BUREAUCRATIC INTERVENTION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF PEASANT AGRICULTURE: THE CASE OF ALDEP IN BOTSWANA

being a Thesis submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

in the University of Hull

by

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August 1990
I dedicate this work to the memory of my grandparents
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

My sincere thanks go first and foremost to the Hull University Southern African Students' Scholarship Fund (SASSF) and the Africa Educational Trust (AET) for financing my studies and research. In Botswana my gratitude goes first to my former lecturers: Dr Thabo Fako, Dr Louis Molamu, and Dr Patrick Molutsi, for their helpful comments on my work. My particular thanks go to Dr Fako, my former supervisor, who unfailingly gave me invaluable help at every stage of my fieldwork.

Many other people who deserve my gratitude in Botswana cannot be mentioned by name as doing so would be a breach of personal trust. However, I am glad to mention Mr K.K. Mmopi, Mr Howard Segwele, Mr Macala, Ms Yvonne Merafhe, Mr Arnold Modikwe, and Mr A.E. Phama for setting aside so much of their valuable time to listen to me. My gratitude also goes to Mr Tebogo Lekgetho who gave me valuable assistance during the questionnaire interviews.

In the Department of Sociology and Social Anthropology in the University of Hull a very special thank you goes to Professor Valdo Pons, for helping me find my way at the very beginning. Above all, I am especially indebted to my supervisor, Dr David Booth. The amount and value of the assistance he has given me throughout the three years it has taken to do this thesis cannot be described in words.

To my family in South Africa who, despite the problems of separation and distance because of my exile were still able to give me moral support, I say 'Nangamso Mantshilibe Amahle'. To my daughter I say the time has now come for us to get to know each other better. Last but not least, I express my gratitude and love to my wife, Nonkululeko, who gave me invaluable moral and practical support throughout. Many thanks.

P.M.
ABSTRACT

In an environment marked by high rates of economic growth and political stability, the state bureaucracy in Botswana perceives its role as primarily that of 'modernisation' (as against that of maintaining the ruling party and politicians in power), and the elimination of structural biases in resource allocation. Along with other important socio-political and economic factors, since the late 1970s a section of this bureaucracy has played a major role in the initiation, formulation and implementation of policies aimed at the re-distribution of economic resources to the peasant sector.

This study eschews instrumentalist, a priori and reductionist approaches which tend to see the state, including the bureaucracy, as synonymous with, and therefore as solely pursuing the interests of, the economically dominant class. It adopts an approach which sees the Botswana state as potentially autonomous vis-a-vis the economically dominant class. This facilitates the detailed analysis of the policy process focusing on the orientations and roles of the bureaucrats and their relationship to the peasantry within the context of the implementation of re-distributive policy. The thesis examines these issues in detail by focusing on Botswana's major agricultural programme, the Arable Lands Development Programme (ALDEP). Field research was carried out in Kweneng District and Gaborone in 1988-89.

Despite its 'progressive character', however, this bureaucracy is ill-equipped to deal effectively with various socio-economic situations facing some of the groups targeted to benefit from the re-distributive policies implemented since the
early 1980s. The study highlights the all-too-familiar trend whereby such policies ultimately benefit better-off sections of the target group. In ALDEP's case this has to do partly with largely stereotypical notions of 'progressive farming' developed in the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA). A direct outcome of these stereotypes is widespread resistance by small peasants to the recommended package of cultivating techniques.

Since the middle peasantry fits into these stereotypes, this group has emerged to become the major beneficiaries from ALDEP, as shown by their increased output. On the other hand, the majority of small peasant households face dwindling sources of income, undermining their capacity to take part in the acquisition of inputs despite the programme's favourable grant/downpayment scheme. As it is presently constituted ALDEP therefore does not appear to provide the framework through which to improve the position of these peasants. Vulnerable groups such as female-headed households have also suffered.

A second form of bias manifests itself in terms of processes operating at the 'wider' political level and impinging on the implementation of peasant-focused redistributive programmes such as ALDEP. A case in point is the initiation in 1985 of the Accelerated Rainfed Arable Programme (ARAP) as a means of placating the politically precedent kulak farmers demanding an equally favourable policy. Incipient intra-bureaucratic conflict arising partly from these biases has served to weaken the autonomy of the bureaucracy and to strengthen the position of elite farmers more closely linked to the political interests of the ruling party.
The idea to carry out a fairly large-scale research project on agricultural policy in Botswana grew largely from library-based work for a Master's dissertation which I completed in September 1987 in the University of Hull. The dissertation argued, among other things, that the effective redistribution of resources in Botswana was precluded by the disproportionate policy focus on mining and on the cattle industry. On the other hand, peasant agriculture was encouraged only half-heartedly. The conclusions of the dissertation were tentative, underscoring the need for further empirical research. The opportunity to do research for this thesis has helped clarify these issues.

My interest in aspects of rural development policy in Botswana dates back far earlier than 1986 when I began the MA course. As an undergraduate student at the University of Botswana I had often participated as an assistant (what students there call a 'spade-worker') in various projects carried out by academic staff. Much of this research was on rural development issues. In my final year I submitted a dissertation to the Department of Sociology entitled 'Rural-urban Differences in Health Manpower Deployment'. The dissertation noted and attempted to explain the factors responsible for 'urban bias' in this respect.

My academic interests subsequently crystallised around two specific areas, both of which I assimilated in detail while on the MA course. The first, agrarian development issues, developed with my enhanced comprehension and appreciation of the sheer scale and complexity of the economic/agrarian crisis in Africa. The second, namely the state and the political sociology of development in Africa, took shape as I aligned myself with the view that this crisis had to do more with internal rather than external factors.

Botswana was then, as it still is today, registering impressive levels of economic growth. The country also seemed, as it still does, free of the apparently intractable political
problems plaguing many other countries on the African continent. This made it all the more interesting to study issues associated with agricultural policy in that country; not least because there was overwhelming evidence showing that the majority of the country's inhabitants, small peasants, continue to live under conditions of severe poverty and deprivation.

I therefore found it important to examine in detail the policies currently being implemented which are apparently aimed at the re-distribution of resources to this group and at improving their standard of living and welfare. I decided to do this by focusing on the country's main agricultural programme, the Arable Lands Development Programme (ALDEP).

As I reviewed the literature on rural development in Botswana it first appeared as though a lot of research had already been done in this area. With close scrutiny I realised that much of the existing research, a large proportion of which is carried out under the auspices of government institutions, has been concerned mainly with the collection of statistical data on peasant production. Its other concern has been to delineate the 'constraints' faced by 'farmers' under the country's rather harsh physical and climatic environment.

There were a few exceptions to this tendency, such as Comaroff's (1980) attempt to explain the transformation of agriculture in the Barolong area of Southern District by examining historical and socio-cultural factors. Others, notably Cliffe and Moorsom (1979), Cooper (1982) and Molutsi (1986), have carried out detailed analyses of the agrarian class structure in its historical and contemporary context. Their work has contributed significantly to narrowing a major empirical gap by showing the extent of exploitation and class cleavages in the rural areas. Writers such as Opschoor (1983) and Hesselberg (1985) have carried out fairly detailed analyses of the socio-economic position of the Botswana peasantry. And a considerable number have dealt with the position of women and female-headed households. However, none of these studies presented a systematic analysis of state policies aimed at re-distribution.

The role of the Botswana state bureaucracy in relation to
development policy has also been studied by several writers, notably Gunderson (1978), Isaksen (1982) and Picard (1987). Their conclusions tended to dovetail with those reached by the majority of the studies which focused on the cattle industry and capital accumulation. Some of these studies are the subject of a detailed critique in this work.

Since so much had changed since the 1970s when many of these studies began to appear, particularly in relation to rural development policy, I felt there was a need, vindicated by some of my major findings, to re-examine the politics of rural development policy in Botswana. Most pressing, I felt, was the need to re-examine the composition and character of the state bureaucracy in order to establish its role in the context of re-distributive policies in the early 1980s. The next step would then be to relate findings in this respect to peasant-bureaucrat relations in the policy context. It is my hope that this thesis makes a useful contribution to the increasing body of literature attempting to get to grips with the Botswana state and its relationship to civil society in the development context.

A note on the usage of Tswana words and terms

The people of Botswana are called Batswana, a prefix also used in reference to sub-groups such as Bakwena, Bangwaketse, etc. The prefix 'Ba-' is synonymous with the English definite article 'the', which therefore renders it linguistically redundant to speak of 'the' Batswana, the Bakwena, etc. Several Tswana words and phrases have been used in the text in preference to their English translations, which are shown in brackets. This is because the meaning of these words and phrases, which in many cases is figurative, is not adequately conveyed by the direct English translation.

NB. As of July 1990, Botswana's national currency, the Pula, was valued at 1.8 US Dollars and 3.4 of British Pound Sterling.
### LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADB</td>
<td>African Development Bank</td>
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<tr>
<td>ALDEP</td>
<td>Arable Lands Development Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>ARAP</td>
<td>Accelerated Rainfed Arable Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>ARDP</td>
<td>Accelerated Rural Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAMB</td>
<td>Botswana Agricultural Marketing Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BDP</td>
<td>Botswana Democratic Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>BNA</td>
<td>Botswana National Archives</td>
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<tr>
<td>BNF</td>
<td>Botswana National Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>DAFS</td>
<td>Department of Agricultural Field Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAO</td>
<td>District Agricultural Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRLFS</td>
<td>Dryland Farming Research Scheme</td>
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<tr>
<td>EFSAIP</td>
<td>Evaluation of Farming Systems and Agricultural Implements Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFAD</td>
<td>International Fund for Agricultural Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFPP</td>
<td>Integrated Farming Pilot Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>Food and Agriculture Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAP</td>
<td>Financial Assistance Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GoB</td>
<td>Government of Botswana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoA</td>
<td>Ministry of Agriculture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MFDP</td>
<td>Ministry of Finance and Development Planning</td>
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<tr>
<td>MLGL</td>
<td>Ministry of Local Government and Lands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDB</td>
<td>National Development Bank</td>
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<tr>
<td>NDP</td>
<td>National Development Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>NMS</td>
<td>National Migration Study</td>
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<tr>
<td>RIDS</td>
<td>Rural Incomes Distribution Survey</td>
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<tr>
<td>RSU</td>
<td>Rural Sociology Unit (MoA)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SADDC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Coordination Conference</td>
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<td>TGLP</td>
<td>Tribal Grazing Land Policy</td>
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MAP 2

LAND TENURE

INTRODUCTION

This thesis, a study of the trajectory of bureaucratic intervention in the peasant agricultural sector in Botswana, focuses on the 1980s. This period was marked by the initiation and implementation of a package of 're-distributive' policies in Botswana, directed mainly at rural development. The centrepiece of these efforts is the agricultural policy known as the Arable Lands Development Programme (ALDEP).

In the late 1970s, various assessments of the process of development in Botswana concluded that the majority of the country's population had benefited very little from the country's impressive record of economic growth. In particular, this was demonstrated in respect of small peasant producers, who constitute about 80 per cent of the country's population. Mounting evidence also showed that the peasants were continuing to live under conditions of severe poverty and deprivation, and in many cases their situation was deteriorating. Evidently, the country's outward-oriented development strategy, based on mineral and beef exports, had been of disproportionate benefit to large cattle owners, and elements of the population deriving their incomes from urban-based occupations.

The combination of rising unemployment, rural poverty and inequality, and increasingly pronounced cleavages in the social structure, signalled a potentially explosive political situation. Most profoundly, these processes led to the emergence of new social forces pressing for change, the most articulate and effective of which were located within the state bureaucracy itself.
The main approach of the Botswana state towards redressing these structural and income imbalances came with the initiation of ALDEP in 1978. The main objective of this programme was presented as increasing rural employment and improving peasant incomes and welfare through the transfer of basic agricultural inputs. These included animal draught power, animal drawn implements, water tanks, fencing equipment and other inputs, as well as extension. These items were to be provided on a credit/subsidy basis, later changed to a more favourable grant/downpayment scheme.

This thesis analyses ALDEP by examining five main themes: (1) the evolution of the socio-political and economic processes leading to the change in the mode of state intervention in the economy; (2) the composition and character of the state bureaucracy and its role in the formulation and implementation of re-distributive rural development policy; (3) the efficacy of bureaucrat-peasant relations in the context of policy implementation; (4) the ways in which intra-peasant class and political relations, in juxtaposition to political relations operating at the 'wider' level, impinge on the programme; and (5) the position of vulnerable groups, particularly female-headed households, in the light of these changes.

The thesis elucidates these issues through the analysis of empirical material collected in Kweneng District and Gaborone in 1988/89. The introductory sections which follow provide the conceptual framework adopted. This is done through an overview of relevant conceptual issues, culminating with a review of the Botswana literature. The methods of data collection employed are discussed in Section 4.
1. The 'developmental state' and intervention in the economy: some wider analytical issues

To avoid being drawn into the intricacies of defining 'the state', I shall adopt the fairly straightforward definition provided by Skocpol (1979: 29). According to her, the state constitutes "a set of administrative, policing, and military organisations headed, and more or less well-coordinated, by an executive authority". This study is concerned mainly with the administrative arm of the state and its relationship with the executive, as well as with civil society.

Recent formulations on state intervention have sought to provide a more systematic view than that which saw the state as the instrument for the pursuit of the interests of the economically dominant class or bourgeoisie (Marx and Engels, 1934). Beginning perhaps with Anderson's assertion that such a state form was not replicated even in the absolutist state (Anderson, 1974: 39-40; 42), the most telling criticism of this view is that it treats states as simple epiphenomena reducible to the economic base.

One variant of this instrumentalism is normally associated with 'dependency' formulations. This refers to the view that the Third World state is the instrument of a 'lumpen-bourgeoisie' (or 'petty-bourgeoisie') which collaborates with imperialism in an exploitative core-periphery relationship which perpetuates the underdevelopment of peripheral countries (Frank, 1972, etc). This became the dominant analytical theme followed by the plethora of studies conducted in the 1970s in several African countries, such as Tanzania (Saul, 1974; Shivji, 1976; von Freyhold, 1977); Kenya (Leys, 1975; Langdon,
Although various terms were used, such as 'bureaucratic bourgeoisie' (Shivji), 'governing class' (von Freyhold), and 'auxiliary bourgeoisie' (Leys), in the final analysis these contributions took for granted the basic 'dependency' (Frankian) view of the African state.

Many criticisms of these studies challenged the view that the African state was simply a tool of external interests. In the Kenyan case Swainson (1980) marshalled evidence to demonstrate the existence and consolidation of an autonomous internal bourgeoisie. Far from serving as the tool of the international bourgeoisie, the Kenyan state supported the local bourgeoisie in its efforts at capital accumulation which were often in competition with those of the former.

Most decisively, doubts were cast over the viability of the 'dependency' view of the Third World state by evidence of successful state intervention in the Newly Industrialising Countries (NICs) of East Asia. These countries, particularly South Korea and Taiwan, exemplify the decisive involvement of the state in the process of setting up an outward-oriented development strategy based on the export of manufactured goods. In these countries the state supervised efforts aimed at penetrating the international market through a variety of measures ranging from setting the levels of the local currency to the imposition of protectionist policies on foreign investment and imports. These efforts were directly responsible for the subsequent rise in the productivity of different sectors of the economy, and the maintenance of relatively low levels of income inequality (Ruggie, 1983;
These developments made it difficult to appreciate Amin's (1976: 213-14) dismissal of the NIC phenomenon as exhibiting a 'new form of inequality' (Browett, 1985: 794). Even more difficult to justify, however, was the insistence by neo-classical economists that the role of the state should be limited to administrative activity, the collection of taxes, the provision of infrastructure, and the maintenance of a 'proper climate' for private investment and enterprise (a view resurrected in the early 1980s by international agencies such as the World Bank and the IMF in dealing with the African economic crisis).

Attempts to formulate a perspective on state intervention which goes beyond the instrumentalism inherent in the classical approaches currently revolves around the concept of 'state autonomy'. The most important early effort in this direction is to be found in the work of Poulantzas (1973, 1975). In a nutshell, Poulantzas' argument can be summarised as follows, that: (1) the 'capitalist type of state' is relatively autonomous in the political realm vis-a-vis the rest of society while the economic sphere is dominated by the bourgeois whose interests largely prevail (Poulantzas, 1973: 49-53; 192); (2) this 'relative autonomy' of the state also manifests itself in the form of "a flexibility which concedes a certain guarantee to the economic interests of the dominated classes" via economic sacrifices by the dominant classes, which makes it possible for the state to devise a social policy (ibid: 182-89); (3) this notwithstanding, "the demands of the dominated classes can be satisfied only to the limited extent that they
are compatible with the definite economic-political interests of the dominant classes and do not challenge the state's power" (ibid: 192) [1].

The view that this autonomy ultimately serves to defend the fundamental interests of the capitalist class while the state 'mediates' on behalf of the bourgeoisie is supported by other writers such as Therborn (1978: 169) and Offe (1974: 54) [2]. This view is also presented by Alavi (1979: 40-43) in his formulation on the 'postcolonial state'. The exception is that for him this particular state form is 'over-developed', in the sense that its role in the economy and the amount of 'surplus' it appropriates are unparalleled in the 'classical bourgeois state'.

Poulantzas' critics assail the 'structural-determinism' of the relative autonomy formulation, pointing that it gravitates towards a conception of state power as only "the power of a determinate class" (Miliband, 1983: 32). Miliband then asserts that "the degree of autonomy which the state enjoys for most purposes in relation to social forces in capitalist society depends above all on the extent to which class struggle and pressure from below challenge the hegemony of the class which is dominant in such a society" (ibid: 67; see also Rueschemeyer and Evans, 1985: 64).

A more penetrating critique of Poulantzas' formulation is provided by Mouzelis (1986). Arguing that the relative autonomy concept "subjects the political sphere to a subtle and sophisticated downgrading" Mouzelis (1986: 22) writes:

... if the state in capitalist formations is defined as an instrument of the economically dominant classes, or even as performing the functions of capital, this rules out of court
the investigation of cases, quite frequent in the periphery and semi-periphery, where the economically dominant groups are the passive creatures of policies initiated by the politically or militarily dominant groups, or cases where state policies hinder rather than advance the enlarged reproduction of the capitalist mode of production (ibid: 206. Emphasis in the original).

The major drawback, therefore, is that these views are based on a priori assumptions whose effect is to close-off empirical study. Mouzelis then proposes the formulation of "conceptual tools specific to the political level". According to him, the formulation of such conceptual tools "not only does not deny the study of the inter-relationships between the economy and polity, but on the contrary provides the fundamental precondition for the opening up of the study of such relationships to empirical investigation" (ibid).

Booth (1985: 773) raises some of these issues in an analysis of some of the factors responsible for the state of impasse into which the sociology of development had evidently lapsed by the 1980s. Focusing on Marxist approaches and their variants, he attributes the impasse to a "metatheoretical commitment to demonstrating that what happens in societies in the era of capitalism is not only explicable, but in some stronger sense necessary" (ibid: 773. Emphasis in the original). In proposing a way of getting out of the impasse, Booth suggests that research should be directed at the empirical study of "the real-world problems of development policy and practice ... " (ibid: 777).

More boldly, Skocpol advocates the view that the state must be seen "as an autonomous structure ... with a logic and interests of its own not necessarily equivalent to, or fused
with, the interests of the dominant class in society" (Skocpol, 1979: 27; see also Block, 1980: 228). She further argues that making concessions to subordinate class demands may be contrary to the interests of the dominant class but not necessarily to those of the state (ibid: 30). State autonomy thus refers to the capacity of states to "formulate and pursue goals that are not simply reflective of the demands or interests of social groups, classes, or society" (Skocpol, 1985: 9; see also Grindle, 1986: 17; and Stepan, 1978: 33).

Another important concept is that of the 'capacity' of the state. This refers specifically to the state bureaucracy. According to Poulantzas (1973: 333), the bureaucracy's functioning "is not directly determined by its class membership, by the functioning of the classes or fractions from which it originates: it depends on the concrete functioning of the state apparatus" (emphasis in the original). This is "precisely why the bureaucracy, as a social category, is able to possess its own unity and coherence, despite the diversity of recruitment and class affiliation of its various strata" (ibid). However, he does not say, as Skocpol (1985: 15) does affirmatively, whether or not this bureaucracy is capable of imposing and pursuing a programme which runs counter to the interests of capital accumulation by the bourgeoisie. The empirical study of the character and role of the bureaucracy in relation to policy is therefore crucial in determining the degree of state autonomy and the nature of state intervention.
2. Intervention or 'withdrawal'? an overview of the current debate on the state and the agrarian crisis in Africa

Since around the mid-1970s, the economies of many African countries have been in a state of crisis. Lofchie (1986: 3-5) provides a cogent summary of Africa's gloomy economic situation when he notes that by 1980 food production in Sub-Saharan Africa was about four-fifths of its 1970 level, and that food imports rose to approximately 10 million tonnes of grain per year - an amount roughly equivalent to the needs of the entire urban population - and that industrial production has declined over this period to approximately 25 per cent of capacity or less.

Current analyses of the crisis point to the mode of state intervention in the agricultural sector. Most assessments show that the intervention of most African states in agriculture has gone against the interests of smallholder producers, who are in the majority, to the disproportionate benefit of elite farmers and urban populations. In this situation, the material conditions and welfare of the majority of producers, have in many cases declined through most of the post-colonial period, particularly since the mid-1970s. This almost universal tendency to 'bias' against smallholder production pervades the whole spectrum of development strategies which have been attempted in various African countries. These range from the so-called 'success stories' of Kenya and the Ivory Coast, to those which have presented more egalitarian, socialist-inclined agrarian policies as in Tanzania and Mozambique. Some of these specific cases are discussed in Chapter 4.

Most analysts of the current agrarian crisis in Africa
point to the adverse effect of state policies on prices, marketing arrangements, inputs and output. It may be true that external shocks such as those induced by the 1973 and 1979 oil price increases coupled with protectionism on the part of the developed countries in response to the recession of the early to mid-1980s, denied many African countries the opportunity to compete favourably in international markets, with disastrous results for economic growth (Bienefeld, 1986; Fieldhouse, 1986; Loxley, 1984; Ravenhill, 1986; etc). However, it is also evident that internal factors have been equally, if not more decisive, in fuelling the crisis.

A powerful, if unsympathetic, assessment of the economic aspects of the crisis was provided by the World Bank through the 'Berg Report' (IBRD, 1981). Focusing mainly on agriculture, this report identified the pursuit by most African governments of import substitution industrialisation (ISI) strategies which necessitated the maintenance of overvalued national currencies, high prices of manufactured goods, and low producer price levels for agricultural products. Others also approaching the argument from a strictly economic point of view assert that the agrarian crisis had been fuelled by excessive state intervention, particularly through a pricing system which de-emphasises incentives (de Wilde, 1980: 49).

Adding to this, Bates (1983: 108) singles out the state's control of publicly-sanctioned monopsonies such as the ubiquitous marketing boards, through which it deliberately depresses producer prices. In so doing, African governments "also lessen the purchasing power of those who earn their incomes in foreign markets ... The maintenance of an overvalued
currency thus represents a tax on exports; export agriculture is hurt in an effort to assist the growth of the industrial sector" (ibid: 110-1). The wisdom of taxing agriculture and then investing in it is also queried (ibid: 116).

As a solution, the World Bank's Berg Report argued for the 'withdrawal' of the state from some of its hitherto key functions in the economy in favour of more market-oriented solutions. This would entail some 'unpopular measures', such as the devaluation of currencies, and the scaling down of state involvement in agricultural pricing and marketing. The promotion of export-oriented agricultural production would be encouraged, focusing on the 'smallholder', "whose activities would be encouraged by a significant increase in their net returns" (Loxley, 1984: 66).

A more controversial aspect, also adopted by the IMF in its stabilisation programmes, is that of cutting back on state expenditure on social infrastructure and services. A major criticism of the Berg Report's recommendations points to its focus on the promotion of private enterprise in general while offering little or no protection for vulnerable groups such as poor peasants. As Loxley (ibid: 70) observes, "the mode of accumulation proposed would require a radical restructuring of the balance of class forces in African societies ... and yet the report does not address the political ramifications of this". The report's tendency to over-generalise and its lack of understanding of, or deliberate insensitivity to, the political situation in individual African countries and in the continent as a whole has also been highlighted (Sender and Smith, 1986: 122).
Evidently, the idea that the state should 'withdraw' from its central role in the economy, which amounts to a reversion to neo-classical theory, does not approximate to reality as shown by several cases. After all, we are reminded by Rueschemeyer and Evans (1985: 44), the 'myth' that even the original industrial revolutions in Western Europe were 'a purely private process' was dispelled long ago by such writers as Polanyi (1944) and Gescenkron (1962). Moreover, the case of the East Asian NICs demonstrates clearly that state intervention in the economy is not inherently anti-developmental.

In developing countries re-distributive policies are a necessary derivative of the access of the state to resources, generated by publicly-owned enterprises such as mines and through taxation. What is obviously lacking and should therefore be examined in detail is the state's capacity to carry out the requisite tasks. This is impeded among other things by problems such as corruption and bureaucratic inefficiency. Booth (1987: 6) posits that "[t]he strengthening of state capacity is very much on the agenda in most countries in Tropical Africa. Moreover, it may be that the possible resurgence of private sector activity is important not just because of its more or less direct contributions to economic revival, but also - and in the longer run, more importantly - as a stimulus to the development of state capacities".

The call to focus activity designed to effect the long-awaited economic recovery on promoting small peasant production is a very welcome change in the thinking of both governments and academics. Several writers (e.g. Lipton, 1977) have argued
persuasively the case that smallholder producers tend to use land and labour much more intensively than large-scale farmers. Many have stressed the need for market incentives to promote smallholders.

The work of Bates (1981; 1983) has been significant in that he attempts to grapple with the political aspects of the crisis. Most interesting in Bates' analysis is his assertion, in agreement with Hyden (1983: 19) that the main problem in African countries is that the state is penetrated by society (see also Bayart, 1986). In regard to agricultural development Bates argues that constituency politics contribute in no small measure towards inefficiency. In their bid to retain political power, government and party officials often choose project-based agricultural policies through which they can exercise discretion, in terms of their location and staffing. This "allows them selectively to bestow benefits upon those whose political support they desire" and to punish those who withhold this support, with the effect that agricultural development generally is undermined (ibid: 126).

Fear of reprisals discourages rural dwellers from organising themselves against government policies, and indeed such organisation is difficult among peasants (Bates, 1981: 106). What Bates is arguing therefore is basically that agricultural policies cannot be understood if viewed as technical instruments; they are political instruments used by governments to appease certain strong interests in order to stay in power. Bates' argument that the solution lies in the entry of elite farmers into the ruling coalition is controversial. It has encouraged some of his critics, such as
Bienefeld (1986: 10) to suggest that Bates' recommendation is politically naive and amounts to the proposal of a framework for the emergence of a rural capitalist class at the expense of the peasantry.

However, other critics of Bates' position (e.g. Barker, 1984: 24, citing Hart, 1982), have indicated that comparative historical evidence does demonstrate that relatively unbiased policies have been implemented in situations where such elite farmers are a significant political force. For Booth (1987: 9-10), the emergence and political entrenchment of a significant group of elite farmers may in fact be a sine qua non, in securing a transition towards a policy regime more favourable to agriculture.

These analytical issues are both interesting and pertinent. As this thesis will show, the Botswana case presents a set of problems which makes it all the more important to grapple with these issues empirically.
3. Perspectives on the state and rural development policy in the Botswana literature: a critique

Rural development constitutes one of the major topics of research interest in Botswana. Most of the literature is generally concerned with the relationship between capital accumulation and re-distribution. This has occasioned a long-running research interest in the relationship between state and class within the framework of the country's multiparty political system and its relatively impressive record of economic growth [3]. However, the almost exclusive focus by many of these studies on processes associated with the cattle industry, coupled with their timing, has led to conclusions on the Botswana state and its relationship to civil society which today must be re-assessed.

The theme of capital accumulation has been dealt with from various points of view. These range from a concern to analyse the country's 'trajectory of dependent development' (Parson, 1979; 1984), to seeking to explain the extent to which Botswana's chosen path to development represents a 'model for success' (Picard, 1987). In Parson's work (1979; 1980a; 1980b; 1984) the main concern is to examine the extent to which "a self-sustained and autocentric process of capital accumulation directed by a national bourgeoisie" could arise in a country whose socio-economic basis is as a 'labour reserve' for South Africa.

According to Parson, such a transformation is held back primarily by the dependence of the Botswana economy on foreign capital and markets. Since it is premised upon the interests of a dependent ruling class, such a transformation is "not
successful and [does] not lead to the creation of prosperous and fulfilling lives for the mass of the population" (ibid: 126; 211-12; see also Molutsi, 1983). This dependent ruling class or 'petty bourgeoisie' is overwhelmingly composed of the cattle barons, who are represented in the state apparatus, in parastatals, and who often enter into joint ventures with multinationals, foreign traders, and industrialists. Within the limits of these relations of dependency, capital accumulation occurs with the support of the state.

The fact of dependency as a constraining factor in a general sense cannot be denied. An analysis of Parson's work, however, reveals several analytical weaknesses, some of which can be traced to the concepts which he employs. The first of these is the term 'petty bourgeoisie', which he presents as synonymous with the state or ruling class. The effect of this failure to distinguish different elements is the conflation of different levels of analysis. This tendency emerges more clearly in Picard's discussion (1987) of 'socio-economic elites', discussed below.

Another analytically unhelpful term which Parson uses is 'peasantariat'. Parson's reasons for coining this term are understandable given the complex and often confusing socio-economic category of an oscillatory migrant worker-cum-peasant producer (Parson, 1979: 347). However, when employed in reference to the majority of the rural population and the rural social structure, 'peasantariat' is far from accurate and satisfactory. Subsequent research in this area has demonstrated the existence of and inter-relationships between elements of a rural class structure comprising up to five
strata. Some of these works are referred to in the analysis of the rural social structure in the section on methods below.

Parson's analysis therefore represents an example of a tendency to present arguments in such a way as to close-off the scope for the empirical study of processes associated with redistribution. This is because he tends to assume beforehand that it is not in the interest of such a 'dependent' capitalist state to re-distribute resources to the majority of the population. As a result, no systematic analysis of the state's relationship to the peasant agricultural sector is offered. This sector is mentioned only in reference to the exploitation by the cattle barons of the 'peasantariat' which is disguised under practices which make wage labour on cattleposts and in arable agriculture appear to be a "non-exploitative patron-client exercise and as a form of welfare" (Parson, 1979: 201; 211-12; see also Cliffe and Moorsom, 1979: 41).

Despite the weaknesses in Parson's schema, there is much truth in the suggestion that the Botswana state tends to promote activity supporting capital accumulation among the cattle barons and other capitalist classes. This issue is best illustrated in studies of the cattle industry and in particular the Tribal Grazing Land Policy (TGLP). The TGLP was introduced in 1975 in the form of a government White Paper purporting to be designed as a rural development strategy whose main thrust was land reform and range management. It soon became clear that the main purpose of the policy was to expedite the modalities of commercialising the cattle industry, whose main beneficiaries were a small number of people, mainly the cattle barons (Cliffe and Moorsom, 1979; Parson, 1980b, 1984;
There were very few positive assessments of the TGLP, some of which highlighted the significance of the advantage of good pasture and stock management in a drought-prone environment (von Kaufmann, 1978: 257-58).

The state had also taken advantage of new market opportunities in EEC countries created in the wake of the Lome Conventions. This was followed by massive investment in the cattle industry and the promotion of the interests of cattle owners in many ways, particularly through the maintenance of a low taxation regime on the industry (Hudson, 1981; Hubbard, 1986). Although the actual distribution of cattle among the population in terms of numbers varies considerably, the large cattle owners in Botswana include members of the Cabinet, members of Parliament, high ranking government bureaucrats and local-level politicians.

Recognition of these issues has served to reinforce the view that the state and the dominant class in Botswana are synonymous and that therefore the state's main function is to promote capital accumulation among this class. However, attempts have been made recently to move away from this rather crude instrumentalism. A new type of analysis is presented with different levels of emphasis in the work of Picard (1987), and Molutsi (1986; 1988). These works have raised the question of the 'autonomy' of the Botswana state.

For his part Picard has dealt with the 'autonomy' of the Botswana state in relation to the question of dependence on international markets and capital. He points out that unlike in the area of trade and mineral extraction, the cattle
industry is in the exclusive hands of local 'elites'. Consequently, therefore, "Botswana elites have been able to create a degree of autonomy" from direct control by foreign capital (Picard, 1987: 15). A glaring shortcoming of this analysis is that it does not address the question of state autonomy vis-a-vis the local economically dominant class.

The most significant attempt to grapple with this issue is to be found in Molutsi's work (1986; 1988). Anchoring his analysis to the broad outlines of dependency theory, Molutsi nonetheless attempts a formulation which takes into account the possibility of the state's autonomy from direct control of internal capitalist classes. Molutsi (1986: 51) postulates that:

This is ... neither an instrumentalist state in the classical Marxist-Leninist sense nor a neutral state serving the interests of all classess in society as often assumed by development economists. Rather, this is a state characterised by a considerable degree of autonomy from the different classess in Botswana. Thus, while most of its policies promote class inequalities, this state is still able to carry out programmes designed to benefit subordinate classess ...

He then posits the view that "[b]y legislating policies and undertaking development projects which enable the rapid accumulation of capital by the petty bourgeoisie and at the same time carrying out programmes for the lower classes, the Botswana state has been able to reconcile the contradictory roles of accumulation and legitimation (1986: 51). He however dismisses as inconsequential the initiation by the government of programmes such as ALDEP, as these are seen as doing "nothing new but [to extend] the old pupil/master farmer scheme [which benefited rich peasants] to all peasants"; and that
"ALDEP might be doing nothing other than introducing the peasants to the burdens of imported capital intensive inputs now crippling the larger farmers" (p. 185; 254). This position reveals a lack of understanding of the nature of ALDEP and reflects the dangers of a priori reasoning.

The notion that the Botswana state's apparently redistributive activities are basically 'symbolic' gestures which amount to a 'sop' to the rural population has been highlighted by many writers. This point is made more strongly by Picard (1985). Picard uses the example of the Accelerated Rural Development Programme (ARDP), which was introduced in 1973 for the building of essential rural social infrastructure such as primary schools, health posts and clinics, water points and roads. Noting quite correctly that this programme "tended to satisfy basic needs rather than stimulate rural production directly", Picard points out that this programme had been necessitated by the 1974 general election which was due just over a year after the programme had been launched (Picard, 1985: 194-95).

Holm (1982) has gone further to argue that rural development is a 'low priority' in Botswana. He asserts that the country's leaders have constantly articulated 'formidable excuses' to disguise the government's failure to promote rural development. He gives the examples of military spending in the wake of aggression by the then Rhodesian army, the planned takeover of the railway from Zimbabwe, and the need to fight outbreaks of foot-and-mouth disease (1982: 96-7). For Holm, the multiparty system (elections) in Botswana does not promote rural development. He laments the tendency for rural dwellers
not to bother to elect people who have the interest of rural development at heart because a substantial number of them derive their income from South Africa (1982: 91).

The views discussed above are supported by the few studies that have been made of the state bureaucracy and its relationship to development policy. Picard identifies the Botswana bureaucracy as an 'administrative elite', which is one of the dominant 'socio-economic elites'. Since it is part of the ruling class, this administrative elite therefore enjoys considerable autonomy in decision-making on policy issues which is left largely to it (Picard, 1987: 195). Isaksen (1981: 33), whom Picard concurs with, had implied earlier that the main function of this bureaucracy is to promote the interests of the cattle industry.

Is the entire Botswana state bureaucracy committed to pursuing a programme for capital accumulation by the economically dominant class? It is my contention that to assume that this is the case is an over-simplification of the nature and character of the Botswana state bureaucracy, and reflects a failure to appreciate its evolution over the years since independence. As will be shown in Chapter 2, the view that the Botswana state bureaucracy is a homogeneous entity pursuing the programme of the ruling class is not borne out by empirical scrutiny.

Another issue which represents a significant empirical gap relates to socio-political conflict. Many of the existing studies are too quick to give the impression that Botswana is a tranquil society devoid of conflict. Some have shown, quite persuasively, that the state seeks to maintain political
quiescence, not by repression but by the use of legal mechanisms, albeit short of preventive detention, to deal with its political opponents (Stevens and Speed, 1977; Picard, 1987). This, however, does not mean that conflicts do not exist. They do exist, albeit in largely non-violent forms, and they revolve around the distribution of resources, at various levels of the social structure. The loci of these conflicts are the various government bureaucracies, and local level institutions such as the tribal kgotla (customary court and tribal assembly) and Village Development Committees (VDCs).

It has been noted that the state has increasingly assumed the role of mediating these conflicts. Holm (1985) identifies the state itself as the source of major conflict over social change, and not social classes. According to him social class "is simply one among a number of social factors which may influence the social change process" (Holm, 1985: 157). For him the example of the TGLP demonstrates that conflict is generated by bureaucrats who in this case pursued efforts which ran counter to the immediate interests of large cattle owners (ibid: 163-170). Apart from the obvious flaw in the view that the TGLP was of little benefit to the large cattle owners, this analysis reveals a failure to acknowledge the fact that bureaucratic action does not take place in isolation from the wider class conflict and the struggle for resources. This study demonstrates this in relation to ALDEP.

This review shows that the tendency to see the system as tailored to the interests of the economically dominant class derives from assessments focused on the cattle industry. This is explained partly by the fact that from the attainment of
independence in 1966 to circa 1980, state policy was focused almost exclusively on the cattle industry. In other words, a major factor which influenced these analyses was the timing of the research and the particular processes studied. The contribution of this literature - notwithstanding some of its conceptual inconsistencies - cannot therefore be dismissed.

The socio-economic composition and character of the national political leadership in the country is also such that one can speak of a ruling coalition largely constituted by an oligarchy of capitalist interests rooted in cattle production. This, however, does not necessarily mean that the state functions purely in the interests of this oligarchy. The emergence of new trends, such as unemployment, and social forces within the state machinery and civil society pressing for re-distribution, have served to counterbalance this tendency. It was pointed out by Colclough and McCarthy (1980: 243) that "the view that the present generation of leaders in Botswana are merely pursuing their narrow class interests is too simplistic". These writers did not, however, offer any further analysis of this issue except to conjecture that the most significant factors favouring change are "perhaps those which stem from the democratic process itself".

The response of the state to these developments in the 1980s through the initiation of re-distributive policies demonstrates that the Botswana state should not be viewed as an ossified structure impervious to pressure for change. This introduces another important element, namely that the character of the state and the state-civil society relationship, at least as the Botswana case shows, must be seen as gradually
undergoing change. It also suggests that forces operating within civil society within the framework of the country's multiparty system are also not as inert as is often implied. Thus, what is now lacking are empirical studies which focus on the relationship of the state to issues concerning redistribution.

To avoid the much too common tendency to reify 'the state', I believe that these issues can be studied effectively by focusing on the bureaucracy and the policy process. It is also important to study the role perceptions of the bureaucrats, their relationship with the peasants, and conflicting 'knowledge systems' between bureaucrats and peasants. Having done this we can establish the ways in which these factors impinge on the implementation of agricultural policies and radiate through the rural social structure. This represents an important way in which to escape the grip of a priori theorising and circular arguments. This thesis attempts to tackle these issues through the systematic study of ALDEP.
4. Research strategy, the case study and methods

The research strategy

The previous section has demonstrated the need for empirical study of the various issues associated with redistributive agricultural policy in Botswana. I decided that these issues could best be dealt with through a research strategy emphasising a combination of methods. I decided on a regional case study, as this would facilitate in-depth, detailed analysis (see Casley and Lury, 1981: 62; 63; Stacey, 1969). It was not the main intention of the study to obtain findings that were 'generalizable' on a national scale. The aim was to seek information that would facilitate the analysis of the ways in which a nationwide phenomenon manifests itself in a specific case. Nonetheless, in many instances it has been possible to draw inferences about the national situation from existing national data, comparative material from other regions, and from interviews.

It was also important to maintain a fair balance between in-depth, 'qualitative' information and quantitative data. I therefore made use of both a survey and in-depth interviews. The importance of in-depth interviews in social research has been emphasised by many writers (e.g. Stacey, 1969; Burgess, 1982; Ward, 1983; etc).

The case study and units of analysis

Since the implementation of ALDEP is concentrated on the relatively fertile eastern hardveld, the case study chosen, Kweneng District, is located within this area. Kweneng
District's average annual rainfall of 500 mm is not far off the average for this eastern belt which is 475 mm.

Another factor considered in the choice of Kweneng District was its size. In this respect I took into account the fact that this district is of 'medium size', occupying an intermediate position between larger districts such as the Central District, and smaller ones such as the Kgatleng. The population of Kweneng District was estimated by the 1981 census to be 117,127, projected to increase to 166,051 by 1991. This means that 12.5 per cent of the total population of the country and 15 per cent of the rural population live in the district. On the other hand, the census returns for 1981 gave the populations of Kgatleng and Central Districts as 44,461 and 319,347 respectively.

Another factor which was taken into account when choosing Kweneng District is that the largest village in the district, Molepolole, has roughly 50 per cent of its population involved in agricultural occupations. On the other hand, according to the CSO's projections (in NDP VI, 1985: 113) the villages of Mochudi in Kgatleng District and Kanye in Southern District could attain urban status by 1991. Since both arable farming and cattle keeping are dominant practices (in 1981 the area was estimated to have 111,872 ha of cultivated land and 180,900 cattle), Kweneng District is a 'typical' Botswana rural area. This may be compared for example to the Barolong area of Southern District and Gantsi in the west which respectively are high-output arable-producing and large-scale cattle-ranching areas.

The units of analysis chosen were the rural households and
government bureaucratic structures. The former is a complex and controversial concept in Botswana. This is mainly because most rural households are made up of several families or a loose kinship group deriving income from a number of sources (RIDS, 1976: 178; NMS, 1982: 901-4). The composition of a rural household may assume any of a wide variety of combinations. For example, a widowed mother may reside within one compound (lolwapa) with her married son and his wife and children, as well as with her unmarried daughter and her children.

However, as the NMS report points out, household functions are not necessarily carried out within single physical structures (malwapa). They are often carried out by 'household members' residing in a number of nucleated settlements such as villages, arable lands, cattleposts, towns, and the mines in South Africa (ibid). The rural household in Botswana is therefore somewhat 'segmented', with the segments "revolving between the various economic zones" (ibid; see also Alverson, 1979: 41; Hesselberg, 1985: 121, who describes these households as 'multi-active'; World Bank, 1985: 21-2; etc).

Alverson (1979: 41) criticises what he calls 'after-the-fact research' in Botswana, which he accuses of being "accompanied by a predilection for studying households as if they were rather autonomous, individualised production units". He observes that:

The fabric of a rural life composed of systematic alliances and exchanges among households, lineages, and other institutions, will be masked by a ... methodology that defines a priori the household as an independent sampling unit. Yet data on household activity is much richer in the literature than data on the linkages among households (ibid).
Similar complaints have been made in relation to the literature on women and female-headed households in Botswana (Peters, 1983: 107).

These are perfectly legitimate concerns. However, they relate specifically to studies which tend to be concerned with the presentation of typologies of households rather than the study of their inter-relationships. When taking the latter into account, the concept of household becomes analytically and methodologically more accurate. This is particularly the case when considering the fact that the inter-linkages referred to above make it even more inaccurate to use individual 'farmers' as units of analysis (see below).

Background to the survey

A major early concern was how to go about obtaining a stratified sample. Previous studies (Cliffe and Moorsom, 1979; Comaroff, 1980; Cooper, 1982; and Molutsi, 1986) have identified up to five categories or strata among the rural population. It is important to discuss each of these categories in some detail, since all invariably feature in various parts of the discussion in the thesis.

At the top of the structure are the large-scale commercialised arable farmers and/or cattle owners, who represent a small but powerful minority - roughly 5 to 9 percent of the rural population. The large cattle owners (who are often referred to as 'cattle barons') own a minimum of 200 cattle (cf. Molutsi, 1986: 211) and some of them are known to own over 10,000 head. Among them this group own about two-thirds of the national herd currently estimated at 3.4 million.
This group includes many of those in the senior levels of the state apparatus such as Cabinet ministers, Members of Parliament and senior government bureaucrats, as well as traditional authorities.

The large-scale arable farmers are located mainly in the fertile freehold areas or 'blocks' which constitute 4 per cent of the total land area of the country (Map 2). They cultivate food crops such as maize and beans, and cash crops such as sunflower seeds, groundnuts, etc. The sale of the foodcrops either on the domestic or South African market is determined by price levels, while the cash crops are sold mainly in South Africa. These farmers employ both permanent and seasonal labourers, who are paid in cash.

A sizeable number of indigenous farmers belong to the category of large-scale arable farmers. Many of them are located in the Barolong area of Southern District. According to Comaroff (1980: 98) these farmers cultivate more than 1,000 acres of land [405 ha] and produce more than 1,000 bags of grain "in all but the poorest years". They are mechanised, and they "regularly rent out implements, services and transport facilities to those who lack them ... [and] most enter into sharecropping agreements with less wealthy households". Some of them "have also gained control of available (local) administrative institutions" (ibid).

The rich peasants or kulaks represent about 5 to 8 per cent of the rural population. By social origin their members come from tribal ruling families and therefore hold high social status in their respective communities (Molutsi, 1986: 216). A significant number are dikgosana (village or ward headmen),
District Councillors, and district or village representatives of the political parties, especially the ruling party. Unlike the cattle barons whose representation in the state machinery is at the highest level, the kulaks' representation is largely at the middle level. They therefore serve as the 'intermediate link' between the ruling national politicians and the 'masses'.

This group is normally involved in both arable farming and cattle production. Their land holdings average 50 hectares, while their minimum cattle holdings range from 50 to 100. They are semi-mechanised and commercialised, although their production is mainly confined to food crops such as sorghum, maize, millet, melons, beans, etc. They produce a minimum of 200 bags of grain which they sell mainly on the local market. They also have adequate transport in the form of heavy duty vans, small trucks and tractor trailers. While they often hire sophisticated machinery such as combine harvesters and threshers, they own at least one tractor, acquired through loans from the NDB. They also employ labour, but mainly on a seasonal basis. The 'employees' are usually paid in kind, mainly in the form of bags of grain, rather than in cash.

The kulaks also enter into sharecropping arrangements with other, smaller producers. They also rent out agricultural implements, especially their tractors as draught power. These relationships are often based on patron-client linkages whose effect is to mask the exploitation of the poor peasantry. It is in this context that the official categorisation of this group as 'progressive farmers' has an ironic and rather hollow ring to it.

It is important to provide some explanation as to the use
of the term 'kulak' to describe this group. Admittedly, this term has a negative connotation, particularly in view of its usage in Russia and the Soviet Union. For example, Shanin (1985: 156) points out that in Russia 'kulak' was

... a peasant term of abuse aimed at 'smart alecs' who prospered not by the sweat and slog of peasant farming but by usury, go-between activities, deals, etc., mostly at the expense of the communities they belong to. [4].

The term kulak as commonly used in Africa simply designates the richest stratum of the peasantry (cf. Thoden van Vezlen, 1973). I employ this term not only in reference to this but also in recognition of this group's political power and exploitative relationship with the rest of the peasantry.

The middle peasants constitute a more difficult group to identify and define, hence the conflicting and often vague descriptions of this group in the literature. A number of writers, such as Cliffe and Moorsom (1979: 40-41; Cooper (1982a: 275-79); and Molutsi (1986: 217-221) tend to conflate the characteristics of rich, middle and small (poor) peasants. Middle peasants constitute the relatively prosperous small-scale producers. They produce grain beyond the subsistence needs of their households. They use 'traditional' technology and farming methods, such as animal draught power and animal drawn implements. They rely on family labour, although during peak periods in the cropping cycle such as weeding and harvesting they may employ two or three 'assistants' who are often paid in kind, in bags of grain.

Other characteristics of middle peasant households are the following: access to relatively good arable land of roughly 10-
15 hectares on average; at least one wage earner within the household; and ownership of some 30 to 50 cattle, some of which may be held under the traditional system of cattle 'lending' called mafisa, though a significantly decreasing number as we shall see in Chapter 5. These farmers produce an average of 40-50 bags of grain in good years, producing a surplus equivalent to roughly half the amount they produce for subsistence.

Although on a national scale their political role is limited, the middle peasants have successfully taken control of small local-level institutions such as Farmer's Committees (FCs), and Village Development Committees (VDCs). They have also cultivated good relations with agricultural officials.

The category of small peasants can be divided into three sub-strata. As a general category these peasants comprise about 70 per cent of the rural population and normally exist under precarious economic conditions. Among them these peasants have access to only 12 per cent of all rural incomes (Watanabe and Mueller, 1984: 115; Hesselberg, 1985: 189). The precarious position of these peasants is underlined by the fact that natural disasters such as drought and animal disease often wipe out their stock and reduce their grain production in a matter of a few years. For many, recovery takes several years while for some it becomes impossible.

The first sub-stratum, the 'small peasants proper', who constitute about 60 per cent of this group, produce less than 20 bags of grain, and rely solely on family labour. Their production therefore hovers around the subsistence level. Since this labour is not usually sufficient because of
migration to the mines and increasingly to the towns, these households rely on the pooling of resources with other households. These resources include labour, draught power and implements. However, as will be shown, these household reciprocities of labour and draught power exchange have declined substantially over the years, particularly in the 1980s. Their land, which averages 3.5 hectares, is usually of relatively low quality.

The poor peasants constitute about 20 to 25 per cent of small peasants, and probably 10 per cent of all producers. They produce less than 10 bags of grain and plough an average of 2.8 hectares. The overwhelming majority of these households are female-headed, many of them constituting unmarried women with children. The lack of male labour, which may be important in performing some of the agricultural tasks, is a particular handicap. Cooper (1982: 275) describes this category of peasant farmer as a 'lumpenpeasantry', distinguished by the fact that they often do not plough their lands. They are therefore obliged to provide their labour, in most cases seasonally, to richer farmers who, depending on the type of farmer (i.e. kulak or freehold capitalist farmer) pay them either in cash or in kind. They also tend to hire out their land, mainly to kulaks or middle peasants, or enter into sharecropping arrangements. During droughts many of these households become semi-destitute or destitute, and thus become recipients of relief packages.

The last category of small peasants constitutes those who are landless and semi-proletarianised. Many of them work in the freehold farms and in large farms such as those found in the Barolong area. They are a smaller but gradually increasing
proportion of the rural population as land becomes less and less readily available for younger households. They constitute roughly 10 per cent of all rural dwellers. Many of them belong to minority groups such as Basarwa ('Bushmen'), Bakgalagadi, and others, while an increasing number are drawn from the Tswana majority. As low wage earners who are sometimes also paid in kind, they are very poor. Their only political role is that of voting. In terms of participation in national politics they are therefore in a more or less similar position as the small and poor peasants.

The sample and sampling techniques

As is often the case with a questionnaire survey in LDCs, obtaining a reliable sampling frame was a major problem. Fortunately, this task was eased by the relative reliability of the existing compendium of official statistics in Botswana. This is the case particularly with agricultural statistics, known in many Third World countries to be notoriously unreliable (Casley and Lury, 1981: 10), which have been compiled with a reasonable degree of regularity since 1967. This, however, must be seen within the context of the tendency - which is to be found in Botswana as much as anywhere else - for official statistics to be collected and compiled in such a way as to leave out data that the academic researcher might consider important (Bilton et al, 1988: 527-9; Bulmer and Warwick, 1983: 4-5).

