The Critique Of The Traditional Theory of Rationality

being a Thesis submitted for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

in the University of Hull

by

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September 1980
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INTRODUCTION

This essay is concerned with exploring and analysing some of the criticisms levelled against a conception of rationality which has been variously described as, "the contemplative account of knowledge", and, "the idealist conception of knowledge", but which we shall call the traditional theory of rationality. (1) The essay does not make any pretence at being a complete survey of the critical appraisals which this theory of rationality has received. It has confined itself to a selection of those theoretical contributions believed to be most useful in illustrating certain fundamental ideas embodied in the traditional theory.

The first chapter outlines the basic assumptions of the theory and considers the peculiar conception of the intellectual which is often its companion. These assumptions are illustrated by a discussion of Platonic epistemology and it is argued that Plato gives the first coherent articulation of this theory of rationality.

The main body of the essay is divided into two sections, each of which examines one of the substantive claims of the traditional theory.

(1) This phrase is taken from B.C.Parekh's 'Social and Political Thought and the Problem of Ideology'. p57 in Knowledge and Belief in Politics; the Problem of Ideology R. Benewick, R.N. Berki, B.C.Parekh (eds.). Allen and Unwin Ltd. London 1973. This same conception of rationality is described by Mannheim as 'the idealist conception of knowledge' and, in a more recent book by B.Barnes, as the contemplative account of knowledge. See K.Mannheim Ideology and Utopia Routledge, Kegan and Paul London 1972 p265 and B.Barnes Interests and The Growth of Knowledge Routledge, Kegan and Paul London 1977 ppl-3.
The first section entitled 'The Marxist Critique', challenges the assertion that knowledge is independent of the social and historical context of the individual knowing subject. The writers considered in this section stress the social and historical character of knowledge and emphasise the importance of economic interests upon the individual's thought.

One of the earliest sustained critiques of the traditional theory of rationality was contained in Marx's elaboration of his theory of ideology and this is outlined in Chapter two. On Marx's account, knowledge was intimately related to the interests and aspirations of social classes which were defined predominantly, but not solely, according to an economic criterion. According to Marx, a whole range of knowledge, from the most commonplace beliefs and conceptions to the most rigorous and theoretical constructions of Classical Political Economy, were subject to the limiting and distorting influence of social class.

Chapter three considers how Mannheim, through the sociology of knowledge, developed Marx's insights into the relationship between ideas and social structure. Mannheim's critique of the traditional theory was more comprehensive than Marx's since he argued for the influence of a wider range of social factors upon thought and challenged Marx's own claim to objectivity by asserting the social and historical determination of all thought; excepting only certain areas of natural science and logic.

Gramsci's concept of hegemony and his discussion and radical treatment of the intellectual are the subject of Chapter four. Two aspects of his critique of the traditional theory are emphasised. First, Gramsci denied the possibility of any absolute truth by
arguing for a conception of knowledge which stressed the relativity and historicity of all thought; including the natural sciences. Second, he dismissed the view of the intellectual as impartial and disinterested, by asserting that in a sense all men were intellectuals and by his classification of intellectuals according to criteria which emphasised their political and partisan character and their close relationships with social classes.

Chapter five considers the ways in which Reich and Fromm developed Marx's base and superstructure model by drawing upon concepts from social psychology. In this sense their work may be seen as an attempt to link themes contained within the Marxist and the Irrationalist critiques. Against the traditional theory, but with Marx, they argue for the social character of ideas. However, they go beyond Marx to suggest that psychological factors, such as character, personality, and socialisation, can predispose individuals towards an acceptance of certain ideas and a rejection of others.

The second section of the thesis, entitled 'The Irrationalist Critique', considers a group of thinkers concerned to challenge that aspect of the traditional theory which distinguishes reason from passion and relegates the latter to an insignificant role in epistemology. Pareto, Freud and Sorel seek to reassert a substantial part for the irrational in human thought.

Chapter six examines Pareto's theory of derivations and the role he claimed for sentiments in conditioning human thought and beliefs. Ideas, he argued, were simply rationalisations to mask non logical actions. Moreover, contra the traditional theory, Pareto argued that ideas acquire credence not on the basis of any inherent truth, but because of their social utility; this theme
was also explored by Sorel.

Like Pareto, Freud's major objection to the traditional theory was his suggestion of an influential role for the unconscious in human ideation. In Chapter seven, his claim that certain ideas are best understood as illusions based on wish fulfilment, is considered. For Freud, the wishful thinker was unable to appraise ideas objectively and favoured those ideas corresponding to his wishes; religious ideas were one example of such illusions. Religious ideas performed significant social functions yet, for Freud, they were the expression of latent psychological motives contained in the unconscious mind.

The final Chapter discussed the Sorelian concepts of myth, ideology, and utopia and Sorel's attack on intellectuals and the intellectualism of the ideology of progress. Sorel shared Pareto's concern with two aspects of the traditional theory and both are considered in this chapter. First, his claim that the truth of a doctrine was not necessarily relevant to its social utility and secondly his assertion of an expanded role for the irrational in human thought.

In the conclusion it is argued that the credibility of the traditional theory of rationality has been undermined by the critique it has sustained. Its view of knowledge as the product of disinterested reason operating independently of its social context is untenable. However while the arguments levelled by critics against the traditional theory have served to highlight some of its shortcomings, it is argued that they do not themselves constitute a coherent account of rationality which might replace the traditional theory.
Philosophy, Hegel said, was a tragedy man plays with himself. This was, of course, a very abstract proposition, but Hegel in his theorising used abstractions liberally. So this man, whose tragedy was philosophy, was an abstract man - his society, his time left unspecified. Nonetheless, Hegel's statement focused on one significant question. Why should men ask themselves the question, what is man? It seems prima facie an extremely simple, almost naive, question and yet it has proven something of an obsession for philosophers who have continually returned to this issue in an effort to resolve it satisfactorily. On occasions, theorists have answered this question with an enviable air of finality. For some man was a sinner, for others he sought the good life, while for yet others, he was a creature dominated by the twin masters of pleasure and pain which required him to become involved in a relentless pursuit of his self interest. For some, man's defining characteristic was his possession of reason while for others he was a being possessed of a powerful emotional dimension which overwhelmed his reason and guided his actions in an irrational way. However, these certainties about the nature of man were inevitably shortlived as they came to be questioned, turned into doubt and finally replaced by new ones which appeared, at least in the short term, more satisfactory. Hegel, and subsequently Marx, came to realise that man could not be defined in terms of a set of constants for he was continually changing and could always be more than, and different to, what he appeared.

A substantial part of philosophy's concern with man, and his defining characteristics, has centred on questions concerning the
extent to which man is a creature of reason or passion, the extent of his knowledge of the world, the means by which he acquires his knowledge and the standards or criteria by which man could reliably judge the truth or falsity of his knowledge. These questions, central to that branch of philosophy called epistemology, have occasioned as great a diversity of responses at different times as the former question concerning the nature of man; indeed the two questions are directly related.

For Plato, man was essentially a contemplative being gifted with a rational soul who acquired knowledge through the exercise of reason alone. Locke and Condillac took a different view. Knowledge they argued was derived from man's contact with the external world through the medium of his senses. On this account, the mind, to borrow Popper's phrase, was like a bucket which was slowly filled with sense data. (1) Karl Mannheim offered a third view. Man's knowledge, he argued, was decisively influenced by a number of factors of a non intellectual kind, amongst the most important of which was the society in which man lived and his position in the social structure of that society.

One notable attempt to answer these central questions of epistemology is contained in what we have termed the traditional theory of rationality. This account of the extent of man's knowledge and how he acquires it has proven, perhaps more than any rival, both persistent and influential in Western thought; persistent

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because it has a substantial pedigree which can be traced to its origins in the Classical thought of the Pre Socratics and influential since some of even its most ardent critics share a number of its fundamental assumptions.

For a good period of time the traditional theory of rationality attracted little critical attention and its basic tenets were unchallenged. One of the earliest most substantial and sustained criticisms of the theory came from Marx who, deriving much of his philosophical inspiration from Hegel, argued that man's knowledge varied across time and across societies. Subsequent to Marx, the traditional theory has been subject to a variety of attacks from a number of theorists and the concern of this study is to evaluate this critique. The purpose of this chapter is two-fold. First, to outline the basic features of the traditional theory and the peculiar conception of the intellectual which is often its companion. Second, to explore and illustrate this theory of rationality by presenting the epistemological ideas of Plato which represent the first comprehensive, and arguably the most articulate, expression of the traditional theory.

The traditional theory of rationality makes a number of basic assumptions. First, it assumes a clear distinction between theory and practice according to which thinking is considered a purely theoretical or contemplative activity. Thinking has no practical purpose and is motivated by a desire for the truth which is its ultimate telos. Moreover, knowledge is achieved by the disinterested individual subject who does not seek to interpret the object or impose any preconceived intellectual framework upon it, but simply to know the object, 'as it is'. The subject confronts
reality directly and intrudes minimally between the object and his knowledge of it; subject approaches object with an 'open mind' and lets the object 'speak for itself'. Mind's concern is to apprehend the truth in a disinterested way and the knowledge thus produced is a function of reality alone.

The traditional theory also assumes that knowledge is independent of the social context of the individual knowing subject. No significance is attached to the subject's position in the social structure, his membership of a particular social group or stratum, any interests or expectations which may derive from such group membership, or the social mores and norms of his society. In summary there is no suggestion that the individual's knowledge may be limited, partial or in any way inhibited by his social environment; mind and its thoughts transcend the conditions of social existence. Similarly, knowledge is assumed to be independent of the historical conditions in which it emerges. It is claimed to be immune to the influence of historical changes and developments within a society. The traditional theory does not accept the view that all knowledge and intellectual manifestations are relative to a particular historical epoch and can be understood only in the context of the total Weltanschauung of the period.

Further, the traditional theory assumes an almost complete divorce between reason and passion. Thought and knowledge are not influenced by the unconscious psychological motives of the individual; his desires, wishes, fears or anxieties. Mind, which is the seat of reason, should seek to isolate itself from the disturbances of the emotions and thereby nullify their effect on thought.
The traditional theory also assumes that, since knowledge is divorced from the social and psychological background of the knowing subject, true knowledge once discovered is considered timeless, objective and eternal. There is a realm of truth as such although there are many obstacles and hindrances which lie in the path of its discovery. However, once discovered, it can be appreciated, tested and verified by everyone; a view which Popper calls the theory that truth is manifest.\(^{(1)}\) On this account, since knowledge is not context dependent, any rational individual can affirm the truth or otherwise of any statement.

In brief, the traditional theory of rationality offers a view of knowledge in which there exists a strict separation between theory and practice and which emphasises the objects of knowledge to the almost total exclusion of the knowing subject. Where the subject emerges, he is characterised as an isolated, contemplative individual who lacks any social or emotional dimension, and any historical situation. This theory of rationality is often accompanied by a particular conception of the intellectual.\(^{(2)}\) On this

\(^{(1)}\) K.Popper *Conjectures And Refutations* Routledge, Kegan and Paul London 1963 p5.

\(^{(2)}\) Mannheim suggests that the traditional theory of rationality derives much of its inspiration from this peculiar interpretation of the philosophical life. "That in the 'idealist' conception of knowledge, knowing is regarded as a purely 'theoretical' act, in the sense of pure perception, has its origins", he suggests, "in the fact that in the background of this epistemology lies the philosophical ideal of the contemplative life". K.Mannheim *Ideology And Utopia* Routledge, Kegan and Paul London 1972 p265.
account the intellectual, usually in the guise of the philosopher, is someone detached from the practical concerns of everyday life, who enjoys the higher pleasures of the philosophical life, who attempts to distance himself from his community - in popular thought he 'lives in an ivory tower'. He is the disinterested thinker who pursues knowledge unhindered by, and oblivious to, the social and economic tendencies of his time. His concern is with the universal rather than the particular, the theoretical rather than the practical. Julien Benda's portrait of the intellectual in his book The Betrayal Of The Intellectual (1) expressed this view well.

In Benda's words, intellectuals are 'all those whose activity essentially is not the pursuit of practical aims, all those who seek ... the possession of non material advantages, and hence in a manner say, "My kingdom is not of this world"'. (2) Intellectuals should not reject 'the Platonic ideals' (3) and 'descend to the market place'. (4) They should be 'solely preoccupied with the truth', (5) and their work should be 'the mirror of disinterested intelligence'. (6) In the previous ages the intellectual's concern had been the

(2) ibid p30.
(3) ibid p33.
(4) ibid p36.
(5) ibid p53.
(6) ibid p50.
discovery and articulation of universal truths, but Benda lamented the ease with which modern day intellectuals had betrayed that legacy. They had allowed nationalistic and political sentiments to intrude upon their work and narrow the focus of their view from the universal to the particular. Modern intellectuals regarded universal truths as a mere phantom. 'There exist', claimed Benda, 'only particular truths, "Lorrain truths, Provencal truths, Brittany truths ...' Moreover, 'humanity hears the same teaching about the classes and learns that there is a bourgeois truth and a working class truth; better still that the functioning of our minds should be different according to whether we are working men or bourgeois'.(1) That political and nationalistic sentiments and interests should influence the work of intellectuals was anathema to Benda. The intellectual should rise above the practical and immediate concerns of the ordinary man. From this lofty position his detachment and impartiality are secured, allowing him to resist the temptation to 'consider everything only as it exists in time, that is as it constitutes a succession of particular states, a 'becoming' a 'history' and never as it presents a state of permanence beyond time under this succession of distinct cases'.(2)

The intellectual then, on Benda's account, was someone who distanced himself from his community, because he had no interest in the practical and immediate concerns of his society. Indeed the philosopher may even appear naive and ignorant to the ordinary man, (1) ibid p77.  
(2) ibid p79.
but this was simply a product of his detachment from particular and trivial matters and his obsession with more general concerns.

Benda was a modern proponent of the traditional theory of rationality, but this view of the intellectual was given its best expression by Plato in *Theaetetus*

>'From their youth up they have never known their way to market place or law court or council chamber or any other place of public assembly; ... to take any interest in the rivalries of political cliques, in meetings, dinners, and merry making with flute girls never occurs to them even in dreams. Whether any citizen is well or ill born or has inherited some defect from his ancestors on either side, the philosopher knows no more than how many pints of water there are in the sea. He is not even aware that he knows nothing of all this; for if he holds aloof it is not for reputations sake, but because it is only his body that sojourns in the city, while his thought disdaining all such things as worthless, takes wings, as Pindar says, 'beyond the sky, beneath the earth, searching the heavens and measuring the plains, everywhere seeking the true nature of everything as a whole, never sinking to what lies close at hand'. (1)

This conception of the philosopher was based upon Plato's general epistemology which is outlined below since it illustrates some of the fundamental concerns of the traditional theory.

Platonic epistemology derived much of its inspiration from the philosophical tradition of the pre Socratics; two themes were particularly influential. First, from the Orphic religious sect came the belief in reincarnation and the idea that the body is a prison from which the soul, the highest of man's faculties, secured

release upon death. To this basic principle the Pythagoreans added the belief that intellectual pursuits, especially the cultivation of science and philosophy, would assist the soul in its release from the body. (1)

Second, from the philosophy of Parmenides came a certain conception of truth and illusion based upon a distinction between sense and reason. For Parmenides, the senses of sight, touch, taste and so on, were a source of illusion and error. In order to discern truth from error, Parmenides argued for the exclusion of the senses and a reliance upon intellect alone. (2) Plato's theory of knowledge embodied and elaborated both of these ideas. His rejection of knowledge as sense perception was the subject of The Theaetetus. (3)

In this dialogue, Socrates asked Theaetetus, a young mathematics student, to give an account of knowledge. Theaetetus answered that knowledge was geometry, the sciences and, 'the crafts of the cobbler and other workmen'. (4) However, as Socrates quickly pointed out this was not a satisfactory answer since he had asked about knowledge itself and not about particular examples of

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(3) Translated with commentary by F.M. Cornford 1970 op cit pp15-164.

(4) Theaetetus op cit 146d.
knowledge. Eventually Theaetetus offered the view that knowledge was nothing but perception, an argument which Socrates rejected on a number of grounds.

First, the assertion that knowledge was sense perception, which Socrates attributed to Protagoras, was simply claiming that what appeared to be true for a particular individual, was true for that individual. Such a belief would render teaching impossible for, if all perceptions were equally true, the student's perception would be just as accurate and true as that of the teacher. Indeed on this account of knowledge, no man could claim to be any wider than a pig, baboon or tadpole.

Second, Socrates argued that perception tended to yield contrary impressions of the same object under differing conditions. The same object would appear large when close and smaller when distant, brightly coloured when viewed in daylight and much duller if viewed in darker light. Which of these perceptions, asked Socrates, was correct?

Finally, the assertion that knowledge was perception, destroyed the objectivity of truth and undermined any notions of proof or disproof. What was false for one individual might be true for

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(1) ibid 146c-147b There is a close parallel here with the first part of the Meno. When asked to define virtue, Meno makes the same mistake as Theaetetus by offering a list of virtues instead of addressing the question of the nature of virtue itself.

(2) Theaetetus op cit 151d-e.

(3) ibid 161d.
another and sense perception provided no objective yardstick to arbitrate between such differing beliefs. Socrates turned the argument of self criticism against Protagoras. For if 'every man is to have his own beliefs for himself alone and they are all right and true, then ... where is the wisdom of Protagoras to justify his setting up to teach others and', Socrates added somewhat cynically, 'be handsomely paid for it'.

Knowledge Socrates argued was always knowledge of something that is, that existed and, moreover knowledge had to be infallible. Such infallible knowledge could be attained but it was not the same as sense perception which was relative, elusive and subject to a range of influences which impined upon both subject and object. For Plato, the objects of sense perception were always in a state of flux, of becoming; they came into being and passed away, and were infinite in number and variety. In contradistinction, the objects of true knowledge were stable, abiding and fixed.

Having rejected the view of knowledge as perception, Plato offered a distinctive view of knowledge which had two elements which will be discussed in turn. The first was Plato's assertion of the immortality of the human soul and its endeavours to free itself from the body and the world of the senses. The second was the Platonic theory of forms; the doctrine of anamnesis provided

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(1) ibid 161d–e.
a link between these two elements. As Cornford noted 'its twin pillars are the immortality and divinity of the rational soul, and the real existence of the objects of its knowledge - a world of intelligible 'forms' separate from the things our senses perceive'. (1)

For Plato, the soul was divisible into three parts which he called the reflective, passionate and the appetitive and, according to this division, only the reflective part of the soul was rational. (2) Moreover, each had a particular physical locus with the reflective located in the head, the passionate in the breast and the appetitive below the waist. The passionate part of the soul displayed courage, love of honour and in general, the more noble emotions. It had a certain affinity with reason, in that it had an instinct for what is noble, but this was mere instinct and was not rational. The passionate aspect of the soul and the appetitive, which was characterised simply as sensuous appetites, were both destructible.

The reflective part of the soul was where man's true self resided. It was immortal and its characteristic function was rational reflection, what Plato called "nous". The reflective part of the soul held sway over the inferior two parts, which

(1) F.M.Cornford 1970 op cit p2.

(2) This is Plato's account of the soul in The Republic op cit pp126-36. In the Phaedo Plato had argued that the soul was not tripartite but incomposite. The rational soul stood in opposition to the passions and desires of the body which continuously hindered the soul in its pursuit of knowledge. In The Republic conflict arises between the different aspects of the soul itself.
constantly sought to divert the attention of the reflective soul from its pursuit of knowledge. In the Phaedrus\(^1\) Plato drew the celebrated comparison in which the rational element was likened to a charioteer, and the passionate and appetitive elements to two horses. The one horse was good (the passionate element) and, while the good horse was easily driven according to the directions of the charioteer, the bad horse was unruly and tended to obey the voice of sensual passion, so that it needed to be restrained by the whip.\(^2\) The reflective element was highest and born to rule since the other elements of the soul were bound up with the body, with the sensual world, and had no direct part in reason and rational thought. Because the lower parts of the soul were a distraction, the reflective soul continuously tried to detach itself from them. In Cornford's words "Spirit's proper function is thought and reflection ... and is best carried on when spirit withdraws from the flesh to think by itself, untroubled by the senses".\(^3\) The ultimate detachment of the soul from the body was achieved in death.

\(^1\) Plato's Phaedrus Translated with commentary by R. Hackforth Cambridge University Press 1972 246a.

\(^2\) Plato's use of the charioteer and two horses to represent reason and passion is reminiscent of J.S. Mill's discussion of this subject. In his analysis of the relationship between reason and passion, Mill suggests the analogy of a steersman. For Mill the intellect was the most powerful aspect of human nature because it gave direction to the passions. "To say that men's intellectual beliefs do not determine their conduct", he argued, "is like saying that the ship is moved by the steam and not the steersman. The steam indeed is the motive power; the steersman, left to himself, could not advance the vessel a single inch; yet it is the steersman's will and the steersman's knowledge which decide in what direction it shall move and whither it shall go".


\(^3\) F.M. Cornford 1970 op cit p4.
and for Plato, philosophical reflection was a rehearsal or anticipation of death and an approximation to it. As Plato expressed it in *The Phaedo* "... those who betake themselves to philosophy in the right way are engaged in only one thing, namely training themselves for dying and being dead". (1) The pursuit of knowledge was, in a sense, not a human activity since it was best achieved when the body had died and the divine soul was released from its prison to join the company of the Gods.

In life, only the philosopher is able to develop the necessary detachment of soul from body and attain knowledge by the exercise of pure thought alone.

Then the clearest knowledge will surely be attained by one who approaches the object so far as possible by thought, and thought alone, not permitting sight or any other sense to intrude upon his thinking, not dragging in any sense as an accompaniment to reason; one who sets himself to track down each constituent of reality purely and simply as it is by means of thought pure and simple; one who gets rid, so far as possible of eyes and ears and, broadly speaking, of the body altogether, knowing that when the body is the soul's partner it confuses the soul and prevents it from coming to possess truth and intelligence. (2)

This complete divorce of the soul from the body occurred at death, but Plato meant here the death of the body since the soul was immortal. (3) After death, if a man had cultivated the knowledge of ideas and philosophy, his soul returned to its natural home in

(1) *Plato's Phaedo* op cit 64 see also 80d–e and 82d–84c.
(2) *Plato's Phaedo* op cit 65e–66 see also *The Republic* op cit 485d.
(3) *Plato's Phaedrus* op cit 245c–246 *Plato's Phaedo* op cit 105d 81b–c 86b. *The Republic* op cit 610
the world of ideas, where it had first existed. It inhabited the
divine world of pure thought and the contemplation of ideas until,
after a period, it again returned to earth in a body.

Plato argued that in the course of its wanderings, the soul
had learned all that there was to know, but that on reincarnation
it forgot; as Popper put it 'birth is man's fall from grace'.(1)
The soul reacquired its knowledge in this life by a process of
recollection of the truths known before reincarnation. Learning
was therefore not a process of discovery but a recollection of
knowledge of which the soul has become temporarily ignorant.(2)
It was therefore possible, starting from something which an individ-
dual consciously knew, to remind him of the other knowledge which
was latent in his mind.

This theory of anamnesis was elaborated in The Meno when
Socrates conducted an experiment with a young slave, at the request
of Meno. The slave, though professing a complete ignorance of
mathematics, solve a complex geometrical problem assisted only by
Socrates' questioning. Socrates claimed that he did not tell the
slave anything, but only, by his questions elicited knowledge which
must have been in the slave's mind although he had been hitherto
unaware that he possessed it.(3)

(2) Plato's Meno Translated by W.K.C.Guthrie with critical essays
   edited by M.Brown. Bobbs Merrill Co Inc America 1971 80c-
   86c. Plato's Phaedo op cit 72e-77a, 79d, 94b-d, 105d.
   The Republic op cit 61d. For a discussion of anamnesis see
   W. T. Stace op cit p217, K.Popper 1963 op cit p9, R.E.
   Allen 'Anamnesis In Plato's Meno and Phaedo' Review of
   Metaphysics Vol XII 1959 pp165-74.
(3) Plato's Meno op cit 82b-85c.
The soul was thus immortal and omniscient. Its imprisonment in the body caused it to forget and hindered its pursuit of knowledge. This divorce of mind and body was central to Platonic epistemology. The body and its senses perceived objects in a state of flux and change and therefore it could not apprehend stable and universal knowledge. Plato argued for the relativity of sense perception but did not accept a total relativism. Absolute knowledge could be obtained, not through sense perception, but through the activities of the reflective soul. To argue this Plato had to posit the existence of an objective universally valid reality, independent of the world of perception and this he found in his theory of forms. (1) Plato was drawing here a twofold distinction between on the one hand two different states of mind, and on the other between two different sets of objects corresponding to those different states of mind. The non philosopher's state of mind was belief (doxa) and its objects were the many particular things, acts and sense impressions. The philosopher's state of mind was knowledge (episteme) and its objects were the forms; the objects of rational understanding. (2) Plato argued that these universals, or forms, were not abstractions devoid of objective content, but rather that to each true universal concept there corresponded an objective reality. The forms were eternal, unchanging universal absolutes which enjoyed an existence independent of the world of phenomena and appearances. Absolute beauty, justice and equality were the


(2) Theaetetus op cit 173d Plato's Phaedrus op cit 249c The Republic op cit 476.
universal forms, of which the many particular individual things which were called beautiful, just or equal in the world of sensual appearance were like images or reflections. A flower may be beautiful or a woman, a painting, a poem or a certain landscape but, Plato argued these were particular embodiments of beauty and not beauty itself. A poem was clearly different to a landscape, but both may be beautiful and it was this essential beauty which had to be discovered; beauty was one thing not many. The same was true of other forms such as justice, goodness and equality. Thus if a man was asked what equality is and he replied by offering particular instances of equality, imperfect embodiments of equality which fall short of the ideal, then his state of mind would be a state of doxa. He has seen and understood only copies and images and mistaken them for the original. But if a man has an understanding of equality in itself, if he can rise above the images provided by sense perception, to the form, the idea, the universal, whereby all particular instances can be judged, argued Plato, then his mind is in a state of episteme. (1) For Plato there was a thing which was equal, not in the way that two pots of gold or two sticks were equal, but something just equal in itself - equality. This equality cannot be known through the apparent equals of sense, for sensible equals and equality are different sorts of things. To know equality, said Plato, is to know it as perfectly equal; it cannot in any sense be unequal.

Sensible equals however may appear both equal and unequal to

(1) Plato's Phaedo op cit 75b, 66b-e The Republic op cit 476, 484
different observers or from different perspectives. For Plato, equality, like all forms was universal, eternal and unchanging; it was a yardstick with which to assess the extent to which particular things and instances fell short of the ideal.\(^1\)

Plato's epistemology then rested upon a number of distinctions between the body and mind, between different states of mind and between two different sets of objects corresponding to those two different states of mind. He distinguished between two orders of reality. There was the world of being, the real world which is stable and unchanging, which contained the objects of rational understanding and true knowledge which, since they were independent of the physical world, could not be known through it, but only through reason. The world of becoming, by contrast, was continuously changing. It contained all the particular things perceived by our senses and gave rise to beliefs or doxa. A division was drawn between the rational mind and the sensuous body or, in Plato's later formulation of the soul as tripartite, between the different aspects of the soul with the reflective proving hegemonic.

This theory of knowledge outlined by Plato, may be considered the first coherent exposition of the traditional theory of rationality. It posited a rational mind, divorced from sensual passions, which was characterised by its disinterested desire for truth. On this account knowledge, absolute and eternal, was independent of its economic and historical context and was true for all rational men.

\(^{1}\) *Plato's Phaedo* op cit 74b-75.
It was a conception of knowledge which condemned as trivial the everyday practical concerns of men and emphasised the value of pure thought as a means to apprehend truth. The most worthwhile life was that of the philosopher for he, above all others, was inspired to live up to and approximate this ideal view of human existence.

We noted at the beginning of this chapter, that the emergence of any sustained and systematic critique of the traditional theory has been a relatively modern phenomenon. The challenge came from two distinct groups of theorists, each concerned to question a different aspect of the traditional theory. The first group, whom we have called the Marxists, sought to stress the intimate relationship between knowledge and social structures. This argument had its roots in Marx and was developed through his concept of ideology. Subsequent writers have extended Marx's basic insights on this question and argued that a considerable range of factors of a non intellectual kind may be extremely influential upon thought.

The second group of theorists who we have termed the 'irrationalists', were a good deal more heterogeneous in character than the first. Towards the end of the nineteenth century, there emerged in Europe a number of sociologists, psychologists and political philosophers who, while being quite independent of each other, appeared to signify an important and developing trend. Its direction was towards re-establishing the importance of the irrational in society. With regard to the traditional theory of rationality, they were critical of its emphasis on rational and the divorce it sought to establish between reason and passion. They wished to demonstrate that irrational and unconscious motives
intruded upon man's reason and were influential upon his thought and knowledge. We will consider each group of critics in turn.
THE MARXIST CRITIQUE
KARL MARX AND THE THEORY OF IDEOLOGY

The substantive elements in Marx's critique of the traditional theory of rationality can be stated briefly at the outset. First, Marx argued that ideas were closely related to the social context in which they emerged and hence any understanding of ideas and beliefs which saw them as context independent was, on his account, deficient. Second, Marx suggested that knowledge was not only related to a particular social context but also to an historical context. Ideas were 'appropriate' to specific historical periods and did not express timeless truths. Finally, Marx insisted that ideas and beliefs were not the product of the contemplative activity of disinterested individuals and they could not be explained by reference to an individualistic psychology. Ideas developed from the activities of social groups, specifically social classes, related to their involvement in the process of production.

This critique of the traditional theory of rationality was embodied in Marx's discussion and elaboration of his theory of ideology. Although ideology was a significant concept in Marx's theorising and central to his epistemology, it is only recently that any sustained investigation of the concept has been undertaken. (1)

One commentator has described Marx's theory of ideology as an 'extraordinarily confused doctrine', (1) but generally, those studies which have been undertaken reveal that in Marx's writing ideology was a highly complex concept which has been interpreted by subsequent scholars in a variety of ways. Most academic attention has focused on ideology in the sense of a coherent system of socially and historically conditioned ideas, which express and support the economic interests and aspirations of a social class and which disguise or distort social and political reality. (2)

In brief, Marx considered ideology to be at best an inadequate and, at worst, a distorted view of the world. He postulated the notion of a relationship between ideas and practical social life and attempted to relate the rise and decline of systems of thought and belief to the rise and decline of social classes. By

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(1) (Cont.)  


so doing, Marx cast very serious doubts upon the validity of the traditional theory and hence his discussion of ideology is central to our concerns. (1)

(1) It should be noted that in addition to this primary sense of ideology, Marx used the term in at least two other distinct senses. First, Marx used ideology to refer to philosophical idealism or, as he preferred to call it, 'speculative' philosophy. The locus classicus for this usage of ideology is The German Ideology in which the whole thrust of Marx's argument is that certain German philosophers had failed to appreciate the supremacy of materialist philosophy. Idealism had misunderstood and inverted the relationship between philosophy and reality. The tendency of German idealism to see ideas as independent of material existence lead to the belief that social relations and institutions were established in accordance with abstract ideas and notions and not, as Marx believed, the opposite way round. It would be difficult to list all the occasions on which Marx used the term ideology in this sense, but the following are representative. K. Marx, F. Engels The German Ideology Lawrence and Wishart London 1965 p23, 24, 31, 37, 38, 52, 56, 259, 504, 507, 600, 671. K. Marx Capital Lawrence and Wishart London 1970 Vol i p373. K. Marx The Poverty of Philosophy Progress Publishers Moscow 1973 pp91, 95, 100, 101.

However, on occasions Marx used ideology in a wider sense which designated all ideas and forms of consciousness of an epoch, with the exception of scientific thought, ideological. This meaning for ideology is most clearly expressed in the Preface to Marx's A Contribution To The Critique Of Political Economy, where he claims the following

With the change of the economic foundation the entire immense superstructure is more or less rapidly transformed. In considering such transformations the distinction should always be made between the material transformation of the economic conditions of production which can be determined with the precision of natural science and the legal, political, religious, aesthetic, or philosophic - in short ideological forms in which men become conscious of this conflict and fight it out.


Marx also used ideology in a third and less well defined sense. The word appears in adjectival form in his discussion of productive and unproductive labour when the latter is referred to by the synonym of the ideological professions. The occupations listed under this general heading include judges, doctors, schoolmasters, poets, professors, clowns, parsons, jugglers and whores. It is uncertain what Marx wished to convey by this derisory labelling of unproductive labour as the ideological
When he designated a set of propositions or a system of ideas ideological, Marx argued that they had three distinctive features. First, the system of ideas in question could be subjected to a reductionist analysis and thereby given an origin in any one of three possible socio-historical locations. These three professions and yet it remains a fairly consistent usage of the word in Marx's writings. See K. Marx Grundrisse (Tr) M. Nicolaus Penguin London 1973 pp272, 305, 468. K. Marx Theories of Surplus Value Lawrence and Wishart London 1969 pp165, 174, 218, 267, 268, 286, 287, 300, 301, 401. K. Marx Capital Vol I op cit p446.

This multiple meaning for ideology in Marx's work can lead to confusion. However, coupled with this is the curious infrequency with which Marx employed the term ideology and the associated terms ideologist and ideological.

If The German Ideology is excluded from consideration, the term ideology does not appear in Marx's writings until 1850 with the publication of The Class Struggles In France 1848-50. (International Publishers New York 1972 p57 and p83). If this use of the word seems sparse, it is more remarkable to note that throughout his entire literary output (again excluding The German Ideology) Marx uses the term ideology on only one other occasion. If this use of the word seems sparse, it is more remarkable to note that throughout his entire literary output (again excluding The German Ideology) Marx uses the term ideology on only one other occasion to the two mentioned above (Capital op cit Vol I p765). The terms ideologist and ideological also make but rare appearances. Ideologist appears in The Holy Family (K. Marx & F. Engels Selected Works Lawrence and Wishart London 1975 p123) The Poverty Of Philosophy op cit p101 The Communist Manifesto (Penguin London 1967 p91) The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (in Marx & Engels Selected Works op cit p157) Capital (op cit Vol I p608) and finally in a letter to Ferdinand Lassalle dated 19th April 1859 in Marx & Engels Selected Correspondence (Lawrence & Wishart London 1965 p117).

Marx seems to have preferred the adjectival form, ideological, but again, in the period following the publication of The German Ideology, it appears on only a handful of occasions. See The Poverty of Philosophy op cit p96. The Communist Manifesto op cit p102 The Class Struggles in France 1848-50 op cit pp34, 77, 78, 110 and 111. Preface to A Contribution To A Critique of Political Economy op cit p183, Grundrisse op cit pp164-5 Capital op cit Vol I pp373, 446, 573 and in a footnote by Engels p532, and Theories of Surplus Value op cit Part I pp174, 285, 287, 300, 301.
locations of ideology were, of course, interrelated but could be distinguished for the purposes of analysis. The first location of ideology was in a specific social class. Each class produced its characteristic ideas and beliefs because of its position in the economic and social system; that socio-economic position being the decisive factor in determining the nature and content of beliefs.

In the Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte this relationship between ideas and class position was made explicit.

Upon the different forms of property, upon the social conditions of existence, rises an entire superstructure of distinct and peculiarly formed sentiments, illusions, modes of thought and views of life. The entire class creates and forms them out of its material foundations and out of the corresponding social relations ... The single individual who derives them from tradition and education may imagine that they form the real motives and the real starting point of his activity.

Thus Marx ascribed to people certain ways of thinking congruent with their social background. Class position imposed blinkers on the individual such that he could understand the world only through the mediation of socio-economic categories. Thus for example the petty bourgeois always 'imagines himself elevated above class antagonisms generally', while the bourgeois fails to recognise that 'the bourgeois form of production is historical and transitory ... the bourgeois man to them is the only possible basis of every ...

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(1) D. MacRae has denied this connection; 'yet the word ideology has no necessary connection with the concepts of class and class relationships'. Ideology and Society Hein. London 1963 p63. See also R. V. Burks 'A Concept of Ideology for Historians' Journal of the History of Ideas Oct 1944 p188.

(2) K. Marx Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte op cit p118-19.

(3) ibid p123.
society; they cannot imagine a society in which men have ceased to be bourgeois'.

Marx's first claim then was that certain types of illusion corresponded to a given position within the class structure.

The second possible location of ideology was historical in nature. Here Marx ascribed to a certain historical age or epoch, a specific view of the world; what might be termed the ideology of the age. In this second location the nature of men's thought was related not to their class background but rather was seen as a product of their historical circumstances. Thus historians 'in each historical epoch have had to share the illusion of that epoch'.

Equally limited in their outlook are the 'bourgeois economists' who are unable to understand political economy scientifically because they 'are so much cooped up within the notions belonging to a specific historical stage of social development'. For Marx the ideas which were characteristic of any historical period merely represented in ideal form the material conditions prevailing at that time. As the material conditions of production changed, so men's ideas and conceptions of the world underwent a similar revision and ideas that were once thought to be natural and eternal were recognised as

(1) Marx in a letter to P.V.Annenkov 28th December 1846 in Marx and Engels Selected Works op cit p676.

(2) K.Marx and F.Engels The German Ideology op cit p52.

transitory and historically located. Such propositions seemed self evidently true to Marx.

Does it require a deep intuition to comprehend that man's ideas views and conceptions, in one word man's consciousness, changes with every change in the conditions of his material existence. ... What else does the history of ideas prove, than that intellectual production changes in character in proportion as material production is changed.(1)

Marx proceeded to give an example of how ideas related to particular modes of production. Religion and morality, he believed, both varied according to their historical setting.

When the ancient world was in its last throes, the ancient religions were overcome by Christianity. When Christian ideas succumbed in the 18th century to rationalist ideas, feudal society fought its death battle with the then revolutionary Bourgeoisie. The ideas of religious liberty and freedom of conscience merely gave expression to the sway of free competition within the domains of knowledge.(2)

Notions such as freedom and justice were common to all ages because the different forms of consciousness of the differing epochs exhibited an underlying theme; namely they were all products of antagonistic social relations. 'No wonder', Marx wrote, 'that the social consciousness of past ages, despite all the multiplicity and variety it displays, moves within certain common forms, or general ideas, which cannot completely vanish except with the total disappearance of class antagonisms'.(3) Thus while certain ideas were appropriate to specific historical periods, other ideas spanned different epochs because they were the product of the perpetual antagonism between social groups.

(1) K.Marx and F.Engels The Communist Manifesto op cit p102.
(2) Ibid p103.
(3) Ibid p103.
The third source of ideology for Marx was the social category of the ideologists. This social group emerged within society as a consequence of the division of labour, which took place within the ruling class. The dominant class divided its functions; some of its members worked as the thinkers of the class, as active ideologists, who made their living by perfecting the illusion of the class about itself; others developed a merely receptive attitude to the ideas and illusions produced by their ideological spokesmen. This lack of intellectual commitment stemmed from the particular role of these members of the ruling class which demanded great practical activity; the active members, Marx argued, simply had less time to invent ideas and illusions about themselves.\(^1\) The appearance of this specialised category of ideologists had a crucial significance in destroying the relationship between consciousness and existence which Marx had postulated as basic.\(^2\)

Now consciousness lost its connection with real life and the fictitious idea arose that consciousness was no longer determined by existence. This division of labour caused consciousness to replace life with its own creations. At this point man became unable to recognise that consciousness was nothing else but conscious existence.

From this moment onwards, consciousness can really flatter itself that it is something other than consciousness of existing practice, that it really represents something without representing something real.\(^3\)

\(^{(1)}\) K.Marx and F.Engels \textit{The German Ideology} op cit p61.

\(^{(2)}\) \textit{Ibid} p61.

\(^{(3)}\) \textit{Ibid} p43.
Specialised professional practitioners of politics, law, and religion now emerged who had an interest in maintaining their respective ideological sphere. The longer the traditions of each of these disciplines the greater was this feeling of autonomy from material existence. The ideologists attempted to assess the validity of one idea against another, to relate ideas to each other in abstraction from the real world in which they had their origin. Each change and progression in the history of ideas was, for the ideologist, simply a development of ideas which was not related to any material change. (1)

Marx pointed out that the ideologists of the ruling class need not necessarily be in harmony with the other members of the dominant social group. Indeed there can develop 'within this class ... a certain opposition and hostility between the two parts'. (2) However such hostility can occur only on a limited basis and would never develop to the point where the existence of the class as a whole was threatened. (3) Marx asserted that in the event of a collision between a class and its spokesmen, in which the interests of the class were endangered, the interests would ultimately win out. However Marx does say in The Communist Manifesto (4) that a certain section of the bourgeois ideologists would ally themselves to the proletariat at the 'decisive hour' when the abolition of bourgeois society was at hand.

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(1) K. Marx and F. Engels The German Ideology op cit pp671-2 and in a letter to F. Mehring dated 14th July 1893 in Marx and Engels Selected Correspondence op cit pp459-60.

(2) Ibid p62.

(3) Ibid p62.

