THE UNIVERSITY OF HULL

AGRICULTURAL CHANGE AND RURAL CLASS FORMATION
IN IRINGA DISTRICT, TANZANIA

BEING A THESIS SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE OF

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

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BY

BENSON CHARLES NINDI, B.A.(HONS.) (DAR-ES-SALAAM)
M.A. (DAR-ES-SALAAM)

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regard the final product as being worthy of the assistance they gave. Needless to say, none of these individuals or institutions share any responsibility for the content, any errors or whatever misinterpretation of the facts there may be in the final presentation. The conclusions that I have drawn are mine alone.

NINDI, B.C.
This thesis is a study of rural development policy in Tanzania with special reference to Iringa District. Its principal aim is to assess the ujamaa (rural socialism) programme. However, an historical approach is adopted and the thesis devotes considerable attention to the development of agricultural production, particularly maize and tobacco, in Iringa District. Based upon fieldwork conducted during the author's stay in Tanzania in 1976/77, the thesis draws on a variety of unpublished documentary sources and the testimony of informants.

The early chapters discuss pre-colonial Tanganyika, the incorporation of the territory into the international capitalist system, and the role of the colonial state in the rural areas. Infrastructures and forms of exploitation are examined in the context of colonial capital accumulation, and it is suggested that colonial policy underwent significant shifts between the 1930s and the post-war period.

The thesis argues that the post-Independence government made a disastrous mistake in generalising an experience with co-operatives which had already shown its negative side in the 1950s. Moreover, the ujamaa policy, originally intended as a policy for self-initiative by peasants, was transformed into a state policy for the compulsory resettlement of the rural population in nucleated villages. As a consequence of this bureaucratic approach towards rural development, agriculture was disrupted, production dropped, the will to work of the producers decreased and mismanagement intensified these problems. In
short, the technocratic approach towards agriculture has failed to release the productive forces and change the social relations of production in rural Tanzania.
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TANZANIA
150 Miles

- Main roads
- Railways
- International Airports
TANZANIA: BASIC FACTS

Geographical Location
East between latitude 1° to 11° 45'S and Longitude 29° 20' to 40° 38' East bordered on North by Kenya and Uganda, on South West by Zambia on South by Mozambique and Malawi and West by Rwanda Burundi and Zaire and on East by the Indian Ocean.

Area - 945,203 square kilometre (364,943 square miles). See Map 0.1.

Population - 16,000,000 (estimate). An outstanding feature of the country is the uneven geographical distribution of the population. Density of population varies from 170.1 persons per square kilometre in Ukerewe to 1.3 persons per square kilometre in Mpanda. Two thirds of the entire population in fact live in one-tenth of the area. In general, the population is concentrated along the periphery on the coast, in the rainy highlands of the south, around Mount Kilimanjaro and Mount Meru and along the shores of Lake Victoria. This is due largely to the lack of permanent water supplies - a fact which greatly reduces the natural fertility of the country - and also to the tsetse fly which has rendered large tracks of land uninhabitable. There is thus a parallel between population distribution and the distribution of natural and agricultural resources (if we equate agricultural fertility with the level of rainfall).

Date of Independence
Former Colonial Power

Zanzibar was declared a British Colony in 1890, Tanganyika was a German Colony from 1891 to 1919 when it was occupied by Britain during the First World War, formally mandated to Britain by the League of Nations in 1920, made United Nations Trusteeship under Britain 1946.

Capital - Dar-es-Salaam; now moved to Dodoma.

Main Mineral Resources - Diamonds, gold and tin.
Main Exports - Coffee, cotton, diamonds, sisal, cloves and cashew nuts.
Main Trading Partners - United Kingdom, West Germany, Japan, Iran, China, United States, Kenya, Uganda, Zambia and Mozambique.

Head of State - Mwalim Julius Nyerere since December 9, 1961.


Official Language - Swahili, English also used.

Currency - Tanzanian Shilling (T.Sh.): T.Sh.1 = 100 cents; T.Sh. 14.40 = £1.

Average per capita G.N.P. for 1973 was estimated at U.S. $110 per annum, but in many rural areas per capita income does not exceed U.S. $40 per year.
INTRODUCTION

This thesis is concerned with the evaluation of the ujamaa policy for rural development in Tanzania. It examines both problems of rural policy and issues involved in analyzing processes of rural development. The work is based on a variety of original source materials. Also our aim has been to develop a theoretical framework adequate to investigating the specificity of rural development policy, and to test such a framework in the analysis of particular issues and forms of social change.

We have chosen to concentrate on the rural sector partly because of its strategic importance for the poorer countries of the world and partly because our own interest and research experience is in the countryside. Although rural phenomena cannot be understood without taking account of the wider socio-economic structure, the rural sector in Third World areas is distinctive in the kinds of practical and analytical problems it presents. Rural poverty is one of the more persistent problems of the Third World, and land reform is a frequently advocated solution. But land reform is not an adequate solution; it is only an ideal framework within which other policies may be implemented.

Peasants still constitute a large proportion of the world's population and produce a substantial part of its food and raw

1. This implies that the problem is the starting point of inquiry. Scientific research is often marred by mistakes in the selection of the problem. A problem is not something one does not know, but something one does not understand. For details, see, Internal Paper No. 6, 'The Methodology of Research into village leadership'. UNESCO Research Centre on Social and Economic Development in Southern Asia, Delhi, 1965.
materials. Of the underprivileged majority of mankind, they are the most underprivileged and in the Third World they suffer severe exploitation and poverty. No such group of people has a longer history of struggle against such conditions. Our interpretation of rural development policies is generally concerned with the welfare of the living people in the rural areas. It seems very clear, however, that a change is required in order to bring about improvements in the welfare of all the people in the Third World.

Most important, however, rural development is an arena for policy-making which is of obvious importance in a predominantly rural country like Tanzania. Moreover, it is in the countryside that the Tanzanian Government has begun to work out its more daring socialist initiatives. This sector of the economy consequently provides a promising field for detailed case-studies of processes of change.

Tanzania, one of the world's poorest nations, has become noted throughout the globe for her serious attempts to achieve socialism by peaceful means. To a considerable degree the emphasis on agriculture by the Tanzanian leadership was the result of sheer economic necessity. For quite some time discussion about problems of development led to a constant re-examination of what model of progress was suitable for a Third-World African country with some socialist aspirations. The answer invariably came back that agriculture, being the backbone of the economy, was the key resource in the country.

and that 'planning' had to reflect this. Concentration on agriculture also followed logically from the post-Independence and colonial experiences.

Much of the course of recent Tanzanian development has been charted by the evolution of President Nyerere's own thinking. According to Arrighi and Saul, the relatively unchallenged acceptance of certain party policies does testify to the 'relative social autonomy and plasticity' of the leadership1. Lack of 'revolutionary intellectuals' among the leaders is a striking feature. Much depends upon parallel efforts using the democratic mechanisms peculiar to Tanzania's one-party system both to rouse the mass of the peasant population to express their interests as a social force, checking possible abuses of their position by the leaders; and at the same time to raise the level of mass consciousness so that such 'intervention' is of a progressive sort.

The most significant new point of departure in the post-Independence period in Tanzania was undoubtedly the Arusha Declaration and the new policies, institutions and ideas which followed in its wake. According to Cliffe, whilst there had been little time to alter the nature of the social formation or the political structure, there had been significant changes in the political atmosphere2. There was a realisation on the part of the leadership that Tanzania was moving along a familiar post-colonial path: that the benefits of Africanisation and what

1. Giovanni Arrighi and John S. Saul, 'Socialism and economic development in Tropical Africa', in ibid., p.3.
progress had occurred had been enjoyed by a small, privileged group consisting of the politicians themselves, senior civil servants, businessmen and traders, as well as skilled and semi-skilled workers employed by big firms. 1

President Nyerere increasingly displayed a sophisticated awareness of many of the patterns of African change, the importance of the 'rural-urban' dichotomy, the relative lack of socialist direction provided by a mere 'attitude of mind', and some of the ambiguities of foreign economic involvement in the domestic economy. Nationally there had been, as a result, a rapid process of class formation. A similar process went on in the rural areas, with the concentration of land, skills, new techniques and farming opportunities in the hands of a limited number of people. Nyerere expressed a growing concern with the realities of class formation in the rural areas, particularly with the emergence of what he termed a 'rural proletariat' and he suggested, rather tentatively, the ujamaa villages to meet this challenge to egalitarianism. 2

According to Saul, The Arusha Declaration and the policy statements that followed it were only the first tentative stages in the definition of the new strategy. The main elements in the socialist pattern were intended to limit the further expansion of the indigenous capitalist and rentier group and eliminate them completely from access to political power. Secondly, this implied that Tanzania should develop from a pre-capitalist society directly to a socialist structure. Third,

2. Arrighi and Saul, op.cit., p.4.
it was clear that such a socialist society would be made up, in very large part, of co-operative villages. Fourth, the industrial and commercial sectors, social services and bureaucracy would serve the interests of these socialist villages.

Both socialist and non-socialist thinkers had doubted the possibility of a country moving from a pre-capitalist, predominantly rural society directly to a socialist one. Few countries had attempted this, and not even China had started from Tanzania's low resource base. In particular, a high degree of sacrifice would be demanded from the Tanzanian leadership, given their very close association with elites in neighbouring countries who were hardly exhibiting much self-denial.

At the same time, Cliffe points out, there was the danger that the bureaucratic educated stratum might become completely alienated from the regime, as happened in Ghana; and anyway their skills were needed. In the text we shall demonstrate on the contrary that the bureaucracy in Tanzania remains a hindrance to progress.

These broader questions aside, the key points to be raised here for discussion are: Who was to see that public enterprises and institutions were not only run efficiently but followed socialist pricing and investment policies? Could one expect those party and government leaders who had been acquiring interests to apply the new conditions of leadership to themselves,

and who was to instruct them in the proper understanding of socialist principles? And, the toughest of all, what agency would persuade, encourage and guide the rural population so that they would revolutionise their modes of production and their way of living? In the course of the thesis it will become important to see how land reform was implemented in Tanzania generally and in Ismani Division in particular and what the consequences were.

Despite all the above questions, one thing was clear to Saul: Tanzania was increasingly carrying on the debate about socialism at a high level of sophistication. Recent works by scholars like Andrew Coulson, Michaela von Freyhold and others raise important new questions. Who is going to control ujamaa villages? Why has the state intervened in agriculture? According to this group, the reality of the Tanzanian development process contradicts the expectations of those who saw the Arusha Declaration as a move away from the 'neo-colonial' path taken by many Third World countries. At one level, Tanzania's official ideology contained more progressive ideas than those of many African countries. On the other hand, it is clear that, because of the class struggle in Tanzania, the country is not moving towards socialism, if that means changing relations of production and giving more power to the peasants and workers. The question to be answered is whether the nature of the petty-bourgeoisie precludes a genuine alternative, and how this

'nature' has to be analysed in order to avoid unrealistic expectations in the future.

The rise to power of the governing class in Tanzania, as we said, showed various progressive measures undertaken by the state, but these measures have also made this group of people extend its control of Tanzanian society. According to von Freyhold, for example, appointed political commissars in the industrial sector watch over party branches to stop the workers from making 'unreasonable' demands and criticisms, and if the workers in these firms launch actions of protest it is T.A.N.U. that authorises their detention and dismissal. The governing class in Tanzania rely on their main supporters in the upper and middle ranks of those holding posts within the different branches of the state apparatus, while the immediate producers are partly suppressed and partly pacified by the co-option of leaders into the supporting class. Since no local group dictated to the governing class in Tanzania as to the road it should take, a close analysis of the class which led the country into its present direction is required.

Much of the confusion indicated above originates in ideological factors: people think they are talking about the same problem, when in fact they define crucial points in radically different ways. More perverse still, there are those scholars who use the terms precisely on account of their ambiguity in order to convince governments to adopt methods whose consequences would be more or less radical. Whatever its political functions and development, this kind of manipulation confuses the issues for
those who seek to interpret the world in order to change it. Reality itself is upside down.¹

The consequences of such reforms raise the following points.

First, the analysis of agrarian structures often starts by asking why some desirable processes are not at work rather than asking what is happening in social reality. Second, in the examination of the agrarian reform, the question arises: has the process reduced inequality? A parallel but separate source of confusion, which sometimes comes from the ultimate emotional observation of 'scholars' of wickedness and hunger, is the idea that the elimination of the exploiters at the given time would lead almost by itself to the disappearance of food shortage or hunger.

As long as our analytical formulations and conceptualizations follow lines of these kinds, our understanding of the social and economic processes at work will be seriously impaired, and the answers even to these 'value-laden' questions will be extremely limited. In this thesis we seek to advance a framework for the analysis of rural development policies in Tanzania which is informed by critical theory in the precise sense that it challenges the conceptual ordering applied by politicians, planners and bureaucrats. We seek to develop concepts which can help to distinguish the forms and extent of commoditization, in other words the consequences of the commercialization of agriculture for rural people. Our

questions are also related to the examination of particular institutions which inhabited these processes. The main rationale for the presentation of these data is that of identifying and evaluating the *ujamaa* policy.

The contemporary rural development policy in Tanzania is directed towards the 95% of the people who live in the rural areas. The rural people are dependent on agriculture and 40% of the G.N.P. is derived from this sector.

Socialist logic demanded that the sparse population should be re-grouped in villages that made sense in economic terms: the so-called *'ujamaa experiment*. After long delays, it was largely carried out in a remarkably short period, 1973-75, which followed three years of drought and the world energy crisis and coincided with an acute balance of payment squeeze. Imports were cut so severely that in some areas the result was counterproductive. Why was this radical change undertaken?

Agricultural growth at 2 to 3 per cent had been too slow for a decade, export values had stagnated and industrial production had dropped. With the help and advice of the World Bank, there was a massive switch in investment from infrastructure to industry and agriculture.

Because of her policies, Tanzania has been one of the most successful nations in the Third World in attracting foreign aid. Donor nations point to the excellent and responsible government housekeeping. This is partly because of Nyerere,

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who lives simply and modestly, disdaining the material benefits of high office. He is incorruptible and for many he is Africa's greatest moralist and philosopher. The confidence that these factors have generated has resulted in foreign aid that meets more than 25% of the national budget and more than half of all development expenditure, much of it in outright grants. On the other hand bureaucracy has grown considerably, especially with decentralisation, so that a disproportionate allocation of funds is used to pay officials. No effective substitute has been found for capitalist incentives and inefficiency is often appalling. If the system has eliminated corruption at the top, there is no doubt that petty dishonesty is becoming a creeping problem at the bottom.

It is important that we distinguish Party guidelines, resolutions and actions in order to see the relevance of these rural development policies. Moreover, it is difficult to see how the Party's revolutionary policies could be put into practice without class struggle and, more importantly, whether such policy statements could be revolutionary if inequalities rather than conflict are the basis of their social practice. If the Party is seriously trying to fight inequalities, it is, however, ignoring the important contradictions arising from the country's incorporation by the capitalist system and its consequences. If the Party and government ignore these issues they cannot build socialism and fight poverty in rural Tanzania. Such questions can only be answered by detailed and accurate case-studies about class relations in the countryside within a wide framework.

Our intention here is to focus upon the variations in response
to generally similar social forces shown by different groups of
people, and to examine how local economy is articulated with the
wider system. Such an examination must be set within the context
of an historical study of the economic and political structure
of a concrete area so that the various stages in the process
may be isolated and analysed.

Needless to mention, a crucial dimension to take into account
is the changing nature and policies of the state machinery.
A more meaningful picture of this process within the above
framework can only be obtained by examining the interplay of
the local and national processes and the specific role played
by the rural sector. State-intervention at regional and local
levels raises analytical problems. Here we may make three
points.

First, state policies are intimately related to the structure
of the national economy which varies according to the
importance of agricultural and non-agricultural sectors and to
the group interests of the people who control the government
machinery and formulate agricultural policies. A second
important point to be discussed concerns the kinds of
institutions set up to put into practice these policies and the
nature of their relationship to central government bodies.
Finally the precise objectives and feasibility of these policies

1. Needless to say, it should be stressed that this is not a
matter of the technical correctness or otherwise of the
policies. The present structure of Tanzanian society
reflects the preference and consumption pattern of the
bureaucratic bourgeoisie which controls almost all aspects
of government decision-making. As a consequence, continued
emphasis on primary exports and complementary emphasis on
final stage processing of high income consumer goods are
maintained.
and their effects raise other problems.

The important above mentioned questions demand careful consideration of the way particular classes interpret the objectives of the government/Party and its scheme, how they participate in them; and how they may utilize the newly available financial resources, etc. in pursuit of their own objectives. The discovery of these problems is best tackled within a regional framework of analysis, since this allows us to examine the consequences of national politico-economic processes for different localities and social classes. This permits an understanding of the socio-economic structure of the region and how it articulates with other parts of the national economy, and the inter-relations of different social classes.

Despite the large amount of work which has been done on questions of rural development, there are few 'sociological' studies of this nature. When comprehended by a structural analysis of the complex relations between different modes of production and their linkages, we have the basis for a sounder approach to explaining social change.

In our case study we have attempted to examine the history and organisation of maize and tobacco production in Iringa District in order to assess the ujamaa policy. Iringa District is one of the few areas in Tanzania where we find a long history of commercial agriculture. Maize and tobacco are the most important crops grown in Iringa District. In the 1950s Ismani Division in Iringa District used to produce about a third of the total maize required in the country. On the other hand
tobacco is a government priority crop which brings in foreign currency needed by the government.

Previous studies of agriculture in Iringa District by Awiti, Alibhai and others have tended to study maize and tobacco separately, neglecting the connections between them. Moreover, in the case of Awiti, he admits that he discusses neither the existing social formations prior to colonial conquest and occupation nor the historical process of establishing the capitalist mode of production. Awiti admits that a study of the pre-colonial mode of production of African society, and why such societies were defeated by the colonial forces, would be an important scientific contribution towards a correct understanding of present-day African society and its contradictions. This is what we have tried to do in order to fill this gap.

Finally Awiti, attacks scholars who have tended to study exclusively the technical aspects of rural development. According to him, all the research studies of rural communities have concentrated on the examination of rather technical subjects, e.g. livestock development, co-operative movements, financing rural development programmes, and so on. According to Awiti, those who have carried out such research studies have carefully and wittingly written reports within the purview of bourgeois liberalism. He objects to such an approach and presentation because he considers it to be unscientific. Awiti's work concentrates on

the aspect of economic differentiation among the peasantry and the resulting problems of *ujamaa* implementation.

Here we would like to make the following points. First, discussion must not merely be in terms of statistical measures indicating whether or not differentiation exists. We have to indicate the basic nature of the processes that are at work and their future tendencies. Secondly, Awiti neglects to examine the ambiguities of *ujamaa* philosophy. Finally, his omission for example to analyze the historical development of the co-operative movement in Iringa, makes him fail to see why the post-colonial government encouraged institutions which had shown negative aspects in the 1950s in an attempt to build rural socialism.

With respect to tobacco, we may be justified in saying that nobody, to our knowledge, has studied the history of tobacco production in Iringa District. Alibhai attempted to show generally the areas which produce tobacco in Tanzania and the increase of peasant participation in tobacco production in the late 1950s\(^1\). Due's work is mainly concerned about the credit facilities to tobacco producers in Iringa in the 1970s\(^2\).

Hence for the first time we are going to examine the historical development of tobacco production in Iringa in some depth. We are going to argue that settlers in Iringa District had tremendous difficulties in getting the tobacco industry started, but that, once their system of production got on its feet, it

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1. ibid., p.214.
proved to be a more efficient system of agriculture in the
district than any other. Settlers now not only produce tobacco;
their maize production has also increased significantly.

On the other hand, maize was always produced by Africans in the
1950s and 1960s. Partly because of price structures,
productivity problems and other factors, agriculture has been
a less promising activity recently. As a consequence, African
farmers have tended to invest less in agriculture and increase
their investment in Iringa Town business, especially transport.

In our case study we have studied maize and tobacco at the same
time, because there are important connections between them.
First, the two above mentioned crops compete for labour.
Second, African farmers and settlers compete again for credits
in order to buy inputs, farm implements and so on. Third, both
the African farmers and settlers struggle to use their economic
power to influence the government institutions in Iringa Town.
Finally, it is an interesting fact that recently settlers and
African farmers have worked together and jointly invested their
capitals in garages, transport business and such like. What is
important is to show the operation of these elements of regional
economy and how these aspects are related to the national
process. This is a theoretical task which no previous work has
attempted.

Partly, the above-mentioned weaknesses of studies done in
Iringa came about because about 80% of all the maize in Iringa
District originates from Ismani Division and most of the
tobacco from 'pockets' of fertile soils around the district.
As we said, maize being an African crop and tobacco a settlers' crop, the scholars mentioned were forced to respect this geographical distribution in their analyses. Besides, the above-mentioned connections, what is crucial for us is the question: why was it that maize started as an African crop and tobacco as purely a settlers' crop? Another general but related question is: why did colonial capitalism fail to revolutionise agriculture?

The growing manifestations of rural unrest, the unsatisfactory growth of agricultural production, the increasing importation of foodstuffs, the malnutrition of the majority of the people and the acrimonious debate on land reform are proof that the agrarian question has gone beyond the realm of academic discussion. The agrarian problem which means the transformation of the entire social formation must be understood as one reflecting the very structure of society.

Furthermore, it is impossible to discuss socialist development within the confines of academic disciplines. For this important reason, we have made no attempts to respect the boundaries that separate various academic disciplines. It is only in this way, we feel, that we can raise important and relevant questions about our topic as well as provide a clue to the possible solutions.

We agree with Rodney and others that these problems are mainly the consequences of colonialism\(^1\). It is important to note that our concern is chiefly with social development, and therefore

it is essential that we discuss the matters within a historical framework. To discuss policies, ideas and so on outside the realm of history cannot reveal their true nature and meaning, for to disregard history in the study of social phenomena 'would be like pretending to study the process of birth but ignoring motherhood'.

Colonial consequences are a historical process. Development policies and problems cannot be understood unless they are analyzed in the full context of their historical setting. This means that they have roots that go back to events that took place in the recent past and also many decades ago, the consequences of which are still being felt. It also means that it is not helpful to approach these questions of rural development policy with highly simplified, formalistic and mechanical economic models. History cannot be forced into a preconceived straitjacket.

The most important determinant of Tanganyika's development has been the specific mode of its incorporation into the international capitalist system of Western social formations. This cannot be considered a simple cause. Rather it is a complex historical process which can only be understood and studied if it is analysed in a historical perspective. Changes occur over time in both metropoles and 'periphery', and these changes should be studied historically.

We have tried to go as far back as pre-colonial times because

the ideology of African Socialism, based on the conception of traditional family and village co-operation, has been essential to President Mwalim Nyerere's formulations of the goals of *ujamaa* policy in Tanzania. Tanzania's special brand of socialism is discussed in Party meetings at all levels, but the ideas that are worked out are essentially President Nyerere's. His openness and honesty have drawn more aid from both Eastern and Western blocs than has gone to almost any other developing country. The mobilization force for *ujamaa* development has been the political party T.A.N.U. Organized down to cells of ten families, T.A.N.U. reaches the grassroots of the rural areas and, in its pyramid-like structure rising through Village Development Committees and ward organisations, it provides a hierarchy for channelling both policy decisions and local opinions. At the village level it provides a forum within which a group of farmers can debate Nyerere's ideas, farmers' problems and wishes to be passed to the Party and Government.\(^1\)

The unpaid leaders of the Ten Cell family known as Balozi, keep records of the cell membership, collect dues from Party members and pass on political and policy information to the cell. The Balozi settles local disputes which otherwise would go to the courts. The position is political but, with Party and development matters so closely linked, the Balozi fills an economic role as well. Although the 10 cell system has not been working uniformly well, partly because the duties of the Balozi have become overburdensome, it does provide an effective two-way

channel for information and a means to police the countryside.

In spite of frequent appeals for people to be practical and realistic, the Nyerere doctrine is essentially idealistic. Although the President has a perfect understanding of his own ideas, most of the people he is trying to help do not. What is worse, many administrators only have the vaguest grasp of the policies they are supposed to interpret, and hardship has all too often resulted. Nonetheless it is important for us to analyse the ambiguities of this philosophy theoretically and empirically as well. The long time-span is important because the destruction of the natural economy took a variety of forms according to the character of pre-existing social formations, the nature of the destructive forces and the historical context.

This study is based upon field work conducted during the author's fourteen-month investigation in Tanzania between July 1976 and September 1977. Because of the nature of our problem, we needed concrete historical evidence; this explains why we started our investigation at the National Archive in Dar-es-Salaam (mid-July 1976 to December 1976). We continued our project at the East Africana Section of the University of Dar-es-Salaam Library (January to April 1977). The above two places are the only major sources of historical evidence in the country. The period from May to early September was spent investigating in Iringa District. The whole of September 1977 was used discussing relevant problems related to our project with the Agrarian Group of Dar-es-Salaam University.

The thesis is mainly based on the documentary evidence, although
some information was gained through conversation. Apart from the above-mentioned major sources of documentary material, we also consulted the Iringa District government files. Two further collections of documents which proved valuable are those of Kalenga Museum and Mkungugu ujamaa village. Knowing some officials in the Iringa District, our experience in the area helped us to check official data against what we saw and heard, and against information supplied by local people. It also meant that we had access to a range of local official materials available to few. Needless to say, in some offices, like the National Maize Corporation, officials were reluctant to help us to collect data on marketing and so on. We had to use other offices like the Tanzania Rural Development Bank, the District Planning Office, the Co-operative Union and the Ministry of Agriculture, to work out material which could have been easily collected from the National Milling. Finally, the published and unpublished material on our subject is listed in the bibliography.

Peasants in Mkungugu ujamaa village in Ismani Division provided us with a good deal of information. Detailed local investigation, however, supplemented and amended this account substantially. It was obvious that one of the first things to do when going to live in the village was to win the confidence of the people. The fact that we were not foreigners and spoke the local vernacular, and especially the fact that we went to live in a hut like that of everybody else in the village, helped to gain the confidence of our neighbours in a few weeks. It was essential to accept the people as they were and not to take an educator's attitude. So we enjoyed being taught about
local practices in many fields. We shared, first passively and
gradually more actively, the community life. We participated
in communal harvesting and so on. We discussed many things,
ranging from sports, urban life, current affairs, politics and
some concrete village problems. We asked a specific set of
questions and also answered questions which the people posed.
We used the above techniques to collect information because
we felt that was the best method to gather material under the
circumstances.

We are fortunate to be able to publish material never before
available to the reader which throws some fresh light upon
rural development policy in Tanzania and the realities of the
countryside. This material is yet further evidence of the
richness and the diversity of the response of Tanzania's rural
people to changing forms of manipulation from above. We do not
take the positivist view that data speak for themselves.
Rather it is in the way we present and interpret our material
theoretically that the reader will see how we reached our
conclusions.

Our thesis is divided into the following chapters.

Territorial Economy:

Chapter One begins with an analysis of Hehe political history
and the most important economic activities in this area of
Tanganyika before direct colonial rule. This discussion is
followed by an examination of Tanganyika's incorporation into
the world capitalist system by the corresponding colonial
power, Germany, and of the establishment of commercial
agriculture and its consequences between the 1880s and 1914.

In Chapter Two we argue that the British Colonial Government had an opportunity to formulate an agricultural policy free from the political constraints of a settler group between the First and Second World Wars. In many ways, the theme central to our analysis is the nature of capital accumulation.

Regional Economy: (within a wider perspective)

Chapter Three examines the history and organisation of maize production in Ismani Division and in a wider perspective from World War II to 1970. Here we discuss labour processes and the history of marketing co-operatives in Iringa District.

Chapter Four is mainly concerned with the difficulties associated with the development of a settler-based tobacco industry in Iringa District from World War II to 1960. Here we are concerned with processes and determinants in the development of wage labour in the colonial economy. Our analysis discusses wage labour in terms of the needs of capital. In early times methods of the extraction of a surplus tended to be less subtle and more violent than later on, when the system was more widely accepted.

Chapter Five provides a review of the ujamaa policy debate and examines the agricultural development experiences of the 1960s and the early 1970s. In this chapter we argue that the ujamaa programme was supposed to be voluntaristic, that is started by the peasants themselves, but that in the 1970s the policy changed and started using coercion and compulsory villagization. Agricultural production was disrupted and the
will of the peasants to work was weakened. This chapter provides evidence to show state intervention into agriculture and its consequences.

Chapter Six picks up the argument from Chapter Four and discusses tobacco production in Tanzania during the 1960s and up to 1977. Our discussion here is related to questions of rural enterprise and development policy. In Iringa District the government's attempt to encourage ujamaa villages to produce tobacco has failed, and tobacco has remained a settlers' crop. In this chapter we also discuss the importance of child labour in tobacco production. The final section of the chapter looks at the problem of the nationalised industrial sector of the economy, with reference to the Tanzania Tobacco Company.

In the final chapter we present an overall picture of agricultural policy implementation and its consequences in Iringa District. The first part of the chapter examines the implementation of ujamaa policy in Ismani Division within a villagisation perspective. Secondly, we examine the aims of Operation Ismani and locate its problems. Thirdly we show the connection between Operation Ismani and the National Maize Programme and the consequences of the latter. An assessment of the maize project is provided in our attempt to assess ujamaa policy.
CHAPTER ONE

PRE-COLONIAL TANGANYIKA AND EARLY COLONIAL PENETRATION: 1880-1914

What were the most important elements of the pre-colonial economy?
Under what circumstances did the Hehe people unite and become the most powerful tribe in the country? Why did the first of the colonial powers, Germany, acquire Tanganyika? We intend to argue that the colonial administration used ideological tools to further the interests of capitalism.

Pre-colonial Tanganyika was not a classless society. This much is clear from what we know about the prevailing relations of production. The development of the colonial economy was the result of the destruction of the pre-colonial economies to meet the specific needs of different branches of capitalism in specific historical conjunctures. We are going to argue that the most important determinant of Tanganyika's development has been the specific mode of its incorporation into the international capitalist system. This cannot be considered a simple cause, but rather a complex historical process in which the changing requirements of capital have inter-acted with the structures and processes generated by its earlier phases. The purpose here is not so much to provide a chronology as to indicate some of the important processes involved.

This thesis is part of a wider study of rural development in Iringa District, which focuses on aspects of production and consumption, settlement, land use, marketing and co-operative organisation and their potential for rural transformation according
to the aims of Tanzania's development plan and policies. The thesis, however, confines itself to outlining the historical trend of change and the development of agricultural production, particularly maize and tobacco, in Iringa.

When looking at the present system of production, consumption and exchange of the small holders and large farmers, it was realised that the nature of the process could only be comprehended if the changes during and after the colonial period were studied and analysed in a historical perspective. This thesis provides such an attempt, going back as far as the pre-colonial period, to some point before direct colonial rule.

There are other reasons for adopting such a time perspective. The major changes incurred as a consequence of the imposition of colonial rule relate especially to such factors as the development of food and cash-crop production for exchange. These fundamental changes notwithstanding, traditional forms of production, as well as the indigenous social and political systems, often survived more or less intact. At least in appearances, some of them still look like pre-colonial tribal institutions, though their properties and nature are determined by new and different sets of conditions.

The ideology of African Socialism, and more specifically the idea of ujamaa, is based on a particular conception of traditional family and village co-operation. This conception has been instrumental in formulating goals and aims for the present-day rural development in Tanzania, as has been explained by President

1. United Republic of Tanzania, formed on April 27th 1964, name Tanzania adopted on October 29th, 1964. Here Tanzania refers to mainland Tanzania, unless stated otherwise.
Nyerere. This provides an additional impetus for looking at pre-colonial African social formations and attempting to assess their present potential for rural development.

Pre-Colonial Economy

For some years, a debate has been going on around the problem of identifying modes of production in African history. This debate can be traced theoretically to Marx's own references to and study of the 'Asiatic mode of production'. For a long time, indeed, Marxist scholars with an interest in pre-capitalist modes of production in Africa were unable to free themselves from the terminology provided by Marx. Hence, pre-capitalist modes in Africa were defined as varieties of the Asiatic mode of production.

We suggest that an examination of the process of the colonial impact must start from a first approximation of the pre-capitalist modes of production in Africa, in order to understand the specific mode of their incorporation into the international capitalist system.

Lionel Cliffe suggests that, on the basis of property relations and the size and form of distribution of any surplus, there were several major categories of mode of production in East Africa. For example, under the 'primitive' mode of production, man was helpless before nature, and this is what explains the collective forms of labour and communalistic social relations implicit in

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the collective ownership of the land and the egalitarian forms of distribution of products. First, there were societies that produced almost no surplus. These were based on shifting cultivation, using a hoe, with a sparse population consisting of small non-hierarchical communities of subsistence producing families. However, a more thorough specification of the actual relationships of production is still essential to determine the formations' own internal dynamic. Sahlins came to the interesting conclusion about these pre-surplus, pre-exchange economies, that the absence of surplus in the so called "domestic mode of production" was not due to the lack of potential inherent in the environment or the technology. There was a potential abundance which social relations, above all, prevented from being realised.

At the other end of the scale were found formations in which feudal relationships of production were discernible i.e. in the inter-Lacustrine Kingdoms. These societies were feudal in that not only were the masses of people subject to the rule of individual lords or chiefs, but these latter also claimed rights over a proportion of the land and the peasants who dwelt on it and thereby extracted surplus in the form of surplus labour. Labour is the producer of all material and cultural wealth needed for human life. Exploitation of man appeared only after the disintegration of primitive society, when the labour of

people began to yield some surplus product over and above the minimum needed for subsistence\(^1\). These were the few social formations where state systems had evolved, existing and co-existing with other modes of production such as the slave mode, whose presence in the immediate pre-colonial centuries was more widespread than was once realised.

A third category consisted of less centralised and hierarchical 'chiefly' societies where the state was only in process of emergence\(^2\). These certainly produced a surplus, which in turn supported a division of labour more complex than of the different producing tasks of age groups and sexes. But the appropriation of part of the surplus by political authorities or even via the unequal access to land or to livestock was the result of relations of distribution, not of relationships of production, that is, access to surplus of others' production through the alienation of 'property relations' from the act of production. This corresponds to what others have referred to as the tributary mode of production.

A fourth mode of production not based on crop husbandry should be recognised as present in several areas which were largely dependent on livestock. Unlike land, a larger herd of cattle or goats did not require a proportionate increase in available labour. This kind of social formation was so shaped that different groups were differently affected and relationships transposed by contact with the capitalist market economy when it

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1. ibid., p.27.
finally caught up with the pastoral areas of East Africa.

Whatever the relations of production associated with the first three above mentioned basic types or the particular combination or mix of them within the social formation, many parts of East Africa had in common dependence on family-based small-scale agriculture. The fact that land was not everywhere a 'property', that rights to it were vested in the extended family and not the individual, and that generally no propertyless class or group of people existed, should not blur the essential characteristic that production was small-scale and occasionally supplemented by exchange. This realisation is crucial in assessing the likely impact when capitalist social relationships impinge on this small production unit.

The absence of private property in land which has enamoured many African socialists did not mean that prior to its incorporation into the world capitalist system Africa was an eldorado of egalitarianism. In many societies, class divisions had emerged, expressed in the inequality in property relations that arose among peasants.

In Africa prior to the advent of imperialism, there were certain societies which had no state machinery, but there also existed societies that had developed to a point where social classes appeared and where governmental functions were reserved for a minority who exercised power in an exclusive way. The destruction of Africa's political economies changed the relation of production in these societies.
In pre-colonial Tanganyika, land being by definition the dominant element in an agrarian economy, the land-tenure system was the key to the relative stability of the economy. Each family constituted in actual fact an autonomous centre of production and consumption, covering a wide range of activities, it supplied its own food, built housing, made clothes, weapons and so on; in short it was a self-sufficient unit. At the village level, co-operation between families was related to clearly defined activities. Work was performed by family - or extended family-groups and where there was a shortage of hands in peak periods, communal arrangements would be made for exchange of labour\(^1\). Non-family members might be assimilated into the working group but their reward and their conditions of work and life would approximate to those of the employing family\(^2\). Each member of Hehe community, for example, received a portion of land, eliminating the possibility of there being a role for an active class living exclusively on revenue from ground rent. This does not mean that land was free in the sense that anybody could do whatever he wished with it. Rights over land that was the property of the group were jealously guarded by social institutions. In the case of the Hehe, individual strangers or captives could have access to land only as servants or slaves, but these restrictions were limited.

This land tenure system seemed to be aimed at protecting against an artificial land shortage, thus preventing a privileged few from accumulating it all. However, we suggest that such a system

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2. ibid., p.283.
did not exclude certain inequalities in the distribution of tasks. Louise Fortmann\(^1\) suggests that the family women and young men did most of the work, to the benefit of the old people who consumed the largest share. But since each man in the course of his life passed from one age group to another, it balanced out in the end.

Captain Wilson\(^2\) suggests that the Hehe chief Mkwawa grew grain to feed his troops. On the other hand Joseph Thompson\(^3\) reported, and the testimony of the Hehe elders agrees on this, that agriculture was of minor importance in those days, the sphere of women and children, men being very much occupied with guarding cattle (not a child's job at that time) and in war. Having been involved in a series of wars from the time of Muyugumba to Mkwawa, the Hehe people acquired most of their necessities through plunder and long-distance trade. Similarly, there developed trade exchange between villages, though limited to locally produced goods. Some areas supplied salt, e.g. the Gogo, while others provided iron hoes. Some produced surplus food grain; others cattle. Some did not produce any particular surplus but specialised in trade itself.

The market was the centre of communications, an occasion for exchanging news and even, in certain societies, for the meeting of sexes\(^4\). These markets had political advantages as a means of control by the chiefs over the people who frequented it and the

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3. 'Remains of an earlier people in Uhehe', Tanganyika Notes and Records, No. 27, June 1949, p.43.
goods that were offered for sale. The political authority in return guaranteed peace in the market places.

Whatever its origin, this egalitarian land tenure system seems to have hindered economic progress. In the Hehe society, parallel to subsistence agriculture (its significance is a debatable issue) there developed war and trade activities, creating prosperity for vast political ensembles. It was from long distance trade that the major part of the surplus came. There were two ways of procuring goods: through war and through trade. War was the characteristic form of 'production' in parasitic military societies in which the state machinery seemed to be an enterprise of external depredation in search of the cattle and captives required in the economy. The particular feature of social existence was based upon the combination of a patriarchal agrarian economy with a low internal surplus and the exclusive ascendancy of one group over long-distance trade.

In a more differentiated political system, e.g. Hehe, there developed a privileged class which succeeded in controlling long-distance trade by means of a hereditary caste as a result of the beginning of accumulation of cattle. The regime expressed a more or less coherent synthesis of the tribal-patriarchal system and a new kind of territorial ambition. As long as the village transmitted its tribute to the chief at the province, it ran the life of the collectivity as it pleased. The leaders of the Muyinga clan assured the worship of the clan's ancestors; the chief of the clan allotted arable land to each family and each generation the women groups set the rules for transactions on the local food markets. African stagnation was the consequence of socio-economic organization.
MAP 1. Central and South Tanzania.
History of Heheland between the 1850s and the 1890s

The Hehe people won fame by defeating a German expedition in 1891 and maintaining their resistance for seven years until Chief (Mkwavinyika) Mkwawa killed himself to avoid capture. The Germans were convinced that the Hehe were one of the most important peoples in German East Africa (G.E.A.) and they knew that no other part of G.E.A. had cost Germany so much blood as Hehe.

The area which has been generally recognised as Uhehe has varied at different times. Now it coincides with the administrative districts of Iringa and Mufindi. There are two difficulties in writing about the pre-colonial history of Uhehe. The first is that the name is of relatively recent origin and has not always been used to refer to the same people. Secondly, remarkably little is known about the Hehe before 1850. In most early descriptions of the Hehe by Europeans it was stated that the name was derived from their war cries. They used to go into battle shouting 'Hee Hee Hee Yatavangu twihoma ehee' (Hee Hee Hee we are fighting the enemy ehee) and other similar cries. The name Hehe was probably first used by their enemies to refer to any people in this area who went into battle shouting 'Hee Hee Hee' and only later was used specifically to refer to the subjects of chiefs Muyugumba and Mkwawa. However, in describing these people the Hehe elders suggest that, it is more correct to refer to their small ancestor group or to their place of origin.

Hehe tell stories about their ancestors coming from other places. For a long time there have been close links between Usagara and

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Uhehe and this was reflected in the argument of the founder of the ruling Muyinga dynasty coming from Ikombagulu in Usagara on a hunting expedition. This general outline of many small migrations is consistent with what little is known about concrete situations in the interior of Tanganyika in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. It was a peaceful, sparsely inhabited place, where famine and epidemics caused small groups of people to migrate. Within and around Uhehe some local trade developed. Uwemba and Ubena were said to have been important areas for iron smelting, and Malenga Makali on the Ruaha plains was a place from which people obtained salt. Game was an important source of food and for those who hunted elephants, at least during the second half of the nineteenth century, it also became a source of wealth, because trade goods were usually obtained in exchange for ivory. Being a social animal, man develops both co-operation and a social division of labour which is not only made possible by, but increases the possibilities of, the production of a surplus over and above what is needed to maintain the individual and community of which he is part. The existence of both the surplus and social division of labour makes possible exchange.

In the 1830s, there were at least fifteen chiefdoms in Uhehe before Muyugumba united them. Members of these ruling families and some others in the area often married their cross-cousins (vahisi). Those ruling families which were not agnatically

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related to each other often intermarried. The male members of a number of these ruling families were addressed with the praise name 'Mulugu'. These ruling families were often set apart from their subjects, the producers, because, instead of throwing away the corpses of their dead into bush, they buried them together with a living person. Members of particular families associated with the chiefly dynasties were chosen for this task, which involved sitting in the grave and supporting the upper part of the chief's corpse in one's lap. Some chiefs' graves were marked by elephant tusks.

One of the interesting customs of the Hehe people was the care and reverence with which their hereditary chiefs were buried and their graves maintained. Ngaonalupembe, who died in the 1820s, was particularly remembered for the ability to beget innumerable children. His grave is situated at Ulelingombe, Iwawa, the former seat of Uhehe chiefdom. All the members of the royal family have carefully kept and situated graves, but the hallmarks of a chief's burial ground are the elephant tusks which circle it, the two largest of which are placed at his head. It is important to mention that the chief kept a large quantity of European cotton aside to be used at their funerals. The body was wrapped in a thick layer of cloth, which gave it the form of a cylinder. This burial package which could attain enormous proportions, constituted a repeated drain on wealth, as did the sacred festival that accompanied the ceremony, requiring huge offerings by the household.

Our data tend to suggest that no other member, but that of the ruling chief was entitled to this mark of distinction. The grave of the chief did play an important part in the ancestor worship cult of the Hehe. These days the rituals attached to them have apparently fallen in disuse. The belief in the former times particularly to Ngaonalupembe, due probably to his prodigious prolificness, was in the ability of the spirit of the former chiefs to bring rain. The grave in a season when the rains threatened to fail or after a year of drought became a sacrificial grove. Here in order to enlist the aid of the spirit of the departed ruler a completely black bull and ram were sacrificed by the Rain-Maker. It is interesting to note that as far as can be ascertained, though 1949 was one of the worst years in the memory of many old men as regards rain, no such sacrifices took place that year.

Moreover, the chief's grave was also of particular significance to the members of the royal family. When any pressing difficulty such as the severe illness of a favourite child or some complex internal conflict had seemingly no solution without supernatural aid, the member or members of the royal family concerned would go and place a jar of native or local beer between the two largest elephant tusks in the hope that the spirit of their ancestor would succour them in their troubles. This offering was always placed in its appointed position at dusk. Next morning after the sun had risen the jar was inspected and if the level of the beer had dropped there was much rejoicing for the spirit of their

1. A.A. Oldaker, Provincial Commissioner (PC), Annual Reports of the Provincial Commissioners for the year 1949, 1950, Southern Highlands, p.15.
ancestor was deemed to have heard their prayers and by drinking expressed his willingness to help them solve their difficulties. This also has fallen into disuse, as today the popular belief is that the level of the beer decreases not due to the thirsty spirit but due to evaporation. This note's main interest was perhaps, the illustration of the rapidity with which the old beliefs and rituals are being abandoned for modern and scientific explanations.

Ngaonalupembe had ruled only a few years before he was killed. There was a tradition that he was murdered on the instructions of his younger full brother. Binini succeeded him and then took the name Muyungumba.

The Unification of the Hehe Chiefdom

The date of chief Muyugumbas succession is not known but it was probably between 1855 and 1860. Soon after he had become the chief, Muyugumba attacked Udongwe, less powerful chiefs in northern Uhehe. Thus he took over the chiefdoms of northern Uhehe, acquired the territory of Uhafiwa in the north west and all Uzungwa. Msambila mwaMudemu ruler of the large Ifwagi chiefdom was killed while fighting Muyugumba, who thus annexed his chiefdom. Muyugumba was involved in a complicated series of wars, alliances and counter-alliances between the Kinamanga chiefs of Utewikwila, the Songea Ngoni and the Sangu. Soon after he had driven off the Ngoni Muyugumba became ill and died probably at the end of 1878 or early in 1879.

The political map of this part of Tanzania had altered much during Muyugumba's reign. Instead of many small chiefdoms in the plateau and highlands of Uhehe, the whole area was ruled by
one chief whose subjects had acquired the reputation of being a warrior people, having won important victories against their most powerful neighbours, the Sangu and the Ngoni. One of the Muyugumba's problems was the shortage of superior arms, but his personality and ability were important factors contributing to his military achievements, and his relationships with some of the chiefs of Uhehe helped him to make alliance and annex chiefdoms. For example the people of Uzungwa mountains and Hehe plateau may also have realised the advantages of unity in the face of a common external danger.

**Political Organisation**

The Hehe were partly influenced by the Sangu political and military organisation. Both the Hehe and the Sangu divided their forces into named regiments and at least three of these regimental names *Vanamwambi, Valambo* and *Vatengelamutwa* were used by both parties. The details of how and when the Hehe chiefdom started are not known for the earlier part, but the broad outline of their political organisation during the latter part of Muyugumba's reign and during Mkwawa's reign is clear. The chief (Mtwa) himself owed his position partly to his genealogical position, as a member of the Muyinga dynasty who also had connections with the chiefs of Lungemba, Udongwe and Ilole, partly to his own ability and intelligence and partly to supernatural sanctions. He was believed to have a special relationship with the spirits (*masoka*) of the dead chiefs to whom he was related and made offerings on their graves to ask for assistance in matters which concerned the whole chiefdom, such as rain and success in war. Both Muyugumba and Mkwawa had war medicine (*amahomelo*) and their success in war was seen as
proof of its potency and of their fitness to rule. They were wealthy and had many wives, great herds, much cloth and ivory. They were treated with respect by their subjects, greeted in a special way and buried in a particular manner.¹

Muyugumba and Mkwawa each made for himself a new capital in a strategic position, the former at Lungemba the latter at Kalenga. The chief lived surrounded with some senior men to assist him as councillors (vatambule), war captives (vanyawingi) who performed servile tasks, young men in training for war (vigendo) who were also servants and messengers, and a small number of hereditary bondsmen (vafugwa) who performed special tasks such as herding their chief's donkeys and from whom were selected those to be buried alive with the chief and his relatives.

He delegated authority to subordinate rulers (vanzagiló) a few of whom lived at his capital but most of whom lived in other places and were responsible for the areas in which they lived. They had to keep order, judge lesser disputes, inform the chief of important news and assemble men for public works and war. The areas which they ruled were not of even size, those who ruled frontier areas were important and, living far from the chief's main residence, they probably had the greatest opportunity to act on their own initiative.

Some subordinate rulers were selected by the chief on account of their intelligence and bravery, many were his relations or affines and some had formerly been independent chiefs. Many

¹. Redmayne, op.cit., p.45.
subordinate rulers in turn appointed their own subordinates, who were also referred to as vanganga. Because there was no elaborate organisation of hereditary officials, and because the office of subordinate ruler was so adaptable, the Hehe apparently had little difficulty in developing their political organisation to meet rapidly changing circumstances.

Chief Mkwawa
Muyugumba may have intended his enlarged chiefdom to be divided between two heirs, but whatever plans he had were disrupted by Mwambambe, an important subordinate ruler whom he had appointed to rule the south-west of the chiefdom to guard the frontier against the Sangu. Possibly he was a war captive who had earned Muyugumba's favour and had been given one of his daughters as a wife. The Hehe see this as the great villain in their history. He killed Muhalwike, a younger brother of Muyugumba who had strong claims to the chiefship. This caused some other members of the chief's family to escort Mkwawa, son of Muyugumba, to safety in Ugogo. Mkwawa was in exile for two years and Mwambambe was living in the south of the chiefdom at Uhenga in Ubena.

In 1880 this situation led to war between Mwambambe and the supporters of Mkwawa, who had persuaded Mkwawa to return from Ugogo and who had made a temporary alliance with the Sangu chief Merere Towalamahamba. He then returned to Uhehe with a group of followers recruited in Kiwele and Ukonongo, many of whom were armed with guns, and joined the battle with the forces of Mkwawa. Mwambambe was forced to withdraw to Kiwele in Northern Ukumbu where he sought the aid of the Nyamwezi war lord Nyungu ya Mawe. Mwambambe was defeated after a fierce struggle in which he was killed. 1

1. This interesting information was collected from interviews we had with Hehe elders at Mkwawa's capital Kalenga, 20th-30th May 1977.
Between his return from Ugogo in 1880 and February 1883, Mkwawa had selected a new site for his capital and there built a large wooden stockade, which was bisected by the Little Ruaha river, in which there were many huts and open land on which cattle grazed.

In 1882-83, he inflicted crushing defeats on the Ngoni and Nyamwezi, his warlike neighbours, he fought the Gogo and established control over the whole of Southern Tanganyika. By that time he was the unchallenged ruler of all Uhehe.

