediate benefits strong enough to stimulate a supportive response’ (Easton 1965: 273)
two types of diffuse regime support that contribute to system maintenance and the persistence of democracy. However it is obvious from the previous chapter that many legislatures cannot be very effective as instruments for active system maintenance and their performance could not be sufficient for the persistence of democracy. Even though they may contribute to support, they do not signal the legitimacy of the regime. Thus as Mezey (1979) suggests, diffuse support for political institutions such as the legislature contributes to the broader kind of allegiant political culture which can only be built with long term support and confidence in the legitimacy of successive policies. In other words only established democracies with a history of gradual build-up of diffuse support could enjoy high levels of congruent and allegiant attitudes towards the political system as a whole. This claim will be examined throughout this chapter.

Since diffuse support is a behavioural and cultural phenomenon that is nested within a set of supportive attitudes toward all political institutions that make up the political system, it is important to have an idea of the structural characteristics of these principles in addition to cultural values and norms of the system. Diffuse support will increase only if citizens perceive these structures as commensurate with their generally accepted values and norms. Inevitably the congruence between citizens and the state and the support given to the state by citizens will differ and be of various sources, even among consolidated democratic systems. However, these levels should be systematically related in a manner which is crucial to the functioning of democracy in any country and is the core to the maintenance and improvement of legitimacy and democratic quality of system as a whole.
Thus the prerequisite of legitimation and democratic stability of a system is that its citizens accept the (culturally embedded) values by which it is legitimised. This prerequisite does not exist in many political systems below singularity of the cusp catastrophe model in chapter three, since there is often a lack of congruency between the structures and the cultural values held by the citizens. The prerequisite of a successful legitimisation process is that citizens accept the values upon which the system is legitimised.

Furthermore, a political system becomes more legitimate, and more stable, when there is greater congruence between structure and culture (Almond and Powell 1978, Fuchs 1989, 1995). Naturally then, the rise in human development and the quality of democracy among developed democracies should increase legitimacy for representative political institutions. Mezey has argued that diffuse support over the long run, is related to specific support since successive policy making over an extensive period of time produces diffuse support and the continuation of this support with regime persistence will engender supportive attitudes among citizens toward the system as a whole (Mezey 1979). But on the other hand many empirical studies, particularly of developed democracies tend to suggest the opposite or a crisis following a downturn in political support among citizens. This paradox will be investigated in the next section and throughout this chapter.
Consolidated democratic norms expect more active involvement from the citizens than non-democratic order because democracy includes the aggregation of public preferences into binding collective decisions. Almond and Verba believe that such an aggregation necessarily requires an active citizenry because it is through interest articulation information and deliberation that public preferences can be identified, shaped and transformed into collective decisions that are considered as legitimate (Almond and Verba 1968, 1989: 13). A participatory political system of this kind also requires a political culture that is consistent with it. Almond (1980: 28) uses Easton’s (1965, 1975) analysis of the political system to define its culture:

‘The system culture of a nation would consist of the distributions of attitudes toward the national community, the regime and the authorities to use David Easton’s formulation. This would include the sense of national identity, attitudes toward the legitimacy of the regime and its various institutions and attitudes toward the legitimacy and effectiveness of the incumbents of the various political roles.’

This definition contains citizen attitudes towards the political community as well as the relationship among themselves. Hence congruence with the regime structure and a commitment to democratic values within the democratic system is pivotal to the persistence of the political system and its legitimacy. Furthermore the political culture must be derived from the attitudes of citizens...
on a normative basis (not coercion) following an internalisation of democratic processes within society.

*The Civic Culture* uses a broadened concept of political culture through which the ‘relationship between attitudes and motivations of the discrete individuals who make up the political systems and the character and performance of political systems may be discovered systematically’ (Almond and Verba 1968, 1989: 32). The theory is a product of democracy (Barry 1978: 51-52) and provides implications for the performance and stability of the political system once democracy exists. It presupposes that subjectively oriented citizens are necessarily active (Almond and Verba 1968, 1089:190) and participation is the result of a sense and ability to participate along with the individual’s allegiance to the system and is a reflection of the evaluation of the legitimacy and effectiveness of the system (ibid 191). The assumption is that those who participate in decisions will be more satisfied with political decisions and will be more supportive of the system. The system responds to inputs from the citizens and produces beneficial outputs that in turn lead to more effective outcomes in terms of satisfaction and system support. Hence from the point of view of active participants the system becomes effective and legitimate. The active citizen in democracies has satisfaction and trust in individuals and institutions. Trust at this level reflects satisfaction with the legitimacy of the system and to use Easton’s analogy, refers to the qualities (not performance) of the people occupying authoritative positions at a certain time (Easton 1975: 449).
In this view, active citizens are intrinsic elements of the democratic system who have knowledge and awareness to state their positions on an autonomous basis without submitting themselves into relationships of dependence or becoming patronised. Active citizens have been described by Judith Shklar (1991) as citizens who:

'Keep informed and speak out against public measures that they regard as unjust, unwise or just too expensive. They openly support politics that they regard as just and prudent. Although they do not refrain form pursuing their own and their reference groups interest, they try to weigh the claims of other people impartially and listen to their arguments...they are public meeting goers and join voluntary organisations who discuss and deliberate with others about politics that will effect them all.'

(Shklar, 1991: 5)

Compared to inactive or passive citizens who, according to Almond and Verba, have low subjective competence, active citizens are regarded to be self-confident who follow and discuss politics, are active partisans though likely to be more satisfied with their role in society (Almond and Verba 1968, 1989: 205). Most significantly active citizens are regarded as being more favourably disposed toward the performance of the political system and generally having more positive orientations towards it. Although activists are usually portrayed as not having a favourably disposition toward political decisions, Almond and Verba have argued this is because satisfaction generally takes three different types. Satisfaction is towards the structure of political influence; satisfaction to the structure of governmental output; and the more diffuse type of satisfaction or the diffuse orientation to the political system as a whole (Almond and Verba 1968,
1989: 192). However, while the first and second types of satisfaction would vary with system performance, the third type is relatively stable and unrelated to specific output in the short run. The diffuse orientation is argued to enable the system to weather a crisis in its performance and survive. This is not to say that dissatisfaction with government performance over time will not lead to a decline in legitimacy of the political system, but as Easton suggests (1965), under such conditions and over time, the regime and the political system as well as the society it sustains could be threatened.

Another characteristic of the active citizen is personal efficacy which Holdon (1988: 327) calls an ‘inherent virtue’ of democracy. Citizens, who are more competent, knowledgeable, skilful and efficient, tend to evaluate politics using more demanding standards. A core element of this efficacy is the individual’s self-image as an active and influential participant in the society. Politically efficacious citizens are seen as comprehending, controlling and mastering their political environments (Gabriel 1995: 359). Hence the concept of political efficacy relates to the input component of the political system, regarding citizens as able and willing to participate.

Inglehart (1977, 1990) believes that there has been a shift in citizen attitudes and values as the result of human development in advanced industrial democracies and post-modern or post-material changes even though the political structures have remained the same. Post-materialists are more politically active, more articulate and are able to increasingly make demands to the system which require responsiveness. Whereas materialists generally perceive all political institutions
to be more responsive to their interests, post-materialists fault dominant social actors for rejecting their alternative values. This shift has made the position of political elites difficult as mass publics become increasingly critical of their political leaders and increasingly likely to engage in elite challenging activities (Inglehart 1999: 250).

Inglehart (1977, 1990) maintains that changes to post-materialist citizens as the natural consequence of economic development and the development of the modern welfare state in developed democracies, has led to increased citizen interest in new values dealing with the quality of life. Individuals have become less concerned with material wealth and more concerned with issues such as the environment and the pursuit of personal interests. Previous satisfaction with the responsiveness of democratic institutions creates a ratchet effect with citizens demanding more responsiveness and satisfaction to individual needs. If institutions cannot adapt quickly to deal with the demands or lack resources, then there is a rise in dissatisfaction with the government and other political institutions. In other words, post-materialists increasingly take the older values for granted bringing ‘new, more diverse and demanding standards to the evaluation of political life and confront political leaders with more active, articulate citizens’ (Inglehart 1997, 297-8). Such demands put a strain on political institutions to perform.

In consolidated democracies, active citizens require active political institutions. Modernisation is not sufficient for activeness (Etzioni 1968: 5). So on the one hand, active citizens or post-materialists in developed democratic states appear
to resist control from government. On the other hand, they want a strong political structure capable of being decisive, responsive and flexible to their demands. In this regard resistance does not necessarily take a negative form indicating any kind of immediate threat or crisis. Rather it reflects the need to include broader citizen involvement (engagement) in political issues (policy making) and is considered as the strength of a developed democracy. Democratic states are strengthened through their interaction with the society by persuading (not coercing) active citizen without losing legitimacy and support. Etzioni (1968: 513) argues that a high level of political flexibility creates a close ‘fit’ between the distributions for political and social power. Political power is control over the state and other macro-level political organisations, whereas social power is distributed among active citizens and groups.

In Etzioni’s view a transition to an active society requires a closer ‘parallelism’ between society and state, a more flexible and responsive polity which in turn allows societal guidance to be less centralised and to decrease greatly the reliance on coercion as compared to the situation in post-modernist states (Etzioni 1968: 517). New values are adopted through the interaction between the state and the active citizens. The direction of this interaction between the political institutions and active citizens is indefinite and changeable. However, it can be assumed that the causal direction of this transfer moves top-down in more established democracies where people’s orientations are shaped in a sustained way by socioeconomic forces from above (Ingelhart 1977, 1990). Whereas in newly established democracies and democratising system which have a growing involvement of civil society, the causal direction is more likely to move from
below (Mishler and Rose 2002). The quality of democracy itself in developed post-industrial societies depends on the active balance between the autonomous sub units in the society and political structures. The causal model below depicts the interaction between the active citizen and the legitimacy of the state through the performance of political institutions, and in particular the legislature.

![Causal Model](image)

**figure 5-1: Legislative performance in active democracies**

The figure above shows the linkages between active performance of a collective political institution, in this case the performance of the legislature with the individual performance of active citizens and how the relationship leads to diffuse support in the political system as a whole. The allocation of responsiveness appears as the most important concern for legislative performance in developed democracies. Legislative responsiveness has been linked directly to the quality of democracy and rising confidence in the system.
that ultimately leads to the main goal of system support and the maintenance and gradual improvement of legitimacy.

Responsiveness of the legislature is enhanced through its main functions or intrinsic democratic values: equality, representation, accountability and efficacy. These values are linked to other values of an institutional nature and are eventually linked to personal or psychological values that are also intrinsic to democracy though from the perspective of active citizens. As mentioned there are no arrows to show the direction of these linkages because in post-modern established democracies their relationship is not strictly top-down (Dahl 1971) or strictly bottom-up (Cohen 1989, Fishkin 1991). Indeed it is possible to have simultaneous top-down and bottom-up relationships due to the flexibility of political institutions and the unpredictably of the environment.

According to this framework, support for active legislatures in developed democracies cannot be maintained only using Mezey's three indicators of support, namely institutional continuity; public attitudes towards government leaders and elites; or corruption (Mezey 1979, 1990: 157-8). Neither is support for active legislatures maintained by account of their policy power (capacity to legislate) or how they perform budgetary obligations, provide oversight, and ratify international treaties as no doubt all developed legislatures are capable of all such things. Rather performance in such legislatures should be measured by how well they manage to maintain and improve on responsiveness, the quality of democracy, and confidence in the institution which builds legitimacy and support for the system as a whole. In an ideal scenario, the active citizen would
have personal satisfaction with his/her performance (psychological value) and satisfaction with the performance of democratic institutions leading to rising democratic quality and inevitably to system legitimacy and support for the system as a whole which adds to the stability and persistence of the system (Easton 1965, 1975).

5-3 The Threat to Support in Democracies

A number of scholars investigating the cause of declining trust and confidence in the political system have identified the decline in the performance of representative democratic institutions as a main reason for the loss of trust (Easton 1975, Putnam, Pharr and Dalton 2000, Katzenstein 2000). The cause and effect linkage model of legislative performance (figure 5-1) shows that performance is not an independent value and the fact that the two values at the top and bottom of the framework are linked together through a set of other interrelating values shows the significance of each value for the whole of the system. In other words each value has to be met before moving up or down to the next value indicating there must be good, if not significant, correlations among the dimensions of support.

But as Mezey has pointed out, studies show that there is either a very small or insignificant correlation between the dimensions of support, specifically, voting turnout and support; efficacy and support; or voting duty and support (1979, 1990: 162). In Easton’s terms (1965) such weak correlations could be caused by
using inappropriate measurements or because institutional confidence as a measure of support for the political regime is more important for our understanding of political stability than measures of support for authorities which are volatile. Mezey also believes these inconsistencies are the result of measurement problems since the concept of diffuse support is too abstract a term to measure and because it measures support in terms of people’s reaction and perceptions to hypothetical situations (ibid). To avoid this problem, Mezey suggests making a distinction between expectations and diffuse support. Expectations are basically public views about the performance of institutions, hence being more concrete and empirically measurable.

Some of the more recent studies of democracy and support also stress distinguishing between trust in people and confidence in institutions (Giddens 1990: 83-8, Newton 2007: 344-345). This line of reasoning has become acceptable since one can observe that citizens in democratic societies are increasingly trusting people around them whom they have personal knowledge about, but do not trust political institutions as such. Whereas trust or confidence in institutions such as parliament or political parties is not static and usually based on how citizens perceive their performance at a given time. Legislatures for instance, are based on rules and procedures within the political sphere which carries with them greater risks and unpredictability compared to the face-to-face relations of personal (social) trust. Newton (1999: 179) argues political trust is thinner than social trust because of increasing risk and unpredictability of political trust and it is getting more so under the pressures of modern political
life. Thus trust and confidence in political institutions are not stable but changeable depending on the responsiveness of the institutions themselves.

Since post-materialists are more active than before, in order to survive, political institutions and politicians have reacted by becoming more responsive to keep up with this demand. In spite of this, studies carried out in developed democracies using world values data shows that post-materialists do not have high levels of trust because they consider their political leaders unresponsive (Gabriel 1995: 375). The reason for this according to Newton (1999: 180) seems to be that social and political trust are related to different sets of social, economic and political variables. His empirical analysis of a number of developed democracies has suggested that indicators such as age, education and income are often related to variations in social and political trust (though results vary from country to country). Moreover political distrust could trigger a lack of political support for politicians and organisations. And despite a feeling of personal efficacy, the active citizen could become less engaged and participative. Inglehart (1990: 306) has expected ‘the impact of post-materialism to be weakest on voting behaviour....and relatively strong support for social change’.

A study by Kulmin (2007) on the relationship between satisfaction with the performance of welfare institutions and political trust in fifteen European societies has shown that dissatisfaction with public health services and education is negatively correlated with political trust, but is unrelated to general welfare

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5 Political support according to Easton (1975: 436) 'refers to the way in which a person evaluatively orients himself to an object through his attitude'
state support. This phenomenon has caused, in several cases, a significant impact on voting behaviour and the probability of voting for a government party. Dissatisfaction at the political level does not undermine the general support for civil society. In other words political dissatisfaction in advanced democracies is not because people want a change in the political system as a whole but shows that they are not happy with the way it performs and require higher quality of democracy (Dalton 2004; Klingemann and Fuchs, 1995; Norris 1999; Thomassen 2007).

Since active citizens have more self confidence in their personal efficacy and wellbeing, and as economic development increasingly shifts interests from previous collective issues toward new issues dealing with the individual’s quality of life (Inglehart 1990, 1997), it is argued that the modern voter apart from pursuing his or her own interests (issue voting rather as opposed to package voting) is becoming more disengaged and disconnected with political institutions, and as a result has become more demanding and critical of the performance of political institutions and demands higher standards of efficacy (Norris 1999, Halman 2007). Incompetent and inefficacious political institutions have often been cited as the primary reason for the decline in democratic performance and the disparity between public expectations of government performance and the actual ability of the state to perform due to political and

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7 The concept of political efficacy was introduced into empirical research by Campbell, Gurin and Miller (1954: 187) with this definition: ‘Sense of political efficacy may be defined as the feeling that individual political action does have or can have, an impact upon the political process, i.e. that it is worth while to perform one’s civic duties. It is the feeling that political and social change is possible and that the individual citizen can play a part in bringing about this change’. 

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While this kind of dissatisfaction is very high in developing countries and as McAllister (1999) shows that developed democracies do not rate government incompetence as badly, there is a modest, but constant relationship between support for political institutions and subjective economic satisfaction. The more that post-materialists perceive political institutions to be inefficient and unresponsive, the more critical they become of such institutions, while at the same time becoming less attached to them. Less attachment in developed democracies does not signal passiveness (as it would in countries below democratic consolidation) but more critical and active citizens. Unlike the unconsolidated democracies, the overloading of the state by citizen demands in consolidated democracies would not indicate any immediate crisis as dissatisfaction with the democratic process will not be generalised to apply to the structures of democracy itself. As Klingemann and Fuchs (1995: 6) note, ‘Western democracies have a reserve of legitimation at the structural level which provides a significant buffer against the shortfall in performance at the process level’.

However this is not to say that legitimation is not threatened by performance shortfalls, and constant dissatisfaction with political processes in consolidated democracies, but that a catastrophe would be highly improbably (but not impossible) and require long-term shortfalls in institutional responsiveness and incongruence between institutional values and the shifting preferences of the
post-materialist value priorities. Thus low levels of confidence in political institutions should be read as an indicator that something is going wrong but it does not necessarily reflect a threat to the legitimacy of the system. Legitimacy would be threatened only if the public was losing trust and at the same time should start increasing support for alternatives to existing institutions which is doubtful since no such viable alternative exists (Klingemann and Fuchs 1995, Listhaug and Wiberg 1995). The threat of performance deficit is examined further below.

5-4 Performance Deficit and the Crisis of Consolidated Democracies

Since the performance of political institutions in representative democracies, and parliaments as the key institutions of representative democracies in particular, depend so much on satisfaction from below, then it is believed that dissatisfaction and distrust in the performance of parliament and its representatives would in the long-term pose a threat to the legitimacy and support for the democratic system in general (Crozier et al, 1975). Evidence from comparative studies of representative democracies suggests that despite the fact that evaluations of regime performance and trust in individuals vary substantially from one country to another, it can be generally assumed that political support for the core institutions of representative democracy (parties, parliaments and government) has fallen (Norris 1999). The challenge for consolidated representative democracies is not about replacing existing institutions for higher performing institutions (as alternatives are not available)
but according to Fuchs, Guidorossi and Svensson (1995: 325-6) ‘to reform and enrich them through forms of direct democracy in favour of the active citizens’.

According to Easton, a political system can persist only if stress\(^8\) is kept under a critical rate through improving performance of the elements within the system. This could only be manageable via feedback loops linked to the system from the environment. Easton believed that by controlling its endogenous stress the political system is able to become predictable and persistent. Stress to a system is produced by increase in demands from below which could lead to a lack of political support (Easton, 1965: 127-8). However stress is not always prevalent but as Easton maintains under the conditions of stable democracies, citizens distinguish that their institutional structures and their values correspond with each other in their country and thus develop strong support for the system or a sense of legitimacy which contributes to a ‘reservoir of good will’ (Easton 1975: 444). This leads citizens to accept performance deficits for a while but in the long run could cause a crisis for diffuse system support (Easton, 1975: 445).

The idea of a potential crisis in democracy as a result of intrinsic and endogenous threats and challenges to the political system is a theme also shared by Crozier, Huntington and Watanuki (1975), who also blame the performance deficit of political institutions as a result of them becoming overwhelmed with so many diverse demands from citizens; weak political leadership; and incompetence in failing to effectively plan for economic and social development.

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\(^8\) Stress to a system was produced by demands and a lack of support from the environment. The way that the system could respond and reduce stress would depend on the quality of information coming into the system and the system’s determination to act upon it (Easton, 1965: 128).
The limited capacity of the state to respond and select between citizen demands in addition to structural features of representative democracies which encourage an often unnecessary party competition aimed at disqualifying policy for no other reason than partisanship also becomes a threat to the legitimacy of the system and may produce dissatisfaction with the system of representative democracy. Furthermore they argue that such intrinsic threats are unavoidable as the system becomes more democratic. Hence democracies must learn to avoid, moderate or live with the contextual challenges facing them by educating the citizen about the structures and processes of the state (Crozier et al, 1975: 8).

Yet as already mentioned, the political system is not as predictable as Easton or Crotzier and his colleagues have assumed. Moreover as Norris (1999) argues, active democratic citizens do manage to distinguish between the different levels of the regime, and are often seen as strongly supporting certain democratic values while becoming highly critical of the way the democratic government works in practice. Contrary to arguments of crisis, Norris sees no evidence that prolonged government deficit in developed democracies has created a loss of diffuse system support over a lengthy period of time. Rather, the active citizens are able to make clear judgements about different institutions within the regime and express confidence in a certain political institutions whose performance seems adequate while at the same time show distrust in other kinds of institution and still maintain confidence in the system as a whole (ibid). Hence the performance deficit of political institutions such as parliaments poses a challenge to diffuse support rather than a crisis.
Both ideas of crisis or challenge to democracy are centred on the assumption of performance deficits in political institutions of developed democracies to be the result of inadequate responsiveness of the political institutions of the state to general or specific demands from the citizens in those systems. Fuchs, Guidorosi and Svensson (1995; 326-327) believe that such deficit is affected by three factors:

- **Dissatisfaction** - The more intense the dissatisfaction, and the longer its duration, the more likely it is generalised.

- **Effective Government/Opposition** – Effectiveness depends on whether the dissatisfied may assume that at least one opposition party might perform better than the ruling party or parties and that this opposition party has a real chance of participating in the government in the foreseeable future.

- **Legitimation** – System legitimacy based on fundamental values of democracy to the extent that its citizens believe that the structural arrangements correspond with fundamental democratic values.

According to Fuchs et al (1995: 325), despite a slight threat to the erosion of legitimacy of Western democratic institutions, a crisis or challenge to democracy has never materialised because there is no credible alternative to democracy. This central theme that the changing of citizens’ values in developed democracies has resulted in the erosion of respect and legitimacy for authority by reducing public confidence in political institutions has been mentioned by many
and is the central idea in all contributions to the *Crisis of Democracy* (Norris 1999). In such societies there is general agreement that post-materialists or active citizens are increasingly showing more social confidence in fellow citizens and civil society institutions while becoming more sceptical of the functions of hierarchical political institutions, or as Dalton (2000: 261) puts it, ‘legitimacy based on inclusion is replacing legitimacy based on hierarchical authority’. However, as results from studies of political satisfaction in developed democracies show, more than three quarters of the public in such countries accept that democracy is the most legitimate form of government and support democracy as an ideal (Dalton 2000: 262-3).

A study of public dissatisfaction in the 1980s carried out by Fuchs et al (1995) reveal that the problem was less to do with an overload of government responsiveness to certain demands but the result of post-materialist value change. They argue that representative democracies in the West were not structurally able to process new citizen demands adequately generating dissatisfaction and that structural reform proposals which could be regarded as a credible alternative may also constitute a challenge to the system (ibid). Using Eurobarometer data from the 1970s and 1980s, they show that 90% of the respondents (95% in most countries, including newer democracies) in Western democracies support the idea of democracy in general and the principle commitment to the idea of democracy is almost universal. Although active support for democracy as a form of government is only 70% which is slightly lower, it is nowhere near a crisis level, but a cause for concern.
Putnam, Pharr and Dalton (2000: 23-24) present a model for explaining the change or decline in public trust in developed democracies. They believe that public satisfaction with representative institutions is a result of information that is exposed to citizens and is the criteria by which the public evaluate government, politics and the actual performance of the institutions. According to this model, the decline in public satisfaction depends on three variables. Firstly changes to the accuracy and comprehensiveness of information on political institutions as a result of modernisations and the public become increasingly better informed. Secondly changes to public criteria for evaluation of politics and government which poses a challenge to institutions to catch up and adapt to evolving public standards. Thirdly there may be an actual deterioration of performance in representative institutions which will depend on how performance is assessed and objectively measured.

Studies of political support in developed democracies usually take into consideration three sources of public dissatisfaction or disillusionment: politicians, political parties and political institutions. Although these trends vary in developed democracies depending on the culture and history of the system which influences how the public view their politicians, political parties and institutions, there is an overall declining pattern of public trust and confidence in all these countries (ibid). The overall assumption is that the more disparity that exists between citizens' support for democracy and their moral assessment that they give to their politicians, parties and political institutions, the less support there is for the political community and dissatisfaction with its performance.
Dissatisfaction with political elites, although quite prevalent in developing democracies, is not necessarily viewed as a sign of dissatisfaction with the performance of democracy in developed democracies (although variations in the levels of trust exist among developed democracies, active citizens tend to separate elite mismanagement or corruption from the democratic system). The evaluations of individual politicians or support for particular political parties is the most specific and short-term measure of political support (Dalton 1999: 59). Post-materialists generally do not show a high level of trust in politicians and political leaders and elites whom they mainly regarded as unresponsive (Gabriel 1995: 375). Although a decline in trust in politicians does not indicate a definitive decline in trust for political institutions, particularly many of the western European democracies, it would be more related to declining trust in representative institutions and has serious implications for support for political parties and the government, especially at times of economic crisis and uncertainties.

The decline in party identification and partisanship and party membership in post-industrial democracies (Dalton 2000, Scarrow 2000) as well as a decline in cleavage-based voting (Franklin et al. 1992) and electoral participation (Wattenberg 2000) are also taken to be the result of modernisation (Inglehart 1990, 1999) and cognitive mobilisation (Dalton 2000) in the society which indicate systematic and enduring structural change in the relationship between citizens and political parties in contemporary democracies.
The decrease in partisanship is generally greater among post-material citizens who are (compared to previous generations) younger, better educated, knowledgeable and politically sophisticated and who are interested in the political process but remain non-partisan and prefer to vote on issues rather than party platforms. According to Dalton, dissatisfaction in this regard does not imply dissatisfaction toward democracy and so cannot be systematically related to the weakening of party ties (Dalton 2000). Scarrow (2000) also cautions against signifying the general decline in party membership to weak party organisation (performance) since organisation does not need active membership and there is no factual evidence of a decline in party performance. Evidence of better party organisation is also central to Katz and Mair’s (1995) notion of cartel parties (discussed further in chapter six) where the parties within the legislature are strengthened by institutionalising government support (financial, electoral and organisational) at the price of insulating themselves from the public and weakening accountability.

It is argued that partisanship contributes to democracy by stabilising predictable, individual voting behaviour and a downturn in partisanship improves the electoral prospects for new parties contributing to the further fractionalisation of party systems but tends to complicate efficacy of government formulation process and coalition building (Schmitt and Holberg 1995: 100). From the citizen perspective, partisanship may contribute to the mobilisation of citizens in conventional political participation and strengthen individual party choice. It also seems to promote beliefs about legitimacy (depending on support for government party and its performance) and help integrate citizens into the
political order (ibid: 102-104). Participation in political campaigns and activities is generally higher when partisanship is stronger (Verba et al 1978) and the weakening or erosion of parties has usually been generalised into a hypothesis of partisan dealignment in developed democracies (Dalton et al, 1984; Dalton 1984, 2000; Inglehart 1990). This downturn in public dissatisfaction with parties does not indicate dissatisfaction with democracy, but rather evolving forms of democratic politics such as direct democracy and other forms of public influence in the policy making process (Fuchs et al. 1995).

The process of cognitive mobilisation as a result of declining participation in developed democracies allows citizens to become more active, increase their political sophistication and ability to deal with the complexities of politics (Dalton 2000: 32) and demands parties to adapt themselves to these changes to survive, similar to other service providing organisation. In this analogy voters are becoming more like savvy customers and instead of aligning themselves to a specific brand and regularly display their dissatisfaction with products through their process of selection.