(4) K. Marx and F. Engels The Communist Manifesto op cit p91.
In addition, Marx suggested that the ideologists of the ruling class need not themselves be members of that class. What made a set of ideas the ideology of a class was that it corresponded to the purposes and practices, to the actual long term needs and interests of that class. Similarly what established thinkers, irrespective of their class origin, as ideologists of a specific class, was the fact that in their thoughts and ideas they did not progress beyond the limits which that class would achieve in real life. Marx was unusually lucid on this subject. The ideologists of a class need not be members of that class for 'according to their education and their individual position they may be as far apart as heaven and earth'. However, 'what makes them representatives ... of a specific social class ... is the fact that in their minds they do not get beyond the limits which the latter do not get beyond in life, that they are consequently driven, theoretically, to the same problems and solutions to which material interest and social position drive the latter practically. This is in general the relationship between the political and literary representatives of a class and the class they represent'. (1)

Here Marx was presenting the reader with two distinct usages of the term 'ideologist'. In the first, ideologists were members of the ruling class who become preoccupied with ideas and treated them as autonomous entities independent of material existence. In the second sense, ideologists were seen as the spokesmen for the

(1) K.Marx The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte op cit p121.
interests of a particular social class, irrespective of their own class background. Marx was not being inconsistent by investing the term ideologist with a dual meaning for these usages correspond to two senses of ideology noted earlier; namely ideology as speculative philosophy and ideology as an apology for class interest.

The second thing which Marx suggested when he called a set of ideas ideological was that these ideas functioned in a certain way. This function was to give the class cohesion and further to represent its particularistic ideals and aspirations as universally valid and appropriate to other classes. Viewing itself and other classes through the medium of distorting ideology, the ruling class imposed its ideology on society as a whole. While this ruling ideology was no more than the expression of the needs and aspirations of the dominant class, it appeared both to those who articulated it and to those upon whom it was imposed, to be of a general and more universal relevance.

The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas: i.e. the class which is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force ... the ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant material relationships, the dominant material relationships grasped as ideas; hence of the relationships which make the one class the ruling one, therefore, the ideas of its dominance.(1)

The whole society remained unaware of the illusion which prevailed and in this way ideology functioned to promote stability by acting as an apology for the iniquities of the existing productive relations. Marx continually referred to the spokesmen of bourgeois class interests as apologists and to their ideas as apologia. In

(1) K.Marx and F.Engels The German Ideology op cit p61.
'The Chapter On Capital' in the *Grundrisse* Marx wrote 'The economists take refuge in this simple process in order to construct a legitimation, an apology, for capital by explaining it with the aid of the very process which makes its existence impossible'. In *Theories of Surplus Value* volume one bourgeois economists were called 'philistine apologists of bourgeois society.' Marx saw behind the overt appearance of social and political ideas the latent motivation of class interest. Critics often considered such an attitude annoying and one of them complained that 'religious persons, theologians and metaphysicians, cannot but feel they are being made to appear absurd when they are told that all their arguments count for nothing in themselves, but are a sort of squeaking noise given out by the grinding of their own axes'. Yet for Marx this was precisely what he considered to be the function of ideology.

The third thing which Marx implied when he designated a set of beliefs ideological, was that these ideas somehow failed to accurately reflect the real world. The distortion could be confined to a single idea but in Marx it usually extended to the whole range of ideas and modes of thought and expression of a particular group or class.

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(1) K. Marx *Grundrisse* op cit p322.

(2) K. Marx *Theories of Surplus Value* op cit Pt 1 p388 Marx's references to ideology as apology are too numerous to document fully. However the following are representative. *Theories of Surplus Value* op cit Pt 111 p61, 453, 501, 502, 534. Pt 11 p527-35, 564-576. Pt 1 p264-6, 299-300, 387-9. *Capital* Vol 1 op cit p15 Vol 11 op cit p33.

Ideology was a misleading and limited view of the world, which stood in opposition to scientific thought and signified an inability to reach a scientific understanding of productive relations. (1) Marx drew the analogy between the image in a camera and man's ideological image of his real existence.

If in all ideology men and their circumstances appear upside down as in a camera obscura, this phenomenon arises just as much from their historical life process as the inversion of objects on the retina does from their physical life process. (2)

Later in Theories of Surplus Value he noted that 'economic categories are reflected in the mind in a very distorted fashion'. (3)

From the ideological standpoint 'everything appears ... distorted and turned topsy turvy'. (4) 'Economic, political and other

(1) It should be noted that for Marx, a failure to understand productive relations scientifically could be arrived at by either of two possible routes. First a theorist could concern himself with the material world - as the theorists of classical and vulgar political economy had done - and yet, because of the operation and influence of a variety of social and historical factors fail to understand it. The misunderstanding here concerned misconceptions about real processes and relations between men. On the other hand, a theorist need not concern himself with the real world at all. If like the idealists a thinker remained obsessed with abstract and ideal notions divorced from the real world, then clearly he could not hope to understand the real world of men and their relationships in a scientific manner. The misunderstanding arose here, Marx believed, because of misconceptions of a spiritual nature which bore no relationship to reality. This was Marx's claim against the German ideologists, Stirner and Bauer, and gave rise to the second sense in which Marx employed the term ideology; namely philosophical idealism. Ideology in the sense of philosophical idealism, was also a pejorative, with both senses implying an inadequate and unscientific approach to comprehending man and society.

(2) K.Marx and F.Engels The German Ideology op cit p37.

(3) K.Marx Theories of Surplus Value Part III op cit p163.

(4) K.Marx Capital Vol III op cit p691.
reflections are just like those in the human eye, they pass through a condensing lens and therefore appear upside down, standing on their heads ... this inversion ... forms what we call ideological conception'. (1) Both Marx and Engels used the metaphor of inversion and reflection to illustrate the nature of ideological perception. (2) Political consciousness became for Marx an upside down view of reality and commonplace assumptions about political life were explained away as illusions; the ideological realm was 'an enchanted, perverted, topsy turvy world', of false images and misrepresentations.

Marx's understanding of the problem of ideology was also expressed in terms of the distinction between appearance and essence and ideology arose when the former was mistaken for the latter. His basic argument was as follows. Ideological mystification arose because reality was hidden from men by the appearances which it assumed and in which it displayed itself to them. The appearances or forms which reality assumed disguised the hidden underlying relations which were themselves the source of the mystifying and illusory appearances. For Marx a distinction had to be sustained between appearance and reality - between phenomena which were immediately evident to observation and investigation and the latent processes,

(1) F. Engels in a letter to C. Schmidt dated 27th October 1890 in Marx and Engels Selected Correspondence op cit p419.

relationships and laws which manifested themselves in these appearances and informed the observed facts. Scientific knowledge could only be attained by advancing from the appearance of a phenomenon to its essence; to remain at the level of appearance was to remain at the level of ideology.

It was precisely in this sense that the work of the vulgar economists was ideological. Thus when Marx discussed the way in which these economists considered the problem of the rate and mass of surplus value, their work was ridiculed and he clearly thought it to be of little value.

Vulgar economy which, indeed has learnt nothing, here as everywhere sticks to appearances in opposition to the law which regulates and explains them.(1)

In a later work, a similar charge was directed against Lassalle whose 'iron law of wages' was seen to be but 'following in the wake of the bourgeois economists'. This was because he 'took the appearance for the essence of the matter'.(2)

(1) K.Marx Capital Vol 1 op cit p307. See also p538.

(2) K.Marx Critique Of The Gotha Programme in Marx and Engels Selected Works op cit p329.

Cunningham has commented on the ambiguity and multiplicity of metaphors employed by Marx in his analysis of ideology using this distinction between appearance and essence. See his "Reflections on Projections; The Range of Ideology" in R. Benewick, R.N.Berki and B.C.Parekh (eds) Knowledge And Belief In Politics op cit p50 and p55, and also J.Mepham in Radical Philosophy op cit p14. The distinction between essence and appearance is expressed by using a number of interchangeable terms.

Thus appearances are semblances, phenomenal forms, estranged outward appearances, illusions, forms and forms of manifestations. In a similar way, essence becomes fundamental forms, inner mechanisms, real relations, real nature, secret or hidden substratum, actual relations, content and inner connection. However while Marx employs a number of terms to express this distinction between essence and appearance, the distinction is systematically employed by Marx to explain illusory ideology.
Marx's claim then was that bourgeois social relations presented themselves to individuals in a disguised form. As Geras interpreted this view,

... capitalist society necessarily appears to its agents as something other than it really is ... it is because there exists at the interior of capitalist society a kind of internal rupture between the social relations which obtain and the manner in which they are experienced. (1)

This view was endorsed by Marcuse.

The central phenomena connected with this process (capitalist production) do not immediately appear to men as what they are in 'reality' but in masked 'perverted' form. (2)

Perhaps the best way to clarify the relationship between appearance and essence and the problem of ideology, is by considering a specific example which Marx worked out in some detail.

In *Capital* Marx compared and contrasted the real situation of the wage labourer with the way in which bourgeois political economy saw the worker as an individual who freely disposed of his labour in the market place. Marx considered the real situation of the proletarian to be analogous to that of a slave. He is bound to capital in much the same way as the negro slave was bound

(2)(Cont.)

I tend to agree with Seliger's argument contra Mepham, that while the profusion of metaphors may well express Marx's dissatisfaction with any single one of them, it is not evidence to suggest any substantial differences between the theory of ideology in the 'early' and the 'mature' Marx. See M. Seliger *The Marxist Conception Of Ideology; A Critical Essay* op cit p33.


(2) N. Geras 'Essence and Appearance; Aspects of Fetishism in Marx's Capital' *New Left Review* No. 65 Jan/Feb 1971 p71.
to his master. 'In reality he belongs to capital', (1) since 'he cannot get free from capital'. (2) For Marx this was the real relationship between employer and employee, between bourgeois and proletarian, but this was not the way in which the relationship was experienced by either party. (3) 

The labourer appeared to dispose of his labour freely because he was able to reject what one capitalist offered in favour of better conditions of employment offered by another; in other words he was free to choose to which capitalist he would sell his labour power. However, since the labourer lacked capital and possessed only his labour power, he was obliged to sell himself in order to survive. In essence the labourer was bound to capital and enjoyed no independence from it.

In bourgeois society capital is independent and has individuality while the living person is dependent and has no individuality. (4)

Bourgeois political economy saw the labourer as an independent agent but this independence was no more than an appearance which his real position as a wage slave assumed. The appearance was functional, disguising to both parties the actual nature of the contract. The labourer's appearance of independence, his ability to select his

(1) K. Marx Capital op cit Vol 1 p577.
(2) Ibid p613.
(3) For further discussion of Marx's analogy between the wage labourer and the slave see 'Wages, Prices and Profit' in Marx and Engels Selected Works op cit p213.
(4) K. Marx The Communist Manifesto op cit p98.
employer, was the phenomenal form which his slavery assumed and under which it was concealed.

The Roman slave was held by fetters: the wage labourer is bound to his owner by invisible threads. The appearance of independence is kept up by a constant change of employers and the fictio juris of a contract.(1)

and again

His (the wage labourers) economic bondage is both brought about and concealed by the periodic sale of himself, by his change of masters, and by the oscillations in the market price of labour.(2)

In brief Marx argued that when according to bourgeois ideology the proletarian disposed of his labour power as a free agent, the true relationship between employer and employee was reversed.

This phenomenal form, which makes the actual relationship invisible and, indeed, shows the direct opposite of that relationship, forms the basis of all the juridicial notions of both the labourer and capitalist, of all the mysteries of the capitalist mode of production, of all its illusions as to liberty.(3)

Such was Marx's explanation of ideological phenomena. Capitalist society could not be fully understood for its real nature was obscured by appearances and illusions and yet 'These imaginary expressions arise from the relations of production themselves. They are categories for the phenomenal forms of essential relations. (4) Since these 'imaginary expressions' were a product of the relations of production, it followed that, for Marx, a change in

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(1) K. Marx Capital op cit Vol I p574.
(2) Ibid pp577-8 see also pp541, 614, 614.
(3) Ibid p540.
(4) Ibid p537.
the relations of production would ensure a change in the form of mystification, if not its total eradication. In brief, Marx believed ideology to be a historically specific phenomenon. Capitalist social relations would, he believed, create the possibility of a society where 'the practical relations of every day life offer to man none but perfectly intelligible and reasonable relations with regard to his fellow men and nature'. (1) A socialist society would be one where social relations would not be concealed or distorted by mystificatory ideologies.

If we conceive society as being not capitalistic but communistic, there will be no money capital at all in the first place, nor the disguises cloaking the transactions arising on account of it. (2)

Only when the process of material production was 'treated as production by freely associated men, and was consciously regulated by them in accordance with a settled plan' - which Marx believed would be the case under socialism - does society 'strip off its mystical veil'. (3)

(1) K. Marx *Capital* op cit Vol 1 p79.
(2) K. Marx *Capital* op cit Vol 11 p318.
(3) K. Marx *Capital* op cit Vol 1 p80. G.A. Cohen has argued that for Marx socialism would not only bring to an end the era of ideologies but also the era of the social sciences. See 'Karl Marx and the Withering Away of the Social Science' in *Philosophy and Public Affairs* Vol 1 1971-2 pp182-203. Science, Cohen argues, dealt with the underlying relations which lay behind the appearance and thus with the advent of Socialism, when social relations become transparent, the distinction between essence and appearance will disappear and social science will be redundant. There is some support for this viewpoint in Marx's writings. In a letter to Engels, Marx claimed that if appearances were not mistaken for reality, 'what need would there be for science'. Selected Correspondence op cit 27-6 1867 pp190-1. Again in a letter to Kugelmann, Marx wrote '... the vulgar economist thinks he has made a great discovery when, as against the revelation of the inner connection, he proudly claims that in appearance things look different. In fact he boasts that
However to say that for Marx ideology was simply distorted, mystifying and illusory thought is to miss the theoretical richness and complexity of the concept he was developing. The notion of ideology as illusion must be clarified in three ways in order (i) to prevent the confusion of ideological error with simple empirical error, (ii) to examine the relationship between illusion and reality and, finally (iii) to elucidate the dialectical relationship which Marx believed to obtain between the elements of truth and falsehood in ideology.

It is firstly necessary to distinguish ideological error from empirical error. Of course ideology was an error but it is a special kind of error. A theory may embody factual errors without it thereby becoming an ideology and, conversely, an ideology may contain a number of truths; as Marx had argued was the case with Classical Political Economy. However, the falsity and illusion which is embodied in ideology must, for Marx, be found at the level of the whole theory and not in any single fact or aspect of the theory. This confusion of ideology with error has occasionally led to incorrect definitions of ideology by even the most eminent of theorists. Talcott Parsons, for example, suggests that the 'essential criteria of an ideology' are 'deviations from social science objectivity'.

(3)(Cont.)

he holds fast to appearance and takes it for the ultimate. Why then have science at all? 11.7.1868 Selected Correspondence p209. Finally in Capital Vol 111 Marx claimed '... all science would be superfluous if the outward appearance and the essence of things directly coincided. However Cohen ignores the fact that Marx saw his own analytical system as scientific. Certain aspects of Marx's conceptual apparatus are not historically specific and can be employed to analyse non exploitative societies. For example such concepts as forces and relations of production are appropriate to the analysis of any social system including socialism.
of distortion is that statements are made about society which, by social scientific methods, can be shown to be positively in error'. (1) This ability to show that statements are 'positively in error' is however by itself, insufficient to establish a particular viewpoint as ideological. Secondly, it is important to stress that Marx did not consider ideology to be illusory; illusion was related to reality in a two-fold sense. First, every illusion had its source in reality. It reflected definite conditions of material life and from definite social relations, experiences and activities. 'The term 'appearances' should not be taken to mean 'mere', i.e. false, appearances', wrote Geras. 'They are not illusory appearances but realities'. (2) Secondly, since ideology reflected reality - since it embodied the forms and ways in which individuals experienced reality - it could affect that reality by imposing rules and limitations on real living men; it informed men's thoughts and guided their actions. In short, ideologies formed a part of actual experience. This fact explained the persistence of ideological illusion for it was not simply a process of indoctrination which gave illusions credibility, but rather the fact that they occurred within certain existing material conditions and served to explain them.

They (ideologies) offer a way of seeing the world and of living, that is to say, up to a certain point, a praxis which is at once illusory and efficacious, fictitious and real. (3)

(1) T. Parsons An Approach to the Sociology of Knowledge Transactions of the 4th world congress of Sociology 1959 p25.
(2) N. Geras op cit p75.
(3) H. Lefebvre op cit p80.
As Marx himself put it '... the actual agents of production ... feel completely at home in these estranged and irrational forms of capital-interest, land-rent, labour-wages, since these are precisely the forms of illusion in which they move about and find their daily occupation'.

In this sense ideologies were not totally illusory. They reflected the real world, they provided men with an explanation of reality and offered a framework of ideas which motivated and guided them. Lefebvre summarised the 'real' nature of illusions.

Social reality, i.e. interacting human individuals and groups, produces appearances which are something more and else than mere illusions. Such appearances are the modes in which human activities manifest themselves within the whole they constitute at any given moment - call them modalities of consciousness. They have far greater consistency let alone coherence than mere illusions or ordinary lies. Appearances have reality and reality involves appearances.

The third aspect of ideological illusion was the most significant. For Marx ideological illusion was not totally false but contained latent elements of truth. Marx believed that although ideologies necessarily displayed, to a greater or lesser extent, elements of falsehood, they also contained important elements of truth. This was particularly the case with the belief system of an emerging, progressive or revolutionary class. This was because Marx believed that the interests of such a new class were initially in accordance with the interests of society as a whole. In its infancy a class needed to confront reality boldly and its ideology, therefore, might well partake of truth without of course expressing

(1) K.Marx Capital op cit Vol I 111 p830.
(2) H.Lefebvre op cit p62.
all of it. An ideology was thus a 'rag bag' of ideas containing elements of truth and falsehood. (1) Maurice Dobb has coherently expressed the marxist position on this question.

Ideologies were not pure illusion ... Certainly there was a large even predominating, element of 'false consciousness', especially in the ideology of an established ruling class which clung to power when already faced with a revolutionary challenge. But at the same time, an ideology, especially in its revolutionary and formative phase, could contain an important scientific or realistic element, which could be treated according to the objective criterion or human experience as an addition to human knowledge. Absolute truth was not a Kantian unknowable, even if it could never be reached at any finite point in the historical process: it could be approached asymptotically, and criteria existed by which one could speak about being nearer to it or more remote. (2)

Thus Marx did not perceive the relationship between truth and falsehood as one between distinct and polar opposites, but rather as a dialectical relationship in which truth and falsehood interpenetrated each other and were mixed together. There was for Marx a continual two way movement between truth and falsehood. (3) 'Truth and error', wrote his colleague Engels, 'like all thought concepts which move in polar opposites, have absolute validity only in an extremely limited field ... both poles of the antithesis become transformed into their opposites truth becomes error and error, truth'. (4) Indeed, any work aspiring to the status of science should refrain from employing such terms.

(1) K. Marx The German Ideology op cit p 62-3.
(3) H. Lefebvre op cit p 85. For a fuller account of this dialectical relationship between truth and falsehood see R. N. Berki's essay in R. Benevick et al op cit p 92.
(4) F. Engels Anti Duhring Foreign Languages Publishing House Moscow 1954 p 128.
Real scientific works therefore as a rule avoid such dogmatically moral expressions as truth and error.\(^{(1)}\)

Marx considered truth to be, in a certain sense, a product of falsehood. Truth could emerge from error and did not totally refute the latter but rather transformed and retained it through the medium of scientific criticism. It was careful and rigorous critical evaluation of an opponents ideas, rather than their total rejection which Marx believed offered a scientific road to the discovery of truths. This relationship which Marx perceived between truth and falsehood explains why, although on occasions he was hostile towards bourgeois ideology, on others he showed the greatest admiration for its most eminent representatives. For example, Marx often made critical remarks about Ricardo and yet it was not inconsistent for him to write in *Capital* of his intellectual debt to classical political economy.

N. Sieber, Professor of political economy in the university of Kiev in his work 'David Ricardo's Theory of Value and Capital', referred to my theory of value, and money and of capital, as in its fundamentals a necessary sequel to the teaching of Smith and Ricardo. That which surprises the Western European in the reading of this excellent work is the author's consistent and firm grasp of purely theoretical position.\(^{(2)}\)

Later in *Capital* Marx feels it to be perfectly in keeping with earlier critical remarks, to write of the economist.

Ricardo was of this opinion, but afterwards expressly disclaimed it, with the scientific impartiality and love of truth characteristic of him.\(^{(3)}\)

\(^{(1)}\) F. Engels *Anti Duhring* Foreign Languages Publishing House Moscow 1954 p130.

\(^{(2)}\) Afterword to 2nd German edition of *Capital* Vol 1 op cit p17.

There are similar favourable comments about Adam Smith.

Here therefore Adam Smith in plain terms describes rent and profit on capital as mere deductions from the workman's product, or the value of his product, which is equal to the quantity of labour added by him to the material. This deduction however, as Adam Smith himself previously explained, can only consist of that part of the labour which the workman adds to the material, over and above the quantity of labour which only pays his wages, or only provides an equivalent for his wages; that is the surplus labour the unpaid part of his labour.\(^{(1)}\)

From these quotations it is clear that Marx regarded Smith and Ricardo to have made considerable contributions to political economy and often acknowledged the fact that much of his own work was based on insights previously discovered by bourgeois economists. Having established this relationship, Marx thought it would be imprudent to totally reject bourgeois ideology as something which was illusory and false. It was rather something containing elements of truth which would evolve as the ideas which it encompassed were criticised and transformed. Marx did not see his analysis of capitalism as a total rejection of bourgeois ideology but rather as a scientific advancement over it made possible by the assimilation and re-evaluation of the more progressive sentiments which it articulated; the rational kernel within the mystical shell as Marx put it.

Marx's concern with the ideology of bourgeois political economy formed the greater bulk of his work; certainly his later work. The raison d'être for this concern was that Marx saw in bourgeois political economy a highly elaborate theoretical system which justified bourgeois productive relations. For Marx bourgeois

\(^{(1)}\) p256 of the manuscript of Theories of Surplus Value quoted by Engels in the preface to Capital Vol II p10. For other favourable comments see Capital Vol I pp46, 47, 123, 362-3, 388, 410, 569, 619, 621, 713, 738, Vol I p9, 10, 13, 143, 193, 369, 393, 491, Vol II pp238, 324, 142, 225, 331, 383, 615, 767, 768, 787.
economists 'simply express in theoretical terms the notions of the practical men who are engrossed in capitalist production, dominated by it and interested in it'. (1) 'He (Ricardo) himself is so much the prisoner of a capitalist standpoint'. (2) A meaningful critique of capitalism must therefore seek to criticise 'both the capitalist and his ideological representative the political economist', (3) 'the capitalist and still more his theoretical interpreter, the political economist', (4) 'the political economist', and, 'his ideology'. (5)

Throughout his writing Marx viewed the political economist as the 'ideological representative' of the bourgeoisie, as a spokesman, as someone whose analysis of political economy conformed to the long term economic interests of the bourgeoisie. (6) Marx's analysis of Bourgeois political economy, as has been shown, led him to recognise that certain aspects of bourgeois political economy were insightful and worthy of absorption into his own analysis of capitalism. However he did not consider all ideas to be of equal worth and was thus more hostile towards some than others. Marx isolated three types of political economy which he ranged on a three tier scale of decreasing merit.

(1) K. Marx Theories of Surplus Value op cit Vol 111 p265.
(2) Ibid p115.
(3) K. Marx Capital op cit Vol 1 p573.
(4) K. Marx Capital Vol 11 p452.
(5) K. Marx Capital Vol 1 p765.
He considered the work of the vulgar economists to be the
most inadequate formulation of economic theory. Vulgar economy
never probed beyond surface appearances to investigate the under-
lying reality; it was obsessed with observing the immediate and
the obvious. 'The ... vulgar economist's way of looking at things
stems from ... the fact that it is only the direct form of mani-
festation of relations that is reflected in their brains and not
their inner connection'. (1) Vulgar economy 'only ruminates without
ceasing on the material long since provided by scientific economy,
and there seeks plausible explanations of the most obtrusive pheno-
mena, for bourgeois daily use, but for the rest confines itself to
systematising in a pedantic way, and proclaiming for everlasting
truths, the trite ideas held by the self complacent bourgeoisie
with regard to their own world, to them the best of all possible
worlds'. (2) Of all the vulgar economists Malthus was singled out
by Marx for special criticism. Malthus exhibited all the short
comings which characterised vulgar economy but in addition to this
was also a plagiarist who 'often copies whole pages'. (3) Moreover
his continual defence of the interests of the aristocracy in the
face of contradictory evidence rendered his work 'base'. (4) Marx

(1) Selected Correspondence op cit Marx to Engels 16th Aug 1867
p191 see also K.Marx Capital Vol 1 op cit p307.
(2) K.Marx Capital Vol 1 op cit p81.
(3) Ibid p647 footnote 1, p616, footnote 2 and Marx's letter to
J.B.Schweitzer Jan 24th 1865 in Marx and Engels Selected
Correspondence op cit p152. K.Marx Theories of Surplus
Value Pt III op cit pp13-69.
(4) K.Marx Theories of Surplus Value Pt II op cit p119.
had nothing but contempt for vulgar economy. Although critical of 'men like John Stuart Mill', Marx believed 'it would be very wrong to class them with the herd of vulgar economic apologists'.\(^1\) Mill seems to have fallen midway between the classical economists and vulgar economy in Marx's judgement.\(^2\)

At the level above vulgar economy Marx placed classical economics. Marx saw his own work as the heir to the tradition of English classical political economy, perceiving in the latter both failings and points of merit. Unlike the vulgar economists, classical economics - whose main representatives were Adam Smith and David Ricardo - penetrated beyond the level of mere appearance to study the underlying productive relations. 'By classical political economy' Marx understood 'that economy which since the time of W.Petty, has investigated the real relations of production in bourgeois society, in contradistinction to vulgar economy which deals with appearances only'.\(^3\) Marx was of course critical of classical economy. 'One of the chief failings' of this school 'was its inability to understand that form under which value becomes exchange value'.\(^4\) Moreover, 'even the best spokesmen of classical economy remain more or less in the grip of the world of illusion which their criticism had dissolved, as cannot be otherwise from a bourgeois standpoint, and thus they all fall more or less into inconsistencies, half truths and unsolved contradictions'.\(^5\) Perhaps Marx's most

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\(^1\) K.Marx Capital Vol 1 op cit p610 footnote 2.

\(^2\) Ibid p15.

\(^3\) Ibid p81.

\(^4\) Ibid p14.

\(^5\) K.Marx Capital Vol 111 op cit p830.
severe criticism of classical political economy was its inability to appreciate the historical specificity of the capitalist mode of production and its resultant productive relations. Capitalism was not an eternal, immutable social structure as had been assumed by bourgeois economists who tended to 'smudge over all historical differences and see bourgeois relations in all forms of society'. (1)

Marx saw classical political economy as a half way house between vulgar economy and his own scientific analysis. It 'nearly touches the true relation of things, without however, consciously formulating it. This it cannot do as long as it sticks in its bourgeois skin'. (2)

Despite these criticisms, classical economy was a definite conceptual advance over the vulgar economy which it preceded. Marx felt that the key to understanding the degeneration of classical economy to vulgar economy lay in the wider social conditions in which both developed. (3) Classical economy developed at a propitious time (1820-30) (4) when the bourgeoisie was still in the process of establishing its hegemony over society. The interests of the emerging bourgeoisie seemed at this time synonymous with the interests of all classes within society; classical political economy had an opportunity to develop in a scientific direction.

'Political economy can remain a science' Marx noted 'only so long as the class struggle is latent or manifests itself only in isolated

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(1) K.Marx Grundrisse op cit p105.
(2) K.Marx Capital Vol 1 op cit p540.
(3) K.Marx Theories of Surplus Value Pt III op cit pp501 & 109.
and sporadic phenomena'. Classical political economy 'belongs to
the period in which the class struggle was as yet undeveloped'. (1)
However, by 1830 the class struggle between the bourgeoisie and the
proletariat became manifest in society. The bourgeoisie was now
established as the dominant class in society and the year 1830 marked
a watershed between classical political economy and vulgar economy.
'Then things take a new turn' Marx wrote 'and the bourgeoisie tries
to justify 'economically', from its own standpoint, what at an
earlier stage it had criticised and fought against'. (2) The
scientific aspirations of classical political economy degenerated
into the apologetics of vulgar economy.

In France and in England the bourgeoisie had conquered
political power. Thenceforth, the class struggle, practically as well as theoretically, took on more and
more outspoken and threatening forms. It was thence-
forth no longer a question whether this theorem or that
was true, but whether it was useful to capital or harm-
ful, expedient or inexpedient, politically dangerous or
not. In place of disinterested inquirers, there were
hired prize fights; in place of genuine scientific
research, the bad conscience and evil intent of
apologetic. (3)

(1) K. Marx Capital Vol 1 op cit p14.
(2) K. Marx Theories of Surplus Value Pt I op cit p301.
(3) K. Marx Capital Vol 1 op cit p15. H. M. Drucker has attempted
to make much of this regression from classical economy to vul-
gar economy by claiming that Marx has two theories of ideology;
ideology as 'false consciousness' and ideology as 'apology'.
The distinction which Drucker is attempting to establish is
one which sees ideology firstly as class conditioned thought
and secondly as a body of ideas which functions in a certain
way. Thus for Drucker when Marx says of a theory that it is
ideological 'he is commenting on either (a) the 'false cons-
ciousness' which has led the author of the theory to speak in
this mistaken way or (b) the way the theory functions ... to
serve the interests of his class'. The Political Uses of
Ideology op cit p15. See also by the same author 'Marx's Con-
cept of Ideology' in Philosophy April 1972 and his review of
Ranked above both vulgar economy and classical economy was Marx's own scientific analysis of capitalist production relations. Marx incorporated the valuable elements of classical economy - most significantly Ricardo's formulation of value - and superseded it with his own theory of surplus value. Moreover Marx's entire analysis stressed the transient nature of capitalist productive relations. Marx considered his political economy to be the pinnacle of his theoretical achievement. From these giddy heights he looked down upon the admirable yet inadequate classical political economy and the detestable and apologetic vulgar economy.

This was Marx's account of ideology. It is a complex assemblage whose components may be distinguished analytically, yet which should be viewed as a totality. What emerges from this complex notion of ideology is that for Marx ideology was a pejorative term which signified a misleading, distorted and unscientific viewpoint. His formulation of ideology issued a challenge to political economists and indeed all social theorists, by refusing to accept their ideas at face value and seeking to characterise them as rationalisations and apologies for class interest. Ideas he claimed were decisively influenced by the social context from which they emerged and were not indifferent to the class position of their advocates. More than

(3)(Cont.)
this, he pointed to the historical character of ideas and suggested that they were a good deal more ephemeral and transient than previously imagined.

Marx's elaboration of ideology added a new dimension to academic argument and debate. Marx not only took issue with opponents on the substantive content of their ideas, evaluating and criticising them, but also attempted to 'get behind' the ideas, to impute motives and to offer an explanation why his opponent held the views that he did. This strategy, as Mannheim noted, proved an extremely powerful weapon in debate until turned upon Marx himself. But more significantly it cast substantial doubt upon the very nature of knowledge itself and the extent and reliability of man's knowledge of his world.
Marx's critique of the traditional theory of rationality had suggested the need to consider ideas in the context of the social structures in which they emerged and by which they were conditioned and influenced. However, Marx, in accordance with the traditional theory, believed ultimately in the possibility of true knowledge and considered his own writings to be precisely this. Ideological thought was not totally pervasive and objective and scientific knowledge about the social and political world could be achieved. The problem was to strip away and remove certain obstructions from the processes of rational thought. Marx suggested that objectivity could come about only when ideas were 'purified', and broke free from the falsifying ambiance of the social. Ideology was not a perennial problem, an inescapable intellectual condition, but a mental symptom indicating the presence of social ills which could be cured by revolution.

Mannheim's critique of the traditional theory was more radical than Marx's in two respects. First, he argued for the influence of a greater range of non intellectual, or as he preferred existential factors upon thought. Second, and this was the radical departure in the study of ideas which began with Mannheim, he rejected Marx's belief in the possibility of non ideological thought; for Mannheim all thought, with the exceptions of logic and natural science, operated within a specific socio-historical milieu and was thus deemed ideological. (1)

(1) Mulkay has argued that, although Mannheim is generally considered to have distinguished natural science from socio-historical thought, and excluded the former from his thesis of existential determination, there is some evidence to suggest
Such total scepticism challenged the validity of knowledge and raised important doubts about the theoretical status of the social sciences. In 'Ideology as a Cultural System' (1) Geertz expressed these doubts in different terms when he argued that 'the term ideology has itself become thoroughly ideologised'. (2) He explained that this happened through an 'historical process by which the concept of ideology came to be itself a part of the very subject matter to which it referred'. (3) Geertz called this Mannheim's Paradox. His complaint was that the analysis of ideology had itself become an ideology. This was precisely Mannheim's claim about Marxism; it had no right to posture as science, standing aloof from the competing claims of ideologies, but should recognise its own ideological nature. However, Mannheim's attitude towards Marx's concept of ideology was anything but critical. He considered Marx to have achieved a considerable insight into the nature of ideas and their development. Even so, Mannheim thought that Marx had not developed his critique of the traditional theory to its logical conclusion, nor had he answered the many questions

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(1) (Cont.)
that Mannheim did 'waver on this point'. He claims that Mannheim does question the independence of natural science from sociological determination in Ideology And Utopia. See M.Mulkay Science And The Sociology of Knowledge George Allen & Unwin London 1979 pp10-17.

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(2) Ibid p47.

(3) G.Geertz 'Ideology as a Cultural System' op cit p47.
which he had raised. A new discipline was required which would analyse the theoretical implications of Marx's concept of ideology and Mannheim directed much of his intellectual efforts towards its establishment. (1) Mannheim christened the new discipline the sociology of knowledge and proceeded to establish its methodological principles and the range and scope of its studies. The sociology of knowledge was to be committed, as its name implied, to a consideration of ideas and intellectual phenomena through an examination of extra-theoretical factors. Intellectual productions were to be related to aspects of the social structure from which they emerged. The sociology of knowledge visualised mental productions as rooted in existential factors and, 'The existential basis of thought ... appears to include all stimuli to thought that are not referable to the logical or imminent development of thought'. (2)

(1) G.W. Remmling has argued that Mannheim's work can be divided into four phases and that each phase is concerned with a different problem. It is only the first phase of Mannheim's career, up to 1933, Remmling claims, which is concerned with the analysis of ideas. From 1933-41 he was concerned with social planning, from 1941-46 he was concerned with the irrational elements in social action and from 1946-47 with political power. This argument seems doubtful. The underlying element of continuity in Mannheim's work is to be found in his concern to establish consensus at both the intellectual and social levels. His earlier analysis of ideology had political consequences and formed the basis for what he eventually termed 'planning for freedom'. However, if mere repetition were sufficient to guarantee correctness, Remmling's interpretation would be beyond question. See his 'Philosophical parameters of Karl Mannheim's Sociology of Knowledge', in Sociological Quarterly Vol 12 1971 p531. 'Karl Mannheim: Revision of an Intellectual Portrait' in Social Forces 1961 pp23-24. The Sociology of Karl Mannheim Routledge, Kegan & Paul London 1975 Chapter 4. 'The Significance and Development of Karl Mannheim's Sociology' in Towards an Understanding of the Sociology of Knowledge Routledge, Kegan & Paul London 1973 pp217-9.

(2) F.E. Hartung 'Problems of the Sociology of Knowledge' Philosophy of Science XIX 1952 p18.
Two decisive influences were pervasive throughout Mannheim's work. First, as has been noted, Mannheim's sociology of knowledge was profoundly influenced by Marx's investigations into the concept of ideology and Marx's 'hint that there is a correlation between the economic structure of a society and its legal and political organisation and that even the world of our thought is affected by those relationships'. (1) Like Marx, Mannheim treated political, legal, philosophical, religious and other ideas in their intimate relationships with economic and social changes. 'There are modes of thought', he believed, which 'cannot be adequately understood as long as their social origins are obscured'. (2) Further 'it could be shown in all cases that not only do fundamental orientations, evaluation, and the content of ideas differ but that the manner of stating a problem, the sort of approach made, and even the categories in which experiences are subsumed, collected and ordered vary according to the social position of the observer'. (3) Such statements could easily be mistaken for Marxist orthodoxy and bear testament to the extent of Marx's influence. But, if Marxism was the chief, it was not, of course, the only influence which shaped Mannheim's work. (4)


(3) Ibid p130.

From the historicists, particularly Dilthey, Mannheim derived his commitment to the view that all cultural manifestations are relative to a particular historical epoch and can be understood only in the context of the total Weltanschauung of the period. (1) Mannheim's historicism implied that every socio-historical situation was located at a specific point on a unilinear, ever continuing and never returning continuum - history. Each situation was therefore unique and the knowledge to which it gave birth, and which was true within it, was equally unique, bound to its time and place.

Mannheim's fusion of Marxism, with its emphasis on the relationship of ideas to social position, and historicism, meant that human intelligence was to be doubly restricted. It could not understand reality in its totality because reality was historical while man lived at a specific moment in history and because society was socially differentiated. (2) These two influences on Mannheim's work have been noted by the translator of his Ideology and Utopia.

The Historicist view that each age has its own distinct problems, views of the world; ... the Marxist view that there are bourgeois and proletarian truths; ... came together in Mannheim's thought in the 1920s. (3)

Three strands emerge from the Sociology of Knowledge as central to Mannheim's critique of the traditional theory. First, his notion of the social and historical determination of ideas. Secondly, the key concepts of ideology and utopia which he employed in his

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(1) P. Kecskemeti elaborates the personal roots of Mannheim's attachment to historicism in his introduction to Karl Mannheim Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge Routledge, Kegan & Paul London 1952 pp1-33.

(2) H. R. Wagner gives a fuller account of Mannheim's employment of historicist analysis in 'Mannheim's Historicism' in Social Research 19 1952 pp300-21.

critique and thirdly, his historical and sociological analysis of the intelligentsia and his emphasis on its role in establishing intellectual consensus within society. Each of these aspects of Mannheim's system will be related below and finally examined.

Mannheim's critique of the traditional theory of rationality was based on Marx's assumption that ideas and values were related to social structure; more specifically they were related to the position of the cognitive subject within that social structure. It was in his essay 'Competition as a Cultural Phenomenon'(1) that Mannheim suggested for the first time that intellectual movements should be interpreted directly in political terms. '... one runs far less risk of going astray', claimed Mannheim, 'if one proposes to explain intellectual movement in political terms than if one takes the opposite course and from a purely theoretical attitude projects a merely contemplative, internal, theoretical thought pattern on to the concrete, actual life process itself. In actual life it is always some volitional centre which sets thought going ...'.(2) The world of ideas was held to be extremely responsive and sensitive to any change in the social structure, and vice versa. Thus it is that

The greater art of the sociologist consists in his attempt always to relate changes in mental attitudes to changes in social situations. The human mind does not operate in vacuo; the most delicate change

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(2) Ibid p213.
in the human spirit corresponds to similarly delicate changes in the situation in which an individual or group finds itself, and, conversely, the minutest change in situations indicates that some men too have undergone some change. (1)

All this sounds very similar to Marx's conception of ideology in which ideas emerge as the product of struggle between differing social groups. But Mannheim was reluctant to employ the term 'ideology' when discussing the socially conditioned ideas of a group or individual, precisely because he found it difficult to divest it of its Marxist and 'moral connotations'. (2) He replaced ideology with the slightly different concept of 'perspective'. The perspective of a thinker was the Weltanschauung or general outlook which conditioned his perception of reality. Perspective represented the subject's 'whole mode of conceiving things, as determined by his historical and social setting' and it signified 'the manner in which one views an object, what one perceives in it and how one construes it in his thinking'. (3)

The concept of perspective thus represented the internally integrated values, beliefs and conceptual organisation the individual employed in his perception of reality. The optical analogy with perspective was both immediate and obvious. The shape an object assumed depends on its position in relation to the cognitive subject; a different perspective on the object meant that the subject was viewing it from a different position. Thus a square table

(1) From the essay 'German Sociology' in Essays on Sociology and Social Psychology Routledge, Kegan & Paul London 1952.
(2) Ideology and Utopia op cit p239.
(3) Ibid p244.
viewed directly above appeared square. However, if the subject placed his eye at table level near to one corner, then the table appeared to be diamond shaped. The same was true of 'ideological' perspective, the same reality viewed from different social and/or historical positions gave the subject a different perspective on that reality. Reality may be viewed from this multiplicity of perspectives since '... groups and strata in a functionally differentiated society have a different experimental approach to the common contents of the objects of their world'. (1) In this way 'diverse meanings can arise due to the divergent social origins of the different members of the whole society'. (2)

The individual born into a group and always within one or another, could never shake off this group perspective, and his own outlook had deep roots in the perspectives of the group or groups with which he had been, or was, involved. Mannheim was not putting forward here the idea of a group mind, but simply stating that ideas 'do not have their origin in the first place in the individual's becoming aware of his interests in the course of his thinking. Rather they arise out of the collective purposes of a group which underlie the thought of the individual, and in the prescribed outlook of which he merely participates. (3)

Thus the perspective of a given thinker or group can be identified or reduced to the social base from which it emerged. This process of correlating mental productions with specific societal

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segments, Mannheim called 'particularisation'. He hoped that the process of particularisation might lead the supporters of a given perspective to realise that their assertions might represent only a partial view. In turn, this recognition might promote a psychological receptivity to opposing ideas and opinions.