After they had made a truce with the Ngoni, the Southern borders of Uhehe were relatively peaceful, but they could never leave this frontier unguarded. Mkwawa kept at least two garrisons in the area so that they were always ready for war. The Sangu had fled from Uhehe and settled in Usafwa, but they never accepted defeat. They tried to return to their old lands and were repulsed by the Hehe, who several times attacked the Stone Fort of the Sangu at Utengule Usongwe but failed to break in.

Mkwawa was given two daughters of chief Merere, Towelamahamba's son, as wives, yet the two men never made peace. Towelamahamba's son, Chief Merere Magundilwa or Pambaku, assisted the Germans in their wars against the Hehe. A common tactic used by the German Commanding Officer was to play off one chief against another to conquer both.

During Mkwawa's reign the Hehe were also constantly at war in the north. They raided in many parts of Ugogo and as far east as

1. Redmayne, op.cit., p.47.
Usagara and Uvidunda. There were two reasons for the increasing number of Uhehe raids to the north of the Ruaha River. First was Mkwawa's own knowledge of the conditions in Ugogo near the caravan route and the greater number of caravans, which as the Hehe became stronger and more experienced in warfare provided better opportunities for plunder than before. Second, though they were probably more numerous than the Hehe, the Gogo were never united, and the Sagara were fewer, disunited and had never been good fighters.

Thus, there were no people capable of defeating the Hehe in the north. Muyugumba had caused the Sagara south of the Ruaha to acknowledge his overlordship and under Mkwawa the Hehe extended their influence further east. From here the Hehe could obtain information about the events on the caravan route and on the coast. They also traded with the Arabs at Mukondoa, near the site of the present Kilosa town. A few Arabs and Swahili traders entered Uhehe and reached the fort at Kalenga. The Muyinga clan controlled the trade in ivory. Mkwawa himself every year sent ivory to Bagamoyo. In return he got guns, clothes, beads, alcohol and so on.

As regards ivory, the chief totally controlled the trade. In practice the hunters were bound to give him the tusks of slaughtered elephants and these were either transformed into ornaments or horns for the chief or sold externally for profit. This long-distance trade was an essential element in the functioning of the entire social formation. Like every

1. ibid., p.48.
distributive mechanism it created no wealth (this was born in
the process of production) but it gave it a concrete form
appropriate to the reproduction process 1.

Further to the east, the Hehe made less important raids. The
Kinamanga chief did not make any effort to recover their lost
land in Utemikwila, but the Ndanda, an unwarlike people who
inhabit the banks of the Kilombero valley and its tributaries,
accepted Mkwawa's overlordship and so were protected from the
raids of the Kinamanga chiefs and their Bena subjects.

Mkwawa attacked Uvidunda primarily in order to capture people,
for there were no cattle there, only goats. The Hehe were
partially successful but the Vidunda could always retreat into
their steep mountains, where it was impossible to attack them.
By the late 1880s the Hehe had become a recognised threat to
traffic on the caravan route, particularly in the area between
Kilosa and Mpwapwa. When the cattle of Uhehe were dying of
rinderpest, Mkwawa ordered his warriors to go and capture more.
Many Sagara, having had their cattle stolen and their huts burnt,
fled, leaving fields uncultivated.

By 1890, only ten years after Mkwawa had returned from exile in
Ugogo, the Hehe community, particularly the ruling dynasty, were
wealthy and self-confident, and Mkwawa was feared not only by all
the neighbouring peoples who suffered when they were raided, but

1. Marx wrote in the Poverty of Philosophy: 'In general the form
of exchange of products corresponds to the form of produc-
tion. Change the latter and the former will change in
consequence'. In asserting in this way the primacy of the
viewpoint of production for the study of social reality he
clearly separates himself from bourgeois economics which not
being very concerned with revealing the real origin of
profits addresses itself for preference to the relations of
distribution.
also by many of his own subjects who therefore obeyed him. He was clearly very ambitious and wished his defence and attack to be well organised. Mkwawa had his fort at his capital Kalenga rebuilt. He made an eight foot wall around the fort, which was one mile long and one mile wide, \(^1\), replacing the original wooden stockade with a wall of stones and mud, a very large task which must have taken several years and a lot of labour to complete. The stone was called 'Lipuli' a Kinyamwezi word meaning 'strong elephant'.

**Early Colonial Penetration in East Africa**

As we have seen, great changes took place in East Africa during the nineteenth century, especially in the south, in what was to become Tanzania. Some areas were devastated by slave-raiding and Ngoni warfare, but elsewhere African societies began to adapt themselves to long-distance trade \(^2\) and European penetration, particularly in the shape of missionaries, as we shall see. At the same time, even greater changes were happening in Europe as a result of the Industrial Revolution. Throughout the world, Europe's new economic and military power was forcing other peoples either to reorganise themselves or suffer defeat and colonial rule.

Before 1884, Germany's interest in East Africa was limited. The idea of conquest came from an individual named Carl Peters. He was determined to acquire colonies for Germany in Africa. From

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his friend, Count Joachim von Pfeil, who had lived in South Africa, he learnt that 'the country opposite to Zanzibar belonged to 'nobody' and was suitable for colonisation. So on 28th March 1884 they founded the 'Gesellschaft Für Deutsche Kolonisation', with funds, mostly from private donations, amounting to 3 to 4 million marks (£150,000-£2,000,000). On 1st October 1884, Peters, von Pfeil and a few others departed for Zanzibar and later landed on the mainland of East Africa. They crossed the strip of the country under the Sultan of Zanzibar and struck inland, concluding dubious treaties with several native chiefs.

On 19th December, the main part of the expedition, including Peters, hurried back to Germany. His friends were enthusiastic and, in view of Bismark's unfriendly attitude, they approached King Leopold of Belgium on the matter. The Congo Conference was on at that time and the King was more than willing to extend his colonial empire to the Indian Ocean. Then, suddenly Bismarck swung round and, one day after the Conference, on 27th February 1885, he and the Kaiser Wilhelm I signed a Charter for the Gesellschaft Für Kolonisation, in which Peters was the chairman. In September 1885 the name of the company was changed to the Deutsche-Ostafrikanische Gesellschaft (DOAG).

The territory acquired by Peters in the few weeks of his sojourn in Africa extended north and south of Morogoro on the present

2. Ibid., p.38.
central railway line and west as far as Mpwapwa. Immediately after obtaining the Charter, the territory was enlarged.

Negotiations were carried on with the Sultan of Zanzibar from 1887 on with a view to acquiring the coastal strip. A treaty with the Sultan was to come into force on 15th August 1888, but on that date a rebellion broke out on the coast. The Reichstag voted the money on 2nd February 1889 and von Wissman was sent out a month later to suppress the rebellion. By March 1888 the rebellion was over.

The negotiations with the Sultan were resumed and were concluded in July 1890 with the payment of 4 million marks. The actual boundaries of the territory were laid down in the Treaty with England on 1st July 1890 by which Heligoland was ceded to Germany and England obtained suzerainty over Zanzibar. On 1st April 1891, the German Government took over the D.O.A.G. and the territory became a German colony known as Deutsch Ostafrika. In this context, having no special reputation as a producer of valuable minerals, East Africa was looked upon by the imperialist power as a potential producer of strategic agricultural raw materials to service human and industrial consumption in the metropolis.

The creation of the Colonial Economy by violence 1890–1906

In 1891, as we have mentioned, the Imperial German Government undertook direct political supervision of the colony of German

East Africa. The D.O.A.G., the Chartered Company which previously shouldered this responsibility, was unable to carry out the first task of colonisation, namely conquest. It is now clear that the successful advance of the Hehe to the North and East coincided with the advance of the Germans inland. The Germans began to build administrative forts at Mpwapwa and then at Kilosa, on the caravan route. The Hehe were in a good position to raid the people who lived near the forts and who submitted to the colonial power. The Germans realised that the Hehe were a major obstacle to their occupation and colonisation of the interior, and Mkwawa understood that the Germans were a more powerful and more important threat to his growing empire than any of the enemies he had already overcome.

In 1891 a German Commander was sent to Usagara, where, with the help of Arabs, he began to negotiate with the Hehe subordinate ruler at Ulanga. He agreed that some Hehe should go to the coast to have talks with the Governor and, when the Hehe returned inland, the Germans assumed that they had left with peaceful intentions. However in June 1891 the Germans heard that Ngoni were raiding the hinterland of Kilwa and that the Hehe subordinate ruler was taking prisoners. An expedition, under Commander Zelewski, was sent to pacify the area. It destroyed a number of huts in the area and then moved towards Kalenga, where another fight broke out in which ten Germans, including the Commander, were killed. The Germans lost many troops, porters,

arms and baggage. The survivors returned to the coast, where the news of their humiliating defeat made a deep impression.

On the other hand, the Hehe losses were so heavy that Mkwawa forbade mourning\(^1\). For about two years the Hehe were unable to undertake another major expedition. Our Hehe informants\(^2\) suggest that the Hehe had captured a large quantity of arms and ammunition and confirmed their reputation as the most powerful military tribe in East Africa.

After their defeat, the Germans hoped that Mkwawa might be persuaded to make peace. They sent Arabs again and French missionaries from Ulanga as intermediaries to negotiate with the Hehe, who had no interest in making peace. They did not believe that the Germans, who were moving reinforcements into the interior, really wanted to come to terms. In October 1892 the Hehe attacked and virtually annihilated a large commercial caravan at Mukondoa. However, the Germans could not organise another expedition against the Hehe for some time, partly because of their losses and the demoralising effect of the last campaign and partly because they had to deal with the other chiefs who resisted their authority.

By the dry season of 1894, the new German governor von Schele had prepared another better organised troop for use against the Hehe, which he himself led. In order to avoid Zelewski's route up the escarpment near Image, this second expedition, having

\(^1\) Redmayne, 'Hehe', in Roberts, ed., op.cit., p.31.
\(^2\) This information and the details mentioned below of the sad story of the defeat of the Hehe were recorded from the elder people at Kalenga in May 20th 1977.
obtained the assistance of the Hehe subordinate ruler of Ulanga, approached from the valley. Before dawn on 30th October, von Price led the attack and, after the German’s troops had climbed into the fort, there followed hours of hard fighting from the roots of the huts and in the doorways. Many men fled in disorder, while Mkwawa and Rumaliza escaped unrecognised. By the evening, the Germans had taken possession of the fort, destroyed the weapon store and recovered some ivory and guns. Then the Hehe attempted to ambush them at Image as they were returning to the coast, but this ambush was a failure.

The Hehe look upon the destruction of the fort 'Lipuli' as the effective end of Mkwawa’s rule, yet he continued to have a profound influence on events in Uhehe for nearly four years. From time to time, the Germans hunted him relentlessly, but Mkwawa continued to elude them, the Hehe giving him unswerving loyalty, supplying him with food and information, helping his warriors and sacrificing themselves rather than let him be captured. In 1898 there was no one to hide him any longer. The Germans’ attempts to capture him were in top gear; they left no stone unturned in this attempt to capture Mkwawa. The German Colonial Government offered a reward of 5,000 rupees – a fantastic sum at that time – for his head and this was a temptation for someone to betray his whereabouts. Mkwawa committed suicide rather than be captured.

With his death, in June 1898, the period of occupation and resistance 'ended'. The Germans built powerful forts at strategic points throughout the country. Twelve miles away from Kalenga, they built a fort which they called Neu Iringa (New Iringa) in contrast to Kalenga which they called Alt Iringa
(Old Iringa). The German Colonial Government began to demand taxes. Plantations were started and a new period of administration began: colonisation through economic relations, accompanied by political domination.

Principal ideological apparatus used by the German Colonial Government

In order to get a clear picture of this subject, it is important that we give a brief review of missionary activities in the territory. Before the influx of missionaries in the late nineteenth century, some European and American companies were already trading in East Africa. Capitalist industry badly required sources of raw materials and markets for its manufactured goods.

It was at this historical juncture, however, that European missionaries appeared on the East African scene. It is a historical fact that the first missionaries came from the most advanced capitalist formation of the time, namely Britain. These people preceded and prepared the ground, to a certain degree, for the complete colonisation of the area. It would be a distortion of the facts to say that all missionaries consciously identified themselves with imperial ambitions. But whether they did so or not is beside the point.

In 1862 the Holy Ghost Fathers set up a mission station at Bagamoyo. In 1872 it comprised 24 European priests and nuns,

1. See the interesting analysis of the different attitudes of German missionaries towards Imperialism in Marcia Wright, 'Lutherans and Morovians in the Southern Highlands' in her German Missions in Tanganyika 1819-1914, 1971, p.7.
and 324 ex-slaves, 251 of whom were children. By 1885, five other missionary societies had established themselves in Tanganyika. On their arrival they started working along the coast and later penetrated the interior. However, it was not a coincidence that the early missionaries followed the established trade routes and settled in the proximity of some trading centre, establishing a more or less self-contained station, which grew its own food and had its own laws to regulate life on the mission and even a sort of police force to maintain order. Thus, by 1890 the White Fathers' station at Kibaga, on the shore of Lake Tanganyika, had a vast plantation, which grew rice, maize, sweet potatoes, oil palms, bananas, sugar cane and vegetables. The work on the plantation was done by the converts. They worked for three days a week on the mission plantation spending the rest of their time on their own plots. As wages, they received a few pieces of cloth.

The principal aim of the missionaries was to propagate their faith. Most of their initial converts in fact had no choice but to adopt Christianity. Categorically, these were former slaves, 'freed' by the British and passed on to the missions for cultural and ideological enslavement! Due to fear of being recaptured and the lack of means of transport to take him back to his home area, the ex-slave was compelled to remain on the mission. Also, the fact that many of the slaves who had been captured and handed

1. The missionary societies started were the University Mission to Central Africa, Church Missionary Society, Holy Ghost Fathers, Lutheran Mission Society and White Fathers.
over to the mission were young children made them easy victims of the missions.

However, after an initial period of settling down, the missionaries looked for converts beyond the immediate surroundings of the mission. The initial reception accorded to the missionaries and the extent of their success depended largely on the concrete socio-economic and political situation in the different areas. The issue of historical specificity is important. For example, in areas ravaged by famine or disease, or where the population had been dislocated by tribal wars, the missionaries were able, in general, to penetrate easily. They found it more difficult to penetrate prosperous tribes which had strong links with coastal traders. A common strategy on the part of the missionaries was to establish links with, in order to convert, the tribal chief. Once this was done, a major obstacle was removed and they were able to work more freely in the area. Carefully chosen presents were enough, in some cases, to win favour from the chiefs. In other cases, the chiefs themselves desired a mission in their area for reasons of diplomacy. Also the superior technology and scientific knowledge which the missionaries possessed assisted them to establish their reputation amongst the local people.

Gradually the missionaries realised that provision of elementary educational facilities was useful to accelerate the rate of conversion. A literate congregation rapidly absorbed religious ideas through reading the Bible and participating in activities like hymn singing. The African christian families living in the areas not very far from the mission regularly participated

1. ibid., p.248.
in activities such as construction work, clearing the surrounding areas for farming and so on. Gradually a complex emerged in which activities like construction, agriculture, evangelical work, literacy training and nursing the sick were carried out, and the missionaries also visited nearby villages to extend invitations to the chiefs to come to the missions. It was in such a context that the educational activities of the missions emerged and mission school developed. An integral feature of mission education was manual work and training for practical jobs; hence the pupils also engaged in productive and constructive activities.

Another important feature of the tactics used by missionaries was an emphasis on catechist training right from the early days. In the past, conversion had been solely through contact with European missionaries. The process was then localised, in so far as it was the local churchworker, who had internalised the christian ideology, who diffused it amongst the people. The catechist was an important weapon in the missionaries' crusade against Islam and local religions.

Whatever their tactics, the missions came into conflict everywhere with traditional customs and ideas which could not be reconciled with christian precepts. The missionaries' interference began to arouse more and more hostility. Many of the customs had a material basis in the concrete conditions of existence of the tribal societies and could not just be washed away. However, it was the use of catechists that was partly instrumental in overcoming this hurdle. The catechist was looked

1. ibid., p.251.
upon by the people as someone who had learned the ways of the white man. He represented a future image of themselves. Being one of them, he encountered less hostility and was more able to move and work among them. In areas where Muslim influence was strong, the missionaries were not able to make much headway. This was the case, for example, along the coast.

But besides the ideological basis for conflict between the Muslims and the missionaries, there was a deep-rooted material basis as well. At the time of the missionary intrusion, the Muslim traders from the coast had entrenched themselves in many parts of the country. In some areas, they were allied with big chiefs. The coastal traders, in alliance with and backed by the Sultan of Zanzibar, dominated the territory's internal and external trade. Initially, the coastal traders and the European merchants required each other's services and did not interfere in each other's domain of activities. The European trader brought his commodities from Zanzibar to exchange them for goods brought from the interior. The inland import of western manufactured goods and exports of local items was monopolised by the coastal merchants, who used local porters to carry the goods. To cap it all, the missionaries were followed by the European trading companies, the agents of finance capital. German trading concerns had been operating from Zanzibar since 1849 and, by the early 1870s, about one fourth of Zanzibar's trade was with Germany. These firms penetrated inland to establish trading outposts. In some places, the conflict assumed violent

proportions right from the start. The struggle reached its climax and assumed territorial proportions after the G.E.A. Company was granted the Charter to administer Tanganyika. The principal contradiction between the two merchant classes was the basic cause underlying the uprising against company rule which erupted in 1889 in the coastal districts. The suppression of this uprising resolved once and for all the question of the political and economic position of the coastal traders, who were relegated to a subordinate position in relation to the European colonisers. The consequence was the sharpening of the contradiction between the coastal traders on the one hand and the European companies and missionaries on the other, the former struggling to retain their established positions and the latter attempting to make further advances.

Conquest and Consolidation

The initial two decades of German colonisation were marked by two coloniser's efforts to consolidate their political hegemony over the territory. However, pacification was not achieved purely through military means. It was considerably facilitated by a judicious utilization of the ideological apparatus which the Germans found in existence and whose further growth they promoted. These were the missionary and the Muslim religions, the educational apparatus and some elements of tribal social structure.

Of course, the German Colonial Government did not adopt and utilise the Islamic apparatus due to any particular liking for Islam as such, but for reasons of political expediency and practical administration. This utilisation by the Germans of aspects of

the Islamic apparatus offers a classic example of how an emergent social formation can dominate, modify and adjust the superstructural elements of a pre-existing social formation to suit its own needs. The Germans also used the political institutions which existed along the coast before their arrival to serve their own interests. In the coastal areas 'Liwalis' continued as before to be civil servants, the difference being that now they were under the colonial governor. The Europeans available were too few to undertake all the administrative activities\(^1\). Thus, the German colonial state utilised three aspects of the Islamic ideological apparatus: personnel, political institutions and language (Swahili).

The missionaries and the colonial government came into prolonged conflict over this issue. The clergy accused the government of favouring Islam, an allegation which was flatly rejected by the government. They also opposed the importance accorded to Swahili, giving preference to German or local vernacular languages. However, despite disagreements over these issues, there was a fundamental objective unity between the missions and the local authorities. Their relationship may have been marred from time to time due to conflicting interests over specific issues, but in the long run their goals complemented one another. It is to this relationship between the missionary ideological apparatus and colonialism that we now turn our attention.

The missionary's objective role was not simply to make the colonised person work but to make him consent to work for the

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colonisers, that is to make him accept the colonial system. Ideological enslavement perpetuated by the missionaries was essential for colonial exploitation to be conducted smoothly. The whip alone was not sufficient; it had to be supplemented by ideological work. However, besides the mission and Quran schools, there was also a government system of education during this period. The government's demand for literate and skilled personnel could not be completely satisfied by either of the two religious systems. By 1902 there were about 400 pupils attending government schools in the territory.

We now turn to the development of commercial agriculture, by looking at cotton, sisal, coffee and rubber production.

The beginning of commercial cultivation

Explanations for the late nineteenth-century invasion of East Africa have not been lacking, but writers have tended either to focus too exclusively on the diplomatic manoeuvres of statesmen in Europe, the so-called "official mind of imperialism", or, having nodded politely in the direction of changes in Western societies, to proceed to omit them from further consideration. Before 1856, wrote Coupland with pardonable exaggeration, there were not many parts of the world about which the western people knew less, or cared less, than they knew about East Africa; and

1. Nowhere more fitting in the colonial situation is Marx's characterization of religion: 'the sigh of the oppressed creature, the sentiment of the heartless world and the soul of soulless condition', quoted in T.B. Bottomore and M. Rubel eds., Karl Marx: Selected writings in Sociology and Social Philosophy, 1967, p.41.

yet, within the next forty years, European aloofness rapidly gave way to penetration, partition and conquest. What had happened? Why was there such a momentous transformation in European attitudes towards East Africa? Our task is to try and present the data themselves in order to explain these changes.

The factors most frequently cited are the struggle between the nation states of Europe, Britain's hostility to the East African slave trade, and her concern to control the route to India. All these factors can be seen as contributing to the partition but they do not in themselves provide a complete explanation. We would suggest that it is necessary to look deeper. The dynamics behind the penetration of East Africa are not to be found in the minds of the third Marquess of Salisbury and Prince Otto von Bismarck. They are to be found in the changing character of the capitalist social formations of Western Europe and United States. The progress of industrialisation in these countries rapidly increased their capacity and incentive to penetrate, dominate and control the economy of East Africa, and, at the same time, economic competition between the industrial states created an eagerness for the sources of strategic raw materials. The economic potential of this area had been demonstrated in the half century before partition by the Zanzibar Sultanate of the Oman Arabs.

1. We do not mean to take the positivist view that 'the facts speak for themselves' - they do not. It is simply a matter of clarity and a convention of the reporting of scientific work which allows the reader to see how we have arrived at our interpretations.
Cotton

During the colonial phase, African territories tended to have a particular economic role forced upon them as part of a conscious division of labour within a metropolis-dominated economic system. Different African countries were looked upon as sources of minerals, plantation crops, areas for European settlement or supplies of peasant-produced cash crops, surplus value from African labour being extracted in each case by different means. For example, in the first two cases a capitalist mode of production was introduced de novo but, in order to obtain the necessary labour force, economic and political pressures were exerted on the indigenous social formation.

When the Germans first came to East Africa, they found cotton being grown for household purposes, mainly for mattresses and other domestic uses. The coastal people grew Indian cotton, while, in the regions of the Great Lakes, Peruvian cotton was grown. The Germans' first attempts were to replace the varieties they found with Egyptian and American cotton. The earliest attempts by the Germans to encourage further cotton growing in the country in the 1880s and in the 1890s met with little success. But a change took place at the beginning of the twentieth century as a consequence of the fact that the rapid increase in consumption of raw cotton by European factories was not being accompanied by a similar growth in American raw cotton exports.

The American War of Secession in the sixties of the past century had caused a great decrease in the production of cotton, and

latterly the production of this commodity had not kept pace with the needs of the world market. Since 1889, the consumption of America had risen by 60 per cent, whilst production sunk by about 12 per cent compared with the average of the previous ten years, a fact which led to wild speculation, with the result that prices were raised by more than 50 per cent. In fact, in America itself from 1899 to 1905 the increase in raw cotton consumption was greater than that of production as illustrated by Figure 1.1.

**FIGURE 1.1**

*U.S. Raw Cotton Production and Consumption, 1889-1905*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Increase in U.S. raw cotton consumption</th>
<th>Increase in U.S. raw cotton production</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1889-1900</td>
<td>+ 59%</td>
<td>+ 35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1899-1905</td>
<td>+ 95%</td>
<td>+ 41%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


There was every reason to fear that the whole European textile industry would fall under the tyranny of an American trust and therefore the mill-owners of the various European nations started to take joint steps to open new fields for the cultivation of cotton. European textile mill-owners began the search for alternative sources of raw cotton. The German textile owners formed the Kolonial Wirtschaftliches Komitee (K.W.K.) (Colonial Economic Committee) in order to encourage cotton production. In the British territories, the British Cotton Growing Association

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made successful efforts in this direction. In May 1904 an International Congress of cotton manufacturers accepted the necessity of struggling for the cultivation of cotton.

Ever since early times, the cotton plant had been indigenous in East Africa. This fact suggested that methodical cultivation might prove successful in this part of the world. The first experiment in G.E.A. was made at Kikongwe on the Pangani River, where the climate and soil were found to be very suitable. In 1891 and 1892, 4,600 kg. Texas (longstaple) and 500 kg. Sea Island were exported.

Twenty hundredweight of seed were provided free of charge to Arab farmers and a price of 4d was guaranteed for a pound unginned. Soon a ginnery was erected at that place and in 1897 we find that the produce was valued as 'middling Texas good colour', its staple being better than 'even running Texas'. The only fault was some fly in it.

However, the price it fetched on the home market was 3½pfenning per pound, only ½pfenning less than best Texas. Successful experiments were also made near Kilwa and Mikindani. But soon the plant began to suffer under various pests. Locusts, especially in 1894, did a great deal of damage, and a general fall in price brought about by temporary over-production made cultivation unprofitable. Several plantations gave up the commodity, inspite of all assistance guaranteed to them. The Deutsche Ostafrika Linie promised to carry the product free of charge and premiums were granted by the K.W.K. for every hectare

1. ibid., p.108.
planted with cotton during a certain period.

Nobody was more conscious of these limitations than Governor Graf von Gotzen. He was preoccupied with attempts to bring more funds from the authorities in Berlin to regularise the position of the chiefs in district administration and to expand European settlement in the north. European agriculture was depressed and government revenue static. He organised an experiment to introduce a scheme devised for the German West African colony of Togo, by which African cultivators would be induced to grow cotton as a 'Volkskultur', a people's crop. Since cotton had failed in the north, he believed that individual cultivators could not grow cotton successfully. He therefore ordered that a plot be established at the headquarters of each headman in the experiment area, on which each of the headman's adult male subjects would work for some 28 days a year. Introduced in Dar-es-Salaam district in 1902 and subsequently into all the southern coastal districts, the scheme was a disastrous failure. The sums paid to workers were so small that some refused them. The work required soon far exceeded the amount planned and seriously interfered with subsistence farming. Much corruption and brutality was involved and cotton became a grievance which united precisely those people who rebelled when the 1905 picking season began.

Several leaders of the rebellion were headmen who had suffered from the scheme, and one of the first rebel actions in many areas was commonly to burn the cotton fields. The scheme

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threatened subsistence production far more seriously than did any of the demands of the European settlers in the south. The Maji Maji Rebellion became a mass movement. It acquired an ideological content which persuaded people to join and fight; the ideology was religious.

The following historical features seem to be particularly relevant to the state of cotton production in those days. First, the Committee distributed planting seed free to Arabs and African growers. Moreover, active support was given to cotton research by both the Economic Committee and the Colonial Government. Second, the Colonial Government introduced commercial cotton, both as plantation crop and as a peasant cash crop. It was later discovered that plantations were unsuitable for cotton growing at a very early stage: not only were the Africans generally unwilling to work in plantations but the problem of quality control on plantation was enormous. Since labour was a major problem throughout the colonial period, one of the chief tasks of the Colonial Government was to provide labour for the plantations. In many instances, forced labour was resorted to. As a result, there was widespread resentment among Africans which sometimes led to the violent and bloody confrontations between Africans and the Colonial Government.

Sisal

The sisal plantation was started in G.E.A. very unauspiciously:

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3. For a definition and discussion of the concept of plantation, see G.L. Beckford, Persistent Poverty, 1972, pp.3-18.
of 1,000 plants imported from Florida in 1893, only 3 per cent arrived in a state fit to be planted. The climate nevertheless seemed to suit the sisal better than its old home in the western hemisphere. While there it needed from five to eight years to arrive at maturity, on the East African coast it matured in less than four years and propagated longer leaves which gave a finer fibre.

The introduction of sisal cultivation was expanded rapidly at the beginning of this century as a result of a large rise in the world market price, caused by the failure of general production owing to political troubles in the West Indies. So a German company, which at the time of its foundation had based its calculations on an expected price of £15 per ton, realised for its first crop in 1903 £40, and even £45, per ton. After that, prices fluctuated a good deal but always remained high enough to justify the running of a sisal plantation as a paying undertaking.

Of course, the sisal planter needed a good deal of capital, as the machines were expensive but, the more the plantations expanded, the larger the profits that were made. Exports from G.E.A. rose from 1,000 tons in 1904 to 2,800 tons in 1907 and 4,057 in 1908. In British East Africa, the first sisal plantation was started in 1902. Commercial sisal plantations were begun in 1907, after the news had come that the G.E.A. produce had sold for 5½d per pound on the American market. A general fever to plant sisal arose, but the German government poured cold water

2. ibid., p.104.
on this by placing a heavy prohibitive export duty on the produce of their colony. Under an Act of November 1907, for each exported sucker 25 cents, and for each bulbil 10 cents, had to be paid. The government had been forced to adopt this measure by the farmers in order not to lose the advantage, which did lay on their side as a result of their earlier operations. The result was, apart from a good deal of ill-feeling on the side of the British Government, that farmers had to order plants from more remote countries, especially from Ceylon, and paid prices somewhat higher than those of G.E.A.

Coffee

In 1892 the Deutschstafrikanische Gessellschaft at Pangani planted 115,000 trees of coffee. In 1896 about 800,000 trees were reported in the eastern Usambara. The first experiments were very favourable and the climate and soil seemed suitable. The price realised per ½ kg. averaged from 90 pfenning to about 1 mark. But soon came counter-strokes: in 1895 the Hemeileia Vostatrix made its appearance and later followed a heavy fall in price on the home market. The labour question caused difficulties and the soil did not appear to fulfil its promises. The old plantations carried on but refrained from further development. The export via Tanga amounted in 1903 to 336 tons and rose to 400 tons, to which figure it fell again after a sudden increase to 497 in 1907. In 1908 a figure of 650 tons, at a value of 799,000 marks, was reached, but for 1909 a

1. ibid., p.105.
2. Experiments at Lewa were made with nearly every possible tropical produce. The results of the first experiments were discouraging. In November 22nd 1891, a German company obtained a concession to build a railway line from Tanga to Usambara. Work went on pretty slowly, partly because of inadequate capital.
remarkable decrease was reported.

In proportion, as coffee cultivation was being abandoned in Usambara, its cultivation increased near Kilimanjaro. The soil there seemed more favourable, the labour was far cheaper and the overall running of farms was less expensive because, whereas in Usambara most of the plantations belonged to large companies with a great administrative staff, on the Kilimanjaro small farmers, mostly Italians and Greeks with no high standard of life, did the business. Exports from the Moshi district of peasants' and settlers' production were as shown in Table 1.2.

**TABLE 1.2**

Coffee Exports from Moshi*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>TONS</th>
<th>VALUE IN MARKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1904</td>
<td>0.025</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1905</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5,369</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1906</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>21,380</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1907</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>31,745</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1908</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>49,798</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1909</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>47,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>10,071</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


* It must be noted that those figures include only the export via Mombasa. The coffee which went down the Usambara Railway to Tanga represented at least 20 per cent of the total produce.

A good deal of the Moshi trade, according to official estimates about 20 per cent, was diverted to Tanga and it was only due to the wise tariff of the Uganda Railway that this line did compete with the Usambara Railway. Ivory was the only commodity which
was cheaper to be transported on the Usambara line. On all the other goods, the difference of transport was greatly in favour of the Uganda Railway and it was no wonder that traders and farmers preferred to bear the discomfort which transit through a foreign country naturally involved, instead of paying extravagant charges on the home railway. Moreover a change was caused when the administration of the Uganda Railway started regular shipping on the lake. Exports of the principal commodities amounted in the calendar year 1903 at Mwanza to 71,185 marks, at Shirati 19,768 marks and at Bukoba 22,184 marks, or a total of £5,657. Imports to Mwanza were 208,795 marks in value, to Shirati they were 43,025 marks and to Bukoba they were 86,432 marks, making a total of £12,912.1.

The chief export commodities from the beginning were hides and skins. The number exported from Mwanza during the calendar year 1903 represented a value of £12,000, those from Shirati £600, and from Bukoba £1,200. In 1904 the exports from Bukoba amounted to a quantity of 300 tons valued at £21,500. The corresponding figures were for Mwanza 277 tons, valued at £12,900, and for Shirati 44 tons with a value of £3,100. The highest figures were reached in 1907 viz:--

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Tons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mwanza</td>
<td>£44,863</td>
<td>748</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bukoba</td>
<td>£22,053</td>
<td>298</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shirati</td>
<td>£3,188</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The year 1908 showed a slight decrease owing to the general depression of the American market.

Rubber

Rubber had always been indigenous to the East African mainland as a creeper called Laudolphia. The article collected by natives had for a long time formed a valuable item of the export statistics. The German and British Governments were jointly interested in seeing that the produce of their possessions maintained a good name on the home market, and at an early date an ordinance was issued in G.E.A., as well as in Zanzibar and in British East Africa, against the adulteration of country produce. As far as rubber was concerned, it had been ordained by both Powers that the collection, sale, and the extraction of rubber from boiled bark was prohibited, and every ball was to be cut through the centre to show that no foreign or inferior substance was admixed.

The abundance of wild rubber in the country justified the opinion that its cultivation on plantation would also be successful and experiments which had been made in G.E.A. since 1893 proved that the Manihot Glaziovic (Cera Rubber) did well on the east coast. The first export of plantation rubber in 1907 was estimated to amount to 50 tons. British farmers followed the German example after 1906, but their plantation had not yet reached the bearing stage.

The English market took a great interest in rubber cultivation and in 1908 an exhibition was held in London, where examples grown in all parts of the British Empire were shown. The sudden rise of the rubber price in 1910 produced a sort of fever among

1. ibid., p.100.
English businessmen. The high dividends which were paid to rubber smallholders in Ceylon and in the Straits Settlements caused the foundation of numerous new companies in London which tried to acquire plantations wherever they could. So many of the G.E.A. plantations came into English hands and those who had started them realised high prices which enabled them at once to establish new plantations. The period of export production had started.

The Role of Colonial Policy

An important aspect affecting success in cash crop production was the policy of the Colonial Government. Much compulsion was used by both the Germans and the British to establish cotton growing in Sukumaland. By contrast, the Colonial Governments discouraged cotton production in the Pangani valley in order to ensure the sisal estates a supply of food and labour power. This area was one of the few fertile parts of the country where no major cash crop was grown during the colonial period. But government policy was not normally a decisive factor. The Matengo coffee crop flourished despite numerous attempts by the Colonial Government to destroy it, while in 1928 an agricultural officer reported that:

"The area of Native coffee in Arusha is increasing against all the discouragement which is possible for my department to give." 

The Reichskolonialamt and Kolonialwirtschaftskomitee viewed the

1. A.E. Haarer, TNA, SMP 11160/66, District Agricultural Officer Moshi to Provincial Commissioner Northern, 10 July 1928.
German colonies chiefly as sources of raw materials. They could also act as markets, e.g. for textiles, and offer opportunities for capital exports and population migration. But their primary function was viewed as that of expanding output of tropical products, over which the Anglo-Saxon powers had hitherto exercised a virtual monopoly. However, the Germans were not indiscriminately interested in cheap raw materials. Rather they wanted strategic commodities, especially cotton, sisal, rubber and gold. These were strategic in the sense that the industries requiring these raw materials, which were of such importance to the economy for political or military reasons, required an independent source which the Germans could effectively control. The Germans started producing cotton in order to have an independent source of supply, even though, on the average, American imports were cheaper, since they wanted to reduce the risk of price fluctuations brought about by the American suppliers. An independent supply of these commodities would also ease Germany's foreign exchange requirements. It was for these reasons that,

1. Iliffe, op. cit., p. 77 and Eric Moore Ritchie, The Unfinished War, 1970, p. 73. Gustav Stolper supports this point when he says of Germany at the turn of the century that, "... the industrial affluence and exporting capacity of the country were entirely dependent upon the importation of raw materials and foodstuffs which by far exceeded the exports of finished goods". Gustav Stolper, Germany Economy, 1870-1940: Issues and Trends, 1970, p. 53. For British motives, see Lord Lugard, The Dual Mandate in Tropical Africa, 1965.


3. Thus although between 1897 and 1906 the average price of American raw cotton in Hamburg was 70 pf. per kg., in February 1904 it was 170 pf., in December the same year it was 70 pf., and in September 1907 it was 100 pf. The textile manufacturers, especially Leipzig Cotton Spinners and Stuttgart millionaires, sought independent sources of supply of cotton.
as Table 1.3 illustrates, practically none of these items was sold to countries other than Germany.

**TABLE 1.3**

**Principal total exports and exports sent to Germany, 1911**

*(in thousands of marks)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Exports 1911</th>
<th>Exports sent to Germany 1911</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-plantation rubber</td>
<td>4,781</td>
<td>3,511*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plantation rubber</td>
<td>3,610</td>
<td>2,539*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sisal fibre</td>
<td>4,532</td>
<td>4,423*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hides and skins</td>
<td>3,035</td>
<td>237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Copra and coconuts</td>
<td>1,848</td>
<td>185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cotton</td>
<td>1,332</td>
<td>1,267*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coffee</td>
<td>1,266</td>
<td>561</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gold</td>
<td>1,023</td>
<td>1,013*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beeswax</td>
<td>817</td>
<td>452</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timber</td>
<td>515</td>
<td>460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Groundnuts</td>
<td>490</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivory</td>
<td>485</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sesame</td>
<td>404</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mica</td>
<td>348</td>
<td>348*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rice</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gum copal</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wattle and bark</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TOTAL EXPORTS**

| 22,438                | 13,207       |

*Asterisks indicate 'strategic' raw materials to Germany.*

**Source:** Michael J. Taffey - "International Transactions Before and During the Germany Period", Economic Research Bureau, University of Dar-es-Salaam, 1967, p.8.
The issue that plagued the German administration was one of means: that is, whether they should encourage settler plantation or African smallholder production. This dilemma – which, as we shall see in Chapter Two, was subsequently faced by the British – was effectively resolved as a result of the arrival of German settlers. By 1912 there were 758 who wanted to establish plantations. This event necessitated the alienation of community land and the recruitment of African labour to man the plantations. By 1913, 542,124 hectares had been alienated through the eviction of indigenous citizens from their best lands.

Conclusion:
Any study of the major features of an economic system must take into account the two fundamental problems of political economy. First, it must explore the social relations determining the size of the economic surplus, its distribution and utilization, and this implies the analysis of conditions of production and the relations of production. Second, it must study the relations governing the adaptation of the social formation to changing social conditions, especially in confrontation with external threats.

Before systematic European colonisation, the vast majority of mainland Tanzania consisted of independent producers still involved in 'pre-capitalist' modes of production, generally clustered in various socio-cultural groupings that are normally referred to as "tribes". A general characterization of these units is extremely difficult because of their heterogeneity.

1. Graham, referring to British settlement after the war, concurs: 'It is a fact that the land already chosen ... was the best in Ubena and much of it had been in continuous cultivation for 50 years'. See J.D. Graham, 'Changing Patterns of Wage Labour in Tanzania', Ph.D. Dissertation, Northwestern University, 1968, p.178.
and the inadequacy of information about them, but a few features that are pertinent to our analysis have been shown. Although agriculture and animal keeping were important activities, the most important activity was trade. The Hehe people were constantly involved in wars throughout the period under discussion for reasons which were explained when we looked at Hehe political history in a great depth.

Although one of the larger ethnic groups in the country, the Hehe were really thirty or so small ethnic groups that had welded themselves into one. The consolidation of this ethnic group was achieved by two remarkable chiefs, Muyugumba and his son Mkawa. The Muyinga clan started to extend their authority by conquest and eventually established hegemony over the majority of the ethnic groups who made up the Hehe. The chief controlled the trade in ivory himself and every year he sent ivory to Bagamoyo. In return he got guns, cloths, beads and spirits. A group of blacksmiths controlling the manufacturing of weapons of war and agriculture made a significant contribution to surplus generation. However, the bulk of the surplus was contributed by peasants, partly in kind as a tax and partly in labour. Peasants worked for some days on the Muyinga clan’s (chief) shambas (farms) as an obligation (they also had to fight for him in times of war). Whoever could control either the trade or means of production could appropriate surplus and became a ruling class.

Social classes describe the relations between producers and those in control of their production. The question of whether social classes exist or do not exist, or did or did not exist, in Africa can be understood and answered only on the basis of a truly
scientific method of studying economic and social development. The determination of fundamental classes in society is not a task of empirical observation but one of theoretical investigation of the relations of production that are the foundation of society.

The most important determinant of Tanzania's development has been the specific mode of its incorporation into the international capitalist system. This cannot be considered a simple cause, but rather a complex historical process in which the changing requirements of capital have interacted with the structures and processes generated by its earlier phases. We have shown that the primary function of the colonial government was the extraction of primary products for the strategic and industrial requirements of the metropolis by the cheapest possible means. In partial contradiction at certain points was the requirement to secure the conditions of production of the European colonialists whose prior incursion had, to some extent, generated the German colonial venture in the first place.

This implied the total restructuring of the regional economy to this purpose, destroying the pre-existing Indian Ocean trade dominated by the Sultan and replacing existing internal commodity specialization and exchange with a pattern favouring primary-product export. The destruction of petty commodity production of iron implements and cotton provided, according to Raikes, a small market for metropolitan products. More importantly, it imposed a requirement for cash to purchase the imported replacements, which could only be met through wage-labour or export-commodity production. Systematic European colonisation was discussed in
a way which revolved around the following elements:

(a) the establishment of the plantation system;

(b) the introduction of metropolitan-oriented cash crops to the African peasantry, with the consequent class formation;

(c) the financial and other infrastructure which was to serve the production structure thus introduced; and

(d) the establishment of the basic institutions of foreign trade with the metropolis. For example, Deutsche Ostafrika Gesellschaft, the oldest chartered company with land concessions and plantation holdings, had the widest trading network. It had the monopoly of sisal, cotton, and most of the produce. In turn it imported most of the country's requirements.

As we have tried to show, the study of class and class formation under Imperialism is extremely complex. In the study of class-relations, therefore, our objective is to develop a theoretical understanding of certain conditions which do not exist in a pure form. Such a definition is a pre-requisite for an explanation of class reality, in Tanzania as elsewhere.
CHAPTER TWO

DEVELOPMENT OF A COLONIAL EXPORT ECONOMY
BETWEEN THE FIRST AND SECOND WORLD WARS

In Tanganyika between the Wars the British Colonial Government had an opportunity to formulate an agricultural policy free from the political constraints of a settler class. In this sense the period is of special interest to the wider issue of how political interests interact with the process of learning from experience in the formulation of agricultural development strategies.

What were the most important sectors in agriculture between the Wars? Why did colonial agricultural policy favour peasant production? In seeking to answer these questions, this chapter falls into five main sections. First we suggest that the period after the First World War was a time of intense suffering for Africans. Then we examine the colonial economic structure in order to see the most important sectors in agriculture. Second, the Colonial Government favoured peasant production and it is important to understand the reasons behind their policy. Third, we focus on the 'labour problems' that constituted the most serious and intractable issue facing the colonial state. The means sought for the resolution of this problem coloured every aspect of colonial policy between the Wars. Fourth, we look at the purpose of the 'Grow More Crops Campaign' in relation to the wider issue of how interests of various kinds determined these policies. Finally we discuss the formation and the functions of the Marketing Boards in the context of the crisis of the sterling area after the Second World War.
(i). The Colonial Economic Structure

Between 1914 and 1921, war and its aftermath brought most of the activities of the capitalist sector of the Tanganyika economy to a halt and destroyed many of the facilities that had previously been created, e.g. roads, buildings and so on. A considerable number of workers were killed in the war or died in famines and epidemics, while others survived under conditions of distress unable to satisfy their needs, which had become tied to certain imported commodities and the inflow of wages into the economy of the rural reserves.

Many historians pass lightly over the period of the First World War in East Africa, e.g. Z. Marsh. In reality, this was a period of intense suffering for Africans. The British and the Germans fought their African campaign mainly with African askaris (soldiers). As a result the majority of the casualties were sustained by African combatants. More staggering still were the losses among African porters. Men toiled for long hours, with heavy loads on empty stomachs, along barely passable roads. Through a combination of ignorance and indifference on the part of the British, the provision of food and of preventive and curative medicine for the porters was scandalously poor. By 1917, the carrier corps employed some 150,000 porters and at any given time at least 15,000 of these were so ill as to be confined to bed. Over a period of 24 weeks in 1917, known deaths among porters were recorded as 11,484, which was an average of more than 68 per day¹. In the end, war statistics did not bother to

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account for porters who had died in fulfilling their duties and tasks.

Most parts of the country felt the pinch of the war. Sometimes, Africans were induced to sell more food than they ought to have done in the light of their own requirements. At other places, the food was forcibly requisitioned. In a district as famous for food surplus as Ulanga, famine was a direct result of the German exploitation of the food supply. In central Tanganyika impressive herds of cattle, goats and donkeys were decimated. The adverse effects were compounded because the area was already prone to drought. The Gogo, in particular, suffered tremendous hardship when the 'great famine' struck, forcing them to abandon their homesteads. Disease claimed innumerable lives. Influenza, smallpox, diarrhoea, plague and cerebro-spinal meningitis, killed tens of thousands. Influenza alone took an estimated 50,000 to 80,000 African lives between 1917 to 1919.

The period under British rule until the end of Second World War, was marked by a slow but regular outflow of capital from the colony, which considerably hampered the internal process of capital accumulation. Nevertheless, the period from 1922 to 1929 was a time of slow recovery of the capitalist sector. By the end of the twenties, employment and output within this sector had begun to surpass the levels reached at the end of the German period. In the mid-1920s however, a substantial sector of commercialised peasant agriculture had emerged. Some of the groups who had previously offered their labour on the market were now able to

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sell the products of their labour instead.

The economic crisis of the early thirties inaugurated a period of an uninterrupted decline of the real wages which lasted for more than fifteen years. Employment and output in the capitalist sector dropped too but rose again to previous levels by the middle of the thirties. One important result of the economic crisis was the emergence of working class protests, which merged into the nationalist movement against colonialism. The speculators, fortune seekers and cranks who had spearheaded the capitalist initiative in Tanganyika had no intention of leaving their profits in the colony, but moved them out again into safer fields as soon as they could, because colonial agriculture even under the Germans was never a secure investment.

In the colonial period, the state assigned economic functions to each area of the country and its inhabitants. The roles of the different geographical areas are interesting. The territory was divided into three types of economic region. First, there were regions which specialised in production-for-export, e.g. the sisal estates, the main cash-crop areas and the towns. These were surrounded by a second category of region, which supplied the export-producing regions with food and other services: Uzaramu, Ukaguru, and Ulanga supplying food to sisal estates; Kondoa supplying cattle for the Tanga and Korogwe markets; and so on. Finally, spreading out beyond the export-and-food-producing regions were peripheral regions which either supplied migrant labour or stagnated in near isolation from the territorial

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colonial economy. One interesting and important fact about Iringa region is that inside its boundaries all the above mentioned specialised economic activities were carried on during the colonial period.

Peasants and workers had become economically dependent on exchange with the capitalist sector in order to gain access to certain means of subsistence which were not produced within the colony. The state continued to regulate what peasants grew and how they grew it. It continued to regulate the flow of migrant labour from the villages to the centres of capitalist production. The reasons for this despotism are to be found in the specific requirements of primitive accumulation. During periods of rising export prices and wages, the state was occupied with stopping the colonial subjects from becoming fully integrated into the capitalist economy, while during economic depression the same state was concerned with keeping the colonial producers in the market.

This pattern of regional specialisation - all of it focused ultimately on export production - is one of the main features of the colonial economy as John Iliffe was one of the first to point out. To understand the economic history of any particular area of Tanganyika in the colonial period, it is necessary to define how the area in question fitted into this pattern in different periods. To understand the agricultural situation in the country as a whole in the 1930s and early 1940s, it is

necessary to realise that, by this time, different, but equally serious, problems had arisen in both the export-producing and the peripheral regions. The major problems were land shortages and exhaustion, the backwardness of the productive forces, and a growing discontent with dependence on the production of cash crops for the world market. The peripheral areas experienced stagnation whilst 'unbalanced development' was characteristic of the export-producing areas. In Kigoma the Ha people seem to have been subjected to a vicious circle as a result of labour migration and the expansion of the tse tse fly. The absence of the men reduced the labour available to clear the bush and allowed the fly to advance, eventually making the area totally uninhabitable. In other areas, (e.g. Ukimbu area) the reverse process happened: a rapidly growing population, which because of an unsuitable environment or inadequate transport could not produce cash crops, reached the point where land shortage and exhaustion of the soil produced a gradual involution of agriculture in the form of reduced yields and periodic famines.

(ii). Agricultural Policy

One of the most striking features of British policy in Tanganyika was its bias in favour of African peasant production. One of the reasons for the adoption of this policy, although by no means the only one, was the experience of the German colonial administration in implementing their own policy of favouring European-run plantation agriculture. In some ways, the German policy had not been unsuccessful. They had introduced sisal into the country and, even after the coming of British rule, it was

1. ibid., p.32.
recognised that this crop was best produced on large plantations, with central processing of the fibre. However, the large amount of land in settlers' hands highlighted a number of problems. The Germans had alienated almost two million acres and nothing in a Mandate precluded further transfers of land. Africans working their own land to produce their subsistence, had little incentive to leave to go and work of Europeans.

The British were more successful imperialists, partly because they understood the value of liberalism, as we shall see. After First World War, the German settlers had been evicted from their farms and the numbers of new settlers was subject to the discretion of the British authorities. Lyall suggests that the British had an excellent opportunity to examine the German experience and formulate a policy free from the political pressures created by an entrenched settler class. The colonial state was essentially an extension of the metropolitan state in Britain and likewise an instrument of the same class, the metropolitan bourgeoisies, who constituted the British ruling class. Colonial officials had no private property of their own to defend in Tanganyika. Their 'property' of which they were custodians for the rest of the class was the relationship of exploitation between the metropolitan bourgeoisie and the peasant and African workers. The Asian commercial class and the European settlers were intermediaries whom the Colonial Government would support in so far as they were useful and effective in that

1. W.C. Aman, Cotton in South and East Africa, 1926, pp.79-84.
function. Settlers were a class of capitalist farmers, their livelihood depended upon plentiful supply of cheap African wage labour power, a commodity often difficult to obtain, which was one of the reasons why few of them were successful. This issue is very important if one wants to grasp how political interests have interacted with the process of learning from experience in the formulation of agricultural development strategies between the wars and afterwards (1950s).