5-5 Political Dissatisfaction with the Performance of Legislatures

The third source of political distrust and dissatisfaction as indicated by Putnam, Pharr and Dalton (2000) is the dissatisfaction with the performance of political institutions. In representative democracies, the most prevalent political institution is the legislature which links citizens and elites and maintains the balance between authority and responsiveness in developed democracies through
its accountability function. In order to assess the level of support for legislatures, one usually looks at the attitudes towards the institution from citizen surveys and polls. The performance of the legislature is influenced to some extent by the performance of the other two sources of dissatisfaction mentioned earlier (political elites and parties), but a drop in satisfaction for the legislature is generally considered to bring about a potential crisis to the democratic system as a whole.

For Mezey support for legislatures is linked to support of the policy-making process. This kind of support is a type of specific support which Easton (1965: 273) explains ‘flows from the favourable attitudes and predispositions stimulated by outputs that are perceived by members to meet their demands as they arise or in anticipation’. Mezey believes that increase in specific support over the long run will increase diffuse support. But as mentioned before, active citizens are also increasingly critical citizens and tend to show dissatisfaction with policies by reducing specific support, though not diffuse support.

From a political culture view (Almond and Verba 1963, Easton 1965) trust in institutions such as the legislature is a relatively stable characteristic of society, reflecting the socialisation of citizens into its dominant and prevalent norms. But this view of institutions is static and tends to exclude factors which might contribute to a change in the confidence levels of the mass public. Post-material priorities on the other hand are not static and relate to ‘physical sustenance and the quality of life’ (Inglehart 1990: 60). Thus support for political institutions such as parliaments, depends on the attitudes and values of individuals while
confidence in them will depend on ideological orientations of the public as well as the performance of the institution itself which Mezey defines as expectations (Mezey 1965, 1990: 163). According to Listhaug and Wiberg (1995: 301) as the economic role of the government expands in all sectors, it is likely that mass support for public institutions – parliament included – becomes increasingly sensitive to public expectations and an performance evaluations. This hypothesis is supported in empirical analysis of the more affluent OECD states by Ian McAllister (1999) who observes a modest decline in public confidence in parliaments and the civil service from 1981-1991.

But if the erosion of trust in the efficacy of political institutions, including the legislature, is inevitable with modernisation as Inglehart suggests, then the trend in dissatisfaction with performance in developed democracies is probably unstoppable since the growth in economic well being, education, health and other factors relating to human development is less likely to take a downward trend and so dissatisfaction will always persist to some extent depending on how institutions manage to adapt themselves to new demands. Empirical research directed at the analysis of the impact of education on trust by Döring (1990, 1992) show that this indicator bears only an indirect relationship and that higher education may not breed cynicism towards all types of institutions. Döring’s research contends that the higher educated will show an overall inclination towards low confidence in institutions, but they might 'place confidence in those institutions that criticise or punish rulers in case of breach of trust: the judiciary, the press, and possibly the parliament' (Döring 1992: 128). So Inglehart’s theory is probably less helpful in the study of legislative performance of long
established and persistent democracies, than it would be in explaining democratic performance in newly established democracies and democratising systems. Studies of the performance of the core political institutions of established democratic regimes, especially parliaments, show that they are adopting and evolving to meet the new challenges of the society rather than declining (Norris 1999).

At the micro level there is a significant indirect relationship between social trust and trust in parliaments in developed democracies. According to Newton and Norris (2000: 62) social trust helps build social capital and social capital in turn helps strengthen political institutions, the performance of which may improve citizen confidence. Though it is possible to imagine a government performing unsatisfactorily in spite of good institutions; it is difficult to imagine satisfactory government performance without effective institutions for making and implementing policies. Thus confidence in institutions is a good standard to assess regime performance. However their analysis of confidence in parliament in trilateral developed countries, shows that it has not fallen indicating concern but no crisis to democracy (ibid: 71) the reason is that although the relationship between social trust in government performance and the performance of legislatures is significant, it is weak. At the macro level, confidence in parliament is negatively related to political and economic measures such as government instability, inflation and unemployment (Listhaug and Wiberg 1995: 320).
Norris (1999) has studied the relationship between constitutional design and institutional trust in developed democracies and in particular whether certain types of constitutional arrangements generate stronger levels of institutional confidence than others. The study finds patterns of fluctuation in support which is suggested reflect the public’s overall evaluation of the performance of the political leaders and more generally, the ability of the administration to handle the economy (Norris 1999: 218). The more institutions succeed in meeting public expectations, the more they generate diffuse support towards the political regime in general, while no single (political, economic, cultural) variable is responsible for shaping overall attitudes of confidence in institutions (ibid). Over a long period of time the constitutional arrangements can be expected to shape our general orientations towards the political regime and be reflected in diffuse support for the system (ibid: 219). For example if citizens feel that the rules of the game allows the party they endorse to be elected to power, they are more likely to feel that the legislature is representative and it performs well.

But contrary to Lijphart’s (1969) consociational democracies thesis which he believes would produce higher levels of institutional trust by maximising the number of winners compared to majoritarian arrangements (winner-take-all), empirical analysis of trilateral democracies carried out by Norris (1999: 221) indicates that confidence is greater in countries with majoritarian rather than proportional electoral systems. Moreover institutional confidence is most likely to be highest in parliamentary democracies characterised by plurality electoral systems, two party or moderate multi party system and unitary states (ibid) and
confidence in the performance of political parties influences confidence in legislative performance.

5-6 Conclusion:

The focus on trust in advanced legislative institutions raises the question of whether low confidence levels should be seen as a threat to the legitimacy of the political system in general. The concept of legitimacy moves the analytical focus beyond specific support for particular parties, politicians, incumbents or certain institutions towards the measurement of legitimacy and improving democratic quality in advanced democratic systems. Trust and satisfaction in legislatures is not a sole measure of legitimacy but can be considered as a measure of legislative performance and its responsiveness to popular demand.

As the framework for legislative performance (figure 5-1) illustrates, legislative performance itself is linked not only to satisfaction of the legislature’s democratic functions but also satisfaction with the efficacy of the legislature in doing its job right. In order to improve responsiveness, legislatures must enhance the performance of their main functions in a balanced way. Maintaining responsiveness and the right balance between functions at the same time is a challenge for all developed legislative institutions. For example some may argue that the legislature, instead of worrying about making the majority happy, should focus instead on facilitating government to carry out policies for the future benefits to the system, but a sudden drive towards increasing efficacy of the
The legislative system may come at the price of reducing accountability or even representation which could cause further dissatisfaction and trust.

The depiction of active legislative performance (figure 5-1) places emphasis on an important theme that is crucial in the analysis of performance: political trust and confidence must be understood as a multi-dimensional phenomenon related to the ultimate goal of system support and is distinct from social trust or support (Easton 1965, 1975, Putnam 1993, Norris 1999). Easton’s analytical framework (1965, 1975) distinguishes between support for the community, and support for the regime and authorities. In this conception the regime constitutes the basic framework for governing the country. People do not pick and choose between different elements of the regime, approving of some parts while rejecting others. The consequence of such a system is that if the regime does not perform well in any of its functions, then support is lost. In other words regime support could only be maintained once all elements leading to it are maintained satisfactorily.

According to Dalton, ‘It is clear that contemporary democracies face new challenges and their future depend on the nature of the response...democracy must adapt to survive’ (Dalton 1988: 73). The problem for the relationship between the political system and the citizens is not in the emergence of these new demands but in the extent of responsiveness. In order to solve this problem and meet the demands of citizens, developed political institutions have oriented toward service providing organisations adopting frameworks of performance measurement to meet the requirements of service delivery.
System legitimacy is generally defined on the bases of democratic norms and values. Thus democracy as a cultural value is the standard by which democracy as a structure of institutions is evaluated by the citizens (Putnam 1993, Fuchs 2007). The prerequisite of a successful legitimisation process is the citizens' acceptance of democratic values. Thus a political system is more legitimate, the more stable it is and the more congruency that exists between the structure and the culture (Easton 1975, Almond and Powell 1978, Fuchs 1989, 1995). Empirical analysis of Western European Democracies show that, despite marked cultural difference among countries, there is extremely high levels of agreement with the idea of democracy indicating no such decline in legitimacy and system support, whether in the past three decades or in the foreseeable future (Fuchs et al, 1995: 350-1). Democracy is not under threat in developed democracies, rather as Inglehart (1999: 236) argues, the rise of the more critical and demanding citizen in post-modern societies have subjected authority figures and hierarchical institutions to more searching scrutiny than before, making governance more difficult than it used to be. This is not a threat to democracy but rather creates short-term dissatisfaction with the way politics works.

Unlike non-consolidated democracies in which the social and political components are not clear and conceptually distinct, citizens of developed democracies do distinguish between the two which is why they are able to show dissatisfaction with the representative political institutions such as parliaments, bureaucracies, legal system and the police but maintain a high regard for democratic regime. Whereas in less developed or developing democracies such dissatisfaction is potentially a cause for crisis, in democratic societies even at
time of economic pressure, political confidence could wane but even so, it would not contribute to a decline in the support for the way democracy works in general. Instead such decline in confidence would add to a healthy democracy by the creation of more critical citizens which aids gradual reform and improvement of the democracy.

In advanced democracies as governments have expanded their economic and welfare role into all sectors, mass support for all public institutions, including parliaments, is becoming increasingly dependent on how the public evaluates the performance of these government-led programmes. Evaluations of support for institutions are usually equated with institutional performance and are based on measures such as public opinion surveys. Performance evaluation of legislatures using these measures is more subjective and may involve factors that are not directly related to the performance of the institution itself (such as inflation, unemployment or immigration).

On the other hand finding objective measures of legislative performance like all institutions is quite challenging but none the less, necessary for performance measurement to succeed. One possible way of evaluating institutional performance which is supported by empirical evidence in organisational studies suggests a strong link between staff satisfaction and commitment with client satisfaction of the institution which inevitably increases citizen trust and confidence in the institution itself (Schneider 1993). Thus to improve legislative performance, and improve confidence in the institution, improving the satisfaction and commitment of members and staff to institutional performance is
crucial. The next chapter will discuss the challenge further and take a closer look at how performance measurement frameworks such as the Balanced Scorecard has been incorporated into legislative systems to improve on their performance.
Chapter 6: How Parliaments Assess Their Performance

6-1 Introduction: Overriding Functions for Assessment

This chapter will study the assessment of performance in the developed legislatures of consolidated democratic systems. Previous chapters show that only developed legislatures above this threshold have managed to incorporate the two separate concepts of excellence and democracy and have reached the potential for measuring democratic performance while other legislatures are still strengthening these concepts and have yet to relate the two systematically. The term excellence often used in performance management terminology, implies superior performance, usually built on merit. Thus excellent performance will be the distinctive quality of legislatures above singularity (catastrophe model, chapter four), separating them from the performance of lesser developed systems (in terms of democratic capacity building) of a similar kind. Although democracy denotes equality, and all things within the system to be treated equally, the concept does not appear to have the same weight among countries on the two separate sides of singularity.

As shall be discussed in this chapter, democratic quality and performance of developed legislatures are synonymous in democratic governance systems and legislatures are the medium through which political discourse starting from civil society is funnelled (Habermas 1996). Thus, if democratic quality can be assessed in a system, then so too can legislative performance and this chapter
intends to look into existing frameworks whereby performance management techniques are used to assess legislative organisational performance\(^1\).

Chapter four also recognises the fact that democracy cannot be spoon-fed to nations on the assumption that globalisation or humanitarian intervention will bring about a spill over effect on individual countries around the world. The foundations of democracy must be established well before any such move can proceed successfully. Even with the democratic institutions in place, there is no guarantee that such institutions would perform the same as the models they have been taken from.

The fundamental aim of legislatures in the area above the democratic threshold is to maintain stability in their systems (or system maintenance and keeping democratic governance at an equilibrium state) while continuously trying to excel. In other words, democratic performance in developed political systems must include continuous improvements in all layers of active society and maintain a high level of participation, alleviate all forms of poverty and maintain legitimacy in the democratic system as well as create the ground for continual

\(^1\) It should be emphasised again that even to assume all legislatures can assess performance using the same indicators would be a big error of judgment and contrary to the catastrophe model in chapter four. The gap in governance is so too great that even to assume that the same functions are carried out by similar institutions and bear similar performance outputs for all their citizens would be a miscalculated assumption. Unfortunately this gap in governance is getting larger in some parts of the world despite legislative institutions in place and economic growth and in some cases, particularly resource rich developing countries, growth has outstripped development making it harder to justify the lack of democratic development. Chapter four is only an attempt to limit the number of legislatures for performance measurement purpose, but also show that these discrepancies exist and should be addressed.
growth in human development. To do this legislatures need to maintain and improve performance of the political system by increasing their own performance in regards to their functions of representation (legitimating the political system and maintaining trust and credibility); oversight (increasing accountability and transparency and professionalism) and accessibility (improving information and education). This chapter will consider some particular cases of legislative performance management.

One major difficulty in comparative assessment of performance in legislatures in established democracies relates to the different styles of legislative organisation. Undoubtedly measuring performance will depend on each particular legislature’s institutional design and constitutional structure, as well as taking into consideration political and cultural differences. A presidential system will not perform with the same variables of a parliamentary model and a parliamentary system that uses a proportional representation electoral model will not bear the same outcomes as a first past the post style voting system. To reduce complication, any comparative performance framework will inevitably be narrowed down to consider the overriding and most common functions of all legislatures in maintaining and gradual improvement of democratic governance. Since democratic legislatures above singularity are becoming more similar in sharing common goals and democratic values due to impacts such as globalization and regional cooperative treaties, it could be argued that factors

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2 This study has assumed that developed legislatures already have mechanisms to improve performance and enhance the quality of their budgetary function.
such as geography, culture, economic growth and historical issues could become secondary with regards to performance measurement.

In dealing with legislative performance measurement it must be reemphasised here that ‘legislative capacity’ and ‘legislative performance’ are separate concepts. Such stress is necessary to avoid confusion of mistaking legislative strength or its potential power with its performance or systematic output (Arter 2006a: 245). Thus, policy power is not definitive of legislative performance and what is at stake is not if the legislature has the power to make or influence political decisions but rather how it can optimize its already existing potential and maximize outputs and whether it is performing successfully in delivering the outputs. The final assessment will be on the performance of the legislature in terms of maintaining and improving the system it has been created to support.

This chapter consists of two parts. The first part will inquire about the mechanisms available to political systems above the consolidated democratic threshold that allows them to perform with the certain degree of observable and distinct democratic quality. The emphasis is on the role of legislatures, as complex democratic organisations, improving their democratic quality. However, as legislatures interact within a system, there is no escape from the fact that their immediate and non-immediate environments must be included in any type of legislative performance framework. It is important to include all actors, the assessors and the assessed, in the process of performance measurement in order to increase the likelihood of the final outcome ‘the maintenance and improvement of the legitimacy of the democratic system’.
Once the intrinsic values are in place, it is possible to quantify or apply metrics and the prospects of democratic performance measurement models in legislative systems become achievable. The second part of this chapter consists of case studies which assess the attempt to incorporate performance measurement into legislative institutions. It must be noted that any attempt to assess the ultimate success of legislative performance will be dependent on how such frameworks are implemented requiring a certain amount of organisational change, which will take time and dedication. Thus, the cases studied in the second part of this chapter cannot be representative for all legislative assemblies in mature democracies, but may be demonstrative of how certain performance models have been applied and what kind of implications may be expected as a result.

6-2 Part I: Active Democratic Performance

Using insights from institutional theory, performance has generally been defined when elites dominate an organisation; a high degree of professionalism exists; and the organisation pursues a technical function where its outputs can be measurable. However, as Meyer and Zucker (1989, 11-12) have argued, performance will be construed much more broadly if:

'[T]he norm of participative democratic governance operates, sometimes in the formal structure or rules of the organisation [;]...the interests of multiple constituencies are given recognition [;]... the organisation’s functions are non-technical and outputs elude measurement'
This argument conflicts, to a degree, with the perceived definition of performance measurement. But its significance is in the emphasis it places on a distinct corporative view in performance management and the fact that, to perform well all organisations\(^3\) are dependent on the interests and values of multitude stakeholders. It is important to create a balance between various stakeholders as tilting towards one constituency or group of stakeholders will reduce the chances of any organisation to meet the objectives of its other stakeholders and this would in effect reduce the chances of performance reaching the long-term goal of system survival. Stakeholders in political systems above democratic consolidation will more or less share common values which as a result reduces interest options. Nevertheless a variation of interests will still exist. An optimising performance management system in such circumstance will be required to bring about consensus among stakeholders as democratic performance cannot be reduced to a zero-sum assumption of power from the central authority (government) but rather a cohesive governing unit that acts to improve performance of the system as a whole\(^4\).

\(^{3}\) As already mentioned in previous chapters, the terms ‘organisation’ and ‘institution’ are used interchangeably in this work

\(^{4}\) According to Etzioni (1968: 352-372), there are three type governance relationships between the political unit (state) and its subunits. The first type is coercive power relation which leads to regulation put into place. The second kind is utilitarian power which is usually in the form of economic incentives. The third type is normative power in which governance is achieved through the means of information giving. Normative power requires the citizens to have the knowledge and awareness to recognize the parallel interests between themselves and the government. Citizens will allow themselves to be governed because they approve of the measures taken as a matter of principle. An example of normative power is the legislation to ban smoking in pubs and restaurants in the UK in 2007 (also being implemented in EU member states) which was widely accepted even by smokers but which would not have been so easily implemented in political systems below the democratic threshold.

To be more specific, countries on the top right hand side of the cusp catastrophe diagram in chapter 4 have met the requirements for an active democratic society as Etzioni’s vision of ‘active society’ (Etzioni 1968) require authority from the centre rather than a weak government. These countries have managed to control and secure ‘Responsiveness’ to the needs of their active citizens and the involvement of the majority in political decision making. Responsiveness is considered as the most important indicator in maintaining legitimacy for the system and reducing
The active democratic system illustrated in the previous chapter provides the state with unique powers in society (as in the legislature, the executive and the judicial powers) while at the same time becoming more and more dependent on its social actors. As represented in figure 5-1 (previous chapter), for a state to maintain political authority, it needs to rely on the efficacy and satisfaction of its citizens to the responsiveness of its democratic institutions. A government that is unable to raise the resources necessary to maintain its commitments of public policy would potentially weaken the likelihood of achieving satisfaction of the system (Rose 1979). The Legislature needs to ultimately perform so as to strengthen the effectiveness of the government and consent for effective government performance will indicate a strong and effective legislature.

A state-centric model of governance in modern parliamentary democratic societies above singularity does not in any way imply authoritarian rule or centralisation as it would for countries below the democratic threshold. The central role of governments include ‘goal setting’ and ‘steering’ which can only be implemented in a somewhat consensual and cooperative settings in order to avoid potential vetoes or blockages towards the overall mission of the state. As mentioned before in an active society, people rule by having the power to make and influence decisions through their representatives and the channels that are clearly open and active. As a result, the citizen’s active involvement enhances the legitimacy of the state and simultaneously raises democratic governance. The level of alienation by bringing about a balance between the society (the political organisation) and its subunits including citizen, interest groups and other forms of political expression. (Ibid).
rise in the quality of governance influences the prosperity of a democracy to survive.

In this view, democratic institutions will perform best if they are able to reconcile the twin goals of central authority and broad inclusion. In order to maintain the legitimacy of the central state authority, the legislature would have to convince the society of its responsiveness (democratic performance) by keeping a high record of its accountability, efficacy, equality and representativeness. This type of governance is similar to the 'Responsive Party Government Model' presented by Walter Bagehot (1867) and later versions of Democratic Centralism. In non-democracies, features such as a single party control over legislation and sovereignty signals authoritarian regimes or dictatorships. However in active democracies above the consolidation threshold, the mechanisms of electoral accountability ensure that any period of one-party rule or coalition rule is in the public interest and will focus on getting the job done and maximizing responsiveness.

6-2.1 Performance in Parliamentary and Presidential Systems

Parliamentary systems by virtue of their fusion of the executive and legislative functions in a single body facilitate political decision making and help to bring about a more cooperative and consensual style system as it is not possible for a

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5 Bagehot had given five functions for the House of Commons which included: to supply the Government; to express the minds of the people on all matters that come before it; to teach the nation on what it does not know; to inform the public; and to legislate (he also implied a financial function). Bagehot (1867) 'The English Constitution' (London: Fontana 1993): 152-156. For instance of democratic centralism see Ranney, A (1962) 'A doctrine of Responsible Party Government: Its Origins and Present State' (Urbana: University of Illinois Press)
serious and enduring division to spring up among the major actors (the prime minister, the cabinet and back benchers). Such organisation encourages a more corporatist style of government which is less compatible with top-down conceptions of governance and offers a closer link with society as compared to traditional pluralist democratic models of governance. The social actors in the corporatist model are effectively co-opted into the realm of the state which in turn strengthens the state’s decision making power (Pierre and Peters 2001, 35).

Whereas in presidential systems, the existence of two separate institutions of the legislature and the executive with overlapping powers yet different constituencies in addition to (sometimes) different electoral cycles and partisan composition often leads to unnecessary blockages (vetoes) which prevents consensus building and cooperation, or decisions taken by a sole constitutional authority that brings about either efficiency concerns or legitimacy problems and concerns about the quality of democracy. In such an environment, it is easy to see why presidential bodies tend to favour a hierarchical model of governance or one where there is little formal organisation at all (Blondel and Manning 2002). Inclusiveness of the public tends to follow top-down pluralist models with government being quite autonomous from interest groups and society is treated

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6 However, in the case of Westminster which Lijphart (1999) considers as the strongest plurality style parliamentary model in legislatures, as the electoral system rests on the votes of a few electors in swing districts, party leaders take people’s opinion very seriously and test the public opinion carefully before taking any initiative and is claimed to have a populist style of leadership oriented toward pleasing the electorate rather than serving long term interests (Hart, 1992) similar to market policies of strengthening consumer power. As the society becomes more active, citizens make the judgment of choosing long-term interests over short-term measures (such as protecting the environment or fair trade) which provides a more corporatist style governance and allows politicians to change their strategies in line with serving long-term goals and maintaining satisfaction, trust and enhanced performance.
as a largely disorganised and incoherent set of groups with little systematic impact on policy (Pierre and Peters, 2000: 34).

Studies of system survival have also shown that parliamentary democracies have a higher rate of survival than presidential democracies which will allow them to implement long-term strategy and assess performance. Stepan and Skach have used the levels of economic development as an indicator of system survival and have shown that parliamentary democracies have a rate of survival that is three times that of presidential democracies (Stepan and Skach 1997: 10-11). Przeworski and his colleagues have also analysed the survival rates of democracies using economic indicators and have concluded that 'a democracy's life expectancy under presidentialism is less than twenty years while under parliamentarism it is seventy-one years' (Przeworski et al, 1996: 39). The relative longevity and sustainability of the parliamentary systems allows continuity which is necessary for long-term performance frameworks to succeed.

Foweraker et al (2005) rather than relying on system survival, have measured democratic quality using different variables of constitutional design, such as democratic accountability, representation, constraint, participation, political rights, civil rights and minority rights, in presidential and parliamentary democracies. They find that parliamentary systems again perform better than presidential systems by measures of participation and of political, civil and minority rights (Fowerker et al, 2005: 55-56). They also show that established

7 In Foweraker, Joe; Landman, Todd and Harvey, Neil (2003), Governing Latin America. Although the research is limited to Latin American countries, they have provided comparative analysis with some other presidential and parliamentary democracies.
democracies outperform the new democracies in the same variables used and the wealthier the democracy, the better it performs by measures of constraint, participation, political rights, civil rights and property rights. This study concludes that the difference in performance of the more established wealthy and 'European' democracies is created more by their 'rights' measures than by 'institutional' measures\(^8\) (ibid: 58).

These studies all seem to suggest that the parliamentary systems that perform well in the quality of their democratic governance have opted towards maintaining a balance between pluralism and corporatism in their relations with the society\(^9\). They have become more pluralistic in the sense that their governance models have become more representative and participatory by involving as many actors as possible. These legislatures have become more corporative by connecting democracy with excellence and giving all actors legitimate status (based on merit) for influencing political decision making. This kind of structure forces all participants in the process to confront each others demands and to negotiate the priorities and the coordination that is central to governance (Pierre and Peters 2001: 35). Society becomes more active and the legislature becomes more responsive and flexible to political change. Ultimately, such cooption provides the means for 'the creation of public solidarity and the legitimatisation of the representativeness of the government' (Selznick 1966: 260).

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\(^8\) ibid: 58 (emphasis added)  
\(^9\) As also suggested in Olsen (1987)
6-2.2 Performance in Centripetal and Pluralistic Systems

Cooperation between the legislature and society is a core procedural phenomenon of democratic governance in Western European democracies (especially Scandinavian political systems). In Lijphart’s article on consociational democracies, he has argued that all homogenous and stable democracies should also be referred to as ‘Centripetal’ (Lijphart 1969: 224-25)\(^\text{10}\). This argument was made about four decades ago, though the case for centripetal democratic systems becomes even more plausible today regardless of whether the system is homogenous (as in the Anglo-American models or the Scandinavian working democracies) or consociational (European hybrid democracies). However, it should be emphasised again that centripetalism in established democracies is very different to centrifugal systems in less developed and developing democracies. In the former democracies, central authority under centripetal systems would not lead to autocratic rule but a ‘collegial style of policy deliberation’ and ‘a cooperative style of decision making among various bodies’ (Gerring and Thacker 2008: 63) which enhances smooth performance in the system and continuous growth and development, while at the same time improving the broad levels of social inclusion.

The similarity between systems in this regard can be the source of empirical comparative studies. The link between system performance and political

\(^{10}\) While distinguishing centripetal from centrifugal democracies which he identified as unstable democracies and fragmented democracies of continental European in addition to non-democratic state, Lijphart has mentioned that many centripetal democracies have some extent of consociational features and that the stability of centripetal democracies not only depends on an essential homogenous political nature, but also consociational devices (Lijphart 1969).
legitimacy could be measured using outputs of the legitimacy process of governance sub-systems. The sub-system which this study is interested in is of course the legislature whose performance is directly linked to the quality of democratic performance of the political system as a whole. However it should be noted that centripetal cooperation in parliamentary systems without proper accountability would weaken the parliamentary system in terms of viscosity as compared to presidential style legislatures (Blondel 1969) which could ultimately reduce the quality of governance in a polity. Centralised political authority should be compatible with the inclusion of diverse interests and not reduce the role of opposition parties which one backbench MP compared to 'heckling a steamroller' (Mitchell 1995: 201). Even for liberal democracies, at least two-thirds of a parliamentary government's proposals will be enacted into laws (Rose 1979: 69).

For the reason stated above, accountability and scrutiny of the government is usually considered at the apex of legislative performance (along with other channels such as special committees and commissions, corporate-style government consultations, benchmark reports by ombudsmen) and is responsible for the strength of the popular legitimacy or the persuasive powers of a state. But the reality of some parliamentary systems shows that power is often perceived as performance within a predominantly behavioural (and pluralistic) framework and the focus is usually on the individuals and their tactics rather than the ideologies and structures of the institution that may frame outcomes. Despite power being observable and as a result measurable, its relationships with the legislature and executive takes the form of zero-sum games rather than cooperation where the
winner is usually the executive, not the parliament. Thus to understand performance it is crucial to see the interrelationships and to base power on dependency rather than the dominance of the executive while at the same time maintaining this balance between government effectiveness and consent. According to Philip Norton (1983: 55) such a perception of legislative performance would require an attitudinal shift among the politicians involved in the process in addition to including factors such as the structure, culture, and historical context of the institution as well as resources and the professionalisation of actors (parties and individuals).