Mannheim's assertion then was that ideas were socially determined, but determination was not meant to imply that individuals passively reflected certain social conditions in their thought patterns. He simply claimed that there were links which connected social position and mental productions, but he never specified what they were and as a result his theory becomes vague. The term 'seinsverbundens wissens' (literally existence connected knowledge) used by Mannheim in the original German text, was rendered as 'social determination of knowledge' by the translators, who noted that the German form leaves the exact nature of determinism open. (1) Mannheim seemed reluctant to commit himself on the question of determinism. He posited the existence of significant links between ideas and social structure but, he claimed, an understanding of the precise nature of these links must await further empirical investigation. 'Here we do not mean by 'determinism' a mechanical cause effect sequence ... we leave the meaning of determinism open and only empirical investigation will show us how strict is the correlation between life situation and thought process or what scope exists for variation in their correlation'. (2)

(1) Ideology and Utopia op cit footnote p239.
(2) Ibid.
Mannheim regarded his essay on the development of German Conservatism in the early 19th century as going someway towards testing his theory of the social determination of ideas, by examining the nature of the links between social and ideational structures. (1) The problem which Mannheim sought to resolve was how the predominantly Conservative and Romantic climate in Germany between 1800-1830 could be accounted for in terms of a struggle among social groups, for 'The key to the understanding of the changes in ideas is to be found in the changing social backgrounds mainly in the fate of the social groups or classes which are the 'carriers' of this style of thought'. (2) However he was quick to add 'This relationship between a style of thought and its social carrier is not a simple one'. (3)

His essay sought to explain first the nature and growth of conservatism in general and second the specific form which conservatism assumed in Germany at this time. Mannheim claimed that to understand the growth of conservatism it was essential to begin with rationalism; the philosophy of the enlightenment. Modern rationalism was associated with the emergence of the bourgeoisie, for the characteristic quality of capitalist bourgeois consciousness is that it knows no bounds to the process of rationalisation. (4)

(1) 'Conservative Thought' in Essays on Sociology and Social Psychology op cit pp74-165.
(2) Ibid p74.
(3) Ibid p74.
(4) Ibid pp84-6. Mannheim claimed that this rationalism was a product of the new economic system.
Romantic conservatism was the political and intellectual reaction to the continuing process of rationalisation, which was destroying the old world; it called for a restoration of that world.

The sociological significance of romanticism lies in its function as the historical opponent of the intellectual tendencies of the enlightenment, in other words against the philosophical exponents of bourgeois rationalism. (1)

The carriers of this intellectual reaction were mainly 'those social and political strata which remained outside the capitalistic process of rationalisation and played a passive role in its development'. (2)

These strata included peasants, small bourgeoisie and mainly the nobility and landed aristocracy who opposed the enlightenment philosophy. (3) In this sense conservatism and not socialism was the first opponent and critic of capitalism seeking to preserve, among other things, the non-rational elements of life which it considered valuable. (4) 'It is well known that romanticism developed from the enlightenment as antithesis to thesis'. (5) Therefore conservatism like socialism was a fairly modern phenomenon which represented the intellectual and political expression of class interests and values.

(1) 'Conservative Thought' op cit p89.
(2) Ibid p87.
(3) Ibid p89.
(4) Mannheim establishes many fascinating points of contact between the socialist and conservative critique of bourgeois rationalism. Both conservative counter-revolutionary and socialist revolutionary are, in a way, romanticists; they both need principles which transcend the cold rationality of the bourgeois. The irrational element in proletarian thought is a product of the class's social position. Any attempt at revolution inevitably produces a chiliastic or messianistic element and herein lies its affinity with conservatism. However at bottom, proletarian thought is
Conservatism attacked every tenet of rationalist thought and proposed alternatives. It opposed reason and the deductive method with 'history', 'life and the nation' and emphasised the essential irrationality of reality. Further, it denied the claim of universal validity of principles and posited the historically unique character of each society. Such was the basis of conservatism in general.

Mannheim now narrowed the focus of his enquiries to account for the particular guise which conservatism assumed in Germany between 1800 and 1830. Two related factors were crucial for this investigation. The first clue to the nature of conservatism was to be found in Marx's observation that 'Germany experienced the French revolution on the philosophical plane'. (1) In Germany the counter revolution was purely intellectual in character and as a result, the polarisation between romanticism and rationalism was more extreme than anywhere else in Europe. Mannheim did not find this surprising, for '... in Germany there has always existed a tendency to go to extremes in pushing logical arguments to their ultimate conclusions'.

(2) This tendency and the resulting divergence between romanticism and rationalism was explicable in terms of the social conditions fundamentally rational (Ibid pp91-3). However, the two propositions are obviously not identical. The proletariat accepts the industrial society created by capitalism because it wishes to develop it to its utmost, to utilise it for its own purposes. Conservatives reject the industrial trend for it represents a threat to 'organic' life patterns on which order and culture rest.

(5) Ibid p89.

(1) 'Conservative thought' op cit p80.

(2) Ibid p79, as Mannheim notes, conservatism had its origins in Britain in the writings of Edmund Burke, but it was in Germany that it found its most extreme expression.
peculiar to Germany. More specifically, Mannheim considered the particular class structure of Germany at that time to be of crucial significance. An independent commercial or industrial middle class did not exist as it did in France and England. There were only two politically influential groups; the landed nobility and the bureaucratic personnel of the centralised monarchical administrations. However the increasing challenge from the emergent bourgeoisie forced the nobility to defend their threatened power; the conflict between the classes demanded an effective formulation, by the nobility of their political aspirations. Conservatism was the ideology of the dominant but challenged aristocratic and traditional society, the reflection of a class society and an outgrowth of class conflict and polarisation. This brief insight into conservatism shows how deeply Mannheim was influenced by Marx. The form and content of German conservatism and the ways in which it differed from French and English conservatism could only be understood against the background of German social structure.

However, Mannheim felt that Marx's analysis of the social basis of thought was limited. He broadened the concept of ideology

(1) Conservative Thought op cit p121. 'Marx's view is probably correct' wrote Mannheim, and he held that 'the social conditions in Germany in 1843 corresponded roughly to that of France in 1789'.

(2) Ibid pp83 and 121.

(3) Ibid p120.

(4) For a full critique of Mannheim's position on conservatism see S.J.Tonsor 'Gnostics, Romantics and Conservatives' in Social Research 1969 pp616-34.
to take account of other social influences on the formation of thought. The general notion of the social determination of thought left open the question of how non-economic factors, such as race, nationality, occupation and other social factors might influence man's knowledge and ideas. While class stratification was the most significant factor determining a given perspective, there were many others which included 'generations, status groups, schools, etc.'(1)

Unless careful attention is paid to highly differentiated social groupings of this sort and to the corresponding differentiations in concepts, categories or thought models, i.e. unless the problem of the relation between super and sub-structure is refined, it would be impossible to demonstrate that corresponding to the wealth of types of knowledge and perspectives which have appeared in the course of history there are similar differentiations in the sub-structure.(2)

Mannheim considered generations to be the most significant non-economic factor and in one essay he attempted to explain the replacement of predominant social outlooks within identical strata, through the succession of generations; thought was not merely socially located but was also subject to generation location.(3)

For Mannheim a generation was not a concrete group in the way that the family was for example, since its members need have no personal knowledge of each other.(4) Nonetheless belonging to the

(1) Ideology and Utopia op cit p248. Mannheim considered competition and generations as the two most important non-economic factors. See Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge op cit p286, and 'Competition as a Cultural Phenomenon' op cit pp191-3.

(2) Ideology and Utopia op cit p248.


(4) Ibid p289.
same generation determined certain facets of the behaviour and thinking of its individual members; this was because they occupied the same place (lagerung or social position) in a 'structural' whole. The meaning of the term social location may be understood by considering another category which shares 'a certain resemblance to it - namely the class position of an individual in society'.

In other words, social location - be it class or generation - is the objective position individuals occupy in the social structure which tends to determine their perspectives and life chances. As a result the concept of class and generation share a certain affinity.

The fact of belonging to the same class and that of belonging to the same generation, or age group have this in common; that both endow the individuals sharing in them with a common location in the social and historical process and thereby limits them to a specific range of potential experience; predisposing them for a certain characteristic mode of thought and a characteristic type of historically relevant action.

Mannheim did not deny that this similar type of location of individuals was based on biological facts; namely that people born in the same year share a common temporal location in the social process. Social generations were ultimately based on this fact. However, he maintained that simple generational separation of this type was insufficient. Generational analysis at the level of social and cultural structures presupposed conceptual differentiations among three generational groupings. Mannheim distinguished between (i) the generation location (ii) the generation as actuality and (iii) the generation unit.

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(2) Ibid p291.

(3) Ibid p292.

Generation location referred to individuals who were located in the same generation by simple accident of birth and therefore shared a common experiential location in the socio-historical process. On this basis individuals were exposed to a specific range of experiences (actual or potential) and denied others. In this way emotional and intellectual data varied from generation to generation.

But this did not imply that the different stratification of members of a single generation should be ignored.

Even a mental climate as rigorously uniform as that of the catholic middle ages presented itself differently according to whether one were a theologising cleric, a knight, or a monk. (1)

Thus the individuals who constituted a generation location could be divided into actual generations by 'participation in the common destiny of his historical and social unit'. (2)

An actual generation could in turn be subdivided into a number of generation units since while different individuals experienced common social and intellectual fortunes, they might nevertheless respond to them in different ways.

Youth experiencing the same concrete historical problems may be said to be part of the same actual generation; while those groups within the same generation which work up the material of their common experience in different ways constitute separate generation units. (3)

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(2) Ibid p303.
(3) Ibid p304. The example of generation units that Mannheim gives is the romantic conservative generation unit and the liberal rational unit. Both belong to the same actual generation 'romantic conservatism and liberal rationalism were merely two polar forms of the intellectual and social response to an historical stimulus experienced by all in common'.

These generation units may be antagonistic and, if so, tended to polarise into a dominant and oppressed unit.\(^{(1)}\) The minor generation units become swamped by the dominant unit, whose interpretation of the world appeared to have total sway in any given historical period, despite the oppositional activities of the minor groups.\(^{(2)}\)

As well as explaining how certain ideas gained prominence at a certain time, generations secured the continuity and accumulation of culture as 'fresh contact' was made between old and new generations. This resulted in a certain loss of culture but also selection and change; 'it facilitates re-evaluation of our inventory and teaches us both to forget that which is no longer useful and to covet that which is yet to be won'.\(^{(3)}\)

However in periods of accelerated social and cultural change, the need for rapid changes in basic attitudes, ruptured the process of cultural transmission and created a generation gap. This motivated new generation units to form a novel generation style which was sharply set off from the life style of the older members of society. This analysis of generations acquired new significance in the 1960s with the emergence of student political movements which seemed to be based, to a large extent, upon age and espousing a doctrine which seemed to express the aspirations of a particular generation.

\(^{(1)}\) 'The Problem of Generations' op cit p306.

\(^{(2)}\) All this is very reminiscent of Marx's dictum concerning the ideas of the ruling class being the ruling ideas in society.

Mannheim's analysis of the influence of generations on thought was part of his wider investigations into the relationship between thought and social structure. All ideas, he believed, had their origin in social phenomena. But these phenomena were of a more diverse kind than mere social class, and included the part played by social processes and institutions such as competition and generations.

Mannheim's studies of the relationship between ideas and social structures were informed throughout by two key concepts; these 'two slogan like concepts', were 'ideology and utopia'. (1) These two antithetical movements of thought were engendered according to Mannheim, by the conditions of conflict and polarisation of groups within society. Men 'act with and against one another in diversely organised groups, and while doing so they think with and against one another'. (2)

Mannheim used the term Utopia in a sense which was quite distinct from the connotations which it has assumed in common usage. It was not a striving for the impossible, as it had been for Campanella and More, but rather an intellectual anticipation of the future of society.

... utopian thinking reflects ... that certain oppressed groups are intellectually so strongly interested in the destruction and transformation of a given condition of society that they unwittingly see only those elements in the situation which tend to negate it. Their thinking is incapable of correctly diagnosing an existing condition of society ... in their thinking they already seek to change the situation that exists ... In the utopian mentality the collective unconscious, guided by wishful representation and the will to action, hides certain aspects of reality. (3)

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(1) Ideology and Utopia op cit p36.
(2) Ibid p3.
(3) Ibid p36.
Utopias were thus systems of thought which were orientated towards the future; by concentrating on those elements of reality which offered a potential for social change, utopias failed to grasp the nature of society.

Mannheim held that in Marxian theory the utopian mentality had reached its highest and most adequate stage so far. Further, Marxism marked the turning point from speculation to science. Henceforth it would be possible to establish a sociological system that would not only serve as a key science but also represent the utopia of the present day. (1) The sociology of knowledge would have to take part in the coming conflict between 'a complacent tendency to accept the present', and 'the utopian trends'.

In *Ideology and Utopia* Mannheim developed four major examples of the utopian mentality: (1) the orgiastic chiliiasm of the Anabaptists; (2) the liberal humanitarian ideas; (3) the conservative idea; (4) the socialist communist utopia. Each of these ideal type utopian mentalities existed at specific historical periods, linked to the interests and aspirations of specific social classes and each developed against the ideologies and social formations of the period within which it functioned. Thus there was a linkage between all four which developed as each appeared. The liberal humanitarian idea functioned as replacement for the anarchism of chiliiasm; the conservative idea existed in romantic thought as a counter utopia against liberal rationalism and the socialist communist utopia rejected all three as a prelude to its attempts at

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(1) *Ideology and Utopia* op cit p222.

(2) *Ibid* p236.
a complete socio-political transformation. Utopia was for Mannheim one of the most important causes of social change. Each of these ideal types could be taken to describe a particular impetus towards new social groupings, a new theory of social organisation which formed the context under which rising social classes might attempt to achieve change. If, at some time in the future, society reached a state of equilibrium which did not require change, and which consequently did not contain utopian elements, the effects on man of this loss of 'reality transcending elements' would be disastrous.

The disappearance of utopia brings about a static state of affairs in which man himself becomes no more than a thing. We would be faced then with the greatest paradox imaginable namely, that man, who has achieved the highest degree of rational mastery of existence, left without any ideals, becomes a mere creature of impulses. (1)

On the evidence of such passages, Mannheim's preference for utopian thinking is obvious. Yet he devoted much of his time to the analysis and development of its counter concept: namely ideology.

By ideology, Mannheim meant that ruling groups, motivated by a desire to maintain the status quo, become incapable of seeing the real nature of society since to do so would have undermined their position within it.

The concept 'ideology' reflects ... that ruling groups can in their thinking become so intensively interest bound to a situation that they are simply no longer able to see certain facts which would undermine their sense of domination. There is implicit in the word ideology the insight that in certain situations the collective unconscious of certain groups obscures the real conditions of society both to itself and to others and thereby stabilises it. (2)

(1) Ideology and Utopia op cit p236.
(2) Ibid p36.
Mannheim developed his analysis of ideology by distinguishing between the particular and the total conceptions of ideology. (1)

The particular conception of ideology had a limited scope. It called into question the particular set of ideas and assumptions which were propagated by a social group. This complex of ideas was held to be no more than a product of efforts to mask certain social processes and facts which would be damaging to the group concerned if discovered by the group's opponents. This attempt to mask reality lead to its distortion which may involve conscious lies or unconscious rationalisations.

The particular conception of ideology is implied when the term denotes that we are sceptical of the ideas and representations advanced by our opponent. They are regarded as more or less conscious disguises of the real nature of a situation, the true recognition of which would not be in accord with his interests. These distortions range all the way from conscious lies to half conscious and unwitting disguises; from calculated attempts to dupe to self deception. (2)

The limited nature of the particular conception of ideology was illustrated by its emphasis on the content or substance of ideas and interpretation of ideological deception as a merely psychic process which, as Merton contends, demanded the imputation of motives with the understanding that, even if the opponent was lying, it was possible to uncover that lie on the basis of some common criterion. Though the interests of individuals may be different, they shared a common universe of discourse, common standards of validity and a shared theoretical framework. (3)

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(1) *Ideology and Utopia* op cit p49.
(2) Ibid.
(3) R.K.Merton *op cit* p238.
conception of ideology was therefore concerned to discover the disguised self interest of the opponent. In contrast, the total conception of ideology was concerned with the total formation of an opponent's mental character.

By the total conception of ideology 'we refer to the ideology of an age or of a concrete historico-social group, e.g. of a class, when we are concerned with the characteristics and composition of the total structure of the mind of this epoch or of this group'. (1) While the particular conception designated 'only a part of the opponents assertions as ideological', the total conception in contrast 'calls into question the opponents entire Weltanschauung (including his conceptual apparatus) and attempts to understand these concepts as an out-growth of the collective life of which he partakes'. (2) Here, the theoretical frameworks themselves are divergent and there are no common criterion for discerning validity. To the extent that mental frameworks themselves arose out of different collective social conditions the very 'categories' of thought employed were different. Examples of the total conception might be conservative thought, or bourgeois liberal ideology. When individuals express these ideas it is not a matter of deceit or even interest in any narrow sense, but rather the expression of the total outlook of a whole social group whose existential circumstances they share.

The element which was common to both conceptions, particular and total, was that neither allowed reliance on the face value of

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(1) Ideology and Utopia op cit pp49-50.
(2) Ibid p50.
what an adversary professed. Instead the opponent's representations had to be functionalised by inquiring into the situational conditions under which the assertions were made. Assertions were always to be interpreted as functions of the structural conditions under which they appeared. However, whereas the particular conception operated at the psychological level and was concerned with the content of an individual's assertions, the total conception operated at the noological level and analysed the form of assertions made by groups.

As soon as the total conception of ideology is used we attempt to reconstruct the whole outlook of a social group and neither the concrete individuals, nor the abstract sum of them can legitimately be considered as bearers of this ideological thought system.(1)

It is a testament to the quality of Mannheim's scholarship that his investigation of these two conceptions of ideology was not merely analytical for, by outlining the gradual philosophical evolution of the notion of ideology from the particularistic to the total viewpoint, it becomes historical.

The development of a total conception of ideology was dependent on a philosophy of consciousness which saw thought as structured into a unity of coherent elements, which was produced by the Enlightenment and later historicised by Hegelian philosophy.(2) Ultimately this led to a position in which ideology was a description of the whole thought of a social group. It was Marx who first fused the particular and total conceptions of ideology,(3)

(1) Ideology and Utopia op cit p52.
(3) Ibid p66.
and interpreted ideas as reflections of the individual's position in the productive process; i.e. class position. However, Marx had ultimately excluded the working class from ideology since he believed in a correspondence of proletarian ideas and interests with the real life process of history. Mannheim felt this belief to be unjustified and thus while Marx's conception of ideology was total, it remained 'special'.(1) Marx had not extended his analysis to the point where he subjected his own intellectual position to questioning. He had established to his own satisfaction the situational nature of bourgeois thought while remaining unaware that his own theoretical system was subject to a similar charge from bourgeois theorists; namely that it too was influenced by the social situation in which it found itself. When this was the case, Mannheim called it the special formulation of the total conception of ideology. The 'general conception' on the other hand was to be employed when 'one has the courage to subject not just the adversary's point of view but all points of view, including his own to the ideological analysis'.(2) When the general formulation of the total conception of ideology is adopted it implies that 'the thought of all parties in all epochs is of an ideological character'.(3)

The appearance of the general formulation also heralded the transition from the simple theory of ideology to the sociology of knowledge. 'What was once the intellectual armament of a party is

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(2) Ibid p69.
(3) Ibid p69.
transformed into a method of research in social and intellectual history generally'. (1)

However Marx was not to be criticised too severely for his failure to extend his special conception to the more general position, for Marx could not have thought out the implications of the general conception without throwing considerable doubt on the validity of his own position.

Thus we see how the narrow focus which a given position imposes and the driving impulses which govern its insights tend to obstruct the general and theoretical formulation of these views and to restrict the capacity for abstraction. (2)

Mannheim had one more distinction to make in his analysis of ideology; this was between the non-evaluative, total general conception of ideology and the evaluative total general conception. If the former approach is used in an investigation it means that judgements are suspended as to the truth or falsity of the ideas in question; the only concern being to trace the social origins of the ideas involved.

The non-evaluative general total conception of ideology is to be found primarily ... where ... no judgements are pronounced as to the correctness of the ideas to be treated. This approach confines itself to discovering the relations between certain mental structures and the life situations in which they exist. (3)

However this approach raised a significant question. Did the sociology of knowledge imply that truth was relative; i.e. dependent upon the subjective standpoint and social situations of the knower?

Mannheim said that this was not so, for while the study of history

(1) Ideology and Utopia op cit. p69.
(2) Ibid p249.
(3) Ibid p71.
from the standpoint of the sociology of knowledge did not reveal any absolute truths this implied not 'relativism' but 'relationism'.

(1)

The relativist dilemma, under which no knowledge can serve as a point of departure for validity or value judgement, occurs only when criticism proceeds from an outmoded epistemological orientation that has its basis in the older mathematical and physical science models. (2) The static absolutist norms of traditional epistemology demanded the production of unperspectivistic thought, results that were determined neither by the socio-existential position of the observer or the experimental situation of the scientific researcher. However Mannheim claimed that these norms were irrelevant to the changeable dynamic subject matter of the human and social sciences rooted as they are in the flux and flow of human life and history. 'Even a God could not formulate a proposition on historical subjects like $2 \times 2 = 4$. (3)

Mannheim gave an example to illustrate the principle of relationism and its claimed superiority over relativism. A boy from the country comes to the big city where the viewpoints and horizons are at least different if not broader. When he looks back on the opinions of his family and former group 'he no longer discusses these opinions as a homogenous participant, that is, by dealing directly with the specific content of what is said. Rather he relates them to a certain mode of interpreting the world, which

(1) *Ideology and Utopia* op cit p70.
(2) *Ibid* p70.
(3) *Ibid* p85.
in turn, is ultimately related to a certain social structure which constitutes its situation. This is an instance of the relational procedure'. (1) However, this relational procedure still had no implications for the validity of the assertion in question. Relationism did not impugn the validity of an insight, it merely drew attention to the fact that the insight was dependent upon and confined within a specific socio-historical situation.

Relating individual ideas to the total structure of a given historical - social subject should not be confused with a philosophical relativism which denies the validity of any standards and of the existence of order in the world ... Relationism does not signify that there are no criteria of rightness and wrongness in a discussion. It does insist however that it lies in the nature of certain assertions that they cannot be formulated absolutely but only in terms of the perspective of a given situation. (2)

However, as Mannheim acknowledged, to accept that all knowledge is relational knowledge, which can be formulated only with reference to the social position of the observer, does not solve the problem of how to discriminate between that which is true and that which is false in that knowledge. Unfortunately Mannheim never went much beyond this to clarify further the implications of relationism for validity and truth.

His position was confused. It seems to have been at times that the analysis of the social basis of ideas and their validity were two relatively separate questions.

The truth or falsity of a proposition or of the entire theoretical sphere can be neither supported nor attacked by means of a sociological or any other genetic

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(1) Ideology and Utopia op cit p253.

(2) Ibid p254. See also Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge op cit p194.
explanation. How something came to be, what functions it performs in other contexts is altogether irrelevant for its immanent character of validity.(1)

At other times, social analysis was not entirely irrelevant for the determination of validity, but what precisely that relevance was, Mannheim never made explicit.

The social genesis of our ideas is relevant not merely to their occurrence, meaning and scope but to be ascertainment of their truth as well, ... the function somewhere in a fashion hitherto not clearly understood, between irrelevance to the establishment of the truth, on the one hand and entire adequacy for determining the truth on the other.(2)

The evaluative conception of ideology, however, provides a pragmatic criterion of validity; practice or action is the test of a theory's truth.

A theory is wrong if in a given practical situation it uses concepts and categories which, if taken seriously, would prevent man from adjusting himself at that historical stage Antiquated and inapplicable norms, modes of thought, and theories are likely to degenerate into ideologies whose function it is to conceal the actual meaning of conduct rather than reveal it.(3)

Again an 'ethical attitude is invalid if it is orientated with reference to norms with which action in a given historical setting, even with the best of intentions, cannot comply'.(4)

The evaluative sociologist of knowledge must therefore distinguish between ideas that are historically relevant to reality

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(2) Ideology and Utopia op cit p256.

(3) Ibid p85.

(4) Ibid p84.
and thus true, and those which are not, and thus false. In this sense ideas were true as long as they were congruent with the actual social situation of men, as long as they were successful in guiding the accommodation of human action to the changing context of group life. Mannheim was operating here with a radically different conception of the truth. The individual who was in contact with the living forces of his age, and social situation, had the truth or perhaps better was in the truth. Truth had lost its claim to universality. The partial perspectives of individuals embodied truth if they orientated them to their socio-historical situation.

However Mannheim argued, that the many and diverse social stand points with their corresponding partial perspectives, did not represent intellectual chaos, but mutually complementary parts of a comprehensive insight into the totality of the world. (1) The partial insights must be synthesised (perspectivism), claimed Mannheim to reveal a complete overview which would provide objective knowledge.

All points of view in politics are but partial points of view because historical totality is always too comprehensive to be grasped by any one ... Since however all these points of view emerge out of the same social and historical content, and since their partiality exists in the matrix of an emerging whole, it is possible to see them in juxtaposition, and their synthesis becomes a problem which must continually be reformulated and resolved. (2)

By synthesis, Mannheim did not simply mean the collection of disconnected partial truths, but the interpenetration and fusion of thought styles. Moreover the synthesis must be 'dynamic'; i.e.

(1) Ideology and Utopia op cit p132.

(2) Ibid p134. The possibility of synthesis is raised earlier in 'Competition as a Cultural Phenomenon' op cit p221.
must be reformulated when necessary to keep pace with social reality in which 'everything is in the process of becoming'.

Such was Mannheim's dilemma and his proposed solution. Having asserted that knowledge was connected with and dependent upon the social position of its proponents, meant that he had to isolate a social position, within the class structure, from which it would be possible to view the historical variations and the contemporary multiplicity of thought systems with sufficient detachment to evaluate them properly. The recognition of such 'supra social' position was an essential precondition for synthesis.

The social group which Mannheim elected to develop this synthesis was the socially unattached intelligentsia. Their alleged suitability for this task was attributed to their lack of direct participation in the economic process when compared with other groups such as workers and entrepreneurs and, therefore as a result, it was claimed their thought was not as interest bound. Only the comparatively uncommitted intelligentsia was likely to approach the truth. From its unique and particularly favourable viewpoint it should, through a process of introspection rid itself of its socially imposed prejudices and elaborate a total perspective which would synthesise the conflicting contemporary world views and thereby neutralise, or to some extent overcome, their onesidedness.

Such a dynamic synthesis was the nearest possible approximation to a truly realistic attitude within the limitations imposed by a given epoch.

(1) Ideology and Utopia op cit p135.

(2) The term was originally employed by Alfred Weber, see Ideology and Utopia op cit p37.
As noted above, the main reason for Mannheim's selection of the intelligentsia for this task was that it did not form a class.\(^{(1)}\) Intellectuals had no common material interests, could not form a separate political party, were incapable of common and concerted action, and finally did not respond to issues as cohesively as did other groups.\(^{(2)}\) They were in fact 'ideologues' of this or that class but never spoke for themselves.\(^{(3)}\) For Mannheim the intelligentsia was essentially a 'classless aggregation' or an 'interstitial stratum' which became 'a satellite of one or another or the existing classes or parties'.\(^{(4)}\)

Intellectuals were not to be conceived as a superior stratum, nor did their peculiar social position assure any greater validity for their perspectives. Intellectuals are not 'an exalted stratum above the classes and are in no way better endowed with a capacity to overcome their own class attachments than other groups'.\(^{(5)}\)

However their position did enable them to do something of which other strata were less able. While most intellectuals did share the orientation of one class or another, 'over and above these affiliations he is motivated by the fact that his training has

\(^{(1)}\) *Ideology and Utopia* op cit p138, see also *Conservative Thought* op cit p128.

\(^{(2)}\) 'Nothing is farther from this stratum than ... cohesion' *Essays on the Sociology of Culture* op cit p104.

\(^{(3)}\) In his analysis of conservative thought Mannheim showed how it was the relatively unattached intelligentsia who formulated the tenets of conservatism on behalf of the nobility. *Essays on Social Psychology* op cit p123-8. He wrote of intellectuals who 'sell their pen to one government or another' p126.

\(^{(4)}\) *Essays of the Sociology of Culture* op cit p104.

\(^{(5)}\) Ibid p105.
equipped him to face the problems of the day in several perspectives and not only in one, as most participants in the controversies of their time do. We said he is equipped to envisage the problem of his time in more than a single perspective although from case to case he may act as a partisan and align himself with a class'.

Thus the life situation of the intellectual created a tendency to reject any narrow perspective and promoted a self conscious appraisal of a broad range of perspectives available in society. In this sense the intellectuals were suitable as synthesisers of the various political perspectives, because 'certain types of intellectuals have a maximum opportunity to test and employ the socially available vistas and to experience their inconsistencies'.

The social composition of intellectuals was also important. Intellectuals were recruited from all social classes and thus while not forming a class themselves they incorporated a multiplicity of perspectives which contained the interests of all classes. The fact that intellectuals had all taken part in a common educational heritage, tended to suppress differences of birth, and status; all were united on the basis of educational attainment. Class and status ties did not totally disappear but these differences, ameliorated by the educational process, fused into what was a microcosm of the wider social struggle, the 'conflicting purposes and tendencies which rage in society at large.'

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(1) Essays on the Sociology of Culture op cit p105.
(2) Ibid p106.
(3) Ideology and Utopia op cit p138. Also Essays on the Sociology of Culture op cit p111.
(4) Ibid p156.
The emergence of the intelligentsia as an open and fluid stratum, a relatively modern phenomenon, was the product of a gradual historical development; again Mannheim added an historical dimension to his analysis. The institutions in which intellectuals could be discerned as relatively free and detached were the salons and coffee houses. However while salons enabled individuals of different social backgrounds, views and allegiances to mingle, entry to the salon required social acceptability and was in that sense restricted. The coffee houses on the other hand were open to all and 'became the first centres of opinion in a partially democratised society'.

Membership and participation were now determined not by rank and family ties but by intellectual interests. Thus in modern times the relatively unattached intellectual emerged with his unique abilities.

One of the most impressive facts about modern life is that, unlike preceding cultures, intellectual activity is not carried on exclusively by a socially rigidly defined class, such as a priesthood, but rather by a social stratum which is to a large degree unattached to any social class and which is recruited from an increasingly inclusive area of social life. This socio logical fact determines essentially the uniqueness of the modern mind, which is characteristically not based upon the authority of a priesthood, which is not closed and finished, but which is rather dynamic, elastic and in a constant state of flux, and perpetually confronted by new problems.

The modern intelligentsia was thus a key social grouping whose unique life situation promoted a form of reflection capable of transcending the interest bound thought which plagued all others in society. The

(1) "Essays on the Sociology of Culture" op cit p138.
(2) "Ideology and Utopia" op cit p159.
intellectuals became the mental guarantors of the mental interests of the whole society; they 'play the part of watchmen in what otherwise would be a pitch black night'.

Mannheim's treatment of knowledge stood in polar opposition to the traditional theory of rationality. Knowledge was not the product of individuals but of interacting social groups, and therefore its generation could only be understood by reference to the social and cultural context in which it arose. Moreover, the evaluation of knowledge as true or false, was not a matter for individual judgement but communal judgement; the truth of knowledge did not derive from its congruence with reality, but from how it related to the objectives and interests of society. Mannheim's critique was both interesting and forceful and, like Marx before him, issued a challenge to the fundamental assumptions of the traditional theory. However an examination of his theory shows that often he formulated his propositions in a vague and ambiguous way and as a result his investigations remain stimulating rather than satisfying. Criticism here will focus on Mannheim's notion of the social determination of ideas, the concepts ideology and utopia, his views of the intelligentsia and his interpretation of the implications of the sociology of knowledge for scientific inquiry.

The first problem in Mannheim's elaboration of the social determination of ideas was that he never made clear which areas of thought were to be subject to his thesis of the existential determination of thought. Merton describes this inadequacy.

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(1) Ideology and Utopia op cit p143.
Knowledge at times is used so broadly as to include every type of assertion and mode of thought from folkloristic maxims to rigorous positive science; ... ethical convictions, epistemological postulates, material predications, synthetic judgements, political beliefs, the 'categories' of thought, eschatological doxies, moral norms, ontological assumptions and observations of empirical fact are more or less discriminately held to be 'existentially determined'.(1)

More significantly, while Mannheim revealed empirical correlations between social position and mental productions - his analysis of the social basis of German conservative thought in the first half of the 19th century is particularly useful on this point - he did not identify the nature and force of those mechanisms which connect the ideas of a particular group to the social process.(2) It is clear from Mannheim's analysis that correlations exist, but he did not illustrate how they arose, or their nature.

He seemed to address his remarks to avoid a premature commitment to determinism. As a result he used an abundance of phrases to describe the relationship between knowledge and the social process.

A position in the social structure carries with it ... the probability that he who occupies it will think in a certain way.(3)

It is never an accident when a certain theory ... fails to develop beyond a given stage of relative abstractness ... Here too the social position of the thinker is significant.(4)

Men in certain groups who have developed a particular style of thought ... in responses to ... situations characterising their common positions.(5)

(3) Ideology and Utopia op cit p264.
(4) Ibid p248.
(5) Ibid p3.
In Social Theory and Social Structure, Merton,\(^{(1)}\) lists numerous examples of Mannheim's circuitous attempts to describe determinism. He clearly felt uneasy about the term and as a result the processes whereby ideas are linked to social structure, are never lucidly elaborated. This gap in Mannheim's theory is significant. As Connelly notes, the capacity of the intellectual to render the perspective which he brings to an enquiry more self conscious, and his ability to overcome the limitations of his own perspective, are related, at least in part, to his comprehension of how his perspective developed and how it is linked with specific social groups.\(^{(2)}\)

Another shortcoming in Mannheim's schema is the mechanistic way in which, at times, he appeared to conceive the relationship between a change in beliefs and ideas and wider social changes. This is so despite his reluctance on other occasions to commit himself to determinism. Even 'the most delicate change in the human spirit' he wrote, 'corresponds to similarly delicate changes in the situation in which an individual or group finds itself'.\(^{(3)}\)

Taken in its most literal sense this implies that individuals do not change their ideas without an appropriate alteration of their social position. Formulated in this direct and mechanistically causal way, Mannheim's theory is unable to explain a number of phenomena. For example, it cannot explain how people might change their ideas without a corresponding change in social location or, how a change in social location might not be accompanied by a

\(^{(1)}\) R.K. Merton 1957 op cit p461.


\(^{(3)}\) 'German Sociology' in Essays on Sociology and Social Psychology op cit.
different viewpoint. How is Mannheim to explain the continued international existence of superstition and religious beliefs, despite the vast socio-economic changes involved in the transition from feudalism to capitalism, or from a predominantly agricultural based economy to an industrial and technologically based economy. Mannheim neglects the importance of traditional belief systems and the powerful claims which they can make on men's minds. Marx had been aware of this 'deadweight' which hung like 'a nightmare on the brain of the living' (1).

A further aspect of this relationship between ideas and their social origin requires comment. Mannheim's extension of Marx's insight that social classes give rise to ideologies, did not resolve the problems which it brought to light. Mannheim might well be right to argue that not only social classes but many other social groups and factors - generations, ethnicity, competition, etc. - give rise to ideologies. However a question still remains as to the relative importance of these differing groups and factors in shaping the outlook of a given historical period. If Marxists are wrong in attributing a decisive importance to class ideology, then it must be shown how class ideology is modified by other factors; how it is obscured or rendered less significant by ideologies developed from other social locations and experiences. Otherwise, the multiplicity of social influences leaves the individual facing a quite indeterminate social situation in which it is impossible to say with any precision how the style of thought in question has been produced. In brief, Mannheim's basic thesis

(1) K. Marx, *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* op cit p97.
concerning the social determination of ideas remains confused. As Parekh notes, Mannheim does not say which ideas are determined by which existential factors or indeed whether the ideas are determined by, conditioned by, or simply respond to certain 'social' factors. (1)

Mannheim's formulation of the concepts 'ideology' and 'utopia' is also unsatisfactory since it contained a logical flaw. According to Mannheim, ideologies and utopias obscured the real conditions of society; they were distortions of reality which ignored some facets of reality and over-emphasised others. However all ideas are classifiable within the compass of these two key concepts; i.e. all thought was either ideological (seeking to maintain the status quo) or utopian (stressing potential elements of change). But since ideologies and utopias were distortions they presuppose the possibility of valid and undisputed knowledge against which to measure the distortion of a given political interpretation. Before these concepts can be applied to a concrete situation someone must be in possession of objective knowledge which enable him to decide in which direction the political interpretation is distorted. A distorted view is a distortion of some reality and the scope and/or direction of the distortion cannot be assessed unless it is considered against a background of valid knowledge. (2)

Moreover, Mannheim's concepts, ideology and utopia, are useful only in an historical investigation. Ideologies focus on

(1) B.C. Parekh 'Social and Political Thought and the Problem of Ideology' op cit p69.

factors which maintain the status quo while utopias are distorted because they 'are interested in the destruction and transformation of a given condition of society'. (1) How then is it possible to know whether a current political interpretation is ideological or utopian? In short, it is not. The concepts, ideology and utopia, can only be applied to past historical epochs for only from an historical vantage point is it possible to tell which perspective at any time and situation focused on factors about to be transcended, and thus ideologies, and those which focused on factors in the process of becoming, and hence utopias. So defined, the concepts cannot be applied by the contemporary social scientist to current political perspectives and hence their effectiveness is limited.

Concerning the intelligentsia, Mannheim's claim was that they had a social responsibility to construct and examine socio-political interpretations relevant to contemporary problems. But Mannheim's failure to delimit the social functions of the intelligentsia results in his formulation of their social role being open to interpretation. His vagueness led to a tension in the theory between democracy and elitism. One commentator has written, 'There can be no doubt about Mannheim's aversion to authoritarianism. But in the end his philosophy of history, for all its liberal sympathies ... is a version of the oldest kind of philosophy of history. It is the kind which assigns to a chosen people the task of doing the great work of history ... it lacks the utopian overtones which have usually gone with Platonism but at bottom, it is a return to the Platonic dream that cities of man will not cease from ill until

(1) Ideology and Utopia op cit p36.
philosophers are Kings'. (1) For Lord Lindsey, Mannheim's intelligentsia is 'too much like Plato's Republic'. (2) Many of Mannheim's statements conveyed this implication; consider for example his claim that 'there will, therefore, in every planned society be a body somehow similar to priests, whose task it will be to watch that certain basic standards are established and maintained'. (3) This 'body of priests' is to be composed of the leading elements of the intelligentsia. However, if the intellectuals were to form an elite Mannheim would be presented with a considerable problem.

The intellectuals present position carries with it certain strategic advantages for the construction of a synthesis of contending political perspectives. However these advantages exist because this stratum is relatively detached from the social conflicts of the day and because as a group it does not possess a privileged power position which it might seek to protect. It is the intelligentsia's position between the classes and on the periphery of the power structure, combined with their relative diversity of class background which makes them potentially more able to construct the synthesis.

All of these advantages and the potential social functions which intellectuals would promote would be lost if this 'unattached stratum'

(1) C. Frankel The Case for Modern Man Boston Beacon Press 1955 pp140-1.

(2) Review of 'Freedom, Power and Democratic Planning' in British Journal of Sociology Vol 3 1952 p86. It is interesting to note that while Mannheim's analysis began from very different assumptions to those contained in the traditional theory, his discussion of intellectuals and their role in society ended by closely approximating the Platonic ideal.

became consolidated into a ruling class; transformed into an elite of privilege and power, intellectuals would develop the same type of interest bound orientation that other ruling groups have developed. However in later works, Mannheim did seem to view the intelligentsia in a more elitist way. In *Man and Society* Mannheim envisaged the intellectuals enjoying a specialised and segregated education at an institution very similar to a British public school, which he considered 'combined excellently this tendency to exclusiveness and the concommitant esprit do corps with ascent opportunities for those best qualified of the lower classes*. (1) Mannheim never quite resolved this tension between elitism and equality in his theory of the intelligentsia which meant that the ability of that strata to fulfil the functions of synthesis must be called into question.