In 1925, however, all restrictions over the entry of ex-enemy aliens were removed by the Colonial Government in Tanganyika and since Germany became a member of the League of Nations, German citizens were entitled to equal treatment with other members as regards entry, residence, and holding of land in Tanganyika.

Fears soon began to be expressed by settlers and their sympathisers that Germany would make a bid to regain her old colony. The possibility that the territory might be transferred to Germany inhibited the growth of the colony after 1936. If Britain could not discriminate to keep Germans out, the best thing was not to let in many settlers of any nationality. The pro-settler weekly 'East Africa' raised the subject in a strongly-worded and chauvinistic editorial in November 1925. It strongly attacked the idea of Germans being allowed to enter Tanganyika and buy land. In the British Cameroons, the Germans outnumbered the British and held all the plantations worth having. The best thing was not to encourage any form of European settlement

1. See Article 119 of the Peace Treaty which Germany signed with principal Allied and Associated Powers. All her rights over her overseas possessions, including German East Africa, were to be governed by mandatories on behalf of the League of Nations. Quoted by John Lance Geoghegan, 'The Movement for Independence in Tanganyika', M.A. Thesis, Faculty of the Graduate School of the University of Pennsylvania 1965, p.8.
and to rely on African peasant cultivation:

"The only safe policy is that which we have followed up to the present, encourage development of natives working for themselves on their own land. They can beat the white man out of the field except in the case of a few crops such as sisal and of course in mining: in those areas suitable for European settlers only allow small areas to be alienated and treat them as the exception rather than the rule remembering that the country can be quite prosperous without them... if we are reluctant to lease to Englishman the Germans cannot complain of being treated in the same way".1

The German threat was probably overestimated. Germany had no means to enforce the move; she could only make the application to the British Colonial Office and wait for an answer. But weak as it was, the 'German threat' served to reinforce the policy of excluding white settlers from Tanganyika and relying on African peasant cultivation for most crops. In a letter to the President of the Reichsbank, Strachey warned:

"We do not want to spend millions on a railway to the south-west in order to enable 'compact settlement' of German population to send raw materials to Germany at any rate".2

The issue was to reinforce the policy of excluding white settlers and relying on African peasant cultivation for most crops. Lyall suggested that Strachey stood firm on this question when he wrote:

"What I hope is that nothing will be done to prevent Tanganyika developing on Uganda lines rather than on Kenya lines if as time goes on that appears to be the natural course ..."3

1. Quoted in Lyall, op.cit., p.205.
2. ibid., p.207.
The German movement to get back their colonies by settling large numbers of German settlers in their former colonies, had one interesting sidelight in Tanganyika. Many German missions had been established under the German administration of the country and they continued to hold their land after the British took over. In one district in the southern highlands, 11,000 acres were in the hands of German missions. In an attempt to aid the return of German settlers to the colony, the missions subdivided their land, in order to lease it to the prospective settlers. The scheme was disclosed in an issue of the weekly paper 'East Africa'. Under the ordinary system of land alienation by rights of occupancy, the Government selected the land and put it up for public auction. The German missions, on the other hand, were entitled to sell or lease the land privately, making sure that it went only to German purchasers. Obviously, this was a loophole which the British administration had to stop. The government quickly passed the Religious and Charitable Societies (Disposal of Land) Ordinance 1929, which forbade religious or charitable societies from transferring freehold or leasehold to private individuals except by public auction.

According to the 1931 Non-Native Census, the number of Europeans engaged in agriculture in the country was only 1,129 out of a total European population of 8,228 and this figure hardly varied until Independence showing only slight net increase in the period. Less than 50% of the settlers were British which further contributed to their political 'weakness'.

1. ibid., p.212.
2. ibid., p.213.
Our archive material suggests that during the twenties, under the regimes of Sir Horace Byatt and Sir Donald Cameron\(^1\) critical decisions were taken to encourage African agriculture. Both administrators came in with experience of areas dominated by African production. Byatt was from Somaliland and Cameron from Nigeria, where he had been strongly influenced by the Indirect Rule paternalism of Lugard and Clifford\(^2\).

It was in 1925 before war damage was effectively repaired and a new administration fully established. This meant that little could be done to encourage settlement before that date, so that the whole effort was virtually confined to the years between 1925 and 1929, when market conditions were favourable. Equally important, the existence of the East African common market meant that Tanganyika's temperate climate foodstuffs had to compete on equal terms with their much better established northern neighbours, i.e. Kenya, as well as with other producers on the world market. Brett has suggested that, equally important, these economic disadvantages were paralleled by an official policy commitment to African production which only partially recognised the legitimacy of the expatriate sector\(^3\).

Local whites strongly resented this treatment, northern settlers petitioned for transfer to Kenya, and unofficial representatives used the first session of the Legislative Council set up under Cameron to air their grievances. Feelings were especially strong

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1. Donald C. Cameron, My Tanganyika Service and Some Nigeria, 1939, p.28.
2. G.W. Hatchell, Tanganyika Territory, Annual Reports of the Provincial Commissioners on Native Administration for the year 1930, Iringa Province, 1931, p.29.
with regard to African coffee-growing and regulations relating to native labour power. After 1921, the Chagga on Kilimanjaro were actively encouraged to grow Arabica coffee, sometimes in close proximity to European plantations. During this period, a major transport development was the decision to build a railway line from Tabora to Mwanza on Lake Victoria to traverse an area of exclusively African cotton production. Peasant cotton production was encouraged because it was possible to maintain closer control over the quality of the product.

The first objective of the Government, wrote a British governor in 1926:

"...is to induce the native to become a producer directly or indirectly, that is to produce or to assist in producing something more than the crop of local foodstuffs that he requires for the sustenance of himself and his family."

Moreover, according to the same source, in localities in which natives like the Wanyamwezi were industriously growing economic crops under conditions which were entirely suitable from the point of view of climate, soil, transport facilities, etc., and going out to labour, the administrative officer should encourage them in both forms of activity. In other localities suitable for the cultivation of economic crops where the natives were not so industrious, the administrative officers should exhort them, through their chief, to adopt some form of active work, but, should inform them, at the same time, that they are free to grow

1. By Charles Dundas, the Local District Commissioner.
2. Aman, op.cit., p.86.
their own crops for sale or export, or to labour for others as they may wish. Propaganda work, in connection with peasant cultivation of crops for sale or export should be done by the Agricultural Department. As soon as it was shown, to the satisfaction of the administrative officer, that a body of natives desired to grow economic crops for sale or export, he should assist them to do so in every way. If, however, a particular community turned a 'deaf ear' to his exhortations to adopt some active form of work, it was his duty to use every legitimate means at his command to induce them to take up the cultivation of economic crops. Finally, in localities in which the natives could not grow economic crops owing to lack of transport facilities, administrative officers could best serve the state by exhorting the natives, through their chiefs, to adopt some form of active work, pointing out that, situated as they are, they can only do so profitably by working for the Government or for the farmers who were seeking their labour. If a native wanted to leave home to seek work or under contract of labour and desired to take his family with him, no pressure was to be exerted to prevent him.

With regard to new settlers, Delamare in Kenya founded a company in May 1925 to promote this in Tanganyika with the capital of £6,000. He organised a conference of people from Kenya, Tanganyika, Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia which met in southwestern Tanganyika in October that year. Resolutions, calling for a more active policy to promote settlement and especially

1. ibid., Labour Department, letter No. 3/1945.
for the extension of a railway into the area, were passed and then put to the Governor's conference in January, where they were formally endorsed.

In order to see the picture as a whole, it is useful to classify the European economy according to the origin and extent of its resources. There was a small group of wealthy farmers, who had very considerable private incomes from sources outside Tanganyika. Lord Chesham and Delamare are the two best known names, but there were a number of others, some of whom participated in the political scene. Then there were the company farms, which were often branches of larger concerns, like the tea plantations owned by Brooke Bonds in the Mufindi District. These were often joint stock companies, able to mobilise capital from external sources and which were independent of the finances of the colony. The third group, we have called 'small farmers' because, unlike the other two, they were nearly always short of financial resources, e.g. settlers in Southern Highlands, even in the 1920s at the peak of high prices. Further, they were 'small', compared to the other two groups, in terms of the amount of land they cultivated.

By 1938, the European community numbered only 9,345, of which 4,054 were British and 3,205 Germans, whose loyalty to the British system was questionable. In the same year, British settlers controlled 788,000 acres of land, Germans 476,000 and Asians (against whom no Kenya-style discrimination was practiced) 280,000. Unlike Kenya, these holdings were not heavily

1. ibid., p.227.
concentrated around the capital and provided with good communications but were scattered across the country, particularly isolated from Dar-es-Salaam and from each other. Their contribution to exports was very significant, particularly with regard to sisal. The overwhelming importance of the sisal estate sector points to the importance of sisal and to a significant difference between Tanganyika and Kenyan patterns. With all these settler pressures in Tanganyika, besides sisal peasant production remained the most important agricultural sector of the colonial economy in Tanganyika between the wars. Natives working their own land encouraged to produce crops for export had little incentive to leave to go and work for Europeans.

(iii). Labour Issues

Awarded the Mandate over Tanganyika in 1919, the new colonial ruler sought to establish the flow of labour to European enterprises by introducing compulsory labour on public projects into which any adult man could be recruited for 60 days per year unless he had worked at least three months for an employer in the previous year. Labour recruiters employed rough methods, e.g. beating, corporal punishment, etc., and labour on the estates was often reported to be 'unruly'. During this period of recovery from the war, the colonial government, in April 1923, introduced the hut and poll tax.

For some years, a hut tax of ten shillings and a poll tax of ten shillings for all males over sixteen were collected in all


2. TNA, File No. 24/25/1, Hut and Poll Tax, comparative returns called for by government.
districts, except when the Governor decided to reduce these taxes. Whoever failed to pay this tax was expected to work instead. However, even those who had paid their taxes could find themselves requisitioned to do compulsory labour for up to 60 days either for a government department or, more often, for the Native Authority. There was also a law against 'Destitute persons' (1923), which made it possible to bring to court persons who had no 'visible' or sufficient means of supporting themselves and detaining them for a month while some work was found for them.

In 1926, in response to growing complaints by settlers about labour shortage, the Governor of Tanganyika, Lord Cameron, issued a directive suggesting that, in all localities in which natives could not grow economic crops owing to the lack of transport facilities, administrative officers could best serve the state by exhorting the natives through their chiefs to adopt some form of work, for the government or on farms which were seeking labour. By the end of the twenties, many workers were already voluntarily recruited. Planters were still not satisfied, however, because those who offered their labour power for economic reasons were already too experienced in bargaining to satisfy the requirements of the weaker capitalist enterprises.

The demand for particularly cheap labour was partly met by pushing the Buha people of Kigoma into the labour market. During the second half of the twenties, heavy taxes were imposed on a

2. TNA, Ref. 178/22/3, Labour recruitment Circular No. 35 of 1927 to all Provincial Commissioners.
particularly impoverished peasantry. At the same time, they were prevented from developing a marketable crop. Congruently, actual restrictions on the growth of such cash crops as cotton were imposed and, more negatively, no research, extension or infrastructural facilities were provided. This pattern of temporary migration of productive labour further constrained any technical improvement in local agricultural production. In many ways, the social relationship in the area were significantly mediated by the cash nexus. For instance, bridewealth took a cash form and in fact was subject to rapid inflation. Cash incomes allowed for this but the absence of menfolk put a greater premium on a faithful and, more importantly a hard-working wife.

Most people in the colony felt the full effect of hut and poll taxes throughout the colonial period. Government generally denied that the level of taxation was high or that it was intended to stimulate wage labour. But, by the end of German rule, African taxation already provided 34 per cent of the government's total local revenue. The contribution was, therefore, large enough to substantiate the administration's contention that their interest in direct taxation was due to the revenue gained. Nevertheless there can be no doubt that it had also contributed largely to the growth of the plantation labour force. The purpose behind these taxes was both to raise revenue and to coerce labour:

1. TNA, File No. 24/25/1, Hut and Poll Tax.
"We consider that taxation is the only possible method of compelling the native to leave his reserve for the purpose of seeking work. Only in this way can the cost of living be increased for the native ... and it is on this that the supply of labour and the price of labour depends."¹

The pressure of taxation proved to be particularly effective when applied to peoples whose traditional economy was thoroughly dislocated in the aftermath of rebellions and destruction from war. This was particularly true of the Ngoni, whose numerical importance as migrant labourers was second only to that of the Nyamwezi and who remained the most experienced migrants when the Nyamwezi began to settle down to peasant farming. Von Freyhold has suggested that while it can be shown that most of those people who were forced to specialize as migrant labour had experienced a destruction of their previous modes of material existence, either as a result of the abolition of ivory and slave trade or as a result of the war, such misfortunes cannot explain why they continued to provide migrant labour for an extended period. Analytically, the answer can only be that, labour migration, as a system, comprised the destruction and restructuring of the local economy for those who participated in it and made the return to a self-reliant economy impossible². The deterioration of 'traditional' patterns of agriculture, the need for imported

² Where capitalism 'coexist' with pre-capitalist modes of production, it uses the lever of trade and part-time employment, of producers reared and sustained by the pre-capitalist modes or economy, to appropriate value that has been generated outside the capitalist mode of production. The colonial economy thus does not simply out pre-capitalist formations, it dominates and feeds on them until they disintegrate. In the meanwhile, the colonial economy can carry on according to its own momentum. There is no 'peaceful co-existence' of modes of production. See for instance, an article by Von Freyhold, 'The rise and fall of colonial mode of production', (n.d.) mimeo, Dar-es-Salaam.
commodities and the demand for cash by those who were left behind, sooner or later made labour migration a self-perpetuating system. The only alternative open to a people that had already become dependent on the market economy was 'peasantization' and participation in export crop production. Export crop production required the provision of seeds and advice on marketing points, stores, transport facilities and reasonable freight rates.

In the meantime, wage labour had not only become a normal stage of life for people from various parts of the country, it also involved a much larger number of people than ever before. By 1923, employment in the capitalist sector reached and surpassed the figures attained in the German period and involved about 200,000 workers. By 1926, one quarter of the adult male population, that is about 300,000 people, had become engaged in wage labour. In 1930 employment dropped again almost to the level of 1923, but a recovery had set in by 1934, so that according to one estimate, 308,754 workers (excluding domestic servants) were in employment once more by 1938. Moffet has suggested that almost one quarter of all men in the colony were in wage employment by this time 1.

The careful preservation of seemingly traditional structures, and labour reserves, were necessitated by the fact that colonial capitalism was slow in completing the process of primitive accumulation and in moving to a more mature form of capitalism. In their search for absolute surplus value, capitalists were interested in getting as many hours of work for as little time

as possible without much effort to use the labour power they had purchased on these terms in a more intensive manner. During early German times, we are told by Hehe elders, capitalists tried to stretch the working day to the physical limits of the workers; later, working days became shorter and instead there were constant pressures to reduce wages. In the middle of the twenties, the tendency was to reduce expenditure per worker, while maintaining a stable output per labour day, rather than to keep wages stable and increase output. It was not necessary to economise on land and labour so long as the state could help to provide these resources if there was a need and so long as it was cheaper to increase the labour force than to improve its productivity.

In order to prevent competition among themselves from forcing up the price of labour, capitalist employers made agreements with each other or called upon the state to maintain discipline in their ranks. The regional agreements between employers fixing maximum wages, are examples of efforts to restrict competition. The purpose of such agreement was partly to protect the weaker capitalists against the stronger.

The state also assisted in keeping labour cheap for the weaker capitalist by passing an ordinance against "decoying labour" which was first applied in 1923. The law prohibited the 'seduction' of workers by offering them better conditions of work if they joined another employer. The interests of the weaker capitalist were also served by laws which made desertion by an employee a

1. TNA, File No. Ref. 178/22/10, Complaints - Wages.
2. TNA, File No. 24/Ll/1, Policy and Instructions. Ref. No. IRA/64/22 Iringa District, Wages and Tasks.
criminal offence and by the general support which the state gave to the system of contract labour. While initially, long term contracts and sanctions against desertion were necessary because most workers were more or less involuntarily recruited, contracts later became mainly a means of binding workers to particular employers who offered wages and conditions that were below average:

"I do not suppose any European would much care to live in a rotten leaking banda (hut) full of rats and fever ticks and so on. Yet I have seen many employed natives so accommodated, surely something must be wrong when that happens [sic] it seems to point to a lack of interest or indifference towards the native or is it that grass huts are considered cheap or both."

The fact that the question of the distribution of workers between different enterprises was the main issue which required state action in order to curb competition highlights the fact that, throughout this period, no reserve army of 'unemployed' had been created. The economic crisis at the end of the twenties relieved the state from the task of opening up new labour reserves for a number of years. By the middle of the thirties, however, the call for more and cheaper workers arose again and was this time met mainly by the importation of contract labour from neighbouring territories. The backwardness of the political economy of Portuguese East Africa (Mozambique) forced thousands of Makonde and some Yao to stream across the border. A similar development took place with regard to the Warundi, except that recruiters and the Belgian government itself took a more active part in

supervising Warundi labour to Tanga and central line estates.

(iv). The Depression and World War II

The cash crop peasantry expanded throughout the 1930s side by side with sisal plantations and not at the expense of the latter, while settlers did not do as well. Many settlers foundered during the Depression and settler coffee-growing was virtually wiped out in the Southern Highlands. (They were helped to re-establish themselves with new crops such as tea, pyrethrum and tobacco later on as we shall see). Returned Germans came to dominate the settler field until the outbreak of the Second World War. Boers continued to be encouraged, particularly in Arusha where they were heavily subsidised to grow wheat and maize.

To suggest that the international depression of 1929-31 was a turning point in Tanganyikan history may well appear Eurocentric. Yet the simple fact is that the Tanganyika economy was by then dependent on the capitalist metropoles and no more vivid proof of this is needed than the spread of the Depression to the colony from America and Europe.

The period between 1929 and 1945 was dominated by two external events, a slump in the capitalist world's economic activity, 1929-31, and a world war, 1939-45. That statement by itself illustrates a form of dependence. But their impact on the growers is even more revealing, as we shall see. The moment that Tanganyika or any part of Africa became integrated into world capitalism, it became subjected to the same remorseless economic laws as the metropoles themselves. The sharp

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contradictions between production and consumption and between capital and labour, leading to periodic crises and recessions in America and Europe, also affected East Africa, notably in 1907-1908, 1921 and 1925. Then came the most decisive slump of all in the 1930s, sending ripples even into the most peripheral corners of a peripheral economy. Not only were Tanganyikan sisal, coffee and cotton affected, but the marginally involved pastoralists were hit by falling prices for hides, while areas producing food for sale locally found that their market had disappeared.

The sisal estates reduced their labour force drastically. The manifest inability of Africans to pay taxes when no money was available led to some relaxation in tax collection, but on the whole Tanganyika survived the depression by placing the brunt of the burden on the African workers and peasants. One of the indices of this was that the few social services that were provided for Africans were cut down. Walter Morris Hale makes a strong case concerning the deliberate withdrawal of educational services from Africans in the 1930s. Events on the sisal estates followed a parallel course.

There is a shortage of data on the subject of wages, compounded by the fact that the wages shown on paper were often not the same as the actual wages paid but included wages used as an incentive by labour recruiters. It is, however, possible to say that wage levels were 'low': low in terms of purchasing power of imported commodities, low in terms of total farm running costs and low in terms of African living standards. The purchasing power of

1. S.B. Jones, Tanganyika Territory, Annual Reports of the Provincial Commissioners on Native Administration for the year 1931, 1932 Iringa Province p.16.
2. TNA, File No. 24/M1/1/1 33 Medical and Sanitations, 'Tanganyika Territory Medical Department Memorandum and Medical Policy 40750/11/38 October 25, 1938.
wages was very limited. For the sake of the argument, a skilled labourer's average wage can be taken as sh. 10 per month and payment of taxes can be ignored. There was very little that could be bought with such a wage. A bicycle, for instance, was beyond the means of the vast majority. Up to 1930, workers earned from 15 sh. to sh. 30 per assigned task or labour card Kipande. With the slump, wages fell to sh. 10 or sh. 12 and the size of the tasks were increased. No benefits were offered to the labourers after the slump ended except that a bonus of sh. 3 was offered to certain categories of workers who completed the Kipande within 42 working days. When another recession emanated from the Euro-American economy and hit Tanganyika late in 1938, the employers withdrew the bonus and also reduced the numbers of workers receiving rations\(^1\). Despite the good price for sisal in the post war period, the wages for unskilled labour had barely risen above the wages prevailing before 1929\(^2\).

In this crisis, the colonial government once more resorted to thinly-veiled coercion in the form of Grow More Crops Campaigns. This idea relates to the wider issue of how interests of various kinds in the colony determined the agricultural policy between the wars. The real purpose of the Grow More Crops Campaign was

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1. TNA, File No. 24/L1, Labour Iringa letter 1/1R/12/2.
2. The F.O.B. price per ton of sisal in 1920-29 was about £33, between 1949-52 the average F.O.B. price was £122, the wages for unskilled workers in Tanga before the depression varied from sh. 22-30 per month. When the major increase took place in 1952, cutters the highest paid among the unskilled could expect sh. 27 with an additional bonus of sh. 12 if the work was completed in 42 days, the costs of living in contrast had shot up at a fantastic rate between pre-war and post periods.
to get Africans to expand the area of production and to increase output in spite of non-remunerative prices. Throughout 1932 and 1933 the Governor made speeches on this topic and above all the Director of Agriculture propagated and exhorted. Years afterwards, other agricultural officers reviewed the 'Grow More Crops Campaign' as having been technically unsound. It sacrificed quality for quantity and encouraged extremely poor land usage. But it achieved its primary purpose which was that of maintaining the colonial economy. This is particularly important for us in order to see how political interests have interacted with the process of learning from experience in the formulation of agricultural development strategies. Similar techniques had been tried on a smaller scale for earlier slumps in 1921 and 1925. When the next periodic crisis came in 1938, the colonial state was fully prepared to deal with it in the manner which had proven its efficiency: namely by forcing Africans to paddle harder against the current so that they might at least stay in the same place.

In October 1941 the acting Chief Secretary to the government complained about the shortage of labour experienced in various employment areas in the Territory. This was causing considerable concern and the government had in consequence placed under review its policy restraining the recruitment of voluntary labour for private enterprise in areas of compulsory enrolment for military service\(^1\). Hitherto, by administrative instruction, the recruitment of labour through agents had been restricted or entirely stopped in areas where recruiting for military purpose was taking place.

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1. TNA, File No. 24/L1/13, Iringa Labour.
These restrictions had been in operation for some time but it had become evident that unless they were removed the resulting labour shortage would seriously affect production. This had to be avoided not only because it was necessary to maintain the economic life of the country but also because certain products, such as sisal, were required for war purposes. As was mentioned in His Excellency's personal letter to the Chief Secretary dated the 31 December 1941, the territory was expected to produce at least 150,000 tons of sisal in 1942. To meet this target, the sisal estates needed approximately 12,000 additional labourers in as short a time as possible.

But under existing circumstances there were a number of factors operating against the normal and rapid recruitment of men. Among these were:

(a) two of the best recruiters, Sager and Leeman, were on military service and those who remained had no experience;

(b) compulsory recruitment for military service;

(c) the drive for greater foodstuff production by natives (discussed in Chapter Three); and

(d) more local employment opportunities than usual in certain areas.

As a result of the course of the war in the Far East, sisal production was an important war industry. Sisal was required for a number of purposes by the British Navy and the Navy could not do without it. 'The position in short is that sisal estates in Tanganyika must produce to capacity to supply the tonnage
required'. To do this they had to have the necessary labour and His Excellency stressed the need for Administrative Officers to give all possible assistance in obtaining it:

"If as a last resort it should become necessary to conscript for these estates an additional burden would be thrown on the Administration throughout the Territory which already has its hands full in supplying personnel for military purposes .... I have instructed that all legitimate means short of compulsion must be used to encourage men to proceed to work. It is considered that much can be done by intensive propaganda in all districts."

A careful survey of manpower statistics in relation to estimated military and industrial requirements had been made, and the conclusion reached in consultation with the Director of Manpower was that, the restriction placed on private recruitment could be removed without endangering the fulfilment of Government's recruiting commitments for military service. The Acting Chief Secretary to the Government, L. Tester, suggested that people rejected for military service who returned to their homes had an opportunity of offering themselves for employment if labour agents were available in the area.

(v)a. The Immediate Post-War Years: Marketing Boards and the Crisis of the Sterling Area

Most of the marketing boards for handling export crops, which dominated Tanganyika agriculture in post-war years, were established by the British during or after World War II. Their purpose was to expand overseas sales to ensure a steady supply of raw materials for Britain's home industries and/or to earn hard currencies to enable her rapidly dwindling Empire to pay off its

accumulated war debts. The very existence of marketing boards clearly demonstrated the point of view of both the Colonial Government and the trading companies: they provided a means of facilitating expansion of the essential exports of East African raw materials.

In 1948 Britain's Labour Government established a number of Marketing Boards in the colonies as sole buyers, graders, sellers and exporters of particular agricultural products. In East Africa the boards were granted monopoly rights over the export of both cotton and coffee. In theory they were supposed to shield the growers from the fluctuations of the world market by guaranteeing them in advance a stable price for the duration of the season. By setting the domestic price lower than the world price, a reserve fund could be built up which would serve a number of important ends: it would provide savings which could be used to develop the country's economy, it would drain off excess purchasing power and thus prevent inflation and it would provide a source from which the producer's income could be maintained in the case of a collapse of world prices. In other words, any surplus accumulated in one season was to be used to boost the price offered in the next. Over the long run, the board price and the market price were supposed to even out. In fact, however, since the boards were able to fix the buying prices of both raw and ginned cotton, they were able to keep a substantial margin between the price they paid and that collected for exported cotton, thus accumulating a substantial surplus.

1. TNA, File No. 24/1/2/8, 12 Circulars - Secretariat Circular letters Iringa, from the member for Finance Trade and Economics S.A.S. Leslie to all PCs and DCs Ref No. 36453/94 November 20th 1948.
Throughout the entire decade of the 1950s, our findings suggest that the prices paid to producers fluctuated within narrow limits, while the export price was consistently higher and usually much higher. If we keep in mind that cotton and coffee were the two major exports of Tanganyika next to sisal, it is immediately apparent that during these crucially important formative years of Tanganyika history a very large part of the country's economic surplus was being collected and centralised by these marketing boards. The importance of the boards was accentuated by the spectacular rise in the prices of both cotton and coffee during and after the war. The price of cotton rose from sh. 70/= per hundredweight in 1938-39 to sh. 280/= in 1949-1950. Coffee that fetched £41 a ton in 1938 fetched £100 a ton in 1946. The price paid to growers remained low. And if we keep in mind that the extent and direction of a country's development is dependent on how it uses its surplus, we can appreciate the importance of what the coffee and cotton Marketing Boards did with the millions of pounds they accumulated by selling the abovementioned crops on the world market at nearly twice the price they paid to the African producers.

(b). The War, the Pound and the Empire

To pursue this issue further it is necessary to place Tanganyika in its proper historical and international setting. To finance her enormous import requirements during the Second World War at a time when her capacity to export was drastically curtailed, Great Britain was obliged to borrow abroad. What happened was

1. ibid., Iringa Cotton.
that the dependent countries sent their goods to the United Kingdom in exchange for pounds sterling which for the time being they were unable to spend. The total of Britain's sterling liabilities increased in this way from £500 million before the war to over £3,000 million after the war.

These balances remained as a source of constant pressure on the pound. Nor in the conditions of the post-war were they the only danger to the pound. Britain needed imports of all kinds to make good the losses and damage caused by the war. Export capacity was slow to recover. Military requirements, occasioned by unrest in the Empire and the incipient Cold War, continued at a high level. The inevitable result of all these pressures and needs was a series of post-war financial and balance-of-payments crises which threatened Britain with international bankruptcy. It was in these circumstances that two things happened.

First, the United States organised a huge operation, culminating in the Marshall plan, which poured nearly $7 billion of aid into the United Kingdom in the decade following the war. And, second, the British government itself (under the control of the Labour Party, be it noted) took unprecedented steps to force its remaining colonies to transfer their surpluses to London to support the pound. The core of this new strategy was the establishment of a network of marketing boards in the colonies, as our archival material makes very clear. Marketing boards were established in Malaya and West Africa as well as in East Africa.

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In West Africa there was a marketing board for every commodity from peanuts to mahogany.\(^1\)

By establishing marketing boards throughout its colonies, Great Britain, once the free trade centre of the world, carried out what was perhaps the most thoroughgoing attempt to control the market-place since the Diocletian Code. From Accra to Dar-es-Salaam and across the Indian Ocean to Kuala Lumpur, the marketing boards all operated in the same way. First buying and selling monopolies were established, then producer prices were set below the world market price, then the boards began to accumulate the difference. What did the marketing boards do with the money? A large part of it they simply sent off to London where it was held as sterling balances. These sterling balances were gradually invested in long-term British government securities. In other words, the colonies were lending money to Great Britain.

**Conclusion**

In this chapter we have suggested that the British colonial government had an opportunity to study and formulate an agricultural policy free from the political constraints of settler class in Tanganyika between the wars. Nevertheless, political interests interacted with the process of learning from experience, with the effect that policies were formed which favoured peasant production. First, the peasants were induced to bring their own land and their own tools free of charge into the production of exports, for prices which did not even cover the costs of reproduction of the peasants themselves. They were expected to satisfy most of their needs through 'subsistence

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\(^1\) Bob Fitch and Mary Oppenheimer, *Ghana: End of an Illusion*, 1968, p.43.
production', bringing their surplus labour in the production of marketable agricultural products. Through the 'Grow More Crops Campaign', the colonial authorities sought to maintain peasants in cash crop production in times of depression. Second, the capitalist sector of the colony, recruited migrant labourers and kept them at work as long as it was possible to do so without incurring any expenses for their children, wives or old age. Taxation was a mechanism used to raise government revenue and force Africans to go and seek wage employment. The instrument which regulated the unequal interaction between these important sectors of the colonial economy was the colonial state. Primitive accumulation was thus institutionalised in the two abovementioned ways. Finally we have discussed the formation and functions of Marketing Boards and the crisis of the sterling area after the Second World War and how these institutions were used to help Britain to make good the losses and damage of the war.
CHAPTER THREE

HISTORY AND ORGANISATION OF MAIZE PRODUCTION IN IRINGA DISTRICT, FROM WORLD WAR II TO 1970

Why was maize production begun in Ismani after the Second World War? What were the farming systems used and what kinds of labour did they attract? How were marketing activities carried out? Who started the first co-operative in Ismani and why, and how did this co-operative function? In seeking answers to these and related questions of history, this chapter also provides evidence in support of a general analytical proposition: that the post-independence government made a disastrous mistake in generalising an experience which had already shown its negative side in the 1950s. This is true with regard to extension services, settlement schemes and co-operatives. Although in this chapter we shall focus our attention on co-operatives, there are more lessons to be learned from the experience of colonial agricultural policy in general than has usually been recognised.

The chapter falls into four main sections, which are further divided into several sub-sections. First we look at location, climatic factors and other aspects of the Ismani setting. Second we consider the settlement phase, the attendant labour migration and the Ismani Development Plan of 1953-56. Third we examine a number of seasons in detail, focusing on marketing and pricing issues. Finally we look at the years 1953-60 and the formation of the Ismani Co-operative Society. The successes and problems of this early venture are discussed at some length.
A. Ismani Division

Ismani is an area of approximately 250 square miles lying at the northern end of the Iringa district in the south of Tanzania. Its altitude ranges between 4,000 and 5,000 feet and is located in the middle zone of Iringa District, between the highland zone of Dabaga and the lowest zone of Pawaga and Idodi. The climate is tropical savannah, with a fairly high temperature and rainfall lasting from late November/early December until late April/May. Rainfall in the area averages between 510mm and 760mm annually (see Map 3.1) and is unevenly distributed. The months of highest rainfall are followed by several months of dry weather. The soils are primarily red and sticky clay loams which originate from ferrisols and sand stones but in some areas there are patches of black, sticky and poorly drained soils.

Today Ismani is the most important part of Iringa District; most of the economic activities of the District are concentrated there. Until the late 1940s, however, Ismani was sparsely populated by a part of the Hehe tribe, who live throughout Iringa. With a population of about 26,000 during the dry period and 52,000 during the wet season, the Division's inhabitants are estimated at 34,044, giving a population density of 8 persons per sq.km.

After the Second World War, the demand for maize in Tanganyika rose steadily, and a market was created in Iringa with the establishment in Iringa town of a major mill. The expansion of

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1. Iringa Region is composed of four districts namely, Iringa District, Njombe District, Mufindi District and Rudewa District. Iringa Region was called Southern Highlands Province during the colonial period.

IRINGA REGION
RELIEF, MAIN RIVERS AND COMMUNICATIONS
PROBABILITY OF ANNUAL RAINFALL (RUSSEL 1961)

MAP 3.1

KEY REFERENCE

REGIONAL BOUNDARY
ROAD
RAILWAY

LAND OVER 5,000 ft (1,524 m)

ANNUAL RAINFALL
10 - 20 (254 - 508 mm)
20 - 30 (508 - 762 mm)
30 - 50 (762 - 1,270 mm)
> 50 (1,270 mm)

AMOUNT IN INCHES LIKELY TO BE EXCEEDED
4 YEARS OUT OF FIVE YEARS (on average)
maize production occurred in all parts of the district which had access to markets, resulting in a land shortage in some parts and a decline in soil fertility. It was at this time that Ismani was 'discovered' by African entrepreneurs seeking to create new farms and expand existing maize production.

Today Ismani is populated by peasants from many ethnic groups including Wahehe, Wakinga, Wanyakyusa, Gogo and Wawanji, but all are settled together and accept a common identity as Tanzanians. Swahili is the language most commonly used. Sunflower, beans, cassava, groundnuts and tobacco are grown but maize is the main crop, accounting for over 80 per cent of all farm economic activities in the area. Ismani Division is divided into four administrative units, namely Nduli, Kihorogota, Izazi and Malenga Makali.

B(i). The Settlement of Ismani in the 1950s

In the period prior to the early 1950s, the whole of Ismani was bush, inhabited only by wild animals. The reasons why people did not settle in the area before are as follows. First, the Hehe people did not settle in Ismani because there was no perennial water source for human and animal use. Moreover, the Hehe occupied land available elsewhere in Iringa District. The 1943/44 Provincial Commissioners' report said:

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"In the report of this province for 1943, it was recorded that the short rains of the 1943/44 season were late. The main rains were, in the event, excellent and it is safe to say that never before had the province reaped such a crop of the staple maize as in 1944, for never before had excellent rains and their results been experienced in conjunction with a campaign for increased production for the war purposes. That campaign had been hampered by ill-spaced rains in previous years, but its results in 1944 were almost embarrassingly plentiful, and may even have upset long-standing ideas of supply and demand for some years to come.1

The Hehe marketed over 1,900 tons of maize which, with non-African production, came close to satisfying the demands of the Iringa District. The report went on:

"The four year plan (1946-1950) to increase food production for the Territory gives us just those four years in which to introduce on a wide scale of the higher priced crops which we need, and which are at present strange to the African, as a complement to bulk food production. We must, at the same time pay adequate attention to the threatened erosion, dessication by fire, deforestation and over stocking, ...."2

A third reason for the non-settlement of Ismani was that quite a number of peasants were forced to work on European farms, in the Lupa Goldfield and on road construction, with the result that there was no immediate cash-need to increase the farm size in the native-occupied area. Fourth, livestock keeping was the most important economic activity but this was mainly concentrated in the Pawaga and Idodi areas which were not thick bush and where water was available for human and animal use. These perennial water sources were supplied by rivers including the Little Ruaha

1. Tanganyika Territory Annual Report of the Provincial Commissioners (PC's) for the year 1944, 1945, Southern Highlands Province (S.H.P.) p.72.
and parts of the Great Ruaha. The area free from tsetse fly was
generally very favourable to livestock, so that even now the main
concentration of livestock in Iringa District is in the Pawaga,
Idodi and Izazi areas. Apart from the above, one could add that
lack of knowledge of how good the soil of Ismani was for maize
farming and the general fear of dangerous animals in the area
could have been possible factors preventing farmers from elsewhere
in the District from settling there.

Settlement in Ismani began on a major scale only after the Second
World War when colonial policy started to encourage and push
African peasants to earn money through their own agriculture. In
the late 1940s a number of people, chiefly residents of Iringa
Township and including lorry drivers, former sisal workers, traders,
former mine workers, shop-owners, mechanics and ex-soldiers1,
successfully applied to the headman of Ismani area for land. The
people who came to Ismani did so mainly because they wanted to
produce maize for the market. Those people who lived in Iringa
came to Ismani with money which they had saved from their salaries
or from trade.

These Hehe farmers are an illustration of the sort of people who
became entrepreneurs in Tanganyika. As John Iliffe puts it:

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1. 1945 Provincial Commissioner’s report for S.H.P. said the
following about the ex-soldiers from World War II:
"It is pleasing to record that almost without exception
the altitude and conduct of returning native soldiers has
been excellent. They all looked extremely fit and cheerful
for most of them are anxious to buy a hoe, cattle ...."
PC’s Annual Report 1945, 1946, S.H.P., p.82.
Wide experience and unusual vision were the main requirements for entrepreneurship so long as this meant adding a new crop to the previous system of subsistence agriculture. But another sort of entrepreneurship was also possible: to break away from peasant agriculture altogether and instead become a large-scale farmer employing labour. This sort of entrepreneurship needed not only vision but also capital to pay the labourers in the early years and possibly to purchase new implements. Since it was difficult for Africans to accumulate capital, entrepreneurship of this type was rare in the colonial period. One example was in the Ismani area of Iringa District ....

However high maize prices and special grants to large producers induced some people from Iringa to obtain large acreages there. Bowles has suggested that this had something to do with the sharp rises in prices of export crops when world prices rose during the Korean War Boom of 1951-53.

B(ii). Farming Systems

It is impossible to discuss the question of maize production systems in Iringa District without giving major emphasis to Ismani Division, for during the past 30 years this area has experienced no less than three different systems of maize production, as can be seen from figure 3.1.

The first system emerged in the early fifties when rapid migration into the area, coupled with large scale bush clearing and burning, resulted in an extensive but nevertheless profitable system. Not themselves living in the area, farmers hired migrant labour to burn the bush and scatter maize seed broadcast on the land, without any attempt at cultivation.

1. Iliffe, "Agricultural change in modern Tanganyika", op.cit., p.23.
### Figure 3.1

**EVOlUTION OF MAIZE PRODUCTION IN ISMANI DIVISION, IRINGA DISTRICT**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FEATURES</th>
<th>1950</th>
<th>PERIOD 1</th>
<th>1962</th>
<th>PERIOD 2</th>
<th>1970</th>
<th>PERIOD 3</th>
<th>1977</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Village Technique</td>
<td>Manual Clear and Burn</td>
<td>Oxen Tractors</td>
<td>Full Mechanization</td>
<td>Oxen Tractors</td>
<td>Full Mechanization</td>
<td>Oxen Tractors</td>
<td>Full Mechanization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On-Farm Inputs</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Implements, Tractors</td>
<td>Seed, Insecticide Fertilizer</td>
<td>Implements, Tractors</td>
<td>Seed, Insecticide Fertilizer</td>
<td>Implements, Tractors</td>
<td>Seed, Insecticide Fertilizer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sources of Labour</td>
<td>Own Plus Local Hired Labour</td>
<td>Own Plus Local Hired Labour</td>
<td>Group Labour</td>
<td>Own Plus Local Hired Labour</td>
<td>Group Labour</td>
<td>Own Plus Local Hired Labour</td>
<td>Group Labour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sources of Capital</td>
<td>From Trade and Salary</td>
<td>Accumulated from Farming</td>
<td>Supplied by Government</td>
<td>Accumulated from Farming</td>
<td>Supplied by Government</td>
<td>Accumulated from Farming</td>
<td>Supplied by Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Principal Labour Bottleneck</td>
<td>Bush Clearing</td>
<td>Decline Fertility</td>
<td>Poor Management</td>
<td>Bush Clearing</td>
<td>Decline Fertility</td>
<td>Poor Management</td>
<td>Decline Fertility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Principal Factor Limiting Productivity</td>
<td>Decline Fertility</td>
<td>Shortage of Labour</td>
<td>Declining</td>
<td>Decline Fertility</td>
<td>Shortage of Labour</td>
<td>Decline Fertility</td>
<td>Shortage of Labour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>Rapid Settlement</td>
<td>Peak</td>
<td>Declining (2200 Kg/ha)</td>
<td>Peak</td>
<td>Declining (2200 Kg/ha)</td>
<td>Peak</td>
<td>Declining (2200 Kg/ha)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yield</td>
<td>High (C 3400 Kg/ha)</td>
<td>Declining (2200 Kg/ha)</td>
<td>Low (C 1200 Kg/ha)</td>
<td>Declining (2200 Kg/ha)</td>
<td>Low (C 1200 Kg/ha)</td>
<td>Declining (2200 Kg/ha)</td>
<td>Low (C 1200 Kg/ha)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Adapted from TRDB Project URT/71/004 Iringa Region Tanzania - Integrated Rural Development proposals vol.1 Part 1 Table 4.1.1.
The method of farming used was relatively simple, as may be appreciated from the description by the Agricultural Assistant Mr. E. Edward:

"Let us first examine his methods of cultivation. In the first place he cuts the existing forest to within 4 to 5 feet of the ground, clears and burns all undergrowth, leaving a layer of ash on the surface of the soil. No further preparation of the soil is made. When he is ready to sow his seed he merely chops a hole with his jembe (hoe) sows from 4-6 seeds per hole in the case of maize, and so the whole shamba (farm) is sown in usual native fashion. In the two remaining seasons no proper cultivation preparatory to sowing is done, other than to clean the shamba of any weed growth that might have appeared."

However germination was good, as the land had benefited from many years of growth and decay of grass and leaves, and potash from wood helped to improve further the fertility of the top soil. The same practice was carried out in the following agricultural cycle: maize stalks were burned and seeds again broadcast without any pretence at cultivation. In the fourth year in most cases, as the top soil began to harden, it became more difficult to broadcast seeds without cultivation. At this point, as the fact that the tree stumps and roots had been left began to make cultivation difficult, the land was usually abandoned and new areas were cleared for farming.

This method of shifting cultivation soon began to make land scarce because those who moved to farms in new areas considered such new areas to be theirs, whilst it was accepted that nobody could claim the areas they had temporarily abandoned. This explains how most of the rich peasants in Ismani came to own several plots of land.

1. TNA, File No. 24/A/3/36v, Iringa Recruits and Reports.
in several villages in the area.

It is important to note that the above method of cultivation was preferred because it yielded the best results; for example, one acre produced about 15 bags of maize. This was profitable because there was no expenditure on cultivation and the farmers weeded only once, not twice or three times as became necessary in the years that followed.

The second farming system developed in a less dramatic fashion than the first as a result of the closing of the Ismani 'frontier'. When most of the available land had been claimed, mechanized production (using oxen or tractors) began to expand rapidly, causing the distinction between a landed and a labouring class to become more obvious and important.

An essential feature of production during this period was declining fertility due to mining of the soil under maize mono-culture without replacement of soil nutrients. Both the first two periods were characterized by land extensive systems, resulting after the first few years in only modest yields per unit area but with quite high productivity per man and power unit. An additional feature was that the crop production season in Ismani was complementary to that in the colder highlands of the Region, so that the extended use of capital and labour, producing two maize crops per annum, became possible by moving the two factors of production between the two areas, i.e. a transhumance system. This system was still viable even when yields were falling in Period 2 towards the usual low but stable levels consequent upon years of

maize mono-culture with inadequate fallow periods and no manuring.

There were indications in several areas of the province that an African 'yeomen farmer' class was emerging. Many farmers expanded their farms, using ox-drawn or tractor-drawn cultivators, enclosing their fields and generally moving away from the traditional cultivation of small holdings sufficient only for subsistence economy. Mr. Griffiths, Provincial Commissioner (PC) for the region, described the process:

"General indications throughout the province show a tendency among Africans towards a steady, if slow increase in crop production and the departure from subsistence agriculture. The use of mechanical and other agricultural implements is becoming more popular and in one or two areas Africans are buying their own tractors. It is more than passing interest that it is estimated that there are over 11,000 ox-drawn ploughs in the province. The emergence of a yeomen farmer class is being encouraged and there are several farmers, both in Ismani Iringa, and Njombe, who cultivate between 200 and 300 acres each. It is interesting to note that one or two of these are interested in taking out rights of occupancy."1

The third system came into operation in 1971 and the change was the most dramatic of all. The private ownership2 of large holdings was prohibited and much of the land previously farmed privately turned over to ujamaa villages. We shall discuss this issue in some detail later. The complementary double maize crop system based on transhumance was abolished. Though the total area

2. The ownership was not a formal title in law but the traditional right to combine use of land cleared and developed by the individual farmer.
under maize in Ismani declined, there was a pronounced rise in the
use of improved inputs, particularly seed, fertilizer and insecticide,
and a corresponding increase in multiple tractor operations on very
large plots. All these inputs were government-supplied, but their
provision failed to have any significant impact on productivity
and marketed output dropped sharply, accounting for the low
marketing in 1971/72.

B(iii). Sources of migrant labour

Our next task is to discuss the issue of the migrant labourers,
particularly the Gogo from Dodoma, who came to work in Ismani.
In Dodoma, drought constitutes the region's single biggest
environmental problem. Partly in response to this environmental
factor, the Gogo had acquired the custom of taking their cattle
and moving away temporarily in search of wage employment. "A
history of Dodoma Region is a history of famine among the Gogo
cultivating pastoralists", as Peter Rigby has pointed out. For
example, in the 1947/48 season Dodoma and Manyoni Districts had
only 12 inches and 14 inches of rain respectively. In the
following season, 1948/49, there were eight months of drought and
general famine. 12,363 tons of food had to be imported for sale
and a famine officer was appointed to Dodoma District.

The situation improved in the following two seasons, but again in
the 1952/53 season there was a severe famine and food reserves

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1. We shall return to this issue when we discuss the National
Maize Project in detail in Chapter Seven.
2. M. Potton, "Dodoma 1929-1959, A History of Famine", mimeo,
BRALUP Research Paper No. 44, University of Dar-es-Salaam,
1971, pp.3-6.
4. 1949 rain was poor for Iringa as well. Herders normally
satisfied with the income to be delivered from sales of
stable surplus to their needs went out to work in tobacco
and maize farms in considerable numbers.
were rapidly exhausted. The estimated crop was only 25 per cent of a normal harvest, with many farmers harvesting virtually nothing; 100,000 cattle starved to death. Prices of staple foodstuffs in the villages rose precipitously.

By the end of 1954, there were some 10,000 people in Mpwapwa District working on famine relief projects to obtain money with which to buy food. Drought had reduced cattle production by 60 per cent since 1952. In the three Gogo districts, 1955 started with famine at its worst and ended with floods unprecedented for thirty years. Between these two major disasters, there was an invasion of desert locusts. In 1956 rains were good, but Quelea bird invasions caused problems and a good deal of damage in many areas. In the mid-1950s there were 5,000–7,000 Gogo in Iringa District in search of food and work.

In regard to this situation it is important to note the following additional points. First, Gogo people also migrated to other areas in search of work. Second, some Gogo migrants took cattle and goats to Ismani and exchanged them for grain. This type of transaction was one of the ways in which the emerging rich peasants in Ismani started to accumulate wealth. Third, it is important to mention that some migrants also came in search of work from Njombe District. Gogo migrants were sometimes paid wages, but most of the time they were given food only. This also applied to Bena and Kinga migrants from Njombe, but this group usually insisted on being paid in cash, as most of them had had some experience as migrant labourers on the sisal or tea plantations. Migrants from Njombe District also differed in that in most cases they stayed in Ismani for short periods before
returning home, e.g. six months. The migrants from Dodoma are
known to have stayed in Ismani and worked for longer contracts
there, e.g. 5 years.

It is important to appreciate that there are peaks of labour
activity and also slack periods, when much less labour is demanded.
Feldman and Fournier have suggested, with regard to a comparable
situation, that the seasonality of labour demand has meant that
agricultural production has depended on the utilisation of a
substantial casual labour force. The point here is that the
combination of a demand for surplus production in agriculture
with substantial seasonal variation in labour demand in an economy
with limited opportunities outside the surplus agricultural sector
must lead to the existence of a special kind of labour force.
This is a labour force that can maintain itself in those periods
when the surplus production system does not require it.¹

The development of the agricultural surplus is therefore associated
with two phenomena, seasonal migration and the existence of small
subsistence holdings alongside the larger surplus-producing
enterprises. The specificity of the process of accumulation
through surplus agricultural production does not necessarily, or
usually, result in similar social relationships to those usually
included in the 'capitalist mode of production'. Furthermore,
there are substantial differences between different circumstances
of surplus production in agriculture. These differences are
concerned mainly with the nature of the labour force and the way

¹. We have borrowed this argument from David Feldman and Alan
Fournier, "Social relations and Agriculture Production in
Nepal's Terai", Journal of Peasant Studies, Vol.3, No. 4,
July 1976, p.453.
it relates to capital. What is important is to be able to identify the particular conditions which lead those different sets of relations. To understand the process of surplus production, appropriation and realisation in agriculture, one must explain the totality of the process. This totality should include the reproduction and maintenance of the labour force as well as the way the surplus is realised.

B(iv). The Ismani Development Plan and Credits to African Farmers

High maize prices and government policy having resulted in uncontrolled clearing and maize cultivation by Africans, the colonial government came to the view that:

"... if allowed to continue this activity will lead to severe erosion and rapid diminution in production."

The construction of three dams provided a permanent strategic water supply which had not previously existed. This enabled more settlement, and the introduction of livestock increased. Because of a rapid acquisition of huge land areas without the use of modern methods of farming and the farmers' method of evading tax, the colonial government was forced to consider introducing more effective measures to control land acquisition in Ismani.