The sample needed had to contain cultivating small and middle peasant households, households of ALDEP participants, and those of kulaks. The size and mode of selection of the
sample was influenced by several factors. First, I had access to some 'raw' data relating to producers who had obtained ALDEP inputs in the District. These data, contained in documents called 'Management Sheets', are official compilations kept at the District Agricultural Office (DAO) based on entries by extension staff.

At the time of my research the DAO's Management Sheets contained data on 815 households in Kweneng South and 335 in Kweneng North. The overall total of 1,150 represents 14.3 per cent of the estimated 8,000 crop farms in the District. The data contained in the Management Sheets range from sex and age of the participant, to size and location of the land ploughed, agricultural assets, and to the type of ALDEP package obtained.

Access to these data reduced the need to conduct a large-scale survey on this group. I therefore decided on a smaller sample situated within a closely knit area within the District, to which it would be possible to administer a detailed questionnaire. For reasons of convenience I selected Molepolole, the District administrative centre and largest village in the Kweneng. Apart from the advantage of the proximity of local institutions and officials, Molepolole forms the residential core of households engaged in arable production in 'lands (or extension) areas' located within a radius of up to 50 km of the village.

Settlement in Botswana's rural areas takes the form of a trilocal pattern. The village forms the core residential area, while arable fields (officially called lands or extension areas) are situated on the fringes of the village and may be located as far away as fifty kilometres or more. Cattleposts
are situated even further away. Massey (1981: 55) attributes this trilocal settlement pattern to adaptation to the ecological conditions.

In Kweneng District most of the lands areas are located within the agricultural district administratively designated as Kweneng South, which has a total of 19 extension areas with an estimated 5,600 arable holdings out of a district total of 8,000 (MoA, 1986: 72). The number of heads of households engaged in arable production resident in Molepolole was given in 1981 as 1,014 (CSO, 1982: 30-082). In 1981 the total village population was estimated at 26,360, projected to reach 32,490 by 1991. To an outsider, this large village size might seem surprising. This is also recognized among scholars in Botswana, as underscored by the definition by some of these settlements as 'agro-towns' (Silitshepa, 1982: 33-5).

The total sample for the detailed questionnaire survey was set at 120 household heads. The selection of the sample followed a pilot survey which was administered on 10 respondents. An attempt was made to carry out the sampling process through the random (probability) method. However, in practice it proved impossible to maintain strict randomness. I also decided to adopt some stratification with disproportionate sampling.

While sampling in the village I selected a total of 70 respondents from within seven wards (i.e. 10 from each), out of a possible total of 25 (or even more than 50 when including sub-wards). The wards were chosen according to distance from the village centre, where the administrative offices are located in order to establish the extent to which this could be
an important factor in determining access to information and facilities.

I attempted to select every fourth and seventh household as I went on with the interviewing. However, since the previous rains had come late, many people were still at the lands harvesting or threshing. I therefore had to go to the lands, where it was virtually impossible to apply random sampling techniques. At the lands I interviewed the household heads who were not present when I visited their homes.

I had decided initially to make a rough stratification by size of operation and select a subsample of kulaks separately from the main sample. In this way it was possible to sample disproportionately in order to guarantee adequate representation of the kulaks, who are a small but important minority. It has been noted that sampling disproportionately from sub-populations is a departure from strict randomness for the population taken as a whole. As a result "statistical adjustments must be made in generalizing about the total population" (Pelto and Pelto, 1978: 134). I selected 20 kulaks for the survey interview, who represented 16.6 per cent of the total sample.

During the sampling process I also decided to separate the ALDEP from the non-ALDEP households. This came after I had realised that my strategy for random sampling was leading to a very low representation of the former. These two sub-samples were designated Samples A and B, and they contained 70 and 50 respondents respectively. Sample B, the ALDEP sample, was selected with the aid of a list obtained from the District Agricultural Office (Management Sheets). I selected every
fifth and tenth name on the list.

The survey questionnaire focused on five main variables: socio-demographic and economic details, extent of agricultural involvement, information on ALDEP, utilisation of ALDEP, and attitudes toward ALDEP. The questionnaire was written in English but was administered in Setswana. The interviews took two hours on average, allowing for at least four interviews a day. The survey as a whole took two months to complete.

The questionnaire interviews were conducted typically with individual heads of household, often in the shade outside their houses. Occasionally a group would converge and in several cases the respondent conferred with them to 'verify' such things as the number of cattle, and so on. To what extent this affected the quality of the data I cannot say with certainty. Nevertheless, I do believe that this had a minor effect since I had an assistant present during all the interviews who alerted me of any inconsistencies. My assistant also acted as an interpreter in those instances where I did not understand a given word or phrase, which made it possible to rephrase or probe a particular question when the need arose. The full text of the questionnaire is reproduced as Appendix 1.

In-depth interviews

The in-depth interviews which were conducted with the agricultural producers were carried out with 26 respondents selected from among those who had participated in the questionnaire survey. They were chosen according to no special method except that I took special interest in cases which exhibited some unusual characteristics, such as extreme poverty
for example. I also preferred those who had been cooperative
the first time. These were lengthy unstructured interviews,
lasting on average about two hours and often taking more than
one session, often on different days. The interviews were
conducted as 'conversations', and as far as possible in a
relaxed manner. I took notes during the interviewing but could
not use a tape recorder because many of the respondents
regarded it with suspicion.

A similar strategy was used when interviewing government
bureaucrats, although in some cases I had a list containing
certain points to serve as a guide during the interviewing. A
total of 62 government bureaucrats were interviewed in this
manner. Of these 28 were local-level and the remaining 34 were
based at headquarters in Gaborone. Most of the latter were
based at MoA. In particular, officials linked to the ADEP
Monitoring and Evaluation Unit were the subject of repeated
visits. A total of 13 extension officers, called Agricultural
Administrators (ADs), were also interviewed at length.
Needless to say, I also obtained some useful information
through observation.

Some of the statements made by some of my respondents are
reported in full in the text but their real names have not been
used. This is not to say that they are taken at face value.
They are used in order to illustrate the way a particular
opinion was expressed within the context of a general analysis
of the issues involved. Important information gathered through
documents has also been used. However, since some of these
documents were of a confidential nature they are not shown in
the bibliography.
Notes

1. It is not necessary here to argue about the extent to which these are in fact original formulations, as that would entail a different discussion. However, it is worthwhile to note that some of these issues are developed to some extent by Marx in The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (1963) and in The Critique of the Gotha Programme (1966). See also F. Engels, The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State (1972), V.I. Lenin, The State and Revolution (1947), and A. Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks (1971).

2. This should not, however, be confused with corporatism, which denotes the "official sanctioning of functional organisations [such as trade unions] supervised by agents of the state bureaucracy under a vertically segmented representational system" (Kaufman, 1977: 111).

3. Excluded from this review is the small number of studies whose fascination with Botswana's multiparty system leads them to conclusions bordering on the hagiographic.

4. For a discussion of the concept of 'kulak' in relation to the debates conducted within the ranks of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union under Stalin see Lewin (1975).
CHAPTER 1

THE POSTCOLONIAL STATE AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT POLICY, 1966-80

Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to highlight key background information on the evolution of rural development policy in Botswana. The discussion begins with a general survey of the economic and political changes which came in the wake of independence in 1966, set against the background of a brief overview of the colonial period. Three trends are then discussed: (1) a period characterised by an almost exclusive focus on the cattle industry, which amounted to the promotion of capital accumulation among a small elite of large cattle owners under the aegis of government policy; (2) corresponding to this pattern, meagre efforts to devise strategies to address the problem of widespread poverty among the majority of the rural population, most of whom are peasant producers; and, (3) beginning around the late 1970s, the initiation of policies apparently aimed at increasing the income-generating capacity and economic opportunities among the rural poor.

This move towards some form of 're-distribution' of economic resources and benefits was signalled most emphatically by the initiation in 1978 of ALDEP, an agricultural programme targeted at peasant producers. The central thrust of the chapter is therefore to analyse the significance of this shift. A particular concern is to explore the significance of this new trend in explaining some recent aspects of the evolution of the Botswana state and its changing relationship to the rest of society.
1.1 The foundations of Botswana's development strategy

Much of the post-colonial period in Botswana has been characterised by the pursuit of an outward-oriented development strategy based on the promotion of mineral and beef exports. Under this strategy, the less favoured sectors such as arable agriculture are expected to benefit from the 'trickle down' effect of the revenue generated by these outward-oriented sectors. It was in this context that the government formulated its economic planning objectives of "rapid economic growth, social justice, economic independence and sustained production" (NDP V, 1979). As will become clearer later, within this framework 'social justice' is understood to be a spin-off of growth rather than as a central feature of development strategy.

In explaining the adoption of the outward-oriented development strategy it is important to consider three elements of background. These can be summarised as follows: (a) the colonial economic legacy which resulted in Botswana's inheritance at independence of an extremely underdeveloped economy lacking a viable internal market; (b) aspects of the political transition to independence, particularly the composition and orientation of the group that came to power in 1966 to establish the postcolonial state; and (c) the emergence of new opportunities for economic growth occasioned by the discovery of vast deposits of minerals, particularly diamonds.
The colonial economic legacy

Colonial rule came to the territory which became known as the Bechuanaland Protectorate in a manner much unlike the way it did in many other parts of Africa. The declaration of the Protectorate by Britain in 1885 came partly in response to a request by three Tswana chiefs fearing the incorporation of the territory into the neighbouring Boer Republics. More decisive, however, were Britain's own imperialist designs for the region, chief among which was to halt the expansion of the Germans from the west and the Portuguese from the east (Halpern, 1965, 81-88; Munger, 1965: 11; Sillery, 1965: 217-31), and to protect the so-called 'road to the north' which supposedly went through Bechuanaland.

Bechuanaland thus became one of the three 'High Commission Territories', which included the two other British protectorates of Basutoland and Swaziland. These territories were administered by a High Commissioner resident at the Cape in South Africa and internally by a Resident Commissioner. The first step taken by the colonial authorities within Bechuanaland was to demarcate land in this vast territory of 582,000 square kilometres into three categories, consisting of nine 'Native Reserves', Crown Land and Freehold Land [1].

The British colonial authorities did very little to develop Bechuanaland. Seeing no potential for development the colonial authorities saw the territory as nothing more than a 'road' for imperialist expansion to the north. This vast expanse of territory attracted its fair share of philanthropic Christian missionaries, romantics, often unscrupulous traders, cattle rustlers, and bandits. Colonial economic policy, which
has been described as 'benign neglect' (Mmusi, 1983: xvi), or
'structural underdevelopment' (Picard, 1987: 111), had been
reinforced by the belief that Bechunaland would be eventually
incorporated into South Africa (The Fabian Society, 1965: 1).
The threat of incorporation only ended in the mid-1950s.

From the very outset, the colonial authorities made it
clear that the territory would have to provide its own revenue
to cover administrative expenses. The chiefs thus agreed to
cooperate with the colonial authorities in collecting taxes
from the African population (the 'Hut' or 'Poll' Tax, to which
a 'Native' Tax was added in 1919). This became the main
justification for the promotion of the migrant labour system, a
policy pursued by the colonial authorities with much enthusiasm
throughout the colonial period [2]. The deleterious effects of
the migrant labour system, particularly on agricultural
production and family life, have been well documented
(Schapera, 1947). The transformation of Bechunaland into a
labour reserve for South Africa remains colonialism's most
enduring legacy in the country.

The territory's harsh physical environment, characterised
by a semi-arid climate, poor quality soils, and low and highly
variable rainfall, posed additional difficulties for its
inhabitants. This affected both of the territory's major forms
of economic activity, namely arable production and cattle
farming. Despite this situation, the pre-colonial Tswana
societies (or 'polities') had been able to maintain a degree of
self-sufficiency in food production (Colclough and McCarthy,
1980: 8; Opschoor, 1983: 161) [3]. Additional sources of
subsistence and luxury goods were provided by regional trade
networks, hunting and gathering. The effect of colonial economic policy was to seriously undermine this self-sufficiency and curtail development, particularly in arable farming.

The meagre 'developmental' activities which took place during most of the colonial period were mainly covered by revenue obtained through the Native Tax. This tax had been levied as from 1919 as an additional charge to the Hut Tax in order to create a 'Native Fund', administered by the chiefs. This fund was designed to meet expenditure costs on African education, medical development and the control of cattle diseases, as well as other measures supposedly designed to benefit Africans (Colclough and McCarthy, 1980: 19-20). It has been estimated that taxation took one-fourth to one-third of the cash income from South Africa (Picard, 1987: 111).

The bulk of colonial expenditure in the territory (over 90 per cent) went into routine administrative costs. In the early 1930s, there were only 70 hospital beds at five small missionary hospitals (Pim, 1933: 73). Even on the eve of independence the two secondary schools which provided the full five-year matriculation (university entry) course produced only "a dozen or so ... [matriculants] in the Cambridge Certificate annually" (The Fabian Society, 1965: 14). Consequently, those young Batswana who could afford it completed their matriculation studies in South Africa.

The mid-1950s saw a period of increased colonial economic expenditure in anticipation of the granting of self-government and eventual independence to the territory. Among the early measures which were undertaken was the establishment of the
Lobatse abattoir by the newly created Colonial Development Corporation (CDC) [4]. The cattle industry, which had been supported even before the 1950s, received further support through increased disease control measures and the drilling of boreholes. These measures coincided with a rise in world demand for the territory's beef (Hubbard, 1983: 136) [5]. The significance of the cattle industry is shown by the fact that during 1953 cattle and cattle products realised 75 per cent, roughly £1.9 million, of the total value of exports from the Protectorate which amounted to £2.6 million (ibid: 53). During this period Botswana's major markets consisted of the mining areas of the Witwatersrand in South Africa and the Central African Copper Belt, but access to them was "subject to frequent exclusion as the demands of the mines and domestic cattle numbers and offtake fluctuated" (ibid: 135).

A new agricultural programme was also introduced during this period, called the 'pupil farmer scheme'. Until then the only notable activity in arable agriculture had been a 'demonstration scheme' to promote 'superior methods of husbandry' which was initiated in the 1930s in an attempt to alleviate the effects of the global depression. This scheme was quickly discontinued because of lack of adequate funding and technical support. The 'pupil farmer scheme' came along with the initiation of a low-key programme of research into seed development and the setting up of marketing facilities.

Participants in this scheme were provided with extension advice, and depending on their 'level of knowledge of the use of the improved husbandry techniques', would go through the stages of 'pupil farmer', through to 'improved', 'progressive',

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and eventually to the highest level of 'master' farmer. This was an elitist scheme focused mainly on the kulaks and middle peasants who were able to afford the expensive technological packages and inputs required for enrolment. Pupil farmers' expenditure on the requisite equipment was estimated at £35 to £40 (BNA File S. 564/9). Considering the burdens of taxation and the very low mine labour income, many small peasants could not afford these inputs. The increase in colonial investment in the agricultural sector as from the 1950s therefore contributed significantly to accelerating rural class formation and in laying the foundations for the present social class structure in the country (Molutsi, 1983: 192).

However, Botswana began its life as an independent nation having inherited very little. As Colclough and McCarthy (1980: 27-8) put it "at independence Botswana was worse off in terms of both social and directly productive infrastructure than any other ex-British colony in Africa". Parson (1984: 58), summarises the Botswana economy in 1966 quite succinctly:

The GDP in 1966 was P36 million, of which agriculture, forestry, hunting, and fishing accounted for P11.1 million, or 30 per cent; mining, manufacturing, water and electricity generation, and building and other construction combined accounted for only 19 per cent; wholesale and retail trade, restaurants, and hotels accounted for 13.7 per cent. Imports of goods represented 32.8 per cent. It was an externally-oriented, low productivity, and relatively undifferentiated economy.

Parson adds to the figures cited above another list of indices of severe underdevelopment: the constitution of important elements of Botswana's economy (for example the major road network and railway) primarily as extensions of South Africa's and Rhodesia's; the determination of Botswana's agriculture,
manufacturing and trade primarily by the country's place in the South African Customs Union Agreement (SACUA) and the South African Rand Monetary Area [6]; dependence on migrant labour employed on South African mines, farms and industries (in 1966 over 30 per cent of Batswana men between the ages of 20 and 40 were working in South Africa, and in 1970 the estimated rural per capita income was only P35 per annum); lack of facilities for secondary or higher education within the country; and the absence or inaccessibility of other basic social services such as health facilities, especially in remote rural areas (ibid: 57-8).

The political transition to independence

The nature of protection under the British also had negative political effects on the people of Bechuanaland. Except for a few instances of largely unsuccessful protest by individual chiefs and other aristocratic critics of the system, there had been no mass mobilisation or agitation against the colonial system. In the words of Robertson (1979: 501), "Tswana protest tended to be aimed at specific issues affecting internal matters rather than the demagogic denunciation of colonialism per se, as was the case elsewhere [in Africa]". In addition to economic neglect the other price paid by Batswana in return for British protection was therefore the maintenance of political quiescence despite the excesses of colonial rule. Chief among these excesses was the deliberate impoverishment of the territory's people through the relentless promotion of the migrant labour system.

Nationalist mobilisation within the territory thus began
relatively late, around 1960, at a time when the principle of
decolonisation had already been accepted by the colonial
administration [7]. One extreme point of view holds that "independence was attained without a nationalist struggle being
necessary" (Wiseman, 1977: 77). As Blake (1978: 174) puts it:
"If nationalists in Nigeria ... in some sense pioneered the
pursuit of independence in English-speaking Africa and
consequently suffered all its pangs, the Batswana, coming late
in the race, took it by their stride". In the event, two
political parties assumed centre stage in the mobilisation for
independence in the early 1960s. These were the Bechuanaland
(later Botswana) People's Party (BPP), formed in 1960, and the
Bechuanaland (later Botswana) Democratic Party (BDP), formed in
1962 as a political and ideological rival of the BPP.

The BDP came to power in 1966 following parliamentary
elections in which it won 28 of the 31 National Assembly seats
(80 per cent of the poll), with the remaining 3 going to the
BPP who garnered only 14 per cent of the poll. The BDP has won
every subsequent general election, of which there have been
five so far, with landslide victories. The BPP's poor showing
was partly explained by a disabling two-way split which
resulted in the formation of a new party, the Botswana
Independence Party (BIP). Most important, the BPP's political
fortunes were undermined by efforts by the colonial
administration, such as the banning of its rallies, designed to
frustrate the party's efforts at mobilisation. Worse still,
many chiefs, most of whom had thrown their lot behind the BDP,
also refused BPP leaders permission to address the people
within their areas. Having gone into sustained decline, after
the 1969 general election the BPP was eclipsed as the largest opposition party in parliament by the Botswana National Front (BNF). The BNF was formed in 1968 as a coalition of urban-based socialist-leaning intellectuals and some disaffected chiefs.

The BDP may be described as politically conservative. Its vehemently anti-socialist stance is mirrored in its espousal of the ideals of liberal democracy as understood in Western Europe, and private enterprise. This is the basis of the BDP's ideology, notwithstanding the fact that government spokesmen often claim that the Botswana state is not preoccupied with ideology (Tordoff, 1974: 299), or that it has no ideology at all (Molutsi, 1988: 45-6).

The BDP came into being at least with the tacit approval of the colonial authorities impressed by its multi-racialist stand and disturbed by the radical anti-colonial rhetoric and mass mobilisation campaigns of the BPP (Vengroff, 1977; Nengwekhulu, 1979; Polhemus, 1983; Gunderson, 1971; etc). According to Halpern (1965: 293), the first President of the country, Sir Seretse Khama, had been given a senior post under a 'trainee-minister' arrangement "seen in the Protectorate as a grooming of Seretse Khama as a future Prime Minister". The BDP had within its ranks ten out of the twelve members of the colonial Legislative Council (ibid). Tafa (1981: 23) argues that the emergence of these leaders from within colonial administrative structures "suggests that these bodies were used, among other things, to groom pro-colonial leaders for post-independence leadership".

The BDP's leading members formed part of a coalition
comprising former colonial civil servants, teachers, and small businessmen, most of whom had aristocratic connections. All of these leaders were large cattle owners or farmers who had benefited immensely from the colonial programmes introduced in the 1950s. The transition to independence thus resulted in the transfer of political power to a relatively conservative group exhibiting no inhibitions over capital accumulation and capitalist development generally. As will be seen, the significance of the socio-economic composition of this group found concrete expression in the pattern of development expenditure. It also had a direct influence on the country's general trajectory of socio-economic development.

At independence, this group immediately sought to entrench itself in power. This was done through a series of measures designed to penetrate the rural areas politically and administratively and to superimpose state structures over local institutions. Among the legal measures undertaken to effect these changes was the promulgation of a corpus of laws which removed the traditional power of the chiefs to allocate land, control stray cattle (matimela), and collect 'tribal taxes'. The creation of the District Councils in the former 'Native Reserves' was aimed at superimposing 'modern' administrative structures over the Tribal Administration. The effects of the post-colonial administrative changes on the relationship between the chiefs and the state are discussed in detail in Chapter 2.

Other measures were designed to undercut the chiefs politically by restricting their participation in national politics. The Chieftainship Act of 1966 which outlined these
changes only provided for such activity on condition that the chiefs resigned their positions. For some writers, these measures were aimed at avoiding "parochially-focused" support (Wiseman, 1977: 76) which would be exercised "without giving thought to parties and issues" (Proctor, 1968: 62). They seem, however, to have been designed to deliberately marginalise the chiefs in anticipation of planned changes, such as in land tenure and grazing rights, that would irrevocably alter the traditional order.

Today the BDP remains by far the dominant political party in the country. Although a significant challenger to the BDP in the urban areas, the BNF has not been able to garner more than 5 of the 34 seats in the National Assembly. On the other hand, the other opposition parties, such the BPP, the Botswana Independence Party (BIP) and Botswana Peoples Union (BPU) have lapsed into becoming regional parties which between them hold only three seats. Thus, while the existence of liberal democracy in Botswana must be acknowledged, Botswana's political system is basically dominated by one party (Picard, 1987: 305).

The first six years of independence saw very little development-oriented activity. Faced with a chronic shortage of revenue and dependent on British grants-in-aid for as much as half of its budgetary requirements, the Botswana government simply proceeded with the programmes implemented during the colonial period. In relation to the cattle sector, immediate post-independence programmes focused as usual on borehole drilling and disease control. A few classrooms, small dams, and rural roads were built in the rural areas under the largely
unsuccessful 'community development' programme called 'Ipelegeng' (self-reliance). These activities were later linked to a 'food-for-work' programme introduced as a drought relief measure financed by external sources.

The bulk of government revenue (23 per cent) was spent in the construction of office blocks and urban facilities in the new capital, Gaborone. The capital was established in 1965 in time to accommodate the first elected government when the administration of Bechuanaland was moved from Mafikeng in South Africa. Budgetary self-sufficiency was finally reached in 1972/73, after the discovery of substantial deposits of diamonds which heralded the onset of an economic boom.

The new economic opportunities

The remarkable change in Botswana's economic fortunes which came in the wake of the discovery of large reserves of minerals, especially diamonds, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, has been well documented. Gross National Product per capita grew by some 8.5 per cent annually between 1965 and 1985, which according to Harvey and Lewis (1990: 1), was "the most rapid rate of any country in the world". Rates of economic growth in the 1970s were in excess of 15 per cent per year (Colclough and McCarthy, 1980: 55). From US$ 80 in 1966, GNP per capita had reached US$ 910 in 1984. By 1988 GDP stood at P2,749, a remarkable leap from the P36.9 recorded in 1966. Formal sector employment also grew rapidly, averaging 3,000 jobs per year between 1964 and 1980 (Colclough and McCarthy, 1980: 177), a rate of 9.6 per cent (Harvey and Lewis, 1990: 1) [8].
Minerals dominate exports; for example, in 1985 mining accounted for 77.8 per cent of the country's total exports of US$ 353.1 million. On the other hand, meat exports accounted for 8.0 per cent, while imports of manufactured goods, food and investment capital amounted to 80 per cent of GDP (Bhiyan, 1987: 150-55). The beef sector, which until the late 1970s accounted for up to 20 per cent of total exports, continues to enjoy access to a lucrative market currently protected under the Lome Conventions. To its great advantage, Botswana has also been the recipient of large amounts of foreign aid. In 1986 alone, Botswana received US$ 213 million in foreign aid (UNDP, 1987: v) [9].

This growth-focused development strategy has been pursued within the framework of attempting to maintain a certain level of political quiescence, particularly in the rural areas (cf. Picard, 1987: 149). Damachi (1976: 39) offers some insight into this in his analysis of the late President Khama's ideology of 'kagisano'. The ideals set out under kagisano are 'unity, peace, harmony, and a sense of community' - a set of principles said to be rooted in traditional Tswana culture but not meant to imply that the rich should distribute their assets to the poor (ibid). The specific mechanisms through which political quiescence has been maintained since independence are discussed in Chapter 2.

The planning framework which developed after the diamond boom was to focus economic development on the export sector. The main assumption underlying this planning framework was that a small capitalist country like Botswana could best achieve high rates of growth through close association with the centres
of world capitalism (Parson, 1980a: 49). For one writer, this was a 'diligent' decision reflecting the 'ingenuity' of the country's leaders who clearly understood the importance of such an alliance for managing a 'growth economy' (Hartland-Thunberg, 1978: 9-80). For another (Johns, 1973: 225), Botswana undertook these measures in an understandable attempt to limit links with the more risky option of South Africa. For Parson (1980a: 47), this amounted to a 'diversification of dependence'.

In 1975 the Botswana government reached an agreement with the De Beers mining conglomerate of South Africa to split ownership and control of the diamond mining operations (at the Orapa-Letlhakane, and later, Jwaneng mines) on a 50:50 equity basis. Under the agreement De Beers was also given control of marketing through its international agency, the Central Selling Organisation. The mere fact that Botswana managed to salvage for itself at least half of the profits from the mines was in itself quite significant [10].

De Beers also supplied the necessary equipment as well as other inputs, including crucial expertise. On the other hand, the Botswana government successfully negotiated 'soft loans' from the World Bank, Britain, Canada and Scandinavian countries for the development of mining infrastructure and for some assistance with service projects, as well as the provision of some skilled personnel (Magketla, 1982: 72). Since it had been operating from a weak position, which limited its influence on the choice of technology, the Botswana government could do nothing but express its 'disappointment' when it turned out that the mines provided little employment, as De Beers (for
obvious economic reasons) decided upon the use of highly capital intensive technology for the new mining operations (Kowet, 1978: 124).

There are a number of obvious disadvantages arising from Botswana's dependence on multinational capital, technology, and personnel. However, one finds it difficult to make sense of the view that "dependence on external sources of capital results in the benefits of economic growth going largely to capital owners and not to the majority of the population of Botswana" (Molutsi, 1986: 91). When interpreted in this manner, the problem of dependence assumes a rather opaque quality. Dependence on external sources of revenue does not necessarily mean that the state is unable to determine the use of those resources which accrue directly to it.

It is not difficult to find the basic justification for orienting the economy outwards rather than inward. With a small population of 596,510 in 1971, of whom over 90 per cent were rural dwellers, Botswana had, and still has, a very small internal market. Above all, Botswana's prospects for large-scale industrialisation continue to be stifled by the dominance of South Africa in the manufacturing sector. This is despite the fact that the whole SACUA market is theoretically Botswana's as well (Isaksen, 1981: 20-29) [11]. Even in 1986, Botswana's manufacturing sector accounted for only 6 per cent of GDP - a clear sign of the lack of success of government efforts to attract foreign investors under favourable terms.

The most important question which then arises is: How have the benefits of this impressive growth been distributed? This issue is tackled beginning with the next section.
1.2 The Botswana state and capital accumulation: the case of the cattle industry

The onset of the economic boom in Botswana quickly resulted in a pattern much too familiar in the Third World. There was a tendency towards 'urban bias' in the investment of productive capital and in the provision of basic services. The growing urban areas became the focal points of employment creation and economic opportunities. However, underlying these trends was the implementation of government policies which were directed mainly at promoting the cattle industry.

A useful starting point in analysing this phenomenon is to briefly examine the structure of cattle ownership in the country. It was known even in the early 1970s that there were sharp inequalities in the structure of ownership of cattle in Botswana (Fosbrooke, 1971: 174-76; Tordoff, 1973: 172). However, the most authoritative and comprehensive outline of the scale of this trend came with the publication of the findings of the Rural Incomes Distribution Survey (RIDS) in 1976. The RIDS (pp. 109-111) reported that 45 per cent of rural households own no cattle, 40 per cent own up to 50 head each, and 15 per cent who are large owners own three-quarters of the national herd.

The cattle industry in Botswana is firmly in the hands of the indigenous bourgeoisie. On the national level, this allows the local bourgeoisie a degree of autonomy "from direct control by foreign capital" (Picard, 1987: 15). It has also been shown that the large cattle owners are also significantly represented within the state apparatus by senior national politicians and senior civil servants (Colclough and McCarthy, 1980: 112;
Parson, 1980b: 237; etc). Reporting the findings of an elaborate study on the 'Botswana political elite', Cohen (1979: 357) found that 48 per cent (13 out of 27) members of the General Assembly own more than 100 head of cattle each, with a further 7 per cent (2) owning 51 to 100 head. In other words, the Botswana political elite also forms part of the economically dominant class, i.e part of the 15 per cent of the population (some 10,000 individuals) who own more than three-quarters of the national herd (Colclough and McCarthy, 1980: 112) of three to four million. Many of the country's cattle barons identify themselves politically with the ruling BDP to which they regularly make handsome financial donations. One leading example of such a personality is the well known cattle farmer who is believed to account for 25 per cent of cattle entering the Lobatse abattoir (estimated to earn him R33 million in 1983) (Bush, 1985: 60).

Opportunities in the international beef market which began to emerge from the 1950s were given a significant boost in the early 1970s. This was marked by the institution of the EEC market under the Lome Conventions which provided favourable trade terms to Botswana as member of the ACP group. In addition to benefiting from the standard Lome terms, such as a guaranteed market, Botswana directly negotiated an EEC guarantee of high prices for chilled and frozen beef, as well as exemption from the Common External Tariff (CET) and from 90 per cent of the variable levy of on a quota of 18,916 tonnes of boneless beef (Hubbard, 1986: 162). The Botswana government took full advantage of these opportunities, and subsequently the country became Africa's largest supplier of beef to the EEC.
The successful negotiation of this favourable agreement had immense political advantage as well:

With the political base of the [BDP] firmly centred in the cattle-owning portions of the population ... and with beef exports still 40 per cent of total exports in 1974, there were few issues with a higher government priority in the mid-1970s than avoiding the application of the full levy on Botswana's beef (Harvey and Lewis, 1990: 55).

To achieve the EEC agreement Botswana had to meet a number of strict standards. Most important of these was the eradication of cattle diseases, particularly foot-and-mouth disease. Large sums of money were spent by the government on the development of veterinary facilities. The capacity of the Botswana Meat Commission (BMC), which was nationalised immediately after independence, was increased and plans were made for the construction of another abattoir at Maun in the north. Today Botswana boasts the most developed veterinary services for cattle in the SADDC region and Gaborone is the site for the organization's diagnostic and research laboratory facilities (SADDC, 1980: 160).

The BMC's sales effectiveness has been impressive. For example "[n]et sales (i.e. sales minus freight, storage and other expenses) rose ... from P9 million in 1966/7 to P44.5 million in 1976/77 to P96 million in 1983" (Hubbard, 1986: 153). However, as Hubbard further notes:

In the post-colonial period to the mid-1980s ... [t]he associated political influence of cattle owners and the much increased availability of public finance from other sectors (notably mining) caused the industry to become an increasingly net recipient of public funds, whereas in the colonial period it had been a net contributor (ibid: 194).
The reversal of fiscal incidence in the cattle industry manifests itself no better than in regard to the taxation of the beef producers. Hudson (1980: 50) postulates that "cattle farming makes a large contribution to the [GDP] of Botswana, yet the industry as a whole makes virtually no net contribution to government revenue". Noting that government figures on the taxation of the cattle industry are often not revealed, Hudson proceeds to describe the existing taxation set-up in the following terms: the BMC's turnover in 1978 was P3.2 million while income tax on farming (cattle ranching) individuals was P0.5 million, compared to the Customs Union pool of P78 million, and mineral revenue, including company tax, of P49 million, and so on (ibid).

Obviously, if the cattle industry is so marginally taxed it makes a very negligible, if any, contribution to national, especially rural, welfare and development. The bulk of the income from beef exports thus accrues to a relatively small number of private individuals. This favourable 'taxation' regime has certainly helped the cattle barons to increase their wealth immensely. One result was that as from the mid-1970s many large cattle owners began to diversify their economic operations into retail trading, transport and the property market (Colclough and McCarthy, 1980: 39; Watanabe and Mueller, 1984: 120-26).

Table 1.1 below shows the pattern of planned expenditure in the agricultural sector as a whole between 1966 and 1980:
Table 1.1: Planned Development Spending on Agriculture, 1966-1986 (Percentage allocation)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Trans Plan</th>
<th>NDP I</th>
<th>NDP II</th>
<th>NDP III</th>
<th>NDP IV</th>
<th>NDP V</th>
<th>NDP VI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Livestock and</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>59.3</td>
<td>80.7</td>
<td>74.3</td>
<td>68.6</td>
<td>56.6</td>
<td>22.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>animal health</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arable</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>46.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>26.9</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>27.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: based on Harvey and Lewis (1990: 90).

From the first NDP in 1968 the figures indicate a strong bias towards the livestock sector, broken only after 1985 (NDP VI: 1986-91) when for the first time arable agriculture overtook livestock. The factors which influenced this change are examined in Section 1.4.

Perhaps the most penetrating criticisms of the favourable policy regime towards the cattle industry and the bias in favour of the large cattle owners have come in the form of the now numerous analyses of the Tribal Grazing Land Policy (TGLP). The TGLP was introduced in 1975 and was presented as a programme designed to redress the problem of serious overgrazing which had resulted from 'bad pasture management practices', over-stocking, and the 'chaotic' state of water supplies in the rural areas. There was a genuine fear of the possibility of ecological collapse. These issues were articulated quite persuasively by the report of a study carried out by two consultants invited in 1972 to investigate the crisis. Their major recommendation was that the range be divided into commercial, mixed, and communal grazing areas.
The government translated these recommendations into a White Paper which launched TGLP in 1975. In the words of the White Paper (GoB, 1975: 6) the basic objectives of the policy were to "make grazing control, better range management and increased productivity possible ... [and] to safeguard the interests of those who own only a few cattle or none at all". The policy provided for the zoning of tribal land "to induce people to move cattle out of overstocked areas" (ibid: 10) through the creation of commercial grazing areas to be populated by owners who would be granted leases to erect fenced ranches.

Three types of land would be created under the policy. The first would be commercial land, given to ranchers who would enjoy exclusive land rights. The second, communal land, would remain under the customary system of tenure. Finally, provision was made for 'reserved land', which would not be allocated under the policy but would be set aside for the future. Successful applicants for ranches would be provided with leases for up to 50 years. These leases were renewable and "revocable only under clearly defined terms and procedures provided for in law" (GoB, 1975: 15). The leases were to be given to those owning a minimum of cattle which was unspecified in the White Paper but which Cliffe and Moorsom (1979: 39) place at 400 head.

The launching of the TGLP therefore represented a major attempt at land reform. There are three types of land tenure in Botswana: 'communal' land, which represents about 49 per cent of the total land area, 'state land', which accounts for
47 per cent, and freehold land (4 per cent) (see Map 2). The system of 'communal' tenure dates back to the pre-colonial period. Under this system all the people were guaranteed access to residential and arable land, allocated by the chiefs, which they could not sell but could pass on to succeeding generations (Schapera, 1943: 149). Access to grazing lands, normally situated beyond the villages, was, and to some extent still is, open to all cattle owners. Although the structure of ownership and access to both cattle and arable land has always been skewed, the relative openness of access to communal land provided a degree of security to most peasants. The TGLP apparently sought to alter this situation significantly.

Changes to the system of access to land in the rural areas were effected for the first time after independence through the Tribal Land Act of 1968. This law removed the right of chiefs to allocate land and transferred this function to newly created government institutions called Land Boards. However, under the Land Act the traditional system of land tenure was left relatively intact. To most commentators, the measures which accompanied the implementation of the TGLP amounted, as Cliffe and Moorsom (1979: 51) aptly put it, to "the rationalisation of de facto private land tenure", in a situation where the land is supposed to belong to the people as a whole. As it were, the TGLP instituted "a massive land grab" (Parson, 1980b: 251). An additional criticism of the policy was that its planning had been based on dubious assumptions, such as the notion that there existed 'empty lands' in the western sandveld, ignoring evidence which showed that these areas were occupied particularly by hunter-gatherer minority groups such as Basarwa.
The implementation of the TGLP thus resulted in the eviction of some of these people (Hesselberg, 1985: 194).

A trend has also been observed whereby the ranch-owning large cattle owners have nonetheless continued to graze their cattle in the already overgrazed 'communal' areas (which they do by customary right) as well as in their private ranches, while "no maximum cattle quota has been established for the communal areas" (Hesselberg, 1985: 194; Livingstone and Srivastava, 1980: 14). Most importantly, these studies show that the state decided to press ahead with implementation even though the policy had been rejected by the smaller cattle owners and poor peasants. In the Kgalagadi for example, the rejection of the policy centred around 'fencing', which was singled out as "the arch symbol of a divided range" (Peters, 1984: 44). Moreover, the 'group ranches' envisaged in the White Paper for the communal areas never materialised.

Further criticisms of the TGLP had been expressed during a 'consultation exercise' mounted by the authorities, which was preceded by favourable radio announcements on the policy. According to one report, the poor non-cattle-owning peasants, as well as those owning small herds, stated that the policy would seemingly do nothing for them and that the statements on 'social justice' in the policy were therefore meaningless (in Parson, 1980b: 251) [12]. As Parson puts it: "the TGLP ... emerged primarily as a mechanism for a variety of medium and large-scale cattle owners to advance their position through exclusive land rights which [amounted] to a form of dispossession" (ibid: 249). This is notwithstanding the fact
that progress in implementing the policy has been generally slow (Picard and Morgan, 1985: 171; Masalila, 1983: 156).

The socio-economic composition of the ruling coalition in Botswana, whose interests are rooted in cattle production, may be described as constituting an oligarchy of capitalist interests. This view is reinforced by the fact that the ruling group consists of a small number of people and families linked to the old traditional order. Molutsi (1986: 51) suggests that these characteristics explain the Botswana state's development ideology which "promotes political and social inequalities inherited from the pre-colonial and colonial periods". In my view, this should not be taken to mean that the state necessarily functions purely in the interests of this oligarchy. The next section thus examines the record of rural development and 'social justice' before 1980.
1.3 Poverty, inequality, and rural development policy before 1980

The period 1966 to around 1980 witnessed very little government investment in rural development generally and in arable agriculture in particular. For example, rural development was allocated only 3.5 per cent of planned expenditure in NDP II (1968-73). The RIDS (1976) provided data showing that, inter alia: (1) out of a total of 91,121 rural households, 41,129 (45 per cent) had incomes below the poverty datum line (the basic minimum required level of income for basic needs to ensure a decent standard of living); and (2) access to income was severely unequal, with the wealthiest 10 per cent of rural households possessing 42 per cent of the total rural income, while 50 per cent had access to 17.4 per cent (pp.110-11; see also Watanabe and Mueller, 1984: 115). Subsequent research suggests that since the 1970s, the number of poor households has probably increased in absolute terms (Hesselberg, 1985: 187, citing Oden, 1981).

It is important at this stage to provide some explanation of the meaning of 'rural poverty' in the Botswana context. An obvious starting point is to examine means of getting access to adequate income. Sources of income are varied and they include crop production, the sale of cattle, wages from formal sector employment (normally accruing to some households as remittances from migrant workers), business activity, and hunting. However, only half of rural households had access to remittances and reliable sources of cash income in 1974-75 (Lucas, 1985: 139). Moreover, because this cash income is often small, the majority of even those households with access
to some cash income have just enough to ensure bare survival. Even though formal sector employment grew at a high rate (9.6 per cent per year), during the years following independence, it could still not match the rapid increase in the domestic labour force of over 21,000 per year. In order to survive, the majority of rural households, therefore, engage in a variety of other income generating or subsistence activities, including cattle and crop production.

Cattle production is more attractive than arable agriculture in terms of its potential returns. Obviously, the 45 per cent of rural households owning no cattle are ruled out from benefiting from this activity. Moreover, many small owners lack the capacity to make the best of the available opportunities in the cattle industry. The small cattle owner's greatest disadvantage is that he or she is under constant threat from natural hazards such as drought and disease (Livingstone and Srivastava, 1980: 9-12). The need for other essential capital investment in cattle production, particularly water supplies, rules out many small owners because of the prohibitive prices of boreholes (ibid: 12; 10).

The best option for the majority of rural households therefore lies in crop production. However, agricultural production in Botswana is so-called 'deficit agriculture', marked by sub-subsistence cultivation (Hesselberg, 1985: 159); about half of the cultivating households produce too little basic food to sustain themselves throughout the year, while only a little more than one-third produce more than the family can consume (ibid). One good indicator in this regard is that presently, Botswana imports over half of its staple food.
requirements and the bulk of processed food. Arable agriculture presently accounts for around 3 per cent of GDP (Bank of Botswana, 1988: 3), while migrant workers' remittances contribute about 3 per cent, and as a proportion of imports 4 per cent (ODI, 1987: 2). In the early 1970s, arable agriculture accounted for a mere 13 per cent of the rural product, whereas livestock accounted for 74 per cent (NDP III, 1973: 187). Table 1.2 shows the decline in agriculture's contribution to GDP relative to other sectors since 1966.

Table 1.2: Changes in the Structure of GDP: 1966, 1976 and 1986 (Percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1966</th>
<th>1976</th>
<th>1986</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade and hotels</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Harvey and Lewis, 1990: 32.

Productivity indicators in the agricultural sector have shown a marked decline since independence. In 1966, 87 per cent of households held land (of 14 acres - about 5.7 ha - on average), and they obtained average yields of sorghum of 1 bag per acre or around 250 kg/ha (Opschoor, 1983: 160). Yields of the main crops of sorghum, maize, millet, and beans currently average 200 kg/ha, and the mean production is 9.6 bags of 90 kg each (Odell Jr. et al., 1980: A-96). This is far below the 13.8 bags (or 1,250 kg) considered to be minimum necessary to feed an average rural family of six persons (EFSAIP, 1982: 52) [13].
Partly as a result of these trends, the degree of self-sufficiency in food production had declined from 90 per cent around independence to some 50 per cent by 1980 (Opschoor, 1983: 161; GoB/FAO, 1974: 17). Today about 30 per cent manage to meet their subsistence needs while a very small group (about 10-15 per cent) regularly produce a surplus. In the 1970s these farmers, the majority of whom are located in the Barolong area of Southern District, contributed over 90 per cent of the crops supplied to the BAMB (ALDEP, 1979g: 1).

Small-scale peasant production in Botswana revolves around the use of animal draught power and animal-drawn implements. The ox-drawn plough is used for repeated cultivation of extensive areas with rather low yields per hectare, unlike much of Africa, where arable cultivation is traditionally carried out by hand on relatively small plots which are intensively cultivated for a few years and then abandoned (Colclough and McCarthy, 1980: 11). The size of the harvest is therefore to a large extent determined by the size of the area ploughed as well as by the quality of the tillage operation. Access to cattle as well as ox-drawn implements is therefore crucial. However, since the distribution of cattle is so skewed, many small peasant households do not have adequate access to draught power. Moreover, kinship-based exchanges of assets related to ploughing were already in decline in the early 1970s (Curtis, 1972: 69-80).

Taking into account the climate alone, agricultural production is a risky enterprise in Botswana, particularly in view of the country's erratic rainfall. With a severe drought likely to occur every six to ten years, it is most important.
for farming households to be adequately supplied with sufficient backup in productive capital (cattle, cash, and implements). Again, this rules out the majority of small peasants who generally lack sufficient access to the necessary factors of production.

While the trends in arable agriculture look depressing, it nonetheless remains the only sector of the economy presently with the potential to increase income generation among the majority of the rural population. Several studies have shown that with increased investment in the agricultural sector coupled with the adoption of certain production techniques, the average production of the country's main food crops could increase far above current 'deficit' levels. It has been suggested by technical experts that yields as high as 803 kg/ha for sorghum and 443 for maize can be reached; at present these are 191 kg/ha and 274 kg/ha respectively (EFSAIP, 1982: 52; Alverson, 1984: 5) \[14\]. Jones (1981:31) argues that "[i]t is technically possible to obtain yields of two tonnes per hectare (2.47 acres) for the cereal crops in most years".

The only agricultural programme which existed during the period 1966-80 was the 'pupil farmer scheme' which had been introduced during the colonial period. This programme benefited a very small group, about 5 per cent of the cultivating population. Virtually all extension efforts, farmer training courses, research activities, and input supply programmes were focused on this group. These farmers also benefited from agricultural credit, which by the early 1970s still "played a minor role in agricultural and livestock development" (GoB/FAO, 1974: 25). Credit was provided by the
National Development Bank (NDB) on a three to five year basis at 8 per cent interest. Since eligibility for this credit was judged on the ability to declare assets such as cattle, the major beneficiaries were the better-off farmers. Small wonder therefore that labour migration to South Africa actually increased during the early post-independence period from 35,700 in 1964 to 48,000 in 1971 (Osborne, 1976: 205).

The 1970s saw relatively more success in the area of infrastructural development. It has been suggested that this new development resulted from the realisation by the Botswana government after the 1969 general election that "it did not have full control of the rural areas" (Picard, 1987: 237). In that election the BNF (then led by a former chief, Bathoen II of Bangwaketse, who had resigned his post in order to take part in national politics) had captured three key constituencies in the south which included that of the former Vice-President and current President, Dr Masire.

This new shift towards more serious efforts in rural development was signalled by the publication of a government White Paper entitled 'National Policy on Rural Development' (GoB, 1972). This document set out government policy on rural development as being aimed at increasing the provision of social services, halting the deterioration of the land through overgrazing and promoting 'social justice' (GoB, 1972: 3; Picard, 1987: 239). These issues were articulated in greater detail in a consultancy report by Chambers and Feldman (1973).

The direct outcome of these reports was the initiation in 1973 of a programme called the Accelerated Rural Development Programme (ARDP). According to Picard (1985: 194-5) this
programme started as a directive from the President to the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning (MFDP) on November 30, 1973, "the primary objective [of which was] for projects to be visible, on the ground, by 30 September 1974 ... twenty-six days before the [1974] general election". Rural roads, primary schools, village water supplies, rural health posts and clinics, rural administrative buildings, and other types of physical infrastructure, were built. Altogether this programme was financed by about P21.1 million (Chambers, 1977: 5), obtained mainly from external donors.

Many of these projects were indeed 'highly visible' by the election date of 26 October 1974, and the programme was continued after the election. The 1974 election result, as Picard observes, may not clearly illustrate the relationship between the electoral success of the BDP and the visibility of ARDP projects, but the BDP gained 3 seats in the National Assembly, while the party's increases in District Councils were even greater (ibid). Moreover, 32 per cent of the 'elites' subsequently interviewed by Picard "volunteered that they felt the programme, because it was a successful scheme, helped the BDP in the election [and] 62 per cent indicated that they felt ARDP was designed to garner support for the ruling party in the 1974 elections" (ibid: 196). Holm (1982: 95) is more forthright in suggesting that "the programme's main objective was publicity". However, a survey conducted under the auspices of the University of Botswana and Swaziland found that "only 29.5 per cent [of rural dwellers] had noted any ARDP project" (Parson, 1977: 643).

Though significant in a different sense, infrastructural
projects do not necessarily contribute to improving living standards. As Chambers (1978: 38) who reviewed the policy puts it: "The ARDP was not designed to confront, and did not confront, the central issue of the poorer people in the rural areas". The health projects and the Primary Health Care (PHC) strategy which was introduced in their wake do seem to have contributed significantly to subsequent reductions in the country's infant mortality rate. The infant mortality rate was estimated to be about 64 infant deaths per 1,000 live births in 1986 compared to almost twice that proportion before 1966. It is significant that many other African countries, including Nigeria and Zimbabwe, have higher values in this regard (World Bank, 1986: 232). However, the seriousness of the need to improve food production and rural welfare in Botswana is demonstrated by the fact that nutrition-related diseases such as tuberculosis (which accounts for about 25 per cent of all adult deaths in hospital) and diarrhoeal diseases, (which account for 20 per cent of recorded deaths among children under 5 years of age) are still widespread (NDP 6, 1985: 307).

Clearly, very little was achieved in the area of rural development before 1980. What factors explain this situation? It is obviously not sufficient to attribute it to the fact that during this period government policy was focused on the cattle industry. This begs the additional question why, even though the cattle industry was promoted, so little was done for arable farming. Explanations to the effect that the BDP government had the advantage of "running a visibly growing economy"; and therefore were perceived to be "doing a good job" (Stevens and Speed, 1977: 380; Polhemus, 1983: 417) are also unconvincing.
Rather, the answer seems to lie in the configuration of political factors operating during this period.

A significant attempt to analyse these factors is provided by Holm (1982). Holm (1982: 91-2) postulates that elections in Botswana generally do not promote rural development. He then notes that since it is the government leaders who assume the critical role of providing subsistence goods during trying periods such as droughts, "[t]hose criticising rural development policies thus run the risk of aggravating their main source of security during the next drought" (ibid: 92-3). In other words, voting behaviour is determined to a large extent by people's calculations of their chances of benefiting directly from the persons voted for. In my view, the causes of the relative neglect of rural development during 1966-80 are more complex than this.

The first clue is provided by the structure of the BDP as well as the opposition parties in Botswana. These are not mass parties operating a cell system, and as Colcough and McCarthy (1980: 41) point out, the BDP for example "scarcely exists between elections". The highest form of organisation by the BDP in the rural areas takes the form of small constituency groups made up of a few influential individuals. As echoed by Tordoff (1974: 301) the BDP "has a weakly articulated structure" in the rural areas. Party activity in the rural areas revolves around the local MPs and the District Councillors.

The exclusion of the peasantry from participation in the political parties beyond mere voting derives primarily from the manner of their mobilisation into national politics. The
Botswana peasantry were inducted into participation in the country's electoral system not as an occupational group, i.e. as agricultural producers or peasants, but in the form of the more amorphous category of 'the people' - 'Batswana'. They were mobilised to vote in the first election under the BDP slogan: 'a vote for the BDP is a vote for your chiefs' (Moamongwe, 1982: 13), thus giving credence to a loyalty justified by tradition. The majority of the rural population were also not included in the party structure in the rural areas. They were instead expected to be politically acquiescent while the state carried on with the task of 'development'. Some of the mechanisms through which this political quiescence is maintained are discussed in Chapter 2.

The effect of this approach to mass political mobilisation was the exclusion of the agrarian question from the political agenda from the very outset. Moore (1983: 3-4) discusses a similar trend in a slightly different context in Sri Lanka. Moore highlights the failure of peasants in that country, who have a record of voting different governments into power, to get the system to provide better prices for agricultural products. However, Moore also points out that the government in Sri Lanka tends to re-invest the money taxed out through low prices in rural social infrastructure. In Botswana the problem is the more fundamental one of getting the agricultural sector off the ground. As will be shown in the next section, this situation changed significantly from the end of the 1970s.
1.4 ALDEP and the shift to re-distribution.