Mannheim also seemed to overestimate the competancy of the intelligentsia for self analysis - i.e. their ability to rid themselves of their own prejudices. As Popper notes, not only would self analysis fail to reveal unconscious assumptions but may lead to a more subtle self deception. Popper claims that it is usually people who are most convinced of having rid themselves of prejudices that are the most prejudiced. (2) The difficulty of achieving a thorough socio-analysis has been compared to Munchausen's feat of trying to free himself from a swamp by pulling on his whiskers. (3)

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(1) *Freedom, Power and Democratic Planning* op cit p100.
(3) R.K.Merton *op cit* 1957 p507.
One commentator claimed that Mannheim's description of the intelligentsia was merely a description of his own social group.\(^{(1)}\) Popper extends this criticism to the point where he suggests that the whole sociology of knowledge might represent no more than the interests of the sociologists of knowledge;\(^{(2)}\) indeed, assuming the theory of total ideology to be correct, it would be part of every total ideology to believe its own group was free from bias and was the elect body which alone was capable of objectivity.

Remmling\(^{(3)}\) questions how Mannheim could have put forward his theory of an open minded, flexible intelligentsia at a time when the German universities of the Weimar Republic were dominated by intellectuals who had open allegiances to either social class or partisan interest; for example the Frankfurt school was avowedly Marxist while many other academics supported Nazism. In view of this it is not surprising that Mannheim finds it difficult to correlate his concept of the socially unattached intelligentsia with any concrete social group. Even his more precise definitions of intellectuals were unclear, yet perhaps he should not be criticised too severely for this shortcoming, as L.A.Coser notes, 'few modern terms are as imprecise as the term intellectual'.\(^{(4)}\)

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\(^{(2)}\) K.Popper op cit p216. Popper seems to have little but contempt for what he terms the 'verbal fireworks' of the sociologists of knowledge. Ibid p222.

\(^{(3)}\) G.W.Remmling The Sociology of Karl Mannheim op cit chapter 5, 'Beyond Ideology and Utopia'. This point is elaborated by A.Arblaster in 'Ideology and the Intellectuals' in R.Benewick et al Knowledge and Belief in Politics op cit p120.

Another difficulty arises when the role of the intellectual is considered from the point of view of efficiency. It is possible to imagine Mannheim's intellectuals being so impartial and fair to all perspectives that they are unable to act on any. In brief it seems that Mannheim's intelligentsia can afford him no relief from charges of relativism. He offered no reasonable grounds to expect that the intelligentsia is structurally able to perform the task of synthesis. Moreover his theory contained an immanent element of elitism which would undermine any potential for perspectivism which might exist.

Perhaps the severest problems in Mannheim's work are the epistemological claims he made for the sociology of knowledge. If all doctrines, including social theories themselves are socially determined as Mannheim claimed, is there any sense in which it could be asked if they are true or false. The very criteria which may be applied to judge their truth or falsity are themselves socially determined, and thus incapable of providing an objective standard. Such a total relativism leads into serious difficulties. Moreover it would eliminate theoretical disagreements and substitute for them ideological confrontation. There could be no dialogue between members of differing total ideological perspectives; all common ground has been removed from them. How are they to settle their disagreements, when each of the parties inhabits a differing cognitive world from the other, with no point of contact or mutual understanding between them? In such a situation since no validity could be claimed for any proposition, all that could be said of an opponent's doctrine is that it originated in a certain social structure, that it served the interests of a particular social group, and that
it functioned in order to maintain or transcend the status quo.

Mannheim's attempt to evade this relativistic dilemma by adopting a relationist position must be considered unsuccessful. Relationism becomes a reformulated relativism, for it simply reduces relativism to the level of an assertion that some knowledge is dependent on the 'subjective standpoint and the social position of the knower', whilst itself asserting that all historical knowledge is 'relational knowledge and can only be formulated with reference to the position of the observer'. (1) Methodologically then Mannheim's relationism is quite unsatisfactory for it offers no grounds on which to suppose that the discipline itself is capable of providing anymore than a representation of the values and interests of the sociologists of knowledge. As Bottomore notes, 'relationism is indistinguishable from relativism'. (2) This objection to Mannheim's theory is familiar. Every critic has brought against it in one form or another the ancient argument against scepticism, that of self contradiction. (3)

The notion of relativism or relationism as developed by Mannheim is self contradictory, for it must presuppose its own absoluteness. The sociology of knowledge must assume its own validity if it is to have any meaning. (4)

(1) Ideology and Utopia op cit p71.
(4) Dalke in Barnes et al op cit p87.
As Popper comments, the sociologists of knowledge 'invite the application of their own methods to themselves with an almost characteristic hospitality'.(1) In the form of a reductio ad absurdum the argument is quite simply, the statement that there is no such thing as truth cannot itself be true. It is a reformulation of the Cretan paradox; a Cretan says all Cretans are liars.

Thus Mannheim has problems establishing criteria of validation because of the relativism implicit in his theory. Further, his claim that the intelligentsia might provide a 'structural warranty' for the validation of knowledge seems unjustified. However Mannheim does offer other criteria of validation in Ideology and Utopia but each turns out to be of little value.(2) For example if a group's social position, conditions its social outlook, said Mannheim individuals sharing a thought system are able to ascertain the validity of propositions within their own socially defined range. The criterion for establishing this partial validity is unanimity of observation and conclusion. Knowledge derived in this way may be said to be authentic for the universe of discourse under consideration. But such a criterion of validation has no logical relation to processes of validation. All it allows is to establish the existence of common beliefs and the absence of deviating opinions; whether the former constitute 'truths' or the latter 'errors', is not dependent on the unanimity of the group members' judgement. The mere counting of heads can never act as a substitute for judgement.

(1) Popper op cit p216.
(2) H.R.Wagner op cit lists six different criteria of validation with which Mannheim attempts to distinguish between competing social theories.
Popper has argued that the most serious charge against Mannheim is that he fails to understand the 'main subject', the 'scientific method'; 'scientific objectivity cannot be described as the inter-subjectivity of scientific method'. (1) Two aspects of scientific method are important and together constitute what Popper terms 'the public character of scientific method'. These are 1) free criticism which implies that everything in a theory is questioned and 2) experience is recognised as an impartial arbiter in all disputes. Experience is public, and not private, in nature (i.e. an experiment) and anyone who wishes, may repeat the experiment.

To sum up ... what we call 'scientific objectivity' is not a product of the individual scientist's impartiality, but a product of the social or public character of scientific method; and the individual scientist's impartiality is, so far as it exists, not the source but rather the result of this socially or, institutionally organised objectivity of science. (2)

However Popper's claim that Mannheim had a naive view of scientific method is unsubstantiated. Moreover it is based on Popper's 'naive view' of the sociology of knowledge. Mannheim's assertions cannot be refuted as Popper suggests merely by citing the techniques leading to collective agreement, that scientists use to correct for personal bias. It is not simply personal bias that is at issue, but a bias that a whole community of scientists may share.

Mannheim's main theme was that thought was conditioned by social influences. The essential nature of beliefs, of beliefs

(1) K.Popper op cit 1963 p217.
(2) Ibid p220.
that form the basis of social systems, is that they are social phenomena; socially derived and socially sustained through the medium of language. The point is clearly a valid one. Every child born into the world needs parental protection for many years if it is to survive. During this period the child learns language, how to think, order its thoughts and develop concepts. In this sense 'socialisation' and the influence of social factors on thought are inevitable for no child could live without such parental protection; in brief, that social factors should influence man's thoughts is an inextricable part of the human condition. As Williamson notes, even Robinson Crusoe was socialised before being isolated on his island. (1) Thus Mannheim's main theme that ideas are socially conditioned is an obvious one. However, Mannheim's mistake was to assume that because thought is socially conditioned it is therefore necessarily false, misleading or partial. That a man's thought should be influenced by those around him is inevitable but the inevitable is not necessarily to be regarded as a shortcoming and thought that is socially conditioned need not be false.

Mannheim's exposition of the relationship between the social origins of a proposition and its validity was confused. At times he suggested that questions of genesis and validity were related. Dalke claims that Mannheim first posited the ideological nature of all thought and then concluded by an 'unpardonable non sequitor' that 'all thinking is false'. (2) While it may be true that systems

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(1) C.W.Williamson 'Ideology and the Problem of Knowledge' in Inquiry 1967 p130.

of thought are social emergents and that causal analysis might help explain how and why various systems of ideas have emerged, this is irrelevant to the validity of the ideas.\(^1\) Explanations concerning the origins and functions of propositions can account for an individual's ability, or inability to arrive at the truth but say absolutely nothing whatever about whether the proposition the individual believes is true or false.\(^2\) Sociological analysis may explain why an individual is in error but it cannot show that he is in error.

Questions of causality and validity must remain distinct.

Mannheim's work is difficult to assess since at times it was unsystematic and lacked cohesion. His position on important issues was often vague and ambiguous and he occasionally shifted from one standpoint to another on the same issue without informing the reader of his move. Perhaps Mannheim's own justification of his methods of study was sufficient.

If there are contradictions and inconsistencies in my paper this is, I think, not so much due to the fact that I overlooked them but because I make a point of developing a theme to its end even if it contradicts some other statements. I use this method because I think that in this marginal field of human knowledge we should not conceal our inconsistencies, so to speak covering up our wounds but our duty is to show the sore spots in human thinking at its present stage.\(^3\)


\(^2\) DeGre distinguishes between the sociology of knowledge and the sociological theory of knowledge. The former attempts to relate thought to a specific social origin while the latter is an epistemological endeavour which attempts to assert the validity of propositions. See deGre 'The Sociology of Knowledge and the
Moreover, he was heavily indebted to Marx for much of his inspiration and one commentator has written 'Karl Mannheim ... presents Marx in the garbage of a new terminology with old definitions in current verbiage'.(1) Indeed at times it is difficult to disentangle Mannheim from Marx. Yet his critique of the traditional theory of rationality is powerful; to hear it is to feel its force. Mannheim attempted to go beyond Marx by showing that the latter's own theory was influenced by social factors and that the range of social influences on thought was much wider than Marx had imagined. He described how the rise and decline of styles of thought, such as German Conservatism, could be explained by reference to wider economic and social movements. He suggested that each individual had a limited and partial view which was related to a unique set of socio-historical arrangements. Finally he emphasised the need to radically reconsider the notions of truth and objectivity and the implications which the origin of an idea had for its validity.

(2)(Cont.)


(1) O.Dalke op cit p82.
Gramsci's substantive criticism of the traditional theory of rationality was its failure to recognise that ideas and beliefs emerged within specific social structures and were influenced by them. Like Marx and Mannheim, he argued that a number of social factors, especially social class, were significant in their effects upon thought. In his elaboration of the concept of hegemony, Gramsci suggested that the rise and decline of systems of belief could only be explained when they were located in a wider social setting. However, his critique of the traditional theory of rationality went beyond those offered by Marx or Mannheim. Two points are worthy of mention here.

First, while Marx distinguished between those social theories and philosophies which were ideological and those which were scientific, Mannheim had suggested that all social thought, Marxism included, was ideological. Gramsci's commitment to historicism was stronger than Mannheim's and he was unwilling to exempt natural science from the limitations of existential determination. He argued that all knowledge, natural science included, was ideological.

Second, Gramsci radically challenged the conception of the intellectual which was cherished by the traditional theory. Intellectuals on his account were not the impartial and disinterested scholars portrayed by Benda, but, on the contrary, were fiercely partisan and closely allied to a particular social class. They acted as spokesmen for the class and created and articulated a coherent world view for the class by interpreting its practical experiences and activities.
Although these conclusions had a substantial significance for a theory of knowledge, the initial questions which prompted Gramsci's reflections were not primarily epistemological in character but political.

As a militant and active Marxist, the questions which Gramsci concerned himself were those which he considered to be of practical import for the processes of revolutionary social change. He began by reducing political science to its most basic concerns. 'The first point', he wrote, 'is that there do in fact exist rulers and ruled, leaders and led. The whole of the science and art of politics is based on this primordial, irreducible ... fact'.

Having established the need to accept this conflict model of social relations the next concern was 'the problem of the relations between structure and superstructures which needs to be posed exactly and resolved in order to reach a correct analysis of the forces working in the history of a certain period and determine their relationship.'

More specifically, his concern with ideas and beliefs was,

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(2) A.Gramsci The Modern Prince and Other Writings International Publishers New York 1972 L.Marks (Ed.) p143.

(3) Ibid p165.
initially with their function and efficacy in creating and sustaining social groups in positions of social domination or subordination. Gramsci wanted to understand why there had been a revolution in under-developed Russia and not in the developed West, where the objective conditions had been 'ripe' for many years.

By what processes did Western ruling classes perpetuate their dominance of society and why had the Russian ruling class failed in this respect? Why was the Western proletariat indifferent to revolutionary ideas? Had Marxism underestimated the role of tradition, culture, ideology - the superstructures in general - in the processes of social change? What was the role of ideas and ideologies in sustaining or undermining social structures? Gramsci's theory of hegemony provided an answer for each of these questions. (1)

(1) It should be noted at the outset that reading Gramsci is notoriously difficult and a number of obstacles confront a study of his work. First, references to any particular subject remain fragmentary and scattered throughout the 2,848 pages of the 32 prison notebooks, his prison letters and his contributions to a variety of Italian newspapers. Any reading therefore involves a large amount of interpretation with the associated risks. Second, because of the close scrutiny to which his prison writings were subjected, by the prison censors, Gramsci was obliged to employ a system of code for key words and phrases. Thus throughout the prison notebooks the word 'Illich' signifies Lenin, while 'philosophy of praxis' substitutes for Marxism. Third, those writings of Gramsci which are available for study are selections made by the Italian Communist Party, on unknown criteria, from the original mass of material produced. One commentator has suggested 'that Gramsci's manuscripts are published in obedience to political considerations', and bemoans the fact that 'independent scholars do not have access to much relevant material which might be assessed, without censorship or prejudice'. (N. McInnes 'Antonio Gramsci' Survey Vol 53 1964). This is particularly important since Stephen White claims that the Italian Communist Party represent the 'complete negation' of what Gramsci stood for (see 'Gramsci and the Italian Communist Party' by S. White in Government and Opposition 1972 No. 2 p204). Fourth, Gramsci's early writings between 1914-26 were written as a militant activist and are scattered in journals. Their tone is often polemical and they usually deal with a specific event or
The concept of hegemony was central to his political theory; 'it is the unifying thread of Gramsci's prison notes, and appears to be the logical conclusion to his total political experience'.

Gramsci himself recognised the significance of the concept. 'The essential characteristic', he wrote, 'of the most modern philosophy of praxis consists precisely in the historicopolitical concept of hegemony'.

The idea of hegemony can only be fully understood by reference to two other aspects of Gramsci's work with which it is closely interwoven; namely his theoretical formulation of the role of the intellectuals in the processes of social change and his novel treatment of the concepts of 'state' and 'civil society'.

However before discussing these other aspects of his work, it might be useful at this stage to briefly outline the way in which Gramsci employed the term hegemony.

(1) The word 'hegemony' was not new and situation making it difficult to establish any underlying coherence. Finally, since his death, Gramsci's work has been elevated by many to the status of holy scriptures; a Gramsci 'cult' has developed; (see, for example, N.McInnes op cit p3. 'On Antonio Gramsci' E.D.Genovese Studies on the Left Vol. 7 1967 p83. Where Genovese calls Gramsci 'the greatest Western Marxist theorist'. 'Gramsci' by G.Thompson in Marxism Today Nov. 1957 p61. The Open Marxism of Antonio Gramsci C.Marzani Cameron New York 1957) and one writer has described him as 'the patron saint of the Italian Communist Party'. (Consciousness and Society H.Stuart Hughes op cit p99; see also p101).


Perry Anderson has a useful discussion of Pre Gramscian uses of hegemony in his 'Antinomies of Antonio Gramsci' New Left Review No. 100 Nov 76/Jan 77 pp15-18. Anderson claims that the term was one of the 'central political slogans of the Russian Social Democratic movement from the late 1890s to 1917' (p15). Anderson documents the use of hegemony by Plekhanov, Axelrod, Martov, Lenin and Trotsky.
its first usage in English dated back to the sixteenth century. During the course of its career the word has acquired varying meanings but it has always implied domination; it retained this connotation in Gramsci's usage.

It should perhaps be mentioned here that Marx himself used the term hegemony. Marx's usage of the term implied class domination or class rule. '... each new class which puts itself in the place of the one ruling before it, is compelled, merely in order to carry through its aim, to represent its interest as the common interest of all members of society, that is, expressed in ideal form it has to give its ideas the form of universality and represent them as the only rational, universally valid ones ... Every new class, therefore, achieves hegemony only on a broader basis than that of the ruling class previously ...' (2)

To return to Gramsci, the first meaning which he gave the term was equivalent to the sense in which Lenin employed it: to signify leadership. For Lenin the hegemony of the working class implied the leadership of the working class over the peasantry in the revolutionary struggle. Lenin's claim was that the proletariat 'as the only consistently revolutionary class of contemporary society ... must be the leader in the struggle of the whole people ... The proletariat is revolutionary only insofar as it is conscious of and

(1) *Oxford English Dictionary* p194 gives the following account of hegemony "Leadership, predominance, preponderance; esp. the leadership or predominant authority of one state of a confederacy or union over the others; originally used in reference to the states of ancient Greece whence transferred to the German States, and in other modern applications".

(2) *The German Ideology* op cit pp62-3.
gives effect to this idea of the hegemony of the proletariat'. (1) Gramsci used the word in this sense in his earlier writings when he was general secretary of the Italian Communist Party.

In his essay on 'The Southern Question' he discussed "...the question of the 'hegemony of the proletariat', in other words, of the social basis of the proletarian dictatorship and the Workers' State. The proletariat can become the leading and ruling class to the extent to which it succeeds in creating a system of class alliances which enables it to mobilise the majority of the working population against capitalism and the bourgeois state". (2)

The second sense in which Gramsci employed the term signified the authority of one country, or group of countries, over others. Thus Europe had exerted its hegemony over the rest of the world to such an extent that even the geographical terms 'east' and 'west' were a product of an Eurocentric world view. Japan is termed the 'far east' but such a designation makes sense only if Europe is considered the centre of the world. 'This can be seen more clearly', said Gramsci, 'from the fact that these terms (i.e. east and west) have crystallised ... from the point of view of the European cultured classes who, as a result of their wide hegemony, have caused them to be accepted everywhere'. (3)


(2) The Modern Prince op cit p30.

In Gramsci's later writings a third meaning for the notion of hegemony emerges, and it is this sense of the term which is usually recognised as quintessential. 'Roughly the term refers to a situation wherein a social group or class is ideologically dominant'. (1) T.R. Bates has expressed the view that 'the concept of hegemony is really a very simple one. It means political leadership based on the consent of the led, a consent which is secured by the diffusion and popularisation of the world view of the ruling class'. (2)

This sense of hegemony implied that the domination of any social class relied on a combination of two aspects; first, physical coercion and force exercised through the repressive state apparatus. Second, moral intellectual, i.e. ideological leadership. By diffusing its peculiar world view, through a system of 'private' institutions, the ruling class was able to ensure the consent of the subjugated classes to its rules. The ideology of the ruling class 'saturated society', (3) to such an extent that it became difficult to think beyond its confines. In brief, the ruling class hegemony demarcated the parameters within which thought can operate. Hegemony was therefore the predominance of one class over another,

(1)(Cont.) closely to the Oxford English Dictionary definition of hegemony. See also the section in The Prison Notebooks 'Hegemony of Western Culture over the Whole World Culture' pp416-18. See Modern Prince pp165 and 171.


(2) T.R. Bates op cit p352.

(3) This is Raymond Williams phrase. For an attempt to develop Gramsci's basic concepts into a full blown Marxist Cultural theory see his article 'Base and Superstructure in Marxist Cultural Theory' New Left Review No. 82 Nov/Dec 1973 p8.
secured by consent rather than coercion. In Gramsci's own words it was rule 'by consent, i.e. by virtue of cultural direction as distinct from the movement of force, of restraint, of state intervention through the law and the police.' Gramsci was reiterating here Rousseau's dictum that force alone can never secure stability. Rulers need the support of the ruled. 'The strongest is never strong enough to be always the master', Rousseau observed, 'unless he transforms strength into right, and obedience into duty'.

Gwyn Williams' definition of hegemony expresses well this third sense of the term.

By hegemony Gramsci seems to mean a socio-political situation in his terminology a 'moment', in which the philosophy and practice of a society fuse or are in equilibrium; an order in which a certain way of life and thought is dominant, in which one concept of reality is diffused throughout society in all its institutional and private manifestations, informing with its spirit all taste, morality, customs, religious and political principles, and all social relations particularly in their intellectual and moral connotations. An element of direction and control, not necessarily conscious is implied. This hegemony corresponds to a form of state power conceived in stock marxist terms as the dictatorship of a class.


However, despite the care taken by Gramsci to distinguish the rule of a social class by ideological direction (hegemony) from the domination of a social class maintained by coercion, at times he used the term hegemony to imply both physical coercion and intellectual leadership.

The 'normal' exercise of hegemony in a particular regime is characterised by a combination of force and consensus variously equilibrated, without letting force subvert consensus too much, making it appear that the force is based on the consent of the majority. (1)

While Gramsci invested hegemony with four meanings it was the third sense of the term which occurred most frequently in his writings. However to understand Gramsci's theory of hegemony, his discussion of intellectuals and his distinction between state and civil society must also be considered.

The Intellectuals

While some commentators claim that Gramsci's originality stems from 'his novel conception of the role of the intellectual' (2) others go further and see in this concept the significant nucleus of Gramsci's thought. (3) Certainly Gramsci himself seems to have expended a great deal of time and effort in elaborating his theory of intellectuals. In a letter to Tatiana he expressed his confusion on this issue. 'As far as the notes on the Italian intellectuals are concerned, I really don't know where to begin;

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(2) G. Williams op cit p586.
(3) P. Piccone for example writes 'it is a major theoretical focus which encapsulates all his other major notions'. See 'Gramsci's Hegelian Marxism' Political Theory 1974 p39.
they are scattered through a series of notebooks, mixed up with other variegated notes and my first job would be to collect them together and get them into some sort of order'. (1) Some months later another letter expressed further uncertainties. 'I don't know if I shall ever send you the outline I promised of my work on the Italian Intellectuals. The standpoint from which I view the question changes periodically; maybe it's too early yet to summarise it and make a synthesis. The material is still in a fluid state and has yet to undergo its final elaboration'. (2)

The novelty of Gramsci's theory of the intellectuals lay in the social functions which he gave them and the way in which they were defined according to their specific social location. Prior to Gramsci, definitions of intellectuals such as that offered by the traditional theory, had tended to stress the intrinsic nature of intellectual activities; characteristics such as a capacity for abstract reasoning, and a concern for theoretical problems and their interconnections became definitive of the intellectual. (3)

For Gramsci such definitions were inadequate since they did not make explicit the social context within which these intellectual

(3) In the Oxford English Dictionary the following definition may be found under the headings 'Intellectual'. 'Characterised by or possessing 'intellection', understanding or intellectual capacity; intelligent'. For a similar view see 'The Role of the Intellectual in the Modern World' B.Russell in American Journal of Sociology Vol. XLIV Jan 1939 No. 4 pp491-8.
qualities, developed and manifested themselves, and this, he argued, was central. (1)

The most widespread error of method seems to me that of having looked for this criterion of distinction (between the intellectuals and the non-intellectuals) in the intrinsic nature of intellectual activities, rather than in the ensemble of the system of relations in which these activities (and therefore the intellectual groups who personify them) have their place within the general complex of social relations. Indeed the worker or proletarian, for example, is not specifically characterised by his manual or instrumental work, but by performing this work within specific conditions and in specific social relations. (2)

In this sense, of course, there was no 'criterion of distinction' - between the intellectual and the non-intellectual - for 'all men are intellectuals', inasmuch as first, all human activity involved some intellectual activity and, secondly all men participated in a particular conception of the world. 'This means that, although one can speak of intellectuals one cannot speak of non-intellectuals, because non-intellectuals do not exist.' (3) However, while all men were intellectuals, 'not all men have in society the function of intellectuals'. (4)

(1) It should be noted that this tendency to understand intellectuals within their social context is not exclusive to Gramsci. Mannheim of course developed this theme and sought to locate his 'free floating intelligentsia' very precisely within the social structure.

(2) Prison Notebooks op cit p8.

(3) Ibid p9. See also pp8, 347, 344, 323.

(4) Ibid p9. 'Thus, because it can happen that everyone at sometime fries a couple of eggs or sews up a tear in a jacket, we do not necessarily say that everyone is a cook or tailor'. Similarly all men use their intellect but need not be intellectuals.
Gramsci attempted to relate those who function as intellectuals in society to specific social classes. He distinguished two types of intellectual which he called the 'organic' intellectual and the 'traditional' intellectual. The origin and development of a group of organic intellectuals corresponded with the emergence of a new social class. The intellectuals were closely linked to the class, expressing its economic, social and political aspirations, with responsibility for creating its peculiar world outlook. 'Every social group coming into existence on the original terrain of an essential function in the world of economic production creates together with itself, organically, one or more strata of intellectuals which give it homogeneity and an awareness of its own function not only in the economic but also in the social and political fields'. (1) However not all intellectuals were of this type. Every social class had, in the process of its development, been confronted by a group of 'pre-existing' intellectuals who regarded themselves as independent of any social class and who appeared to embody a tradition and continuity which was derived from their own institutions and the works of their predecessors. (2) Historically these groups of intellectuals were associated with particular institutions (of which the church was the most significant) within society which were quite powerful and usually relatively remote from existing classes including the ruling class. (3)

(1) *Prison Notebooks* op. cit. p5.

(2) *Ibid* p7.

Not only have these intellectuals seen themselves as independent of the ruling class but they actually have enjoyed, on the whole, a greater autonomy of the ruling class than the latter's own organic intellectuals; their intellectual products were thus less subject to the immediate intellectual demands and inhibitions of the dominant social class. Gramsci called this category of intellectuals the 'traditional' intellectuals.

However, every 'essential' social group which emerges into history out of the preceding economic structure, and as an expression of a development of this structure, has found (at least in all of history up to the present) categories of intellectuals already in existence and which seemed instead to represent an historical continuity uninterrupted even by the most complicated and radical changes in political and social forms. (1)

The traditional intellectual was personified in the 'man of letters, the philosopher, the artist', (2) while examples of the organic intellectuals of the Bourgeoisie were found amongst 'the capitalist entrepreneur', 'the industrial technician', and 'the specialist in Political economy'. (3)

A new class of intellectuals was required which would arise from, and be organically tied to, the working class; and which would not only articulate the critical world outlook of the proletariat but also be actively involved in practical life as organisers. 'The mode of being of the new intellectual can no longer consist in eloquence, which is an exterior and momentary mover of feelings and passions, but in active participation in practical

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(1) Prison Notebooks op cit p7.
(2) Ibid p9.
(3) Ibid p5.
life as constructor, organiser, 'permanent persuader' and not just a simple orator'.

(1) This was the importance of the intellectuals for they were to be the leaders of the revolutionary movement, creating a critical class consciousness amongst the masses. "A human mass", claimed Gramsci, "does not 'distinguish' itself, does not become independent in its own right with, in the widest sense, organising itself; and there is no organisation without intellectuals, that is without organisers and leaders". (2) Each development of the category of working class organic intellectuals, both numerically and in terms of its elaboration of a revolutionary consciousness, was accompanied by a similar progression amongst the masses. "The process of development is tied to a dialectic between the intellectuals and the masses. The intellectual stratum develops both quantitatively and qualitatively but every leap forward towards a new breadth and complexity of the intellectual stratum is tied to an analogous movement on the part of the mass of the 'simple', who raise themselves to higher levels of culture". (3)

However if the working class wished to exercise political power,

(1) Prison Notebooks op cit p10.

(2) Ibid p334. Members of the revolutionary party of course are considered intellectuals since their main function is education. Gramsci described the Communist Party as a 'collective intellectual' Prison Notebooks p159.

(3) Ibid p334. Although it is often claimed that Gramsci does not owe the intellectual debt to Lenin which he himself professed, it is clear that Gramsci's organic intellectuals function in a similar way to the role Lenin allocated the ideologists of the working class. Two quotations illustrate Lenin's view: "The 'ideologist' is worthy of the name only when he precedes the spontaneous movement, points out the road and is able ahead of all others to solve all the theoretical, political, tactical and organisational questions ... 'ideologists' are 'politically conscious leaders'"
it would not be sufficient merely to produce its own organic intellectuals; it had to win over sections of the 'traditional' intelligentsia. 'One of the most important characteristics of any group that is developing towards dominance' claimed Gramsci 'is its struggle to assimilate and to conquer 'ideologically' the traditional intellectuals, but this assimilation and conquest is made quicker and more efficacious the more the group in question succeeds in simultaneously elaborating its own organic intellectuals'.

Moreover, in a battle of competing ideas and world views different tactics must be adopted to those employed in a military campaign. In a military battle attacks should be directed to the weakest part of the defences whereas in the world of ideas it is the most powerful intellectual representatives of the enemy which must be confronted.

(3)(Cont.)

"The mass movement lacks 'ideologists' sufficiently trained theoretically to be proof against all vacillations; it lacks leaders with such a broad political outlook, such revolutionary energy, and such organisational talent as to create a militant political party". 'A Talk with Defenders of Economism' in Lenin Selected Works Lawrence and Wishart London 1968 pp46 and 47.

(1) Prison Notebooks op cit p10.
political and military struggle it can be correct tactics to break through at the points of least resistance in order to be able to assault the strongest point with maximum forces that have been precisely made available by the elimination of the weaker auxiliaries ... On the ideological front, however, the defeat of the auxiliaries and the minor hangers-on is of all but negligible importance. Here it is necessary to engage battle with the most eminent of one's adversaries. Otherwise one confuses newspapers with books, and petty daily polemic with scientific work'. (1)

The intellectuals thus occupied a central position in Gramsci's theory of social change. The working class organic intellectuals were intimately involved in the life style of that class and were charged with a responsibility for organising and educating the class, and creating for it a coherent world view which would challenge and eventually supersede the Bourgeois Weltanschaung. Gramsci felt that this formulation of the role of intellectuals 'leads on to certain definitions of the concept of the State'. (2) Gramsci's concepts of 'state' and 'Civil Society' must now be considered.

State and Civil Society

Gramsci's concepts of state and civil society are, as his translators note, somewhat confused. (3) They find their most lucid

(1) Prison Notebooks op cit pp432-3.
(3) Prison Notebooks op cit p207. "The state is ... defined as 'political society and civil society', and elsewhere ... as a balance between political society and civil society". In yet another passage, Gramsci stresses that "in concrete reality, civil society and political society are one and the same". See P. Anderson op cit pp22-4, for a discussion of Gramsci's formulation of the concepts 'state' and 'civil society'.

expression in one of Gramsci's prison letters. Gramsci was bemoaning the fact that the state "is usually regarded as 'political' society (in other words dictatorship, or an apparatus of coercion to control the masses of the people in accordance with the mode of production and the economic system prevailing at a given period) and not as an equilibrium between 'political' society and 'civil' society (i.e. the hegemony of a social group over the entire society of a nation - a hegemony exercised by means of and through the organisations commonly called private, such as the church, the Trade Unions, the schools, etc.)" (1)

Thus for Gramsci, the state had two components "two major superstructural levels", 'political' society and 'civil' society. (2) Political society was composed of public institutions - the government, courts, police, army, etc. - which exercised 'direct domination' over the oppressed stratum of society. In this sense political society corresponded to the phenomenon which Marx identified as the state. Civil society for Gramsci was a network of private institutions which were manned by intellectuals, (the schools, church, etc.) through which the ruling class disseminated its ideology to the wider society in order to legitimise and justify its dominant role in society and secure the consent of the masses; in brief the ruling class exercised its hegemony through the agencies

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(2) Prison Notebooks op cit p12.
of civil society. \((1)\) "These two levels (political society and civil society) correspond on the one hand to the function of hegemony which the dominant group exercises throughout society and on the other hand to that of 'direct domination' or command exercised through the state and 'juridical' government". \((2)\) Thus a class ensured the stability of its rule by exercising a regulated combination of physical force, and ideological manipulation. Violent repression and the intensity and frequency with which it was employed was a product of, and a comment upon, the efficacy of the hegemonic apparatus. This conceptualisation of political society and civil society, and the ways in which the dominant class maintained its rule in each of these spheres, had, Gramsci thought, significant implications of a strategic nature.

First, a precondition of the working class assumption of state power, was that they should exercise a dominant function within the institutions of civil society. "A social group can, and indeed must, already exercise 'leadership'," wrote Gramsci, "before winning governmental power (this indeed is one of the principle conditions for the winning of such power) it subsequently becomes dominant when

\(\text{(1) This Gramscian division between state and civil society and the function of each sphere in ensuring social stability has recently been developed by two French writers. See N. Poulantzas Political Power and Social Classes New Left Books 1973 and his article "On Social Classes" in New Left Review No. 78 pp27-54. Also "The State in Capitalist Society" in New Left Review No. 58, Nov./Dec. 1969. See also Louis Althusser "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses", in Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays New Left Books 1971 pp121-77. Althusser's argument is distinctly Gramscian. The state, he claims, has two components. (1) The Repressive State Apparatus (RSA) comprised of prisons, police courts, etc., which function through the exercise of physical coercion to ensure stability. (2) The Ideological State Apparatus (SA) comprised of Trade Unions, family, school, church, parliamentary institutions, which function by persuasion and seek,}
it exercises power, but even if it holds it firmly in its grasp, it must continue to 'lead' as well". (1)

Secondly, and following from this, such a conception of civil society, explained the revolutionary success in Russia and the failure of the working class movement in the West. In Russia, civil society was undeveloped and primitive; the revolutionary movement had merely to conquer political society to assume power. In the West, a sophisticated and highly developed civil society reinforced political society thus making a revolutionary social transformation more difficult. "In Russia", wrote Gramsci, "the state was everything, civil society was primordial and gelatinous; in the West, there was a proper relation between state and civil society, and when the state trembled a sturdy structure of civil society was at once revealed. The state was only an outer ditch, behind which there stood a powerful system of fortresses and earthworks ..."). (2)
Gramsci's concepts of state and civil society require comment if not criticism. Gramsci's basic proposition was that "by 'state' should be understood not only the apparatus of government but also the 'private' apparatus of 'hegemony', or civil society". But by identifying 'private' institutions, such as the church, universities, and trade unions, with the state, Gramsci was confusing state power with class power. Poulantzas has expressed, in Gramscian guise, a similar relationship between private institutions and the state. "These apparatuses", he claims, "belong to the state system because of their objective function of elaborating and inculcating ruling ideology, irrespective of their formal juridical status as nationalised (public) or private". It is this passage which Miliband argues "carries to caricature forms the confusion between different forms of class domination and ... makes impossible a serious analysis of the relation of state to society and of state power to class power". Miliband's critique applies, with equal force to Gramsci's analysis. He concedes that the hegemonic institutions of civil society play an important role in the process of political socialisation, but considers this insufficient justification for categorising them as a constituent of the state. They

(1) Prison Notebooks op cit p261.

(2) N. Poulantzas op cit p47. Poulantzas goes so far as to include business enterprises under this general heading of the state (p52). However in this he is only following Lenin who wrote "capitalism has created an accounting apparatus in the shape of the banks, syndicates, postal service ... The big banks are the state apparatuses". V.I. Lenin Can the Bolsheviks Retain State Power Progress Publishers Moscow 1971 p21.

are a single constituent of a system of power, which is protected by, and increasingly associated with the state, and yet should not be confused with the state. (1) He concurs that these institutions are increasingly subject to a process of 'statisation' and that given "the permanent crisis of advanced capitalism" they will "assume even greater responsibility for political indoctrination and mystification". (2) However, more relevant, says Miliband, is to note how such institutions perform their ideological functions 'outside the state'. Such an approach would facilitate comparison with systems where ideological institutions lack any autonomy and form part of a state monopolistic system of power. (3)

It is now possible to discuss more fully what Gramsci meant by Hegemony. The seeds of Gramsci's concept of Hegemony were planted many years previously by Marx, and find expression in his famous dictum that "The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas; i.e. the class which is the ruling material force of society is at the same time its ruling intellectual force". (4) Developing this theme, hegemony, for Gramsci, was a form of political power and class rule, in which a dominant class, which controlled the economic and political institutions of a society, also possessed a privileged access to the primary ideological institutions of that society; religion, culture, education, communications media. The dominant class used its privileged access to these institutions to

(2) Ibid p262.
(3) Ibid p262.
propogate values which reinforced its structural position within society. Such propogation involved not only the inculcation of its values and the censorship of contrary views, but also and especially the ability to define the parameters of legitimate discussion and debate over alternative beliefs, values and world views. Censorship and direct indoctrination were extreme aspects of the hegemonic process and indeed could prove disfunctional. The attempts of the established order to reinforce norms and patterns of behaviour which had become illegitimate for many, simply created further illegitimacy. There were occasions in social development when the very means of ideological repression create the basis for radicalisation. (1)

However the effective aspect of hegemony was found in the suppression of alternative views through the establishment of limits which defined what was legitimate reasonable, practical, sensible and worthwhile. The institutions of civil society were instrumental in creating a mentality essentially favourable to the given society, drilling its values into the mind. They made critical decisions automatic like socially conditioned reflexes. Dominant values were internalised through these institutions leading to a routinisation of response. They made social relations seems incontestably

(1) A.Wolfe writes for example, "it is the nuclear family which is responsible for the commune, the media which breed the underground newspapers, religion which breeds agnosticism or the search for a new spirituality, work which creates alienation and discontent. "Political Repression" in Monthly Review December 1971.
reasonable. In Gramsci's view, the hegemonic process produced a continuous flow of spontaneous consent. For Gramsci, the hegemonic process ensured that the majority of the population remained unaware of alternatives to the status quo and the world view which legitimised it, since that very same dominant world view circumscribed discussion of alternative patterns. In the absence of alternatives, no mass based opposition emerged and the structure of control was able to continue unchallenged. The hegemonic process did not create a uniformity and consensus of values and ideas among the subaltern social group - a coherent set of beliefs - but rather a confused, fragmented and inconsistent belief system. (1) Thus, the hegemony of the bourgeoisie did not imply that what should be the socialist and revolutionary consciousness of the proletariat was replaced by the ideology of the bourgeoisie. For, putting aside the question of the validity of either of these belief systems, both were relatively coherent and systematic bodies of ideas. In contrast, the consciousness of the masses, under the hegemonic sway of the bourgeoisie was composed of confused and often contradictory elements. The point Gramsci wished to emphasise was that as a result of the hegemonic process, the consciousness of the masses was bifurcated into contradictory aspects and components. Garson's study of car factory workers came to the same conclusion.

"Rather than possessing a coherent ideology, whether reactionary,

(1) In this sense Gramsci differed from writers such as Marcuse, who seemed to believe that subordinate classes accepted and internalised the values of the dominant class; and that they held a coherent view of the world if not an accurate one. See his essay on "Repressive Tolerance", H.Marcuse Beacon Press Boston 1970 in A Critique of Pure Tolerance pp98-9.
liberal or radical, one finds them to be full of ambiguity and overlays of consciousness. Different and seemingly contradictory orientations will be evoked depending upon the context." (1) Thus there was no systematic response to political questions and radical opinions mingled, without noticeable unease and discomfort, with reactionary ideas, in the consciousness of the worker. So, for example, while a man might express a radical viewpoint concerning the ownership of the instruments of production and the distribution of wealth in society, Gramsci believed he might equally uphold racist opinions.

This somewhat confused philosophy of the ordinary man is embodied in language itself, which is a totality of determined notions and concepts, ... common sense ... popular religion and, ... also in the entire system of beliefs, superstitions, opinions, ways of seeing things and of acting, which are collectively bundled together under the name of 'folklore'. (2)

Gramsci explained how these contradictory elements within consciousness have occurred.

The active man-in-the-mass has a practical activity, but has no clear theoretical consciousness of his practical activity, which nonetheless involves understanding the world insofar as it transforms it. His theoretical consciousness can indeed be historically in opposition to his activity. One might almost say that he has two theoretical consciousnesses (or one contradictory consciousness): one which is implicit in his activity and which in reality unites him with all his fellow workers in the practical transformation of the real world; and one, superficially explicit or verbal, which he has inherited from the past and uncritically absorbed. But this verbal conception is


(2) Prison Notebooks op cit p323. By 'common sense' Gramsci means the incoherent set of generally held assumptions and beliefs common in a society.
not without consequences. It holds together a specific social group, it influences moral conduct and the direction of will, with varying efficacy but often powerfully enough to produce a situation in which the contradictory state of consciousness does not permit of any action, any decision or any choice, and produces a condition of moral and political passivity". (1)

Common sense was inherently eclectic and disjointed. It was unsystematic, lacked intellectual rigour and was a composite of elements drawn from earlier ideologies appropriate to a variety of social classes. It contained elements drawn from "the Stone Age and principles of a more advanced science, prejudices from all past phases of history at the local level and intuitions of a future philosophy which will be that of the human race united the world over". (2)

However, this fragmented consciousness, this 'common sense' contained the possibility for the emergence of a new coherent, and critical world view; at the present Gramsci argued this new conception remained confused and mixed with elements of the dominant class' Weltanschauung. "... The social group in question may indeed have its own conception of the world, even if only embryonic; a conception which manifests itself in action, but occasionally and in flashes - when, that is, the group is acting as an organic totality". (3) This 'embryonic' conception of the world can, under the guidance of the party and the intellectuals, develop and progress towards the 'cathartic moments', in which it established

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(1) *Prison Notebooks* op cit p333.