Specifically the Native Authority, working together with the

1. Whether there are peasant farms producing for the market, large labour force using farms or capital intensive heavily mechanised farms with the minimum and declining reliance on hired labour.
3. There were complaints from the Ismani sub-chief that the new migrants paid labourers to work on their farms but that they did not own a house and did not pay taxes to the headman. Some 60,000 acres had been carved out of the Uhehe bush for maize cultivation by local tribesmen and aliens with the result that soil erosion and agricultural holding problems became difficulty.
District Commissioner (DC) and the Department of Agriculture, decided to assert some control over land acquisition and methods of production. The measures taken to control cultivation in Ismani were spelt out in a circular letter written by the DC to the Provincial Agricultural Officer on 9 June 1951:

"(a) Existing cultivators .... with plough [are to be allowed] a maximum acreage [of] 50 per plough [and] a maximum acreage per family/household [of] 100 acres, which may be extended subject to permission of the Native Authority being after consultation by the latter with DC and Agricultural Assistant.

(b) Existing cultivators with hoes [are to be allowed] a maximum acreage [of] 30 acres per hoe [and] a maximum acreage per family/household [of] 50 acres."1

The limits applied to new as well as old migrant farmers. In order to carry out this plan effectively, a field Agricultural Officer was seconded to the scheme in 1955, the Native Treasury being responsible for his salary.

The Native Authority worked out a Five Year Development Plan for Ismani Settlement. The actual expenditure incurred over the (4 year) period 1953–56 was £4,266. 16s. 44d. (85,345 Tanzanian Shillings). The actual and estimated costs of the scheme during the period of Five Year Development Plan was as shown in Table 3.1(a).

1. From the records of the Ismani African Maize Growers' Co-operative Society.
TABLE 3.1(a)

Actual Expenditure, Ismani Development Plan, 1953-56

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>£</th>
<th>Shs. Pence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>1,088.</td>
<td>10. 49.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>3,120.</td>
<td>00. 00.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

£4,266. 16. 44.

The breakdown of the annual costs was as shown in Table 3.1(b).

TABLE 3.1(b)

Breakdown of Annual Costs, Ismani Development Plan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1953</th>
<th>1954</th>
<th>1955</th>
<th>1956</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>£</td>
<td>£</td>
<td>£</td>
<td>£</td>
<td>£</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Development</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field Officer Emoluments</td>
<td>767</td>
<td>1,860</td>
<td>2,627</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport and Official Travelling</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>510</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demonstration Farm</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>500</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seven Tembe (hut) Houses</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>200</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field Officer Quarter</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>200</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>27</strong></td>
<td><strong>32</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,089</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,120</strong></td>
<td><strong>4,268</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The money was spent mostly on the Field Officer’s transport and official travelling expenses and on a demonstration farm. Attempts to control land holding and to introduce modern ways of farming did
not meet with any success in Ismani. The people who came to cultivate maize in the area did not plan to reside there and so did not have any interest in following the demands of the Plan. Awiti suggests that it was because they considered that the area did not belong to them, since they did not have legal rights of land ownership and land use as such, that they were deterred from considering long-term investment in the area.

During the 1950s, rich peasants, people who owned more than 100 acres, were interested in short-term investments that generated immediate profits. When such people applied for commercial bank loans before independence they were refused by the District Loan Committee, of which the DC was the chairman. Yet it was difficult for the Africans to apply 'modern' ways of farming without being given credits; this was a contradiction in the policy. The Colonial Government did not want to finance Africans, partly because some of these farmers were active in the anti-colonial struggle.

Quarterly Reports on loan funds available to Africans suggest that applicants were expected to supply adequate security, which might be in the shape of housing, cattle, agricultural machinery or produce from a perennial crop. Each application was examined on its merits and only those schemes which were considered by the Committee to give an adequate return on the capital to be invested in them were approved. Mr. Jackson, the Agricultural

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1. Awiti, op.cit., p.213.
Officer in Iringa, explains this point:—

"During the past month, about 6 applications for Land Bank Loan have been made and all but one are for the purpose of purchasing tractors and implements. So far as can be seen however, all the people wanting tractors are liable to be disappointed, as not one of them seem to have a shamba of more than about 50 acres and it would be ridiculous to approve a tractor loan for such a small acreage."

Such were the results. Some rich peasants tried to get loans by applying through advocates, but with disappointing results:—

"On behalf of our client Murisho bin Ruumba of Madhira District Iringa, we Hyam and Sethna advocates have to request you DC as under .... Our client is an African cultivator and he has a Ferguson (sic) Tractor of his own with which he ploughs .... He is growing maize on 150 acres of land and for that he applies for a loan of the sum of sh. 9,000/=.

He is offering his tractor by way of security. Our client is a hard working farmer and got 250 bags of maize in the last season (1955). He has developed his farm by doing irrigation and lots of other expenses. He requires every encouragement and assistance from the Government."

The DC's reply was that "on the advice of the Agricultural Officer, we refuse this as it is a 'crop loan' and contains no element of development in it i.e. it is all for your own profit and not for the profit of your fellow countrymen."

Many reasons were given to Africans for their not being granted loans, for example that the application form was not filled in

3. ibid, letter D3/6/11/46.
well or that it was submitted too late. Alternatively it was claimed that the complexity of African family relationship and land tenure made it impossible to trust an apparently prosperous African. The Committee preferred to deal with customers who passed all their transactions through their banks, i.e. the Iringa branches of Barclays or the Standard Bank. With Africans, the Bankers maintained, it was impossible to know with any certainty just what their actual financial position was. These complications did not arise with Europeans, they argued. As we have shown, although some rich peasants who applied for loans did not have sufficient security and possessed no legal rights to the land they used, those Africans who did have security were also refused loans because the colonial administration was not interested in financing them.

At this time it also was common for poor peasants to borrow money from rich peasants or to hire tractors from them. In return poor peasants sometimes gave part of their land to rich peasants or worked for them during the peak period of labour demand, maintaining their small plots as well. The large farmers increasingly depended on the existence of the small peasants for their conditions of production. The vital point here is that small commodity producers are articulated into capitalist forms of commodity circulation without themselves being capitalist enterprises.

2. This point is made by Bob Fitch and Mary Oppenheimer, in Ghana, op.cit., p.70.
Our data (archive material, Colonial Reports and interviews) suggest that, in Ismani in the 1950s, in order to obtain capital or inputs for agriculture, some influential farmers, especially those Africans who formerly worked for traders as drivers, made secret contracts with Asian and Arab traders. The merchants would advance goods to farmers to set up a shop or give them foodstuffs on credit, which could be used to pay the workers on the farms. In return the rich peasants acted as the traders' agents in buying maize from other peasant producers. Prices for these transactions were agreed in advance.

Rich peasants did not like this system and tried to sell their produce to the highest bidder. Asian and Arab traders were able to dominate maize buying in the whole of the Ismani area because they had capital and transport facilities. The weakness of the Ismani marketing co-operative made it much easier for the middlemen to take advantage of the situation. These traders made some profits: for example, they bought a 90 kg sack of maize at sh. 25/= on the farm and sold it to Unga Ltd. in Iringa at sh. 30/= to 35/=.

Sometimes they sold maize directly to Dar-es-Salaam for even higher profits. But since in Ismani the maize trade was highly profitable, such activities were considered favourably in 'high circles' (businessmen) in the area. When the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) was formed on 7 July 1954, many peasants, rich and poor, became members and they did so to protest against this exploitive system as well as to oppose

colonial rule in general\(^1\) (see photo 3.1)\(^2\).

C(i). Agricultural seasons and Marketing 1948/9-1953/4

Maize is grown to a greater or lesser extent in every province. It is grown on large farms and on small-holdings. It is grown in pure and mixed farms and is often eaten immature. Under such circumstances it is difficult to make even a reasonably accurate guess either at the total acreage sown or at the total production in the country before 1950. As a further complication, the figures for maize passing through local markets collected over the past years have included sorghum grain, and it is impossible to disentangle the two commodities. However, since the local Grain Department started operating, the following local purchases have been made:

\[
\text{TABLE 3.2}
\]

Maize Purchases in Tanganyika

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Tons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1949/50</td>
<td>19,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950/51</td>
<td>54,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951/52</td>
<td>61,428</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


2. President Nyerere is at the centre with African Leaders, Co-operative leaders, farmers and transporters. The man on the President's left hand side making a point is the richest African in Iringa and one of the richest African businessmen in the country. He is the member of the Party National Executive and Central Party Committee, Chairman of Tanzanian Licencing Board and Chairman of Bakwata (Muslim Association). He is definitely an influential man. This photo was taken in 1958 in Iringa.
It was estimated that in a normal year 45,000 tons were required to supply the needs of non-producers, but in a bad season a further 60,000 tons were necessary to meet the requirements of those who normally produce a large proportion of their own food.

After the Second World War, the Colonial Government gave Unga Ltd., a Kenyan milling company, a lease on the former German flour mill in Iringa. In order to persuade them to take over milling operations, the government allowed Unga Ltd., to exercise a monopoly on the milling and marketing of all wheat and maize grown in Iringa and Njombe Districts. In order to encourage food production, the government offered subsidies to all farmers who planted more than twenty-five acres of maize.\(^1\)

Southern Highlands is a province of farmers where agriculture is of paramount importance. In 1946/47 rains were not above the average in quantity but were admirably spaced, and there was no appreciable dry gap. As a result rain crops were excellent throughout the province.\(^2\) It was also reported that in the following agricultural cycle favourable weather brought good returns to all communities.

With prices of all products remaining at good levels, the economic climate was encouraging. In 1947 the basic price for maize was sh. 15 cents 65 per 100 kilos at the Iringa mill of Sao Hill. Beans and peas and other pulses in 1947/48 were purchased at a

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flat rate of sh. 17/= per 100 kilos in all markets in Iringa District. Unga Ltd. had a basic price at the mill of sh. 25 cents 15 including a sack or sh.22 cents 50 per 100 kilos naked (without a sack). Sunflower proved so popular a crop with native producers and non-native alike, due to both price and ease of cultivation, that some anxiety was felt; it was thought that it would seriously affect maize production in 1949. Propaganda was undertaken to counter this. 925 tons of sunflower were produced in 1948 and carried a cess of sh. 2/= per kilo.¹

In 1949 the price of sunflower dropped by sh. 70/= per ton. In the previous season the basic price had been sh. 459/80 per ton naked at Iringa. In 1949 the price was believed to be sh. 70/= less, which was sh. 389/80 per ton of 2240 lbs. at Iringa, which was sh. 38/28 per 100 kilos with a cess, or fee, of 5 per cent, which was sh. 1/91. The fall in the price of sunflower and pulses to growers was very unpopular especially to African growers, who had been encouraged to increase production of these two crops during the past two years.²

As we have seen, 1948 was a most successful agricultural year with production records broken in several instances. Maize produced such an excellent harvest everywhere that great difficulty was experienced in evacuating available surplus owing to the shortage of transport. In Iringa 4,360 tons were produced, two thirds of it by Africans, which allowed the export of nearly 2,000 tons from the District³. By contrast, 1949 was one of the worst agricultural

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¹. TNA, File No. 111A/9/111 Agriculture.
². TNA, File No. 24/G2/2/X, Iringa Office Station on Grain Storage.
seasons. Instead of a normal dry season extending to six months, there was no significant rain for seven, and in some places eight, months and this ensured a poor crop. Grain had to be imported to avoid the danger of famine owing to the poor rainfall.¹

Hopes that the bad agricultural season in 1949 would be succeeded by a better 1950 season were realised. Rainfall in the calendar year was above normal². The ban on brewing local beer, which had been imposed to conserve exiguous foodstocks in the Iringa District at the beginning of June 1949, was lifted.

Plenty of rain in 1950 brought good harvests, which were followed by a better 1951 season with outstandingly good harvests. 1951 was again followed by another good year in 1952, when, our data suggest, all previous records were broken. There was a large exportable surplus. The province figure for exportable maize surplus was 17,844 tons and out of this 12,770 tons came from Iringa district.

The following two seasons, that is 1953 and 1954, were not good. Rainfall was generally below average and in some isolated areas, especially in the south, it was so slight as to create local food shortages. Two successive dry years had their effects in lowering the water table in several parts of the province and this in turn affected boreholes and springs³. Nevertheless overall staple food crop production in 1954 exceeded expectations and some 12,000 tons of maize passed through markets. With satisfactory prices for all

¹. A.A. Oldaker, PC, Tanganyika Territory Annual Reports of the PCs for the year 1949, 1950, S.H.P., pp.115-120.
the main economic crops, money circulated freely and revenue collections were up to expectations.

Highlights from the above detailed discussion include three successful agricultural seasons, namely 1950, 1951, and 1952, which were followed by a poor harvest in 1953 as a result of which a certain degree of internal redistribution of the food became necessary. At the mid year of 1953, an exercise in good neighbourliness was undertaken in an appeal for the Wagogo in the Central Province which resulted, as had been hoped, in the delivery of a quantity of seed, food and cash to that famine-striken area.

We mentioned earlier that Unga Ltd. had the monopoly of buying maize and wheat in Iringa and Njombe Districts. We now discuss the two different methods of marketing recognised under the law. The first method was under the Market Ordinance, which said that only in places declared as markets might native produce be bought and sold. The purpose of this law was to prevent dealers in produce from approaching Africans on their shambas or in their private houses and bargaining with them to the Africans' disadvantage. The effect of bringing all produce to market was to make all dealings open and public, so that the prices given were known to and understood by everybody present. This was to enable a fair and reasonable price to be obtained for the produce.

The second method which operated under the law was covered by the Produce Control Ordinance which established that particular kinds of produce might not be sold to any trader before they had been

offered to the Government or its agents, in this case Messrs. Unga Ltd. These produce consisted of maize, groundnuts, rice and wheat. Maize was a controlled product; all produce surplus to the requirements of the grower had to be sold to the Grain Storage Department or its appointed agents at fixed prices.

These two methods operated for some time, until 1955. The markets were not the exclusive property of Unga Ltd. but this firm was a government agent. Other produce, such as beans, could be bought by any licenced trader who came to the market. Therefore at any market there might be several buyers offering different prices at the same time before the Market Master.

Sometimes this competition led to open conflicts among the traders in relation to the Market Master. One common issue was the allegation of some form of favouritism by the Market Master. The following case over a conflict between a trader named Abdala Moledina and the Market Master, is an example:

"Melodina complains that he was in time at the auction at the market of produce still the market master did not take his bid of maize and sunflower. He says that he bought sunflower yesterday from the market at cents 50 per kilo. Today someone started with a bid of cents 40 per kilo. He (Melodina) raised to 45 cents but the market master refused to take his bid for maize he offered cents 25 per kilo still he did not give him he gave to someone else."

1. Moffet, ed., op.cit., p.379. From sh. 5 a bag during the slump the price in 10 tons lots naked had risen to sh. 20 per 200 lb. in 1948. This was increased to sh. 21 in the following year in 1951 a further rise of sh. 25 was granted and sh. 32 was promised in 1952.
2. TNA, File No. IIIA/9/III, Agriculture.
Besides this there were justified complaints about the cheating of peasant producers at the market places, as Mr. T.M. Skinner, the Iringa DC, explained in 1951:

"During the recent baraza (meeting) held at Kilolo various complaints were made to me regarding the marketing at Ihimba. In the first place it started that in the case of those who sell maize to the market by bag the clerk Faransi insists on the bag being filled to the top and over-flowing, so that there is not sufficient space left to sew it down. The additional amount so taken by the clerk is not weighed or paid for and then prior to sewing this is again removed and is regarded by the clerk as his property. In the event of a seller refusing to do so as ordered he is required to move his maize from the market which is not bought. I appreciate that complaints of this nature are so numerous at the market due largely to the ignorance of the producer but in this particular case I gained the impression that there is definitely cheating by the clerk .... it will be appreciated if Unga Ltd. could arrange for an investigation."

As we have suggested, peasants were in a bad position in relation to these marketing activities, not to mention price fluctuations which were a common phenomenon. However it was soon reported that, in response to this situation, natives were grouping together and hiring lorries to take crops to Iringa for direct sale to traders, thereby depriving the Native Treasury of Market cess. The Report for the month ending 31 August 1952 shows moreover that the natives of Ismani were not alone in the business of direct delivery. In other areas too, it had been realised that a few shillings extra might be gained by hiring a lorry and sending maize direct to the Iringa mill. Even in Idodi, which

was not an area which gave a big crop, six Africans in 1952 sent around 450 bags of 100 kilos each bag which at sh. 24 cents 80 naked was showing a very good return.  

However, this was not the end of the problem. Producers taking maize to the Unga Ltd. mill were required to pack their maize in bags according to the accepted weight standards. Contraventions to this requirement were subjected to a suggested penalty, as Unga Ltd. explained:

"Almost every African maize producer is still delivering his grain in bags of about 100 kilos each and it would appear that no notice has been taken of the circular letter No. 28 from Grain Storage Department regarding the 200 lb. pack. For reasons explained to you DC we have not yet refused to accept high weight consignments as re-packing to 200 lb. standards on our premises is not practicable during the rush season. May we suggest that if a penalty of cents 50 per bag was imposed on every bag over 220 lbs. and under 180 lbs. we consider this practice would soon ease and the penalty would be to some extent compensate the Department or the Agent for the additional handling and/or re-weighing."

In response to this, the Iringa DC arranged for a gang of ten convicts to work for Unga Ltd. over the rush period and these people were paid at the rate of sh. 1 cents 56 per convict per day in December 1951.

C(ii). Pricing

According to Circular No. 27 of 1952, the basic price to the producer of maize and white mtama (a type of sorghum) harvested

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2. ibid, File No. 24/A/Vol. 30.
in 1953 was sh. 30 cents 30 per 200 lbs. naked, such basic prices being modified according to the place of delivery and the quantity as shown in Table 3.3.

**TABLE 3.3**

**Buying Prices of 1953 harvested maize and white mtama**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PLACE OF DELIVERY</th>
<th>QUANTITY</th>
<th>PRICE WHEN DELIVERY MADE BY THE PRODUCER</th>
<th>PRICE WHEN DELIVERY MADE BY PRIMARY TRADERS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iringa</td>
<td>3 Tons</td>
<td>Shs. 27.77</td>
<td>Shs. 25.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sao Hill</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>26.82</td>
<td>24.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Njombe</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>25.32</td>
<td>22.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mbeya</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>25.55</td>
<td>23.10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


When maize and mtama were offered with a moisture content exceeding 13 per cent they were accepted with the following compensatory weight penalties:—

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Moisture Content</th>
<th>Compensatory Weight Penalty per 200 lbs. nett</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Between 13% and 14%</td>
<td>2 lbs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Between 14% and 15%</td>
<td>4 lbs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Between 15% and 16%</td>
<td>6 lbs.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In 1953 prices of grain in Dodoma Province were higher than those of Iringa, as the Director of Agriculture explained:—
"The price of maize has shot up to cents 80 per kilo at all stations on the Central Line ... the chances of black market activities between your area and Central Province are very great ... While it is appreciated that small transactions cannot be economically stopped, I would suggest that the establishment of road block on the way to try and stop any large scale movement which I think you will agree is essential from your own district's point of view."  

The Iringa DC completely supported this view:—

"I entirely agree about the desirability of road block and therefore arrange for one to be put immediately at the Ruaha River bridge on the Great North Road. This is an ideally strategic point as the river is impassable except by this bridge and another bridge on the Kilosa road. I have not arranged for a block to be put on the Kilosa Road bridge because I understand that there are no famine conditions at Kilosa and that maize meal would not fetch a price in that District comparable with the cost of imported maize."  

The above measure helped, but late in November 1953 the DC, Mr. Huck, was alarmed that maize reserves in the District were not sufficient to see the District through the whole year. He noted that one of the principal loopholes in the Produce Control Ordinance was section 21, which entitled anybody to take what were called "retail quantities" out of the District without any permit. The DC immediately gave a notice that stopped this loophole and required a permit for any export whatsoever. It was not considered necessary to apply such control to any produce other than maize. By that time four convictions had been made as a result of the two road blocks and about 100 lbs. of maize had been forfeited to the Crown. A suitable fine and costs were

2. TNA, File No. 24/G2/2/IX, Grain Storage Ref. AX3/6/IX/92.
levied on the persons convicted.¹

We have seen that in a good year the District exported maize. For example, in 1951 approximately 5,600 tons of maize were exported. Only in bad years, for example 1949, was the District obliged to import maize. It is perhaps of interest to note that our data show that in February 1952 American maize was sold to Liverpool in the United Kingdom at sh. 131 per 480 lbs. f.o.b., which was about sh. 54 cents 60 per 200 lb. bag. At the same time Ethiopian maize was selling at £43 sh. 10 per metric ton, or about sh. 79 cents 10 per 200 lb. bag. The Executive Officer of the Iringa District Production Committee, Mr. Peter Hill, suggested that, on these figures it might seem that the Iringa maize surplus, even at this year's price, would be exported to United Kingdom with profit².

D. Co-operative Societies and TANU political goals.

(i) Background.

The history of the co-operative movement in Tanganyika goes back to the voluntary growers' association of the 1920s. Colonial policy encouraged co-operation to improve the cultivation and preparation of the crops. In the 1930s the aim was to bring co-operatives under State control and displace local middlemen, but without challenging the colonial companies' hold on the export-import trade. A government ordinance brought co-operatives under statutory regulation in 1932. The initiative to start co-operatives partly came from Africans such as Joseph Merinyo, who started the Kilimanjaro Native Planters Association in Moshi, and Paul Bomani, whose Victoria Federation of Co-operative Unions

² TNA, File No. III A/9/III Agriculture, Production Committee Minutes No. 27 of 8/5/1951.
in Mwanza rapidly became one of the biggest African-controlled commercial organisations in the whole Continent.

Tanzanians, frustrated by the racial discrimination and indirect-rule policies of the Colonial Government, found in the co-operative movement an avenue to African success in business. Ironically, in much of what they did they were supported by the colonial administrators. In 1933 Lord Lugard explained the reasons for this support:

"The fundamental principle of the (co-operative) system is identical with that of 'Indirect-Rule' - which could be better named co-operative-rule - the essential aim of both being to teach personnel responsibility and initiatives ...."¹

Lord Lugard required co-operatives in Africa to avoid politics. He insisted on close Government control in the form of a 'Registration' with the power to "set up societies and if need be to liquidate any which do not obey the rules."² Co-operatives received consistent support from the Agricultural Department, as the Annual Reports show. Staff of the Agricultural Department disliked the Asian and Arab traders, principally because they could not control them but also because they felt they cheated the African peasants. The Agricultural Department preferred Government control of marketing, but this called for an arm of the bureaucracy capable of undertaking the actual purchase of crops from the farmers. Co-operative societies provided in effect this lowest bureaucratic rung in a Government-controlled marketing system. Co-operative development in Tanganyika worked

² ibid, p.15.
out as Lugard foresaw it might. Once a co-operative was started, it received not only support but also direction from the administration

Tanganyika therefore provides a useful case-study of the effect of particular socio-political structures upon the functioning of co-operative institutions, a case study which is also valuable in contributing to any more general effort to identify the range of 'social pre-requisites' for successful co-operation.

We have chosen to focus in the first instance upon the co-operatives which deal with the marketing of agricultural produce, both because of their tremendous economic importance and because until very recently they were the major focus of Tanzania's effort to make use of the instrument of co-operation in realising her development goals. Although co-operatives have been highly researched, most of these works have been unsatisfactory or inadequate theoretically. It is partly because of this aspect that our earlier assertion becomes very important. The post-independence government made a disastrous mistake in generalising an experience which had already shown its negative side in the 1950s.

D(ii). The Ismani Native Maize Growers' Co-operative Society Ltd.

The co-operative movement in Tanzania has historically had connections with national politics, providing a training ground

for post-independence national leaders. Co-operative societies in Ismani, as elsewhere in Tanzania, were established to take over the role of Asian and Arab traders who acted as middlemen. The first co-operative in Iringa District was set up in Ismani in 1953 by a number of leading farmers who sought to organise their own transport and marketing of maize. The enterprising Hehe maize growers in the new development area at Ismani chose 1953, a year in which they reaped a negligible crop, to start a co-operative society. That in such a bad year this new society operated successfully was an earnest of progress and success.

Initially they demanded a share membership of sh. 100, a sum that was vetoed by the colonial administration as effectively excluding the majority of their fellow farmers. The size of the sum proposed indicates the exclusiveness of the stratum of farmers who set it up. Maisala Musa Kiwanga told me that membership fee was sh. 5 per person, the society started with 31 members. The Provincial Co-operative Officer, Mr. Shipman, recommended that the society be advanced a bank overdraft of sh. 100,000 to carry out its activities. Rich peasants who had bought second-hand lorries which had been used during the Second World War bought empty gunny bags (sacks) for the society as well.

The aim of the society was to gain primary, as well as secondary

1. At the present time while the ruling Party Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), and co-operative function quite separately nationally they both reach into the rural area and provide not just a forum for the achievement of local power but also for their leaders a straddling of the distance between the villages and the centres of decision making. Co-operatives have recently been abolished in the country.


3. Interview with Mr. Maisala Musa Kiwanga 6 June 1977. Maisala was the secretary of Ismani Native Maize Growers' Co-operative Society Limited during 1953–1960. We also collected information from interviews we had with men who were elders in Iringa town in the same period. This allowed us to check our data and get a detailed picture of our subject.
trade margins by buying produce from the farmers and selling it to Unga Ltd. in Iringa. The profit thus secured would be used for the development of the area instead of going into the pockets of individual merchants.

Co-operativewise, Ismani Society Ltd., with a membership of 185 in 1954, had a successful year and marketed 851 tons of maize.\textsuperscript{1} Seven more maize marketing societies were registered in the Iringa District during the course of the year; of these, Malangali Maize Growers' Co-operative Society Ltd., with a membership of 51, collected by the end of October 150 tons of maize; the Mufindi Maize Growers' Co-operative Society Ltd., with a membership of 84, collected 236 tons of maize; the Mafinga Maize Growers' Co-operative Society Ltd. collected some 300 tons of maize; the Kiponzelo Maize Growers' Co-operative Society, with a membership of 22, collected 130 tons of maize; the Kalenga Maize Growers' Co-operative Society Ltd., with a membership of 37, collected 140 tons of maize; the Mlolo Maize Growers' Co-operative Society Ltd., with a membership of 16, collected 144 tons of maize, and the Uzungwa Maize Growers' Co-operative Society Ltd., with a membership of 91 collected 240 tons of maize\textsuperscript{2}.

It was clear that the 1954 April estimates made by Agricultural Office Iringa about the marketed surplus of maize were on the pessimistic side. The early cessation of the rains had in fact caused a reduction of yield but it was not as great as had been feared\textsuperscript{3}.

Many Africans, being very short of money, sold more than they ought to have for the safety of their food supplies later on. In October 1954 the food supplies position was reported to be very satisfactory. Maize sales exceeded expectations and Unga Ltd. bought 6,750 tons. The Agricultural Officer was of the opinion that it was still difficult to justify the large amount of maize coming in when one considered the relatively poor crops in the field. The opening up of new land in the lower areas, particularly Ismani, must have been greater than was believed. Table 3.4 shows the percentage deliveries from African sources.

TABLE 3.4

Sources of Marketed Maize

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Per cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>From Markets</td>
<td>37.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From Co-operative Societies</td>
<td>21.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct to Unga Ltd. in lots of 3 tons</td>
<td>36.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct to Unga Ltd. in lots of under 3 tons</td>
<td>5.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Co-operatives were prohibited from trading. Because of the above situation, the Iringa Agricultural Officer reported that it seemed certain that African Co-operative Societies were illegally buying maize at the local market price and were selling it on to Unga Ltd. as their own members' produce. He warned that this might well become a serious problem which would be difficult to control.

1. ibid, Monthly Report April 1954.
This activity was becoming a source of conflict between the co-operatives and Unga Ltd., as the Co-operative Officer detected:

"There appeared to be some misunderstanding in regard to the margin to which co-operative society was entitled .... The Co-operative Society who collect and deliver maize to Unga Ltd. contend that the buying margins provided in price structure should be passed on them. Unga Ltd. who do nothing but receive the maize into their store are holding back secondary margins until such time as a decision has been arrived at by you (the DC). I must admit I am under the impression that if handled, transported and delivered to Unga store the account payable would be shs. 29/76 and I cannot see that Unga have any right to the secondary margins."1

However Unga Ltd. told the DC that Ismani Co-operative was infringing the Principle and Law of the Co-operative, because they were buying maize from non-members. Because of this, the company proposed to give the society a traders' price which was lower than the one given to the co-operatives. Ismani Co-operative appealed to the Registrar of Co-operatives through the Provincial Co-operative Officer. The following two points were raised by the society to support their case.

The membership total was not 31, as suggested by Unga Ltd. The correct figure was 851, and membership was increasing rapidly. Second, Hehe society was polygamous, which meant that a large quantity of produce could come from one household as a unit of production. After three weeks of battle, the Society's appeal was a success.

After this victory, producers were paid in advance, according to the policy of the society. Ismani Co-operative paid its members

an extra cents 3 per kilo after the society had made all the appropriate deductions. This aspect made the members realise that the co-operative was operating in their interests at that moment and it also showed clearly how the traders or middlemen used to exploit their labour. So membership increased very fast, and producers were encouraged to grow more maize in 1955. In order to achieve this goal of increasing grain production in the territory, the basic producers' price for maize and white mtama for 1954 season was increased as shown in Table 3.5.

TABLE 3.5
Price Calculation 1954 harvested maize

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>IRINGA</th>
<th>SAO HILL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Price per 200 lbs. naked at mill as per Grain Dept. Storage Circular No. 24 of 26 October 1953</td>
<td>35.08</td>
<td>34.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less: Primary Buying Margins</td>
<td>2.15</td>
<td>2.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less: 5% Market Fees payable to Hehe Native Treasury</td>
<td>1.49</td>
<td>1.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Price per 200 lbs. naked at mill</td>
<td>28.39</td>
<td>27.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Price per 100 lbs. naked at mill</td>
<td>31.29</td>
<td>30.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Price per 1 kilo naked at mill</td>
<td>31½</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


By approving the increase in the basic producer price, the government had in mind the fact that, where mechanical methods were employed, production costs had increased. The decision had also been made, as mentioned earlier, in the light of the continued need to increase production to meet internal requirements and reduce Tanganyika's dependence on imported supplies.
FIGURE 3.2

Marketed maize produced in Iringa District between 1948 and 1959

In Tons

Tons

30,000
25,000
20,000
15,000
10,000
5,000
0

Period/Year

Scale: 1 mm = 500 tons.

The year 1955 went down in the annals of the Southern Highlands Province as a good year for agriculture, with bumper harvests and high prices. This is evident in Figure 3.2, which gives a summary of marketed maize over the whole period 1947-1959. Record maize and paddy crops were reaped in 1955, while tea, tobacco and coffee also did extremely well. Marketing arrangements for rice and maize were not easy owing to the glut of these products in the territory but the difficulties were later solved by the Grain Storage Department. Cereal food crops exceeded all previous records; maize production amounted to some 24,250 tons, compared with the previous high of 11,441 tons in 1952.

The position over maize was not good. Unga Ltd. in Iringa were forced to limit the intake of maize because they were forbidden to remove the stuff to the Central Line fast enough. Their storage was completely filled and they could only take in at the rate they could send out. The result was that sales to Unga dropped off somewhat and there was still a lot of maize in the District lying about waiting to be sold.

Some of the maize from Iringa was by-passing the local market and being taken to the Central Line at Kilosa and other places. The trouble seemed to be partly that adequate storage was not provided on the Central Line, despite the fact that a bumper crop was foreseen in the estimates seven months previously.

The Grain Storage Department moved in and solved the issue of shortage of storage later in the year. It was reported afterwards

1. J.E.S. Griffiths, PC Tanganyika Territory Annual Reports of the PCs for the year 1955, 1956, p.135.
that the position over maize had improved and Unga Ltd. were despatching the crop to Dodoma as fast as it could be taken. The bottleneck on the Central Line was apparently removed. Unga Ltd. continued to buy maize at the old price until the end of February 1956 in order to get as much of the last year's crop as possible. Exports of maize out of the district eased the storage position to the point where the situation was later said to be quite satisfactory.

By April 1956, it was reported that marketing of food crop was decontrolled and all Unga Ltd. markets numbering 52 were closed. Andrew Coulson suggests that grain crops were under the exclusive control of the Grain Storage Department but this lost money in the 1954/55 season, when it was forced to export surplus maize at a loss, and was disbanded in 1956. From then on grain surplus was uncontrolled (i.e. left in the hands of Asian and Arab traders and millers) until just after Independence, when a new marketing board, the National Agricultural Products Board was set up to buy grain crops, oilseeds and cashew nuts from Co-operative Societies.

Because of the above situation, in 1956 it became difficult to check sales of maize and the estimates given can never be proved correct or otherwise. The majority of Native Authority markets remained open throughout and maize continued to come forward in considerable quantities. Large quantities of peas were sold on permit outside markets for sh. 50 to sh. 60 per bag.

1. Coulson, op.cit., p.16.
2. TNA, File No. 24/A3/11, Agriculture.
The Ismani Co-operative, the largest in the district, delivered 2,846 tons to Unga Ltd. to a value of £42,000. The only non-maize Co-operative Society in Iringa was the Ibangi Native Co-operative Store Ltd., a highly successful consumer co-operative at Malangali. In one society, the Mlolo Maize Growers' Co-operative Society Ltd., the average payment to each member exceeded £150. However:

"This as far as production is concerned was fictitious and an example of the pernicious habit which has sprung up among these societies of members buying from non-members and marketing through their society." 

The year 1956 did not see the bumper harvest reaped in 1955. Excessive rains caused damage to crops. Perennial crops did well during the year and record harvests of tea, coffee and pyrethrum were seen. These crops brought in £1,163,000 to the producers. Maize, on the other hand, did badly and in Iringa the approximate value of the crop dropped from some £400,000 to £90,000. Maize production fell from last year's record of nearly 27,000 tons to 7,500 tons.

The eight maize-marketing societies in Iringa District had a bad year. Although membership increased from about 800 to approximately 1,200, only some 1,100 tons of maize were marketed,

3. The Ismani Development scheme concentrated on better land usage had a setback due to poor harvest. The African farmers particularly those farming large acreages did co-operate with Agricultural Department and the Native Authority to increase the productivity of the area. This was reported by the local District Commissioner.
this figure representing less than half the crop marketed by the co-operative societies in 1955. This was partly due to disloyalty by members, who, operating for the first time on a free market, were not prepared to await a second payment and preferred outright sale of their produce to local traders, albeit at a lesser rate than they would have received through their societies.

The Mlolo Maize Growers' Co-operative Society Ltd., which, as noticed in the 1955 Report, averaged payment in excess of £150 per member, did not produce any maize in 1956.

The year 1957 may be described as a year of progress and development. Good harvests were reaped everywhere. As far as Ismani was concerned, one of the most important results was an awakening of interest, particularly among some of the larger cultivators, in better farming methods and less dependence on a maize mono-culture. Both perennial annual crops did well during the year. Annual food crops were mainly for local consumption but 400 tons of maize were exported. On basic food crops, high transport charges eliminated most of the profit. Maize sold on the market fell to 5,126 tons and continued to be the staple food of the province. In Iringa District the above thoughts that small co-operatives could die did not materialize: all societies stood up well to the lifting of controls and the fall in price. The eight marketing societies in the district, with a few exceptions, continued their decline and, with a total estimate of 3,400 tons, showed little likelihood of marketing as much as 1,000 tons. The Ismani Maize Growers' Co-operative struggled to

survive and printed a news sheet giving crop prices and other items of interest to its members.

The 1958 season was again an excellent year for both perennial and annual crops. Ten new co-operatives were registered during the year, making a total membership of nearly 30,000. The eight Iringa Maize Societies, with a total membership of over 1,000, handled nearly 500 tons of maize, which realised £9,463. Their general 'unwise' speculation of maize prices resulted in the income of all but one of these societies being inadequate to cover running expenses. Production of the specifically African crops was satisfactory and showed considerable progress, and maize production with an exportable surplus of over 15,000 tons, showed a huge increase on the previous year.

Our data show that 1959 was not a good year, and Iringa maize prices were down to as little as cents 17 a kilo at one time. The year was a fair one in general for co-operative enterprise, which handled a large share of African agricultural produce. Nevertheless, the eight Iringa maize societies handled scarcely sufficient for one viable unit and were unlikely to survive with a total membership of 1,366. One society ceased to operate during the year and the remaining societies handled barely enough produce for one viable society. All operated at a heavy loss and six failed to clear overdrafts at the bank. What were the reasons behind these failures, given the fact that only three seasons were bad (1949, 1953 and 1956) throughout the period under discussion? We shall return to this point in the next sub-section. As we have seen, things were not good for the co-operatives in

1959: only one society had cleared its debts, four more had reduced theirs by more than half and one had done so by 25 per cent.

In 1960, the year before Independence, the Iringa maize group consisted of eight unaffiliated primary societies of 1,324 members. One society had ceased to operate. The financial year 1960/61 showed some improvement over the previous year, although the group as a whole operated 307 tons below minimum economic viability and incurred a loss of £307. 566.3 tons of produce, mainly maize, were handled, realizing gross proceeds of £10,094, of which members received 71.8 per cent on £7,823. Total bank overdrafts were reduced by 68 per cent, from £3,659 to £1,140. Four societies remained indebted to the bank at the close of the financial year.

At this point we turn and look more closely at the leadership of the co-operative societies, particularly the Ismani Native Maize Growers' Co-operative Society Ltd., in an attempt to explain various aspects of the experience just outlined.

D(iii). Co-operative Society Leadership

The success of the Ismani Native Maize Growers' Co-operative Society Ltd. during 1953-55 proved to be short-lived. First, the internal conflicts within the society between the rich peasants who were the leaders and the poor peasants majority increased as time went by, partly because of the absence of internal democracy and partly for other reasons. Second, the struggle between the society on the one hand and the merchants,

Unga Ltd., and the colonial administration on the other increased, especially after the bumper harvest of 1955 when maize became a decontrolled crop. This was partly for the reasons we have seen and partly because of the co-operative society's involvement in the anti-colonial struggle.

It was the policy of Ismani Co-operative Society to have one committee member present at the weighing posts to witness correct marketing activities, so as to ensure that members of the society were not cheated. Germs of corrupt practices started to emerge among the committee group. The committee members made secret alliances with the weighing clerks to cheat the producers, for example by giving false weights, adjusting the scale and so on. Our data (archive material, Provincial Reports and interviews) tend to suggest that peasants knew about these activities but that there was little they could do about it. Farmers resisted the above corrupt practices and low producer prices by selling to smugglers or by reducing production, even to the point of not harvesting crops.

At the same time the Ismani Co-operative Society decided to look for brokers in Dar-es-Salaam where prices were said to be high, ranging between sh. 35 and sh. 50 per bag of about 90 kilos.

The first brokers found were Messrs. B.B. Doshi and Sons, H. Vithaldas, J.S. Patel and later Laxman. The society made plans to market its produce on contract basis. There were a lot of traders interested in buying maize and some even came from as far as Dar-es-Salaam.

1. This point has also been raised by Gavin Williams, "Taking the part of peasants: Rural Development in Nigeria and Tanzania", in Gutkind and Wallerstein, op. cit., p.133.

2. Interview with Maisala, Also see, TNA, File No. D3/4 Ismani Development.
Given all these factors, there was another major problem for the society, the problem of transport facilities. The competition for transport was great. The Railways and Southern Highlands Roadway vehicles were not enough. Asian and Arab traders were not keen to hire their lorries to the co-operative society because these traders were themselves interested in maize transactions. The DC and Unga Ltd. did not like the proposal of the Ismani Society to take its produce to Dar-es-Salaam.

The transport problem was the subject of discussions between the society and their brokers in Dar-es-Salaam. The former were then introduced by the brokers to Messrs. D.T. Dobbie and it was agreed that the society might hire or even buy trucks from this firm.

While these discussions were in progress the Registrar of Co-operative Societies learnt about what was being planned. He then strongly warned the Ismani Society Leaders that what they were negotiating was contrary to the Principles of Co-operative Societies, because Ismani Co-operative was not a multipurpose society. The Registrar also advised Messrs. D.T. Dobbie that all activities between his firm and Ismani Co-operative Society in future must first get the approval of his office. The prospect of getting trucks for the society did not materialize.

Ismani Society Leaders asked the chairman of the Licencing Board if they could be allowed to use African transporters to carry their maize to Dar-es-Salaam. This idea was accepted by the

1. TNA, File No. 24/69/10 Transport, Complaints against Moloo Manji Transport Charges.
chairman. But these local transporters were not allowed to carry any goods from Dar-es-Salaam to Iringa because it was illegal. Under these conditions the transporters suggested to charge the society a double rate to cover the Dar-es-Salaam/Iringa journey. This was not accepted by the society.

All this time most of the society's produce was in storage at Unga Ltd. and the other portion was in stores in Ismani, where it was being destroyed or spoiled by rats, ants and so on. Some of the maize was reported to have been stolen by the committee members.

In 1959 season, Ismani Society was advised by the DC and Unga Ltd. to store their produce at the Unga Ltd. godown (storage) and wait for better prices. Unga Ltd. agreed to find markets for the co-operative and suggested taking maize to Dar-es-Salaam. But the prices there turned out to be below the price the co-operative was paying to the farmers. According to Maisala the situation was made worse by the rich peasants who used the society's funds to enrich themselves. To be exact, from the time of bumper harvests until 1960, the society's profits were neither distributed to the members nor used for the development of the people as a whole in the area (profits were only shared between 1953-mid-1955).

In 1955 the rich peasants mobilised the entire population of the area to contribute funds for a water development project. They collected one bag of maize from each household and the rich peasants contributed two bags each. The rich peasants, who were residents in Iringa town, could not themselves know the real water problem which the poorer peasants experienced during the
dry seasons. The project was not a success and the reasons given are contradictory. Leaders of the project argued that the failure was due to lack of funds. On the other hand, poor peasants suggested that money accumulated for the project was used by the leaders to buy tractors, lorries and so on.

The poor peasants' contribution to the project was very substantial, given the fact that they were the great majority, even though individually they contributed only one bag per household. The colonial government was not interested in providing water for the people in Ismani. It was left to the post-Independence government to provide water for the people, and indeed by 1968 there was a pipeline supplying water to nearly every village in the area.

In 1959 the committee members of Ismani Society each advanced themselves some money from the co-operative fund and they never returned empty gunny bags (sacks) which belonged to the society. On the other hand the DC, who did not approve of the alliance which had developed between the co-operative and TANU, suggested that the bank cut down the Society's overdraft from sh. 100,000 to sh. 20,000. The combination of the internal problems within the society and this external pressure led to the society's collapse. The Iringa Co-operative Officer reported the matter to the police, who then confiscated some of the committee members' property, including maize. A number of co-operative leaders ended up in jail after being convicted for corrupt practices.

D(iv). Post-Independence Government Co-operative Policy

Shortly after Independence, the government decided that the co-operative movement should be made an integral part of the political structure of the country and the co-operatives should be established in all areas where previously they had been absent. The result was inefficient, corrupt and undemocratic co-operatives.

A Special Presidential Committee reported in 1966 that losses averaged around 3 per cent of turnover in a sample of 300 societies. The farmers were aware of these situations but unable to do anything about them because of the lack of democratic control.

The opportunities for fraud increased as the number of societies expanded faster than the supervisory staff of the Co-operative Development Division. When the co-operatives became the main vehicle for Government credit schemes for small farmers, the committee men were usually the first to receive the credit and often avoided repayment. In fact it complemented it by allowing larger-scale farmers to expand their operations under the cloak of socialist ideology.

3. Their success in the late 1950s alongside the opposition to the rules and regulations of the Land Conservation Scheme provided the basis for TANU's support in the rural areas. Both TANU and the British administration could support co-operatives as a means of increasing peasant production and African control of marketing. Without co-operative movement TANU could not have mobilized rural support so quickly and the British would have found it much more difficult to hand over power. In the early 1960s when their inefficiency and corruption became obvious they became the first nationalist institutions to be attacked by the peasants. The 1966 Report of the Presidential Committee of Enquiry into the co-operatives is a monument to the fact that the peasants were conscious of what was happening within five years of independence. Coulson op.cit., pp.19-20.
As far as Iringa is concerned, after the collapse of Ismani Co-operative Society the Iringa Farmers Co-operative Union Ltd. was formed in 1963. It marketed 36,000 tons of maize that season. In the following year each of the seventeen branches of the mammoth Iringa African Farmers Co-operative Society was registered as a fully-fledged Co-operative Society, and these joined together to form the Iringa African Co-operative Union. The Union was subsequently joined by the three other co-operative societies which had operated previously bringing the total of affiliated societies to twenty and individual membership to 3,610.

The Union marketed almost every crop in Iringa but by far the chief crop was maize; 33,229 tons were handled, £454,344.9 being paid to the growers in cash. Other crops handled by the Union were: 324 tons of beans, 700 tons of yellow peas, 338 tons of sunflower, 203 tons of kunde (a type of bean), 837 tons of finger millet and 36 tons of pyrethrum. For these the growers were paid £37,263.7 in cash. Small quantities of castor seed, groundnuts, paddy, pea seeds and wheat were also marketed. The Union acted as the agent for the District Council for the collection of produce cess and £21,785.6 was paid to it. Out of its own savings, the Union erected a £16,400 godown capable of storing over 40,000 bags of produce.

In 1965 the Union handled 32,708 tons of maize, 582 tons of oilseed, 105 tons of pyrethrum and 1,889 tons of other produce—a total of 35,284 tons. The inadequacy or non-existence of storage

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on the primary societies caused a severe difficulty for the Union, which as a consequence sustained a loss of £43,253 accounted for mainly by shrinkage due to exposure and theft\textsuperscript{1}.

Overall or average development and production growth in Ismani were relatively good in the late 1940s and throughout the 1950s, compared with later years. During the early 1950s, the yield per acre was higher than in the late 1960s. For example one acre produced around 15 bags\textsuperscript{2} of maize whereas in the late 1960s the acre produced only around four bags of maize. During the 1950s (an average of the ten years) the cost of production was about sh. 60 per acre, whereas by the 1960s the production costs had doubled. Although the price of maize fluctuated enormously from year to year, the price of maize in the late 1940s and in the early 1950s was about sh. 35 per bag of 90 kilograms and sometimes went up as far as sh. 38. In the early 1960s, prices steadily declined to a low figure of sh. 23/40 per bag. In comparison with its boom period of the 1950s, Ismani experienced a decline, and for the majority of the farmers there was little hope of actually advancing their material position by the cultivation of maize\textsuperscript{3}.

A rough comparison of costs of production, yields per acre and producer prices, in the late 1940s and 1950s on the one hand and in the 1960s on the other, shows clearly that the incomes of the 'poor peasants' decreased while costs of production increased. Why only poor peasants? This was mainly because of the deterioration of soil fertility and the small scale of production.

\textsuperscript{1}Annual Report on Co-operative Development 1965, 1968 Iringa Farmers Co-operative Union Ltd., p.11.
\textsuperscript{2}Agricultural Policy (Siasa ni Kilimo) May 1972, p.3.
\textsuperscript{3}Feldman, op.cit., p.157.
units. But the rich peasants, who had already amassed a huge land area and employed a large migrant labour force to work on their farms, had access to loans after Independence because the government channelled rural credits through the co-operatives. 'Kulaks' manipulated and controlled the funds.

With increasing differentiation within the peasantry, the rich peasants gained control over the Iringa Co-operative Union and turned its considerable resources to their own advantages in the form of privileged access to farming services, of access to ancillary business opportunities, such as transporting the crop, and of jobs in a vast co-operative bureaucracy for their families and clients. These peasants applied modern methods of cultivation, intensified land use and constantly increased their income by exploiting the labour power of rural workers.

Conclusion

We have analysed the history of maize production in Ismani Division. After the Second World War the demand for maize in the territory rose steadily and a market was created in Iringa town. High maize prices and special grants to large producers induced a number of people from Iringa town to obtain large acreages in Ismani. We have discussed the evolution of the cultivation system and have shown that the seasonality of labour demand meant that agricultural surplus was produced by the utilisation of a substantial casual labour force consisting of migrants. This

1. Nindi, op.cit., p.111. We must put emphasis on the quality of the co-operative and oppose any tendency to concentrate solely on increasing their number and membership to the neglect of their quality. We must therefore give serious attention to the work of checking up the co-operatives.

2. ibid., p.114.
was a type of labour force that could maintain itself in those periods when the surplus production process did not require it. This commercial maize-producing area in the Iringa District has only been cleared and settled, by African Farmers in the last generation. The relationship of production have thus been from the beginning of a capitalist nature, untrammelled by pre-existing forms. While it is important to explain how colonial relationships have shaped the social structure of Tanzania at the National level, the concomitant changes in rural areas must be examined if the subsequent course of development is to be understood. The class structure in the countryside shapes the conditions for future development whatever political strategy is adopted.

We have also discussed the two marketing procedures. First, Marketing Ordinance meant that all places declared as markets were the only places produce could be bought or sold. Second, the Produce Control Ordinance meant that, certain kinds of produce may not be sold to any trader but first be offered to the government or its agents. We have also seen the way merchant traders used to dominate crop transactions in simple circulation of capital - they bought crops in order to sell and make a profit. Finally we have explained how co-operative societies emerged in the country and in Ismani particularly. Thus despite the egalitarian ideals of the co-operatives, in practice they simply reinforced the divisions which already existed between the farmers. They were assisted in doing so by the commercial criteria they were supposed to apply to the allocation of credits, which tended to exclude those peasants who most needed assistance. Early post-Independence agricultural policy was based on the colonial policy, without learning from the mistakes of those policies.
Co-operatives had had some negative effects but after Independence these institutions were generalised without any attempt to correct their negative features. There are more lessons to be learnt from the experience of colonial agricultural policy than was usually recognised. As a logical consequence of our assertion, maize price fluctuations forced farmers to decrease their investment in maize production and invest in a more profitable business, namely transport in Iringa District. Transport is now the most important economic activity in the district. The priority to be given to rural transformation cannot, however, be assessed solely in terms which pose considerations for revolutionary change in the countryside against the danger of the entrenchment of rural capitalism. The calculation has to be made with reference to the appropriate overall strategy for building socialism. The resolution of such policy issues can only be predicted on an accurate analysis of the situation in the rural areas in a wider perspective.