The end of the 1970s heralded a significant change in the Botswana state's definition of priorities for rural development. This change was announced in NDP V (1979-85), which outlined its theme for that period as 'rural development and employment creation'. The most important of the package of policies announced in 1979 was the Arable Lands Development Programme (ALDEP). This programme marked a new trend of focusing rural development policy on productive activity, particularly in arable farming. In the words of the then Vice-President and Minister of Finance and Development Planning "... the NDP V represents a further development of our thinking, and emphasises the development of the productive sectors of the economy. [ALDEP] is currently the most widely publicised aspect of this new emphasis" (Mmusi, 1983: xix).

The factors which brought about this change are several and complex. The most obvious of these was the failure of 'trickle down' from mining to provide the many jobs which had been envisaged. Because of an increase in construction activities as well as the growth of the public sector, formal sector employment grew considerably, by about 36 per cent, during 1972-76 (Dahl, 1981: 10). On the other hand, the number of formal sector jobs within Botswana was set to grow by only 11,500 per year in the 1980s (Whiteside, 1986: 12). This was certainly not enough to provide jobs for the 21,000 school leavers entering the labour market every year (ibid) [15]. Adding to this figure were the estimated 2,000 migrants returning annually from South Africa in the wake of the decrease in demand for labour there since the mid-1970s. In
1976/77 alone, the decline in recruitment of mine labour was of the order of 50 per cent.

The planned rate of formal sector job creation could also not keep up with the very high rate of rural-urban migration. This is partly illustrated by the rate of urbanisation, which at 11.3 per cent per year in 1973-84 was the third highest in the world after Oman (17.6 per cent) and Lesotho (20.1 per cent) (World Bank, 1986: 240-41).

Politically, the situation does not lend itself to a straightforward explanation. The BDP continued to enjoy large electoral majorities ranging from 68 per cent to as high as 77.8 per cent. However, voter turnout has been varied but generally low, as demonstrated by the fact that 56 per cent of the eligible population voted in 1965, 30 per cent in 1969, 21 per cent in 1974, 37 per cent in 1979 and 56 per cent in 1984 (Holm, 1987: 124). A possible source of worry for the BDP is that its share of the vote has tended to fluctuate, reflecting losses to the opposition. It was 68 per cent in 1969, and reached its all-time high of 77.7 per cent in 1974, seemed steady at 75.2 per cent in 1979, and then declined to 68 per cent again in 1984. These may be 'wild' swings which do not illustrate an underlying pattern, and they may also reflect a degree of voter apathy. It has been argued, however, that "many instances of non-registration and non-voting are expressions of discontent rather than satisfaction with the status quo" (Polhemus, 1983: 424). This may be true, since for example the peak of 77.7 per cent was reached at a time when the government was implementing the ARDP.

Nevertheless, the state increasingly came under pressure
from an increasingly articulate and confident opposition and, more often than not, from BDP back benchers, to be seen to be doing more for the rural population. The issue of 'excess liquidity' in foreign reserves was also highlighted. These reserves are currently estimated at some 2.4 billion (Financial Times, 28 September 1989). The government's conservative fiscal policy is a favourite political talking point among opposition politicians who often refer to 'money which is lying idle while no development takes place'. The sheer increase in the national income, mainly from mining, in itself therefore constituted a factor influencing the shift to re-distribution.

The mounting criticisms of the TGLP also increased the possibility of anti-BDP voter vengeance at the polls. As one of my respondents put it: "From a grand policy which was seen as the panacea to all rural problems and the basis for socio-economic transformation from which everyone would benefit, TGLP suddenly became a potential vote loser" (interview, Gaborone, July 1988). The largely negative reaction to the TGLP had revealed the fragility of the government's political control over the peasantry.

External political factors also played a significant part in influencing changes in government thinking on rural development policy in the late 1970s. Like other countries in the region, Botswana has been a constant target of what has become known as South Africa's regional policy of economic and political destabilisation [16]. The most serious threat has always been that of punitive economic sanctions, such as the possible withdrawal of South African exports to Botswana, of which over 50 per cent would constitute food products. Such a
development would not only be economically damaging but would seriously undermine the BDP politically.

Another important factor which influenced the Botswana government's shift to re-distribution were the changes in the thinking of the World Bank and other donor agencies about rural development during the 1970s. These agencies had begun to advocate the 'smallholder focus' in agricultural programmes as against large-scale farming. This change in thinking was soon translated into a condition for aid, which Botswana could not escape from.

The most important and decisive factor which influenced the shift towards re-distribution, however, emanated from within the state machinery itself. A number of government bureaucrats, located mainly in the Ministry of Local Government and Lands (MLGL) as well as in MoA, began to highlight the problems facing the majority of the rural population. The findings of the RIDS and other surveys of the socio-economic situation in the rural areas were cited regularly. Since many of these bureaucrats were directly involved in rural development activities, they spoke authoritatively of the 'crisis' in the rural areas. The failure of the TGLP to be of any significant benefit to the poor was singled out for special criticism. Moreover, the TGLP had had its most profound repercussions within the bureaucratic machinery of the state, creating tensions and conflicts, discussed in Chapter 2.

The calls for the 're-distribution of resources' were often made in reference to the country's good record of economic growth in the wake of the diamond boom beginning in the late 1970s. A more detailed analysis of the Botswana state
bureaucracy is provided in Chapter 2.

In response to all the factors mentioned above, the first step taken by the state was to assess the employment problem by commissioning an EEC-supported study by Professor Michael Lipton in 1977/78. Among the items prefaced to the final report as the terms of reference for this study was a general statement that "the Employment Development Adviser shall develop detailed proposals for a strategy to improve levels of productive employment, self-employment and labour utilisation, covering all sectors of the economy". The 'Lipton Report' pointed to agriculture as the most viable sector for employment creation.

Many of the recommendations of this report, however, were controversial. For example, the report recommended a pilot loan scheme for small ploughing herds which could set the stage for "Government-backed loans [which] could make sure that every farming household owns at least 6-12 cattle" (Lipton, 1978: 66). If implemented, this programme would have entailed the transfer of large herds of cattle form the cattle barons to the poor. As a result, nothing concrete came out of this particular suggestion. Nevertheless, Lipton's report was instrumental in laying the general framework for ALDEP, particularly through his detailed articulation of the need for a 'smallholder-focused' agriculture-based, employment creation policy. Lipton pointed out that:

... to stress the bigger farmers means that the 'few' will compete the 'many' out of work, as has happened in many countries ... Plentiful evidence shows that small farmers - because they have little income and much time to spare - are the most productive in using any particular productive method. But they need much help to adopt improved cropping methods: timely access...
to draught power, to credit and inputs, and to extension (Lipton, 1978: ix). (Emphasis in the original.)

Lipton also suggested the introduction of 'high-yield seed varieties' (HYVs) along with the increased use of nitrogenous fertiliser (pp. 80-2).

Given all this information, the prognosis was fairly straightforward: efforts were needed to transfer resources to agriculture, particularly the small-scale sector. When it was eventually initiated in 1979, ALDEP was presented as the single most comprehensive and important policy in the Botswana government's strategy for promoting rural development and employment creation. It was stressed that the programme lay at the core of an 'integrated' rural development strategy, backed up by other new efforts in settlement planning, communal (village area) development, and the encouragement of small rural industries. ALDEP thus emerged as an effort apparently aimed at redressing the country's major structural and economic problems, particularly the continued bias against arable farming.

As outlined in government documents, the major aim of ALDEP was to raise the productivity and standard of living of small peasant farmers. In the words of NDP V (1979-85), ALDEP aimed:

to increase production to achieve self-sufficiency in basic grains and legumes at rural household and national levels plus export surplus for these and cash crops in all but the poorest rainfall years; in so doing to raise arable incomes (both self-employed and waged) through improved agricultural productivity, and to optimise income distribution effects by concentrating on smallholder development; and to create employment in the lands areas to absorb
Perhaps rather too optimistically, it was also claimed that the programme would develop a surplus grain export sector "in the not too distant future" (The Courier, 1985: 22). This would earn or save foreign exchange "through import substitution and rising exports" (NDDC, 1979: 148).

The programme targeted the group defined as 'resource poor farmers', i.e those cultivating less than 10 hectares and owning less than 40 cattle. These producers constitute an estimated 60,000 to 70,000 'traditional' farmers practising rainfed crop production. The programme was to be implemented in the major crop areas in the south and on the eastern hardveld in which the majority of the people live.

It is important at this stage to explain my understanding of the apparent move towards some relative re-distribution of economic resources in Botswana. In my view, in Botswana's case re-distribution refers to the commitment of revenue, facilities, and services provided by the government with the purpose of enabling underprivileged sections of society to increase their income. This is illustrated by increased government expenditure in arable agriculture after 1979. At the inception of the implementation stage in 1981, ALDEP was financed with P23 million (equivalent to US$29 million). Of this amount US$8 million was obtained in the form a loan obtained from the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) and the Africa Development Bank (ADB) and the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD). The Botswana government itself covered 20 per cent of the
initial financial outlay for the programme.

The FAO of the UN agreed to provide 'technical assistance' in the form of a few specialists. The IFAD was commissioned to carry out the detailed financial appraisal of the programme and together with the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) produced the report which formed the basis for its implementation in 1981. Subsequent spending in arable agriculture, particularly after 1985 resulted in a situation where for the first time funding for this sector outstripped that for the livestock sector. In NDP VI (1985-91) arable agriculture was allocated 46.9 per cent of the budget for the agricultural sector (P23.8 million out of total of P52.8 million), compared to livestock which was earmarked to receive 22.5 per cent (11.6 million). This may be explained by the fact that the livestock sector is now well developed and protected.

ALDEP was launched on a nationwide scale in 1981/82 after undergoing a pilot phase between 1979 and early 1981. As I will begin to show in Chapter 3, the specific ramifications of planning and implementation are a different matter, however.

Under ALDEP small peasants were to be given access to agricultural implements and inputs (officially called 'investment packages') under a credit scheme which was changed three years later to a grant/downpayment scheme. Under this scheme the farmer meets 15 per cent of the cost of a particular package while the remaining 85 per cent is covered by the government. The packages provided under ALDEP are the following: animal draught power (donkeys, oxen, or mules), animal drawn implements (ploughs, row planters, cultivators, and harrows), fencing materials, and water catchment tanks. In
addition to these, the producers would benefit from extension activity and input delivery activities which would be directly linked to the programme.

Recent studies of the state and intervention in the economy have suggested that the re-distribution of resources to under-privileged classes signifies autonomous state action. This is the case particularly if this action is undertaken against the interests of the dominant economic class (Skocpol, 1979: 27-9, 1985: 9; Rueschemeyer and Evans, 1985: 63-4; etc). When considering the case of Botswana, this issue must be treated with extreme caution. This is primarily because the main economic interests in the country are based and well entrenched in cattle production and not in arable farming. Moreover, there is nothing to suggest that the cattle barons, who represent the economically dominant class, at any stage felt significantly threatened by the prospect of ALDEP. If senior government officials are considered as this group's public spokesmen, then judging by their statements ALDEP was indeed given the stamp of approval of the cattle barons.

However, ALDEP did pose a significant threat to the group whose economic interests are based on arable farming, namely the kulaks. Since the programme sought to spread the services provided by government agencies among a larger group of farmers, to this group ALDEP seemed to pose the threat of diminished income. Moreover, ALDEP also heralded the abandonment of the 'pupil farmer scheme' under which the kulaks had enjoyed almost exclusive access to the services provided under the auspices of MoA.

Although numerically small and therefore not in a position
to significantly shift voting patterns, the kulaks represent the most politically important group for the BDP in the rural areas. Some of them are District Councillors and local party activists. Did the Botswana state in its efforts to defuse the bigger socio-economic crisis facing the country decide to 'sacrifice' the kulaks? The political importance of ALDEP was underlined in the statement made by the then Minister of Local Government and Lands, the late Mr Lenyeletse Seretse: "Government leaders and planners have tended to ignore the small farmer having lost sight of the fact that any assistance to the majority of the rural poor would promote tranquility in the rural areas" (quoted in Botswana Daily News, 30 June 1981).

Evidently, therefore, the programme was perceived as, among other things, another means of sustaining the BDP's policy of maintaining political quiescence. To a limited extent this shows a change in the character of the state. As will be shown in Chapter 4, in the mid-1980s the Botswana state responded to the increasingly persistent protestations of the kulaks by initiating a new programme called the Accelerated Rainfed Arable Programme (ARAP).

By initiating ALDEP the Botswana state undertook a path which fundamentally altered its approach to rural development. This change came in response to significant economic and socio-political changes in society. By instituting these changes the Botswana state demonstrated that it had itself undergone some change between 1966 and the late 1970s. This suggests that the Botswana state should not be seen as an ossified structure impervious to pressure, as suggested in the many analyses which were based on the study of the cattle industry before 1980.
Obviously, the state expected some political benefit out of ALDEP. As will be seen from Chapter 3, this has found concrete expression in the emergence of a relatively prosperous middle peasantry.

The trends of the 1980s suggest the need to fashion more appropriate analytical tools to replace the now evidently outdated instrumentalist approaches to the role of the state. However, the extent to which these changes are irrevocable is open to empirical scrutiny. The same applies to whether or not the particular form of intervention in agriculture chosen by the Botswana state does indeed represent an effective way of resolving the problems which have been identified.
Part of the agreement reached in 1885 was to transfer a strip of land along the eastern belt of the territory to the British South Africa Company (BSAC) on which to build a railway. This created a lingering but never realised threat of eventual transfer of the Protectorate to the BASC, which by then had taken control of Southern Rhodesia.

Since migrant mine labour was the only means available to most ordinary Batswana to earn cash to pay the taxes, the chiefs cooperated in the recruitment of this labour. An extreme twist to this situation was illustrated by the decision by some chiefs, such as Chief Isang of Bakgatla, to draft tax defaulters to the mines (Picard, 1987: 111). In the Protectorate as a whole, the number of recruits to the mines grew from 2,266 in 1910 to 18,411 in 1940; and by independence this number had reached 45,000 (Schapera, 1947: 32; Picard, 1987: 112). During the colonial period, recruits from Kweneng numbered almost half of the total of able-bodied men in the reserve (BNA. File S. 264/6).

These societies were, however, by no means as prosperous as some rather romanticised versions of pre-colonial Tswana history tend to suggest.

A further boost to the cattle industry had come in 1941 when South Africa lifted a disabling embargo imposed on Bechuanaland cattle in 1924. This embargo, which was essentially a price control mechanism brought about in the wake of the collapse of beef prices around 1919, took the form of weight restrictions on the territory's beef. The weight restrictions "were imposed because they had the advantage of curtailing the export of cattle owned by Africans, which were generally below the minimum weight [initially set at 800 lb and after 1926 increased to 1,100 lb for oxen, and 840 lb for cows], while permitting the continued export of white-owned cattle, which were generally of better quality and therefore heavier" (Massey, 1981: 83).

Hubbard (1986: 120-21) points out that the European market (especially the UK) became more important for the Protectorate as from the later 1950s, due to an increasing US beef deficit, which resulted in New Zealand and Australia (the only exporters of refrigerated beef veterinarianly acceptable to the US) switching their supplies from the UK to the more attractive US market. This opened a gap in the British frozen beef market, which favoured peripheral Commonwealth suppliers who were exempted from the hitherto heavy tariff on imports of boneless and canned beef.

The terms of the SACUA, which was signed in 1910, are cogently summarised by Colclough and McCarthy (1980: 15), who write:

... the High Commission Territories were to receive a share of the total imports to the area consumed by each territory over the three years immediately prior to the signing of the agreement. The level of
tariffs chargeable on all imported goods was to be determined by South Africa. Since the South African government collected and apportioned all duties on behalf of the other partners, the High Commission Territories received revenue benefits without incurring administrative costs. On the other hand, these smaller partners had no control over the rates chargeable and therefore were unable to take revenue initiatives by varying their own levels of excise or import duty.

The SACUA was re-negotiated in 1969.

7. This date is the subject of much controversy in the literature. However, while some of the activities of early individual critics of colonial rule may be considered to have been 'nationalistic' (Parsons, 1985: 37-8), there is no record of the existence of an organised nationalist movement in the country before 1960.

8. To underscore the country's rapid rate of economic growth, Botswana's classification by the World Bank (1986) changed from 'low-income' market economy to 'lower-middle income'. This places Botswana within the same bracket as the Ivory Coast, Indonesia, Peru, Zimbabwe, Cameroon, and Morocco.

9. A good reputation for honouring international financial agreements which the Botswana government has cultivated since independence, combined with its maintenance of a comparatively low external debt, estimated to be some US$ 700.7 million in 1989 (Financial Times, 28 September 1989) have served to place the country in a good position vis-à-vis donor agencies and governments.

10. See also Parson (1983: 52) who postulates that the De Beers multinational was prepared to reduce its profit margin partly because "a greater return to Botswana would be compensated for by greater long-term stability in the trade as a whole" (citing De Beers Annual Report, 1975). Other important factors were De Beers's anxiety to control its world-wide marketing monopoly through the Central Selling Organisation, and the long-term objective of controlling Botswana's mines which would account for nearly half of De Beers' diamonds (ibid).

11. This is much contrary to Landell-Mill's expectations (1971) when he analysed the 1969 agreement optimistically.

12. Within government agencies the focal point of criticisms of the TGLP was the MLGL.

13. ALDEP (19791: 1) gives the range of 1,000 to 1,500 kg (i.e 11-17 bags of 90 kg each). There is some controversy over these estimates, as different researchers have set different levels of 'calorific minima'. These are discussed by Cooper (1982a: 277). He points to Alverson's estimate (1978) of 1,600 kg (i.e 18 bags) and Kerven's (1979) of 14 bags (or 1,260) kg. Alverson's estimate is similar to that
of the Nutrition Unit of the Ministry of Health (interview, Gaborone November 1988). I believe that the EFSAIP estimate provides a good mean which covers the range given by AI.DEP.

14. The 191 kg/ha and 274 kg/ha have been calculated from Alverson's estimates based on yields per half hectare in his comparisons of observed trials under the IFPP and 'Bangwaketse traditional system'.

15. See also Harvey and Lewis (1990: 15-26).

16. Botswana's vulnerable position in relation to South Africa has been the subject of several studies, most recently Kostuik (1984), Dale (1985), and Ajulu and Cammack (1986). The last mentioned refer to the case of the proposed Soda Ash Project at Sua Pan in northern Botswana as a leading example of South Africa's use of political blackmail against Botswana. In this case the South African government had initially refused to assist in financing the project unless Botswana agreed to 'cooperate' with the former on 'matters of security' (p. 158).
CHAPTER 2

THE STATE BUREAUCRACY AND THE IDEOLOGY OF 'MODERNISATION'

Introduction

The Botswana state bureaucracy has evolved over the past two decades to become the single most influential institution in the country. Its influence, which in some respects surpasses that of the ruling party, can be seen in its almost total control of the development policy process, at the levels of both planning and implementation. Most important, Botswana civil servants have, particularly since the late 1970s, played a decisive role in influencing significant changes in government policy. The importance of analysing this bureaucracy lies in its close interaction with various sections of the population through the policy implementation process. This chapter therefore serves the purpose of providing a general framework for the subsequent analysis of bureaucrat-peasant interaction in the context of the formulation and implementation of ALDEP.

The chapter examines the administrative structure, orientation, and internal relationships of the bureaucracy involved in rural development. In Section 2.1 the chapter begins by providing a structural profile of the postcolonial civil service. This is preceded by a brief overview of aspects of the present post-colonial bureaucracy which are traceable to the administrative system of the colonial period. The section then proceeds to discuss the role of the bureaucracy in policy making. In Section 2.2 the discussion focuses upon central-local linkages and the administrative framework for the
implementation of rural development policies. The section highlights and critically examines the top-down nature of this structure.

Section 2.3 examines the question of inter-bureaucratic conflict in the Botswana context. Finally, Section 2.4 focuses on the structure and orientation of the bureaucracy of the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA). The section also discusses MoA's increasing political influence in the rural areas.

2.1 A general profile of the Botswana state bureaucracy

As in many other countries with a colonial history, significant aspects of the Botswana administrative structure derive from the colonial era. However, this continuity is markedly limited in terms of the orientation of the bureaucracy to development. This is partly because in Bechuanaland in particular, the role of the colonial bureaucracy was limited to low-key administrative and economic activity. This restrained administrative approach was justified in terms of the colonial policies of 'parallel' and 'indirect rule', which sought to eschew direct intervention in 'tribal affairs'. Indirect rule came into effect after 1930 when the territory's financial and economic position as well as its system of administration came under review. The new system was regularised under two proclamations, the Native Administration Proclamation No. 74 of 1934 and the Native Tribunals Proclamation No. 75 of 1934.

These proclamations were aimed at setting up an
administrative structure that would operate partly through the indigenous institutions of government. Their effect was to subject the chiefs to "a single hierarchy system in which the African 'layer' was completely subordinated to the European 'layer'" (Parson, 1979: 77-8). Proclamation No. 74 placed the chief "under a legal obligation to obey lawful orders or instructions issued to him by the Resident Commissioner personally or through a magistrate" (Hailey, 1953: 219). This proclamation also set out the variety of 'disciplinary measures' to which those chiefs considered recalcitrant were to be subjected [1]. Proclamation No. 75 regularised the operation of customary courts and restricted their jurisdiction. Those cases defined as falling outside of the chiefs' jurisdiction were to be heard by Resident Magistrates. The District Commissioner was to perform the role of serving as the link between the chiefs and the administration, represented at the highest level by the Resident Commissioner who himself was answerable to the High Commissioner at the Cape.

When taking into account the way in which it was established, the colonial administrative bureaucracy was therefore part of a mechanism for political and social control. The chiefs were inducted into this bureaucratic structure at a relatively junior level, with the result that their powers were severely curtailed [2]. This provided the framework for the implementation of an economic policy designed to limit investment while creating structural inequalities through the migrant labour system (as shown in the previous chapter). The element of political control through the bureaucracy also became an important feature of the postcolonial administrative
structure. This phenomenon is discussed in the next section in relation to the position of District Commissioner, which itself was first established during the colonial period.

However limited the colonial intervention and expenditure may have been, the colonial bureaucracy in Bechuanaland, like elsewhere, did nonetheless see itself as 'modernisers' or 'civilisers'. This was particularly the case with those bureaucrats who were recruited into the technical departments (e.g. agriculture, veterinary services, public works, etc) which expanded significantly following the dramatic increase in economic activities in the 1950s.

However, this 'modernist' ideology was far removed from the fundamental interests of the majority of the African population which the colonial bureaucracy basically did not identify itself with. The senior colonial administrators in particular were "an elitist corps made up of men with certain qualities of character and personality who lived by a code of paternalism" (Picard, 1987: 78). They were recruited into the colonial administrative service according to what Picard refers to as the 'Oxbridge Model' (ibid: 70; 91).

This elitist model in a way also extended to those few Africans who were recruited into the civil service within the Protectorate. Although recruited mainly into relatively junior, mostly clerical positions, these people were relatively highly educated and came from wealthy (and often aristocratic) backgrounds. According to Halpern (1965: 313) in 1962 "there were only three Batswana in the service's 155 professional and administrative (or senior) grades, seventeen out of 260 in the technical (or medium) grades, and twenty-two out of the 182 in
the executive (or lower) grade".

These figures also show that the Bechuanaland civil service was numerically small. This situation reflected the paucity of investment in economic and social development. When including administrative and clerical positions, its numbers rose slightly from 1,420 in 1948 to only 1,600 in 1960 (Colonial Reports on Bechuanaland, 1948-60). It has been shown that in the late 1950s the total technical and professional establishment in the Department of Agriculture was only 18, with an additional 108 African Agricultural Demonstrators (ADs) "each of whom [could] be responsible for four to five pupil farmers at a time" (Morse et al., 1960: 62). In 1955, there were one agricultural and livestock officer and 10 ADs administering 59 pupil farmers in Kweneng District (BNA. File S. 556/7).

Although relatively small, the post-colonial civil service has expanded rapidly, particularly since the 1970s. In 1985, there was a total of 45,000 individuals employed in the public sector (NDP 6, 1985: 337), roughly half the number of all people in formal employment. In 1986, the civil service comprised 3,511 individuals holding professional, technical, administrative and managerial positions. Of these 2,411 were Batswana (2,057 in central and 354 in local government), while there were 1,100 expatriates of whom 1,000 were employed at central and 100 at local government level (CSO, 1986: 23; 30). Many positions throughout the hierarchy, however, remain vacant.

The highest legislative organ in the country is the National Assembly which has 34 members representing various
constituencies, and an additional four members elected by the Assembly. At the top of the central government structure are nine ministries. Among these those directly involved in rural development activity are the ministries of: Finance and Development Planning (MFDP); Agriculture (MoA); Local Government and Lands (MLGL); Education (MoE); and Health (MoH). Also involved in the implementation of programmes in the rural areas but to a lesser extent are the ministries of Mineral Resources and Water Affairs (MRWA), Works and Communications (MWC), and Commerce and Industry (MCI). Foreign Affairs, Justice, Public Service Administration and Defence fall under the Office of the President. Among themselves all these ministries have 53 departments.

Two types of government bureaucrat can be distinguished in the Botswana civil service. The first category constitutes senior bureaucrats (whom Isaksen, 1981: 36 refers to as the 'macro managers') recruited mainly from within the ranks of the ruling BDP. This group includes Permanent Secretaries, directors of parastatal enterprises, the army and police top brass, and other senior administrative positions. These bureaucrats exhibit similar socio-economic characteristics to the senior national politicians in the country. As with the politicians their economic base rests in large-scale cattle ranching and their political loyalties lie with the BDP.

The Botswana government has a tradition whereby some of the senior civil servants are eventually appointed to ministerial positions. One recent example of this trend was the appointment of a former Permanent Secretary to the position of Minister of Public Administration and Presidential Affairs
after his successful first attempt in the 1984 general election. A former Permanent Secretary to the President became Minister of Finance and Development Planning after the 1989 general election. Perhaps a much more interesting case was the appointment, also after the 1989 election, of the former commander of the Botswana Defence Force (BDF) to a ministerial position in the President's Office. Another tendency, which is discussed below, is that of the employment of expatriates in senior administrative, professional and technical positions in the civil service.

The second category of government bureaucrat is largely the product of the evolution of Botswana's economy and society since independence. This category of bureaucrat has also benefited a great deal from the country's multiparty system [3]. This group mainly comprises younger entrants into the civil service most of whom are graduates of the local university and institutions of learning situated abroad. Their recruitment into the civil service is not necessarily subject to membership of the BDP. These civil servants are therefore not necessarily bound by loyalties to the ruling party. They are salaried officials recruited mainly according to their qualifications or experience. This contrasts sharply with the dominant view of the state bureaucracy in most of Africa as being made up mainly of political appointees recruited through a system of patronage and clientelism (cf. Bates, 1983; Hyden, 1983; etc).

Many of these bureaucrats often find themselves occupying middle-level administrative or technical positions at ministerial headquarters or in local government. As an
illustration of this group's idealism, one respondent belonging to it described himself and his colleagues as "the true nationalists, the standard bearers of the aspirations of the majority of the people in [the] country" (interview, Gaborone, September 1988). These government bureaucrats largely perceive their role as that of 'modernisation' (as against ensuring the continued stay in power of the ruling party and politicians). In this regard, it may be said that these bureaucrats exhibit an *esprit de corps* deriving from their understanding of their role in society.

Since most of them originate from peasant rural backgrounds, these bureaucrats tend to claim a strong affinity with the rural population. This group often expresses a deep resentment of some of the policies of the present government, pointing to the increasing control of the business sector by foreign capital, particularly South African investors. They routinely deride the government for what one respondent referred to as the "[government's] tendency to ignore the widening gulf between rich and poor". Most of all, they are highly critical of what they perceive to be a deliberate policy of slowing down localisation. As one respondent put it:

> We have in this country a situation where the vital positions are held by expatriates. This is not accidental, but represents a deliberate measure by the BDP government to keep progressive individuals out of the top posts. If these posts are sensitive then why are they left in the hands of foreigners for so many years? (interview, Gaborone, September, 1988).

The 'expatriate question' presently represents a major political issue in the country. To illustrate that it also regards the issue with some seriousness, in 1981 the Botswana
government launched a presidential commission which resulted in the publication of a a White Paper outlining the 'National Policy on Economic Opportunities' (GoB, 1982). The White Paper pointed out that expatriate numbers have been decreasing progressively since the mid-1970s, from 70 per cent in 1974 to 47 per cent by 1980 (ibid: 4). By 1986, this figure was around 30 per cent [4]. The White Paper also states that rapid economic growth increased the demand for skilled Batswana in newly-created as well pre-existing jobs which could not be met by the country's low educational base (ibid).

The ideology of 'modernisation', however, cuts across the entire bureaucratic structure. The dominant view at all levels of the hierarchy is that the civil service exists primarily to assist in changing society for the better. However, this concept is subject to different interpretations. The fundamental position of the group at the top of the hierarchy is the promotion of unhindered capital accumulation from which the poor would benefit from the trickle down effect. The other section of the Botswana state bureaucracy believes that capital accumulation and re-distribution should go hand in hand, or if necessary, the former must be curtailed in the interests of the latter [5].

It is within this ideological framework that many of these bureaucrats also define their role as that of representing the interests of the poor. As shown in Chapter 1, this role has been of significance in influencing a new trend towards some kind of re-distribution of resources to the peasantry. These bureaucrats have apparently taken up this role in view of the absence of effective grassroots organisation designed to bring
pressure to bear on the government to initiate better policies. As one respondent put it:

We have to admit that the masses in the rural areas are still ideologically backward. They vote for the present government repeatedly because it claims that it is in the process of bringing about the much-needed development (ditlhabololo) to the rural areas. They are not organised and therefore cannot effectively agitate for their interests. Before they get organised, the task of ensuring fair play lies on those of us who work within the government as we are in a position to press for better policies (interview, Gaborone, November 1988).

As will be shown in the next chapter, this situation has, however, had the negative effect of reinforcing an essentially top-down approach to policy administration and a paternalistic attitude towards the rural population.

There is plentiful evidence which suggests that generally speaking, state bureaucrats play a key and central role in policy-making with very little 'interference' by the national politicians (Isaksen, 1981: 32-4; Picard, 1987: 17; 147; 196). This point will be illustrated in various chapters of the thesis. In apparent reference to the group at the top of the hierarchy, Isaksen (1981: 32-33) posits the view that the exercise of this policy-making autonomy by the bureaucracy functions within the limits of "two main borderlines [which] are to avoid critically endangering the relationship with South Africa and to refrain from promoting interests which are seen as directly in competition with those of the cattle industry". Also in apparent reference this group Picard (1987: 147; 196) postulates that the Botswana government is content to leave the day-to-day running of the country to the administrative cadre of the civil service because it shares with it a number of
socio-economic characteristics.

The views of Isaksen and Picard are open to one major criticism. They have tended to exaggerate the unity of the bureaucracy resulting from their focus on senior civil servants. My findings point to the existence of a category of more independent-minded bureaucrats who are prepared to challenge even the 'set of limits' which Isaksen refers to. My objection to Picard's views derives from his rather narrow application of the Weberian concept of the 'administrative state'. As Gunderson (1971: 7), with whom Picard concurs analytically, puts it, the Botswana state is an example of an administrative state [in which] resources are allocated by commands issued by administrative elites, and there is no control by any other social group over decision-making ... the administrative elites have complete control over the decision-making process in the administrative state.

This concept is of some significance, but does not necessarily denote a situation where decision-making is always tailored to the interests of 'elites'.

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2.2 The institutional framework for rural development: anatomy of a top-down model

As shown briefly in Chapter 1, the major immediate change brought about by the postcolonial state at independence was to establish new local government and administrative institutions. As we have also shown, these institutions were superimposed over the tribal administrations with the result that the powers of the chiefs in a number of areas were curtailed. The logic underlying this move by the new government has been aptly described as an attempt "to establish its legitimacy and to forge a common national allegiance, as well as to build an effective administration" (Jones, 1983: 133). This section examines the interplay between central and local institutions in this context and particularly in relation to the administration of rural development policy.

The first of these institutions to be set up were the District Councils, which were established in 1966 on a recommendation made by a Local Government Commission of 1963. There are presently ten district councils in the country which vary according to size, population, and resources. The number of council seats range from 16 in the smallest district (Kgatleng) to 60 in the largest (Central District). In terms of resources, both natural (particularly water and soil fertility) and human, the general tendency is for those districts situated along the eastern part of the country and closer to the line of rail to be generally better-off compared to those in the remoter western and north-western parts (such as the Kgalagadi and Ngamiland Districts). This tendency applies also to infrastructure and communications.
Each council elects a chairman, who may be a chief, and a vice chairman. The chairman may be an ex officio appointee of the national President. The Council Secretary, who is far more powerful than the chairman is also appointed by the President or chosen from among the elected District Councillors. Council elections take place at the same time as elections to the National Assembly. The BDP presently holds majorities in eight of the ten district councils. In Kweneng District the BDP holds 27 of the 28 council seats (with the BNF holding only 1 seat).

The powers and responsibilities of the District Councils were defined by statute. The functions of the District Councils (as cogently summarised by Tordoff, 1973: 176) inter alia include: to provide primary education in the districts as prescribed in the Education Act of 1966; to collect local tax; to collect trade licensing fees; to control the manufacture and sale of traditional beer; and, to be responsible for the provision of sanitation and water supplies, the construction and maintenance of public roads, and the 'establishment of markets'. The councils, however, operate under the firm grip of the Ministry of Local Government and Lands (MLGL). While they have the power to make bye-laws, subject to the approval of the Minister of Local Government and Lands, they have adopted a number of such bye-laws drafted by the Ministry (ibid: 176).

The MLGL performs the vital roles of meeting all staffing requirements in administration and teaching within the districts, as well as having responsibility for the Local Government Audit. According to NDP VI (1985: 77), the MLGL
"constitutes the focal point of overall planning, coordination and control of local authorities". Questions about appointments, salary scales, promotions, transfers, termination of service, disciplinary action, or any other matters affecting local government employees" are determined by the minister (ibid). The Tribal Administration is also responsible to the MLGL, and answerable to the District Commissioner who is the ministry's chief representative in each district. The District Commissioner is the head of the District Administration, which is staffed by bureaucrats responsible to government ministries in Gaborone.

Again it is the MLGL which performs the important function of land allocation, which it exercises through institutions called Land Boards. These institutions were established under the Tribal Land Act of 1968 which removed the central role of land allocation from the chiefs. As will be shown in Chapter 5, however, the chiefs still retain some influence over the land allocation process through a clause inserted in the amended version of the this law in 1970 which provides for 'overseers' of the land allocations. The MLGL therefore is extensively involved in land use planning and surveys. This ministry has also commissioned a number of studies, through its Applied Research Unit (ARU) on the land and socio-economic situation in the rural areas. The significance of this research activity will become clear in the next section.

As the direct result of the firm control exercised from the centre, the political power of the District Councils is therefore very limited. More effective political power within the rural areas rests with the District Commissioner who is a
political appointee of the President. This can be seen in the District Commissioner's extensive and broadly-defined functions. At independence the District Commissioner was responsible for supervising the tribal administration, making tours of inspection, arranging the programme for ministerial visits, and serving from time to time as electoral returning officer (Tordoff, 1973: 181). Even though the District Commissioner was given no statutory powers over the District Councils, he was made an ex officio member of the District Council by amendment in 1970 of the Local Government (District Councils) Act of 1965.

The District Councils therefore play a limited role in decision making. This marginality was further enhanced when a Presidential Circular issued to the districts in January 1970 announced the creation of new structures, called District Development Committees (DDCs). The creation of these structures, which were superimposed over the councils, was justified in the circular on the grounds that there was evidence of a "lack of cooperation between departments". The DDCs would thus create the necessary framework for the coordination of administrative and developmental efforts.

The primary responsibility for coordinating the major rural development efforts in the districts was conferred upon the District Commissioner who was to be directly answerable to the Permanent Secretary of the MLGI and through him to the Minister. In the words of the Presidential circular:

In each District, the District Commissioner is the principal representative of Government on political and policy matters. Within the limits of his District he will be responsible for the coordination of the District Development Plans and for ensuring the effective implementation,
through liaison with Ministerial Officers, of the National Development Plans as they affect projects in his District. In addition, he will be responsible for the efficient conduct of public business and, to this end, will ensure the coordination of the activities of all departments in the District.

Through this Presidential circular, the District Commissioner was established as the most powerful government representative in the districts. The political significance of the District Commissioner was underlined by the complete localisation of the position in the early 1970s. As observed by Picard (1985: 181-94), the District Commissioner gradually assumed the role of monitor of political events in the rural areas on behalf of the government. This role is performed mainly through the use of legal measures against opposition politicians considered to be acting illegally. In this way, the District Commissioner performs an major role in the implementation of the BDP's policy of maintaining political quiescence.

A total of ten DDCs were thus established, one in each district. Their functions were to coordinate inter-ministerial rural development activities, serve as a planning body for the districts, and act as an advisory body to central and local government institutions on development matters (Tordoff, 1974: 293). The DDCs are composed of 6 permanent members with the District Commissioner as chairman and the District Officer (Development), who is a senior member of the District Administration, as its Administrative Secretary. Five additional members are appointed by the Minister of Local Government and Lands. These appointees normally include the District Council Secretary, the head of an administrative
department and a chief or his representative.

The DDCs were the subject of acrimonious political dispute at their inception. In particular, the district councillors feared that the DDCs heralded the proscription of the councils. Initially the DDCs were not welcomed by some councils (particularly those with a strong opposition influence) which charged that their introduction amounted to 'a duplication of existing institutions' (ibid: 295). The DDCs, which were staffed primarily by central and local government bureaucrats, took over rural development policy planning, while large sums of money, far outstripping the council budgets, were funnelled through them (Picard and Morgan, 1985: 141). This effectively rendered much of council activity largely 'symbolic'. As Isaksen (1981: 32) puts it:

At the local level, politicians (District Councillors) very often see their task as serving the district bureaucracy and bringing its views forth in their village rather than to function as the political masters of the bureaucracy and further the views of their constituents. (Emphasis in the original).

The bureaucrats working at the local level are directly responsible to their respective ministries and are under no obligation to obey orders issued by a councillor unless authorised by a senior government official. Needless to say, this situation favours the bureaucrats, who feel 'relieved' from direct control by the local politicians. It must be borne in mind, however, that the councillors play an important role, in the party political sense, within the rural areas. They actively take part in campaigns and meetings, and are generally regarded as key sources of information on local political trends [6].
Ideally, the central-local structure includes grassroots-level institutions such as Village Development Committees (VDCs) and the kgotla. The VDCs were established in 1968 as non-party, non-statutory, voluntary organisations to which membership was theoretically open to any successfully elected village resident (Macartney, 1978: 256). Its members are elected (often by acclamation) in the village kgotla and comprise a chairman, vice chairman, treasurer, secretary and (in some cases) an assistant secretary all chosen from among the villagers. Ex officio VDC members may include the local extension officer, the head teacher, the District Councillor, and the representatives of voluntary organisations such as the Red Cross and Young Women's Christian Association (YWCA).

It was claimed that the role of the VDCs was to discuss village needs and suggest village projects to the district administration which could then be incorporated into district development plans (ibid). In reality, many of the 400-odd VDCs currently in operation are largely ineffectual due to underfunding and inefficiency (Macartney, 1978: 256; Noppen, 1982: 136, Reilly, 1983: 164). The inclusion in a district development plan of a project suggested by the VDC is the exception rather than the rule. The VDCs therefore play no significant role in development planning.

On the other hand, the kgotla continues to perform its traditional role as a tribal assembly and as a customary court presided over by a chief or headman (within the limits imposed under the country's legal system). This institution provides a convenient forum for national politicians who use it as "a means of addressing the people and of discerning the popular
will" (Colclough and McCarthy, 1980: 39). As fundamentally a traditional institution, the kgotla, which exists in virtually every village, helps give credence to the BDP's ideological goal of maintaining political quiescence ('sense of community'). Its role in the maintenance of this status quo rests on its authoritarian tendencies, reflecting its traditional character, disguised under some kind of 'oligarchic democracy'.

This institution functions mainly as the place where important announcements are made. Much to the contrary of claims about local-level 'consultation' and 'participation', (as will be shown in the next chapter) discussions in the kgotla revolve around decisions already made by the central government or by the district administration. The kgotla performs a marginal role in decision-making on matters associated with rural development policy. Moreover, proceedings in the kgotla are usually dominated by powerful socio-economic groups who tend to seek to focus attention on their specific problems rather than those of the population as a whole. Women are a particularly marginalised group in the kgotla. The conduct of debate within the kgotla is not as open as some writers suggest (Kuper, 1970: 110). Contemporary calls for the transformation of the kgotla into a 'modern' institution concerned with rural development (Odell Jr., 1985: 83) can thus be realistic only when such important issues are addressed. Both the VDC and the kgotla thus represent the bottom rung in an essentially top-down central-local policy framework.

The top-down organisation of the bureaucratic structures
is in evidence in virtually all government ministries involved in rural development. Elements of this structure are discussed in Section 2.4 which focuses on the Ministry of Agriculture. The functioning of this structure at different levels of the policy process is illustrated in various sections of this work.
2.3 Rural development policy and inter-bureaucratic conflict

While the Botswana state bureaucracy generally exhibits a 'progressive' character, the relations between the government ministries and agencies cannot by any account be regarded as harmonious. Existing conflicts originate mainly from the bureaucrats' different role perceptions within the context of rural development and from overlapping inter-ministerial areas of activity. A leading example of this tendency is the often tenuous relationship between bureaucrats in the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning (MFDP) and those in the MLGL. The MFDP is arguably the most senior of all the ministries because of its role in planning and its capacity to veto certain aspects of the budgets of other ministries.

Relations between the two ministries became strained in the early 1970s when a number of changes were effected to the District Administration system in the wake of the Presidential Circular issued in January 1970. As mentioned in the previous section, this Presidential Circular provided for the establishment of District Development Committees and strengthened the position of the District Commissioner. Another event which soured relations between the two ministries was the publication of a report on the District Councils by two expatriate volunteers working in the MFDP who argued that these institutions were incompetent and inefficient (Baur and Licke, n.d., mimeo). Seeing this as a reaffirmation of the position of the MFDP, which had long argued along similar lines, the MLGL officials began to respond in defence of the councils and other areas of their ministerial responsibility in the rural areas. One example of the MLGL's newly found
readiness to get involved in disputes with other ministries can be seen in the fact that many of these ministries "became recipients of caustic correspondence such as this: 'Your uninvited comments on the way this Ministry chooses to deal with its own portfolio responsibilities are surprising'" (in Macartney, 1978: 354). At issue in this case were the much-publicised complaints by the Ministry of Mineral Resources and Water Affairs over the MLGL's alleged slowness in equipping boreholes (ibid).

With respect to the DDCs, the main source of rivalry between MFDP and MLGL bureaucrats concerned the role of the District Officer (Development) (DO[D]), who is essentially a bureaucrat in the district administration. The MFDP held the view that the DO(D) would work under the supervision of their ministry while the MLGL insisted that this officer should be under its supervision (Picard, 1987: 183). Another issue was that of staffing and finance in the districts. The MLGL took over the district staffing function through the Unified Local Government Service (ULGS). It also sought to strengthen the planning capacity of the district council by creating a new cadre of planning officers who would act within a framework coordinated by the DO(D), and "also tried to address the financing issue" (ibid: 184). However, many of the councils, which had financial deficits, became increasingly dependent on central government to meet their recurrent expenditures which had to be "approved by both the DDC and the central government" (p.185).

Another and more acrimonious conflict occurred between the MLGL and MoA during the period of the introduction of the TGLP
immediately after 1975. The MLGL has always seen itself as the champion of 'social justice'. Bureaucrats in this ministry often point to their role in the planning and implementation of programmes such as the Remote Area Dwellers (RADS) programme, which is aimed at alleviating the situation of small minority groups such as Basarwa. MLGL bureaucrats also point to their concern to ensure as far as possible that programmes such as land allocation are not disadvantageous to the 'small man' (interviews, Gaborone, December 1988) [7]. Further evidence of this can be found in the surveys conducted by the MLGL's Applied Research Unit (ARU), which have tended to focus on the problems faced by the more disadvantaged groups in the rural areas. Officials in the ARU have carried out studies ranging from income generating activities, the position of rural women, to the 'informal sector'.

The existence of the ARU in MLGL may to some degree be a reflection of this Ministry's desire to have its own data-gathering system without relying on the the MFDP's Central Statistics Office as well as the data-gathering agencies of other ministries. One of these agencies is the Rural Sociology Unit (RSU), which is located in the Ministry of Agriculture and whose main function is to collect and analyse socio-economic data related to agricultural activity in the rural areas. In effect, the existence of these different ministerial units which perform more or less the same function often results in the duplication of activity. The fact that such duplication takes place bears testimony to the underlying deep distrust among the various ministries which encourages the tendency towards independent activity.
The existence of an inter-ministerial committee called the Rural Development Council (RDC) does not seem to assuage this situation. The RDC is "responsible for reviewing all plans for rural development, advising Ministers on appropriate new initiatives and making recommendations to Cabinet" (NDP 6, 1985: 63). Its coordinating function should thus partly serve the purpose of mitigating existing conflicts and avoiding potential ones. However, the existing evidence suggests that this institution has not been very successful in this regard.

The MLGL-MoA conflict in the 1970s centered around the components of the formulation of the TGLP. The main planners of the programme, particularly officials belonging to the MFDP and MoA, had concerned themselves chiefly with land commercialisation, fencing, and the policy's long-term objective of solving the country's problem of overgrazing and land degradation. The MoA and MFDP bureaucrats took the initiative to formulate the policy in a paper presented for discussion at a conference held in 1971 under the theme of 'Sustained Production in Semi-Arid Areas' (Holm, 1985: 167). They followed this up with an effort to present their own interpretation of the recommendations on rural development made by Chambers and Feldman in 1973.

The officials in the MLGL were concerned that the policy should have written into it some essential safeguards against its possible negative effects on the more vulnerable sections of the rural population. In effect, the MLGL group was active in attempting to provide a framework for reducing the income inequalities within rural areas between the large cattle holders and the rest of the population (Holm, 1985: 167).
"mobilised an effort to reshape the [TGLP planning] document to attend to critical issues of social justice. They hoped to give protection to those with smallholdings of cattle or none at all" (ibid: 168). A report by the MLGL on the 'consultation exercise' which preceded the implementation of the TGLP stated that the policy did not provide any answers to questions of what was to happen to the poor (cited in Parson, 1980b: 152; see also Chapter 1).

More clashes have occurred between these bureaucracies over specific aspects of the TGLP. These issues include "the specific areas to be turned into commercial ranches, the amount of rent to be charged, the need to recognize the rights of Basarwa in the sandveld, and the authority local land boards and councils should exercise in land allocation." (ibid). The MLGL drew some strength from the fact that it was chiefly responsible for the zoning and allocation of the land through the Land Boards functioning mainly through the Land Use Planning Advisory Groups (LUPAGs). There is some evidence that MLGL officials used this advantage to delay implementation as well as to complicate the process of allocation of commercial land. One respondent in MoA said as much about this when he recalled:

First, we were given the impression that the zoning would be a time-consuming exercise. The next thing we were told that there was no qualified staff to carry it out effectively. In the meantime, the MLGL was building its case against the TGLP generally (interview, Gaborone, September 1988).

When taking bureaucratic role perceptions into account, MoA bureaucrats differ considerably with their counterparts in the other ministries. Their main defining characteristic is
that they are concerned primarily with production. For example, an official in the Family Health Division of the Ministry of Health (MoH) complained that MoA officials do not appreciate MoH's involvement in food consumption and distribution activities, with the result that there was "a long period of misunderstanding" between the two ministries (interview, Gaborone, November 1988). MoH also operates a system of extension through its health personnel. The most important of these in the extension sense are the Family Welfare Educators (FWEs) who are the basic cadres implementing the Primary Health Care (PHC) programme in the clinics and health posts in the villages and remote areas. The MoH official was particularly concerned at the failure of MoA to activate a nutritional evaluation system which it had pledged itself to develop. The respondent attributed this to "a deliberate tendency to ignore the consumption side and to stress ploughing, as if people can survive by staple foods alone".

These differences thus contributed significantly to a tendency to centralise the planning of agricultural policy in MoA, a situation which is apparently supported by the Cabinet. This in itself should not pose any serious problems since MoA has the technical expertise in this field. As will subsequently be shown, however, this centralisation is partly responsible for the failure on the part of this ministry to appreciate the social aspects of agricultural development. Consequently, this has had a negative effect on the implementation of 'comprehensive' programmes such as ALDEP.
2.4 MoA and agricultural policy: the agronomic and technicist approach

The Ministry of Agriculture is presently the most important government agency involved in rural development in Botswana. This is explained primarily by two factors related to the development of this ministry during the postcolonial period. The first is the ministry's rapid expansion in numerical terms throughout the postcolonial period. The second and related factor is that the initiation of new agricultural programmes since the late 1970s has led to a substantial increase in the scale of MoA's operations and in the range of extension activities. It will be shown later how this expansion has given rise to a third development, namely the increasing utilisation of the ministry by the ruling party for political purposes.

MoA's numerical growth since independence has indeed been phenomenal. The ministry's personnel at both central and local levels rose from a mere 126 (18 professional and 108 ADs) in the late 1950s (Morse et al., 1960: 62), to 539 in 1976/77, and by the mid-1980s stood at 2,116 (NDP IV, 1976: 166; NDP VI, 1985: 199). This rapid growth of this ministry has been translated into the expansion of the extension network in the rural areas. The most senior organ in MoA is the Division of Planning and Statistics, under which there are four main departments: Agricultural Field Services, Agricultural Research, Veterinary Services, and Cooperative Development. (See MoA organizational chart in Appendix 2).

The extension system is the responsibility of MoA's Department of Agricultural Field Services (DAFS). There are a
number of specialised departments under DAFS, one of which is
the ALDEP Monitoring and Evaluation Unit. The extension system
is based on six agricultural regions, each headed by a Regional
Agricultural Officer (RIO). Each region is divided into
Agricultural Districts (which do not necessarily correspond to
the administrative districts of local government), of which
there are 22. The most senior official at the district level
is the District Agricultural Officer (DAO). The DAO's staff
include one or more district agricultural supervisors, crop
production officers, animal health officers, and clerical
officers. The DAO's duties are largely administrative, while
he is also expected from time to time to conduct regular tours
of inspection in the field.

Each district is divided into a number of Extension Areas
(EAs), whose size is determined according to the extent of
concentration of the farming population. The main extension
officer is the Agricultural Demonstrator (AD). There are 225
EAs, a figure which it is claimed "gives a farmer/AD ratio of
approximately 364 households to one AD [which] compares quite
favourably with other developing countries" (NDP 6, 1985: 173).

The source of MoA's strength lies in its maintenance of
close day-to-day contact with the rural population through its
extension activities. The operation of this extension system
together with the implementation of programmes seen as crucial
in redressing inequalities in the rural areas has inculcated in
many MoA officials the belief that they are chiefly responsible
for helping the nation to feed itself adequately (interviews,
Kweneng District, September 1988). By the early 1980s this
ministry had surpassed all the others (i.e. those involved in
the development of infrastructure, the provision of potable water, district administration, health, etc) in the extent of its involvement in the rural areas.