(2) *Ibid* p324.

(3) *Ibid* p327.
its own hegemony over society. (1) Any social class which sought to establish its hegemony must necessarily evolve historically through three 'moments or levels; the economic, the political and the hegemonic phase'. (2) Each of these different phases of development was characterised by a distinct 'level' of consciousness; in other words the outlook and ideas of the class changed with the various changes in its economic and political development.

The economic stage marked the birth of the social class. Every social class emerged as an economic entity, as a product of the development of the material forces of production. Each class had a specific function and position within the world of production.

In the political phase, Gramsci was concerned to analyse the various degrees of homogeneity, self awareness, organisation - i.e. the general political consciousness - of the potentially hegemonic group. It was possible to discern two levels of the political moment. It was at the first of these levels, the 'economic-corporate

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(1) Gramsci means by 'catharsis' the acquisition of revolutionary consciousness. "The term 'catharsis' can be employed to indicate the passage from the purely economic (or egoistic - passional) to the ethical-political moment, that is the superior elaboration of the structure into superstructure in the minds of men". Prison Notebooks op cit p366. Gramsci's usage of this Freudian expression is highly original. For Freud, catharsis was the process in which material, formerly repressed in the unconscious, enters the conscious mind. In this sense it is a coming to consciousness at the individual level. For Gramsci it was a social class which became conscious of its interests in the cathartic moment. It is difficult to know if Gramsci was aware of the ways in which Freud used the term and was influenced by this. His translators suggest that the word catharsis was used to fool the prison censors. Prison Notebooks op cit p366.

(2) Prison Notebooks op cit pp180-2.
level', that members of professions became conscious of the need for unity and organisation within their particular profession without yet recognising the need for homogeneity between professions within a particular social class. Thus "a tradesman feels obliged to stand by another tradesman, a manufacturer by another manufacturer, etc., but the tradesman does not yet feel solidarity with the manufacturer". Consciousness was thus limited to the awareness of common economic interests within a trade. The second level of the political moment was "that in which consciousness is reached of the solidarity of interests among the members of a social class - but still in the purely economic field". At this level of consciousness the class became involved in the parliamentary institutions of society seeking to reform them to protect its own economic and political interests. At this stage the class' strategy was reformist rather than revolutionary and its parliamentary involvement was enacted within the existing political and social structures created by the dominant class.

In the hegemonic phase "one becomes aware that one's own corporate interests, in their present and future development, transcend the corporate limits of the purely economic class, and can and must become the interests of other subordinate groups too". This stage was characterised by the "passage from the structure to the sphere of the complex superstructures". The social class, now organised in the party, assumed state power through a "confrontation

(1) *Prison Notebooks* op cit p181.
(2) *Ibid* p181.
and conflict" of world views from which its own conception emerged as triumphant. Its ideas now filtered throughout civil society creating a political, economic intellectual, moral and cultural unity. From this point onwards the dominant class posed "all the questions around which the struggle rages not on a corporate but on a 'universal plane'" and thus created "the hegemony of a fundamental social group over a series of subordinate groups. It is true that the state is seen as the organ of one particular group ... But the development and expansion of the particular group are conceived of, and presented, as being the motor force of a universal expansion ... In other words the dominant group is co-ordinated concretely with the general interests of the subordinate groups". (1)

Thus the breakdown of any form of society - for example, bourgeois society - in all its aspects economics, politics, culture, must be accompanied by the creation of an all encompassing weltanschauung, a new system of ideas, beliefs and values.

Such was Gramsci's concept of hegemony. The hegemony of a dominant social class implied a form of rule maintained through the medium of ideologies rather than physical force or coercion. The institutions of civil society served the internalisation of a hegemonic system of values. A hegemonic consensus filled the air, like an atmosphere, a mental climate which left nothing out of its reach. By fostering the values of the dominant class, suppressing alternative belief systems, and defining the limits of legitimate discourse, the hegemonic apparatus divided the consciousness of subordinate

(1) Prison Notesbooks op cit p182.
groups and rendered any mass belief system an inconsistent, contradictory and incoherent 'hotch-potch' of ideas. This chaotic 'common sense' and 'folklore' could be nurtured by intellectuals and the party into a critical hegemonic force. During the transition, the class and its world view must pass through various stages of consciousness and political achievement. Gramsci's discussion of hegemony put into sharp focus, many of the questions concerning the relationship between ideas and their sociohistorical context which previously had been raised by Marx. However, in his analysis of ideas Gramsci was a good deal closer to Mannheim. Both men tried to relate ideas beliefs philosophies, and knowledge to aspects of the social and economic structure of society. More specifically, for Gramsci and Mannheim it was the relationship between ideas and social class which was of paramount significance. For Mannheim an individual was born into a particular social group and shared that group's perspective. The individual's ideas were a product of the 'collective purposes' of the group in whose world outlook he 'participated'. In the same way, Gramsci always stressed the 'collective' nature of thought. "In acquiring one's conception of the world", he wrote, "one always belongs to a particular grouping which is that of all the social elements which share the same mode of thinking and acting. We are all conformists of some conformism or other, always man-in-the-mass or collective man". (1)

Similarly, both men exhibited a powerful belief in historicism. They believed that ideologies, being rooted in specific

(1) Prison Notebooks op cit p324.
sociological conditions were necessarily historically transient. Following from this, both characterised Marxism as an ideology.\(^{(1)}\) "That the philosophy of praxis", wrote Gramsci, "thinks of itself in a historicist manner, that is, as a transitory phase of philosophical thought, is ... implicit in its entire system".\(^{(2)}\) Moreover, "If the philosophy of praxis affirms theoretically that every 'truth' believed to be eternal and absolute has had practical origins and has presented a provisional value (historicity of every conception of the world and of life), it is still very difficult to make people grasp 'practically' that such an interpretation is valid also for the philosophy of praxis itself".\(^{(3)}\) From such a statement it is clear that Gramsci was operating with, to use Mannheim's expression, a total general conception of ideology since he subjects "all points of view, including his own, to the ideological analysis".\(^{(4)}\) But Gramsci's acceptance of an historicist position forced him to face squarely, the same problems which plagued Mannheim and which the latter never satisfactorily resolved; i.e. the associated problems of relativism and the possibility of objective knowledge.

Marx had believed in the objectivity of the natural sciences and of his own scientific political economy. Further, he displayed

\(^{(1)}\) See K. Mannheim _Ideology and Utopia_ op cit pp68-9.

\(^{(2)}\) _Prison Notebooks_ op cit p404.

\(^{(3)}\) Ibid p406. See also p465, where Gramsci writes "The philosophy of praxis is absolute 'historicism' ... an absolute humanism of history". Also, p138 and p442.

\(^{(4)}\) _Ideology and Utopia_ op cit p69.
an epistemological optimism which led him to believe that given the appropriate social conditions it was possible to eradicate the problem of ideology. Developing Marx's theme, in a more pessimistic direction, Mannheim claimed that all social theories, Marxism included, were ideological (i.e. socially and historically conditioned) and that the problem of ideology was inherent to stratified social structures. In line with Marx however, Mannheim excluded the natural sciences from his general thesis of the social determination of ideas.

Gramsci was less hopeful concerning the possibility of valid knowledge than either Marx or Mannheim. For Gramsci posited the historicity and relativity not only of social theories but also of science. Gramsci felt that "the problem of what 'science' itself is has to be posed". (1) His conclusion was that science, no less than social theories, was intimately related to human needs and interests and therefore could not be universally valid or objective knowledge. "If reality is as we know it", he wrote, "and if our knowledge changes continually - if, that is, no philosophy is definitive but all are historically determined - it is hard to imagine that reality changes objectively with changes in ourselves ... What are phenomena? Are they something objective, existing in and for themselves, or are they qualities which man has isolated in consequence of his practical interests (the construction of his economic life) and his scientific interests (the necessity to discover an

order in the world and to describe and classify things, a necessity which is itself connected to mediated and future practical interests) ... our knowledge of things is nothing other than ourselves, our needs and interests, that is that our knowledge is superstructure".

(1) Natural science was for Gramsci a human and historical category for 'matter' was important only when it was organised by men for productive purposes. "Matter as such therefore is not our subject but how it is socially and historically organised for production, and natural science should be seen correspondingly as essentially an historical category, a human relation ... Electricity is historically active, not merely however as a natural force (e.g. an electrical discharge which causes a fire) but as a productive element dominated by man and incorporated into the ensemble of the material forces of production, an object of private property".(2)

But if science offered no basis for establishing objective knowledge, what criteria could be employed to avoid the pitfalls of total scepticism or relativism? Ultimately, for Mannheim, the possibility of objective knowledge was offered by the 'perspectivism' of the intelligentsia. Objective knowledge for Mannheim was pluralistic; the end product of a process of examination and synthesis, by the intelligentsia of a number of partial and limited perspectives. For Gramsci, objectivity conceived in a 'mechanical' way was not possible. "It might seem", he wrote, "that there can exist an extra-historical and extra human objectivity. But who is the judge

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(1) Prison Notebooks op cit p244.
of such objectivity? Who is able to put himself in this kind of 'standpoint of the cosmos in itself', and what could such a standpoint mean? It can indeed be maintained that here we are dealing with a hangover of the concept of God, precisely in its mystic form of a conception of an unknown God'.

The notion of objectivity must be historicised and humanised, for it can be understood only by reference to history and man. "We know reality only in relation to man, and since man is historical becoming, knowledge and reality are also a becoming and so is objectivity". Objectivity was thus no static entity. For Gramsci objectivity meant a subjective consensus among men within a given cultural and historical context.

"Objective always means 'humanly objective' which can be held to correspond exactly to 'historically subjective'; in other words, objective would mean 'universal subjective'. Man knows objectively only insofar as knowledge is real for the whole human race historically unified in a single unitary cultural system ... There exists therefore a struggle for objectivity (to free oneself from partial and fallacious ideologies) and this struggle is the same as the struggle for the cultural unification of the human race". For Gramsci, all knowledge, including the natural sciences, had no tenable claim to universality or objectivity.

His analysis of ideas shared an affinity with themes raised by Mannheim in the sociology of knowledge and his critique of the

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(1) Prison Notebooks op cit p445.
(2) Ibid p446.
(3) Ibid p445.
traditional theory contained the following elements.

First, ideas and beliefs were influenced by the class relationships of the society in which they developed; a change in the relationship between social classes had implications for the world of ideas. Second, Gramsci's historicism led him to conclude that ideas only had meaning within the particular historical epoch in which they emerged and were appropriate. Third, it followed from this historicist position that the notion of objectivity held by the traditional theory was invalid. Fourth, Gramsci argued that intellectuals, instead of attempting to be impartial investigators, should consciously seek to ally themselves with a particular social class and articulate its peculiar world view; whether consciously aware of it or not, all intellectuals were partisan or partial in their viewpoint. Fifth, for Gramsci, ideas and beliefs were not abstractions, neutral in their effects and without implications for the practical world; they were weapons in the class war. Their social function for the hegemonic class was to generate consent and acquiescence from subordinate classes.
In his critique of the traditional theory of rationality, Marx posited a relationship between the realm of ideas and the world of material production. Ideas were intimately related to economic and social life and could not be understood independently of that social context. His claim was that "the production of ideas, of conceptions, of consciousness, is ... directly interwoven with the material activity and the material intercourse of men, the language of real life ... Men are the producers of their conceptions, ideas, etc., real active men ... Consciousness can never be anything else than conscious existence and the existence of men in their actual life processes". (1)

This intriguing, provocative, but rather general formula of Marx's provided a starting point for the study of ideas, their nature and origin. Subsequent research and investigation attempted to pinpoint more precisely the exact nature of the relationship between the processes of material production and the ideas and conceptions which embodied an awareness of material life. What were the mechanisms which transformed experience into conscious of that reality? How did day to day experience become ideas within people's heads? How was it possible to explain the growth of different belief systems from a common material world? Karl Mannheim and Antonio Gramsci extended Marx's analysis by exploring the insights and possibilities which his base/superstructure model offered,

through their respective studies of the sociology of knowledge and the concept of hegemony. Two other Marxist writers, Wilhelm Reich and Erich Fromm were convinced that these questions could only be answered satisfactorily by the inclusion within Marx's framework of materials drawn from psychoanalysis; for such materials both men turned to Freud. While they agreed with Marx that the role of social influences was crucial to the explanation of the development of belief systems, they also argued for the impact of unconscious and instinctual processes on the creation of world views; against the traditional theory they argued that the genesis of ideas and beliefs required both sociological and psychological explanation.

Although the concern of Reich and Fromm was to establish a general theory of rationality with which to understand the growth and development of systems of ideas and beliefs, they concentrated their attention on a specific belief system; namely German Fascism. Before turning to this, it may be helpful to outline, briefly, the socio political context from which their studies emerged and the points of contact and divergence between their respective works on Fascism. Reich was concerned to explain the discrepancy in the Marxian theory of social change between the revolutionary role allocated to the proletariat by Marxian theory and the reality of proletarian reaction as evidence in the widespread support for Fascism. He became intrigued to explain how political ideas could become so grossly out of step with economic conditions and interests and why, contrary to Marx's prediction 'at the crossroads between socialism and barbarism; it was in the direction of barbarism that the society first proceeded'.

(1) 'Official Marxism' embodied in the

German Communist Party (K.P.D.) could not explain the phenomenon of Fascism because it had reduced Marx's original base/superstructure model into a one-sided mechanistic model, which stressed the supremacy of economic conditions over ideological forces. The K.P.D. believed that severe economic conditions must inevitably lead to the development of a socialist revolutionary consciousness amongst the workers. Reich attacked such vulgar Marxism violently.

Writing in the early 1930s and already faced by the rapidly developing phenomenon of Fascism, Reich felt that psychoanalysis could help "to determine as completely as possible the myriad intermediate links in the transforming of the 'material basis' into the 'ideological superstructure'". Only psychoanalysis could put its 'finger on the ways and mechanisms by means of which man's social entity is transformed into psychic structure and, thereby, into ideology'. Reich interposed a psychological variable, between the 2 layers of the orthodox Marxian typology of 'base' and 'superstructure', which mediated between them. In this way 'Psychoanalysis proves that the economic structure of society does not directly transform itself into ideologies 'inside the head'. Reich concluded that only a synthesis of Marxism and Psychoanalysis could explain satisfactorily the genesis of ideas. He was one of the first to attempt such a synthesis of Marx and Freud and the first to develop the political implications of psychoanalysis in

(2) Ibid pxxiii.
(3) W. Reich Dialectical Materialism and Psychoanalysis Socialist Reproduction London pp44-5.
the direction of revolutionary change. Although Reich's work was highly influential and widely admired, not least by Freud himself, official psycho-analysis found Reich's communism unacceptable and in 1934 he was expelled from the International Psychoanalytic Association: at the same time, he incurred the suspicion of the German Communist Movement and his membership of the party was terminated. (1) Reich founded a new movement, 'sex economy', later called 'orgonomy', which was based on his theory of orgasm and his theory of character structure. Reich's notion of character structure was an attempt to understand man in his totality. Character structure embraced an understanding of man's instinctual and unconscious drives as well as the economic and social context in which they operated. Reich described his development towards sex economy:

Sex economic sociology was born from the effort to harmonise Freud's depth psychology with Marx's economic theory. Instinctual and socio-economic processes determine human existence... Psychoanalysis is the mother, sociology the father, of sex economy. But a child is more than the sum total of his parents. He is a new independent living creature. (2)

(1) Reich's life seems to have been as unhappy as it was fascinating. Rejected by the orthodox psychoanalytic and communist movements, he was persecuted throughout his career by the media and popular opinion. His books were banned by the K.P.D. and burned by both the Nazis and the American government. (see The Tragedy of Wilhelm Reich, D.Jarret in Humanist Vol. 85 February 1970 p46 and The Fate of Dr. Reich's Books, P.Goodman Kulchur 1960 p21 and editorial). A tragic and isolated figure, Reich died in a Federal penitentiary in 1957 following two years of imprisonment. For full biographical details see the very powerful and often emotional book written by his third wife, Ilse Ollendorf Reich, Wilhelm Reich a Personal Biography Elek Books London 1969.

In much the same way as Reich, Erich Fromm attempted a synthesis of Marx and Freud in order to explain the phenomenon of Fascism. (1) Unlike Reich, Fromm's work has achieved recognition and he is now established as an academic of considerable standing. (2) The two men have much in common. Both were born around the same time, both experienced the growth of Fascism at first hand, both shared a common intellectual debt to Marx and Freud and each, by building on this common fund of ideas, tried to explain the development and function of ideas and mass belief systems. However, while I wish to stress the similarities between the analyses of Reich and Fromm, perhaps the differences between the two thinkers should be stated at the outset.

Paul Goodman has drawn attention to the points of divergence in the work of Fromm and Reich in two articles in the journal Politics. (3) Goodman took Fromm to task for his lack of emphasis on Freud's libido theory. While Reich had accepted Freud's

(1)(Cont.)
The Life and Work of Wilhelm Reich. M.Cattier Discus Books 1973 U.S.A. Chapter XI. For Reich's early work with the Austrian Social Democratic party and the formative political influences on his theories see The Politicisation of Wilhelm Reich A.Rabinbach New German Critique Number One Winter 1973 pp90-98.

(2) Reich The Mass Psychology of Fascism op cit pxxiii.

(1) Erich Fromm Fear of Freedom Routledge, Kegan Paul London. For his attempt to integrate Marx and Freud see Beyond the Chains of Illusion; My Encounter with Marx and Freud.

(2) For biographical details of Fromm see E.Z.Friedenberg "Neo-Freudianism and Erich Fromm" in Commentary XXXIV No. 4 October 1962.

concept of the libidinal drive and, indeed, gave it a central place in his analytical scheme, Goodman accused Fromm of 'underestimating the role of instinctual drives and advocating the view that character directly reflects the social pattern'.(1) Fromm had gone too far in making an allowance for sociological factors in the genesis of ideas. By downplaying the centrality of the instincts, at the expense of social forces, the character of man for Fromm was 'sprung from nowhere ... without a past ... without an unconscious and transparent through and through'.(2) Here Goodman is anticipating Marcuse's notion of adaptionism and his critique of Fromm by a clear 10 years.(3) According to Goodman different theories of neurosis (i.e. those of Reich and Fromm) directly imply ... different political philosophies'. The theory of Wilhelm Reich implies the 'psychology of the revolution', and the theory of Fromm corresponds to 'the ideal of the industrial status quo'.(4) Despite these differences their analyses of Nazism are similar enough to be treated together. However in this chapter it is Reich's work that will form the main focus of our attention. Two reasons account for this partial neglect of Fromm.

First Reich's book The Mass Psychology of Fascism made its appearance some 10 years before Fromm's Fear of Freedom and thus Reich was a pioneer in the analysis of Fascist ideology from a psychoanalytic viewpoint.

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(1) P.Goodman "The Political Meaning of Some Recent Revisions of Freud" op cit p198.
(2) Ibid p199.
(3) H.Marcuse Eros and Civilisation Sphere Books London 1969. See the Epilogue; Critique of Neo Freudian Revisionism pp190-217.
Second, not only did Reich's work precede Fromm's, but it seems that Fromm was intellectually indebted to Reich. Bertell Ollman has put this more bluntly by claiming that 'Erich Fromm's better known psychological study of Fascism Escape from Freedom (1942) cripbs very heavily, and without acknowledgement, from Reich's Mass Psychology of Fascism (1933)'.(1) It is doubtful that Fromm deliberately 'cribbed' Reich's work and such a statement ignores the very real differences between the two writers. However certain facts are relevant. It is known that Fromm met Reich in Berlin in 1930 and was impressed by the latter's attempt to relate Marxist sociology to clinical psychoanalysis and wrote an enthusiastic review of Reich's Einbruch der Sexualmoral in the Zeitschrift fur Sozialforschung in 1932.(2) It is also known that in 1942 Fromm wrote a book which had a very similar theme and conclusion to The Mass Psychology of Fascism and which drew on much of Reich's earlier analysis, without making a single reference or footnote of acknowledgement to his predecessor. Reich's work must be recognised as

(3)(Cont.)
Marcuse, one of the most outspoken critics of the cultural school of Erich Fromm, pointed out that Fromm's argument that conflict with society led to neurosis, led ultimately to 'adaptionism' since if a patient would conform to social norms his conflict would be over.

(4) P. Goodman "The Political Meaning of Some Recent Revisions of Freud op cit p197.

(1) B. Ollman The Marxism of Wilhelm Reich; The Social Function of Sexual Repression in D. Howard (ed) Marxism The Unknown Dimension op cit p223.

a source of inspiration for the later writings of Fromm.\(^{(1)}\) For these reasons Reich's work will assume central significance here.

I. Reich's analysis of the genesis of Fascism has its roots in his earlier work in the field of clinical psychology. More specifically his theory of orgasm and his theory of character formation and structure are the twin pillars supporting his socio-political speculation.

Reich's orgasm theory arose as a logical extension and development of Freud's libido theory. The centrality of sexuality to the problem of the etiology of neuroses, seemed obvious to Reich from an early age. On March 1st 1919 he wrote in his diary, "Perhaps my own morality objects to it. However, from my own experience, and from observation of myself and others, I have become convinced that sexuality is the centre around which revolves the whole of social life as well as the inner life of the individual".\(^{(2)}\)

His theory of orgasm was an attempt to establish this moncausal relationship between sexuality and neurosis. Sexual energy he claimed was built up in the body at a faster rate than that at which it was expended, and needed release. If an energy equilibrium was to be restored and maintained in the body this energy surplus must be discharged; this was the function of the orgasm. If release of the libidinal energy was inhibited for any reason, 'stasis' of the energy sets in giving rise to neurotic mechanisms.

\(^{(1)}\) Apart from Ollman, King and Boadella, this view is held by P.A.Robinson. The Sexual Radicals Padalind 1970 p44.

\(^{(2)}\) W.Reich The Function of the Orgasm Panther Books 1968 p44.
In brief, an incapacity for full оргastic pleasure became for Reich the central fact of any neurosis. The implication of Reich's orgasm theory was quite simply that anyone exhibiting neurotic symptoms could not enjoy a totally satisfactory sex life since sexual energy was not being fully discharged during orgasm.

The criticism which was levelled at Reich was that many neurotics seemed to enjoy a healthy sex life. This led Reich to investigate the nature and quality of the orgasm experienced by neurotics, by questioning some of his patients. In 1924 Reich read a paper to the Psychoanalytic Congress at Salzburg on The Therapeutic Importance of Genital Libido in which he redefined what constituted orgasm. With his love of neologism, Reich coined the phrase оргastic potency as a substitute for orgasm.

 оргastic potency is the capacity for surrender to the flow of biological energy without any inhibition, the capacity for complete discharge of all dammed up sexual excitation through involuntary pleasurable contractions of the body ... not a single neurotic individual possesses оргastic potency; the corollary of this fact is the fact that the vast majority of humans suffer from a character neurosis.

Such was Reich's picture of homo normalis and the vicious circle in which he was trapped. Man became a creature incapable of fully discharging sexual energy during orgasm because he was neurotic; the neurosis itself was fed and maintained by the very energy which it inhibited. The vast majority of mankind was condemned to neurosis and unsatisfactory sexual relations.

(1) W. Reich The Function of the Orgasm Panther Books 1968 p123.
(2) Ibid p114.
Reich's theory of character was designed specifically as a companion to the theory of the orgasm.\(^{(1)}\) It was an elaborate theory which considered the origins, functions, nature and social effects of character structure. The exegesis below is necessarily brief and simplifies Reich's analysis, hopefully without vulgarising it.

For Reich the genesis of character structure lay in the conflicts of the oedipal period and represented the response of the individual to pressures and threats from the outside world, the nature and intensity of character reflected the form of repression to which the individual was subject during this time.\(^{(2)}\) It was the conscious or unconscious fear of punishment which provided the motive for developing such character structure. In accommodating to parental demands the child transformed its spontaneity into character structure which functioned as a web of defences which insulated the individual from the outside world. However in the mature adult, the function of character was transformed. Protection against the external world became secondary to protecting the individual against internal dangers; the unruly impulses of which society disapproved which must be repressed by the character


\(^{(2)}\) Reich Character Analysis op cit p156.
mechanisms. In both cases the character structure functioned as an armour which protected the psychic equilibrium of the individual from internal and external threats. 'This character armour', Reich claimed, 'has a definite economic function. Such armour serves on the one hand as a defence against external stimuli; on the other hand it proves to be a means of gaining mastery over the libido which is continually pushing forward from the id.'(1) In the mature adult character structure blocked sexual impulses and redirected their energy thus acting both as suppressing agent and controller of the resultant anxiety. Character structure was thus the antithesis of the orgasm. It developed quite literally at the expense of the orgasm since it consumed the psychic energy not discharged during orgasm.

This psychic character structure or 'armour' had a physiological counterpart in 'muscular armour'. Reich had noted this muscular armour in his neurotic patients, manifested in their tense and awkward mannerisms and their bodily stiffness. He argued that neurosis was not only a psychic phenomenon but also an illness which had a somatic counterpart; all neurotics he claimed suffered from muscular armour.

Human armour was conceived as having three layers. At the deepest inner layer, or the core, were man's natural wholesome instincts; 'natural sociality and sexuality, spontaneous enjoyment of work, capacity for love'. All revolutionary sentiments, all

(1) Reich Character Analysis op cit p48.
genuine science and art, stemmed from this 'natural biological core'. (1) However the instincts which reside in this deeply rooted core are repressed by a sex negating society and give rise to the second or intermediate layer. Freud never penetrated beyond this secondary layer to the inner core and thus this layer represents the Freudian unconscious. The forces of 'sadism, greediness, lasciviousness, envy, perversions of all kinds', (2) operate here. This intermediate layer is covered and kept in check by the outermost of the three layers; the equivalent of the Freudian superego. This layer is the 'artificial mask of self control, of compulsive, insincere politeness and of artificial sociality'. (3) Reich challenged Freud's contention that instinctual release would lead to chaos and was convinced of the ultimate sociality of the instincts at the core of man.

Such then is Reich's picture of man in society. Man has become alienated from his true instinctual nature, building defences and repressions not only in his mind but also in his body. These take the form of muscular rigidities and tensions which hamper spontaneous movement and life. Man has become encapsulated within this rigid muscular armour which serves to protect him from life and the best within himself - his own erotic impulses. For Reich it was the nature of this character armour which explained why people behaved irrationally; that is why the masses who have an objective stake in socialism acquire a subjective interest in

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(1) Reich The Mass Psychology of Fascism op cit pxiii.
(2) Reich The Function of the Orgasm op cit p232.
(3) Ibid p232.
reaction 'a stake in their own repression'. "Sexual inhibition changes the structure of economically suppressed man", claimed Reich, "in such a way that he acts, feels and thinks contrary to his own material interests".\(^{(1)}\) Only by reference to the character structure of the masses can irrational behaviour be understood for "what has to be explained is not the fact that the man who is hungry steals or the fact that the man who is exploited strikes, but why the majority of those who are hungry don't steal and why the majority of those who are exploited don't strike; thus social economy can give a complete explanation of a social fact that serves a rational end, i.e. when it satisfies an immediate need and reflects and magnifies the economic situation. The social economic explanation does not hold up, on the other hand, when a man's thought and action are inconsistent with the economic situation, are irrational, in other words".\(^{(2)}\)

Having established that sexual repression had led to neurotic character formations amongst the majority of the civilised world, Reich now turned his attention to those factors responsible for its formation and maintenance. Reich asserted that character armour with all its deformations was determined by social structure.

The point is that every social order produces in the masses of its members that structure which it needs to achieve its main aims ...\(^{(3)}\) The repressor of the vital energies of man is a conventional morality (compulsive morality in Reich's terms) in its

\(^{(1)}\) Reich The Mass Psychology of Fascism op cit p32.


\(^{(3)}\) Ibid p32.
sexual aspect as imposed on the young by school, religion and most significantly the family.\(^1\) 'From a political standpoint, Reich observed 'the family and the school today are the workshops of the Bourgeois social order, designed to turn out well behaved obedient subjects'.\(^2\) Reich was highly critical of the patriarchal family as it was within this institution that he perceived sexual repression to be instigated; character structure resulted from the internalisation of the repressive anti libidinal values of the authoritarian family. The family was 'the foremost breeding place of the ideological atmosphere of conservatism'.\(^3\)

Within the confines of the family sexual repression began during childhood. The child eventually comes to suppress all those needs, the enactment of which would incur parental disapproval or punishment. The child develops a pleasure anxiety, a fear of enjoyment and is afraid of his own sexual drives and any tendency to rebel against authority. According to Reich 'The moral inhibition of the child's natural sexuality ... makes the child afraid, shy, fearful of authority, obedient, 'good' and 'docile' in the authoritarian sense of the words. It had a crippling effect on man's rebellious forces because every vital life impulse is now burdened with severe fear'.\(^4\) Further the deference for paternal authority within the patriarchal family, is extended to all authority as the father becomes associated with the state.

\(^{(1)}\) Reich Character Analysis op cit pxxiv.

\(^{(2)}\) Reich The Sexual Struggle of Youth Socialist Reproductions London p65.

\(^{(3)}\) Reich The Sexual Revolution op cit p71.

\(^{(4)}\) Reich The Mass Psychology of Fascism op cit p30.
The father in his normal role is the representative of the bourgeois authorities and the power of the state within the family. The authority of the state claims the same obedient and submissive attitude from adults as the father demands from his children when they are young or adolescent. The lack of critical spirit, prohibition of rebelliousness, and absence of personal opinion characterise the relationship of children loyal to their family with their parents; as they characterise the relationship of employees and functionaries devoted to authority with the state. (1)

Under the pressure of parental conditioning, an authoritarian character structure develops. As the child progresses towards adolescence, the process of repression continues. Reich had advocated complete sexual freedom from the age of puberty but such freedom was however inhibited by the parents and the sexual repression begun in childhood is reinforced as is the resultant character armour. Finally as the individual reaches adulthood, it is 'forced' into monogamous marriage by the conflict between instinctual drives and socio-economic structures. Reich considered monogamous marriage a further source of neurosis since a sexual relation with a single individual may lose its attraction but the marriage is maintained by economic and moral pressure from society. (2) If children are born into this family unit, the parents pass on their own repression, neurosis and character armour to the child, and the cycle is complete. In The Sexual Revolution Reich makes explicit the educational function of the family.

(1) Reich The Sexual Struggle of Youth op cit p65.

Its cardinal function ... is that of serving as a factory for authoritarian ideologies and conservative structures. It forms the educational apparatus through which practically every individual of our society, from the moment of drawing his first breath, has to pass. ... It is the conveyor belt between the economic structure of conservative society and its ideological superstructure; its reactionary atmosphere must needs become inextricably implanted in every one of its members. (1)

The two other social agencies which propagated anti sexual morality were organised religion and education. Christian ethics were anti sexual, endorsing the patriarchal family, respect for property and hierarchy. Religion for Reich, as for Freud, was a fantasised substitute gratification for actual orgastic gratification. Thus 'an understanding of the psychological effect of mysticism in general is an indispensable part of an investigation of fascist ideology'. (2)

Such was Reich's analysis of the origins of reactionary political ideologies. The social function of sexual repression, which was enforced primarily by the family and religion, was to give man a character structure which inhibited his capacity for criticism, rebellion and the perception of his own economic interest. It was this character structure - a product of sexual repression, which explained the lack of class consciousness among the proletariat and the widespread support for fascism. This character structure which was particularly receptive to fascism, Reich called the 'authoritarian personality'. The genesis and occurrence of ideology was to be understood by reference to this particular personality type. (3)

(1) Reich The Sexual Revolution op cit p72.
(2) Mass Psychology of Fascism op cit p116.
(3) It is important to note that neither Reich or Fromm sought to explain Fascism in solely psychological terms to the exclusion
Every social organisation produces those character structures which it needs to exist. In class society, the existing ruling class secures its position, with the help of education and the institution of the family, by making its ideologies the ruling ideologies of all members of the society. However it is not merely a matter of implanting these ideologies in all members of the society. It is not matter of indoctrinating attitudes and opinions but of a far reaching process in each new generation of a given society, the purpose of which is to effect a change in, and mould psychic structures (and this in all layers of the population) in conformity with the social order. (1)

Reich was the first to develop what has since become a key concept in the social sciences; the authoritarian personality which he felt described the condition of modern man. (2) The authoritarian personality had a fear of freedom, a conservative mentality and a deeply rooted psychological fear of rebellion. Reich's pioneer work with this new concept has since received endorsement from other social scientists working in this area. (3)

(3) (Cont.)

of political, sociological and economic factors. Reich does not deny importance of economic depression or the Versailles Treaty for example in the development of fascism. Equally he is aware that fascist economic policy is in the financial interests of the larger capitalists and that fascism is politically rooted at least initially in lower middle classes. He simply wishes to explain why fascism could appeal to workers on such a large scale and this is why he employs psychoanalysis. Fromm also wrote in Fear of Freedom (p188) "psychological conditions were not the cause of nazism. They constituted its human basis without which it could not have developed, but any analysis of ... Nazism must deal with the strictly economic and political, as well as with the psychological conditions"

(1) Mass Psychology of Fascism op cit pxii.

(2) For an attempt to verify the widespread existence of the 'authoritarian personality' by clinical experiment see Dr. Stanley Milgram's book Obedience to Authority Tavistock Books 1974.

(3) e.g. E. Campbell and B. McCandless 'Ethnocentrism, Xenophobia and Personality' in Human Relations 4(1951) pp185-92. A.W. Siegman, A. Cross "Cultural Investigation of the Relationship between Ethnic Prejudice, Authoritarian Ideology and Personality" in
Like Reich, Fromm took as his starting point Marx's proposition of a general relationship between the economic structure of society and the world of ideas. Again like Reich, Fromm felt that Marx had not pinpointed with sufficient precision the processes by which the individual's actual life experience is transformed into ideas and beliefs. Fromm believed that social psychology could supplement the base/superstructure model. 'I believe', he wrote, 'that by using the tools of psychoanalysis, this gap in Marxian theory can be filled, and that it is possible to show the mechanisms through which the economic basic structure and the superstructure are connected. One of these connections lies in what I have called the social character, the other in the nature of the social unconscious'. (1) These two concepts, social character and social unconscious are decisive to Fromm's analysis of belief systems.

Fromm saw his concept of social character as an intermediary level between socio-economic structure and the realm of ideas; it is the '... transmission belt between the economic structure of society and the prevailing ideas'. (2) Moreover a dialectic operated between each of the three tiers in this conceptual construction. Fromm expressed his model graphically in the following way.

(3)(Cont.)


(2) Ibid p78.
"It is the economic basis which is responsible for creating a certain social character which, in turn, creates appropriate ideas and beliefs. Once created, the ideas may influence the social character, the economic basis. ... It (the social character) is the intermediary in both directions, from the economic basis to the ideas and from the ideas to the economic basis". (2) By social character Fromm referred to that character orientation which typified the majority of individuals within a specific cultural group. 'I refer in this concept', he wrote, 'to the nucleus of the character structure which is shared by most members of the same culture, in contradistinction to the individual character in which people belonging to the same culture differ from each other'. (3) The social character was not simply an aggregate of individual character traits and thus it could be determined statistically; rather its nature had to be sought by a functional analysis. The function of the social character was "to mould and channel human energy within a given society for the purposes of the continued functioning of this society". (4)


(2) Ibid pp86-7.

(3) Ibid p78.

(4) Ibid p79.
In other words, social character was that general orientation of beliefs and attitudes that enabled individuals to act in accordance with the demands and limitations which a particular socio-economic structure imposed, while simultaneously finding satisfaction in activity which the society required for its continuation. "They have to desire what objectively is necessary for them to do. Outer force is to be replaced by inner compulsion and by the particular kind of human energy which is channelled into human character traits". (1) Fromm gave the example of the social character which was necessary for the development and perpetuation of capitalist social structures.

Modern industrial society could not have attained its ends if it had not harnessed the energy of free men for work in an unprecedented degree. Man had to be moulded into a person who was eager to spend most of his energy for the purposes of work, who had the qualities of discipline, orderliness and punctuality to a degree unknown in most other cultures. It would not have sufficed if each individual had to make up his mind consciously every day that he wanted to work, to be on time, etc., since any such conscious deliberation would lead to many more exceptions than the smooth functioning of society can afford. Nor would threat and force have sufficed as a motive since the highly differential tasks in modern industrial society can, in the long run, only be the work of free men and not of forced labour. The social necessity for work, for punctuality and orderliness had to be transformed into an inner drive. This means that society had to produce a social character in which these strivings were inherent. (2)

In this way the economic structure of society determined the social character. Social character in turn became the basis from which

(1) "Individual and Social Origins of Neurosis" in American Sociological Review Vol. 9 1944 p381.

(2) Beyond the Chains of Illusion ... op cit p79.
ideas developed and were sustained. Fromm explained the relationship between social character and ideas by drawing an analogy between individual and social character. At the level of the individual certain ideas will be particularly attractive to a certain personality type and at the level of the social character the same is true. In much the same way as "a person with a hoarding ... character orientation, will be attracted to the idea of saving", and, "repelled by ideas of what he would call 'reckless spending'" (1) so with the advent of modern capitalism with its stress on private property, a social character developed for which "private property is sacred, and the idea of the invulnerability of private property is a cornerstone in its ideological edifice". (2) These ideals, such as the sanctity of private property, become so deeply embedded even in those who do not have any economic interest in the continuation of a social system based on the private ownership of the means of production, that "the average person in a capitalist society considers any attack against private property a sign of barbarism and inhumanity". (3) For Fromm, economic structures produced a peculiar social character which was particularly receptive to those ideas required for the maintenance of society and economy.

Fromm's notion of the social character was only one of the "connectives" between the base and superstructure of a society.

"The other link lies in the fact that each society determines which thoughts and feeling shall be permitted to arrive at the level of

(1) Ibid p83.
(2) Ibid p85.
(3) Ibid p85.
awareness and which have to remain unconscious". (1) As with the social character, so with the social unconscious, the analogy between 'individual' and 'social' was close at hand. Freud had argued that the individual represses into his unconscious much dangerous and disturbing material which could potentially disrupt his psychic equilibrium if it entered the conscious mind. Fromm expanded Freud's original notion of the unconscious mind to the social level. The social unconscious became an invisible censor, which selected permitted desires and enforced taboos on all dysfunctional and disruptive ideas, emotions and impulses. By social unconscious Fromm meant 'those areas of repression which are common to most members of a society; the commonly repressed elements are those contents which a given society cannot permit its members to be aware of if the society with its specific contradictions is to operate successfully'. (2) Modern man received information relating to the nature of social reality through "a socially conditioned filter; experience cannot enter awareness unless it can penetrate this filter". (3) Certain ideas and facts were repressed by this filter and remained outside the view of the mass of the people. "Man may begin to realise that his life makes little sense, that he has little freedom and is bored with work and yet society is able to repress any awareness of these feelings". (4) An obvious example of one way in which this repression operated was the 'brain washing'

(1) Ibid p88.
(2) Ibid p88.
(3) Ibid p115.
(4) Ibid p122.
which Fromm argued was conducted by parents, schools, churches and
the mass media. (1) The effect of this unconscious filtration was
to make people blind; they perceived only certain facts and ignored
others. In this way the contradictions and irrationalities of
capitalist society remained hidden for "the irrationalities of any
given society result in the necessity for its members to repress
the awareness of many of their own feelings and observations". (2)
The repression of awareness of facts was attended by the acceptance
of fictions. Repression left a gap in man's perception of reality
which was filled by various ideologies which were 'fed' into him.
Thus Fromm informed the reader "we are christians; we are indivi-
dualists; our leaders are wise; we are good; our enemies (whoever
these happen to be at the moment) are bad; our parents love us and
we love them; our marriage system is successful and so on". (3)
Thus for Fromm the problem of illusory and misleading knowledge
arose in one of two possible ways. First, man's knowledge of
social reality was incomplete because of the activities of the social
unconscious which denied him access to certain forms of knowledge.
Man's insight into social phenomena was necessarily partial and
arbitrary; he could not understand reality in its totality for he
could not perceive it in its entirety. Secondly, the problem of
ideological beliefs could arise because of man's readiness and
eagerness to accept distorted perceptions of the world; denied a

(1) Ibid p125.
(2) Ibid p123.
(3) Ibid p125.
full perception of social reality, man sought a substitute perception in fiction, lies and distortion. Because of the social unconscious man inhabited a world of illusions and fantasies which he grasped as a substitute for real knowledge.