2. ibid., p.208.
CHAPTER FOUR

HISTORY OF THE TOBACCO INDUSTRY IN IRINGA DISTRICT
FROM WORLD WAR II TO 1960

As we saw in Chapter Two, colonial agricultural policy between the Wars favoured peasant production of export commodities. Chapter Three showed that in the 1940s and 1950s, the Ismani Division saw the emergence of a group of rich African peasants in the sector of maize production. A parallel and sometimes neglected development was the creation of a settler-based tobacco industry in Iringa District. The period from World War II to 1960 was one in which the difficulties of establishing the tobacco industry in Iringa, as in the rest of Tanganyika, generated changes in policy and the establishment of new infrastructures. This chapter documents the most important of these changes.

The History of Settlers in Iringa District

European settlement of the Iringa District\(^1\) took place rapidly after 1921-22 when Captain F. Billinge and Mr. W. St. Lenger Seaton became the first British settlers to take up residence in the district, which had had, however a small number of German settlers in pre-war days\(^2\). From 30 in 1920, the European population rose to 60 in 1925, 120 in 1926 and 240 in 1927, exactly doubling itself annually. Of the last number, 102 were landowners with about 10,000 acres under actual cultivation and a further 70,000 acres grazed by stock out of 200,000 acres alienated to Europeans. By 1945 there were 1,412 Europeans in the District. Prospective settlers were recommended to apply to the local Farmers' Association for all information regarding

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capital required.

Iringa town was the headquarters of the Colonists Ltd., an organisation founded, by Lord Delamere, to foster white settlement in the province. The management was in the experienced hands of the 1820 Memorial Settlers' Association, which communicated with H.M. Eastern of the African Dependencies' office in London. In order to carry out production, settlers needed land and labour. The colonial state provided land by supporting the land alienation policy, particularly in the well-watered fertile parts of Tanganyika. From the point of view of European settlement, the Southern Highlands probably offered the greatest attraction in Tanganyika. As the Provincial Commissioner put it:

"The Southern Highlands, with its generally healthy climatic conditions, offers a pleasant home for both its native and non-native inhabitants; it is doubtful whether there are many other parts of Africa under our rule which can offer more varied or attractive stretches of country than those which are to be found in this province. In order to appreciate its economic position it must be realized that much of the existing road communication is of fairly recent construction. In the early days when they came to settle in the province, planters and miners were faced with heavy transport charges and many were unable to produce on a large scale, owing to lack of adequate capital."

McMahon suggested that poor communication and inadequate capital made early settlement in the area difficult. The alienation of land from a people who were entirely agricultural was the fundamental precondition for the subsequent exploitation of Hehe labour and the subsequent major contradiction which emerged.

1. ibid., p.29.
2. C. McMahon, in Tanganyika Territory, Annual Reports of the Provincial Commissioners for the year 1938, 1939, S.H.P., p.70.
between the settlers and the Africans — the ruled.

Land in the Iringa Province suitable for European settlement was selected, surveyed and auctioned through certain newspapers. Samples from 46 soil profiles had been collected by Geoffrey Milner, so that it was possible to obtain the broad outline of the problems likely to be faced. Phosphate deficiency stood out clearly as the most likely limiting factor in soil improvement. On the road running due south from Iringa township and about 25 miles out lies the Ifunda valley. Here English settlers such as Lord Delamere, Lord Egerton of Tatton and Messrs. Tarton, Burman, Coke and Grant had their holdings. The whole area depended on the prospects of tobacco and pig raising. Observers commented that Iringa was destined to have a great future, especially if a railway was built from Dodoma, for that would permit the development of an export trade in cereals by natives and white settlers.

The beginning of the settlement was, anyhow, a great disappointment. Many of the would-be settlers, who had come with some capital, were impoverished before they got the deeds on which they might have raised money. The paradise which they hoped to find appeared as a country with unproved means. Many came with insufficient knowledge of agriculture and wasted their capital on unpractical experiments. Even those who had been able farmers elsewhere, were faced by new conditions and suffered losses which crippled them.

3. Brooke. op.cit.. p.120.
Discussing a comparable situation, V. Liversage pointed out that a stranger to the country would find, 'dairy farmers who did not know how to milk (and) arable farmers who depended on native headmen to organise their work and get it done'. V. Liversage described these men not so much as 'amateur farmers', but as 'amateur capitalists'. Few settlers did any manual work and while some plantations and general farms were well managed, the majority of private farms were grossly inefficient. These were the main features of settlers in the Southern Highlands in the 1940s and 1950s.

Lord Delamere tried to induce Englishmen to take up mixed farming in Iringa District by building a bacon factory there. Few, if any, British farmers were attracted though, and the bacon factory ceased production when Delamere died in 1931. Dozens of German families settled in Iringa District during the late twenties, remaining there until the outbreak of World War II. Aware that the district was naturally suited to mixed farming, they tried wheat, maize, vegetables and pig-raising before deciding that tobacco would be their best bet:

"In the absence of a railway .... mixed farming will not pay .... and the settler is justified in taking up tobacco as his main chance while developing his farming economy in the direction of mixed farming to a degree commensurate with this expectation of cheap transport."²

Africans who sought to grow Turkish tobacco communally, were urged to wait until it was discovered whether the European tobacco growers could make it pay. Under these circumstances

many Africans decided to produce maize for the market instead.

The construction of a concrete bridge over the Ruaha River on the Kilosa-Iringa road was completed in 1938, making the road passable for through motor traffic from Kilosa to Iringa. Permanent bridges remained to be erected along the whole section of the road within the province. The road was regarded as all-weather. The opening of this road enabled farm produce from Iringa to be marketed in Dar-es-Salaam more quickly and cheaply than via Dodoma. By 1954 there was a considerable development in the roads in the province. Perhaps the most impressive work was the widening of the Kitonga Gorge on the Kilosa-Iringa road. This constituted a vital link in the projected throughroad from Dar-es-Salaam to Iringa. Moreover, several improvements had been carried out on stretches of the Great North Road, bridges had been constructed and much work had been done to improve the main and district roads of the area.

The problem of inadequate capital was reduced when the colonial state established the Land Bank, which was established by Ordinance No. 47 and opened for business on October 1948. The purpose of the bank was to assist agricultural development in Tanganyika. To be more accurate and specific, the aim of the bank was to finance the settler economy for export production. The original capital authorised to the bank was £300,000. This amount was found to be insufficient, so overdraft facilities of up to £200,000 had to be granted by a commercial bank and

1. McMahon, op.cit., p.76.
guaranteed by government. The rate of interest charged on both long term and short term loans was 5 per cent per annum. In 1955, according to Circular No. 81, the local Bank Rate was increased to 6 per cent per annum. The maximum loan to any one farmer did not exceed £10,000. The security required was a first mortgage on a freehold or leasehold in land or a first mortgage on a right of occupancy having not less than 15 years to run. Up to the end of December 1951 the Land Bank advanced 238 loans totalling £366,271, which are summarised in Table 4.1.

**TABLE 4.1**

**Land Bank loans to settlers,**  
**October 1948 - December 1951**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Long term loans issued</td>
<td>£243,096</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Short term loans issued</td>
<td>£123,175</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Long Term</th>
<th>Short Term</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Acquiring interest in Agricultural land</td>
<td>£134,871</td>
<td>3,500</td>
<td>137,371</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Discharging existing mortgages</td>
<td>17,500</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>17,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Costs of clearing land</td>
<td>13,085</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>13,085</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Dipping tanks</td>
<td>1,720</td>
<td>1,550</td>
<td>3,270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Fencing</td>
<td>1,050</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Wells, Bole holes, Dams</td>
<td>9,250</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>10,250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Irrigation</td>
<td>2,255</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>3,755</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Soil protection</td>
<td>3,265</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3,265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Purchase of livestock</td>
<td>3,725</td>
<td>4,075</td>
<td>7,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Purchase of Machinery and Equipment</td>
<td>8,450</td>
<td>80,854</td>
<td>89,304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>Cultivating harvesting and marketing and other farming operations</td>
<td>17,550</td>
<td>27,371</td>
<td>44,921</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Grand Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>£243,096</strong></td>
<td><strong>£123,175</strong></td>
<td><strong>£366,271</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** J.P. Moffet, ed., Tanganyika - A Review of its Resources and their development, 1955, pp.496-497.
In the post-war period £100,000 was allotted to this Development Loan Fund, which lent capital to individuals. An additional loan amounting to £15,675 was made in 1952.

In order to carry out building programmes, the Iringa Tobacco Board borrowed £13,000 from the Government. In addition growers obtained a promise to retain the £3,000 which the Board owed the Government from the previous loan. Southern Highlands Non-Native Tobacco Growers Association Ltd. Board of Directors included in the budget for 1950 7½ cents per lb. to be raised for a Reserve Fund. The fund was to be used in future to finance planters. Moreover, the Board of Agriculture approved in 1950/51 the provision of £200,000 to be known as the Agricultural Land Rehabilitation Fund to assist farmers to turn over to a more balanced system of farming.

Despite all this money pumped into settler economy, very few settlers were successful. There appears to have been a tendency from the beginning of settlement for a concentration in the pattern of land ownership. The banks gave settlers loans based on the value of their land rather than on the value of crops and so were likely to have put the smaller farmers heavily and persistently in debt. Many settlers seem to have put most of their resources into land purchase and so depended on loans for their everyday affairs, and also on the prices of their agricultural products. Very few were able to utilise all the land they owned, although they were able to raise finances on all the

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3. ibid., p.3.
land owned, so they had to pay interest on unproductive resources. The burden of debt therefore hampered capital accumulation and impoverished settlers during periods of low prices. Settlers were consequently dependent on low wages, but labour was difficult to obtain, which increased their difficulties.

By the middle of the 1950s, the Bank was reluctant to give more credit to Iringa settlers, partly due to the failure of the Union to produce the required quality of tobacco. This was both a social and a technical issue. Moreover, the problem was further complicated by the fact that funds were sometimes misused.

In 1942, a Non-Native Tobacco Board was formed to advise government on the requirements of the industry and to organise the processing and marketing of the crop. In 1949 the Non-Native Tobacco Growers Union was launched as a company and took over grading and packing activities. In 1953 Seatondale Experimental Station was established just outside Iringa. Until the government seconded a Research Officer to the Southern Highlands Non-Native Tobacco Growers Board in 1954, there was no specialist staff in the Territory. In 1955 the first Virginia type of leaf to be sold as such left Iringa, though the quantity was small.

Mr. D.M. Duthie, soil chemist, suggested that the analytical data were by no means complete but that phosphate deficiency stood out clearly as being the most likely limiting factor on soil improvement. It was difficult to correct this deficiency partly because the transport costs involved in bringing fertilizer to

Iringa were high. Moreover, many farmers did not know how to use these inputs. The quality of tobacco produced in the area remained of low grade, partly because of the lack of experience and know-how relating to tobacco production. Moreover, certain individual settlers took advantage of the international market situation and continued to produce a leaf of a poor quality. Mr. Super, the local Administrative Officer, suggested that it was foolish to use valuable man-days in turning out an inferior product: 'Quality must come first, quantity second.'

Ehler, the hard dark quality leaf grown in Iringa, had no future; the future was therefore concerned exclusively with the Virginia type. With this in mind, two major difficulties were in sight. First, in Iringa the climate was considered marginal for Virginia varieties. This difficulty did not arise with the much hardier Ehlers variety. Second, production of flue-cured tobacco throughout Tanganyika exceeded the local demand, so any leaf produced as surplus to local requirements had to be exported in order to be sold. Farmers had no choice, if they were to survive, except to try and produce the leaf of a high quality needed in the world market.

In 1950, the Governor visited Iringa District. The tobacco growers invited the Governor to a dinner, of which Mr. Constantinidis the Chairman of the farmers said:

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1. TNA, File No. IIIA/9/111 Agriculture, Production Committee Minute 142, March 12, 1952.
"This dinner, as you all know, was a great success. There is no doubt that His Excellency was well pleased with the arrangements, and we are certain that it will go down in the chronicles of Iringa as an outstanding occasion."

His Excellency replied, and here under we quote the three major points made to planters:

"The first is that proper attention must be paid to good cultivation and to modern methods and above all, to maintaining the fertility of the soil. Secondly, every effort must be made to improve the quality of your product so that it will get a reputation which will ensure it a permanent market. Thirdly, if you wish the industry to survive, it is essential that you should avoid the temptation of going into temporary markets when you can obtain inflated prices even for low quality tobacco, but that you should establish a market where you will be assured of a fair and reasonable price over a prolonged period. So long as you follow these three courses, it will be possible for government to do all it can to assist you, but no assistance can be given to those who mine the land and then expect to be given new land in exchange, who take advantage of the present premium on lower grade tobacco and thus pay insufficient attention to improvement of quality or who prefer speculation to sound marketing."

The Chairman of Tobacco Growers Association then made the following points:

"After twenty years of struggling with tobacco, we have at last succeeded in organising ourselves into this Union; one step forward to unity and prosperity we hope, but our troubles are not yet over. We still have many problems to solve, some are domestic, which the present Directors believe can be solved eventually if time is given, but there are other problems in which we want help sic. The government has been very helpful in the past; in fact without Government's assistance and the co-operation and understanding of Agricultural Development and your administrative officers here the industry would have been dead years ago. We hope this policy of the past will continue and

2. ibid., letter HTC/ATH, April 10th 1950.
your help will be available to solve some of our problems which we as individuals cannot solve. We are pleased to say that the policy of the Board of Directors for the administration of the Union is based on the lines as recommended by His Excellency."

In the early 1950s selling difficulties were encountered and it became clear that, unless a more acceptable variety of leaf was grown, the Iringa flue-cured industry would die as quickly as it was started. In 1952 the East African Tobacco Company entered into a contract to buy decreasing quantities of Ehlers leaf over the ensuing five years. Growers hoped to find means of producing economically the desired neutral-flavoured Virginia type leaf but isolated efforts of individuals did not provide encouraging signs of success.

The first full year of the new system of licensing for tobacco growers was 1953. Mr. McQueen expressed his dissatisfaction at the way licences were given to farmers who could not produce a high quality leaf. By the end of 1954 some 360,000 lbs. of the tobacco remained unsold in Iringa. The Board felt that before issuing licences for the 1955 season the Licensing Authority had to obtain more detailed advice from the Southern Highlands Non-Native Board. In a letter addressed to the Director of Agriculture, the tobacco growers' union suggested that there should be closer co-operation between the Licensing Authority, the Union and the Board. Southern Highlands Non-Native Tobacco

1. ibid., letter HTC/AJH, April 10th 1950.
2. TNA, File No. 24/A3/41/Vol. 1 Agriculture, Southern Highlands Tobacco Licensing Authority.
4. TNA, File No. 24/A3/41 Vol. 1 Agriculture.
Growers Union Ltd. attempted to induce growers to limit their acreages voluntarily in the 1955 season by issuing a quota in lbs. of tobacco to each grower, against which the Union was prepared to advance cash on delivery of the tobacco to their factory. Very few growers reduced their acreage, with the result that there was over-production. It was obvious, therefore, that the situation could not have been controlled by voluntary measures. It was felt that the Licensing Authority should be given power to refuse a licence to grow tobacco to any person who could not satisfy them that he possessed sufficient funds or had access to sufficient funds to enable him to grow successfully.

The Secretariat, from Dar-es-Salaam, decided against the Tobacco Union. The authority said it was impossible for it acting in accordance with its legal powers to limit acreages because of marketing difficulties. It was considered that the tobacco growers themselves, associated as they were in a Union which was itself advised by a marketing agent and with considerable experience in marketing their tobacco, were in the best position to decide for what varieties and what quantities a remunerative market was likely to be found and to take responsibility for that decision. Mr. A.E. Trotman added:

"The decisions conveyed above are in accordance with the general policy of Government that responsibility for the marketing of their cash crops should, whenever possible, be vested in the growers themselves. Where controlling authorities exist it is the aim of policy that they should transfer their responsibilities to

2. ibid., letter AN1/0T, 30 May 1955."
growers' organisations as soon as possible and Government is not prepared to take the retrograde step of moving in the opposite direction in the case of the Southern Highlands Tobacco Industry."

The General Manager of the Southern Highlands Non-Native Tobacco Growers' Union, Mr. David McQueen, suggested that the method of marketing tobacco at the majority of tobacco growing centres was different from the method used in Iringa. At the majority of the big centres, such as Salisbury, tobacco was bought by auction by brokers representing manufacturers or, in the case of some of largest manufacturers, such as the Imperial Tobacco Co., by their own buyers. This was the most satisfactory method for all concerned, but Iringa had to more than treble its production of good quality leaf before it could open an auction floor in Iringa.

In these circumstances, Iringa farmers had to rely on selling their tobacco to the highest bidder. It was particularly impossible for the Union to sell its Ehler leaf direct to manufacturers in the United Kingdom and the Continent, as the 'Tobacco Ring' was a tough one and anybody who tried to by-pass the usual brokers or merchants would only find themselves 'frozen' out of the market.

In 1949, the Union total of 1,343,000 lbs. was made up of 366,000 lbs. of high grades (i.e. - 5A) and 977,000 lbs. of low grades, i.e. 5B and downwards. It was estimated that the total crop handled by the Union was in the region of 2,000,000 lbs. and therefore some 650,000 lbs., mostly of low grades, remained to be

1. ibid., Secretariat, 30 May 1955, Mr. E.A. Trotman, Member of Agriculture and Natural Resources.
sold. Buyers in Germany for example indicated that they welcomed any reduction of the grades already sold to them. Moreover, very serious mistakes were made in the processing and packing in 1949 season, with the result that, when the tobacco arrived at its destination, it was found to be overheated and almost unusable. Owing to deliveries ex the 1949 and 1950 seasons not being up to samples, buyers on overseas markets showed a certain amount of 'sales resistance' to Iringa leaf.

The tobacco industry received a very disappointing report from Holland on the 1949 shipment. Some of the tobacco was not up to specification and there were serious complaints over the two grades 6B and 10D. The Twenntsche Overseas Trading Company Ltd. of Dar-es-Salaam reported that their buyers in Germany said:

"The colour of this year's crop is inferior.... and that it is meeting fierce competition from Indian tobacco which have appeared on the German market at cheaper prices. Furthermore, Germany has at present a fair quantity of Marshall Aid dollars available for the purchase of American tobaccos and in all the circumstances it would be very difficult at the moment to find a market in Germany for Iringa tobacco."

The marketing situation in Liverpool was not promising for Iringa tobacco. About 20,000 lbs. of air-cured leaf was to be shipped to Liverpool in lots of 5,000 lbs. in 1950. As the venture was still in the early experimental stages the agents, Noakes Ltd., strongly recommended that 5,000 lbs. of the best quality produced

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1. ibid., Monthly Bulletin No. 19, 31 August 1951.
2. ibid., Minute 222 of the 24th meeting of Directors of the Southern Highlands Union held on the Union's office at 11.30 a.m. on Thursday the 14th August 1950.
3. ibid., Minute 234, Report from T.O.M. on offers to Germany.
be shipped to enable them to introduce this tobacco to manufacturers. Noakes Ltd. warned: 'poor quality leaf at this stage of the proceedings would quite possibly kill any further interest in this type of leaf from Iringa'. Noakes Ltd. wanted to have a sample of Ehlers grades. A sample of air-cured tobacco from Mloa in Iringa District was then sent to London:

"We have now examined the sample you kindly sent us and regret to report that this tobacco is, in our opinion, almost unsaleable in this country. It certainly could not be sold, so far as we can judge, on a remunerative basis, as other types are available from sterling areas which are far better and more suitable for this market, probably at no higher cost. Furthermore, the demand for these types is not large in the United Kingdom. We are therefore returning the sample to you as requested, and are sorry not to be able to give you a more favourable report."1

What conclusion can we draw on the basis of this sort of evidence?

It seems very clear that the Governor's advice about improving the quality of the leaf was, in effect, not taken.

We would also suggest that, besides the above discussed problems, the availability of labour to the industry affected the historical development of the industry tremendously. In order to make the settler system a profitable venture, it demanded not only the alienation of land and provision of capital, but also the creation of a labour force to work the huge estates carved out by the Europeans. The settler's alienation of land was inextricably linked with his need for cheap African labour. As noted earlier, the alienation of land in itself, was not sufficient

to force the African to work for the European. The importance of labour to the whole settler economy in the province can not be underestimated. The labour question was bound up with the matter of quality in the production process of the leaf. Labour was scarce but it was also not used to the best advantage given the level of the development of the productive forces.

**Labour in the Settler Economy**

As a consequence of economic adjustment, when the period of trade depression ended in 1935, the non-native agricultural industries called for more labour, difficulties were experienced by potential employers and complaints of "shortage of labour" began to be made. Lupa gold mining industry developed with unexpected rapidity and the demands for labour by the industry accentuated the difficulties of the situation. This state of affairs generally persisted up to the outbreak of the Second World War, but the situation did not become acute owing to a slowing down of the tempo of development by the political situation.

The outbreak of the war caused a considerable dislocation of the labour market. A large number of employing concerns, and particularly agricultural undertakings, were owned by German nationals, practically all of whom were interned. In some cases production continued with very little effect on the labour. Because of the war situation, conscription for military service and for essential agricultural work was in top gear. Considerable numbers of labourers were required in Iringa for the construction of reception camps for Italian civil internees, Polish refugees,

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etc. This demand, coupled with an unfortunate drought and famine in 1942 and 1943, strained the food supply of the country. Conscription for civil employment could no longer be avoided. Major works such as the construction of railways, trunk roads, modern aerodromes and a deepwater harbour were planned and put into execution to expand the export-oriented economy. The ill-fated groundnut scheme was launched. All these projects increased the demand for labour, and the numbers in paid employment rose from 324,200 in 1945 to 455,398 in 1951. What is very important for us to note is that some of the natives who had previously offered their labour to the market were now able to sell maize, beans, etc., the products of their labour, instead.

Up to the end of the war, the main reservoirs of labour in Tanganyika were the Central, Lake, Southern Highlands, Southern and Western Provinces, whilst the Eastern, Northern and Tanga Provinces were generally receivers of labour. Africans from the Central Province had for many years been accustomed to proceed to farms in the Northern Province in search of employment, whilst the sisal industry drew much of its requirements from the other four provinces. The Lake Province furnished men for the mining industries in that Province.

After the war, complications arose, due partly to the fact that three of the supplying provinces (Southern, Southern Highlands and Western) became themselves, important areas of employment. Again, the high prices obtained for primary produce deterred many Africans from seeking re-employment. The Hehe people of Iringa

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District produced a lot of cash crops for the market, so there was a very little chance for them to seek employment.¹

In Iringa District, as tobacco production increased, shortages of labour were increasingly commented on by settlers. The province, particularly Njombe District, was a large reservoir of employable labour. It sent thousands to the sisal estates each year, but each new acre of tobacco required one man, and the Wattle Project started in Njombe required several hundreds. The year 1949² was one of the worst agricultural seasons. It was only natural that in a year of food shortages more labourers than usual should have left the province for work outside. Employers within the province competed for labour with the sisal estates. It was estimated that over 40,000 men were employed inside the province. This figure fluctuated owing to the fact that employment in the tobacco industry was seasonal.

The Provincial Commissioner warned that the position had been reached when further calls for labourers to be employed either within or without the province for a considerable period would probably endanger the foodstuffs position internally and rendered it most improbable that locally produced grains could suffice for local needs in the feeding of employed labour. This view was later modified by the settlers, when they encouraged the labour to grow their own food and began to draw labour from the nearby areas around their farms. This process increased as more land was grabbed³, and taxation increased rapidly. For example,

¹ ibid., p.149.
² Oldaker, 1950, op.cit., p.135.
taxes paid in 1943 were over £54,000, for an estimated population of 125,250 people. By 1952 the numbers of African taxpayers in the Iringa District registers exactly doubled in the 1939\(^1\) figures and the rate of tax had been raised to sh. 15 per person.

Agricultural labour demand in the Iringa District was normally satisfied by Wabena and Wakinga, and Gogo from Dodoma, as we saw in Chapter Three. Broadly speaking, the post-war improvement of communications and the organisation of recruiting by the Sisal Labour Bureau, maize production in Ismani, etc. increased the labour needed in agriculture.

As the harvest was good in 1951, in the face of the attractions offered by large outside employers there was again a severe shortage of labour in Iringa, where the local African maize crop had put a large amount of money in African hands. It was recorded from Iringa that some tobacco farmers, on account of labour shortages, turned from tobacco\(^2\) to paw paw, groundnuts, castor and even sisal, though it was not clear how the labour situation could be improved thereby. How did the tobacco growers tackle this problem of chronic labour shortage? What steps did they take?

On 10th October 1950 arrangements were made for the establishment of a working committee to consider the advisability of the setting up in Iringa a Labour Utilization Board, and what action, if any, was to be taken to combat the serious difficulties which had risen in Iringa District due to shortage of labour\(^3\). Individual

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3. TNA, File No. 24/L1/T Labour, Labour Utilization Board letter ref. 28/23/1 of 10th October 1950. Members present were Mr. H.J. Constantinidis, V.S. Tofas, W. Dickinson, T.M. Skinner and David McQueen.
members were asked for their views on the question of the labour shortage and to what extent the shortage existed. Mr. Skinner D.C. stated that a shortage existed far in excess of the usual seasonal shortage. He had heard it stated that the shortage was due to the famine of 1949 and all natives were planting up their shambas to avoid famine conditions in the following seasons. Mr. Skinner thought that these views were not correct and pointed out that labour shortage was due to other causes.

Mr. Dickinson said that the Tea Co. at Mufindi found the labour shortage worse than at any previous time and that at Mufindi they had a shortage of around 50 per cent of the total number employed at that time. Only 60 per cent were adults, the remainder being children. Mr. Constantinidis stated that in the tobacco industry they were 60 per cent short on the 5,000 which the industry usually employed. The shortage of the Tobacco Union's Processing Plant, according to Mr. McQueen, was approximately 65 per cent. Mr. Constantinidis said the trouble commenced about August 1949, and that the inducement of offering higher wages had not attracted any more labour. The D.C. pointed out that the Sisal Labour Bureau (SILABU) was likely to increase its recruiting activities and asked whether employers found that the Wahehe were not turning out to work or whether the shortage was due to labour not turning out from other districts. He was informed that the local Wahehe turned out to work and that the shortage was due to labour other than Wahehe not offering themselves for employment.

Brigadier Scumpham had heard while in Mbeya that some 18,000

1. ibid., letter 28/23/1.
adults from the province worked in Rand, the copper belt and Southern and Northern Rhodesia, but despite this he said: 'there should be plenty of adult labour available in Iringa District'. It was his opinion that the shortage was as much due to a disinclination of the local natives to work as due to their obtaining good prices for the crops they grew. According to the classic racist views of Brigadier Scumpham, the natives were not interested in exerting themselves further but preferred to laze about in their huts. He considered it was up to the Government to take some energetic action with a view to stopping the 'deterioration of the native' and teaching him that he could not expect advancement and better conditions unless he was prepared to help himself by working. He thought that the hut tax was far too low in relation to the money the native earned and, particularly, what he was capable of earning. It was the unanimous opinion of the meeting that something would have to be done in the very near future to attempt to rectify the position if production was not to suffer severely. It was recommended that Colonel Hill investigate this problem by carrying out a study.

On 29th November 1950, Mr. McQueen informed the meeting that Colonel Hill had received sufficient replies to his questionnaire to enable him to prepare a useful analysis of the replies received. This analysis was tabled by Colonel Hill and revealed that, out of 111 farmers addressed, 76 had completed and returned the forms. The analysis also revealed that the labour shortage was of approximately 4,000 people (2,755 adults, 795 women and 365 children). The total labour force required in the district was

1. ibid., letter 28/23/1.
2. ibid., letter 28/23/1, Colonel Hill's questionnaire.
in the region of 16,500. It also appeared that wages increased as one progressed northwards, partly because big farmers were concentrated there. On the other hand, the study demonstrated that:

(a) sisal contract labour received (including bonus) sh. 30.50 plus ration per month, as compared to sh. 15 paid to labourers in Iringa. Amenities on sisal estates, e.g. housing, were better than those provided in Iringa.

(b) The returning sisal labourer, whose wife and child have also laboured, arrived at Iringa at the end of his contract with between sh. 300 and sh. 600 in cash, plus alarm clocks, mouth organs, a tin truck, blankets, etc.

(c) The average district wage for an adult male, seemed according to the forms received, to be about sh. 15. It was doubtful whether the amenities on Iringa farms were as good as those on sisal estates.

(d) It therefore appeared that, to compete with sisal, Iringa settlers would have to increase their expenditure on labour (wages and amenities), by about 33 per cent.

Some of the remedies put forward by Colonel Hill were to reduce the Sisal Labour Bureau recruiting activities in the province, to mechanise the Public Works Department, and to increase kodi (tax), modified conscription and registration of labour.
Mr. David McQueen thought little could be achieved by such decisions, as the existing labour difficulties were territorywide and therefore it was necessary for employers throughout the territory to take concerted action. The D.C. pointed out that a telegram had been received by Messrs. Dickinson from Mr. Le Maitre regarding a territorial meeting to be held in relation to labour shortage 1.

It is important to mention that, within Southern Highlands, some other planters were against the formation of the proposed Labour Utilization Board. The relevant statutory functions of such a board briefly stated would be:

(a) to restrict numbers of employees on farms to a reasonable figure; and to this end

(b) to require employers to submit returns and to submit to inspection; and finally

(c) to recruit labour.

To operate any of the above functions a fund would be necessary and this would be secured most easily by a surcharge on recruiting costs. The strongest opposition to the formation of such a board came from the Tanganyika Tea Company Ltd. 2 This opposing side felt that postponement was advisable, particularly in view of the facts that:

1. ibid., Mr. Le Maitre of the Sisal Growers Association Tanga, 23 November 1950.
2. ibid., Tanganyika Tea Company Mufindi, Ref. 13/5 30 January 1951.
Government had announced its intention of holding an inquiry into the labour situation; and

the Tanganyika Sisal Growers Association proposed to initiate a territorial conference of employers in all major industries in the near future for the same purpose.

The representative from the Tea Company argued that these two inquiries would take place at a higher-than-District level and 'I should have suggested awaiting the results of these enquiries before asking the Government to set up an Iringa District Labour Utilization Board'. The Sao Hill representative was also against the setting up of a Labour Utilization Board. 'It would appear that the request to the Government is really coming from the Tobacco Planters of Iringa only', W.G. Dickinson concluded. The Provincial Commissioner, from the same source, pointed out that:

"It does not appear from your letter No. 28/23/23 of the 16th December 1950, that demand for a Board is in fact unanimous in the Iringa District. Should e.g. the tea industry be excluded, a definition of the area of jurisdiction of the proposed Board would be necessary. Moreover, I would note that in the tobacco industry, where a large majority of employers are non-British, who may reasonably be expected to have no precise knowledge of the law, it does not appear to have been made clear when canvassing opinion, that the essential function of a Board is that defined in para. 2(a) above."  

The P.C. required information as to the means whereby proper representation could be secured in the Iringa District. He made

1. ibid., Tea Company Mufindi, 1951.
2. ibid., Ref. 16/33/12 proposed Labour Utilization Board 19th January 1951.
it clear that, he was not unwilling to recommend the establishment of a Board in the Iringa District but:

"I cannot do this until a practical scheme is advanced which is clearly supported by a majority of employers with full knowledge of the law on the subject. If all that is intended is to enable a certain part of the Iringa District to speak with one voice to Government on the subject of labour scarcity, then I suggest that the Provincial Council is the proper medium. If on the other hand it is desired to start by making a survey of labour in its relation to acreage farmed by crops, then I suggest that without tackling the knotty problem of funds to pay for a Board, the Labour Officer can already provide data from his records to the sponsors of the proposals."¹

Mr. W.G. Dickson, supporting the P.C., said:

"I still adhere to the view expressed in that letter and I feel that the request was not representative of the feelings of the District, but only of a portion of it. The shortage of labour is Territory-wide and calls for investigation and measures on a Territory-wide basis. ... we do not all agree that a Labour Utilization Board is necessary for the purpose ... As far as speaking with one voice is concerned, the Tobacco and Tea Industries between them employ the larger part of the labour in the District, and these industries can easily meet to decide on the representations to be made. Nor do I think that there would be difficulty in obtaining the views and support of farmers from areas such as Sao Hill. Much of the labour employed in the Iringa District comes from outside the District (mainly from Njombe District) further the Wakinga and Wabena seek work and are recruited for work in other parts of the province and outside the province itself."²

Clearly, Mr. Dickinson saw the issue as involving more than the particular problems of the Iringa District. He was not convinced that a Labour Utilization Board was either necessary or desirable to attain their objective. On the other hand, Mr. Constantinidis

¹ ibid., letter ref. 16/33/12.
² ibid., letter 13/5.
expressed angry feelings against those who opposed the formation of the Board. Things were difficult because labourers from Njombe were sometimes blocked in one way or another on their way to Iringa, as Colonel C.L. Town put it:

"It would appear that in some way it has been made increasingly difficult for volunteer labour to reach our farms. I normally have a sum deposited with the Railway's at Njombe, so that any of my boys returning from leave, may bring friends who wish to work for me. I have had to abandon this as it now appears that the boys are questioned and examined so much that they are unable to get through, and twice, boys of mine have been returned off the Railway Bus by Jumbe and other officious persons. Boys walking are turned back, to such an extent that I have had to employ a man to find out the various check posts, so that I can circumvent them. It would appear that this is unwarranted interference with the liberty of African and this must certainly be condoned by some Government officials, in view of the large extent to which it is done." 

What conclusion can we draw from this discussion? It is clear that officials used to block labour in times of labour shortage. Mr. Skinner, the D.C., found that the labour position was getting no better and he felt that the Committee's request for the formation of a Labour Utilization Board should be allowed to stand.

The Chairman pointed out that a practical view of the situation had to be taken and, in view of the fact that certain members of the Committee were definitely against the immediate formation of a Labour Utilization Board, he thought that an attempt should be made to form an Association of Employers. Such employers should be brought together from the Southern Highlands and not

1. ibid., Minute of a meeting of the working committee established to consider the advisability of settling up in Iringa a Labour Utilization Board held in the office of the D.C. Iringa at 10.00 a.m. Friday, 16 February 1951.
2. ibid., letter to the D.C. Iringa March 15th, 1951.
merely confined to the Iringa District. The decision taken in November 1950 by the committee was to recommend to the government the formation of an Association of Employers to cover all farmers in the Province. 1

In January 1951, an important decision was taken. His Excellency gave instructions for a manpower survey to be carried out and for the consultant's report on this subject to be considered by a Committee, on which unofficial members would sit. Because of this step, settlers were asked to postpone any action on the matter of an Iringa Labour Utilization Board pending the findings of the Committee. 2 However the tobacco growers did not stop here in their efforts to overcome the problem of labour shortage in Iringa.

Our archive material suggests that, after all this controversial and complicated discussion about the problem of labour scarcity, the settlers of Iringa District worked out a strategy to solve or reduce the problem on a District level. First, it was decided that strong labour recruiting measures should be adopted, in consultation with Chief Adam Sapâ Mkwawa, M.L.C., M.B.E. of Uhehe, with a view to supplying the marginal requirement of sixty to seventy additional labourers weekly. 3 The necessary arrangements were left with the Iringa D.C. It was also decided that free transport should be provided for the labourers when

1. ibid., Minute of a meeting held on the 29th November 1950 of the working committee.
2. ibid., S.H.P. Mbeya 902/8 January 24th 1951.
3. TNA, File No. 24/L1/7 Labour, letter ref. no. 12/5 of February 6th 1952. Jumbes were required to send labourers to the chief, failure to do that was an offence and offenders could be fined. Moreover, the efficiency of both the chief and sub-chiefs was measured partly by their ability to supply labour. These people were government servants; part and parcel of the 'Indirect Rule'. 
recruited. Each user-department had to contribute its share of the costs, either by loan or by provision of petrol. Temporary labour camps were erected in a number of sub-chiefdoms, including the headquarters of Hehe Native Administration. This method, of using the local chiefs for recruiting people, was very effective for acquiring labour, since refusing to work or to accept a sub-chief's instructions on this issue was punishable by imprisonment.

As we have documented, certain farmers made vocal complaints from time to time regarding the difficulties of obtaining an adequate labour supply. But it is a significant fact that, the farmer who gained for himself a reputation for fair treatment and prompt payment of labour was never short of men. Farmers partly solved this problem by introducing standard wages and tasks to be applicable to all settlers. It was possible to devise effective action against a grower who paid high wages in a time of labour shortage in order to induce his neighbour's workers to desert and engage with him. The solution was to fix a standard wage for the District as a whole. One point needs to be emphasized here, however, and that is, the failure to pay labourers after finishing their contracts was a burning problem which complicated the entire situation. Let us pick a few examples to illustrate this point.

Edward bin Kadunda complained before the Iringa D.C. that he had not been paid his wages. He stated that he had worked for Dallaris Kidewe Estate as a carpenter and the agreed pay was

1. ibid., Notes Ref. No. 12/1, N.C. Kalenga 'A', 8 January 1952.
2. TNA, File No. 178/22/10 Complaints - Wages, letter Ref. 22/10/89 of 9 February 1943.
she 18/- per Kipande, but Dallaris did not pay Kadunda for the month of January and 8 days. Dallaris agreed that Kadunda had finished his Kipande but said he was sorry that he could not pay him, as he had received different orders from the owners of the plantation. Again one reads, from the Iringa D.C. Mr. S.A. Walden, the following complaint: 'two natives have appeared before me .... both of Kipengere. They allege that they have not been paid for their work ....'. Mr. Walden suggested that these people should be paid their wages, either in the form of stamps on a card, if their taxes remained unpaid, or in cash if their taxes had been paid. The following case is interesting. As the acting D.C., Mr. A.G. Harvey, put it:

"I regret to have to inform you Togni Mahenge that I have this day received a complaint from S/C Mtaki concerning the non-payment of wages to one Usondole bin Mwakiwaga who I understand was employed by you .... I have to ask you to be good enough to pay the wages which were due to him up to the time of dismissal."1

Antogn Togni's reply was that:

"Usondole .... is a liar. My headmen and all other employees here can prove that I did not send him away. He was very lazy and for this reason I put him working with women and children but he did not want to work and asked for his salary which I refuse to pay unless he finishes his kipande."2

The District Commissioner suggested that Usondole should be paid at once. These examples demonstrate very clearly the form of exploitation and domination which the labourers had to go through. There was no incentive given to workers and as a result

1. ibid., letter ref. 22/10/6, 23 April 1941.
2. ibid., letter of 26/4/41, Mahenge.
productivity was low. Sometimes these struggles resulted in actual fighting:

"This is not the first time we all the planters [sic] have been threatened to be beaten unreasonably by some bad natives here. Mr. Ritchloff was beaten by the natives, Mr. Dallaris was wounded by the same, Mr. Warbug had called for help, Mr. Togni and myself Phyllida were threatened .... is it right when because of some difficulty we delay to pay our boys for a few days to be humiliated or threatened to be beaten by them as if we did that on purpose to cheat them?"1

Without losing the threads of our original argument, the tobacco growers, faced with labour scarcity, tried to remedy the situation by increasing the number of youths coming to work on their farms.2 This strategy was preferred, partly because it was possible to pay these boys and girls small sums of money. Moreover, the planters in Iringa also increased the wages to their labourers. More labour was also drawn from the surrounding areas within the settler economy. During its peak periods, tobacco requires heavy, but fluctuating, labour inputs.

It was at this time that settlers started improving their instruments of production and making more effective use of the commodity labour power in the production process. Improvements in the labour camp and general conditions were made but, at the same time, our archive material suggests that the tobacco settlers made the workers work harder for the same working time and in most cases the working hours became longer in the late 1950s and early 1960s. With the introduction of farm machinery, plus the more effective use of labour, productivity increased3. Progress

1. ibid., letter 19th May 1942, Phyllida.
2. TNA, File No. 24/28/3 Iringa - Labour.
of production is expressed in an increase in labour productivity, that is, in its fruitfulness. As the production process improved, the amount of labour time embodied in each unit of output was reduced.

By 1957 the Provincial Commissioner was in a position to say that the pattern of employment in the province was generally satisfactory and the supply was adequate to meet all requirements. In Iringa the tobacco farmers, although never completely satisfied because their demand for labour coincided with African season, were at no time really very short.

A committee of tobacco farmers in Iringa approved the establishment of a Southern Highlands Agricultural Employers' Federation. The objects of the Federation were to establish basic tasks, wages and bonuses for the industry, to maintain amicable relations among employers and to control the flow of labour into the industry. The establishment of the Federation meant that labour relations and complaints could be dealt with within the industry itself. An interesting comparison was made at this time with respect to the output of the labour employed in the tobacco industries of Iringa and Southern Rhodesia. As the Iringa D.C. reported:

"The agricultural officer 'Tobacco' has produced some interesting figures regarding tobacco labour, vis-a-vis Southern Rhodesia and Tanganyika. In Rhodesia 100 acres are farmed by 70 labourers who are paid at the rate of sh. 70/- per month. In Tanganyika 100 acres of tobacco require 140 labourers who are paid sh. 27/50 per month. There is no doubt that the key to improved labour conditions just as the key to increased production is better farming and not increased alienation."1

Figure 4.1 gives a summary of tobacco production in Iringa District between 1947 and 1959. In Iringa District in 1956, 5,827 acres of tobacco were cultivated; the change from Ehler to Virginia tobacco continued and it was estimated that 168 tons of Virginia was marketed in the same year. Ehler production in the same year amounted to 1,054 tons, which was in excess of that expected. In future a quota had to be imposed on growers to avoid embarrassment to the Tobacco Union and to the marketing agents.

A good average tobacco season was experienced in Iringa in 1957 when 6,046 1/2 acres were cultivated, and the results were most encouraging. Over 4,000 acres were planted to Virginia and 2,000 to Ehlers. The total amount of the year's crop amounted to approximately £379,000. Tobacco production for the three years up to 1957 was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Virginia</th>
<th>Ehlers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2,909,890</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>376,193 lb.</td>
<td>2,362,090</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>1,260,019 lb.</td>
<td>835,806 lb.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6,169 1/2 acres were cultivated in 1958 and a successful year was experienced by the tobacco farmers in the district with the production of some 2.5 million lbs. of Virginia and 200,000 lbs. of Ehlers.

In 1959, 6,835 acres of tobacco were cultivated in Iringa District.

FIGURE 4.1

Tobacco Production in Iringa District 1947-1959

In Tons

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Tons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>1500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>1500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>1000</td>
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<td>1955</td>
<td>1500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Period/Year

Source: Tanganyika Territory, Annual Reports of the PC for the years 1947-1959, 1948-60.
which was grown almost entirely by non-African farmers, had a record production year\(^1\). Unfortunately 65 per cent of the 3,500,000 lb. crop consisted of low-priced grades and the chief buyer, the East African Tobacco Company, was reluctant to accept more than its contract figure of 2,000,000 lb. At the end of the year 300,000 lb. remained unsold. In 1959, for the first time, the entire crop had been Virginia, which displaced the Ehler variety. It should be recognised that dissension amongst growers had not made it any easier to organise the industry on sound lines\(^2\). By the time of Independence the estate sector produced about 3,000,000 lbs. of tobacco; and had reached a 'take-off' stage.

Conclusion

The period 1940 to 1960 was one in which, despite all the financial support provided by the government and the regulations which excluded Africans from producing the high valued leaf, settlers continued to face a number of basic difficulties. Among these basic difficulties, were transportation, marketing systems, mechanization and the improvement of leaf quality. There can be little doubt that the problematic supply of labour constantly affected the development of the tobacco industry. The manner by which the government and farmers tackled issues of labour shortage and the way they responded to market demands characterised the whole period.

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In Chapters Three and Four we examined the development of maize production in Ismani Division and the difficulties faced by settlers in trying to establish the tobacco industry in Iringa District. In both cases our discussion covered the period between the Second World War and Independence. This chapter provides a review of the general debate on Tanzanian socialism, especially the *ujamaa* programme.

*Ujamaa* villages were supposed to be voluntaristic production and marketing units started by peasants themselves. In the 1970s, the state started using coercion and compulsory villagisation. On November 7th, 1973, the government paper, the *Daily News*, quoted Mwalimu Nyerere as saying: 'To live in villages is an order'. How are we to explain such a rapid change in the policy and its implementation? We shall argue that the villagisation programme was started by the Party in order to have effective control of agriculture and that this bureaucratic implementation of the policy has acted as a barrier to the release of the productive forces and to changes in the relations of production necessary to increase production. In particular, the will to work of the peasants was definitely disrupted.

**Background**

As we discussed earlier, Tanzania's road to socialism is not via class struggle and President Mwalimu Nyerere criticises those socialists in western countries who are unable to conceive socialism as anything but the antithesis of capitalism, an
attitude of mind that gives capitalism a philosophical status which capitalism neither claims nor deserves. According to Humphrey, as early as 1962, Mwalim had a clear conception of the type of society and social development he wished to see in Tanganyika, although it was not until five years later that these ideals were translated into a declaration of intent and a socialist 'strategy' of development.

The Arusha Declaration of 1967 was a declaration of policy intent developed from Mwalim's socialist philosophy. The proclamation commenced by outlining the principles of 'socialism' relating to exploitation, ownership of the means of production and democracy. The major part of the declaration discussed 'self-reliance'. Turning to the people and agriculture, the proclamation stated that hard work and intelligence were necessary conditions for progress and development. As we shall see, the emphasis was on the land, the people and good leadership.

The Declaration showed concern for the country's rural population, which was bearing virtually all the burdens of the economy and yet received little reward. To ensure that the fruits of Uhuru (Independence) and social development were for all, the Declaration stated its purpose of fighting growing elitist tendencies in government and Party. Because the proclamation proved to be so important in defining the direction which policy should take in Tanzania, it is worthwhile trying to trace the events leading up to the Declaration and the various

2. ibid., p.143.
3. ibid., p.144.
issues determining the policy.

Ruthernberg, Humphrey and others have suggested that higher wages and faster Africanization were seen as being against the national interest.\(^1\)

The policy of self-reliance was in part necessitated by disappointment during the First Five Year Plan over foreign capital inflow and the need to raise this shortfall within Tanzania. Although the country was reasonably successful at this, overall performance did not match with that planned. As we shall see, the need for self-reliance was underlined by the failure of capital-costly government village-settlement schemes and the transformation approach to rural development, in contrast to the success of schemes and projects started by local initiative.\(^2\)

As we saw in Chapter Three, in 1965 there was peasant discontent over poor crop prices, higher taxes, corruption and the higher life-style of some party and co-operative officials. A more direct chain of events heading to the proclamation started in October 1966. Mwalim announced, as a part of his anti-elitism strategy, that all undergraduates should do six months' National Service followed by 15 months in their jobs at 40 per-cent salary. This irritated the students, causing demonstrations and a strike, which Mwalim countered by rusticating four hundred students for one year. Mwalim then cut his own salary by 20 per cent, government and Party officials had similar cuts, and official Mercedes-Benz cars were given up.\(^3\)


\(^2\) Humphrey, op.cit., p.145.

\(^3\) ibid., p.146.
Humphrey suggests that the National Union of Tanganyika Workers (N.U.T.A.) called for a Presidential Commission to investigate methods to implement socialism in the country. According to this assertion, pressure was exerted on Mwalim by a chain of events calling for a change at the same time as it was becoming clear that on another level anti-socialist tendencies were growing. Mwalim chose February 1967 to make a declaration of intent putting previously expounded ideas into social practice.

The Three Year Development Plan 1961/62 - 1963/64

The Three Year Plan was based on the recommendations made by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development to Tanganyika in 1959/60. The World Bank Report basically recommended a continuation of the economic policies pursued in the 1950s. The report proposed development along four lines in agriculture:

(i) improvement of extension services and an increase in marketing facilities and loans;

(ii) schemes of agricultural transformation under close supervision methods;

(iii) building up of existing large-scale farm enterprises; and

(iv) initiation of irrigation schemes aimed at covering about 7,500 acres by 1966, and 25,000 acres by 1970.

All but the last of these proposals were adopted.

1. ibid., p.147.
Humphrey has suggested that this plan was something of a stop-gap measure, there having been inadequate time for an examination of the economy and an appraisal of its potentialities. This plan was a summary of proposed development expenditure whose uncertain objective was to create a basis for later development. The budget for the Three Year Plan was about £24m, almost £5½m of this channelled to agriculture and water supplies. Thus agriculture took 23 per cent of the budget, roads 18%, education 14 per cent, urbanization and building construction 12 per cent, police and army 10 per cent, and power 7.5 per cent, with industry taking only 2.9 per cent. Agriculture accounted for 61 per cent of G.N.P. in 1960 and 50 per cent in 1968, and hence the rate at which the agricultural sector grew had a large influence on the overall growth rate of the economy. The basic strategy was still that of the colonial era, namely agricultural production increases aimed for especially in the field of export crops.

Under colonial administration, agricultural extension was plagued by hesitancy. After Independence, politicians regarded the introduction of technical innovations to large numbers of peasants as an opportunity to gain followers in a joint struggle against ignorance and poverty. It was assumed by the planners that Independence would bring a considerable change. In the first months of Independence, according to Ruthenberg, it became obvious that the realization of the Plan's basic idea would be difficult. It was reported that for the first time in the

2. ibid., p.156.
history of the Agricultural District Office, farmers, headmen and Party secretaries requested advice on agricultural matters.

By the end of 1962, almost all higher agricultural posts on a District and Regional level were held by Africans. As a result of the rapid Africanization, many persons were given much responsibility too suddenly. These people also inherited colonial values. District Offices were flooded with paper-work and officers had to take responsibilities which lay outside their fields of interest and experience. There was no time left to do actual extension work. Ruthenberg has shown that an academic diploma and seniority in the job were decisive qualifications for promotion. Experienced and talented persons who did not have a professional or academic training were easily forgotten. In face of the late educational preparation for the transfer of responsibility to Africans, it is noteworthy that the system did not break down completely, despite all these problems.