As with the other bureaucracies, the style of administration within MoA is basically top-down. The local staff mostly implement tasks which are assigned to them through directives issued from the DAFS headquarters in Gaborone. However, there is a significant difference as well. Local bureaucrats and extension officers have significant influence - though indirectly - on the decision making process within the ministry. This derives from the fact that the bulk of baseline data upon which MoA relies in making its assessments of the agricultural situation are collected by extension officers. Thus, as will be shown in more detail in Chapter 4, the local bureaucrats also influence the content of this information which is often tailored to fit into existing bureaucratic stereotypes of 'progressive farming'. It will also be shown in that chapter that these stereotypes are responsible for bias in the extension system as well as the implementation of programmes such as ALDEP in favour of the better-off sections of the farming population.

The primary source of these stereotypes, however, is the centre. By providing information which is tailored to the stereotypes the local bureaucrats thus serve to perpetuate MoA's essentially agronomic and technicist orientation towards agricultural policy. The dominant view in MoA is that 'progressive farming' can be found at two levels. The first level is that of large-scale mechanised farming. The second is 'small-scale' farming utilising 'improved' technologies,
methods of production and farm management techniques, as well as improved seed varieties (NDP 4, 1973: 158-59; EFSAIP, 1985). These are currently dominant approaches to agricultural development in many parts of Third World. In Botswana, the second approach represents the core of a programme aimed at the modernisation of the 'traditional' agricultural sector.

As the result of generally unfavourable climatic conditions, agronomic research in Botswana has focused on dryland farming techniques. On the other hand, technological research has focused on the development of 'cost-effective' animal-drawn implements (EFSAIP, 1976-84). These activities are linked to an extension policy which revolves around a package of crop production practices recommended to peasant producers in the country. These measures include row ploughing and planting, early ploughing (i.e. around October), winter ploughing to ensure moisture conservation, the use of animal manure and chemical fertiliser, the adoption of the recommended crop spacing and mixing system (i.e. inter-cropping, as against mixed cropping), and regular weeding. The 'traditional' system on the other hand follows seed broadcasting, ploughing only after the first rains, and mixed cropping. These issues are dealt with in more detail in Chapters 3 and 4.

The prime source of the diffusion of the agronomist/technician approach to agriculture in Botswana has been the type of training offered to future bureaucrats and technical specialists. The overwhelming majority of the bureaucrats in MoA have received their training mainly in physical and technical science, and most of the senior staff have undergone advanced training overseas, usually in Britain or North
America. Many of the senior officials, in ALDEP as well as in the other departments and divisions, have received diploma and degree-level training in agriculture, project management, soil science and other specialised fields related to agriculture.

Locally-trained officials have also received more or less similar training. This is particularly the case with the Botswana Agricultural College at Sebele near Gaborone which is the site for the training of ADs and other junior personnel. This college offers certificates, diplomas and as a recent development, a degree in agriculture. These qualifications are also offered in the field of Animal Health. During 1979 to 1984 a total of 303 students graduated from the agricultural college with diplomas and certificates in agriculture, while those who graduated with qualifications in animal health numbered 311 (NDP VI, 1985: 199).

The core syllabus that is followed in these courses emphasises veterinary, agronomic and technical aspects of agricultural development. In an attempt to obviate the imbalance between social and natural science aspects of the syllabus recently there have been attempts to strengthen the hitherto weak social science subject component of the syllabus (interview, Sebele, November 1988). In short, the cadre of ADs currently in the field in Botswana have received training mainly in technical and physical aspects of agricultural development and are accordingly to a considerable degree ignorant of the socio-economic aspects, or perhaps how to deal with them.

In my view, it is beyond question that science and technology represent integral elements of agricultural
development. However, it is also important to take into account the fact that agricultural development is as much a physical and technical process as it is a social one. The dominant approach in MoA is that of stressing the former at the expense of the latter. Criticisms of the dominant tendency within the ministry have been expressed by some of its officials. According to one senior agricultural economist:

The thrust of most projects in agriculture has tended to be biased towards the technical side; how much yield per hectare, etc. This tendency is dominant, but this is not unique to Botswana, mainly because the entry of social science into agriculture is a fairly recent phenomenon. Hence the bias in favour of technical science. In recent years, however, the two have been gradually coming together through farming systems research, which combines social and technical aspects such as appropriate technology (interview, Gaborone, November 1988).

Ideally, the activities of MoA's small Rural Sociology Unit (RSU) should make an important contribution towards strengthening the socio-economic component in MoA research. Since its inception in 1972, the RSU has carried out essential research which has included village studies, migration and female-headed households, the mafisa system, local institutions and, increasingly, base-line socio-economic surveys related to ALDEP. However, when taking into account the direction and nature of the implementation of programmes as will be demonstrated as from Chapter 4, this information has been rarely utilised.

Because of its extensive involvement in the rural areas, MoA has increasingly been seen by the government as a convenient vehicle for the pursuit of its political objectives in these areas. As one respondent put it: "The BDP now sees [MoA] as a
formidable powerbase, not only for the promotion of the economic interests of its leaders but also for maintaining its grip on the rural areas through these new programmes". This new trend was signalled after the 1984 general election by the transfer of the BDP secretary general from another ministry to head MoA.

The result has been an increasing trend marked by MoA's utilisation in the pursuit of an essentially populist mobilisation strategy mounted by the government since 1985. This populism revolves around the theme of helping farmers to develop their production. This new trend demonstrates the political importance currently attached to agriculture. It also represents a significant break from the past when agriculture was of low priority on the political agenda. Not surprisingly, this politicisation of MoA has generated a feeling of frustration and anger among some bureaucrats at apparently being used for the purpose of spearheading the ruling party's programme (interviews, Gaborone, October 1988). These issues, as well as the resultant internal conflicts within MoA, are discussed in Chapter 4.
Notes

1. These 'disciplinary measures' included suspension and dethronement, in some cases together with forced exile. Vengroff (1975: 46) cites among others the case of Chief Sebele II of Bakwena who was deposed in 1925 for allegedly misusing kgotla funds, bribery and favouritism, insulting and assaulting the people, and for "attacks on Christianity". He was exiled to Gantsi near the Namibian border. Years later, in 1949, Regent Tshekedi Khama of Bangwato was banished to the Kwena Reserve after a series of clashes with the officials of the colonial state.

2. A good description of the role and status of a Tswana chief during the pre-colonial era is provided by Schapera (1970: 62) who writes:

   The chief as head of the tribe occupies a position of unique privilege and authority. He is the symbol of tribal unity, the central figure around whom the tribal life revolves. He is at once ruler, judge, maker and guardian of the law, repository of wealth, dispenser of gifts, leader in war, priest and magician of the people.

3. Much of the discussion relating to these bureaucrats is based on in-depth interviews conducted between July 1988 and January 1989.

4. This estimate is based on rough calculations of figures contained in the CSO's 'Labour Statistics Bulletin' (1986).

5. A minority of the bureaucrats interviewed actually held the view that it was necessary to curtail capital accumulation altogether.

6. Vengroff's description (1977: 104-111) of the functioning of the BDP's ward-level structure gives the impression of a complex and apparently smooth-operating structure. Although many of the leaders of VDCs were linked to the BDP (as alluded to in pp.107 and 110), I found very little evidence during my research of influence on policy making by local-level party members.

7. It is not quite clear where this ministry's concern with social justice originates from. One obvious clue is the range of activities in which the ministry is involved, which may have an influence on the type of official required. The ministry has, however, not escaped criticism for inefficiency, particularly with respect to land allocation under the Land Boards.

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CHAPTER 3

THE TOP-DOWN MODEL AND THE FORMULATION OF ALDEP: 1977-81

Introduction

This chapter assesses in detail some aspects of rural development policy making in Botswana within the context of the formulation of ALDEP between 1978 and 1981. Its other central aim is to relate certain issues associated with the planning of the programme to the immediate impact of its implementation. Two issues associated with the planning process are of immediate concern. The first relates to the institutional and research backing for the programme. The second concerns the much-vaunted 'consultation exercise' carried out during the planning of ALDEP between the programme's central planners based at MoA headquarters and local-level bureaucrats. These issues are dealt with in Sections 3.1 and 3.2 respectively.

I seek to demonstrate through the analysis of these issues that, in essence, ALDEP was planned on the basis of a top-down model. The idea of consultation was introduced in the mid-1970s and became an important feature of government rhetoric during the planning of the TGLP. It emerged primarily as a mechanism for circumventing criticism and, allegedly, mistakes and inconsistencies seen as emanating from top-down and over-centralised planning. My analysis will demonstrate that the ALDEP consultation was essentially a routine bureaucratic exercise which amounted to the refinement of the top-down model.

It will also be shown in Section 3.2 that no meaningful
consultation took place between government bureaucrats and the rural population during the planning of ALDEP. The immediate consequences of this essentially top-down approach to policy planning are examined in Section 3.3 which discusses the ALDEP credit/subsidy scheme. This scheme was introduced in 1981 and then abandoned in late 1983 when it was replaced with a more favourable grant/downpayment scheme. Finally, Section 3.4 examines the framework for the implementation of the programme created in the wake of the grant/downpayment scheme. This section also discusses a new factor which came into play as the immediate result of the introduction of this scheme, namely the 'bureaucratization' of the extension system.

3.1 The planning of ALDEP: the institutional and operational framework

It will be recalled that ALDEP was conceived as some kind of panacea to the major economic and social problems facing Botswana's rural population. Among these problems, those considered as deserving immediate attention were, and remain, widespread poverty and inequality, and high levels of unemployment and under-employment. As primarily an agricultural programme, ALDEP would, according to the official view, represent a "multi-dimensional effort aimed at overcoming the constraints facing the development of arable agriculture in Botswana" (ALDEP, 1982: 39).

As shown in Chapter 1, ALDEP's long-term objective is the attainment of self-sufficiency in food production at both national and household levels. Towards this end, the
The programme's main objective is to increase the production of basic food grains among small-scale peasant producers. It was hoped that the immediate effect of increased food grain production would be to increase employment and income generating opportunities in the rural areas. The surplus grain production envisaged for the long term via the generalised commercialisation of the peasant sector would contribute towards an increase in rural incomes and curtailing rural-urban migration.

To underscore the optimism surrounding ALDEP's prospects with regard to surplus production, one of the programme's stated objectives was to earn and save foreign exchange through import substitution and rising exports (NDDC, 1979: 148). These objectives were to be pursued through the provision of implements, draught power, and seasonal inputs such as certified seeds and fertiliser initially under a credit/subsidy scheme. The target group was estimated to number some 60,000 to 70,000 small-scale peasant producers cultivating less than 10 hectares and owning less than 40 cattle. These farmers represent about 75 per cent of all crop farmers in the country. In addition to the implements and inputs, the target group farmers were earmarked to benefit from improved extension services. These issues will be discussed in more detail later.

In terms of institutional and infrastructural support, peasant agriculture in Botswana was, to say the least, in a parlous state at the time when ALDEP was initiated in 1978. The successful attainment of the programme's objectives would, therefore, to a large extent depend on a substantial increase in the provision of resources for this sector. However, in
what was essentially a set of guidelines on the planning of the programme, much emphasis was placed on the use of existing structures and resources "with no incremental cost" (Purcell, 1982: 5). Furthermore, no additional resources were to be made available for a large-scale research programme linked to ALDEP. It was claimed that existing agronomic, technical and socio-economic knowledge was 'adequate' for the purpose of planning the programme [1]. This conservative approach to resource backing for the programme deserves to be discussed in some detail.

**ALDEP's financial and institutional backing**

The conservatism with which the Botswana state approached the question of resources for the ALDEP is reflected first and foremost in the financial outlay for the scheme. The total amount to cover all aspects of the programme decided upon was P23 million (equivalent to US$29.39 million when the programme was first implemented in 1981).

When taking into account the number of households expected to participate, the programme would provide about P383 for each household (cf. Jones, 1982: 323, who places this figure at P300). On the other hand, the cost of a full package of ALDEP inputs in 1981 was estimated to be around P3,100. Even deducting the anticipated farmer contribution, which averaged 50 per cent per item, this figure would still not be less than P1,500. Costs on seasonal inputs such as seeds, fertiliser, and pesticides, which under the programme were also to be obtained on subsidized credit, would add at least another P120 (see ALDEP, 1981a, Annex 4, Table 9).
Also included in the total outlay for the programme was expenditure on management, such as the payment of the salaries of technical experts, the purchase of vehicles and the construction of ADs' quarters. The amount that was to cover activities directly involving the peasant producers, such as the provision of inputs, would be relatively lower. This point is illustrated by Table 3.1.

Table 3.1: ALDEP Phase 1 Investment Costs
(P '000)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>Year 1</th>
<th>Year 2</th>
<th>Year 3</th>
<th>Year 4</th>
<th>Year 5</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>On-farm investment</td>
<td>746.4</td>
<td>1,080.2</td>
<td>1,325.9</td>
<td>1,570.7</td>
<td>1,811.8</td>
<td>6,535.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seasonal Inputs</td>
<td>53.9</td>
<td>119.4</td>
<td>197.8</td>
<td>314.3</td>
<td>402.3</td>
<td>1,088.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Mgt &amp; Coord.</td>
<td>172.0</td>
<td>122.0</td>
<td>148.0</td>
<td>124.0</td>
<td>125.0</td>
<td>691.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extension Service</td>
<td>1,005.0</td>
<td>817.0</td>
<td>1,031.0</td>
<td>789.0</td>
<td>788.0</td>
<td>4,430.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Credit Service</td>
<td>195.0</td>
<td>184.0</td>
<td>137.0</td>
<td>46.0</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>581.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marketing &amp; Input Supply</td>
<td></td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>54.0</td>
<td>38.0</td>
<td>156.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitoring &amp; Evaluation</td>
<td>162.0</td>
<td>112.0</td>
<td>137.0</td>
<td>114.0</td>
<td>115.0</td>
<td>640.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-total</td>
<td>2,334.3</td>
<td>2,225.6</td>
<td>3,008.7</td>
<td>3,012.0</td>
<td>3,299.1</td>
<td>14,121.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical Contingencies</td>
<td>160.0</td>
<td>173.9</td>
<td>229.4</td>
<td>245.5</td>
<td>277.4</td>
<td>1,086.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Price Contingencies</td>
<td>375.1</td>
<td>850.5</td>
<td>1,686.0</td>
<td>2,440.0</td>
<td>3,615.1</td>
<td>8,966.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>2,869.4</td>
<td>3,491.0</td>
<td>4,924.1</td>
<td>5,697.5</td>
<td>7,191.6</td>
<td>24,174.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


As mentioned earlier, the programme was expected to utilise existing structures and resources without additional cost. The most important of these structures was the extension

-128-
system which functions under MoA's Department of Agricultural Field Services (DAFS). As a measure supposedly designed to 'strengthen' the extension system, five agronomists were recruited abroad and were attached to each of the five Agricultural Regions in the country. Their main task was defined as assisting in developing a work programme for extension staff (ALDEP, 1981a: 23). The number of Agricultural Demonstrators (ADs), which was estimated to be 217 in 1979 (NDDC, 1979: 143), was to be increased.

An ALDEP Monitoring and Evaluation Unit headed by an agronomist, also recruited abroad, was established at MoA headquarters. This unit would work closely with the officers in other agencies in MoA. The overall coordinator of the programme was recruited locally.

At the forefront of the implementation of ALDEP at the extension area level were to be the ADs. Their main tasks would include the selection of participating farmers and the provision to these farmers of information concerning the credit schemes and the available packages. The ADs would also be responsible for implementing MoA's basic extension package consisting of a set of cultivation techniques, which was to be implemented through ALDEP.

It was acknowledged from the beginning that ALDEP would bring with it a considerable increase in the workload of the ADs. This problem, it was hoped, would be resolved through adequate training, motivation and guidance (ALDEP, 1981a: 23). Efforts were to be made designed to update the knowledge of local-level officials (including the ADs) through annual seminars, workshops and short training courses. The question
of motivating the ADs would be addressed mainly through improvements in accommodation facilities, especially in those EAs (95 in all) identified as having either inadequate or no facilities (ibid).

The administration of the credit scheme, marketing and input supply would also be carried out through existing institutions. The applications for credit were to be expedited through existing financial institutions such as the National Development Bank (NDB) and the Botswana Co-operative Bank (BCB). The NDB was established in 1964 as a government financial institution empowered to provide loans to individuals involved in a variety of business and agricultural ventures.

The BCB, on the other hand, was formed primarily to give financial support, chiefly through loans, to members of the various agricultural (mainly cattle farming) cooperatives. Many of these cooperatives were established on the initiative of the state and enjoy generous government financial and institutional backing through the MoA-based Department of Cooperative Development (CODEC). The majority of the members of these cooperatives are large cattle-owners, kulaks and to a lesser extent middle peasants. Private wholesalers were also expected to assist in the supply of the ALDEP packages.

The most important agency charged with the organisation of marketing and the supply of on-farm seasonal inputs is the Botswana Agricultural Marketing Board (BAMB). The BAMB was established by statute in 1974 and functions as a parastatal organisation. One of the reasons behind its establishment are said to have been the "reluctance and inconsistency of the private sector to perform tasks on behalf of the government
because it was not obliged to buy grain from local producers" (interview, Gaborone, October 1988) [2]. Its principal functions are to provide agricultural marketing, storage, and transport facilities, as well as set producer prices for food and cash crops. The BAMB's pricing policy is discussed in detail in the next chapter.

The BAMB is statutorily obliged to buy all the produce sold to it by local farmers irrespective of the prevailing levels of demand. The BAMB is also committed "to ensure adequate supplies of scheduled produce for sale to consumers at prices which are in the prevailing circumstances of the market" (BAMB, 1988: 1). Among this parasatatal's major local consumers are the country's beer brewing companies. The BAMB is also responsible for the import and export of crops. Under ALDEP the BAMB was expected to increase its storage capacity to 65,000 tonnes by an additional 10,000 tonnes. This was to be done through the establishment of additional storage depots and nine lock-up stores, each of the latter with a storage capacity of 200 tonnes (ALDEP, 1981: 36).

**ALDEP's research backing**

The planning of ALDEP, it has been claimed, benefited 'fortuitously' from existing research programmes carried out since the early 1970s under the auspices of MoA's Department of Agricultural Research (DoAR) (ALDEP, 1981: 12; Purcell, 1982: 4). Three major agronomic and technological research programmes were influential in shaping the programme's character. The first of these was a British-funded ten-year
programme called the Dryland Farming Research Scheme (DLFRS), which began in 1970 and released its final report in 1983. The DLFRS emphasised agronomic research focusing mainly on tillage systems. These revolved around animal-drawn tillage operations, such as row planting, moisture conservation techniques, and the testing of various types of implements.

At its completion, the DLFRS had developed a 'technological package', i.e. a set of methods of cultivation, developed with the aim of increasing small-scale arable production. All the research activities under this scheme were carried out at the main research station at Sebele near Gaborone.

The second major research programme which influenced ALDEP was the Evaluation of Farming Systems and Agricultural Implements Project (EFSAIP), which was initiated in 1976. In addition to research on tillage systems, EFSAIP researchers were also involved in the design and testing of various types of animal drawn implements. Their other task was to "evaluate systems developed by DLFRS under farmer conditions [particularly the] technical and managerial feasibility of the technological package developed by the DFRLS for small farmers" (ALDEP, 1981a: 12; Segwele, 1982: 65). According to Segwele "EFSAIP researchers concentrated on the modification and improvement of the single row planter [subsequently to be known as the Sebele Planter after the research station where it was developed] and the animal-drawn versatile tool plough [or toolbar]" (ibid: 65; see also MoA, 1983: 146; EFSAIP, 1984: 257-68).

The most influential research project in shaping the
character of ALDEP was the Integrated Pilot Farming Project (IFPP) which took off in 1974/75. The IFPP's central aim was to "test and extend technology packages developed under DLRFS and [later] EFSAIP in a farming community" (ALDEP, 1981: 12). This farming community comprised about 325 households farming an area of 23,000 hectares at Pelotshetlha in Southern District. According to Alverson (1984: 3) this farming community is "by and large more prosperous than most in Botswana", as underlined by the fact that only 35 of the families which took part in the IFPP lacked "demand rights to cattle". Their holdings ranged between 6 and 10 hectares, which is significantly higher than the national average of 4.5 hectares. To induce the farmers to take part in the scheme, subsidized fertilisers were provided, as well as "free initial use of a multi-purpose ox-drawn toolbar ('locally adapted') and lots of advice and supervision" (ibid: 4).

Other research into crop production and protection focused on the areas of seed development, plant performance trials, plant pathology, weed and pest control, and so on. These research projects produced a number of significant results. To start with, the research programme on seed development and crop protection has made significant progress since its modest beginnings at Mahalapye in the 1950s. One of this programme's greatest achievements has been the development of a reasonably drought resistant sorghum seed variety called segaolane, which the country's farmers are currently being encouraged to use.

However, much of MoA's research is conducted at the research station and thus tends to produce results which, though excellent, are difficult to replicate under real life
conditions. For example, research plots currently produce about 1,300 kg/ha of sorghum (Lightfoot, 1981: 11). According to one respondent, these results suggest that those farmers with the means to do so could 'easily' increase their production from the present 400 kg/ha [the majority produce an average of 200 kg/ha] to over 800 kg/ha (interview, Sebele, November, 1988). Reality, however, has tended to prove otherwise.

The same is true of projects such as the IFPP which are supposed to have been based on 'real life situations'. For example, Alverson's criticism of the IFPP scheme (1984) singles out the exaggerations of the differences in performance between the IFPP farmers and 'traditional' Bangwaketse farmers living nearby who did not participate in the scheme. Alverson does acknowledge that the yields recorded by IFPP researchers of 825 kg/ha for maize and 358 kg/ha for sorghum are impressive. However, he also points out that the estimate of yield performance of the 'traditional system', which was given by the same researchers as 358 kg/ha and 142 kg/ha for maize and sorghum respectively, appeared "anomalously low" (ibid). According to him this did not tally with the average yield for the whole Southern Region which was reported in the MoA survey for 1976/77 to be 250 kg per hectare (Alverson, 1984: 7).

An additional criticism made by Alverson was that the IFPP package required extra labour and about twice the time than is generally available to most households and is normally required to work an average field under the 'traditional system'. Moreover, the use of the IFPP technologies would require an investment of about 87 per cent more money than would be
required under the traditional system (ibid). The IFPP's findings thus presented a rather idealised version of agricultural production which, as we shall show from Chapter 4, is far removed from the reality of peasant agriculture in Botswana. However, these findings formed the basis for the many of ALDEP's estimates and projections.

This brings us to another major weakness in ALDEP's research base, namely the lack of adequate research into socio-economic aspects of agricultural production. This issue is raised by Segwele (1982: 7) who points out that another major shortcoming of much of the research carried out by MoA's DoAR is its lack of "a socio-economic component". One may add that this problem has not been overcome despite the numerous surveys carried out by officials working under MoA's various departments.

This is to be found for example in a study carried out in 1978 which resulted in a report entitled 'Planning for Agriculture in Botswana: A Report on the Arable Lands Survey', hereafter ALS (Odell, 1980). This was not an ALDEP study per se, but was the product of a collaborative effort between the Institute of Development Management (IDM) [3] and MoA. The ALS was partly an attempt to overcome the problems of generalisation associated with broad national survey data (such as the RIDS report), as well as detailed information based on a small area with no account of regional differences (such as the IFPP scheme) (p.i).

The ALS was a questionnaire survey of relatively small sample populations (some as few as 67) in nine villages. Its primary aim was to delineate the socio-economic
characteristics of cultivating households. This survey also examined the distribution among these households of farm implements and inputs, draught power, extension, labour, land, yields, and farm practices. The main significance of the ALS's findings was that they provided a useful update of quantitative information on the agricultural sector which was already available in various forms since the publication of the FAO's 'Constraints Study' in 1974. MoA's annual statistical and farm management surveys have since provided a constant update of these data.

This therefore opens the ALS to several criticisms. First, it failed to go beyond the mere identification and enumeration of these factual data. Second, the ALS data were not the product of a national sample survey, but were based on information derived from a handful of villages which had apparently been chosen arbitrarily. These data therefore do not provide a comprehensive picture of the arable sector at either the national or district level and should therefore be treated with extreme caution (See Odell Jr et al., 1980: A-90, appended to Odell, 1980). MoA's annual statistical and farm management surveys present a more comprehensive picture in this regard.

A crucial shortcoming of the ALS was therefore its failure to carry out a systematic and in-depth study of socio-economic aspects of agricultural production. An example of a study which went a long way towards overcoming these problems was Gulbransen's report (1980) on research carried out in Southern District which focused on the developmental cycles and inter-household interaction within the context of agricultural
production. Gulbransen's study, however, was not linked to, and, evidently, did not attract the attention of the ALDEP's planners. When taking into account all the above issues, Makgetla's observation (1982: 83), that by the early 1980s ALDEP was "strictly limited in scope and still lacked a research basis and concrete guidelines" is quite pertinent.
3.2 The planning process: contradictions of centralisation and the limitations of 'consultation'

Centralisation

When it eventually got off the ground in early 1978, the planning of ALDEP was the initial responsibility of a closely-knit group of professionals in MoA. This group consisted of a so-called 'inter-disciplinary preparation team': an agricultural economist as team leader, a sociologist, an extension agronomist, and an agricultural project specialist. All except the rural sociologist were expatriates, with the project specialist having been recruited from the IFPP project. This planning team was responsible administratively to the Permanent Secretary (PS) of MoA through the Chief Agricultural Economist. Ultimately they reported to the ALDEP Steering Committee which comprised the PSs of MoA, MLGL and MFDP. The main responsibility of the ALDEP Steering Committee was to make policy decisions relating to the programme and review progress on its formulation, as well as 'provide guidance' to the ALDEP team (Minutes of 6th National District Development Conference (NDDC), 1978: 169). In effect, this committee's main responsibility was to monitor the formulation process on behalf of the Cabinet.

The responsibilities of the ALDEP planning team were outlined by the team leader at the 6th National District Development Conference held in Gaborone in 1978 [4]. According to the minutes of the NDDC these responsibilities were: (a) to carry out an arable lands sector analysis to establish the physical, socio-economic and infrastructural baseline resource situation in the main lands areas; (b) to identify the
constraints acting against increased production and employment and improved incomes in the lands areas; (c) to establish the optimum production potentials based on research, testing and pilot projects, nutritional and socio-economic analysis and infrastructural support systems; and; (d) to design area-based development programmes using knowledge gained in (a), (b) and (c) (ibid: 168).

The planning process thus began with the preparation by the four-person team of a general outline of the main issues to be addressed. According to the ALDEP team leader:

the basic philosophy [which guided the formulation of ALDEP] was ... that different farmers with different needs, circumstances, problems and aspirations would require different measures. ALDEP would therefore provide a range of different measures from which farmers would choose in accordance with their own particular circumstances and perspectives (Purcell, 1982:6).

The decision to focus on the small peasants was in line with Lipton's recommendations (1978, although he had placed the threshold on the size of the landholding much higher at 15 hectares). On the other hand, the decision to eschew the 'progressive' farmers (kulaks) was taken in the full knowledge of the fact that these farmers were already benefiting from existing credit and subsidy schemes provided by the government under favourable terms. Thus, a potential political and bureaucratic struggle against the kulaks was evaded early in the planning process. Moreover, the fact that ALDEP was itself conceived as a credit/subsidy scheme was seen by the kulaks as not amounting to denying them any special benefits. This fact notwithstanding, for many bureaucrats stressing the small farmer represented a moral triumph over the problems which had
arisen from the TGLP which had been presented as though it was designed for all rural dwellers.

A crucial factor was that at that stage the kulaks were convinced that the small peasants could not compete them out of favour with the government. They also felt that ALDEP would not possibly eliminate their source of labour which is drawn mainly from the poorest peasants, nor would it disturb their traditional domination of the local grain market. As we shall see in the next chapter, the attitude of the kulaks shifted when ALDEP was changed to a grant/downpayment scheme, resulting in the introduction of a new agricultural programme and serious bureaucratic conflict. As will be shown in Chapter 5, as ALDEP began to create a newly-prosperous, surplus producing middle peasantry, a new concern of the kulaks became the possiblility of the long-term depression of producer prices. This concern was fuelled particularly during the 1987/88 agricultural season (a good rainfall year), when the crop sales of the middle peasants rose sharply.

When presenting its first outline of the basic ALDEP plan at the 6th NDDC in 1978 the ALDEP preparation team outlined three broad targets for the programme. The first of these, designated 'production targets' revolved around the objective to increase arable production by 4 to 6 per cent per annum (ALDEP, 1981b). Under this plan average yields would rise from the present 200 kg/ha (and the mean of 10 bags - ALDEP, 19791: 2) or so, to over 400 kg/ha. The group of 11,000 small peasants who would participate in the ALDEP Phase I project were expected to increase their production of foodgrains from 595 tonnes in year 1 to 21,581 tonnes "at full development".
There would also be "incremental production of about 3,000 tonnes of cash crops (mainly sunflower) that would be directly marketable and would generate about P500,000 per annum" (ibid: 39). This was to be accompanied by the expansion of the land area cultivated by these producers "from approximately 40,000 ha in year 1 to 64,000 ha by year 8" (ibid). As will be shown in Chapter 5, existing information, backed by the data collected in Kweneng District, demonstrates that the estimates on land availability among this group have proved to be exaggerated.

The second set of aims, designated 'income targets', revolved around raising average rural income from its estimated level of P460 per annum to P1,060 by the year 2000 (NDCC, 1978: 166; cf. ALDEP, 1981: 37-8). Under the third targets, covering 'employment creation', it was hoped that agriculture would provide around 2,500 jobs per year, in the form of self-employment generated by the envisaged commercialisation of smallholder production (ibid). The implementation of ALDEP would go through 'phases', with Phase I expected to last from 1981/2 to 1985/6. A total of 11,000 farmers, roughly 15 per cent of the target group, would take part in Phase I.

The farmers belonging to the ALDEP target group were divided into three categories, which were designated Models 1, 2 and 3. All these groups of farmers plough under 10 hectares and own less than 40 cattle. The categories were distinguished according to a number of characteristics. The characteristics of the Model 1 category were given as the following: they cultivate land falling within the range of 2-5 ha; they own no cattle and have no access to draught power; 54 per cent are
believed to be women or female-headed households; they produce an average of 170 kg/ha of sorghum; and they are estimated to be around 45 per cent of the target group. Of these, 3,000 would be selected to take part in Phase I.

The Model 2 farmers on the other hand have access to some draught power, although this was seen as 'inadequate' as their cattle holdings fall within the 'unreliable' range of 1-25. Moreover, many in this group are believed to own less than 10 cattle. Their average production of sorghum was estimated to be 190 kg/ha. It was believed that these farmers constitute about 40 per cent of the ALDEP target group. Of these farmers 3,000 were earmarked to participate in Phase 1 of ALDEP.

The Model 3 category are those considered as having 'adequate' draught power since they own between 21 and 40 cattle. Their average production of sorghum was estimated at 200 kg/ha. They were estimated to represent 15 per cent of the target group and 4,000 were to take part in Phase I. An additional but smaller group, designated as Model 4, comprised 'molapo' (riverine) farmers, whose participants in Phase I would number 1,000. A peculiar feature of these farmers is that they were regarded as falling "in any one of [the] ... three categories, but who practice farming in the Okavango Delta which is liable to seasonal flooding" (ALDEP, 1981: 19).

These categorisations are open to a number of criticisms. First, they are not sufficiently detailed, which reveals a lack of appreciation of various aspects of the rural class structure. For example, no consideration was given to sources of income and reciprocal and dependency relations between cultivating households. Many of these characteristics and
relations were assumed as given or constant. The consequences of these and other shortcomings are discussed in Chapter 5.

The second criticism that may be made regarding the official ALDEP categories is that they underestimate the poverty of the Model 1 group and overestimate that of the Model 2 and 3 groups. For example, it was assumed that the target group households plough a mean of 4.5 hectares. It was expected that with more encouragement for debushing and destumping, these lands could be increased to the 6 hectares considered essential to reach the household production targets envisaged (ALDEP, n.d.: 2, see also Odell, 1980: 58). I shall show in Chapter 5 that many of the poorest farmers have no land at all while those who do only have access to an average of 2.8 hectares.

The participating farmers were also expected to gradually abandon the production practices of broadcasting of seed, minimal weeding (estimated by Odell, 1980: 13 to be practiced by only 10 per cent of target group), and little or no use of kraal manure or chemical fertiliser (ALDEP, 1979d: 1). It was expected that 'at full development' these farmers would produce about 18,500 tonnes of grain and pulses valued at about P3.6 million. This would not only guarantee them subsistence but would also lead to the realisation of "substantial marketable surplus to improve their income" (ibid).

The ALDEP plan was implemented on a 'pilot' basis in 1979. The nature of these pilot activities, was, to say the least, curious. For example, the participants were expected to obtain the inputs on subsidized credit. The subsidy provided was as high as 70 per cent of the price of planters and cultivators
while donkeys were to be provided free of charge. This, however, did not impress the producers, many of whom saw little difference between the pilot projects and the main programme. As in the main credit/subsidy scheme, the loans obtained during the pilot phase were to be repayable over a five-year period.

Moreover, the pilot activities were not effectively coordinated. There is evidence that they were hastily put together. In many areas, such as Kweneng, even as these projects began many farmers still did not know what exactly was required of them [5]. Not surprisingly, therefore, participation levels were low. For example, the DAFS annual report for 1979/80 shows that a total of 130 packages of implements were distributed to farmers in 13 Extension Areas (EAs), i.e about 10 per EA, while 30 donkey draught power packages were made available in all EAs.

The Gaborone Region reported a much higher level of participation than the other regions, with implements distributed to 190 farmers in 19 EAs, while only two donkey draught packages were distributed (DAFS, 1979: 26-7; 40-1; cf. NDDC, 1979: 151). All in all, the number of participants in this scheme did not exceed 350. This is a rather low figure for a pilot programme designed to provide data to be applied to a possible total of 70,000.

Moreover, it was shown that the poorer categories of target group farmers were under-represented in the pilot projects. Opschoor (1983: 171, citing Bingana, n.d.) points out that small peasants represented only 6.1 per cent against the national estimate of 45 per cent, compared to 93.8 per cent of the middle and wealthy peasants. These evidently unreliable
data subsequently formed the basis for the nationwide implementation of the credit scheme. Not surprisingly, as I shall show in the next section, this had negative consequences.

**Central-local 'consultation'**

The notion of 'consultation' first gained currency within Botswana's government bureaucracies in the heady days of the introduction of the TGLP in the mid-1970s. As shown in the previous chapter, much controversy had surrounded the introduction of DDCs and other central government structures at the local level in the early 1970s. These were seen by some bureaucrats, particularly those in the MLGL, as designed to 'swamp' local government institutions, especially the District Councils, with bureaucratic agencies of central government. These bureaucrats believed that the local institutions would thus be effectively emasculated by being cut off from rural development policy planning.

The idea of 'consultation' was linked to the planning of the TGLP primarily as a pre-emptive move on the part of MFDP and MoA bureaucrats designed to fend off criticism by their counterparts in the MLGL. The main criticism voiced by these bureaucrats, in various meetings and workshops, was that the planning of the TGLP was "far removed from the reality facing the ordinary Batswana in the rural areas" (interview, Gaborone, September 1988). Many of the assessments of the TGLP planning process also concluded that it did not involve any significant amount of 'consultation' (Noppen, 1982: 40). The policy papers which outlined the need for a consultation exercise (OoP, 1975, in Noppen, 1982: 38), had listed as some of the objectives of
consultation the provision of information on the policy and the
stimulation of public discussion.

However, even after the so-called consultation had taken
place, the final version of the policy prevailed with little
amendment. This was despite the fact that, as shown in Chapter
1, the policy had been severely criticised by small cattle
owners and peasants. The consultation exercise associated with
the TGLP therefore amounted to the legitimisation of the plan
originally formulated by the bureaucrats. It also served to
legitimize the government's basically rhetorical definition of
the concept of consultation as "a means of involving the people
in government decision-making" (Noppen, 1982: 40).

This perceived failure by the TGLP planners to consult
effectively with the people prompted a critical salvo by the
MLGL on this vexed question. For the MLGL bureaucrats, the
TGLP had provided evidence of the need to link consultaton
with the participation of the 'target groups' in the planning
process. Hence statements such as the following:

One of the aims of the District planning process
is to ensure that people are involved in rural
development, so it must address the problems,
opportunities and priorities as identified by the
communities this development is intended to bene-
fit. If this aim is to be achieved then a dialogue
must be established between the communities and
development authorities (District Development Hand
book, MLGL, 1979: Section G.1.3.)

When ALDEP was initiated, the relevant authorities found
it necessary to give assurances that 'true, meaningful'
consultation would take place during the planning of the
programme (interviews, Gaborone and Molepolole, August/
September 1988). It was claimed that "[t]he ALDEP Preparation
Team decided at its inception to place a major emphasis on
carrying out a discussion/consultation exercise before proceeding with the detailed design of the programme" (Purcell, 1982: 7). It was also claimed that "[p]articular attention was given to aiming the discussion/consultation exercise at district level institutions" (ibid). This was done partly in response to complaints about "the over-centralisation and top-down nature of government planning [which] often came to an acrimonious head at the annual National District Development Conferences" (ibid). The ALDEP consultation was thus presented as an attempt to obtain feedback on the programme from the districts to the centre.

Judging by the minutes of the NDDC held in 1979, there was indeed a significant amount of consultation between central (i.e. MoA) and district level bureaucrats on the ALDEP plan. A special session of this conference dealt with district responses to the ALDEP plan which was spelt out in twenty-three 'discussion papers' circulated to the districts. These were brief summaries of 3 to 5 pages in length of the main issues covered in the main ALDEP plan written, as Purcell puts it, "in (hopefully) fairly straightforward language comprehensible to laymen" (ibid: 10).

Many of the contributions to the debates during this conference focused on points of clarification on the formulation structure, communication links between government agencies, and general features of the plan. Papers presented by district representatives addressed primarily administrative and operational issues rather than the basic assumptions of the programme itself. A major concern was to determine the role of local authorities in relation to ALDEP. A particular concern
was that:

ALDEP should not be a top-down exercise as some other programmes have been. In order to avoid this, it was felt that the ministries and the districts should work as closely as possible. It was suggested that a representative from the Ministry of Agriculture should travel to the districts and address the various councils on ALDEP. It was felt that by doing this, the ALDEP Team could get a more accurate feeling of the needs of local representatives (NDDC, 1979: 121).

It was stressed that ALDEP should not be a 'single-fronted nor unilateral effort'; "it should be carefully integrated and coordinated with other rural development programmes" (ibid: 122). This latter point underlined the concern of many local bureaucrats that the programme would result in the concentration of efforts in one area, i.e. agricultural production, while ignoring others such as social infrastructure provision as well as other productive activities.

The conference resolutions focused on a number of specific issues. These included the additional workload which ALDEP was likely to impose on existing extension staff; the reiteration of the idea that the target group for ALDEP be the small farmer; a call for the review of the role of the Land Boards in the light of ALDEP and that "the land issue in relation to ALDEP ... be addressed"; and the integration of ALDEP with other rural development programmes (ibid: 138-39).

The point was also raised during general discussions that direct consultation should take place between the central government and the rural population. As the minutes stated, "[w]ithout this source of primary information, any programme directed at promoting rural development will run the risk of missing the intended mark" (p.124). This view was essentially
developed in the MLGL whose bureaucrats had begun talking of the concept of grassroots 'participation' in rural development planning. Articulating this view, the 'District Planning Handbook' cited earlier stated:

[Participation] is not a process whereby planners prescribe what is 'best' for others and then simply provide resources which, it is hoped will accomplish the prescribed development. True participation demands that beneficiaries are brought into the decision making process in a real way. All too often 'consultation' and participation are viewed by authorities as simply an obligation to inform people of what is to be done (MLGL, 1979: Section G.1.4).

However, during the formulation of ALDEP there was very little, if any, consultation with the rural population generally and the target group in particular.

Both the central and local bureaucrats did not carry out a comprehensive study of the views of the people on aspects of the programme. The officials were content to make announcements on the programme's imminent implementation in several kgotla meetings called for this purpose. As one respondent put it: "All we were told was that the government was about to start a scheme to assist us to grow more crops. The official addressing us closed the meeting by asking for our acclamation for the government's good work, and that was all" (interview, Molepolole, August 1988). No room was given for any suggestions from the people which could add to or even alter the framework already decided upon. The failure of meaningful consultation with the people was to have severe consequences for the implementation of the programme as whole.
3.3 The limits of top-down planning: the failure of the ALDEP credit/subsidy scheme

When the implementation phase of ALDEP began in 1981, all participating farmers were to obtain the packages and inputs on a credit basis. With the exception of cattle, the prices of these items would also be subsidized for up to 50 per cent. The other 50 per cent would be payable in cash over a five-year period after a grace period of one year, at up to 12 per cent interest (ALDEP, 1981a: 22). The role of the MoA bureaucracy in executing the credit scheme was minimal, since as we have shown this was the responsibility of financial institutions. Nevertheless, the extension personnel were expected to select and provide information to farmers regarding the procedures to be followed when applying for inputs under this scheme. Officials at the District Agricultural Office (DAO) would be responsible for completing application forms on behalf of the farmers and forwarding them to the banks in Gaborone.

According to BCB data, a total of 118 farmers obtained ALDEP packages between 1981 and 1983 [6]. All these farmers made their applications through eleven cooperative societies based in various parts of the country of which they were members. For its part the NDB approved a total of 2,928 packages during this period (NDB, 1984: 19; see also DAFS Annual Report, 1981/82: 189), which were obtained by 2,331 farmers. When adding the 118 assisted by the BCB, the overall total comes to 3,046. The ALDEP annual report for 1986/87 provides some clues regarding the differential impact of the credit/subsidy scheme on the target group. The report states that only 6.6 per cent of the farmers who obtained ALDEP
packages during this stage were Model 1 farmers, with Model 3 group taking the largest share of the inputs (ALDEP, 1987a: 73).

By mid-1983, senior MoA bureaucrats had come to the conclusion that the credit/subsidy scheme had failed. Apparently, government ministers were fairly quick in accepting this assessment. The subsequent investigation into an alternative formula was also conducted with some urgency. The result was the decision announced through the media in December 1983 that as from early 1984 ALDEP would be a grant/downpayment scheme. Under this scheme the farmers were to make a cash downpayment valued at 15 per cent of the price of a given item, with the government covering the remaining 85 per cent. Before discussing this scheme, the most important question at this stage is: why did the credit/subsidy scheme fail?

The answer to this question is partly contained in a report on a baseline survey of target group farmers carried out in 1982 by the ALDEP Monitoring and Evaluation Unit (ALDEP, 1983). This report points out that the ALDEP "outreach effort fell far short of the outreach goals planned for [1981/82]" (ALDEP, 1983: ix). The report cited as an example of this the fact that only 703 loans were approved in 1982 (ibid). At this rate, the programme would not cover even a quarter of the 11,000 earmarked to obtain ALDEP packages during the allotted first five years. Most important, perhaps, was the report's finding that countrywide, "better than 76 per cent" of the ALDEP farms had received their cash income from non-agricultural employment while 43 per cent received their income from the sale of livestock (ibid: 33).
This report failed, however, to articulate the meaning of this finding in terms of the low rate of the uptake of the packages. One important reason for this was that the survey failed to investigate the situation of the households which did not participate. Had it done so, it could have found that many of those not participating in the scheme did not have a reliable source of income. The report nonetheless provided useful evidence indicating that the majority of those who participated had a reliable source of income.

Setting aside the shortcomings of the 1982 ALDEP survey, extensive information on the rural poor was available at the time of the formulation of the programme. Though this information was admittedly lacking in detail, it was fairly reliable because most of it was up-to-date in the late 1970s and early 1980s. This information was contained in government documents ranging from the FAO-sponsored 'Constraints Study' of 1974, through the RIDS (1976), Lipton's report (1978), to the National Migration Study (NMS) (1982). The NMS researchers began to make their findings available for comment in seminars and workshops from 1979. On the question of sources of income, the NMS demonstrated that about a quarter of rural households were dependent solely on arable agriculture and had no access to remittances (Kerven, 1982: 562).

Lipton had warned in his report that "even well-planned development programmes ... tend to benefit mainly the better off, who own that capital - and use it, rather than labour" (Lipton, 1978: 64). This was confirmed by a study of ALDEP beneficiaries carried out by Opschoor in 1983 which showed that, among other things, the ALDEP credit/subsidy scheme had a
regressive effect. According to the results of Opschoor's study, which was carried out in the Central and Southern Agricultural Regions, ALDEP was benefiting the richer farmers from the start, i.e. as from 1981.

According to Opschoor (1983: 171-72), out of 83 farmers who obtained credit for implements in the Central Region only 26 of them owned less than 41 head of cattle while another 22 owned more than 60 (citing Hope, 1981). In the Southern Region the 'very poor' (about 20 per cent of rural households nationwide) "obtained virtually no loans; the poor ([about] 17 per cent nationwide) received 12.6 per cent; the middle peasants (some 41.5 per cent of all rural households) obtained 73.5 per cent of all loans and the remaining 13.4 per cent went to the rich" (ibid: 172). Opschoor's findings suggest that at that stage a substantial number of those who benefited from the programme, such as those owning more than 40 cattle, belonged to categories not covered by the definition of the target group. This suggests a looseness in the implementation system.

Opschoor suggests that the regressive effect of the ALDEP credit scheme stemmed from the eligibility conditions for loans specified in the ALDEP circulars on the various credit/subsidy schemes (ibid: 171). The ALDEP Project Appraisal Report (ALDEP, 1981a: 20) stated that credit was to be made available on a variable subsidy basis, "taking into account [the farmer's] capacity to take the various packages on credit during a five-year implementation period of the project". According to this arrangement, all participating farmers would be entitled to a 30 per cent subsidy. Applicants for the donkey draught scheme would obtain a 50 per cent subsidy, while
subsidy levels for the water tank package would be 30 per cent for Model 3, 70 per cent for Model 2, and 80 per cent for Model 1 households (ibid: 22).

In the specific case of seed and fertiliser, the policy papers stated that the provision of these would "be limited to those farmers who will adopt the row planting system" (ibid: 21). In other words, in order to gain access to subsided fertiliser the farmers would have to first acquire a row planter. The eligibility criteria for the credit and the inputs were thus characterised by two elements. First, they were rather vague. Second, they were presented in such a way as to make it difficult for the poorer farmers to enrol in the scheme. For example, many farmers were not sure whether enrolling in ALDEP was on condition that they undertook to adopt the recommended production practices or vice versa (interviews, Molepolole, November, 1988). The uptake of seasonal inputs was therefore generally low (ALDEP, 1983: xii).

It is tempting to argue that the ALDEP credit/subsidy scheme was designed to attract the richer sections of the target group farmers while doing little to assist the poorer ones. Molutsi (1983: 107) goes as far as to suggest that ALDEP was tailored to benefit the rich farmers in order to "maintain and perpetuate the relations of subordination and exploitation in the rural areas". This argument is contradicted by the fact that the funds committed for the programme were to include the coverage of 3,000 poor farmers among the initial group of 11,000.

The most realistic explanation is that the credit/subsidy scheme failed as a direct result of top-down planning. Its
implementation was based on a number of wrong assumptions on the socio-economic characteristics of the target group population. The most crucial of these was the belief, totally unsupported by existing evidence, that all the target group farmers would be able to produce the money required in order to participate in the programme.

Another important factor which contributed to the failure of the credit/subsidy scheme, cited earlier in relation to Opschoor's findings, was that the linkages between the implementation of the scheme and the extension system were weak. As a result, the flow of information on the programme between extension staff and the farmers was inadequate and the offtake of the packages was therefore slow. Moreover, the programme also benefited non-target groups.

The slow offtake of the packages is suggested for example by NDB data which indicate that this bank assisted an average of only 780 farmers each year between 1981 and 1983. As one respondent put it:

What was happening was that this essentially agricultural programme, which required a well-organised input by our extension cadre, was simply beyond our reach [at MoA]. Our people therefore did not know which farmer was prepared to obtain or had obtained what ALDEP item. It was totally impossible to put our core extension programme into effect, especially considering that very few farmers came forward for the loans (interview, Gaborone, July 1988).

This was despite the fact that the district agricultural offices were charged with assisting the farmers to complete their applications. As one district-based official pointed out:

There was no coordination. Farmers came from different parts of the District, with different aims. Some ADs had less than 10 farmers
getting on the scheme. Obviously, administering the extension programme on 10 out of a possible 500 farmers or so would have very little impact on the improvement of production in that particular community (interview, Molepolole, August 1988).

At both the central and local levels, therefore, concern was expressed over the ineffectiveness of the extension programme. Many bureaucrats regard extension as important as the provision of inputs. It could thus have been expected that any changes which were aimed at bringing the programme closer to the implementation of the extension package would be most welcome, particularly at the local level. In effect, subsequent events proved otherwise.

The decision to replace the credit/subsidy scheme with the 85 per cent grant and 15 per cent downpayment scheme came along with a decision to place all aspects of the programme's implementation under relevant bureaucratic organs of MoA. It was also announced that those who had already obtained loans would be liable to repay only 15 per cent of the total amount owed. The banks were instructed to reimburse those applicants whose payment was in excess of 15 per cent with the difference.

The change to the grant/downpayment scheme was announced to the district administrations by means of a circular dated January 1984. This circular spelled out the revised policy guidelines for implementation. The 'general circular' was accompanied by a batch of four other circulars detailing the particulars of each of the ALDEP packages under the new scheme. The guidelines cover, inter alia, the conditions for eligibility for benefit under the new scheme and the 'operational procedures' for its implementation. Table 3.2 shows the
'estimated costs to farmers and government' for each package under the grant/downpayment scheme.

Table 3.2: Estimated Costs 'to Farmers and Government': ALDEP Packages under the Grant/Downpayment Scheme, 1984.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Package</th>
<th>Maximum value (Pula)</th>
<th>Grant (Pula) %</th>
<th>Downpayment (Pula) %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Animal draught - donkeys</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>510</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>oxen/tollies</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fencing</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>595</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implements - planter/</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>468</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cultivator</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Water tanks</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>550</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ALDEP General Circular, January 1984: 3.
* Added from ALDEP Annual Report, 1987a: 5.

The ALDEP circular also listed the prices for specific items such as ploughs (which cost either P91, P105, or P161, depending on the size and model), Sebele row planters (either P159 or P315), harrows (P202), cultivators (P190), and the Safim (toolbar) planter which cost P286 in 1984. The maximum value for implements and fencing equipment have each since been increased to P1,000 (ALDEP, 1987a: 5). The main suppliers of these packages are the BAMB, wholesale dealers and the Botswana Cooperative Union (BCU) as well as private agents.

The four specific circulars on various components of the grant/downpayment scheme (ALDEP, 1984b, c, d, and e) outlined the conditions for eligibility for a grant for each package. The main eligibility criteria with regard to animal drawn implements were that the applicant must: own less than 40 cattle; have access to a minimum of 3 hectares of cleared and
destumped land; possess draught power or take an animal draught power package; and, be willing to use graded seeds and a row planter. The criterion for eligibility for animal draught power was that the applicant must own less than 20 cattle. However, the applicants for the fencing package were expected to have 6 hectares of cleared and destumped arable land. For those wishing to obtain water catchment tanks, the main condition was that the applicant's fields must be located far away from a permanent water supply.