Better administrative performance under centripetal style administration is said to grant the government the liberty and flexibility to engineer administrative details in a manner suitable to the contingencies of the policy and to adapt to new circumstances and ideas as the case may warrant (Gerring and Thacker 2008: 83). This requires managerial as well as political accountability on the part of the legislature as it would have to make systematic and comprehensive changes in procedures and processes as the actions of the government need to become transparent at every stage. A more professional parliamentary scrutiny results in a more responsible and transparent executive and will inevitably produce better quality policy. But without the commitment to such reforms (as a result of political pressure from the executive or parties), accountability will suffer and so will the performance of parliament itself. This is evidently the case in the increasing cartelisation of party politics in the section below.
6-2.3 Performance and Professionalism at a Threat to Representativeness

A result of legislative development has been the rise of professionalisation which according to Best and Cotta (2000: 495) can be fitted into the wider conceptual framework of modernisation theory with the trend becoming more synchronised in European politics than ever before (Cotta and Best 2007: 21). The analysis of recruitment patterns in developed legislatures indicates the rise of professional career politicians (Norris 1997, Best and Cotta 2000, Katz and Mair 1995) along with declining demand for direct representation by disadvantaged classes of the society. The recruitment of professional politician follows supply and demand models of electoral recruitment comparable to recruitment models of other professional occupations (Patzelt 1999).

Talcott Parsons, considered to be the father of contemporary sociology, recognises that commitment to social rather than self-interest marks the distinction of professions from business occupations. He distinguishes professionals as having to do with the institutional alignments that favour social responsibility, whereas business-interests are based on micro-level individual altruistic motivations (Parsons 1949: 203). Parsons characterised the privileges and freedoms of professionals as a functional exchange for which the society receives the technical competence it needs to achieve critical ends. He also places the university at the centre of the ‘professions complex’ as a source of technical training and knowledge, as well as a channel through which cultural values can be communicated to individuals who take up important social roles (ibid). Education brings a certain degree of autonomy which for the
representative serves as a portfolio of resources and a competitive edge with regards to other individuals in the field and empowers the representative with authoritative views in the legislative arena.

The change in specialisation of representatives from law degrees and backgrounds to degrees in economics and public administration and management is not only a sign of the business orientation of legislatures but of the changing specialisation of parliaments from law-making bodies to developed representative professional bodies of public scrutiny and accountability\textsuperscript{11}. In most cases professionalisation has become institutionalised within the political and social structures, institutions and normative patterns which define the legitimate and expected modes for recruitment. According to Parsons ‘A fully-fledged profession must have some institutional means of making sure that such competence will be put to socially responsible uses’ (Parsons, 1968: 536). In parliamentary democracies, the power of selecting professionals lies within the party organisations who act as strong intermediaries between the individual candidate and the electorate (Best and Cotta 2000: 12).

Studies conducted on a cross country basis in European political systems reveal degrees of convergence and divergence among the systems as a whole. However the professionalism of representatives seems to follow broadly convergent patterns towards common models of professionals sharing a number of

\textsuperscript{11} In a study by Gaxie and Godmer on European legislators found that a majority of them had university law degrees in the second half of the 19\textsuperscript{th} century which has now reduced and replaced by deputies holding university degrees in public administration, economics, social science and other humanities apart from law. Gaxie, D and Godmer, L(2007) ‘Cultural Capital and Political Selection: Education backgrounds of Parliamentarians’ in Cotta, M and Best, H. ed. Democratic Representation in Europe: diversity, Change and Convergence: 106-134
standardised features (Cotta and Best 2007). First of all, there is a rise of representatives entering their new roles having previously served in the public sector (Cotta and de Almeida 2007) which is advantageous in their professional oversight of government policy and (possibly) their ability to use performance information effectively but may also become disadvantageous as some countries have shown an increasing domination of the bureaucratic state over society (ibid: 55). The problem with the rise of professionals in the public sector stems from the nature of professional work in which it is acceptable for professionals to work for the public but not so much with the public. Furthermore the social trustee view in which specialised knowledge and skills are invested in professionals by the larger society, maintains that the professional role may only be judged by fellow professionals not the society at large (Dzur 2008: 75). This may pose a threat to democracy and the loss of legitimacy, participation and connection with the society at large.

Finally, there is the rise of political party control over the process and professional recruitment, also termed as the ‘Cartelisation of party politics’ (Katz and Mair 1995) that seems to provide more or less homogeneous patterns of organisational change and development among the parties and may effectively enhance performance measurement at the price of damaging democratic representation. The cartel party is a characteristic of centripetal systems in which the state becomes the institutional structure that absorbs and supports political parties. The political parties in return change from being ‘simple brokers with the civil society and state’ into delegates of the state and eventually turning to ‘semi-state agencies’ (ibid: 16). The effect of the inclusiveness of parties would be that
they are all included in the governing process, would no longer require competing for their survival, and have access to state resources\textsuperscript{12}.

Politics is definitely regarded as a profession in cartel politics and there is an emphasis on managerial skills even though efficiency is contained within the system. Parties compete for the opportunity of their leaders to occupy government offices and to take responsibility for government performance at the next election (ibid: 21). As a result the performance of the legislature is often dependent on a watered-down performance of the government and the degree to which voters can punish parties is reduced due to the similarities between parties and policies. Democracy becomes a means of achieving social stability rather than change (which is not a problem in established democracies) and there is the risk of weakened representativeness in the absence of performance systems aimed at holding government accountable. Performance information, usually in the form of benchmarks is vital as feedback for the government to lower costs as well as achieve acceptability for their policy.

One way of reducing the damaging implications of the cartel system as Katz (2001: 227) suggests is perhaps to democratise the candidate selection process in parties while maintaining control from the centre. Democratic performance of legislatures in such systems is directly related to the democratic performance of their parties and it is probably unrealistic to expect improvements in legislative performance without improvements in party behaviour. This study does not

\textsuperscript{12} Katz and Mair mention that Westminster shares characteristics with cartel parties as the opposition parties have access to ‘the spoils of the state’, some share of patronage appointments and unaffected media access. (1995, 17)
intend to look at party performance but assumes that because of such interactions between the legislature and parties in open democratic systems, improved performance of one area is bound to have improving effects to the performance of the other\textsuperscript{13}. To improve performance under pressure of a cartel, the legislature must maintain autonomy to maximise accountability and transparency of the government and the scrutiny processes while staying responsive and representative to the people which in management terms is usually seen as ‘closeness to the customer’.

An advantage of the cartel party system is that it allows politicians to pursue long-term careers in politics working up from the bottom and to regard their opponents as fellow professionals rather than adversaries. The emphasis will be on efficiency and getting things done rather than blocking proposals from the other side on the basis of partisanship. A result of such an atmosphere created through increased professionalisation in developed legislatures brings forward the need to utilise professional corporate management techniques for the enhancement of performance. Furthermore, the setting of standards and measures to boast the effectiveness of performance outputs will be necessary to gain value for money and strengthening information technology and the quality of responsiveness (outcome measures). These goals will be the aspiration for all professionals working within professional legislative institutions.

\textsuperscript{13} In contrast, improved performance of one part will have a reverse effect on the performance of another part of closed, mechanical systems and will come at the price of deteriorating the efficiency and effectiveness of that part. In less democratic systems cartel parties are usually means the domination of an overpowering executive in the name of political parties or they are so strong that the legislature do not have any autonomy to perform without their influence.
This part established a link between the rise of professional legislative institutions in the developed democracies and the use of performance management to improve on legislative performance and democratic quality. In the next part of this chapter, case studies will be developed where performance measurement tools have been employed to carry out assessments of legislative performance. These case studies intend to show the value of legislative performance measurement towards improving actual performance of the legislative system and how much of an influence can be made to enhance democratic quality in general.

6-3 Part II: Case Studies

The second part of this chapter illustrates instances where performance measurement frameworks have been applied to developed and developing legislatures and assesses the overall usefulness of the methods to the performance of the legislature as a whole. In the first instance a study of the House of Commons Services is conducted which highlights the evolution of House Services and their adaptation of the balanced scorecard approach to improving performance of services to the House. Although this framework is still in its infancy and requires time to assess its full impact, this case study provides an initial assessment and offers comparisons to similar experiences carried out in a few developed legislatures. It is important to stress here that any meaningful assessment of performance in legislatures should first and foremost
assess the management structures that allow the legislature to manage its democratic functions (administrative performance).

The study into the performance of House Services in Parliament is followed by another study which assesses the performance of the British Parliament in general and in particular the effectiveness of its modernisation agenda and reform programmes. It must be emphasised that the British Parliament is a unique case and will not be definitive of all democratic legislatures (as no legislature can) but certain trends and reforms, especially in administrative functions, is of definite value for comparative legislative performance research. Although the performance of the House Services is distinct from the performance of the House of Commons, not only in its functions but also in the use of methods and tools specifically designed for performance measurement and management there is a definite link between the two and as the study shows, the improvements in performance in the first study has surely influenced the performance of the second, in other words the overall performance of Westminster.

Finally in order to illustrate the argument made in the previous chapters in which expecting too much from performance management of legislatures below the democratic threshold is immature, a case of performance measurement in the Iranian legislative system will be presented at the end of this chapter. This was not an ongoing programme at the time of implementation and the balanced scorecard framework was merely applied to show the shortcomings and difficulties involved in performance measurement, not only in this instance but
(to a certain extent) all legislative systems below the consolidation threshold. It is important to stress again that this study does not intend to take one specific case and generalise to a whole set of legislative systems, but to argue that developed legislatures may also expect to have promising results from the implementation of performance measurement frameworks whereas those legislatures below consolidation should not expect to gain much from such frameworks and would be better off focusing their resources on strengthening the foundations for democratic consolidation.

6-4 Case Study I: The House of Commons Services

The role of the House Services Committee is to ensure that members of the Commons are provided with the type and quality of services that enables them to perform their functions with excellence in addition to continuously improving the performance of services to the House. In comparison to the very long history of Parliament, the history of services, as a distinct operational arm of the legislature is relatively new. In 1965 the Select Committee of Westminster (appointed in the same year) recommended a House of Commons Services Committee to advise the Speaker of the Commons on the control of the accommodation, powers and services (Rush and Shaw 1974: 33)\(^4\). At the time the Services Committee had four subcommittees in charge of catering, the

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\(^4\) Before 1965 the supreme control of the services and facilities of the Palace of Westminster had been vested in the Lord Great Chamberlain who delegated responsibility for the part of the accommodation of the House of Commons, when the House was sitting, to the Sergeant at Arms, acting on behalf of the Speaker (ibid).
library, the administration and the accommodation and housekeeping, but as Rush and Shaw argue, these arrangements did not provide a clear line of responsibility and authority; no single person was in charge of services and facilities; and there was in practice a substantial degree of decentralisation in the hands of the these departments. The role of the Services committee was principally to advise and make recommendations and it lacked executive power apart from certain restaurant facilities (ibid: 34-35).

In 1972 five independent departments of House Services were established which were: the Department of the Clerk of the House; the Department of the Sergeant of Arms; the Department of the Speaker; the Library; and the Administration Department\(^{15}\). These changes were not considered as a major expansion to the services and facilities provided to members in their duties, but were generally perceived to be in satisfactorily. The absence of empirical methods to assess member satisfaction at the time would have meant that members could only express dissatisfaction with the services either by informal means such as speaking to a member of the staff in the departments, or writing to the head of the Committee or the Speaker.

\(^{15}\) The Department of the Clerk of the House consisted of the Clerk, Clerk Assistants, Committee Office, Overseas Office, Private Bill Office, Table office, Clerk Administrator, Higher Executive Officers and clerical and secretarial staff. The Department of the Sergeant of Arms consisted of the Sergeant of arms, Deputy Sergeant of Arms, Assistant and Deputy Assistant Sergeants of Arms, Admission Order Office, Doorkeepers, Office keepers, Attendants and Cleaners. The Department of the Speaker consisted of the Speaker’s Private Office, Official Report (Hansard), Vote Office and Sales Office. The Library consisted of a Librarian, Deputy Librarian, a Parliamentary Division and a Research Division. The Administrative Division consisted of a Clerk administrator, Personal Secretary, Fees Office and Establishments Section. The total number of employees in these departments was 384 in 1972 (Rush and Shaw 1974, 36-7)
The changes at the time would probably be considered more piecemeal than pragmatic. The slow change in the provision of services to the House over this period was perhaps more related to the confusion over the true nature of the role of MPs rather than the lack of resources to accommodate them in their roles. In 1971 a survey conducted in Parliament by the Boyle Committee had found that almost seventy-percent of backbenchers, had part-time occupations outside the House of Common (their role as an MP was only part-time) and the time they spent on jobs outside of Parliament could be anything up to thirty hours a week (HC 1971). The 1978 Procedure committee, following up on the recommendations of the Boyle Report, moved towards clarifying this ambiguity by claiming the role of the Member of Parliament as a full-time profession and stating that the previous part-time notion of MPs and their duties was indeed inconsistent with current parliamentary practice and obligations. Full-time professional MPs were expected to ensure the responsibility of monitoring, influencing and criticising government policies and administration through select committee service.

Gradual changes to the role of Members of Parliament brought with it a continuing need to accommodate them in their professional roles. According to Menhennet and Palmer (1969: 97) the Palace of Westminster was:

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16 HC (1978) ‘Minutes of Evidence ‘ First Report of the Select Committee of procedure, Session 1974-75. House of Commons Report 588-II. (London: HCSO). The Boyle report on the salaries of MPs had previously drawn a distinction of their parliamentary work by mentioning that ‘most Members must be considered as working on a full time basis and we consider that the level of remunerations should be considered accordingly (Boyle Report 1971: para. 25). This report was a major step in professionalizing the job of an MP as it made clear that they should no longer regard their job as only one of their occupations. The Boyle Report is better known as the ‘Ministers of the Crown and Members of Parliament: First Report’ Review Body on Top Salaries (chairman: Lord Boyle of Handsworth), Cmnd 4836, Dec. 1971
'[A] building designed in an age when the sphere of parliamentary activity was much smaller than it is now, when most legislators were part-time and when the urgency of public events was less pressing'.

Compared to developed legislatures Parliament (being the oldest legislative building) lacked purpose built accommodation for their entire members and staff. One MP has been quoted to explain the situation as:

'When I came here in 1950 I was given a key with a locker which was no bigger that the one I had at school. That was the only accommodation, the only amenity I had in the building'.

Despite a general theme of excellence in the quality of services provided by the Clerk Office and the Library, Parliament at the time had a lower standing in terms of support, services and facilities provided to MPs compared to a number of democracies such as the United States Congress, The Japanese Diet and the German Bundestag.

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6-4.1 Corporate-style Services

The House of Commons Administrative Act of 1978 (which had replaced the House of Commons Offices Act of 1812) was the cornerstone in the organisational development of services of House Services and set new directions in the management of Parliament. Although it did not present any immediate changes in the actual services provided for members or the way those services were organised at the time, it did establish a body of members independent of the government or the party whip, which had the power to employ full-time staff of the House and lay estimates before the House of costs of their employment and of any other expenses incurred for the services of the House of Commons (Bolton 1991).

Most importantly the Act established a basic framework for administrative decision-making which for the first time took account of the concerns of members and reflected the separate traditions and interests of the different House departments. By this time there were six departments of the House and of the Speaker’s Office which were directly employed by the Commission of the House and were involved with dealing with the growing demands of the Members of Parliament and their staff. The independence and interdependence of the six departments of the House was demonstrated by the common membership of department heads to a Board of Management. This Board was chaired by the Clerk of the House and was set up to consider issues effecting services of the House as a whole.
In 1990 the Commission appointed Sir Robin Ibbs to examine the feasibility of an autonomous coordinating decision making structure of Services\textsuperscript{18}. The Ibbs Report recommended that the Commission should be the body responsible for decision making and that the Management Board should enhance its corporate role and be responsible for providing advice and support to the Commission, as well as the Accounting Officer and the Finance and Services Committee of the House. The report also recommended that overall management responsibility should be given to the Clerk of the House acting in the capacity of the Chief Executive of the Management Board (Ibbs 1990). This delegation of responsibility from the Commission to the Clerk gave more transparency to the process of managing House Services. Bolton describes the Commission before this transition as a ‘relatively private body’ and the minutes of their meetings were so private that they were not even communicated to the heads of departments (Bolton 1991: 7). The executive role of the Board not only signalled more coordination between the departments involved in Services, but also more transparency about the management of Services to the House itself.

In 1999 the Commons Commission asked Michael Braithwaite to review the status of the management of House Services, which had been set up following the Ibbs report of 1990, and to give recommendations on the way forward. The report provided a thorough and comprehensive review of the current status of services, in addition to new recommendations, and their expected benefits for the House. The corporate nature of management of the House set by Ibbs was

\textsuperscript{18} At the time responsibility for the management and services of the House of Commons and its facilities was divided among the Commission of the House, The Select Committee on House of Commons (Services), the Department of the Environment and the Leader of the House (Tebbit Report, Annex 4)
further emphasised with recommendations for the Commission to approve a ‘strategic plan’, covering policies and goals, long term resources and priorities (Braithwaite 1999: 15). The Board of Management was proposed to give monthly reports that provided strategic information to aid the Commission on the direction and supervision of this strategy (ibid), in addition to improving the communication of decisions between the Commission and all customers and stakeholders (not just key officials). The terms ‘Stakeholder’ and ‘Customer’ were used instead of members of parliament and other interested parties to give a business dimension to service provision and link performance to outcomes (customer/stakeholder satisfaction) rather than focus on departmental outputs.

This report recommended that the Office of the Clerk should press ahead with the corporate agenda that had started with the Ibbs report and that the Management Board ‘fully adopts corporate behaviour’ (ibid: 4) with members of the Board to receive training in financial and management skills in order to be able to ‘handle issues within a corporate framework’ (ibid: 15). The improved quality of general management would benefit the use of techniques of performance measurement and monitor of performance targets (ibid) and benchmarks. The focus of these targets should include measures of cost efficiency and value for money, customer satisfaction, improved quality and speed of service delivery added to the previous goals of accountability and efficiency of House Services.

The Braithwaite report had taken a holistic approach to the provision of the services to Parliament as a whole and proposed cooperation between the House
of Commons and House of Lords with a view to reduce costs incurred to the legislative system and to improve performance. This is especially noticeable in the considerations of information technology (IT) services to be carried out with close consultation with the authorities of both Houses of Parliament (ibid: 25).

The systems approach is also apparent in the recommendation for a ‘foundation period’ of ‘cross posting’ to different departments for new staff (ibid., 29) with the intention of giving the new recruit a systemic understanding of House services.

Following the recommendations of the Braithwaite report and as a result of collaboration with legislative bodies in the British Isles that had applied (or were in the process of adopting) corporate strategic plans for their services, the House of Commons Commission adopted a Strategic Plan for the Commons Administration in July 2005. This plan stated the purpose of House Services¹⁹, alongside its objectives²⁰ and goals and the values²¹ of House Services for the

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¹⁹ The purpose of the House Services is to: [a] support, inform and record the work of the House of commons as an elected parliamentary chamber in accordance with the decisions of the house and the House of Commons Commission [b] make its work and information about that work widely accessible to the general public [c] contribute to parliamentary democracy by sharing its knowledge with parliaments and assemblies worldwide [d] maintain the heritage of parliamentary buildings and documents in trust for the public and future generations (HC 2005)

²⁰ The primary objectives in the Strategic Plan were: 1- To provide the advice and services that enable the House and its committees to conduct their business effectively. 2- To provide the advice and services that enable individual members (and their staff) to perform their parliamentary duties effectively. 3- To promote public knowledge and understanding of the work and role of Parliament through the provision of information and access. These three primary objectives are supported by six supporting objectives (tasks): 1-To provide a skilled and motivated workforce; giving recognition to and reward for achievement and ensuring that all staff realise their full potential regardless of level of background; and promoting diversity. 2- To provide a healthy, safe and secure physical environment in which the business of the House can be effectively conducted; this includes accommodation, office services, catering and security. 3- to plan and manage all the house’s resources to a high standard, achieving value for money and matching current public service standards including in the areas of risk and change management and environment protection. 4- To maintain the heritage and integrity of the Palace of Westminster and other buildings, objects and documents for the benefit of future generations. 5- To ensure that information is well-managed in pursuit of the primary objectives, in part by exploiting technology effectively. 6-To maintain a good working relationship with the
next five years (2006-2011). The strategy plan in effect set out targets for the Board of Management to achieve in all departments and was obliged to provide reports by the end of each consigned period. With the implementation of these goals and values, the departments are able to develop a large range of individual output-based (efficiency-based) measurements which were presented every month to the Board of Management. The Management Board was left with the (confusing) task of integrating individual department measures and converting them into outcome-based measures within the core objectives of the strategy (performance). The problem of performance measurement of services to the House was intensified amid some evidence of, perhaps unintended, competition between the Departments and overlapping activity (HC 2007: para 93). In addition, the proposed method of benchmarks only provided a set of past performance measurement and needed to be put into a strategic context if they were to give a picture of current performance and help manage future risk.

21 The values of House Services are: 1- serving with honesty, probity and political impartiality 2- striving to achieve high ethical standards, value for money and professional excellence in all that it does. 3- Seeking to be responsive to changing requirements. 4- As an employer, House Services is committed to maximising the personal development of House staff, valuing diversity and the contribution of all individuals and equal opportunity (ibid)
6-4.2 The Balance Scorecard in House Services

In 2006 amid the growing trend of performance measurement techniques in the administration of public sector bodies as well as the administration divisions of performance driven legislatures such as the Irish Oireachtas and the Swedish Rikstag, the Commission of the House commissioned Sir Kevin Tebbit, the architect of the Balance Scorecard in the Ministry of Defence in 2002, to review the management and Services of the House of Commons. The Tebbit Report was published in June 2007 and its legacy has been a change and renewal of a more structured management of House Services based on the Balance Scorecard (BSC). The use of this management tool would in theory bring about a more balanced performance measurement by simultaneously integrating all aspects of House Services which inevitably affects the way Parliament works.

The Tebbit report is in line with the Strategic Plan for the House of Commons Administration 2006-2011. It has looked at the performance of House Services by examining the implementation and consequences of the Braithwaite's recommendations; the extent that House services has become more complex and the challenges it faced since the publication of the report; and the results of a 2006 survey of Member satisfaction with the services arrangements. The Tebbit report has also been helped by the evolution of professionalism in Parliament and the adoption of a generic job description for MPs by the Senior Salaries Review body published in 2001. The body recognises the job of an MP as to 'Represent, defend and promote national interests and further the needs and
interests of constituents wherever possible. Thus the role of House Services in relation to the MP becomes clear as providing services to them in their activities designed to assist the passage of legislation and holding the Executive to account (core responsibility) and their promotion or defence of the interests of their constituencies (representative responsibility). The report praises past achievements by endorsing the Commission of the House as the overall supervisory and policy-making body with an annual strategic plan, resources and with expert knowledge of the House which gives them the authority and professionalism to implement effective performance measurement. Praise is also given to the Commission’s work on governance and management in carrying out the primary objectives of the House’s strategy plan 2006-11.

The Tebitt report proposes a management structure that includes three main bodies (composed of MPs) namely, the Speaker and the House of Commons Commission; The Finance and Services Committee; and the Administration Committee. These committees all have an advisory role and the report does not suggest change but that they adopt a performance management system which

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22 HC (2001) 'Senior Salaries Review Body', House of Commons Commissions Report, Cm 4997-11. According to this document the principle accountabilities of the MP are to: 1- Help furnish and maintain Government and Opposition. 2- Monitor, stimulate and challenge the Executive to influence (or change) government action in ways that are considered desirable. 3- Initiate, seek to amend and review legislation so as to help maintain a continually relevant and appropriate body of law. 4- Establish and maintain a range of contacts throughout the constituency, and proper knowledge of its characteristic so as to understand affecting issues and further their interests. 5- Provide appropriate assistance to individual constituents to progress and where possible help resolve their problems. 6- Contribute to the formulation of party policy to ensure that it reflects view and national needs that are relevant and important. 7- Promote public understanding of party policies in the constituency, media and elsewhere to facilitate the achievement of party objectives.

23 The commission has managed to work on the main indicator of success, satisfaction, as also indicated in the Braithwaite Report. It has successfully carried out a survey of the members of Parliament and their staff as customers of House services. They have published their findings according to which thirty-nine percent (out of forty-five percent respondents to the survey) had thought that house services have become more effective. Only ten percent had found the new services ineffective and the rest (fifty-two percent) did not see significant change (HC 2007: 17).
would express strategies and objectives in a more concrete form than the present Corporate Business Plan. The report predicts that such a change would allow them to focus on priorities and enables progress to be measured much more effectively (ibid: para 83).

The establishing of an impartial management board has been essential in the structure of the House Services and it is essential that the Members of Parliament are recognised not only as customers receiving the service, but also as stakeholders of the services of the House. So it is important that the Commission establishes a management board which could operate independently from the political domains of Parliament. According to the Tebbit Report the challenge is to:

'Construct an orderly system which preserves the principle of the customer as governor, while meeting the demands of the public accountability and transparency, effectiveness and value for money'

(HC 2007, 10)

The transfer of executive power to the Clerk of the House as Chief Executive of the Management Board (recommended in the Braithwaite report) had to be reinforced in order to enforce capability for corporate policies, decisions and performance (ibid, 21). The structure of the Management Board is unlike other organisations who hire an external management consultant to coordinate overall performance. The Tebbit report does not suggest any change to the current arrangements within the Management Board despite acknowledging that the
'single most beneficial reform' would be to appoint a Chief Executive from outside to run House services in a more business-like manner (ibid: para 84). One reason for not recommending change to the current structure of the Management Board could be the political nature of the Commons that would impose constraints on what they would regard as an institutional change. Another reason may reflect the actual power of the Chief Executive in Parliament and the fact that it is the Speaker who has the power of administration not the Chief Executive, whose powers remain advisory (to the Commission and the Speaker) and whose executive power only covers the Management Board and the departments involved. The Tebbit report only proposes that the Chief Executive must have good experience of management systems and preferably spent time working outside of Westminster. Instead the report proposes that two 'external advisors be appointed to the board as non-executive directors with the expectation of improving its performance management' (ibid, 71). This recommendation has been partially carried out in 2008 with the appointment of one external member, Alex Jablonowski, to the board (HC 2009).

The rationale for the business-like manner of the management of House Services according to this report is based on the reputation, responsiveness and resource considerations or the 'three Rs' of the House. Following this rationale,

24 The three Rs include (HOC 2007, 22):
- The Reputation of the House of Commons as a self-governing institution, able to withstand detailed scrutiny of governance and management
- Responsiveness to the needs of the Members and staff for services of a quality that meet recognized standards of best practice
- Resource considerations and the need to ensure that the budget available is used rigorously in support of the Houses defined objectives and priorities, as distinct from individual Departments
the Tebbit Report has recommended that a new Office for the Chief Executive be established for the purpose of controlling the BSC and to indicate the objectives, measures and targets for the implementation of the strategy for House Services. The BSC framework below is the BSC framework for House Services proposed by the report and is an adaptation from the BSC framework for the Ministry of Defence. This Framework illustrates the task of House Services and consists of four boxes, each representing one of the four perspectives of BSC in the original Kaplan and Norton BSC model. The order of the perspectives has been adapted for non-financial organisations with the customer perspective placed on top of the framework (replacing financial perspective in the original Kaplan and Norton model) which is to show that the main aim is customer satisfaction. However, as customers and stakeholders are the same in Parliament, the top perspective is called the 'purpose perspective' and is allocated to all stakeholders or the House in general (Members, staff and Parliament as an entity). This box does not include the public or any other group as customers since the services are exclusive to the internal environment of Parliament.
Are we fit for today’s challenges and ready for tomorrow’s tasks?

Are we using our resources to best effect?

Are we a high performing Organisation?