The obvious question which Fromm was required to answer was why people should repress their awareness of reality. What was the motive for repression? For his answer Fromm returned to Freud. In Freud's original analysis of the individual unconscious, the motive for repression was fear of castration. For Fromm the motive was man's fear of isolation and ostracism. "For man ... the sense of complete aloneness and separateness is close to insanity. Man as man is afraid of insanity, just as man as animal is afraid of death ... This need to be one with others is his strongest passion ... for this reason, the individual must blind himself from seeing that which his group claims does not exist, or accept as truth that which the majority says is untrue, even if his own eyes could convince him that it is false". (1) Social unconscious and social character then are the two concepts which informed Fromm's analysis of ideological beliefs. The key to understanding the popularity of fascist ideology was the authoritarian nature of the German social character. (2) More specifically, it was the social character typical of the low middle class which provided particularly fertile soil for the development of fascism. (3) The syndrome of attitudes

(1) Ibid p126.
(2) Fear of Freedom op cit p183.
(3) Ibid p182.
which characterise the authoritarian personality, outlined by Fromm, has much in common with the personality type which Reich considered to be receptive to reactionary political ideas. For Fromm the lower middle class was characterised by their 'love of the strong, hatred of the weak, their pettiness, hostility, thriftiness with feelings as well as with money, and essentially their asceticism. Their outlook on life was narrow, they suspected and hated the stranger, and they were curious and envious of their acquaintances, rationalising their envy as moral indignation; their whole life was based on the principle of scarcity - economically as well as psychologically". (1) Moreover the middle class exhibited "the very traits to which the fascist ideology had its strong appeal: its craving for submission and its lust for power ... the authority of religion and traditional morality was still firmly rooted. The family was still unshaken and a safe refuge in a hostile world". (2) This authoritarian character developed in childhood as a response to the child's conflict with his parents and the irrational nature of the authority which they exercise over him. (3) The authoritarian character, nurtured initially by the parents, was consolidated by the

(1) Ibid p183.

(2) Ibid p184.

(3) Fromm "Individual and Social Origins of Neurosis" op cit p381. Fromm distinguished between two types of authority, 1. Objective or rational authority - i.e. authority based on the competency of the person in authority to function properly with respect to the task of guidance he has to perform. 2. Irrational authority - i.e. authority based on the power which the authority has over those subjected to it and on the fear and awe with which the latter reciprocate. Fromm concluded that "in most cultures, human relationships are greatly determined by irrational authority". p381.
educational apparatus as the child grew. The freedom and spontaneity of the child, which for Fromm were the essential human characteristics, were destroyed in the conflict with irrational authority; the human potential of the child was repressed and he became a lifeless machine. "Today we come across a person and find that he acts and feels like an automaton; that he never experiences anything that is really his; that he experiences himself as the person he thinks he is supposed to be; that smiles have replaced laughter; meaningless chatter replaced communicative speech; dulled despair has taken the place of genuine pain". (1)

The pathological authoritarian character was suffering from a 'socially patterned defect', which Fromm believed to be such a widespread phenomenon that he was justified in his book The Sane Society, in talking of the 'pathology of normalcy'. (2)

It was in their respective discussions of the authoritarian personality, its nature, how it was formed and maintained, and its receptivity to fascist ideology, that the conceptual schemes of Reich and Fromm converged and had most in common. Both men took as their starting point Marx's notion of a relationship between base and superstructure and, within that framework, attempted to elaborate an explanation for the popularity of fascism; the reasons why "fascism ... had become an international reality and ... had visibly and undeniably outstripped the socialist revolutionary movement". (3)

(1) Ibid p383.
(3) Mass Psychology of Fascism p3.
Marxists had failed to explore the 'subjective' factor in history. The K.P.D. failed to recognise the ability of ideology to react on the economic base and had put their faith in an automatic conversion of miserable economic conditions into a revolutionary socialist ideology. Marx's base/superstructure model had been reduced by 'official Marxism' into a sterile and mechanistic formula. (1) Reich and Fromm provided a solution to the problem of the emergence of Fascism by imposing a psychological variable to mediate between the two layers, of infrastructure and superstructure, in the traditional Marxian typology. This psychological variable - the authoritarian character structure - typified the character structure of the masses and was particularly receptive to fascist ideas; Hitler's success was explained by a congruence between the ideals of fascist ideology and the character structure of the masses. For Reich and Fromm an essential relationship existed between the economic structure of society and the mass psychological structure of its members, not only in the sense that the dominant ideology was that of the ruling class - an orthodox Marxist proposition - but, because the contradictions of the economic structure of a society were also embedded in the psychological structure of the subjugated mass.

To conclude, their argument was that man's thoughts, ideas and beliefs were doubly inhibited. First, man lived within a particular socio-economic setting which strongly influenced his

(1) For Reich's attack on the 'Vulgar Marxism' of the K.P.D. see Mass Psychology of Fascism ppix-xxvi and pp1-10. For a discussion of the debate between Reich and the Communist Party see C.Sinelnikov 'Early 'Marxist' Critiques of Reich' in Telos No. 13 Fall 1972.
ideas and beliefs. With Marx they suggested that the superstructure of ideas and beliefs differed between societies and, within a particular society, across different historical periods, in accordance with changes in productive relations; within a society different beliefs represented the different social location of agents within that structure. Second man's ideas and beliefs were not the product of reason alone. A number of psychological factors, of which the most significant was character structure, intruded upon reason and must be taken into account by any theory of rationality. In this sense, Reich and Fromm's critique of the assumptions of the traditional theory was the most comprehensive of the marxist critiques. By moving beyond Marx's emphasis on the role of class interest, they anticipated, and to some extent explored, themes contained in the irrationalist critique of the traditional theory.
The traditional theory of rationality placed great emphasis upon the role of reason in human understanding and characterised mind as essentially rational. The emotional dimension of the human subject was thought to have no significant consequences for his knowledge and understanding of the world. When the existence of passions, desires and other psychological motives was acknowledged, they were characterised as troublesome hindrances whose influence upon thought could be overcome by the rational mind's ability to detach itself, to retreat into the realm of pure thought and contemplation of the objects of knowledge. Even if there were important irrational elements in men's minds, these could be controlled, contained or in some way harnessed. Pareto considered such assumptions misguided and he was not alone in this opinion. Towards the end of the 19th century there emerged a number of sociologists, philosophers and psychologists who appeared to signify a developing and important trend towards reestablishing the importance of the irrational in the analysis of society. (1) Pareto perhaps more than any other theorist exemplified this belief in the fundamentally irrational nature of social behaviour and thought. "Reason", he wrote, "is of little or no importance in shaping social phenomena. The operative forces are different ones; this is what I want to prove in my sociology". (2) "Men think they are choosing

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(1) For the historical background of this emergent trend see H. Stuart Hughes: Consciousness and Society - The Orientation of European Social Thought 1890-1930 pp105-113.

their opinions but instead, these are imposed on them by their mode of life just as it is imposed on fish that they must breath through gills and on mammals that they must breath through lungs". (1)

Contra the traditional theory, Pareto tried to show that most actions were non-logical, were motivated by sentiments and were subsequently rationalised by mental constructs.

Pareto's theory that ideas were related to sentiments continued a development that began when British social philosophers of the 17th and 18th centuries initiated their search for what Hume called the "regular springs of human action and behaviour". We must acknowledge Hume argued in Section VIII of his Inquiry that there exists "... a great uniformity among the actions of men ... passions mixed in various degrees and distributed through society, have been from the beginning of the world, and still are, the source of all the actions and enterprises which have ever been observed among mankind". (2)

Pareto began his career as an engineer and later, in 1893, following his interest in economics was appointed to the chair in economics at the University of Lausanne. Pareto believed that in terms of its methods and techniques, economics was akin to the natural sciences; it was a logical science based on rational principles. The science of economics reflected the fact that in their economic behaviour men behaved rationally and employed appropriate


means to achieve certain ends. However, in other areas of social life men seemed to be motivated to non-logical actions and the disciplines of sociology and psychology reflected this irrationality. If social science was to develop in a fruitful direction a scientific economics needed to be complimented by a scientific sociology and psychology. The special concern of these disciplines would be the study of those non-logical elements which economics neglected. In his Treatise on General Sociology, Pareto tried to establish the fundamental principles of the kind of sociology which he believed necessary. In brief his work may be described as a logical theory of non-logical conduct.

Pareto's early enthusiasm for the natural sciences and economics, coupled with his concern for a logical approach to social theory, had important methodological consequences for the development of his work in the field of sociology. Pareto wished to construct a system of sociology on the model of mechanics, physics, or chemistry. In expounding his scientific sociology, Pareto employed a method which he termed 'logico-experimental science'. He intended "to remain absolutely in that logico-experimental field, refusing to depart from it under any inducement whatever". By the logico-experimental method, Pareto meant science based exclusively on the observation of facts and their inter-relationships, coupled with logical inferences based upon those facts. Sociology, he thought must proceed by "reducing highly complicated concrete phenomena to

(1) Trattato di Sociologica Generale translated and edited by A. Bongiorno and A. Livingstone as Mind and Society. Jonathan Cape London 1955 paras 802 and 161. All references to this treatise will be to the numbered sections and not pages.

(2) Ibid 20.

(3) Ibid 17.
simpler theoretical phenomena, being exclusively guided all the while by the intent to discover experimental uniformities, and judging the efficacy of what one has done only by the experimental verifications that may be made of it". (1) Just as in Comte's philosophy of history, the progress from the theological, through the metaphysical to the positive stage in the intellectual development of mankind was made to appear as the central trend of social evolution, so in Pareto's 'Treatise', the distinction between logico-experimental science and non-logico-experimental science, which he formulated at great length and with much emphasis by reiteration in order to indicate the specifications to which a scientific sociology may be expected to conform, constituted a very important part of his analysis of the life and history of society. Nothing which went beyond the facts, beyond the inductive method of describing social facts, of classifying them, and seeking their uniformities or qualities, could compose an element of the logico-experimental method. Logico-experimental reasoning was held to be an entirely uncorrupted yardstick allowing judgement and measurement of human irrationality. The facts with which sociology must concern itself were outlined by Pareto.

Current in any given group of people are a number of propositions ... such propositions combined by logical or pseudo logical nexuses and amplified with factual narrations of various sorts, constitute theories, theologies, cosmogonies, systems of metaphysics and so on. Viewed from the outside without regard to any intrinsic merit with which they may be credited by faith, all such propositions and theories are experimental facts and as experimental facts we are here obliged to consider and examine them. (2)

(1) Ibid Vol iv 2060.
(2) Mind and Society op cit 7.
Men's ideas, systems of belief, theories and theologies (in Pareto's terms derivations) were social facts which, by the application of the logico-experimental method, might yield an insight into the nature of society, human motivation and historical change.

Throughout the Trattato, Pareto sought to understand the relationship between human thought and human society. This was the central concern of his work and something which was clearly understood by his English translators when they offered Mind and Society as the title of the treatise. His intention was to unmask the sentiments underlying the dominant values and ideas of his society. The 'intrinsic merits' of these beliefs 'escapes our attention entirely; but we do want to know how that belief arose and in what relationship it stands to other social facts. (1) In the last two lines of this quotation - "we do want to know how that belief arose and in what relationship it stands to other social facts" - Pareto expressed, in its most general terms, the fundamental focus of his study of ideas.

Pareto's analysis of the relationship between 'mind and society' began with a more general examination of the social system. For Pareto, the social system could be best understood by reference to a mechanical analogy. It was a system of mutually interacting elements in a delicate state of balance which Pareto terms 'social equilibrium'. These elements were divided into three main classes. (2)

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(1) Mind and Society op cit 69
(2) Ibid 2060.
First, the natural elements which included "soil, climate, flora, fauna, geological, mineralogical and other like conditions".

Secondly, there were those elements external to a given society. Included in this group were other societies and the previous history of the given society. The third group was the most significant and it was upon this group that Pareto wished to concentrate his attention. These were "internal elements, chief among which, race, residues (or better the sentiments manifested by them) proclivities, interests, aptitudes for thought and observation, state of knowledge and so on. Derivations also are to be counted among these latter". (1) It was this last grouping of elements which, for Pareto, was decisive in maintaining the social equilibrium. More specifically, it was the residues, sentiments and derivations which were the crucial social facts to be examined if any worthwhile comprehension of social action was to be achieved.

Residues, briefly, were the "principles underlying non-logical action", (2) they "exist in the mind of the human being", (3) they were the causes of the greater part of human action and idea- tion. Defined in an extremely vague way by Pareto, residues stood between the sentiments which were few and constant and the rationalising derivations which justified non-logical action prompted by the residue. Residues were socio-culturally rather than biologically transmitted. This was proven by the many examples of the way in

(1) Mind and Society op cit 2060.
(2) Ibid 306
(3) Ibid 798.
which residues varied in distribution as between different societies, occupations, social classes and historical periods.

The fact that classes of residues change but slightly or not at all in a given society over a given period of time does not mean that they may not differ very widely in different societies. (1)

The deeply rooted immutable sentiments were the real causes of human motivation, but these were unknowable. The sentiments could only be understood through a study of the socio-cultural residues for, "the residues are the manifestation of instincts and sentiments as the elevation of mercury in a thermometer is the manifestation of a rise in the temperature". (2) The residues themselves were, in turn, unknowable except by a study of the derivations which continually sought to rationalise them. (3) It was thus the derivations which became the prime social facts for study.

II Having stated the scope and method of his study, Pareto began the main part of his Treatise with an analysis of human actions. He divided all human actions into three major classes. First, there were certain purely instinctive actions which did not involve the intermediation of any process of reasoning. Secondly, there were logical actions; third and most numerous were the non-logical actions whose significance had, to that date, been either ignored or underrated. Pareto defined logical action in a very precise way.

Suppose we apply the term logical actions to actions that logically conjoin means to ends not only from the standpoint of the subject performing them, but from the standpoint of other persons who have a more extensive knowledge.

(1) Mind and Society op cit 1720
(2) Ibid 875.
(3) Ibid 2083.
... in other words, to actions that are logical both subjectively and objectively in the sense just explained. Other actions we shall call non-logical (by no means the same as illogical). (1)

A logical action was thus one which first isolated a certain end and then employed means appropriate to its achievement. The logical connection between means and ends must exist both in the mind of the actor and in objective reality, and these two relations, one subjective and one objective, must correspond to one another.

For example, a businessman, Pareto might have said is being logical when he buys shares at a low price in anticipation of a future rise in price, when the end he has in mind is to make profit. He is employing means appropriate to the achievement of the desired end. If, however, following the purchase of the shares the businessman goes to church to ask God's blessing for this business venture, his behaviour is non-logical. While for the businessman the process of prayer might seem as logical a connection of means and ends as his former act of buying the shares (i.e. subjectively logical), an economist, Pareto would insist, would say that God has no power over market forces which are the real determinants to be considered for the success of the venture. Means and ends must logically be connected not only in the mind of the actor but also in the mind of the knowledgeable observer. Pareto considered economics and science as mainly logical activities and also included some actions, "connected with military, political, legal and similar activities". (2)

(1) Mind and Society op cit 150.
(2) Ibid 152.
While logical action was defined in fairly clear terms, non-logical action, which for Pareto was more conspicuous in human affairs, remained a residual category; i.e. it was an umbrella grouping which included all action which was not logical in Pareto's very precise sense of the term. Clearly not all non-logical action was of a similar type and Pareto divided this class of action into four sub-groups. These types of non-logical conduct may be graphically expressed in the following way, giving four categories of action with differentially related means and ends.

**ARE MEANS RELATED TO ENDS?**

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Categories one and three were of little significance and neither had an end that was subjectively logical. In category one the means were related to the ends neither in reality or the awareness of the actor. Many actions imposed by custom or etiquette belonged to this grouping. It was a rare category because man was a reasoning being. No matter how ridiculous an action may be, "human beings have a very conspicuous tendency to paint a varnish of logic over their conduct".

Category three included those actions which produced a result logically related to the means employed, but without the actor having been aware of this relationship. All instinctive and reflex actions

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(1) *Mind and Society* op cit 151, for Pareto's full classification of non-logical action.


were subsumed under this grouping.\(^{(1)}\) For example the individual who instinctively moved his head to avoid a falling object was acting logically in an objective sense - in as much as the object missed his head - while at the moment of action he was not aware of the means he was employing to attain that particular end. Behaviour of this type was really suitable rather than logical.\(^{(2)}\)

While men may act from instinct or custom, the vast majority of human actions had ends that were subjectively logical and they therefore belonged to the second and fourth categories of non-logical actions.

Actions of the second class had an end that was logical subjectively but not objectively. Into this category fall all those actions of a symbolic, magical, ritualistic and religious nature.

Operations in magic when unattended by other actions belong to genus 2 ... Hesiod ... warns against crossing a river without first washing ones hands in it and uttering a prayer. That would be an act of genus 1 (i.e. no logical end objectively or subjectively). But he adds that the Gods punish anyone who crosses a river without so washing his hands. That makes it an action of genus 2.\(^{(3)}\)

Actions of the fourth group had a logical end both subjectively and objectively. This was the definition of logical action, but the non-logical actions of this group differed significantly from logical action; in logical actions the end corresponded with the purpose while in non-logical action this correspondence did not exist. The means employed did produce an objective result and

\(^{(1)}\) Mind and Society op cit 154 and 155.
\(^{(2)}\) The formation of language belongs to this grouping ibid 159.
\(^{(3)}\) Ibid 160.
further these means had been placed in relation to ends in the mind of the actor, but what happened did not conform to what should have happened according to him. In this group were actions produced by error and actions dictated by the illusions of politicians and intellectuals.

For Pareto, non-logical actions were ubiquitous in human society but this had not been realised for two reasons. First, men had perpetually made a mistaken assumption that individuals were motivated to action by the beliefs and ideas which they held. For Pareto the motivation to action lay elsewhere. "Logical actions", Pareto claimed, "are at least in large part results of processes of reasoning. Non-logical actions originate chiefly in definite psychic states, sentiments, subconscious feelings and the like". (1) Pareto attempted to formulate the relationships between thought action and sentiment in a pseudo mathematical fashion.

In animals the relationship between the state of mind (A) and the action (B) was a direct one; namely (A) impelled the animal to a certain action (B).

The animal does not reason it acts exclusively by instinct. It uses no derivations therefore. The human being however wants to think and he also feels impelled to keep his instincts and sentiments hidden from view. Rarely, in consequence is at least a germ of derivation missing in human thinking, just as residues are rarely missing residues and derivations can be detected every time we look at a theory or argument, that is not strictly logico-experimental. (2)

(1) Mind and Society op cit 161.
(2) Ibid 1400.
Thus when considering men, the relationship between A and B was more complex. The state of mind or residue A not only impelled men to action B, but also to theories or derivations C which attempted to make the non-logical action B more coherent to the actor. Pareto represented A, B and C graphically as the three sides of a triangle. The state of mind (A) was at the right angle of the triangle. From A extended two sides of the triangle; in the horizontal direction was B (action) and in the vertical C (theories) or verbal expressions of sentiments.

As was previously noted, Pareto believed that men had a tendency to paint 'a varnish of logic' over their actions and it was for this reason that they tended to see B as an effect of C; that is men believed that they behave as they do because of the beliefs they hold. Pareto argued that it was more correct to say that men believe as they do because of the way they behave. However the truth of the matter Pareto claimed was that both thought and action sprang from the same root; namely the sentiments. "Beliefs and conduct are not independent, their correlation lies in their being two branches of one same tree".

The relationship between A, B and C may be characterised as one of mutual interaction. Both social theories C and social action B influence the residual root from which they emerge. "Logical interpretations of non-logical conduct become in their turn causes of logical conduct and sometimes even of non-logical conduct; and

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(1) Mind and Society op cit 162
(2) Ibid p166.
they have to be reckoned with in determining the social equili-
rium". (1) However the decisive element in this threefold
equilibrium was A the sentiments.

The same sentiment that restrains people from performing
an act B (relation AB) prompts them to devise a theory C
(relation AC). A man for example has a horror of murder,
B, and he will not commit murder; but he will say that
the Gods punish murders and that constitutes a theory C. (2)

Thus human society is characterised by non-logical action although
this has not always been obvious because of this mistaken tendency
to locate the motivation to action in belief systems. The second
factor responsible for disguising the pervasiveness of non-logical
action - was the fact that the men who wrote about society were
social reformers rather than social scientists. They sought to
change society in accordance with certain ideas and beliefs and
therefore had to convince themselves that ideas were the causes of
human action; i.e. that actions were logical. While recognising
the existence of non-logical actions, their own predisposition for
change imposed upon them the need to see social action in logical
terms.

Most scholars are not satisfied with discovering what
is. They are anxious to know, and even more anxious
to explain to others, what ought to be. In that sort
of research logic reigns supreme; and so the moment
they catch sight of conduct that is non-logical,
instead of going ahead along that road they turn aside,
often seem to forget its existence at any rate generally
ignore it, and beat the well worn path that leads to
logical conduct. (3)

(1) Mind and Society op cit 260 see also 1747.
(2) Ibid 162.
(3) Ibid 264.
When the sociologist was led astray in this way "from the scientific laboratory he steps over into the pulpit". (1)

Thus Pareto believed the study of non-logical conduct had been doubly inhibited by firstly, certain predispositions of social scientists and secondly, the mistaken belief in the role of ideas in motivating individuals to action.

Let us recap so far. When studying a social phenomenon a distinction must be made, Pareto claimed, between "a constant, instinctive non-logical part and a deductive part that aims at explaining, justifying and demonstrating the first". (2) In human societies from the earliest times, Pareto claimed, certain fundamental elements of man, which he termed sentiments have persisted with little change and have constantly manifested themselves in behaviour. The non-logical explanations or justifications to which the sentiments give rise have varied widely. These he called derivations. One of the many examples Pareto cited to establish this distinction between residues and derivations was the ritual of baptism. For the Christian church, the act of baptism was said to efface original sin. From this single fact it was hardly possible to identify either the residue (the constant element). But Pareto's observation that pagans also made use of water for purification, led him to associate the ceremonial use of water with moral purification. However, similar social facts indicated a wider generality for the phenomenon since other substances such as blood were employed in a similar way; moreover, transgression of taboos brought a

(1) Mind and Society op cit 253.
variety of consequences each designed to absolve an acquired stain. Thus, Pareto argued, although a great variety of rites and explanations of their efficacy existed, beneath these there was something which remained constant.\(^1\) This was the sentiment that by means of certain practices the integrity of the individual, which had been damaged by certain real or imaginary causes, might be re-established. This sentiment gave rise under varying conditions to varying actions and equally varying explanations - derivations. Since this constant residue was, for Pareto, the prime mover in social action, he spent a considerable time discussing their classification.

III The nature of residues is very unclear from Pareto's account. They are not sentiments, nor are they instincts. Pareto described them as 'manifestations of sentiments'.\(^2\)

Pareto isolated 52 residues which he classified into six main groupings;\(^3\) of these the first two were the most important. The first class consisted of the 'instinct of combination', that is, of those residues which motivated men to make new combinations, to innovate. It expressed the tendency to establish relations between ideas and things and to draw conclusions. This class of residues was subdivided into six subgroups, some of which were in turn classified into smaller groups.

The second class of residues was opposite to the first and was termed, 'persistence of aggregates'. While the instinct for

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\(^{1}\) Mind and Society op cit 863.

\(^{2}\) Ibid 1401.

\(^{3}\) Ibid 888 for his full classification.
combination impelled man to innovate, to change society, to develop knowledge, the persistence of aggregates was comparable to inertia, it was a brake. It was the human tendency to maintain the combinations that have been created and to reject change.

... an instinct very often comes into play that tends with varying energy to prevent the things so combined from being disjoined, and which, if disintegration cannot be avoided strives to dissemble it by preserving the outer physiognomy of the aggregate. This instinct may be compared roughly to mechanical inertia; it tends to resist the movement imparted by other instincts.(1)

These first two groups of residues thus had a considerable sociopolitical significance; the former embodied those tendencies towards change and development and the latter consisted of those forces seeking to conserve and stabilise that which exists.

The third class contained residues which "express sentiments by external acts". The example Pareto gave here was religious and ritual action. "Religious chants, contortions, dances, mutilations performed in states of delerium", as well as the ritual acts of those strange bedfellows the Welsh revivalists and the Salvation Army,(2) all belong to this group of residues.(3)

The fourth class comprised the residues of sociability which made man a social being. The fifth class was the 'integrity of the individual' while the sixth class of residues was the sexual instinct. It is the cultural expression of displaced or repressed sexuality that Pareto had in mind here, rather than sexual desire

(1) Mind and Society op cit 992.
(2) Ibid 1098.
(3) Ibid 1094.
and activity itself. "Mere sexual appetite is no concern of ours... We are interested in it only insofar as it influences theories, modes of thinking; as a residue". While Pareto made no reference to Freud the analogy with the latter's notion of sublimation is obvious.

Having classified the residues, Pareto investigated two aspects of them. First, he examined the fluctuations and change of intensity, of the various subgroups of residues, within each of the six main categories. Secondly, he looked at the changes in the force of whole classes of residues and the implications that such variation might have for the development of society and polity. He concluded that there was little change in the intensity of a whole class of residues although there was some change in the various subgroups of each class. The intensity lost by one subgroup in a specific class was gained by another in the same class so that the action of the class as a whole remained constant. For example, the third class - the need to express sentiment by outward acts - had experienced a decline in one of its subgroups accompanied by a corresponding increase in another, so that the force of class three residues was stabilised.

As regards class III residues, devotion to the rites of Christian worship has diminished among civilised peoples; but it has been in part superseded by worship of socialist and humanitarian saints... one can detect no substantial difference between the festivals of a Catholic saint and the celebrations in honour of Rousseau's bicentenary.

(1) Mind and Society op cit 1324.
(2) Ibid 1712.
Thus while the residues remained constant, their various subdivisions had a degree of variability witnessed by the way in which they increased or decreased.

It was however the small changes in the whole classes of residues which provided the motor for historical change. The changing balance of the two key groups of residues (I and II) in the governing elite forced the history of human society into a cyclical pattern. In one era the men of combinations (class I) the 'foxes' were in the ascendant. This was a time characterised by experiment, innovation and enterprise but also by intellectual uncertainty, economic swindling and political fraud. It was ended by a reaction of the men of persistence, the 'lions' (class II) who rose up and swept away the 'foxes' if necessary by force. This insurrection was followed by a period of stability and conservatism accompanied by a resurgence of national feeling. But because of their expertise and resource, the men of combinations could never be dispensed with for long. Slowly they infiltrated into the ruling elite and eventually the elite was transformed from an elite of lions into an elite of foxes. The circular development was thus completed and began again. Thus while the changes in the subgroups of residues, and their resultant derivations, were more noticeable, while classes of residues could change, but this change was both slow and very small. In this way societies, for Pareto, were systems in a state of continually shifting, but ultimately unchanging, equilibrium.

IV The fifth subdivision of the first class of residues 'the need for logical developments', was of particular interest for it
motivated men to create reasonings and rationalisations for their behaviour. Men must give reasons for their actions - this being a subdivision of the residue of combinations which supplies the drive for both logical and non-logical reasoning. In fact this sub-class of residues of class I was at the root of the intellectual advance of mankind and the evolution of intelligence and civilisation. However these reasonings need not always accord with logico-experimental science.

The demand for logic is satisfied by pseudo-logic as well as by rigorous logic. At bottom what people want is to think - it matters little whether the thinking be sound or fallacious. We need only reflect on the tanglewood of fantastic discussion that has flourished and still flourishes around such incomprehensible subjects as come up in the various systems of theology and metaphysics - wild speculations as to the creation ... and such things - to gain some conception of the imperiousness of the need that is satisfied by such lucubrations.(1)

This need to think, to reason, gave rise to derivations. The human mind, Pareto claimed, insisted on searching for unknowable and ultimate causes, beyond the facts, which could be established by the logico-experimental method.

The human imagination refuses to stop there (i.e. at the fact). It insists on going on, insists on knowing its 'cause' and if it cannot find a real cause it invents an imaginary one.(2)

These imaginary causes, or derivations, lead to unconscious self-deception. In just the same way that ideology for Marx had been an unconscious process so for Pareto the rationalising derivation

(1) Mind and Society op cit 972.
(2) Ibid 973.
was not self-conscious. "It is a mistake", he wrote, "to assume that men who deceive one another (about their real motivation) must invariably act in bad faith; on the contrary, that is very rarely the case, and most of the time the deceiver had first to deceive himself ...". (1)

These imaginary and pseudo-logical theories or derivations were a product of the residues. Religion, mythology, political theories and all other interpretations of social life were considered as mere justifications of human conduct. They were "Manifestations of the human being's hunger for thinking ...". (2)

As Borkenau pointed out "derivations, ... comprehend the whole of arguments used to justify sentiments, everything, which, in other systems is called 'ideologies'. It comprehends jurisprudence, morals, religious beliefs ... They are mere derivations, similar-logical variations in argument to justify an ever remaining unchanging substratum". (3) In Pareto's analysis, derivations were the non-logico-experimental rationalisations and speculations which had no basis in fact. The used indeterminate words (such as justice, liberty, legitimacy, democracy) which corresponded to nothing in the real world. They existed because of a deeply felt need for logical explanation and a belief that men ought to behave rationally. The function of derivations was not to provide any objective or verifiable truth but rather to offer justification for non-logical behaviour; they disguised non-logical behaviour by

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(2) Mind and Society op cit 1401.
offering a quasi-logical explanation. Whereas Marx has seen such ideological mystification as a transitory phenomenon, for Pareto it was endemic in human society.

As he had done with the residues, Pareto proceeded to classify the derivations into four main categories; (i) assertions; (ii) authority; (iii) appeal to sentiments; (iv) verbal proofs. (1)

Assertions were merely dogmatic statements that were not to be contradicted. The force with which they were uttered seemed to give them reliability. They comprise "simple narrations, assertions of fact ... which are offered in an absolute, axiomatic, dogmatic manner". (2) An example of such an assertion might be the phrase "it is better to give than to receive" or "silence is an ornament to all women".

Derivations or justifications of the second class were more complex. Derivations of this class appealed to the authority of a man, or tradition or custom, or God or some other divine being; e.g. "God has commanded I do this" or "I behaved as any English man would".

In the third class, derivations justified by appealing to sentiments or principles. For example to the collective interest (revolution would benefit mankind) or to juridicial entities (the social contract) or to principles which Pareto would have seen as mere abstractions, such as progress and solidarity.

(1) *Mind and Society* op cit 1419 for the full classification where each of these four divisions is further sub-divided.

(2) Ibid 1420.
The fourth class of derivations was verbal proofs. This class Pareto claimed, "is constituted by verbal derivations obtained by the use of terms of indefinite, dubious and equivocal sense terms that have no correspondence to reality". Thus all derivations that appealed to justice, morality, the good, the true, and other indefinite terms, fell into this category. This then is the heart of the Paretian system. Men are essentially non-logical because they are impelled into action by non-logical forces; sentiments. But men also have a persistent need to rationalise their conduct. This they do by means of pseudo-logical formula which Pareto termed derivations.

The four types of derivation approximate to what Marx called ideology. More specifically, since derivations were psychological rationalisations of non-logical actions, they are more readily equated with Mannheim's particular conception of ideology. Moreover, derivations are always present, except where behaviour is instinctive or logical - i.e. most of the time.

V Pareto's theory of derivations, formed part of his more general theory of social dynamics and provided a preliminary framework within which to study the relationship between sentiments and ideas. Pareto stressed, however, that it must not be assumed that because non logical actions were based on sentiments and non scientific premises, that they were lacking in social usefulness; on the contrary, he suggested that the social utility of derivations

(1) Mind and Society op cit 1543.
could not be underestimated in as much as they contributed to social equilibrium.

This distinction between the inherent truth and falsity of a belief and its social utility was, Pareto suggested, central to understanding the social role of beliefs. Pareto argued, first, that simply because logico-experimental truth was objective, there was no guarantee that its role in society would be beneficial. Second, the fact that non-logico-experimental belief might have no foundation in objective truth did not necessarily imply that it might be harmful to society; indeed it might prove to be most beneficial. The distinction between the truth and the social utility of a doctrine must always be clear.

When a scientist advances a proposition he can, Pareto claimed, verify this proposition by a process of experimentation and observation. However this is not so for the statements of the philosopher, theologian, or politician. Their theories and the conceptions which they use, such as freedom, liberty, justice, equality and God, do not avail themselves to verification by logico-experimental means. Yet, while theories of natural law made little sense from the scientific point of view, they could not be totally ignored for they were social facts and powerful forces in the maintenance or disruption of the social equilibrium. Their power as ideas was not related to their truth or otherwise, but simply resulted from their ability to stir men's emotions.

To explore this further, Pareto suggested that such ideas should be analysed by distinguishing between their subjective and objective aspects. Therefore, given a certain proposition, such as "All men are equal", the following questions arose: "1 Objective aspect.
Is the proposition in accord with experience or is it not?"(1)
If the proposition, "All men are equal" is supposed to be a statement of fact, then it is manifestly false since many inequalities of aptitudes, education, height, wealth, physical features and power can be observed amongst individuals and groups within societies. However, those who stated this proposition usually did not mean it to be taken as a statement of fact, but as a normative statement, "All men should be equal". This proposition was of an entirely different order to the first since there was no way in which it could be scientifically verified. This, Pareto said, was because it was not a statement about reality, but the expression of a wish; the manifestation of a sentiment. In this second case, it was not possible to say whether the proposition was true, false or probable; in other words there was no means available for determining its truth value from the point of view of logico-experimental science.

However, as Pareto admitted, he was not particularly concerned with the objective aspect of propositions, but rather with the subjective aspect. Why did certain individuals assert that "All men are equal", and why did other individuals believe this proposition?"(2) Pareto argued that the main concern of the sociologist was not to verify the propositions which were his data, but in discovering the motivations which operated within the individuals who stated or believed the propositions involved, and

(1) Mind and Society op cit 14.
(2) Ibid 14.
the social factors which conditioned their acceptance or rejection of certain ideas.

Closely involved in the subjective aspect of propositions was the aspect of utility. "What advantage (or disadvantage) do the sentiments reflected by the proposition \( A = B \) have for the person who states or advocates it, and for the person who accepts it? What advantage (or disadvantage) does the theory have for the person who puts it forward, and for the person who accepts it". (1)

The social utility of a proposition or theory had to be distinguished from its truth as established by logico-experimental science. When a doctrine was shown to be meaningless or absurd, it was in no sense an implication that the doctrine was 'detrimental to society; on the contrary, it may be very beneficial". (2)

Conversely when it was shown that a body of propositions was highly beneficial to society it did not imply in any way that it was true. "In short a doctrine may be ridiculed on its experimental side and at the same time respected from the standpoint of its social utility. And vice versa". (3)

Pareto claimed that this distinction between truth and social utility explained the influence of the newspaper propaganda, political speeches and all types of ideas which influence the emotions and sentiments. Instead of scientific proofs they used the authority

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(1) Mind and Society op cit 14.
(2) Ibid 73.
(3) Ibid 73 and 78.
of verbal pseudo-logical proofs which appeal to the sentiments. In spite of this such derivations were often more convincing than scientific proofs if the derivations were in agreement with the dominant residues. Hence Pareto argued any attempt to change the ideas and opinions of men will meet greater success if it attempts to change the residues.

For Pareto all religions were scientifically false since they transcended experience and yet they have been of considerable social utility. Marxism too, had no truth with reference to logico-experimental method and yet it remained a powerful force in the delicate balance of social equilibrium. "Indirectly it was an essential element of progress in our time, and this quite independently of its intrinsic value and logical content. Little does it matter if a theory is from a certain viewpoint, false, provided the emotions it inspires are useful". (1)

Employing this distinction, Pareto drew an analogy between Socialism and Catholicism, claiming that while neither was verifiable in scientific terms, each had a function in maintaining the social equilibrium. Socialism, like Catholicism was a religion and both ideologies sprang from the same residual root. In this sense Socialism becomes a faith and indeed throughout the Treatise, Pareto deals with Socialism as a religion. "This book", he wrote (referring to Marx's Capital), "is the gospel of an ever increasing number of men". (2)

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(2) Les Systemes Socialistes quoted in S.E.Finer op cit p21.
We are witnessing the rise and dominance of the democratic religion, just as the men of the first centuries of our era witnessed the rise of the christian religion and the beginning of its dominion. The two phenomena (Marxism and Christianity) present many profoundly significant analogies. To get at their substance we have to brush derivations aside and reach down to the residues. The social value of both those two religions lies not in the least in their respective theologies, but in the sentiments that they express. As regard determining the social value of Marxism, to know whether Marx's theory of surplus value is true or false, is about as important as knowing whether or how baptism eradicates sin in trying to determine the social value of christianity - and that is of no importance at all. (1)

However, why a particular residue should manifest itself in the rise of Socialism rather than a revival of Christianity did not seem to interest Pareto; it was certainly never explained. There would seem to be a great difference between a Christian who worships God and an atheistic Socialist; yet Pareto claimed that both beliefs were prompted by the same residue. The only difference, Pareto claimed, between the two was that the Christian worshipped his God and corroborated his belief by reference to the bible, while a Socialist deified or worshipped Marx, Lenin, etc. and sought to corroborate his belief by reference to 'Capital'. Neither belief was true but each had a substantial social significance and each made a direct appeal to sentiments.

In his discussion of the utility of doctrines, Pareto considered those doctrines which played an important part in social change and, following Sorel called such doctrines, myths.

(1) Mind and Society op cit 1859.
"The capacity for influencing human conduct that is possessed by sentiments expressed in the form of derivations that overstep experience and reality throws light upon a phenomenon that has been well observed and analysed by Georges Sorel, the fact, namely, that if a social doctrine (it would be more exact to say the sentiments manifested by a social doctrine) is to have any influence, it has to take the form of a "myth". To restate in that language an observation that we have many times made, we may say that the social value of a doctrine, or of the sentiments which it expresses, it not to be judged extrinsically by the mythical form that it assumes, which is only its means of action, but intrinsically by the results that it achieves". (1)

Pareto was discussing here what might be termed the 'future utility' of a myth. The myth provided an end towards which certain social actions were directed, and the utility of the end was not to be judged on the basis of whether or not it was attainable, but by the effect it had upon the social actions of the individuals and groups who believed in the myth, and in the practical consequences of that belief. To illustrate this point, Pareto employed the following graphical device.

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(1) Mind and Society op cit 1868.
"Since the situation here is not an easy one to grasp, a graph may help to make it clearer. The picture we set before the reader is a very crude affair. Too exacting a scrutiny would even prove it fallacious, but it will nevertheless serve to clarify the more precise statement that is possible with words. Ignoring the case where people think they are going in one direction and are actually going in another, let us keep to the case where they are going to some extent at least in the direction desired. An individual finds himself, let us say, at h, where he is enjoying a certain amount of utility represented by the index ph. The idea is to induce him to go on to m, where he will enjoy a greater utility, qm. To state the matter to him in that fashion would amount to little in the way of rousing him to action. It is wiser, therefore, to put before his eyes the point T, located at quite a distance from the curve hm on the tangent hT, where he would enjoy an enormous, though altogether fantastic utility, rT. The result now is somewhat analogous to what happens in the case where a material point is moved by a tangential force, hT, along a curve, hm. That is to say, the individual aspires to T, and moves towards T, but hampered by all sorts of practical ties (correlations, checks) he cannot hold to the tangent hT. He is forced to keep to the curve and ends up m, whither, however, he might never have gone had he not been stimulated by a tangential impulse along the line hT". (1)

In this graph, T represented the myth, or 'ideal' as Pareto later called it, while the curve hm represented the effect of the myth in terms of the increasing utility of the individual whose activity was directed towards the myth. At point m on the curve, the possible utility flattened out as the maximum utility was approximated so that eventually, in spite of his efforts to achieve any goal, the individual could not achieve any further utility.

(1) *Mind and Society* op cit 1869.
Although T was imaginary, impractical or transcendant, it nevertheless gratified an important human need for the rationalisation of actions and motives. The function of myth was simply to provide an incentive for action; their significance was to be evaluated according to the degree to which they motivated men to bring about changes in social, economic and political development.

As was the case with all ideas, both the utility and effectiveness of myth was independent of its congruence with logico-experimental science. Rationalised ideals served as ultimate ends which human agents attempted to approximate in their conduct, but whose full realisation lay beyond the possibility of human achievement.