The First Five Year Development Plan, July 1964 – June 1969.

The First Five Year Plan showed a greater concern for Tanzania's long term strategy, but it was still far from clear that Tanzanians were really choosing and planning their own economic and political destiny. According to Mwalim to 'plan is to choose to move forward'. This Plan was the work of expatriate economists with little assistance from other institutions. T.A.N.U. was little involved and consented to the strong influence of the technical planners by failing to provide adequate political aims to which the plan targets and schemes could be related.

1. ibid., p.111.
No positive guidance was given to the economists, who had to substitute their own assessment of how they thought Tanzania should progress socially. Humphrey makes a strong point when he argues that the Plan was not the ideal product of a planning process, but rather a collection of projects describing the hoped-for development of the entire economy.

When introducing the Plan, Mwalim said that it was not intended as a blueprint of Tanzania's future, but, despite that warning, the Plan did take a rigid view of the course of the country's development. When the Tanzanian economy took a direction other than that put forward in it, as occurred shortly after its introduction, the document was rejected. This situation developed largely because of uncertainties over factors affecting the entire economy.

First, although climatic conditions varied throughout the Plan period, the weather cannot be said to have been unduly adverse. Second, although the government had made estimates of export prices, there was no certainty as to their trends. The Plan assumed that the price of sisal fibre would be £100 per ton, whereas the price slumped to about £40 per ton in 1968 and later stabilized at £70. In fact the price of Tanzania's sisal fell from £144 per ton in 1963 to £81 per ton in 1966. Third, the inflow of funds from overseas for the development budget was very much less than expected. Foreign help did not materialise as expected due to political disagreements with donors and possibly also to over-ambitious expectations of potential aid. Because of

1. Humphrey, op. cit., p.175.
Tanzania’s stand on the Rhodesian Unilateral Declaration of Independence, a British loan of £7.5 million was frozen when diplomatic relations between these countries were broken off. Total realised Tanzania Government investment expenditure was sh. 1,496m, of which sh. 506m was raised externally and sh. 990m (66%) raised internally. The plan had hoped to raise only sh. 450m internally.

According to the views of Humphrey, Meyns and others, Tanzania’s present policy of self-reliance was largely a product of experience in the First Plan period. Secondly, the experiences in the First Five Year Plan period demonstrated the need for ready adaptability of the economy and its organisations to changing circumstances. Thirdly, there was the lesson of the importance of the issue of implementation. A plan was of little value if it could not be put into practice, and the problem of bottlenecks to implementation in the first years of this plan was evidently thought serious enough for questions to be raised about the flexibility of the plan.

**Nyerere’s Approach to Socialism**

Mwalim Nyerere suggested that the extended family of traditional African society should be developed and built on to achieve socialist goals. He placed much significance on overcoming the colonial de-Africanization of minds by returning to the cultural and moral heritage of Africa. The individual was given

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security by the tribe which demanded from him in return co-operation and tribal turnouts. Tribal traditions did transmit a classless society: tribal members were equals. Tribal traditions discouraged individual, differentiated, activities which would endanger the unity of the group, which was a matter of survival under conditions prevailing in former centuries. African Socialism proposed to take advantages of these traditions. The economic policy of Tanganyika was largely synonymous with agricultural policy, so that agriculture became the testing ground of African Socialism.

On the other hand, a different interpretation of the ujamaa policy is given by scholars such as Von Freyhold, Shivji and others. First, this 'school' rejects, amongst many other things, the idea of the classlessness of pre-colonial Tanganyika and Africa as a whole. Second, as far as the contemporary ujamaa policy is concerned, the argument is that it is crucial to know which class is going to control it. In fact, Von Freyhold has shown that neither was the hostility to 'kulaks' expressed in the Arusha Declaration meant as a gesture towards the poor peasants, who had not yet developed such feelings and were not encouraged to do so afterwards, nor was it a sign of 'progressiveness' on the part of the 'petty-bourgeoisie'.

The 'petty bourgeoisie, according to Von Freyhold, simply saw the kulaks as a possible focus of opposition against measures which affected the peasantry as a whole. Where this was the case, e.g. in Ismani, the rich peasants had to be pushed aside

in the name of socialism. Rich peasants who sided with the bureaucracy and were helpful in the process of implementation of government directives had no problems and often became the undisputed leaders of 'ujamaa villages'.

After Independence, a period of rapid political change, aims both realistic and unrealistic were considered: 'We must work hard; land is there. We must throw away the hoe and use tractors'.

According to Ruthenberg, the future belonged to large mechanised farms. The time for peasant production was over. Peasants had to be organised to use land co-operatively. The T.A.N.U. Youth League (T.Y.L.) had to be a carrier of innovation in the villages.

There was an awareness that hasty measures could give rise to opposition. The whole population was to participate in economic development. **Uhuru na Kazi** (Independence and Work) was the slogan.

By providing the political impetus, Mwalim wanted to induce the baba kabwela (poor peasant) to become more active, to develop wider interests, to participate in communal action and thus to help himself.

Being the Head of State and Chairman of the ruling party, Mwalim is the authority about the Tanzanian policy of socialism. The philosophy and directives of rural socialism in Tanzania are most clearly formulated in his speeches and his paper entitled 'Socialism and Rural Development'.

Mwalim's rural socialism, as we have argued, is based on very firm assumptions about traditional African societies, whose structures are supposed to allow continuous evolution towards a modern socialist society. There were, writes Mwalim, three basic assumptions underlying

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the traditional *ujamaa* system:

(i) Mutual respect by each member of the kinship group. This involved a recognition of mutual involvement in all activities, which was governed by rights and obligations fixed for all individuals.

(ii) The material goods of the group, such as land and other resources were held in common and this prevented the development of economic differentiation.

(iii) There was an obligation on all members to work, that was to contribute to the collective welfare of the group.

These three assumptions are argued by Mwalim to be the foundation of human security, practical equality, and peace in society. They are further assumed to be a sound basis of the development of a modern socialist society.

David Feldman has shown that this idealistic representation of the traditional Tanzanian social formation was tempered by the recognition of two major shortcomings. First, there was the subservient situation of particular people within the family, such as women or younger members of the household. Second, there was extreme poverty. The latter is explained by Mwalim as being caused mainly through ignorance and the small scale of operations.

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2. We do not fight poverty in abstract we fight against an exploiting class. This needs a class analysis of a social formation.
Mwalim implies that the above shortcomings can be ameliorated without a departure from the beneficial collective aspects of the *ujamaa* society.

The objectives of *ujamaa* are thus equal rights, and opportunities, peaceful existence without suffering or exploitation and socially-oriented individual motivation. By the alliance of *ujamaa* principles to the knowledge to defeat poverty, material welfare would be steadily raised. Mwalim recognised that the spread of cash economy historically tended to encourage individualistic and acquisitive attitudes and increased dependence on wage labour rather than co-operative work. He wished to reverse this trend.

Nyerere recognised the role of individual progressive farmers in introducing new techniques and methods. Therefore he argued that changes should not unduly restrict progressive farmers. The need was for empiricism and gradualism. The demand and recognition of the need for changes had to come from the peasants themselves, rather than just being imposed upon them.

Some Ambiguities in Ujamaa Policy

It has been a tendency of many ruling groups, particularly in Africa, to romanticise about the past and crave for its return.

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1. In 1958 Nyerere commented about commercial agriculture and said: 'If we allow land to be sold like a robe, within a short period there would be only a few Africans possessing land in Tanganyika and all others would be tenants ... When a lot of people accept the introduction of a method which will enable a few people to claim ownership of a thing which is actually God's gift to all His people they are in actual fact voluntarily accepting slavery', Nyerere, *Freedom and Unity*, 1966, p.53-58. Quoted in Coulson, *Freedom and Unity*, October 1977, *op. cit.*, p.9.

In social practice such groups of people seek to turn the wheel of history in backward motion, and this is why none of them has ever succeeded in achieving this brand of 'socialism', to say the least. In order to develop this argument, it is important that we put the issue in its proper theoretical framework.

Historical materialism does recognize (as an abstract concept) a mode of production - primitive communism - which is characterised by common ownership of the means of production and therefore by the absence of social classes. Marx and Engels pointed out its main features. According to them the first form of property was tribal property. It corresponded to an undeveloped stage of production in which a people lived by hunting and fishing, by cattle breeding or at the highest stage by agriculture. In the latter case, a large area of uncultivated land was pre-supposed. The division of labour was at that stage, still very elementary and was no more than an extension of the family, with patriarchal family chiefs.

Since this point is most central in Tanzania socialism, it is extremely important we document our argument in full. Engels explains how this mode of production changes in history and how it is related to the whole issue of socialism. He argues that all civilized people begin with the common ownership of lands. With all peoples who have passed a certain primitive stage in the course of the development of agriculture, this common ownership becomes a fetter on production process. It is then abolished or

1. We see strong similarities between Nyerere's Socialism and Narodism as criticised by Lenin in 'Sismondi and Economic Romanticism'.
2. Mapolu, op.cit., p.34.
negated and, after a longer or shorter series of intermediate stages, is transformed into private property. But according to Engels at a higher stage of agricultural development private property becomes in its turn a fetter on production. The demand that it also be negated, that it should once again be transformed into common property, necessarily arises. As Mapolu has correctly pointed out, the important argument here is that this demand does not mean the restoration of the old original common ownership, but the institution of a far higher and more developed form of possession in common which, far from being a hindrance to the production process, on the contrary, for the first time frees production from all fetters.

The second point which we would like to mention is that there is no specified period given in which the above-mentioned principles are supposed to have been in operation, nor are these principles located in terms of space. It is interesting to note that, on the eve of direct colonial penetration in Tanganyika, numerous social formations had already showed signs of feudalism. Communal relations had been overpowered, as we saw in Chapter One for the case of the Hehe people under Chief Mkwawa. The point about communal past pre-supposed here is mythical. At the same time, African societies showed a considerable degree of unevenness of development. We would suggest that exploitation of man by man appeared only after the disintegration of primitive society, when the labour of people began to yield some surplus production over and above the minimum needed for subsistence.

1. ibid., pp.34-35.
2. ibid., pp.35-36.
But exploitation is by no means eternal.

The above discussion has emphasized certain important features which concern policy choices. First, there is the conceptualization of traditional African society as an ujamaa society whose essential elements are desirable and appropriate as a basis for economic development. Here we have shown the weakness of such a conceptualization. Secondly, there is the rejection of a policy of modernization based on the encouragement of individual achievement, on the grounds that it leads to the growth of a rural class system, with exploitation inevitably arising from land and labour markets. According to David Feldman, there is also an emphasis of gradualism, popular acceptance and the minimizing of central direction.

Ujamaa vijijini policy (rural socialism)

To what extent was a new policy of ujamaa vijijini a rational response to definite shortcomings of earlier experiences? This calls for an examination of the earlier policy to begin with. Here we give a summary.

One of the first measures taken after Independence was to bring politics into the administration. The Regional Commissioner (RC) is the highest official of the Region, the Area Commissioner (AC) the highest official of the District. Immediately after taking office RC's and AC's were entrusted with development projects in accordance with the idea of levee en masse. This was part of the Three Year Development Plan and the objective of this plan was to increase agricultural production. The

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1. Feldman, op.cit., p.89.
peasants were induced to 'help themselves', for example to perform unpaid communal work in road construction and so on in order to relieve pressure on the Treasury.

The Regional and District Development Committees, Party officials and Members of Parliament were the leaders expected to make the masses of the people achieve these aims. The newly-formed Village Development Committee (VDC) were expected to be the most important of these institutions.

The old African tradition of 'tribal turnouts', which under colonial rule was hated as forced labour, was successfully rejuvenated and, known as 'self-help', it became a public event.

The achievements of self-help schemes by 1963 were as follows:

116 schools, 134 community houses, 31 hospitals, 66 dispensaries,
10,000 miles of feeder roads, 6 bridges, 10 drifts, 903 miles of road improvements, 321 miles of water pipes, 313 miles, 142 small dams for water supplies and 110 miles of furrows and 10 watering places.

The value of the above activities was estimated at £200,000 and the government contributed £40,000 of the total. The number and popularity of the self-help schemes exceeded the government's expectations. For the newly-appointed RCs and ACs these projects became the yardsticks of their work. Ruthenberg suggests that the first task of VDCs was to set cultivation targets and that these were set all over the country. Each peasant was to cultivate 10 or 15 acres. Targets for the 1962/63 season were thought out and put on paper in the Agricultural Offices without

the villager's knowledge. Things happened in a hurry.\(^1\)

Parallel to cultivation targets, efforts were made to introduce co-operative land-use. Several approaches were introduced.

First was the establishment of communal farms through communal land-clearing. The number of these farms in 1963 was estimated to exceed 600. They varied in size between 1 and 15 acres, and in some areas participants employed wage labourers. Second, there were Farming Associations—non-registered co-operatives which incorporated at least 20 members and could apply for loans in order to buy a tractor. Co-operation in this case was limited to the use of the tractor. The group tractor also cultivated the fields of individual farmers. For example, 100 farmers, in addition to their own fields, cleared 200 acres of land and then divided these among themselves in equal plots. The people who took part in this project were responsible for planting, weeding and harvesting. Tractor costs had to be covered by crop returns.

The third kind of activity were 'co-operative schemes' formed by the unemployed. The then Minister for Labour had condemned the unemployed people as lazy.\(^2\) Discontent with the unemployment situation in towns gave rise to enthusiasm to form groups as a response to the Party's call of 'freedom and work'. Usually the leaders of such groups were men of very strong personality. The Agricultural Officers chose suitable land and distributed seeds and tools free of charge to those who wanted to go 'back to the land'. The government delivered maize

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1. Ruthenberg, op.cit., p.118.
2. Ibid., p.121.
and milk-powder provided by the United States to these people until the first harvest. In October 1962, 13 such settlements existed. There were far-reaching conceptions of model village settlements, each equipped with a school, a dispensary, a tractor station and an organizational set which corresponded to the Moshaw system of Israel. Soon the realization of settlement plans suffered because very few unemployed turned up. Life in the countryside proved very difficult for them, so the projects collapsed within a short period.

Finally there were the settlements started by the T.A.N.U. Youth League (T.Y.L.). The T.Y.L. appealed to the youngster, who joined a kind of voluntary labour service. The youth cleared land with an enthusiasm that was so great that they did not even think of asking for guidance and advice. The slogan was 'Freedom and Work'. It was believed that hard work - which was indeed being done - and enthusiasm for co-operative action were enough. Most of these schemes failed, partly because of inadequate planning and management¹. In Southern Tanzania, though, some such schemes survived for some time. These joined into an association for mutual assistance, which further ensured their survival, as the more developed ones were in a position to lend a helping hand to those in difficulties.

Litowa village was the original settlement of these schemes and was started in 1960. Factors which worked for its creation as a new settlement and for the survival of it and its sister schemes include the following: First, of course, is the widespread call for national construction encouraged by President Nyerere's

¹. ibid., p.123.
support and writing since as far back as 1960. By 1967, because of this encouragement, some twenty such villages had been established and had formed themselves into Ruvuma Development Association (R.D.A.)\(^1\). We could say, these were among the first ujamaa or familyhood villages in Tanzania. Mapolu has shown that most of those originally involved believed in the populist ideology of 'human dignity, love, peace, freedom, co-operation' and so on\(^2\). These villages were lucky in having a leadership dedicated to these ideals and prepared to serve other settlers.

The second factor has to do with the general backwardness of the area. Songea area was and is still at a relatively very low level economically and moreover this area is cut off from the rest of Tanzania by poor means of communication. The main task for the people there could only be that of sheer subsistence or migrate to the coast in search of wage employment. This area was one of the labour reserves during the colonial period. According to Mapolu the average peasant here had nothing on his own plot to show for several generations of toil. Strictly speaking, he was in a position there of the gambler with nothing to lose. So when the R.D.A. claimed their scheme would reduce, if not remove, poverty, ignorance and disease, the response of many was that, since nothing previously had successfully fought and eradicated these social problems, 'let us give the R.D.A. a try'.

The third important factor was that these schemes acquired some recognition abroad from different groups of people. The projects

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were not only publicised but given material assistance by generous organizations in the capitalist countries such as War on Want, Oxfam and so on. These organizations took an interest in this project for one reason or another. Besides giving material assistance they sent personnel as well. The government also invited the foreign countries to come and help the above schemes and projects. As the then Minister for Commerce and Industry, Mr. A.Z.N. Swai, said in May 1961:

"Bring young capital, enterprise and technical know-how to Tanganyika and explore here for mineral wealth. Bring it in the knowledge that your capital will be welcome and protected and that you will be sure of getting fair play and all reasonable encouragement in your endeavours. This land is the land of opportunity for us, it is also the land of opportunity for you."

The above discussion suggests that these schemes were given both financial assistance and personnel. Given this kind of background, the 'settlers' and their foreign advisers looked at the kibbutz for a model of what they wanted to construct.

As we have shown, given the low level of economic resources, it was not difficult at all for these people to assume communal activities very soon. For example, at the period of the debacle of the government settlement schemes, the R.D.A. generally carried on communal production of all their crops, with individuals holding insignificant plots of land surrounding their buildings. Houses were set up communally, since settlers had moved into these projects literally without anything. Socially and culturally, settlers lived in a big family with communal meals,

1. ibid., p.24.
sometimes communal dances and so on. Issues like bride price or dowry were covered by the scheme labour.

Although the R.D.A. was to be closed down, with T.A.N.U. and the administration taking over direct responsibility for these villages, the R.D.A. was able to develop a model which shaped much of the thinking about ujamaa and also acted as a training group for village leaders and for future party and government ujamaa cadres. In other words, R.D.A. provided a practical testing-ground for the theories which Mwalim Nyerere had developed in his paper on ujamaa published in 1962 and it afforded valuable experience on the problems involved in collective life and work.

Independence and efforts to implement the above plans brought unusual activity in rural Tanganyika. One must not ignore, however, the difficulties which developed. First, large numbers of inexperienced personnel were employed and insufficiently supervised. In the government bureaucracy, salaries were out of proportion to productivity. They were much higher than was justified in an underdeveloped economy. Government officials were paid according to what was paid to British personnel, which was a dangerous colonial heritage.

Second, African administrators trained by the British colonial government and influenced by their technocratic attitudes did not always approve of the working methods of their new superiors, the Party, RCs and ACs. The latter on the other hand, according to Ruthenberg, did not always trust those who had faithfully

served the British. In some Districts, Village and District Development Committees were known as 'talking-councils'. More seriously, some political leaders at all levels included ambitious people who wanted to get rich fast. For example, influential leaders took loans from banks, built expensive houses and then rented them to embassy people in Dar-es-Salaam, demanding a rent of, say, five to ten years, to be paid in advance. Then they would invest this money in more house construction or other businesses.

According to Ruthenberg, roads were constructed where they were not needed, self-help projects were begun which could not be accomplished locally. The government was thus compelled to put money and personnel into areas which did not have priority. This was serious in agriculture, where people applied the rule 'take the hoe and cultivate this land; the government will help those who help themselves', often before the land was tested for its suitability. This was a technical problem. Economic use of officials and the technical personnel on the other hand seemed to be particularly difficult. For example, the services of expensive specialists were requested without realizing the cost.

Third, maize contributed by the United States played an important role, partly helpful and partly dangerous, in settlements and self-help schemes. 90,000 tons of maize and 2,000 tons of powdered milk were supplied between 1961 and 1963.

2. New offices were built in the most expensive streets of a town. The personnel drove around expensive cars where a bicycle or motor cycle or cheap car would do. Moreover, it was not always clear that it was justifiable for example, to get an agronomist trained for years overseas for a 100 acre scheme.
It began because of failing crops. In the beginning maize was supplied unconditionally to the needy. Later on, the distribution of maize was combined with emergency projects. One adult received for one day's work sh. 1.50 plus 1 lb. of maize and 2 oz. of powdered milk. With the passage of time, allocation of maize became an important attraction for settlements and self-help schemes, so that it was not always easy to determine the motive for participation. There is no doubt the United States' maize prevented starvation in certain areas. However, it seriously affected willingness to work in others. In some places the peasants considered it was more advantageous to participate in emergence schemes, where work was easy and supervision scarce, than to cultivate their own fields. The first years of Independence brought great expectations, hasty changes in personnel and an appeal to African patriotism. The government and T.A.N.U. avoided unpopular measures; activity was encouraged rather than ordered.

In summarising the agricultural development in April 1966, the Vice-President announced the end of the settlement schemes. The schemes had been heavily 'over-capitalised', the settlers had worked far less hard than settlers, say, on unassisted schemes and they had expected the Government to give them everything. Over £1 million had had to be written off.

Ujamaa and Villagization

February 1967 saw the Arusha Declaration, followed by nationalisation of the banks, the largest subsidiaries of foreign firms, eight import/export houses and the most profitable sisal estates. In March 1967 Mwalim Nyerere introduced 'Education for Self-Reliance',
and in September 1967 'socialism and Rural Development' specifically rejected rural capitalism and turned the ujamaa of the 1962 paper into a national policy:

"We can be made to work together by, and for the benefit of, a slave owner or by, and for the profit of, a capitalist. Alternatively we can work together voluntarily for our own benefit. We shall achieve the goals we in this country have set ourselves ...."¹

Mwalim suggested that we already had groups of people who were trying to operate this system in many areas of Tanzania. Other people had to be encouraged to adopt this way of life. It was not a question of forcing these people to change their habits. It was a question of leadership and education.

Yet, as early as 1968, some RCs were forcing peasants into ujamaa villages. It is widely known, for instance, that in many parts of the country peasants had been herded into ujamaa villages by either force or threats.² Mwalim argued, however, that development cannot come from outsiders, that people can only develop themselves. The ujamaa village was a new conception based on the post-Arusha Declaration understanding that 'what we need to develop is people'. Mwalim argued that no one could be forced into an ujamaa village 'for if these things happen ... that is if an outsider gives instructions and enforces them - then it will no longer be an ujamaa village'.

In the same policy paper, 'Socialism and Rural Development', Mwalim explained that many mistakes had been made and that it

². Mapolu, op.cit., p.45.
was very important that the right lessons should be drawn from these mistakes. He emphasized this point in relation to the issue of rural development:

"We have tried to promote rural development in the past we sometimes spent huge sums of money on establishing a settlement ... In other cases we just encouraged young men to leave the towns for a rural area then left them to their own devices ... We acted on the assumption that there was a short cut to rural development to go to the new settlements by promising them that they could quickly grow rich there or that Government would give them service and equipment which they could not hope to receive in the towns or in their traditional farming places. In very few cases was any ideology involved, we thought and talked in terms of greatly increased output of things being provided for the settlers."¹

Mwalim emphasised that ujamaa living or production and distribution of material things would have to start, as in China, with small groups of people rather than large villages. Chinese influence on the policy in Tanzania cannot be underestimated and it was strengthened by Chinese aid to Tanzania. One can also suggest, however, that the policy was learnt from the failures which we have shown earlier and from the successes of those small groups like Litowo which began and grew on a different basis.

The thesis that ujamaa living would have to start on a voluntary basis, with small groups of people rather than with large villages was clearly stated in the policy document 'Freedom and Development':

But shortly afterwards Nyerere seemed to have decided that this sort of ujamaa would be both slow and divisive. This suggests that what the government wanted was to have effective control of agriculture even though this contradicted the earlier interpretation of ujamaa village-formation and implementation. This was the start of the villagization policy. In 1969 there were four policy changes which legitimised the use of force and led to a national policy in favour of large villages.

Presidential Circular No. 1 of 1969 ordered all Government departments to give preference in their investment policies to the new villages, and a Regional Development Fund was created, putting about two million shillings a year into the hands of RCs to be spent on small projects. The sudden availability of funds allowed officials and politicians to promise groups of peasants who agreed to start villages that they could be provided with whatever social service they wanted. Since local politicians were judged according to the number of villages they could report in their area, the same mistakes made during the early settlement schemes - authoritarian leadership, over-capitalization and corruption - were repeated. As a result the will of the people to work collapsed and all these issues led to a tremendous drop

in production. We shall document this and give more evidence later.

The programme was to be implemented in three overlapping phases. The directive showed in general terms what role T.A.N.U. and the various government Departments were expected to play.

First, T.A.N.U. and government leaders had to be educated and trained in the ideology and methods of establishing ujamaa villages. This task was performed by the party college at Kivukoni and by T.A.N.U. itself. Though ujamaa was to be implemented by the peasants themselves, it was also a government policy and as such the responsibility of government bureaucrats, whose success and capabilities were to be judged in terms of their achievements in implementing ujamaa.

The second phase consisted in the taking of the ideas of ujamaa to the people through education and helping them to start such production units. T.A.N.U. had to carry out this task.

In the final phase the Ministry of Rural Development in co-operation with the Regional and District authorities was charged with the providing organizational and technical aid as well as guidance and soil services to the prospective villagers. Lack of specificity reflects the lack of clarity as to how to go about implementing the policy which had not yet been put in any programme form. The lack of clarity also shows how seriously the issue was to be taken generally. Lionel Cliffe reported that, in the first draft of the Second Five Year Plan (1969-1974),

2. ibid., p.46, also Lionel Cliffe, 'The Policy of ujamaa village and class struggle' in Cliffe and Saul, op.cit., p.197.
there was originally no mention of *ujamaa* villages, and this was included only after the first draft had been rejected by Mwalim Nyerere.

Villages soon found that officials had very little interest in whether or not production succeeded. Until 1977 in Ismani, for example, communal yields were negligible as a proportion of total production.

Presidential Circular No. 1 of 1969 was important for a second reason. According to Coulson it went out of its way to give the same weight to State Farms as a means of raising production that it gave to *ujamaa* villages. The Second Five Year Plan was revised to incorporate provision for about 40 State Farms under Kilimo (Ministry of Agriculture). Because it had already been noted that production was decreasing fast, the government had to start these ventures to make good the loss. In July 1969, with totally inadequate preparation, money was put in 15 of these. All of them proved extremely unprofitable. First, very few civil servants were available with experience of running large-scale agricultural production and the government accounting system encouraged purchases of expensive farm equipment before basic management systems had been worked out. Second, costs were very high, yields were low and there was considerable corruption. All along they had been opposed by many official workers of Kilimo. Coulson suggests that the sudden appearance of the policy in 1969 showed that Mwalim no longer saw *ujamaa* as the only acceptable way of raising agricultural production.

In this sense the *ujamaa* policy only lasted for about two years.

The third important event of 1969, as we argued earlier, was the abolition of the Ruvuma Development Association. From the start, the R.D.A. had enemies. In the early years these included expatriates who felt that the project was attracting settlers away from the village settlement schemes. Later they included RCs and other politicians who tried to force every peasant producer in the area to cultivate one acre of fire-cured tobacco leaf. Peasants resisted and argued their case pointing out that fire-cured leaf was a very time-consuming crop whose low yield and low price did not at all justify the labour involved.

In September 1969 Mwalim allowed the R.D.A. to be gazetted as an illegal organisation. It's assets were confiscated by T.A.N.U. and the most advanced *ujamaa* organisation in Tanzania was destroyed. *Ujamaa* policy lasted for a short period because, first, the peasants were reluctant to form these units of production. Second, Mwalim was no longer satisfied with the speed of progress that would be implied by leaving *ujamaa* to small groups of committed individuals. Nor was Mwalim prepared to allow the emergence of a new form of differentiation between committed socialists and the rest. Moreover, he specifically rejected calls for a 'vanguard party' or for 'cadres', instead stressing the need for a frontal approach, the need to involve every person in Tanzania, and in particular everyone in the Party, however small, in the move towards socialism. The R.D.A. was one of the first big casualties of this new approach.

Between 1970 and 1973 a number of 'operations' were suggested and put into practice by the government officials. For example
the 'Presidential Planning Teams' were set up and visited different regions of Tanzania. These teams were composed of young Tanzanian experts. According to Coulson, these specialists sometimes collided with more experienced regional political leaders. The Ruvuma RC, Wilbert Klerruu, repudiated the Presidential team and instead used his own staff for village planning. By the end of 1970 this region reported 750 villages out of only 1,956 villages in the whole of Tanzania.

Dr. Klerruu was a Chagga, the most academically qualified politician in the country, with a Ph.D in Political Science awarded for research on 'The One Party System of Government'. He was also the most effective at founding villages. Klerruu was transferred to Iringa Region, where by the end of 1971 651 villages were registered. But on Christmas Day 1971 he was shot dead by an African capitalist farmer at Mkungugu village, in Ismani Division. After his assassination, politicians were reluctant to use ideas of socialism or confrontation to persuade farmers to form villages. (We shall return to this case in some detail in Chapter Seven). Agricultural production in Iringa District declined and the 1972 T.A.N.U. statement on Siasa ni Kilimo (Politics in Agriculture) was noticeable for its lack of emphasis on ujamaa as a means or strategy of increasing production. Instead it stressed technical methods - oxen, use of manure and so on:

1. ibid., p.28.
There is a widespread fall in the production per acre. For instance, when Ismani was still a virgin land 20 or 25 years ago, the maize production per acre stood at 20 or more bags of maize per acre. Today, Ismani produces an average of only 7 bags of maize per acre. Also despite the fact that there are better cotton seeds today, than in the past, the production in the areas where cotton is usually planted has decreased. Even for new crops like tobacco in many areas already the production per acre has begun to fall. Soil erosion has spoiled and continued to spoil the land in many areas.¹

The policy paper stated that, if our agricultural techniques remained the same we should not be in a position to maintain the existing position, let alone improve it. Moreover the policy of socialism would have failed if in the years to come we were unable to produce sufficient food. If we failed to acquire foreign reserves from our exports, there would be a halt in our development projects. However, the development of agriculture is not a purely technical task, as Siasa ni Kilimo tended to suggest. It can succeed only with the co-operation of the farmer and on the basis of an accurate understanding of the social formation of which the farmer is part.

In July 1972 there was a decentralisation of the civil service. Elected local government was abolished and replaced by a civil service administration under the Prime Minister. A similar reorganisation of the Party strengthened the salaried Party officials at the expense of the elected representatives. Actually for the first time this process created a strong, well-paid bureaucracy at regional, district, divisional and ward levels which concretised the government's attempt to

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control and police the countryside effectively.

It was clear from the start that the main job of both the Government and the Party bureaucracies was to organise operations. In September 1973 the T.A.N.U. Biennial Conference approved the resolution that the whole rural population should live in villages by the end of 1976. The party paper Uhuru reported on 4 July 1975 that there were 9,140,000 people living in the newly created villages under the villagization programme. In December 1973 Mwalim was quoted as saying: 'To live in village is an Order'.

Reports from many regions confirm that large amounts of force or threats were used, so that the majority of peasants found it prudent to move first and argue later. The crudest methods of mobilising people into these villages were used by the leadership. This is not to say that all peasants were against moving. Many no doubt saw the advantages of being closer to roads and so on. Others may have had reservations about moving away from land they had farmed for years. Some resented the timing; in Iringa District people were moved at the beginning of the long rains, the time when cultivation was supposed to begin.

The village sites had been chosen by Ward Development Committees and approved at District and Regional levels without consulting the peasants, people who had had long experience in these areas. Sometimes, conflicting ideas from the officials resulted in the moving village sites many times. Mwalim himself admitted these

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mistakes in his speech celebrating the tenth anniversary of the Arusha Declaration. In his Report to the 1973 T.A.N.U. conference, Nyerere said that 2,028,164 people were living in villages¹. Two years later, in June 1975, he reported to the T.A.N.U. conference that approximately 9,100,000 people were living in village communities, and that by 1977 there would be about 13,065,000 people living in 7,684 villages. This was a tremendous achievement, he argued. It was an achievement of the party and government. It meant that something like 70 per cent of Tanzanians had moved their homes in the space of about three years. Pointing to mistakes and failures, Mwalim said:

"We have become defensive about the villagisation exercise because there were widely publicised cases of maladministration, and even of mistreatment of people. Some few leaders did act without thinking, and without any consultation with the people who had to move. Therefore we did have cases of people being required to move from an area of permanent water to an area which is permanently dry. We have other cases where the new villages were made too large for the amount of land available. And there were cases where people were rounded up without notice, and dumped on the village site, without time to prepare shelter for themselves. But it is absurd to pretend that these cases were typical of villagisation. They did occur, and they were bad examples of leadership failure. Of course they made people very angry - and rightly so. If one fish in a barrel goes bad, they all go bad. Yet it remains true that 11 million people could not have been moved by force in Tanzania we do not have the physical capacity for such forced movement, any more than we have the desire for it."²

The move certainly involved short term costs. It was implemented in the middle of several very poor years for food production. Mwapachu reported to the government that cotton

production was directly affected by the villagisation and other cash crop growing must have been affected too.

There may also be an agricultural cost in the long run. For the soils in areas of cultivation immediately around the newly created village sites will be in a danger of getting exhausted quickly, and where there are many cattle there will be a strong danger of soil erosion along cattle tracks and near watering places, as Coulson and others have correctly pointed out.

Government and party officials defended villagisation for reasons very similar to those that Mwalim had given in 1962, that it would make it easier for the government to provide social services like water supplies, dispensaries, schools, famine relief in bad seasons and so on. This was undoubtedly the reason why the overriding requirement for new village sites was always that they should be very near an all-weather road. According to von Freyhold, the party told the peasants to pull down their old homes and move to large villages whose only visible advantages were better accessibility to administrative supervision and it was the Party which brought in the militia, the field force and the army if peasants refused to move. It was the Party which told the peasants how many acres of what crop they had to grow and enforced these rules. Gone were the days when peasants could ignore unwanted official orders. Recent villagisation operations taught the peasants that such old forms of resistance were no longer workable.

4. ibid., p.7.
Coulson has criticised the argument put forward by the government that the provision of services to the countryside justified the villagisation programme. The first point is that the government in fact found it difficult to maintain the existing services even before villagization. Why should the Party and government create demands for services which it must have known it could not provide?

Second, in some parts of Tanzania people were moved from places where the population density was so high that the services could have been provided within perhaps a range of two miles of every household without more than a very few people having to move. We are dealing here with a complex problem of social change; it is clear that provision of services cannot have been the only consideration behind the move.

Mwalim claimed that the object of the move was to increase agricultural production, but we were not told precisely how villagisation was supposed to increase production. In Chapter Seven we shall suggest on the contrary that in the long run it may have exactly the opposite effect.

A set of arguments from Issa Shivji have claimed that the object of villagisation was for the officials to control peasant production and thus achieve control of all the means of production in the country. Bureaucrats are unable to produce themselves and thus are dependent on getting production out of the peasants. But merely to indicate an increase in direct state intervention in the agricultural sector does not tell us much, even if one

2. Shivji, op.cit., pp.107-120.
documents the increasingly open use of force which has accompanied it. What is important is how this development emerged from the assumptions and modes of operation of a specifically bureaucratic group of people controlling the State, and the relation of this to the emergence of the rich peasants. Raikes has pointed out that any full analysis of this issue would also demand the specification of the role of international capital.

Greatly increased foreign aid for agriculture lessened the short-term problems of production. This aid included in 1974/75 gifts of food grains from the United States, Canada and various European countries, and even small contributions from North Korea and India. Denmark gives more aid to Tanzania than to any other country. Aid to Tanzania includes International Development Agency credits for every crop of importance. Villagisation, unlike ujamaa, has an attraction to donors such as the World Bank as a way of bringing orderliness into rural investment. The distinction we made earlier between ujamaa and villagisation is a very important one in this respect.

Ujamaa's critics suggest that villagization has often been bad for agriculture. Some villagers have lived naturally in houses scattered about the countryside in pockets of good land. This has sometimes been for very good reasons: because there is insufficient fertile land to support a large community without the addition of many expensive inputs such as irrigation, fertilizers and insecticides. Shifting settlement was natural for nomadic stock-raising people. When people are grouped in villages there

is often not sufficient good land within walking distance and often water for human and animal consumption proves to be insufficient, as argued earlier. Frequently there is inadequate agricultural expertise to ensure that the right crops are grown and the right farming methods and techniques followed.\(^1\)

Moreover critics also advance the statistical argument that production has been falling for most crops since 1970-71, the year after the villagisation programmes were put into effect. Surely the acid test of ujamaa, if we may put it that way, is the success of agricultural production. If villagisation fails to boost the level of consumption of the peasants and create a surplus to feed the towns and to export, if Tanzania's overall agricultural production falls, then the policy has failed. The proponents of ujamaa are quite prepared to be judged eventually on this criterion.

We now turn to the official statement accounting for the fall in agricultural production since the 'experiment' began.\(^2\) Sales of wheat to the marketing boards rose from 1968 to 1971 but then declined from a record 57,000 tons in 1972 to barely 10,000 tons in 1974. In Dodoma region the marketing boards were able to purchase 52,000 tons of maize, the national staple crop, or 50 per cent of total production to feed the towns in 1972-73, but by 1974-75 this surplus had dried up altogether. There was no maize for sale to the National Agricultural Marketing Board because the peasants had none to spare.

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1. Daily News, October 21, 1975. Nyerere had a considerable body of research behind him when he said that, even if he was to sack all agricultural officers, agricultural production would in no way be affected, because the experts confined themselves to statistics and report-writing anyway.
Government officials admit the downward trend since 1972. Before then food production was gradually rising. Then came the first year of drought in 1971, followed by even worse years in 1973 and 1974. According to the official report, the drop in agricultural production was always entirely due to the drought and the bad figures corresponded precisely to the years of bad rainfall. The argument is that, though villagisation started in 1970, it was only in 1974 that the real campaign to move the people started. Villagisation cannot be blamed because production was falling before the process started.

In fact the argument could be put the other way round. Tanzania launched its intensive villagisation programme in September 1973 because production was already falling and because again drastic action had to be taken to cope with the situation. But critics have also produced figures to show that the total rainfall in the whole country over the worst drought years was not far down on the seasonal average. The explanation given by spokesmen for the Ministry of Agriculture is that the rains came at the wrong time. A short burst encouraged farmers to plant, and then dried up. A little more came, and the farmers replanted, but the seed dried before it had time to swell. The issue is very problematic.

Other reasons put forward by government officials as to why agricultural production declined are as follows. First, there was a lack of investment in food crops and a dependence on

subsistence surplus to feed the towns, when the need was for commercial production. Too much emphasis was put on cash crops in the colonial tradition, partly because infrastructure and marketing were geared to supply metropolitan industries. On the other hand, Tanzania is so poor that in the past many have been content with only one meal a day but now some are asking for at least two meals, so food consumption has been rising. Second, the management of producer prices has been very poor. There were no proper price reviews based on long-term strategies before 1974. The reason producer prices were kept at low levels was because of the need to keep down prices of basic items of consumption and protect the urban workers and most active T.A.N.U. members against inflation, in order to avoid political unrest there.

The World Bank and other aid organisations pressed for higher prices on the grounds that they would spread wealth to the rural areas, where it was really needed, and give peasants an incentive to produce more. The Tanzanian government has now fully accepted this. Tanzania is said to be a social formation organised to achieve Robert McNamara's dream of 'reaching the poorest of the poor'. The last phrase applies well to the 95 per cent who live in rural areas in Tanzania.

World Bank aid to Tanzania started to build up in a big way in 1973. Before then between $15m and $25m was disbursed each year, but in 1974 a total of $120m was committed to new projects. The World Bank is also well advanced in setting up a national

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1. ibid., p.83.
maize project to help the government boost food grain production. We shall return to this issue in Chapter Seven.

Conclusion

In this chapter we have looked at the agricultural difficulties in Tanzania in the 1960s and at the origin of the agricultural policy and where its leading ideas came from. We have also tried to show how the ujamaa vijijini policy has undergone a rather striking metamorphosis during the past decade. Originally announced as a policy for self-initiation by peasants, with encouragement from the Party and government, of communal and co-operative farms, it has been transformed into a state policy for the compulsory resettlement of the rural population in nucleated villages.
CHAPTER SIX
TOBACCO PRODUCTION IN TANZANIA, 1960-1977

Why did tobacco production expand rapidly in the 1960s and up to 1977? Which groups of people produce tobacco in Tanzania, and how are these people related to the government policy? What is the role of the nationalised sector, in this case the Tanzania Tobacco Company, in the national economy?

In seeking answers to these and related questions of rural enterprise and development policy, this chapter provides evidence in support of the following assertions. Our first contention is that the government's attempts to encourage tobacco production in ujamaa villages in Iringa District has failed and tobacco continues to be dominated by settlers. Second, nationalisation of the tobacco industry is a necessary step but is not sufficient to cut off exploitation by the big foreign firms and so build 'socialism' in Tanzania.

The chapter falls into two main sections, which are further divided into several sub-sections. In the first section (A), we begin by looking at tobacco as a priority government crop in the Second Five Year Plan. Second we consider the main areas of tobacco production in Tanzania in order to understand the production system, the people who cultivate the crop and the way these people are related to government policy.

Section (B) starts with an examination of the development of the tobacco industry within the wider context of the role of the nationalised industrial sector in Tanzania. Second we look at the role of the Tobacco Authority, and the third
sub-section focuses closely on tobacco production in Iringa region, including the role of child labour in this industry. Finally we consider the impact of the official policies and make an evaluation of ujamaa performance.

(A)(i). Background

Tobacco has been an increasingly important crop as a foreign exchange earner in Tanzania. Its importance was amplified by the fact that the government chose it as one of the priority crops in the Second Five Year Development Plan, 1969-74.

Flue-cured tobacco became a profitable cash crop in the mid-1960s, as the Tanzanian government encouraged the expansion of tobacco production in order to fill the gap in the world market created by sanctions against Rhodesia. Rhodesia had exported about 200 million lbs. of flue-cured tobacco to Western European capitalist social formations just before sanctions. On the other hand, India was switching over parts of its tobacco area to food-crop production. These developments were taken seriously by the Tanzanian government, and officials took the view that there would be a demand for Tanzanian tobacco on the world market for some time to come.

(ii). Areas of Production

It is important to identify the main areas of tobacco production in Tanzania, because this enables us to see what groups of people produce the crop, the type of leaf they produce and the way these groups are related to government policy. The whole discussion will be centred on flue-cured tobacco, the reason being that fire-cured tobacco has become a problem crop due to lack of markets as well as falling farmer - and world prices.
There are three major areas where flue-cured tobacco is grown in Tanzania. The two major types of tobacco grown are flue-cured Virginia and fire-cured. Flue-cured tobacco is grown in Tabora, Mpanda and Nzenga Districts (Tabora Region), Iringa, Mufindi and Njombe districts (Iringa Region) and Chunya District (Mbeya Region). Production of a third type - air-cured Burley tobacco - is still at an experimental stage in Morogoro and Handeni areas and the quantities produced so far are insignificant.

The Urambo/Kilima area in Tabora is by far the largest producer of tobacco in the country. After the failure of the groundnuts scheme in Urambo, the Overseas Food Corporation tried various alternative crops and found success in tobacco growing. In the late 1960s the government sponsored tobacco village settlement schemes in the area west of Tabora and the British American Tobacco Company had schemes around Tabora East. Now there are also a considerable number of peasants producing tobacco in this area. The region now produces about 56 per cent of the total flue-cured leaf in the country.

Iringa Region is also famous for tobacco growing (see Map 6). The estate tobacco growers are Greek settlers and Asians and a small number of African peasant growers. Iringa Region produces about 24 per cent of the total flue-cured leaf. Normally these settler farms grow only tobacco with some acreage under maize to feed the labour force.

IRINGA REGION

LARGE-SCALE DIRECT PRODUCTION AND PRODUCTION INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS: 1969-1974

KEY REFERENCE

- LIVESTOCK / NATIONAL RESOURCES PROJECTS
- CROP PRODUCTION PROJECTS
- PRODUCTION INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS

© IRINGA SUB DISTRICT OFFICE, BOX 162, O/1977 KAMIN / PRM. SOURCE 1976 FAO
The Lupatingatinga settlement scheme in Chunya District is a new area but has good soil for tobacco production and offers considerable scope for tobacco expansion. This area in Mbeya Region produces a small quantity of tobacco. A notable feature of these tobacco areas is that tobacco growing is clearly the most lucrative and profitable agricultural activity. Recently it has been the policy of the government to encourage these growers to produce food crops as well, mainly for feeding labourers. This enables better farming (rotation etc.) and a full utilization of labour and other factors of production.

(iii). Production systems

Until 1964 the largest supply of Tanzanian tobacco came from plantations owned by Europeans in the Iringa and Tabora Regions. The number of such growers has declined but there are still about 50 Greek and Asian large-scale farmers in Iringa District. Our findings show that a large farm has about 120 acres under tobacco and, although highly capitalised, it still uses a considerable amount of hired labour, especially children, in order to keep the costs of production down. We shall return to this point later.

Table 6.1 shows the increase in peasant participation in the tobacco industry during 1959-68. The table shows the rapid increase in tobacco production resulting from the opening of new land in Tabora region by peasants. The table also shows the more or less steady absolute position of the estate sector. In fact, as we shall see later, attempts by the government in Iringa District to encourage tobacco production in ujamaa villages in order to 'replace' settlers have failed.

1. This fact was confirmed by the Iringa District Labour Officer whom we interviewed on May 10th 1977 at his office.
TABLE 6.1

Estate and Peasant Production of Tobacco in Tanzania, 1959-68

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>PEASANTS (LBS.)</th>
<th>ESTATES (LBS.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>67,452</td>
<td>4,513,712</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>132,640</td>
<td>3,611,138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>514,226</td>
<td>2,985,096</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>482,588</td>
<td>1,907,751</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>1,112,907</td>
<td>2,177,966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>1,992,427</td>
<td>1,897,870</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>4,829,275</td>
<td>3,813,928</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>4,886,357</td>
<td>2,996,944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>6,689,133</td>
<td>3,433,760</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>8,004,343</td>
<td>3,224,264</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Tanzanian production is confined to the flue-cured and fire-cured types, the former at present being grown almost entirely by non-Africans and the latter chiefly by Africans. This distinction largely represents the relative capital investment necessary for, and the profitability of, the two types. Different environments, different varieties and different processing techniques are required for each.

If we look at the historical evolution of peasant production we find that peasant production of flue-cured tobacco was not

initiated until the early sixties. In the early stages, these peasant producers were each restricted to one acre and their cultivation of the commodity was highly supervised. Lack of capital meant that not all the peasants could start tobacco production.

Alibhai suggests that, when the Tanganyika Agricultural Corporation took over the assets and liabilities of the defunct Overseas Food Corporation, the East African Tobacco Company, a subsidiary of British American Tobacco (B.A.T.), and several settlement schemes under the Ministry of Agriculture, started encouraging peasants to produce more tobacco by providing loans and material inputs. Some success was made but the speed of development was not fast enough according to the government. Owing to problems of co-ordination and the lack of a large number of extension personnel, all small-holder production was put under the Settlement Division of the Ministry of Agriculture.

No accurate costings for production on the farm are available for tobacco for a number of seasons. Alibhai has presented figures for the 1966/67 season on the costs of production of an acre of flue-cured tobacco at Urambo settlement, Kiwere settlement scheme in Iringa, a large estate farmer in Iringa and the small-holders in a B.A.T. scheme around Tabora. These areas were chosen as examples to give a picture of relative costs of production at a particular moment in time.

These government-sponsored agricultural projects all received

their inputs from their headquarters in Dar-es-Salaam and so the price of these stores was the same for any scheme except for the different transport costs. Another important point is the way wages stood. It is difficult to get a rate applicable to all settlers but one fact stands out, that wages were 'low', in the sense discussed in Chapter Four. Moreover, costs per acre varied from season to another. Let us pick one example to illustrate this point. If, say, the rainfall were very heavy during a given season the fertilizer might get washed away and this might necessitate a dressing which would increase the fertilizer inputs. The information on the costs and returns of four different farms in the 1966/67 season was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Production Costs, Capital Investment and Returns per Acre of Tobacco, 1966/67 season: Large Estate Farmer, Iringa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fertilizer 5 bags at sh. 46/= @</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Depreciation</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Labour</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Paper - Hessian Twine</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Petrol - Fuel</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Insecticide - Fumigants</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Interest at 8%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total costs per acre (A)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Returns per acre:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>900 lbs. at 2.48 per lb. (B)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Profit (C) = (B) - (A)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Urambo Settlement Scheme, Tabora

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Shs. Cts.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fertilizer</td>
<td>177.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insecticide/Fumigants</td>
<td>10.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paper - Hessian Twine</td>
<td>34.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tractor hire</td>
<td>44.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Depreciation</td>
<td>137.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>407.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seedbed Pack</td>
<td>32.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest 5%</td>
<td>35.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-operative Levy at Cents 20 per lb.</td>
<td>140.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total costs per acre (A)</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,016.50</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Returns:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Shs. Cts.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>700 lbs. at 2.45 per lb. (B)</td>
<td>1,715.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Profit (C) = (B) - (A)**

### Kiwere Settlement Scheme, Iringa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Shs. Cts.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Depreciation</td>
<td>129.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fertilizer - 5 bags at 46/=</td>
<td>230.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D.D.T.</td>
<td>5.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ploughing/harrowing/ridging</td>
<td>105.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hauling tobacco/firewood/grass</td>
<td>25.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baling/handling hessian paper twine and haulage 900 lbs. at cent 10 per lb.</td>
<td>90.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water charge</td>
<td>24.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>172.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest</td>
<td>30.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cess at cents 20 per lb.</td>
<td>180.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total cost per acre (A)</strong></td>
<td><strong>990.25</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Returns per acre:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Shs. Cts.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>900 lbs. at 2.30 per lb. (B)</td>
<td>2,070.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Profit (C) = (B) - (A)**

### Calculations

- **Urambo Settlement Scheme, Tabora**
  - Total costs per acre (A) = 1,016.50
  - Returns = 700 lbs. at 2.45 per lb. = 1,715.00
  - Profit (C) = (B) - (A) = 698.50

- **Kiwere Settlement Scheme, Iringa**
  - Total cost per acre (A) = 990.25
  - Returns per acre = 900 lbs. at 2.30 per lb. = 2,070.00
  - Profit (C) = (B) - (A) = 1,079.75
B.A.T. Scheme Tabora - Tumbi

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Shs. Cts.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Depreciation</td>
<td>90.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>155.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fertilizer 6 bags at 44/= @</td>
<td>264.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seedbed Pack</td>
<td>32.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D.D.T.</td>
<td>9.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest</td>
<td>27.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Twine</td>
<td>16.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-operative levy cents 15 per lb. 600 lb./acre</td>
<td>90.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baling charge cents 10 per lb. 600 lb./acre</td>
<td>60.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total costs per acre (A)</td>
<td>743.50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Returns per acre:
- 600 lbs. at 2.20 per lb. (B)       1,320.00
- Profit (C) = (B) - (A)              576.50


(B) Tanzania Cigarette Company:
(i). Background to the Tobacco Industry

Several policies followed the Arusha Declaration. B.A.T.(T) was among the nationalised firms, and fair compensation was guaranteed. In May 1975, transfer of ownership from B.A.T. to State ownership was completed in Dar-es-Salaam. This date marked the birth of the Tanzania Cigarette Company Limited, which has effectively taken over the interests of the B.A.T. Group in Tanzania. It is noteworthy that Tanzania continued to lean on B.A.T. London for advice in some areas of operations through a Consultancy Agreement lasting three years from January 1975.