Purpose (stakeholders - what do they want from us? How will we know we are providing it?)
A: House: To provide advice and services to the House and its Committees
B: Members: To provide advice and services to individual Members and their staff
C: Parliament: To promote public knowledge and understanding of the work and role of Parliament

Are we building for future success?

What is our target?
Supporting democracy through Parliament and representing the United Kingdom population

Enabling Processes (What do we need to do to deliver what our stakeholders want? How do we know we are delivering this?)
H People Management: Manage and invest on our people to give off their best
I Health and Safety: Provide a healthy, safe and secure environment for Members, their staff, house staff, contractors and visitors
J support services: manage supporting Services so that they enable the business of the House to be effectively concluded
L Partnerships: Maintain a good working relationship with the House of Lords

Resources (what do we want with our resources? How will we know we are using them effectively and efficiently?)
D People: Ensure we have a skilled and motivated workforce
E Finance: Manage resources to a high standard and achieve value for money
F Estate: Maintain the heritage and integrity of the Palace of Westminster and Other buildings, objects and Documents for the benefit of future generations
G Reputation: Help people to understand the work of Parliament

Potential (What skill/technologies do we need to improve our delivery? How do we know we are doing this?)
M People Development: Develop the skills and professional expertise we need for tomorrow
N Efficiency and Change: Develop flexible and efficient organisations and processes to support the House of Commons
O Information: Manage information and technology effectively

Figure 6-1: Balanced Scorecard for the Management of Services of The House of Commons  (Source: HOC 2007: 30)

This recommended framework, unlike business models, does not have a separate financial perspective since Parliament does not have budget concerns like other organisations. ‘Finance’ (E) is included as one of the objectives to the ‘Resources’ perspective and only implies maximising value for money outputs for increased quality. The ‘People’ (D) objective refers to recruitment and manpower and is similar to the Ministry of Defence Scorecard (most terms are common between the two frameworks as they were design by Sir Kevin).

The primary objective of the innovations and growth perspective is to ‘Develop People’ (M) which in this context is to provide adequate skills and training for
MPs, their staff and House staff. Efficiency and Change (N) is about developing flexible and efficient organisations and processes to support the House\textsuperscript{25}. The quadrant ‘Enabling Processes’ refers to processes that are required by stakeholders/customers from the House in order to become a ‘high performing organisation’. These procedures include people management, health and safety, support services, business management, and partnerships with the House of Lords\textsuperscript{26}. For this area of performance, Sir Kevin has suggested an activity and functional costing system together with benchmarking against ‘peer’ organisations and areas (ibid: para. 107) which is currently in collaboration with other parliaments and assemblies in the British Isles to identify common benchmarks that could improve effectiveness in resources and cost efficiency.

In the centre of this proposed framework is the target or vision ‘Supporting democracy through Parliament and representing the United Kingdom population’. The vision in BSC is a statement that has to balance the interests of all groups and perspectives and present a future that will lead to a win for

\textsuperscript{25} The Ministry of Defence BSC has a very similar, if not the same, objective in its innovations and growth perspective (with the difference that the term ‘House’ changes to ‘Armed Forces’). Since this bottom perspective in the BSC is all about growth and learning most frameworks put efficiency and change along with the perspective that deals with processes. However as long as the framework can be implemented effectively and balanced out successfully, it should not create problems for overall performance.

\textsuperscript{26} Here again this perspective closely resembles the 2005 Ministry of Defence BSC apart from the slight differences in the wording of the objectives (e.g. the Defence BSC uses ‘personnel management’ instead of people management, ‘health and safety’ which is the same in both organisations, and ‘logistics’ replaces support services in the framework above. The only variation in the layout of the two frameworks is that the Defence BSC has ‘business management’ instead of ‘partnership’ in the framework above, despite having the same nature). The 2005 Defence Scorecard can be found in Annex 9 of the Tebbit report (HC 2007)
everyone involved (Niven 2002: 88). This target must be acceptable and desirable by everybody involved in the process and affected by it (by consensus). This framework, as it is only a recommendation, has left out the strategy which is more complex and involves the goals rather than targets which identify ‘what to do’ and ‘what not do’ to get to the target. Goal setting will involve the identification of performance indicators, tasks and the risks involved in achieving targets.

The report does not indicate any performance indicators and only mentions the problems involved in identifying them, regular sampling and measuring output performance due to the nature of the tasks in Parliament that are often demand-led, unpredictable and may involve political concerns (since performance measurement leads to increased transparency and accountability). The report also stresses the need for inter-parliamentary contact to find common measures and benchmarks to aid comparative performance measurement. The proposal to adopt a performance management system based on a Balanced Scorecard was approved in principle by the House of Commons Commission in December 2007 and the facility to accommodate such decision (the Office of the Chief Executive) was setup in early 2008.
Figure 6-2: Balanced Scorecard Dashboard – Performance Management

CSF1: Members impressed by our services
- Past
- Current
- Future(s-t)
- Future(l-t)

CSF2: Public impressed by our services
- Past
- Current
- Future(s-t)
- Future(l-t)

CSF3: New key projects delivered on time and to budget
- Past
- Current
- Future(s-t)
- Future(l-t)

CSF4: Improvement in priority areas
- Past
- Current
- Future(s-t)
- Future(l-t)

CSF5: Performance of core services
- Past
- Current
- Future(s-t)
- Future(l-t)

CSF6: Demonstrable improvement in VFM
- Past
- Current
- Future(s-t)
- Future(l-t)

CSF7: Our budgets are on track
- Past
- Current
- Future(s-t)
- Future(l-t)

CSF8: Our budgets are spent on priorities
- Past
- Current
- Future(s-t)
- Future(l-t)

CSF9: Parliament is environmentally sustainable
- Past
- Current
- Future(s-t)
- Future(l-t)

This is a copy of the dashboard used by the Management Board of House Services to assess risk. The Office of the Chief Executive has kindly provided this copy and permission to use in this research.
The House Services BSC has not been published but interviews with individuals involved in the process indicate that despite the framework not being a carbon copy of the one proposed by the Tebbit Report, it has adapted many of his original recommendations to the particular circumstances of the House Services. For instance the *Purpose* quadrant in the adapted version, answers to Sir Kevin’s ‘What do they [MPs] want from us?’ (as above). The indicators also follow Sir Kevin’s suggestion, and have been determined using the findings of the Survey of Services that had asked MPs to name three top services which are most important to them. The adapted framework has been updated to include a separate framework that incorporates risk management (third generation BSC).

The Tebbit report has emphasised that improved member satisfaction with House Services is a key performance indicator of the BSC framework which should be measured on a regular basis and should be inclusive of all those receiving services of the House by seeking the views of a representative cross-section of Members’ staff in addition to Members (ibid: para. 264). Since the approval of this recommendation, FDS International (surveying company) and the Commons Services have conducted regular surveys to assess member and staff responses of House services and its results have been included in the reports of the Board of Management. Response rates have gone up compared to the previous year and significantly since the first survey of Services in 2003 and the overall feedback has been generally positive.28

28 The response rate in the House of Commons Commission Report 2007/8 reported a response rate of 52% (45% Members and 54% Member’s paid staff) during a three-week field work period as compared to 45% the previous year (HC 2007, 17). Only 5% of the respondents thought that House Services had become less effective (compared to 10% in the previous year) whereas 37%
The House of Commons Commission Reports that are published since the report have included most of Sir Kevin’s recommendations. The reports focus on the primary and supporting tasks of the 2006-2011 House Services Strategy (which is reassessed every year in the *House of Commons Corporate Business Plan*) and assesses the success of benchmarks set out by the Management Board with the help of measurements from Member satisfaction surveys and targets set by consensus among the four heads of Services departments, the Director of PICT (or Parliamentary Information and Communication Technology, established in July 2007 to provide a joint service to both Houses) and the Chief Executive.

Benchmarks are naturally tools to review and enhance performance as outputs and increase the transparency of the performance system which is exactly what the annual Commission reports intend to do. Although there is a tendency to exclude unsuccessful benchmarks (or at least highlight the more successful results), the BSC framework should provide information on different perspectives simultaneously and combine the separate elements of an organisation’s agenda into the report, and all interacting aspects of performance must see an improvement before performance of the whole can improve. For benchmarks to contribute to overall performance, they need to become outcome oriented and mix measurable outputs with subjective feedback reports which are what the Management Board does through the Office of the Chief Executive. The Office insists that it not only uses benchmarks and indicators such as Member satisfaction, but also bellwether services to indicate future trends in the

thought that it had become significantly more effective and 58% had not noticed significant change from the previous few years. (HC 2008)
performance of House Services (not yet apparent from the published annual reports). Even though the House Services BSC does not measure outcomes at present, it intends to do so in the future. The framework is becoming increasingly recognised and supported by the Members of Parliament and has gained full support from the management of the House\textsuperscript{29} which is a promising sign of future success.

In September 2008 the House Service BSC was produced by the Strategy, Planning and Performance Team in the Office of the Chief Executive following consultation with the Management Board and departments of House Services. This framework has been based on the five goals that had been set out in the Commons Corporate Business Plan 2009-10 (HC 2009a)\textsuperscript{30} which include:

- To make Members feel they are receiving an excellent service from all parts of the House Service
- To deliver continuous and measurable improvement in the services we provide
- To ensure that we have the capability to deliver the services required now and in the future
- To make all staff feel that they are valued and work for a first-class organisation
- To increase and demonstrate the value for money and the environmental sustainability of the services we deliver

\textsuperscript{29} This was mentioned by the Head of the Office of the Chief Executive, Philippa Helme in an interview

\textsuperscript{30} HC 'Corporate Business Plan 2009/10', Management Board, Office of the Chief Executive (March 2009) p. 5
This framework is in line with the Tebbit Review and by the Commons own admission is the first time that business plans of the House have been clearly linked to its financial plans (HC 2009b)\(^{31}\). The BSC has been described by the Commission as only a 'monitoring' tool in the hands of the Management Board to constantly check past, current and expected performance which would enable it to identify the resources that should be directed towards areas of greatest priority in services to the House (ibid).

However, off paper and in an interview with a senior Board Member, the expectations are somewhat downgraded and the BSC is described as 'A performance management tool to help institutionally create mechanisms for learning and development and eventually lead to cultural change in Parliament'. Perhaps the role of the Balance Scorecard in House Services is deliberately downplayed\(^{32}\) due to scepticism that exists in among some Members who favour traditional methods of quality control instead of a strategic approach to performance measurement. An assessment of the success of this framework follows below.

\(^{32}\) In the 31st annual Report of the Commission (HC 2009b) the role of BSC has been downplayed to look as if it is only a tool for the third supporting task of the House Services which is 'To plan and manage all of the House Resources to a high standard, achieving value for money and matching current public service standards including in the areas of risk and change management and environmental protection'. However, the framework has been designed to include all the areas which the Management Board is involved in which will include all primary objectives and supporting tasks.
6-4.3 Evaluating Use of BSC in House Services

In order to analyse and assess any BSC framework, a definite implementation period is necessary. Norton and Kaplan (1996, 2001), the architects of BSC, recommend that the framework be applied at least four years before any meaningful evaluation can be achieved. The House services BSC was accepted by the Commission in 2008 and is still in its infancy, which probably explains why not much about the framework has been published in the annual reports of the House. The framework, being in its early stages, has still to receive full recognition and endorsement by the Members it serves. Thus any assessment will have to rely on the views and interviews of those who are involved in the implementation or comparisons with performance measurement frameworks used for this purpose in other legislatures.

Before any assessment it is worthwhile to indicate why the BSC has become the chosen method of performance measurement in many organisations around the world. The BSC has been predicated on the idea that better alignment of an organisation’s strategy and its performance measures lead to better performance (Norton and Kaplan 2001). It puts the organisation’s vision and its strategy towards that vision (not control) at the centre of its measurement system and emphasises the cause and effect relationships (Kaplan and Norton 1992). The other advantages of BSC, as mentioned in chapter three include:

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33 In the case of the House Services BSC, a minimum implementation period of 4-5 years was stressed by the Head of the Executive Office.
- The framework provides information on all four perspectives simultaneously, so as to combine the disparate elements of an organisation's agenda in one report\textsuperscript{34}.

- The framework limits the number of measures, preventing information overload and concentrates on the few success factors only.

- The framework guards against sub-optimism as managers consider all key operating measures together and how improvement in one area may be at the expense of another. Thus supporting strategic communication and information flow.

- The framework is forward-looking. Unlike other methods which rely on past data, BSC looks at present data in order to make predictions about future performance.

- The framework necessitates teamwork and involvement of all operational managers facilitating cross-functional integration and is consistent with continuous improvement\textsuperscript{35} (Norton and Kaplan 1992, 1996, 2001)

The difficulty of using the balanced scorecard approach for non-profit organisations and public services is defining a clear strategy\textsuperscript{36}. Kaplan and

\textsuperscript{34} These groups have been identified by Norton and Kaplan as: Financial, Customer, Internal Processes and Learning and Growth.

\textsuperscript{35} It should be emphasised that the linkages made between performance measures and the objectives of each unit of the organisation must be forged by consensus among all managers of that unit. Failure to have consensus on each strategic linkage and decided measure will result in the strategy map becoming redundant and the measures would become similar to those of earlier performance evaluation models. The measures must also link immediate measures (or leading measures), such as customer satisfaction for example, with non-immediate or lagging measures such as long-term returns even if they may not always be positively related.

\textsuperscript{36} The original balanced scorecard model was based on a strategy of increasing financial gains. In their later revisions of the model, Kaplan and Norton resolved the problem of strategy by stating that a strategy is not only what an organisation intends to do (or not to do) financially, but also non-financial decisions on how such decisions can improve and what measures are linked to their success (Kaplan and Norton, 1996, 2001)
Norton have suggested that since these organisations also follow an operations excellence theme, they would improve performance by taking their current mission as given and then try to excel by working more effectively, efficiently, reduce costs, incur fewer defects and save time (Norton and Kaplan 2002: 134). From this perspective the BSC framework acts similar to other quality models and performance measurement methods used in industry, notably the Japanese Kaizen (Imai 1986) despite being more forward looking. The House of Commons has its own budget and its priority has not traditionally been to reduce costs but to maintain costs within its budget. Performance measurement in Parliament has the advantage of limiting itself to cost efficiency (not reduction) and there is no need to sacrifice the quality of services as cost reduction is deemed as an added advantage not a requirement.

However, as strategy in such non-profit institutions is not necessarily focused on product leadership or customer intimacy, scorecards usually resemble more traditional auditing methods of finding key performance indicators (KPI) rather than true measures. In these instances providing long term planning in the processes leading to strategy building becomes more difficult to achieve. Non-profit organisations may not have precise measures to use as indicators and there may not be any consensus on the information about the indicators and their relevance. In the case of House Services, the current strategy is made from the five goals mentioned earlier in the Corporate Business Plan 2008/09 in the form

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37 For example, the BSC framework used by the Canadian Parliament Centre on legislative budgetary performance relies on the KPIs rather than balancing performance measures, which is more similar to measurement approaches such as the Total Quality Method (TQM) and Malcolm Baldrige Awards (chapter 3). Strategy making in cases where indicators are used usually involves relying heavily on cause and effect patterns and can become complicated to follow.
of four Core Tasks and five Supporting Tasks. These tasks have been agreed internally among members of the Board and each department has been assigned a number of KIPs that will be audited against the tasks every four months and assessed every year published in the annual Commission Report and Corporate Reports. At this stage of implementation it is difficult to say assess the measures chosen for the KPIs or how well the measures blend into the measurement framework.

The KPIs for each department along with the annual budget that has been allocated in the five-year Commons Corporate Plan is available in the yearly Corporate Business Plan also with the name of the person who is responsible for the performance of the department. This has the effect of creating transparency and accountability for performance of the Services in line with their commitments to their goals. However the more traditional methods of auditing KPI has not been replaced by performance measurement practices used in the Balanced Scorecard and this raises the problem of the framework not giving proper assessments of current and future measures of performance. The framework used in the House Services is closer to the performance measurement framework that has been used by the Swedish Rikstak in its design, though not implementation.
- Assisting the work of Members in the Rikstag Chamber and Committees
- Assisting Members and Parties in the Rikstag
- Informing Citizens about the work of the Rikstag
- Maintaining and Preserving the building and Documents
- Being a Good employer
- Making the Administration Green

Box 6-1: Core Tasks of the Rikstag Administration - Source: Rikstag Administration Annual Report 2008 (Rikstag 2009)

- To provide the advice and services that enable the House and its committees to conduct their business efficiently
- To promote the advice and services that enable individual Members (and their staff) to perform their parliamentary duties effectively
- To promote public knowledge and understanding of the work and role of parliament through the provision of information and access
- To maintain the heritage and integrity of the Palace of Westminster and other buildings, objects and documents

Box 6-2: Core Tasks of House of Commons Commission 2008/2009 (HC 2009b)\(^{38}\)

\(^{38}\) As the two boxes show, the first four tasks of the Rikstag are roughly similar to the core tasks of the Commons Commission 2006-2011. The last two core tasks of the Rikstag are the same as the first two supporting tasks of the Commons Commission. The task of making the Administration Green has just been adopted as a core task by the Rikstag and it is in the process of introducing an environmental management system. It is quite possible that this would also be a core task of the House Services in next year’s report too. The Core tasks of the Commons Commissions in the 2008/09 Corporate Business Plan had also changed from the initial Corporate Plan 2006-2011 (Footnote 19) which only has three core tasks with the fourth core task mentioned only as a supporting task (HC 2009b).
This problem of linking external accountability to internal assessment is further exacerbated by the fact that it is usually very difficult to secure a consensus from all sides of the board on what the output or objectives of the organisation is and then to measure performance. The management board in charge of the BSC must have consensus on the performance measurement and the chief executive of the board must have power of execution and be held responsible for the decisions of the board. The Commons Corporate Business Report 2008/09 provides some extent of accountability and transparency as all the people responsible for the decisions are named and measures of departmental targets are published in the annual reports of the Commission. However the nature of House Services in the Commons as a supportive body, not executive, makes responsibility rather ambiguous. House Service departments can support the business of the House but are not held accountable for key issues of quality and quantity of legislation passed and the success in holding the executive to account, in debating, securing redress for constituencies and in securing high voter turnout in elections. Because there is no political constraint on House Services due to their apolitical nature, it is perhaps hard to move the attitude of the MPs and political parties in favour of the idea of leadership and management, even for House Services, coming from the administration.

As already mentioned in chapter three the BSC is a very flexible and needs-led approach to performance measurement. It is neither an audit-led, nor a model-led
approach and can only be successful if there is internal consensus among the management within the organisation. For this Kaplan and Norton (1996) propose facilitators or management consultants on the management board in order to provide the lead and to ensure consensus from inside the organisation. These facilitators must encourage the managers in the implementation of their strategy by constantly focusing the board on two main questions: 'What is the main objective to be achieved?' and 'How to achieve it?' The facilitators must also maintain internal consensus for each of the perspectives in the framework and on the operational goals of the institution. As mentioned the House Commission has moved in this direction and has recruited an external member to the Management Board in 2008 to facilitate and maintain internal consensus on decisions at board level as well as focus on goals rather than tasks (as was previously the case). This step should eventually help change the orientation of services from outputs indicators towards outcomes and bring about a stronger sense of leadership and control within the Management Board.

The key issue in promoting performance measurement within Parliament concerns the receivers of services or the Members of Parliament and their staff. The House Services does not like to use the terms ‘Customers’, which is the term used in performance management to define those who receive a service, and they are not keen to use the term ‘Stakeholders’ either and have opted to use just ‘Members’ instead. Within the rational choice tradition, legislators are considered to be in pursuit of self-interest and strive to optimize their individual careers. They may often have limited interest in specific areas of performance management, and what contributes to suitable outcomes for the whole
organisation. Hence the House Services may be tempted to choose short-term indicators of customer satisfaction in the interest of boasting performance.

However in the case of the BSC this is not possible as there has to be a balance in all parts leading to the performance of the whole organisation. Even though the perception of the external environment is essential to the successful implementation of any performance related model, it is essential that the BSC is formulated from the inside with a view to the outside. According to Douglas Millar the measures must relate to the 'key practical work or the House' and not merely to 'MP standards'. It is vital that performance measures do not take customer satisfaction as the only performance indicator since customers usually take no interest in services when things go well but are quick to acknowledge dissatisfaction during crisis which could undermine the performance of the system if only satisfaction is measured.

The annual reports of the Commons Commission along with the Corporate Business Plan published by the Executive board constitute a means of assessing the performance of House Services and are only a snapshot of how well the legislature performs its functions. Since the current House departmental structure was only established in January 2008 and the BSC adopted seven months after that, the performance figures in the Commission Report of 2008 cannot be the

39 In an interview with Douglas Millar, Director General of Chamber and Committee Services, he explained some MPs are rather impatient and assess performance of Services badly if they come across a printer that is running out of ink, not by practical measures concerning the House. He gave light anecdote of MPs expecting personal service from the House by saying some MPs measure the performance of clerks not by how well they manage committees and write reports but no whether they are able to get them train tickets for a certain time. Such an anecdote is not specific to MPs but can be general to all customers who usually express dissatisfaction rather than satisfaction and would feel satisfied when a service is directed to them personally.
basis to evaluate House Services or the BSC framework. However, there are signs that a more integrated approach to services has reduced costs and improved performance. The most obvious example is better performance as a result of integrating services between the Houses of Commons and Lords in areas such as computing (PICT established as a joint department) as well as some other areas such as security, estates, archives and records, broadcasting, outreach, education and visitor services and tours (HC 2009a). Performance has improved in terms of service delivery which has resulted in a thirty million pound reduction in the costs of Parliament, despite an increase in costs to opening the new visitor centre in Parliament earlier in the year.

In terms of supporting the functioning of the House and its committees, the 2008/09 report (HC 2009a) shows House Services have achieved or surpassed its performance targets in many instances. For example the Public Bill Office achieved a 100% rate in processing and printing government bills in accordance with instructions from parliamentary counsel; the Library produced 200 Debate Packs (an increase of 7% compared to the previous year) in advance of non-legislative debates and also exceeded target for answering enquiries within a 10-day deadline despite an 18% increase in overall enquiries; the Vote Office provided papers immediately to support the Houses’ work 99.99% of the time; and Hansard surpassed its targets of accuracy in recording the debates of the House with one typological error in 22 columns (target: one error in 13 columns).

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In terms of improving outreach, in 2008 House Services launched a YouTube channel and podcasts, photograph collections on Flickr in addition to an internet highlights service on Twitter; the Parliament website was redesigned with a significant addition of new content (launched in April 2009); and new web pages were launched in 2008 to replace the Explore Parliament website including a revised version of he film You’ve got the Power and a new film called Democracy? You decide that were added to YouTube (ibid). All of the above achievements point to a consistent improvement in terms of services to the House and to democracy. The majority of services are ongoing whereas a minority are new. While it may be relatively easy to monitor each service separately they have to be built into an overall framework and integrated in order to show the whole contribution that Services make to the performance of Parliament.

While these examples and other instances in the 2008 report shows improvement in the performance of services in the House, it does not give any assessment of the performance measurement framework compared to other service organisations within developed legislatures. Most developed democracies have some form of performance management system for parliamentary services but only a few have adapted the BSC framework for performance measurement purposes. This study has identified the administration of the Rikstag and Oireachtas as being successful in blending the performance management ethos, and the BSC in particular, into their services division.
In the 2007-09 Strategic Plan of the Houses of Oireachtas Commission entitled ‘Excellence in Parliamentary Service’ the Commission sets out by its own admissions, a very ambitious Vision Statement: ‘A world class Parliament, enabled by excellence in parliamentary services’ (Oireachtas 2007: 6). This plan uses the BSC framework and provides a clear Purpose, Mission, Vision and Value statements along with its core commitments (termed as ‘core tasks’ in the House of Commons Strategic Plan) within the framework of four managerial divisions which must interact together and be responsible for the ‘indicators of successful delivery’ of the Commission (ibid).

Box 6-3: The Core Commitments of the Commission of the Oireachtas. Source: (Oireachtas 2007: 7)

- To serve the sitting of both Houses
- To serve the Members and provide them the services required to do their work
- Promoting Parliament and public understanding of the work it does
- Delivering better management systems to meet public service and best international standards and practice

The Oireachtas Commission is like a parliamentary agency for both Houses of Dail and Seanad, and its fundamental purpose is:
'To serve the sittings and businesses of both houses and members in the performance of their constitutional roles as public representatives' (ibid)

The Commission oversees the Office of the Commission which is in charge of the management of four departments responsible for Services to the Oireachtas. The Commission is composed of 11 members including the Chairmen from the Dail and Seanad and the Secretary General of the Commission Office who is also the Chief Executive of the Commission. Thus the Secretary General of the Commission Office has executive power and the impartiality of the Commission is maintained as neither of the speakers nor members from the two Houses have the executive power of the Commission. Apart from impartiality, the core values of the Office of the Oireachtas are: professionalism, responsiveness, honesty and integrity (ibid: 8).

The performance framework used to measure performance of the Commission's duties is a balanced Scorecard with details of performance indicators for each commitment set under each commitment with the tools to measure success also identified (targets are not included in the Strategy plan and must be approved internally within the divisions). The Houses of Oireachtas 2008 Report has assessed the progress of these strategic commitments towards the delivery of services and includes a surveying of members, staff and officeholders who are all

\[41\] The 11-member composition of the Commission of Oireachtas are:
- The chairman of the Dail
- The chairman of the Seanad
- The secretary General of the Office of the Houses of Oireachtas
- A member of one of the Houses of Oireachtas appointed by the Minister for Finance
- 4 ordinary members of the Dail
- 3 ordinary members of the Seanad
referred to as ‘customers’. Measurement is audit-led which may produce difficulty in measuring future performance as well as integrating the various measures into the framework. However, the report gives plans of a pilot project for an ‘Executive Dashboard’ to start in 2008 which is an interactive BSC tool that provides simultaneous performance measurement information in four key areas of financial (pay and other expenditure); operational (activity and output levels); reach (progress in achieving corporate and strategic targets); and customer satisfaction (results from surveys and interview) performance. The success of this project would undoubtedly signal a new era of performance measurement in the administration of legislatures.

The Rikstag Administration is the authority within the legislature which is responsible for supporting the Acts of the Rikstag; providing services and information to the public; and supplying the necessary resources for the smooth functioning of the work of the chamber, the parliamentary committees and other Rikstag bodies (Rikstag 2006). Like the House of Commons Services, this division is led by a management board (or the Rikstag Board) but unlike the former, this board is chaired by the Speaker of the Rikstag. The Speaker only chairs the board and the board’s overall executive responsibility lies with the Secretary General of the Rikstag Administration (chief executive) as well as the

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42 The 2008 Oileachtas Commission report indicates that the Executive Dashboard project has been developed following detailed project work with staff and CEOs from neighbouring assemblies in the UK, Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales and involves benchmarking approaches to reporting on performance and developing the best practice model with assistance from external consultants. (Oileachtas 2008, 50). This will help comparative studies of legislative performance and it will be interesting to see whether these benchmarks will evolved into performance measures as the project advances. Interviews with managers from the House Service Departments in the Commons confirm that the House Services has begun to use a ‘Executive Traffic Lights’ which like the Dashboard is interactive and should provide a simultaneous and constant monitor of how indicators perform.
Administration Division\textsuperscript{43} that is responsible for performance measurement. The main goal of the Division is to enhance the performance of the Rikstag by: supporting the decision-making process (effectiveness); providing adequate services and administration (efficiency); providing information to the public (openness, accessibility and increase public interest); and supporting international activities (development commitment of the Rikstag). These goals are supported by the tasks and are benchmarked regularly and published in an annual report of the Rikstag Administration.