VI Pareto's formulation of the relationship between ideas and society may be criticised on a number of grounds; the first of these being methodological. His attempt to construct a social science by employing the methods and concepts of the natural sciences was misguided, for such a methodological reduction creates problems of which Pareto seemed unaware. Throughout the Treatise, Pareto's mechanistic analogies for social phenomena were ubiquitous. The whole social system was conceived as an enormous closed energy system. The ascendency and decline of the differing sub-classes of residues, such that the overall force of the class remained constant, was reminiscent of Newton's third law of motion in which the action and reaction of a body in motion is always equal and opposite. This whole mechanistic conception of the social system was as naive and unhelpful as Bentham's felicific calculus, but Pareto insisted and imposed on social science a system of mechanics
irrespective of its appropriateness to social science. (1) Moreover, Pareto himself was not consistent with his own logico-experimental method. (2) Pareto considered the Treatise to be a detached scientific observation of social facts. He wrote to his friend Pantaleoni, "I have no prejudices of any kind ... which hinder others to do scholarly work in this field ... I entertain no preconceived ideas about the phenomena". (3) If Pareto had employed such neutrality in his investigations, the Treatise would indeed be worthy of the considerable scholarly respect it seems to have achieved. However throughout the work Pareto's own value judgements are obvious. There are "innumerable eruptions of temper of an exasperated and pessimistic moralist; bizarre sallies and outbursts of antipathy against 'metaphysics', Plato, Kant, Hegel, etc. and most curious of all, incessant attacks on those who band together for the improvement of public and private morals and who agitate against obscene books and postcards". (4) It is difficult to see how a writer so prone to such outbursts could hold before himself the ideal of the calm, rational and dispassionate scientist

(1) For a fuller discussion of this point see W. Stark In Search of the True Pareto in J.H. Meisel op cit p46, also B. Croce "The Validity of Pareto's Theories" in Saturday Review 25 May 1935 p12.


(3) Quoted in Werner Stark op cit p49.

(4) B. Croce op cit p13.
and have recognised himself in it. It is clear that the entire Treatise is itself a derivation.

Pareto also seems to have been mistaken in designating economics as science and assuming that all economic action was logical. Economics was not the rational pursuit which Pareto assumed it to be. Pareto considered such concepts as demand to be determined by rational criteria. However, Veblen argued, more convincingly, that the direction of demand may be decisively affected by irrational strivings and his concepts of 'conspicuous consumption' and 'conspicuous waste' were deep insights into the nature of economic man.

It seems Pareto may be criticised more severely for what he excluded from consideration than for what he did include. For example, he completely ignored the influence of social conditioning upon an individual's ideas. More noticeable is the almost total lack of discussion of the role of interests and socio-economic classes in the ideational process. With a characteristic lack of precision, Pareto's notion of 'interests' and how they differ from residues was not lucid. He seemed to mean by interests material wants. Such material wants may give rise to reasoning but this is largely of a logical nature and gives rise to logical conduct. However, Pareto recognised that often men invent theories about freedom and liberty which are not verifiable by an external observer and are often motivated by a desire to satisfy a material want.(1)

(1) In Manuel D'Economie Politique Pareto cites the propaganda of the English Protectionists as an example, see Finer op cit p42.
In such a case Pareto claimed the interest is giving rise to a derivation and is thus behaving as a residue. However later he wrote, "The sum of sentiments called interests is of the same nature as the sentiments to which the residues of the present variety correspond; hence sentiments of interest ought strictly to be put in. But they are of such great intrinsic importance in the social equilibrium that they are best considered apart from residues". (1) In fact they receive hardly any further attention at all. Their absence is, Finer commented, "one of the most misleading features of its (the Treatise) gigantic malproportions". (2)

Pareto seems aware of his neglect of 'interests' and the minimal role he assigns to reason in the origin of ideas, when he says that derivations "derive the force they have, not, or at least not exclusively, from logico-experimental conclusions, but from sentiments". (3) The qualifying phrase 'or at least not exclusively', would seem to indicate some reservation on his part. However Pareto never asks the questions which are consequent upon such qualification. Which areas of social life are determined by sentiments and which by rational considerations? How is the manifestation of greater rationality in certain contexts and periods and conversely, the greater role of sentiments in other contexts and periods, to be explained? Under which conditions of social life do men tend to be more or less rational? Moreover, if

(1) Mind and Society op cit 1207.
(2) S.E.Finer op cit p49.
(3) Mind and Society op cit 1397.
Pareto considered sentiments as the main determinants of ideas and if sentiments are constant, then he is unable to explain certain questions. How is it that an individual may change his beliefs and ideas over a period of time? If sentiments are unevenly distributed between different classes within society, why do some members of the same class hold different views to others, while members of different classes hold similar views?

Any meaningful critique of Pareto's work must concentrate its attention on his theory of residues. His residue theory was the foundation stone on which he created his entire intellectual structure. It was from residues that Pareto sought to explain both ideas and social action. The residue theory is inadequate in three respects. A) His definition of residues was extremely vague and confusing. B) His attempts to prove the existence of residues degenerates into a crude animism. C) His use of residues to explain historical development was contradictory.

First let us deal with the question of definition. Pareto claimed that a requirement of the logico-experimental method was that careful attention be paid to an exact and rigorous definition of terms. "In logico-experimental sciences the aim is to make language as exact as possible". Further, "we shall use terms of ordinary parlance explaining exactly what they represent". Unfortunately Pareto did not live up to these demanding standards and consequently the exact nature of residues is confused. Holman

(1) Mind and Society op cit 1927.
(2) Ibid 119.
and Curtis admitted with admirable honesty "we have struggled hard to make clear what we mean by a residue and we are afraid that our struggles have only involved us more deeply in the mire of words".

(1) Residues are described in a variety of ways. They are manifestations of sentiments (2) although the two terms are often used interchangeably. Another time, they are those parts of the whole such that if the residues are known, the acts will also be known. (3) Yet the residues are unknowable for only the derivations can be known. (4) Again the residues are modified by the derivations (5) while repeatedly residues are declared to be invariable, almost constant. (6) Residues are not innate and biologically determined yet his class i residues are called instincts of combinations and he wrote that a residue "corresponds to certain instincts of men". (7) Nowhere in the entire four volumes was this central concept defined. Further when Pareto attempted to classify the six main groups of residues he gave them such a broad definition as to make them useless in any meaningful analysis of social action. Class i for example,


(2) Mind and Society op cit 865.

(3) Ibid 1690.

(4) Ibid 2083.

(5) Ibid 1735.

(6) Ibid 850 and 1916.

(7) Ibid 850. While instinct in the Freudian sense was an innate biologically determined drive this does not seem to be what Pareto had in mind. For this reason much of Borkenau's work seems invalid Pareto F.Borkenau Chapman and Hall London 1936.
the residue of combinations, is of such a wide scope that it includes
the whole synthetic activity of the mind the operations of science
and the constructive imagination. A similar confusion is evidenced
if the concepts of instinct and sentiment are examined. In the
Manuel D'Economie Politique Pareto had argued that sentiments were
both innate and socially acquired.

These sentiments originate in man's nature combined
with his life circumstances and it is not open to
us to assert a priori that the two are logically
connected.\(^\text{(1)}\)

Later, in the Treatise, Pareto deliberately stops short of
defining sentiments for he saw such a definition as being beyond
the scope of sociology. "Psychologists explain such phenomena as
effects of the unconscious, or in some other way. We do not choose
to go quite so far back here; we stop at the fact".\(^\text{(2)}\) It was
this deliberate methodological limitation which explains Pareto's
ambiguity of concepts and terminology.

The lack of lucidity in defining his central concept was
exacerbated by the circular proof which Pareto offered for the
existence of residues. Pareto argued that it was only possible to
establish the existence of the residue by an examination of the
overt actions and ideas which were its effects. However he also
admitted that the existence of residues was inferred from the overt
acts and ideas themselves. Thus the only evidence for the
existence of the residue were the ideas and actions which were

\(^\text{(1)}\) Manuel D'Economie Politique Chapter 2 p622 quoted in Finer
op cit p43.

\(^\text{(2)}\) Mind and Society op cit 802.
alleged to be its effects. Such circularity of proof is unaccept-
able. "Like many other psychologists", Sorokin wrote, "Pareto
'puts' these 'residues' into a man and later on deduces from them
whatever he likes". (1) The same author continued that such a view
differed only in terminology from a totally animistic conception. (2)

Finer's example is illustrative of this argument.

The native asserts that the movements of the tree are
the movements of the God that possesses it. He then
proves the existence of the God by pointing to the
movement of the branches. (3)

In brief the only reason Pareto gave for asserting that residues
were the primary cause of action and ideas was the assertion that
action and ideas are the effects of residues. The third aspect of
Pareto's theory which demands criticism is the contradictory way in
which he employs residues to develop a theory of history.

Pareto asserted that the six main classes of residues have
remained almost constant over the last two thousand years. Any
social changes that have taken place could be explained, he claimed,
by the dominance of class i over class ii residues in the governing
class or conversely, a preponderance of class ii over class i resi-
dues in that same class. The possibilities for social change were
dependent entirely on the relative proportions of these classes of
residues. On Pareto's account, Greek, Roman, Medieval, Feudal and
Capitalist society are all to be understood as products of the inter-
play between these two classes of residues. However Pareto argued

(1) P. Sorokin Contemporary Sociological Theories Harper and
Brothers 1928 p60.

(2) Ibid p60, footnote 84.

(3) Finer op cit p73.
that the greatest difference between modern society and all previous forms of society was to be found in the increase in the natural sciences and the decline of superstition and magic. (1) Similarly among class iii residues, religious faith had declined but had been replaced by the secular faith of Nationalism and Socialism. (2) But this presents Pareto with a problem for the natural sciences, magic and superstition are all subdivisions of class i residues. As one subclass of residues increases (natural sciences) other decline (magic) so that the force of that total class of residues is constant. (3) Therefore the difference between the ancient and the modern world is ascribed not so much to a relative change in the force of class i and ii residues as an intensification of one subclass of class i residues and a corresponding diminution of another. However Pareto never discussed the intensification of subclasses of residues in any detail and thus the process which was decisive for ensuring social change remained unexplained.

Despite these considerable shortcomings, certain aspects of Pareto's analysis and treatment of ideas was useful. He was an ardent critic of his society who sought to expose the predominance of non logical action, characterise the most cherished beliefs as rationalisations and wishful thinking, and label men's ideas as so much self deception. Pareto's challenge to the traditional theory of rationality moved beyond the arguments of its Marxist critics in two important ways. First, and most significantly, while he too

(1) Mind and Society op cit 2392 and 1698.
(2) Ibid 1699-1717.
(3) Ibid 1718.
saw society enveloped in a web of largely illusory ideation, he sought to explain this phenomena by reference to factors other than economic interest or social class. For Pareto it was sentiments and deeply rooted human predispositions which created the confusion he considered endemic to society. He subjected all social philosophies and theories to critical examination and suggested they were rationalisations for non logical actions.

Second, he argued that the credibility of any system of ideas had less to do with their inherent truth, or their accordance with logico-experimental science, than the extent to which they made a direct appeal to sentiments. This insight into the distinction between the truth and the utility - to either an individual or society - of a doctrine were provocative and seem relevant to what may be termed a modern theory of propaganda. Unlike Marx\(^{(1)}\) who undertook a detailed analysis of political economy, or Mannheim, who investigated German Conservatism, Pareto was relatively unconcerned with the individual particularities of derivations or theories. Pareto was concerned with the function of derivations rather than their content and, on this account, considered socialism and christianity to share a number of affinities. For Pareto, ideas were either logical or simply so much gossip and rationalisation of a more fundamental motive; if they were of the latter kind they could still prove extremely useful in sustaining social equilibrium.

While Pareto criticised the traditional theory by the conclusions he reached from studying the relationship between ideas and society, one of his contemporaries, Sigmund Freud, was arriving at similar conclusions through his study of the individual.
FREUD AND THE RELIGIOUS ILLUSION

Freud suggested that many of the systems of ideas and beliefs which were popularly held within society, were best understood as rationalisations of unconscious impulses, fears and wishes; they were in Freud's terminology, an illusion. His concept of illusion, as an unconscious rationalisation of instinctual motives had a clear affinity with Pareto's view of sentiments. In both accounts there was a reluctance to accept ideas at their face value and an attempt to explain them as distorted self deceptions which had their roots in an irrational non ideational base. This attempt to reduce ideas and human thought to an extra intellectual source and to show the influence of non rational factors on human thinking stood in complete opposition to the traditional theory of rationality.

It was in Freud's discussion of religious ideas that his critique of the assumptions of the traditional theory were most explicit. Freud's work on the religious illusion was a pioneer study, within the psychological tradition, of mass belief systems, their origins, the social functions of such beliefs and the mechanisms whereby they achieved popular acceptance and credibility. (1)

However, it is clear that he believed his arguments concerning religious ideas should apply with equal force to other belief systems and his awareness of the wider implications of his religious studies is evident when certain passages from his work are examined.

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Consider for example the following extract from The Future of an Illusion.

Having recognised religious doctrines to be illusions, we are once confronted with the further question; may not all our cultural possessions, which we esteem highly and by which we let our lives be ruled, be of a similar nature? Should not the assumptions which regulate our political institutions likewise be called illusions?(1)

This passage suggests that Freud intended his analysis of religious ideas to have a wider and more general relevance. What Freud offered here was not a particular study of religious ideas, but a more universally applicable method of analysis with which to examine social theories and mass belief systems; religious, moral, social and political. Like Pareto, his interest was not in the specific content of any belief system, whether religious or political, but with the irrational motives underlying it and its functions both within society and for the individual.

The topic of religion seemed to fascinate Freud and it often appeared in his writings. He wrote to a friend "I myself can believe in the solution to the (religious) problem. It has pursued me through my whole life".(2) Freud's attitude to religion was often extremely aggressive and hostile and displayed little of his customary detachment from his subject matter. Religion is variously described in his work as an 'illusion', 'a fairy tale',(3) 'a universal obsessional neurosis of mankind',(4) a belief system which was 'patently infantile ... so foreign to reality'.(5)

(1) S.Freud 1973 op.cit p30.

Many commentators have attempted to explain this intolerance by pointing to the personal roots of Freud's interest in religion and his own ambivalent feelings towards the Judaic tradition. Born a Jew, Freud spent his early childhood in predominantly Catholic Vienna and, despite the fact that he 'went through life from beginning to end as a natural atheist', he remained very much within the confines of Jewish culture.

Religion became something approximating an obsession with Freud. It is perhaps ungracious to subject Freud's writings to his own psychoanalytic interpretation, yet at times it is difficult to avoid doing so and on occasions the reader cannot help but suspect that Freud's anxious, sometimes, tortuous, theorising about religion is more telling about Freud than religion. However an investigation of the personal motivation behind Freud's theory seems unsatisfactory on two counts. First, by 1907 Freud had already assimilated religious beliefs and practices to obsessional neuroses and he never withdrew from that position. On the contrary, in Moses and Monotheism (3) this theory was repeated, and elaborated,

(3)(Cont.)
The Future of an Illusion op cit p25.


(2) E.Jones op cit p376.

(3) Moses and Monotheism in The Standard Edition op cit Vol. XXIII.
and the imaginative pseudo-historical data with which he sought to establish it testifies to the extent to which religion had become, for Freud, an enduring intellectual interest and concern. Second, the subject of religion was an ideal object of study for a psychoanalyst and would have held considerable intrinsic interest for Freud on three accounts.

In the first place Freud's affinities with the irrational were as fundamental as Pareto's. He too maintained that more basic than man's rationality (derivations in Pareto's terms), was his emotional and instinctive life (residues and sentiments). The whole of Freudian metapsychology was an attempt to show that the sources of man's action lay in the unconscious, hidden for the most part from view, and that man's conscious thought controlled his behaviour only to a small degree. For Freud the study of man was the study of the irrational and since in religion Freud saw the irrational belief system par excellence, and yet one which was given credence by the majority of men, it seemed inevitable that he should have been fascinated by it. Secondly, and following from this, Freud did not concern himself with critical theology, but only with religion as a mass emotional belief system. Freud's concern was with the origin, nature and function of irrational belief systems in society. Thus he was 'concerned much less with the deepest sources of the religious feeling than with what the common man understands by his religion ... with the system of doctrines and promises which on the one hand explains to him the riddles of the world with enviable completeness, and, on the other, assures him that a careful providence will watch over his life and will compensate him in a future existence for any frustration he suffers here'.

(1) Civilisation and its Discontents op cit p11.
For Freud, this was the 'only religion which ought to bear that name'. (1) His endeavour was to discover 'how these ... people have been able to acquire their belief in the divine being', and, 'whence that belief obtained its immense power which overwhelms reason and science'. (2) Thirdly, since Freud had established to his own satisfaction a connection between religion and neurosis, this brought the study of religion within the scope of psychoanalysis. Within that field Freud was a pioneer discoverer of causes and cures of neuroses and therefore adequately qualified to study the religious phenomena. In his *New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis* Freud denied the claims of religion to be concerned with a different sphere of truth which science had no right to invade and insisted that religious beliefs were just as much a legitimate object of psychoanalytic investigation as any other mental phenomena. Thus the reasons for Freud's concern with religious beliefs need not be sought in personal motivations since religion was an ideal object of study for psychology. The religious phenomena raised many questions which this relatively new discipline was especially well qualified to answer. What was the nature and origin of irrational beliefs within society? How did they gain credibility on a mass basis? What needs did they fulfil? What was their function in society? For each of these questions Freud's analysis provided an answer. Before discussing his interpretation

(1) *Civilisation and its Discontents* *op cit* pl11.

of religious ideas it is necessary to outline very briefly the fundamentals of Freudian metapsychology which formed the basis for his later social and political speculation.

II Freud proclaimed psychoanalysis a science, but in truth it was not. It was rather a uniquely profound and rich body of knowledge empirically arrived at by way of extraordinary intuitive work by him. Freud's metapsychology was a dynamic system continually changing and subject to constant revision in the light of his day to day clinical experience.

In the first form of his theory, the psychology of the individual was divided into a conscious, an unconscious – containing the more basic instinctual factors of emotional life, which were strongly sexual in nature – with a censoring mechanism operating between the two spheres. Consciousness consisted of what was in the mind at any given moment and the store of memories which readily flowed into consciousness at the appropriate stimulus or association. Behind this conscious system lay the unconscious mind of which the individual had no direct knowledge, and which contained a store of unremembered experiences. The unconscious was continually striving to become conscious but was prevented from doing so by a process of repression. (1) This process of repression acted as a censor protecting the conscious from unconscious materials.

Inspired by his clinical work, Freud later modified this scheme such that the central elements of the psyche now consisted

of the id, the ego and the superego; the id, which contained the
instincts, the sole source of psychic energy, assumed many of the
features of the original unconscious and the superego assumed many
of the functions of the former censor.\(^{(1)}\) The id instinctually
sought gratification and a release for its energies but was hindered
in this respect by the superego; i.e. the internalised moral norms
of the society in which the individual lived.

Still later, Freud conceived man's instinctual life as being
composed of a grand battle between the two competing instincts for
life and death; Eros and Thanatos. It was from Freud's assumption
of a death instinct coupled with his belief in the essentially anti-
social nature of the instincts, that much of his pessimistic social
theory stemmed. Central to Freud's analysis in his socio-political
writings was the conviction that since men were innately aggressive,
the only alternative to civilisation, with its repressive moral
schemes, was a primordial Hobbesian chaos of mutual destructiveness.
"Every individual", he wrote, "is virtually an enemy of civilisation"
\(^{(2)}\) and therefore society must "reckon with the fact that there are
present in all men destructive, and therefore anti-social and anti-
cultural trends".\(^{(3)}\) From this it followed that "every society
must be built upon coercion and renunciation of instinct".\(^{(4)}\) If

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\(^{(1)}\) The Standard Edition op cit Vol. XXIV p90.

\(^{(2)}\) The Future of an Illusion op cit p2.

\(^{(3)}\) Ibid p3.

\(^{(4)}\) Ibid p3.
the moral restrictions of civilisation were lifted then "one may take any woman one pleases as a sexual object, ... one may without hesitation kill one's rival for her love or anyone else who stands in one's way ... one can carry off any of the other man's belongings without asking leave". (1) This atavistic state of nature had been transformed by a social contract of moral rules into civil society. Thus "insecurity of life, which is an equal danger for everyone, now unites men into a society which prohibits the individual from killing and reserves to itself the right to communal killing of anyone who violates the prohibition. Here, then we have justice and punishment". (2) Human nature being what it was, the best adjustment between instinct and reality that could be hoped for was one that required the neurotic repression of much libidinal energy. Civilisation in short was a necessary neurosis. (3) One method of neurotic repression, in fact the most important such mechanism for Freud, was religion which functioned as a divine sanction to keep man's anti-social impulses in check. For Freud, it was "the most important item in the psychic inventory of a civilisation". (4) Religion was the chief instrument of coercion in a larger system of coercions defined as culture.

III In *Psychopathology of Everyday Life* (1904) Freud first expressed his rationalistic outlook on religion. Religion, mythology and superstition he claimed could be interpreted according to

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(1) *The Future of an Illusion* op cit p11.
(2) *Ibid* p36.
(3) *Civilisation and its Discontents* op cit p81.
a psychological model which perceived in religious phenomena a projection of unconscious factors into a world beyond reality. Metaphysics must be understood by the processes of metapsychology. "I believe", wrote Freud, "that a large part of the mythological view of the world, which extends a long way into most modern religions, is nothing but psychology projected into the external world. The obscure recognition ... of psychical factors and relations in the unconscious is mirrored - it is difficult to express it in other terms, and here the analogy with paranoia must come to our aid - in the construction of a supernatural reality which is destined to be changed back once more by science into the psychology of the unconscious". Anticipating much of his later writing in this sphere he continued "One could venture to explain in this way the myths of paradise, the fall of man, of God, of good and evil, of immortality and so on, and to transform metaphysics into metapsychology". (1)

Freud's earliest work devoted entirely to an analysis of religious beliefs came in 1907. This short paper entitled 'Obsessive Actions and Religious Practices' for the Zeitschrift fur Religionpsychologie, formed the basis for much of Freud's later speculations concerning religion. His thesis was as daring as it was simple. Certain individual and collective actions in religious ceremonials he claimed bore a great similarity to the obsessive actions of neurotics. (2) The affinity between sacred

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(2) 'Obsessive Actions and Religious Practices' op cit p117.
ritual acts and neurotic ceremonies was threefold. First, whether it originated in obsessional neurosis or religious customs, the ritual act derived from an inner constraint, a compulsion which was tinged with fear of a misfortune or punishment following the omission or incorrect execution of the rite. The idea of an imperative urge which must be satisfied on pain of an automatic punishment was thus common to both. Secondly, such acts were both carried out in isolation to other acts and, thirdly, both were enacted with meticulous concern for detail.\(^1\) In this way "an obsessional neurosis presents a travesty, half comic and half tragic, of a private religion".\(^2\)

This was not however to ignore the very great differences between these two phenomena. First, there was the infinitely greater variety of neurotic ceremonial actions compared with the very uniform and stereotyped nature of religious rituals and secondly the private nature of the obsessive actions in contrast to the public and communal character of religious worship.

Common to both actions was a strong unconscious feeling of guilt. The sense of guilt of obsessional neurotics finds its counterpart in the protestations of pious people that they know at heart that they are miserable sinners; and the pious observances ... with which such people preface every daily act, and in especial every unusual undertaking seem to have the value of defensive or protective measures".\(^3\)

\(^1\) 'Obsessive Actions and Religious Practices' \textit{op cit} p119.

\(^2\) \textit{Ibid} p119.

\(^3\) \textit{Ibid} pp123-4.
Both obsessional neurosis and religion were protective mechanisms, Freud believed, based on the repression and renunciation of instinctual impulses. However the nature of these suppressed drives was distinct. In the case of hysterical neurosis Freud thought that the drives which were being warded off by defensive actions were primarily sexual in nature while in religion the suppressed elements were the egoistic and aggressive tendencies dangerous to society. (1) Because of the essential similarities involved in these seemingly diverse activities Freud concluded that "one might regard obsessional neurosis as a pathological counterpart to the formation of religion and, to describe that neurosis as an individual religiosity and religion as a universal obsessional neurosis". (2)

It was three years later in his study of Leonardo da Vinci that Freud briefly outlined his major thesis concerning the source of religious beliefs; namely that God the father was no more than a projection of the earthly father and that religion had its source in the oedipus complex. This idea, which was to become central to his later writing on religion, was mentioned very briefly in an almost throw away passage. The idea was not expanded or developed at this stage but merely stated and left dangling rather tantalisingly and provocatively before the reader.

Psychoanalysis has made us familiar with the intimate connection between the Father complex and belief in God; it has shown us that a personal God is, psychologically, nothing other than an exalted father, and it brings us evidence every day of how young people lose their religious beliefs as soon as their father's authority breaks down. Thus we recognise that the roots of the need for religion are in the parental complex; the almighty and just God, and kindly nature, appear to us as grand sublimations of father and mother or rather as revivals and restorations of the young child's idea of them. (1)

The implications of this insight were developed some years later in The Future of an Illusion. In the meantime Freud wrote Totem and Taboo which was a general theory of primitive society and an explanation of the origins of social structure, morals, religion and specifically Totemism. (2) In Totem and Taboo much of Freud's earlier theorising was reiterated. He reaffirmed his belief in the role of the oedipus complex and a sense of guilt in the genesis of religion. "What constitutes the root form of every religion", remained for Freud, "a longing for the father". (3)

Totem and Taboo was the product of a highly fertile and intuitive imagination. It sought, without any basis in historical or anthropological data, to reconstruct the origins of civilisation and social structure. It was a highly elaborate fantasy which resembled serious social science less than a naive and romantic poetic licence. Fascinating though Freud's conjectures were, they remain conjectures and thus need detain the reader but briefly.


(2) S. Freud Totem and Taboo; Some Points of Agreement Between the Mental Lives of Savages and Neurotics Routledge Kegan Paul London 1961.

(3) Ibid p148 see also p147.
Taboo customs, cultural restrictions, were identified by Freud with the manifestations of the symptoms of compulsive neurosis in three ways; in their lack of apparent motivation, their enforcement through an inner need and in the causation of ceremonial actions resulting from the forbidden activity. Totemism, which Freud took to be the oldest form of religion and social structure, was characterised by a peculiar system of taboos of which two were of major significance. Totemism enforced taboos on, first, the killing and eating of the totem animal and secondly on sexual intercourse with totem companions of the opposite sex. Freud assumed that this system of taboos arose in the following way. He shared with Darwin the belief in an unstructured primitive horde under a primal father who was envied and feared by his sons. The father monopolised the sexual services of all the women for himself, until the sons finally banded together and killed him. They were then seized by guilt and remorse and in their anxiety substituted a symbol - a totem animal - for the primal father, making it taboo to kill and eat the totem. They denied themselves intercourse with the women of the horde and in so doing originated the phenomenon of clan exogamy. In annual ceremonies the totem animal was killed and eaten as a ritual enactment of the original crime. (1) Such was the genesis of civil society.

The totem meal, which is perhaps mankind's earliest festival, would thus be a repetition and commemoration of this memorable and criminal deed, which was the beginning of so many other things - of social organisation, of moral restrictions and of religion. (2)

(1) Totem and Taboo op cit pp141-2.
(2) Ibid p142.
While Freud had no wish to "overlook the complexity of the phenomena under review", (1) he felt able to assert quite confidently that "Totemic religion arose from the filial sense of guilt in an attempt to allay that feeling ... all later religions are seen to be attempts to solve the same problem". (2)

Freud's consideration of the human needs that lead to the formation of religious beliefs in Totem and Taboo stressed the necessity for the individual to come to terms with his complex emotions concerning his father. In Future of an Illusion Freud added another causal factor which complemented this; namely man's three-fold helplessness in the face of the overwhelming forces of nature outside himself, the instinctual forces within himself and from his relations with his fellow men.

The civilisation in which he participates imposes some amount of privation upon him, and other men bring him a measure of suffering ... to this are added the injuries which untamed nature - he calls it fate - inflicts on him. (3)

Mankind reacted to this deep sense of helplessness by personifying the forces which terrified him. In this way man created his Gods; but such Gods were an illusion, the material of which was taken from the individual's own experience as a child. The need for protection in the face of danger revived in man the infantile dependence on the father. To the child the father had appeared omnipotent but now that the child had grown, the earthly father

(1) Totem and Taboo op cit p157 footnote 2.
(2) Ibid p145.
exhibited all his own human frailties. A new father was needed now for protection and thus the individual projected his unconscious memory image of the once omnipotent father into the outside world.

And thus a store of ideas is created, born of man's need to make his helplessness tolerable and built up from the material of memories of helplessness of his own childhood and the childhood of the human race. It can clearly be seen that the possession of these two ideas protects him in two directions - against the dangers of nature and fate, and against the injuries that threaten him from human society itself. Here is the gist of the matter.(1)

With the advent of monotheism, man's relationship with God was thrown into clearer perspective for "now that god was a single person man's relations to him could recover the intimacy and intensity of the child's relation to his father".(2) Religion could now, Freud thought, be seen as a childish fantasy, an illusion, "the universal solution to the oedipus complex".(3)

However, when Freud employed the term illusion he had a very specific sense of the term in mind; he was careful to distinguish between illusion, error and delusion. An illusion was different from an error, nor need an illusory belief necessarily be a false belief. What characterised beliefs as illusory was that they derived from human wishes and thus they shared a certain affinity with psychiatric delusions. However delusions were defined as being in contradiction with reality and as noted earlier this was not necessarily the case with illusions.

(2) Ibid p15.
Thus we call a belief an illusion when a wish fulfilment is a prominent factor in its motivation and in so doing we disregard its relations to reality just as the illusion itself sets no store by verification. (1)

An illusion was thus constituted by this complicity between wish fulfilment and unverifiability. By employing such esoteric definitions, Freud was careful to distinguish between questions of causality and validity. Freud's psychology of religion attempted to show why people formulated the idea of God. He claimed that the unreality of the theistic concept was demonstrated by exposing it as an illusion based on man's wishes. However the fact that an idea satisfied a wish did not necessarily mean that it was false. Indeed Freud claimed that "the truth value of religious doctrines does not lie within the scope of our present enquiry". (2) But it is clear that Freud considered religious beliefs not only illusory but also false and chapter five of _Future of an Illusion_ was devoted to a systematic rejection of the validity of such beliefs. Later in 1933 he wrote "in our view the truth of religion may be altogether disregarded". (3)

Having established to his own satisfaction the nature of religious beliefs, Freud considered the way in which such beliefs functioned in society. Religious beliefs had two main functions. First they could be beneficial in as much as they offered consolation to some people and could even save them from individual neurosis. He saw religion as a palliative, a narcotic, upon which the

(1) _The Future of an Illusion_ op cit p27.
(2) _Ibid_ p29.
(3) 'New Introductory Lectures' _The Standard Edition_ op cit Vol. XII p112.
believer had become dependent. Turning to the United States of
the twenties, he attacked the proponents of the prohibition which
provided him with a contemporary illustration of his suspicions
concerning religion. "That the effects of religious consolations
may be likened to that of a narcotic", he claimed, "is well illus-
trated by what is happening in America. There they are now trying
... to deprive people of all stimulants, intoxicants and other
pleasure producing substances and instead by way of compensation
are surfeiting them with piety". (1) But the conditions under
which religions could help stifle neuroses seemed to be diminishing
as civilisation progressed. As a result there had been an
"extraordinary increase in neurosis since the power of religions
has waned". (2) However these beneficial aspects of religion
were dubious for religion bestowed the very fears and anxieties it
claimed to appease. While religion might in some cases prevent
neuroses in others it caused them.

The second function of religion was the most important.
Religion was the major weapon in the armoury of civilisation to
ensure social control and stability. It was a system of moral and
ethical beliefs which, assuming the guise of divine saction,
repressed man's anti social instincts and made of him a creature
capable of communal existence. The repression of these aggressive
instincts inevitably lead to the formation of neuroses; neurosis

(1) The Future of an Illusion op cit p45.

(2) 'The Future Prospects of Psychoanalytic Therapy' in The Standard
was the cost of social stability. The religious sanctions which made civilisation possible produced neuroses which religion sought to control. Such was the contradictory predicament of religious beliefs.

Freud next turned his attention to the future of the religious illusion. Religious ideas would diminish Freud believed, as the power of science, based upon reason, developed. Expressing his adherence to an evolutionary conception of historical development with a confidence in science which would have made Comte envious, Freud wrote that "parallel with the human progress in the mastery of the world has gone a development in his weltanschauung which more and more diverged from the original belief in omnipotence, mounted from the animistic phase, through the religious to the scientific one". (1) Religious ideas originated in the "ignorant childhood days of the human race", but "experience teaches us that the world is not a nursery". Religion is "a parallel to the neurosis which the civilised individual must pass through on his way from childhood to maturity". (2) As science continued to develop to explain the frightening mysteries of nature, religion would decline.

Our God Logos will fulfil whichever of these wishes nature outside us allows, but he will do it very gradually, only in the foreseeable future and for a new generation of men. He promises no compensation for us who suffer grievously from life. On the way to this distant goal your religious doctrines will have to be discarded, ... you know why; in the long run nothing can withstand reason and experience and

(2) New Introductory Lectures op cit p112.
the contradiction which religion offers to both is all too palpable. Even purified religious ideas cannot escape this fate so long as they try to preserve anything of the consolation of religion. No doubt if they confine themselves to a belief in a higher spiritual being whose qualities are indefinable and whose purposes cannot be discerned, they will be proof against the challenge of science; but then they will lose their hold on human interest. (1)

Religious thinkers were thus impaled upon the horns of a dilemma. If they did not come to a more sophisticated understanding of their faith, tutored by reason and experience, they would be bypassed by the religion of reason; if they did come to a more sophisticated understanding, they would lose all interest in religion. Reason for Freud became the new god in much the same way that it had for Voltaire. Religion may offer consolation to a few but this is no justification, "ignorance is ignorance". (2) Reason will prevail over the irrationalism of religion. "The voice of the intellect is a soft one but it does not rest until it has gained a hearing. Finally, after a countless succession of rebuffs it succeeds". (3) Such a statement was extremely uncharacteristic of a man who had always argued for the power of the emotions over reason. This was Freud at his most rationalistic.

Religion he claimed was no more than a phase in human evolution; a belief system appropriate to the childhood of mankind. The analogy which Freud drew here between the individual man and mankind seemed to him an obvious one. Just as every child must

(1) The Future of an Illusion op cit p50.
(2) Ibid p28.
(3) Ibid p49.
learn to distinguish between the wishes of his fantasies and the facts of reality and, moreover to learn to do without the protection of its parents, so must mankind as a whole. "Infantilism is destined to be surmounted. Men cannot remain children forever; they must in the end go out into hostile life". (1) But to say that man can grow out of the infantile religious stage once the reasons for his illusions are revealed to him displays a certain naivety. To show man his limitations is not to show him how to transcend them. To explain to the cripple the reasons why his legs do not function does not enable him to walk. Moreover his belief in the power of reason to dispel the religious illusion seemed to wane later when he expressed doubts about whether man would ever transcend religion. "To one whose attitude to humanity is friendly", he wrote in Civilisation and its Discontents, "it is painful to think that the great majority of mortals will never be able to rise above this view (the religious view) of life". (2)

Freud had two major objections to religious beliefs. His first claim against religion was that by teaching people to believe in an illusion, and by prohibiting critical thought, religious beliefs were responsible for an impoverishment of the intellect. Before the individual had developed any capacity for critical thought his intellect was stultified by religious prejudices - "the bitter sweet poison". (3) These stifling effects of religious education must be removed. Man must educate himself to face reality.

(1) The Future of an Illusion op cit p46.
(2) Civilisation and its Discontents op cit p11.
(3) The Future of an Illusion op cit p45.
If he knows that he has nothing to rely on except his own powers, he will learn to use them properly.

By withdrawing their expectations from the other world and concentrating all their liberated energies into their life on earth, they will probably succeed in achieving a state of things in which life will become tolerable for everyone and civilisation no longer oppressive to anyone.(1)

Only the man who has freed himself from prejudice can make use of his intellect and grasp the world and his role in it objectively, without illusion, but also with the ability to develop and make use of the capacities inherent in him.

Freud's second objection to religion, which had a dual edge, concerned its relationship to morality and ethics. In the first place, religion had throughout its history been allied with and sanctified corrupt institutions. "In every age", he wrote, "immorality has found no less support in religion than morality has".(2)

Secondly and more significantly, religion put morality on shaky ground. If the validity of ethical norms rested on their being God's commands, the future of ethics stood or fell with the belief in god. Since Freud assumed that religious beliefs were on the wane, he felt that the continued connection between religion and ethics would lead to the destruction of society's moral values. Thus "civilisation runs a greater risk if we maintain our present attitude to religion than if we give it up".(3) Religion invested

(2) The Future of an Illusion op cit p34.
(3) Ibid p31.
man made cultural prohibitions with divine sanctions. It was not God that forbid murder but man who needed such a restriction if collective life was to be possible. If the divine sanction were removed, the need for the restriction remained although people may no longer realise it. Therefore "it would be an undoubted advantage to leave God out altogether and honestly admit the purely human origin of all the regulations and precepts of society."(1) Morality must seek a more secure foundation. It is only a matter of time, Freud argued, before the mass of the people discover the fallacy of religion and then they will "vent their hostility towards civilisation against its weakest spot". (2) Religion, Freud held, could no longer function as a system of repressions. The instinc-
tual renunciation which Freud considered indispensable for man's communal existence could now be maintained by other means and thus "the relationship between civilisation and religion must undergo a fundamental revision or else the masses can only be suppressed by force". (3)

This then was Freud's analysis of religion. In places creative to the point of being bizarre, in others perceptive and stimulating, but always profound and well considered. God was seen to be an exalted father, a fantasy substitute for the actual and never wholly satisfactory parent; a projection to compensate for an infantile sense of helplessness. Freud's psychological account of religion tended to devalue the significance of ideas by seeing

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(2) Ibid p35.
(3) Ibid p35.
them as determined by latent psychological motives. The world of ideas emerged for Freud as no more than reflections and rationalisation of the unconscious. Pareto found the basis of the ideational realm (the derivational superstructure) in sentiments manifested by residues, while Freud in similar fashion declared the psychological motive of an instinctual nature to determine the realm of ideas by a rationalising process.

IV Freud's account of religious ideas may be subject to criticism on a number of grounds. First, his statements concerning religious beliefs often took the form of dogmatic assertions rather than any form of argument or proof. Thus it is not surprising to find that Freud exhibited a certain lack of clarity in the definition of his fundamental concept; namely religion. His definition was vague. "We will take our stand on the following one", he claimed, "religious ideas are assertions about facts and conditions of external (or internal) reality which tell one something one has not discovered for oneself and which lay claim to ones belief". (1) But this definition of religion is far too broad to be satisfactory since it may include almost any category of belief imaginable. On Freud's own admission it would apply equally well to a geography book as to the bible. However there is the difference that the assertions of the geography book are verifiable by methods which Freud will recognise as valid; assertions about God are not. But the definition is also too narrow.

However important or otherwise may be creeds, teachings or simple assertions, for religion, it is surprising that anyone could suppose religion consists of them and apparently little else. In reading Freud's work on religion the reader must be aware that a familiar word like religion is being given an unfamiliar extent of meaning. This extension of meaning is functional for having confined religion to assertions the task of showing God to be an illusory rationalisation of unconscious wishes is greatly simplified. Further the use of the term religion in The Future of an Illusion is one which fits the Jewish, Islamic and Christian complexes of religions, which are built on the notion of a creator God. Freud's theory is less appropriate to Hinduism, Taoism or Buddhism which explicitly teach there is no creator God.

Second, to explain all religions in terms of a longing for the protective father is surely a simplistic and superficial thesis. Freud himself seems to have been aware of this. "I do not in the least", he admitted, "overlook the complexity of the phenomenon under review". He felt that he had only added "a new fact to the sources, known or still unknown, of religion, morality and society—a factor based on the consideration of the implications of psychoanalysis".(1) There is here at least a note of caution, a recognition that there is more to the matter than comes within the competence of psychoanalysis. However this appears to have been a temporary relapse for his continues, "without prejudice to any

other source or meaning of the concept of God, ... the paternal element in that concept must be the important one". (1) It is "the root form of every religion". (2)

In order to confine the genesis of religion to this single factor, Freud had to turn his back on a wealth of anthropological data with its contrary causal explanations. (3) Modern anthropological data denies Freud's thesis. Sundkler's study of Separatist church movements in Africa for example attests to the effects of colonisation and racial segregation upon religious beliefs and practices. (4) For Lantenari, the beliefs of the messianic religious sects of Central and Western Africa are no more than nationalist political aspirations articulated in religious guise. They are "the spontaneous result of the impact of the white man's presence on native society. ... By making a display of their religious independence the people strive to fight the racial segregation, forced acculturation or destruction of tribal life imposed by the missionaries and by the colonial administrators". (5)

(1) Totem and Taboo op cit p157 footnote 2.
(2) Ibid p147.
(3) Anthropological investigation into totemism has revealed a number of inadequacies in Freud's argument. For a summary of anthropological arguments against Totem and Taboo see R. Banks 'Religion as Projection; A Reappraisal of Freud's Theory' in Religious Studies Vol. 9-10 1973-4 pp410-11.
Such accounts suggest that the genesis of religious beliefs is a complex phenomena which cannot be confined to any single explanation.