An additional condition which applied to all of the packages was that all applicants were expected to "agree verbally to undertake improved crop management practices and to attend relevant training courses as advised by the AD" (ALDEP, 1984b: 2-3). The AD also had the discretion of choosing the applicants whom he "considered suitable". This suitability was determined by the given farmers' record who must have "shown that their crop husbandry management is adequate as shown for example by their past ability and willingness to carry out timely ploughing, planting and weeding operations" (ibid). These conditions for participation in the grant/downpayment scheme were clearly linked to the extension efforts regarded as central to ALDEP's success [7]. These eligibility conditions were rather stringent. Their immediate effect, as will be shown in the next chapter, was to marginalise the majority of small peasants who, for a number of reasons to be discussed, lack the capacity to fulfil many of them.
3.4 The grant/downpayment scheme and the 'bureaucratization' of the extension system

A longstanding problem facing the government services concerned with rural development administration in Botswana is the shortage of adequately trained manpower. This is particularly the case in the lands areas and remote districts and settlements. A related problem is that the bulk of the best trained personnel tend to be absorbed by the central bureaucracies. It has also been noted in previous studies of policy implementation in rural Botswana, that "a marked asymmetry [often exists] between local institutional capabilities and the performance requirements of the policy" (Picard and Morgan, 1985: 126). These writers observe that in the case of the TGLP "[l]ocal government institutions such as district councils and land boards did not have the capacity to implement either the grazing land policy or the other rural development policies that went with it" (ibid).

The lack of capacity of local-level institutions to effectively implement rural development policies derives mainly from under-staffing. The DAFS annual report for 1979/80 revealed the scale of the problem of manpower shortage in MoA's extension department when it pointed to the existence of a serious shortage of ADs. The report attributed this shortage mainly to the imposition of manpower ceilings on government departments and, among other things, to a high attrition rate among MoA employees (DAFS, MoA, 1980: 4). According to this report, there were 617 posts in the DAFS in 1979/80, while 160 extension areas (EAs) were manned out of a total of some 210, leaving 24 per cent of EAs vacant (ibid).
Current shortages of ADs, which differ from one region to another, range from 1 to 4 ADs per district. This value may be considered to be relatively low given the fact that in most districts with, say 15 EAs, about 12 would be staffed at any given time. In Gaborone Region for example, only 4 out of 61 extension areas lacked an AD in 1986/87 (ALDEP, 1987a: 56). The main problem, however, lies in the workload of individual ADs. For example, the AD/farmer ratio in Kweneng District is 1:440, a level seen by many extension officers as "unbearably high" (Agrinews, November 1988).

Another important factor which contributes to the lack of bureaucratic capacity to carry out specific tasks associated with rural development in Botswana is the inexperience of the extension personnel. Many of the ADs for example are relatively young, with their ages ranging from 20 to 29 years (Trent et al., 1986: 5-9). There is a high attrition rate with many of the ADs (about half) spending less than three years in professional agriculture and often opting for jobs in other government departments, the parastatals, or the private sector (interview, Gaborone, October 1988; cf. DAFS, 1980: 4; also cf. ibid). Most of them (96 per cent) qualified in the one-year Certificate in Agriculture offered at the Botswana Agricultural College (BAC) (Trent et al., 1986: 9).

The procedure followed in expediting applications for ALDEP packages created more work in the form of additional paperwork for the local bureaucrats. As spelt out in the 1984 ALDEP General Circular (pp.1-2) which announced the introduction of the grant/downpayment scheme, this procedure would be as follows: farmers were to apply for a given package
through the AD, who would evaluate the application; the AD would then complete a form, in triplicate, containing the information relating to the items required by the farmer; and the farmer would take a copy of the form to the District Agricultural Office 'for final evaluation, approval and costing'. Once there the 15 per cent downpayment would be calculated in Pula by the District Agricultural Supervisor (DAS) (who was designated the revenue officer for the scheme) and checked by the DAO. The farmer would be advised on the approval of the application and on the amount due as downpayment which he or she would be required to pay to the DAS who would issue the farmer with a receipt. The DAO must then issue a general purchase order (GPO) indicating the supplier(s) from whom the farmer would obtain the package(s).

Copies of all documentation regarding the purchase of each package and expenditures incurred in each District must be collected monthly by Regional Managers from the DAOs and then forwarded to the ALDEP Coordinator's office at MoA headquarters. This information is contained in documents called 'Management Sheets' which are compiled on a monthly basis by the DAO. These documents consist of data collected by the ADs, relating to all of the ALDEP applications. The Management Sheets contain data on the age and sex of the applicants; size of their land and livestock holdings; the number of cattle; donkeys and small stock owned; the package(s) applied for; previous package(s) obtained; and, the dates when the applications were submitted, approved, and when the package was obtained.

The process of expediting the ALDEP applications is
obviously elaborate and time-consuming. It has entailed the allocation of additional tasks to the various officials. The introduction of the ALDEP grant/downpayment scheme therefore led to an extensive bureaucratization of the work of agricultural officers at the local level. 'Bureaucratization' as used here refers to the increase of 'office-type' work, particularly in relation to the work of the ADs, in proportion to and at the expense of extension.

The increase of the extent of bureaucratization of the work of agricultural officers is illustrated by the sheer amount of paper work being done on a daily basis. Before the introduction of the new scheme 'clerical' work was done mainly by the DAO and his staff. Their main responsibility in this regard consisted of the compilation of reports. To some extent they were also responsible for assisting farmers applying for credit from the NDB or the other financial institutions to complete the requisite forms. Since the new scheme was introduced virtually all staff members in the District Agricultural Office spend up to 75 per cent of their time attending to matters related to applications for grants, input delivery, and so on [8]. Extension activities have to be squeezed in in between. The District Agricultural Office thus finds it difficult to cope with the increased paperwork which has resulted from the introduction of the new scheme.

The fact that many of the ADs are responsible for at least 400 farmers is itself a clear indication of their amount of work. The problem of asymmetry between the capacity of the local bureaucrats and the policy requirements of ALDEP emanated mainly from the organization of programme's implementation.
The general attitude among the local bureaucrats towards the changes effected in the approach to the implementation of ALDEP as from January 1984 is contained in a statement made by one respondent who said:

Frankly speaking, the Government should have left the financial side of the programme to the banks or other relevant institutions, and the task of seeing to the delivery of the packages to agencies such as the BAMB, which have always done this. What is happening now is that we spend day after day sorting out applications, finances, etc. This is stifling the real extension work which we have been trained for and employed to discharge (interview, Molepolole, October 1988).

This view, which was expressed by a large number of ADs, as well as district agricultural staff, stands in sharp contrast to that held by senior bureaucrats at MoA headquarters. They generally hold the view that the success of a programme like ALDEP depends on linking its implementation to extension. According to this view, therefore, it is the 'duty' of the ministry's extension services to implement all aspects of the programme. Ironically, as will be shown in the next chapter, this view has had the effect of slowing down the process of implementation. Another consequence is a tendency among the ADs to select for the scheme mainly those farmers who are prepared to comply with the recommended extension package. I shall show in the next chapter that the majority of these farmers are mainly the more prosperous among the small peasants.

The 'view from below' is that extension work can be carried out more effectively if the responsibilities for expediting applications is removed from the extension personnel. In 1986 MoA headquarters responded to this
viewpoint by instituting a system of allocating two 'field assistants' to each AD. The field assistants, who are made up mainly of primary school leavers, are employed on a temporary basis. However, complaints were expressed shortly after their appointment that these field assistants lack the expertise to function effectively in this role.

Many of the ADs are therefore not sufficiently motivated to carry out the work associated with ALDEP. Attempts to address this problem through the improvement of housing and transport facilities for the ADs have not met with much success. The amount of resignations among ADs remains high regardless of these efforts.

At the lands where the ADs are based the phenomenon of a bureaucratized work schedule takes on a much more serious dimension. 10 out of 14 ADs whom I interviewed in Kweneng District (the District total is 35) pointed out that they spent at least two-thirds of their time filling in forms or engaging in activity associated with the agricultural programmes such as calling farmers to meetings to make announcements about various aspects of the schemes. Except on Sundays and Saturday afternoons the AD normally receives about five farmers a day, with whom he spends at least 45 minutes to one hour [9]. In the majority of cases, the main issues dealt with by the AD relate to one or the other of the programmes. All the ADs whom I interviewed stated that they lacked time to carry out essential extension work because most of their time was spent on work connected with the schemes. The next chapter will show that the introduction of ARAP, which also involves the filling of forms, led to the doubling of this kind of work.
Notes

1. These 'guidelines' were issued via lengthy discussions with administrative specialists in the relevant Ministries: MoA, MLGL, and MFDP in a series of preliminary meetings among senior bureaucrats.

2. My respondent, a senior BAMB official based in Gaborone, stated: "We sell to everyone. In fact, we would be very happy if the beer brewing companies bought all the grain we have here. You cannot run away from these things. When the Russians decided to cut down on the production of liquor, people bought sugar to make their own beer. And now there is a shortage of sugar!" (interview, Gaborone, October 1988). He also pointed out sardonically that some of the private companies tended to buy grain from South Africa and sell it in Botswana "at a ridiculously high price".

3. The Institute of Development Management is a quasi-academic centre located within the grounds of the local university in Gaborone. Its primary function is to provide training to bureaucrats from the BLS countries on practical aspects of development administration.

4. The National District Development Conference is an annual event during which representatives of the various government ministries involved in rural development (at both local and central level), meet to review the progress of the implementation of programmes and to assess current plans. The proceedings are elaborate and detailed, usually taking place over the period of a week. The minutes of these conferences are published by the MLGL.

5. I was told by some of my respondents that even the officials could not explain the nature of the pilot projects and the role of the producers, as well as the benefits that would accrue to them.

6. These are unpublished 'raw' data consisting of computer printouts.

7. Interestingly, the application forms use the Setswana word mpho, which literally means 'gift' to denote the government grant.

8. Personal observation.

CHAPTER 4

POLICY IMPLEMENTATION AND 'BIAS': ALDEP IN KWENENG DISTRICT

Introduction

This chapter seeks to demonstrate that during the 1980s the implementation of ALDEP was characterised by bias in favour of the better-off sections of the target group. This phenomenon is explained through an analysis of the configuration of actors, interests and institutions which coalesced in the implementation of ALDEP. The chapter focuses mainly on three issues: (1) the provision and offtake of the ALDEP inputs; (2) the rate of adoption of the recommended extension package; and, (3) opposition to the scheme by elite farmers not belonging to the target group.

The chapter begins in Section 4.1 with a brief overview of the phenomenon of 'bias' in African agriculture. Section 4.2 examines the question of bias in Botswana by analysing the offtake of ALDEP packages since the introduction of the grant/downpayment scheme in early 1984. The section then proceeds to examine bureaucrat-peasant relations within the context of the implementation of ALDEP. The section also examines the character of agrarian politics, which since the introduction of ALDEP has revolved around input supply and extension outreach. Of particular interest in this regard is the role of the bureaucrat in relation to organised groups of farmers.

The chapter then examines bureaucrat-peasant relations within the context of the implementation of the ALDEP extension package. This section (4.3) highlights the emergence of a clash
of approaches and methods between the bureaucrats and the peasants, which is reinforced by the factors responsible for bias.

The question of opposition to ALDEP is dealt with in Section 4.4. The focal point of the analysis carried out in this section is the Accelerated Rainfed Arable Programme (ARAP), which was introduced in 1985 partly to placate the kulaks who had become vociferously critical of certain aspects of the new policy regime focused on smallholder production. The section thus examines in some detail the relationship between the kulaks and the state. The section proceeds to assess the impact of ARAP on ALDEP within the context of intra- and inter-bureaucratic interaction.

4.1 Agricultural policy and 'bias': the problem specified

The tendency towards bias in the allocation of resources in the agricultural sector is an all-too-familiar phenomenon in many Third World countries. When discussing this phenomenon of bias, I shall briefly examine two elements. The first relates to the tendency to invest resources disproportionately; i.e., by concentrating financial support, infrastructure, and services in the large-scale sector at the expense of the peasant sector. The second type of bias, which has been observed in those cases where a policy regime favourable to peasant agriculture exists, is of direct relevance to the Botswana case. Many analysts have argued that although the peasant sector may be given enthusiastic support in such cases, it is often squeezed in a
number of ways, chief among which is lack of production and market incentives.

Concern over these issues has been generated primarily by the fact that peasant producers constitute the majority of the population of many Third World countries. There have been very few exceptions to this trend, notably Taiwan and South Korea among the East Asian NICs (Amsden, 1985; Wade, 1985; Haggard and Moon, 1983; Fajnzylber, 1981). To some extent the exception in Africa is Zimbabwe (Bratton, 1986), and to a lesser extent Swaziland (Hinderink and Sterkenburg, 1987).

One of the well-known analysts of the development process in Third World countries (Lipton, 1977) attributes unfavourable policies on smallholder production to 'urban bias'. Lipton argues that urban bias - defined as the concentration of investment for development in urban areas - is maintained partly through measures designed to guarantee low prices for food staples in the urban areas. The most important of these measures is the 'buying off' of the large farmers by the 'urban classes' through subsidies and favourable credit facilities, which makes the depression of producer prices politically acceptable (ibid: 17; 287-328).

Other analysts have sought to explain bias in the agricultural sector within the framework of a structural-dualist model. This analytical model has featured prominently in the intense and long-running debate on the 'agrarian question' in Latin America. According to this model, bias against peasant agriculture derives from the subsumption (as against the elimination) of the peasant sector under the large-scale capitalist sector in an exploitative relationship
designed to guarantee large profits to the latter (de Janvry and Garramon, 1977: 206; see also Deere and de Janvry, 1976; de Janvry, 1981; etc). While allowed to exist, the peasant sector is given limited scope for development beyond its present role of providing subsistence for the peasants and cheap labour for the large-scale capitalist sector. According to this school of thought this stifling of the peasant sector is the "objective outcome of the laws of capital accumulation in the periphery of the world capitalist system" (de Janvry and Garramon, 1977: 206). A more or less similar model was employed in analysing agrarian transformations in African societies by such writers as Wolpe (1972), Meillasoux (1975), and Rey (1975).

Countering this formulation in the Latin American context, Grindle (1986: 98) argues that bias in the agricultural sector originates mainly from state policies and the 'development ideologies' from which they are derived. According to her, these policies are not necessarily oriented towards dominant classes. They derive from a policy emphasis on 'modernisation' characterised by the quest for rapid industrialisation and the capitalisation of the agricultural sector (ibid).

An attempt to bridge the gap between these opposing views comes in the form of actor-oriented studies focusing on 'interface relationships' between bureaucrats and peasants in the process of policy implementation (Long, 1988, 1989; Arce and Long, 1987). This approach is useful in a number of ways. However, it also poses the additional danger of over-reliance on observations of interaction between individuals or groups in relatively small areas. This may result in de-emphasising the efficacy of 'wider' structural factors and social trends.
Nevertheless, these issues are not of immediate interest at this point and therefore need not detain us.

Attempts to explain bias in terms of the role of the state in agricultural policy are a relatively new phenomenon in African research. Many of the studies highlighting this issue were carried out in the wake of the economic and agrarian crisis which has plagued the continent since the mid-1970s. For many analysts the role of the state has contributed significantly in deepening the economic crisis (Bates, 1981, 1983; etc). These studies have shown that this tendency pervades the whole spectrum of development strategies which have been attempted in Africa. To illustrate this point further, it is important to briefly examine a few cases.

One dominant theme relating to bias in African agriculture is that of the effect of 'Green Revolution' strategies on smallholder production. These strategies have been implemented with some enthusiasm in South Asia and within sub-Saharan Africa in Ghana and Nigeria. They are noted for their tendency to benefit only a small number of elite farmers since many of them require a considerable degree of mechanisation and capitalisation (Hayami, 1984).

It was observed in the Ghanaian case that these strategies also derive from the fact that the state acts as an 'agrarian entrepreneur'. This is demonstrated by the tendency by the state to exercise monopsonistic powers to promote export crops at the expense of food crops as well as to dispense agricultural inputs as economic patronage on the basis of party support (Hart, 1982: 92-3; 95; see also Beckman, 1976). In Nigeria on the other hand, although the whole agricultural
sector suffered generally because of a disproportionate focus on oil production, this was accentuated by Green Revolution strategies. Their implementation led to a situation where smallholders were ignored, to the extent that many of those engaged in cocoa production ceased to cultivate this crop altogether (Wallace, 1980: 60; Berry, 1987: 207).

The tendency towards bias has been noted even in those cases which have been considered 'success stories' or economic 'miracles'. These include Kenya, the Ivory Coast, and Malawi. In the Kenyan case, the main beneficiaries of the transformation of the agricultural sector during the postcolonial period which resulted in substantial increases in the production of indigenous farmers are the large farmers and middle peasants (Heyer, 1981: 94, 101, 111-117; Cowen, 1981: 121; Peterson, 1986: 59). On the other hand, the country's smallholders, who are estimated at up to 80 per cent of the population, have fallen victim to a cycle of low prices and high repayment rates for credit and other inputs (Buch-Hansen and Marcussen, 1982: 21-9).

On the other hand, the 'economic miracle' in the Ivory Coast has meant the promotion of capital accumulation among the small class of large planters while the peasants have been largely ignored (Hecht, 1983: 26; Campbell, 1984: 168). A similar trend has been observed in Malawi, where, it is suggested, the stifling of the peasant sector has resulted in the "rapid transfer of labour into wage employment and the decline of peasant production" (Kydd and Christiansen, 1982: 355). The decline of peasant agriculture is also attributed to consistently low prices and the heavy-handedness of state
marketing agencies (ibid).

A similar tendency has been noted in those countries, such as Tanzania and Mozambique, which formulated more egalitarian agricultural policies supposedly designed to benefit smallholders. Many studies of Tanzania since the adoption of the *Ujamaa* policy in 1967 have shown that these policies have led to the deterioration of the terms of trade and the impoverishment of peasant producers. This has been attributed mainly to price mechanisms designed to depress producer prices in order to support ISI programmes and a proliferating state bureaucracy (Ellis, 1983: 236; etc).

In Mozambique the smallholders (or the 'family sector' as it is officially called) have also generally fared badly as agricultural producers. One explanation of this situation is that the postcolonial state inherited a "rapidly disintegrating economy" (Roesch, 1984: 291; Wuyts, 1985: 185-86). Also important in this regard is policy emphasis on large state farms (most of which constitute the farms abandoned by the Portuguese settlers) which themselves have not performed any better (Barker, 1985: 59; Roesch, 1984: 294-97; Wuyts, 1985: 186, 192-199). War has also played a major, if not greater role in disrupting the agricultural sector generally.

In Zambia on the other hand, a major complaint is that the state has generally ignored agriculture mainly because of urban bias in resource allocation. This is due partly to the greater comparative political importance of the urban population. The agricultural sector as a whole has thus suffered as the result of institutional weaknesses, meagre support services, inadequate capitalisation, and outright
corruption among officials (Cowie and Momba, 1984: 239; van Donge, 1982; Szeftel, 1982).

What patterns are observable in the Botswana case? As I shall show in some detail from the next section onwards, bias exists in Botswana within the framework of a policy regime favourable to the development of small-scale production. This bias derives from a number of factors. Briefly, these include stereotypical views of 'progressive farming' developed by MoA bureaucrats combined with stringent 'eligibility criteria' for participation in ALDEP. The result has been the concentration of the uptake of inputs and the provision of extension on the middle peasants and relatively prosperous small peasants while the majority of poor small peasants have become marginalised.

Within the context of the implementation of the extension package, these views have come into conflict with those of the peasant producers. This has resulted in the widespread non-adoption of the extension package. At the wider political level, pressure on the state by the kulaks for equally favourable policies has resulted in the diversion of efforts to improve agricultural production away from smallholder production. These issues are dealt with as from the next section.
4.2. Peasant-bureaucrat relations and the implementation of ALDEP: the tendency to bias

This section seeks to analyse and explain some of the factors which lie behind the fact that, after over a decade of its implementation, a very small proportion of the poorer sections of the ALDEP target group have benefited from the programme. I shall examine this issue mainly within the context of bureaucrat-peasant relations. A useful starting point is an assessment of the official data on the progress of the programme. Some of these data are provided in Table 4.2 below.

Table 4.1: ALDEP Beneficiaries Nationwide by Category, 1982/83 to 1987/88 (the number of packages disbursed is shown in parentheses)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Farmer category (Model)</th>
<th>1982/83</th>
<th>1983/84</th>
<th>1984/85</th>
<th>1985/86</th>
<th>1986/87</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>309</td>
<td>713</td>
<td>982</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>2,606</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(82)</td>
<td>(28)</td>
<td>(343)</td>
<td>(772)</td>
<td>(1,008)</td>
<td>(572)</td>
<td>(2,805)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>546</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>2,778</td>
<td>4,182</td>
<td>3,206</td>
<td>3,246</td>
<td>14,162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(560)</td>
<td>(241)</td>
<td>(2,947)</td>
<td>(4,426)</td>
<td>(3,509)</td>
<td>(3,708)</td>
<td>(15,391)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>557</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>741</td>
<td>1,066</td>
<td>627</td>
<td>1,222</td>
<td>4,266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(571)</td>
<td>(90)</td>
<td>(794)</td>
<td>(1,170)</td>
<td>(732)</td>
<td>(1,342)</td>
<td>(4,699)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>1,183</td>
<td>279</td>
<td>3,828</td>
<td>5,961</td>
<td>4,815</td>
<td>4,968</td>
<td>21,034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1,213)</td>
<td>(359)</td>
<td>(4,084)</td>
<td>(6,368)</td>
<td>(5,249)</td>
<td>(5,696)</td>
<td>(22,969)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: ALDEP Reports, 1987a; 1987b; and 1988a.

According to this table, during the period 1982/83 to 1987/88 ALDEP benefited mainly those producers designated as Model 2 farmers (i.e. those owning between 1 and 20 cattle). This group accounts for 67.3 per cent of the total of 21,034 beneficiaries. It may also be seen that Model 3 farmers comprise 20.2 per cent of the total, which places the overall participation of this group much higher than the Model 1 group,
who represent only 12.5 per cent.

The point that the main beneficiaries of the ALDEP inputs have been the relatively better-off small farmers is illustrated in Table 4.2. The table contains basic data on the Model 2 category.

Table 4.2: 'Model 2' Farmers in Kweneng South by Scale of Operation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cattle owned</th>
<th>Size of land in ha.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-9</td>
<td>294</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-20</td>
<td>296</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>584</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: These figures have been worked out from the DAO's Management Sheets. The 584 Model 2 farmers shown in this table constitute 72 per cent of a total of 815 producers who obtained ALDEP inputs in the District between 1984 and 1988. The Model 1 and 3 categories constitute 116 (14.1 per cent) and 115 (13.9 per cent) respectively.

This table shows that the group designated as 'Model 2' can be sub-divided into two groups. The first group, which comprises 55 per cent of the total, is made up of farmers who cultivate between 2 and 5 hectares of land and own between 1 and 9 cattle. In contrast, the second group is made up of producers who cultivate between 6 and 10 hectares or more (with an average of 10.1 hectares) and own between 10 and 20 cattle.

Additional information based on our survey of a sample of ALDEP beneficiaries in the Molepolole area suggests that the richer Model 2 beneficiaries (i.e. those owning between 10 and 20 cattle and cultivating) tend to produce more grain (on average 15 to 20 bags in a good year) compared to the poorer
group (i.e. those owning between 1 and 9 cattle) who only manage an average of 9 bags. This places these peasants slightly above subsistence-level production since their production of sorghum normally averages 1,400 kg, which is 200 kg (2.8 bags) above the mean subsistence threshold for a rural family of six which has been estimated to be 1,500 kg (EFSAIP, 1982: 52). The survey also found that these are mainly male-headed households which have at least one wage earner and are therefore relatively better-off.

It can therefore be concluded from the above account that the proportion of the total who are better-off small or middle peasants constitutes about half (49.6 per cent as shown in Table 4.2) of those who benefited from ALDEP during this period. This group constitutes less than 30 per cent of the target group as a whole. This observation, however, does not, strictly speaking, demonstrate the existence of 'leakage' or "spillover of benefits from target groups to non-target groups" (Bell and Duloy, 1974: 113). There is no evidence that those who have benefited do not satisfy the conditions for qualification. However, what this finding does demonstrate is the fact that official statistics have tended to exaggerate the coverage of the poorer stratum of the ALDEP target group. Official statistics normally present the various categories of beneficiaries by highlighting their general characteristics, and therefore not giving much attention to a number of other important differences.

There is little doubt that, given the existing constraints on arable production in Botswana, the category of the target group which is in a more favourable position to become regular
surplus producers within the framework of ALDEP are the middle peasants. By surplus we mean the marketable proportion of food crops produced by a rural family beyond its subsistence needs. The relatively better-off small peasants, who are normally subsistence producers, may also be able to garner a surplus. On the other hand, the poor small peasants, who are at present sub-subsistence producers, could more realistically be able to increase their production to subsistence level. It is, however, ALDEP's primary aim to ensure household self-sufficiency in food production. The channeling of aid to potential surplus producers is contrary to the declared aims and 'spirit' of ALDEP. Self-sufficiency in this context refers to the ability of all crop farmers to produce food crops sufficiently to maintain the subsistence of their families (interview, Molepolole, October 1988).

There is some evidence suggesting a close connection between the social origins of MoA's field bureaucrats and the bias in favour of middle peasants and the relatively rich classes of producers generally. The majority of these officials originate from middle or small peasant families. This can be inferred from Kerven's observation that in Botswana "... wealthier and higher class families usually invest from the proceeds of inherited or accumulated cattle in the higher education of their children" (Kerven, 1982a: 546). While this situation benefits the richer classes, "lower class poorer families do not have access either to large profitable cattle herds or higher education ..." (ibid). This point was confirmed by all the ADs and local bureaucrats whom I interviewed.
The bias in favour of the middle peasants and the better-off small peasants also emanates from the attitudes of the local bureaucrats to the different types of small farmers. The following statement, made by a senior local bureaucrat, is instructive:

There are basically two kinds of small farmers. There are those small farmers who, despite such problems as drought, remain determined to improve their production and their economic position. These farmers also face problems such as insufficient draught power, implements and other inputs. However, with ALDEP, these farmers have at last found the opportunity to increase their output. The other kind of small farmers are undoubtedly very poor, but they are also generally lax and show little interest in the kind of assistance which we are trying to give to the agricultural producers (interview, Molepolole, October 1988).

The above statement demonstrates that, as suggested partly by the figures cited earlier, the enthusiasm shown in supporting the middle and the relatively better-off small peasants mirrors an opposite attitude towards the poorer small peasants.

However, it is important to stress that even though he or she plays a major part in it, the responsibility for bias at the implementation level is not that of the AD as such. Like any other extension worker, the AD is "first and foremost a bureaucrat with a loyalty to the organisation that pays him and only in the second place is a change agent" (Noppen, 1982: 5). He or she therefore operates within the framework and rules set by MoA.

There are several such rules relating to the framework for the implementation of ALDEP. The most important of these rules is that the AD must select the participating farmers on the basis of their capacity and readiness to fulfil certain 'eligibility conditions'. These conditions were outlined in
the 1984 ALDEP circulars announcing details of the operation of the grant/downpayment scheme. One of these conditions is the notion that in order to benefit from the scheme, the applicants must have "shown that their crop husbandry management is adequate as shown for example by their past willingness to carry out timely ploughing and weeding operations" (ALDEP, 1984b: 2-3). Another of these conditions gives discretion to the AD to select these farmers if he or she considers them 'suitable'. This means that these farmers must already practice good methods of crop husbandry. They should also be those who are most likely to greatly improve their arable production and to generate more income from [it] (ALDEP, 1984b,c,d,: 2. Emphasis added).

An additional condition for eligibility for the grant/downpayment scheme relates to the draught power package. The farmers applying for this package are expected to "have labour to care for and use the new draught power" (ALDEP, 1984e: 3). As will be seen, many poor peasant households, about two-thirds of whom are headed by women, generally lack adequate agricultural labour. The low uptake of this package therefore may, in addition to other factors (also to be discussed), have resulted from this condition. The formulation of the eligibility conditions in this way has contributed towards the marginalisation of the poorer sections of the target group.

The marginalisation of the poor peasantry has also been greatly accentuated by the approach to policy implementation being currently employed in the agricultural extension areas. In Botswana the local bureaucrats, particularly the ADs, communicate with the producers in their extension areas in
groups. The usual practice is to address the producers in a kgotla meeting, or at the AD's office-cum-residence. Another important institution through which the ADs communicate with the producers is the Farmers' Committee (FC), which is the major (though often erratic) organisational unit among peasant producers at the extension area level. These institutions have increasingly become the focal points of peasant agrarian politics in the country.

The FC is a government-created organisation which was introduced in the wake of the inauguration of a 'group development' strategy in the 1970s. This strategy had been implemented, albeit with little success, under the TGLP which provided for the formation of 'group ranches' by smaller cattle owners. With the implementation of the ALDEP grant/downpayment scheme as from 1984, the group strategy was seen as a simpler means of coordinating extension efforts and of facilitating the access of the producers to the available resources. Thus, according to some observers, the group approach was designed to broaden the coverage of farmers (Willett, 1982: 53-55; Baker, 1988: 5). In my view, a more plausible explanation is that these organisations have been created in order to maintain a link with the state through the bureaucracy.

The functions of the FC include the publicising of special MoA programmes such as farmer training schemes, farmer field days, agricultural shows, information campaigns, veterinary vaccinations, and mobile crop buying. This organisation also helps initiate small projects such as vegetable production, poultry farming, small dam construction, and livestock-related facilities such as drift fences, diptanks, and so on. The
funding of projects of this type is normally provided under the
Small Projects Programme (AE10) and SLOCA.

FCs are normally allowed to operate on condition they have
a written constitution, which must be approved by the DAO. The
leadership of the FCs comprises of a chairman, vice-chairman,
secretary, vice-secretary, and treasurer. This leadership is
elected by 'all farmers' who, theoretically, constitute the
bulk of its membership at a meeting chaired by the AD. Additional FC members may include the family welfare educator
(FWE), the local head teacher, the local councillor, and two ex
officio members comprising the AD and veterinary assistant. FC
members should be elected at least once in every two years in a
meeting chaired by the AD.

The group strategy has, however, decisively benefited the
middle peasants. Most FCs and farmer groups assume the
character of organised associations of middle peasants. It is
important at this stage to illustrate the exact ways in which
organisations such as the FCs function to serve the interests
of middle peasants. It must first be stressed, however, that
the overall record of various FCs has not been a successful
one. Some of them are inactive - they meet on very few
occasions in the year - while some have met for as few as three
times since their formation in 1977 (Baker, 1988: 3). The main
reason often advanced in explaining this inactivity is lack of
cooperation among members, and between them and headmen,
councillors and other local political leaders (cf. Willett,
1982: 41). The same charge has been made in relation to the
Village Development Committees (VDCs) (Macartney, 1978: 261)
which have recorded attendances as low as 43 per cent of the
eligible population (Wynne, 1981: 36). The level of acrimony and animosity within the VDCs has sometimes been so high that some officials in the District Administration see no point in their continued existence [1].

The 1986/87 annual report of the Gaborone Agricultural Region contains some useful indices of the kind of problems afflicting group projects. This report (Gaborone Region/MoA, 1987: 8-11), pointed to a total lack of activity among the three groups in Kweneng North, all of whom were engaged in vegetable production. The report cites as the main reasons for this tendency lack of cooperation among members, delays in starting operations, and simply non-action. However, three out of four main groups in the Bamalete/Tlokweng District were operating. In the Kgatleng District, while the VDC was "dormant due to lack of cooperation among members" (p. 10), the three main groups engaged in agricultural projects were active. In Kweneng South, seven out of ten group projects were functioning, "despite poor relationships between members [and] lack of water".

Those FCs which do function usually involve very few farmers, most of whom are middle peasants. The ADs generally tend to show enthusiasm towards these successful FCs. Thus, the usual pattern is that these FCs are relatively well informed about developments in the area of policy, and new opportunities for advancement by use of the various MoA schemes. These FCs also tend to have a high success rate in their efforts to secure funds for various small projects. For example, one of the most successful FCs had negotiated a grant of P8,454 for a borehole, P1,545 for a drift fence, P230 for a lock-up store,
and P1,017 for a spray race. This FC had also assisted groups of women to start a horticultural and poultry project, both of which were reported to be functioning fairly well. The majority of this FC's members have enthusiastically participated in courses provided for farmers at the Denman Rural Training Centre and at the local RTC. The local AD has been instrumental in assisting these farmers to take advantage of these schemes and benefits.

The phenomenon of the local bureaucrat acting as a 'broker' in this way has been highlighted in the case of Mexico by Grindle (1977: 156-58). According to her, the local bureaucrats often mediate with their superiors on behalf of the peasants and often represent their interests with regard to the allocation of goods and services (ibid: 142; 149-55). In Botswana, unlike Grindle's case in which this role is seen as being performed in the general interest of all peasants, mediation and brokerage by local officials benefits mainly the middle peasants. As the case of Rre Temo, a poor peasant, will demonstrate in Chapter 5, poor peasants generally find the ADs to be uncooperative and insensitive to their particular needs and problems.

Close scrutiny of the successful FC reveals that it is in actual fact dominated by middle peasants who own around 50 cattle on average (possibly much higher), keep around 60 smallstock, plough between 11 and 15 hectares of land, and possess the basic implements (and in a few cases a tractor). Furthermore, while poor peasants may somehow benefit from the drift fence and diptank - although this is unlikely considering that most do not own any cattle - among the members of the FC
referred to above the beneficiaries from the borehole, and the horticultural and poultry projects are undoubtedly the middle peasants who dominate this organisation.

A case in point which demonstrates the readiness of the local bureaucrats to come to the assistance of middle peasants is that of grain marketing. This is illustrated by our case and survey material relating to Kweneng District during the 1987/88 crop season. As a result of the heavy rains which broke the drought in late 1987, many farmers wished to sell some grain after the harvest in July-August 1988. The 1988 harvest (of sorghum, maize, beans, cowpeas, melons, and sweet reed) had been generally good.

This does not necessarily mean, however, that this harvest had broken any previous record. The enthusiasm to sell resulted mainly from the fact that for the first time in more than five years production had reached levels which are normally characteristic of the pattern of production in Botswana during such a year. The majority of the farmers had not produced a surplus as such, but wanted to sell some grain in order to augment their income so as to be able to buy other types of food. This is common in the rural areas in Botswana, especially among those households which have a wage earner or have reliable alternative sources of income.

This sudden increase in grain production took some farmers by surprise, especially the poor peasant producers. Faced with the problem of finding the necessary extra labour to help them complete their harvesting, a significant number of poor peasants left their fields full of unharvested sorghum for long periods. For many, this led to losses of up to 50 per cent,
particularly as a result of quelea bird damage. On average, small peasants had produced 15 bags, which amounted to 1,050 kg, which is 200 kg (about 3 90 kg bags) short of the assumed subsistence level necessary for an average rural family. The margins of variance even among the small peasant group were so wide that in actual fact 40 per cent of this group averaged less than 10 bags. Rich peasants (kulaks) had harvested an average of 410 bags, and middle peasants 62.

Thus, in 1988 the problem of transportation, storage and pricing of grain became contentious issues of the time. One kgotla meeting was told by a group of irate producers that the government had "done absolutely nothing" to help the 'small' farmer sell his grain. References were made to the inadequate storage facilities in the area. One speaker said, "it is a disgrace that people should store their sorghum out in the open and rotting in the rain, and yet for many years government officials have known about this problem". Many producers had stored some of their grain inside their huts.

The BAMB was singled out for criticism, for its "unfair and arbitrary pricing system", and its "failure to provide transportation for those who want to sell". One of the functions of the BAMB is

\[
\text{to secure, for producers and consumers alike, a stable market for scheduled produce and to ensure efficient and fair distribution thereof throughout Botswana at prices that are, in all circumstances, equitable, avoiding any undue preference or advantage (BAMB, 1988: 1).}
\]

This means, among other things, that the BAMB is committed to buy all the produce sold to it irrespective of the prevailing levels of demand on the consumer market. This is compensated
for by the fact that the parastatal is also responsible for creating a grain stockpile, called the National Strategic Grain Reserve, as an insurance against drought.

The BAMB operates a 'grading' system whereby both red and white sorghum are divided into three grades while the mixed 'bird proof' variety, which is considered to be of low quality, is not graded. During the 1988/89 marketing season the prices for graded sorghum (both red and white) were: P21.15 for a 90 kg bag of grade 1, P20.65 for grade 2, and P14.90 for grade 3. These prices are said to have been set at a level equal to the landed cost of the produce (ibid: 4). One speaker in the kgotla said that the grading system was "arbitrary", and pointed out that in most cases the purchasing officers decided on grade 3. For this speaker, this was "the same kind of deliberate depression of prices which has encouraged Barolong farmers to sell their grain to South Africa". The BAMB's prices are generally far lower than those offered in South Africa, which encourages rich farmers in the southern parts of the country to sell in that country.

These complaints were characteristic of the general mood which prevailed among small farmers in the country at the time as reported in the national press. Major issues included the inadequate storage capacity of BAMB which had resulted in many bags of grain "being left to rot in the open", a fact which drew the ire of the Minister of Agriculture (Botswana Daily News, 12 October 1988). There were 15 major BAMB depots in 1988 with a capacity of 55,000 tonnes. When including the twelve private and cooperative agencies authorised to buy and sell agricultural produce on behalf of the BAMB, the storage
capacity could reach 134,000 tonnes (interview, Gaborone, November, 1988). This storage capacity is apparently not sufficient. Under ALDEP, a total of 40 lock-up stores were to be built in remoter areas located far from the major villages and the towns. These were also inadequate as evidenced for example by the fact that many extension areas in the Kweneng did not have lock-up stores in 1988.

Another issue taken up enthusiastically by the press concerned the slowness of the buying process at BAMB depots, with some farmers (as one small farmer from Dithojane Lands in the Central District told the Botswana Daily News on 16 November 1988) and others in the Kweneng and elsewhere, having to wait for up to two weeks before their grain could be bought. The allegation had also been made in Kweneng District that some small farmers in their dispair had been reduced to accepting as low as P6 for a 90 kg bag from local traders, who then proceeded to ferry the grain to local BAMB selling points in their trucks [2].

Even those few farmers (30 in our sample of 120) who owned ox- or donkey-drawn wagons, faced the problem of the extreme slowness of their means of transportation, which was compounded by the long queues (personal observation). On the other hand, those with adequate transport had sold their grain directly in Gaborone or the nearest major depot, where long queues were not so much of a problem. The management of BAMB conceded that the organisation was faced with a serious problem of storage, pointing out that the parastatal faced the problem of storing and disposing with 60,000 metric tonnes of grain.

The speakers at the kgotla therefore requested the AD to
bring pressure to bear upon the "higher authorities" on their behalf regarding the issue of marketing arrangements, particularly in the area of prices and transportation "to ascertain that this situation does not arise next time". However, none of the farmers present was really a 'small farmer'. No mention was made of the plight of the poor peasants who were facing the problem of finding labour to help them complete their harvesting. One such farmer, Rra Temo is quoted in Chapter 5 as saying that the role of the ADs seems to be that of "squeezing" the poor producers in order to bolster the richer farmers.

The AD took to the task of interceding on behalf of the producers on the question of grain storage and marketing with seemingly boundless enthusiasm. Among other things, he requested an audience with the DAO and other senior officials at District headquarters. A meeting of all agricultural personnel in Kweneng South held in October 1988 dealt with these issues at length. The ADs whom I interviewed during this period expressed the view that, despite the disappointments caused by the 'inefficiency' of BAMB, their efforts to assist 'serious' farmers to increase their production were gradually becoming successful.
4.3 Local bureaucrats, peasants and the ALDEP extension package

This section focuses upon the bureaucrat-peasant relationship in the context of the implementation of the ALDEP package of production techniques. As will be shown, there is a systematic relationship between the recommended package of production techniques and the ALDEP inputs. These production techniques constitute the following: ploughing and planting in early to late Spring, i.e., in October/November; row planting; mono-cropping or, if wishing to cultivate a variety of crops, inter-cropping; 'proper' plant spacing; the use of animal manure and chemical fertiliser; regular weeding; winter ploughing of crop residue in order to conserve soil moisture; the use of certified seed; and, the fencing of crop fields.

The most effective way of analysing the implementation of this package of techniques is to begin by carrying out a brief comparison of the bureaucratic (so-called 'modern, scientific') and peasant (so-called 'traditional') approaches to agricultural production. The reasoning behind the recommendation of ploughing at the onset of the first rains in the Spring is that early ploughing enhances the conservation of soil moisture and allows the crops a longer period to mature. According to one report, research findings suggest that "timely ploughing increases yield by more than 200%" (ALDEP, 1988b: 1).

The majority of the small-scale producers, however, normally begin ploughing in mid-summer, i.e., around December/January. According to a recent report, out of a total of 56,800 'traditional' farmers who had ploughed in 1985, only
1,950 (i.e. 3.4 per cent) did so in October, compared to 10,050 (17.6 per cent) who had ploughed in November (MoA, 1987: 120; see also ALDEP, 1987a). Those who had ploughed in December numbered 22,200 (39.0 per cent), while 18,450 (32.4 per cent) did so in January (ibid). The producers cited the country's erratic rainfall pattern as the main justification for ploughing after November. Many of those who lack draught power usually begin ploughing around December or January, mainly because hired or 'borrowed' draught is seldom made available on time to plough after the first rains. This is because those who do the hiring-out also use the same cattle or tractors to plough their own (often larger) fields.

Row planting represents the most important of the package of techniques recommended to small-scale producers in the country. It is generally regarded in MoA as the greatest contributor to increased yield (ALDEP, 1979d). The majority of the peasants, however, practice the broadcast planting method. According to a MoA report (1987: 130), 87.1 per cent of the 'traditional' farmers who ploughed in 1985 used this method. Most farmers broadcast seed when planting because they often lack the extra labour, draught power and implements needed to carry out the row planting operation. Planting in rows requires the use of an animal drawn planter over a field which has already been ploughed.

Another practice recommended by MoA which peasant producers generally do not comply with is the use of animal manure as well as chemical fertiliser in liberal quantities. There is no doubt that fertiliser and animal manure contribute significantly towards increasing soil fertility and to enhance
the growth of the crops. However, around 90 per cent of peasant producers in Botswana tend to avoid using both manure and fertiliser, chiefly because of a fear that this increases weeds (Baker, 1988b: 9). Particularly damaging varieties of weed in Botswana, known as 'creeping grass' or *synodon dactylon*, and 'mollwana' (*striga asiatica*) have been found to affect 49 per cent of crop farms generally and according to Opschoor (1981: 125), 73 per cent in Kgatleng District.

The majority of peasants in Botswana also fail to comply with the recommendation that they must weed their fields at least on two occasions during the crop year. According to a recent estimate (MoA, 1987: 134), 87.7 per cent (41,850) of the 47,650 crop farms which were weeded in 1985 did only one weeding, while those which were weeded twice or thrice numbered 4,550 (9.5 per cent) and 1,250 (2.6 per cent) respectively. Odell (1980: 23) estimated that only 10 per cent of 'traditional' farmers weed their fields frequently (see also ALDEP, 1979d: 1). Batswana peasants also avoid the ploughing under of crop residue after harvesting in winter. According to MoA, doing this helps conserve soil moisture. For many peasants, however, this again requires labour and draught power, as well as time.

Most of the peasants also do not comply with the recommendation that they should practice mono-cropping. The recommendation of mono-cropping is based on the view that farmers should concentrate on planting sorghum, which generally performs better than maize under the climatic conditions prevailing in the country. A related suggestion is that if they prefer to plant a variety of crops, they must practice
inter-cropping. This means the planting together of different crops in rows. The widespread practice among the producers however is that of mixed cropping, i.e., the planting of different crops in the same area. Apparently, this is done generally because of a desire to cultivate as wide a variety of crops as possible with the minimum use of labour (interviews, Molepolole, September 1988).

Thus, most producers normally plant sorghum, maize, beans, millet, cowpeas, and watermelons all at once through the broadcasting method. As my respondents stated, mixed cropping also facilitates a relatively balanced diet with the minimum use of labour. In the case of maize in particular, which is popular among the producers despite its weaker resistance to dry weather compared to sorghum, the main advantage is that it can be consumed green or dry, and may also provide a much higher income as it commands considerably high market prices. Maize is also believed to take a much shorter period to mature, compared to sorghum.

There are two main areas in which the peasant producers comply with the recommended extension package. The first is the use of certified seed. This is due partly to the evidently good performance of these seeds, especially the locally-developed sorghum variety called segaolane. These seeds are usually provided free of charge. The second area in which most of the producers comply with MoA's recommendations is that of fencing. This has been due chiefly to the contract mine labour system whose effect was to reduce the number of people available to perform the tasks of arable production and cattle-keeping. Thus, with his sons in the mines, "a man needed to be
with his field and with his cattle at the same time, and so the cattle moved to the lands" (Kooijman, 1978: 73). This has encouraged the practice of 'mixed farming' characterised by the grazing of cattle near arable fields. The presence of cattle in the lands areas has created a serious problem of crop damage and as such has encouraged most farmers to seek means with which to fence their fields. According to Opschoor (1981: 125), crop damage due to cattle affects 66 per cent of farms in the Kgatleng.

What factors explain the reluctance of the small peasants to take up the recommended practices? In tackling this question we must first consider the extent to which these practices are seen by the peasants as desirable. Secondly, we must establish the extent to which the officially recommended methods provide a feasible framework for increasing peasant production. And third, we need to establish whether the extension system is reaching the producers effectively.

Regarding the first point, our data suggest that the 'traditional' approach to arable practices constitutes a mixture of good sense and risk avoidance. As Lightfoot (1981: 1) correctly argues, the outlook of most Batswana farmers, which is that of 'low input', is understandable given the country's harsh natural environment, which makes arable production a high risk activity. In other words, this is not a fatalistic peasantry locked in an inhibiting culture and mentality which causes them to be inclined to 'resist change' (Foster, 1965; Rogers, 1970). Their insistence on the 'traditional' methods derives chiefly from experience. The behaviour of small peasants in Botswana exemplifies a quasi-
Schultzian type of peasantry constantly making marginal productivity calculations. As in Schultz's (1964: 5) analysis, small peasants in Botswana tend to limit their production to the factors of production at their disposal.

On the other hand, the set of practices recommended by the bureaucrats are not obviously or necessarily efficient or feasible. According to Segwele (1982: 7) the resistance of most traditional farmers to adopt these techniques emanates from the fact that many of the techniques are based on research findings derived from controlled experiments carried out under ideal conditions. Several of these research schemes, such as the DLRFS, EFSAIP and the IFPP, have been discussed at length in Chapter 3.

In a devastating critique of these research schemes, Lightfoot (1981: 7) asserts that these "improved technologies have not resulted in significant increases in yields". He concludes on the basis of evidence from trials conducted on 'traditional' and 'improved traditional' farms under the auspices of the EFSAIP that "there is no large difference between the yields of row and broadcast crops" (ibid). These yields were recorded in those trials as 1,298 kg/ha for the improved traditional and 1,310 kg/ha in a broadcast trial (ibid: 11). For him these findings suggest that broadcast planting has a "high yield potential" (ibid).

The small peasants therefore do not see the bulk of these practices as necessarily desirable. Thus, a deadlock has resulted from the peasants' insistence on their 'traditional' methods and that of the bureaucrats on 'improved' techniques. The peasants are generally convinced of the 'superiority' of
their own methods over those suggested by the bureaucrats, and vice versa. A more or less similar situation was noted in Mexico by Arce and Long (1987: 7-23; 27). They found that conflicting, and often incompatible 'life worlds' and 'knowledge systems' between the bureaucrats and peasants resulted in "the reinforcement and legitimation of each system of knowledge" (ibid).

With regard to the fundamental question of extension outreach, one main issue may be raised. The extent of extension outreach among the peasants is generally low. For example, out of my sample of 120 producers in the Molepolole area, only 45 (i.e. 35 per cent) reported that they had been visited by the AD for the purpose of advice on methods of cultivation. Moreover, 47.6 per cent of these farmers are kulaks or middle peasants. However, almost the whole sample (92 per cent) were aware of the basic extension package.

Does ALDEP provide a useful framework for reconciling the opposing approaches to agricultural production between peasants and bureaucrats in Botswana? The total figure of 21,034 farmers assisted under ALDEP since 1982, which amounts to more than one-third of the target group total of 60,000, is indeed impressive. As it is this figure is, however, merely an unanalysed aggregate. The purpose of the programme is to assist farmers to increase their production by giving them access not just to inputs but to the means of introducing high-yield performing methods of cultivation. However, even official data show that the uptake of these methods has been low even among those producers who have taken some of the ALDEP packages (ALDEP, 1987b: 41-8).
This is partly explained by the fact that most of these producers have concentrated on obtaining ploughs and fencing. According to the ALDEP report for 1987, ploughs account for 86 per cent of the total number of implements of different kinds taken so far under the programme (ALDEP, 1987a: 12). Row planters, and cultivators together account for the remaining 14 per cent. The ploughs do not seem to entail any commitment to the recommended methods of cultivation. This is mainly because the same type of ploughs provided under the programme are used (and indeed have always been used) even though the extension package is not complied with.

Fencing material, which is the second most popular package, accounts for 45 per cent of the packages taken by the Model 2 group. This package is even more popular among the Model 3 group, accounting for 56 per cent of the packages taken by this group. On the other hand, only 32 per cent of those Model 1 farmers who have participated in the programme had taken the fencing package. The popularity of the fencing package derives from the fact that it provides vital protection for crops against damage by animals, but those with fenced fields need not apply the recommended methods of cultivation. On the other hand, the low uptake of planters and cultivators, which together account for only 14 per cent of all the packages taken, serves as a limiting factor on the adoption of the recommended techniques. Row planting, for example depends on the acquisition of a planter.

A very small minority of the ALDEP target group have over the eight years during which the programme has so far been in operation acquired all the inputs necessary to enable them to
follow the extension programme. For example, only three respondents to my survey of target group farmers in Kweneng South possess all the implements provided under ALDEP. On the other hand, an analysis of the whole sample suggests that those who own all the implements (in some cases up to 6 ploughs) are kulaks. On the other hand, while only 16 (13 per cent) of the non-kulak group do not possess a plough, 72 (60 per cent) have no row planter.

In my view, the failure of the peasants to take up these methods and the requisite implements may be construed partly as a critique of the type of bureaucratic intervention they are confronted with. This critique takes the form of an assertion of the rationality of local knowledge and the positive role it can play in efforts aimed at improving the production and welfare of the producers. The offtake of the ALDEP packages thus seems to reflect the priorities of the producers, which in turn reflect their assessment of their capacity to adopt the recommended production techniques. ALDEP can most realistically achieve its aims when those producers benefiting from it possess most of the inputs, particularly draught power, ploughs, planters and fencing.

A crucial factor serving to limit the offtake of items such as planters is access to the amount in cash required as downpayment (ALDEP, 1987b: 42). A related issue, and one which we have highlighted above, is that of labour (see also ibid: 42-3). These issues are discussed in more detail in Chapter 5.