The overall performance framework presented in these reports is very similar to the work of the Commons Commission Reports and confirms a remark from a researcher in the Commons Executive Office about very close collaboration with its Swedish counterparts. The Rikstag Administration seems to have adapted the BSC framework only as a monitoring tool to assess overall performance of the Administration. But for each division, it has simply used guidelines (or goals) and tasks and measures performance by regular benchmarking of the task indicators\textsuperscript{44}. The performance measurement system of the Rikstag Administration fulfils its promise of efficiency and transparency and is helped by the nature, functions and size of the legislature and the longevity of its performance management system.

\textsuperscript{43} The Administration Office of the Rikstag changed its name to ‘Administrative Division’ in 2008 (Rikstag 2008)

\textsuperscript{44} In response to an enquiry to Lena Ulhin, Senior Advisor to the Director General, about the application of BSC framework in Rikstag, she affirmed that ‘the Administration has not used BSC but its own method’. There is no publication in English to confirm this statement, but the Rikstag Administration annual reports seem to suggest that performance measurement has been simplified to benchmarking for KPIs and the BSC is used as a tool for integrating the performances into one report.
The Commons Services framework is more performance-oriented that the Rikstak in description but is perhaps not as successful because of its function, its authority (the executive power of House Services does not lie in its Management Board and is subject to political considerations) and the size of the British Parliament. The performance of services of the Houses of Parliament may lag behind the services of the Houses of Oireachtas for the same reasons mentioned above and also due to the existence of two distinct departments for services within the House of Commons and the House of Lords (despite recent successful efforts to join some of services provided to both Houses) which adds to inefficiencies in all areas of performance and the duplication of services.

Despite the issues mentioned above, the evaluation of the Commons Services using the only set of standard benchmarks for ranking democratic legislatures receives excellent results. The Benchmark for Democratic legislatures (CPA 2006) is a 13-page document published by the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association in association with the UNDP, World Bank, European Parliament and National Democratic Institute for International Affairs. The Framework consists of ninety-seven separate benchmarks, ten of which are directly to the administration division of legislatures. The House of Commons Services receives top scores for all its relevant benchmarks which conclude that the organisation is certainly befitting of a world-class institution.

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6-5 Case Study II: Evaluation of the House of Commons Performance

The study that follows is an attempt to evaluate the impact of the performance of the House of Commons’ reforms programme, following New Labour’s Modernisation Agenda and the establishment of the Modernisation Select Committee in the House of Commons in 1997. In order to do so, this study first takes a chronological look at this the ongoing reform programme and then identifies the strengths, weaknesses and effects of such managerial reform in relation to the accountability and democratic legitimacy of Parliament as a whole.

It is very important to stress from the start that any analysis of legislative performance and its impact on reforms has to be analysed within the framework of the functions of the specific institution and its constitutional context. Hence, Parliament must be analysed within the framework of a ‘policy influencing’ legislature (as opposed to policy making) which does not have the capacity to make laws of its own and can only amend or reject the policy brought before it by the government (Norton 1993: 50-1). The core defining function of Parliament is its legitimisation or ‘assent of measures of public policy given on behalf of a political community that extends beyond the government elite responsible for formulating those measures’ (Norton 1990: 1).

Since Government governs through Parliament, it is enticing to assess the performance of Parliament through the performance of the Government it assents

46 Policy influencing legislatures are also termed as 'reactive' (Mezey 1979)
to. However, apart from legitimising the government and its measures, the House of Commons performs other duties and functions which may conflict with government efficiency and effectiveness. The most important of these roles are noted as (Norton 1981):

- Providing the personnel of government
- Scrutinising and influencing the measure and actions of the government
- Providing representation
- Providing and sustaining a forum of debate for government and opposition parties

As Philip Norton argues in Strengthening Democracy (Norton 2000) as well as some overlap, there is indeed a degree of conflict between some of the Commons functions especially in respect to providing a sustainable government and ensuring assent to its policies with the scrutiny of government policy and ensuring that the concerns of citizens are met. There is a common tendency in studies of the House of Commons reforms only to concentrate on one function, usually scrutiny, in isolation and give a verdict on the performance of Parliament as a whole. Even though scrutiny does have a direct impact on accountability of the system, the performance of the House of Commons would depend on the balance of all its functions in relation to one another (and in a desirable way to all those concerned in the process).

Secondly as Norton also points out in Does Parliament Matter (1993) scrutiny has different forms, each of which embodies a range of consequences for
parliamentary reforms. In addition to administrative scrutiny, the House of Commons is responsible for the scrutiny of government policy at different stages of its legislative process as well as to the effects of the law upon implementation. Each stage must be evaluated separately with its own set of measures before the overall impact of Parliament’s scrutiny function can be established. Moreover, there is the added complexity of generating indicators and criteria for performance measurement’s sake, which should be approved by consensus among those involved in the process. These measures must then be incorporated with other measurements of parliamentary functions to get a full evaluation of performance of Parliament. No study of this scale can give a full empirical assessment of performance in Parliament and this study only provides a qualitative look at modernisation reforms within Parliament and how they have affected performance in the institution to date.

6.5.1 Modernisation and Reform in Parliament

Over the years, modernisation and reform in Parliament has meant different things. Traditionally these two terms were considered as separate issues. Modernisation has meant practical and procedural changes to update Parliament and bring it more in tune with the day-to-day businesses but not in such a way as to inflict any kind of institutional change. Whereas reform was understood as a conscious decision made by the executive and legislature to institutionally change the structure or behaviour of the institution and as a result move the
balance in the distribution of power between parliament and the government. The difference is shown in a debate on procedural reform given by Richard Crossman, Leader of the House in 1966:

'I would call into attention one confusion which is always recurring in our discussions of Parliamentary reform. There is a great deal of talk about the need for modernisation, for equipping the House with a more efficient voting system, for improving our libraries, for improving our physical accommodation even on occasions for television. I would not decry for one moment the modernisation of this kind and I shall have something to say about it. But there is a difference between modernisation and parliamentary reform. One can for example be in favour of introducing loudspeakers into the House of Commons or improving the library system and yet be opposed to every proposal for adapting our procedures to modern conditions. Equally one can be in favour of parliamentary reform and yet determined to preserve tradition where it does not destroy efficiency.'

The pace of both modernisation and reform were slow in the first half of the twentieth century and, as the previous study also shows, modernisation took precedence over reform in the latter half of the century as measures were carried out to improve working conditions and facilities in the Palace of Westminster, improve the qualifications and professional qualities of MPs and the resources available to them in general. Philip Norton believes that once modernisation starts to take pace, a ratchet-like effect is created that is not possible to simply reverse (Norton 2000). As modernising changes came into place, the clock

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47 Hansard (1966) Debates 14th December, volume 738, column 479
could not be turned back and Parliament had to carry on looking for innovative ways of modernising the system further. These substantial changes inevitably led to reforms or at least brought about the conditions for increased debate on reform. Hence a reform can be considered as the result of a system adapting itself to modernisation.

In the nineties, the coverage of managerial change expanded greatly in academic books on public policy in the United States and Britain (Pollitt 1990, Masey 1992). In public management studies reform is usually seen as a step-by-step process and is a kind of change that is beneficial to the system. Modernisation and reform became acceptable as two sides of a coin and both were necessary to deliver results. At this time the public sector was already going through systematic reforms aimed at improving performance and suggestions were made for parliament to step up its reform policies to keep afloat of changes.

Within the House of Commons, despite the introduction of significant reforms such as the departmental select committees in 1979, the Special Standing Committees in 1980 and the creation of opposition days in 1982, such reforms had not kept up with the growth of modernising changes which were initially intended to improve Parliament’s communication role with the public (such as improvements in media coverage and various other services to inform the public.

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48 For instance the Joplin Committee during John Major’s Government gave some reasonable reform proposals aimed at altering Parliament’s sitting patterns during the week more use of special Standing Committees (Ryle 1996). In 1993 a report from the Hansard society’s Commission on the legislative process, Making the Law (also known as the Rippon Report) gave reform proposals such as the introduction of timetabling of Bills and developing better techniques for scrutiny of proposed scrutiny; a more systematic examination of Bills by the Select Committees, both at pre-legislative and post-legislative stages of the process; and the establishing of a Business Committee to manage the legislative process in Parliament (Hansard 1993, 123, 150).
of the work of Parliament alongside the growth of constituency role of MPs) which had resulted in increased responsiveness, professionalism and influence among the backbenchers. Moreover, the executive’s management of reforms in the House of Commons restricted the implementation of Parliament’s scrutiny function which resulted in the weakening of accountability. The House of Commons was not only limited in exerting significant influence on the government, but also on the institutions of the European Community in its policy making power (Norton 1993).

Such instances prompted a revision of how Parliament could be strengthened to enhance its performance. In the 1990s the Labour party which had been in opposition for a long time began the campaign for rigorous reform of Parliament. Tony Blair’s opening speech at a Charter88 seminar on parliamentary reform in 1996 stated the necessity of reforms and changes to protect the rights of the backbenchers, strengthen the accountability to Parliament, and bring Parliament closer to the people49. During this time the two main opposition parties, Labour and Liberal Democrats collaborated in a joint consultative committee chaired jointly by Robin Cook and Robert Maclennan. The report (known as the Cook-Maclennan Agreement) was published in March 1997 and suggested areas of parliamentary reform that a new government should prioritise with the establishing a select committee for modernisation. These areas included (Cook and Maclennan 1997: paras 66-72):

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- To programme parliamentary business to ensure fuller consultation, more effective scrutiny of bills and better use of MPs time
- To improve the quality of legislation by better pre-legislative consultation and use of mechanisms such as special Standing Committee procedure where evidence is taken before legislation is passed
- To change Prime Minister Question Time to make it a more genuine and serious means holding government to account
- To overhaul the process for scrutinising EU legislation so that decisions from the EU are more transparent and Parliament’s role is more clearly defined
- To strengthen the ability of MPs to make government answerable for its actions
- To enhance the role of Select Committees in ensuring the accountability of departments

In 1997 the New Labour Government came into power upon a manifesto that claimed Parliament is ‘in need of modernisation’ (Labour Party 1997: 33) and a promise to modernise it. It got to work on its promise straight away and established the Modernisation Select Committee (MSC) in June of that year with a remit to, ‘consider how the practices and procedures of the House should be modernised’. Apart from a reform agenda, the Government also brought with it an unprecedented high turnover of fresh members (240 new MPs) including a large number of women MPs. Many of the new members had experienced

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modernisation and reforms in their previous professional backgrounds and were expecting to see quick and effective reform in Parliament. The following section takes a closer look at the reform agenda since the inception of MSC.

6-5.2 The Modernisation Select Committee

Despite aligning modernisation and reform in pre-election campaigns to show both a willingness to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of parliamentary functions, it seems that after establishing the MSC, the Government reverted to the traditional sense of bringing more efficiency to how the Commons processes the business of the executive rather than focus on effectively holding the government to account. Of course this is to be expected of any government that has been out of power for some length of time to be voted back on a popular mandate and with a raft of proposals and policy to pass through Parliament amid high expectations from the electorate (62 Public Acts were passed in the first year alone).

In the first few years, it has been argued that the total effect of modernisation reforms was to make it easier for the Government to pass through its legislative programme (Stuart 2009). Critics of the modernisation plan often claim that since this Committee is chaired by the Leader of the Commons (not a backbencher like other select committees) who is a member of the cabinet, it is bound to side with the government and ignore strengthening the legislature itself. However, this argument could also be turned around to enhance the strength of
MSC and lessen the possibility of a government veto to reform as the chairmanship of the late Robin Cook clearly shows.

The first Chair of MSC, Ann Taylor, while serving as shadow leader of the House, had been a long advocate of a modernisation road map for Parliament. She had announced a set of reform proposals in the previous year to make ministers more accountable; improve the quality of legislation; enhance Select Committees and set up a modernisation select committee; support opposition parties financially; and make better use of parliamentary time. In setting out the agenda for the first four years of the Committee, she stated that ‘Government should not seek change for change’s sake’ but to pay attention to certain aspects concerning:

- The handling of legislative proposals on which the order establishing the committee instructs it to make an early first report
- The means by which the house holds ministers into account
- The impact of the house’s procedure and practices on the working lives of members
- The style and format of proceedings

It has been argued that the package introduced by MSC in July 1997 contained very little that was novel but included procedures that had already existed but not carried out. The new measures had been examined before and recommended in

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52 Modernisation Select Committee of the House of Commons ‘The legislative Process’ HC 190, 23 July 1997, appendix 1, para.1
previous select committee reports as well as successive reports from the Hansard Society and other authoritative sources but were side stepped by the previous government (Kennon 2000: 3 Blackburn et al 2003: 752). According to Ryle, the first reform package looked as though it had not been thought through well enough and that the Government appeared not to have decided how their objectives for reform be achieved in practice (Ryle 1999: 134).

Although the proposals seemed to be a watered-down version of the reform agenda proposed earlier, it is important to note that Parliament as the nation’s arena requires all organisational players (corporately, the government, the opposition front bench and the backbenchers) to operate in coherent and responsive way to any executive reform proposal and there should be consensus for the modernisation initiative before it becomes a binding measure of reform. In its first year, MSC produced seven reports which led to some changes, including a manageable conduct of the chamber, scrutiny of European Business, a more comprehensible Order Paper, the carry-over of bills (only implemented that year) and changes to the hours of sitting of the House. If more radical kinds of change had been introduced then perhaps none of these proposals would have passed through the House in November 1997: By Parliament’s standards as an institution that acts with restraint and caution, this must have been a good start.

In terms of strengthening the legislature, the proposals had less impact on Parliament’s power to scrutinise the executive, rather than strengthen another of the main functions of the House of Commons which is to support and assist the government to pass legislation. For instance changes to the timetabling of issues
before the House which were designed not to allow the opposition to abuse the
debating system by calling Commons divisions on the most trivial or non-
legislative matters and keeping government up late into the night without
resolution (Cowley 2002) may also be seen as ‘automatic guillotines’ and a
threat to accountability53 (Cameron 2009). The case for programming and
timetabling of bills which was initially intended to decrease time wasting to
avoid the guillotine motion on bills has not been successful in eliminating this
problem and the guillotine motion was used four times on three major bills in the
1997/08 session (Gay 2005: 372). The executive intervened in the programming
phase to ensure that it was carried out on the Government’s terms and did not
apply to all legislation (Seaton and Winetrobe 1999) which tilted the balance of
the legislature and the executive towards the latter.

Many of the proposals included measures that are desirable to both the
legislature and the executive. For instance the proposal intended to ensure better
pre-legislative scrutiny of bills, recommended that the government publish a
number of bills in draft for the select committees to examine before they are
introduced to Parliament and allowing the relevant select committee or joint
committee to scrutinise policy before a bill’s legislative stage. This option is
desirable for the Government too as a public and parliamentary scrutiny of the
draft will lead to a better bill being introduced and allows smooth passage of
legislation, saving time in the legislative process. Moreover it is arguably easier
for ministers to make changes at this stage than when the government’s prestige
is engaged as the bill goes through the formal legislative process (Blackburn et al

2003: 624-5). However, in the case of presenting draft bills for legislative scrutiny, within the implementation of the MSC reforms, only two bills were prepared in draft form in 1997/08 session. Despite the steady rise in the numbers of published draft bills over the years, they remain relatively small compared to the number of primary and secondary legislation and are of a selective nature.54

The main reform that did get through (with government backing) was the change to the parliamentary calendar and the introduction of Thursday morning sittings in favour of freeing up Fridays for constituency work (striking a better balance between the MPs' Westminster and constituency duties with their commitments to family life). Even though this proposal did receive initial negative reaction within the Commons as a government initiative to reduce scrutiny, it has been more beneficial for strengthening the constituency role of the MP, another of the functions of the Commons. In terms of connecting Westminster with the public, the Committee made some improvements by instigating changes to a few archaic rituals such as the practice of wearing top hats during points of order as well as the spying on strangers' ritual.55

The change in Prime Minister's Questions Time from two fifteen-minute slots on Tuesdays and Thursday to one thirty-minute slot on Wednesday has been criticised as a sign of MSC caving in to the Prime Minister's demands and giving him the opportunity to spend less days in Parliament and answerable to it.

54 See reports on pre-legislative scrutiny for the House of lords Constitutions Unit. Although it must be said that some of the initial blame for such a small number of draft bills probably lay on the management structures within Whitehall itself, as anyone who had watched the BBC series of Yes Minister and Yes Prime Minister would agree!
55 These two reforms for dated rituals were presented in the Modernisation Select committee of the House of Commons Report 1997/08, HC 600.
However, this decision does not have to do with the MSC and the arrangements were made by the Prime Minister before the Modernisation Committee was set up and as Biffen notes, '[a] Prime Minister with a large majority does not need to be too accountable to the Parliament' (Biffen 2005: 231). In terms of time management of the House bi-weekly Prime Minister's Question Time lasting fifteen minutes each is less efficient than a thirty minute session being held once a week as it takes up too much attention and time that could be effectively used for other parliamentary functions. This session wrongly receives most of the media attention as a theatrical political battle scene between the Prime Minister and the Opposition who show off their rhetorical skills and is mainly responsible for the increasing presidential style politics in Westminster rather than strengthening the functions of Parliament.

What is often neglected in assessments of MSC and its reform agenda is the need to improve the effective and efficient management of procedures of the Commons, rather than place too much emphasis at the scrutiny and accountability of Government. During Margaret Beckett's leadership of the House, the balance in the modernisation development agenda moved towards better management of procedures that not only support legislation, but also parliamentary business and its members. Beckett has often been regarded as a Leader of the House who was unwilling to compromise her Cabinet loyalty when chairing MCS and was tied in bitter public exchanges with the Liaison

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56 After retiring as an MP, Paddy Ashdown mentions in an interview about the functions of the House of Commons that 'the only function it performs tolerably well is that of providing circuses for the people to watch on Television. The theatre is excellent but there it finishes' (Morrison 2001, 415). Surely he is referring to Prime Minister's Question Time which usually provides very amusing viewing even to a person who is unfamiliar with politics.
Committee, following its publication of *Shifting the Balance*, which sought to strengthen the role of select committees in relation to the government by removing the influence of party whips, enhance the committees’ resources and promote the select committee system as an alternative career path for backbenchers. The fact that the proposals for reform were made by senior government backbenchers (chairs of select committees) and the Government rejected all of its proposals, is itself an indication of the imbalance between the House of Commons collectively and the Executive. The Liaison Committee responded to the Government’s rejection of its proposals with disappointment and surprise:

'We found it surprising that the Government which has made so much of its policy of modernising Parliament should apparently take so different a view when its own accountability and freedom of action are at issue.....We believe that in its reply the Government has missed an opportunity of reforms which would have been greatly to its credit. It is strange that the expressions for support for increasing the effectiveness of the Select Committees are not matched by the things that make a real difference....There has been much discussion about shorter sitting hours and more family-friendly scheduling of business in the House. This may all be very well; but any real modernisation of Parliament must provide better accountability and tougher scrutiny of the government of the day.'

57 Liaison Committee ‘Shifting the Balance: Select Committees and the Executive’ HC 300, Session 1999/2000, 3 March 2000
During Beckett’s two-year tenure, the MSC produced just as many reports as it had in its first year alone (the committee met only once a week bringing the total of meetings in the two-year period to forty-two, whereas MSC held sixty-seven meetings in the 1997/08 session). These reports centred on pro-executive and non-controversial reforms about the programming of legislation, sitting hours, parliamentary calendar and sittings at Westminster Hall (parallel debating forum to the chamber), which were all approved and implemented. The output of the committee was increased as all recommendations were agreed upon, implemented or made permanent. Modernisation was making progress in bringing about more efficiency of Parliament but according to Tony Wright modernisation as effectiveness was still absent from discussions of political reform (Wright 2000) which was damaging to the accountability of Parliament and Government.

A reason for Becket’s focus on procedural management may be the coinciding of her chair with the publication of the Braithwaite Report (1999) which prioritised administrative reform, and gave proposals on the corporate management of the Commons (discussed in the previous case study) focusing on the need to accommodate MPs and modernise IT facilities in the Commons (as well as provide online publications of parliamentary business and information on the administration of the House). Her priority was not only to assist legislation, allowing it to pass as smoothly as possible, but also to reform the management of the House. But as Gay claims, in her attempts to raise the efficiency of the House in terms of legislation programming has been ‘passed from being a consensual planning instrument to the refinement of the guillotine so deplored by
parliamentary reformers’ (Gay 2005: 374). The only positive reform that has been noted to support legislative debate and scrutiny in a constructive way was to make the sittings of Westminster Hall permanent.

The result of the first phase of the reform programme was a general sense of dissatisfaction about the direction of reforms which necessitated a change of course on the modernisation debate from how procedural matters should be conducted to the main issues of parliamentary reform and how Parliament should be strengthened to address the existing imbalance in its relationship with the government. Parliament not only needed to become efficient, but also effective in its functions. Surely modernisation was essential for Westminster to lose its connotations of an ‘unwelcoming 19th century gentleman’s club’, earning the nickname ‘Hogwarts-on Thames’\textsuperscript{59}, but an image change alone would not make Parliament fit for purpose and enable it to maintain legitimacy, let alone improve the quality of democracy. At this time two major reports on Parliamentary reforms were published challenging the existing modernisation programme and proposing further changes to the system.

The report \textit{Strengthening Parliament} was published in July 2000\textsuperscript{60}. This report was an initiative from the Conservative Party (in the position of the government’s main opposition party and keen for change), which set up a

\textsuperscript{59} Referring to charter 88, Unlocking Democracy, Strategy Document which states ‘The fact that the customs and traditions of the UK Parliament are based on those of a 19th century gentleman’s club sends a clear message to the public, “We are not like you and you are not welcome here”’. The phrase ‘Hogwarts-on Thames’ is a reference to the fictional Hogwart’s wizardry school in the famous Harry Potter stories. It has been depicted to show Parliament is technically and culturally not in line with the modern UK society. I am not sure who first used the name but it appears in Morrison (2001, 412)

commission to strengthen Parliament chaired by Lord Norton. The academic background of the commission chair ensured a thoroughly investigative and non-political approach to Parliamentary reform that first looked at the problem from all angles before making close to 100 recommendations on changes towards a more efficient and effective institution fit for the challenges of the 21st century. This report rather than debating the value of reform for reform’s sake provided the means, or tools, for realising the goals of reform. In other words, the report set out the conditions that must exist for achieving successful reform to enhance the performance of the system. The proposals and recommendations in this report have become a baseline for MSC programmes since the chairmanship of Robin Cook up to present-day committee proposals.

In addition to proposing a change of attitude by members to reform, Lord Norton’s report also proposed a change of attitude to the way recommendations for reform were made to Parliament by introducing a ‘Big Bang’ approach. This approach calls for an extensive and implementable package of reforms to be introduced by MSC in one go rather than proposing for one single big change61 (Norton 2000: 7). The interaction of several achievable and coherent targets would make compromise and the realisation of the main goal more successful. This approach was used during the tenure of the late Robin Cook as Leader of the House which has been said to be a major factor for his success as chair of MSC62 (Power 2007).

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The next report *Making Government Accountable* was the work of a commission set up by the Hansard Society and chaired by Lord Newton who was a former Leader of the House. The Hansard commission report was similar to the commission on strengthening Parliament, both in composition and their method of investigation since both comprised of a broad membership from inside and outside Parliament and produced authoritative reports after a period of consultation and investigation. Though unlike the previous report that took a holistic view to performance as an interaction of different parliamentary functions, the Hansard report only considered ways of enhancing Parliament’s scrutiny of the Government.

According to Norton three conditions are usually necessary for significant reforms. First of all there must be a window of opportunity that usually comes after a general election. Second is a set of coherent proposals that MPs can unite behind. Finally there needs to be strong leadership, usually from the Leader of the House to carry through the proposals (Norton 2000: 13). Apart from the window of opportunity, the two other conditions were not so strong in this phase of reform as even desirable proposals such as the carry-over of bills from one session to the next got little result during this period. There was now a platform for Parliamentary reform and pressure on the Government to take notice. The Government had also won the second general election and the window of opportunity was provided for again. What was missing in the previous term was

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a strong leadership and management of MSC to pull reforms through which seemed to appear when the late Robin Cook became leader of the House.

In his state of the Union lecture at the University College London Cook had stated that, 'If the Commons wants to earn more respect it needs to adopt a business-like approach which reveal a chamber more concerned with the public interest and less motivated by party'. He admitted that such an approach would require reform to parliamentary procedures and select committee structures but these reforms can only come about if MPs' attitude to Parliament changes and 'Members really see scrutiny as the prime requirement of their job description' (Robin Cook 2001). As mentioned in the previous case study, the Senior Salaries Review Body of the House of Commons had made the Leaders' job easier by providing a generic job description for the MP (footnote 28) that specifically included the monitoring and challenge of the executive for influencing desirable outcomes, as one of the main responsibilities on members. The Leader of the House was also aware of directing reform so that parliament becomes less marginalised by the media and more relevant to the public especially the younger generation (ibid).

Realising that modernisation required a clear vision rather than a mixed bag of unrelated reforms, Robin Cook set about to provide the goals around his vision of making Parliament more effective and relevant, before presenting the raft of measures for reaching these goals. The package of reforms had been facilitated

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by the publication of the two Reports by Lord Norton and Lord Newton as most of the first package used adaptations of recommendations in these reports. The measures proposed centred around the improvement of the legislative process (scrutiny and procedure); carry-over of bills (becoming routine); and making Parliament more accessible and welcoming to public and media. To improve the legislative process, he recommended the publication of more pre-draft bills (stopping short of setting targets); rational and accessible sitting hours (modernising working hours); and flexibility in procedures (which meant that exchanges in the chamber would become more topical and relevant to issues at the time).

These reforms all had certain advantages not only to the efficiency of Parliament, but also to its effectiveness. For instance when bills are carried over from one session to the next, it prevents the creation of a ‘tidal wave’ of legislation and allows for a manageable distribution of bills, time and resources that will lead to better scrutiny (Cook 2003a: 11). Modern working hours not only makes sense in energy efficiency, but also encourages a more equal distribution of women MPs who would probably be put off by the idea of having to continue debate into the early hours of the next day. Also providing better facilities for the media to access Parliament would bring more coverage and connect Parliament with the public. Cook believed that creating more interest about the functions of Parliament as a whole and lead to higher participation and turnout in election and would in turn improve the quality of democracy (Cook 2003b).