Perhaps a more damaging critique of Freud's analysis is offered by Karl Popper's notion of falsifiability. Popper's argument is that the way to distinguish a scientific, from a non scientific, theory is to test it by experience. However, if a theory is capable of being tested it must also be capable of being falsified. Some theories, Popper argues, have been so constructed that whatever criticism is offered against them can be absorbed and made to comply with the theory. In such a case the theory is unfalsifiable and hence unscientific. Freudian metapsychology is encompassed by this critique. Freud argued that God represented no more than a projection of the father and religion no more than a reaction to man's helplessness in the face of natural forces. If the religious person objects that this is not the basis of his beliefs, Freud could reply that he could not know this since his longing for the father is an unconscious desire and hence one of which the believer could not be aware. The criticism is thus absorbed and the theory unrefuted. It is ironical that one of Freud's arguments against religion, namely that the existence of God cannot be refuted since it cannot be proven, should so neatly be turned against him.

To conclude, Freud considered religious ideas an irrational belief system that could only be explained adequately by utilising concepts from the new discipline of psychology. Any account of the genesis of ideas, religious or otherwise, which ignored the findings of psychology was deficient and it was precisely on these
grounds that Freud's work was critical of the traditional theory of rationality. His study of the religious illusion suggested a number of shortcomings in the traditional theory.

First, as noted, Freud believed that psychology served to illustrate, on a scientific basis, the extent to which thought and intellectual judgement reflected non rational influences. Like all non scientific ideas and intellectual constructions, religion was the end product of a process of unconscious rationalisation. It was evidence of the degree to which man's unconscious fears and emotions condition and distort his capacity for reason by intruding upon it. Against the traditional theory of rationality, Freud argued that mind could not in some way detach itself from unconscious influences and contemplate the world through the medium of reason alone. Large areas of human thought were the distorted product of instinctive mechanisms: intellectual judgements and utterances were shaped by hidden fantasies derived from the repressed sex and aggressive instincts. These fantasies aimed at wish fulfilment and produced a mode of thought directed by wishes that were unconscious. The wishful thinker is thus not able to appraise facts objectively; he favours facts corresponding to his wishes and dismisses others that oppose them. Man's intellectual activity springs from the unconscious selecting and using only such knowledge as it requires to satisfy the unconscious wishes of the thinker.

Second, psychology was able to explain not only the content of religious beliefs as projections of emotional needs, but also, and more significantly, it could explain the function of such beliefs at both the individual and the societal levels. For the
individual, religion functions as a protective shield, offsetting his helplessness in the face of the forces of nature and the instinctive forces within himself. At the societal level, religious beliefs functioned as a divine sanction against anti social, instinctual impulses. It provided a set of rules within which the social game was played and laid down the parameters of acceptable behaviour.

The widespread acceptance of religious beliefs within society was to be explained by the functions they fulfilled and not by any inherent character of truth; religious beliefs were necessary to, rather than credible to, a society.

Third, Freud suggested that psychology offered an understanding of the phenomenon of the superego, which was significant for the study of belief systems. The superego was one of the mechanisms by which traditional ideas and beliefs were transmitted across generations and sustained. Freud argued that the contents of each individual's superego was built on the parent's superego and "takes over the same content. It becomes the vehicle of tradition and of all the age long values which have been handed down in this way from generation to generation". (1) In this sense man's ideas are never wholly appropriate to the present but somehow lag behind rooted in the past.

It was the absence of any consideration of the impact of psychological factors on thought which prompted Freud's critical remarks concerning Marx's study of ideology. "It is probable",

Freud wrote, "that the so called materialist conceptions of history err in that they underestimate this factor, the superego. They brush it aside with the remark that the 'ideologies' of mankind are nothing more than the resultants of their economic situation at any given moment, or superstructures built upon it. That is the truth but very probably it is not the whole truth. Mankind never completely lives in the present; the ideologies of the superego perpetuate the past, the traditions of the race and of the people, which yields but slowly to the influence of the present and to new developments and, so long as it works through the superego, plays an important part in man's life, quite indendently of economic conditions". (1) Marx's construction of the relationship between ideas and the social world was, for Freud, too rationalistic; like the traditional theory, it ignored the role of the superego in influencing men's ideas and beliefs.

Freud accepted the possibility of true knowledge arrived at by the scientific method, but like Pareto, was impressed by the predominance of ideological beliefs based on illusions. The processes which occasioned such beliefs were for Freud centred within the individual and could be understood only by exploring the emotional aspects of man. Both Pareto and Freud attempted a scientific study of the irrational in the hope that it might prove possible to understand the world in a more rational way.

SOREL'S CONCEPTS OF MYTH, IDEOLOGY, AND UTOPIA

Georges Sorel's writings present the reader with a curious picture of a mind that shifted its allegiance from one political position to another with comparative ease and frequency; during his lifetime Sorel was associated with Syndicalism, Marxism, Bolshevism, and Nationalism. The patchwork quality which these changes of allegiance gave to Sorel's writings was compounded by his literary style which lacked cohesion and continuity; Berlin has noted that 'Sorel's writings have no shape or system'. It is thus not surprising to find that while some commentators claim Sorel as a theorist of the 'left', others see his work as the inspiration for fascist doctrines, while others have interpreted his work as a synthesis of Marx and Nietzsche. His work was certainly acclaimed by many eminent thinkers such as Croce, Pareto and Bergson and also by men of diverse political persuasions.


(2) 'Georges Sorel' I Berlin Times Literary Supplement 31 Dec 1971 p1617.

(3) D.Beetham 'Sorel and the Left' Government and Opposition 4(3) Summer 1969 pp308-23.


However the central concern of Sorel's work has never been in doubt; he wished to study the respective roles of reason and irrationality in human thought, social action and historical change. His conclusions were in opposition to the traditional theory in a twofold sense. First Sorel believed that history illustrated the fact that human behaviour could not always be explained in rational terms. Second, Like Pareto and Freud, Sorel pointed to the social utility of doctrines suggesting that it was moral passion rather than scientific rigour which gave beliefs their appeal. Both of these criticisms were contained in Sorel's discussion of myth. His claim was that

The intellectualist philosophy finds itself unable to explain phenomena like the following ... the sacrifice of his life which the soldier of Napoleon made in order to have had the honour of taking part in 'immortal deeds' and of living in the glory of France ... the extraordinary virtues of the Romans who resigned themselves to a frightful inequality and who suffered so much to conquer the world.(1)

Sorel insisted that throughout history such actions had been prompted by adherence to an irrational myth. Myths embodied the political

(6)(Cont.)


will and aspirations of a social group or nation and presented them in the form of images which would stir emotion, function as a spur to action, and justified the sacrifices which may be necessary in the course of their enactment. The content of myth was essentially manichaestic since it usually presented a picture of the world divided into the forces of good and evil. Further it was a bellicose affair; the imagery it offered was that of a battlefield in which the ultimate victory of good over evil was assured in some final and dreadful confrontation. Much of Sorel's work was devoted to a study of these myths and the various forms they had assumed at different periods in history. Like Pareto and Freud, his intention was to analyse the role of emotion in individual and social life and assert a generally wider recognition for the significance of irrational ideas and motivation; as Meisel notes his interest was 'in pointing out the limitations of the intellect'.

However, in suggesting, with Freud and Pareto, that the role of reason was substantially more limited than the traditional theory had assumed, Sorel was not totally abandoning reason and advocating the irrational. Rather, his claim was that an attempt must be made to understand and come to terms with irrational ideas and beliefs. His study of the irrational was born of a desire to understand it, to control it, and thereby deploy it to some meaningful end. As Horowitz noted 'rather than characterise Sorel as an anti-intellectual, it might be more prudent to note that he simply expanded the intellectualist ideal to a rational study of irrational factors in human behaviour'.

throughout by the three concepts of myth, ideology and utopia which are discussed below; finally Sorel's analysis of the ideology of progress is briefly considered.

Sorel defined myth as a group of images relating to some future event which also had some interpretive value for the present. It embodied ... 'all the strongest inclinations of a people, of a party or of a class, inclinations which recur to the mind with the insistence of instincts in all the circumstances of life and which give an aspect of complete reality to the hopes of immediate action by which, more easily than by any other method, men can reform their desires, passions and mental activity'. (1)

Men 'always picture their coming action as a battle in which their cause is certain to triumph. These constructions, knowledge of which is so important for historians, I propose to call myths; the Syndicalist General Strike and Marx's catastrophic revolution are such myths'. (2) Sorel's concept of myth can best be clarified by a comparison with its counter concept, utopia. (3)

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(2)(Cont.)

Radicalism and the Revolt against Reason I.L.Horowitz Routledge Kegan Paul London 1961 p39. Stuart Hughes has suggested that although Sorel was 'obsessed, almost intoxicated with a rediscovery of the non logical, the uncivilised, the inexplicable', to call him an irrationalist is to fall into 'a dangerous ambiguity' (H.Stuart Hughes op cit p35). The title, he claims, suggests a preference and a tolerance for the realms of the unconscious, when the reverse is true; Sorel's concern with the irrational was only to exorcise it. "By probing into it, (he) sought ways to tame it, to canalise it for constructive human purposes". (ibid p35). R.Vernon argues that Sorel's irrationalism consists in his denial of 'the idea that history forms an intelligent whole'. See 'Rationalism and Commitment in Sorel' Journal of the History of Ideas Vol 34 1973 p405.

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(1) Sorel op cit p125.

(2) Sorel op cit p41.
First, 'myths are not descriptions of things, but expressions of a determination to act'. (1) Utopias, on the contrary, were descriptions of a future possible organisation of society. A utopia was ... an intellectual product; it is the work of theorists who, after observing and discussing the known facts, seek to establish a model to which they can compare existing society in order to estimate the amount of good and evil it contains'. (2)

Secondly, myths were supra intellectual and originated in modes of thought which differed from discursive thinking. It was possible to reason and discuss utopias whereas the content and possible fulfilment of myths was irrelevant. A myth could not be refuted 'since it is at bottom identical with the convictions of a group, being the expression of these convictions in the language of movement ... A utopia on the contrary can be discussed like any other social constitution ... it is possible to refute utopias'. (3)

(3)(Cont.)
Horowitz has argued that Sorel's myth is similar to Mannheim's concept utopia. See Horowitz op cit p110. This is a curious equation for while Sorel's myth and Mannheim's utopia are both anticipations of the future, this is where any similarity ends.

(1) G.Sorel op cit p50.
(2) Ibid p50.
(3) Ibid p50 see also pp43, 126, 52, 127.
Sorel claimed on many occasions that the fact that a myth never matures or is fulfilled is irrelevant.\footnote{Ibid pp43, 126, 127.} Vernon Lee has likened Sorel's myth to a pot of gold at the end of a rainbow. No matter how long or how hard you persevere and chase the pot of gold at the rainbows end, you can never find it. However you can never be sure that it wasn't waiting just around the next corner.\footnote{V.Lee 'M.Sorel and the Syndicalist Myth' \textit{Fortnightly Review} Oct 1911 Vol 96 pp664-80.}

A myth did not predict any forthcoming reality for Sorel believed such historical prediction to be impossible; the function of myth was its motivation to action.

Thirdly, myths had to be absorbed as a whole and could not be taken apart for study; 'they must be taken as a whole as historical forces'.\footnote{G.Sorel \textit{op cit} p41 see also p50.} Utopias on the contrary were composite constructions resulting from the juxtaposition of several clear and distinct ideas; 'it is a construction which can be taken to pieces'.\footnote{Ibid p49.}

More significantly, myths lead to revolution. 'As long as there are no myths accepted by the masses', Sorel thought that 'one may go on talking of revolts indefinitely without ever provoking any revolutionary movement'.\footnote{Ibid p50.} The inevitable consequence of utopias however was reformism. 'The effect of utopias' he believed, 'has always been to direct men's minds towards reforms which can be brought about by patching up the existing system'.\footnote{Ibid p50.}
Finally, utopias were external to the individual like all the products of reason, while myth was absorbed into man's personality, and made part of his psychic life. As an integral part of the individual's psychology, myth was a reaction of his entire will as opposed to a mere intellectual weighing of pros and cons which can never lead to action. In the introductory 'Letter to Daniel Halevy', Sorel discussed this relationship between myth and individual psychology more closely. (1) Quoting Bergson with approval, Sorel claimed that there were two selves, with one the external projection of the other. Man's projected self was the normal self, the self which lived for the world external to it, which rarely acted itself yet was constantly acted upon. The other, the inner self could be reached only by introspection and was identified by Sorel with 'creative consciousness'. Man recovered possession of this inner self only at those rare moments when he made grave and serious decisions when 'making an effort to create a new individuality' in himself or 'endeavouring to break the bonds of habit which enclose' him. (2) It was on these exceptional occasions that man acted and acted freely. Man was prompted to action by his imagining a future and, as yet artificial world created from his deepest aspirations; these aspirations constitute a myth. (3) Sorel then applied this psychology of the individual to the proletariat. The proletariat was motivated to free activity by an artificial world; the general strike. Such a myth was the

(1) G.Sorel op. cit pp46-9.
(2) Ibid p48.
(3) Ibid p48.
translation of the masses ideas and sentiments, an articulation of conviction which inspired confidence and prompted action.

'These artificial worlds', Sorel claimed, 'generally disappear from our minds without leaving any trace in our memory's, but when the masses are deeply moved, it then becomes possible to trace the outlines of the kind of representation which constitutes a social myth'. (1) Thus for Sorel, myths inspired individuals to regain their inner selves; utopias remained external, abstract, intellectual models which prompted discussion rather than action.

These two concepts, myth and utopia, were ideal types which, in reality, rarely existed in pure form. It was more common to find in ideas, theories and beliefs, a mixture of mythical and utopian elements. (2) Sorel believed that the best example of pure utopia was Liberal political economy and its conception of perfect competition. While the notion of perfect competition was an extremely logical and coherent conceptual scheme, it was essentially an abstract formulation whose implementation in practice would prove impossible. (3) Sorel cited the history of French democracy and political liberalism as a case of a combination of myth and utopia. Its utopian element lay in its rationalist construction of an ideal polity which would ensure justice, liberty, and equality for all. The mythical element represented the aspirations of the emergent

(1) G. Sorel op cit pp48-9.

(2) Ibid p49.

(3) Ibid pp50-51.
Bourgeoisie in their struggle against the Ancient Regime. Political liberalism could not be refuted as long as it retained its mythical content; 'the myth safeguarded the utopia with which it was mixed'.

The example of pure myth was the syndicalist myth of the general strike. Other examples of myth were primitive christianity, the reformation, the French revolution, the followers of Mazzini and catholicism with its view of life as a struggle between satan on the one hand and Christ and the catholic church on the other.

It mattered little, with the benefit of hindsight, whether the vision embodied in these myths had been realised in practice. What was significant was the utility of such myths and their impact upon human action. 'The first Christians expected the return of Christ and the total ruin of the pagan world'. However, although 'the catastrophe did not come to pass ... Christian thought profited greatly from the apocalyptic myth'. Similarly the hopes of Luther and Calvin based on the religious exaltation of Europe were not at all realised, but much resulted from their dreams of a Christian renewal. The actual developments of the French Revolution bore little resemblance to the visions of the early revolutionaries, but without this vision the revolution would have lost its impetus. Mazzini pursued a mad chimera, but without him Italy would never have become a great power.

(1) G.Sorel op cit p51.

(2) Ibid p42.

(3) Ibid p125.
Sorel had considered Marxism with its picture of the world divided into two antagonistic groups, to be a myth. However, it had become inappropriate and assumed a secondary significance to the syndicalist myth of the general strike for three reasons. First, Marx had shown an unacceptable tendency to incorporate utopian elements into his scheme. 'In the course of his revolutionary career', wrote Sorel, 'Marx was not always happily inspired, and too often followed inspirations which belong to the past; he even allowed from time to time, a quantity of old rubbish which he found in the utopists to creep into his writings'. (1) Secondly, in his 'Décomposition du Marxisme, Sorel argued that empirical analysis had shown the myth of Marxism to be remote from reality. Much of Bernstein's socio-economic analysis found favour with Sorel. (2) Finally, the myth of the general strike seemed more relevant to a society characterised by a growth in trade unions and their activity. The notion of a general strike had some historical validity for at the time of Sorel's writing, violent strikes were a contemporary phenomena. The first general strike in history occurred in Italy in 1904, the experience of revolutionary upheaval in Russia carried by a vast strike movement a year later, the way in which the Belgian socialist party used the weapon of strike in May 1906 to gain universal suffrage, all served to convince Sorel of the redundancy of the myth of Marxism and its supersession by the myth of the general strike. For Sorel this myth would be effective as a revolutionary formula since it contained the essence of socialist thinking.

(1) Sorel Ibid p177. For other criticisms of Marx see Ibid pp29, 90, 93, 121-2.

(2) For a translation of Decomposition du Marxisme see I.L.Horowitz op cit pp207-255.
The general strike ... is the myth in which socialism is wholly comprised, i.e. a body of images capable of evoking instinctively all the sentiments which correspond to the different manifestations of the war undertaken by socialism against the modern society.(1)

The content of Sorel's myth was simple. Socialism would appear on the stage of history when all the workers came out on strike simultaneously, paralysing capitalist industry and the state. Parliamentary socialists argued that such a unanimous strike would demand that all the workers were socialist and that the state was ready for overthrow. If such were the case socialism would already have arrived and there would be no need of the general strike. The general strike was thus, in this sense, not a means to socialism since it assumed socialism as a prerequisite. Sorel had anticipated such a critique and saw it was irrelevant. By offering the notion of the general strike as a myth, and since myth could not be refuted, Sorel believed he had placed himself beyond refutation. 'I thus put myself', he claimed, 'in a position to refute any discussion whatever with the people who wish to submit the idea of a general strike to a detailed criticism, and who accumulate objections against its practical possibility.'(2)

Rationalist arguments totally misunderstood the four fold function of myth. First, it maintained and nurtured the feelings and sentiments of revolt among the masses by offering a means of action and an assurance of their ultimate victory. Secondly, the myth crystallised the division of society into two antagonistic groups.

(1) Ibid p127.
(2) Ibid pp43 and 139.
Thirdly it avoided compromise by sharpening social conflicts and class struggle, effectively blocking reformist schemes. Finally, the myth epitomised the aspirations of the masses ensuring their relentless confrontation with the status quo. If the ultimate end of the general strike was the establishment of socialism, its means were violent.

While Sorel realised that the myth of the general strike might lead to violence he did not recommend indiscriminate violence; he did not offer an apologia for violence but rather wished to see how it functioned in society. (1) Violence he claimed was ubiquitous in modern society and yet the majority of people were tolerant of it in the form of international warfare or the force of the state; only oppositional violence against the state was condemned. (2) Moreover, it was important to look at the historical context in which violence occurs. The violence associated with early christianity for example, marked clearly its rejection of the status quo and its refusal to compromise. In such a case, violence might be allied to a progressive and heroic morality; it need not in itself be a bad thing for it could be noble and represent the birth of a new civilising agency which would ensure the regeneration of civilisation.

In his conclusion he wrote that "the idea of the general strike (constantly rejuvenated by the feelings roused by proletarian violence) produces an entirely epic state of mind and at the same

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(1) Ibid p59. Violence, Sorel claimed, had been misunderstood and the prejudices against violence could be revealed by a study of the historical judgements of the revolution. Sorel's aim was to show that these prejudices "are shaped by the memories which the word revolution evokes almost automatically". Further, "it is supposed that the Syndicalists, merely because they call themselves revolutionaries, wish to reproduce the history of the
time bends all the energies of the mind". The historical significance of proletarian violence was this; "In the total ruin of institutions and of morals there remains something which is powerful, new and intact and it is that which constitutes properly, the soul of the revolutionary proletariat. Nor will this be swept away in the general decadence of moral values, if the workers have enough energy to bar the road to the middle class corrupters, answering their advances with the plainest brutality". (1)

Thus for Sorel myth was a mass collective belief in which each individual must have complete faith. Its truth of falsity, or the possibility of its realisation was irrelevant; it had merely to exist. Only by complete adherence to myth could anything be achieved on the level of action. Myths became an essential and irremovable part of an individual's psychology and inspired his actions with a sense of the heroic.

For Sorel, ideology was related to myth. In his 'Materials for a Theory of the Proletariat' Sorel defined ideology as a rational structure but with its foundations in myth; an ideology thus had a mythical nucleus. Ideologies were the translation into abstract form of the myths which impelled men towards their ultimate goal.

(1)(Cont.)

revolutionaries of '93'. Ibid p99. The prejudices against proletarian violence, in short, reflected the current interpretation of the terror.

(2) For Sorel's distinction between force and violence see Ibid pp171 and 175. In brief he suggested that "The subject of force is to impose a certain social order in which the minority governs, while violence tends to the destruction of that order. The middle class have used force since the beginning of modern times, while the proletariat now reacts against the middle class and against the state by violence". (pp171-2).

(1) Sorel op cit pp248-9.
The myth became transformed into an ideology which conveyed the original aim and force of the myth but in such a rationalised form that its applicability was extended beyond the historical period which created the myth. Thus syndicalism was an ideology with the general strike as its myth. Halpern wrote that 'ideology embodies myth by grasping it intellectually'. Thus 'it may be that the Bolsheviks will end by succumbing ... but the ideology of the new form of the proletarian state will never perish; it will survive by merging with the myths which will take their substance from the popular accounts of the struggle of the Republic of the soviets against the coalition of the great capitalist powers'.

It was in his analysis of ideology that Sorel came close to Marx. Sorel believed that the key to understanding specific ideologies lay in an examination and understanding of the wider social context in which they arose. Sorel's method for the analysis of ideologies, thus rested on the assumption that the social context contained the data from which every ideology, whatever its pretensions, was constructed; it was therefore necessary to study that context to discover the ideology's social origins and, thereby, its "real" character. For Sorel, this social context included not only the economic life of a society, which provided a passive economic base, but the structure of classes, political concepts, wars and revolutions, legends, traditions and ideals. This method of analysis was employed by Sorel

(1) See H.Tudor Political Myth Pall Mall London 1972 p121.
(2) B.Halpern 'Myth and Ideology in Modern Usage" History and Theory Vol 1 1960-61 p139.
(3) Reflections On Violence op cit p280.
in his study of the ideology of progress. His claim was that "The theory of progress was accepted as dogma at the time in history when the bourgeoisie was the dominant class and it thus should be regarded as a bourgeois doctrine. Consequently the historian should find out how this doctrine depends on the conditions under which the formation, rise and triumph of the bourgeoisie are observed. Only when we examine this whole great social adventure can we truly understand the place the idea of progress occupies in the philosophy of history".

(1) Such a position did not lead to historical determinism for this approach to ideologies was only a general formula which could aid the historian. (2)

What the historian strives to know and what, besides, is the easiest to know is the ideology of the victors ... It depends in different ways on the instincts, habits and aspirations of the dominant class. It also has many connections with the social conditions of the other social classes. The ties that can be observed between the prevailing ideology and all its points of connection cannot be completely defined; as a result to speak of historical determinism is nothing but charlatanism and puerility. The most we can hope to do is shed a little light on the paths historians ought to follow to direct their course towards the source of things. (3)

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(3) *The Illusions of Progress*, op cit, pxliv.
Thus for Sorel ideology was closely related to wider social conditions. (1) His analysis of the ideology of progress began by considering the social context within which it emerged.

(1) Halpern has argued that Sorel had two definitions of ideology (Halpern op cit p138). In the first sense of the term, ideology conveyed 'the conventional lies of a civilisation' and 'expresses the interests of the status quo, and functions as an opiate stultifying the consciousness of the potentially rebellious class'. (Ibid p138). In Sorel's second sense of ideology, Halpern claimed, the term 'appears ... as signifying ideas not of conservative but of revolutionary origin'. (Ibid p139). In brief, Halpern distinguished two meanings of ideology in Sorel and differentiated between them on the basis of their effects upon social change; in the first sense ideology supported the status quo while in the second it supported revolt. However, Halpern's conclusions seem to have been influenced by the aims of his enquiry. His article was an attempt to compare the usage of the terms myth, utopia and ideology in the writings of Mannheim and Sorel. Halpern seemed to be attempting to impose Mannheim's concepts of ideology -- ideas that support the status quo -- and utopia -- ideas that transcend reality -- upon Sorel's concept of ideology. Sorel did not have two definitions of ideology; the two meanings which Halpern isolated were merely two aspects of a single theory. What Halpern failed to understand is that Sorel, in common with many other writers, but in opposition to Marx and Mannheim, employed the term ideology in an epistemologically neutral and non pejorative way. In this sense, ideology referred to any more or less coherent set of ideas and beliefs, irrespective of whether it aimed to support, or destroy, the status quo; in either case the truth or otherwise of the ideas was not questioned. In this way Sorel designated both Marxism and syndicalism as ideologies without implying that either was necessarily distorted or false. He thus felt able to write that 'syndicalism claims to create a real proletarian ideology and, whatever the middle class professors say about it, historical experience ... tells us that this is quite possible, and that out of it may come the salvation of the word'. (Sorel Reflections on Violence op cit p226. For other non pejorative uses of ideology see pp64, 185, 273, 280). Used in this way, ideology need not be pejorative. However, Sorel was clearly aware of the pejorative connotation Marx and others had given the term. 'Marxists' he claimed, 'are accustomed to seeing the ideologists look at things the wrong way round'. (Ibid p233). In The Illusions of Progress, where Sorel disagreed with an argument made concerning Voltaire he denigrated it by referring to it as 'an ideological and highly superficial explanation'. (Illusions of Progress op cit p9. For other pejorative uses of ideology see Reflections on Violence op cit pp40, 80, 86, 93, 96, 100, 101, 184, 241).
The ideology of progress, born in the atmosphere of an idle salon society reflected its parentage and birth. It embodied the belief that all conflict could be ameliorated and would progress into harmony when rationality and the social nature of man finally emerged victorious from their battle with the debilitating and corrupting influences of past ages; man's ignorance, selfishness and superstition. The basic ingredient of this ideology was an optimistic and rationalistic humanitarianism which Sorel opposed with a vision of glorious and heroic struggle and war. For Sorel rationalism lead to gross distortions of reality. It sought to simplify and reduce all the complex data of social reality into a coherent and unitary system.

Moreover if the origins of the ideology of progress were examined, Sorel believed, it could be shown that such ideas served the interests of the bourgeoisie, for 'here we have a very remarkable example of the adoption of an ideology by a class that has found in it certain formulas to express its class propensities'. (1) Each of the tenets of the ideology of progress stood in opposition to Sorel's own view. His objections to the ideology were many. He asserted the need for pessimism over optimism in politics, he rejected any form of historical prediction or inevitability, he objected to the emphasis which the ideology placed upon reason, the intellect and intellectuals, he asserted that thoughtful reflection served only to compromise action and claimed a role for heroic values and action as the only means through which society might 'progress'.

(1) The Illusions of Progress op cit p14.
First, the ideology of progress was characterised by an underlying optimism about man and society. The optimist in politics was naive, misguided and failed to understand his subject matter. By simplifying problems and pretending that they might be resolved, the optimist deluded the masses. More often than not the optimist was a reformist who thought that 'small reforms' will be sufficient to 'mitigate those evils of the contemporary world which seem so harsh to the sensitive mind'.

The optimist in politics is an inconsistent and even dangerous man because he takes no account of the great difficulties presented by his projects ... The optimist passes with remarkable facility from revolutionary anger to the most ridiculous social pacifism.

Moreover, pessimism as a doctrine has often been misunderstood. The pessimist had a more realistic approach to politics and understood that the development of mankind would always be inhibited by man's 'natural weakness' and his knowledge of the obstacles preventing this development.

Sorel's second objection to the ideology of progress was its emphasis on a mechanistic conception of history. For Sorel history did not proceed causally, according to strict social or economic laws and thus any form of prediction about what the future might hold was meaningless. There could be no science of politics. 'There is no process', he claimed, 'by which the future can be predicted scientifically'.

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(1) Reflections on Violence op cit p32.

(2) Ibid p32. For other anti reformist remarks see pp75, 81, 82, 83, 104, 116, 117, 122, 134.


(4) Reflections on Violence op cit p124.
restrict as the ideologists of progress believed, but were only pointers to possible action which emerged from, and were developed by activity. The future was open.

The third and most significant element in Sorel's attack on the doctrine of progress was his stance against intellectuals and his anti intellectualism. Sorel believed that intellectuals transformed socialism from a spontaneous mass movement into an abstract conceptual scheme and thereby stultified revolutionary action; the sophistry of intellectuals stripped ideas of their power to motivate to action. If revolution was to be a realistic possibility, socialism had to be purified from the debilitating effect of the intellectuals. 'The more syndicalism develops by abandoning the old superstitions', he wrote, 'which come to it from the old regime and the church - through the men of letters, professors of philosophy and historians of the revolution - the more will social conflicts assume the character of a simple struggle, similar to those of armies on campaign'. (1) Intellectuals, Sorel believed, were not disinterested scholars or seekers of truth. They were motivated by individual rather than the general interest, they were partial and biased in their judgements, they were allied to the petty bourgeoisie and the bourgeoisie and thus opposed the best interests of the proletariat, they were incapable of leadership, they saw themselves as an elite group whose destiny was to impose a new order on the world; worst of all they believed history was developing in a set pattern and thus problems were foreseeable and

(1) Ibid p115.
solutions should be contrived. However, the existence of this
group was to be short lived; following the revolution, there
would be no place for intellectuals within socialist society.

... the revolution appears as a revolt, pure and simple,
and no place is reserved for sociologists, for fashion-
able people who are in favour of social reforms, and for
the intellectuals who have embraced the profession of
thinking for the proletariat. (1)

Sorel's attack on intellectuals was part of his wider attack on
intellectualism. Sorel's view of intellectualism was extreme.
He conceived it as an excessive rationalism which neglected the
role of instincts and emotion in human thought and action and
which saw progress as inevitable. Sorel's main objection to the
intellectualism and emphasis on reason, which was the keystone to
the ideology of progress, was that it thwarted action. Sorel
believed there was an opposition between thought and action.
Theory was a hinderance to action and was incompatible with a belief
in spontaneous political action by the masses motivated by a myth of
heroic images. The revolutionary proletarian 'must have in himself
some source of conviction which must dominate his whole conscious-
ness, and act before the calculations of reflection have time to
enter his mind'. (2) Sorel returned to his favoured theme of the
myth which impelled men to action; the abstract formulas of the
ideology of progress lead nowhere.

The professors of the little science are really difficult
to satisfy. They assert very loudly that they will only
admit into thought abstractions analogous to those used in

(1) Ibid p138.
(2) Ibid p207.
the deductive sciences; as a matter of fact this is a rule which is insufficient for purposes of action for we do nothing great within the help of warmly coloured and clearly defended images, which absorb the whole of our attention.(1)

Moreover myth inspired not just action but heroic action; 'it raises civilisation from mediocrity to a moment of grandeur'.(2) The revolutionary proletariat was for Sorel akin to heroic Greek warriors. Their action alone could stem the degeneration of the bourgeoisie and regenerate society. Therefore 'let us salute the revolutionaries', Sorel extolled 'as the Greeks saluted the Spartan heroes who defended Thermopylae and helped to preserve the ancient world'.(3) For Sorel the ideology of progress was the ideology of a decadent and declining bourgeoisie. It was an ideology which perverted the minds of the masses coaxing them into the blind alleys of social democracy and reformism. Its emphasis on calm reflection, designed to undermine action, must be countered by the working class' own ideology of syndicalism with its myth of the general strike. The myth would present the workers with an heroic vision of the future, of their struggle with the bourgeoisie, and the final cataclysm in which they were assured of winning all the battle honours and from which a radically new man would emerge.

Sorel's discussion of myth would, he believed, expose the influence and significance of irrational factors in human thought and the powerful appeal which can be made to human emotions by irrational ideas which may, over a period of time, be absorbed into

(1) Ibid p148.
(2) Georges Sorel Prophet Without Honour; A Study in Anti Intellec-
(3) Reflections On Violence op cit p98.
political ideologies. It was this emphasis on the problem of the irrational in human thought which placed Sorel squarely in opposition to the traditional theory of rationality and explained his hostility to the ideology of progress.

Coupled with this criticism was his insistence that an understanding of social and political phenomena required not the detachment advocated by the traditional theory, but a sympathetic involvement and experience. "To judge properly", it was essential "to put oneself into the movement and to acquire an intellectual sympathy for it; otherwise one could not get to the bottom of things". (1) Moreover, the popularity of ideas was to be explained not by reference to their scientific pretensions or any logical coherence or validity, which they might possess, but by the appeal they made to emotions and their ability to prompt action. Finally, Sorel suggested that ideologies, such as the ideology of progress, should be related to the social context from which they emerged, and understood as merely the articulation of the interests of the dominant class.

CONCLUSION

The purpose of this study has been to examine the wide range and variety of attacks made upon a particular view of rationality described as the traditional theory of rationality. It was noted at the outset that the traditional theory rests upon the following assumptions.

First, it assumes a distinction between theory and practice and considers thinking to be a purely theoretical and contemplative activity divorced from the practical concerns of the subject. Second, it assumes that knowledge and beliefs are independent of the social and historical context of the subject and are immune to the mores, norms and cultural values of his society. Third, knowledge is considered a product of the deliberation of isolated individuals rather than the result of individuals' involvement in the collective activity of group life. Fourth, knowledge is assumed to be uninfluenced by the subject's unconscious wishes or fears which are either ignored or rendered insignificant by the claim that reason can isolate and detach itself from such disturbances. Finally, it assumes that it is possible to achieve objective knowledge; that these are timeless truths which can be unequivocally accepted as such by all rational individuals.

Each of these assumptions has been challenged and, in this process, serious doubts have been cast upon the credibility of the traditional theory.

Contra the traditional theory, marxists have stressed the intimate relationship between theory and practice, suggesting that ideas and beliefs emerge from the practical activity of changing
the natural and social worlds. Again they suggest that human thought is decisively influenced by the social and historical context within which it arises. A whole range of sociological factors, of which social class is the most significant, are dramatic in their effects upon thought and an understanding of these effects is a crucial ingredient to any theory of rationality.

Third, against the assumption of the individual thinking in his sovereign isolation, critics have forwarded the view of individuals not only acting and participating, but also thinking in groups. Membership of a particular social group confers upon individuals a shared perspective and view of the world. The collective purposes and interests of the group underlie the thought of the individual; he merely participates in a particular outlook.

Fourth, critics have been sceptical of the role attributed to reason by the traditional theory and suggests that unconscious motives and desires may have important consequences for knowledge and beliefs. The traditional theory is psychologically simplistic. Man is a creature gifted with reason but he is also a creature of passions, emotions and desires; to see reason and passion as polar opposites or the extremes of a continuum, is to put the question wrongly and to misunderstand completely the relationship between them. Man's passions and emotions are always tempered by reason while his exercise of reason is always permeated, influenced and inhibited by his emotions; human thought is thus a product of these two interpenetrating elements. Like Hesse's Steppenwolf there is no simple twofold division between the poles of reason and passion but a thousand divisions in which human existence is comprised of many interrelated aspects which are both instinctive,
savage, chaotic, primitive, and yet cultivated, spiritual and artistic.

Finally, the view of truth and objectivity held by the traditional theory is variously dismissed as outmoded, naive, a myth and a 'utopian construction'. Objectivity is not to be achieved by denying the influence of social factors upon thought and the consequent variety of perspectives but, on the contrary, by acknowledging such variety and exploring, comparing and criticising the different viewpoints seeking the worthwhile elements in each in order to construct a more comprehensive viewpoint.

However, while these criticisms have served to indicate the potential weaknesses and shortcomings of the traditional theory, none of its opponents, considered either singly or collectively, can offer a coherent alternative theory of rationality. The inadequacies of the traditional theory, with respect to its discussion of the assumed independence of ideas from their social context and the role of unconscious motives in thought, have been suggested by marxists and irrationalists and yet they have failed to offer satisfactory answers to the many intriguing questions which they have raised in their respective critiques.

If, as marxists wish to suggest, ideas and beliefs are related to the particular interests of a social class within a social structure, then they must be able to explain in a convincing way any exceptions which might exist to confound this general rule. They must for example be able to explain why beliefs which seem appropriate to the interests of a particular class are not held by that class and yet may, indeed, be prevalent within a different class. Conversely, they should be able to give an account of why a class holds beliefs
which have no obvious connection with its assumed interests. Moreover, there is a need to explain the enormous diversity of beliefs which is so apparent within any particular class, the fact that different social classes may share certain common beliefs and the continuing existence of traditional ideas both across classes and substantial periods of history. Moreover, by asserting a significant influence for social factors upon thought, theorists have been obliged to confront the problem of relativism; the proposed escape routes from this dilemma, offered, for example, by the existence of a supposedly supra social group such as the intelligentsia, have proven unsatisfactory. In brief, the marxists have not given a totally convincing or sufficiently thorough account of the mechanisms through which ideas are influenced by, and related to, social structure.

Similarly, while the irrationalists critique of the traditional theory was correct in drawing attention to the influence of non rational factors in human thought and the powerful appeal which can be made to human emotions by certain ideas, they offer no suitable alternative theory of rationality. Their analysis leaves many questions unanswered.

If ideas are to be considered unconscious rationalisations of some deeper motive, there is a need to know first why some ideas are influenced by such motives while others appear immune to their effects and, second, which ideas are influenced in this non rational way. Further, if the assumption is that unconscious motives are fairly constant, how is it possible to explain an individual who changes his views or the existence of a variety of ideas and beliefs within society.
Moreover, if the marxists are correct in suggesting a relationship between ideas and social structure, then it must be shown how the influence of social factors upon thought is modified, constrained, encouraged or offset by the action of irrational motives or the appeal of irrational ideas.

A major failing of both marxist and irrationalists has been their reluctance to attach sufficient significance to the individual agent's own account of why he holds the particular beliefs which he does. There has been a tendency not to accept statements at their face value and to offer derivative or reductionist explanations of ideas and beliefs; i.e. both groups of thinkers have presented ideas and beliefs as derived from some non ideational source whether it be social class, some other social group or process, or an unconscious psychological motive. Human thinking has been approached mainly from the point of view of the influence of such factors as sentiments, impulses, wishes and instincts in conditioning thought processes; or from the perspective of the sociological factors such as class, interests, power relationships and social processes which also, according to this account, direct and influence human knowledge. A shift of emphasis from the factors which condition thought to a consideration of the human agent who does the thinking, of the subjective purposes that motivate individuals in their thinking, of the meanings which actions embody for individuals and an understanding of the agents own reasons for holding the particular beliefs which he does, may all prove to be fruitful inquiries.
But to suggest that the marxist and irrationalist critiques have tended to underrate the significance of agents’ own accounts of their beliefs, is not to suggest that they have ignored or downgraded the role of the subject in epistemological concerns. On the contrary, what distinguishes the traditional theory from its critics is the concentration of the former on the objects of knowledge to the almost total exclusion of the subject, while the latter have sought to redress this imbalance by placing the subject more centrally in epistemological discussions. In the traditional theory the subject lacked any social, historical or emotional dimension; critics of the theory have provided precisely this missing dimension. In attempting to show how social and non rational factors influence the structure of human thought the critics of the traditional theory are seeking to relate ideas and beliefs to the persons who hold them, rather than ideas to the objects to which they may refer. This emphasis on the subject rather than the object in epistemological discussion is one of the consequences of the critique of the traditional theory; there are a number of others which seem, at least potentially, beneficial.

First by asserting the social roots of thought and by indicating that the different social positions of groups implies divergent systems of thought, a more critical and sceptical posture is encouraged towards any theory which claims to have attained absolute truth or eternally valid knowledge.

Second, if it is correct to argue that a different social location reveals a distinct perspective, then each social group is in a position to reveal certain aspects of reality, to which it has unique access and which are concealed from other groups. Because
of its peculiar social position and its consequent perspective, each social group can make a valuable contribution to human knowledge. By collecting or pooling these perspectives it becomes possible to create a wider fund of knowledge which would provide a more complete representation of the natural and social world.

Third, the critique of the traditional theory provides a useful research tool with which to study the intellectual history of man. Once ideas are understood as a product of the conditions of social existence, they cease to be mysterious things which develop through any immanent logic, in a transcendant realm of ideas or sphere of human spirit. Instead ideas become natural phenomena to be causally explained by reference to social and material conditions. In this way, the starting point for the analysis of any system of ideas, becomes the socio historical context of its advocates. Thus Marx suggested that much contemporary political economy was apologetics for the dominance of the bourgeoisie in British society, while Mannheim related German conservatism to the peculiar social structure of that country in the 19th century.

Finally, when men's ideas and beliefs are understood as products of their material and cultural environment, disagreements are attributed not to ignorance, malice or ill feeling, but to a differing perspective derived from a unique historical, cultural or economic context. Such an awareness may be instrumental in promoting a better understanding between men, a greater intellectual humility and consequently a higher degree of mutual respect and toleration of oppositional viewpoints. If this last proves to have been the only consequence of the critique of the traditional
theory of rationality, then it will have achieved a good deal. The critique does not offer a coherent and plausible theory of rationality which might replace the traditional theory, but it has served to undermine the credibility of the traditional theory, indicated those areas where it is deficient and to suggest possible lines of development to remedy existing shortcomings.
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