The foregoing analysis has shown that the approach of the bureaucrats to the implementation of the ALDEP extension package is based upon an essentially reified notion of
scientific knowledge. As van der Ploeg (1989: 159) notes, the 'scientific' scheme based on the notion that rural development is dependent on technological change not only marginalises local knowledge, but also makes it a superflous or counter-productive element. In this situation, local knowledge and practice (the 'art de la localite') "when perceived through the matrix of scientific criteria ... thus becomes nearly invisible, ignorance of the people involved being one of the common assessments" (ibid: 147). However, the introduction of advanced technology and methods of production does not necessarily represent a retrograde step. As argued above, the main problem lies in the context within which this new technology and methods are being implemented.
4.4 The kulaks and opposition to ALDEP: the case of ARAP

Throughout the 1980s, political discourse in the rural areas of Botswana has revolved around the implementation of government programmes. Central elements of this discourse include the improvement of the welfare of rural dwellers generally and the provision of inputs to farmers. As suggested in previous chapters, this discourse has been shaped as much by the bureaucratic ideology of modernisation, as by the state's changing political agenda.

The Botswana state has been relatively successful in placing itself at the centre of this rural political discourse. It has taken advantage of its role as sole dispenser of benefits to the farming population. This has been demonstrated by the now ritualistic exultations through speeches of government and ruling party leaders of rural dwellers to enrol for one or the other of the schemes. These speeches are loyally reported in the government media, which have taken on an increasingly propagandistic tone in relation to agricultural development.

The 1980s have thus seen the ushering in of a new era of agrarian populism in Botswana. This populism partly serves as a mask to conceal the government's policy bias in favour of the cattle industry. It is also concretized by the existence of the programmes targeted at the peasant agricultural sector. As suggested briefly in Section 4.2, the implementation of the ALDEP grant/downpayment scheme has heralded the emergence of a relatively prosperous middle peasantry. Since it is still in its infancy, the emergence of these middle peasants has, however, not yet significantly altered the political balance in
the rural areas. This is demonstrated by the fact that the state continues to attach greater importance to the kulaks. It is also clear that the state seeks to cultivate this middle peasantry into a politically loyal group in order to strengthen its grip on the rural areas and thereby fend off any serious challenge from the opposition.

As was shown briefly in Chapter 3, the introduction of ALDEP was initially welcomed by the richer farmers in many parts of the country. Having weighed their political position, the kulaks were satisfied that small peasants could not compete them out of favour with the government. They were also satisfied that ALDEP could never eliminate their source of labour which is drawn from the poor peasantry. They also concluded that these peasants, however prosperous they could become, could never succeed in eliminating their (the kulaks') traditional dominance of the grain market. I shall show in Chapter 5, however, that after the good 1987/88 agricultural year when many peasants produced a marketable surplus, many kulaks began to worry about the long-term possibility of the depression of producer prices. This was brought about mainly by the sudden increase in the amount of grain sold by the middle peasants.

The introduction of the ALDEP grant/downpayment scheme set the stage for a major government-kulak confrontation. Murmurings of discontent and talk of an equally 'free' programme for the rich arable farmers could be heard as early as 1984 [3]. This was fuelled by the fact that the economic fortunes of the kulaks had been seriously undermined by increasing indebtedness and bad harvests in the drought years.
of the early to mid-1980s. In the words of one kulak farmer who is also a leading political figure in Kweneng District:

"We [rich farmers] were left to cope with disabling debts while everybody else was being offered farm inputs almost free of charge. We understand the principle behind these efforts by the government, that the main idea is to help the poorer farmers to be able to feed themselves. But they are not alone in facing problems, and frankly it is not possible to attain food self-sufficiency in this country on the basis of small-scale production alone (interview, Molepololoe, September 1988)."

In particular, complaints began to mount over NDB loans, which many kulaks had obtained for the purpose of stock breeding, tractors and other machinery, diesel fuel and seasonal inputs. The usual annual rate of interest on these loans is around 10 per cent. By 1986 many of these farmers owed the NDB in the region of P10,000 per year on average, and continue to accumulate more debts, averaging P3,000 annually (interviews, Gaborone/Molepololoe, November 1988). The kulaks decided to act in early 1985.

An example of the ways in which the kulaks represent their interests to the government is provided by Molutsi (1986: 259) in a discussion of rich Barolong and Bangwaketse farmers in the early 1980s. He shows that the kulaks often act in unison and in a well organised manner when faced with a crisis. The Barolong and Bangwaketse farmers decided to send a delegation to meet the Minister of Agriculture in 1983 following a series of particularly unfavourable events stretching from the effect of the oil price rises in the 1970s to consistently low producer price levels at BAMB. These farmers demanded from the minister the writing-off of their short and long-term NDB...
loans. The government agreed to do this at a loss of P2 million to itself. To demonstrate the extent to which the government felt rattled by this development, the Minister conducted a high profile tour of the area after which statements were made about the 'plight' of these farmers to justify the announcement of the decision to write off the NDB loans.

Realising by 1985 that the stirrings of discontent among the kulaks could lead to 'unrest' marked by political uncertainty, in 1985/86 the government decided on two strategies to defuse the issue. First, the government announced an across-the-board writing-off of NDB loans for agricultural items. The main reason given was that these farmers had suffered badly during the drought. In an interview with the NDB's journal, Tswelelopele in 1988, the NDB's General Manager pointed out that the bank had been instructed as per Presidential Directive, that "seasonal input loans from the ploughing seasons 1981/82 to 1986/87 should be written off". About 1,400 farmers were involved. During the campaign for the 1984 general election, the President had disclosed to an audience of farmers in the Good Hope area of Barolong that P2.29 million had been forwarded to the NDB for this purpose (Botswana Daily News, 4 September 1984). However, other estimates place the amount eventually used for this purpose at somewhere between P5 and P8 million (interview, Gaborone, October 1988).

The NDB also made an undertaking that those who had already repaid their loans in full or in part were to be refunded either by the crediting of their accounts with other
banks or in cash. It was stated that these measures would apply 'only to dryland farming'. The definition of dryland farming includes all types of rainfed production, regardless of the scale of operations. The kulaks, then, had won the first round.

A bolder move to placate the kulaks came with the announcement in 1985 of the initiation of the Accelerated Rainfed Arable Programme (ARAP). ARAP was presented on 16 September 1985 in a speech to Parliament by the Minister of Agriculture as essentially a drought recovery measure and as a government initiative designed to benefit that "large group of farmers engaged in arable production [but] not covered by either ALDEP or FAP" (Hansard [Botswana Parliament], 1985). As stated in a MoA Savingram sent to all local agricultural offices on 9 October 1985, ARAP had been necessitated by the fact that the other programmes, such as ALDEP and the FAP "did not fully cater for the middle-level farmers". Subsequent government notices on the programme, which was introduced during the 1985/86 agricultural season, pointed out that this was to be "a project which would not be discriminatory to any group of farmers" (MoA Information Leaflet, February 1988; see also Farrington and Marsh, 1987: 10). This implied that ARAP was some kind of 'bonanza' scheme heralding prosperity to virtually every arable farmer. The budget for this programme was placed initially at P29,890,000, but would grow larger as the implementation of the programme continued year after year. Of this amount P9,220,197 was spent during the crop year of 1985/86 (financial year ending 21 March), overstepping by P1,970,197 the original P7,950,000 set
aside for that year. By March 1988, a total of P55,858,008 had been spent on the programme. This amount is over double that provided under ALDEP.

An analysis of the implementation of ARAP reveals that the programme was formulated hastily. This suggests that the pressure to introduce it was immense. Unlike ALDEP for example, whose formulation took over four years to complete, ARAP was announced suddenly. From the Cabinet decision to operationalise it, ARAP was taken through the pre-launch formalities in less than six months. Again unlike ALDEP, ARAP was financed entirely from government coffers.

Another peculiar feature of ARAP was that it provided cash payments to farmers for carrying out certain operations on their own land or on those of others lacking the technical means to do so for themselves. These operations included ploughing, for which the farmers were paid P50 per hectare ploughed up to a maximum of 10 hectares; row planting, P20 per hectare up to a maximum of 10 hectares; and destumping, P30 for 1 to 30 stumps removed, P40 for 21 to 30 stumps, and P50 for 30 stumps or more. P10 per hectare was offered for weeding, which was dropped from the scheme when it entered its second year in 1987/88. Each farmer could claim free seed amounting to 8 kg per farming household, estimated to cover a 10 hectare plot. All households would also receive four 50 kg bags of fertiliser, calculated to cover 22 kg/ha out of a total of 3 hectares.

These inputs were to be collected at the BAMB depots and other suppliers who were also contracted to supply the ALDEP inputs. Fencing was also to be made available under a 85 per
cent grant and 15 per cent downpayment scheme as in ALDEP. Also as in ALDEP, a free fencing scheme was introduced under ARAP in 1987.

Even a cursory examination of the progress of ARAP between 1985 and 1988 reveals that it has been of disproportionate benefit to the tractor-owning kulak farmers (derisively referred to by their poorer counterparts as 'BoRaditirekele' ('tractor men' - a usage which when taken in its socio-political context carries a connotation somewhat similar to a word like 'gunmen'). Table 4.2 shows the expenditure pattern under ARAP.

Table 4.3: ARAP Coverage and Expenditure, 1986-88

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>No. of beneficiaries</th>
<th>Expenditure (Pula)</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1986/87</td>
<td>1987/88</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destumping</td>
<td>5,758</td>
<td>10,832</td>
<td>3,817,245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ploughing</td>
<td>56,024</td>
<td>95,644</td>
<td>45,706,427</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Row planting</td>
<td>13,409</td>
<td>16,794</td>
<td>3,034,918</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weeding</td>
<td>16,323</td>
<td>35,302</td>
<td>1,699,284</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fencing</td>
<td>752</td>
<td>1,988</td>
<td>1,600,134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>92,266</td>
<td>160,560</td>
<td>55,858,008</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


*These figures exclude expenditure on the ARAP water scheme.

This table shows that within three years more government expenditure had been made on ARAP compared to ALDEP. Except for the P1,600,134 spent on fencing (2.9 per cent of the total), which since 1986 has been provided free of charge to a selected group, and the P3,817,245 spent on destumping (6.9 per cent) the remaining P50,440,629 (90.4 per cent of the total)
was spent on non-permanent agricultural activities such as ploughing, row planting and weeding. Ploughing was the most popular of all these activities, accounting for 81.8 per cent of the total and covering a larger number of beneficiaries. In 1987/88 ploughing alone covered 452,015 hectares, while row planting was done on 103,425 hectares, weeding on 121,760, and destumping on 42,305 hectares.

Clearly, ARAP has been able to reach a considerably large number of farmers. However, official ARAP data do not specify the categories of farmers assisted under the scheme. One has to rely on some simple but useful estimates based on known national data concerning the distribution of draught power among the cultivating households. When considering that under ARAP those who own draught power were paid for ploughing for those without it, we may conclude that on a nationwide basis no more than 20 per cent of the farming population received cash payments for ploughing. This figure is based on the assumption that 50 per cent of agricultural producers in the country are definitely known to be lacking draught power and 35 per cent have inadequate draught power.

Of the 20 per cent who have access to adequate draught power the overwhelming majority are the large-scale capitalist farmers and kulaks, who own tractors (many of them two or more) and who for this reason were able to plough for more people and still have time to plough their own extensive fields. ARAP statistics showing the total number of beneficiaries include all farmers ploughed for by others under the scheme and not necessarily those who obtained cash for doing so. Even those farmers who lacked draught power had their fields ploughed.
after those with draught had ploughed their own fields, bringing up once again the problem of late ploughing due to lack of draught power as observed in Section 4.3.

An analysis of the uptake of the other ARAP operations also confirms that ARAP has been of benefit mainly to the richer farmers. Table 4.3 shows lower values for destumping, for which P3,817,245 was spent for 16,590 farmers, row planting (P3,034,918 for 30,203 farmers), and weeding (P1,699,284 for 51,643 farmers) during the period 1985 to 1988. Again the figures for numbers of farmers who have participated are not readily available. It has already been established that only 13 per cent of farmers row plant, and fewer still (about 10 per cent) perform weeding regularly (Section 4.3). The destumping operation, which requires a considerable amount of labour, can only be performed effectively by those who have access to this labour in the form of family labour and those who are in a position to hire or obtain it by other means.

While it is clear that the majority of farmers collected free seed, the data on the use of fertiliser are sketchy. While not saying exactly how many farmers obtained fertiliser, the ARAP Annual Report for 1987/88 nonetheless points out that: "[t]he programme does not provide enough fertiliser sufficient for 10 hectares, since this is used as a demonstration purpose (sic) (it is enough for about 25 per cent of the farming households)" (ARAP, 1988: 3). Moreover, the fertiliser was provided to farmers on a first come first served basis.

From existing data for the Gaborone Region, which has an estimated total of 18,200 farmers, only 1,699 benefited from the package during the 1986/87 agricultural season. This more
or less allows for the assumption to be made that those who obtained the fertilizer (considering the fact that many extension areas have inadequate storage facilities), were mainly those who had the means of transportation with which to collect the fertilizer at BAMB and other depots, most of which are located in the towns and large villages [4].

The effect of the implementation of ARAP on ALDEP was to severely restrict its modest but selective progress. ARAP was literally superimposed over all the other MoA institutions and activities involved in arable agriculture. The key institution drafted to implement the scheme was the DAFS and its extension network. Although the post of ARAP coordinator was created, the structures and personnel functioning below him consisted of the whole gamut of institutions placed at the disposal of ALDEP.

The first salvo of criticism of ARAP's effect on ALDEP came from the ALDEP Monitoring and Evaluation Unit (ALDEP, 1987a; 1987b). These documents focused on the pressure exerted by ARAP on the time of the ADs, who under this programme were expected to measure farmers' fields to establish the extent to which particular ARAP operations had been carried out. Having done this, the ADs would then calculate the amount of money due to the farmers and complete forms in triplicate each for destumping, ploughing, row planting, and weeding, which the farmers would then take with them to the District Agricultural Office to claim payment. Considering the large amount of bureaucratic work already faced by the ADs as noted in Chapter 3, this more than doubled the paperwork done by these extension workers.
One ALDEP document noted that the ADs "who are primarily responsible for the screening and recommending applications for ALDEP packages, remained wholly occupied with measuring of fields for issuing certificates to ARAP farmers to receive payments" (ALDEP, 1987b: 4. Emphasis in the original). This conflict over the use of extension services was presented in another report which stated that ARAP was having a "negative effect on ALDEP", with the "result [that there] has been a loss of momentum for ... ALDEP which [relies] heavily on extension" (ALDEP, 1987b: 32). Senior bureaucrats responded to these criticisms by pointing out that ARAP was a short-term and 'emergency' programme. Underlining the underlying conflict between central and local levels of the MoA bureaucracy one official observed bitterly that:

Here at headquarters we theorise a lot about policy implementation and yet we are not giving the extension side of the work any chance of success. Our officers in the field are working as clerical officers, not as extension agents. They spend a lot of time filling these ARAP, NDB, ALDEP forms, and so on. These programmes are there to subsidise farmers. As an extension worker you teach people how to utilise certain resources efficiently. But now we are teaching them where to find these resources (interview, Gaborone, November 1988).

Another serious point of conflict revolved around the fact that ARAP was providing free of charge some of the inputs for which ALDEP was at that time insisting on a 15 per cent downpayment. ARAP's free fencing package was cited as a major cause of the programme's negative impact on ALDEP. Even though ALDEP had introduced a free fencing package for the poorest farmers in 1987, a major complaint was that in some districts the "eligibility criteria prescribed under ALDEP regarding the
provision of poles have tended to be bypassed by ARAP" (ALDEP, 1987a: 32).

The most important cause of consternation among MoA bureaucrats over ARAP was their resentment of being made to participate in a programme perceived as a populist BDP political mobilisation strategy. This view was expressed with more frequency after the government decided to extend ARAP into the 1988/89 season, albeit minus the weeding component. While the circular announcing its continuation stated that "this is the last time the programme is to be repeated" (MoA, 3 October 1988), the government media attributed its extension to its 'popularity with the farmers'. Underlining the fact that the scheme was benefiting those who were ploughing for others, one report stated that the programme was being repeated because many farmers had "still not recovered sufficiently from the effects of the ... drought to enable them to continue production on their own" (Botswana Daily News, 10 October 1988). Ironically, the government media were at the same time referring to a so-called 'bumper harvest' in the wake of good rains which broke the drought during the previous season.

Criticisms of the programme also took on a wider national dimension. For example, the leader of the opposition BNF, Dr Kenneth Koma, took the opportunity of introducing his party's candidate for the Molepolole constituency in the 1989 general election to accuse the government of "using ARAP as a political instrument" (Botswana Daily News, 8 June 1989).

District-level bureaucrats also voiced their displeasure with the scheme. A typical statement to this effect is contained in the 1986/87 Annual Report on ARAP of the Central
Region which reads: "We feel that ARAP should not be re-introduced afresh. It must be reviewed to become a subsidy [scheme] for seasonal and on-farm inputs like herbicides, pesticides, fertiliser, etc." (p.3). Around this time it had become evident that the implementation of ARAP was lowering morale among extension workers [5].

Another complaint that was frequently made, especially by specialists based at headquarters, was that ARAP was serving as a disincentive on increased production since it offers money instead of market incentives, etc. In the words of one respondent:

ARAP is creating a dependent society. People now just wait for the government to announce that it will pay them if they plough, destump, row plant and weed their fields. The reality is that if farmers have the means to do this they can do it without being paid. Otherwise what is the point of extension? Those who are benefiting most are the ones with the means. Those without the means are being made to depend on those with the means, instead of being given the means. ALDEP has been trying to do this, irrespective of all its problems. Subsidies are always the best because they increase commitment. If you provide things free of charge, these people may even find it unnecessary to send their children to school (interview, Gaborone, November 1988).

This point has also been raised repeatedly in relation to drought relief projects which will be discussed briefly in Chapter 6.

Among the unintended consequences of ARAP the most serious was an unprecedented increase in corruption and fraud involving both farmers and local-level agricultural officials. This took the form of claims for payments for fictitious ARAP operations by some farmers in collaboration with some local officials and ADs. This issue was taken up by the local private press with
characteristic enthusiasm. The Botswana Guardian reported on 7 October 1988 that the government had been 'swindled' of a total of P178,000. Four cases of alleged fraud were cited in the report, which was alleged to have taken place in locations as geographically diverse as Lobatse in the south, Mahalapye and Machaneng in the Central District, and Molepolole which is situated in Kweneng in the south-east.

The fact that the majority of the offenders were tractor-owning large scale farmers rather than small peasants served to underscore the point that the availability of so much funds was corrupting particularly those with the capacity to make the best out of the scheme. According to a police investigator dealing with the case in Molepolole, there were indications that the few cases uncovered were only the "tip of the iceberg" since more and more people were being investigated.

When assessing ARAP as it progressed into its second year, it seems that it had become something of a political quagmire for the Botswana government. There was still no policy that would satisfy the kulaks if the programme was discontinued. Complicating things further for the government is the fact that tractor owners have expressed strong misgivings about the setting of the price for ploughing at P50 per hectare. According to a report in MoA's newsletter Agrinews, "countrywide [these farmers] want[ed] the P50/hectare to be increased to between P60 to P70", mainly on the grounds that the prices of diesel and spares had increased. This prompted a tour by the Deputy Director of Agricultural Field Services during which he addressed audiences of tractor owners to explain that nothing could be done to increase the fee.
On the other hand, the political conflict which ARAP had generated was not lost to the national politicians. The programme was also an obvious drain on financial and other resources. This was accentuated by the revelations about corruption and fraud. ARAP thus underlined the Botswana government's problem of maintaining its constituency level support from the kulaks while at the same time building (in order to undercut an opposition looking increasingly prepared to carve itself a rural support base) a strong base among the middle peasants.
Notes

1. This was mentioned to me by virtually every Agricultural Demonstrator (AD) and by many district agricultural officials.

2. I observed in July-August 1988 that many small producers in parts of Kweneng South were resorting to such low prices.

3. Some of my respondents disclosed that they had made several representations to the local Member of Parliament and to senior BDP leaders to discuss this issue.

4. An ALDEP Quarterly Progress Report filed by the Central Agricultural Region in 1988 stated that "ALDEP farmers [in Central Region] did not benefit from ARAP fertilisers" (Central Agricultural Region, July 1988).

5. This sentiment was expressed in numerous meetings and in the field by extension staff.
CHAPTER 5

THE IMPACT OF ALDEP: OFFICIAL ASSUMPTIONS VERSUS THE EXPERIENCES OF SMALL PEASANTS

Introduction

This chapter presents and illustrates the argument that despite ALDEP the present socio-economic position of small peasants in Botswana is untenable. This relates particularly to the financial and material capacity of small peasant households to improve their situation within the framework of the programme. The chapter presents empirical material based on survey and in-depth interviews. It also makes use of other published material and to a limited extent post-survey reflections on the issues observed and analysed.

The discussion begins with the re-examination of ALDEP's assumptions regarding the availability of arable land. Also in the context of re-examining the programme's assumptions, Section 5.2 provides an analysis of the question of access to sources of cash income. In a slightly different context, the two remaining sections assess the extent and efficacy of inter-household cooperation among the ALDEP target group in Kweneng. Sections 5.3 and 5.4 discuss access to draught power, and exchanges of labour and implements respectively.

A major concern of the chapter is to examine these issues in the context of rural class relations. In the final section I thus introduce and briefly discuss the phenomenon of 'individualism' and the emergence of the middle peasants as significant surplus producers. The section then assesses the social and political implications of this development.
5.1 ALDEP and land availability

Generally speaking, the question of land availability remains one of the most inadequately studied aspects of rural life in Botswana. The most systematic in-depth study of this phenomenon in Botswana remains the now largely outdated monograph by Schapera which was published in 1943. Nevertheless, recent studies of various regions and districts, such as Gulbransen's study of Southern District (1984) and Arntzen's (1985) research in Kgalagadi, have provided useful pointers on the question of the land allocation process and utilisation in the 1980s. There also exists a large body of literature, emanating mainly from the Applied Research Unit (ARU) of the Ministry of Local Government and Lands. The ARU has produced useful factual information relating to settlement patterns in the rural areas. The degree of lack of understanding of the land issue can be seen in the largely erroneous assumptions made within the framework of ALDEP's planning. Before focusing more closely upon this issue as well as my own data, it is important to assess the land issue in Botswana as presented in some of the literature.

One of the earliest attempts to assess the land situation after independence was made by a joint Government of Botswana (GoB) and FAO study, which reported in 1974. This study found that "lack of land is not a major constraint to agricultural production", as only 7.6 per cent of the population interviewed had reported that they had no land (GoB/FAO, 1974: 57-8). This point has been echoed more recently by the Report of the Presidential Commission on Land Tenure (GoB, 1983), which recognised the existence of a problem of scarcity of grazing
land in some areas. With regard to arable and residential land the commission found that "there is generally little shortage ... save for the smaller tribal areas" (ibid: 5). However, the GoB/FAO report (1974: 57) pointed out that the mere availability of land does not imply that this land is of sufficient size or is of the required quality, or is situated in a desirable location. This finding has been confirmed in subsequent research.

The GoB/FAO report stated that 40 per cent of the households which participated in the survey reported that they had 'insufficient' land to meet their food requirements (ibid). Writing eight years later, Cooper (1982a: 270) also reported that the same proportion of his sample claimed that they had insufficient land. Odell (1981: 54), who considers insufficient land to be anywhere between 1 and 4 hectares, found that 55.8 per cent of all holders who ploughed in 1973, and 40.5 per cent of the 258,000 hectares under cultivation in that year, comprised those with insufficient land. She also found that from one area to another, households holding no land would vary from 2 per cent to as high as 20 per cent (ibid: 56).

In his study of Kgatleng District, Opschoor (1981: 122) found that "both in 1979 and 1980, close to 20 per cent of all households and 24 per cent of all crop farmers said to want more land". This point is re-iterated by Arntzen (1985: 51) who notes that while there is no evidence of an 'absolute scarcity' of land in the Kgatleng because "all interested persons are able to find fields ... relative scarcity becomes evident from the fact that it is difficult to find fields with
good soils close to the village". Giving a succinct summary of this issue, Opschoor writes:

... obviously 'getting land' is not what is important, but getting good farming land. Many cleared fields may not be ploughed on because they are infertile and infertility may in fact lead to abandoning certain areas for more promising ones, leaving the old, cleared fields unused (Opschoor, 1981: 122).

Clearly, then, the main element which has been highlighted in the Botswana literature is that of land insufficiency as against the more serious one of land shortage. Although several recent studies (e.g. Gulbransen, 1984) have warned of a looming crisis of landlessness in the future, none has shown that this problem actually does exist. Those which do provide some estimates of the number of households possibly without land fail to demonstrate the ways in which landlessness manifests itself. For example, Kerven (1982a: 563), who estimates the proportion of landless households to be 21 per cent, seems to suggest that these are households which prefer generating income through wages and/or cattle as against crop production (with those with no cattle, wages or land being placed by her at 3 per cent). In my view, this does not fully address the issue.

A useful initial step towards a reliable assessment of information regarding land availability and landlessness is to be seen in data which show the number of households by the size of land ploughed during a 'good' rainfall year. Table 5.1 contains such data relating to my sample of 120 producers in Kweneng South during the 1987/88 season:
Information obtained through my in-depth interviews illustrates the problem that most of these already meagre lands (as established through the survey) are infertile. Moreover, most of these lands are situated at a considerable distance from the villages where the people live. A case in point is that of Rre Sehuba [1], a small poor peasant producer and retired migrant worker aged 43, who is married with four children. Rre Sehuba obtained his land, a five-hectare plot, through the Land Board (an institution discussed in some detail later). He had approached the Land Board in 1980 because when the family plot, which was about 10 hectares in size, was subdivided according to the boswa Tswana inheritance custom after his father's death in 1978, his share had amounted to about 2 hectares. When he was promised land by the Land Board he had thus volunteered that this plot be further sub-divided among his four other brothers. In those days Rra Sehuba used to spend up to nine months each year working as a labourer in the mines in South Africa.

Rre Sehuba had decided in 1980, a year after he got married, that having a piece of land would enable his wife to "grow food for the children", while he would, time allowing, assist with the ploughing. He had planned to double his herd of five cattle by the time he retired when he turned 40 or so. However, due to the fact that his family grew larger and with it financial responsibilities, he was able to purchase only two cattle. Three cattle perished during the 1981-87 drought, leaving him with five in 1988 (one cow had been sold earlier in 1985 while the birth of two calves had helped "stabilise the herd somewhat"). However, Rre Sehuba "gave up on ploughing"
Table 5.1: Number of Kweneng Sample Farmers by Size of the Field ploughed in 1987/88

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size of Field Ploughed</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not ploughed</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Ha or less</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-5 Ha</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-9 Ha</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10+ Ha</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


This table shows those ploughing more than 10 hectares as representing 22 per cent of the sample. These are mainly rich peasants (kulaks). These rich peasants, 20 in all, ploughed a mean of 53 hectares, while the remaining 6 within this group who are middle peasants ploughed an average of 10.5 hectares. The table also shows that 52 per cent of the cultivating population in Kweneng ploughed between 3 and 5 hectares of land. The average size of the plot of land worked by the 62 producers who ploughed between 3 and 5 hectares is 3.7 hectares; 73 per cent ploughed less than 6 ha (cf. MoA, 1987: 74 which gives the figure for the average size of fields on 'traditional farms' as 3.8 hectares).

It is significant to note that the average size of 3.7 hectares held by small peasants in Kweneng means that they cannot meet the basic requirement for participation in ALDEP. ALDEP participants are expected to have access to at least five hectares of cleared and destumped land. Thus, the crucial factor becomes the ability of these households to obtain more land. It will be recalled from the discussion in Chapter 1.3 that under Botswana's largely semi-arid conditions (other things held constant), efficiency in agricultural production is greatly enhanced as the size of land increases.
his land after three successive years of trying because, as he put it, the land which he was allocated was a patch on dry parched ground where nothing can grow. In the beginning I was optimistic because I had to do something to feed my children. Moreover, I had heard of government assistance schemes to farmers, and I had reckoned that if given items like good implements and seeds as well as fertiliser, things would get better. In the event, I could not harvest anything, even during those few years when it did rain, despite the fact that I used fertiliser and tried as hard as I could to follow the AD's advice on methods of cultivation (interview, Molepolole, October 1988).

After abandoning his land, Rre Sehuba began an apparently thriving business of brick-laying and roof thatching.

A slightly different case is that of Rre Diatla, also a poor small peasant but still employed on the mines. Rre Diatla, who is aged 36 and is married with three children, decided from the very outset that he would not plough the land allocated him by the Land Board, because as he described it, "it was in such an arid area only a fool could even bother to try to cultivate it". He had gone to the Land Board because he wanted to supplement the three hectares of the ten or so hectares of the family plot which he ploughs. Since his parents are still alive, Rre Diatla also assists (time allowing) in the cultivation of the parent's plot, and usually the produce from all the lands is shared among the three nuclear families (Rre Diatla's, his brother's, his sister's, and his parents) which in all comprise 16 individuals, i.e. seven adults and nine children. According to Rre Diatla, the total produce from the family field as well as his own "cannot feed even half the children". Thus, wages remitted by him and his brother (the parents and sister are not wage earners) play
"an important role in keeping everyone alive". Rre Diatla reckons that

As it is we are squeezed in terms of land. When the land we have is sub-divided, none of the families will be able to grow enough food. Apparently, there is no point of going to the Land Board for more land since they [the Land Board officials] will give us arid patches again, and when we complain they will say, as they always do "so, if there is nowhere else we can allocate you land what do you expect us to do?"(interview, Molepolole October, 1988).

Another interesting case is that of Rre Thlogo, a 66 year old retired miner, lay preacher, dedicated crop farmer, and enthusiastic participant in government programmes such as ALDEP. Rre Thlogo is also a small peasant, although with his 8 hectares, 22 cattle, 50 goats, and 16 sheep, he may be said to be relatively prosperous. All four of his sons are in wage employment, with two of them working within Botswana. His two daughters are married and live with their husbands in the towns. So far as Rre Thlogo is concerned, his daughters' welfare is the "business of their husbands". Thus, he lives only with his wife, but he also feels that it is his responsibility to look after the two wives of his sons who live in the village and their five children, although their houses are situated away from his. Rre Thlogo points out that

As young families, my sons' families need to be assisted to make good of their cultivation. Since only one of them has a field and is interested in ploughing, I provide oxen to plough only two fields, mine and my son's. However, his field is situated far away and it is not of good quality either. So most of the food must be produced on my land (interview, Molepolole, October, 1988).

In 1985 Rre Thlogo had obtained through ALDEP a plough (adding to one he already possessed), a row planter, wire fencing, and

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two tollies (young bulls), all of which cost him P750. He has occasionally collected bags of fertiliser and seed "whenever it is said these items are being distributed free of charge". His harvest in 1987/88 was 20 bags, a "not-too-bad harvest", according to him, but one which is not sufficient to feed the whole family (which includes daughters-in law and grandchildren) because the daughter-in-law who ploughs "always gets less than five bags from her infertile three hectare plot".

While there are more cases of respondents to in-depth interviews which one may cite in relation to the land issue, the three already cited should suffice to illustrate the point that, inter alia, (a) as demonstrated by processes of fission within rural households, those entitled to inheritance of land through the boswa custom are likely to receive increasingly diminished plots; (b) increasingly, within families, younger (newly established) households are likely to receive from government institutions such as Land Boards land which is not conducive to successful arable production. A significant number of these households tend to prefer to abandon these lands. Thus, the case of Rre Sehuba suggests a hypothesis about the circumstances of the 18 per cent of producers (as shown in Table 5.1) who do not plough in Kweneng; and (c) even in the case of those households with relatively larger fields and with assets, other variables such as size of the household and responsibilities in the extended family (the element of 'fusion' among households) play a decisive role in determining the extent to which a household is able to satisfy its basic food requirements.

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At this point it is useful to examine the question: what factors have accounted for this phenomenon of 'insufficient' land among small peasant households? A related question is: if possible, how can this situation be redressed? A most obvious explanation of this phenomenon is population increase. The increase by 31.5 per cent of the rural population from 530,228 in 1971 out of a country total of 596,944, to 774,759 in 1981 out of a total of 941,027, is significant (CSO, 1987: 19) [2]. Underlining the significance of this high population growth rate, which is attributed to rising fertility and declining mortality rates, is the fact that it has occurred at a time when the rate of urbanization is also high, currently estimated at 11.3 per cent.

However, existing data on the growth of arable farming households in Botswana tend to be confusing because in some years, as in periods of drought, the number of producers actually declines. For example it was reported that there were 65,600 crop farms in 1980, and by 1986 these had declined to 56,800 (Agric. Stats., MoA, 1981: 60; 1987: 74). This may also be suggestive of a rather high drop-out rate from arable production.

Although it would be necessary to control for other variables such as migration, the number of households wanting land is increasing. Another element is that of land transfers through inheritance (boswa), which has been touched upon briefly. Family land transfers through inheritance are one of the common ways through which most rural households acquire land. About 35 per cent of those whom I interviewed stated that they had obtained their land through inheritance. The key
factor is the rule that determines whether and how land is divided at inheritance. These transfers occur within the sphere of customary law, and serious disputes over such rights are usually dealt with by the customary courts (Gulbransen, 1984: 20). The usual practice is that

... sons are offered a piece of the father's land, if any, as they successively mature and create their own families. The youngest son is offered the parent's developed land, albeit leaving as much of it for either of the parents' needs for as long as they are alive. The daughters have no claim to the land unless they remain unmarried. If they marry after having been allocated land, the plot reverts to the father or the boswa if he is dead (ibid).

These transactions are therefore based primarily on the rule of premogeniture in succession. The system of allocating land to heirs by parents before they die is called tshwaiso ('anticipated inheritance'). Chapter 6 contains a brief discussion of the land question as it applies to female-headed households.

Another important mode of acquiring land, namely hiring, can be discussed briefly. Very little information can be found in the existing literature regarding the way in which the practice of hiring out of land originated. My findings suggest that the majority of the households hiring out their lands or portions thereof in Kweneng are the poorest peasant households. These findings seem to indicate that the majority of the households which obtain land through hiring are the richest kulak households in the district.

However, since it was impossible to obtain precise data from the recipients of hired lands, the incidence and distribution of this phenomenon can only be gleaned indirectly from other data as well as from information obtained from those
who hire out land. For, example, I was able to establish that none of the small peasant households in my sample had obtained any land through hiring. On the other hand, 16 poor peasants, 13 per cent of my sample, stated that they had hired out some, and in 10 cases all their land. In all cases the beneficiaries were large farmers. The size of land transferred in this way ranges from 2 to 5 hectares. In nine cases, the mode of payment is in the form of an undisclosed amount in cash. In the other seven cases payment is usually in the form of 5 to 8 bags of grain, depending on rainfall in a given crop year. At the time of my research, all the households who had hired out their lands had done so for more than five years.

The practice of hiring out land raises a number of analytical issues. Among these is the nature of the relationship which has evolved between those hiring the land and the recipients of such land. I found in Kweneng that this relationship is essentially clientelist in nature. While one may in the same breath easily invoke terms such as 'exploitation', what seems to be the central defining characteristic of this relationship is that both parties benefit, although to varying degrees. The poor peasant may expect some form of remuneration or part of the produce, while the large-scale farmer expects to derive some financial profit from the surplus produced on the small peasant's plot. A salient point here is that in effect the existence of this relationship means that, unless there is some dramatic change in the poor peasant's income-generating capacity, this situation is bound to remain a permanent one. Do existing policies address this issue? As will become clearer below,
this does not seem to be the case.

Having dealt with these issues, three other trends must be examined at this stage, namely (a) the concentration of large tracts of land among kulak farmers; (b) the increasing conflict arising from a tendency of encroachment of cattle grazing near arable lands (the phenomenon of 'mixed farming' which has coincided with increased permanent settlement in the lands areas); and (c) negative features of the interaction between agricultural officials and land-allocating institutions. Since 1970 when the Tribal Land Act came into effect (the law itself was promulgated in 1968), land allocation functions in rural Botswana have been vested in an institution called the Land Board. In effect, the creation of the Land Boards removed the vital land allocation function from the chiefs, who had traditionally performed it (Schapera's monograph of 1943 provides a most illuminating and detailed description of land allocation under customary law).

Ideally, applications to the Land Board for a customary land grant for arable purposes should not pose any problem. For as long as the applicant is 21 years old or more and can show by producing a customary land form signed by the local headman that he or she is an 'authentic' member of a given local ward, the Land Board should be able to allocate him or her some land. However, as the cases cited above have shown, the quality of the land obtained is a totally different matter.

Successful applicants for arable land are entitled to a piece of 440 by 484 metres (roughly 4.5 hectares), for which an extension of up to 200 by 200 metres may be given. Such extensions are authorised, as one respondent put it, "when
there is evidence that the applicant has ploughed all the land already allocated". A certificate of ownership is then issued, for the obvious purpose of proof of ownership. As the respondent explained, this is also done partly in order to "make it easier for the government to compensate those with lands through which public projects, such as a road, have to be built" (interview, Molepolole, August 1988).

The concentration of large tracts of land among the kulaks can be traced to the fact that these farmers and others claiming large tracts of land often point out that they acquired them before the Land Boards were established. The findings of my survey indicate that the lands held by the kulaks in Kweneng average 53 hectares. The kulaks are also part of a small number of arable farmers with relatively large tracts of land who also seem to have benefited from the system of extensions, in some cases applying for and acquiring these extensions up to three times. As one respondent stated "it is not stated anywhere that the Land Board should not extend land for as many times as is feasible". Hence, as a result of the extension system, Land Boards have allocated some people up to 1,000 by 1,000 metres (interview, Molepolole, August 1988).

While all of them indicated that they needed more land, none of the respondents to my interviews reported that they had been given an extension of their plot of arable land by the Land Board. One can therefore conclude that if there have been any extensions, the main beneficiaries have been the immensely influential kulaks, and perhaps some middle peasants as well. Some of these large farmers are Land Board members themselves, or are in close contact with those who are. Hence for this
reason, there is a general sense of mistrust of the Boards among most rural dwellers, particularly the poor. This is illustrated by some of the cases cited and others to be discussed later.

Another important factor ensuring the continued concentration of land among kulaks and other large landowners is the right, by dint of the Land Act, accorded ward headmen to make 'objections' to certain applications for land. Usually, the main reason given for any such a 'objection' is that the land in question had already been allocated to someone else. The 'principle' of objection came by way of an amendment of the Land Act (1970). It was apparently necessitated by realisation that the chiefs and headmen were the most reliable sources of information pertaining to land allocations made before the Act was passed. Gulbransen (1984: 9) observes that this amounts to according considerable discretionary powers upon the headmen/overseers, as these 'objections' are not specified in the Act.

Gulbransen also documents an array of issues which, as a consequence of this vagueness in the Land Act, place the headman/overseers at an advantage over the Land Board members. For example, he writes: "Being aware of the increasing scarcity of arable land, some ward heads explicitly state that they have to reserve the uncultivated land left for future generations of their own ward and for expansion of existing holdings" (ibid: 9-10). Moreover, headmen claim vast parts of the prior trusteeship as their own holdings. This is not, however, the case of customary allocation continuing de facto, since these lands are being kept by the headmen and not being allocated to the population. Thus, many applicants fail to obtain the kind
of land which they prefer, or in an unknown number of cases, any land at all. I did not, however find any record of outright usurpation of land already allocated.

Another consequence of the vagueness of the Land Act regarding the kind of objections which a headman/overseer may make concerns a 'five-year rule' specified in the Act which states that "a customary land grant to arable land might be cancelled by the Land Board if the land has not been in use for five consecutive years". However, this rule, which could have discouraged the practice of leaving land unused, particularly among the headmen/overseers, "has never been implemented" (ibid: 16). This is partly because if this rule were ever to be implemented, the Land Boards would have to repossess the large holdings claimed by the headmen/overseers as well as those of the large holders who were granted their land before the Land Boards came into operation (ibid).

In other words, the implementation of the five-year rule would trigger a massive land re-distribution programme which would completely transform the structure of land ownership in rural Botswana. However, this is unlikely to happen because the structure of land ownership in Botswana corresponds to the structure of political power. As shown in Chapter 4, at present the role of the kulaks (most of whom are the representatives of the ruling party and the state in the villages), appears indispensable to the state's policy of maintaining political quiescence in the rural areas. In my view, the implementation of a meaningful land reform programme in Botswana can therefore only come through 'bottom-up' pressure. As will soon become clear, there is little evidence
that this is likely to happen in the foreseeable future.

Another dimension to the land crisis in rural Botswana takes the form of what has been called the 'arable grazing conflict'. The main issue here revolves around the 'encroachment' of large herds of cattle into arable lands and of arable farmers into areas designated as pastureland. To start with the former, one reason for this trend is that some of the cattle owners who own ranches and cattleposts continue to graze some of their cattle in the 'communal' areas. Noting that even small herd owners keep and graze their cattle in the lands, some writers have suggested that this tendency has developed as a result of the labour constraints caused by labour migration, which has forced some households to move their cattle to the lands (Kooijman, 1978: 73).

Silitshena (1982: 221-3), who has devoted much time to the study of settlement patterns in Kweneng, suggests that a trend towards permanent settlement in the lands began to develop, particularly after independence. This has resulted from increasing distance between permanent settlements such as villages and the lands areas. Thus, wishing to manage their crops and livestock better, most producers have moved permanently to the lands. Fortmann and Roe (1982: 311-14), who made similar findings as Silitshena's regarding the reasons for permanent settlement in the lands, also noted the inverse trend whereby lack of permanent sources of water in the lands serves to inhibit permanent settlement.

It was subsequently noted that a significant number of households practice 'mixed farming', defined as the operation of cultivation and herding simultaneously and in close
proximity to each other. Opschoor (1981: 130) suggests that at least 40 per cent of households practice mixed farming in Kgatleng.

Inevitably, the presence of increasing numbers of cattle in the lands areas has generated many complaints from arable farmers. In the extension areas around Kweneng South for example, a significant number of the cases brought to local headmen concern cattle damage to crops. In many areas, local producers have responded to this problem by erecting drift fences. Interestingly, the government's solution to this problem is to provide fencing at highly subsidised rates (in some cases free of charge), rather than address the question of increasing land scarcity. Through the ALDEP and ARAP programmes, a substantial number of cultivating households have acquired fencing equipment (see Chapter 4). However, in so far as it represents an attempt to resolve the problem of pressure on land in the communal areas, this is essentially a medium-range measure which can only achieve temporary success. The more people demand land for cultivation and for grazing their cattle, the more it will seem meaningless to simply fence in existing lands.

Complaints over the encroachment of arable farmers into grazing areas are not heard very often, although in several instances there have been confrontations over attempts by some arable farmers to cultivate crops in grazing areas. If this phenomenon, which is marked essentially by illegal self-allocations of land, exists in Kweneng, it is most certainly a new development. When it does get into full swing, as it certainly will unless there are some significant changes in the
land situation in the not too distant future, the problem will indeed be as serious as it now is in some areas, such as in parts of Southern District. Within Kweneng, normally those few complaints that have been made over 'encroachments' by arable farmers into grazing areas have become vociferous when a claimant of land in an area designated as grazing land, fences it in, thus keeping the cattle out of the land even when it is not ploughed [3].

Finally, it is important to examine, albeit briefly, the nature of the relationship between the Land Boards and agencies implementing agricultural programmes. In this respect, the most notable issue is that these two agencies do not seem to interact closely and, at least in Kweneng, have a highly tenuous relationship. This situation arises out of a perception of the Land Boards by members of the local and central agencies of MoA as 'incompetent' and 'inefficient'. This situation in turn has resulted in lack of cooperation in a number of crucial areas. For example, an ALDEP planning paper (1979f: 3) noted that "in one district local authorities claimed that virtually all the land had been allocated, while aerial photographs indicated only one in seven agricultural plots had been ploughed that season".

Thus deciding to make their own estimates, the paper's authors suggested that each of the 60,000 households known to be ploughing could, if given the requisite inputs, manage to increase their land to at least five hectares. ALDEP's planners had worked on the assumption that there were 3.4 million hectares of arable land in the Eastern Hardveld and 1 million hectares of grazing land (cf. NDP II, 1970: 33-7, which
gives the estimate of 8,170,000 acres or 1,308,850 hectares). When dividing these by the estimated number of cultivating households, i.e. 70,240 in all, the resultant mean figure of available arable land becomes 48 hectares!

On the other hand, as one Land Board member summed up this issue:

The officials at MoA have a tendency for being arbitrary and simplistic when dealing with the question of land. They do not understand that the issue is extremely complicated. For example, they have systematically cultivated the myth that the Land Board is failing in its duty of allocating land to people who need it. Why should the Board do that? The fact is, there isn't so much land as most of those who know little about the issue seem to believe. We are operating under conditions of extreme difficulty. We have to make checks and cross-checks so that we do not end up allocating land which has already been allocated. This cannot be achieved in one day. Besides, we have to try and find unoccupied land in areas which are literally saturated with fields (interview, Molepolole, August 1988).

For his part, a senior MoA official felt that such statements are designed to "disguise the inefficiency, toothlessness, and indecisiveness of these Boards". The respondent added: "In effect, these institutions are so scared of offending the large landowners that they rarely, if at all, raise the issue of all these lands which have stayed unused for decades. That is the main issue" (interview, Gaborone, November 1988).

Indeed, it does seem that the main issue is one of inequality in land distribution. By my estimate, albeit a conservative one, judging by the national data regarding the distribution of arable land, the kulaks cultivate about 35 per cent of all available arable land. If we need to add the 'unused' lands claimed by headmen, this would bring this figure to about 45 per cent. On the other hand, small and middle
peasants, who make up over 75 per cent of the cultivating population, have access to only 55 per cent of the land.

How, then, can ALDEP be of any effect if the question of inequality in the distribution of arable land is not resolved? The acrimonious nature of the relationship between MoA and Land Board officials serves to eliminate a potential source of pressure on the central government for a more realistic approach to land allocation other than the present one which literally gives headmen the power to veto some much-needed allocations. As for ALDEP itself, it appears that those in charge of the programme lack adequate understanding of the nature of the land situation in rural Botswana.

Thus, given the evidence already cited, one may conclude that there is no conceivable way in which the majority of small peasants in Botswana can increase their production to the desired and officially recognised levels unless the land question is resolved in their favour. Until this issue is resolved, ALDEP will remain a medium-range programme which will be of benefit only to those within the target group who have access to reasonably sufficient land. So far, some 'favourable' trends have helped avert an explosive situation. One of these is the fact that an estimated 10 per cent (my estimate) of rural households opt not to plough regularly, while a further 10 per cent seem to have dropped out of ploughing altogether. What will happen when these cease to have their present 'cushioning effect' can only be left to the imagination.
5.2 Agricultural policy and peasants' sources of income

A central element underlying the implementation of agricultural development policies in Botswana, particularly ALDEP, is the assumption that the majority of small peasant households have the financial capability to participate in these programmes. The analysis presented in this section shows that, while it is true that a significant number of small peasant households have access to a variety of sources of income, in the majority of cases this income is hardly sufficient to meet even the basic needs of these households.

A significant proportion of small peasant households in Kweneng belonging to the ALDEP target group have access to a number of income sources. Table 5.2 illustrates this point.

Table 5.2: Number of ALDEP Target Group Households by Sex and Sources of Income (Kweneng Sample)

| Sources of income | Category | | | | | |
|-------------------|----------|---|---|---|---|
|                   | Male | Female | Total | Not applicable | Total |
| Remittances       | 24 | 44 | 68 | 32 | 100 |
| Livestock         | 18 | 10 | 28 | 72 | 100 |
| Beer brewing      | 24 | 29 | 53 | 47 | 100 |
| *Other            | 9 | 1 | 10 | 90 | 100 |


*Includes money earned through temporary or seasonal employment, sale of firewood, hawking, etc. Savings are excluded since none of the respondents reported that they were able to save any of the cash at their disposal.

This table excludes data on income from crop production as this issue is discussed in greater detail later. The data shown in the table have been computed from a total of 100 households, which excludes the 20 kulaks in the sample because they are not part of the ALDEP target group (with the result that the percentage values correspond to the actual numerical
The data in Table 5.2 show clearly that a large number of peasant households in Kweneng (68 per cent of the sample) have access to remittances (cf. Mbere, 1985: 14). This figure is very close to the nationwide estimate that two-thirds of the households had access to this source of cash (NMS, 1982: 53). In 1986, about 2,721 migrants were recruited by South African mining companies from Kweneng, the figure having declined by some 50 per cent from the 5,442 recruited in 1978. The national figure for 1986 was 21,537 (CSO, 1987: 88).

The figures shown in the table seem to suggest some consistency in the proportion of households having access to cash remittances despite the progressive decline in the number of recruits to the South African mines. This is mainly because to some extent, the urban Botswana labour market has been able to absorb some additional labour due to increases in construction activities and the growth of the diamond mining (although not a major employer in the country) and commercial sectors. However, the huge annual increases in the number of unemployed individuals suggest that this has been largely a temporary respite. A substantial minority of rural households, especially those headed by relatively young people, face an increasing problem of having no wage earner. As Table 5.2 shows, presently 32 per cent of the households in Kweneng do not have access to cash remittances.

In principle, access to cash remittances and other sources of income should result in better income levels and standard of living for the majority of households which do benefit. Although accounting for only 3 per cent of GDP (1985 estimate), migrant workers' remittances make a major, and in some cases a
decisive contribution to household income and welfare. However, this begs the question: to what extent are those households which have access to cash remittances been able to invest this income in crop production?

The most reliable method of estimating the extent to which remittance funds are spent on crop production is to infer from data concerning patterns of cash expenditure among the ALDEP target group households (the 68 shown in Table 5.2) which receive remittances. Some of these data are contained in Table 5.3.

Table 5.3: Consumption and Expenditure of Cash Income Among Households with Wage Earners, Kweneng Sample, 1987/88.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Food</th>
<th>Crops</th>
<th>Cattle</th>
<th>Housing</th>
<th>Child support</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>68</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


These data suggest that expenditure on both crops and cattle are a low priority among the majority of ALDEP households receiving remittances in Kweneng. It is also significant that none of these households reported having made any savings. The finding that 12 per cent of these households spend cash on crop production is twice as high as the national aggregate estimate of 6 per cent provided by the NMS (1982: 6). This is probably due to the fact that the NMS findings include data pertaining to regions where crop production is a low-key activity.

Another important point to note when analysing information such as that contained in Table 5.3 is that patterns of household expenditure are also determined by variables such as
the size of the household and the sex and age of the household head. The need to control for the age of the household head derives from the observation that larger households are more likely to spend their income mainly on food compared to smaller ones (Lucas, 1982: 645). The assumption here is that 'older' households are likely to be larger than 'younger' (newly established) ones. Table 5.4 contains data on sex and age of household heads according to their order of priority in using cash income. Since all the households with access to cash through remittances regard food as their first priority, data on purchases of food have been excluded from the table.