The Tanzania Cigarette Company was the manifestation of the nation's efforts to bring about economic independence. The National Development Corporation (N.D.C.) acquired 60 per cent of the shares but so much progress had been made in the field of self-reliance that the Government of Tanzania decided in 1975 to take over the remaining shares and place the company under Tanzanian management.

(ii). Tobacco Authority of Tanzania

The Tobacco Authority of Tanzania (T.A.T.) was created by the Tobacco Industry Act of 1972, which became effective on 1st July 1972. T.A.T. took over the activities of the then Tanganyika Tobacco Board and the Ministry of Agriculture's activities in the promotion of tobacco production in the country. The Tanganyika Tobacco Board, which had been formed under the Agricultural Products (Control and Marketing) Act of 1962, embraced the buying of tobacco from farmers, its processing and its marketing, whilst the Ministry of Agriculture concentrated on the tobacco production extension services. T.A.T. activities span the whole field of tobacco promotion in the country, which includes development, production, processing, marketing, research and the manufacture and distribution of tobacco products.

T.A.T. has two processing factories, one in Morogoro and the other in Songea. There are some 6,500 employees of whom 200 are in Headquarters, 1,800 in the Regions, 3,000 at the Morogoro factory and 1,500 at the Songea factory.

There has been a rapid increase in tobacco production under the T.A.T. From 7,700 tons in 1966/67, total production rose to 19,000 tons in 1975/76 and early in 1977 estimated production
for 1976/77 was 25,100 tons. The T.A.T. General Manager anticipated that production would be 30,000 tons by 1980\(^1\). This rapid increase could be attributed to:

(i) Mobilisation of farmers to increase production, the number of tobacco growing farmers having increased from 13,000 in 1966/67 to 47,000 in 1975/76.

(ii) More effective extension services to the farmers and the consequent adoption of better crop husbandry by the farmers, including timely planting, better spacing and better use of agricultural inputs, particularly N.P.K. fertilizer.

During the period 1967-1976 T.A.T. bought tobacco from farmers through their co-operative societies. As a result of the dissolution of the co-operative societies as from May 1976, T.A.T. now buys tobacco directly from the farmers. T.A.T. exports of tobacco have increased simultaneously with the increases in production. About 84 per cent of the 1975/76 production was exported, of which 22 per cent went to countries in Africa and 78 per cent to Overseas Countries. Domestic consumption was about 16 per cent of total production.

During 1975/76 season tobacco was the fifth most important foreign exchange earner for Tanzania, following coffee, sisal, cloves and cotton in that order\(^2\). T.A.T.'s partners in the

### TABLE 6.2

Tobacco Production in Tanzania by Type of Tobacco, 1966-77

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Flue-Cured</td>
<td>4,600</td>
<td>5,100</td>
<td>8,200</td>
<td>8,900</td>
<td>10,600</td>
<td>10,800</td>
<td>15,300</td>
<td>11,900</td>
<td>14,500</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire-Cured</td>
<td>3,100</td>
<td>2,100</td>
<td>3,500</td>
<td>3,200</td>
<td>3,600</td>
<td>2,200</td>
<td>2,900</td>
<td>2,300</td>
<td>4,500</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burley</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>7,700</td>
<td>7,200</td>
<td>11,700</td>
<td>11,000</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>14,200</td>
<td>13,000</td>
<td>18,212</td>
<td>14,223</td>
<td>19,039</td>
<td>25,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flue-Cured as % of Total</td>
<td>59.74</td>
<td>70.83</td>
<td>70.08</td>
<td>80.91</td>
<td>73.33</td>
<td>74.64</td>
<td>83.07</td>
<td>84.01</td>
<td>83.67</td>
<td>76.20</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** R.A. Lyatuu, General Manager (T.A.T.)
### TABLE 6.3

Tobacco Sales During the Year 1975/76 (Tons)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>FLUE-CURED</th>
<th>FIRE-CURED</th>
<th>BURLEY</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania (Domestic)</td>
<td>2,200</td>
<td>800</td>
<td></td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>15.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>895</td>
<td></td>
<td>8,895</td>
<td>46.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holland</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>875</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,375</td>
<td>7.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Germany</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>120</td>
<td></td>
<td>420</td>
<td>2.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>2,800</td>
<td>540</td>
<td></td>
<td>3,340</td>
<td>17.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>1,150</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>1,389</td>
<td>7.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
<td>150</td>
<td>0.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
<td>70</td>
<td>0.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>14,500</strong></td>
<td><strong>4,500</strong></td>
<td><strong>39</strong></td>
<td><strong>19,039</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** R.A. Lyatuu, General Manager (T.A.T.)

tobacco business include: (i) Overseas: U.K., Holland, Ireland, Australia, West Germany, Belgium, Denmark, Sweden, France and Kuwait; (ii) African countries: Kenya, Somalia and Mozambique; (iii) Domestic: Tanzania Cigarette Company, Dar-es-Salaam and the Zanzibar Cigarette Company. Tables 6.2 and 6.3 show national production trends 1966-77 and tobacco sales for 1975/76. The tables show a considerable increase of tobacco production and also that most of the tobacco is exported.
The Tanzania domestic market is an English Virginia market with only a touch of pseudo-American blend in the form of Senate Filter Tipped. It is also a large market for fire-cured tobacco in what is popularly referred to as Kali cigarettes, which are also quite popular in France and Latin America. Ten years ago Kali cigarettes accounted for as much as 53 per cent of the total cigarettes consumed in Tanzania, but this has now dropped to 37 per cent today, indicating the smoking public's preference for a lighter smoke. There is also a significant trend from plain to filter-tipped cigarettes which, during the period under review, increased from 28 per cent to 71 per cent of the total market in Tanzania.

The officials of Tanzania Cigarette Company argue that, among the several features which make the Company one of the most successful of those owned by the State, is effective financial control and planning. This company has always remained financially viable and has never had recourse to overdraft facilities, apart from occasional 'overnight' needs. As borne out by the figures in Table 6.4, the Company has provided a considerable boost to government revenue by increasing its tax contribution year after year since nationalisation.

### TABLE 6.4

**Tanzania Cigarette Co. Revenue Contribution to the Government**  
*(millions of shillings)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Excise and Sales Tax</th>
<th>Corporation Tax</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Per Cent Increase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>65.6</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>72.0</td>
<td>+ 20.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>79.5</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>86.7</td>
<td>+ 16.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>92.3</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>101.1</td>
<td>+ 13.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>105.7</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>115.2</td>
<td>+ 17.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>125.7</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>135.3</td>
<td>+ 17.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>148.2</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>158.9</td>
<td>+ 23.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>179.4</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>196.3</td>
<td>+ 38.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975*</td>
<td>257.5*</td>
<td>14.5*</td>
<td>272.0</td>
<td>+ 14.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976*</td>
<td>297.7</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>312.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Adjusted for 12 months  
* Estimate


This topic calls for a brief digression to the role of the 'industrialised' sector in Tanzania, which in turn requires us to locate Tanzania in its proper historical and international setting.

Following the Arusha Declaration the N.D.C. acquired a majority ownership in several foreign-owned companies, that is the commanding heights of the economy. Shivji, however, has suggested that nationalisations do not necessarily mean the socialization of the economy. In fact, they do not even loosen

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the grip of the Multinational Corporations (M.N.Cs.)\(^1\) for the
N.D.C. immediately went into a variety of partnership
arrangements with them. In most cases the M.N.Cs. were satisfied
to be minority shareholders. Partnership between the N.D.C. and
M.N.Cs. meant entering Management Service Agreements,
Consultancy Agreements, Marketing and Sales Management Agreements,
Licensing Agreements and so on. We have seen that this is the
case of the Tanzania Cigarette Co. It is quite common for such
agreements to provide that payments will be made wholly or
partly in hard currency.

According to Shivji, these partnership arrangements allow
multinationals to achieve the old ends of exploitation through
new forms. Furthermore, the newer forms had also become
necessary because of important changes in the international
economic and political order.\(^2\)

The monopoly of technology in the hands of the M.N.Cs., plus
their large size, relative financial autonomy and long-term
horizon, and the political leverage of their powerful state,
has meant that the M.N.Cs. command a very strong position
(bargaining or otherwise) vis-a-vis the Third World. Hence,
complete ownership of the means of production in the
'periphery' was not absolutely necessary to them.

The Tanganyika Development Finance Co. had something like sh. 226
million invested in a number of projects at the end of 1971.\(^3\)

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1. Ronald Müller, 'The Multinational Corporation and the
   Underdevelopment of the Third World', in Charles K. Wilber, ed.,
   The Political Economy of Development and Under-
   development, 1973, is a concise and informative account on
   the impact of the M.N.C. in Latin America.
3. ibid., p.169.
Out of this, total local capital constituted about 63 per cent and foreign capital about 37 per cent. A large portion of the so-called foreign capital may in fact be part of the profits made during the company's operation in the 1960s and ploughed back, thereby increasing the assets of the company without any net foreign exchange gain for the national economy. By associating with public capital, the foreign partner retains its previous market and gets a foothold in the new market, with all the protection and backing of the State.

According to Shivji, these foreign firms are then given tariff protection, tax concessions and so on. This considerably reduces the competition that the foreign company would otherwise have to face from rival oligopolies. In partnership with State capital, the foreign firm gets a chance to use infrastructural facilities such as loans from the nationalised banks. The parastatals are now the largest customers of the commercial banks, accounting for over 60 per cent of the total credit outstanding.

The historical relation between Tanzania and the developed capitalist countries has meant, besides many other things, the drain of a large portion of the economic surplus. Profits and other revenues repatriated by the M.N.Cs. represent a net loss of the Tanzanian economy. It is difficult to estimate this

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1. ibid., p.170.
2. John Loxley and John S. Saul, 'Multinationals, Workers and the Parastatals in Tanzania', *Review of African Political Economy*, No. 2, 1975, p.54. The term parastatal is generally used to refer to those governmental organisations (e.g. Tanzania Cigarette Co.) which fall outside the main lines of the Departmental and Ministerial hierarchies and which in consequence enjoy some measure of quasiautonomy in their day to day activities. Parastatals are important as generators and users of the national surplus.
loss, especially after the nationalizations, when association with M.N.C.s. takes on such forms as Management Agreements. In addition, foreign firms are in a good position to manipulate intra-corporation prices, to employ over-invoicing and so on, thereby enhancing the profits of the Group as a whole.¹

While, therefore, it is difficult to estimate exactly the extent of capital export resulting from the exploitation by foreign capital, there is no doubt that this is substantial. Thus partnership with these foreign firms substantially reduces the size of economic surplus available for investment².

All too often the justification for reliance on western management and partnership with Tanzania has been that the M.N.C. helps the country to get the necessary technology and train local manpower³. The argument is that Tanzania is dependent upon western companies for the supply of technology, machinery, etc. This argument is similar to a broader 'school' which treats the problem of 'underdevelopment' in similar deterministic fashion, claiming that the predominance of modern technology in the western developed capitalist world and its relative absence in the 'periphery' countries is the real causal factor underlying the disparity in the level of productive forces between the rich and poor⁴. We suggested in Chapter Two that it was the exploitative character of imperialism which created and continues to consolidate 'underdevelopment' as a phenomenon and that the technological gap is itself a product of this exploitation. It follows that simple technological transfers will not solve the

2. ibid., p.173.  
3. ibid., p.175.  
4. Loxley and Saul, op.cit., p.75.
problem and close the gap until these fundamental exploitative ties have been severed. Nationalization is, by itself, insufficient to eradicate exploitation and poverty when foreign management ties remain intact; nationalisation is a necessary but not a sufficient condition of progress towards socialist goals.

(iii). Tobacco Production in Iringa Region

With rapid expansion of tobacco production elsewhere in the country, especially on ujamaa farms in Tabora Region, Iringa's stagnant output has given her a declining share in national production of flue-cured tobacco. This share fell from 38 per cent in 1969/70, to 35 per cent in 1970/71, 27 per cent in 1971/72 and 24 per cent in 1972/73, rising slightly to 27 per cent in 1973/74. Despite poor weather in 1973/74, total tobacco production in the region increased 16 per cent over the previous year. The number of small-holder growing tobacco communally in Iringa region increased between 1972/73 and 1973/74 but decreased markedly between 1973/74 and 1974/75, for reasons which we shall discuss.

Tobacco is purchased by T.A.T. at prices fixed in advance by the Ministry of Agriculture with the approval by the Cabinet Economic Committee. These prices are related to expected and recent world market prices for the leaf. Information from T.A.T. files and the Tanzania Rural Development Bank in Iringa

1. Haslemere Group and Third World First, 'Get off their backs: an account of the way in which aid, trade and private investment are used by the rich countries to maintain their economic and political domination over countries in the Third World', 1972, p.13. Also see Pierre Jalee, The Pillage of the Third World, 1968.
2. Due, op.cit., p.10.
suggests that in the Tobacco Authority auctions there are 101 different quality grades for flue-cured tobacco and nine for fire-cured, and each grade fetches a different price. A lot of skill and experience is needed in this process of classification, grading, curing, etc.

The announced producer prices are therefore weighted averages of expected prices across the quality range. For example, the guideline producer price for flue-cured tobacco in 1973/74 was sh. 5.85 per kilo, while the national average price actually paid in the same season was sh. 6.63 per kilo. The price structure was generally like this between 1970 and the 1974/75 season. Since the export price attained for the same period was about sh. 15/=, we may suggest that considerable surpluses have been accumulated by the Tobacco Authority in the above process. Part of this surplus is used to subsidise inputs.

As far as the Iringa regional economy is concerned, marketed output stagnated around 3,000 tons from the 1970/71 season until the 1973/74 agricultural cycle, when a sudden boom of 40 per cent occurred. This increase is largely explained by yield increases resulting from favourable weather conditions and better husbandry, experience of course being included. Indeed there was a decline in the cultivated tobacco hectarage from 3,638 in 1972/73 to about 3,200 in 1973/74 season, far below the ambitious targeted 4,585 hectares.

The large-scale farmers, who are mainly Greeks, are the members of the Southern Highlands Tobacco Growers Association; a few

medium-scale African farmers are also the members of this Association\(^1\). A large number of permanent and casual labourers are needed by this settler economy. Government statistics show that some 95 per cent of total production in Iringa Region comes from the large- and medium-scale estates (which are found entirely in Iringa District) as Table 6.5 shows for three years between 1974 and 1976.

**TABLE 6.5**

*Areas under Flue-Cured Tobacco Production in Iringa Region*

(a) 1974 Season - Summary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Co-operative Society</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Weight Purchased in kgs.</th>
<th>Value in T/Sh.</th>
<th>Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S.H.T.G. Association</td>
<td>93.4</td>
<td>4,058,813</td>
<td>26,381,916.80</td>
<td>6.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M/S T.A.T.</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>3,632</td>
<td>27,153.90</td>
<td>7.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiwere Ujamaa Co-op</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>67,795</td>
<td>434,390.60</td>
<td>6.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ujamaa villages</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>209,709</td>
<td>1,222,907.20</td>
<td>5.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary Schools</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>4,857</td>
<td>25,556.30</td>
<td>5.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Regional Total</strong></td>
<td>100</td>
<td>4,344,806</td>
<td>28,091,924.80</td>
<td>6.46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) 1975 Season - Summary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Co-operative Society</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Weight Purchased in kgs.</th>
<th>Value in T/Sh.</th>
<th>Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S.H.T.G. Association</td>
<td>92.0</td>
<td>3,159,337</td>
<td>25,341,016.20</td>
<td>8.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiwere Ujamaa Co-op</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>56,000</td>
<td>412,418.00</td>
<td>7.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M/S T.A.T.</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1,273</td>
<td>11,451.20</td>
<td>8.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ujamaa Village</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>212,756</td>
<td>1,579,570.00</td>
<td>7.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary Schools</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>6,473</td>
<td>41,814.70</td>
<td>6.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rungemba College</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>1,539.20</td>
<td>6.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Regional Total</strong></td>
<td>100</td>
<td>3,436,064</td>
<td>27,387,809.30</td>
<td>7.97</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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1. This is the former Southern Highlands Non-Native Tobacco Growers Association. The Association was registered on 15th March 1973 under registration No. 4993. It has 65 members.
Southern Highlands Tobacco Growers Association records suggest that in 1973 there were 54 settlers who cultivated 6,000 acres, in 1974 there were 51 settlers who cultivated 8,000 acres, in 1975 there were 48 settlers who cultivated 10,000 acres and in 1976 10,000 acres had been cultivated. 14,000 acres had to be cultivated in 1977.

The expansion of tobacco acreage in Iringa has meant an increase in the number of labourers. But this means labour of a special type. Historically child labour has played an important part in the tobacco industry. In recent attempts to cut down the costs of production, the tobacco growers have intensified the recruitment of child labour. In 1977 the Iringa Police Force mounted a search for agents who recruit primary school children from Njombe to sell their labour power in capitalist farms in Iringa District. The search was prompted by the death of a

student on 4th September 1977. 15 year-old Reuben Kalamu was knocked down by a lorry while running to catch a bus to go and labour.  

Kalamu's school mate told the Police that they had been recruited by a recruiting agent (the same old system but now carried on by the back door) to travel to Iringa for work on a tobacco farm. The recruiting agent promised them school uniforms.

The Njombe Area Commissioner suggested that about 40 per cent of the primary school pupils in three divisions of the District desert to seek manual wage labour in Iringa District annually. The same source shows that there are 35 primary schools in the three divisions of Bulongwa, Lupalilo and Ukwama, with a total enrolment of 7,340.

The Iringa Education Office argued that, as early as 1975, they had decided at a meeting to ask the National Union of Tanganyika Workers (N.U.T.A.) to look into child labour in the tobacco fields. The Education Officer said: 'we know some of the children are students. But they do not come from this district. When we ask these children they claim they have completed std. VII. But some are too young to have done so'. It was also revealed that about six individual large-scale farmers sent trucks to Njombe District to collect child labourers. Some of these children are only about six years old, and they are paid one or two shillings a day. Another Education Officer said they had debated the issue at a meeting and ruled that the effective solution would be for parents in Njombe District to

2. This point is confirmed by the Iringa District Labour Officer whom we interviewed on May 10, 1977 and in mid-July 1977.
stop their children from taking up the contracts.

Sources from Iringa District Labour Office confirmed that the child labourers were paid as little as sh. 2/= a day. Mr. Kyupa Mwaisamila, a Labour Inspector, said: 'when we talk to youths of about 15, they tell us they are paid as little as sh. 2/= a day, but they are made to thumb print registers showing they have received full required rates'. The same official suggested that, once an inspector's car was seen racing towards a farm, the farmers contacted each other by telephone and child labourers were hidden. His office had advised the employers that it was illegal to employ children. According to the official, the stipulated minimum wage for farm labourers in Iringa District was sh. 8.85 a day for adults and sh. 7.60 for under 18 year olds. However, our findings on the basis of talking to the rural workers themselves show that rural labourers receive sh. 4/= a day or sometimes sh. 5/=.

Child labour has been a puzzling issue to government officials in Iringa. The labour officer asked: 'how can we prosecute employers when these registers stand as evidence against us?' An official from the N.U.T.A. office in Iringa denied they had been asked to check employment in the tobacco farms. 'All we have been asked to do is to ensure that minors, the under 18 year-olds, are paid in accordance with laid-down rates; and this is what we have been doing'. The Njombe District Development and Planning Committee expressed great concern over the alarming rate at which pupils were deserting to seek employment in tobacco farms in Iringa District. The tobacco season starts in November and ends in May. Cheap labour is
exploited in planting and sorting out after harvest. This
desertion of children contradicts the government's policy of
Universal Primary Education for Tanzania.1

On 8th September 1977, it was reported that seven children, aged
between seven and twelve and found travelling from Njombe for
manual labour in tobacco farms owned by settlers in Iringa
District, had been held by Police for questioning. The issue
had already attracted national attention.2 The Prime Minister's
office directed the Minister of National Education to present
to Parliament in October 1977 a bill demanding that parents who
hesitate to send their children to school be prosecuted. The
Minister from the Prime Minister's office argued that, once the
law was enacted, the Government would deal with parents in
Njombe who let their children of primary school-going age travel
to Iringa to labour in capitalist farms at meagre wages. Such
a law would cover the whole country and include the case of
nomads who withdraw children from school to move away with them.
It would also cover the coastal belt where, through tradition,
brides-to-be have been withdrawn from school for 'hibernation'.

Our findings show that some regions had by-laws to impose a
sh. 100/= fine on parents who neglect their children's education.
The fine was totally inadequate, as some parents had paid it over
and over again and still kept children at home. The Minister
suggested that the law alone would not be effective and a mass
education campaign must be launched to help parents overcome

1. School term dates have not been steady; children are given
   a short break during Christmas and are needed back to school
to take part in education for self-reliance which includes
   farming.
sociological and environmental problems.

N.U.T.A. headquarters Dar-es-Salaam directed its Iringa regional office to launch a full-scale investigation into child labour on tobacco farms in the area. Mr. Peter Macha, N.U.T.A's Deputy Secretary-General, described the issue as a 'complex national problem that requires a three frontal approach'. He said the law enforcement was complicated by the presence of a collusion of interest between the children, parents and employers. 'We are faced with a social problem, for we have willing parents, willing children and willing employers. This is why the parents release their children in the first instance and then the children hide from N.U.T.A. and labour inspectors the fact that they are grossly underpaid'.

Mr. Macha suggested that rural poverty forced parents to contract their children for work in the tobacco farms. A long-term solution was the extension of primary education to 10 years and diversification of the training programme so that village skills were taught. Villages should also have proper plans to absorb school drop-outs. 'It will take combined efforts of Government, our Union and parents to break this vicious circle. We must move in and protect the children from this abuse of their labour', Mr. Macha concluded. This means, we would suggest, that what is needed is planned social change, which takes us back to the problem of ujamaa villages. But for the moment let us pursue further this interesting case about child labour as it progressed in Iringa.

In Njombe two agents who recruited primary school pupils to work for a pittance in capitalist-owned tobacco farms in Iringa were jailed for three months each. In Iringa it was reported that one such agent fled when he saw a police car approaching. In Njombe the police managed to disembark nine pupils from a bus that was taking them to a tobacco estate.

The Commissioner for Labour, Mr. Saidi Makutika, said: 'hiring children below fifteen is a criminal offence in Tanzania, punishable by fines or imprisonment or both'. He explained that only children aged between fifteen and eighteen were allowed to work. These, however, must be hired on a daily basis. Moreover, these children must return to their parents or guardians at the end of the working day. The problem of bogus parents complicated the situation and many farmers used this loophole.

According to section 4 of Act No. 5 of 1969, designed to check the recruitment of minors, any employer or his agent hiring child labour can be prosecuted. When convicted, the offender can be sentenced to a fine not exceeding sh. 5000/= or jailed for up to one year, or both. Commenting on the recruitment of child labour in Njombe, the Commissioner for Labour said that both the farmers and their agents were flouting the law.

The Commissioner for Labour had been aware of the employment of under-age children as far back as September 1970. In his letter addressed to labour officers in Iringa and Njombe Districts, he argued that illegal recruitment 'resulted in children of primary school age discontinuing their education in order to take

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up paid employment in the tobacco farms on their own or accompanied with their parents or guardians'.

The same source shows that sub-agents, concentrated in the villages, paid the mothers about a shilling each to get 'the talks' started. The mothers, forsaken by their husbands for casual work outside the village or district could not maintain the families on their own. The District Party Authorities in Njombe District took a series of measures to check the recruitment of children for work in privately owned tobacco farms in Iringa and tea estates in Mufindi District. The measures were:

(a) All parents whose children had been recruited by the sub-agents or agents would register the children's names with ward secretaries who would submit them to the District Party Office.

(b) All suspected agents and sub-agents in the village would be taken to the ward secretaries who would then take them to the police.

(c) Proprietors of buses carrying the recruited children would be prosecuted.

(d) The Iringa Regional Party Secretary was being asked to launch similar campaigns in the district to flush out employers, sub-agents and agents and the children involved in this racket.

By the middle of September 1977, about 250 child labourers left the tobacco estates on the way back to Njombe District. But it was not known how many children were still breaking their backs
in Iringa tobacco estates and Mufindi plantations. The estate owners, some 75 Greek and 30 African families, had admitted at a meeting that the minors were hired on their estates. During a meeting held in Iringa District on 12th September 1977, and attended by leaders of the Southern Highlands Tobacco Growers Association, Party Leaders warned that legal action would be taken against such employers and agents.

The Regional Party Secretary said that the Association’s chairman, Mr. Mitchel, promised they would not employ the minors on the estates. The children used to plant tobacco or weed out suckers. The Party officials outlined measures that would be taken to end recruitment of children for work in tobacco and tea estates in the two districts:

(i) Starting from 17th September 1977, a team consisting of Party and N.U.T.A. leaders and the Association's representatives would visit all tobacco estates in Iringa, ferreting out minors.

(ii) Another team composed of officials from the Party, Parents Association and N.U.T.A. would visit villages susceptible to recruitment, educating the people on the vice.

(iii) All the children in the villages had to be registered, checking whether the new totals coincided with those made when Universal Primary Education registration took place. This exercise involved questioning parents.

(iv) All parents who had released their children to work in squalor on the estates had to be taken to court, along with sub-agents and agents.

(v) Regional Party and Government leaders were studying the by-laws prohibiting such recruitment in order to tighten them up.

Reports from Njombe District indicated that twenty-seven children aged between 11 and 13 had been taken out of Iringa-bound buses and returned to their parents since the clamp down was launched. The Iringa police were checking all vehicles in search of the children. Owners of all types of vehicles carrying the children were to be prosecuted.

Our assertion in Chapter Two was that the destruction and restructuring of the local economy for those who participated in it made the return to a self-reliant economy impossible. The deterioration of the 'traditional' agricultural system, the need for imported goods, and the demand and need for cash by those who were left behind, sooner or later made labour-migration and child-labour employment a self-perpetuating system.

(iv). The Impact of Official Policies

Despite long experience over more than a decade of involving African farmers in tobacco production in the regional economy, the scale of activity is tiny, with no signs of vigorous growth but rather the reverse. In this perspective, however, several components in the experience with official government policies

1. T.R.D.B. Project URT/71/004 op.cit., p.4.3.7.
can be identified as contributing to the situation under discussion. Before 1967, tobacco was mainly produced on large estates in Tabora and Iringa Regions and by small and medium sized African peasants on settlement schemes, both on pre-existing estates and on newly opened land. As we saw earlier in the chapter, during the Second Plan period, emphasis was laid on the expansion of small-holder production on a co-operative basis, either in the ujamaa village or in 'tobacco complexes' as they were named. Fifteen of these were designated as ujamaa co-operatives for the production of flue-cured tobacco.

Within this programme, eleven of the schemes were to be provided with free inputs and the remainder were to receive credits for these items. Two of these schemes were located in Iringa Region. Kiwere, a former village settlement scheme, was allocated sh. 20,000/= for 1969/70 agricultural season and Karume was allocated about sh. 138,000/= for 1969/70 and up to 1974. After a short period of minor and unsteady production, the latter scheme was wound up in 1972. Reports indicate that it had accumulated enormous debts, reaching four million shillings if interest on the loans is included. The failure was due mainly to corrupt management and poor organisation. It may be noted that similar projects sponsored by the World Bank in Tabora progressed well and showed some good and encouraging results, particularly where good leadership was found on the project.1

Apart from the two settlement schemes, small-holder participation in tobacco production was restricted to a few selected ujamaa

1. ibid., 4.3.8.
villages. This policy has not been without problems and some of the difficulties are because of the way ujamaa villages were started. Among the reported problems are shortage of extension staff, poor leadership and shortage of labour. In addition, the impact on growers' morale of the collapse of the previously mentioned tobacco schemes, especially Karume project, was an important factor.

However, government officials tried to correct the organisational problem by changing tobacco production policy. A change of policy regarding tobacco growing in Iringa Region was effected in 1972 by the Regional Development Committee, which passed a resolution that tobacco growing should be restricted to the following groups of farmers:

(a) large estate farmers, mainly Greek settlers, cultivating not less than 50 acres;

(b) medium-scale African farmers, each cultivating not less than 20 acres; and

(c) other African farmers who were to cultivate and process the crop, communally rather than co-operatively, in ujamaa villages.

This last requirement resulted in the writing-off of the investments in individual curing barns made by small-holders in the period 1968-72, requiring them to invest in new curing barns designed to handle communal production.

From this discussion it is clear that in the 1970s tobacco will continue to be a settler crop in Iringa District. Some people have suggested a state-farm approach as the only strategy to increase local participation in the enterprise. On the other hand this would mean overlooking the alternative mode successfully developed in Tabora of individual small-holder production coupled with co-operative central services. The correct choice of production organisation is one necessary condition therefore. Communal production, run and organised by the producers themselves, is a higher form of work organisation than individual production. But the former needs a lot of preparation in the form of political work integrated within an overall socialist strategy to transform the entire economy of the society.

In Njombe District during the 1973/74 season, Luilo Ujamaa village received an average price of sh. 7/92 per kilo, which was higher than the average for the members of the Southern Highlands Tobacco Growers Association, i.e. sh. 6/51 per kilo. This suggests that there is a lot of potential for transformation in forms of communal production which are organised so as to increase the material welfare of the producers themselves.

To what extent can the poor performance of the African producers be attributed to inadequate provision of inputs, especially extension advice and working capital? Our investigation suggests

1. Tobacco is said to be a crop which requires very sustained and careful attention and 'small scale production'. This is true but settlers in Iringa have been growing tobacco on big farms as well, so there is a contradictory tendency here which needs to be explained.

2. According to Lenin: "...to understand the advantages of the participation of the whole population in the work of the co-operatives and to organise this co-operation [civilise the population ...] We need no other devices to enable us to pass to Socialism'.

that tobacco extension services are better staffed than those for any other crop except tea. There is on average one extension worker in each tobacco growing village. Many of them, however, are junior and poorly trained personnel, which means there is scope for increasing their efficiency and effectiveness through more training, both in tobacco techniques and economics and in wider farm systems into which tobacco can slot as a profitable component.

An average of 85 per cent of total hectares planted, and 95, 94 and an estimated 91 per cent of receipts in 1972/73, 1973/74 and 1974/75 respectively, were accounted for by the large private farmers, members of S.H.T.G.A. Ltd. The average price received per kilo by the large farmers and the small-holder ujamaa growers are very similar, showing that the quality of commodity tobacco grown by the two groups is comparable. According to Due, however, yields per hectare of the ujamaa farms were 262, 416 and 609 kilos per hectare for 1972/73, 1973/74 and 1974/75 respectively, whilst the average yields of the S.H.T.G.A. Ltd. members were 977, 1015, and 911 kilos per hectare. Thus small-holder communal yields were 27, 41, and 67 per cent respectively of the yields of the larger farmers.

If the quality and prices received per kilo of tobacco produced and marketed are comparable between the small farmers and large farmers, yields of small-holders are significantly lower, it follows that returns per hectare planted are significantly lower for the small-holder in ujamaa villages. T.A.T. estimated that average returns per hectare, excluding labour and land, were

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1. Due, op.cit., p.12.
1,548, 2,480 and 3,592 shillings for the small farmers between 1972/73 and 1974/75 seasons compared with 5,548, 6,598 and 6,222 shillings for the large farmers. Thus estimated average returns per hectare of small farmers average 41 per cent of those large farmers for the same three-year period. Due has suggested that not only are the estimated returns per hectare low due to low yields, but estimated returns per member of ujamaa village as a production unit averaged sh. 447 per member for the 3-year period, or about sh. 149 per member per year. Thus returns per day worked are extremely low.

It is possible that returns would increase substantially if yields of small farmers could be increased to be equivalent to those of the large farmer. Due's assumption is that land planted by small-holders and large farmers is of comparable quality. This assumption, however, is validated only by the fact that some of the ujamaa plots are on land appropriated from former large settlers. We would suggest that such cases are few. Settlers still have most of the good land for tobacco growing under lease, as we discussed in Chapter Four. Moreover, these farmers still expand their farms by using their economic power to manipulate the law.

Secondly, small-holders complained that their inputs did not always arrive on time. Rural Bank and government officials stated that this was often unavoidable, as fertilizer ordered from Tanga, the only government owned fertilizer plant, did not

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1. In 1976/77 season, Kiwere Ujamaa village showed some progress. The highest returns per member were sh. 1200 and the lowest sh. 54. People were paid according to their work contribution. We collected this information from the interview we had with Kiwere Ujamaa village Chairman on June 10, 1977.
arrive on time due to production and transport difficulties. Moreover, the use of fertilizer was slow in gaining ground because it demanded changes in the traditional method of organising labour. Besides, large farms draw a lot of their labour from ujamaa villages.

On the other hand, small-holders were of the opinion that S.H.T.G.A. members always obtained their inputs before the season and asked for excess loans each year so that a balance was carried forward. This explains the social condition of existence of the big farmers and why the small-holders could not compete with them.

Our assertion here is that settlers in Iringa have become efficient farmers. As one of them said:

"I have disciplined workers. If a worker fools around he is fired and I only pay them if I am satisfied with the task done. I organise production, manage and plan it. I do always make the necessary preparations in advance, apply and make effective use of modern husbandry."  

The difficulties of ujamaa villages producing tobacco were discussed by government and party officials who in November 1974 attended a seminar in Iringa to discuss the role of inputs in agriculture. Mr. D.M. Badi pointed out that in 1972/73 Nduli ujamaa village, one of the only two villages growing tobacco in the district, had 183 members, who cultivated 40 acres. Total sales were sh. 47,533.20. The Tanzania Rural Development Bank

2. Interview we carried with one settler at the Iringa Hotel on 12th June 1977.
deducted 75 per cent of the total sales for loan repayment, which was sh. 35,649.90. This meant sh. 11,883.30 was cash left to the 183 ujamaa village members, who each received sh. 65 if we follow Mr. Badi and simply take the average. Thus, returns per member are extremely low, as we mentioned earlier.

Conclusion

We have shown that it is essential to understand the areas of tobacco production in Tanzania, because this enables us to see what groups of people produce this crop, the type of leaf produced and the way these groups are related to the government policy. We have argued that ujamaa villages in Iringa District which produce tobacco have failed to increase production. Tobacco still remains a settlers' crop in Iringa District. Settlers are given all sorts of assistance, for example credits to buy inputs, to help them produce tobacco, which brings in foreign currency needed by the government. Settlers have also proved to be good organisers of production and run their agriculture efficiently. Moreover, these settlers use their economic power to influence the government and party officials in the District. We have also shown that child labour has played and still plays a very important role in the tobacco industry in Iringa District.

At another level our argument has been that nationalisation of the industrial sector is a necessary step but not a sufficient one in challenging the big foreign firms.
CHAPTER SEVEN
THE ORGANIZATION OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION
IN THE IRINGA REGION

In the Iringa Region, the ujamaa village scheme, Operation Ismani and the National Maize Programme were the basic mechanisms through which the national government sought to organise and control agricultural production. The aim was to promote local and regional development within a national context. Serious problems were encountered in the organisation and implementation of the scheme, including bureaucratic mismanagement, local resistance and lack of local participation in decision-making. This chapter examines ujamaa village schemes, Operation Ismani and the National Maize Programme so as to provide an evaluation of the overall organisation of agricultural production in Iringa District.

Implementation of ujamaa in Ismani Division

Iringa District has an estimated population of 286,000. The district is divided into nine divisions and twenty-seven wards. The ujamaa programme was introduced in Iringa Region in early 1970, before Wilbert Klerruu came to Iringa as the Regional Commissioner from Mtwara Region. Although the programme was introduced in Iringa Region in early 1970 it did not come into effect in Ismani Division until October 1971.

According to President Nyerere, socialism in Tanzania will be achieved step by step, depending on how people understand it

for their own development. Mkungugu ujamaa village was officially inaugurated on 1st November 1971. Accounts of how the programme was introduced to Mkungugu village have varied. According to Mr. Martin Kalolo, who later became the Chairman of the village, Klerruu told the inhabitants of Mkungugu at a meeting that there would no longer be individual farming but people should work on the communal farm together. On the first occasion, Kalolo denounced the proposal. In October 1971, Klerruu called again, and at this meeting, after detailed discussion, villagers were told that any person who refused to be a member of an ujamaa village had to leave the village; and all those who remained must be members of the ujamaa village. Some people left, most of them rich peasants, and others remained. Mr. Martin Kalolo had no choice. He decided to remain and to be a member of the ujamaa village.

Mr. Nobert Nyenze, who became the Vice-Chairman of the village, said that a Party-Secretary (Mr. Mduda) visited Mkungugu village and addressed the people there about the ujamaa philosophy. The villagers rejected the idea. When land was officially expropriated in May 1971, Igula was among the first villages to accept the policy and become ujamaa villages. High government officials visited Mkungugu village again, and addressed the peasants at great length about the policy. Nyenze, with his experience in a co-operative society, took the initiative and

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2. Author's interview of July 7, 1977 with village chairman and elders.
3. The High Court of Tanzania, Criminal Session Case No. 37 of 1972 at Iringa, mimeo, p.4.
held talks with the ten-cell leaders in the village, and they agreed to summon another meeting to discuss the possibilities of forming an ujamaa village. 44 people agreed to form an ujamaa village and requested that the Divisional Staff pass their ideas on to the government officials in Iringa Town. The Divisional official asked the villagers why they had rejected the idea at the first meeting. They told him that they had changed their position, and now accepted the policy's demands.

The issue here is, what made the villagers 'change their minds'? As we shall see, there was a lot of pressure from the state to get people into the so-called 'planned villages' in order to establish and maintain an effective control over agricultural activities.

The Divisional Secretary then suggested to the Mkungugu villagers to form a Committee and when this was done Mr. Martin Kalolo was elected Chairman and Mr. Nobert Nyenze became the Vice-Chairman. Mkungugu ujamaa village was officially opened on 1st November 1971. The Iringa Area Commissioner sent them axes, hoes and a tractor, and the villagers proceeded to work. According to Nyenze Klerruu had instructed that, if the Mkungugu people were not ready to form an ujamaa village, he was prepared to split the village and merge one half with Kising'a ujamaa village and the other half with Ndolela ujamaa village. Those who did not agree to these policy instructions would lose their shambas and would have to leave the area.

Professor James has recalled that President Nyerere once

welcomed the principle of compensation, in his essay on National Property:

"When I use my energy and talent to clear a piece of ground for my use it is clear that I am trying to transform this basic gift from God, so that it can satisfy a human need .... By clearing that ground, I have actually added to its value and have enabled it to be used to satisfy a human need. Whoever then takes this piece of ground must pay me for adding value to it through clearing it by my own labour."1

The same source, on the other hand, quotes the Chief Justice as also saying that:

"Since Tanzania believes in ujamaa, the interests of many people in land cases should override those of some individuals. The Judiciary cannot be used as a tool to oppose ujamaa."2

The above contradictory views created a dilemma for the judges and magistrates responsible for resolving disputes according to the obtaining Law, especially since Nyerere also said: 'The Rule of Law is part of Socialism. Until this prevails Socialism does not prevail'.

After the ujamaa policy was implemented in Ismani towards the end of 1970, the mobilization of the larger farmers hostile to the programme grew rapidly. It culminated in the arrest of over twenty large Ismani farmers, and the Iringa Regional Police Commander, following the murder of the Iringa Regional Commissioner, Dr. Wilbert Klerruu, by Mr. Abdallah Mwamwindi of

2. ibid., p.4.
Mkungugu village. These influential farmers had clubbed together to raise sh. 30,000 for the defence fund of the assassin.

Mwamwindi had been the owner of a 160 acre *shamba*, which included his residential premises consisting of 2 main houses and his family grave-yard. He had had four wives. He had started with 3 acres in 1955 when he was a lorry driver. Later he had given up the driving job and started farming, expanding the farm to about 160 acres before the *ujamaa* programme started. Mwamwindi and others had hoped that it would be possible to implement a project for opening up virgin lands and using them for the communal farms. It had turned out, however, that individual holdings were required to be included in the programme and partly because of this, according to Mwamwindi, the project had been rejected. He felt his *shamba* had been stolen.

The Mkungugu village plan dealt with the big area of land that had become *ujamaa* land. The programme did not forbid individual holdings as such. The Iringa-Dodoma road runs through Mkungugu village (see Map 7.1) and the village chose to reserve the land on the left side of the Great North Road, facing Dodoma, for their collective farms. Three acres of land on the other side were reserved for allotment for individual farming.

It was possible for a member to own two pieces of land, one on each side of the road. Mwamwindi had been one such person. Mwamwindi, his brother, his sister and his wives, had been allotted about twenty acres as individual plots.

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How did Mwamwindi's former holding stand in relation to the *ujamaa* programme and in relation to his new holdings? The fresh allocations of individual *shambas* were cut out of his former holding in that area. The rest of the land had been allotted to other members. The temporary individual plots allotted to Mwamwindi in the area reserved for communal activities were again taken out of his former holding. This area was some 350 feet from his premises and about 180 feet from his family grave-yard. It was on this *shamba* that Mwamwindi was ploughing with his tractor when Klerruu met him on the afternoon of December 25, 1971.

To appreciate what happened, it is crucial to examine the events of the previous day, 24th December, 1971, as recorded in the transcript of Mwamwindi's trial. These events enable us to see exactly how the policy was put into practice. The best period for maize planting is between November and December and maize planted outside this period is unlikely to yield a good harvest. Klerruu was keen to help the *ujamaa* villagers plough their communal farms and plant their maize seeds before the planting season. He spared no effort, but went from one village to another encouraging the people and personally helping the peasants in different activities on their communal plots.

Klerruu arrived at Tarafani *ujamaa* village on the morning of 24th December 1971 to supervise the tractors ploughing the communal plots. From there Klerruu and the agricultural field worker left together for Igula village to check on the progress.

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1. ibid., p.9.
2. ibid., p.10.
of the communal activities. From Igula they proceeded to Ndolela ujamaa village. Work on the communal farm was interrupted by rain when they arrived there at about 5 p.m. Klerruu called a meeting of the villagers and asked if the members were prepared to work on the following day. The ujamaa members agreed and Klerruu promised to return to help them in their work.

On the following day, Klerruu turned up as he had promised. There were two tractors on the farm with a team of 90 members of the Ndolela ujamaa village. The villagers and Klerruu spent their Christmas Day ploughing and planting maize seed. They had no lunch on that day, by around 5.30 p.m. the villagers were exhausted, hungry and tired, so they withdrew with Klerruu. By then, sixty acres had been ploughed and planted with maize.

The tired R.C. then left the village, drove alone and unescorted in his government car towards Iringa Town. The Regional Police Commander stated that he had not been told that the Regional Commissioner was to go on safari that day and the result was that Klerruu was not provided with a police escort.

Klerruu stopped at Mkungugu village on his way to Iringa and parked his car close to Mwamwindi's house. According to the evidence of the accused himself, Dr. Wilbert Klerruu said to Mwamwindi:

"What are you doing? To this Mwamwindi said: Sir, ... I am cultivating this place which has been given to me by my fellow villagers! I do not know what annoyed him the accused's testimony continues he started to abuse me. ... Then Mwamwindi said to Klerruu: Sir, why and what did I do? Mwamwindi goes on: He replied me, Be quiet, shut your mouth, what hii, hii, hii? And he was abusing in English."

1. ibid., p.18. Mwamwindi's words were interpreted to English in court.
According to the evidence produced in court, Klerruu asked Mwamwindi to climb down from the tractor. According to Mwamwindi's story Klerruu held a stick in his hand with which he was pushing him. Mwamwindi says: 'I thought to snatch the stick (sic) from him, but I thought that he might have a pistol'. Mwamwindi insists that Klerruu also abused him in English but he was only able to catch the phrase 'bloody fool'. When Mwamwindi asked Klerruu why he was abusing him, Klerruu retorted: 'Tazama ninawaambia lakini hamsikii' (Look, I tell you but you would not listen).

Mwamwindi then went into his house, collected a gun and returned. Klerruu was shot and fell down dead. Mwamwindi drove the car to the place when Klerruu fell. A boy was called by Mwamwindi to help him to put Klerruu's dead body in the car. Then Mwamwindi drove to Iringa Town. He first went to his residence at Mlandege and then finally reported at the Iringa police station. Later, the jury found Mwamwindi guilty of the murder of Klerruu, and on 2nd October 1972, he was sentenced to death.

The following points need to be considered if the significance of the assassination is to be grasped. First, as we mentioned earlier, wealthy farmers in the district contributed money for the defence of the assassin. Second, there was a split among the assessors in court as to whether Mwamwindi was guilty or not. Third, there were rumours that earlier there had been plans to eliminate the R.C. at the Welfare Center in Iringa town. Klerruu had been tipped about this, so he never turned

1. ibid., p.21.
up and saved his life. Fourth, after Klerruu's death, Iringa town attracted national attention. It was partly because of the murder that the Party held a meeting in Iringa in 1972 and published *Siasa ni Kilimo* (Politics in Agriculture). In order to cool down the social tension in the district, this policy statement stressed a technocratic approach towards agriculture. A National Football Tournament was held in Iringa in 1975, despite the fact that it was known that gate collections would not be sufficient to fund that exercise. The Ministry of Culture had to step in with funds in order to keep the tournament going to the end. Finally in 1976 the Saba Saba celebration was held in Iringa Town. (Saba Saba means 7th July, the day when T.A.N.U. was born. This day used to be a big national public holiday, with invited Heads of State from nearby friendly countries. This occasion was the last Saba Saba holiday, because the T.A.N.U. and AFROSHIRAZI Parties were merged in February 1977. So Iringa was greatly honoured).

The political climate in Iringa town after these events gives an indication of the 'people's' reaction towards the current agricultural changes. What steps did the government take to carry out its agricultural policy after the 1971-72 events, and what were the consequences of these later moves?

After Wilbert Klerruu's death, local politicians were reluctant to use ideas of socialism to persuade farmers to form *ujamaa* villages. According to Coulson, production dropped - not least in Ismani Division\(^1\). The 1972 Party statement on agricultural changes.

\(^1\) Coulson, October 1977, op.cit., p.18.
policy *Siasa ni Kilimo* was noticeable for its lack of emphasis on *ujamaa* as a means of raising production, as we showed in Chapter Five. Instead it emphasised technical methods, like the application of manure, oxen and so on.

Since it was clear that self-initiation of villages in Ismani could be a slow process, and since the chosen mode of implementation was administrative, there had to be specific kinds of incentives to get peasants to join the *ujamaa* village programme. One incentive, we propose, could have been careful planning and political education to show peasants how they could develop themselves through co-operation. This strategy, however, requires knowledge and patience, which were not available, and, interestingly enough, quite a number of bureaucrats were themselves doubtful whether it could work.

**Operation Ismani**

In 1972, Operation Ismani was declared. 30 villages were registered in the division as multi-purpose *ujamaa* villages. The aims of this operation were to replace large scale farmers and to increase production through *ujamaa* villages by using inputs and machinery. Credits had to be arranged with the Tanzania Rural Development Bank (T.R.D.B.). Each village had to cultivate 120 acres. Official documents show that the operation received one million shillings for this purpose.

The same source shows that 16 (I.M.P. 165) tractors were purchased at a total cost of sh. 750,000/=; fuel and seeds exhausted the remaining sh. 250,000/=. The Ismani operation started with

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twenty tractors in 1972, and later twenty more tractors were brought from the Dodoma Operation and a mobile workshop from Tabora Region.

According to the above project, the T.R.D.B. had to channel its credits to the Ismani villages through the Iringa Region Co-operative farmers. As we showed in Chapter Three, this was the official government policy. Government officials were to provide the expertise. In doing this job the above three bodies had to work co-operatively in order to achieve their objective. In reality, the government officials, Co-operative workers and T.R.D.B. people did not work as a team. This resulted in delays in delivery of inputs, and sometimes wrong materials were delivered. On top of this, since decisions about credit facilities were made by the government officials, there was what we could term a 'communication gap' between the Region Co-operative Union and ujamaa villages on whether the materials supplied were delivered on a loan basis or as government assistance. The situation developed along these lines partly because the desire of the bureaucrats was to see large areas under maize irrespective of the ability and the capacity of the villagers to manage the farm effectively. This was the situation in the 1971/72 season; production was not increased and government had to subsidize all inputs.

A close examination of the performance of the Ismani operation in 1971/72 suggests that the most critical constraint, if we may put it this way, was not new inputs. Inputs of course play

a very important role in increasing production, if accompanied
with other social and technical pre-conditions. But good labour
organisation is essential to put into practice the simple
husbandry like early planting and proper weeding. To concretise
this point, we would point out that a survey carried by T.R.D.B.\(^1\)
of 14 ujamaa villages in 1974 demonstrated that the average
yield for 1971/72 on ujamaa farms was 595 kgs./ha., while the
individual farms gave an average yield of 869 kgs./ha., despite
the fact that ujamaa farms applied fertilizer.