65 The extent of the problem is apparent in the comment of Anne Campbell MP: ‘It is far easier to buy a drink at Westminster at 2 am that it is to send a fax to a constituent’ (Quoted in Morrison 2001, 413).
Robin Cook’s tenure as Leader of the House is usually noted for his changing of the working hours. However, perhaps the most important feature of the Cook reforms which provides the means for performance analysis in the House of Commons was the strengthening of the position of select committees in different stages of the legislative chain and introducing core tasks or functions which would provide measures to assess their performance. Hence an assessment of the core tasks of select committees would provide a good snapshot at the performance of the Commons in terms of holding Government into account and improving the quality of legislation. The idea of core tasks was brought up in by the Hansard Society Commission on Parliamentary Scrutiny report which argued that to make scrutiny more systematic:

'The select committees should be given a set of core duties. The committees should retain the freedom to initiate inquiries according to the interests of the committee or to respond to emerging issues....these objectives might include: balancing inquiries between administration, finance and policy of their department; monitoring all departmental reports, business plans and performance indicators; conduction a regular cycle of work on activities of the regulators, executive agencies, quangos and other associated bodies within their department's purview; and review the progress of the department following the committee's previous reports' (Hansard Society 2001: paras. 25, 26)

66 In Strengthening Parliament, Norton argues for committees having a stronger role in pre-legislative scrutiny of bills which would result in better legislation as 'What government loses in the short term (speed of passage) will be off-set by what it will gain (better quality legislation) in the long term' (Conservative Party 2000, 32)
Allocating core tasks to select committees offered them an opportunity to improve their own effectiveness; the effectiveness of the House (by compensating for the modernisation programme which was aimed mostly at efficiency); and the effectiveness of Government. So it must be a highly desirable step. MSC presented its recommendations or core task or the ‘illustration of what we would regard as the principal objectives of departmental select committee’ for debate in February 2002 and in June of that year the Liaison Committee agreed and published ten core tasks based on the recommendations made by MSC report. Even though the approved core tasks were watered down and less prescriptive than the original recommendations of MSC, in theory the performance of the scrutiny function of the House of Commons could be assessed using the core tasks as well as enhancing scrutiny and improving the image of Parliament and its members in the eyes of the Public. Following the implementation or core tasks in the first year, the Liaison Committee report in 2003 stated:

'The discipline of assessing their work against core tasks has encouraged committees to ensure that they monitor the widest possible range of departmental

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67 Select Committee on the Modernisation of the House of Commons (2002), 'Select Committees', 12 February HC 224 Session 2001/02: para. 34. The report proposes 11 core task:
- To consider major policy initiatives
- To consider Government’s response to major emerging crisis
- To propose changes where evidence persuades the committee that the present policy requires amendment
- To conduct pre-legislative scrutiny of draft bills
- To examine the report on main estimates, annual expenditure plans and annual resources accounts
- To monitor performance against targets in the public service agreements
- To take evidence from independent regulators and inspectorates
- To consider the reports of Executive agencies
- To consider, and if appropriate report on, major appointments by a secretary of State of other senior ministers
- To examine treaties within their subject areas
activity; it also allow the public and the media to appreciate more easily the comprehensive examination of Government which committees undertake.68

To enhance the businesslike approach to select committee performance and encourage the committee membership as an alternative career path for MPs to serving Government, incentives had to be introduced which made committees viable alternative career option for MPs rather than competing for the frontbench. Cook’s package also proposed better funding for the select committees and extra remunerations for select committee chairs; two-term sessions for select committee chairs; increasing the membership of the select committee; and to make committee nominations independent of the whips.69 The Liaison Committee approved the first two recommendations but the Committee did not accept to limit chairmanship to two parliaments and not to change its structure by increasing membership. The final proposal in the package was defeated in the chamber. Tony Wright MP (2004: 370) states:

‘When the Leader provided MPs with an opportunity to decide on a free vote whether they wanted the composition and chairs [of select committees] chosen by whips...or themselves, they voted for the former option’

As this comment shows not all opposition to reform could be attributed to Government or the lack of reforms blamed on the power imbalance between the Commons and the Government. The proposals coming from the Leader of the

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69 Modernisation Select Committee, ‘Select Committees’ HC 224, Session 2001/02
House, a cabinet member, must have had Government approval; but the prospect of reforms was lost due to opposition from members themselves and their attitudes to reforms. The problem according to Wright is down to the fact that parliament does not act as a collective entity with a common set of values but members see reform from the prism of their party rather than how a reform would strengthen Parliament as a whole (ibid: 507-8). This view was also shared by Cook and Maclellan (1997, 2005) who believed that politics has become too disciplined and adversarial which is disconnecting Parliament from the public.

Of course opposition to reforms from the Commons does not diminish the fact that the Government genuinely dislikes reforms that are designed to limit its power. In response to the fast pace of the reform packages presented by the MSC, the Government created a Cabinet Sub-committee on Modernisation. Although this committee was chaired by the Leader of the House, according to Greg Power, it was designed to ensure that the Leader consults with his colleagues before presenting a package to Parliament and would be kept in line by the Cabinet Office secretariat that serviced the committee (Power 2007: 501). The effect of such body would be to slow down reforms and add to the frustration of negotiating each reform in the package. It has been suggested that the frustration over Cooks attempts to reform the House of Lords with the introduction of a substantial elected element which was resisted by the Cabinet and Prime Minister may have contributed to his resignation from Government over the Invasion of Iraq (Thomas 2005: 250).
Before his resignation, Cook had announced that the next MSC investigation would look at how Parliament could engage more with the public. The pace of Commons' reform slowed down significantly but as Power argues he had deliberately insisted on a slower pace as the result of a realistic political assessment of how much change was further achievable as well as reflecting the mood in the Commons of a lack of appetite for any additional sources of division (Power 2007: 503-4). The change of direction and speed of reforms must have also been in the interest of creating a balance in the performance of the different functions of Parliament and not overstressing on one aspect but creating a balance among the competing priorities of Parliament, government and society at large. Under the Leadership of Peter Hain, the MSC changed direction towards reforms that would promote widespread support rather than increase divisions.

The MSC 2004 report, Connecting Parliament and the Public, set out a series of practical recommendation designed at making the Westminster building more accessible and welcoming to constituents; making greater effort to engage with young people; and encouraging better use of information and communications technology (HC 2004, 11). The recommendations in this report (such as the radical upgrading of the Parliamentary website, including youth engagement section on the website and constant review of digital broadcasting) could be more effectively implemented since the Leader of the Commons is also a member of the House of Commons Commission (previous case study), the result being the publications the Commissions Strategy Plan in 2005. These measures

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were not given the adversarial treatment as previous measures of MSC reports had and only fourteen members voted against the measures in January 2005.\textsuperscript{71}

This change of direction could also be related to the fact that subsequent appointees to the post of Leader of the House had mostly been promoted to the post (except for Jack Straw) and were expecting further promotions in their political careers by remaining loyal to the Cabinet, whereas Robin Cook had been politically demoted as Foreign Secretary to the post and didn’t feel he would lose much from pushing the Government to the limits of reform. Though, however one speculates the reasons for a change of direction of reforms it must be emphasised that such a change in the direction of reforms is necessary for the sake of creating a balance among the different roles Parliament. What is important is the fact that the foundations for reform were set. Despite some setback to some of the reforms such as the House voting in January 2005 to return Tuesdays to its past working hours, the nature of the House necessitates that the pace of reforms be set internally by consensus.

The Labour Manifesto of 2005 reiterated its commitment to improve scrutiny and its relationship with the public. The focus of reforms in the 2005/06 session was scrutiny of bills in the legislative stage. A common criticism of the Standing Committees responsible for the legislative stage is that while they provide the opportunity for line-by-line scrutiny of bills, backbenchers are often discouraged from participating and so the amendments put forward by anyone except the

\textsuperscript{71}Out of the opponents, 13 MPs were from the Tories and 1 MP from Liberal Democrats. The Public Whip website at: http://www.publicwhip.org.uk/division.php?date=2005-01-26&number=49
government is rarely accepted and the Government is rarely defeated at this stage (Riddell 2002: 11-12, Whitaker 2006: 696). The programming of bills introduced in this stage of the legislative cycle received adversarial tension and has been abandoned. The main limitation that has been argued is that it is not possible to accurately anticipate the time needed for adequate consideration and time may run out before major parts of the bill can be adequately scrutinised (Brazier 2004, 16). Despite better means pre-scrutiny of bills, and more use of special Standing Committees and Joint Committees, it was obvious that the current system did not contribute to stronger scrutiny of the Government.

This problem was addressed during the Jack Straw’s of the House. In its first report for session 2005/06\(^{72}\), MSC announced not only that Special Standing Committees should become the norm for all Government bills replacing all Standing Committees (HC 2006: para 58), but also to avoid confusion all such arrangements (special standing committees) were to be renamed as ‘Public Bill Committees’ with individual committees being designated by the name of the bill allocated to them (ibid: para 65). This was not only a cosmetic change to the name and appearance of the Committees, but also provided the new committees with the ability to receive written evidence and the means for better scrutiny and lessening of partisan division.

Another reform toward the systematic improvement of scrutiny in Parliament is the Government’s publication of the Draft Legislative Programme in July 2007.

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\(^{72}\) House of Commons Modernisation Select Committee (2006), *First Report*. Session 2005/06, HC
The draft provided a summary of the Government’s intentions for the next parliamentary session in advance of the Queen Speech. Although the programme was first presented as part of the Government initiative ‘Governance of Britain Agenda’, it has now become part of the MSC reform programme and consultations are currently underway to improve the effectiveness of the programme. The present Leader of the House, Harriet Harman and her two predecessors have taken a more consultative role as the Chairman of MSC and (as the previous study suggests) integrated reforms of the House within the management of the Commons to create a more effective corporate structure of how business is managed within the House.

6.5.3 Evaluating Parliamentary Reform

Parliamentary reform in Westminster follows a pattern of cautious evolution. Unlike newer, developing parliaments that cherry pick and adopt new structures and behaviour from effective models of legislative scrutiny previously designed and tested out by established democracies, Westminster must find a way of adapting reforms to its unique institutional framework without changing its policy influencing nature and to make reforms compatible with its already established structures, resources and behaviour which could at times be painstakingly slow. Reforms in Westminster have been a non-stop and continuous process, though the pace of reforms has perhaps not moved as fast as the demands for democratic accountability from the society. But, as Day and Klein (1987) suggest the purpose of democratic accountability is not only
concerned with efficiency but also effectiveness of government. Accountability becomes an essential means of determining both whether maximum government effectiveness and efficiency is reached and encouraging further improvement. To achieve this end it is crucial that scrutiny systems in Parliament use performance information and measurement systems to manage government accountability.

The debate on parliamentary reform today has evolved from the conception of accountability as effectiveness in the proper use of resources and clear management objectives for the Government to reform in the context of sensible, prudent and wise policy making which requires effective mechanisms for scrutiny and accountability by Parliament. It is generally perceived that this latter concept of accountability has not kept pace with the former and the tools and mechanisms necessary to make this change need updating and change. What Parliament needs to do to avoid creating a vacuum in public accountability is to meet the rising professionalism of the public sector with professionalism from the legislative system (Hogg and Jenkins 1999, 145). Failure to reform in this way would not only cause a loss of respect for Parliament but the inability to maintain or improve legitimacy for the political system as a whole.

Although this study cannot provide a full evaluation of reforms in Parliament since a complete evaluation would require a thorough investigation of the performance of both Houses of Parliament, it has examined reforms to the procedures and practices of the House of Commons since the modernisation agenda of 1997. In order to evaluate reforms it is necessary to assess them
against a set of criteria of parliamentary functions. The core functions of Westminster and other policy influencing legislatures are (Norton 2000, 6):

- To create a sustainable Government
- To ensure that the business of government is carried on (through giving assent to government bills
- To facilitate a credible opposition
- To insure measures and actions of Government are subject to Scrutiny
- To ensure voices of citizens are heard

These five functions provide the core elements with which reforms should be assessed. An overall assessment of reform would require a holistic approach with regard to the balance of all of the core elements. It is clear that most developing legislatures below singularity would struggle to maintain balance among these functions which is necessary for system stability (marked by the absence or very weak presence of the last three functions). As for Parliament, its scrutiny role has never been very strong compared to some other political systems in Western Europe (Norton 1998). This is despite the fact that in recent years there has been a significant rise in the volume of legislation compared to a decline in the number of Government Acts which means that Parliament has devoted more time and effort to better scrutiny of Government bills. What has become dominant in discussions about reforms is not so much about the capacity

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of the system to scrutinise government policy, but the lack of scrutiny tools for improving accountability. Since its establishment, the Modernisation Committee has been given the task of introducing the tools necessary to modernise the practices and procedures of Parliament. The creation of the Committee alone should be seen as a new phase for parliamentary reform in the House of Commons.

Most assessments of the modernisation reform programme instead of holistically evaluating the impact of reforms on the performance to the House of Commons tend to reduce individual issues in terms of efficiency and effectiveness and conclude that since most reforms have helped the efficient passing of legislation (government output) there is a diminished impact on effectiveness in terms of scrutiny. This outcome together with recent poll results that show 85 percent of the population does not feel represented by parliament (Hansard 2009: 29) and provides an image of a declining ability of Parliament to manage its reforms. However, performance as the mass of efficiency and effectiveness taken together should be assessed from the inside of the institution with a view to the outside (such as satisfaction surveys of members as in previous case study) not vice versa, and definitely not at times of global economic crisis.

In terms of legislative scrutiny, the Commons has improved its status as a policy-influencing chamber. The most significant measures can be summarised here as:

1. Receiving more policy information in the form of green papers and consultation from the Government working with clear guidelines;
(2) Receiving pre-draft of bills allowing for more policy influence and better consideration of policy from the Government before the bill is formally introduced to parliament\textsuperscript{74};

(3) The pre-publication of Government policy set forth in the Queen Speech (coming into effect in 2007) and a renewed Government commitment to publish as many bills as possible for legislative scrutiny along with that publication\textsuperscript{75};

(4) The structural change in pre-legislative scrutiny of bills by Joint Committees allows for more in-depth scrutiny of bills and a good degree of bipartisanship in the committee’s approach to inquiries (HL 2004);

(5) The carryover of bills not only enhances pre-legislative scrutiny but allows for a more organised distribution of parliamentary resources and time;

(6) The application of programming and timetabling carried on a consensual basis within Parliament, offers the chance for greater scrutiny and flexibility to consider topical issues of public interest. Without consensus, timing is often regarded as the government’s effort to control the legislative process;

(7) Westminster Hall has become a parallel debating chamber providing extra opportunity to debate on backbench issues, hence optimising parliamentary time;

(8) The establishment of Public Bill Committees have provided more in-depth and flexible scrutiny of legislation by taking a seminal approach to legislative scrutiny and allowing evidence from individuals and bodies from outside Parliament to influence and improve the legislative process;

\textsuperscript{74} This measure has been carried out on an adhoc basis and as mentioned does depend on the personality of the Leader of the House. For instance in the 1997/98 and 2003/04 sessions 42 bills were published in pre-draft and this figure has gone down to only five bills in 2004/05 session. The decision of which bills should be published still lies with the Government, nevertheless the practice serves as a great tool for strengthening Parliament and the with time is bound to improve in terms of efficiency and effectiveness.

\textsuperscript{75} Office of the Leader of the House of Commons (2007) ‘The Governance of Britain: The Government’s Draft Legislative Programme’, 11 July 2007, cm 7175. The MSC has since given recommendations on the better timing of this practice to ensure maximum effectiveness.
(9) The introduction of Core Tasks not only provides select committees with a
generic job description, but the setting out of the committees’ scrutiny roles
enhances and defines their tools for performance measurement. The role of
legislative scrutiny is not only confined to pre-legislation and legislation stages,
but also the scrutiny of government performance in the post-legislative stage;
(10) Select committees have become more resourceful and specialised and their
membership is seen as a viable alternative career path to frontbench positions for
aspiring politicians;
(11) Parliament provides adequate resources, information and training to
committee members and MPs in order to boast their performance as scrutineers
of the government and engagers with the public;
(12) Changes are underway to simplify the language of parliament, not only in
terms of making the institution less alienating\textsuperscript{76} but also a measure of facilitating
scrutiny;
(13) The Prime Minister is scrutinised directly by the Liaison Committee twice a
year (each session lasting two and a half hours) and held accountable on a whole
range of issues\textsuperscript{77}.

The reforms mentioned above are only some of the changes to the performance
of Parliament since the start of MSC and it is clear that each of these main issues
resulted from the transaction of other reforms and changes. Although the success
of MSC is usually seen in its ability to apply efficiency related changes, such as

\textsuperscript{76} The H\textsuperscript{a}nsard report, \textit{Parliament in the Public Eye} (2005) had stated that ‘Parliamentary
language is often obscure and confusing, reinforcing the view the Parliament is relevant only to a
bygone age’ (H\textsuperscript{a}nsard 2005, 63).
\textsuperscript{77} Although this was not a recommendation of MSC but an initiative of Tony Blair (Riddell
2002) it is included in the list since it is a reform towards effectiveness in Parliament.
parliamentary time and calendar, rather than improve scrutiny, the above shows that the House of Commons is potentially improving its performance by becoming both efficient and effective in terms of its ability to influence policy and provide effective scrutiny.

One of the results of the modernisation agenda is that Parliament has adapted patterns which associate it with working parliamentary models that provide a parallel and democratic audit of government business. If Parliament is to go down this route then it will sooner or later need to establish a business committee that takes the control and management of parliamentary business out of the hands of the Government and into the control of elected representatives. The MSC had proposed such a committee in 2002 but was made (under pressure from the cabinet) to change its proposal to a vague commitment to collective consultations with the parties on the broad shape of the legislative year (Russell and Paun 2006: 11). However as mentioned before such a centripetal style would require less adversarial politics and for more cooperation and ultimately an attitude change within Parliament which remains a challenge.

The management of parliamentary business still carries through 'the usual channels' which is a term used to define the informal and bilateral negotiations predominantly between the whips of the two main parties. However, these usual channels open only after behind the scenes negotiations between the government chief whip and his or her private secretary and the government usually gets its way (ibid: 6-7). The House of Lords Constitution Committee, under the chairmanship of Lord Norton, produced a report on Parliament and the
Legislative Process\textsuperscript{78}, in which it stated that ‘Westminster was an outlier in comparative terms to the level of Government domination of the timetable’ (HC 2004: para 116). The report conducted comparative studies of legislatures with business committees and concludes that such structures do not prevent governments from getting business through but rather ensures greater openness and time for proper scrutiny (ibid: para 118) and proposes such a committee to be established within Westminster. This proposal was given a negative response by the Government at the time and the debate for such a committee still continues today.

Another criticism made of MSC is that its functions overlap and undermine the functions of the Procedure Committee. Kelso believes that the reason MSC exists is to shape House procedures so that they most benefit the Government rather than the Commons and minimise accountability of the executive. By shaping of procedures, the MSC has usurped the Procedure Committee making it a redundant body (Kelso 2007). However, had this been the case MSC recommendations would not have been overturned by the procedure committee such as the reversal to previous hours on Tuesday. It would be fairer to say that had there not been MSC, then even the reforms that some regard to be small would not have managed to get through. As mentioned the MSC not only had the problem of dealing with government but also a Parliament that were not so keen to change. Despite facing friction from the Government and Parliament, the MSC has managed to make considerable changes to the way policy is scrutinised.

which often fails to get recognised perhaps due to a culture of cynicism and negative press.

If the procedure committee has become redundant, then maybe it is time for the committee to start considering the order of the business and procedures of the House toward optimal efficiency and effectiveness of the House (similar to a business committee). Such a change could come at the next election with the new government poised to making improvements in the way Parliament carries out its own business. While one would predict much more positive changes towards making the House more efficient in its business in the coming years (which is inevitable due to the ratchet-effect of reforms), there shouldn't be too high expectations since system change will definitely not be on the agenda of either party. Changes will mainly be less radical in content and aimed at maintaining the balance among the core functions of Parliament.

A final remark about the impact of the modernisation reforms on Government accountability has been the enabling of select committees (as stated in their cores tasks) to systematically assess performance metrics in the form of Public Sector Agreements (PSA) and provide systematic scrutiny of the public service sector⁷⁹. Performance information has become crucial in realising the transparency and accountability of Governments despite claims that the practical applications of the PSA system falls short of the rhetoric (James 2004). In an analysis of how select committees have adapted to their core task, Johnson and

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⁷⁹ According to the liaison Committee report (2003) the sixth task of select committees is ‘to examine the department’s Public Service Agreements, the associated targets and the statistical measurements employed and report if appropriate’. Liaison committee (2003) ‘Annual Report 2002’ HC 558, para 13
Talbott (2007) have found that there is a difference of view among select committees and their members regarding the way information is used as well as the practical value of performance management using specific measurement and targets as provided in PSAs. The results of their questionnaire to select committee members at the time showed relatively strong scepticism in the value of performance measurement among MPs and implied that instead of Parliament becoming more of a challenge to the Executive, it has been more challenged and overwhelmed by amount of performance reporting (ibid). The authors have pointed out that since no comparative evidence from other countries using similar policies to PSA (e.g. Japan, USA and France) exist it is too early to assess the Parliament’s success in managing government performance. Improvements in the system in time will undoubtedly change how Government scrutiny is managed and link its performance to the Performance of Parliament (and its scrutiny function). The foundations for the change in the way Government accounts to Parliament and the public have been laid and it is interesting to see what impact this has on parliamentary performance in future studies.

6-6 Case Study III: Performance Measurement of the Majlis Research Centre

The case study below provides an example of a legislature in a political system below the consolidation threshold. This study provides a summary of findings
into the use of performance measurement for legislatures below the consolidated democratic threshold. Due to the author's background, this study was conducted in the Majlis Research Centre (MRC) which is the research arm of the Majlis Shoura Islami, or the Islamic Consultative Assembly of Iran \(^{80}\).

Apart from the familiarity of the author with the workings of the Majlis, relative access to sources of information and fluency in Persian, the main reason for choosing the Iranian Majlis as a case for an unconsolidated legislative system is the fact that in terms of structure, procedures, resources and budget, research facilities and staff the Majlis is comparable to many of the developed legislatures above the consolidation threshold. The Majlis was built in 1906, has 22 permanent commissions (or select committees) and on paper the legislative process is similar to the French legislature \(^{81}\). However the legislature is volatile and small political changes or tensions in the environment can create large swings in institutional behaviour that can not be seen in consolidated democracies. The Islamic revolution was in itself a case of an extreme catastrophic change and since then the political systems has gone through smaller scale catastrophes (due to an improvement in the control factors mentioned in chapter 4) with each change resulting in the stunting democratic development in the movement toward democratisation and consolidation.

\(^{80}\) The choice of the Iranian Legislature is partly due to the author's background and experience having previously worked there as a researcher. The choice of MRC also allowed the author a fair amount of help and access which could not have so easily been given in other developing legislatures due to their strong bureaucratic framework and dislike for researchers from outside.

\(^{81}\) The constitution of the Post-Islamic Revolution of 1979 was drafted on the French (fifth republic) political system with a strong executive and weak parliament. However the drafters added a number of articles including the doctrine of Velayat-e-Faqith (supreme Islamic jurisprudence) which has thoroughly undermined the logic of the French original and has introduced contradictions to the system which is the source of tensions in today's Iran.
The MRC was set up in 1991 with the aim of providing:

- Research and expert advice on all proposals and bills of the Majlis

- Collective decisions and critiques from a broad field of researchers, academia, executive bodies and institutions, political parties, groups and organisations, and public opinion

- Research into the implementation of laws and the oversight power of the Majlis, the provision of expert analysis and advice on the alleviation of certain barriers in implementation

- Information and data required by commissions and individual legislators

- Topical projects and case studies as required by the management board of the Majlis and individual legislators

- Running of a library and data base, in conjunction with the Main library of the Majlis

- Publishing the results of research in the form of books, journals and papers

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82 'Rules and Regulations of the Research Centres of the Majles: the role of the Majles Research Centre', Majes Shoura Eslami, 3rd revision, 1380 [2000], p.2
The organisational structure of the MRC is illustrated in figure 6-2. As the chart shows the organisation is quite significant in size and has the potential to cover for all the research requirements of the Majlis and their members. The management structure of the MRC consists of an executive board which is chaired by the speaker or leader of the Assembly who is the leader of the majority party in the Majlis. Other board members include the director of the MRC, managers of the two main subdivisions and heads from certain research

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84 This chart is taken with permission from the MRC website at: http://www.majlis.ir/chart/EN-chart-2.htm
85 The research wing of the MRC consists of nine research departments: Legal Affairs, Infrastructure, Energy, Mines and Industry, Economics, Budget, Politics, Culture and Social affairs, and Technology. The MRC library and publications department are also covered by the research directorate. The Majlis has a separate library on site.
departments\textsuperscript{86}. The administrative wing of the MRC includes offices for finance, administration and information technology (IT). There is an inevitable overlap of tasks with some departments in the Majlis itself, however the MRC being a public body (receives public funding) acts independent of the Executive and its departments.

The exercise of building the BSC framework for the MRC and applying measurement to the framework took up an intensive four-week period of lunch-time meetings or workshops with up to four meetings a week\textsuperscript{87}. These meetings, which lasted twenty-nine hours in total, covered a period from the initial introduction of the framework to deciding on the measures and later agreeing on a plan for performance measurement\textsuperscript{88}. Over this time the team managed to get to consensus on the main mission, values, strategy and targets for their performance framework. The final draft of the framework was approved by the executive board and the MRC research council, before measures were discussed

\textsuperscript{86} The executive board members are reinstated every four years which coincides with the elections of the Majlis. As the board is in charge of indicating the centre’s policy, budget and the direction of parliamentary research and oversight into the executive branch, it is obviously lacking the fundamental requirement of a legislative research centre which is to be politically neutral.

\textsuperscript{87} The BSC framework was initially proposed by myself as a continuation of an earlier joint project between the MRC and UNDP entitled ‘Strengthening the Iranian Parliament’. This project was carried out between 2002-2005 and I was involved in its implementation up to September 2003. During this time comparative legislative techniques were carried out to strengthen the procedures of legislation and committee powers. I had first handed in a proposal to improve the organisational performance of the MRC in October 2005 which was subsequently accepted by the executive board in December 2006. I started work in April 2007 and got my first assessment results in March 2008.

The project was carried out with a team from seven MRC departmental heads (which included legal, political affairs, cultural and social issues, economics, infrastructure, and budget) and the collaboration of the top management of the Centre (including the active involvement of the heads of research and administrative departments during most of the meetings and all decisions). All decisions were taken with the consensus of all members and updates were published in the weekly MRC newsletter in order to inform legislators and research staff and receive feedback from them.

\textsuperscript{88} Since the people working in the group had more experience as independent researchers and in addition to cultural reasons were not really accustomed to team work and brainstorming sessions, it was very hard to get at decisions by consensus and for this reason, twenty-nine hours of meetings (April-May 2007), may have probably not been enough to initiate such an exercise.
and applied by consensus. Some of the points raised in the mission statement of the MRC was already stated in the codebook for ‘regulations and conduct’ of the MRC. The final version of the mission statement which was approved by consensus is as follows:

‘Our mission is to provide expert advice and opinion on all proposals and bills in the Majlis and to respond to the various needs and requests of Commissions and individual legislators in addition to providing information on the results of all our research. We are always looking for new and innovative methods of effective and efficient use of our human, financial and technological resources to improve the quality of our consultations with the Majlis.

Increasing the value of our services to our customers and stakeholders is among our greatest goals. This can only be achieved through proper and effective information collection, documentation processes and maintaining the satisfaction and trust of the Majlis and the wider society. The product of our services must satisfy legislators to the extent that they do not want to use any other service. Finally we see ourselves responsible for the achievement of the higher goal of strengthening the rule of the people by keeping people informed of all decisions and activities of the Majlis and to making the institution more accessible to the public’.

As these two paragraphs show, the true mission of the MRC is rather difficult to state. The management team felt under pressure to include all the dimensions above, thus rendering a clear and concise balance scoreboard extremely difficult
if not impossible. The lacking of a clear single performance goal would further complicate the development of a clear cut strategy and performance measures. However this was the only way to get consensus on the scoreboard.

Following the mission statement, the group went on to list a number of values which it considered as essential to the achievement of the mission. The most important values that the group decided by consensus is:

- Political neutrality
- Credibility and trustworthiness
- High work ethics
- Defend the rights of the nation
- Maintain religious values and virtues
- Fight against corruption

It is important to note here that although the management of the MRC all agreed that the most important value is political neutrality, the MRC is not politically neutral since the leader of the majority in the Majlis (whether the leader of the biggest political party or coalition) is the MRC chairman and makes key decisions and appointments (as a result all managers in the MRC are either appointed by the majority party or somehow related to them). Therefore it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to develop a clear balanced scorecard for the MRC. Incidentally one of the managers taking part in the exercise did raise the issue by asking about the point of devising a framework that will only last the current administration as under the circumstances there was no guarantee that the
following management board of the MRC would agree on the BSC approach to improving performance and approve of resources allocated to its continuous usage.