Table 5.4: Cash Expenditure Priorities Among ALDEP Target Group Households with Wage Earners by Sex and Age of the Household Head, Kweneng Sample, 1987/88

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MALES</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Crops</th>
<th>Cattle</th>
<th>Housing</th>
<th>Child support</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20-40</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>41+</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FEMALES</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Crops</th>
<th>Cattle</th>
<th>Housing</th>
<th>Child support</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20-40</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40+</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The figures in this table show that among the male-headed households, the first two priorities for cash expenditure among the group aged between 20 and 40 are child support and housing improvements (building, furniture, household items, etc), followed by cattle and crops. The female-headed households within this age group tend to have similar cash expenditure...
priorities. There is a slight similarity with the data on households headed by women over 40 years of age. The main difference is that the older female-headed households tend to prefer investment in crop production rather than cattle. On the other hand, the older male-headed households tend to consider cattle and crops respectively as the highest areas of priority in this regard. It is important to highlight the fact that the listing of these 'priority' areas does not necessarily imply that the cash required for a particular investment is always available.

At this point it is important to examine the extent to which selling crops represents a viable source of income for the majority of small peasant households.

Table 5.5: Households Selling Sorghum in 1987/88 by Area

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area Planted</th>
<th>Total in sample</th>
<th>Av. no. of bags harv.</th>
<th>Number selling</th>
<th>No. not selling</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-5 Ha</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-10 Ha</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10+ Ha</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>120</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


This shows that slightly over half of the households in my sample sold any grain during 1987/88, which was a good rainfall year. The most obvious reason for this is that the majority of the households, i.e. the 72 ploughing 1 to 5 hectares, did not produce a surplus over their consumption requirements. Data on maize production indicate a much lower incidence of sales among the households which ploughed between 1 and 10 hectares. Only
10 (i.e. 11.5 per cent) of this group sold any maize.

While the households which ploughed 6 to 10 hectares produced an amount of sorghum slightly exceeding the officially recognised level for subsistence (i.e. 1,600 kg or 18 bags of 90kg each), the majority of these households still bought staple foods such as maize meal. The sale of sorghum was intended to supplement their diet through the purchase of other types of food items, as against seeking an additional cash income to be spent on items other than food. Many of the households which sell grain in Botswana do so chiefly for this purpose, while another significant number tend to buy back this grain in processed form, at a price much higher than the producer price. Official figures on production levels on 'aided' (ALDEP) and 'unaided' farms also confirm the finding that the majority of small peasant households do not produce a surplus of foodgrains (ALDEP, 1987b: 61).

In addition to the fact that most peasant households in Botswana do not produce enough grain to sell on the market, there does not appear to be any system of market incentives for peasant producers in operation in the country. Gulbransen (1980: 88) observed that among the factors which could serve as an encouragement for people to become more involved in crop production is the existence of a growing demand and taste for market commodities such as furniture, clothes, radios, bicycles, donkey-carts, and various 'luxury' items [4]. One may add that there also seems to be an overriding desire among individual households to be self-sufficient in food production. My findings confirm Gulbransen's observation that this increased demand for market commodities has not resulted in a
significantly increased interest in arable farming (ibid: 88-9). Why then, do most of the producers continue to eschew expenditure of some of their cash income in agriculture?

One reason for this tendency is that, apart from the fact that crop production is a high-risk enterprise in Botswana, the market for arable produce is not encouraging. The other important factor has already been highlighted, namely that for most of these households the money available is often sufficient only to meet basic household needs. With regard to marketing incentives, the official (BAMB) price for a 70 kg bag of sorghum in 1987/88 in the south-eastern parts of the country was P21.15 and for maize it was P18.75. In December 1988, these prices were some 35 per cent lower than those offered on the South African market. Hence, the majority of surplus-producing crop farmers, especially those in the Southern District and Barolong, decided to sell their grain in that country (interview, Gaborone, December 1988).

Since the BAMB operates within a statutory framework (the 1974 [BAMB] Act) which maintains it as the sole producer grain buying institution recognised by the government, the grain market is seriously constrained. The BAMB operates all marketing functions, ranging from pricing to transportation and storage. For the small producer without the means of transportation to sell in South Africa, the BAMB offers the only viable alternative, since prices on the 'informal' village market tend to be even lower than those offered by the parastatal. The poor condition of the BAMB's facilities, serves as an additional disincentive (see Chapter 4).

Another area often cited as a major (actual or potential)
source of income for most rural households is sale of cattle. It must be stated that, apart from the obvious fact that the distribution of cattle ownership in Botswana is extremely unequal and skewed, few peasant households derive much income from the sale of cattle. First, for any household to be able to make any income from cattle it must own a herd which exceeds the 'critical' level, i.e. 25 or more cattle. Such a herd is comfortably above the threshold of 6 to 12 cattle required for a span of draught animals (Vierich and Sheppard, 1980: 20). A household with such a herd is able sell at least one animal per year and still remain with enough draught power. However, such a household remains vulnerable, as drought or disease could still deplete the herd.

However, as Table 5.6 shows, only a small proportion of small peasant households are able to sell any cattle.

Table 5.6: Cattle Ownership among Sample Households by Farmer Category, 1987/88 (Kweneng Sample)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Number in sample</th>
<th>% of sample</th>
<th>Mean No.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No cattle</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-5</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-10</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-20</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21-30</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30+</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>32.5</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>120</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Fieldwork, Kweneng District.

These data require further explanation. While it appears that most households in Kweneng have access to some cattle, most of these cattle owners have very small herds. When taking
into account the mean number of 7 cattle among the households owning between 6 and 12 cattle (twelve cattle being the critical threshold for self-sufficiency in animal draught), then the number of households which are not in a position to sell any cattle rises to 56, which constitutes 46.7 per cent of the sample. It is also significant to note that, with the mean number of cattle among the group which owns 11 to 20 being 13 cattle, most of the households in this group are unlikely to derive much income from cattle sales. Thus, only 47 households (39 per cent of the sample, i.e. the total of those owning 21 cattle or more) fall within the range of being able to sell.

This group is made up predominantly of middle peasants and kulaks (the mean of 85 among the group owning more than 30 cattle is accounted for largely by the kulaks, some of whom reported having herds as large as 250, while the middle peasants, 27 in the sample, own on average of 41 cattle).

It is therefore clear that a very small number of the small peasant households are in a position to derive an adequate income from selling cattle. On the other hand, the ability to build a large enough herd of cattle depends on other sources of income and productive activity. As already seen, the other major sources of income for most rural households, namely wage earnings or remittances, as well as the sale of crops, in many cases do not contribute enough income to facilitate this kind of investment.

The overall picture which emerges from the analysis carried out in this section is that the majority of rural households in Botswana do not have enough cash to spend in crop production. This means, therefore, that many of these small
peasant households are not in a position to enrol for a programme such as ALDEP. When taking into account that under the current grant/downpayment scheme, a household lacking draught power (and such households constitute around 40 per cent of rural households in Kweneng - a figure which includes the 19.1 per cent with no cattle and the 10 per cent with a mean of 2 beasts - as shown in Table 5.6), implements and other inputs such as fertiliser would need to spend at least P1,000 in the first year.

It is noteworthy that in recent months the ALDEP's planners have come to recognize these issues. They have subsequently instituted a so-called 'zero downpayment scheme' under which all the ALDEP inputs are to be provided free of charge to the poorest farmers. The merits and demerits of these efforts are discussed in Chapter 6.
5.3 Agricultural policy and rural class relations: the decline of customary exchanges of draught power

The implementation of agricultural development programmes often results in significant changes in the character of class relationships among rural populations. For example, in the 1970s in Botswana the TGLP created among cattle-owning households a class of private ranchers operating mainly outside the communal areas. Among other things, this commercialisation process resulted in a significant change in herd management practices. It also resulted in the elimination of customary patterns of cooperation between the large herd owners and peasant households. Until the introduction of the TGLP, these forms of cooperation had guaranteed some poor households access to some cattle and, therefore, to draught power.

Intra-peasant class relations in rural Botswana have been shaped to a large extent by the high-risk nature of agricultural production as well as by patterns of property ownership and access to agricultural assets. Labour migration has also played a major role in this respect, since the absence of some labour has necessitated the pooling of labour resources among the majority of rural households. The question of labour will be dealt with in the next section.

Several studies cited earlier (Curtis, 1972; Litshauer and Kelly, 1981; see also Mahoney, 1978) have shown that agricultural production in Botswana is marked by a variety of customary reciprocities in labour and draught power exchange. These exchanges are interwoven with the 'developmental cycles' of the households and therefore largely take the form of solidary action among families. My findings suggest that in
the 1980s the incidence of these reciprocities, such as the mafisa system, the use of available labour resources in common ('putting in hands'), ploughing together, and ploughing with close relatives, have been declining.

The mafisa system

The mafisa system has traditionally played a significant role as a means whereby households with insufficient or no draught power could gain access to cattle. The normal practice under this system is that a cattle owner with a relatively large herd 'lends' some of his or her cattle to a poorer relative, friend, or fellow villager. It is in this context that in Botswana one may speak of cattle being held by a household as against cattle owned, a point highlighted in the report of the RIDS in 1976. Households holding cattle are entitled to consume their milk and may use them as draught power in exchange for looking after the cattle. The cattle remain the property of the lender. Since this exchange involves a degree of dependency between the parties involved, the mafisa contract exhibits a semi-feudal, clientelist character. The clientelist character of the relationship is marked by the fact that the provider of the cattle benefits from the 'cheap' form of their management, while the holder is able to plough his or her lands.

The existing evidence overwhelming suggests that the incidence of the mafisa system throughout Botswana has declined considerably since the mid-1970s. One significant early estimate of the distribution of mafisa cattle was provided by Curtis (1972: 68), who reported that 21 per cent of his sample
of peasant producers in the Manyana area of Ngwaketse held cattle under this custom. The RIDS (1976: 35) reported that "[a] complete cross-section of households, both rich and poor, were found to have lent their cattle to relatives and friends". One study of two sample villages in eastern Botswana found that the mafisa system could benefit up to 32 per cent of the households (Hertel, 1977: 13). Evidently, the mafisa system benefited a significant number of households in the 1970s.

However, by the end of the 1970s the situation had changed dramatically. In their analysis of official data on the 65,600 households of 'traditional farmers' who ploughed in 1980, Litshauer and Kelly (1981: 3-4) found that only 5.2 per cent of these households used mafisa cattle, while 15 per cent used borrowed draught, and 6.5 per cent employed various combinations of the above. My survey data suggest that only 2.2 per cent of small peasant households in Kweneng benefited from mafisa-based exchanges during the 1987/88 ploughing season. On the other hand, 50 per cent of kulak households and 11 middle peasant households (9 per cent of the sample) benefited from these exchanges. These findings thus confirm the observation made by Cliffe and Moorsom (1979: 49), that "mafisa-ed cattle, although widely dispersed, are heavily concentrated amongst owners of already sizeable herds".

The decline of the mafisa system is due partly to the commercialisation of cattle farming. When large cattle owners began to establish TGLP ranches in the late 1970s, a large number of cattle were removed from the communal areas. A significant number who have hesitated to sign their leases (Holm, 1985: 171) still operate the old cattlepost system.
Nevertheless, even these households are oriented towards production for the market. The opportunities in commercial cattle production which emerged in the mid-1970s (see Chapter 1) clearly far outweighed the benefits which large cattle owners were able to derive from the mafisa system.

The mafisa system was subsequently replaced by one favouring the employment of full-time herdmen who are paid in cash or in kind. The increased use of veterinary facilities, animal feed and other facilities provided under government programmes favours the concentration of the herds in large numbers under centralised management. Moreover, the good market opportunities have encouraged many cattle barons to engage in the breeding of high-grade cattle. The clientelism based upon the mafisa system has therefore largely ceased to exist. Referring to the political costs of dismantling this form of clientelism, one academic observer noted:

Today many people with a reasonably large herd do not feel a sense of loss over the decline of the mafisa system. To them it no longer matters that those who would benefit from these cattle would become their loyal friends and support them at every turn. The village fora where such support would be normally needed, such as the kgotla, have long ceased to be focal points of village politics. Nowadays, an ambitious large cattle owner is a District Councillor, party official or national politician. He operates within a different world of patronage (interview, Gaborone November, 1988).

This suggests causal factors so far not mentioned, particularly that clientelism in village politics no longer revolves around the distribution of cattle. How, then do small peasant households obtain draught power? In attempting to answer this question it is important to begin by examining data pertaining to cattle ownership among small peasant households.
When taking into account the estimate of a 'critical' herd size which could enable a household to have its own draught power which is 6 to 12 cattle, then according to the data in Table 5.5 (Section 5.2), 30 per cent of small peasant households have no or inadequate draught power in Kweneng. Furthermore, when considering that the mean number of cattle within the 6-10 range is 6.4, one could well say that even the producers whose cattle fall within this category (26 per cent of my sample) do not have adequate draught power. Thus, in the sample only 25 households (31 per cent) have reliable draught power.

**Customary reciprocities in draught power exchange**

According to customary practice, the households lacking draught power may obtain it from other households, especially relatives, who have and are willing to give them their cattle. Those with inadequate draught power would expect to benefit from the practice of go lema mmogo ('ploughing together'). This is characterised by the alternate use of a combined span of oxen to plough the different fields of the different owners of the cattle.

However, most households are unable to obtain any assistance with draught power. This is a direct result of a dramatic increase in the practice of hiring draught animals. This phenomenon may be traced to the decrease in the number of cattle available under mafisa as a consequence of increased commercialisation of cattle farming. Thus, realising the opportunities to be gained from making their cattle available only in exchange for cash, even those households owning relatively small herds have joined in the practice of hiring.
The practice of exchanging or sharing draught animals is therefore to be found only among very close relatives. Thus, all the 12 per cent of households in my sample sharing draught power during the 1987/88 agricultural season were close relatives (fathers, sons, daughters, uncles, etc). However, as one respondent put it "sharing animals and being given cattle to plough with free of charge are two different things. Those who share do so because there is no alternative to sharing if you have insufficient cattle to make a span, and someone else, especially if related to you, is in a similar position" (interview, Molepolole, September 1988).

A respondent to an in-depth interview, Rre Kobo, a 32 year old small peasant producer who had no cattle, was assisted by his uncle who provided him with his span of oxen after ploughing his own field. It has been noted that the relationship between an uncle (a mother's brother) and a nephew is very significant in Botswana, and is codified in Tswana custom as close, warm and generally characterised by mutual trust and support (Gulbransen, 1980: 31). However, Rre Kobo as well as several other heads of households in his position indicated that the cattle are often made available after the first showers, a situation which seriously impairs the development of the plants after sowing. Thus, even among those few households with access to draught power through sharing, the ability to make the best out of this situation is determined among other things by the timeliness of the delivery of the cattle.

The hiring out of cattle or tractors, which is not an altogether new development, has increased dramatically in the
1980s. This implies, among other things, that the number of households requiring hired draught have increased while there has been no visible increase among those providing it. For example, 60 per cent of my sample (i.e. 72 out of 120), used hired draught in 1987/88. On the other hand, only 22 per cent hired out their draught power during the same period. Nevertheless, even when accounting for the fact that some farmers hiring out tractors come from outside Kweneng, the overall number of these households remains relatively small.

The price of hired draught has also increased dramatically since the early 1970s. Be it a tractor or oxen, this price is currently around P50 per hectare. This is attributed to the introduction of the ARAP scheme which resulted in an increase of the price from its late 1970s level of around P30 per hectare.

Those households which depend on hired draught power also face the problem of the late delivery of the draught animals or provision of a tractor. The majority of the households which hire out cattle have only one span, which they make available for hire after they have completed ploughing their own fields. One respondent estimated that it takes about two weeks to complete the ploughing operation. Since this is normally carried out about two weeks after the onset of the first rains, by the time the owner of draught power ploughs for the second person, a full month of rains will have passed. Although a tractor is faster than oxen, most tractor owners have large fields which they must plough first.

In addition to the problem of timeliness of ploughing, non-cattle owning households who have to hire cattle or
tractors consider the price of hiring to be exorbitantly high. When considering the fact that hiring costs P50 per hectare on average, then since they plough about 3.7 hectares the majority of small peasant households hiring draught power probably pay at least P150. The government's post-drought recovery scheme, ARAP, through which close to 100 per cent of non-cattle owning households have benefited because of the free ploughing services (with the money accruing to those owning draught power), has only provided a temporary respite for these producers. When this scheme is discontinued in the 1990/91 crop year as indicated by the government, the majority of small peasants will be back where they were before the scheme was introduced.

ALDEP's answer to the peasants' problems with draught power is the provision of a donkey draught power package. Donkeys are used as draught power in Botswana mainly in parts of the north-east. In Kweneng, as well as in other districts of the eastern hardveld, donkey draught is rarely used. Donkeys are regarded by most farmers as slow and inefficient. In a country with a predominantly pastoral culture, donkey draught is also looked down upon and is generally regarded as a humiliating sign of the extent of a given farmer's poverty.

Many district-level officials point out that most peasants have not shown any enthusiasm for the donkey draught power package. Six donkeys are provided for each applicant for the scheme under ALDEP. This package is indeed the most unpopular of all the ALDEP inputs. Under the grant/downpayment scheme the donkey draught power package costs about P600, which is relatively low (for a span of six oxen a small peasant would
expect to spend roughly P2,000). However, the uptake of this package has never been in excess of 15 per cent of the packages taken by participants in the programme. For example, in 1987/88 the uptake of this package represented 10 per cent (572) of the 5,696 packages taken, while implements represented 65.1 per cent (3,708), fencing 23.6 per cent (1,342), and water tanks 1.3 per cent (74) (ALDEP, 1988b: 2). All in all, small peasant households seem to have rejected the donkey draught package provided under ALDEP.

Thus, the government's 'solution' to the problem of lack of draught power has met with little success. It therefore appears that the most meaningful approach to this problem is to devise a strategy for the re-distribution of cattle. This, however, is a complex issue which has major political implications. A suggestion made by Lipton (1978: 66) that "if ALDEP is to benefit poor farmers - i.e. to create enough productive employment - a substantial pilot scheme ... to provide reliable [cattle] draught must be initiated soon", met with no response from the government. This was because this scheme, which would entail the provision of cattle for large numbers of small peasants would, in the words of one informant, be "extremely expensive and unworkable". However, it is more likely that this scheme could not be implemented because doing so would involve massive transfers of cattle from the cattle barons to the peasants, an unthinkable prospect under existing socio-political and economic conditions in Botswana.
Another area in which cooperation among peasant households has declined is that of kinship-based customary reciprocities in the exchange of labour and implements. One of these exchanges is known as go tsenya mabogo ('putting in hands') which denotes the sharing of available labour resources. The practice may also refer to "the exchange of labour for the use of draught animals" (Curtis, 1972: 69). Noting the significance of these exchanges in the 1970s, Alverson (1979: 45) asserts that "the regular use of these practices, coupled with the distribution of rights and privileges of access to other capital inputs, suggests that a household, while an important element in the economics of farming, is by no means a self-contained unit". However, the exchange of labour, which is also found among close relatives, depends in large part upon the availability of extra labour at a given time.

Due to the system of migrant labour, many rural households face the problem of shortage of agricultural labour. For most households, finding draught power does not end their problems. After planting, which as we saw in Chapter 4 is normally done through the broadcasting method, the household will be faced with the tasks of weeding, bird-scaring, and harvesting. For those households wishing to increase the cultivated area within their field, an added burden is that of destumping.

My findings show conclusively that the incidence of these kinship-based forms of cooperation in arable farming has declined considerably. This trend is due mainly to the
particular approach being employed in the implementation of the agricultural schemes, especially ALDEP. The survey data show that only 7 (i.e. 5.8 per cent) of the sample households in Kweneng made their ploughs available to others during the 1987/88 season. On the other hand, only 16 (13.3 per cent) reported that they assisted other households with labour. The decline in the practice of lending out ploughs may be due to the fact that nowadays there are fewer households which lack them. Indeed only 13 per cent (16) of the households in my sample did not have ploughs.

On the other hand, 73 households (60.8 per cent) reported that they needed extra labour during the cropping cycle. On average, these households had 2.3 persons available as labour throughout the cropping cycle. The mean required for an average plot of 2.1 to 8.0 hectares has been estimated to be "approximately four labourers" (Litschauer and Kelly, 1981a: 25).

The problem of lack of labour is as acute among close relatives as it is among rural households generally. The case of Rre Pewo, one of the respondents to in-depth interviews, serves as a good example of the hardships faced by a household lacking labour. Rre Pewo is a small farmer aged 68. He lives with his wife and adult daughter and her two children. Another daughter has a small house nearby where she lives with her two young children. Rre Pewo has a son who also lives with his family nearby. The son's three children are very young, all below 10 years of age. Since Rre Pewo's son is a wage worker in a town in Botswana and is therefore often absent during the crop year, labour on the family plot comprises himself, his 64
year-old wife, and two daughters. Re Pewo's household members also provide some assistance on his son's plot, because the latter's wife, whose children are still young, is unable to work the field alone. Thus, the two household's plots, 11 hectares in all, are worked by five individuals: one elderly man, one elderly woman, and three young women. The harder task of holding the ox-drawn plough is normally performed by the person from whom the family usually hires draught cattle.

The most significant impact of ALDEP with regard to labour has been a substantial reduction of labour available to assist other households free of charge. Most of the households participating in the programme have developed what one may call 'an individualistic trait', brought about by the opportunity to own implements and be self-sufficient in this regard. It is significant to stress that access to implements does not in itself imply that the programme has been successful. This is chiefly because the distribution of these inputs among the target group is uneven. Moreover, only a small proportion of the beneficiaries have taken enough implements to enable them to adopt the programme's package of crop husbandry practices (see Chapter 4). However, access to these inputs has reduced the degree of inter-dependence among peasant households, as those which have acquired the inputs concentrate their resources within their own lands.

The element of 'individualism' in the use of agricultural items is greatly encouraged by the ALDEP programme. The programme emphasises the development of production at the individual household level. Thus, indirectly, ALDEP has contributed towards the progressive elimination of the
customary exchanges of labour and implements. As one respondent noted: "Nowadays people no longer talk about working together. Since some farmers are obtaining help from the government which is selling them inputs cheaply, the tendency now is for people to focus on their own production" (interview, Molepolole, November, 1988).

The approach to the implementation of ALDEP may therefore be said to have had the effect of sharpening class cleavages among the various categories of producers comprising the programme's target group. This can be seen in the fact that the main beneficiaries from ALDEP, namely the middle peasants, have increasingly started to employ seasonal majako labourers in ever-increasing numbers. The majako system is a traditional practice of hiring labour in rural Botswana, which is discussed at length in Chapter 6 in relation to female-headed households. Referring to his increasing need for labourers, Rre Mogoma, a middle peasant, observed:

There will always be those who for one reason or the other are unable to take advantage of the new government schemes. The good thing is that those of us who can produce some surplus are able to provide such people with employment, so that they are also able to maintain a reasonable livelihood (interview, Molepolole, September 1988).

The trend towards individualism signifies the rise of the middle peasants as an important economic and social force in the rural areas. Their position as a new social force was demonstrated at the end of the 1987/88 agricultural season when many of them - most of whom were ALDEP participants - increased their marketable surplus substantially. According to my survey data which contain information on crop sales during good
rainfall years which preceded 1987/88, the middle peasants in Kweneng have increased their production by some 15 per cent. Their average production of sorghum, on holdings which average 10 hectares (cf. ALDEP, 1983: 19) was 60 bags. Of this amount about two thirds were sold to the BAMB.

This is a significant improvement on the known level of surplus production among this group, which has been estimated at about half their total production. These farmers have therefore clearly increased their production under ALDEP. Most of the middle peasants have obtained those ALDEP inputs which facilitate the adoption of the recommended extension package: row planters, cultivators, etc. Indeed, the middle peasants comprise that small category of peasant producers (roughly 15 per cent) who have adopted the recommended package of cropping methods (see Chapter 4). They also take advantage of deliveries of fertilisers, improved seeds, etc., particularly under the drought recovery measures. Moreover, the middle peasants participate enthusiastically in training schemes organised under the extension network at institutions called Village Training Centres (VTCs).

The success of the middle peasants under ALDEP derives mainly from the fact that they were relatively well-off even before the programme was introduced. An interesting outcome of their emergence as significant surplus producers is that it has led to a change in the character of rural class relations and in 'wider level' political relations. This can be seen in the increasing concern among kulaks that the middle peasants' increased production may have the long-term effect of depressing producer prices. I noted this situation during my
fieldwork in Kweneng and it emerged repeatedly during interviews.

Many of the kulaks expressed the view that 'suddenly there were too many people selling crops'. To some extent this had to do with improved marketing facilities. The general complaint among the kulaks, however, was that BAMB prices are low. As one respondent commented:

It is our hope as farmers who produce and sell that the government will not keep the prices low simply because there are so many people who now sell their crops. If that happens, many people will certainly be discouraged from production (interview, Molepolole, December 1988).

As I probed this matter further, it became clear that the emergence of the middle peasants as high output producers is not seen as a welcome development by many of the kulaks. For the middle peasants on the other hand, the attitude of the kulaks is an example of the tendency by these 'BoRaditirekele' ('tractor men'), as one respondent put it, "to expect that they must monopolise everything" (interview, Molepolole, December 1988).

Evidently, the popularity of the government among the middle peasants has increased. This leads us to the question: what is the likely response of the ruling national political leadership in Botswana to this new development? For the obvious reason that this relates to future developments, one may only venture into guesswork. First, the ruling politicians are undoubtedly pleased with the emergence of this new potentially loyal support. On the one hand, their response may be to seek to consolidate their support among the middle peasants by continuing along the present policy lines. On the
other hand, in order to maintain their support among the kulaks they may opt for a more generalised approach, through a programme designed along more or less similar lines as ARAP. Either way, the change in the character of rural class relations already set in train under ALDEP cannot be halted. Of much interest will be the response of the government bureaucrats to this situation, which is much of their own making. These are interesting issues for future research.

As for the majority of small peasants, my findings indicate that ALDEP does not provide the framework for adequately addressing their situation. This chapter has shown in the analysis of their situation ranging from access to land, sources of income, and reciprocal inter-household exchanges of productive assets that the position of the small peasantry has deteriorated rather than improve. This, however, does not mean that room for improvement is completely closed. However, as shown particularly by the analysis of the land question, for such a change to take effect there will be a need for a thoroughgoing transformation of the structure of access to land and aspects of the politico-economic system. An alternative would be the development of the manufacturing sector and the absorption into it of these households. However, these are complex issues which can be fruitfully dealt with by a different study altogether.
Notes

1. 'Re' is the Setswana for 'Mr'. Its feminine form is 'Mme'. The real names of the respondents have not been used.

2. There is some need for caution when dealing with the 1971 census figures as they have been criticised for significant coverage error (CSO, 1983: 11). However, there seems to be some consistency in the large population increases which have ranged between 15 and 30 per cent since 1904 when the first national census was taken.

3. I was told by one of the headmen at a lands area near Molepolole that he had had to deal with four such cases in 1987/88.

4. I also noted the existence of an interest in these items in Kweneng, particularly in Molepolole and the other large villages. Those who can afford these items, who include migrant workers, certainly strive to obtain them.
CHAPTER 6

BOTSWANA'S AGRICULTURE-SPECIFIC RURAL DEVELOPMENT POLICY AND WOMEN

Introduction

The majority of poor peasant households in Botswana are headed by women. While there exists among them a small minority who are better-off, in effect the designation 'poor farmer' or 'poor peasant' refers generally to female-headed households. In the Botswana context, the term 'female-headed household' refers mainly to two household types. These consist of de facto female-headed households, i.e. those headed by married women whose husbands often spend long periods absent as migrant workers; and de jure female-headed households, which are headed by unmarried women, widows or divorcees (Kerven, 1979: 2). The importance of this distinction lies in the fact that these household types tend to exhibit different socio-economic characteristics.

Because of their peculiar circumstances, female-headed households have been the subject of a large amount of research, especially between the early 1970s and mid-1980s. The major concern of these studies has been to develop detailed typologies of female-headed households and to delineate the various constraints facing women as agricultural producers. Responding partly to the information provided by these studies, government policy makers have presented rural development programmes such as ALDEP as adequately providing the framework for systematically eliminating the constraints and problems which have been identified. To what extent has this been the case in practice?
This chapter presents a detailed analysis of the situation of rural women in relation to state policy on rural development. The chapter utilises survey and case study material collected in Kweneng District. Section 6.1 provides a brief overview of the historical evolution of the phenomenon of female-headed households in Botswana. The section then proceeds to present a critical assessment of the existing literature, culminating with the identification of a number of significant analytical and empirical lacunae.

An important area then indicated as deserving urgent systematic study is the policy regime on rural women and the relationship between bureaucrats and rural women in the policy context, which is dealt with in Section 6.2. The issues discussed relate specifically to ALDEP and include package offtake, extension, and recent measures apparently designed to ameliorate the situation of the 'poorest of the poor'. Section 6.3 argues, on the basis of case and survey material collected in Kweneng District, that the socio-economic situation of female-headed households, which was already becoming untenable in the 1970s, has, despite a decade of the implementation of ALDEP, deteriorated even further in the 1980s.

In Section 6.4 the discussion centres around the question of non-cultivating female-headed households which as such are not covered by policies such as ALDEP. The section examines the prospects for the emergence of an effective extra-agricultural policy regime to address the situation of these women. An assessment of the interplay of a number of factors which impinge on this situation at the national and local level is also provided.
6.1 Women farmers as a 'special case': research and policy in the 1980s

The year 1971 marked the turning point in the study of the situation of women and female-headed households in Botswana. The results of the first post-independence national census which were published in that year revealed that 48 per cent of those women over the age of 15 who were unmarried had at least one child; for most age groups over 25 years the proportion of unmarried women with children was over four-fifths (Peters, 1983: 105, citing Syson, 1973) [1]. The 1981 census returns demonstrate the continuation of this trend. This census found that 56.6 per cent of the women over the age of 15 designated as 'never married' had children, and an average family size of 1.60 (CSO, 1987: 82). The 1981 census also showed that out of a total of 143,784 persons engaged in 'family agriculture', 66,048 (46 per cent) were women (ibid: 144).

The emergence of the phenomenon of female-headed households in Botswana has been closely associated with the evolution of the system of contract migrant mine labour to South Africa. In this context, an important direct outcome of the latter was to raise the age at which men became married from around 25 to 35 years. As an increasing number of women also migrated, though at a much lower rate than the men, this had the effect of lowering male authority and the control of fathers over their daughters (Izzard, 1982: 665). As Izzard puts it, as the result of these changes

\[\text{the social sanctions for celibacy waned, and women no longer saw marriage as the chief means by which to enhance their status in society. The role of mother assumed greater significance in the face of declining importance of 'the wife' and the two roles became isolated from each other (ibid).}\]
Thus began a tendency towards 'illegitimacy', i.e. the birth of children outside wedlock, particularly as from the 1930s (Schapera, 1936, 1947; Comaroff and Roberts, 1977). Moreover, men increasingly refused to pay the fines imposed on them in such cases under customary law, as well as to marry the women concerned when ordered to do so. The fines tended to be punitively exorbitant, and were usually payable in the form of cattle, in some cases as many as would normally be required as bogadi ('brideprice'). Among the married men who abandoned their wives and children were the increasing number of makgwelwa ('deserters'), i.e. those who failed to return from South Africa after the expiry of their contracts. Schapera (1947: 6) estimates that among the men who were married when they left for South Africa "nearly half (43.7 per cent) abandoned their wives and tribe".

Given this situation, the chiefs, beginning with Bakgatla tribe (who up to this day have the highest per capita number of male absentees per district in the country), "introduced a series of measures explicitly designed to ameliorate the position of women" (Comaroff and Roberts, 1977: 102). Among these measures was a decision to recognise the right of women bringing cases of a marital nature to represent themselves in court, as well as to own and inherit cattle. Until then women had had to be represented by their guardians, usually their fathers, while cattle were solely the property of men. This innovativeness or 'pragmatism' among the Tswana chiefs amounted to the recognition of the right of women to be heads of their households.

While many of the women who subsequently became single
mothers had been left with no choice, by independence in 1966 a tendency had emerged whereby a significant number of women deliberately chose not to marry. This is explained by a number of factors, some of which are discussed by Gulbransen (1980). According to him one important explanation of this phenomenon is that "it is no longer crucial, legally or symbolically, for the children to have a father as agnatic identity and patrilocality are less important now" (Gulbransen, 1980: 33). This is because birth out of wedlock has ceased to be regarded as immoral, shocking, or shameful (ibid). These points notwithstanding, however, the option of not marrying makes better sense to those women belonging to relatively prosperous families, which are few, who are more likely to receive support from their parents and agnates. While from the point of view of most women staying single brings with it the satisfaction of independence from direct control by a man, for many this independence is not earned out of choice.

This independence is taken into account in the current official definition of a rural female-headed household, which is seen primarily as an agricultural unit. According to this definition, such a household "is a farming household ... in which the farm is managed by a woman who takes the necessary decisions for operating the farm" (ALDEP, 1987a: 61). It is further noted that the land cultivated "presumably ... need not be registered or held in her name" (ibid). Existing estimates suggest that female-headed households constitute no less than 35 per cent of rural households countrywide (Izzard, 1982: 672). The average figure for the more densely populated districts which are situated in the relatively fertile eastern
hardveld which includes Kweneng District is as high as 40 per cent (ibid; cf. Kossoudji and Mueller, 1983: 836). A recent MoA estimate places 'farm holders' who are women at 35.3 per cent (some 29,400), while the proportion for Kweneng is given as 31.4 per cent (MoA, 1987: 21). On the other hand, the de jure category constitutes some 7 to 10 per cent of all female-headed households in the country (Izzard, 1982: 682-3) [2].

The earliest studies of rural women in Botswana, as heads of households or as agricultural producers, appeared in the 1970s. These studies were partly influenced by the 'labour reserve' analyses which located the position of women within the context of processes of capitalist transformation in the region revolving around the migrant labour system. One of the major outcomes of these processes was identified in this literature as the 'artificial' separation of the male migrant from his land in the 'reserves'. This separation was artificial in the sense that the task of working the land remained with the migrant's relatives, particularly his wife. In this way, agricultural production played the role of 'subsidising' the meagre wage of the migrant as well as ensuring the subsistence of his family (Wolpe, 1972). These issues have been articulated more systematically in relation to Botswana by Cliffe and Moorsom (1979: 44), who write:

By forcing women to remain on the land [the contract migrant labour system] devolved onto them alone both the entire burden of housework and of the care of children and inactive adult relatives, and also the extra productive labour which the male migrant was no longer there to perform and which he did not usually compensate with wage remittances, in part of course because wage rates were set only to cover the worker's subsistence ... This exploitation is reinforced by the standard discrimination in capitalist employment which seeks to exclude women from most
productive work, or wage labour, in order to confine them exclusively to housework and reproductive roles.

The latter part of this argument dovetails with some of the formulations on the 'domestication' of women in some of the feminist literature (cf. Rogers, 1980).

The first major study of women in agriculture in Botswana conducted after the publication of the results of the 1971 census was Bond's report published in 1974. This study was a MoA-sponsored sample survey of 204 households in the south-eastern part of the country. Among its major findings was that women performed up to 74 per cent of all agricultural tasks (Bond, 1974: 14) [3]. Bond found that women took part to varying degrees in land clearing, ploughing, planting, weeding, bird-scaring, harvesting and threshing. On the other hand, men did mainly destumping, land clearing, ploughing and planting. It was also found that men perform close to 90 per cent of tasks associated with livestock.

One of the earliest attempts to explain this gender-specific system of allocating agricultural tasks was made by Boserup (1970), who attributed it largely to the prevailing patriarchal values. Many studies in Botswana (RIDS, 1976, Brown, 1983; etc) have also stressed the importance of cultural factors in this context. The sexual division of labour in agriculture has given rise to a tendency to assess the performance of female-headed households in comparison to their male counterparts.

The first detailed nationwide data on the socio-economic position of women in relation to that of men, particularly in relation to the distribution of income, were provided by the
RIDS (1976). These findings are analysed in detail by Kossoudji and Mueller (1983). Concentrating on the 28 per cent of households with no adult male of 'prime working age' (20-64 years) present, the writers show that this group has access to the lowest mean income compared to the other categories. They also show that 44 per cent of members of female-headed households are in the three lowest income deciles, while "only 25% of members in male-headed households fall into the three bottom deciles" (ibid: 838).

Several other studies, which in fact constitute the bulk of the literature on women in Botswana, have also dealt with the question of constraints on assets and other factors of production in terms of the comparison between male and female producers. An example of the approach used in these studies is provided by the work of Brown (1980a, 1980b, 1983) and Fortmann (1981, 1984). Brown's key findings are that 24 per cent of female-headed households (18 out of a sample of 74 of her Kgalenq case study) had no fields; 80 per cent (59) had no cattle; 36 per cent (27) took part in ploughing, and the average harvest of grain produced by these households was 7 bags.

On the other hand, male-headed households did much better with only 15 per cent (21 out a total of 136) having no fields, 35 per cent (48) owning no cattle, while 79 per cent (107) cultivated crops regularly and on average produced 29 bags of grain (ibid). Noting that in the case of most female-headed households the problem of lack of cattle often means having to hire a tractor or oxen, which is expensive, these households tend to face greater problems associated with lack of draught
power and therefore tend to plough late, which reduces yield (ibid: 7; Fortmann, 1984: 456-60). Women also tend to have access to less agricultural labour, which in turn affects the quality of husbandry (Brown, 1983: 377; Fortmann, 456-60).

These studies, however, failed to account adequately for the efficacy of patterns of exchange and other reciprocal economic relations on female-headed households. They therefore tended to present these households as somewhat static entities fixed in an unchanging situation. This shortcoming was partly offset by Gulbransen's study (1980) of the 'developmental cycles and processes of fusion and fission' among rural households in the Bangwaketse area. His study sought to establish, among other things, the ways in which these processes affect unmarried women or female heads of households [4]. Gulbransen's major finding in this regard was that a crucial determining factor of the economic fortunes of a household headed by a woman is the extent to which the 'senior' household from which it emanates has sufficient assets and labour to give it assistance (ibid: 17-34). Gulbransen notes that generally, such households are often marginalised as the developmental cycle proceeds and the process of fission sets in; for example, their access to assets and sources of income becomes restricted as brothers start their own families (ibid: 27-31; 118). It has been shown in Chapter 5 that these forms of cooperation among rural households in Botswana have declined generally.

The studies cited above evidently made a significant contribution towards the understanding of the position of women in Botswana's rural areas. They showed, in agreement with
Boserup, that gender is an important determinant of the division of labour in agriculture. In particular, they demonstrated the importance of the distinction between male and female-headed households in illustrating, in the Botswana context, the effect of gender on differential access to capital and a variety of other factors of agricultural production.

However, many of these studies exhibit a number of fundamental conceptual and methodological flaws. As Peters (1983: 100) correctly argues, they tend to concentrate on "the burdens and [do not pay] any systematic attention to the contradictory consequences for women's independence". Many of them take a "narrow typological approach" which fails to go beyond the "mere description of variation in household structure" (ibid: 101). There is much truth in Peters' observations.

Both as agricultural producers and as part of the socio-political fabric of the rural sector, female-headed households are indeed a 'special case'. However, the studies cited tended to ignore a whole host of issues which have become central to the analysis of similar processes in other parts of Africa. The most important of these issues have to do with the sphere of policy, which impinges on the capacity of these households as both agricultural and non-agricultural units. If the objective is to identify and explain the factors which account for the poverty of households headed by women, we should be looking within the context of the 'wider' socio-political system and specific intra-rural relationships, for the factors generating and maintaining particular policy approaches to the problem of these women.
In so far as policy is concerned, a significant flaw in the studies cited is a tendency to conceptualise these women exclusively as agricultural producers and their households as agricultural units *tout court*. These studies therefore have helped generate and justify a rural development policy perspective on rural women which is focused almost exclusively on agriculture. This, however, is hardly surprising since many of the studies derived from consultancy work carried out on behalf of MoA's Rural Sociology Unit.

These studies thus contributed to a tendency to assume that the problems of female-headed households are fundamentally agricultural. They were therefore rather sanguine about the prospects of an ALDEP-type programme assisting female-headed households generally. As will be shown in Section 6.3, a major outcome of the processes which have led to the marginalisation of rural women in Botswana is the elimination of a significant number of female-headed households from agricultural production altogether. The discussion which begins in the next section is therefore partly aimed at overcoming these analytical inconsistencies and empirical gaps.
6.2 Bureaucrats, agricultural policy and women: ALDEP in Kweneng District

When conceptualising the situation of rural female-headed households in Botswana within the context of state policy it is important to take into account several recent formulations on the question of women and development. The most important assertion expressed in recent studies is that gender alone does not adequately explain the factors which influence particular policy approaches to rural women. It has been shown that gender makes better sense when viewed in conjunction with other important factors, such as relations of class and ethnicity (Wilson, 1985: 1026). Wilson observes that women's status should not be compartmentalised into a 'neat package', as it "comprises a whole series of multi-faceted situations and behaviour". This is because "[i]n situations of social change, women experience both gains and losses and it is the inter-relationship between these positive and negative aspects which determine whether women's position has become more or less acceptable" (ibid, referring to Arizpe's work, 1983; see also Deere, 1985).

This formulation is of particular relevance to the Botswana case. This is because the country's major agrarian reform programme, ALDEP, although much can be said to criticise it, does include women in its general framework. It is the circumstances of their inclusion in the programme, the conceptions and relationships that influence and characterise it, as well as their effects, which require detailed analysis.

There has been a tendency, manifested for many years with an indisputable consistency, for rural development policy in
Botswana to avoid addressing the situation of women directly. This was the case particularly from independence in 1966 up to the implementation of ALDEP in 1981. For example, scant reference is made to women producers in the development plans preceding 1979. The first mention of women in a policy context was made in NDP III (1976-81) which referred to the findings of Bond's study of 1974. Suggesting that this study had been something of an eye opener, NDP III pointed out that its findings had "demonstrated the key role of women particularly in arable agriculture in both the execution of tasks and decision-making" (ibid: 164). This observation was followed by a pledge to increase extension outreach to women by involving them in demonstrations as well as by increasing the number of female extension staff (ibid).

This newly-discovered 'knowledge' of the situation of women and empathy towards them was, however, not reflected in the formulation of ALDEP. Throughout the four-year period of the programme's formulation, no framework emerged for systematically dealing with the question of female-headed households. The only mention of these households in any amount of detail was in a short 'planning paper', in essence an information sheet aimed at district officials, entitled 'Sub-marginal Households' (ALDEP, 1979k).

This paper simply reiterated known factual information relating to these households. The ALDEP paper went no further than identifying these households as poor households 'mostly headed by women' (ibid). Nothing concrete came out of this. One searches in vain to find a single reference to women in the main planning document, the 'Project Appraisal Report' released
in 1981. Presumably, the programme's planners were satisfied that women were adequately accounted for under the general category of 'target group farmers'. Adding a touch of irony to all this is the fact that one member of the four-person ALDEP Planning Team is a woman who had been inducted from MoA's Rural Sociology Unit (RSU).

It was revealed very early into the implementation of the programme, i.e. during the period of the credit-subsidy scheme (1981-83), that the programme's coverage of women was low. For example, the report of the 'ALDEP Baseline Survey' (ALDEP, 1983: 7) pointed to the fact that less than 10 per cent of the 'farm holders' who had participated in the programme at the time of this survey were women. Changes were subsequently introduced after the mid-term review of the programme in 1985.

The question of women and ALDEP was one of the main issues raised, evidently at the instigation of MoA officials, during the mid-term review. (The review mission included ADB, IFAD and FAO officials). The recognition of female-headed households as a 'special case' in the framework of ALDEP represented a major landmark in the progress of thinking on the policy. This change derived directly from the rather belated acknowledgement of the fact that these households represent "more than half the Model 1 farmers", and 54 per cent of "the 23,000 farming households without cattle in the country" (ALDEP, 1987a: 3; 61).

Official statistics indicating the extent of participation by women in the programme are, however, partly misleading. This derives mainly from the fact that these are aggregate figures which are not subjected to detailed analysis. The
uptake of inputs by women in comparison to men is shown in Table 6.1.

Table 6.1: Male Versus Female Distribution of ALDEP Packages, 1981-82 to 1987-88

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Packages taken by sex (%)</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981-82</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982-83</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983-84</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984-85</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985-86</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986-87</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987-88</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Clearly, there has been a significant increase in the number of women obtaining ALDEP packages, from 15 per cent of the total in 1982 to 49 per cent in 1986/87. To its credit the report containing these figures points out that the data relate to "female applicants who have been given inputs and not necessarily [to] female-headed households" (ibid: 63). The report also notes that "[t]he figures on female participation, especially for 1986-87, might appear to be inflated". This is attributed to the fact that 1,578 (about two-thirds) of the 2,579 inputs taken by women during that year were ploughs, and that their offtake was concentrated in the Francistown Region (ibid). This having generated some suspicions of possible cheating, a study was carried out in the area of Tutume in this region by the ALDEP Monitoring and Evaluation Unit. The study
found that although the majority of those who had taken ploughs in this area (82 per cent) were women, 65 per cent were found to be dependants, i.e. daughters, wives, or close relatives, and "not heads of families" (ALDEP, 1987d: 8).

To their credit, official statisticians do differentiate among the female beneficiaries by category (i.e. by 'Model'). For example, the data relating to 1986/87 show that out of 2,579 women who took packages, 567 (22 per cent) belonged to the Model 1 category, 1,772 (68.7 per cent) to Model 2, and 240 (9.3 per cent) to Model 3. This distribution is confirmed to some extent by district-level data contained in the DAO's Management Sheets for Kweneng South. These data indicate that out of the 263 women who took ALDEP packages between 1984 and 1988, only 64 (24.3 per cent) belonged to the Model 1 group. Table 6.2 illustrates this point.

Table 6.2: Cattle Ownership Among Female ALDEP Beneficiaries in Kweneng District, 1984-88

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of cattle</th>
<th>Beneficiaries</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>24.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-10</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>45.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-20</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>22.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21-40</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The low level of participation of Model 1 women is traceable to some of the factors outlined in the previous chapter, especially that many poor farmers find the price of the packages to be prohibitive.

My survey data also reveal other dimensions of this
phenomenon, which are not readily discernible in the official data. Setting aside the question of the low coverage of the Model 1 group, it appears on the surface that women have been covered in a manner not very dissimilar from that of the whole target group. However, the groups owning 11 to 20 and 21 to 40 cattle comprise mainly married women or widows, while the majority of those falling within the non-cattle owning group are unmarried. The married women represent their husbands, from whom most of them obtain the money to cover the ALDEP downpayment. Statements acclaiming the 'increased participation' of women in ALDEP therefore over-stress the point (see for example ALDEP, 1988a: 7).

In order to adequately understand the situation of cultivating female-headed households, two issues require detailed analysis. The first concerns bureaucratic conceptions of the situation of women as agricultural producers. The second centres around the relations between bureaucrats and women farmers in the context of policy implementation. Boserup's work (1970) is of particular relevance in this regard. Boserup argued that colonial bureaucrats and technical advisers "are largely responsible for the deterioration in the status of women in the agricultural sectors of developing countries [because they] neglected the female agricultural labour force when they helped to introduce modern commercial agriculture ... and promoted the productivity of male labour" (ibid: 53-4). This neglect also found expression in terms of a biased approach to extension, where women were advised to apply 'traditional' methods of production, while the men were taught to apply 'modern' methods (ibid).
Various studies around the Third World have shown very clearly that there is a tendency to exclude women from efforts aimed at surplus-generation. This tendency manifests itself partly through inadequate extension. Bond (1974: 41-50) was among the first to highlight this tendency in Botswana. According to my survey data, women accounted for only 9 percent of the 45 producers who were visited by their ADs (out of a total sample of 120) for the purpose of extension advice during the 1987/88 crop year in Kweneng South. Brown (1983: 381) postulates that MoA's poor record of extension on women emanates from a tendency to ignore them because of a basic perception among extension workers that women are inefficient as farmers. This does not resonate well with ALDEP's objective of making all farmers efficient.

It has been argued that the 'invisibility' of women in rural development policies is traceable to 'male bias' on the part of development researchers, planners, and the employees of donor agencies influenced by Western stereotypes on the position of women in society (Rogers, 1980: 47; Safilios-Rothschild, 1985: 301; Brydon, 1989: 95-103). As we shall see, rural women do suffer special disabilities qua women. But it is important to realise that such gender biases operate on top of tendencies which affect female-headed households qua poor households.

A number of additional factors influencing these different levels of bias against women can be identified, particularly in relation to extension. The findings of my research in Kweneng District show that extension workers tend to ignore female producers not because they are women but because they are poor.
The main reason for this is that, regardless of sex, poor producers are regarded as 'hopeless and not worth the trouble' [5]. This leads to intolerance and impatience towards these producers, who are also generally regarded as 'lacking seriousness' [6]. It is common to find an AD bypassing female farmers in the process of disseminating information or extension advice [7]. In response to a question about this, one AD pointed out:

The problem is not with ADs but with the planners. We are expected to implement the extension package on people who lack the most basic means to take part. Only a magician can do that. We sympathise with these poor farmers, especially the women. But we also recognize that it is futile to try to do anything until these people are in a position to effect the advice given (interview, Molepolole, September 1988).

Many women thus feel marginalised and ignored - a sentiment expressed by the majority of my respondents. On the other hand, although admittedly a few cases were observed, the ADs tended to give enthusiastic support to 'successful women', most of whom are wives of better-off peasant farmers.

The tendency to provide inadequate extension support to women has not been checked by the steady increase in female ADs in the 1980s. Female ADs constitute some 15 per cent of the total AD staff (cf. Bettles, 1984). Their effectiveness is greatly undermined by the attitudes of senior officials within the DAFS as well as their male counterparts. They are generally seen as facing 'special problems', and as incapable of performing the required work effectively (Bettles, 1984: 8).

A recent assessment of the problem of low coverage of the 'Model 1' farmers takes the form of the hypothesis that these
farmers (who are often referred to as the 'poorest of the poor') may be failing to take advantage of the programme because they cannot afford the 15 per cent required as downpayment for most of the inputs provided under ALDEP (ALDEP, 1987a: 19). As we have seen in the general discussion of small farmers in Chapter 4, this is partly correct. A so-called 'zero downpayment scheme' was then introduced in mid-1988 as a mechanism for overcoming this problem. The scheme is targeted specifically at the 'Model 1 farmers' and is regarded as the most viable solution to the problem of the low level of participation by the poor producers. Under this scheme the core packages consisting of donkey draught, animal drawn implements, fencing, and water tanks are provided free of charge to Model 1 farmers.

The introduction of the 'zero downpayment scheme' was accompanied by the relaxation of some of the eligibility criteria spelt out when the grant/downpayment scheme was introduced in early 1984. These include the removal of the prescription of a minimum of 3 hectares of cleared and destumped land as qualification to participate in ALDEP. Additionally, the farmer's labour, such as that expended in destumping and the erection of fences was to be counted towards downpayment (ALDEP, n.d.: 5). Nonetheless, a new condition was added, which restricts participation in this scheme to those Model 1 farmers with an annual income of less than P500. This was apparently designed to undercut attempts by those who may have access to cash but qualify for Model 1 status, say on the grounds that they do not own cattle.

However, very early after its initiation, there were
indications that the 'zero-downpayment scheme' was running into problems. It has been stated for example that the offtake of the free fencing package, which was introduced for similar reasons but much earlier in 1986, "has been below expectations" (interview, Gaborone, November 1988). According to this respondent only 72 packages had been taken by eligible farmers in 1986/87, and a little over 200 in 1987/88. The offtake of these packages had been "confined mainly to the districts of the Central Region while the rest were conspicuous by their non-performance in this effort". This, however, may have been due to inefficiencies in the administrative system. The real test of the effectiveness of the scheme has still to be seen.