The Iringa Region Economic Committee was set up to study the
poor performance of the Ismani operation. The committee
recommended that villages which had shown good progress in
1971/72 should be given loans to buy tractors. Ten villages
were picked, and each was advanced a new tractor, worth
sh. 65,000/= . These villages were Mangawe, Ndolela, Nyang'oro,
Mkungugu, Kising'a, Mikongwi, Ismani Tarafani, Igingilanyi,
Igula and Kihorogota\(^2\). The remaining twenty villages received
financial assistance from the Rural Development Fund.

The team of regional bureaucrats developed a plan for maize
production for the 1972/73 season and the subsequent season and
supported it with a credit programme. The programme was to
cost sh. 5,664,181/= for 29 ujamaa villages for the 1972/73
season. When these proposals were presented for final
consideration, the T.R.D.B. decided to phase the project and
agreed to provide only sh. 1,817,692/= for that season\(^3\).

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1. Trends in Maize Production in Ismani and other parts of
2. Hali ya uchumi katika Mkoa Iringa - Iringa Planning Office,
   Iringa, mimeo, 1974.
The money was spent as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Sh. Cts.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(i) 10 Tractors and implements for 10 ujamaa villages</td>
<td>686,771.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ii) 85 Tons of maize seed for 30 ujamaa villages</td>
<td>25,590.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(iii) 426 Tons of T.S.P. fertilizer for 30 ujamaa villages</td>
<td>391,240.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(iv) 426 Tons of C.A.N. for 30 ujamaa villages</td>
<td>291,645.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(v) 109,000 Litres fuel for 10 tractors</td>
<td>117,595.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(vi) 1,885 Litres oil for 10 tractors</td>
<td>8,121.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(vii) 60 Fuel/oil filters for 10 tractors</td>
<td>3,600.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(viii) Transport costs</td>
<td>10,530.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ix) Tractor drivers</td>
<td>8,100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(x) Tractor Hire Service operating for 20 villages</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>272,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,817,692.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In this project the government and the Party did not want to see a drop in maize production because this would reflect badly on ujamaa implementation. Moreover, if the programme failed, it would reduce maize supplies and finally the material conditions of the people in the ujamaa villages would deteriorate rather than improve.

The absence of good tractor drivers and tractor mechanics, and delays in getting spare parts, caused a lot of inconvenience to the villages. In most cases tractors came to the villages too late and sometimes not in good working condition. No working plans were available to make the position clear. Tractor drivers were careless, which resulted in unnecessary damage to the tractors. The drivers enjoyed this situation because they

1. 'Operation' Imarisha vijiji Iringa May 1973, op.cit., p.3.
were paid according to the nights spent in the villages, regardless of whether they worked or not. Worse still, in a number of ujamaa villages the ujamaa tractors were used to do personal work. For example, in Ihumbilizi ujamaa village the tractor was used to take the Chairman to courts, pombe shops (local bars) and so on. In Nyakawangala, the tractor was used to fetch water and firewood for the village leaders. These are just a few of the many examples we could cite.

In order to reach maximum profitability the society should use the machines in the most efficient way and keep their operations under constant supervision. Activities like empty driving should be avoided; empty driving is unproductive and causes an unnecessary increase in operating costs, so it should be avoided as far as possible. Working out of the area of operation before the season starts, and establishing a working plan could help to improve the situation. Because of poor work management, tractors were not well maintained. We would point out that proper maintenance, that is a high standard of maintenance, not only keeps repair costs to a minimum but can extend the lifetime of a tractor considerably. Table 7.1 shows that, out of 116 tractors in the region involved in agricultural activities, 19 tractors were out of order and needed to be repaired after working for a season, and 10 tractors had to be written-off completely.

## TABLE 7.1

**Government tractors working in Iringa Region in 1973/74**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Tractors in good order</th>
<th>Broken down Tractors</th>
<th>Tractors to be written off</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Maize production activities</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Pyrethrum production activities</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Working on villages along the railway (TAZARA) and along the highway</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Operation Ismani</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Tea activities</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Tobacco activities</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Rural Development Fund Pool</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Tractors helping other villages</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Loan to ujamaa villages</td>
<td>28</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Total                                             | 87                     | 19                   | 10                         |

**Source:** E.B.J. Kahatano, Regional Planning Officer, 'Mjadala juu ya mbinu za uzalishaji mali vijijini', Iringa, mimeo, 1974, p.5.

In a comparable situation, in China in the 1950s, J. Gray has shown that Mao developed an important critique of use of tractors. On the other hand, there are a lot of people in the Chinese leadership who seem to have been won back to the idea that advanced technology is more important than releasing the energies of the peasant masses. The above points raise the whole question of industrial strategy in Tanzania, which has not been worked out up to the time of writing.

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The second point to be discussed here is the application of fertilizer under Operation Ismani. Broadly speaking, the major part of Tanzanian soils are chemically poor. The nitrogen and phosphate content is normally not high and in the savannah the phosphate content is particularly low. This was one of the reasons for the pre-ujamaa dispersal of peasant plots. However, particular attention should be given to the isolated areas of fertile land. For example, on the 'young soils', derived from recent volcanic rocks, labour productivity could be much higher, technical facilities being equal. The most widespread tropical ferruginous soils of the savannah, often have an underlying iron hard-pan. Ismani soils have been used for about thirty years. These soils are therefore very degraded already and are in danger of becoming more so, if they continue to be misused (e.g. soil erosion).

The types of fertilizer used in Operation Ismani, and in Iringa District as a whole, include:

(a) Triple Super Phosphates (T.S.P.).
(b) Sulphate of Ammonia (S.A.).
(c) Calcium Ammonia Nitrate (C.A.N.), and
(d) Compound Fertilizer (N.P.K.).

The Iringa District Agricultural Officer suggested that, there was local resistance to the use of fertilizers, especially, in

2. Interview with author, 16 June 1977, Iringa Town.
the Ismani area, partly due to labour costs. Moreover, it was observed that the rate of application was always confused by the farmers even in the presence of Bwana Shamba (Extension Staff). More seriously, fertilizer users in Ismani followed blanket recommendations. Some farmers in Ismani Division now refuse to use fertilizer because, when inputs were poorly applied and this was followed by inadequate rainfall, the whole crop was destroyed. This was one of the fears most of the farmers we interviewed confirmed. At the start, the project planned to have one extension worker in every village, but this did not materialize. The reason given was shortage of manpower.

Dumont has suggested that the quickest return from the chemical fertilizer can be obtained in areas where a whole series of other conditions have been met and where a certain amount of agricultural progress has already been made or, at least, is being made concurrently. The general use of fertilizer especially phosphate and nitrogenous compounds, which are essential for Tanzania, would only be fully economic under a certain number of conditions. The hasty popularization of fertilizer mixtures that had not been thoroughly tested exposed the African peasant to disillusionment.

The effect of fertilizers, which are sometimes spectacular, can open the eyes of the African peasants and make them keenly aware of the advantages of economic progress. On the other hand, scholars like S.C. Dube consider fertilizer as problematic or

2. Dumont, op.cit., p.22.
even harmful in a more or less comparable situation. Dube cited examples of villagers who argued that fertilizers sapped 'the fertility of the soil and burnt the crops'. According to Dube, one villager complained that 'chemical fertilizers are like a strong aphrodisiac - temporarily stimulating but harmful in the long run'.

Operation Ismani had to be financed in phases, depending on progress. The programme was halted as a result of the grossly inefficient performance of the phase under discussion. By 30 June 1974, the arrears of the project amounted to sh. 3,500,000/=2. The result was that Operation Ismani was taken over by the government's National Maize Programme, which was launched in 1973/74 in another attempt to increase food production on a national scale following the upshot of the 'villagization process'.

Other very important problems which affected both the Ismani Operation and ujamaa agricultural policy as a whole, were the distribution of the communal harvest and competition for labour between individual plots and communal plots, especially in peak periods. The Mkungugu Ujamaa village's working timetable for 1973/74 meant that members spent Mondays to Thursdays, from 6.30 a.m. to 10.00 a.m. working on the communal plot. Each member was assigned a task by the village Secretary. Those members who failed to turn up for communal work without any concrete reason three times were expelled in accordance with

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the village constitution. This did not happen very often though.

When it came to the distribution of communal harvest, problems arose. A survey of 14 ujamaa villages carried out by Iringa District Economic Committee in 1973 demonstrated that communal harvest had not been distributed to the producers in 18 villages out of 30 in Ismani. Losses of communal harvest were common in this situation. When producers insisted on getting community harvest, the whole exercise led to unfair distribution. The existence of individual plots in the villages tended to make certain individuals less inclined to engage in communal work, especially during times when their own crops were ready for planting or harvesting.

Peasants had learnt that communal farms could not raise their material position so they concentrated on their individual plots and sometimes sought employment outside the ujamaa village. This sometimes arose from the need to acquire additional money for the purchase of essential commodities, as correctly pointed by Long. In Ismani, ujamaa villages were located close to commercial farms where seasonal wage employment was available and where some settlers took advantage of the situation to offer attractive wages during peak times of the agricultural season. This undoubtedly affected the smooth running of collective labour activities in ujamaa villages. A high standard of organisation and an adequate and reliable supply of labour are important to ensure early planting, weeding and harvesting.

3. ibid., p.166.
In 1974 the Mkungugu ujamaa leadership accumulated a communal harvest that was sufficient capital to start a village shop. However, this business operated for a few months before it became bankrupt and village account books were reported destroyed. By 1976 a lot of men who were members of the ujamaa village gave up their membership. In the village election carried out in 1976, for the first time a woman, Sikitamkanga by name, was elected Chairman. The new Chairman, who was enlightened about some of the principles of ujamaa, introduced some village democracy. When the community harvest for 1976 was distributed, villagers showed considerable satisfaction. The previous leadership had been involved in unscrupulous attempts to steal communal harvest from the village godown (store) and sometimes from the community farm itself at night. Both the ex-leaders and the watchmen had been involved in these activities.

Sikitamkanga's leadership worked against the corrupt practices with reported success. By April 1977, Mkungugu ujamaa village deposited sh. 23,000/= into the Bank. All this was money collected from the milling machine business and from the sales of their communal produce. Sikitamkanga was constantly harrassed and threatened with being beaten up by the ex-chairman's gang. One man involved in this case was jailed for one month.

Villagization in Iringa District

1974 saw an unprecedented number of 'operations' in the district of Tanzania. In 1973 the Biennial Conference of T.A.N.U. had

1. In August 1977, there were 263 families in Mkungugu ujamaa village. Out of this number, 236 were men, and 333 were women; 417 male children and 415 female children.

approved the resolution that the whole population should live
in villages by the end of 1976. The frontal approach in most
cases dropped the concept of ujamaa in favour of vijiji vya
maendeleo (development villages) or vijiji vya kudumu (permanent
villages). Now it became a policy for all peasants in the
country to be compulsorily enrolled in ujamaa villages.

In Iringa District, as in other parts of the country, in few
cases had any trouble been taken to plan. There was consequently
a considerable variety in the types, size and planning of
villages. Villages had to be built along roads and along the
Tanzania-Zambia Railway for security reasons, for both internal
security and because of fears of invasion due to Tanzania's
policy towards Liberation movements in Africa. As a consequence,
in some parts of Iringa District villages were established
regardless of the distribution of fertile soils or easily
available water.

By 1976, about 91.5% of the Iringa District population (286,000)
had been moved. There were cases of property destruction and
use of force. In some cases this had involved absurdities
like the destruction of good houses which were as little as
twenty yards out of the prescribed straight line. As food
planting fell, most districts re-activated colonial by-laws
to enforce minimum acreages. In April 1977, a peasant in
Lukombe ujamaa village in Morogoro District was jailed for four

1. File No. D30/5/Vol. II, Iringa District, Uhamiaji
   Vijijini Correspondence.
2. ibid., operation Sogeza.
months for failing to cultivate the required one acre of cotton.  

One complicating factor in the Iringa political economy has been the changing character of economic investment in the area. Recently the trend has been increasing investment in transport, which has become a more attractive business than agriculture, particularly maize production. A brief digression will be useful.

**Economic activities in Iringa town**

By the mid-1960s local transport in Iringa Region had already proved to be a lucrative business. Rich African farmers increased their investment in this business, especially when transporting fuel to Zambia after U.D.I. If one looks at Iringa Town on the map, it is clear that in relation to transportation the town occupies a strategic position because of its proximity to Dar-es-Salaam. Iringa businessmen expanded their transport activities and bought new trucks to meet this new demand in this conjuncture. The businessmen either took loans from the bank or used the Iringa Co-operative Union, which they controlled, to get credits, and sometimes they went into partnership with settlers. The biggest Transport Company in the region is called Kwacha Transport Company, with more than thirty good vehicles.

When the Tazama pipeline (to Zambia) was completed in the early 1970s, transporters concentrated on local business. More godowns, warehouses and distributing centres were erected in Iringa Town. This area of poor communications made transport a

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1. Ally Juma, 38, failed to comply with a bye-law requiring everybody in the District to cultivate one acre of cotton. Two others, Elias Anthony and Daudi Matanze, pleaded 'not guilty' to the same charge. They were remanded until April 28, 1977, when sentence was given.
more profitable activity than agriculture for 'Africans'. So
African businessmen and Greeks have had part of their capital
invested in garages, restaurants and so on in Iringa Town. (One
point should be made very clear here: tobacco production by
settlers has remained a profitable activity. Many settlers
have also started producing maize with considerable success.)

These groups are economically powerful and their influence is
not confined to the ranks of the local men whom they mislead
and exploit. Unfortunately it penetrates into the government
organs and not even the Party is altogether free from these
pressures. Before the abolition of the co-operatives in the
country, rich African farmers' families in Iringa occupied
strategic posts in the vast bureaucracy of the farmers' union
in order to further their own economic interests.

At this point we return to our account of what followed when
Operation Ismani was halted.

The Case of the National Maize Programme

The Tanzania National Maize Programme was started in the 1973/74
season in order to increase maize production in the country and
cut down imports after the poor crop in 1972/73. It was also
an attempt to help the newly created *ujamaa* villages. The
project was supposed to increase the planted area from 6,400 ha.
in 1974/75 season to a massive 193,000 ha. in the fifth year of
the plan, that is an increase of 3,000 per cent. It was also
suggested that the project's expenditure on *ujamaa* villages
would rise from about sh. 4 million to sh. 110 million per annum

1. Report No. 897a-TA, United Republic of Tanzania, Appraisal
of the National Maize Project, December 8, 1975, p.ii. Also
over the same period.

Drought problems in 1973/74 necessitated additional food imports. A strong political slogan under the title *kilimo cha kufa na kupona* (Life or Death harvest) was initiated to give added impetus to the project during the 1974/75 period.

Maize is the most important cereal in the country and the staple food of much of the Tanzanian rural population. The crop is grown in all regions of Tanzania but in some parts conditions are marginal. Most of the produce comes from Iringa, Tabora, Mbeya, Tanga, Arusha and Dodoma regions. Maize production is largely in the hands of small-scale producers, many of whom live in newly created *ujamaa* villages. Most production is for subsistence.

According to a study by the Overseas Development Group of the University of East Anglia, the villagization program created an urgent demand for more intensive methods and techniques of agricultural cultivation. Moreover, when the rural people became concentrated in nuclear village patterns, land close to the village became very scarce. Cultivation pressure was greatest near the newly created villages and the problem of how to maintain the soil fertility of the already exhausted soils under long periods of continuous farming was expected to become very important in the few years to come. With the concentrated land-use pattern under the villagization programme, the quality and

structure of the soil near the villages and its water retaining capacity would tend to decline and fail to meet both human and animal needs.

Iringa Region official sources suggested that sh. 15 million would be spent on cultivating 41,000 hectares of maize in the region for the 1977/78 season. The money would be spent on inputs and other agricultural expenses. A report from the regional agricultural office estimated that 61,656 tons of maize would be harvested in the season. The report said 18,000 hectares would be cultivated in Njombe District, 10,500 in Mufindi, 9,000 in Iringa Rural and 3,600 in Ludewa. Total direct public expenditure on maize over the plan period would amount to about two-thirds of all direct expenditure on crop production in the Iringa Region and about 52% of total proposed regional development expenditure in all sectors. Major questions arise as to the ability of the government, Party and extension workers to implement a project of this size efficiently.

Distribution of maize production in Iringa Region

In the early 1970s, despite efforts to expand hybrid maize production in Mufindi and Njombe Districts, the great bulk of marketed maize in the region came from Iringa District, particularly the market-surplus of Ismani Division. In 1968 about 1.5% of regional marketed maize came from Njombe District. During 1971-74 Njombe produced an average of about 4% of the marketed output each year. This rise of marketed crop in Njombe came entirely from a decline in production in Iringa and Mufindi Districts, where marketed crop was reported jointly,

1. Iringa District Planning File 1977.
rather than from an absolute increase in maize production and sales of the crop in Njombe District.

As we saw in Chapter Four, Mufindi is important for tea production, both for export and for local consumption. Until 1975, some 90-95 per cent of marketed output in the region came from Ismani Division alone. Recent attempts to increase production of maize in Dabaga highlands have shown some success in this mountainous part of the Iringa District. Communal production has occupied a much smaller area in Dabaga than in Ismani and the planted area and yields have increased yearly. In 1971 four villages had about 100 ha. of communal area, which expanded to about 600 ha. in 1975. At the same time yields increased from 585 kg. per ha. in 1971 to about 1,050 per ha. recently, double the average yield in Ismani ujamaa villages for the same period.

As we saw in Map 3.1, Dabaga is favoured by heavier and more reliable rainfall, but a more difficult terrain makes mechanized expansion as in the Ismani Division more difficult.

Finally, the agricultural report from the region in 1972 suggested that interplanting maize (with beans) is more common in Njombe and Mufindi Districts than in Iringa, where 90% of maize is thus planted.

Maize Project in Practice: Problems and Prospects

Maize production in Iringa Region, until very recently, was based on Katumbili (traditional white flint). Improved

1. TNA, File No. 24/A3/36/11 Agriculture Iringa.
3. The most common mixture are maize/beans, maize/beans/sunflower and maize/beans/peas.
composite types had been bred under the programme, and the two recommended varieties were:

(i) the Ilonga composite for places below 3,000 feet above sea level, and

(ii) Ukiriguru composite for areas between 3,000 and 6,000 feet.

Moreover, the introduction of hybrid seed varieties from Kenya for small-holder producers, particularly in Njombe, led to the current National Maize policy of recommending hybrid types for places above 6,000 feet above the sea level.

As correctly pointed out by E.R.B. Report No. 23 and T.R.D.B. Project URT/71/004, the reduction of all complicated ecological variation in Tanzania to three altitude zones is not only erroneous and arbitrary, but it overlooks important and crucial variations in soil fertility, rainfall reliability and the like. This stereotyped and centralized approach to crop production is a major technical contributory factor to the problems of fluctuating production in Iringa Region. The system has become increasingly uneconomic, with rapid increases in inputs costs.

It is a well-known and unfortunate fact that the prices of farm inputs and machinery, especially those bought from overseas, have been rising rapidly in the 1970s - more rapidly than either producer prices or world prices for the major food crops. This was at a time when Tanzania's foreign exchange reserves were under increasing pressure. Tanzania's economic situation had

never been as bleak as it was during the second half of 1974, with soaring food prices, swelling fuel import bills and inflation. Planners, economists, politicians and sociologists were caught quite unaware. The blows to the foreign trade balance were: the oil crisis and two years of poor harvests. The costs of nitrogen and phosphate inputs, major components of the production package under the maize project, rose dramatically (see Tables 7.2 and 7.3).

**TABLE 7.2**

**Fertilizer Prices 1972-75 (sh. f.o.r. Tanga)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N.P.K.</td>
<td>670.50</td>
<td>920.00</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T.S.P.</td>
<td>830.00</td>
<td>967.50</td>
<td>2,154</td>
<td>260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. of A.</td>
<td>425.00</td>
<td>512.00</td>
<td>1,813</td>
<td>426</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** T.R.D.B. Project URT/71/004 Volume I, Table 4.1.3, 1975, p.4.9.

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TABLE 7.3

Iringa Input Prices for 1975/76 at 75% subsidy level

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Price</th>
<th>Price</th>
<th>Price</th>
<th>Price Index 1972/73 = 100</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mid-Year 1972/73</td>
<td>Mid-Year 1973/74</td>
<td>Mid-Year 1974/75</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S.A.</td>
<td>31.20 per 50 kg. bag</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T.S.P.</td>
<td>43.75 &quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.A.N.</td>
<td>36.85 &quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.P.K.</td>
<td>39.40 &quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hybrid</td>
<td>1.10 per kilo</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D.D.T.</td>
<td>0.65 &quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D.A.P.</td>
<td>sh. 100.00 per 50 kg. bag</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.R.E.A.</td>
<td>80.00 &quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.P.K.</td>
<td>70.00 &quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T.S.P.</td>
<td>70.00 &quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.A.N.</td>
<td>62.00 &quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S.A.</td>
<td>50.00 &quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potash</td>
<td>50.00 &quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hybrid - one kilo</td>
<td>2.225</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Composite - one kilo</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source:-- Iringa District Planning Office P.L.0.1 File 1976.

Similarly the on-farm cost of machinery rose quite drastically as Table 7.4 shows.

TABLE 7.4

Prices of Farm Machinery, 1972-75 (Shs.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Price Mid-Year 1972/73</th>
<th>Price Mid-Year 1973/74</th>
<th>Price Mid-Year 1974/75</th>
<th>Price Index 1972/73 = 100</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Massey Fergusson 165 Tractor</td>
<td>39,695</td>
<td>46,000</td>
<td>75,000</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

President Nyerere said at the end of 1972 that:

"Whereas in 1965 we could have bought a tractor with an equivalent of 5.3 tons of cotton, we now find ourselves in a position where if we wanted to buy the same tractor we would have to give in the equivalent of 8 tons of cotton."¹

Is it the same tractor or a bigger and better tractor capable of performing more operations, we might ask? On the whole, though, this is an illustration of possible terms of trade between advanced capitalist formations and ex-colonies.

The importance of these price changes for the maize project as a whole seems to have escaped notice. Until 1975 no adjustments in recommended input prescription levels were made. In Iringa Region input costs per hectare were sh. 1,468 per hectare excluding weeding, harvesting and other agricultural activities. Expected yields per ha. were 22 bags, a level reached in ujamaa villages only under the most favourable conditions. In 1975 a very small proportion of the maize producers escaped these costs, getting 100% subsidies of inputs.

While the low levels of maize sales for 1969 and 1971 reflected unusually adverse seasons it was apparent that the period 1966-77 showed a decline in marketed maize in Iringa Region ².

When there is a shortage of maize, the rigid producer prices and retail levels lead to vigorous black markets, which have become a lucrative economic activity in the area. For example, the black market price in Iringa was about sh. 145 per bag.

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compared with the government producer price of about sh. 60.

One consequence of black market rackets is the difficulty facing the Tanzania Rural Development Bank in recovering capital advanced for maize production\(^1\). T.R.D.B. rely on recoveries from sales in the government single market method provided by the dissolved co-operative unions; black market activities allow producers to default on their repayment by claiming partial crop failure\(^2\). It might be suggested that to eliminate the black market and allow the continuance of the single marketing system is to permit local prices to fluctuate between a fixed floor price and a fixed ceiling price.

Estimates of total production are open to even more suspicion than those for marketed output. Unfortunately no recent reliable figures are available for maize production in Iringa Region. Available figures from official sources on marketed production of maize between, say, 1970 and 1971 are at best contradictory and in some cases the divergence is pronounced\(^3\).

Well known social and technical problems, which include direct state supervision, beset the maize project but seem to have been overlooked. Much of the technology applied was developed outside Tanzania and has not yet been adapted to the local

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1. Due, op.cit., p.9.
3. Like all knowledge, official statistics must be analysed as a product. They are never mere given to be taken as they are or else dismissed as inadequate. Like all products, they must be examined in terms of the conditions and instruments of their production. We have borrowed this point from Barry Hindess, *The use of Official Statistics in Sociology*, 1973, pp.10-12.
Table 7.5

Estimates of Marketed Maize in Iringa Region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1970</th>
<th>1971</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Estimate 1</td>
<td>30,261</td>
<td>5,414</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimate 2</td>
<td>29,599</td>
<td>6,226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimate 3</td>
<td>34,200</td>
<td>7,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimate 4</td>
<td>23,464</td>
<td>4,116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rounded Mean</td>
<td>29,400</td>
<td>5,900</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:**
- Estimate 1: Kilimo Bora cha Mahindi.
- Estimate 2: Iringa Co-operative Union.
- Estimate 3: Marketing Bureau.
- Estimate 4: Iringa Region Agricultural Office, Iringa.

**Note:**
Estimates 2 and 4 supplied as metric tons, others only as tons. Quoted in T.R.D.B. Project URT/71/004 Volume I, 1975, Table 4.1.1., p.4.1.

Concrete situation. While blanket recommendations no doubt make life easier for extension workers they typically do not raise maize production. Bad results discredit agricultural staff in the eyes of the producers and make the latter less receptive to new techniques of production process in agriculture. Frustrated because both technical and non-technical problems stood in the way of increasing production the extension workers sought to circumvent the problems rather than solve them. The evidence above suggests that the role of extension services in increasing production in Tanzania has been exaggerated.

President Nyerere has been quoted saying that, even if he was to sack all agricultural officers, agricultural production would in no way be affected, because the experts confined themselves
to statistics and report-writing anyway. And we have seen what kinds of statistics are produced.

Farm inputs could be obtained relatively easily in the agriculturally more 'developed' areas of Tanzania, which included Kilimanjaro, Arusha, Iringa, Mbeya and Mwanza. Outside these areas, peasants experienced great problems in obtaining farm inputs and the performance of the defunct co-operative unions and primary societies varied tremendously, but were generally poor. Recent government policy discouraged traders and private transporters from engaging in marketing farm produce. Serious problems have been encountered with both rail and road transport and with storage of both farm inputs and produce. These problems are of profound significance for economic development in Tanzania. The distance involved in transporting the above commodities to peasants by road is usually greater than by rail. Road transport has also experienced difficulties, partly on account of shortage of vehicles, lack of spare parts and official discouragement of private transport. Interestingly enough, even where supplies of inputs had been arranged, bureaucratic procedures caused serious delays.

2. The Tanzania-Zambia Railway Line, a magnificent piece of engineering completed by the Chinese in 1976, continues, however, to be plagued by maintenance and management problems, running at only half its capacity and still deteriorating. Chinese advisers had been asked to return to attempt to improve the situation. Further complications arose from delays in the port of Dar-es-Salaam which in August 1978 was running at 16 days delay, an improvement on earlier months of the year. Quoted in The Times, Wednesday, 13 September 1978, Special Report, p.1.
Conclusion

In Ismani Division, Klerruu attempted to mobilise the peasants as a single person. The rank and file of the Party were not involved. In fact, the majority of the high-ranking officials opposed him for being 'radical'. Secondly, the peasants and workers in Ismani were not themselves mobilised against the capitalists. If peasants had difficulties of any kind they had to send somebody to Iringa to ask the R.C. what to do. The implementation and mobilisation thus did not seem to be a consciously planned political strategy aimed at transforming and changing the relations of production of the entire economy.

Rich African peasants have tended to channel their investment away from agriculture and into transport, which is the most important economic activity in Iringa District. Sometimes, this group of people go into partnership with Greek settlers to further their economic interests as a group.

Technocratic approaches towards agriculture, first in the Ismani Operation and later in the National Maize Project, have failed to increase maize production in Ismani Division. The technology put into practice is no longer financially viable without continued massive subsidies. We see no reason for continuing the project in its present form. Credits were written off on the pretext that bad weather resulted in poor harvests; peasants recognise that there is advantage in defaulting and blaming the inability to repay credit on crop failure.

Discipline regarding credit repayments has not been built-up among peasants. Decisions about acreage to be cultivated in villages are made by the local bureaucracy in isolation from
the peasants, who are supposed to put them into practice. Peasants are often called upon to weed large plots of maize planted at someone else's direction. Ujamaa villages are run like state farms but without competent and committed managers. The policy was a mistake right from the start to the end, precisely because it did not rely on individual peasant entrepreneurship.

The current blanket package of inputs does nothing to solve the problems, rather the reverse. Frustration among politicians and planners in turn develops a negative view of their 'unco-operative' clients, as a rationale for the failure. The Tanzanian bureaucratic bourgeoisie does not provide incentives to the production of food crops and it tried to solve this issue by administrative means. But one point is clear, that is state intervention into agriculture and the use of foreign capital has opened a new phase in Tanzanian agriculture.
CONCLUSION

We have tried to develop a theoretical framework adequate for investigating the specificity of the rural development policies in Tanzania, and to test such a framework in the analysis of concrete social formations. Such an analysis had to be set within the context of an historical study of the evolving economy and structure of a specific region so that various stages in the process might be isolated and examined. This involved giving careful attention to particular local groups of people as to how they interpret and implement the aims of government and its programmes; how they participate in them and how they utilize the available resources in pursuit of their own goals. Our case study has provided a detailed understanding of the complex interplay of regional or local and national development processes. Such an attempt provides a necessary theoretical conceptualization for the analysis of the processes of rural development policy.

We have argued that Tanzania's agricultural development policies and the agrarian question as a whole can be understood and conceptualized only by analyzing concrete social formations theoretically and historically. The agrarian problem and colonial consequences are historical processes. Development problems and policies cannot be grasped unless they are analysed in the full context of their historical setting. This means that they have roots that go back to events that took place in the recent past, as well as many years back, the consequences of which are still being felt.
We have demonstrated that pre-colonial Tanganyika was not a classless society. This much is clear from what we know about the prevailing relations of production. The development of the colonial economy was the result of the destruction of the pre-colonial economies to meet the specific needs of different branches of capitalism in specific historical conjunctures.

The most important determinant of Tanganyika's development has been the specific mode of its incorporation into the international capitalist system. This process cannot be considered as a simple question, but is rather a complex historical process in which the changing requirements of capital inter-acted with the structures and processes generated by its earlier phases. The main aim of the colonial state in Tanganyika was the extraction of primary products for the strategic and industrial requirements of the metropolis by the cheapest possible means. This implied a total restructuring of the regional economy for this purpose. Incorporation and subordination were effected by economic and political means. Relations of exchange and appropriation had to be established. The colonial state played a crucial role in the process and imposed its own claims on the surplus of peasant production.

The thrust of the colonial state was to supervise the initial necessary penetration of the pre-capitalist social formations and to organise the conditions of exploitation of land and labour. Mining activities were established by productive capitals from abroad. Land was alienated and appropriated for the production of export crops run by settlers or foreign capitalist firms. These different forms of production process required a
continuous supply of cheap labour, and again the state's intervention in establishing labour reserves and ensuring a flow of migrant labour was crucial.

Another pattern was the establishment of a peasant commercial production process, which did not involve the direct separation of the producers from the means of material production, nor such a drastic change in the instruments and forms of the labour process. Needless to say, despite limited changes in the technical aspect of production, this process involved fundamental changes in the social conditions of production and exchange as a consequence of the incorporation of these social formations in the capitalist world system.

In the colonial period, the state assigned economic functions to each area of the country and its inhabitants. Tanganyika was divided into three types of economic region. First, there were regions which specialised in production for export. These were surrounded by a second category of region, which supplied the export-producing regions with food and other services. Finally, spreading out beyond the export- and food-producing regions, were peripheral regions which either supplied migrant labour or stagnated in near isolation from the territorial colonial economy. Labour migration, as a system, comprised the destruction and restructuring of the local economy for those who participated in it and made the return to a self-reliant economy impossible. Peasants and workers had become economically dependent on exchange with the capitalist sector in order to gain access to certain means of subsistence which were not produced within the colony. The state regulated
what peasants grew and how they grew it. It continued to regulate the flow of migrant labour from the village to the centres of capitalist production.

Between the Wars, the British colonial government had an opportunity to study and formulate an agricultural policy free from the political constraints of a settler class. Nevertheless, various political group interests interacted with the process of learning from experience with the effect that policies were formed which favoured peasant production. On the other hand, however, the taxation system was used both to raise colonial government revenue and to force Africans to go and seek wage employment in the plantations. In the same period Marketing Boards were formed, and these institutions were used to help Britain to make good the losses and damages of the War.

The period after the Second World War saw a rapid development of commercial agriculture in the Ismani Division of Iringa District. The commercial maize-producing area in the Iringa District had only been cleared and settled by African farmers in the last generation. The relations of production had thus been from the start of a rural capitalist nature, untrammelled by pre-existing forms. The development of the agricultural surplus was associated with two phenomena: seasonal migration and the existence of small subsistence holdings along with the larger surplus-producing enterprises. We have argued that it is important to appreciate that there were peaks of labour activity and periods when much less labour was demanded. The seasonality of labour demand meant that agricultural production depended on the utilisation of a
substantial casual labour force. This had to be a labour force that could maintain itself in those periods when the surplus production system did not require it. Rural class formation was a consequence of such processes arising from the relations of production.

In Iringa District, in the same period, a parallel and sometimes neglected development was the creation of a settler-based tobacco sector. Difficulties in establishing tobacco production in Iringa generated changes in policy and the establishment of new infrastructures. Recently, settlers have proved to be good organisers of production who run their agriculture efficiently. Moreover, these settlers use their economic power to influence the government and party officials in Iringa District. We have also shown that the nationalisation of the Tobacco Company is a necessary step but not a sufficient one in challenging the foreign firms.

After Independence, we have argued, the government made a disastrous mistake in generalising an experience which had already shown its negative side in the 1950s. Co-operatives which had shown some negative results during colonial times, became officially recognised as tools for achieving rural socialism. This new development was decisive because the steady expansion of co-operative enterprise enabled Africans to participate in and obtain control of the marketing of produce in an attempt to eliminate Asian and Arab middlemen. Because of the anxiety to replace the middlemen, co-operatives lacked proper supervision and organisation. More and more crops came under compulsory marketing orders which enforced a
single marketing channel through co-operatives. Through the co-operatives and marketing system the government accumulated large surpluses, as had happened during the colonial period. These institutions just increased the differentiation of the peasantry by their mode of operation, as a direct consequence of commodity relations. There are more lessons to be learned from the experience of colonial agricultural policy in general than has usually been recognised.

We have demonstrated the ambiguities of the *ujamaa* philosophy. Some of the problems of rural planning and *ujamaa* implementation are closely connected with the absence of a concerted strategy for the transformation of the economy. To say that a society is following the socialist path is tantamount to saying that it is engaged in a revolutionary process of transformation and reconstruction which enables the labouring people to gain increasing control over their conditions of existence, which strengthens their ability to liberate themselves. Within this framework the industrial sector is the sector of major growth, so investable surplus must be transferred from agriculture to industry. This implies that production and productivity in agriculture must be raised as rapidly as possible and at least initially through techniques which do not demand a major diversion of investment funds to agriculture itself.

The increasingly bureaucratic implementation of the *ujamaa* policy has acted, however, as a barrier to political mobilisation and to the release of productive forces and changes in the relation of production necessary for increasing production. Needless to say, the above mentioned goals cannot be achieved
while peasants and workers are coerced by the bureaucracy and exploited through 'unequal exchange'.

The role of the party, therefore, consists not only in defining sound objectives but also in grasping what the masses are prepared to do and leading them forward without ever resorting to coercion. Its job is elaborating adequate tactics and strategy, and helping the masses to organise themselves.

The *ujamaa* policy has not as yet led to any major increase in production and productivity. Villagization has created an urgent need to evolve more intensive systems of agriculture. When the rural population becomes concentrated in a nuclear settlement pattern land near the village becomes scarce, the quality and structure of the soil near the village, and its water-retaining capacity, tend to decline. The well-known organisational, agronomic and economic problems discussed in relation to the Maize Project seemed to have been completely overlooked. The continuation of the present blanket programme without drastic modifications in our view can only result in a serious misuse of limited funds. Much of the technology employed was developed outside Tanzania and has not yet been adapted to the concrete local conditions in the country.

While the blanket approach, no doubt, makes life easier for *Bwana shamba*, it typically does not raise farm yields. All such results tend to discredit extension workers in the eyes of farmers and make the latter less receptive to new ideas. Frustrated, because difficult non-technical problems have stood in the way of yield and production targets, field workers have sought to circumvent these problems rather than solve them.
The result has been a large increase in the cost of maize production with no increase in output. We need to understand in advance the relative attractiveness of different activities within a farm system if expensive policy mistakes are not to be made.

We have argued that limited insight into the reality of the countryside, within a wider perspective, causes development failures which, in turn, give planners and politicians a negative view of their 'unco-operative' clients, as a rationale for their failure. Failure in agricultural development is largely traceable to inadequate knowledge or an insufficient appreciation of the relevance of all the socio-economic factors that determine the proper approach to the farmers and that condition the farmers' response and receptivity to change. The development of agriculture is not a purely technical task. It can succeed only with the co-operation of the farmer and on the basis of a sufficient understanding of the society of which the farmer is part.

There is certainly a clear need to increase food production for the local market and to improve the quality of foods consumed by the Tanzanian peoples, but this can scarcely be achieved so long as the marketing structure continues to favour the production of export crops. The present Tanzanian society reflects the preferences and consumption patterns of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie which controls almost all aspects of the state machinery.

The resolution of such policy issues can be predicted only on an adequate analysis of the situation in Tanzania, to indicate
the basic nature of the processes at work and their future
direction. Thus the only available class base for revolutionary
transformation would seem to stand in a reconstructed peasantry
so as to develop what Shivji calls a worker-peasant alliance.
However, the development of a consciousness based on class would
only be useful and appropriate as a weapon in the struggle for
socialism where there were marked class differences involving
the regular exploitation of labour. Only the analysis of social
formations, the concrete locus of class struggle, can produce
concrete explanations of such historical development processes.

The interpretation given above has had the purpose of showing
the relation between the day-to-day problems faced by
agricultural development policy, i.e., food shortage,
mismanagement, etc., and some deep-rooted institutional and
structural factors. In other words, these characteristics
constitute some of the fundamental hurdles to the achievement
of the aims of agricultural development in Tanzania. It is
very hard to see how agricultural policy can be effective if
these questions are not seriously tackled.
In Chapters Two and Four we discussed the problem of land alienation and holdings. The following tables give details on Agricultural holdings in 1938.

### Agricultural Holdings in Tanganyika on 31st December 1938 by Provinces

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Number of Holdings</th>
<th>Total acreage ('000)</th>
<th>Average acreage of Holdings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Lake</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>354</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Central</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Western</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>284</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Southern</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>1,054</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Eastern</td>
<td>434</td>
<td>404</td>
<td>999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Northern</td>
<td>587</td>
<td>457</td>
<td>779</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Tanga</td>
<td>377</td>
<td>641</td>
<td>1,701</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Southern Highlands</td>
<td>349</td>
<td>427</td>
<td>1,223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Grand Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,096</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,119</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,012</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Agricultural Holdings in Tanganyika on 31st December 1938

**By Nationality of Holders***

(excluding Africans)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Number of Holdings</th>
<th>Acreage of Holdings</th>
<th>% of Total Holdings</th>
<th>Acreage</th>
<th>Number of Holdings</th>
<th>Acreage of Holdings</th>
<th>% of Total Holdings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>British</td>
<td>520</td>
<td>1,454</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td>39.3</td>
<td>440</td>
<td>1,791</td>
<td>26.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German</td>
<td>375</td>
<td>1,039</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>554</td>
<td>860</td>
<td>32.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Indian</td>
<td>358</td>
<td>914</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>278</td>
<td>994</td>
<td>16.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek</td>
<td>247</td>
<td>963</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>864</td>
<td>13.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South African</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>1,508</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>1,116</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swiss</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1,323</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3,993</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>764</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>1,374</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>1,721</td>
<td>1,116</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>1,690</td>
<td>1,120</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Excluding land held by missions.

**Source:** Tanganyika, Annual Reports of Department of Lands and Mines.
APPENDIX II

In Chapter Four we discussed Land Rights of Occupancy and land distribution; below we present figures to clarify these points.

Types of Land, Tanganyika 1959

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Land</th>
<th>Million Acres</th>
<th>Thousand Square Miles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a) Arable Land including temporary meadows and fallows</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>32.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Land growing trees, vines and fruit-bearing shrubs</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) Permanent meadows and pastures</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>35.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d) Productive but uncultivated land</td>
<td>43.7</td>
<td>68.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(e) Wood or forest land</td>
<td>90.6</td>
<td>141.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(f) All other land (e.g. desert, rock, swamp, bush etc.)</td>
<td>39.6</td>
<td>61.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(g) Total Land Area</td>
<td>219.3</td>
<td>342.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Long-Term Rights of Occupancy over Agricultural and Pastoral Land as at 31st December 1959

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Holdings</th>
<th>Acreage</th>
<th>Percentage of Total Land Area*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>British (other than British of South African origin)</td>
<td>473</td>
<td>1,413,194</td>
<td>0.6443</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek</td>
<td>277</td>
<td>354,972</td>
<td>0.1619</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian and Pakistani</td>
<td>284</td>
<td>256,257</td>
<td>0.1168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British of South African origin</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>186,357</td>
<td>0.0850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutch</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>32,654</td>
<td>0.0149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>32,020</td>
<td>0.0146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swiss</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>31,189</td>
<td>0.0142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Danish</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>30,555</td>
<td>0.0139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>16,956</td>
<td>0.0077**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missions</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>16,850</td>
<td>0.0077</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>9,502</td>
<td>0.0043</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goan</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5,517</td>
<td>0.0025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italian</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4,852</td>
<td>0.0022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syrian</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2,897</td>
<td>0.0013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2,695</td>
<td>0.0012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>548</td>
<td>0.0003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>157,849</td>
<td>0.0720</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,659</td>
<td>2,554,864</td>
<td>1.1648</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The total land area of the Territory was estimated to be 219,331,840 acres.

This figure refers to land held by Africans otherwise than in accordance with local law and custom.

---

### Long-Term Rights of Occupancy over Agricultural and Pastoral Land granted during the year 1959

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Holdings</th>
<th>Acreage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greek</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>18,818</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian and Pakistani</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13,520</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British (other than of South African origin)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British (of South African origin)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1,571</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>790</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>485</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goan</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>38</strong></td>
<td><strong>39,537</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

The total land area of the Territory was estimated to be 219,331,840 acres.

**Source:**
APPENDIX III

In Chapters Six and Seven we discussed credit facilities to ujamaa villages and settlers. Below we reproduce figures on credits granted during 1974-77 to ujamaa villages, and during 1974-78 to settlers. Note that settlers took inputs in excess so that a balance was carried forward. This was done as a precaution against unforeseen shortages.

Approved Loans for Ujamaa Villages (growing tobacco) in Iringa District

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Year 1974/75</th>
<th>1975/76</th>
<th>1976/77</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kiwere</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>sh. 1,664,480.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Msosa</td>
<td>sh. 25,730.00</td>
<td>sh. 44,300.00</td>
<td>41,340.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mgeraitamba</td>
<td>22,032.00</td>
<td>155,775.00</td>
<td>106,500.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lukwambe</td>
<td>34,440.00</td>
<td>73,660.00</td>
<td>108,650.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mapinduzi</td>
<td>24,500.00</td>
<td>85,950.00</td>
<td>54,200.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kitapilimwa</td>
<td>56,450.00</td>
<td>78,679.00</td>
<td>73,550.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magubike</td>
<td>40,519.00</td>
<td>119,780.00</td>
<td>91,200.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nzihi</td>
<td>44,500.00</td>
<td>64,400.00</td>
<td>36,310.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mtwivi1a</td>
<td>62,321.00</td>
<td>78,153.00</td>
<td>27,740.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Itagutwa</td>
<td>26,869.00</td>
<td>36,696.00</td>
<td>71,229.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nduli</td>
<td>115,000.00</td>
<td>184,940.00</td>
<td>9,300.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Image</td>
<td>16,200.00</td>
<td>50,618.00</td>
<td>109,455.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ilalasimba</td>
<td>40,980.00</td>
<td>57,920.00</td>
<td>79,830.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mfyome</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>152,360.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Approved Loans for Southern Highlands Tobacco Growers Association

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1974/75</th>
<th>1975/76</th>
<th>1976/77</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tobacco</td>
<td>sh. 12,500,000.00</td>
<td>25,970,588.00</td>
<td>26,189,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maize</td>
<td>6,000,000.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For 1975/76 and 1976/77, loans for tobacco and maize were combined and put in one figure. For 1975/76 season, stock was sh. 7,000,000 and new loans were sh. 18,970,588, which all adds up to sh. 25,970,588. For 1976/77 stock was sh. 16,019,000 and the value of inputs and new loans was sh. 10,170,000, which adds up to sh. 26,189,000/=.

Southern Highlands Tobacco Growers Association,
Loan Request to finance the purchase of seasonal inputs
1977/78 Season

(A) Tobacco

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Number of units</th>
<th>Cost/Unit</th>
<th>Total Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N.P.K.</td>
<td>80,000 (bags)</td>
<td>sh. 77.00</td>
<td>sh. 6,160,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.A.N.</td>
<td>30,000 (bags)</td>
<td>70.00</td>
<td>2,100,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tarlined Paper</td>
<td>3,000 (rolls)</td>
<td>225.00</td>
<td>675,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jute Paper</td>
<td>50 (bales)</td>
<td>1,250.00</td>
<td>60,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hessian Cloth</td>
<td>100 (bales)</td>
<td>3,000.00</td>
<td>300,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tobacco growing cost</td>
<td>15,000 (acres)</td>
<td>1,500.00</td>
<td>22,500,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>31,795,000.00</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(B) Maize

Maize growing costs 10,000 acres

5,000,000.00

Total loan component: Tobacco and Maize

36,795,000.00

(i) Tobacco

Tobacco growing costs:
T.shs. 1,250 per acre for 15,000 acres

18,750,000.00

(ii) Maize

Maize growing costs:
T.shs. 750 per acre for 10,000 acres

7,500,000.00

Total contribution

26,250,000.00

Total production costs

63,045,000.00
Stock Evaluation. The Association had stocks in its godowns. The stock consisted of:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Number of Stock</th>
<th>Value/Item</th>
<th>Total Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N.P.K.</td>
<td>25,000 (bags)</td>
<td>135.00</td>
<td>3,375,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.A.N.</td>
<td>13,500 (bags)</td>
<td>135.00</td>
<td>1,888,500.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T.S.P.</td>
<td>25,000 (bags)</td>
<td>135.00</td>
<td>3,375,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hessian Cloth</td>
<td>96 (bales)</td>
<td>2,350.00</td>
<td>225,600.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jute Cloth</td>
<td>170 (bales)</td>
<td>850.00</td>
<td>144,500.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tarlined Paper</td>
<td>3,700 (rolls)</td>
<td>150.00</td>
<td>555,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seed bed packs</td>
<td>1,000 (packs)</td>
<td>85.00</td>
<td>85,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total value of stock</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>9,582,600.00</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Loan proposal after stock. The association requested the Bank to carry over stock and treated it as loan for the next season. The proposals were approved and carried out:

(i) Tobacco

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Members contribution T.shs.</th>
<th>18,750,000.00</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>T.R.D.B. Loan</td>
<td>41,377,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Loan</strong></td>
<td>60,127,000.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(ii) Maize

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Members contribution</th>
<th>7,500,000.00</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>T.R.D.B. Loan</td>
<td>5,000,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Loan</strong></td>
<td>12,500,000.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

New loan together with value of stock becomes T.shs. 46,377,600.00

In Chapter Seven we discussed the uses and abuses of fertilizer. Below we provide figures to show total fertilizer sales, and balances in Iringa District for 1976/77 season.

The use of Inputs for the 1976/77 Season, Iringa District

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM</th>
<th>TARGET (BAGS RECEIVED)</th>
<th>ACTUAL SALES</th>
<th>BALANCE</th>
<th>%</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>D.A.P.</td>
<td>7,200</td>
<td>5,742</td>
<td>574,200/=</td>
<td>1,713</td>
<td>171,300/=</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T.S.P.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8,180</td>
<td>572,600/=</td>
<td>5,891</td>
<td>412,370/=</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.A.N.</td>
<td>17,190</td>
<td>12,790</td>
<td>799,375/=</td>
<td>3,047</td>
<td>190,437.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HYB.613</td>
<td>62,260</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>38,250/=</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>33,750/=</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HYB.512</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>9,800</td>
<td>22,050/=</td>
<td>6,600</td>
<td>14,850/=</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HYB.622</td>
<td>5,530</td>
<td>12,442.50</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>900/=</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HYB.632</td>
<td>43,000</td>
<td>96,750/=</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>15,750/=</td>
<td>16.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Z.H.I.</td>
<td>16,740</td>
<td>37,665/=</td>
<td>2,130</td>
<td>4,792.50</td>
<td>12.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THIODAN</td>
<td>25,020</td>
<td>50,040/=</td>
<td>9,650</td>
<td>19,300/=</td>
<td>38.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENDSULPHAN</td>
<td>72,830</td>
<td>9,000</td>
<td>18,000/=</td>
<td>4,200</td>
<td>8,400/=</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.C.A.</td>
<td>119,000</td>
<td>50,980</td>
<td>89,215/=</td>
<td>13,600</td>
<td>23,800/=</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>2,310,587.50</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>895,650/=</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Iringa District Planning Office, P.L.O.I and III files.

**Note:** The above figures show that a large amount of fertilizer remained unused. The percentages give a clear picture of the fertilizer used and not used.
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District Labour Officer, Iringa District.

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Iringa Region Co-operative Union Official.

Maisala Kiwanga (Mr.) - Secretary of Ismani Native Maize Growers Association Ltd., from 1953–1960.

Mungo’ng'o E.Z. (Mr.) - District Planning Officer, Iringa.

Sikitamkanga (Mrs.) - Chairman of Mkungugu Ujamaa Village.

Shuma N.A. (Mr.) - Planning Officer, Iringa.

Steven Matandula (Mr.) - District Party Chairman (Rural).

Tanzania Rural Development Bank Regional Representative, Iringa.

Region and Project Officer, Iringa.

Tsere P. (Mr.) - Planning Officer.

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