By general agreement, the strategy of the MRC was the specific actions that will be decided by consensus to reach the desired goal of strengthening a knowledge-based Majlis and providing the research requirements of the legislature. The common strategy of the MRC as chosen by the group can be summarised as follows:

- Increasing the active presence and continuous involvement of the MRC in the Majlis
- Becoming more attractive, reputable and providing advantageous employment opportunity in order to inspire resourceful staff and lower turnover
- Developing IT systems and effective data collection, processing and dissemination
- Developing the knowledge and skills necessary for providing efficient service to legislators
- Maximising the productivity of MRC research activities in the decision making processes of Majlis
- Making sure that all expert advice from different stakeholders are used in policy making and legislation
Are we maximising our resource potential?

Are our customers happy with our services?

Purpose: Improving performance of the Legislature
(How do the Legislators see us?)
A: Responsiveness: Timely response to legislators' requirements and questions
B: High Quality: Provide high-quality services to legislators

Are we a high performing Organisation?

Resources: Are we making the use of our financial resources to make sure that we provide the processes necessary to fulfill our purposes and objectives?
C Finance: Manage financial resources efficiently and effectively, while maintaining high standards
D Internal satisfaction: Provide necessary resources for maintaining satisfactory levels of personnel, infrastructure, and facilities
E Reputation: Building satisfaction among public and external researchers using our service

Vision: Support the Majlis
By exceeding in the quality of our research, providing timely advice, helping the legislature to hold government accountable, and realise more fully the needs of the society

How are we to attain future growth?

Internal Processes: Are we increasing the productivity of our research activities and enhancing our decision-making strength?
H Increased interactions: Develop stronger interactive ties between MRC and academia and research bodies
J Support services: Making sure the views and opinions of a vast spectrum of knowledge from society is incorporated
L Partnerships: Maintain a good working relationship with Majles regardless of political inclinations

Development and Growth: Are we investing in learning?
F People Development: Develop the skills and professional expertise for future growth and reducing turnover
G Information: Manage information and technology effectively and make sure personnel and legislators have good degree of knowledge of relevant techniques

Figure 6-4: Balanced Scorecard for the management of performance in the Majlis Research Centre

Each of the four perspectives here serves one objective (the question written on top of each quadrant). In order to achieve each perspective, a number of strategic goals were devised which had to be assessed using certain measures. The strategy map of the MRC gave a picture of the organisation's performance through a small number of interconnected measures (indicating a cause and effect linkage between measures).

The group of participants in this workshop decided that unlike most BSC frameworks, the allocation of resources is the most important factor for performance and have placed it below growth and learning in their strategy map (figure below). The group firmly believed that no performance can improve
without first ensuring the right resources are in place and disagreed that learning will take precedence over resources. They argued that perhaps this is one feature that needs to be addressed in designing performance models for developing countries.

Performance measures are not only used to quantify performance indicators, but also to help gather information on the indicators which aid decision makers analyse and implement the performance strategy. The list of performance measures that the management group at the MRC decided upon, following agreement on the strategic objectives of MRC, are brought together below and
have been grouped according to the four perspectives of the balanced scorecard model.

1- Customers (legislators)

- *Improving the performance of the Majlis*
  - How much trust do legislators have in MRC reports? (What percentage of bills and proposals passed through the Majlis has used MRC reports)

- *Timely response to requests from legislators*
  - What percentage of legislator’s responses was made in time?

- *High quality of reports and responses*
  - How well do legislators regard MRC reports? (How well does the research committee of the MRC regard the reports from the MRC?)

2- Internal processes

- *Timely and correct information collection and analysis*
  - What is the ratio (percent) of total responses to the total requests for information?
  - What is the ratio (percent) of the quality of responses to the legislators’ expectations of good quality?

- *Knowledge management*
  - What percentage of expert meetings is actually held compared to the number of meetings anticipated?
  - What is the ratio (percent) of experts attending the meetings to the number of invitations sent out?
- **Identifying research needs**
  
  - What is the number of research titles identified in the initial evaluation phase?
  
  - What is the ratio (percent) of actual written reports to the number of titles identified in the initial evaluation phase?

- **Continuous control of the research processes**
  
  - What is the ratio (percent) of actual documented research undertaken in MRC to the total number of research proposed?
  
  - What percentage of reports is prepared in accordance to guidance sent forth by the committee for improvement?

- **Enhancing collaboration and interaction among MRC staff, academia and other research institutes**
  
  - What is the total number of joint projects undertaken during the evaluation period?

- **Development of IT and communication systems**
  
  - What is the increase in the number of MRC website users during evaluation period (measured by number of hits on the MRC website)?
  
  - How much rise is there in usage of MRC links during this period?
  
  - What is the satisfaction rate with users of MRC website and services?

**Productivity**

- What is the ratio (percent) of finalised reports to the total number of research undertakings?
- What percentage of reports is prepared on time?
- What is the ratio (percent) of actual costs for each project to the initial prediction of costs?

3- Learning and Growth

- *Teach and train legislative knowledge and skills*
  - What percentage of training courses initially proposed is actually held?

- *Attract and recruit the right people*
  - What parity (percent) is there between the job description and the knowledge and work experience of staff?

- *Motivate and retain staff*
  - Percentage of resignations due to unsatisfactory conditions?
  - What is the level of job satisfaction (percent)?
  - What percentage of researchers from outside are not interested to collaborate with the MRC?

- *Institutionalise strategic thinking in the organisation*
  - What percentage of the workforce is aware of MRC's organisational performance programme and their role within it?

4- Resources

- *Increase financial capacity of the MRC*
  - How much increase (percent) of stakeholder credit share is there in joint projects?

- *Allocate more spending on infrastructure, improvement*
- Is the MRC improving on its infrastructural and technological facilities (percent)?

- Increase in human resources of the MRC

- What percentage of new recruits at the MRC fit their job description?

- How much has the MRC improved its reputation as a providing free and fair research analysis (percent)?

6-6.1 Statistical Analysis of BSC Measures for Implementation in the MRC:

Following internal consensus of the Balanced Scorecard framework and measures, statistical tests were carried out to show the validity and reliability of the model in its application to the Majlis Research Centre. For this purpose a questionnaire was distributed among a random sample of thirty MRC managers and legislators. The questionnaire consisted of twenty six questions about the cause and affect relationships among the four chosen perspectives in respect to the main purpose of the model which is aiding the improvement of legislative performance. For the sake of homogeneity, all questions were multiple choice and respondents had to answer among five responses (very strong, strong, medium, weak, and very weak). The twenty six questions in this questionnaire are stated in appendix 6. The Cronbach’s Alpha test was used to show the internal consistency of the questionnaire. The correlation, among the questions (using SPSS) is 0.86 which shows that the questionnaire is reliable and the questions are consistent.
The questionnaire needs to establish that the measures are consistent to an external standard in order to be valid. This cannot be done as easily as to date there have not been external standards for measures of the balanced scorecard. One way of testing the validity of the questionnaire is to compare it with similar questionnaires in existing literature on BSC or to consult experts in the balanced scorecard approach which this study has done.

Another way of testing the questionnaire's validity is using the Chi-Square goodness of fit test to see whether the responses to the questions (distribution of frequencies) are careless and biased or whether the questions are answered thoughtfully\textsuperscript{89}. The first chi Square test looked at the relationship between resources and learning and growth. The first six questions in the questionnaire. The null hypothesis or $H_0$ states that all five answers are of equal frequency, indicating no relationship between learning and growth and resources. Naturally $H_1$ states that there is a strong relationship between the two perspectives. The test shows $P$-Value = 0.000, therefore there is definitely a strong relationship between the two as was recognised in the answers\textsuperscript{90}.

\textsuperscript{89} If it can be shown that the frequency of distributions are not very unequal (the smaller the p-value of the test, the better the fit), we may conclude that the questionnaire is valid as to there being a large degree of homogeneity among respondents. This would further indicate that the respondents accept the cause and affect linkages between the four perspectives of the BSC making the case for BSC in legislative performance measurement valid. The same sample size of 30 people has been used for these tests which is statistically considered as large. Each test allows for four degrees of freedom (df = 4), with the critical range $\alpha = 0.05$ and square value $X^2 = 9.488$. Each possible answer, out of the five multiple choice answers, has been given a number in the following order: 1=very weak, 2=weak, 3=medium, 4=strong, 5=very strong.

\textsuperscript{90} Chi-Square goodness of fit test for cause and effect relationship between purposes (customer focus) and internal processes of MRC (minitab):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Replies</th>
<th>Observed (O)</th>
<th>Proportion</th>
<th>Expected (E)</th>
<th>$X^2 = \sum (E - O)^2/E$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>32.111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>26.694</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>9.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>17.361</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>93.444</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sum</td>
<td>178.611</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[349\]
The second test determined the relationship between the stakeholders (as MRC staff, researchers and experts collaborating with MRC). Using responses to the following seven questions, the test shows that there is a very strong cause and effect relationship between stakeholders and internal processes as the P-Value=0.000 indicating a perfect goodness of fit\textsuperscript{106}.

The third test was carried out to estimate the relationship between internal processes and learning and growth, using fourteen questions (9-22) in the questionnaire. Once again the P-Value=0.000 indicating a definite strong link between the two perspectives\textsuperscript{107}. Finally the last four questions in the questionnaire were tested to show the relationship between resources and learning and growth in the MRC. Here again the P-Value= 0.000 which again confirms a very strong link in the minds of those questioned leaving out the

\textsuperscript{106} Chi-Square goodness of fit test for cause and effect relationship between stakeholders and internal processes (minitab):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Replies</th>
<th>Observed (O)</th>
<th>Proportion</th>
<th>Expected (E)</th>
<th>$X^2= \sum (E - O)^2/E$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6.750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8.333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0.083</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2.083</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14.083</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sum</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>31.333</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{107} Chi-Square for cause and effect relationship between internal processes and learning and growth

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Replies</th>
<th>Observed (O)</th>
<th>Proportion</th>
<th>Expected (E)</th>
<th>$X^2= \sum (E - O)^2/E$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>63.440</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>53.440</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>26.297</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>65.190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>4.297</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sum</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>212.667</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

P-Value = 0.000
possibility that the answers were given randomly and strengthening the validity of the responses\textsuperscript{91}.

6-6.2 Implementing the Balanced Scorecard in the Majlis Research Centre:

Upon approval and validation of the cause and effect linkages, the BSC model enters its implementation stage\textsuperscript{92}. After agreeing on the set of measures by consensus, the group had to decide on the length of time for the evaluation of the BSC framework. The group agreed that the evaluation period would be 10 months (from 10 May, 2007 to 10 March, 2008 to include one whole Iranian fiscal year) and to publish the results and analysis in the summer edition of Majlis va Pajuhesh, (MRC’s journal of parliamentary affairs). This final decision by the executive board meant that the subject would not be treated lightly and the heads of the departments were responsible to sit with their staff and work towards the targets that were set by them.

In order to set targets, the managers were asked to set doable targets towards the decided strategy and the measures. These targets (target column on right of table

\textsuperscript{91} Chi-Square goodness of fit test for cause and effect relationship between resources and learning and growth

\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
Replies & Observed (O) & Proportion & Expected (E) & \(x^2 = \sum \frac{(E - O)^2}{E}\) \\
\hline
1 & 6 & 0.2 & 24 & 13.500 \\
2 & 4 & 0.2 & 24 & 16.667 \\
3 & 14 & 0.2 & 24 & 4.166 \\
4 & 45 & 0.2 & 24 & 18.375 \\
5 & 51 & 0.2 & 24 & 30.375 \\
\hline
Sum & 83.083 & & & \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

\textsuperscript{92} It should be emphasised here again that all the measures, values and strategy were decided upon by consensus of the managers and senior researchers in the centre. My role as a facilitator was merely to organise the points mentioned by the group in the frameworks above and the table below had no effect on the decisions taken or the targets reached.
6-1) mostly in percentage indicate the desirable performance goal for each of the perspectives decided by consensus. The group were also asked at the time they set targets to indicate their proposed plans for reaching such a goal. The plans and targets are shown in the table below, along with the real measurements assessed by the group at the end of the trial period.

**Table 6-1: MRC Balanced scorecard and Performance Measurement**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perspective</th>
<th>Strategic Goals</th>
<th>Performance Measures</th>
<th>Assessed</th>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Proposed Plans</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Customers (legislators)</td>
<td></td>
<td>High quality</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Evaluation of the MRC’s performance throughout the process of legislation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>How well does research committee regard MRC reports?</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>How well do legislators regard MRC reports?</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Producing timely responses</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>Enforcing a legislative time frame for the analysis of all bills and proposals and reports prepared for official use</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Percentage of timely responses to all applications to MRC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Improving performance of the legislature</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Percentage of bills and proposals passed through the Majlis using MRC reports</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>Attaching satisfaction slips to all reports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Percentage of bills that do not pass as a result of MRC research</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>Installing an evaluation system on MRC website for all users to rate our reports and services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>How much trust do legislators have in MRC reports?</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developing IT systems and improving interaction</td>
<td></td>
<td>Satisfaction rate with use of MRC services</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>Develop and improve MRC website making it more user-friendly and improving the languages options for visitors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Rise in number hits on MRC web pages</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Increase number of users of MRC web services</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilitate collaborations between MRC and academia/ research institutes</td>
<td></td>
<td>Number of joint projects carried out in the trial period</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>60</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continuous control of research process</td>
<td></td>
<td>Reports meeting the guidelines set by the research improvement committee</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>- Finding MRC’s strengths in legislative and policy research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ratio of reports documented by control system to all</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>- All offices must regulate their finances under the control system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- No report will be finalised unless it has been documented in the control system and approved by the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Learning and Growth</td>
<td>research carried out</td>
<td>improvement committee</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assessing legislators' research needs</td>
<td>Research titles proposed during trial</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>250</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ratio of written reports to all titles proposed</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge Management</td>
<td>What percent of meetings anticipated were actually held?</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>What Percentage of participants attended meetings</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gathering timely and correct information</td>
<td>What percent of request for information are responded to satisfactorily?</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher Productivity</td>
<td>What is the actual costs per project compared to initial estimate (percent)?</td>
<td>120%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>What percent of reports are prepared on time?</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>What percent of research projects are finalised?</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attract right people for job</td>
<td>What is the parity between job title, knowledge and experience?</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teach/train legislative knowledge/skills</td>
<td>What percent of training courses initially proposed were actually held during trial period</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motivate and retain staff</td>
<td>Researchers not willing of continue their collaboration with MRC?</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>What is the level of job satisfaction among staff?</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutionalise strategic thinking in organisation</td>
<td>What percent of staff are aware of the organisation's performance programme and their roles in it?</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resources</td>
<td>Increase financial capacity of MRC</td>
<td>How much increase have stakeholders had in credit share of joint projects?</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Allocate more spending on infrastructure and improving service</td>
<td>What recent improvements have there been in infrastructure and services (percent)?</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>What percent of new recruits match their job description</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Has MRC's</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- MRC office in Majlis to become more active
- Requiring researcher to be present at commission meetings and prepare minutes
- Documentation of all meetings held inside and outside MRC
- Providing a documentation subsystem within the process control system
- Aim to finalise all reports
- All activities in MRC to be treated as potential projects
- Transferring staff to offices that match their expertise and skills
- Providing on the job training sessions that are required to upgrade MRC's capability
- Letting staff participate freely in any MRC project
- Distribute questionnaires to all involved to evaluate satisfaction with MRC
- Preparing staff evaluation forms based on strategy
- Encouraging strategic thinking in staff meetings...etc
To have a successful balanced scorecard approach to measuring performance in an organisation, it is necessary that all those involved in the process have the skills to analyse and learn from the results generated by the performance measures. It is no good that only the management has the knowledge and they do not cascade it down to all those who affect the way the organisation performs. Thus in order for this exercise to succeed, the staff must receive relevant training and time and energy must be invested from the top. As a result, unless there is a political will to improve, and the means (technical support and training) to do so, the BSC approach cannot improve performance, but instead become a hindrance to development in the organisation. Once the BSC framework has been approved by the group and they have reached consensus on the strategy involved for performance measurement and the measures required to reach their targets, the matter is put into the hands of those working within the organisation that are willing to improve and see change. The framework and the measures do not mean much outside the context that they have been referred to.

Equally, the assessment carried out by internal consensus, will only be correctly interpreted and used if all those who chose the measures stay committed to their implementation. The MRC group met again in March 2008 to compare results and discuss performance. The overall assessment of the performance of MRC

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94 I prefer to use the term 'training' rather than education (sometimes used in BSC related texts) since the method is not difficult to pick up and only requires a change in attitude and a dedication to learn.
was reckoned as satisfactorily as there was a modest improvement in all measurements collected by the group during the trial period. The figures had been provided by the group who had seemed happy with the results although none of the results actually reached the proposed target.

However, the group were not prepared to go into all the details about the assessed measures and methods of data collection (it could not be done in the limited duration of the meeting and no more time was given for that purpose). There was also a sense that not everybody had been committed to the method from the start and had been dragging their feet to prepare reports of progress. The MRC executive board were only half-heartedly supportive of the idea of performance measurement throughout the implementation of the BSC and this was echoed at all structural levels of the organisation. Despite a strong appreciation of, and understanding of the cause and effect linkages of the BSC model, commitment waned in stages of implementation. It seems the MRC was not prepared to realise the benefits of the BSC as a performance measurement tool and with the change of administration and a turnover of new management, the study seemed to fall out of favour with the executive board and was discontinued.


6-7 Conclusion

The case studies in this chapter fits in with the rest of this work which suggests that legislatures in countries below the threshold of democratic consolidation have not yet built the democratic foundations to systematically benefit from performance measurement frameworks to improve performance. Although none of these case studies have actually reached a stage were conclusive assessments may be made about their actual performance, the first two studies provide much evidence of a systematic approach to the whole idea performance management and a profound sense of commitment from those involved to improving performance (despite the lack of consensus on some issues). By contrast the third study has only strengthened the idea mentioned earlier in this study that, Developed legislatures with more management capacities have the ability to perform better than legislatures with less developed management capacity and thus their assessment using performance measurement techniques further enhances the quality of democracy rather than reduces it.

However as Day and Klein have argued (1987: 29) democracy itself does not ensure effective performance and control of the services concerned which is the necessary condition for completing the circle of accountability. It is essential that Parliament develops and improves the tools that enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of its functions before performance measurement bears fruit. The two case studies provide evidence and shows that the House of Commons has managed to evolve its services and functions towards this goal even though the
process are slower than some would like, due to formal and informal restrictions. The House of Commons has steadily adopted a more business-like approach motivated to providing excellence in its core tasks and is acquiring effective tools towards this end. Although the influence of party control remains strong and would never break down, Parliament has the flexibility to maintain balance and achieve reform. The non-written nature of the British Constitution gives Parliament its flexibility and should be regarded as an advantage to making changes and yet maintaining balance which performance systems are all about.
Chapter Seven: Conclusion

7-1 Introduction: Summing up the research

This research highlights the importance of performance measurement systems in legislative institutions, not only as tools for legislators to assess performance in other bodies, but also to improve on their own performance and enhance the legitimacy of the political system as a whole. The first half of this research investigated the hypothesis that developed democracies culturally characterised through efficacy, meaningful and engaging work are associated with higher performance and that strong mission-based cultures perform better than those without or with a weak sense of mission (Putnam 1993, 2000; Brewer 2005). This research extends on the proposition of sociocultural changes linking general public satisfaction with the performance of organisations and argues that active democratic societies with strong mission-based cultures are more articulate in their evaluations of legislative performance. The challenge for developed democracies to enhance legislative performance becomes more prevalent with rises in human development and public expectations that demand political institutions to perform better or face the loss of confidence and trust.

Chapters four and five also proposed that developed legislatures in active democracies are more inclined to focus on outcomes rather than procedures and tend to have more of an external orientation as opposed to the internal orientation of such institutions in developing democracies. Since such active democracies
are also participative and deliberative in nature\(^1\), their legislatures tend to perform better and increase the quality of democracy compared to passive legislatures in non-consolidated democracies. However as Inglehart (1990, 1999) has argued, further advancement in human development in developed democracies has led to the weakening of elite-directed participation such as voting in elections and party loyalty but has not weakened active citizen involvement in politics. The rising of demands from the postmaterialist public on governments could led to growing dissatisfaction with the performance of political institutions as they lose their ability to keep up with public demands.

Since performance in all institutions is related to their institutional capacity (the analysis of capacity sets the stage for understanding performance) it is essential to first distinguish between developed legislatures, with higher democratic capacity and a decentralisation of political control, from the less developed ones. Because capacity is both a qualitative and quantitative notion, chapter four first embarks on a qualitative model to demonstrate how political systems with different capacities may behave with changes to a political system's capacity of democratic growth and the balance between political decentralisation. This model is followed by a statistical analysis to categorise political systems (for comparative purposes) and illustrate the incompatibility of legislative performance measurement tools for political systems on either side of the proposed threshold for consolidated democracy. The nature of democratic

\(^1\) Though it must be emphasised that a representative democracy need not be excluded in this regard as in modern democracies, both elements of participation and representation exists. What should be emphasised is the balance between the two. If the balance is not right, there may be consequences on the quality of democracy, which as Judge argues would result in the delegitimation of the system. See Judge, David (1999).
capacity in political systems situated above this threshold varies significantly from those systems below it. While legislatures below the threshold can benefit more greatly from legislative capacity building methods, legislatures in consolidated democracies would benefit more from using performance measurement and evaluation tools. ²

Since the nature of performance is both absolute and relative, it has to be assessed qualitatively in relation to the organisation’s capacity as well as quantitatively, thus saving the performance framework from criticisms of non-generalisability and subjectivity (although these criticisms cannot be excluded entirely). In chapter five the causal relationship linking active citizen performance and legislative performance is shown using a framework focusing on the maintenance and improvement of responsiveness which leads to the rise in democratic quality and the legitimacy of the system. The framework suggests that any legislative performance model for developed legislatures must focus on achieving responsive outcomes while at the same time maintain democratic quality with regards to its democratic mission.

This framework also suggests that any absence or lack of responsiveness from legislatures could lead to a downward trend in their performance and may result in active citizens withdrawing their voluntary compliance with the system which would signal the loss of legitimacy for the political system as a whole. Though as

² The definition used for democracy in this work has been given by Jon Elster (1993: 98) as 'Any kind of effective and formalised control by citizens over leadership or policies'. The existence of democracy does not depend on whether it is deliberative or representative, or based on a broad or narrow electorate. Democracy requires an active society (i.e active citizens, civil society and a responsive state).
Klingmann and Fuchs (1995: 7) have argued, a crisis in legitimacy in developed democracies is not eminent due to there not being a credible alternative to democracy and legitimation at the structural level which provides a significant buffer making political systems (in western democracies) less likely to suffer severely from a shortfall of performance at the process level. This argument however, cannot be taken for granted since legitimacy is dependent on variables, not all of which may be controlled.

The emphasis on democracy and responsiveness is not a new subject and this study has used the responsive rule only to propose that the most vital characteristic of democratic systems above the consolidation threshold is to achieve responsive outcomes in relation to their evolving environments. Put in another way, all procedures employed by democratic systems should be geared towards the continual maintenance and growth of their responsive outcomes. Hence, if democratic responsiveness could be measured, it would imply that the quality of democracy can be improved and performance can be measured in terms democratic output (institutional outcome).

Legislatures, in addition to being the first in line to legitimising other political institutions, are regarded as the liaison or link between citizens and executive institutions, as well as becoming the place to address citizen grievances and demands. So it is not only crucial for parliaments to maintain and improve on their own legitimacy by constantly remaining responsive and improving on the

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3 Some of the scholars who have written on the relationship between responsiveness and democracy include Etzioni (1968) Lipset (1969), May, (1978), and Saward (1998)
legitimacy of other institutions, but also to maintain and increase the legitimacy of the political system as a whole. In order to achieve dual legitimacy, legislatures must also stay one step ahead of potential challenges and changes in the environment (while maintaining their identity) regardless of the growing need to focus outward. So instead of looking at legislatures as ordered organisations with predictable, stereotypical behaviour that do not adapt to their environment and are unresponsive, they should be regarded as complex and adaptive systems that are explicitly tuned on to their environment and constantly learning from it. Only adaptive organisations have the power to effectively change the environment by being responsive, and to be changed by their environment while maintaining the state of equilibrium as a result.

However, recent events show that legislatures are taking the responsive rule for granted and instead of maintaining or improving the levels of responsiveness in line with the evolving environment, are becoming less responsive, resulting in a loss of legitimacy. The Voice of the People survey conducted by Gallup International in 2006 painted a gloomy picture of democratic citizens' political trust and satisfaction in democratic institutions. Only 28 percent of people in Italy; 26 percent of people in France; and 18 percent people in Germany thought that their countries were governed by the will of the people (Gallup International, 2006). Moreover, a previous Gallup survey carried out on forty-seven countries found that across the world, the principal democratic institution, the legislature,

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4 Complex adaptive organisations are able to co-evolve with their environment. This definition is taken from Dawkins, R (1989), The Selfish Gene, Chapter 12.

5 One such example is the parliamentary decisions to go to war with Iraq in 2003, coming from the two of the most advanced legislatures (the United States Congress and the United Kingdom Parliament). In both cases legitimacy and the representative notion of the legislatures have suffered.
is the least trusted out of 17 global institutions tested (including financial companies)\(^6\).

The problem for advanced democracies seem to be that increasing distrust in political institutions has led to increasing disinterest, mass apathy and disengagement among citizens. For instance the *Audit of Political Engagement*, a joint survey conducted annually by the Hansard Society and the Electoral Commission throughout the United Kingdom, has found that while political knowledge in the United Kingdom is relatively high\(^7\), only a third of the public believe that they could change the way the country was governed by getting involved in politics and one in four of the population regards activeness as a waste of time (Hansard, 2007). The same survey, indicates that only a third of the respondents rated the performance of the present system in the United Kingdom as ‘working well’, or ‘mainly well’ (Hansard 2007: 6). Though this is not to say that mass participation levels have fallen, but participation has taken more active forms such as discussions and petitions rather than voter turnout. These post-material forms of participation if designed at increasing demands on government, may also contribute to distrust if political institutions cannot adapt their performance (Inglehart 1999).

As mentioned in chapter five, the decline in trust and confidence in public institutions along with a parallel decline in civic engagement and democratic

\(^6\) This survey was carried out by Gallup International in 2002. The reports were announced in a press release at the World Economic Forum in Davos, 2003. Available at: http://www.globescan.com/news-archives/Trust_survey.pdf

\(^7\) According to the 2007 report, 67% of respondents, chosen from random members of the public, passed the survey’s ‘political knowledge quiz’ (Hansard, 2007)
participation across developed democracies is a common theme among many scholars despite no factual accounts of a genuine decline in trust in the political system of consolidated democracies. However, this paradoxical rise in human development and the fall of elite-led activeness among citizens and trust in political institutions, including parliaments, in such systems brings a sense of urgency to the issue of legislative performance measurement. Improving parliamentary performance becomes a crucial factor if legislatures are to succeed in producing the outcomes that lead to the rise in the quality of democracy and increase the existing levels of trust between them and the people. Unlike developing nations which have not yet built the necessary democratic capacity of legislatures above the threshold of consolidated democracies, developed legislatures can improve performance by taking advantage of performance measurement frameworks, most notably the Balance Scorecard, to improve performance, which will lead to an increase (or maintenance) of the quality of democracy in the system.

There is empirical evidence in organisational studies suggesting a linkage between staff satisfaction and commitment with client satisfaction in political institutions which inevitably increases citizen trust and confidence. In management literature, this linkage is called the 'satisfaction mirror' (Schneider 1993). Thus to improve legislative performance, and improve confidence in the institution, it would seem natural to start by improving on the satisfaction and commitment of members and staff to institutional performance. Moreover, data analysis from the American customer satisfaction Index which measured citizen satisfaction with the federal government in the United States between 1999 and
2002, suggests that there is a causal relationship between service and confidence, but not vice-versa (Fornell 2002). The above study has concluded that the lack of trust in institutions does not lead to dissatisfaction with services, whereas satisfaction with government services could lead to higher levels of trust (ibid). In other words, overall trust in legislatures, despite being a product of satisfaction with the public perception of performance of the political system, is more largely effected through its role in service delivery and responsiveness. This in turn is largely affected through internal satisfaction and commitment.