Having raised all these issues, it would be unfair to suggest that the bureaucrats embark on measures designed to marginalise women consciously and deliberately. It is my contention that the inconsistencies and problems currently associated with agricultural policy and women in Botswana arise chiefly out of conceptual and practical inadequacies associated with the functioning of the bureaucracy. The initiation of the 'zero downpayment scheme' provides a good example of the long-running commitment among some of the bureaucrats to press the case of the poor. One also cannot fail to notice and appreciate the frankness with which many of the ALDEP reports acknowledge the existence of problems, inconsistencies and failures. As is shown in the next section, however, these very problems, inconsistencies, and failures are largely responsible for the marked downturn in the socio-economic position of women since the 1980s, and for thwarting the prospects of many among them.
6.3 Rural female-headed households in the 1980s: the deepening crisis

This section argues that, despite the much-vaunted 'upsurge' in the participation of women in ALDEP, the situation of female-headed households has generally deteriorated to the point of assuming crisis proportions during the 1980s. Using material collected in Kweneng District in 1988/89, the section also assesses the situation of non-cultivating households. Since it has been shown in the previous chapter that small peasants face formidable obstacles to generating income from crop production, animal husbandry, and wages and/or remittances, it is not necessary to elaborate upon these issues in any further detail. Nevertheless, it is important to present a statistical profile of the female-headed households in my sample in relation to access to land, labour and those sources of income specific to them such as beer brewing.

Table 6.3 contains baseline data on the female-headed households in my sample.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Av. Age</th>
<th>Av. family size</th>
<th>With cattle No.</th>
<th>With wage earners No.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Single</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>20.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Widowed</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>14.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divorced</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>46.2</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>44.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The data shown in this table confirm the view that female-headed households are generally poor. They also show that among those designated as de jure, those headed by unmarried and divorced women tend to be the poorest along with about half of those headed by widows. Other data shown in the table which deserve immediate attention are those depicting age. The finding that the average age of the heads of households who are unmarried women is 33 years compared for example to 46 years among married women is significant (cf. Koussoudji and Mueller, 1983: 837). One explanation of this finding is that many of these women have probably migrated to the towns to join the 'informal sector' of the urban economy. As a caveat to be noted, while these issues are both interesting and important, they fall beyond the the scope of this work.

Data on the size of the field ploughed and cattle owned help present a more complete picture. According to the findings of my survey, the average size of the plot of land cultivated by female-headed households is 2.8 hectares, which is significantly lower than the district average of 3.7 hectares (cf. Fortmann, 1984: 454).

While access to land among the households headed by women usually follows the pattern described in Chapter 5, the situation with regard to unmarried women is significantly different from that of widows. For example, an unmarried woman may benefit from the transfer of a portion of land through the boswa custom provided that she remains unmarried, in which event the land reverts to her agnates (Gulbransen, 1984: 20). However, since "[a]ccording to customary law, unmarried women represent a most marginal category as far as land inheritance
is concerned, a marginality which is often transferred to their children" (ibid: 22), land inherited in this way almost always goes exclusively to the male agnates. While an unmarried woman may help work the parental holding while the parents are still alive, there is no guarantee that she may still continue to do so after their death. On the other hand, a widow is entitled to inherit the property of her husband.

Thus, for many unmarried women with children the only remaining avenue through which to obtain land is the Land Board. Out of nine women whom I interviewed at length only four stated that they had successfully obtained a plot of land through the Land Board. The remaining five work small portions of their parents' holding. During the interviews these respondents generally pointed out that they had been told by Land Board officials that land was not available. One respondent had made three unsuccessful attempts to obtain land in this manner. However, as the respondent put it "there have been many cases of people whom I know being given land. For example, a man who was present when my first application was rejected now has a plot of land and ploughs regularly". This illustrates the marginality of these unmarried women.

This account goes some way towards explaining the mystery of the 46 per cent of de jure female-headed households countrywide which do not own land, while 75 per cent of those designated as de facto have access to some land (Izzard, 1982: 689). According to the findings of my survey, female-headed households owning no land account for about 88 per cent of the estimated 24 per cent of rural households owning no land in Kweneng. However, 20 per cent of female-headed households do
have access to some land but have not ploughed for almost the whole of the 1980s. This has been partly due to the devastating drought of 1981 to 1987, which dissuaded many women from ploughing.

Female-headed households are the most disadvantaged with regard to access to draught power. The NMS (Izzard, 1982: 691) had found that nationally only 22 per cent of female-headed households own or hold cattle. This is one of the long-term effects of denying women the right to own cattle which as was seen in Section 6.1 only came to an end during the early twentieth century. According to the survey the majority of female-headed households (about 78 per cent) do not have access to reliable draught power.

For obvious reasons, female-headed households have been hardest hit by the decline of the incidence of customary reciprocities in draught power exchange such as mafisa, ploughing together, and so on, discussed in the previous chapter. However, there does not seem to be any reason to believe that the these exchanges have ever been to the benefit of the majority of female-headed households. Setting aside the usual problems associated with the use of borrowed cattle as draught power, such as the fact that these cattle are usually provided relatively late in the rainfall cycle, with very few exceptions female-headed households have always faced the problem of lack of access to agricultural assets.

Another important area in which women face a major problem with their production is lack of labour. The shortage of labour among female-headed households is generally attributed to the effects of labour migration. Even before the advent of
migrant labour, however, a largely culturally defined sexual division of labour was in existence. Men were allocated the tasks of land clearing, destumping, ploughing (using the ox-drawn plough), and planting. Women, often assisted by their children, were expected to carry out weeding, bird-scaring, harvesting, threshing, and binding. This is not, however, a hard-and-fast division, nor is it necessarily one determined by physical capacity. For example, women are known to plough, which is another direct outcome of the migration of male labour (Fortmann, 1981: 7; Solway, 1979: 38-9).

The sexual allocation of tasks need not be regarded as a negative phenomenon as such. The problem is that women tend to undertake a disproportionate share of the work (estimated by Bond [1974: 14] to be as high as 73.6 per cent). Although the extent of their activity enhances their decision making in crop production, this is earned at the expense of increased work. Most female-headed households lack the capacity to deploy adequate labour resources at the most critical times during the cropping cycle. This constraint is accentuated by the fact that in addition to activity associated with crop production all women have to perform on a daily basis 'domestic chores' such as cooking, childcare, fetching water and firewood, often from long distances, as well as income generating activity such as beer brewing. Time thus becomes an added constraint which is, more often than not, overlooked when assessing the impact of development projects on women (see Kann, 1986: 31).

Most of these households, particularly those headed by unmarried women which, as shown in Table 6.3 have an average family size of 3.1, have 1.1 adult persons available as
agricultural labour, compared to the district average of 2.4. They usually have only their young children to assist them. The availability of the labour of the children is also determined by school attendance, which often means that they are away at the village during the crop cycle, particularly after January (cf. Brown, 1983: 377). It is therefore quite correct that policy planners often wrongly presuppose the existence of a 'pool' of readily available workers under the category of 'family labour' - a situation which serves to accentuate the position of these households (Safilios-Rothschild, 1985: 300; for an example of this tendency see also ALDEP, 1979p: ii).

Since cash remittances have been discussed at length in Chapter 5 in relation to all ALDEP target group households in my sample, it is not necessary to do so again here. The single most important source of cash income for many rural women, namely beer brewing, has also suffered greatly in the 1980s. This has been due mainly to three factors. First, since the early 1980s, the brewing and sale of bojalwa (traditional sorghum beer) has ceased to be a particularly remunerative activity for many rural women. This is partly due to the large number of households which brew bojalwa in the rural areas (Hesselberg, 1985: 148-49). The majority of rural households brew bojalwa from time to time and 55 per cent of my sample did so regularly in 1987/88. This suggests a marked decline from the national aggregate - roughly applicable to Kweneng District since it is a 'typical' rural area - found by the RIDS (1976: 52) to represent 79 per cent of all rural income from manufacturing.
The second important factor which has contributed to the decline of the scale of traditional beer brewing is the severe drought of the 1980s which resulted in the reduction of beer brewers by some 15 per cent [8]. Since beer brewing is closely associated with agricultural production, the scale of involvement in it tends to correspond closely to arable output.

Thirdly, and most important, the unprofitability of brewing *bojalwa* has resulted from the 'intrusion' into the rural areas of factory-produced 'traditional' beer manufactured at the Chibuku brewery in Gaborone (see also ibid: 149; Roe, 1981: 44). Many of my respondents blamed Chibuku beer for the decline in their income from beer brewing. According to one respondent, the advent of Chibuku has enabled "only the rich people to sell" who buy the beverage at the local depot at a relatively low price, thus marginalising those relying on the sale of *bojalwa*. According to her the result is that

... even if a poor person like myself were able to buy Chibuku there is still the problem of having to compete with such people. An alternative would be to sell on a small scale as most people are now doing. However, this will mean having to settle for a small income as well; in fact much smaller than that which one would normally obtain from brewing *bojalwa* if there was no Chibuku (interview, Molepolole, October 1988).

Thus, for many women brewing beer is increasingly becoming an unviable undertaking. It is also highly likely that the small-scale Chibuku retail market is already saturated, as an increasing number of the relatively better-off peasant households switch to this enterprise. For many women the loss of this source of income is particularly regrettable because the money generated through it accrues directly to them even when a male head is present. It is a particularly serious blow...
to those women who do not engage in crop production altogether.

As the result of the interplay among the above factors, a small but significant number of the female-headed households who do not plough but own some land engage in the traditional sharecopping practice called detele. According to this arrangement, the farmer working a plot of detele land provides the original owner with a portion of the harvest, which is usually in several bags of grain. Although the amount of grain offered is also determined by the size of the harvest, this system is evidently of some benefit to those who practise it. Notwithstanding this observation, however, cultivating one's own land - provided other things are accounted for - is obviously more beneficial, and potentially more remunerative than depending on sharecropping.

Under these conditions most women whose households are not engaged in agricultural production constitute the majority of people who from time to time perform majako labour on the lands of better-off farmers. The majako system is a traditional practice in rural Botswana whereby people are 'employed' during peak periods in the cropping season, especially for weeding and harvesting. Majako labourers are paid in kind, also in bags of grain, whose number depends on the farmer concerned. In recent years, this practice has increased dramatically, commensurate with the increase in the number of poor households. For example, Curtis (1972: 77) found that those who worked for others under this system comprised 0.2 per cent of his sample of 279 producers. In my sample, 46 per cent of the women from time to time do majako work. Among these, 70 per cent do not cultivate their own fields. The wide
difference with Curtis' findings may partly be explained by differences in location (his study was carried out in Kgatleng District). However, the two districts differ little, mainly in terms of size.

Finally, many of the rural female-headed households have been beneficiaries of drought relief schemes introduced in the 1980s. These schemes have included food delivery and 'labour-based' projects. Out of a total of about 155,000 adults who received food aid in 1985 (including 36,538 declared to be destitute) (Hay et al., 1986: 58), over 60 per cent were women. A total of 265,041 children were also receiving supplementary feeding during this period. In Kweneng alone about 43,460 persons were said to be under 'nutritional surveillance'.

The labour-based projects - which were introduced for the first time as 'food-for-work' projects during another devastating drought in the 1960s - provided a source of income for some of the participants. The projects included the building of classrooms, kgotla shelters, residences of extension workers, storerooms, 'handstamping' (sorghum or maize grinding), etc. The participants were paid P2.75 per day. Though small, this amount, which makes up P1,003.75 per year, helped ensure the survival of the households which had access to it. This amount was about half of the minimum wage in building and construction which in 1987 was P5.60 per hour (CSO, 1987: 58).

When taken in the strict sense of saving lives, the drought relief programme has been a relative success. Due credit has also been paid to the organisation of the relief operation (Hay et al., 1985: 53). However, to suggest, as Holm
and Morgan (1985: 469; 475) do, that the P40 million spent by
the government on the programme "has provided for the poor to
increase what they get from the state relative to that obtained
by the rich", is a dubious assertion. This is because this
assertion is based on the unfair comparison between P8 million
spent on a ranch-building project whose beneficiaries were
individual cattle barons, and an amount, however large, spent
on a much larger population in an emergency operation.

Although the drought relief scheme also included measures
designed to assist farmers to cope with it such as the
distribution of certified seed, some of its features bring up
the type of criticism which came in the wake of ARAP. This
applies mainly to the labour-based activities. As one
respondent put it, these projects had created a category of
people who "now believe that the government provides employment
in the rural areas and do not accept the fact that these are
temporary measures". She observed that even among those who
can plough, especially with government assistance through the
existing agricultural programmes, many have now decided not to
resume cropping activities (interview, Gaborone, January 1989).
Several other respondents wondered whether the government will
dare curtail these activities now that the drought seems to be
abating. Since these projects are still continuing, one may
only surmise that this will either create another political
quagmire for the government as ARAP has done, or herald a new
approach to the provision of rural infrastructure which
guarantees some low-cost wage employment to a small but
significant number of the rural poor.

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6.4 Rural development policy and poor women: any future outside agriculture?

One of the significant findings of my research highlighted in Section 6.3 is that as much as 20 per cent of female-headed households in Kweneng District are not involved in crop production. As illustrated in the discussion of access to land and other factors of production relevant to agriculture, these non-cultivating households are obviously not in a position to derive adequate incomes from agriculture. There are two types of poor non-cultivating rural households in Botswana. One constitutes households which have dropped out of crop production permanently, and the other those which have never cultivated crops because of lack of basic factors of production. Again the majority of these households are headed by women.

These households, which constitute a significant proportion of poor female-headed households in the country, have borne the brunt of the country's rural development policy which is focused almost exclusively on agriculture. As was shown in Section 6.1 the agriculture-specific approach to rural development policy in Botswana, as it affects women, was reinforced by their relative exclusion from opportunities for formal employment. As also mentioned, this policy framework was given credence by some of the studies of female-headed households which tended to assume that all these households are 'farmers' whose problems would be resolved through agricultural programmes. A telling shortcoming of these studies is therefore their failure to account for the non-cultivating female-headed households.
Spring (1986: 341) laments the tendency for policy makers in the Third World to see women as 'gardeners' deserving instruction in horticulture and small-scale poultry, rather than as 'farmers' engaged in the production of staple crops and large livestock. The reverse is true for rural women in Botswana; they are seen too much as 'farmers', even when they do not fit this definition by any account.

The existence of these non-cultivating households illustrates the point that rural development is a multi-dimensional phenomenon which cannot be achieved only through agricultural development. It has been shown in the previous chapter that peasant agriculture, because of its intensive character, does not create high levels of wage employment, and where this takes place it is not particularly remunerative. Given this situation, it is only too obvious that the situation of these non-cultivating households can best be ameliorated through policy initiatives designed to assist these women to generate cash income outside the agricultural sector.

This view is supported by the availability of widespread evidence indicating relatively successful innovative entrepreneurial activity among some rural women. Ranging from the production of handicrafts to dressmaking, several individual as well as groups of women in Kweneng and in other districts have initiated small enterprises. Some of these projects have received government support through a programme called the Financial Assistance Policy (FAP) which was initiated in 1982.

The main objective of the FAP is said to be to increase employment in both the urban and rural areas by providing
businesses, large or small, with financial subsidies. Small projects located in the rural areas earmarked for FAP assistance include brick-making, carpentry, tanning, sorghum-milling, poultry farming, bakery, vegetable gardening, and dressmaking. These undertakings can be subsidized by up to 80 per cent. It is claimed that the FAP is devoted to giving a "greater proportion of the assistance" to projects owned by women (FAP, 1985: 3). However, by the mid-1980s the programme had benefited a very small number of women. According to one estimate, by March 1986 women-operated projects approved for FAP funding constituted only 9.8 per cent of all small projects supported under the scheme (MLGL, 1986: 75). Table 6.4 below illustrates this point further.

Table 6.4: Number of Female Grantees out of Total FAP Small-scale Agricultural Grants, 1982-86

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Project</th>
<th>Rural Areas Grants</th>
<th>Urban Areas Grants</th>
<th>Rural Areas No. women</th>
<th>Urban Areas No. women</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Horticulture</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fishing</td>
<td>278</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poultry</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small stock</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dairying</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Piggery</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>446</strong></td>
<td><strong>13</strong></td>
<td><strong>40</strong></td>
<td><strong>5</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Minutes of the Thirteenth NDDC (MLGL, 1986: 76).

The incipient move towards providing women with assistance in the area of horticulture, poultry, and so on has also been taken up by MoA under the Small Project Programme or AE10 discussed briefly in Chapter 4. The scant evidence which is
available in district-level data shows that very few of these projects have been successful, with many failing even to get off the ground. By late 1988, 67 projects had been approved in Kweneng District under FAP, of which 46 (69 per cent) were known to be operating while the remainder had 'failed' [9]. Among these projects 17 were initiated by individual women. An additional 6 were run by women's cooperatives. In all, women were involved in 34.3 per cent of FAP projects in the district.

According to figures available by late 1988, the total number of women involved in all the FAP projects in the District did not exceed 60. This is a small number in a district with a population of non-farming female-headed households numbering around 1,600 [10].

One highly successful project involving a women's cooperative is called the Botswelelo Centre situated in the village of Thamaga where about twenty women are engaged in the production of crafts, basketry, ceramics, leatherware, and dressmaking. Similar cooperatives are also in operation in the villages of Molepolole (such as the Boitshoko Centre) and Gabane. Rogers (1980: 95) criticises projects which emphasise crafts on the grounds that they "are almost all geared to a very limited and unreliable market, the tourist and overseas speciality markets. Objects produced are non-essential items". There is some truth in this statement. However, many such projects are substantially remunerative as well.

At this point a brief examination of a few case studies is worthwhile. One of the women engaged successfully in remunerative activity in Kweneng District is Mme Masego, who is a dressmaker. She began her activities in 1983 after a spell
as a domestic servant in Gaborone which began in 1972. She has never been married and two of her three children are now grown up and employed within the country while the third is still at secondary school. She is currently part of a group of women involved in sewing school uniforms, for which she is paid according to the number she is able to complete. This is a thriving business with a guaranteed and virtually permanent market whose bounds are not limited to the district. Mme Masego attributes her success as a dressmaker mainly to the Kweneng Rural Development Association (KRDA), which is an NGO formed in 1969 whose main function is to promote employment-creating development activity within the district in a range of activities such as brick-moulding, building, engineering and service of vehicles and agricultural machinery, wholesale, forestry, horticulture, etc. She was able to obtain an FAP grant with the recommendation of this institution.

Another interesting case is that of Mme Tebogo who has a thriving business as a hawker. Mme Tebogo is married and her husband is employed by a construction firm in Gaborone. She sells a variety of items ranging from vegetables (she runs her own garden), and small household and personal items. Her success is underlined by the fact that she operates three separate stalls in two villages. Among the achievements which she attributes to her activities are physical improvements to her home, her ability to pay fees for her eldest son who is in senior secondary school, and security in food supply. She attributes her success to her own initiative as well as to her husband's contribution in helping provide the initial financial outlay which got the business off the ground.
The case of Mme Boitumelo is even more interesting. She is a poultry farmer, and her husband works for a government department as a driver. She started her poultry project with the help of an FAP grant obtained in 1984. She commends her husband with providing her with the necessary information about how to find her way round the myriad of government offices, and about "whom to talk to". In her management of the project she has demonstrated exceptional enterpreneurial qualities. She sells eggs and live or pre-slaughtered chickens within the village and in the capital.

These cases demonstrate the importance of factors such as an adequate financial starting base, which most poor women lack, and 'good connections' with government officials, often through an influential husband. The case of Mme Masego demonstrates that entrepreneurship is of relevance in determining success, but provided that such matters as the starting-off base have been accounted for. Thus, the majority of the women participating in FAP projects are mainly those with access to a reliable source of cash income. Many also belong to households which also produce crops and livestock. Depending on the kind of activity involved, an FAP-type project requires a cash outlay which ranges from P500 to P10,000. The majority of rural women are unable to raise the proportion required as 'own contribution'. Thus, in a more or less similar manner as ALDEP, the FAP has, so far, failed to be of benefit to the majority of poor women.

By its very nature, a discussion of the type conducted above can only lead to tentative conclusions. The few available cases of success among women who have been able to
effectively take advantage of the FAP demonstrate the potential for women's participation in income-generating activities outside the agricultural sector. The possibility for the emergence within the government of a policy framework more favourable to the special circumstances of the poor, non-cultivating female-headed households, can also not be entirely ruled out.

Such a change could come about in the form of certain changes in the organization of existing programmes, particularly the FAP. The FAP does to some extent provide the framework for addressing the problem of non-cultivating female-headed households. The necessary changes could be brought about for example through the introduction of a favourable credit-based scheme (or even an ALDEP-type grant/downpayment scheme) under the FAP to enable the women who cannot afford the amount required as 'own contribution'. The most effective way of encouraging these women to take part in such a scheme is to encourage them to organise themselves into cooperatives.

This view is partly supported by evidence of the 'progressive' character of some sections of the government bureaucracy in Botswana (as argued in Chapter 2). Also serving to reinforce this view are some existing precedents, particularly the decision taken by MoA in late 1988 to introduce a so-called 'zero downpayment scheme' under which all the ALDEP inputs were to be provided to the poorest producers free of charge. However, a crucial precondition for success in this regard would be the elimination of the bureaucratic inadequacies and policy inconsistencies dealt with in various contexts in the thesis in relation to peasant agriculture.
It must be said, however, that the capacity of some of the relevant sections of the bureaucracy to marshal such efforts is highly questionable. One of these is the Women's Affairs Unit (WAU) in the Ministry of Labour and Home Affairs which was set up in 1982. This unit has increasingly taken up the question of women in the rural areas as demonstrated for example by a paper submitted at the 13th NDDC (MLGL, 1986) in which the tendency for women to benefit less from programmes such as FAP was highlighted. However, for all that these concerns are worth, the WAU mainly functions as a pressure group for urban women's interests. Apart from issues affecting all women such as their legal status, the WAU lobbies concern themselves mainly with issues affecting urban working women such as paid maternity leave, etc. This is not surprising when taking into account the fact that the WAU is composed of urban-based middle class women.

It must also be stressed that a change to a more meaningful extra-agricultural rural development policy cannot necessarily derive from administrative efforts premised upon the intervention of progressive government bureaucrats alone. In some ways bureaucratic intervention actually encourages the marginalisation of poor women. For example, institutions such as the kgotla are known, through research partly carried out under the auspices of MoA's Rural Sociology Unit, to suppress the interests of women (see e.g Brown, 1980: 11-12). At the same time, some studies emanating from the same unit (e.g. Wynne, 1981) laud the effectiveness of this institution in rural development.

Moreover, while it may be able under certain circumstances
to influence some important decisions regarding the distribution of economic resources, the state bureaucracy in Botswana is not monolithic. Thus, we find very little prospect in Botswana of the kind of 'changes' so optimistically described by Nelson (1981: 48-50) which range from changes in the attitudes of donor agencies to 'the inclusion of women in policy-making bodies'.

The changes which seem to be desired are therefore most likely to come about primarily by political means. Most effective of these means is pressure from below. However, there is as yet no firm evidence of the emergence in the villages of women's social movements and other organisations with the potential of becoming significant pressure groups on matters of rural development policy.

Most of the organisations currently operating in the rural areas have been formed by the government or by non-governmental organisations (NGOs). These include many which are effectively urban-based, such as the Botswana Council of Women (BCW), which provides training courses, mainly in 'home economics' as well as organising social events such as beauty contests in the urban areas. Suggestions to the effect that these organisations function on behalf of all Batswana women (Motsete, 1982: 7) are therefore hard to believe. Others are professional organisations for teachers, nurses, businesswomen, etc. Those organisations which also operate in the rural areas, such as the Young Women's Christian Association (YWCA) and the Christian Women's Fellowship (CWF) do not seem to consider it part of their functions to organise women as pressure groups for better policies.
Existing 'independent' women's grassroots organisations, such as thrift and burial societies, have not as yet assumed the role of effective pressure groups for rural women. The possibility of the emergence of effective women's pressure groups in the foreseeable future cannot, however, be completely ruled out if the unfavourable socio-economic trends affecting the mostly poor female-headed households persist well into the 1990s.
Notes

1. The 1971 census enumerated 596,510 persons. The returns of this census have been criticised for a number of inaccuracies. The report of the 1981 census (CSO, 1983: 11) points out that the 1971 census "had a significant coverage error and ... the rates of mortality obtained were not plausible".

2. The RIDS figures cited by Koussoudji and Mueller (1983: 836) give the considerably high value of 28 per cent.

3. A later estimate (Koussoudji and Mueller, 1983: 847) places this figure at 67.1 per cent.

4. A similar type of analysis has been developed in relation to the case of Lesotho by Murray (1987).

5. Personal observation.

6. Personal observation.

7. Personal observation.

8. This estimate is based on my research in Kweneng District.

9. These data were provided by a respondent.

10. This figure has been worked out by deducting 20 per cent from the estimated 8,144 households headed by women in the district.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This thesis set out to explore, analyse and explain the trajectory of bureaucratic intervention in the peasant agricultural sector in Botswana in the 1980s. The thesis has focused empirically on a complex nexus of issues and processes revolving around the initiation, formulation, and implementation of the country's major re-distributive agricultural policy, ALDEP. The empirical material presented consists mainly of survey and interview data collected in Kweneng District and Gaborone.

The thesis began with a review of approaches to state intervention in the economy and state-civil society relations. In the Botswana literature these views are usually wedded to a 'dependency' framework of analysis which tends to subsume internal to external processes. Having rejected these a priori, instrumentalist and reductionist formulations, the thesis proposed and adopted the perspective which sees the Botswana state as potentially autonomous vis-a-vis the dominant class. I suggested that this approach is particularly useful in studying state-society relations in Botswana as an evolving process within the framework of the country's multiparty political system.

Developing this idea, Chapter 2 described and analysed the emergence within the state machinery of elements of the bureaucracy effectively challenging the policy focus on capital accumulation and effecting change towards re-distribution. Their distinctive characteristics include the non-paternalistic mode of their recruitment and their espousal of views sometimes
at variance with those of the ruling party. They are therefore a specific group, claiming a close affinity to the rural population and showing sympathy with the problems of the rural poor.

The intervention of these bureaucrats was a decisive factor in the initiation of ALDEP in 1978 and its subsequent implementation. These findings raise two issues. First, they cast serious doubt upon the dominant view in analyses of the Botswana case that government bureaucrats function primarily to expedite the process of capital accumulation. Secondly, they indicate bureaucratic intervention as an area of empirical inquiry and analysis to be taken seriously. These issues are as pertinent for research in Botswana as they are in other developing countries, particularly in Africa.

The shift to re-distribution in the late 1970s was premised upon the interplay of a number of economic, political and social factors. At the one extreme, the much-hoped-for 'trickle down' of jobs and benefits from mineral exploitation under the country's outward-oriented development strategy did not materialise and unemployment rose steadily. At the other, the policy focus on the cattle industry to the disproportionate benefit of the cattle barons, mirrored the neglect of arable agriculture. This had the effect of marginalising the already impoverished peasant producers who derive their livelihood mainly from arable farming and who represent the majority of the country's population.

This situation spelled potential conflict, and from the point of view of the state and ruling party, political uncertainty. The decision by the BDP government to initiate
re-distributive rural development policies was therefore also premised upon the assiduous political desire to consolidate its support in the rural areas.

It has been shown, however, that despite its progressive character, from time to time internal conflicts emerge within the Botswana state bureaucracy. This limits its coherence and effectiveness and undermines its autonomy vis-a-vis the national politicians. These differences derive mainly from conflicting organisational roles and professional approaches to problems. A leading example cited is the conflict which arose in the mid-1970s between the bureaucrats in the MFDP and MoA on the one hand, and those of the MLGL on the other, over the character and purpose of the TGLP. This conflict took the form of a struggle between those arguing for the 'economic rationality' of the commercialisation of cattle production and range management, and those arguing for 'social justice' to safeguard the position of vulnerable groups such as small peasants and residents of remote areas. The emergence of MoA as the dominant institution in relation to rural development policy in the early 1980s has also been highlighted and discussed.

Focusing on the process of the formulation of ALDEP, Chapter 3 discussed the top-down process of rural development policy-making in Botswana. While the bureaucrats enjoy much freedom from direct control by national politicians during the process of policy-making, this process is in other respects characterised by excessive centralisation. Moreover, the notion that rural development policy planning is based on 'consultation' is not borne out by the detailed analysis of the
planning of ALDEP. The analysis has shown that 'consultation' is a propagandistic notion which in reality refers to the rubber-stamping of decisions made by the central planners and bureaucrats, while the rural population is excluded from the process. Additionally, a variety of wrong assumptions were made during the planning process, many of which were based on dubious research. An immediate outcome of this was the failure of the ALDEP credit/subsidy scheme which was abandoned in 1983 and replaced with a more favourable grant/downpayment scheme.

The negative elements of this top-down approach have also been demonstrated in the analysis of peasant-bureaucrat relations in the process of the implementation of ALDEP. The first major finding in this respect is the all-too-familiar tendency towards 'bias' in favour of the better-off sections of the target group, in this case the middle peasants. This is illustrated by the concentration on this group of the supply of inputs, the provision of extension advice, and steps designed to improve marketing. This bias emanates from the belief that it is these farmers who meet the essentially stereotypical views and approaches to 'progressive farming' developed by agronomists and technical specialists in MoA.

These biases interact with other features of the situation to produce resistance by small peasants. This is shown by the example of their resistance to the recommended package of production techniques. This illustrates that the top-down policy implementation process seriously undermines bureaucrat-peasant relations and the entire agricultural development effort. It emerged in the discussion that the introduction of the ALDEP grant/downpayment scheme led to a substantial
'bureaucratization' of the work of MoA's basic extension officer, the Agricultural Demonstrator (AD). However, in pursuing these stereotypical notions the AD acts as if he or she were an agent for the promotion of the class interests of the middle peasants.

A different dimension of bias which has been highlighted revolves around the resistance of the kulaks to ALDEP and the subsequent response by the state to this development. The kulaks had viewed with trepidation the existence of such programmes as ALDEP while they were subjected to credit schemes which they considered to be 'stifling'. The state responded in part through the initiation of ARAP in 1985, which may have well been a drought-recovery measure, but whose underlying objective was the desire to placate the kulaks.

This demonstrates the political significance of the kulaks and its disruptive consequences for rural development policies aimed at the majority of the rural population. The implementation of ARAP also resulted in serious bureaucratic conflict within MoA, stemming from the abhorrence of many bureaucrats at their being 'used' to effect a programme perceived as an essentially populist political campaign by the ruling party at the expense of the more re-distributive ALDEP.

In Chapter 5 I provided a detailed analysis of the position of small peasants, demonstrating their increasing marginality. This was done by analysing access to arable land, sources of income, and forms of intra-household cooperation. The chapter also demonstrated the incongruity between the programme's assumptions and the capacity of small peasants to participate in it. It was also shown that an impact of the
programme has been to 'individualise' productive activity. On the one hand, this has been to the detriment of many small peasant households dependent on inter-household cooperation. On the other, the middle peasants have benefited greatly, as shown by the increase in their surplus production of foodgrains by about a third of its normal level. They have thus increasingly become employers of majako labourers, whom they pay in kind. These findings have led me to the conclusion that, as it is presently constituted, ALDEP does not provide an effective framework for addressing the situation of the poor small peasants.

It has also been noted that the increase in the marketed surplus of the middle peasants has heralded a significant change in the character of rural class and political relations. This can be seen from the reaction of the kulaks, who view the emergence of the middle peasants as significant surplus grain producers as likely to lead to the long-term depression of prices. The ruling political leadership on the other hand derives some satisfaction from this incipient rise of a potentially politically loyal middle peasantry. While this strengthens the hand of ruling politicians in the context of the BDP's programme for the political consolidation of the rural areas, it raises certain important questions about the nature of the state-kulak relationship in the long-term.

Analysing the situation of female-headed households, Chapter 6 has noted, confirming existing research, that these households constitute the poorest and most socially marginalised group in the rural areas. The chapter has also shown that the socio-economic situation of these households has
deteriorated considerably in the 1980s, despite ALDEP. It has also argued that female farmers face the double burden that they are marginalised as poor farmers and as women.

It has been shown that in addition to gender, class differences count a great deal in determining the extent of the poverty of these households. This is demonstrated by the fact that better-off female-headed households have done relatively better under ALDEP than the poorest categories. It has also been seen in relation to access by non-cultivating rural female-headed households to the means of deriving income through entrepreneurial activity. This has been shown through the analysis of female participation in the small projects supported under the Financial Assistance Policy (FAP). While bureaucratic pressure is important, a change towards a more favourable extra-agricultural policy regime would be greatly bolstered by the emergence of rural women's social movements and the development of existing ones into effective pressure groups.

Admittedly, this thesis presents a rather depressing picture of an apparently defenceless peasantry beguiled by a formidable array of socio-political forces ranged against it. However, the thesis is not capable of determining the future of agriculture in Botswana. One may only venture to note that the solution to the problems faced by the Botswana peasantry may not lie entirely in the agricultural sector. A partial solution may take the form of the development of manufacturing, which could absorb many of the poor peasants. The nature and specific ramifications of, and problems associated with such a process cannot, however, be assumed beforehand.

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An important issue for further research will be to observe the evolution of rural social movements and their relationship to the policy process. There is also a need for in-depth studies of the urban 'informal sector' and the ways in which it interacts with the rural sector. All in all, this thesis has served to highlight and analyse the complexities and nuances of the situation of small peasants in Botswana. The thesis has also demonstrated the limitations of the particular form of re-distribution to the peasant sector currently being implemented in the country.
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APPENDIX 1

THE SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE

ALDEP AND AGRICULTURAL PRODUCERS IN Kweneng District

Date of interview _____ / _____ / 1988. Kgotla ________________

A. SOCIO - DEMOGRAPHIC AND ECONOMIC DETAILS

1. Are you the head of the household?
   a) Yes 1  
   b) No 2  

2. Sex:
   a) male 1  
   b) female 2  

3. Age: ________

4. Marital status:  
   a) single 1  
   b) married 2  
   c) divorced 3  
   d) widowed 4  

4. Educational attainment:  
   a) none 1  
   b) primary 2  
   c) secondary 3  
   d) post - secondary 4  

6. Occupation:  
   a) farmer 1  
   b) casual worker 2  
   c) other specify  

7. Number of household members / dependants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>male</th>
<th>female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a) children</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) adults</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) total</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8. How many household members are employed in

<p>| | | | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a) employed in this village</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) employed elsewhere in Botswana</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) employed in the South African mines</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) employed elsewhere in South Africa</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e) employed in another foreign country</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

/2...
9. What are your household’s sources of income?
   a) Your salary / wages 1 □
   b) Remittances from members working within Botswana 2 □
   c) Remittances from members working outside Botswana 3 □
   d) Sale of crops 4 □
   e) Sale of livestock 5 □
   f) Beer brewing 6 □
   g) Sale of firewood 7 □
   h) Other specify

10. Of the above, which is your household’s main source of income?

B. EXTENT OF AGRICULTURAL INVOLVEMENT

11. Does your household own a
   a) Plough 1 □
   b) Planter 2 □
   c) Harrow 3 □
   d) Tractor 4 □
   e) Trailer 5 □
   f) Wagon (donkey or ox - drawn) 6 □

12. Number of livestock belonging to the household:
   a) Cattle 1 □
   b) Goats 2 □
   c) Sheep 3 □
   d) Donkeys 4 □

13. How many cattle are
   a) Held by your household under mafisa
   b) Mafisa’d by your household to another family

14. Does your household plough with
   a) Oxen 1 □
   b) Donkeys 2 □
   c) Tractor 3 □
15. Is the draught power your household uses
   a) owned by your household 1
   b) hired from someone else 2
   c) other specify

16. If you use hired draught power in what way (s) do you normally pay for it?

17. If you own a plough, do you usually make it available for another household to use?
   a) Yes 1
   b) No 2

18. Does your household usually assist any other household (s) with labour during the cropping season?
   a) Yes 1
   b) No 2

19. Does your household usually require assistance with labour from another person or household (s)?
   a) Yes 1
   b) No 2

20. Briefly explain why your household usually requires extra labour from another person or household (s)

21. Has your household ever sold grain
   a) over the past 12 months (i) Yes 1 (ii) No 2
   b) over the past 10 years (iii) Yes 3 (iv) No 4

22. What is the approximate size of the area of land which is cultivated by your household? Approx. ____ hectares.

23. Approximately, how many bags of grain does the household usually harvest from all its crop land
   a) after a 'good' rainfall year ____ bags
   b) after a 'bad' rainfall year ____ bags
   c) after a drought year ____ bags
24. Which of these crops do you usually cultivate

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>a) for home consumption only</th>
<th>b) for the market only</th>
<th>c) for both</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(i)</td>
<td>sorghum</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ii)</td>
<td>maize</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(iii)</td>
<td>beans</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(iv)</td>
<td>watermelons</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

25. Has your household ever had to stop ploughing altogether at any point since 1978?
   a) Yes [ ]
   b) No [ ]

26. Briefly explain why your household has had to stop ploughing since 1978

C. INFORMATION ON ALDEP

27. Have you heard of ALDEP?
   a) Yes [ ]
   b) No [ ]

28. Do you consider yourself to be one of those supposed to benefit under the ALDEP scheme?
   a) Yes [ ]
   b) No [ ]

29. Have you ever been informed that you would benefit from ALDEP?
   a) Yes [ ]
   b) No [ ]

30. In which year were you informed that you would benefit from ALDEP? 19

31. Who informed you that you are to benefit from ALDEP?
   a) the chief [ ]
   b) a District Council official [ ]
   c) an Agricultural Demonstrator [ ]
   d) other specify [ ]
D. UTILISATION OF ALDEP

32. Have you ever applied for an ALDEP grant?
   a) Yes 1 □  b) No 2 □

33. If 'yes' did you obtain the grant?
   a) Yes □  b) No 2 □

34. Could you say why you did or did not obtain the grant?

35. Have you since been provided with any of the ALDEP inputs?
   a) Yes 1 □  b) No 2 □

36. If 'yes' please mention these items

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM</th>
<th>QUANTITY</th>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

37. When was the first ALDEP item you ordered delivered? Give answer by year 19

38. Have you ever been given any advice by an agricultural extension worker concerning cultivation?
   a) Yes 1 □  b) No 2 □

39. Could you say this advice has been coming at
   a) monthly intervals 1 □
   b) 3 - monthly intervals 2 □
   c) twice a year 3 □
   d) once a year 4 □
   e) other, specify

/6...
40. What advice were you given about
   a) ploughing
   b) planting
   c) harvesting
   d) marketing
   e) fencing

41. Would you say you are agreeable with all this advice
   a) Yes
   b) No

42. Please explain your answer to question 40

E. ATTITUDES TOWARDS ALDEP

43. Do you find the procedures required when applying for ALDEP inputs
   a) easy to follow
   b) cumbersome
   c) other, specify

44. Please explain your answer to question 42

45. In your view, what sort of people are benefiting most from ALDEP?
   a) large-scale farmers
   b) middle range farmers
   c) small-scale producers
   d) government officials
46. In what ways do you think these groups are benefiting from ALDEP?

47. Would you say ALDEP is beneficial to you?
   a) Yes 1  
   b) No 2  

48. Have you ever been to a meeting in the village at which the ALDEP's progress was discussed?
   a) Yes 1  
   b) No 2  

49. Are you involved in another government-financed scheme other than ALDEP?
   a) Yes 1  
   b) No 2  

50. Please mention this scheme  

51. Which one between ALDEP and this scheme contributes more to your income?
   a) ALDEP 1  
   b) other scheme 2  

52. Is there anything you would like to add or say about any of the questions I have been asking you?
This organizational structure was revised in 1989–90. According to the new structure, effective as from 1 April 1990, the Department of Agricultural Field Services has become the new Department of Crop Production and Forestry. Animal production and related activities have been consolidated under the new Department of Animal Health and Production (Agrinews, February 1990).
APPENDIX 3: ARABLE LANDS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME PROJECT ORGANIZATION CHART

- Normal communication channels Ministry of Agriculture
- Direct access link between PCCU & Perm. Secretary & Planning & Stat. Division
- Project communication channels between PCCU and various levels of extension.

Permanent Secretary (MOA)

Div. of Planning and Statistics

Monitoring and Evaluation

Dept. of Field Services Director

Project Cont and Coordination Unit

Field Section

Animal Prod. Division

Fodder Crop Development

Regional Agr. Officer (Southern Region)

Regional Manager

Regional Agr. Officer (Gaborone Region)

Regional Manager

Regional Agr. Officer (Central Region)

Regional Manager

Regional Agr. Officer (Franstown Region)

Regional Manager

Regional Agr. Officer (Maun Region)

Regional Manager

Distr. Agency Officer

Agricultural Demonstration

850-300 farmers

200-300 farmers

200-300 farmers

200-300 farmers

APPENDIX 4(i): ALDEP INPUT APPLICATION FORM

CONFIDENTIAL

ARABLE LANDS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME (ALDEP)

ALDEP DOWNPAYMENT/GRANT SCHEME

APPLICATION FORM

(To be completed in TRIPlicate - c.r.c. DAO, AD, ALDEP Manager)

Region ________________________________

District ________________________________

Extension Area ________________________________

Date received by DAO ________________________________

Part A

Name of applicant ___________________________ Age _____ Sex _____

Address ________________________________

Village __________________________ Name of Headman __________________________

Type of package ________________________________

Materials/Labour required:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Cost (Pula)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Attach extra paper if space is insufficient)

To be completed by DAO/DAS:

Downpayment __________ % = P _____

Grant __________ % = P _____

Source(s) of supply: ________________________________

Part B: Lands Owned

Hectares to be used for Crop Hectares
Hectares to be used for ___________________________
Hectares to be used for ___________________________
Hectares to be used for ___________________________
Hectares to be used for ___________________________
Hectares to be used for ___________________________

Total Hectares ______

Hectares cleared destumped land __________________________ Hectares
Appendix 4 (i) contd.

Part C: Livestock Owned

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cattle</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calves</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donkeys</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheep/goats</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poultry</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Part D: Machinery and Equipment Owned

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ploughs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planters</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultivators</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harrows</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Part E

Have you ever received an ALDEP package before?  YES/NO
If YES, in what year ________ and for what package?

Indicate the package and amount below:

(a) Fencing  P ____________
(b) Water tank  P ____________
(c) Draft power - Donkeys oxen  P ____________
(d) Implements  P ____________
   How much have you paid back to date?  P ____________ (Package: ____________)
   How much have you paid back to date?  P ____________ (Package: ____________)

Signature/Thumbprint of Applicant

Certified that the above information has been verified and to the best of my knowledge is correct.
This application is Recommended/Not recommended

Signature of AD
Name ___________________________ Date ___________________________

This application is Approved/Not approved

Signature of DAO
Name ___________________________ Date ___________________________
CONFIDENTIAL

ARABLE LANDS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME (ALDEP)

ALDEP DOWNPAYMENT/GRANT SCHEME

LETTER OF APPROVAL

(To be completed in QUADRUPLE - c.c. Farmer, DAO, AD, ALDEP Manager)

Ref: ________________________

(always to be quoted)

District Agricultural Officer,

Dear Sir/Madam,

1. We are pleased to inform you that your application under the above scheme for a package has been approved for an amount of P___________ for the purpose of ________________ at ____________________.

2. Under the terms of the scheme you are required to make a downpayment of % amounting to P__________ to the DAS at the DAO's office as a pre-condition for the disbursement of the grant element of % amounting to P__________.

3. On receipt of your downpayment together with four signed copies of your Letter of Acceptance you will be issued with a Government Purchase Order covering the total cost of the package of P__________ to enable you to collect the materials from your supplier(s).

4. If your downpayment is not received within 60 days of the date of this letter it will be assumed that you are no longer interested in the offer, in which case it will lapse. A further 60 days extension period may be permitted only in exceptional circumstances.

5. In accepting this offer you undertake to apply the proceeds of the grant solely for the purpose of ______________________ on your lands at ______________________ and that no portion of it will be diverted for any other purpose or for your personal use.

6. Our reference number and Government Purchase Order number must always be quoted in any communication concerning this offer.

Yours faithfully,

District Agricultural Officer

__________________________ District
Motlotlegi Rre / Mme,

Dear Sir / Madam,

1. Mabapi le Lekwalo la Ditumelano lwa di ____________ lwa nomore ya ____________.
   I refer to your Letter of Approval reference ____________ and dated ____________.

2. Ke dumela le nako e e beilweng le tsamaiso ya mpho le go duela P ____________ mo mading a ke a duelang ele ____________% a digogi.
   I accept the terms and conditions of this offer and agree to pay P ____________ in respect of my downpayment for ____________% of the package.

3. Ke dumelana le go duela madi a ke tlaa amogelang fæle ga a dirisiwa mo go se aneng a se kopetswe.
   I undertake to refund the amount paid to me as grant if the funds are not utilised for the purpose for which they were given.

4. Fæle ka digogi (dikgomo le ditonki) ke tlhomamisa gore gona le bosupi jo botletseng jwa gore ke tsa yo o dinthekiseditseng.
   In the case of draft power packages (oxen and donkeys) I confirm that appropriate proof of ownership has been presented to me by the supplier.

5. Ke supa gore mafoko a lokwalo le la kamogelo ke a tlhaloseditswe sentle ka Setswana, Mme ebile le ke beile monwana ka fa tshwan-elong.
   I certify that the meaning of this Letter of Acceptance has been explained to me in the Setswana language and that I fully understand it and have signed this letter accordingly.

Kele weno ____________________    Yours faithfully,
Monwana ____________________
Kgwedi ____________    Signature / Thumbprint
Name ____________________  Date ____________
Appendix 4 (iii) contd.

Selipi sa nomore ya ___________ sadi ___________ sa tuelo ya P ___________ sentshitswe.
Receipt number ___________ dated ___________ for down-payment of P ___________ issued.

Nomore ya GPO ___________ ya di ___________ ya madi a P ___________ a ditho tso tlhe a setse a ntshitswe.
Government Purchase Order number ___________ dated ___________ for P ___________ for the total package issued.

_________________________  __________________________
Rabalemisi  District Agricultural Officer
                      __________________________
_________________________  Kgaolo  District

Letsatsi / Kgwedi ___________  Date ___________
During the Agricultural Policy Consultative Conference last month, hundreds of delegates from every part of Botswana’s agricultural sector met to discuss the government’s draft policy document on agriculture, and evaluate the performance of the agricultural sector since independence.

The one-week symposium provided an unprecedented forum for farmers from every district in the nation, as well as government officials, parastatal and non-government employees, private institutions, financial institutions and land board members to voice their opinions and grievances concerning Botswana’s agricultural policies.

The groundwork for the conference actually began in 1983 when government commissioned a comprehensive assessment of the agricultural sector following wide-spread concern over its performance and contribution to the economy. The assessment included macro-economic policy issues, proposals for future development to improve household incomes, and the generation of much-needed rural employment.

When the one-year review was completed in 1988, the Ministry of Agriculture prepared a draft policy paper that defined policy issues and constraints, and formulated policy proposals to be considered by both the government and the general public before being submitted to Parliament. This draft paper established the foundation for the consultative conference.

In his opening statement, the Minister of Agriculture, Mr Daniel Kwelagobe, alerted farmers that since the implications of the conference and the finalized policy have not received formal government approval yet, it would have a vital effect on the agricultural sector for years to come. "You can tear this draft into bits, but before you walk out the door give us something in its place," said the minister.

When the conference was first-ever attempt to thoroughly dissect and comprehensively examine the entire components of the agricultural establishment in Botswana, its week-long program of panelist and discussions were carefully designed to reflect the wide spectrum of professions within agriculture, by reviewing past accomplishments and problems, and mapping out future strategies. Several primary agricultural issues that are outlined in the draft were satisfactorily highlighted during the conference. First, the country’s unchanged agricultural sector since independence, both livestock and crops, is an ongoing concern. "Our crop yields have remained stagnant for almost three decades if not more, and our beef production per animal per hectare has not changed either," said the minister.

Botswana’s food security policy in basic cereals like maize and sorghum is another significant concern. The harsh climatic condition and the increasing environmental constraints placed on the land by wildlife and a growing human population "clearly show that since independence it has been technically, eco-

By David R. Gately

nomically and environmentally difficult to sustain a food security policy," said Mr Kwelagobe.

The development of appropriate technology in the agriculture sector needs to expand, emphasising the development of high-yielding crops and animal breeds that are suitable for Botswana’s environment. Mr Kwelagobe noted that the dramatic changes in the agricultural economies of certain parts of Europe and Asia can be directly related to the quality of advanced technology. "If we don’t join the race for technology now," he said, "we are likely to be left behind forever."

The search for more readily-available and easily-accessible water resources in Botswana is a major stumbling block. Problems of overgrazing, and the communal grazing that constitutes the Tribal Grazing Land Policy (TGLP) are compounded by a lack of water resources.

The minister called for an examination of the current utility tariffs that are adversely affecting local agriculture, and the need to explore how these tariffs are partly responsible for high production costs.

A critical review of the livestock management in the communal areas in Botswana is necessary. It is unlikely that livestock productively will improve if there isn’t a dramatic improvement in management in this country, said Mr Kwelagobe. His announcement that the draft policy paper proposes, "individuals and communities be allowed to fence grazing land to improve livestock productivity," was met with wild applause from the farmers in the audience. (See accompanying story.)

And latterly, it was stressed that agricultural diversification must be properly supported with an infrastructure of increased long-term human resources training and an advancement in information dissemination. The minister noted that although his ministry encourages farming communities and local and foreign investors to venture into alternative agricultural enterprises, the shortage of water, technology and qualified manpower creates a "serious bottleneck" in the system. A long-term human resource development program is a pre-request to facilitate agricultural diversification, he said.

After what most participants called a successful and productive week, Mr John Hummon, local Director of the United States Agency for International Development closed the conference. The conference, he said, was "a super example of the communities outstanding policy for open dialogue and exchange of ideas."
Table 5.1: Number of Kweneng Sample Farmers by Size of the Field ploughed in 1987/88

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Not ploughed</th>
<th>2 Ha or less</th>
<th>3-5 Ha</th>
<th>6-9 Ha</th>
<th>10+ Ha</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


This table shows those ploughing more than 10 hectares as representing 22 per cent of the sample. These are mainly rich peasants (kulaks). These rich peasants, 20 in all, ploughed a mean of 53 hectares, while the remaining 6 within this group who are middle peasants ploughed an average of 10.5 hectares.

The table also shows that 52 per cent of the cultivating population in Kweneng ploughed between 3 and 5 hectares of land. The average size of the plot of land worked by the 62 producers who ploughed between 3 and 5 hectares is 3.7 hectares; 73 per cent ploughed less than 6 ha (cf. MoA, 1987: 74 which gives the figure for the average size of fields on 'traditional farms' as 3.8 hectares).

It is significant to note that the average size of 3.7 hectares held by small peasants in Kweneng means that they cannot meet the basic requirement for participation in ALDEP. ALDEP participants are expected to have access to at least five hectares of cleared and destumped land. Thus, the crucial factor becomes the ability of these households to obtain more land. It will be recalled from the discussion in Chapter 1.3 that under Botswana's largely semi-arid conditions (other things held constant), efficiency in agricultural production is greatly enhanced as the size of land increases.