The case study into the performance of House Services in the UK illustrates this first phase of legislative performance measurement. The provision of services provided to MPs, parliamentary staff and the public has raised their satisfaction levels as surveys results indicate. Such employee and service satisfaction constitutes a 'virtuous circle' where the increase in one element can help generate an increase in the other and vice versa. The result is a build-up of trust and confidence in the institution which ultimately leads to an increase in the quality of democracy and enhances the legitimacy of the political system.

The second case study which looked at the performance of the House of Commons in general, and in particular since the instigation of the Modernisation Committee and reforms presented since, shows that performance measurement cannot be as easily implemented due to the conflicting nature of the two most important parameters of legislative performance in advanced democratic societies: Accountability and Efficacy. These parameters will be elaborated
further below to see whether there is a case of performance measurement dysfunction or not.

7-2 The Incompatibility of Accountability and Efficacy?

As mentioned in this work, performance measurement and reporting is a management concept that has been used by elected officials and managers to address the issues of efficacy (productivity) and accountability. Continuing pressure for greater accountability, better value for money and improved performance have prompted elected officials, especially towards the end of the twentieth century, to consider and endorse the use of performance measurement with a view to improving institutional legitimacy in all areas of public administration and services (Allen 1996, Halachmi 1996, Pollitt 1993, Radin 2000). As a public management concept, the quest to enhance accountability and efficacy in institutions has usually taken the form of data collection and analysis of the inputs, outputs and in some cases the measurement of outcomes. Performance measurement is not a new concept in management studies, but rather the methods used for measuring performance have changed over the decade or so which allow measurement in a more balanced and sustainable way.

Why is a balanced approach to performance measurement in legislatures necessary? It is very important that legislative performance measurement uses a balanced approach since two of the main criteria for advanced legislatures are greater accountability and efficacy that are sometimes regarded as contrasting or
incompatible elements\(^8\). Efficacy is more to do with a continuous and free flow of processes based on new insights; whereas accountability is more about playing it safely and involves internal scrutiny and a relatively rigid use of institutionalised standards and rules. Parliaments, particularly in parliamentary systems, are political bodies responsible for both of these inherently contradictory roles. First of all they have to support and sustain the democratically elected executive to sustain the executive and secondly they must hold the executive to account. The managerial reforms in legislatures have generally helped them perform the first task rather well, but at a cost of losing touch with the accountability function which has resulted in their vulnerability toward critical dissatisfaction.

In other words managerialism in politics, especially over the past two decades, has tilted the balance between these two criteria in favour of efficacy which may have been partly responsible for the loss of trust in democratic institutions. According to Gray (1994: 65) the implications of managerialism in politics and on accountability has been 'a shift in emphasis from democratic accountability to economic accountability: a concern with the public as economic actors rather than citizens'. As a result accountability has in some instances been conflated with responsibility and as Giddings (1997: 50) has noted, 'the process of scrutiny

\(^8\) Halachmi (2006: 261) has noted the differences between accountability and productivity as:
1- Accountability is living up to performance standards that existed when the use of resources and authority was authorised; whereas productivity related to progress, innovation and change.
2- Accountability is primarily about relationships: Who is superior to whom? Who is answerable? Who decide? Whereas productivity relates to progress, innovation and change.
3- Accountability is about staying within the four corners of the contract; while productivity is about management, adaptation, creativity and breaking away from the past.
is mixed with that of discrediting government', rather than improving the legitimacy of the government.

Putnam, Pharr and Dalton (2000: 22-3) suggest two alternatives for states to deal with the parameters of performance or the dilemma for governance facing developed democracies today: The first option is to acknowledge that democracy is not about making citizens happy but about facilitating good government through efficacious policy making whether citizens approve or not. While the second option would be to acknowledge that citizens' collective judgements are the ultimate criterion for a democracy which has to be respected through increased accountability and limiting the power of the executive (and also the power of parliament to support the executive). Thus whatever contextual priority the legislature takes in advanced democratic societies, it seems that the possibility of some tension between the two parameters of legislative performance are unavoidable but nevertheless manageable through creating tradeoffs and balances between accountability and efficacy or as Flinders (2001: 346) argues, 'channelling power and making its exercise more effective and legitimate'.

7-3 The measurement Dimension of performance in legislatures:

Another difficulty in evaluating legislative performance is determining what to measure and how to measure it. For instance as argued in chapter five, improved
legislative performance leads to improved democratic quality and the quality of services provided by the legislature to its members, staff and citizens (as argued in chapter six) is of pivotal importance for evaluating its performance. However, it is well recognised that measuring quality is extremely difficult and the use of indicators such as satisfaction surveys may only provide a broad and subjective view of whether quality of a service has changed from the past. Customer satisfaction surveys are generally acknowledged to have certain drawbacks and limitations due to the limited information of customer service in some cases and the customer’s impaired judgement. Assessing the quality of non-tangible concepts such as democracy would be even harder since democracy cannot be summarised to certain tangible goods and services.

As discussed, citizens may lose confidence in political institutions for reasons that are unrelated to the quality of policy making or the work of the officials. Confidence and trust in political institutions is not usually measured by considering institutional performance records but takes into consideration the complex relationship between the citizen demands and their expectations from institutions. Thus even if performance has not deteriorated, any unbalanced increase in expectations could cause a decline in public confidence which is sometimes mistaken for weak performance. Furthermore, the loss of confidence could be the result of errors of public judgement and information which is why it is important for a performance measurement system to communicate and make information easily available.
Despite empirical evidence to suggest that advanced legislatures in developed democracies are performing more efficiently and effectively than before, there is considerable literature which link the decline of public confidence to poor institutional performance, hence a decline of legislatures. In short performance measurement of political institutions, such as legislatures, are usually linked to the public’s perceptions of performance. When the public have high expectations of how they think a legislature should perform and they do not perceive that it is performing to their expectations (either through misinformation, misjudgement, or general cynicism and usually at times or economic and social difficulty) there is increasing dissatisfaction about the performance of that institution. In addition to this fact, it has also been noted that public trust in political institutions similar to all institutions is closely correlated with the public’s perception with the ethics and morality of those running them (Lipset and Shneider 1987: 74-79). For instance in the United states, Black and Black (1994: 107) note that the American public rate their representatives and senators near the bottom of professions on honesty and ethics, even less than lawyers! A recent instance of damaged trust could be the impact of the media publication of MP expense claims at Westminster in 2009. It is without doubt that the media handling and exposure of MP expense claims (which are minuscule in comparison to other legislatures and legislators in the world) has done more to damage the public perception of Parliament’s performance at a time when evidence shows that the House Services is managing performance better than before.

Since rising expectations in post-material society usually grows at a faster rate than performance which also requires information and resources to match the
need for improving accountability and efficacy, it is very likely that performance can never catch up with the growing demands and expectations of the complex external environment of legislatures. Performance measured through public perception and opinion surveys cannot effectively show the reality of performance in developed legislatures. Thus what is necessary is to base performance measurement on the perceptions of the representatives of the public from within the institution who are oriented to the views of the public but also have an understanding of the processes and indicators of performance that are required for its continuous responsiveness and growth.

7-4 The Relativity of Measuring Outcomes:

Any evaluation that links outputs to outcomes would no doubt come under questions about the reliability of its measures. The use of quantitative targets alone cannot be used to indicate the success of a legislature to implement its desired goals. As mentioned in chapter two, outputs alone cannot be indicative of how good or badly the legislature has performed unless there is a frame of reference with which to estimate the performance of a certain function.

The most common way of assessing performance of a particular decision, policy or function of institutions, is to compare the results achieved after a certain change with those before it by comparing them to standards, benchmarks or yardsticks. But as mentioned performance measures or indicators measured before and after the change may not be referring to the same thing, thus
comparisons of this kind should not be considered as flawless. One way to deal with this problem is, as Pollitt suggests, using appropriate measures of the impact of new policy programmes by assessing where the organisation is at present compared to where it would have been if it had continued developing as it had prior to reform (Pollitt 1993: 144). However, this method requires a great deal of speculation since when measuring results of outputs it is very difficult (or even impossible) to know how much would have been achieved if the programme had not existed.

Furthermore, judging the success of any system cannot be done by simply assessing the success of each of the component parts and then aggregating the results. The merits of the system as a whole should be considered by assessing how responsive the system is despite changing societal preferences and political tides as discussed in chapter five. However measuring tasks such as legislative adaptiveness and political responsiveness will no doubt be a big challenge. This brings a second question into light: Can accountability and efficacy be made more compatible?

In addition to looking at the relationships between democratic performance and responsiveness, this study has looked thoroughly at performance measurement and the methods used in measuring organisational performance. At a conceptual level, the benefits of performance measurement in legislatures are obvious. By holding members accountable for their performance, accountability is raised, individual performance may be recognised and processes are improved leading to better decision making. However, in addition to the problems already
mentioned here, there is the additional downside to performance measurement which includes high costs in some cases and an increase in potential dysfunction (and exploitation) of the system. Thus it is important that a balanced approach to performance is used before measurement is applied and everybody believes in the system in addition to understanding that the measurement criteria used is an incentive to growth (not an impediment).

Because dysfunction is defined with respect to the organisation's intentions, it is important that the performance measurement system indicates what is intended from the measurement system in the first place. The system needs to establish whether the goal of measurement is to motivate members or to provide information about (long-term) improvements in organisational processes. Motivational measures, by definition, are intended to cause behavioural reactions in the people affected, whereas informational measures are less likely to change behaviour and more likely to be representative of the actual events. As these two measures may be incompatible to the final outcomes, it is necessary to make clear the purpose of the measurement system before performance measurement is used. The next section offers a suggested framework for performance measurement in advanced legislatures based on improved responsiveness and leading to the maintenance and improvement of legitimacy of the political system in general.
7-5 A Suggested Balanced Scorecard of legislative performance

Since the purpose of legislative performance is not to encourage compliance with a prescribed plan of action but to improve performance in a legislature by functioning more efficiently in terms of its stated goal (or goals as complex adaptive systems cannot have a single goal, but are regarded as having multiple goals) then it must be realised from the beginning that legislative performance measurement must be informational and not prescriptive. An informational performance measurement would imply that ‘numbers could be assigned to represent qualities’ (Campbell, 1957: 267). Norton and Kaplan (1992: 72) use the analogy of an airplane cockpit to explain informational performance measurement systems and compare the dials (indicators) that help the pilot navigate as measurements that provide him with information summarising the current and predicted environment. With this in mind, a performance measurement framework could be designed using the Balanced Scorecard approach to enhance responsiveness in advanced legislative systems leading to the maintenance and improvement of democratic quality and legitimacy of the political system. Because the balanced scorecard is able to give a balanced and flexible approach to the improvement of all elements involved in the performance of the legislature, it avoids the risk of losing accountability at the price of raising efficacy. A further advantage of using this type of framework is that it requires less financial and time resources than most performance measurement systems (chapter two) despite its theme of continuous
improvement.

Figure 7-1: Suggested Balanced Scorecard of Legislative Performance

With these issues in mind, it probably is easier to see why the Balanced Scorecard suggested in this chapter is focused on how the legislature may increase the quality of democracy through the continuous improvement of trust and legitimacy as the long term goal for legislative performance in countries
above the consolidation threshold in chapter four. Figure 7-1 is an illustration of this suggested framework. It is appropriate to use the term 'suggested' here as it simply refers to a potential framework for performance measurement. Whether this framework (which requires organisational change) is acceptable or implementable is not a question that can be answered here but requires political decision making by consensus from those who are involved in the performance of the institution from inside.

This research is not an attempt to promote the balanced scorecard to legislative performance. Rather, it advocates the idea of a balanced approach to performance measurement in legislatures. Such an approach requires legislative institutions to assume corporate identities in their structures and behaviour so that they can look at the threats and risks to their performance, such as political disengagement, in a holistic way. For instance if opposition parties in the legislature think that disengagement is due to a lack of support for the ruling party, then it would be difficult to get consensus on performance measures let alone the idea of performance management. All stakeholders involved must first agree that disengagement is a formidable threat to the political system as a whole and not just the political future of some of the stakeholders involved.

The figure above is an adoption of a later version of the Balanced Scorecard model for public sector organisations by Norton and Kaplan in 2001. This version places a lot of emphasis on learning and growth as the future focus of the

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9 In countries below the threshold or singularity, there is usually a legitimacy crisis or imposed legitimacy in authoritarian regimes. While countries above singularity do not suffer from a legitimacy crisis, there is the danger that the quality of democracy does not improve with the growing needs of the environment.
organisation. It indicates that without adequate learning and growth in the
direction of the organisation’s vision, the mission cannot be fulfilled. Thus for
legislatures to become more responsive, they must first invest more on research
(independent research capabilities), and training for legislators and staff in skills
that would prepare them for the challenges facing them in targeting their
corporate vision and reaching out to the citizens (customers). The case study into
the performance of House Services shows that Parliament is taking learning and
growth seriously as a priority for future development which is obviously a step in
the right direction.

In order to maintain and improve trust in legislatures, legitimacy must evolve
alongside the evolving environment, and legislatures must be seen as
accountable, transparent and efficient in their processes (which would also
include cost-effectiveness even though the focus of this framework is not
financial). For parliaments to improve and develop their internal processes as a
result of responsiveness (through feedback to the system) they may decide to
become innovative and design a number of initiatives or they may take
advantage of comparative studies of legislative systems and decide to carry out
initiatives which are carried out elsewhere. The purpose of this study is only to
spell out possibilities and the choice of initiatives will obviously depend on the
institution itself.

Whatever method of performance measurement and management a legislature
decides upon, it would definitely need to have some form of performance control
system in place. Performance control has been defined as ‘the process of
monitoring performance, comparing it with some standards and then providing rewards and adjustments’ (Ouchi 1977: 97). Such control is usually regarded as a managerial process and is seen from the perspective of managers. However, since legislatures do not have a hierarchical management structure as corporations do, performance measurement in legislatures, as mentioned earlier, should not intend to assess the performance of the whole institution but a certain aspect of the whole which this study recognises as having the most impact on the quality of democracy. However, it must be stressed that improvement in one part of an open system will inevitably cause improvements in other parts.

The type of performance control and monitoring proposed here that is consistent with the balanced scorecard to enhance legislative performance can only be successful if it is implemented by all the agents or groups of actors in the organisation taking responsibility of their own performance (not a management board as in corporations). In legislatures, the controllers and the controlled are not separate agents or entities so the chance of finding credible outcomes from inputs and measures become much higher. Hence there is a higher chance to detect, correct and learn from errors and negative feedback resulting in better performance control. In other words, legislatures do not need to monitor their performance through a hierarchical system of management control as legislators themselves are in a better position to monitor performance measurement and improve growth through learning from feedback loops from outside.
7-6 Conclusion: Comparative legislative Performance

Kenneth Shepsle writing on the assessment of comparative legislative research predicted that political scholars will in the future continue to write the way they do by commenting and interpreting existing legislative events and regularities rather than speculating about how things will play out (Shepsle 2002: 394-395). This thesis has taken the latter and less conventional of Shepsle's research routes and has presented the idea of a single framework for performance measurement compatible for advanced legislatures while also speculating on whether such measurement systems could be implemented in developed legislatures in order to enhance the quality of democracy. To make the idea of comparative legislative performance work, legislatures had to be narrowed down to comparable types. Chapter four made it acceptable to divide legislatures into two groups of comparable legislature and non-comparable legislatures in terms of performance measurement.10

The study of comparative legislatures today still bears the limitations mentioned by Jean Blondel in 1969 when comparing systems of government. Blondel indicated that the common problem was working out comparative research based on a large pool of individual country studies which is still an apparent problem in comparative legislative studies today. Much of the research into comparative

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10 Although this has been emphasised before, I would like to make clear again that the statistical analysis of the cusp catastrophe model which placed countries below and above a point of singularity intends to show that the performance measurement system proposed may be used in a comparative perspective for countries above singularity. It does not intend in any way to show that comparative studies of countries (or certain aspects of counties) below singularity with counterparts above singularity is not doable. One may argue that countries that lie to the lower edge of singularity are unfairly judged. However, it is important to say that without some sort of categorisation, it would be impossible to have a comparative performance measurement system of legislatures at all.
legislatures is in fact individual country studies in an effort to generalise and identify relationships between a certain legislature with another. Following historical trends in the performance of one legislature provides limited evaluative judgement since it does not answer to the question of whether the institution is performing as effectively and efficiently as it should.

A more reliable way of evaluating legislative performance is to compare the performance of a legislative system with other like systems in a chosen area of performance measurement. In this case developed legislatures in advanced democracies are considered as like systems. It could be possible to include this group of legislatures in a comparative performance measurement framework since they share common values, performance goals and performance feedback from the environment. By comparing how each of these legislatures have progressed toward their common objectives over the same period of time, it is possible to make evaluations of the most and least successful legislatures in regards to performance and reach tentative conclusions about the performance of each legislature in particular.

However, this method of assessment is not flawless, especially considering the fact that legislatures are different in their functions and the processes and conditions for performance measurement vary from one country to another which would be related to their particular political systems in general. Though it is not impossible, since postmaterialist democracies are more or less dependant on their responsiveness to maintain and improve legitimacy to their active citizens, to assess the performance of these legislatures by their responsive
function only and evaluated them on how they manage to improve the quality of democracy through their responsiveness.

This research takes a slightly different view from David Arter who bases legislative performance on a 'broad notion of... various measures of legislative outputs' (Arter, 2006b: 463). This study believes that for performance sake, to include all measures of legislative outputs or even a broad notion of measures under one framework will not work and to include multiple goals and measurements will lead the system to dysfunction. While it is true that performance measurement systems would become more accurate and objective, if they take more measures into consideration, but the nature of political institutions such as legislatures will inevitably include subjective measures which is difficult to quantify, but too important to ignore. Furthermore including too many measures for each dimension of legislative performance would create complications at the implementation stage rather than facilitating it. What is important for the success of a performance measurement framework is that only the most important aspects that affect performance (in the long term) and approved by consensus of those involved in the performance measurement framework need to be considered. Naturally, an improvement in one aspect of performance in a system will lead to other intervening processes to improve too which will improve the overall performance of the system as a whole.

Continuing from the suggested model in this chapter, two distinct methods of comparative legislative performance may be proposed. The first method is based on the idea of causality which is at the heart of management theory. Causality in
organisations suggests that a change or improvement in one management activity will cause a subsequent change or improvement in organisational performance (subject to a causal relationship). If legislative scholars were to consider a balanced scorecard framework such as the one illustrated in this chapter and look at the causal linkages between different perspectives, they could seek out relationships between the different aspects of performance which would have significant implications for evaluation. The balanced scorecard approach would let scholars determine how well the system performs in terms of maintaining and improving the quality of democracy, whether in a single case study or on a comparative basis including different legislatures.

The second type of study would involve statistical analysis and the creation of a pooled time-series data set (such as the Polity dataset but only including legislatures the consolidated democracy threshold). This data set could examine measurements on a periodic basis and show how changes in the performance (of responsiveness programmes) in one legislature would compare to changes in others and how certain ratios can be explained using certain variables. If all the legislatures in this dataset adopt the balanced scorecard method, then the flexibility of the method would essentially create new variables by simply comparing year to year changes. While such a database cannot make predictions in future performance trends, it could say how much these performance measurements conflict (reflecting conflicting goals) and how certain organisational factors contribute to enhance performance. Of course this would be a continuous project requiring time, money and a dedicated team of
researchers, but the long-term impact could be huge especially in terms of improving democratic quality and overall satisfaction with democracy.

As a final remark, it is important to look back at the intentions of this research and whether it has been successful in achieving its goal. This thesis started out as a possible enquiry into the use of performance measurement systems in comparative legislative studies. A performance measurement of such requires an organisational approach to legislative institutions as open systems based on a continuous flow of feedback into the system from the environment and an emphasis on the maintenance of structural stability or the state of equilibrium. But as systems theory is holistic, it has not been favoured in political and legislative studies\(^{11}\). Thus performance assessments of legislatures in the past have mainly been based on auditing methods using evaluations of past performance to identify inefficient trends, especially in budgeting and resource allocation. Strategic decision making within institutions have mainly been ignored. This study takes more interest in recent performance measurement tools such as the balanced scorecard and whether such methods could be adapted to create a balanced general framework of performance management of legislatures and the continuous improvement of democratic quality in the political system.

\(^{11}\) Legislative scholars also have problems dealing with the concept of equilibrium as it is used in open adaptive systems and prefer equilibriums that would only be acceptable in closed systems which have no interaction with the external environment. Furthermore, scientists find a reductionist approach, easier to apply and control in terms of results.
However due to differences in the level of democratic growth and development, not all legislatures can benefit from performance management tools and frameworks in the same way. Using Catastrophe theory, this study devised a model to show political systems below a certain threshold of consolidation do not have the capacity to improve legislative performance using performance measurement frameworks whatever level of democratisation they seem to be facing. The legislative performance pyramid illustrates that a legislature can perform well if it manages to maintain the lower goals or benchmarks of governance or the foundations of democracy.

The challenge thus is for developed legislatures to implement performance measurement frameworks by taking advantage of system maintenance and improvement or in other words legitimation and improving the quality of democracy. Although as the literature suggests the consolidated democratic system is stable and not facing crisis, but this is not to say that constant improvement is not required. The first two case studies looks at the efforts made by a developed legislature to incorporate performance management into its work to improve on the quality of democracy and the legitimation of the political system in general and concludes that the value of performance management is not only in helping to maintain efficacy of the mission set out by the legislature but also legitimacy which is desirable to all developed political systems. Thus the suggested framework presented here indicates one way in which performance measurement may be used not only to assess but also to improve on the performance of the democratic system as a whole.
## Appendix 4-1: Country rankings of Press Freedom Index, HDI and Behavioural Type

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<th>Cat</th>
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Appendix 4-5: VTS, PEPS₁, PEPS₂ and HDI’x scores for 144 countries

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| 82  | Syria           | -----| -7.00 | -8.50 | -0.994 |
| 83  | Indonesia       | 86%  | 5.87 | 7.07 | -0.628 |
| 84  | Vietnam         | -----| -7.00 | -8.50 | -1.643 |
| 85  | Kyrgyzstan      | 74%  | -3.26 | 0.93 | -0.85 |
| 86  | Egypt           | 30%  | -6.00 | -4.96 | -1.164 |
| 87  | Nicaragua       | 89%  | 7.10 | 7.87 | -0.431 |
| 88  | Uzbekistan      | -----| -9.00 | -9.50 | -1.793 |
| 89  | Moldova         | 64%  | 5.10 | 5.38 | -0.54 |
| 90  | Bolivia         | 67%  | 5.32 | 5.65 | -0.191 |
| 91  | Mongolia        | 97%  | 9.70 | 9.70 | -0.56 |
| 92  | Honduras        | 69%  | 4.80 | 5.36 | -0.475 |
| 93  | Guatemala       | 49%  | 3.92 | 3.90 | -0.867 |
|---|-----------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| 94| Equ. Guinea     | -----| -5.00| -7.50| -1.428|
| 95| South Africa    | 64%  | 5.75 | 5.89 | -0.534|
| 96| Tajikistan      | 86%  | -3.14| 2.06 | -0.994|
| 97| Morocco         | 41%  | -6.00| -3.93 | -0.922|
| 98| Gabon           | 55%  | -4.00| -1.52 | -1.044|
| 99| Namibia         | 62%  | 3.73 | 4.22 | -0.528|
| 100| *India          | 65%  | 5.89 | 6.05 | -1.096|
| 101| Cambodia        | 83%  | 1.50 | 4.34 | -1.243|
| 102| Botswana        | 42%  | 3.78 | 3.70 | -0.954|
| 103| Comoros         | 33%  | 1.31 | 0.27 | -2.359|
| 104| Laos            | -----| -7.00| -8.50 | -2.491|
| 105| Pakistan        | 41%  | -5.00| -3.43 | -1.392|
| 106| Bhutan          | -----| -8.00| -9.00 | -1.017|
| 107| Ghana           | 65%  | 3.52 | 4.46 | -1.989|
| 108| Bangladesh      | 75%  | 4.52 | 5.53 | -2.624|
| 109| Nepal           | 76%  | -6.24| -0.42 | -2.055|
| 110| Sudan           | -----| -6.00| -----| -1.28|
| 111| Madagascar      | 55%  | 3.82 | 3.96 | -1.618|
| 112| Cameroon        | 55%  | -4.45| -1.52 | -1.673|
| 113| Uganda          | 74%  | -4.00| 0.42 | -2.335|
| 114| Swaziland       | -----| -9.00| -9.50 | -1.344|
| 115| Togo            | 100% | -2.00| 4.00 | -1.787|
| 116| Djibouti        | 29%  | -0.13| -1.10 | -2.308|
| 117| Lesotho         | 60%  | 4.81 | 5.01 | -2.215|
| 118| Yemen           | 77%  | -2.23| 1.67 | -1.735|
| 119| Kenya           | 39%  | 3.15 | 2.93 | -2.115|
| 120| Zimbabwe        | 50%  | -7.00| -3.52 | -1.446|
| 121| Mauritania      | 49%  | -6.00| -3.07 | -2.367|
| 122| Haiti           | 61%  | -2.39| 0.05 | -1.565|
| 123| Gambia          | 64%  | -5.00| -1.06 | -1.541|
| 124| Senegal         | 41%  | 3.29 | 3.12 | -2.183|
| 125| Eritrea         | -----| -7.00| -8.50 | -1.978|
| 126| Rwanda          | 100% | -3.00| 3.50 | -1.787|
| 127| Nigeria         | 75%  | 2.99 | 4.47 | -1.758|
| 128| Guinea          | 100% | -1.00| 4.50 | -0.757|
| 129| Angola          | -----| -----| -6.50 | -1.418|
| 130| Tanzania        | 53%  | 0.59 | 1.31 | -1.925|
| 131| Benin           | 65%  | 3.88 | 4.47 | -1.928|
| 132| Ivory Coast     | -----| -----| -----| -1.997|
| 133| Zambia          | 36%  | -0.92| -0.91 | -2.033|
| 134| Malawi          | 87%  | 5.08 | 8.00 | -1.738|
| 135| Mozambique      | 59%  | 3.57 | 3.94 | -2.454|
| 136| Burundi         | -----| -----| -----| -3.371|
| 137| Ethiopia        | 60%  | -0.20| 1.50 | -2.423|
| 138| Chad            | 70%  | -2.30| 1.00 | -1.979|
| 139| Central Africa  | 89%  | -----| -----| -1.997|
| 140| Guinea-Bissau   | 63%  | -1.37| 0.76 | -2.066|
| 141| Burkina Faso    | 47%  | -1.06| -0.31 | -1.914|
| 142| Mali            | 33%  | 1.96 | 1.27 | -2.342|
| 143| Sierra Leone    | 89%  | 4.44 | 6.38 | -2.414|
| 144| Niger           | 96%  | 3.85 | 6.62 | -2.359|

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## Appendix 4-6: Data from World Bank Government Effectiveness and Political Stability Indicators and HDI'x

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OECD +EU</th>
<th>Government Effectiveness</th>
<th>Political Stability</th>
<th>HDI'x</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>1.94</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>1.62</td>
<td>1.04</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>1.64</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Canada</td>
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<td>0.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>1.22</td>
<td>0.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
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<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Denmark</td>
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<td>0.84</td>
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<td>Estonia</td>
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<td>Finland</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>35</td>
<td>United States</td>
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